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The Crisis of Multiculturalism?

TransAtlantic Discourses, Intercontinental Divides

Augie Fleras

Sociology

U of Waterloo

Canada

2007

Abstract

Many have said that those who use the same word to describe diverse realities may end up ‘talking past each’ by speaking a different language. Nowhere is this more evident than in transAtlantic discourses and intercontinental divides over references to multiculturalism. This paper argues that the popularity and persistence of Canada’s multiculturalism reflects a model for living together differently that fosters society-building through the bonds of community, commitment, and citizenship. By contrast, the rationale behind European multicultural discourses tend to be more pluralistic yet monocultural, in effect marginalizing minorities from full institutional involvement, equal citizenship, and country-making. The paper also argues that the success of Canada’s Multiculturalism is inextricably linked to its status as an official immigrant society, with a corresponding commitment to facilitate the settlement and integration of new Canadians. Insofar as Canada’s official multiculturalism is not about celebrating diversity, but about removing disadvantage to ensure full and equal inclusion, its embeddedness in Canada’s institutional architecture is both relevant and timely – timely, in coping with the challenges of an increasingly diverse and politicized minority sector; relevant, because it provides a blueprint for multicultural governance that has proven workable, necessary, and fair.

A Paper prepared and delivered to audiences at select German Universities, June 2007. Like the unfinished project that is called Canada, this paper should also be seen as a work in progress, but is loosely based on my forthcoming book, “The Politics of Multiculturalism: Multicultural Governance in Comparative Perspective. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Introduction. Multiculturalism: Crisis, What Crisis?

Of the conceptual trip wires and cultural landmines to have detonated across the Western landscape in recent years, few have triggered as much controversy or confusion as the politics of multiculturalism. While some continue to worship at the alter of multiculturalism, others recoil at the prospect of foisting yet more social engineering on an unsuspecting public (Fleras and Elliott 2007).Timing has played politics with a modernist project that many regard as passe for the postmodern/post 9/11 realities of the 21st century. Inception of multiculturalism as a popular and political discourse may have originated in an era of optimism and reform, but is listing badly at present because of security concerns and integration politics. The paradox is inescapable. What started out as a seemingly progressive society-building idea with enlightened intentions has evolved into a flashpoint for tension and conflict.

In brief, the optics are not looking good. From the Antipodes to Europe, the multiculturalism in multicultural governance is experiencing a crisis of legitimacy (Pilkington 2007). Having outworn its welcome and ostensibly outlived its usefulness, multiculturalism is increasingly maligned as either a good idea gone bad or, alternatively, a bad idea that has unfolded according to plan (Modood 2007). Nowhere is this controversy more deeply etched than in transatlantic disagreements over multiculturalism. While European societies are struggling with expanding demographic and cultural diversity – seemingly frozen stiff with fear and anxiety over new demands and unprecedented challenges – Canadians appear almost blasé by comparison (Keil and Hubner 2005). Wheras European multiculturalism discourses are reeling under the onslaught because of their encounter with the so-called subversive ‘other’ (Hage 2006), Canada’s Multicultural model remains solidly entrenched, with few calls for dismissal or reform (Jedwab 2006). If anything, Canadians are genuinely puzzled by the intensity of European vitriol, especially since core policies related to multiculturalism and immigration enjoy substantial public consensus in Canada and occasional challenges attract little political traction (Soroka at al 2006).

The evidence appears irrefutable: A commitment to multiculturalism is undergoing a near death experience in many European countries (Joppke 2004, 2007; Glazov 2006). Public dismay over the Danish “cartoon” controversy and Paris street riots, in addition to public outrage over the bombings in Madrid and London, confirmed what many had suspected: multiculturalism had gone amok, and the sooner the burial, the better. But before interring the corpse of multiculturalism, let’s check its pulse first. If multiculturalism has outlived its usefulness, what was it that made it so useful in the first place? If multiculturalism is dying, what is it dying of – structural flaws? indifference? expediency? misinformation?misapplication? If its atrophying, who says so, why, and on what grounds can these claims be verified If multiculturalism is the culprit, how to explain the unrest and turmoil in ostensibly unmulticultural societies like France or the USA (Belkhodja et al 2006)? And if Europe reflects a dismissive mode, what accounts for Canada’s rock-solid loyalty to multiculturalism as policy and practice (Seidle 2007).

In looking for explanations and answers, this paper provides a framework for conceptualizing multiculturalism in terms of what works, what doesn’t, and whether good ideas are transferable or situation specific. The paper begins by theorizing multiculturalism as a solution that, paradoxically, is in search of a problem. Multiculturalism as a governance discourse is shown to be undergoing an identity crisis with respect to what it is, in addition to a crisis of confidence in regards to its status and role in light of 21st century realities. A discussion of Canada’s official multiculturalism revolves around a central question: What does an inclusive Multiculturalism propose to do, and how does this compare with what it is really doing, what should it be doing, and what it can realistically accomplish? A look at multiculturalism’s (mis)fortunes in Europe follows next. The politics of multicultural governance are thought to resonate differently than in Canada because of Europe’s commitment to a more accurately termed ‘plural monoculturalism’ (Sen 2006). The focus then shifts to the core of the paper: Why does multiculturalism enjoy popularity and support in Canada but resentment and rejection in European jurisdictions? Numerous reasons are posited, but Canada’s status as an “immigrant society” and its embrace of an inclusive multiculturalism may well prove the tripping factors. The paper ends on a positive note: Canada’s Multicultural model is far from perfect as a ‘social contract’ for managing diversity. But in a rapidly changing and diverse world, it may prove the least imperfect option in addressing the challenges of living together differently without drifting apart.

Theorizing Official Multiculturalism: A Solution in Search of a Problem

The Multiculturalism Paradox:

Not meaning what it says, not saying what it means.

The politics of diversity in Western democracies have generated two often intersecting policy agendas (Soroka et al 2006). One agenda reflects a commitment to diversity, with the result that programs and initiatives are positioned to respect cultural differences by fostering more inclusive citizenships. The second agenda gravitates toward social cohesion and national identity by weaving together the bonds of community and commonality from the threads of diversity. While both these agendas are important and compatible - in theory if not always in practice - political attention in Western democracies ‘pendulates’ back and forth between these intersecting frameworks. Until recently, diversity was seen as an anathema to society-building, and actively suppressed or benignly discouraged. The last quarter of the 20th century saw a shift toward a more accommodative stance that embraced multicultural principles. But in light of social changes and anxieties over order, identity, and conflict, the balance of debate is tilting again toward an integration agenda.

Not unexpectedly, central authorities confront a dilemma when addressing the question of how to make society safe “for” diversity yet safe “from” diversity (see Schlesinger Jr. 1992). A principled framework must be established for building a viable community out of ethnically diverse populations without compromising a commitment to social integration or cultural diversity (Sellers 2005). A fundamental contradiction is at play: To one side is a liberal commitment to the individuality of autonomy, diversity, and equality; to the other side is a society-building imperative to impose a uniformity of language, culture, and identity over an heterogeneous population (Baubock 2005). Too much diversity and not enough unity may destabilize a society to the point of dismemberment. Too little diversity but too much unity can stifle as it standardizes (Fish 1997). But in the absence of measurable values for operationalizing the concepts of ‘unity’ and ‘diversity’, questions abound: How to achieve a balance between integration and differences, who says so, and on what grounds?

