Intimate Terrorism vs - MassLegalServices



Apples and Oranges in Child Custody Disputes:

Intimate Terrorism vs. Situational Couple Violence:

Michael P. Johnson

In this issue of the Journal of Child Custody, Donald Dutton [Dutton, this issue] makes the important and valid point that we put children at risk if we focus so heavily on fathers as potential child abusers that we lose sight of the fact that mothers are more likely than fathers to be a risk to their children. However, Dutton comes to this conclusion by way of a thoroughly misguided attack on feminist perspectives on domestic violence. His core argument, one that was first articulated by Suzanne Steinmetz almost 30 years ago (Steinmetz, 1977-78), is that wives abuse their husbands as often as husbands abuse their wives. Steinmetz’s article drew serious criticism from the beginning (Pleck, Pleck, Grossman, & Bart, 1978) and the debate about the gender symmetry of domestic violence has continued to this day (Archer, 2000a, 2000b; Fergusson, Horwood, & Ridder, in press; Frieze, 2000; Johnson, in press; O'Leary, 2000; Straus, 1999; White, Smith, Koss, & Figueredo, 2000). Dutton has simply repeated the two major errors that Steinmetz made, errors that have kept this debate alive for decades. First, he treats intimate partner violence as if it were a unitary phenomenon. Second, he assumes that agency samples are biased and that so-called random samples are not.

I intend to make three points with respect to these two common errors. First, there are three major types of intimate partner violence, only one of which (intimate terrorism) is the kind of violence that we all think of when we hear the term “domestic violence.” Second, both major sampling designs in domestic violence research are seriously biased, and those biases account for the fact that each side of this debate has been able to marshal empirical evidence to support its position. Third, intimate terrorism (also know as domestic violence, spouse abuse, wife-beating, etc.) is, indeed, primarily male-perpetrated and, in the case of heterosexual relationships, probably best understood through some version of a feminist theory of domestic violence. l will show how the failure of Dutton and others to recognize these points has led them astray.

Three Types of Intimate Partner Violence

A growing segment of the domestic violence literature demonstrates that there is more than one type of intimate partner violence. I first presented this theoretical and conceptual argument at professional meetings in the early 1990s, with publications beginning to appear in 1995 (e.g. Johnson, 1993, 1995, 1996). Since that time I have continued to present and publish papers that document the differences among major types of intimate partner violence (e.g., Johnson, 1998, 2001; Johnson & Cares, 2004; Johnson & Leone, 2005; Leone, Johnson, Cohan, & Lloyd, 2004). The importance of making such distinctions is also supported by other scholars’ publications, some that build upon my framework (Graham-Kevan & Archer, 2003a, 2003b), others that come to the same conclusion from other perspectives (e.g. Holtzworth-Munroe, Meehan, Herron, Rehman, & Stuart, 2000; Holtzworth-Munroe & Stuart, 1994; Jacobson & Gottman, 1998; Swan & Snow, 2002). It is no longer scientifically or ethically acceptable to speak of domestic violence without specifying the type of violence to which one refers. When researchers such as Dutton ignore these distinctions and aggregate the types, they make serious mistakes in their research and, more importantly, in the policy recommendations that follow from it.

In my control-based typology of intimate partner violence the three major types are distinguished from each other by the control context within which they are embedded. Control context is conceptualized at the level of the relationship rather than the immediate situation, and is based on non-situation-specific, dyadic information about the controlling and violent behaviors of both partners in the relationship. Briefly, the three types are (a) violence enacted in the service of taking general control over one’s partner (intimate terrorism); (b) violence utilized in response to intimate terrorism (violent resistance); and (c) violence that is not embedded in a general pattern of power and control, but is a function of the escalation of a specific conflict or series of conflicts (situational couple violence).

Although all three types of intimate partner violence can be either frequent or infrequent within a relationship, and can range from relatively minor acts of violence to homicidal assaults, intimate terrorism is the type mostly likely to be frequent and brutal. Also, it is the type of violence that people think of when they hear the term “domestic violence.” No matter how careful researchers are about spelling out their operationalizations of intimate partner violence, they and their readers routinely fall into the trap of thinking that the research findings apply to the prototype of domestic violence—intimate terrorism. When researchers such as Dutton do not operationalize distinctions among types of intimate partner violence, and instead simply make generalizations about “domestic violence,” they create serious misconceptions.

