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JUAN J. LINZ

Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference?

IN RECENT DECADES renewed efforts have been made to study and understand

the variety of political democracies, but most of those analyses have focused on the

patterns of political conflict and more specifically on party systems and coalition

formation;. in contrast to the attention of many classical writers to. if1stitutional

arrangements.' With the exception of the large literature on the impact of electoral

systems on the shaping of party systems generated by the early writings of Ferdi-

nand Hermens and the classic work by Maurice Duverger, followed by the writings

of Douglas Rae and Giovanni Sartori, Rein Taagepera, and Matthew Shugart among

others,2 political scientists have paid little attention to the role of political institu-

tions, except in the study of particular countries. Debates about monarchy and re:

public, parliamentary and presidential regimes, the unitary state and federalism

.,

have receded into oblivion and not entered the current debates about the function-

ing of democratic institutions and practices, including their effect on party sys-

tems. When a number of countries initiate the process ofwriting or rewriting con-

stitutions, some of those issues should regain saliency and become part of what

Sartori has called political engineering, in an effort to set the basis of democratic

consolidation and stability.

Undoubtedly, the constitutional innovations of the postwar period, the German

constructive nonconfidence vote, and the constitution of the French Fifth Repub-

lic, whose semipresidential regime reinforces the executive to counter the weak-

nesses of assembly parliamentarism, have attracted imitators and scholarly atten-

tion. But we lack a more systematic and behavioral study of the l._mplications for ths;_

_political process of different institutions on which to base some of the ongoing de-

bates about institutional and constitutional reform. With the notable exception of

the book by Kaltefleiter, in which the cases of a bipolar executive like the Weimar

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Juan]. Linz

Republic and the French Fifth Republic are analyzed; the paper by Stefano Bartolini,3 on cases of direct election of the head of state in Europe; the writings of Maurice Duverger and the new book by Matthew Soberg Shugart and John M. Carey,4 the differences between parliamentary, presidential, and semipresidential regimes have not attracted much attention from political scientists. These differences receive only limited attention in the two most recent works comparing contemporary democracies, those of Bingham Powell and Arend Lijphart,5 who has, however, written an excellent chapter on the implications of presidential regimes

for this volume. The neglect is largely due to the fact that with the outstanding exception of the

United States, most of the stable democracies of Europe and the Commonwealth have been parliamentary regimes and a few semipresidential and semiparliamentary, while most of the countries with presidential constitutions have been unstable democracies or authoritarian regimes and therefore have not been included in comparative studies of democracy.6 Since many social, economic, cultural, and political factors appeared central in the analysis of the crisis and breakdown of

democracy in those countries, we find practically no mention of the role of insti-

tutional factors in those crises. Only in the case of Chile has there been some reference to the conflict betwee-; President Allende and the congress in the analysis of the breakdown of democracy.? It might or might not be an accident that so many countries with presidential regGnes have encountered great difficulties in establishing stable democracies, but certainly the relationship between the two main types of democratic political institutions and the political process seems to deserve more attention than it has received. It would have been interesting to turn back to earlier debates of constitutionalists and intellectuals, particularly in Latin America, about presidentialism and parliamentarism.8 But we suspect they would not be particularly helpful for our present concerns because they would reflect, on the one side, admiration for the great American democratic republic and its presidential government, ignoring to some extent what Woodrow Wilson described as congressional government, and on the other, probably bitter criticism of French parlia-

mentarism from the Latin American legal literature; In my own work on the breakdown of democratic regimes, at the stage of cor-

recting proofs I was struck in rereading O'Donnell's analysis of the impossible game in post-Peronist Argentina by the extraordinary difficulty of integrating or isolating the Peronists in contrast to the Italian communists, which in spite of all the strains in Italian democracy never led to comparable consequences. As a result I wrote a brief excursus on the political implications of presidentialism and parliamentarism that I expanded and that constitutes the basic theme of this essay.9 The ideas I intend to develop require further research using empirical evidence from different countries, particularly in Latin America but also the Philippines, South Korea, Nigeria, and perhaps Lebanon. The essays in this volume represent an important contribution in this direction. Further work on the problem would require

Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy

5

research on the perceptions of both political elites and the public of presidents and legislatures in those regimes.