Multiculturalism constitutes a late 20th century experiment for rewriting the rules of political and social engagement in an age of migration (Gagnon and Iacovino 2007). In response to this challenge, white settler societies such as Australia and Canada have endorsed multicultural principles as a blueprint for managing diversity (Pearson 2001; May 2004). However popular and successful a discursive framework, staunch support for multiculturalism has not congealed into consensus over definition, attributes, or applications. Both championed yet maligned, idealized as well as demonized, the term itself has absorbed such a melange of often conflicting social articulations that many despair of any clarity or consensus (Caws 1994). References to multiculturalism simultaneously evoke a two-edged preference for consensus as well as criticism and change; of conformity yet diversity; of control yet emancipation; of exclusion yet participation; of compliance yet creativity (see Vasta 1996). On too many occasions, multiculturalisms serves as a convenient label for a (dis)array of interventions (Uitermark et al 2005), resulting in yet more confusion and contestation, as Todd Gitlin observes:

The word is baggy, a melange of fact and value, current precisely because it is vague enough to serve so many interests. Partisans may use the term to defend the recognition of difference, or to resist policies or ideas imposed by conquerors, or to defend cosmopolitanism—the interests and pleasures that each may take in the profusion of humanity. The purists of identity politics use it to defend endless fission, a heap of monocultures. On the other side, multiculturalism and its demonic twin, “political correctness,” serve conservatives as names for a potpourri of things they detest—including an irritating insistence on the rights of minorities (Todd Gitlin 1995:228).

The conclusion is inescapable: References to multiculturalism connote an uncanny knack for meaning different things to different people, of meaning everything yet nothing (Fleras 2002). These references can prove both perplexing and provocative; after all, a commitment to multiculturalism goes beyond a few diversity add-ons, but may symbolize intensely held perceptions of what society is or should be, and the role of minorities in advancing this vision (see Soroka et al 2006). In that multiculturalism can mean whatever people want it to mean—a kind of “floating signifier” in which meanings are absorbed without much fear of contradiction (Gunew 1999)—this ambiguity has proven a puzzle in theorizing multiculturalism (Willett 1998). Consider the range of models that fall under the sway of multiculturalism (Fish 1997; Sandercock 2003):

• Conservative models subscribe to the principles of a culture-blind multiculturalism. Proposed is a well-intentioned view of everyone as equal before the law and entitled to similar treatment regardless of who they are. No one should be denied or excluded because of their culture or colour according to his line of thinking; by the same token no one should be given special treatment because of their difference. For a conservative model of multiculturalism, then, a society of many cultures is possible as long as cultural differences are rejected as grounds for recognition and reward.

• Stronger models point to a liberal multiculturalism, with its lukewarm endorsement of diversity but more explicit commitment to integration, institutional inclusiveness, and liberal universalism (Sen 2006; also Kymlicka 2008). To the extent that cultural difference are tolerated under a liberal multiculturalism, support is largely superficial or in the abstract. Differences are ‘ok’, but only if they comply with mainstream values, are not used as a basis for reward or recognition, do not block the rights of others because such intolerance is intolerable in a tolerant democracy, and provided that everyone “agrees to disagree” by being different in the same way. Under this model, differences are permissible but only in private, so as to maintain a strict neutrality in public domains (Neill and Schwedler 2007). For this model, multiculturalism represents a belief that a society of many cultures is possible as long as people’s difference do not get in the way of full participation and equal treatment.

• Even stronger versions include more critically oriented models of multiculturalism. This model acknowledges a key paradox: The application of similar treatment to unequal contexts may well have the effect of perpetuating patterns of inequality. To overcome the tyranny of standardization at institutional levels, cultural differences may have to be incorporated for attainment of a genuine (rather than just formal) equality. To level the playing field, group-differentiated temporary measures may be established that address the specific needs of the historically disadvantaged. According to this diversity-friendly multicultural model, a society of many cultures is possible as long as people are treated similarly as a matter of course, yet treated differently by taking into account their differences when necessary for true equality.

• Finally, robust models of multiculturalism endorse a no-holds barred allegiance to radical diversity. Insofar as all cultures are fundamentally different yet of equal worth and value, differences must be taken seriously under this radical multiculturalism, even if these differences result in different group rights, differential citizenship, separate institutional development, and hermetically sealed communities. In going beyond simply stating respect for diversity, the state may have to actively intervene to protect and promote endangered cultural communities. Accordingly, a society of many cultures is possible if differences are taken seriously- up to and including separate communities - as a basis for living together as fundamentally different yet staunchly equal. It remains to be seen if any society can be constructed around a radical relativism that recognizes the value of all cultures in the public realm (Uitermark et al 2005): Survival at best would be provocative; Darwinian at worst.

In short, expressions of multiculturalism span a spectrum of meanings, implications, and scenarios. But while competing models make it difficult to theorize multiculturalism, certain themes can be discerned. References to multiculturalism include a general package of beliefs, including a perception that a society of many cultures is (a) better than a monoculturalism, (b) preferred over assimilation as policy alternative, and (c) possible as long as certain ground rules for managing diversity are in place. By challenging society to move over and make space without losing the interconnectedness that binds and connects, multiculturalism indeed represents a bold if somewhat undertheorized social contract in advancing the goal of living together differently. Not surprisingly, the concept of multiculturalism remains poorly theorized because of competing discourses and hidden agendas as the following questions demonstrate:

1 Is multiculturalism about promoting culture-conscious pluralism (“differences”) or culture-blind participation (“similarities”) as a solution to the problem of equality and inclusion? Does equality arise from ignoring differences and treating everyone the same or, by recognizing differences and treating people differently when required (UNDP 2004)? Does multicultural equality reflect a commitment to treat everyone the same as a matter of course yet also to treat people differently when the situation arises?

2 Is multiculturalism about society-in-diversity or diversity-in- society? Does a multiculturalism endorse a particular vision of the good society by asking how much diversity can be incorporated within the limits of this vision? Or does multiculturalism accept the legitimacy and desirability of cultural diversity as a priority, then re-design the good society accordingly (Sandercock 2003)?

4. Is multiculturalism about diversity (culture) or disadvantage (equality)? Does multiculturalism celebrate differences as ends in themselves? Or does it emphasize the removal of discriminatory barriers to enhance participation for those whose cultural differences are disadvantaging? Or should multiculturalism be concerned primarily with advancing national interests by putting diversity to work on Canada’s behalf (Granastein 2007)?

5 Is multiculturalism a radical policy departure (‘a new wine in old bottles’) or more of the same with fancier labels (‘old wine in new bottles’)? Does multiculturalism involve a new normative framework for integrating minorities into society on more equitable terms (Kymlicka 2005)? Or is multiculturalism a kind of assimilation but in slow motion? How do we reconcile a multiculturalism articulated by academics and policy makers with the everyday subjective experiences forged in neighborhoods, workplaces, and social interaction (Levine-Rasky 2006)?

6. To what extent is multiculturalism more than it admits (a wolf in sheep clothing) or less than it promises (a sheep in wolf’s clothing)? Is it program full of sound and fury, but signifying nothing. Or is the revolutionary import of multiculturalism yet to be played out (Fleras and Elliott 2007)?

7 Is multiculturalism wielded as an excuse to trample on individual rights? Will multiculturalism - in the name of tolerance and cultural freedom - embrace an androcentric tendency to condone practices that compromise gender equity rights (Stein 2007)? Can a multicultural society accommodate and respect different ways of life without violating individual rights (Campbell 2005) or compromising the common values for unifying a society (Cardozo 2005)?

8. Is multiculturalism about universality or particularity? Individual or collective (group) rights? Is it about the right of individuals to affiliate with the culture of their choice, or is it about coexistence of cultural communities (without which individual rights could not be expressed( (Gagnon and Iacovino 2007)? Does a multicultural society endorse the universality principle that what we have in common as rights-bearing individuals is more important – at least for purposes of renewal and recognition - than what divides us into culturally distinct groups? Or does multiculturalism reject the universality of liberalism by emphasizing the primacy of group-differentiated rights as basis for belonging?