Sampling Plans are Biased

The problem of treating intimate partner violence as a unitary phenomenon is exacerbated by the fact that our common sampling designs are heavily biased. On one hand, agency samples gathered from shelters, hospitals, police records, or the courts are biased heavily in favor of intimate terrorism because intimate terrorism is the type of violence that is most likely to be repetitive and to escalate. Such a pattern of violence produces incidents that draw the attention of neighbors, injuries that lead to hospital visits, and terror that leads the victim to seek help from the police, shelters, or courts. On the other hand, general samples, such as the National Family Violence Surveys cited heavily by Dutton, are biased in favor of situational couple violence. These so-called random samples are dominated by situational couple violence for two reasons. First, although estimates of prevalence are never straightforward, the evidence suggests that situational couple violence is by far the most common form of intimate partner violence. Thus, even if a sample were truly representative, any findings regarding the causes or effects of aggregated violence would be heavily dominated by situational couple violence. Second, refusals further reduce the number of victims or perpetrators of intimate terrorism who are interviewed in such general surveys. In the specific case of the National Family Violence Surveys, I have demonstrated that the refusal rate is closer to 40% than to the 18% often claimed for those surveys (Johnson, 1995). it is reasonable to assume that intimate terrorists and their victims are more likely to refuse to participate in such surveys than are couples who have experienced situational couple violence. Intimate terrorists do not want to risk exposure, and their victims are afraid they will be beaten if their partner finds out they have been answering questions about their relationship.

There is evidence that demonstrates these biases. Looking at men only, using 1970s Pittsburgh data, I found that the male violence in a general sample was only 11% intimate terrorism, whereas the violence in a court sample was 68% intimate terrorism, and that in a shelter sample 79% intimate terrorism (Johnson, 2001). Similarly, Graham-Kevan and Archer (2003a), using 2002 British data, found that the violence in a general sample was 33% intimate terrorism, whereas that in a shelter sample was 88% intimate terrorism.

Intimate Terrorism (aka Domestic Violence) is Primarily Male-Perpetrated

There are two types of evidence regarding the relationship between gender and the different types of intimate partner violence. First, there is indirect evidence derived from over 25 years of research that has not operationalized distinctions among types of intimate partner violence. This evidence is indirect because it involves the comparison of findings from general survey samples that are biased in favor of situational couple violence with those from agency samples that are biased in favor of intimate terrorism. Second, there is direct evidence from the relatively small number of more recent studies that have actually operationalized the distinctions.

The most comprehensive indirect evidence comes from the very meta-analysis that Dutton and others cite as the definitive demonstration that women are as violent as men in intimate relationships (Archer, 2000a). Archer found that intimate partner violence in agency samples was heavily male-perpetrated (d = .86), whereas that in general samples was roughly gender-symmetric (d = -.03). In light of those findings, Archer and one of his colleagues have gone on to gather direct evidence that in Britain 87% of intimate terrorism is male-perpetrated, compared with 45% of situational couple violence (Graham-Kevan & Archer, 2003a). Further direct evidence comes from my finding that 97% of the intimate terrorism in a 1970s Pittsburgh sample was male-perpetrated, compared with 56% of the situational couple violence (Johnson, 2001).

Another indicator of the relevance of gender and of feminist theories of domestic violence is the relationship of intimate partner violence to traditional gender attitudes and misogyny. A summary of some of the indirect evidence can be found in Sugarman and Frankel’s (1996) meta-analysis that found a strong relationship between traditional gender attitudes and male-perpetrated intimate partner violence in agency samples (d = .80), and a weak relationship in general samples (d = -.14). Direct evidence comes from Holtzworth-Munroe’s work, in which she finds that male perpetrators of intimate terrorism have significantly more misogynistic attitudes than do nonviolent men, whereas perpetrators of situational couple violence have the same attitudes toward women as do nonviolent men (e.g., Holtzworth-Munroe et al., 2000).

Thus, although situational couple violence is nearly gender-symmetric and not strongly related to gender attitudes, intimate terrorism (domestic violence) is almost entirely male-perpetrated and is strongly related to gender attitudes.

Connections Between Domestic Violence and Child Abuse: Dutton

The evidence presented above calls into question the heart of Dutton’s contention that it is misleading to represent “males… as primary perpetrators of physical abuse [of intimate partners]” [Dutton, abstract]. The problem is the casual use of a variety of terms to refer to intimate partner violence without acknowledging that it takes quite different forms that have quite different causes and consequences. Dutton, for example, uses the following terms just in his title and abstract: domestic abuse, domestic violence, physical abuse, indirect aggression, aggression. This terminological casualness is rooted in the assumption that intimate partner violence is a unitary phenomenon. This assumption leads to the usual errors. Dutton criticizes studies using agency populations for being biased, but assumes that general surveys are unbiased. Remember, agency samples are heavily biased in favor of intimate terrorism; general samples are heavily biased in favor of situational couple violence. Thus, Dutton cites evidence (the National Family Violence Surveys) regarding the gender symmetry of situational couple violence to make a case about intimate terrorism. The evidence is irrelevant. Studies that make the distinctions find that in heterosexual relationships intimate terrorism is, indeed, largely male-perpetrated.