It is striking that most of the discussion of presidential government in classic works on democratic politics is limited to the United States and comparison between that country and the United Kingdom. There is practically no reference to long experience withi presidential regimes in Latin America.w This gap in the literature inevitably weakens my analysis in this essay. It should be taken as a stimulus for further and more systematic thinking and research.

Presidentialism: Principles and Realities

It has been argued that the terms presidentialism and parliamentarism each cover a wide range of political institutional formulas, and that the variety among those formulas is such that it is misleading to generalize about either term. Even two "pure" presidential systems like that of the United States and Argentina, despite the influence of the U.S. Constitution on the constitution Argentina adopted in 1853, are legally quite different-and even more so in practice-so that Carlos Nino contrasts the hyperpresidentialism of his country with a more balanced division of powers in the United States. 11 The same is probably even truer of parliamentary systems when we compare the gouvernement d'assemblee of the Third and Fourth Republics in France with the Kanzlerdemokratie of the Bundesrepublik.I2 There is the temptation in a debate about the two systems to turn to the extreme-and therefore most questionable-cases for or against the merits ofeach. As I will show, there are in modern democracies (even leaving aside the so-called semipresidential or semiparliamentary hybrids) some convergencies between the practices of presidentialism in conflictual multiparty systems (like Bolivia's) and parliamentary systems with a personalization of power or leadership similar to presidentialism when one party has an absolute majority or as in Germany with the "rationalized parliamentarism" of the Basic Law (the Bonn Constitution).

However, this should not obscure the fundamental differences between the two systems. All presidential and all parliamentary systems have a common core that allows their differentiation and some systematic comparisons. In addition, most presidential democracies are probably more similar to each other than the larger number of parliamentary democracies are alike, partly because all presidential democracies were inspired by the U.S. model and partly because the societies with such systems (with the outstanding exception ofthe United States) have some com-~on characteristics. In parliamentary systems the only democratically legitimated Institution is the parliament and the government deriving its authority from the confidence of the parliament, either from parliamentary majorities or parliamentary tolerance of minority governments, and only for the time that the legislature is ~illing to support it between elections and, exceptionally, as long as the parliament IS not able to produce an alternative government.

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Juan]. Linz

Presidential systems are based on the opposite principle. An executive with considerable powers in the constitution and generally with full control of the composition of his cabinet and the administration is elected by the people (directly or by an electoral college elected for that purpose) for a fixed period of time and is not dependent on a formal vote of confidence by the democratically elected representatives in a parliament; the president is not only the holder of executive power but the symbolic head of state and cannot be dismissed, except in rare cases of impeachment, between elections.

v Two features stand out in presidential systems:

1. Both the president, who controls the executive and is elected by the people (or an electoral college elected by the people for that sole purpose), and an elected legislature (unicameral or bicameral) enjoy democratic legitimacy. It is a system of "dual democratic legitimacy." 2. Both the president and the congress are elected for a fixed term, the president's tenure in office is independent of the legislature, and the survival of the legislature is independent of the president. This leads to what we characterize as the "rigidity" of the presidential system. 1

Most of the characteristics and problems of presidential systems flow from these two essential features. Some other nondefining features of presidentialism are often associated with it and are discussed below, such as term limits or no reelection, .~Y tomatic succession by a vice president, freedom in appointing and (even more) in dismissing a cabinet, sameness of head of state and head of government. One characteristic so normal that it is often included in the definition is that the presidency is a unipersonal office. There have been only two cases of directly elected pluripersonal "presidencies": the !Wo-persoJ1_~ypriot adJI!illistration (1_960-63)and the Uruguayan Colegiado (whidigoverned twice-1918-33 and 1952-67). 13

