3 The role of the indirect and the direct passions in the ...



The role of the indirect and the direct passions in the Treatise

The role of the indirect and the direct passions in the Treatise

Abstract

This paper is a trial for illustrating the different roles which Hume assigns to the indirect and to the direct passions in the Treatise. The main object of his treatment of the indirect passions is to establish the basis of the system of the passions through the illustration of “the situation of the mind”(TT396) which is constituted by the four indirect passions, “placed, as it were in a square”(T333). His primary concern in the discussion of the direct passions is, on the other hand, with “the situation of the object”(T419/438) which renders a passion either calm or violent. Hume’s intention in Book II lies in demonstrating the “statics and dynamics of the mind”(KS 161) in terms of the different roles of the two kinds of passions. In order to understand the structure of the system of the passions, we cannot overlook the importance of the distinction between the direct and the indirect passions.

The role of the indirect passions

Hume’s system of the passions depends on these three distinctions, original and secondary, calm and violent, and direct and indirect. The first distinction between original and secondary is nothing but the rephrase of his former division given between the impression of sensation and the impression of reflection. "Original impressions, or impressions of sensation, are such as, without any antecedent perception, arise in the soul, from the constitution of the body, from the animal spirits, or from the application of objects to the external organs"(T275), whereas "secondary, or reflective impressions, are such as proceed from some of these original ones, either immediately, or by the interposition of its idea"(ibid.). Since “the first kind arises in the soul originally, from unknown causes”(T7), it is the second kind, which arises either from the former original impressions or from their ideas, according to him, that is the subject of his investigation.

The reflective impressions or passions are divided either into the direct or the indirect, and are distinguished again into the calm and the violent. The former is a definite distinction which is derived from the difference of the origin of the passions, whereas the latter "is far from being exact"(T276), as it depends solely upon the violence with which passions appear in the mind. It is upon the former division that the whole system of the passions is founded, whereas the latter is intended to provide the basis of the discussion regarding the corroboration of the two aspects of our identity.

In order to avoid a possible confusion, it may be useful to mention here briefly Kemp Smith who maintains that ”Hume is prepared to recognise four distinct types [among passions]”(KS 164), and re-organises Hume’s distinctions in the following way:

What are recognised by Hume as the first type of passions are “the natural appetites, upon which so many of our pleasures depend”(T164): bodily appetites such as hunger and lust, love of life, private benevolence, resentment, and kindness to children”(KS 165). The first type of passions are thus “sheerly instinctive, i.e. not founded on any antecedent experience of pleasure or plain; and in this they differ from all desire and aversion”(KS 164). All these passions arise “from a natural impulse or instinct, which is perfectly unaccountable,” as they are “not founded on precedent perceptions (or enlivened ideas) of pleasure and pain”(KS 165).

The second type of passions are those affections, emotions, and sentiments, which have some antecedent perception of pleasure or pain: grief, joy, hope, fear, despair, volition, desire, and aversion. The third type is a special, additional group of secondary impressions, “which arise when previously experienced pleasure and pain are accompanied by certain ideas involving some kind of reference to a self”(KS 165): pride and humility, love and hatred. The fourth kind are those passions which belong to none of these three types: delight in the beautiful, revulsion from the ugly or disordered, sentiments of praise and blame in the presence of virtue and vice.

Kemp Smith thus classifies Hume’s direct passions into the second and the fourth type, the indirect into the third type, but neither of them into the first type. Hume’s division of the calm and the violent has almost no bearing in Kemp Smith’s classification, though he seems to assume that the fourth type composes the calm passions, as they involve “none of the violence of other passions”(KS 167).

Kemp Smith’s re-classification is plainly a misinterpretation of Hume’s intention. He fails to see that the whole structure of Hume’s system of passions depends on the basic division between the indirect and the direct, and that every passion must belong either to the direct or to the indirect. It is also a mistake to classify the calm passions into any fixed type or kind, as “a clam passion may easily be changed into a violent one”(T438) just as an idea changes into a belief when it is enlivened by some present impression.