Dutton himself [p. 7] cites one clear example of such findings without recognizing their significance (McCloskey, Figueredo, & Koss, 1995). McCloskey, Figueredo, and Koss collected data from three samples, two biased in favor of intimate terrorism and one in favor of situational couple violence. The first two find primarily male perpetration, the third finds as much violence from mothers as from fathers. Had Dutton made the relevant distinctions, he would have seen this study as much more than evidence of feminist biases, or as he puts it, evidence that “a social reality is created that… disregards conflicting data” [p. 8]. The domestic violence literature is a literature in which both feminists and their critics have dismissed data that do not support their position—not necessarily because of their biases, but because they have not taken seriously the evidence that there is more than one kind of intimate partner violence, and that study samples vary greatly in the balance of the various types.

What is generally unstated in the arguments about the link between intimate partner violence and child abuse is that authors are generally referring to intimate terrorism, not situational couple violence. Everyone seems to agree that there is a link between intimate terrorism and child abuse. What we do not know is the extent to which there is or is not a link between situational couple violence and child abuse. It seems likely to me that the sampling biases of various studies account for the wildly different estimates of the overlap between intimate partner violence and child abuse—from 20% to 100% according to Dutton [p. 9]. I expect that the 20% findings involve situational couple violence, the 100% findings intimate terrorism. However, the differences will remain unknown until research is conducted that makes distinctions among types of intimate partner violence and investigates their links to child abuse. If, as I expect, research establishes that violent resistance and situational couple violence are not strongly linked to the risk of child abuse, then the finding that these types of violence involve as many women as men is much less important than Dutton makes it out to be.

Difficulties and Dilemmas in Custody Assessment

I hope you have noticed that I have never denied that women can be intimate terrorists. Certainly there is evidence that some of the violence in lesbian relationships involves intimate terrorism (Renzetti, 1992), and I have personally worked with one male client who was clearly terrorized by his controlling and violent police officer wife. I am simply trying to present an antidote to Dutton’s dismissal of the feminist argument that most intimate terrorism is male-perpetrated and related to patriarchal traditions and structures (Dobash & Dobash, 1979). Good theory and research requires careful conceptualization, and aggregating all violent couples and comparing them with all non-violent couples does not suffice. However, when it comes to what is usually implied by the term domestic violence (i.e., intimate terrorism), I come down on the side of the feminist analysis. Theoretically speaking, patriarchal traditions and structures, average sex differences in the use of violence, and average size and strength differences between men and women all suggest that in heterosexual relationships intimate terrorism will be largely male-perpetrated. Empirically speaking, the evidence, both direct and indirect, confirms that intimate terrorism is largely male-perpetrated and related to gender attitudes.

As Dutton argues, it is important that we do child custody assessments carefully. What he seems to mean by this is that we need to assess women’s violence as well as men’s. I have no quarrel with him there. I would add, however, that we need to make distinctions among types of violence. In cases in which there is a custody battle between an intimate terrorist and a partner who is resisting with violence, the primary risk to the children is the intimate terrorist. In cases in which the relationship involves situational couple violence, it less clear whether there is an increased risk to the children. If the situational couple violence was singular and mild, perhaps there is no problem. If the violence is chronic or severe, I would argue that what is needed is a more nuanced analysis of the situational causes of the violence. If one partner has an anger management problem, then he or she is the parent most at risk for child abuse. If the problem is one of couple communication or chronic conflict over one or a few issues, generalization to child abuse is unlikely. The issues are complicated and differ depending on the type of violence, but one thing is clear: The assessment of the violence must include information about its role in the relationship between the contesting parties. A narrow focus on acts of violence will not do.

Finally, we need to err on the side of safety. Assume that all violence is intimate terrorism until proven otherwise. I am not as sanguine as Dutton seems to be about the advantages of scales over qualitative assessments. We should use all of the tools at our disposal to assess risks to children.

References

Archer, J. (2000a). Sex differences in aggression between heterosexual partners: A meta-analytic review. Psychological Bulletin, 126(5), 651-680.