9 Is multiculturalism about ‘us’ or ‘them’? Is it about inclusion or exclusion? Should multiculturalism focus on addressing the concerns of minority women and men? Or should multiculturalism attend to changing mainstream mindsets and institutional structures in hopes of removing the prejudicial and discriminatory barriers that preclude minority integration?

10 Can multiculturalism address deep differences such as those posed by national minorities and indigenous peoples (Maaka and Fleras 2005)? Is multiculturalism pushed to the brink when visible and faith-based immigrants profess a pan-national commitment to a Law that transcends the laws of the nation-state (Hage 2006)?

11 Where do we draw the line in terms of what is acceptable in a multicultural society? Can intolerance be tolerated by a tolerant multiculturalism, especially if the intolerant prefer to disagree with the principal of agreeing to disagree? How compatible are the national and the multicultural as competing social contracts for living together differently?

12. To what extent Is multiculturalism an end or a means? Should multiculturalism be treated as an end in its own right, namely, the construction of a society of many cultures through the integration of migrants and minorities (‘an integrative model of multiculturalism’)? Or should multiculturalism be seen as a means that guides thinking about integrating diversity along more equitable and culturally responsive grounds (‘a multicultural model of integration’)? By acknowledging the burden of change on both minorities and host community, how, then, does an inclusive multiculturalism bring about a two-way pattern of integration– you adjust/we adapt (“integrative multiculturalism)” + you adapt/we adjust (“multicultural integration”)?

To the extent that no consensus prevails, disagreements persist. As a social contract for living together differently, multiculturalism furnishes a blueprint for facilitating a more equitable integration of minorities (Kymlicka 2005). Yet agreement falters over its role in promoting integration, its capacity to foster or obstruct the integration process, and how much each side must concede as part of the contractual agreement (Jedwab 2005; Mondo 2006). Responses will vary depending on (a) the frame of reference (official multiculturalism versus popular multiculturalism), (b) distinguishing the general (multiculturalism as the informal, the interpersonal, the contextual) from the specific (Multiculturalism as the formal, the official, the principled), (c) the level of analysis (micro versus macro), (d) a proposed vision of multicultural society (mosaic or orbit or kaleidoscope), and (e) the contribution of minorities in achieving this vision (positive or negative). To date, countries like Canada have advanced a vision of society in which differences are seen as legitimate and integral without undermining the integrity and connectedness of the whole. Time will tell if these ‘success’ stories can absorb the more politicized demands of the 21st century.

Canada’s Multiculturalism Model:

The Politics of De-politicizing Diversity

Based on the dual ideals of peace and multiculturalism, Canada is one of mankind’s greatest achievements. It is comparable to the notable civilizations of the past, and indeed exceeds most of them in terms of stability, living standards, and civil liberties (Cowen 1999).

Canada represents one of several democratic societies to have capitalized on the principles of multiculturalism as a principled basis for multicultural governance. As policy and philosophy, Multiculturalism originated as part of a broader process of liberalization during the 1970s, including feminism and human rights, all of which sought to remove inherited forms of inequality through initiatives for inclusion (Kymlicka 2007). In hopes of harmonizing competing ethnicities without losing control of the overall agenda, Canada’s official Multiculturalism persists precisely for the same reason, in addition to political, ideological, and economic considerations involving state functions, private interests, and electoral survival. Multiculturalism also bolsters Canada’s reputation as a pacesetter for managing diversity as different yet equal, without eroding national unity in the process. But appearances are deceiving and, when it comes to the art of managing diversity, things are rarely what they seem to be.

Multiculturalism in a Nutshell

A commitment to multiculturalism has contributed to Canada’s progressive image. Some measure of proof is gleaned from accolades of high flying personalities, including Bono of U2 who claims the world ‘needs more Canadas’ or the Aga Khan who extols Canada as the most ‘successful pluralist society’ in the world (see Biles et al. 2005: 25). Canada’s lofty status as an enlightened multicultural society with an enviable standard of living is further confirmed by several UN panels (UNDP 2004). Finally, Canadians themselves seem to express more positive attitudes toward immigration and multicultural diversity, while taking pride in Canada’s reputation as an open and inclusive society (Biles et al 2005). As we shall see, however, Canadians are better at ‘talking the walk’ rather than ‘walking the talk’.

Any theorizing of multiculturalism in Canada must begin by acknowledging at least four different levels of meaning – multiculturalism as population; multiculturalism as philosophy; multiculturalism as policy; and multiculturalism as practice (Fleras 2002). Few Canadians have difficulty in equating multiculturalism with demographic diversity and an empirical reality across urban Canada with visibilized (“racialized”) minorities accounting for 13.4 percent of the 2001 population. Much more contentious are notions of multiculturalism as philosophy with respect to ongoing debates for balancing minority rights with the national interests of a multicultural society. Equally contentious is the link between philosophical ideals and official policy - a relationship that is often fraught with ambiguity and conflict because what sounds good in theory may prove neither implementable nor workable. That an official Multicultural policy has proven a government mainstay since 1971 reflects one level of theorizing. That this policy has shifted over time - from a focus on ethnicity to that of equity to a civic-oriented emphasis on belonging and participation - reflects yet another level of theorization. Finally, in acknowledging the convergence of policy and philosophy at a grounded level, multiculturalism as practice refers to its application by politicians and minority leaders across a broad range of activities.

Canada’s Multicultural model embraces a society-building agenda. Together with the Official Languages Act in 1969 and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1985, multiculturalism represented the remaining piece of the puzzle for constructing a distinctive yet unified Canada grounded on a universal basis of identity and belonging (Gagnon and Iacovino 2007). In retrospect, inception of an official multiculturalism challenged conventional political wisdom, namely, that diversity was incompatible with good governance because of perceived difficulties in forging unity from a mix of ethnicities. By contrast, an official Multiculturalism was predicated on an entirely different premise, namely, that a society of many cultures was possible as long as a principled (rules-based) normative framework prevailed for managing diversity. In taking this calculated gamble for governing an ethnically diverse Canada, an official Multiculturalism parlayed a potential weakness into an unanticipated strength without sacrificing a commitment to social cohesion, national identity, domestic peace, economic advantage, and the status quo. (It should be noted that there is another official multiculturalism in Canada: Quebec’s model of interculturalism (Gagnon and Iavcovino 2007). Despite a common commitment to integration (Nugent 2006), each multiculturalism model embodies distinct nationalistic/nation-building projects. Canada’s model is aimed at negating a conception of universal citizenship based on national diversity, whereas Quebec’s model aims at articulating a distinct political community with a collective cultural life to which immigrants must subscribe as part of the social (‘moral’) contract.

The ethos of Canada’s Multiculturalism is unmistakably inclusionary (Kymlicka 2007). This multicultural ethos reinforces a commitment to integration through promotion of social justice, identity, and civic participation, primarily fostering tolerance toward diversity, protecting a culture of rights, reducing prejudice, removing discriminatory barriers, eliminating cultural ethnocentrism, enhancing equitable access to services, expanding institutional inclusion, improving creative intergroup encounters and highlighting citizenship (see Chan 2005; also Duncan 2005). As the editors of Spring 2006 issue of the journal Canadian Diversity put it:

Canadian multiculturalism is fundamental to our belief that all citizens are equal. Multiculturalism ensures that all citizens can keep their identities, can take pride in their ancestry, and have a sense of belonging. Acceptance gives Canadians a feeling of security and self confidence, making them more open to, and accepting of, diverse cultures. The Canadian experience has shown that multiculturalism encourages racial and ethnic harmony and cross-cultural understanding, and discourages ghettoization, hatred, discrimination, and violence. Through multiculturalism, Canada recognizes the potential of all Canadians, encouraging them to integrate into their society and take an active part in its social, cultural, economic, and political affairs.

