Norms, Rhetoric, and Actions for the Public Good



Norms, Threat Appeals, and Actions for the Public GoodToby BolsenGeorgia State UniversityDepartment of Political Science38 Peachtree Center Ave., Suite 1005Atlanta, Georgia 30303tobybolsen@January 23, 2011Abstract: Why do some, but not all, citizens make sacrifices for the sake of the public good? Do messages that arouse a perception of threat increase willingness to participate in collective actions? This paper develops a theory in which the effectiveness of an appeal for action is moderated by social norms – what others are doing. Existing literature suggests that taking action requires (1) a direct motivation to do it (e.g., from an appeal), and (2) perceptions that the behavior is efficacious, insofar as others are perceived as doing it too, because if they are not then one person doing it will not make a difference. I utilize data from a survey-experiment to test hypotheses about intentions to discuss energy conservation with others and actual donations to a non-profit conservation organization. The results accentuate the importance of incorporating norms into the study of political behavior.A fundamental problem in societies involves how best to coordinate behavior for the provision of public goods – things that benefit everyone but which no one has an individual incentive to provide. Governments exist, in part, to serve this role; but how governments determine what laws and regulations need to be in place depends, largely, on citizens actions in areas of their lives that sometimes involve choices about whether to assume personal costs for a collective good. When do individuals take these actions? Why do some, but not all, citizens make sacrifices for the sake of the public good? Do messages that arouse a perception of threat – e.g., as a result of inaction – increase willingness to participate in collective actions? These questions are of obvious importance for those interested in political behavior; however, little work – other than research on participation – examines the impact of social and psychological factors on individuals’ decisions to which the government has an incentive to attend. This paper explores the factors that make it more or less likely that individuals engage in behaviors – in the domain of energy – that are individually costly but collectively beneficial. I develop a theory in which the impact of an appeal for collective action is moderated by social norms – i.e., what others are doing. The framework I develop suggests that taking action requires (1) a direct motivation to do it (e.g., from an appeal), and (2) perceptions that the behavior is efficacious - insofar as others are perceived as doing it too, because if they are not then one person doing it will not make a difference. The research I suggest has implications more generally for when individuals take actions that promote the public good. Understanding these conditions helps us to make sense of what governments need to do in terms of providing collective goods, and what can be done to promote individual contributions. I begin by developing a theory that accounts for psychological (attitudes) and social (rhetoric and social norms) forces that shape willingness to take action for the public good. I utilize data from a survey-experiment to test hypotheses about intentions to discuss energy conservation with others and actual donations to a non-profit conservation organization. The results show that a pro norm context moderates (i.e., strengthens) the impact of an appeal that focuses on the collective benefits of taking action, but not a threatening message associated with inaction. This research accentuates the importance of incorporating social forces, in addition to psychological determinants, into the study of political behavior. It also provides insight into energy conservation behaviors more generally.A Theory of Action for the Public Good I focus on the determinants of behavior taken to secure a public good. Behavior refers to “observable activity in a human or animal” (Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary); however, it is often captured in the literature by assessing intentions – e.g., to vote or engage in environmental activism. Therefore, I also account for the determinants of behavioral intentions. A public good is any good that cannot feasibly be withheld from others in a group if it is provided for any member of that group (Olson 1965). Thus, a nation’s energy supply is a public good that the government plays a central role in providing its citizens. While the government generally takes the lead in formulating and implementing energy policies, citizens are primary users of energy, and individuals’ actions ultimately shape collective outcomes. Importantly, taking steps to conserve energy may result in private economic benefits such as money saved from reduced consumption, but these actions may also entail sacrifices such as driving smaller vehicles and reducing travel with benefits that accrue to the general population. Thus, reducing energy usage, in part, may result from the desire to contribute to the