Dual Democratic Legitimacy

The basic characteristic of presidentialism is the full claim of the president, to democratic legitimacy. Very often the claim has strong plebiscitary components although som~times it is based on fewer popular votes than are received by many prime ministers in parliamentary systems heading minority cabinets that are perceived by contrast as weakly legitimated by the electorate. To mention just one example: Allende with a 36.2 percent plurality obtained by a heterogeneous coalition (1973) was certainly in a very different position from Adolfo Suarez with 35.1 percent of the vote (1979), as were the opponents Alessandri with 34.9 percent and Felipe Gonzalez with 30.5 percent, and the less successful contenders Tomic ~ith 2~.8 percent and Fraga and Carrillo with respectively 6.1 and 10.8 percent. A presidential system gives the incumbent, who combines the qualities of head of state representing the nation and the powers of the executive, a very different aura and self-image and creates very different popular expectations than those redounding to a prime

Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy

7

minister with whatever popularity he might enjoy after receiving the same number ofvotes. 14 v-The most striking fact is that in a presidential system, the legislators, particularly when they represent well-organized, disciplined parties that constitute real ideological and political choices for the voters, also enjoy a democratic legitimacy, and it is possible that the majority of such a legislature might represent a different political choice from that of the voters supporting a president. Under such circumstances, who, on the basis of democratic principles, is better legitimated to speak in the name of the people: the president, or the congressional majority that opposes his policies? Since both derive their power from the vote of the people in a free competition among well-defined alternatives, a conflict is always latent and sometimes likely to erupt dramatically; there is no democratic principle to resolve it, and the mechanisms that might exist in the constitution are generally complex, highly technical, legalistic, and, therefore, of doubtful democratic legitimacy for the electorate. It is therefore no accident that in some of those situations the military intervenes as ''poder moderador."

It could be argued that such conflicts are normal in the United States and have not led to serious crisis. 15 It would exceed the limits of this essay to explain the uniqueness of American political institutions and practices that have limited the impact of such conflicts, including the unique characteristics of the American political parties that lead many American political scientists to ask for a more responsible, disciplined ideological party system. 16 In my view, the development of modern political parties, in contrast to the American type of parties, particularly in socially or ideologically polarized societies, is likely to make those conflicts especially complex and threatening.

Without going into the complexities of the relationship between the executive and the legislature in different presidential regimes, 17 the relative dangers of predominance of one or the other, and the capacity to veto or stalemate decisions on legislation, there can be no doubt that presidential regimes are based on a dual democratic legitimacy and that no democratic principle can decide who represents the will of the people in principle. In practice, and particularly in developing countries with great regional inequalities in modernization, it is likely that the political and social composition and outlook of the legislature differs from that of the supporters of the president. The territorial principle of representation, sometimes reinforced by inequalities in the districting or the existence of a senate in federal republics, tends to give stronger weight in the legislature to representatives of rural areas and small towns of the provinces than to the metropolises. And it is easy to claim that the democratic credentials ofrepresentatives ofbackward areas are dubious and that these representatives are local oligarchs elected thanks to their clientelistic influences, their social and economic power. Independently ofthe truth ofthis claim and of the degree to which a democracy would disqualify voters who, rather than being influenced by trade unions, neighborhood associations, and party rna-

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juan]. Linz

chines, are loyal to local notables, tribal leaders, priests, and even bosses, urban progressive elites are tempted to question the representativeness ofthose elected by them. In such a context, it becomes easy for a president encountering resistance to his program in the legislature to mobilize the people against the oligarchs, to claim true democratic legitimacy, deny it to his opponents, and confront his opponents with his capacity to mobilize his supporters in mass demonstrations. 18

It is also conceivable that in some societies the president might represent the more traditional or provincial electorates and might use that support to question the right ofthe more urban and modern segments in a minority to oppose his policies. In the absence of any logical principle to define who really has democratic legitimacy, it is tempting to use ideological formulations to legitimize the presidential component of the system and delegitimize those opposing him, transforming what is an institutional conflict into serious social and political conflicts.