The logic behind an inclusive multiculturalism is implicitly integrative and depoliticized: to draw people into Canada’s existing framework rather than transformative in outlook or process. The disruptiveness of diversity is depoliticized by the simple expedient of either institutionalizing differences or privatizing ethnicity. Compare the logic of an integrative model with the rationale of a critical multiculturalism. According to this model, group differences and identity claims are politicized by challenging the prevailing distribution of social power. Thus, while critical multiculturalisms often focus on group-based rights with an emphasis on the politics of recognition and identity politics, an official Multiculturalism is largely integrative and liberal by securing individual rights of choice for securing an inclusive and equitable society (Fleras 2005).

Putting Multiculturalism to the Reality Test

An official Multiculturalism may well prove Canada’s lasting contribution to world peace. But this lofty reputation (some of it deserved, some not) has not necessarily contributed to internal consistencies. Multiculturalism policy discourses reflect a fundamental paradox: To one side is the belief that a Canada of many cultures is possible as long as peoples cultural differences do not get in the way of full and equal participation in society. Cultural differences are largely irrelevant under a liberal multiculturalism since true equality and inclusion arises from treating everyone equally the same regardless of their differences. To the other side is a belief that a Canada of many cultures is possible when differences are taken into account. Rather than ignoring differences, true equality and inclusion arises from incorporating them into public policy processes and outcomes. The politics of this paradox not only animates the dynamics of Canada’s official multiculturalism. It also generates both confusion and uncertainty, with the result that following fallacies continue to (mis)inform people’s understanding:

Fallacy No 1 – Multiculturalism as Visionary Ideal?

The governing apparatus of the Canadian state has long relied on multiculturalism to fulfill a variety of legitimating functions involving national unity, economic prosperity, and electoral survival (Fleras 2002). Multiculturalism originated in 1971 as part of an all-party agreement in Parliament, acquired constitutional recognition in 1982, and received royal assent with passage of the Multiculturalism Act in 1988. Inception of an official multiculturalism hoped to formulate a new founding myth of Canada as a land of opportunity and equality, thus uniting all Canadians at a time of political turmoil without promising any fundamental redistribution of power (Helly 1993). Introduction of multiculturalism sought to shore up electoral strength in urban Ontario, to counterbalance Western resentment over perceived favouritism toward the Québécois, to alleviate mounting public pressure over the introduction of official bilingualism, to neutralize Quebec nationalism, and to pre-empt the encroachment of American cultural values by erecting a multicultural firewall (Wood and Gilbert 2005).

In short, inception of multiculturalism reflects a degree of political opportunism rather than any long term vision or clearly articulated theory. Canada’s official Multiculturalism did not emerge because of compassion or principle. Instead of a courageous social experiment devised by well meaning liberals, Multiculturalism originated primarily as the political outcome of ongoing political struggles: That is, a political program to achieve political goals in a politically astute manner (Peter 1978; Wood and Gilbert 2005; also Modood and Werbner 1997). That critics say it persists for the same reasons – the control of ‘unruly ethnics by ruling elites’ – makes it doubly important to concede the power of impression management in fostering the illusion of change. [It is possible to overstate the political dimensions: the fact that Trudeau rarely (if ever) mentioned the word multiculturalism again after October 8, 1971 suggests that its largely accidental origins retrospectively assumed larger-than-life proportions as time went on].

Nor should we ignore the role of ‘luck’. Multiculturalism was fortuitously timed when the vast majority of immigrants from Europe were willing to comply with a liberal values and rights based framework (Granastein 2007). With evolving immigration patterns, multiculturalism evolved into a stop-gap measure that proved to have luck on its side. Canada was transformed from a white colony to a cosmopolitan society, but without experiencing major disruptions. In that one should never confuse quiescence with acquiescence, our smugness or complacency may yet prove Canada’s Achilles heel: One major incident is all it takes to rip the scab off the polite fictions of tolerance that often mask patterns of indifference at best, bigotry at worst. Multicultural soul searching, yes, but only when the conflict simmering below the surface erupts into a fully fledged crisis. Finally, Canada’s luck may lie in its geography. By making it difficult for the poor from Africa or the Middle East to migrate, the luxury of distance allows Canada to select who they want and how many, in effect reinforcing public perception of diversity as working for – rather than against - Canadians.

Fallacy No 2- Multiculturalism is about celebrating differences?

Multiculturalism does not set out to celebrate differences per se. To the contrary, Canada’s official multiculturalism wants to depoliticize these cultural differences by channelling potentially troublesome conflicts into relatively harmless avenues around identity or folklore. Differences are further depoliticized (or ‘neutered’) by treating all differences as the same, by circumscribing the outer limit of permissable differences, and by stripping culturally diverse symbols from public places. Diversity is endorsed, but only to the extent that all differences are equivalent in status, subject to similar treatment, and comply with laws and core values, and recognize Canada’s self-proclaimed right to define what differences count and what counts as difference (see Johnson 1994).

Clearly, then, Canada’s Multiculturalism rejects a mindless (or radical) relativism in which “anything goes” because of a misplaced tolerance or political correctness. A commitment to Multiculturalism rejects any customs that violate Canadian laws, interferes with the rights of others, offends the moral sensibilities of mainstream Canadians, or encroaches on core constitutional values. Additional restrictions include the overarching constraints of proficiency in one of the two official bilingualism; respect for liberal democratic rights, constitutional principles of rights and equality; and inter-ethnic cooperation rather than separation. Surveys also confirm what many suspect: Canadians overwhelmingly endorse a belief that immigrants should integrate into Canada, including adopting mainstream beliefs and values pertaining to gender equality. The historian J L Granastein (2007:180) puts it aptly if harshly when he claims:

We need to make it clear to those we choose to admit to Canada that we are a national with national interests, that we are a formed society with values and ways of governing ourselves…and that, if they wish to come here to join our national project, they must accept these facts of life.

Fallacy No 3 –It’s about promoting ethnic communities and collective rights?

In some contexts, multiculturalism endorses a kind of ‘tribalism’ whereby different racial and ethnic groups are encouraged to maintain their group differences despite living in a new country (Jacobs 2004; Friesen 2005; Mondo 2006). But Canada’s inclusive Multiculturalism is firmly rooted in the principle of liberal universalism rather than the particularism of group differentiated rights. Trudeau - who many regard as the architect of multiculturalism - rejected the notion of the nation-state based on emotive ethnic ethos proposing, instead, a more juridicial state based on reason, individuals, and universalism (Gagnon and Iacovino 2007). According to this line of thinking, those commonalities we share as morally autonomous individuals are more important – at least for purposes of recognition or reward - than group membership in hermetically sealed ethnic communities (Breton 2001). By contrast, Canada’s liberal Multiculturalism does not promote ethnic communities or minority group rights. If they so choose (and within limits), the right of individuals to affiliate with the culture or community is tolerated. To the extent that group or collective rights are recognized, they are of temporary nature to address socioeconomic disparities or a residual category derived from the rights of individuals (see Kymlicka 2008).

Fallacy No 4 - Multiculturalism as Transformative Change?

Multicultural discourses exist that challenge, resist, and transform rather than advocate consensus, conformity, and control. These discursive frameworks question the authority and legitimacy of the status quo by contesting the prevailing distribution of power and privilege. But while critical multicultural discourses exist in Canada (Thobani 2000; 2007), generally speaking, Canada subscribes to the principles of an inclusive Multiculturalism, with its emphasis on consensus, conformity, and control. Attainment of these multicultural goals is varied, but generally includes fostering tolerance toward diversity, reducing prejudice, removing discriminatory barriers, eliminating cultural ethnocentrism, enhancing equitable access to services, expanding institutional engagement, and improving intergroup encounters. The rationale behind an official multiculturalism is non-transformative but focused on integrating people into the existing institutional framework. The potential disruptiveness of diversity is depoliticized by the simple expedient of institutionalizing differences or privatizing them. Far from being a threat to the social order, in other words, Canada’s official Multiculturalism constitutes a discourse in defence of dominant ideology. Depending on where one stands on the political spectrum, this discursive framework is cause for concern or contentment.