public good of energy conservation. I next move to the determinants of taking action for the public good. A person’s attitude toward a behavior often is a powerful predictor of action (Ajzen and Fishbein 1980; Ajzen 1991). An attitude is an evaluation toward an object, such as a candidate, policy, or potential action. A person’s attitude toward a behavior is primarily a function of beliefs about its likely consequences (Ajzen and Fishbein 2005, 199). For instance, one’s attitude toward taking action to conserve energy might stem from considerations about its economic and/or environmental implications. Aside from the direct attitude toward a behavior, there are two attitudes that derive from the public goods aspects of energy conservation that are likely to influence action: one’s attitude about the importance of the behavior in question and one’s attitude about the efficacy of action. First, importance refers to the perceived significance of an attitude. Boninger, Krosnick, and Berent (1995, 62) explain, “perceiving an attitude to be personally important leads people to use it in processing information, making decisions, and taking action.” Important attitudes have been shown to guide actions such as voting, writing letters to public officials, and making donations to political organizations. Thus, I predict that as one’s attitude about the importance of energy conservation increases, so will the likelihood of that person taking action to conserve energy. (hypothesis 1). Efficacy refers to the extent to which individuals believe that their actions make a difference in terms of collective outcomes. Research on protest behavior and environmental activism indicates that individuals consider not only the personal costs and benefits resulting from an action, as in traditional expected-utility theory, but also one’s perceived personal influence over collective outcomes, whether the group is likely to succeed, and the expected reciprocity of others (Finkel, Muller, and Opp 1989; Lubell et al. 2007). Other research shows that individuals engage in collective actions because they perceive their behavior as diagnostic of how similar others will act (Quattrone and Tversky 1984). Therefore, I predict that as one’s attitude about the efficacy of taking action increases, so will the likelihood of that person taking action to conserve energy (hypothesis 2). One criticism of psychological approaches to studying behavior is that it does not account for the social context in which decisions are executed (Druckman 2004; Druckman and Lupia 2000). Stern (2000, 418) points out the “large number of single variable studies of environmentally significant behavior” and calls for research “[synthesizing] theories or models that incorporate variables” explaining behavior. Therefore, in addition to accounting for attitudes posited to directly influence action, I also account for two important contextual forces - rhetoric and social norms - known to shape participation in collective actions. Contextual Influences on Collective Action: Rhetoric & Social NormsA vast literature shows that rhetoric - i.e., verbal or textual communications targeting attitude change - can shape individuals’ attitudes and preferences (Hovland, Janis, and Kelley 1953; Petty and Cacioppo 1986; Zaller 1992; Bartels 1993; O’Keefe 2002; Chong and Druckman 2007a, 2007b). Messages that evoke fear, or a perception of threat, are often thought to be a powerful motivator of action. Evolutionary theories of cognitive development explain that parts of the brain are attuned to respond quickly and automatically to threatening stimuli (Gray 1990; Miller and Krosnick 2004; also see Fiske and Taylor 1991; Taylor 1991). Threat appeals are a class of rhetoric that has received considerable attention by scholars in various fields. A threat appeal is defined as “an informative communication about a threat to an individual’s well-being… along with details of the threat itself, the communication suggests measures that can be taken to avoid or to reduce its impact” (Milne, Sheeran, and Orbell 2000, 107). Although threat appeals can be an effective psychological motivator of collective action, as I will explain below, their impact depends on the social context in which the appeal is encountered (Rothman et al. 2006; O’Keefe and Jensen 2007; O’Keefe and Jensen N.d.). While there is a large body of evidence which shows that threat is a powerful motivator of action, recent studies raise questions about whether more negativity is always better. In a meta-analysis of this literature, Witte and Allen (2000) find that threat appeals are often ineffective at motivating action. They attribute this to a two-step cognitive process in which individuals first evaluate their own susceptibility to a threat, and, subsequently, begin a second appraisal in which the efficacy of the proposed response is considered. They find that when information is provided about an efficacious response, threatening messages are likely to produce adaptive behavior; however, in the absence of perceptions of an efficacious response, individuals are motivated to control aroused fear by