Having introduced the three divisions for the system of the passions, Hume directly enters upon the discussion of a set of indirect passion, pride and humility, without giving any explanation why he begins with the indirect and not with the direct passions. A puzzle, not to say "bewilderment," might be our common reaction, as it seems a natural procedure to discuss the latter first: the direct passion arises "immediately from good or evil" whereas the indirect only "from the conjunction of other qualities"(T276). The “Dissertation on the Passions,” the later version of Book II, actually begins with the direct, but not with the indirect passions.

Annette Baier sounds quite plausible in observing that "to understand Book Two of the Treatise, and its place in the Treatise as a whole, we need to see why he there begins with pride, and why its "indirectness" is important"(Baier133). She calls our attention to that "the chosen opening of Book Two shows us something about its relation to the books that precede and follow it"(Baier 134). She thinks that Hume tries to show the connection with the preceding book by appealing to the “indirectness and contrariety” involved in this set of “opposite” passions, pride and humility, assuming that "reflectivity, indirectness, conflict are...themes that are carried over from Book One"(Baier134). She points out another sign of the connection, by observing that Book II is intended to "supplement Book One's incomplete account of self-awareness"(Baier133) as well as its lack of "our awareness of fellow persons"(ibid.). I agree with her opinion that the second book not only succeeds the same theme but also supplement the first. But, is it mainly the matter of Hume's "philosophical priorities" that made him select pride and humility as the opening topic of his new discussion?

In answering this question, I shall not here be concerned with the problem whether these themes of "reflectivity, indirectness, conflict" asserted by Baier are really “carried over from Book One"(Baier134), or whether he really had such "philosophical priorities" for the "indirectness" or "contrariety" as the main themes of his second book. What I try to show instead is that Hume had some serious systematic reason for choosing the two sets of indirect passions as the initial topic of his new discussion.

If Hume’s primary concern in selecting the opening subject of Book II ilies in showing the connection with the system of ideas he has established in Book I, the first subject of his discussion must be the indirect passions: the indirect passions are more like ideas in their nature whereas the direct more like sensations. The indirect passions are, though defined as "simple and uniform impressions"(T277), virtually complex or 'hybrid' impressions in the sense in which they are constituted of peculiar ideas as well as peculiar sensations, both "determined by an original and natural instinct"(T286). When a man is vain of his own beautiful house, “the object of the indirect passion is himself, and the cause is the beautiful house”(T279). The direct passions, on the other hand, are more or less like sensations, as they “frequently arise from a natural impulse or instinct”(T439) so that some of them, e.g. hunger, lust, a few other bodily appetites, produce good or evil rather than proceed from them. When I am angry, “I am actually possessed with the direct passion, and “in that emotion have no more reference to any other object, than when I am thirsty, or sick, or more than five feet high”(T415). The direct passions are therefore adequate for the discussion of the will and actions, which is delivered at the end of Book II.

Besides, if Hume really tries to show that his second book succeeds the preceding discussion in which he has just established the system of ideas in terms of the association of ideas, he has a good reason to introduce the principle of “the double association of ideas and impressions” before mentioning an entirely new principle which is irrelevant to the system of ideas, viz. “the association of impressions.” In other words, if any structural or systematic connection is contrived between the two treatments of ideas and of passions, the latter discussion must begin with such a subject which can be explained by the easy transition of the imagination along related perceptions. The indirect passion is adequate for this purpose, as the indirect passions are derived from the double relation of ideas and impressions: “it is by means of a transition arising from a double relation of impressions and ideas, pride and humility, love and hatred are produced”(T347).

In other words, if his basic strategy in the Treatise lies in holding the analogy between the two systems of ideas and of the passions, his primary concern in his discussion of the passions must lie in the demonstration how “those principles which forward the transition of ideas here concur with those which operate on the passions; and both uniting in one action, bestow on the mind a double impulse”(T284). The productive system of the double association of impressions and ideas then needs to be established first as the basis of his discussion of the passions. For, the new passions is for Hume a proof of “the great analogy betwixt that hypothesis [regarding the belief attending the judgments which we form from causation], and our present one of an impression and idea, that transfuse themselves into another impression and idea by means of their double relation”(T290). In short, in order to show the continuity of the theme which is carried over from the preceding discussion, the indirect passion is more convenient for Hume than the direct passion, because the former arises from the concurrence of both associations of impressions and of ideas whereas the latter arise frequently without being forwarded by the transition of ideas. Here seems the answer of Baier’s first question, why does Hume begin with the indirect, and not the direct passions?

