G8 Research Coding Manual
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G8 Commitment/Compliance Coding and Reference Manual
By
John Kirton, Director,
Ella Kokotsis, PhD, Director of Research
and Jenilee Guebert, Senior Researcher
G8 Research Group
Munk Centre for International Studies at Trinity College
University of Toronto
September 9, 2009
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Table of Contents
Preface 1
1. Introduction: Why Study G8 Compliance? 2
2. What Are G8 Summit Commitments? 2
3. What are Priority Commitments? 7
a. How to Choose Priority Commitments 7
4. What Constitutes Summit Compliance? 8
Official reaffirmation 9
Internal bureaucratic review and representation 9
Budgetary and resource allocations are made or changed 9
New or altered programs, legislation and regulations 9
Over-implementation 9
5. Measuring Compliance 10
What Is the Compliance Time Frame? 10
7. Interpretive Guidelines 16
8. Interim vs. Final Compliance Reports 19
9. How to Write a Compliance Report 20
10. Compliance Report Template 22
Commitment 22
Assessment 22
Background 22
Individual Country Compliance Breakdown 22
11. Special Considerations 23
12. Where to Find G8 Compliance Information Online 24
G8-Specific Sites 24
General Sources 24
International Organizations 25
International News Sources & Newswires 25
Country-Specific Online Resources 25
If the Web Fails 28
Appendix A: G8 Compliance Bibliographical References 30
Appendix B: G8 Summit Performance Indicators by Function 34
Appendix C: Causal Models of Summit Performance 35
Appendix D: Indicators of Major Causal Variables 37
Appendix E: Summary of Variables, Methods and Sources 38
Appendix F: 2005 Gleneagles Summit – Core Commitments Selection 41
Appendix G: Sample Interim/Final Compliance Report 44
Commitment 44
Background 44
Assessment 45
Individual Country Compliance Breakdown 45
Appendix H: 57
Appendix I: 72
Compliance Scores from G8 Summits: 1996-2006 72
Preface
Each year since 1996, the University of Toronto G8 Research Group has produced a compliance report on the progress made by G8 members in meeting the commitments reached at their annual G8 Summits. Since 2002, the G8 Research Group has published an interim compliance report, timed to assess progress at the transition point between one country hosting and the next in the hosting rotation. Building on the interim compliance report, a final compliance report is issued just prior to the annual Summit meeting. These reports monitor and assess each country’s compliance on a carefully chosen selection of priority Summit commitments. They are offered to the general public, policy makers, scholars, researchers, civil society, the media, interested citizens and other stakeholders around the world in an effort to make the work of the G8 more transparent and accessible. They are also conducted to provide systemic data to enable meaningful social science analysis of this unique informal institution. Compliance reports are available on the G8 Information Centre web site at g8.utoronto.ca.
The G8 information Centre (g8.utoronto.ca) contains the world’s most comprehensive and authoritative online collection of information and analyses on the G7/G8 and its related institutions. The Centre assembles, verifies and posts documents from the meetings leading up to and at each Summit. They make available official documentation of all past Summits and ministerial meetings (in several G8 languages), scholarly writings and policy analyses, research studies, data sets, fact sheetsscholarship information and links to related web sites.
The G8 Research Group is a global network of scholars, students and professionals in the academic, research, media, business, government and NGO communities, which follows the work of the G8 and its related institutions, including the G7 and G20. Founded in 1987, it is co-ordinated from the University of Toronto through the International Relations Program based at Trinity College, the Centre for International Studies and the John Graham Library at the Munk Centre for International Studies. The G8 Research Group has offices in London, Paris, Tokyo, Moscow and Montréal. Affiliated G8 Research groups operate at Oxford University in Britain and the State University Higher School of Economics in Russia.
Dr. Ella Kokotsis and Jenilee Guebert
Toronto, June 22, 2009
1. Introduction: Why Study G8 Compliance?
Every year since the Lyon Summit in 1996, the University of Toronto’s G8 Research Group has conducted compliance studies as an important part of the analysis it produces. Why do we embark on this task every year? What is it we and the world derive from our efforts?
The G8 Summit annually produces a series of written, public communiqués or declarations used at the summit that bind the leaders in many cases to hard commitments. Can the impact of these commitments be measured once the Summit is over, the media have dispersed and the leaders have returned home? Are there limits to how much or how often the G8 can comply with their Summit commitments, particularly given that they are autonomous, sovereign states whose leaders are driven by differing domestic and international demands?
It makes little sense for G8 leaders to invest their time and resources, while potentially risking their political and personal reputations, to generate these agreements if they have no intention of complying with them once the Summit is done. Our compliance reports therefore allow us to assess how much credibility the leaders bring to the Summit table, and whether the products of the Summit (communiqués and declarations), deserve to be treated with any attention or seriousness at all.
The empirical findings on compliance therefore offer explanations to three important questions:
1. To what extent and under what conditions do G8 members live up to the commitments, those are the collective decisions that the leaders reach or authorize at the Summit?
2. How does the pattern of Summit compliance vary over time by issue area, and by member?
3. What causes high and low Summit compliance?
Determining how much compliance has happened, when, where and by which country and when, allows one to draw some important conclusions about the overall effectiveness of the Summit process. But before one can describe and explain patterns of Summit compliance, one must first define what is meant by a commitment, since commitments form the basis of the compliance assessments.
2. What Are G8 Summit Commitments?
a. How to Define and Identify Commitments from the G7/8 Communiqué
Commitments are defined as a discrete, specific, publicly expressed, collectively agreed to statements of intent; a "promise" or "undertaking" by Summit members that they will undertake future action to move toward, meet or adjust to an identified welfare target (Kokotsis 1999). There are several key criteria contained in this definition.
First, commitments must be discrete, in that each specified target represents a separate commitment, even if a single set of actions supports these multiple aims. A sequence of specified measures through which these targets are to be achieved, however, do not represent separate commitments, but a single commitment, defined by the given target. For example, many statements in the Summit’s documents specify both a policy instrument and a corresponding welfare target. For example, the following statement consists of two separate policy instruments and one welfare target.
“We pledge to reduce our dependence on imported energy (welfare target) through conservation (policy instrument #1) and the development of alternative energy sources (policy instrument #2).”
This statement classifies as one discrete commitment because it contains only one welfare target.
It is not necessary to extract a policy instrument and a corresponding welfare target in every case. Many welfare targets do not specify a policy instrument, and many policy instruments do not specify a welfare target. Quite often they are simply implied or inferred. For instance:
“We pledge not to increase our greenhouse gas emissions this year.”
One can infer that the reason for making this commitment is to reduce global warming or improve the environment in some way. However, a commitment can only exist if it is specified in the communiqué. It is not appropriate to create a commitment simply on the basis that it is implicit due to the existence of a corresponding policy instrument or welfare target.
The discreteness test is important in determining how many commitments fall under one statement. The question the coder must ask him/herself when determining if two statements should be classified as one or two commitments is: “Would I use different data to determine compliance for the two statements?” If the answer is yes, then they represent two separate commitments. If the answer is no, then they represent a single commitment. The statement below, for example, is split into three parts (e.g. ‘New Efforts in World Trade’, ‘New Efforts in Monetary Matters’, ‘New Efforts in Exploiting Raw Materials’), and therefore assessed as three commitments.
“We also concentrated on the need for new efforts in the areas of world trade, monetary matters and raw materials, including energy”.
Second, commitments must be sufficiently specific and the target needs to be both identifiable and measurable. Targets can include changes in members' behaviour, in the behaviour of other countries or classes, in international organizations or private actors, or in general conditions. General statements of aspiration are excluded, while statements with specified parameters are included.