dismissing the threat or denying they are at risk (Witte and Allen 2000, 294). A key finding is that perceptions about the efficacy of a response tends to be more important in predicting action relative to descriptions of the severity of an impending threat (Ruiter et al. 2001; Floyd et al. 2000). Thus, assuming threat appeals are always more effective at motivating action may be misplaced. When it comes to decisions about whether or not to take action to help secure a public good, threat appeals may be ineffective unless the behavior is perceived as efficacious – i.e., as “having the power to produce a desired effect” (Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary). Based on this literature, I predict that a threat appeal will have no greater impact on willingness to take action to conserve energy relative to an equivalent message that focuses on the benefits of conservation; these appeals will only be effective in a context in which action is perceived as efficacious (hypothesis 3).Social norms are a feature of behavioral contexts which provide cues about the efficacy of a collective action. Norms refer to socially shared agreement about what constitutes appropriate and inappropriate behavior (Cialdini 2005). Simply learning about the opinions of others can trigger social influence processes. Mutz (1998, 5) explains, “…the literature on American political behavior is replete with examples of situations in which people’s political behaviors are influenced by their perceptions of the attitudes or experiences of mass collectives.” For instance, being informed that voter turnout is likely to be high in an upcoming election has also been shown to significantly increase actual turnout (Gerber and Rogers 2009).As defined above, efficacy refers to beliefs about whether one’s own actions exert an influence on collective outcomes. Prior research has shown that individuals base their actions, in part, on perceptions about the likely actions of others, as well as using their own behavior as a diagnostic cue of how others will act (e.g., see Quattrone and Tversky 1984, experiment 2). Thus, a pro-energy-conservation norm should provide a context in which taking action is perceived as efficacious. Consequently, I predict that a pro-conservation norm will moderate (i.e., strengthen) the impact of an appeal for action to conserve energy - increasing favorable attitudes, intentions, and actions (relative to the appeal alone and to the appeal in conjunction with a “con” norm behavioral cue) (hypothesis 4).Experimental Procedure and DesignTo test the hypotheses previously stated, I designed a survey- experiment. The study was implemented by Bovitz Research Group in December of 2009, using a web-based panel that draws a sample demographically representative of the overall U.S. population. Each respondent (n = 500) agreed to participate in an IRB-approved “study about political learning” and was informed he or she would be paid $1 for completing the survey. The main dependent variables consisted of measures for: (a) attitudes about the importance and (b) efficacy of conserving energy, (c) intentions talk with others about ways to reduce energy consumption, and (d) a measure of overt behavior – i.e., whether at the conclusion of the survey the respondent chose to donate a portion of their remuneration to a non-profit organization that promotes energy conservation. I measured attitude about the importance of reducing energy consumption by asking participants to rate on 7-point scales, how important it is to: (a) “take action to conserve energy”; (b) “make a conscious effort to reduce driving”; (c) “replace incandescent light bulbs with energy efficient light bulbs”; (d) “adjust the thermostat setting to reduce home energy usage”; (e) “turn off lights and appliances when not in use to conserve energy”; (f) “purchase energy efficient appliances”; and, (g) “drive cars that get better gas mileage” (1=not too important, 4=moderately important, 7= extremely important) (see Stern 1999, 2000). To measure perceptions about the efficacy of taking action, participants rated on 7-point scales the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with two statements: (a) “I believe my actions have an influence on the nation’s energy situation”; (b) “My actions to help the nation achieve energy independence encourage others in my community to take action that will lead to greater energy independence” (1 = strongly disagree, 4= not sure, 7 = strongly agree) (Lubell et al. 2007; Finkel, Mueller, and Opp 1989). I measured intentions to talk with others about conserving energy by asking participants to rate on a 7 point scale how likely they are to “make an effort to talk with others (e.g., family and friends) about ways to reduce energy consumption?” (1 = extremely unlikely, 4 = not sure, 7 = extremely likely). I measured overt behavior at the conclusion of the study by giving all participants the option to donate a portion of their $1 to “the American Council for an Energy Efficient Economy (ACEEE) – a non profit organization dedicated to advancing energy efficiency as a means of promoting economic prosperity, energy security, and environmental protection.” The survey included standard demographic measures such as education, party identification, age, sex, income, political interest, trust in government, media usage, and a few other items. Experimental Conditions The experiment was designed to test the effectiveness of different types of appeals to conserve energy – i.e., an appeal focusing on the benefits of taking action or the threat associated with inaction - across three normative contexts (no norm, pro-norm, con-norm). The conditions were designed to replicate and extend [citation withheld]. Table 1 lists the full set of conditions, to which respondents were randomly assigned.