The different "legitimacies" of a popularly elected president and a congress are already well described in this text of 1852:

While the votes of France are split up among the seven hundred and fifty members of the National Assembly, they are here, on the contrary, concentrated on a single individual. While each separate representative ofthe people represents only this or that party, this or that town, this or that bridgehead, or even only the mere necessity of electing some one of the seven hundred and fifty, in which neither the cause nor the man is closely examined, he is the elect ofthe nation and the act ofhis election is the trump that the sovereign people plays once every four years. The elected National Assembly stands in a metaphysical relation, but the elected President in a personal relation, to the nation. The National Assembly, indeed, exhibits in its individual representatives the manifold aspects of the national spirit, but in the President this national spirit finds its incarnation. As against the Assembly, he possesses a sort of divine right; he is President by the grace of the people.

Incidentially this is not the analysis of an institutionalist (or political psychologist) but of the "sociologist" Karl Marx in his "Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte." 19

../ Election for a Fixed Term: The "Rigidity" of Presidentialism

The second main institutional characteristic of presidential systems is the fact that presidents are elected for a period of time that, under normal circumstances cannot be modified: not shortened and sometimes, due to provisions preventing reelection, not prolonged. '[he p~!itic~!_process therefore becomes broken into discontinuous, rigidly determin"ed periods without the possibility of continuous readil!s..tments as political, social, and economic events might require. The duration?of the mandate of a president becomes an essential political factor to which all actors in the political process have to adjust, and this has many important consequences.

If I had to summarize the basic differences between presidential and parliamen-

Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy

9

tary systems, I might point to the rigidity that presidentialism introduces into the political process and the much greater flexibility of that process in parliamentary systems. This rigidity might appear to the proponents of presidentialism as an ad~antage because it reduces some of the incertitudes and unpredictability inherent to parliamentarism, in which a larger number of actors, parties, their leaders, even the rank-and-file legislators, including those changing loyalties, can at any time between elections make basic changes, see to realignments, and above all, change the head of the executive, the prime minister. The search for strong power and predictability would seem to favor presidentialism, but paradoxically, unexpected events from the death of the incumbent to serious errors in judgment, particularly when faced with changing situations, make presidential rule less predictable and often weaker than that of a prime minister, who can always reinforce his authority and democratic legitimacy by asking for a vote of confidence.

The uncertainties of a period of regime transition and consolidation no doubt make the rigidities of a presidential constitution more problematic than a parliamentary system, which permits flexible responses to a changing situation.

One of the presumed advantages ofa presidential regime is that it assures the stability of the executive. This has been contrasted with the instability of many parliamentary governments, which undergo frequent crises and changes in the prime ministership, particularly in multiparty European democracies. It would seem that the image of governmental instability in the French Third and Fourth Republics, in Italy today, and more recently in Portugal has contributed to the negative image of parliamentarism held by many scholars, particularly in Latin America, and their preference for presidentialism. In such a comparison it is often forgotten that parliamentary democracies have been able to produce stable governments. Under their apparent instability, the continuity of parties in power, the reshuffling of cabinet members, the continuation of a coalition under the same premier, and the frequent continuity of ministers in key ministries in spite of cabinet crises tend to be forgotten. 20 It is also overlooked that the parliamentary system allows for removal of the prime minister who has lost control of his party or is involved in a scandal, whose cont.inuation in office might create a serious political crisis. He might be replaced by h~s party, by the formation of a new coalition, or by the withdrawal of support of parties tolerating the minority government, without a major constitutional crisis. Unless parliamentary alignments make the formation of a democratically based government impossible, parliament with more or less difficulty and with more or less delay should be able to produce a new prime minister. In some cases of more serious crisis, there is always the alternative of calling for new elections, although they often do not resolve the problem but, as in Germany in the early 1930s, compound it.