This also solves Baier’s second puzzle, “why [does] Hume begin with pride rather than love”(Baier 133)? The opening subject must be pride rather than love, because the latter does not necessary follow the universal rule of the double association of impressions and ideas: "the passions of love may be excited by only one relation of different kind"(T351/2).

But, we may still wonder what made Hume select, among the variety of passions, the four particular ones, and spend so much space as the two third of Book II? Baier, by calling our attention to his “early concentration in Book Two on conflict and on emotional see-saws”(Baier 133), finds the answer of this question in that “they are also important topics for Hume’s later account of how morality depends on a calm steady sentiment, and of how its role is to prevent or end unwanted conflict, both within a person and between persons”(ibid.). The “literary as well as philosophical reasons” for his concentration on the two set of opposite or conflicting passions lies, according to her, not only in "the need to supplement Book One's incomplete account of self-awareness"(Baier133), but also in the need to supplement the lack of “our awareness of fellow persons”(ibid.). This is why, she suggests, Book I, at least in its first half, is "full of 'egotism'”(Baier 134) whereas Book II treats a person as an ordinary person “of flesh and blood"(Baier130) or "as a person among persons"(Baier133). She proceeds to argue that "in Book Two he seems to realize that the best picture of the human soul is the human body, so he can speak of 'qualities of our mind and body, that is self'"(Baier131). Baier’s view is not to be discussed here, though I have a different opinion from hers, as the answer of our present problem seems to lie elsewhere.

In order to explain Hume’s preoccupation with the origin and cause of these two sets of indirect passions, it must be insisted that these four affections “are determined to have self [or the other self] for their object, not only by a natural, but also by an original property”(T280), so that they are “placed as it were in a square”(T333): "pride is connected with humility, love with hatred, by their objects or ideas: pride with love, humility with hatred by their sensations or impressions"(ibid.). In other words, he is so exclusively concerned with the two sets of passions, precisely because he tries to demonstrate “the situation of the mind”(T396) in terms of the four indirect passions which are connected with each other by the double relation of impressions and ideas, and to establish it as the basis of the system of the passions. The production of the indirect passion depends on the transition of the imagination along the four sides of this square established by the similitude of sensation of pain or pleasure as well as by the similitude of ideas of self or of the other self. This “situation of the mind” is such a closed system that any foreign object, even "an ordinary stone," caught by this network system, would cause one of those four passions which, “being once raised, immediately turn our attention to ourselves"(T278) or to the others. For, “these passions are determined to have self [or the other self] for their object, not only by a natural, but also by an original property”(T280), so that “it is absolutely impossible, from the primary constitution of the mind, that these passions should ever look beyond self”(T286) or the other self, the latter of which eventually “turns our view to ourselves and makes think of our own qualities and circumstances” by “a greatest resemblance among all human creatures”(T318). He spends one full section of 14 pages for the eight “experiments” to show how the “easy or difficult transition of the imagination operates upon the passions, and facilitates or retards their transition”(T340), and to prove that, owing to this double-fold ties, none of these four passions can arise independently from the rest. To establish “the situation of the mind” as the basis of his system is a sufficient reason for Hume to spend more than a third of Book II, as it is “a clear proof that these two faculties of the passions and imagination are connected together, and that the relations of ideas have an influence upon the affections”(T340).