Fallacy No 5 – Multiculturalism is about the “other’?

Many assume that Multiculturalism is about the ‘them’ not the ‘us’. Such a perception is so widespread that by the mid 1990s the Canadian government reconfigured its multicultural program to emphasize the ‘we.’ But the logic behind an inclusive Multiculturalism is largely about the ‘us’ - at the mainstream rather than at minorities. After all, if the goal of Multiculturalism is improve inclusiveness by removing disadvantages because of race or culture, emphasis will focus on those who create the barriers that preclude visibilized minorities from full institutional involvement. In that Multiculturalism can be envisaged as device to improve the social climate by ensuring the elimination of prejudice and discrimination from the public sphere, its existence says more about the “us” than the “other”.

Fallacy No 6- Canadians are gung-ho over Multiculturalism?

Official Multiculturalism is unevenly supported across Canada (Duncan 2005). Residents of Ontario and Western Canada appear receptive, but the Québécois and Aboriginal Peoples reject an official multiculturalism as irrelevant or counterproductive (Ignace and Ignace 1998; Breton 2000; Kymlicka 2001; Baubock 2005; Gagnon and Iacovino 2007)). Instead of self-defining themselves as immigrants in need of integration and equality, these ‘nations within’ prefer the language of nationalism over that of multiculturalism when justifying claims to self-determining autonomy over jurisdictions of land, identity, and political voice (Murphy 2004; Maaka and Fleras 2005). Not surprisingly, with its roots in consensus, conformity, and control, an inclusive multiculturalism cannot possibly cope with the highly politicized discourses and demands of fundamentally autonomous political communities who claim sovereignty in their own right yet sharing in the sovereignty of Canada.

Outside of Quebec and Aboriginal Nations, public support for official multiculturalism is ‘soft’. Some Canadians are vigorously supportive; others are in total rejection or denial; still others are confused; and yet others are plainly uninformed or indifferent (see Musto 1997; Cameron 2004). On too many occasions, multiculturalism is made the scapegoat for conflicts that would have flourished regardless (Siddiqui 2007) – suggesting multiculturalism as a proxy for something more sinister, as noted by Kymlicka (2007):

Too often these debates have been initiated by right-wing commentators as thinly disguised strategies for attacking immigrants, particularly Muslims, often accompanied by apocalyptic predictions about how Canada’s experiment in multiculturalism is on the verge of collapse.”

Not surprisingly, the majority of Canadians appear to be caught somewhere in between, depending on their reading of multiculturalism and its contribution (or lack thereof) to Canadian society. Variables such as age, income, levels of education, and place of residence are critical in gauging support, with higher levels of approval among the younger, more affluent, better educated, and urban (Anderssen and Valpy 2003). True, national surveys on multiculturalism suggest a solid base of support often in the 60 to 70 percent range (Angus Reid 1991; Berry 1993; Musto 1997; ACS/Environics 2002; Jedwab 2005). However impressive on paper, in that most Canadians are unsure of what Canada’s official Multiculturalism is trying to do, and why, their commitment may prove more brittle than many imagined.

Fallacy no7 - Multiculturalism is Criticism-Proof

Multiculturalism is rarely criticized in public. Politicians fear losing minority votes, Canadians fear being labeled racist because of misplaced political correctness, and many feel its impolite (and impolitic) to criticize those less fortunate. Others are less reluctant, and pounce on Multiculturalism regardless of what it does or doesn’t do. Multiculturalism stands accused of being too radical or too reactionary, of being progressively inclusive yet regressively exclusionary, of promoting too much or not enough change, of promising more than it can deliver (a sheep in wolf’s clothing) or delivering more than bargained for (a wolf in sheep’s clothing). Critics on the right repudiate multiculturalism as a costly drain of resources that runs the risk of eroding national unity or inviting terrorism. Those on the left have vilified multiculturalism as ineffective except as a mantra for politicians and industry leaders to trot out for publicity purposes. As a capitalist hoax to divide and distract the working classes, minorities are ghettoized into occupational structures and residential arrangements, thereby preserving the prevailing distribution of power and wealth behind a smokescreen of well-oiled platitudes (Dei 2000; Bannerji 2000; Uitermark et al 2005). Moderates are unsure of where they stand. Official multiculturalism may sound good in theory, but implementation difficult because of the ‘slippages’ between rhetoric and reality – thus making it difficult to determine what it is that people dislike about multiculturalism – the principle of multiculturalism or government policy or its practices at political and minority level?

Fallacy No 8 – Assessing Multiculturalism: the Good, the Bad or the Ugly?

In its role as the self-appointed catalyst for social engineering, multiculturalism has attracted its share of criticism. But critics run the risk of simplifying, essentializing, and reifying Multiculturalism by associating it with accentuating differences, intensifying antagonisms, dividing races and nationalities, and fostering separate ethnic enclaves (Granastein 2007 Uitermark et al 2005). True, Canada’s Multiculturalism may be guilty by association with negative indicators, but let’s stand the criticisms on their head. To one side, multiculturalism may be divisive by undermining Canadian unity and identity. Yet it is unmistakably unifying by creating a blueprint for an inclusive Canada. To one side, multiculturalism may be seen as regressive in ghettoizing or stigmatizing minorities. Yet it has proven progressive in reversing discrimination by bringing minority interests into the mainstream. To one side, multiculturalism is criticized for not taking differences seriously because of preference for a pretend pluralism. Yet multiculturalism provides a social climate that not only makes racism socially unacceptable, but also facilitates integration and settlement. And finally, multiculturalism may be accused of being a symbol without substance—a frivolous diversion with no staying power to challenge or transform. Yet multiculturalism has presided over a radical remaking of Canada from an exclusionary monoculture to an inclusive society of many cultures and colours.

In short, Canada’s official multiculturalism is double-edged in impact and implications. The positive and negative interplay dialectically: On the one hand, the benefits of multiculturalism cannot be discounted, thus reflecting the ability of the powerless and dispossessed to convert the very tools for controlling them into levers of resistance and change (Pearson 1994). On the other hand, recourse to official Multiculturalism can de-politicize (‘neuter’) the potency of diversity by channelling it into the private or personal. In that evaluating multiculturalism is not simply a case of either/ or, but of both/ and, a sense of proportion is required: The impact of Official Multiculturalism is neither all good nor all bad but either good or bad, depending on context, criteria, and consequences. Because benefits invariably accompany costs, multiculturalism can be both good and bad simultaneously, both liberating yet marginalizing, unifying yet divisive, inclusive yet exclusive. Multiculturalism is neither the root of all Canada’s social evils nor the all-encompassing solution to problems that rightfully belong elsewhere. It is but one component—however imperfect—for Canada-building by balancing the push of diversity with the pull of unity without losing sight of the bigger picture.