When assessing the Summit’s communiqués and declarations, the following points are helpful in determining how to identify measurable commitments:
|Commitment = |No Commitment = |
|“…call on…” |“…welcome…” |
|“…agree...” |“…encourage…” |
|“…pledge…” |“…reflected upon…” |
|“…seek…” |“… discussed…” |
|“…reaffirm commitment...” |“… are aware…” |
|“…urge…” |“…look forward to…” |
|“…create…” |“…emphasize…” |
|“…ought to/should…” |“…recognize importance…” |
|“…insist on…” |“…we gave particular emphasis to…” |
|“…must renew…” |“…promote…” |
| |“… united in determination…” |
| |“… should stand ready to…” |
| |“…need to address…” |
| |“… express confidence in…” |
| |“… support…” |
A statement that uses the term “pledge” or “commit” is not a commitment if it is not measurable to the extent that the “measurability rule” is satisfied. It is important to note that it is not always necessary for a commitment to be numerically or quantitatively measurable (although quantitativeness is generally sufficient to ensure the “measurability test” is satisfied). Non-quantitative statements such as the following should be classified as a commitment:
“We look to an orderly and fruitful increase in our economic relations with socialist countries as an important element in progress in détente.”
Many statements in the communiqué use the verb “should”.
“Our capacity to deal with short-term oil market problems should be improved, particularly through the holding of adequate levels of stocks”.
In real life, “should” does not always imply intent. When coding Summit documents, however, it is safe to assume that should does imply a commitment to do what is specified. Hence, “should” statements are classified as commitments if they meet the other appropriate criteria.
Third, commitments must be future-oriented, rather than represent endorsements of previous action. However, pledges that "we will continue to..." are included, because they indicate a bound pattern for future action. They rest on an assumption that in the absence of Summit reaffirmation or re-articulation each year, they would normally expire (or be taken less seriously and dwindle). Excluded are actions or decisions in the past that the Summit members "welcome".
Fourth, while action by Summit members is assumed to be required in the future, this does not need to be specified. Verbal instructions to international institutions, issued at the time of the Summit in the passive – "The WTO should pay more attention to the environment" – are included as there is an assumption that Summit members will take action to move toward this result. There is also a specified actor target and welfare target.
Excluded are statements that identify the agenda or priority of issues ("sustainable development is a critical concern", "this conference is a landmark one"), or even descriptions that contain logical language or that set parameters, ("debt relief helps promote democracy").
Finally, who is “we”? The G8 often state that international institutions or groups other than themselves should take a particular course of action. If it is understood to mean that the G8 countries will try to pressure for a course of action from within the institution they are part of, then this entails a commitment. If they are simply giving a suggestion to another country or institution to which they do not have sufficient influence over, then it should not be coded as a commitment.
|Who is "we"? |Who is not "we"? |
|(code as a commitment) |(do not code as a commitment) |
|We should…. |They should… |
|The OECD should… |Other members of the OECD should… |
|NATO should… |Africa should… |
|The World Bank/IMF should… |Developing Countries should… |
|The United Nations should… |All states should… |
Example: This is a commitment:
“We strongly encourage closer cooperation between the IMF and World Bank”.
Example: This is not a commitment:
Trade plays a key role in development. We encourage the developing countries, especially the newly industrializing economies, to undertake increased commitments and obligations and a greater role in the GATT, commensurate with their importance in international trade and in the international adjustment process, as well as with their respective stages of development.
Note: If the G8 specifies a carrot and/or stick (e.g. structural adjustment as a condition of debt-restructuring) with which they will influence other countries, then this is typically sufficient to justify a commitment. E.g. “The industrialized economies will open up their markets as part of structural adjustment. Debt-relief will be provided on the basis of them doing so.”
b. How to Identify Commitments for the G8 Student Group
The G8 Student Group identifies commitments based on the aforementioned criteria. However, several other components should be mentioned as well.
First, a member or group of members from the G8 Student Group must identify the commitments from the G8 Communiqué. This is done by following the abovementioned guidelines and practices.
c. How to Measure the Overall Significance of a Commitment
There tend to be numerous commitments, often hundreds, in the G8 Communiqués released in the leaders’ names at each Summit. Because of this, it is useful to assess each according to their ambition and signification. Here one asks about the following:
1. Ambition--How far-reaching is the commitment?
2. Timeliness--Does the commitment address current issues?
3. Clarity--Is the commitment easily identifiable and measurable?
While the sheer number of commitments can give a useful indication of how productive a Summit is on reaching agreement (creating co-operation), it is important to know how ambitious these commitments were, both individually and overall. Work thus far on commitments has now dealt with the degree of ambition of the commitments, treating instead each individual commitment as being of equal importance (Kokotsis 1999, Kokotsis and Daniels 1999, Juncevic). To make this analytic advance, it is important to develop a scale of level of ambition by which each individual commitment can be scored. The following are some proposed criteria that might be incorporated into such a scale.
1. No Backsliding versus new forward movement
2. Instruments versus targets are included
3. Includes both a target and a timetable
4. Using existing international institutions versus creating new ones
5. Relating to a new agenda or principle rather than an old agenda or principle.
d. What are Compliance Catalysts?
For analytical purposes, it is also useful to assess each commitment for the number and type of compliance catalysts they contain. Compliance catalysts are words, phrases, or factors that are embedded in and guide a commitment. They provide instruction(s) on how to implement, proceed or comply with the commitment. There are a number of different compliance catalysts that can appear within a commitment, and at times, more than one catalyst will appear (Kirton 2006, Kirton et al. 2007). Compliance catalysts include the following types of catalysts:
Priority Placement: When a commitment is placed in the chapeau, preface or is stated in the Chair’s Summary it is considered priority placement.
Past Reference: These refer to commitments that mention past summits or past promises. They are considered iterations. For example, just like at Evian, we stress… (from a more recent summit)
Past Reference to Ministerial: These refer to commitments that make reference ministerial meetings or documents. See above catalyst.
Target: When a commitment refers to a set goal, percentage or numerical allocation it is considered a target. For instance, we will reduce… or we will cut in half…
Time Tables: When a commitment refers to a set date, it is considered a time table. This can be short term (Single-year timetable) or long term (multi-year timetable). Some may break down the commitment even further, over ten year for example, with intra shorter-term goals, say one year intervals.
Self-monitoring: These refer to commitments that require monitoring by the G8 countries. For example, we will continue to monitor…
Remit mandates: These include commitments that refer to future assessment, most often at a future summit.
Money mobilized: When a commitment refers to funds or a set dollar value it is considered money mobilized. For instance, we commit to replenishing…, or we commit to double aid for…
Specified Agents: When a commitment refers to a specified agent through which it will work with or through it is considered to be involving an agent. Example: with developing countries.
G8-body: an agent that was created by the G8 to deal with particular issue areas. Example: Gleneagles dialogue.
G8 Ministerial: When a commitment refers to a ministerial meeting.
Core International Institution/Organization: an agent that was not created by the G8, but works with the G7/8 and deals with the particular issue in the commitment. For example, in the area of health, this would include the World Health Organization (WHO).
Other International Institution/Organization: an agent that was not created by the G8, but works with the G8 on particular issues and is not the core institution that usually deals with the particular issue in the commitment. For example, a health commitment that involves the World Bank.
Legal Instruments: When a commitment states that it will work through a legal instrument, the International Criminal Court (ICC) for example, it is considered a legal instrument.
International Law: International Law includes both general references to international law and references to specific legal instruments (Kyoto, for example). Only codified law, not customary law, is included since it is neither specific or binding within the international setting (the content of the codified instrument has international agreements that take clear precedence over national discretion). Example of this catalyst include the following: Charters, Conventions, Treaties, Protocols, Declarations, Agreements, Frameworks, Guidelines, Internationally Recognized Principles or Standards. Also included are the Millennium Development Goals and calls for the implementation or development of specific international legal instruments.