It may be probably worth adding that, when Hume mentions pride and humility, and love and hatred, they are meant to be "principal" passions which constitute families of similar variations. Love, for instance, is claimed to "show itself in the shape of tenderness, friendship, intimacy, esteem, good-will, and in many other appearances; which at the bottom are the same affections, and arise from the same causes, though with a small variation, which it is not necessary to give any particular account of"(T448). Hume confines himself to the "principal" passions "in their most simple and natural situation, without considering all the variations they may receive from the mixture of different views and reflections"(T447), because, he explains, "it is easy to imagine how a different situation of the object, or a different turn of thought, may change even the sensation of a passion"(T447/8).

The role of the direct passions

Hume's discussion of the passions is divided into three parts in which pride and humility, love and hatred, and the will and direct passions are discussed respectively. The first two parts are spent for the illustration of the cause and origin of the passions and to establish it as the universal rule that, “in order to make a perfect union among the passions, there is always required a double relation of impressions and ideas; nor is one relation sufficient for that purpose”(T419). This is because the production of a new but reflective impression is regarded by Hume as a proof of his hypothesis that "the transition of ideas must forward the transition of impressions"(T380). He has attained his desired result in the first and the second part of Book II, by having proved the exact correspondence between the two systems of the understanding and the passions through the demonstration that "it is by means of a transition arising from a double relation of impressions and ideas, pride and humility, love and hatred are produced"(T347).

We may well expect that Hume’s last business in the third part his discussion of the direct passions is to show the consistency of his system, and to explain the origin of the direct passions by the same method of reasoning, viz. by the double association of impressions and ideas. But, against this expectation, it is only after the 39 pages of “lengthy digression on the subject of free-will and necessity”(Kemp Smith 161) that Hume returns to his main issue, and to spend only 10 pages for the subject of the direct passions. This apparently minor treatment of the direct passions makes such a disproportional contrast with his treatment of the indirect passions, which continues 24 sections of 122 pages, not only by the briefness of the discussion but also by the style with which he delivers his discussion. There is indeed a striking difference in that he was so admirably meticulous and intent all through the treatment of the direct passions, whereas his treatment of the direct passions is so far from inaccurate or scrupulous as to quote Horace’s verse for its reinforcement. It is also observable that the issue of the double association of impressions and ideas has almost disappeared from the latter treatment. The clue to this apparent change may be found in the answer of this question: Why was it necessary for Hume to make the “lengthy digression” on the subject of free-will and necessity before the discussion of the direct passions? But, instead of discussing this problem, I shall here try to solve our puzzles through the illustration of the role of the direct passions.

Let us begin with this puzzle: why is Hume so indifferent to the origin of the direct passions? The main cause of this apparent change of his interest must lie no doubt in that there is not much room for inquiring into the origin of the direct passions, as the direct passions "arise immediately from good or evil, from pain and pleasure”(T399), and "frequently…from a natural impulse or instinct, which is perfectly unaccountable"(T439). The direct passion is certainly the impression of reflection, which is distinct from the impressions of sensations in that “they are derived, in a great measure, from our ideas [of previously experienced pleasure and pain]”(T7). The direct passion, however, has as its family members those bodily or non-bodily impressions, such as hunger, lust, and a few other bodily appetites, as well as the desire or punishment to our enemies, and of happiness to our friends, which “properly speaking, produce good and evil, and proceed not from them, like the other affections"(T439). It may merit our attention how indifferent Hume is to the distinction between the bodily and the non-bodily impression, and that this distinction is not meant to correspond to the division between the impression of sensation and the impression of reflection. In order to understand Hume’s intention in the Treatise, it is important to see that, in all through the Treatise, the distinction between the bodily and the non-bodily impressions has nothing to do with his system, and that “right from the start Hume turns his back on the human body and concentrates on the unity of the human mind”(Questions 210) as David Pears points out.

Hume’s main concern in the discussion of the direct passions is not with the origin of the passions, but with “the different causes and effects of the calm and violent passions”(T418). Because, in his treatment of the indirect passions, what is insisted by Hume as the proof of the analogy between the two systems of the understanding and of the passions is "the double impulse" bestowed on the mind when "those principles which forward the transition of ideas here concur with those which operate on the passions; and both uniting in one action"(T284). But, in his treatment of the direct passions, what he regards as the proof of "the close union between the imagination and affections"(T424) is "the impulse"(T414) for actions involved in the direct passion of "aversion or propensity." This is why the latter discussion is spent not for the illustration how “the prospect of pain or pleasure from any object” gives rise to an emotion of aversion or propensity, but for the explanation how we “are carried to avoid or embrace what will give us this uneasiness or satisfaction”(T414).