To sum up: Canada’s worldwide reputation as a beacon of tolerance in an intolerant world is partly deserved. The fact that Canada has escaped much of the ethnic strife that currently convulses many countries speaks well of its stature in proactively managing diversity. The majority of Canadians, especially the younger and the well-educated, are relatively open to diversity and proud of Canada’s multicultural model. The model itself is tri-dimensional: the principle of social justice (to reduce disadvantage through removal of discriminatory barriers and prejudicial mindsets), the principle of cultural identity (the right to cultural identity but within the framework of creative interaction and Canadian values and law; and the principle of national interests (Canada building through inclusiveness, participation, and citizenship. But even whole-hearted support and international admiration is no excuse for glossing over imperfections and weaknesses (Belkhodja et al 2006). Everyone agrees that there are enough loopholes in Canada’s Multicultural model to dishearten even the most optimistic. Few would deny its vulnerability to manipulation by politicians and minority leaders who see multiculturalism as a platform for putting diversity on display rather than ‘erasing’ racism and inequality. And when carelessly bandied about, fewer still would dismiss its potential to deter, divide, distract, or diminish.

Multicultural Discourses in Europe:

Laissez-faire Multiculturalism or Plural Monoculturalism?

With the hardening of European arteries toward immigration and the Islamic ‘other’, the politics of multiculturalism have catapulted to forefront of 21st century challenges (Morphet 2007; Goodspeed 2006). This provocation is animated by several trends: The break with colonial ties, the opening of eastern European states, the labour markets of an ageing society, increasingly porous borders, the politics of fear, the playing of the security card to suppress minority rights, and futility of curbing undocumented asylum seekers. A role reversal –from emigrant to immigrant - has contributed to the disruption: If Europe was once an exporter of people to Canada and Australia, the status is now reversed. Rather than creating ethnic diversity for other countries, Europe’s main cities are now hosts to diversity and sites of multicultural discourses, even if the creation of tolerant urban regions remains a difficult work in progress..

Intense scrutiny informs Europe’s multiculturalism politics. Multiculturalism may have reigned supreme in Europe for addressing xenophobia and intolerance, but no more, and the multicultural consensus has proven much more fragile than many would have imagined – more of a fatal attraction instead of an empowering solution. Multiculturalism appears to have abdicated its legitimacy and public saliency for policy making to accommodate post War migrants, in part because multicultural discourses rarely addressed the expectations associated with the normative rhetoric that initially launched them (Koopman’s et al 2006). Perverted by a hidden political agenda, European liberals find themselves in an untenable position - not because of excessive tolerance - but because of indifference or uncertainty over how to tackle objectionable ethnic practices, averting their eyes, and then reacting to racists on their terms (Siddiqui 2002). As a result, policies and ideologies that once embraced multicultural coexistence are now dismissed as irrelevant or inferior, a failure or a threat. In the aftermath of 9/11, the Madrid and London bombings, together with the grisly murder of Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh, multiculturalism is blamed (scapegoated) for everything, from terrorist attacks to cultural separatism, from political fragmentation to social ghettoization. Or as Christian Joppke (2007) warns, what multicultural policy to accommodate diversity and foster integration could possibly have averted the tragedies in London or Madrid?

Generally speaking, the prophets of multicultural doom fall into two camps. First, the backlash against multiculturalism functions as a code (or proxy) for expressing hostility toward unwanted immigrants and unsustainable immigration patterns (Joppke 2007). Too much of what passes for immigration in many European countries involves an ill-conceived and mismanaged guest worker program or, alternatively, the patriation of former colonials subjects (Bader 2005). The fact that most European countries do not see themselves as immigration societies – preferring instead to define migrants as a ‘necessary encumbrance’ - not only reinforces the fragility of multiculturalism as accommodation. Failure to create a framework for admission also produces a pool of migrants whose perceived status as illegal, illiberal, and ill-equipped is not without consequences. The relatively easy movement of individuals across borders exerts additional pressure to play the security card against perceived threats to national identity and social cohesion. On the assumption that some minorities are disloyal and need to be carefully monitored and/or controlled, their treatment becomes inextricably linked with questions over national security; after all, before the state can negotiate multicultural rights, it must first secure its existence (Kymlicka 2008). In reaction to perceptions that immigrants were pampered by rights without obligations, multicultural models of integration have shifted accordingly, namely, from a pragmatic plural approach to a more principled assimilationist framework (de Hart 2007). As proof? The popularity of so-called ‘integration’ programs that obligate newcomers to enrol in language and civic courses on (or before) arrival (see Appendix).

Second, the politics of managing diversity in Europe reflects a plural interpretation of multiculturalism. At the core of this plural multiculturalism is an unswerving commitment to radical relativism. According to Melanie Phillips in her book Londonistan, this doctrine holds that all minority cultures are of equal status and worth so that any attempt to impose majority standards is by definition racist. A multiculturalism emerges that explicitly recognizes and financially supports migrants as distinct and segregated ethnic groups with parallel lives (Koopman’s et al 2006). However well-intentioned and intellectually laudable, this plural monoculturalism (or perhaps a monocultural pluralism?) allowed immigrant communities to remain relatively isolated under the benign gaze of their adopted country. The dangers of this laissez-faire multiculturalism was captured by Trevor Phillips, chair of Britain’s Commission for Racial Equality when he contends “We focused far too much on the ‘multi’ and not enough on the common culture” – thereby allowing tolerance to solidify into isolation rather than shared common values. In that immigrants were rarely seen as potential permanent residents, but rather as temporary labourers who would eventually return upon completion of their work status, are references to cultural apartheid that farfetched?

In short, Europe’s embrace of multiculturalism was predicated on a separatist logic known as a plural society. According to the principle of ‘pluralism’, society can be divided into self contained groups, often reflecting a national division of labour, with interaction restricted largely to the marketplace, and social frameworks devised to govern interaction and secure legitimacy (Furnival 1948; Smith 1965). But as Naomi Klein writes in the summer 2005 issue of the Nation, equating pluralism with multiculturalism is a misnomer. European style pluralism has little to do with inclusion or equality, but everything to do with an arrangement between politicians and community leaders for pigeon-holing ethnic minorities into state funded peripheral ghettoes. Lip service to multicultural ideals are dutifully deployed, but without ever abandoning the privileged position of the dominant sector, while centres of public life remain blissfully oblivious to the changes around them (Scheffler 2007).

The consequences of this miscalculation have proven costly. Multiculturalism emerged as a default option once Europeans were reconciled to the fact that guest workers were increasingly concentrated in urban ‘slums’ (Neill and Schwedler 2007). The segregation of differences not only disengaged immigrants from full and equal citizenship rights (Joppke 2007). It also culminated in a diminished view of society as little more than a visionless coexistence of mutually exclusive groups in relative isolatation from each other except for interaction in the marketplace. A plural monoculturalism was consistent with and an extension of Holland’s pillar system – Protestant, Catholic, and Socialist with people living and worshipping within their own institutionally complete and state-funded ‘silos’. Minorities were encouraged to retain their cultural and language skills for readjustment upon return to their home countries. For example, children in Dutch schools learned Turkish or Berber in primary schools, while many lived in ethnic enclaves that encouraged an inward looking isolation rather than creative encounters. But an uncritical live-and-let-live indifference exposes the soft underbelly of multicultural tolerance, as Bruce Bawer writes in the Partisan Review:

The Dutch, perhaps the most liberal people on the planet, have finally faced a critically important fact: that there is nothing at all liberal about allowing one’s reluctance to criticize another’s religion to trump one’s dedication to individual liberty, human dignity, and equal rights. Tolerance for intolerance is no tolerance at all.