3. What are Priority Commitments?
Priority commitments are commitments that are determined a ‘priority’ in the sense that they together best capture what the G8 summit as a whole did on the decision-making dimension of its global governance. They are therefore measured for compliance during the subsequent year. Due to the vast number of commitments that appear in a communiqué, it is impossible to measure every commitment for compliance. Therefore, it is important to be able to choose commitments that best capture the essence of the summit communiqué and do so in a reasonably representative way. The G8 Research Group determines how many commitments it will be able to measure for the upcoming year (based on the number individuals available as compliance assessors, access to reliable information and other available resources). Once this number has been determined, a number of interested parties, including the G8 Research Group Executive, the G8 Research Group Student Executive, including the Compliance Chair(s) from the University of Toronto, the G8 Research Group Administrators, G8 Research Group affiliate members from the Higher School of Economics in Moscow, Tor Veta University in Italy, and the Shanghai International Studies University in China, members from Civil Society Groups such as the Canadian Council of Churches and Green Cross, and government officials who choose to participate, select and rank commitments which they believe are a priority from the standpoint of their particular purposes for the year’s summit overall.
The following provides a set of guidelines for how to choose priority commitments on a primary, secondary, and tertiary basis. Other considerations may also be applied, especially in relation to civil society and government groups who may tend to choose commitments that reflect their own interests. These guidelines cover both the composite set of priority commitments selected and the individual commitments that make them up.
a. How to Choose Priority Commitments
Primary Selection Criteria. Priority commitments should be chosen in terms of their importance in the summit, the G8 and the world at large. At least two commitments should be chosen from each of the priority themes for the summit being assessed. Priority commitments should, collectively, be comprehensive. They should come from the economic, global and political-security domains. At least one should come from each part of the traditional, built-in agenda (i.e. finance, macroeconomics, microeconomics, trade, development, environment/climate change, energy, crime and drugs, terrorism, arms control and proliferation, regional security, international institutional reform). There should be balance amongst the priority commitments. Priority commitments should be selected from each of the separate documents issued at the summit (that contain commitments). The number of priority commitments selected from each document should roughly reflect the percentage of overall commitments from that document at the summit as a whole. For example, if twenty percent of the commitments come from the growth and development document, then approximately twenty percent of the priority commitments should come from that same document. Priority commitments should include those that reflect current crises as well as preventative measures, and long term change. Priority commitments should include commitments that affect the G8 members, non-G8 members and the world as a whole. At least one priority commitment should reflect domestic intrusiveness within distant countries such as Kosovo, Sudan, Zimbabwe or Iran. There should be a range of levels reflected amongst the priority commitments of analysis from individual country action to the structure of global governance as a whole. They should take into account the preparatory process of the summit. They should take into account past commitments, so that comparisons and extended compliance can be monitored (see Appendix J). They should also consider the priority themes for next years summit, when they have already been announced by the host for that year. They should take into consideration current scientific research, such as compliance catalysts mentioned in the previous section.
Secondary Selection Criteria. Secondary selection criteria are to be taken into consideration only after primary selection criteria have been applied. Commitments should be chosen that take into account the key interests of the Heiligendamm Process Partners (historically referred to as the Group of 5, Outreach 5 and Plus 5), so that monitoring and comparison can be made with these respective countries. Individual, as well as collective compliance should be considered. The ability to commit fully to the commitment within a year can and should be considered to simplify the compliance analysis. Availability of reliable information can be considered as it assists in the accuracy of the compliance report. Commitments should be selected for which interpretive guidelines already exist or can be constructed easily.
Tertiary Selection Criteria. Once primary and secondary selection criteria have been applied for primary commitment selection, tertiary selection criteria may also be applied. These include: significance as identified by scientific teams in the host country, significance as identified by experts in the host country, and significance as identified by relevant ministries and G8 team members in the host country.
4. What Constitutes Summit Compliance?
Given the definition of a commitment, what constitutes Summit compliance?
"First order compliance" is national government action geared towards the domestic implementation of the necessary formal legislative and administrative regulations designed to execute Summit commitments. National governments alter their own behaviour and that of their societies and outsiders, in order to reach Summit-specified welfare targets.
Compliance requires conscious new or altered effort by national governments in the post-Summit period. Summit members must actively and consciously endeavour to implement the provisions contained in Summit communiqués. Should a government arrive at fulfilling one of its Summit commitments by chance, this does not constitute compliance.
Compliance is measured according to governmental actions designed to modify existing instruments within the executive branch to accommodate the commitments reached. Compliance therefore requires new or altered efforts by national governments where leaders very actively and consciously plan to implement their G8 commitments. These actions need to be deliberate. A commitment can be said to have been fully complied with if a Summit member succeeds in achieving the specific goal set out in the commitment. However, there can still be varying degrees of compliance in the absence of a complete fulfillment of the commitment. Compliance is therefore assessed according to the following criteria:
Official reaffirmation
Reaffirmation of a Summit commitment is made by individuals working in an official capacity. This may occur either at the national or international context. The government demonstrates its intention to fulfill a Summit commitment by stating its plans to include the commitment in the national agenda. By publicly referring to a Summit commitment, through internal policy debates, speeches or press releases, a leader legitimizes the commitment. Such evidence of remembrance indicates that officials are still mindful of the Summit commitment. A reaffirmation of a G8 commitment represents moral suasion to inside and outside officials as well as the public.
Internal bureaucratic review and representation
The earlier remembrance and reaffirmation of the G8 commitment are then backed by review -- a systematic monitoring mechanism that includes processes such as public consultation. A national government internally reviews the Summit commitment through a formal policy review or the formation of a task force or working group. Personnel are assigned to these tasks and are given new negotiating mandates. These persons are charged with studying and implementing the commitment. Any new diplomatic initiatives required to reach the welfare target are launched.
Budgetary and resource allocations are made or changed
A national government allocates, or diverts from another use, a notable sum of its own money for the purpose of achieving the commitment. Further alterations are made with regard to the distribution of money and other resources to international organizations from the national government.
New or altered programs, legislation and regulations
Broader changes are made in fiscal and monetary policy, to the extent that governments control the latter. International negotiating positions are changed. Programs, necessary for the implementation of the Summit commitment are introduced or altered. Recommendations are made for increased research and development projects.
Over-implementation
Over-implementation occurs when a national government surpasses the established welfare target. This may be desirable if over-implementation compensates for the failures of other Summit members (for example, decreasing one's carbon dioxide emissions by 10% instead of 5% as outlined in the communiqué will be beneficial to other states). However, over-implementation is not always advantageous as it can produce a runaway syndrome.
Although most G8 communiqués contain a number of commitments across a wide range of issues, in order to make the compliance studies more manageable, the reports are limited to one (or, at the most, two) "core" commitments for each of the selected issue areas. "Core" commitments are determined according to three criteria:
1. ambition — how far-reaching is the commitment?
2. timeliness — does the commitment address current or "hot" issues?
3. clarity — is the commitment easily identifiable and measurable?
5. Measuring Compliance
How do we measure compliance? The compliance studies build on the methodology first developed by George Von Furstenberg and Joseph Daniels in “The Meaning and Reliability of Economic Summit Undertakings, 1975-1989” and essentially follow a three-level measurement process:
1. Full or nearly full compliance with a commitment is assigned a score of +1.
2. A score of -1 indicates complete or nearly complete failure to implement a commitment.
3. An "inability to commit” or a "work in progress" is given a score of 0.
An "inability to commit" refers to factors outside of the executive branch that impede implementation. A "work in progress" refers to an initiative that has been launched by a government but has not yet been completed by the time of the next Summit, and whose results therefore cannot be judged.
What Is the Compliance Time Frame?
Commitments are assessed from the conclusion of one Summit to the beginning of the next – so the time frame spans one year. Why? Because commitments in the leaders’ documents are made on an annual basis, so the span of one full year is used to assess whether compliance has in fact occurred. Some commitments may be “re-iterated” - which means they were made at previous Summits but haven’t yet been completed because one year didn’t allow enough time for their implementation. If the leaders re-iterate their commitments, they are still counted as distinct commitments and hence measured.
