Lessons from Russia's Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine

C O R P O R AT I O N

Lessons from Russia¡¯s

Operations in Crimea

and Eastern Ukraine

Michael Kofman, Katya Migacheva, Brian Nichiporuk,

Andrew Radin, Olesya Tkacheva, Jenny Oberholtzer

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Preface

This report is the third in a series about the impact and implications of

the Ukraine crisis on European security. This report examines covert

and conventional operations in Crimea in February and March 2014,

as well as the origins of the conflict in Eastern Ukraine, its phases of

escalation, and the series of events that led to the outbreak of limited

conventional war between Russia and Ukraine in summer 2014. These

operations offer important insights into Russian approaches and objectives in the conflict.

This report should be of interest to those concerned with Russia¡¯s

annexation of Crimea and the ongoing conflict in Eastern Ukraine.

Research for this project was conducted from May 2015 to October

2015.

This research was sponsored by the Army Quadrennial Defense

Review (QDR) Office in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8,

Headquarters, Department of the Army, and was conducted within

RAND Arroyo Center¡¯s Strategy, Doctrine, and Resources Program.

RAND Arroyo Center, part of the RAND Corporation, is a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the United

States Army.

The Project Unique Identification Code (PUIC) for the project

that produced this document is HQD146843.

iii

Contents

Preface. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii

Figures and Table. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi

Acknowledgments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv

Abbreviations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xvii

CHAPTER ONE

Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

CHAPTER TWO

The Annexation of Crimea. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

How Russia Annexed Crimea. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

The Balance of Forces. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

A Chronology of Events. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Russia¡¯s Information Campaign.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Characteristics of the Crimean Operation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Russian-Crimean History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Cultural Proximity Between Russia and Crimea. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Geography. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Russia¡¯s Force Posture and Transit Arrangements with Ukraine. . . . . . . . . . . 18

Target of Opportunity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Ukrainian Actions Contributing to Russian Success. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Factors Enabling Russia¡¯s Operational Successes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Force Composition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Mobility. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Use of Deception at the Tactical and Strategic Levels.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

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