In contrast, presidents are elected for a fixed term in office. The kind of changes that produce government crises and the substitution of one executive by another are ~xcluded for that time. But this entails a rigidity in the political process that makes adJUstment to changing situations extremely difficult; a leader who has lost the confi-

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juan]. Linz

dence of his own party or the parties that acquiesced to his election cannot be replaced. He cannot be substituted with someone abler to compromise with the opposition when polarization has reached an intensity that threatens violence and an illegal overthrow. The extreme measure of impeachment, which is in the constitutional texts, is difficult to use compared to a vote of no confidence. An embattled president is tempted to, and can, use his powers in such a way that his opponents might not be willing to wait until the end of his term to oust him. But there are no mechanisms to remove him without violating the constitution, unless he is willing to resign.21

Voluntary resignation under the pressure of party leaders and public opinion would be one way of avoiding the implications of the rigidity of the presidential mandate without the rumbling of tanks or violence in the streets. However, it is an unlikely outcome given the psychology of politicians. Moreover, in a presidential system, particularly one without the possibility of reelection, the incumbent cannot vindicate himself before the electorate. It is difficult for his former supporters to encourage him to such a step, particularly when some consider a vice president, who would automatically succeed him, even less desirable than the incumbent (as in the Fernando Collor crisis in Brazil in mid-1992). After two years and ten months and the complete failure of his administration, President Siles Suazo resigned, preventing another breakdown of civilian rule. Pressure from the opposition parties, the MNR (Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario) and the ADN (Alianza Democnitica Nacional), which had the majority in the congress, the hostility of the major business organizations, and rumors of a possible coup had reduced his mandate in a little more than a year. It was exceptional in Bolivian politics because instead of a coup, the crisis led to an election in July 1985 in which ADN gained 28.57 percent of the votes and MNR 26-42 percent (an election in which the trade union movement and the radical left advocated abstention or void voting). Paz Estenssoro of MNR was elected president, and a period of democratic stability was initiated. Suazo's resignation is today widely recognized as a patriotic act.

Even "voluntary" resignation under pressure is likely to generate a serious political crisis because the segment of the electorate that brought the president to power might feel cheated of its choice and rally publicly to the incumbent's support. It is difficult to imagine political leaders resolving the issue without bringing the people into the debate and without using the threat of nondemocratic institutions, like the courts, and, more frequently, of political intervention by the armed forces. The intense conflict underlying such crises cannot be contained within the corridors and smoke-filled rooms ofthe legislature, as the nonconfidence vote (or more often the threat of it) against a prime minister or a party leader can be.

./ Identifiability and Accountability

One of the positive characteristics attributed to presidentialism is accountability and identifiability. The voter in casting his ballot knows whom he or she is voting for and who will govern should this candidate win. The person voting for rep-

Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy

11

resentatives of a party in a parliamentary system presumably does not know who the party will support to be prime minister, and if it is a multiparty system in which the party cannot expect to gain an absolute majority, the voter does not know what parties will form a governing coalition.

In reality neither of these statements is true or all the truth the voter would need to know in order to make a "reasonable" choice.

In presidential elections the voter may know much less about who will govern than the voters of a party in most parliamentary systems. The presidential candidates do not need and often do not have any prior record as political leaders. They may not be identified with a party with an ideology or program and record, and there may be little information about the persons likely to serve in a cabinet. The choice is often based on an opinion about one individual, a personality, promises, and-let's be honest-an image a candidate projects, which may be an image chosen by advisers (who are not necessarily politicians). This is even more the case in our age of "videopolitics."22

It may be argued that the voters of PASOK (Panhellenic Socialist Movement) voted for Papandreou, the British Conservatives voted for Mrs. Thatcher, the PSOE (Partido Socialista Obrero Espafiol) voted for Felipe Gonzalez, and so forth, although some might have voted for those parties in spite oftheir leaders or the other way around. Person~Ji~~!~ ................
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