A one year time frame also coincides with the annual cycle of national political agendas – such as budgets and state of the union addresses – which vary from year to year - so the annual Summit cycle accounts for variations that occur on a yearly basis.
6. Interpretive Guidelines for Compliance Measurement
The compliance scale (+1,-1, 0) and timeline have been established, the next step is to identify a set of interpretive guidelines. Interpretive guidelines help individuals score commitments for compliance. While commitments change on a year-to-year basis, there are several general categories that commitments tend to fit within that can help determine how to score commitments. Other times, common concerns and questions arise in regards to the commitments, and these should also fit within the interpretive guidelines and categories. Such categories include the following:
Multiyear Financial Commitments
Multiyear financial commitments are commitments that declare they are going to give a set amount of money over a set number of years. There have been a number of these commitments that have been measured for compliance in the past. In 2006, a commitment on the Global Partnership and Non-proliferation serves as one example: “We remain committed to our pledges in Kananaskis to raise up to $20 billion through 2012 for the Global Partnership, initially in Russia, to support projects to address priority areas identified in Kananaskis and to continue to turn these pledges into concrete actions.” Another example comes from the 2005 priority commitments: “Supporting the Polio Eradication Initiative for the post eradication period in 2006-8 through continuing or increasing our own contributions toward the $829 million target and mobilizing the support of others.”
In these instances, formulas should be established based on initial commitments that measure how much money should be given by each actor. These should first and foremost be based on what it actually says in the commitment. If different countries commit different amounts of money, or if the commitment states that funds will based on country GDP, this is what should be measured. However, this formula should not be applied if it is not explicitly stated in the text of the commitment. In particular, assessments of funding should take into account a government’s previous pledges with regards to the specific topic. This is important when various funding formulas are possible, such as lump-sum funding versus annual disbursements. The author of the Interpretive Guidelines should ascertain which funding structures have been declared permissible by the recipients/brokers of the funds in question.
A simple linear model should not be used to evaluate multi-year financial commitments. First, such a model is contrary to the geometric progression of many budget allocations (i.e. many governments plan on year-on-year percentage increases rather than set increases in the absolute value of their disbursements). Secondly, linear models understate the nominal commitments made by governments. In inflationary environments, governments will have to provide increasingly large nominal disbursements in order to ensure that the same quantity of resources is targeted at a specific issue or problem. As such, it is preferable to have a geometric progression of the increases in resources committed to a specific issue area. This geometric progression should take into account inflationary trends if these are problematic (i.e. inflation of 5% or more per year). For example, if G8 countries promise to double ODA funds over 6 years, the ideal progression of increases should not be assumed to be 18% of the initial year for each of the 6 years. Rather, the ideal progression should be assumed to be 12.5% year on year in the ODA budget, controlling for inflation. In other words, the current year’s ODA budget should be deflated to last year’s price level and a +1 award only if the increase from last year’s budget is approximately 12.5% or higher. This allows for analysts to consider a country’s actions on two levels: progress towards the stated goal since the commitment was first made; and changes in progress from one year to the next. A +1 may therefore also be awarded if the year-on-year increase is considerably smaller than 12.5% but previous increases in ODA budgets have been far greater than expected.
The following is an illustration of the various funding mechanisms that might be employed in the fulfillment of a multiyear financial commitment. The hypothetical situation is one in which a funding initiative with a baseline value of $1 billion is to be doubled over six years.
|Year |Even Yearly Payments |Geometric Progression |Random Progression |Lump-Sum |
|0 |$1 billion |$1 billion |$1 billion |$1 billion |
|1 |$1.17 billion |$1.12 billion |$1.4 billion |$2 billion |
|2 |$1.34 billion |$1.26 billion |$1.4 billion |$2 billion |
|3 |$1.5 billion |$1.41 billion |$1.5 billion |$2 billion |
|4 |$1.67 billion |$1.59 billion |$1.65 billion |$2 billion |
|5 |$1.84 billion |$1.78 billion |$1.8 billion |$2 billion |
|6 |$2 billion |$2 billion |$2 billion |$2 billion |
The crux of evaluation, therefore, is to determine if (1) progress has been made towards the ultimate goal; and (2) if it is still feasible for the given country to achieve that goal. These two criteria can be met under any one of the four funding schemes shown above.
Multiyear ‘Other’ Commitments
Multiyear ‘other’ commitments are commitments that declare they are going to accomplish a non-monetary goal over a set number of years. There have been a number of these commitments that have been measured for compliance in the past. In 2000 one such commitment read as follows: “We therefore commit ourselves in working in strengthened partnership with governments, the World Health Organization (WHO) and other international organizations and other relevant actors in civil society to deliver three critical UN targets: a) reduce the number of HIV/AIDS-infected young people by 25% by 2010; b) Reduce TB deaths and prevalence of the disease by 50% by 2010; c) reduce the burden of disease associated with malaria by 2010.”
In these instances, formulas should be established based on initial commitments that measure how much should be done by each actor. These should first and foremost be based on what it actually says in the commitment. If different countries commit different levels of involvement, or if the commitment states that actions will be taken through an allocated organization, this is what should be measured. Next, a simple model which assumes equal distribution of action over the set length of the commitment should be established. If an actor fails to commit to the previously promised action(s) or it fails to commit in any new way and is behind the minimum formula, it will receive a score of -1. If a country takes new actions and is behind on the minimum funding formula it will receive a 0. If an actor commits in new ways and/or is ahead or on track with the formula it will receive a score or +1. It should be noted that in multiyear ‘other’ commitment cases, funding may be an indicator of compliance, but does not necessary need to be, if the commitment itself does not specify funds as part of the action.
Double Counting
Over the years, concerns have arisen over ‘double counting.’ Double counting refers to actors who consider a single contribution as fulfillment of more than one commitment. Most recently this concern refers to ODA and debt relief. It should first be noted that at the Gleneagles Summit in 2005 when such initiatives took form, it was outright established that ODA and debt relief were to be considered separately. And it can be assumed that because the commitments are referred to separately in the communiqués, they are indeed meant to be committed to individually. For instance, in the 2007 Heiligendamm document, commitments for debt relief and ODA were both identified, and there were done so separately (Commitment 143 stating: “These include the historic multilateral debt relief of up to US $60 billion, the implementation of which is now well underway. Commitment 144 stating: “They also include increasing, compared to 2004, with other donors, ODA to Africa by US $25 billion a year by 2010.”). Therefore, funding allocation must be specified to each area by each actor to be considered compliance in both areas. Any indication by an actor that one donation should be considered to fulfill more than one commitment is not the case, and should be considered for only one commitment. See the DCD-DAC branch of the OECD for more information: .
Burden Sharing
Actors are to be held responsible according to their relative capability at the time of the Summit. Although relative capability may change from the time of the Summit to when commitments are measured for compliance, commitments are made with the understanding that certain situations and crises may arise in the future that cause changes in the respective countries/areas. Governing officials are aware of this possibility, and therefore no excuse(s) should be interpreted, justified or accepted for not complying with a commitment, and no adjustments should be made to compensate for changes in capability (in regards to an actors level of allocation, whether it be funding or otherwise).