[Insert Table 1 Here] As shown in the second column of Table 1, participants were randomly assigned, in all conditions, to read one of two “excerpts” from a “non-partisan editorial” that had “recently appeared in U.S. newspapers.” Both versions stated that “decisions about energy consumption have important environmental implications” and taking personal steps to reduce consumption (or failing to do so in the case of the threat appeal) would help “ensure continued human existence with an adequate quality of life” (benefit appeal) or “result in increasingly uncomfortable [lives]… and eventually make Earth uninhabitable” (threat appeal). Thus, both appeals promote taking action, but for different reasons. The benefit appeal stated that decreasing energy consumption would “reduce greenhouse gas emissions the equivalent of removing all U.S. passenger vehicles off the road for a year,” whereas the threat appeal focused on the “harmful and possibly irreversible changes to the environment” resulting from fossil fuel consumption. To test my expectations, it was essential to ensure the rhetoric treatments were perceived as equivalent in terms of conveying support for taking action to conserve energy, and differ only in terms of threat arousal. To ensure this, I pre-tested each version of the appeal on 153 undergraduate students enrolled in an introductory political science class. The pre-test confirmed that the appeals were equally supportive of energy conservation and equally understandable; however, the threat appeal aroused a significantly greater perception of threat relative to the benefit appeal (2.9 versus 4.97, 1-7 scale very threatening/not at all threatening, t= 13.45, p < .000). I also randomly assigned participants to one of three normative conditions: no norm, pro-conservation norm, or anti-conservation norm. The manipulation itself consisted of “excerpts” from a “press release that recently appeared in U.S. newspapers.” The pro and con treatments varied in terms of the degree to which Americans were portrayed as supporting taking steps to reduce energy consumption. The pro manipulation stated “the vast majority of Americans support taking steps to conserve energy,” whereas the con condition stated “only a small minority of Americans think it is necessary to take small steps to conserve energy.” In addition, the treatments differed in terms of the percentage of people subjects were told had made a contribution to a non-profit organization that promotes conservation in a similar study, i.e., “over 90%” versus “only 3” for the pro and con treatments, respectively. The third column in Table 1 lists the predicted effect of each condition on behavior. Druckman (2001c, 99) highlights the importance of using an empirically derived baseline to evaluate message framing. Because my hypotheses focus on the conditional effect of rhetoric across normative contexts, a key comparison in the analyses below involves the effects of a benefit/threat appeal encountered in the absence of an efficacious context (benefit appeal and threat appeal conditions), to the same appeals encountered in an efficacious normative context (pro-action norm + benefit appeal and pro-action norm + threat appeal), and to the effects of the appeal within an environment where taking action is not the norm (con-norm conditions). Benefit appeal is the baseline condition in the analyses below, and I follow the vast majority of scholars in the framing literature in making comparisons between subjects that received different information treatments. Thus, the benefit appeal condition serves as an empirically derived baseline by which to compare the impact of this same appeal encountered in an efficacious normative context (pro-action norm + benefit appeal), as well as to other conditions where I predict there should be no significant differences (see Table 1). ResultsI begin, in Table 2, by reporting treatment effects across four dependent variables: (1) attitude about the importance of energy conservation, (2) attitude about the efficacy of taking action, (3) intentions to discuss with others ways to conserve energy, and (4) whether a financial contribution was made to a nonprofit organization that promotes energy conservation. In the statistical analyses, I use OLS regression and Probit estimation with dummy variables for each condition.