It may be asked as another puzzle, isn’t Hume inconsistent in claiming the limitation of the double association for the system of the direct passions, in spite of the universal rule of the double relation of the impressions and ideas? Why is it necessary for the discussion of the direct passions to “understand it with its proper limitations, and must regard the double relation as requisite only to make one passion produce another”(T419-420)?

What is needed for the solution of this puzzle is to recall the reason why “there is always required a double relation of impressions and ideas betwixt the cause and effect, in order to produce”(T351) the indirect passions. The new passion must arise, because, as we remember, when “the two attractions of impressions and ideas concur on the same object, they mutually assist each other, and the transition of the affections and of the imagination is made with the greatest ease and facility”(T289). To put it the other way round, “two attractions or associations of impressions and ideas concur on the same object”(T289), precisely because the indirect passions are, though defined as "simple and uniform impressions"(T277), virtually "complex" or "hybrid" in the sense in which they are constituted of these two "original qualities": "a peculiar direction of the thought to a peculiar object"(T286), and "their sensation or peculiar emotions they excite in the soul"(ibid.). But, the direct passions are more like sensations, with “no more a reference to any other object, than when I am thirsty, or sick, or more than five feet high"(T415), though some of them, viz. hope and fear, are “complex, not simple"(KS 165, 166) as Kemp Smith points out. In this view, there may be no wonder if the double association of impressions and ideas is not important for the illustration of the nature of the direct passions.

We shall now try to answer this central question: What could be the role of the direct passions in Hume’s system of the passions? Why is it necessary for Hume to distinguish the two kinds of passions? The key to this question seems to be found in that “the situation of the mind” established in his preceding discussion of the indirect passions is such a closed system in which the imagination only "wheel(s) about (T336) along the four sides of a square constituted of those four passions which have either “self [or the other self] for their object, not only by a natural, but also by an original property”(T280). But, if “the true idea of the human mind” is to consider it as such a closed system of different perceptions “which are linked together by the relation of cause and effect, and mutually produce, destroy, influence, and modify each other”(T261) as he suggests at the end of Book I, does he mean that an individual person is confined in such a blind world, being deprived of any means to get in touch with the outside world?

There seems a sufficient reason to suppose that “the situation of the mind” is intended for this demonstration: the notion of ourselves depends on the notion of the other self, and vice versa, in so far as “we must suppose that nature has give to the organs of the human mind a certain dispositions fitted to produce a peculiar emotion, which we call pride, [humility, love, or hatred]: to this emotion she has assigned a certain idea , viz. that of self [or the other self], which it never fails to produce”(T287). It is this aspect of the human mind that is asserted by Hume when he observes: “The minds of men are mirrors to one another, not only because they reflect each other's emotions, but also because those rays of passions, sentiments, and opinions, may be often reverberated, and may decay away by insensible degrees"(T365). We are never confined within our own solitary world, he insists, as we are all endowed such a remarkable propensity as “to sympathise with others, and to receive by communication their inclinations and sentiments"(T316).

It might here be objected that, even if we are all guaranteed by sympathy that we can "enter so deep into the opinions and affections of others, whenever we discover them"(T319), we are confined after all within such a solitary and ghostly world filled with our own self-images or reflections. Against this objection, Hume prepares an answer in his discussion of the direct passions: if the task assigned to the indirect passions is to illustrate “the situation of the mind” as the basic system by which the idea of the self is produced, whereas the task of the direct passion is to show us the way out of this blind system, and to make us get in touch with the external world.