The relative weight of individual countries’ contributions should not be determined based on PPP GDP alone, unless explicitly stated in the commitment. This method is deceptive, as GDP represents the total wealth of the economy, held by the public and private sectors, and by nationals and foreigners alike. A preferable method is to use the PPP value of the various governments’ revenues, which is a better metric of fiscal capacity to fund new projects or increase funding of existing initiatives. Although the ordinal ranking of the G8 member states is not altered substantially by using revenues instead of GDP, the proportional weight of each country changes considerably when revenues are used instead of GDP:
|Member |GDP (PPP, 2007) |Ranking by GDP |Proportion of |Government Revenue |Ranking by |Proportion of total |
| | | |total GDP |(PPP, 2007) |Revenue |fiscal capacity |
|Canada |$1.27 trillion |8 |4.2% |$0.57 trillion |7 |5.8% |
|France |$2.07 trillion |6 |6.8% |$1.31 trillion |4 |13.3% |
|Germany |$2.83 trillion |3 |9.3% |$1.47 trillion |2 |15.0% |
|Italy |$1.8 trillion |7 |5.9% |$0.98 trillion |6 |10.0% |
|Japan |$4.34 trillion |2 |14.3% |$1.46 trillion |3 |14.9% |
|Russia |$2.08 trillion |5 |6.8% |$0.30 trillion |8 |3.1% |
|United States |$13.86 trillion |1 |45.6% |$2.57 trillion |1 |26.2% |
|United Kingdom|$2.15 trillion |4 |7.1% |$1.16 trillion |5 |11.8% |
|European Union|$14.45 trillion | | |N/A |N/A | |
Glossary of Terms
Words or phrases used in commitments should be interpreted as they are meant. Words and/or phrases that have a deeper underlying meaning and cannot be understood upon first reading should be researched and interpreted as the leader’s intended. If a word or phrase is still ambiguous the following can be used as a guide for how to interpret and measure such word and/or phrases.
Significantly: when a commitment states that it will achieve or work ‘significantly’ or in a ‘significant way’ the work must be meaningful or to an important degree, suggesting it must matter in the eyes of the public. It must not occur by accident or chance and therefore it should be statistically significant.
Universal: when a commitment states a target of ‘universal’ access it should be interpreted to mean all of the intended group. It should not be interpreted to mean a partial or percentage of the whole. It should not be interpreted to mean a small amount or a minority.
Access: access should be interpreted to mean the right to obtain or make use of the entity in reference. In terms of health, according to the World Health Organisation “Access” is a broad concept, which, measures three dimensions of key health sector interventions:
1. Availability, defined in terms of the reachability (physical access), affordability (economic access) and acceptability (socio-cultural access) of services that meet a minimum standard of quality. Making services available, affordable and acceptable is an essential precondition for universal access.
2. Coverage, defined as the proportion of a population needing an intervention who receive it. Coverage is influenced by supply (provision of services) and by demand from people in need of services.
3. Impact, defined as reduced new infection rates or as improvements in survival. It results from the coverage of services, modulated by the efficiency and effectiveness of interventions and changes in other relevant factors. Impact goals have been set in the context of the MDGs.
Close as possible: should be interpreted to mean to come near or close to the goal without there being a major hindrance, obstacle or circumstance of some kind. It should not be interpreted to mean any effort made.
Scaling up: should be interpreted to mean progression or movement forward. It does not include past or previous performance. It does not include action already taken. It can include past measures if further or additional attention is applied to them.
Defeat: should be interpreted to mean to overcome or eliminate.
Substantially: an ample or considerable amount in the eyes of the public. Considered of importance. It should be essential to the whole. It should not be minimal or small in comparison to the other parts.
Few: should be interpreted to mean not many, but more than one. An indefinitely small number.
Meaningful: should be interpreted to mean in an important or significant way. See significantly for further instruction.
Realistic: should be interpreted to mean practical or obtainable. It should not be interpreted to mean far-reaching or ideal.
Equitable: should be interpreted to mean fair and just as indicated by law.
Effectively: should be interpreted to mean operating in a way that produces the intended result. It does not mean any effort, especially thoughtless ones.
Promote – when a commitment states that it will promote, it should be interpreted to mean that it will either support or renew old efforts or create new efforts in the area. It should not have to be have to be a brand new initiative.
Implement – when a reference is made to ‘implement,’ it should be interpreted to mean taking steps forward. While the commitment may be a part of a longer-term initiative and actions on it may continue into the prolonged future, steps need to be taken in the near future to be considered implementation. This should not, therefore, be interpreted to mean only prolonged or delayed action.
Make Efforts – when a commitment states it will ‘make efforts,’ this should be interpreted to mean efforts in the immediate future. It could be based on old efforts, but new steps or initiatives need to accompany the commitment. It should not be interpreted to apply to compliance that has already taken place in the area.
Work towards – when a commitment states it will ‘work towards’ this should be interpreted to mean that actors are applying international diplomacy, such as drafting proposals, putting forth new ideas, encouraging new initiatives, etc. It does not include putting forward no effort, resisting or destroying efforts put forth by other actors, or merely tagging along with the consensus reached.
Certain – when a reference is made to a ‘certain’ entity or group of entities, there is a specific actor/group that is being referenced. In these cases, additional information should be obtained from sources to clarify the member(s) referenced. It should not be interpreted to mean all countries.
Moving forward – when a reference is made to ‘moving forward’ it should be interpreted to mean taking additional steps and should include new initiatives in the area. It should not include past compliance efforts, or continued fulfillment of old promises.
Urgently– when a reference states it must be employed urgently, it should be interpreted as a short-term initiative that should be put into action in the present and/or very near future. It should not include prolonged and/or delayed efforts and compliance.
Initiate – when a commitments states that it will ‘initiate,’ it should be interpreted to mean new efforts. It should not apply to old efforts or initiatives that have been referred to in the past.
Increasing – when a commitment indicates that it will ‘increase’ efforts, it should be interpreted to mean additional efforts to an old commitment. It should not be interpreted as adding new efforts in new ways.
Develop – when a commitment states it will ‘develop,’ it should be interpreted to mean that a new initiative will be established in the area. It should not apply to old initiatives.
Meet shortfalls – when a commitment states it will ‘meet shortfalls,’ it should be interpreted as referring to past initiatives that have failed to be met. It should not be interpreted to apply to new initiatives or old initiatives that have met full compliance.
Remain committed or reaffirm commitment – refers to commitments that have been established in the past. It should not be considered a new initiative, however new efforts in the area should be made.
Take concrete steps – when a commitment states that it will take concrete steps, it should be interpreted to mean visible new steps, which could apply to new or old initiatives. It should not be interpreted to mean questionable compliance or half-hearted actions.
Continue to provide – refers to commitments that are established and implemented. It should be interpreted to mean new actions will be added to the already existing ones. It should not be interpreted to mean no new allocations.
Improve – when a commitment states that it will ‘improve’ it should be interpreted to mean that old initiatives will be updated. It should not be interpreted to mean a brand new initiative.
Measure – when a commitment states that is will ‘measure’ it should be interpreted to mean that steps should be made towards something that is measurable. It should be clear and not vague. It should be shown that measurement is possible, either by past examples, or clear descriptions of how it will be implemented in the future.
7. Interpretive Guidelines
Interpretive Guidelines should be written by a single individual (the Director of Compliance Studies) as soon as possible after the confirmation of the final list of commitments to be assessed in the current year’s compliance report. This ensures consistency in the language and level of detail used for all commitments. The Interpretive Guidelines should also be marked as draft until they are reviewed by the various components of the Group (Chair, Management, and partners at the Higher School of Economics in Moscow). Analysts should be sent the draft Guidelines soon after selection of Group members has been completed, and they should be sent the final version of the Guidelines once all corrections and feedback have been incorporated into the document.
Anatomy of a Typical Interpretive Guideline
The Interpretive Guideline should consist of four components: (1) the actual commitment text, drawn from the most recent commitment bank; (2) a breakdown of the commitment text and explanation of the components, with definitions if necessary; (3) a background section on the commitment topic; and (4) scoring guidelines specific to the commitment.
Although the Interpretive Guidelines have not included citations in the past, it is advisable that future versions of the Interpretive Guidelines include footnotes for the commitment text, background section and commitment breakdown (if necessary). The Interpretive Guidelines are frequently posted along with the Interim and Final Compliance Report. Citations help to ensure that the material can be verified and they also reduce the workload of editors for the Interim Compliance Report, as the Interpretive Guidelines background sections are used by team leaders as the basis of the background sections in the Interim Compliance Report.
Writing the Interpretive Guidelines
The commitment text component is self-explanatory. The Director of Compliance should use only the text included in the Commitment Bank. This may or may not include the context sections placed in square brackets in the Commitment Bank.