[Insert Table 2 Here] The results reported in Table 2 provide clear evidence in support of hypotheses 3 and 4. Hypothesis 3 posited that the threat appeal would have no greater impact on attitudes and behaviors relative to the benefit appeal (baseline); this is precisely what the data indicate. Across all four models, threat appeal has no effect above the baseline (benefit appeal) on beliefs about the importance of reducing energy consumption, the efficacy associated with taking action, willingness to talk with others, or make a financial contribution to a conservation organization. In support of hypothesis 4, significant differences emerge when social norms are introduced. Relative to the baseline (benefit appeal), pro-action norm + benefit appeal significantly increases the importance associated with taking action, willingness to talk with others about ways to reduce consumption, and donations to an energy conservation organization. Thus, the pro normative treatment magnifies the impact of the appeal focusing on the benefits of energy conservation. Also of interest, in Table 2, the “con-norm” treatment in conjunction with either version of the appeal has almost no effect on the outcome measures. The competing cues – i.e., pro-action argument and con-norm - appear to cancel each other out in the con-norm conditions. Notably, counter to my prediction in Table 1, the threat appeal coupled with the pro-action norm decreases the importance associated with energy conservation and has no impact on intentions and actions. To better interpret the magnitude of the treatment effects identified above, I used Clarify to generate predicted probabilities across dependent variables (Tomz et al. 1999). Interestingly, it is the unique combination of the pro-norm and benefit appeal that motivates action. Relative to the baseline (benefit appeal), pro-action norm + benefit appeal increases perceived importance by 5% (Figure 1), intentions to talk with others about conservation by 8% (Figure 2), and donations to an energy conservation non-profit by 19% (Figure 3). The threat appeal – by itself or in conjunction with the pro-norm treatment – is far less effective than the benefit appeal at motivating action. Across all models, pro-action norm + benefit appeal is significantly greater than pro-action norm + threat appeal (p < .05, one-tailed test). As shown in Figure 1, the combination of the pro-action norm and benefit appeal increases the importance associated with taking action to reduce energy consumption 10% relative to the pro-action norm + threat appeal. A similar gap (8%) appears in Figure 2 in looking at the predicted effects of the conditions on intentions to talk with others about conserving energy. The gap widens when looking at actual behavior in terms of making a financial contribution in Figure 3 (21% gap). [Insert Figures 1-3 Here] Having demonstrated the direct effect of the experimental treatments on attitudes, intentions, and actions, I next test whether attitudes about the importance (hypothesis 1) and efficacy of action (hypothesis 2) increase the likelihood of talking with others about conservation and making a donation to a non-profit conservation organization. To test these predictions, I re-estimate the models for intentions to talk and financial contribution (see columns 3 and 4 in Table 2) with the inclusion of attitude importance and collective efficacy as independent variables. The results from these estimations are reported in Table 3. [Insert Table 3 Here]The analyses reported in Table 3 clearly support hypothesis 1 - perceiving energy conservation as important significantly increases intentions to talk with others about ways to reduce consumption and donations to an energy conservation organization. In support of hypothesis 2, perceiving action as efficacious increases participants’ intentions to talk with others about ways to reduce consumption; however, somewhat surprisingly, efficacy beliefs do not influence willingness to make a donation to a non-profit. As importance increases from its minimum to maximum value the probability of talking with others increases by 39% and the probability of making a donation increases by 38%. Thus, individuals are far more likely to take action for the sake of a public good when the action is perceived as important. Table 3 provides no evidence that the treatment effect stemming from the combination of the pro-action norm and the benefit appeal is wholly mediated by the attitudinal measures in each regression, as pro-action norm + benefit appeal continues to have a direct positive effect on the outcome variables. ConclusionThe question of what shapes citizens’ willingness to make sacrifices for the sake of a public good is increasingly important as humanity faces the daunting challenge of maintaining an adequate energy supply and simultaneously mitigating the emission of pollutants associated with global warming. Although numerous studies have explored the effects of single variables that influence private actions undertaken for a public good, extant work has often ignored the influence of social context in determining attitudes and behaviors (Druckman and Lupia 2000; Stern 1999, 2000). I presented a theory and evidence