Archer, J. (2000b). Sex differences in physical aggression to partners: A reply to Frieze (2000), O'Leary (2000), and White, Smith, Koss, and Figueredo (2000). Psychological Bulletin, 126(5), 697-702.

Dobash, R. E., & Dobash, R. P. (1979). Violence against wives: A case against patriarchy. New York: Free Press.

Fergusson, Horwood, & Ridder. (in press). Partner violence and mental health outcomes in a New Zealand birth cohort. Journal of Marriage and Family.

Frieze, I. H. (2000). Violence in close relationships-development of a research area: Comment on Archer (2000). Psychological Bulletin, 126(5), 681-684.

Graham-Kevan, N., & Archer, J. (2003a). Intimate terrorism and common couple violence: A test of Johnson's predictions in four British samples. Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 18(11), 1247-1270.

Graham-Kevan, N., & Archer, J. (2003b). Physical aggression and control in heterosexual relationships: The effect of sampling. Violence and Victims, 18(2), 181-196.

Holtzworth-Munroe, A., Meehan, J. C., Herron, K., Rehman, U., & Stuart, G. L. (2000). Testing the Holtzworth-Munroe and Stuart (1994) batterer typology. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 68, 1000-1019.

Holtzworth-Munroe, A., & Stuart, G. L. (1994). Typologies of male batterers: Three subtypes and the differences among them. Psychological Bulletin, 116(3), 476-497.

Jacobson, N., & Gottman, J. (1998). When men batter women: New insights into ending abusive relationships. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Johnson, M. P. (1993, November). Violence against women in the American family: Are there two forms? Paper presented at the annual pre-conference Theory Construction and Research Methodology Workshop, National Council on Family Relations, Baltimore.

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Johnson, M. P. (1996). Violence against women in the family: The United States and Vietnam. In K. Barry (Ed.), Vietnam's women in transition (pp. 287-296). New York: St. Martin’s Press.

Johnson, M. P. (1998, June). Commitment and entrapment: Wife-beating in America. Paper presented at the Ninth International Conference on Personal Relationships, Saratoga Springs, NY.

Johnson, M. P. (2001). Conflict and control: Symmetry and asymmetry in domestic violence. In A. Booth, A. C. Crouter & M. Clements (Eds.), Couples in conflict (pp. 95-104). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Johnson, M. P. (in press). Domestic violence: It's not about gender--or is it? Journal of Marriage and Family.

Johnson, M. P., & Cares, A. (2004, November). Effects and non-effects of childhood experiences of family violence on adult partner violence. Paper presented at the National Council on Family Relations annual meeting, Orlando, FL.

Johnson, M. P., & Leone, J. M. (2005). The differential effects of intimate terrorism and situational couple violence: Findings from the National Violence Against Women Survey. Journal of Family Issues, 26(3), 322-349.

Leone, J. M., Johnson, M. P., Cohan, C. M., & Lloyd, S. (2004). Consequences of male partner violence for low-income, ethnic women. Journal of Marriage and Family, 66(May), 471-489.

McCloskey, L. A., Figueredo, A. J., & Koss, M. P. (1995). The effects of systematic family violence on children's mental health. Child Development, 66, 139-1261.

O'Leary, K. D. (2000). Are women really more aggressive than men in intimate relationships? Comment on Archer. Psychological Bulletin, 126(5), 685-689.

Pleck, E., Pleck, J. H., Grossman, M., & Bart, P. B. (1978). The battered data syndrome: A comment on Steinmetz' article. Victimology, 2, 680-683.

Renzetti, C. M. (1992). Violent betrayal: Partner abuse in lesbian relationships. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Steinmetz, S. K. (1977-78). The battered husband syndrome. Victimology, 2(3-sup-4), 499-509.

Straus, M. A. (1999). The controversy over domestic violence by women: A methodological, theoretical, and sociology of science analysis. In X. B. Arriaga & S. Oskamp (Eds.), Violence in intimate relationships (pp. 17-44). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Sugarman, D. B., & Frankel, S. L. (1996). Patriarchal ideology and wife-assault: A meta-analytic review. Journal of Family Violence, 11(1), 13-40.

Swan, S. C., & Snow, D. L. (2002). A typology of women's use of violence in intimate relationships. Violence against Women, 8(3), 286-319.

White, J. W., Smith, P. H., Koss, M. P., & Figueredo, A. J. (2000). Intimate partner aggression--what have we learned? Comment on Archer (2000). Psychological Bulletin, 126(5), 690-696.

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