Commitment Breakdown
The commitment breakdown is an important precursor to the scoring guidelines. It provides a concise study of the goals of the commitment and the tools or policy that are to be employed in the completion of the goals.
For example, Commitment 2007-65:
“To this end, we will promote the appropriate policy approaches and instruments, including inter alia economic incentives and sound fiscal policies, minimum standards for energy efficiency, sound and ambitious energy performance labelling, information campaigns aimed at consumers and industry that enhance national awareness, sector-based voluntary commitments agreed with industry, investment in research and development and guidelines for public procurement.”
The breakdown for this commitment was as follows:
Although the energy efficiency commitment is large, the action to which the G8 member states have committed is quite simple: the promotion of appropriate policies and instruments in order to foster energy efficiency. These measures include, but are not limited to:
1) “economic incentives and sound fiscal policies”, i.e. fiscally sustainable subsidies;
2) “minimum standards for energy efficiency”
3) “sound and ambitious energy performance labeling”
4) “information campaigns aimed at consumers and industry”
5) “sector-based voluntary commitments”
6) “investment in research and development”
7) “guidelines for public procurement”
The use of the phrase “inter alia” implies that these are not the only policies or instruments that may be employed to fulfill this commitment.
The breakdown is not simply a reorganization of the commitment. It should separate the commitment into two parts: (1) goals to be attained; (2) means by which those goals are to be reached. In the case of the above commitment, the second component is easy, as the commitment itself contains the means of encouraging energy efficiency. As well, the actors and parties involved should be made explicit. In the above example, the only actors are the G8 member states. Sometimes, however, the commitments call for several different parties to be addressed. Commitment 2007-80 highlights this issue:
“At the same time we remain firmly committed to providing the necessary support to the ASF for its core military capabilities, which require increased investment by troop contributors and donors alike.”
The commitment makes explicit mention of the African Standby Force and “contributors and donors”. This is made clear in the commitment breakdown:
The commitment contains one action, “providing the necessary support to the ASF for its core military capabilities”. One aspect of this action requires “increased investment” from both troop contributors (i.e. more troops for the African Standby Force) and from donors (i.e. more funds). Fulfillment is not limited to these actions and may take other forms, but these two forms of compliance are prioritized.
Some of the commitments contain technical terms or jargon that may not be readily understood by laypeople or by those not familiar with the given commitment topic. Confusion may be avoided by clarifying this language in the commitment breakdown. For example, the 2007 commitment on renewable energy, 2007-90:
“We will make efforts to integrate renewables into the power grid,”
The breakdown for this commitment clarifies what is meant by the phrase “power grid”, which is core to the commitment but not widely understood by those without technical knowledge:
There are two components to watch in this commitment:
1) The energy sources integrated must be renewable: solar, biomass, hydro, wind and geothermal power are all examples of such renewable source energies. So called clean sources, like nuclear power or clean coal, are not acceptable.
2) They must be integrated into a power grid for widespread distribution. This means that the power is consumed by someone other than just the producer.
Thus, the commitment breakdowns should provide textual analysis of the commitments with the goal of clarifying the meaning rather than the context of the commitment. Context is to be addressed in the background section.
Background for a given commitment
The commitment breakdowns are often not sufficient to provide analysts with the information needed to understand the evolution of a commitment or the context in which the commitment was created. Background sections help to fill this knowledge gap. Unlike the breakdown sections, these parts of the Interpretive Guidelines should have historical components and should examine the evolution of the commitment topic – including areas that are not explicitly mentioned in the commitment text. Although the background section may include general information, it should always contain the names of the documents from previous summits in which the topic appeared.
This does not mean that issues that have not been addressed at previous summits should have small or superficial background sections. Rather, information should be taken from the organizations that do work in the relevant field. For example, UNIFEM and the UN were used as sources for information on which the background section of the 2007 Sexual and Reproduction Education (2007-233) commitment was based.
Scoring Guidelines
The scoring guidelines are both the most controversial and the most important part of the Interpretive Guidelines. They provide Team Leaders and Analysts with instruction on how to weigh the various components of their reports and come up with an evaluation that they feel accurately reflects the progress of a given country towards the completion of the promises and goals included in the commitment.
The general guidelines for scoring are as follows:
|-1 |No progress towards compliance or actions counter to compliance |
|0 |Partial compliance with the stated goals of the commitment |
|+1 |Complete or near complete compliance with the stated goals of the commitment |
Although not explicitly stated, countries that are constitutionally prohibited from complying with a commitment (i.e. Canada with commitments on the minutiae of financial regulation) have been awarded a score of 0. The scoring guidelines should include this information when there is a potential for a government to be constitutionally limited in its actions.
Similarly, if a country has already fulfilled all components of a commitment, it should be awarded a score of +1. Such situations may arise in commitments concerning trade, convention/treaty ratifications, economic reforms or “consultations” (i.e. a commitment to hold consultations on a specific reform or policy) and are fairly rare. In general, commitments contain at least one component that has not been completed in full by any of the G8 member states. Nevertheless, if this caveat may be added into the scoring guidelines if it is likely to affect compliance with a specific commitment, such as for simple, single action commitments calling for the ratification (but not implementation) of a convention.
The scoring guidelines included in the Interpretive Guidelines should be tailored to each of the commitments. Do not seek to include extremely detailed information about the actions that have been taken in the past to meet the specified goals of the commitment – such information should be provided by the team leader. Rather, use the components of the commitment outlined in the Commitment Breakdown section in generalized examples for each of the scores listed above.
For example, commitment 2007-65, Energy: Efficiency, has a number of components:
Although the energy efficiency commitment is large, the action to which the G8 member states have committed is quite simple: the promotion of appropriate policies and instruments in order to foster energy efficiency. These measures include, but are not limited to:
1) “economic incentives and sound fiscal policies”, i.e. fiscally sustainable subsidies;
2) “minimum standards for energy efficiency”
3) “sound and ambitious energy performance labeling”
4) “information campaigns aimed at consumers and industry”
5) “sector-based voluntary commitments”
6) “investment in research and development”
7) “guidelines for public procurement”
The use of the phrase “inter alia” implies that these are not the only policies or instruments that may be employed to fulfill this commitment.
The corresponding scoring guidelines are:
|-1 |Country implements no new measures for the encouragement of energy efficiency. |
|0 |Country implements few new policies directed towards energy efficiency. State concentrates exclusively on |
| |encouraging energy efficiency among consumer or industry, but not both. |
|+1 |Country implements widespread new policies to encourage energy efficiency among consumers and producers. New |
| |policies include a variety of instruments, both pecuniary and non-pecuniary, with varying timeframes. |
The guidelines do not use the specific components of the breakdown, but each score is supplemented by a generalized example of the sort of actions that states may take and programs implemented that warrant a given score. Remember that the scores are awarded in a holistic manner – thus individual actions rarely warrant a score on their own. A number of actions and statements must be weighed together and their cumulative effect must be evaluated before a score is awarded.
8. Interim vs. Final Compliance Reports
In 2002, the G8 Research Group completed – for the first time - an Interim Compliance Report – which focused on the extent to which the previous Summit’s commitments were complied with by the time the G8’s hosting chair had passed on to the next member – which happens on January 1 of each year.
Interim compliance studies provide an assessment of how the commitments are evolving in the post-Summit period with respect to their implementation up until January 1, when the G8 presidency changes to the next country in the hosting rotation. These reports are posted on the web and are produced as a preliminary diagnostic --- as an invitation for others to provide more complete information on their country’s compliance performance to date. Final compliance reports – typically issued 2-3 weeks prior to the next Summit, take the interim reports and build on them to assess the extent to which compliance has evolved from January 1 to the period directly prior to the next Summit. The same template is used for both the interim and final compliance reports (see Appendix G).