Without an overarching vision for living together differently, the social and economic integration of migrants and minorities stalled. The benign neglect of immigrant communities was justified on the grounds that European countries did not see themselves as immigrant societies; therefore, they had minimal responsibility to actively integrate immigrants (guest workers) into the social and political fabric. Worse still, far too many immigrants found themselves marginalized as an underclass status because of this unofficial cultural apartheid. National ideologies about multiculturalism may have reinforced myths about the presumed tolerance of the majority public, but it also glossed over the harsh realities of migrant poverty and disempowerment (Koopmans et al 2006). For instance, Muslims in Britain have three times the unemployment rates of the population as a whole, including 16 percent who have never worked or are among the long term unemployed. Rootless and restive, alienated from their communities and shunned by society, young Muslims (that Time magazine in its October 3, 2005 refers to as Generation Jihad) have increasingly embraced religious extremism – further reinforcing public fears that a bankrupt multiculturalism spawned radical spaces for dismantling Europe’s liberal-democratic project. To growing dismay, many young European Muslims express greater alienation from the country they live in than do/did their parents (Ash 2006). Another study by the Pew Research Centre found that one in four younger Muslims in the US believe suicide bombings are justified, although nearly 80 of American Muslims – mainstream, moderate, and middle class - percent reject the legitimacy of such actions (Trounsen 2007). Not surprisingly, many interpret the anti immigration/multiculturalism backlash as a code or subtext for Islamophobia, prompted by fears of jihadist terrorism, clash of cultural values, or ‘influx’ of Muslim migrants.

Explaining the Difference:

Multicultural Inclusiveness vs Plural Exclusion

One of the more vexing shibboleths of the 21st century is the much trumpeted death-knell of multiculturalism. In the ‘security-conscious’ post ‘9/11’ era, the politics of multiculturalism have leapt into prominence in debating multicultural governance, with some saying yes, others insisting on no, and still others maybe (or confused or indifferent). Pundits of varying political stripes have declared that, in outlasting its usefulness, multiculturalism is dying or in retreat, in part because of the encounter with Muslims (Hage 2006). And good riddance too, according to critics. To one side are the perceived excesses associated with campus speech codes, compulsory sensitivity training, the expunging of dead white male authors from course curricula, and ruined careers because of frivolous charges of racism or sexism. To the other side is the proliferation of tribally-inspired identity politics, whose cumulative impact induces a splintered society of inward-looking out-groups. Thankfully, critics conclude, a yearning for national solidarity and a singularity of citizenship has discredited this mis-adventure called multiculturalism, while resuscitating President Kennedy’s clarion call to the common good: “Ask not what your country can do for you, but what you can do for your country”.

But there is a major exception to this trend: Canada. While some Canadians contend that multiculturalism doesn’t work because too little is expected of new immigrants who don’t share Canadian values, there is no sign of backlash or backpedalling. To the contrary, multiculturalism has evolved into such a national icon that few political leaders dare challenge it – even during election years when playing the multiculturalism card if deftly deployed could reap electoral dividends. Even reaction to the news that 17 alleged terrorists were caught planning destruction in Toronto and Ottawa in June 2006 proved strangely muted, thanks to a media reluctance to publicize their Islamicist connections. Counter-intuitively, perhaps, but this ‘crisis’ appears to have had a galvanizing effect in reinforcing Canada’s commitment to multiculturalism, according to a poll of 1000 respondents taken June 7th and 8th by the Strategic Counsel for the Globe and Mail and CTV news. Or consider the defiant stand of Prime Minister Harper in reaction to the ‘terror scare’

It [the arrests] has led some to some commentary to the effect of Canada’s open and culturally diverse society makes us a more vulnerable target for terrorist activity. I believe that exactly the opposite is true. Canada’s diversity, properly nurtured, is our great strength (Third World Urban Forum, Vancouver, June 2006)

Another a survey by the Centre for Research and Information on Canada also confirmed what many had suspected:Canadians value multiculturalism as a defining characteristic of Canada, while substantial majorities link immigration with a host of positive social and cultural advantages (Jedwab 2006).

The conclusion seems inescapable. Europe’s love affair with multiculturalism may be dissipating, but Canada remains relatively impervious to criticism or backlash, with a continued groundswell of support for immigrants and immigration. How do we account for differences? Why is Canada seemingly immune to calls for retrenchment, whereas European jurisdictions are encircling the proverbial wagon against what they see as excessive (read, Muslim) immigration and politically correct multiculturalism? How reasonable are these reactions in Europe? Should Canada be worried as well, inasmuch as its much bally-hooed multicultural fabric may be fraying at the edges (Hurst 2007; Cohen 2007)? Is there something about Canada’s culture, values, mindset, history, geography that transforms immigration and multiculturalism into low risk options for living together with our differences? Does the institutionalization of multiculturalism make it less susceptible to critique, especially when institutional responsiveness is directed at inclusion rather than diversity? Or is Canada just plain lucky because of geographical distances that buffer it from major asylum producing countries?

Canada’s good fortune reflects its status an official immigrant society. Unlike the so called complete (or civilizational) and emigrant societies of Europe (Castles and Miller 1998), Canada embraces immigration as a key resource for ‘nation-building’. There are both principled and proactive policies in place to regulate the intake (both quality and quantity) of immigrants; strongly advocates attainment of citizenship; and has established multicultural programs to facilitate their settlement and integration. As an immigrant society, immigrants are seen as assets rather than burdens, crucial as contributors to Canada building rather than a national liability, and fully fledged members rather than having to earn the right (Joppke 2007). Of particular salience is an implicit social contract involving a reciprocal exchange of rights and obligations: ‘you’ adjust and adopt’, ‘we’ protect and guarantee.

Of course, this buccolic image and reality do not always coincide. Canadians continue to grumble about immigration in terms of ‘how many’, ‘what kind’, ‘where from’, and ‘what for’ (Stoffman 2002). New immigrants are not doing as well economically as those in the past; immigrant credentials tend to be under-recognized creating a body of angry (and underemployed) professionals; immigrant segregation as measured by ethnic neighborhoods is increasing; and Canadian born children of immigrants express worrying levels of dissatisfaction (Gregg 2006; Stein 2007; Reitz and Bannerjee 2007). Debates over reasonable accommodation continue to rile some Canadians, prompting varied reactions over the sustainability of multiculturalism (Cohen 2007) Murmurs of disapproval are palpable: Perceptions that current Multicultural policy is doing more harm than good has culminated in a series of government roundtables involving interested stakeholders to address future directions. Still, Canada continually outpaces other countries on basic measures of immigrant success: belonging, trust, citizenship, and participation (Bloemraad 2006; Soroka et al 2007). Inasmuch as Canada’s Multiculturalism is inextricably linked with a cultural of rights, including a commitment to social justice, protection of human rights, and anti-racism laws, its lofty status is unlikely to be revoked.

In other words, the principled link between immigration and multiculturalism is pivotal. As pointed out by Queen’s University political philosopher, Will Kymlicka, both immigration and multiculturalism tend to garner public support when perceived to be under control. By ensuring an immigration that is legal, skilled, and unthreatening, legislative protocols are in place to defuse any risks. Multiculturalism also represents a safe option for Canadians because of an immigration program that many see as properly managed, reflects Canada’s liberal values, attracts the highly skilled, ensures bona fide permanent residents with access to citizenship rights, and is directed at Canada-building. Support for multiculturalism is further bolstered by fairly explicit rules over ‘drawing the line’. Cultural diversity is tolerated under Canada’s inclusive multiculturalism, but this commitment is conditional and principled: Cultural differences cannot break the law, violate individual rights, or contravene core constitutional values. These differences are not to ‘celebrated’ through inward looking ethnic enclaves or politicized for public power grabs, but as a basis for dialogue and understanding. With a culture-blind multiculturalism, cultural differences are transformed into discourses about social equality and human rights rather than a diversity discourse. Even passage of the 1988 Multiculturalism Act sought to integrate new Canadians into the mainstream through their ethnic identity rather than offer unqualified preservation of their differences.