that supports previous findings regarding the powerful role that social norms play in shaping behavior in this domain (see also, Nolan et al. 2008). A pro-normative context increased the impact of an appeal focusing on the benefits of taking action to conserve energy. This mirrors results from research on the effectiveness of messages that focus on the benefits of taking preventative health behaviors in contexts in which the action is perceived as efficacious (O’Keefe and Jensen 2007; Salovey et al. 2002; Rothman et al. 2006). Thus, messages that promote energy conservation as a way to benefit society, as opposed to emphasizing the threatening consequences of inaction, may be a better way to encourage voluntary energy conservation and related behavior changes. Interestingly, threat appeals were ineffective at motivate action. These messages - alone or in combination with a pro norm treatment - had no effect on behavior. This finding has implications for scholars interested in communicating the need for action with respect to global warming. Negative and threatening messages associated with inaction may not always be an effective motivator of action; instead, their impact depends on the context in which the appeal is encountered. If negative outcomes are viewed as unavoidable, threat appeals may be dismissed, or their perceived impacts psychologically discounted, instead of promoting behavior change (Corner and Hahn, 2009, 207-208). Similar arguments have been made by scholars studying the issue of global warming with respect to the use of a Pandora’s box frame about a looming “climate crisis” unless preventative action is taken and/or specific polices adopted (Nisbet and Scheufele 2009, 5-6; Nisbet 2009). In these cases, the use of threat appeals may be re-cast as “alarmism” by opponents of change, ultimately reinforcing skepticism about the existence or extent of a threat. This study accentuates the importance that social forces play in determining willingness to take action for the public good. People are more receptive to calls for action when the messages emphasize the benefits of action and people perceive others as taking action too. In these situations, norms may provide a signal about the willingness of others to cooperate in order to solve a social dilemma. In addition to shedding light on how appeals within various social contexts shape willingness to make sacrifices for the collective, this is also one of the few studies to move beyond self-reports and measure overt behavior in terms of actual donations to a non-profit energy conservation organization. Future work should continue to test the framework across operationalizations, contexts, populations, and settings. References Armitage, Christopher J., and Mark Conner. 2001. “Efficacy of the Theory of Planned Behavior: A Meta-Analytic Review.” British Journal of Social Psychology 40: 471-499. 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Witte, Kim 1992b. “The Role of Threat and Efficacy in AIDS Prevention.” International Quarterly of Community Health Education 12: 225-249. Witte, Kim, and Mike Allen. 2000. “A Meta-Analysis of Fear Appeals: Implications for Effective Public Health Campaigns.” Health Education and Behavior 25: 571-585. Zaller, John. 1992. The Nature and Origin of Mass Opinion. New York: Cambridge University Press.Table 1. Experimental Conditions, Treatments, and ExpectationsConditionTreatmentPredicted effecton behaviorNNo Norm+Benefit appealeditorialbaseline50Pro-action norm+Benefit-appealpress-release (pro) &editorialincrease action100Con-norm+Benefit-appealpress-release (con) & editorialno effect100Threat appealeditorialno effect (above baseline)50Pro-norm+Threat-appealpress-release (pro) & editorialincrease action100Con-norm+Threat-appealpress-release (con) & editorialno effect100N=500 Table 2. Treatment Effects on Attitudes and ActionsAttitudeImportanceCollective EfficacyTalk withOthersFinancialContributionPro-action norm +Benefit-appeal.16 (.11)*.12 (.15).59 (.29)**.50 (.24)**Con-action norm +Benefit-appeal -.19 (.14)-.06 (.15)-.16 (.29).14 (.24)Pro-action norm +Threat-appeal-.23 (.14)**-.17 (.16)-.01 (.29)-.15 (.25)Con-action norm +Threat-appeal .02 (.14).18 (.16).47 (.29).25 (.24)Threat appeal.02 (.13).02 (.18).44 (.34).32 (.28)N=500/ R2=.03N= 500/ R2=.02N= 500R2 = .03N=500LL = - 279.83 (*) indicates significant differences relative to the baseline (Benefit appeal); *p≤ .10, one-tailed test; ** p≤ .05, *** p≤ .01.Table 3. Determinants of Talking with Others and Making a DonationIntends to Talk with OthersFinancialContributionAttitude Importance.69 (.09)***.53 (.12) ***Collective Efficacy Beliefs.68 (.08)***-.01 (.08)Pro-action norm +Benefit-appeal.41 (.23)**.46 (.25)*Con-action norm +Benefit-appeal .01 (.23).20 (.25)Pro-action norm +Threat-appeal.27 (.23)-.07 (.26)Con-action norm +Threat-appeal .34 (.23).26 (.25)Threat appeal.42 (.27).31 (.28)N=500R2 = .41N= 500LL: -261.91(*) indicates significant differences from the baseline condition (Ba); *p≤ .10, one-tailed test; ** p≤ .05, *** p≤ .01.Figure 1. Treatment Effects on Attitude about the Importance of ActionPnBa = Pro-action norm + benefit appeal; CnBa = Con-action norm + benefit appeal; PnTa = Pro-action norm + threat appeal; CnTa = Con-action norm + threat appeal; TA = Threat appeal. (*) indicates significant differences relative to the baseline (Benefit appeal); *p≤ .10, one-tailed test; ** p≤ .05, *** p≤ .01.Figure 2. Treatment Effects on Intentions to Talk with OthersPnBa = Pro-action norm + benefit appeal; CnBa = Con-action norm + benefit appeal; PnTa = Pro-action norm + threat appeal; CnTa = Con-action norm + threat appeal; TA = Threat appeal. (*) indicates significant differences relative to the baseline (Benefit appeal); *p≤ .10, one-tailed test; ** p≤ .05, *** p≤ .01.Figure 3. Treatment Effects on Making a Financial ContributionPnBa = Pro-action norm + benefit appeal; CnBa = Con-action norm + benefit appeal; PnTa = Pro-action norm + threat appeal; CnTa = Con-action norm + threat appeal; TA = Threat appeal. (*) indicates significant differences relative to the baseline (Benefit appeal), p≤ .10, one-tailed test; ** p≤ .05, *** p≤ .01.Appendix (Supplemental Information)Editorial [excerpt] – Benefit AppealDecisions about energy consumption have important environmental implications. Energy sustainability involves using resources to ensure continued human existence with an adequate quality of life. Along these lines, purchasing energy efficient products would reduce greenhouse gas emissions the equivalent of removing all U.S. passenger vehicles off the road for an entire year. Editorial [excerpt] – Threat AppealDecisions about energy consumption have important environmental implications. Human actions are producing harmful and possibly irreversible changes to the environment. Many threats are a direct result of our reliance on fossil fuels (such as oil) for energy. Unless individuals take steps to reduce consumption, these changes will make life increasingly uncomfortable (due to pollution) and eventually make the Earth uninhabitable. Press Release [excerpt] – Pro normNational opinion polls show that the vast majority of Americans support taking small steps to conserve energy (e.g., switching to energy efficient light bulbs). They believe in the worth of making small contributions. Moreover, over 90% of individuals who completed a public opinion survey about U.S. energy policy chose to donate the pay they received to a non-profit organization that promotes conservation.Press Release [excerpt] – Con normNational opinion polls show that only a small minority of Americans think it is necessary to take small steps to conserve energy (e.g., switching to energy efficient light bulbs). They do not believe small contributions payoff in the larger picture. Moreover, only 3% of individuals who completed a public opinion survey about U.S. energy policy chose to donate the pay they received to a non-profit organization that promotes conservation.Table A-1.Demographic and Political Profile of the SampleVariableScale (overall distribution %)Average (std. dev)Education (N=500)Less than high school (1)3.35 (0.93)High school (18)Some college (38)4 yr. degree (31)Advanced degree (12)Age (N=500)18yrs - 83yrs43 (16)Income (N=500)Less than $50,000 (42)n/a$50,000 to < $100,000 (37)$100,000 to < $200,000 (15)More than $200,000 (1)Rather not say (5)Ethnicity (N=500)White (81)n/aAfrican American (9)Asian American (4)Hispanic (6)Sex (N=500)Male (50)Female (50)Party Identification (N=500)1= strong Democrat (10)3.8 (1.65)2 (15)3 (12)4=Independent (34)5 (12)6 (10)7=strong Republican (7)Ideology (N=500)1= very liberal (6)4.08 (1.56)2 (12)3 (11)4= moderate (38)5 (13)6 13)7=very conservative (7)Interest in politics1 = not interested at all (6) 2 (9) 3 (12) 4= moderately (28) 5 (17) 6 (15) 7= extremely interested (13)4.36 (1.67)Trust in government 1 = none of the time (12) 2 (25) 3 (17)3.19 (1.36)4= sometimes (31) 5 (12) 6 (3)7= just about always (1) Number of days a week watches TV news1 = never (5) 2 (11) 3 (7) 4= a few times a week (18) 5 (14) 6 (22) 7 = every day (24)4.85 (1.85)Number of days a week reads the front page (print or online)1 = never (9) 2 (18) 3 (9) 4= a few times a week (17) 5 (10) 6 (13) 7 = every day (25)4.37 (2.07) Table A-2. Scores for Dependent Variables Across ConditionsConditionMeans (Std. deviations) for key DVsNBenefit appeal Importance = 5.61 (0.93)Collective Efficacy = 4.79 (1.19)Discussion = 4.06 (1.63)Financial Contribution = .20 (.40)50Pro-norm-benefit-appeal Importance = 5.82 (1.01)Collective Efficacy = 4.96 (1.42)Discussion = 4.65 (1.57)Financial Contribution = .37 (.49)100Con-norm-benefit-appeal Importance = 5.35 (1.29)Collective Efficacy = 4.7 (1.48)Discussion = 3.9 (1.86)Financial Contribution = .24 (.43)100Threat appeal Importance = 5.63 (1.13)Collective Efficacy = 4.81 (1.28)Discussion = 4.5 (1.61)Financial Contribution = .30 (.26)50Pro-norm-threat-appeal Importance = 5.28 (1.25)Collective Efficacy = 4.54 (1.53)Discussion = 4.05 (1.81)Financial Contribution = .16 (.37)100Con-norm-threat-appeal Importance = 5.64 (1.11)Collective Efficacy = 5.07 (1.37)Discussion = 4.53 (1.69)Financial Contribution = .28 (.45)100N=500 ................
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