9. How to Write a Compliance Report
The first step when writing a compliance report is to set up a compliance template. At the top of the page clearly state the Summit period being assessed and the subject area being evaluated. Following the title, include a definition of the issue area, and a summary chart of all the commitments involved. Then provide a rationale, by country, for each of the core commitments assessed (see template below and Appendix G).
After the template is completed, the research process begins. Analysts should always familiarize themselves with the agencies and ministries responsible for the topics and issues addressed by the commitment. Commitments often span the jurisdictions of various government ministries and agencies. For example, a pledge to increase energy efficiency among consumers, businesses and generators may involve the ministries of the environment, industry, natural resources, consumer affairs and of the economy. Commitments that address development issues may require analysts to follow press releases and news stories emanating from the ministries of foreign affairs and/or international cooperation, agencies tasked with the implementation of government projects (i.e USAID, CIDA, Agenzia Italiana della Cooperazione) and non-profit organizations awarded contracts and grants by government agencies. Before serious and in-depth research can begin, analysts should have a complete list of the pertinent organizations and independent news media to follow throughout the compliance cycle.
Analysts are instructed to collect information from a restricted set of sources. Press releases and news items issued by government sources directly are to be given priority in the research process, as this allows for analysts to include information that has not been analyzed and processed by a third party in their compliance reports. Next, analysts collect information from international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and the African Union. Finally, analysts use articles from major news media from around the world. Analysts are extremely selective in their use of press sources and seek to take articles from news services that are generally recognized as being reliable and as having a strong editorial board. Furthermore, the use of online sources only for the compilation of the Compliance Report greatly enhances the ability of readers to verify the information included in the Report.
Analysts collect information about their specific commitment over a period that ranges from two to five months. The actual compilation of the compliance report does not begin until a week or two weeks prior to the due date for submission of the report to the Team Leader. This allows for analysts to include the most current and up-to-date information possible in their reports. Analysts sort through the research they have conducted and select the most current and salient items with respect to the focus of the commitment. Pertinent facts are then arranged according to relevance to the commitment, relative importance in the fulfillment of the stated commitment, and time of issuance. Statements or press releases by the Minister or ministry directly charged with compliance should come first, then those made by the Head of Government, followed by officials, ministries or agencies of lesser importance in terms of their relationship to the commitment. Similarly, statements about funding directly related to the commitment should be prioritized, followed by tangential or over-arching funding (i.e. disbursements targeted at the general commitment area rather than the specific topic), statements of support or reiteration, and joint press releases with other political figures or international organizations.
Once research has been sorted and categorized, writing the actual compliance report is a simple affair. The report must always begin with a clear statement about the actor’s performance: “Country X has complied with its commitment on Y as agreed at the Z Summit.” This statement may be followed by a brief explanation of the reasons for compliance/noncompliance, particularly if the report is long or contains a description of a large number of disparate programs. The following paragraphs should contain the information collected and arranged according to the guidelines above. Analysts are instructed to use neutral language in their reports, such that programs, statements and initiatives are presented according to their relevance to the topic at hand, rather than as a subjective evaluation of the policies and priorities of a given government. The prose of the body of the report should be clear and concise, with short sentences preferred over complex ones. Analysts should describe programs and funding with a few sentences and, if possible, provide quotes from speeches or press releases by the appropriate government officials.
All information included in the body of the compliance report must be cited. Analysts are encouraged to cite as often as they feel necessary, particularly when figures and official statements are used. Although the style of citation has undergone minor changes from one year to the next, the basic format for the footnotes included in the Report is as follows:
Title of Article, Source of Article (City of Publication) Date of Publication. Date of Access: Date Accessed.
For example, the citation for the 2005 Gleneagles Summit Document entitled Africa would be:
Africa, G8 Information Centre (Toronto) 8 July 2005. Date of Access: 15 March 2008.
The source of the article should be the organization that maintains the website on which the article was posted – regardless of whether the original document was issued by a different organization. This ensures that any discrepancies between the original document and the one used by the analyst will not be ascribed to error on the part of the analyst.
The last part of the compliance report is the concluding statement. The concluding statement should reiterate the score awarded to the actor in question and provide a brief explanation of why the score has been awarded. It should be no longer than one sentence. For example:
“Thus, Country X has been awarded a score of 0 for its contributions to Fund Y
and its lack of a comprehensive policy on Z.”
This provides a firm reassertion of main points of the compliance report.
10. Compliance Report Template
2005 Gleneagles Interim / Final Compliance Report
Define Issue Area (i.e., Development Assistance)
Commitment
Copy exact commitment, including a reference to the document it comes from as well as the year it was issued (i.e., 2005: Chair’s Statement).
Assessment
|Country |Lack of Compliance |Work in Progress |Full Compliance |
| |-1 |0 |+1 |
|Canada | | | |
|France | | | |
|Germany | | | |
|Italy | | | |
|Japan | | | |
|Russia | | | |
|United Kingdom | | | |
|United States | | | |
|European Union | | | |
|Overall Score | | | |
The overall score is determined by averaging the total scores by country and issue area and converting that score to a %. If there is a N/A (due to lack of available data), that number is excluded from the calculation.
Background
Include a brief overview of your issue area and some of the triggers leading to this commitment appearing in the final communiqué or declaration.
Individual Country Compliance Breakdown
Provide a 1/2 page–1 page compliance analytic assessment for each country, in the following order, including endnotes for each empirical reference. Include for each country concrete examples of how compliance has been achieved (if any). If compliance has not been achieved, provide a rationale (if available).
1. Canada
2. France
3. Germany
4. Italy
5. Japan
6. Russia
7. United Kingdom
8. United States
9. European Union
Compiled by [Your name, and then the names of your analysts listed alphabetically, academic institution, date of submission]
11. Special Considerations
In evaluating the results of the compliance reports, the following considerations should be kept in mind:
• Compliance is assessed against a selected set of priority commitments, rather than all commitments the last Summit produced. The priority commitments selected are not randomly chosen but identified according to a disciplined and systematic process intended to produce a representative subset of the total according to such dimensions as issue areas, ambition, specified time for completion, instruments used and, more generally, the degree of precision, obligation and delegation of each. The aim is to provide a comprehensive portrait of the compliance performance of the Summit as a whole. As such, the individual commitments selected cannot in all cases claim to be the most important ones in their appropriate issue area, nor do they necessarily represent that issue area lodged.
• In addition to the specific commitments assessed in the compliance reports, Summits have value in establishing new principles in normative directions, in creating and highlighting issue areas and agenda items, and in altering the publicly allowable discourse used. Furthermore, some of the most important decisions reached and consensus forged at Summits may be done entirely in private and not encoded in the public communiqué record.
• Some commitments inherently take longer to be complied with than the time available between one Summit and the next.
• In some cases, it may be wise not to comply with a Summit commitment, if global conditions have dramatically changed since the commitment was made or if new knowledge has become available about how a particular problem can best be solved.
• As each of the member countries has its own constitutional, legal and institutional processes for undertaking action at the national level, each is free to act in particular cases on a distinctive national time scale. Of particular importance here is the annual cycle for the creation of budgets, legislative approval and the appropriation of funds.
• Commitments encoded in the G8 communiqué may also be encoded precisely or partially in communiqués from other international forums, the decisions of other international organizations, or even national statements such as the State of the Union Address in the U.S., the Queen’s Speech in the UK and the Speech from the Throne in Canada. Without detailed process-tracing, it cannot be assumed that compliant behaviour on the part of countries is fully caused by the single fact of a previous G8 commitment.
• Compliance is assessed against the precise, particular commitments made by the G8, rather than what some might regard as necessary or appropriate action to solve the problem being addressed.
• With compliance assessed on a three-point scale, judgments inevitably arise about whether particular actions warrant the specific numerical value assigned. As individual members can sometimes take different actions to comply with the same commitment, no standardized cross-national evaluative criterion can always be used. Comments regarding the judgments in each case, detailed in the extensive accompanying notes, are always welcomed by our global audience.