However well it works for Canada, this multicultural adventure may be difficult to duplicate in European countries. Immigrant societies like Canada are based on a belief that everything is possible because everything can be reinvented including immigrants from their original homeland to Canada (Chhatwal 2007). By contrast, the weight of tradition, religion, history, and stratification in European societies exerts limits rather then possibilities, especially when many are surrounded by poor unstable countries from North Africa or the Middle East whose young inhabitants are anxious for opportunities whether as legal migrants, illegal workers, guest workers, or asylum seekers. Insofar as immigration and cultural diversity appear to spiraling out of control to the detriment of society, a disconnect plagues multiculturalism and immigration. White European culture is increasingly experienced as besieged, beleaguered, and devalued, as Ghassan Hage (2006) comments, prompting hostility toward those multiculturalists and ethnicities who reject the national will. Differences are no longer couched in the discourse of the cultural ‘other’, but in the discursive framework of the ‘enemy’ because of securitization and globalization. Hage pinpoints the breakdown as a problem of “whose rules rule”:

For multiculturalism was always about finding a space for the culture of the other, in so far as that culture does not claim a sovereignty over itself that clashes with the laws of the nation….Multiculturalism has always had capacity to find a space for such minor laws within an all encompassing national law. This is part of what defines it. However, for people who take their religion seriously, this situation is reversed. The laws of God are all encompassing, and the national laws of the host nation are minor. For a seriously religious Muslim migrant, to integrate into the host nation becomes a matter of finding space for these national laws within the all encompassing laws of God. We then see how the very relationship between encompassing and encompassed cultures, on which multiculturalism is based, is here inverted

A lose-lose reaction prevails. To one side, a public backlash in inevitable when migrants and minorities recoil at being reduced to the status of a tile within an all encompassing multicultural mosaic (Hage 2006). To the other side, the superiority of a white European culture is defiantly asserted when immigrants are associated with illiberal practices at odds with mainstream norms and values, when immigrants are viewed as illegal by entry or unwelcome for the long haul, and when perceived as incommensurate with the skills and language demands of contemporary European society (Kymlicka 2005). The recipe for a societal disaster is further exacerbated by a plural multicultural ideology that encourages minorities into separate enclaves, discourages people from interacting with others, and disavows any criticism of the cultural ‘other’ as racist or disrespectful (Buruma 2007). Under these circumstances of confusion, uncertainty, and collapse it is doubtful if any kind of multiculturalism could stave off the sense of disconnectedness, despair, and outrage.

In sum: Could it be that multiculturalism is atrophying in those societies that do not see themselves as immigration societies, are feeling defensive because of security anxieties, or have badly miscalculated the politics of migration resulting in an alienated and marginal underclass? Neither the mainstream nor minorities in Europe like what a plural monoculturalism is doing or has done, and have reacted accordingly. Insofar as multiculturalism is seen as dividing, destabilizing or destroying, resistance on both sides mounts.By contrast, Canada’s Multiculturalism models provides a workable recourse for uniting Canadians - at times by rejecting differences, at times by insisting that differences should not preclude full and equal participation, at times, by taking differences into account to provide a more culturally sensitive services. Paradoxically, it is precisely this principled two way balancing act – treating people the same as a matter of course, but treating them differently when needed – that may account for its success and popularity.

Re-calibrating Multiculturalism:

Pathway for the 21st Century

What kind of future can be anticipated as minorities become increasingly politicized in demanding a redistribution of power and privilege, while central authorities retrench and resist in hopes of consolidating the centre against the margins? Different options are available for engaging the growing presence of immigrant and visibilized minorities, including, (a) exclusion and expulsion, (b) tolerant indifference (c) non recognition as persona non grata, and (d) institutional inclusion under the multiculturalism banner. In general, Europe’s post World War Two response to immigration was framed around assimilation into various hegemonic national projects (Hickman 2007). But while multi-ethnicity may now be the prevailing characteristic of most European countries, an ‘official’ multiculturalism is rapidly eroding as a preferred framework for managing diversity. With or without multiculturalism, however, the inescapable challenge cannot be dodged or averted: How to share political, social, and cultural space for living together without conflict or loss of cohesion and identity (Modood 2005)?

At the crux of this conundrum are the politics of limits. Where, indeed, to draw the line with respect to accommodating diversity? How much diversity can a society incorporate without unraveling at the seams? How much unity do societies require before imploding from within? The most successful multiculturalisms embody a relatively explicit and principled statement of what is acceptable as a basis for living together differently. Diversity under the ‘differently’ can be tolerated but the ‘together’ must prevail by way of non negotiable rules that unequivocally assert the primacy of core values related to the rule of law, human rights, freedom of expression, and commitment to equality. Australia’s revised multiculturalism program demonstrates the centrality in setting limits and accentuating integration (McGuaran 2005). Immigrants must express an overriding and unifying commitment to Australia (yes, you can have multiple loyalties, but loyalty to Australia must prevail when there is a conflict of interest); work within basic structures and values of Australia; and accept obligations as well as rights, including a reciprocal responsibility to respect others. Similarly with Quebec’s interculturalism model that explicitly articulates limits including the primacy of French language and culture, democratic rights, and respect for others, while striking a balance between individual rights, accommodation of differences, and social cohesion (Kymlicka 2001; Garcea 2006; Nugent 2006). In short, a diverse and multicultural society is possible, Randall Hansen, a University of Toronto professor concludes, but only if everyone abides by the same rules (cited in Hurst 2007).

The challenge seems inescapable: How to formulate a set of norms that provide a principled framework for responding to minority realities without sacrificing national unity and liberal-democratic values. Whether by default or necessity, multiculturalism seems the likely option for addressing the combination of defiant diversities, robust immigration patterns, politicized agendas, and competing (transnational) citizenships. Neither assimilation nor isolation stand much chance of survival in these politicized times. Pulling up the drawbridge and retreating behind a fortress Europe is no less defeatist, but tantamount to shutting the stable door once the horses have bolted. A much-touted return to traditional values for integrating minorities into a coherent whole sounds good in theory, but may prove impractical in this postmodernist era.

Under the circumstances, it is not a question of multiculturalism or not. More to the point, societies cannot afford not to embrace multiculturalism in their constant quest for political unity, social coherence, economic prosperity, and cultural enrichment. In other words, the crisis in multiculturalism is not the result of too much multiculturalism as a blueprint for living together differently. Not enough of an inclusive, two-way multiculturalism (‘you adapt, we adjust’/ we adapt, you adjust’) should shoulder the blame. Put candidly, it’s not so much the death of multiculturalism that should be mourned, but rather the dearth of multiculturalism as a social contract for living together with differences in ways that have proven workable, necessary, and fair.

Appendix

There is much talk of (civic) integration as a social contract to replace multiculturalism. Yet there is little consensus regarding what integration means and how to bring it about (Neill and Schwedler 2007). To overcome this lacunae, the European Council adopted a commitment to integration in 2004 whose principles are paraphrased below (For critique, Joppke 2007)

• Integration is a dynamic two way process of mutual accommodation by immigrants and host country

• Integration implies respect for the basic values of the European Union.

• Employment is a key part of the integration process for immigrants and host country

• Basic knowledge of the host country’s language, history, and institutions is indispensable to integration

• Access to education is critical to the integration of immigrants

• Immigrant integration requires full and non-discriminatory access to institutions, public and private goods and services

• Frequent encounters and creative interaction between immigrants and member state citizens secures to successful integration

• Integration is predicated on guaranteeing the practice of diverse cultures and religions, provided these practices do not conflict with rights or laws

• Immigrant participation in the democratic process is critical especially in the formulation of programs and policies that impact on their lives

• Integration is contingent on mainstreaming integration polices and measures in all relevant portfolios and levels of government and public services

• Clear goals, indicators, and evaluation mechanism must be in place to adjust immigration policies and evaluate progress.

With its focus on a two way process of accommodation, this commitment to integration ressembles the principles of Canada’s inclusive Multiculturalism.

References on Request

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