Hume tries to explain the latter aspect of the mind relevant to the direct passions in terms of "the situation of the object"(T419, 438) which “will be able to change the calm and the violent passions into each other”(T419), by assuming that the way out of the closed network system is prepared in “the impulse of passion”(T415) for actions. The distinction between the calm and the violent passions is now mentioned as the basis of his discussion of the will and action. He believes that the clue to the influence of passions over the will and actions can be found in the illustration of “the different causes and effects of the calm and violent passions”(T418), as “it is certain that, when we would govern a man, and push him to any action, it will commonly be better policy to work upon the violent than the calm passions”(T419), and “to place the object in such a particular situations as are proper to increase the violence of the passion”(ibid.). The last part of his discussion of the passions is thus spent for the illustration of the circumstance in which, “when we have the prospect of pain or pleasure from any object, we feel a consequent emotion of aversion or propensity, and are carried to avoid or embrace what will give us this uneasiness or satisfaction”(T414).

In order to understand Hume’s strategy for the illustration of the different aspects of the passions, it must be remembered that the Treatise depends on these three “properties of human nature,” viz. the association of ideas, the association of impressions, and the mutual assistance they lend each other, which are claimed to “have a mighty influence on every operation both of the understanding and passions”(T283). It is the third association that is relevant to the system of the indirect passions whereas it is the second that is relevant to the system of the direct passions. We also need to recall this “remarkable difference” between the two kinds of attraction or association: “ideas are associated by resemblance, contiguity, and causation, and impressions only by resemblance”(T283). If so, the system of the indirect passions depends on all the three principles of association, viz. contiguity, causation, and resemblance, whereas the system of the direct passions chiefly on resemblance, as the former involves the association of the ideas as well as the association of impressions, whereas the latter mainly on the association of impressions. Here lies the reason why Hume admits for the latter system the “proper limitations”(T419) of the general rule of the double association of impressions and ideas.

It may be also worth mentioning that, among those “two different causes “from which a transition of passion may arise”(T385), viz. a double relation of ideas and impressions, and the “principle of a parallel direction”(T384), it is the former cause that the system of the indirect passions depends on, whereas it is the latter that makes the system of the direct passions as it is. What makes the core of the former system is therefore the process in which the two kinds of association of impressions and ideas “very much assist and forward each other, and that the transition is more easily made where they both concur in the same object”(T284). But, the core process which makes the latter system as it is is the “transfusion” of passions into each other: when two passions are both present in the mind, “they readily mingle and unite, though they have but one relation, and sometimes without any”(T420) in so far as “their impulses or directions are similar and correspondent”(T381).

Hume is sure that the way out of the closed circle constituted of the four indirect passions can be explained by the latter cause, viz. the principle of a parallel direction, precisely because the two of the indirect passions are always accompanied by the direct passions of “a certain appetite or desire”(T382). Although “the situation of the mind” is such a blind system in which the imagination only wheels about along the four side of the square constituted of the four indirect passions, he reasons, the direct passions of “benevolence and anger” which love and hatred are “always followed by, or rather conjoined with”(T367) would carry the mind out of this circle owing to their “direction or tendency to action”(T381). All this happens, because the direct passion “may be related to another, not only when their sensations are resembling, as we have all along supposed in the preceding cases, but also when their impulses or directions are similar and correspondent”(T381). He also calls our attention to the “remarkable” difference between the two sets of the direct passions: “Love and hatred are not completed within themselves, nor rest in that emotion which they produce, but carry the mind to something further”(T367), but pride and humility are pure emotions in the soul, unattended with any desire, and not immediately exciting us to action”(T367). What attributes to Hume’s system “a statics and dynamics of the mind”(Kemp Smith 161) is, it seems to me, the two differences between the two kinds of passions, viz. the direct and the indirect, and between the two sets of the indirect passions, viz. pride and humility, and love and hatred.

Note:

All references marked as (T ), (KS ), and (Baier ) are quoted respectively from the following book:

David Hume: A treatise of Human Nature: Second Edition e.d. by L.A. Selby-Bigge, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1992

Kemp Smith: David Hume, e.d. by Lewis White Beck, Garland Publishing, Inc. N.Y. & London 1983

Annette C. Baier: A Progress of Sentiments, Harverd University Press, Cambridge, London 1994

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