• Because the evaluative scale used in this compliance report runs from –100 percent to +100 percent, it should assumed that any score in the positive range represents at least some compliance with the specific commitments made by the G8. It is not known if commitments in other international forums or at the national level on occasions such as the State of the Union Address, Queen’s Speech or Speech from the Throne, etc., are complied with to a greater or lesser degree than the commitments made by the G8.
• It may be that commitments containing high degrees of precision, obligation and delegation, with short specified timetables for implementation, may induce governments to act simply to meet the specified commitment rather than in ways best designed to address core and underlying problems over a longer term.
• In some cases, full compliance by all members of the G8 with a commitment is contingent on co-operative behaviour on the part of other actors.
• Although G8 Research Group analysts make an exceptional effort to seek relevant information on the Summit countries, credible commentary on the information offered about the compliance-related activity of some G8 countries remains at times incomplete. The greater such incompleteness, the lower the scores would likely be as a result.
12. Where to Find G8 Compliance Information Online
This reference guide contains useful online sources that can be used in preparing compliance reports as well as G8 country and issue area studies.
G8-Specific Sites
• University of Toronto G8 Information Centre:
• Official G8 Host website (e.g., St. Petersburg web site: or Gleneagles web site: )
General Sources
• Strategies for Locating Foreign Government Information on the Internet:
• Foreign Government Statistics
• U.S. Census Bureau International Database:
• The Political Reference Almanac:
• Political Resources on the Web:
• Country at a Glance:
• Library of Congress Country Studies:
• The CIA World Fact Book:
• U.S. State Department Background Notes:
International Organizations
• United Nations:
• IMF:
• World Bank:
• World Health Organization:
• UNESCO:
• WTO:
• OECD:
• NATO:
• Group of 20 (G20):
• Group of 77 (G77):
International News Sources & Newswires
• International Herald Tribune:
• New York Times:
• Financial Times:
• Reuters:
• Associated Press:
• Canada Newswire:
• Agence France-Presse:
• UPI World:
Country-Specific Online Resources
Canada
Government Resources
• Government of Canada (primary page):
• Federal Dept. index page:
• DFAIT:
• Department of Finance:
• Prime Minister: -ssi
• Parliament:
• Statistics Canada:
• Federal Information by subject:
• Federal Budget Information:
• Government Electronic Publications:
Online News Sources
• Globe and Mail:
• Toronto Star:
• National Post:
• Vancouver Sun:
• Ottawa Citizen:
• CBC News:
• CTV:
France
Government Resources
• Main Government Page:
• President:
• Prime Minister:
• Bank of France:
• Ministry of Foreign Affairs:
• Ministry of the Economy, Finance, and Industry:
• Ministry of the Environment:
• National Assembly:
• Senate:
• National Institute of Statistics:
• Service des Statistiques Industrielles (SESSI):
Online News Sources
• International Herald Tribune:
• La Tribune:
• Le Monde:
• Le Monde Diplomatique:
• The Tocqueville Connection: (english language analysis of French News)
Germany
Government Resources
• Der Bundeskanzler:
• Federal German Government:
• Federal Statistical Office:
• Foreign Office:
• Federal Ministry of Economics:
• Federal Ministry of Finance:
• German Central Bank:
Online News Sources
• Handelsblatt:
• German News (english edition):
• Frankfurter Allgemeine:
• Frankfurter Rundshau:
• Die Welt:
• Germany Online:
Italy
Government Resources
• Government Page:
• Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri:
• Ministero Degli Affari Esteri:
• Italian Trade Commission of Canada:
• Italian Political Parties:
• Ministry of Finance/Ministero delle Finanze:
Online News Sources
• La Buvette:
• Milano Finanza:
• Il Manifesto:
• La Padania:
Japan
Government Resources
• Prime Minister’s Official Residence:
• Ministry of Finance:
• Ministry of International Trade and Industry:
• Ministry of Foreign Affairs:
• Japanese Market Information:
• The Information Technology Promotion Agency:
Online News Sources
• Asahi Shinbun:
• Daily Yomiuri:
• The Mainichi Newspapers:
• The Japan Times:
• Foreign Press Centre:
• NHK:
• Kyodo News:
• Nikkei Net:
Russia
Government Resources
• Main Government Site:
• President:
• The Duma:
• Council of the Russian Federation:
• Central Bank:
• Ministry of Foreign Affairs:
• Ministry of Finance:
Online News Sources
• All News Russia:
• Interfax:
• Russia Today:
• Radio Free Europe:
• TASS:
• ITAR/TASS:
• Russian National News Service:
United Kingdom
Government Resources
• No. 10 Downing St.:
• Main Parliament site:
• House of Commons:
• House of Lords:
• Department of Trade and Industry:
• Foreign & Commonwealth Office:
• Ministry of Defense:
• Her Majesty’s Treasury:
Online News Sources
• Financial Times:
• The Guardian:
• The Herald:
• The Times of London:
• The Sunday Times:
United States
Government Resources
• The President and the White House:
• Senate:
• House of Representatives:
• :
• C-Span:
• Fednet:
• U.S. State Department:
• Office of Management and Budget:
• NAFTA Secretariat:
• The Federal Web Locator:
• You can also try the “hot documents” site at the University of Michigan’s U.S. Document Centre:
Online News Sources
• New York Times:
• Washington Post:
• USA Today:
• Wall Street Journal:
• Los Angeles Times:
• CNN:
• ABCnews:
• MSNBC:
• Drudge Report:
European Union
Government Resources
• The European Commission:
• Council of the European Union:
• Economic and Social Committee:
• European Parliament:
• Court of Auditors:
• Court of Justice:
• Committee of Regions:
• European Investment Bank:
• European Central Bank:
• Europa (the EU’s server):
• Directorates-General (DGs) of the European Commission:
Online News Sources
• Press releases:
• Publications Office:
If the Web Fails
• Consult with reference librarians
• Email web administrators, NGOs, international organizations and governments
– most governments and larger NGOs have staff hired specifically to answer questions
– provide detailed explanations of the information required and the research already completed
• Contact relevant organizations and embassies
– ask to speak to the media liaison
– explain in detail the research question and the sources already researched
– while some embassies may not be helpful at the outset - and it is possible to be passed from official to official – normally, the embassies eventually forward the necessary information
• Contact relevant professors and scholars
– explain the specific research question and why they have been chosen as a contact
– ask if they are aware of anyone conducting research in this area or if they themselves know where to find the necessary information
If the information is not forthcoming after exhausting all of these channels, it is quite likely that the information is not available in the public domain. When information is not available, the countries receive a compliance score of N/A and the score is excluded from the final calculations that determine the overall compliance levels.
Appendix A:
G8 Compliance Bibliographical References
Baliamoune, Mina (2000), “Economics of Summitry: An Empirical Assessment of the Economic Effects of Summits,” Empirica 27: 295-314.
Barnes, James (1994), Promise, Promises: A Review: G-7 Economic Summit Declarations on Environment and Development, (Friends of the Earth: Washington, D.C.).
Buxton, G.V. “Sustainable Development and the Summit: A Canadian Perspective on Progress”. International Journal, XLVII, no. 4 (Fall 1992); 776-795.
Chayes, Abram and Antonia Handler Chayes. The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements.
Chayes, Abram. “On Compliance”. International Organization, 47, no. 2 (Spring 1993): 175-205.
Chayes, Abram and Ronald. B. Mitchell. “Improving Compliance with the Climate Change Treaty”, in Henry Lee, ed. Shaping National Responses to Climate Change: APost-Rio Guide. Washington, D.C., Island Press. 1995.
Daniels, Joe (1993), The Meaning and Reliability of Economic Summit Undertakings, (Hamden, Connecticut: Garland Publishing).
G8 Online 2002 Lecture 6, 2004 Lecture 3
G8 Research Group, Compliance with G8 Commitments: From Köln 1999 to Okinawa 2000
G8 Research Group, Compliance Assessments,
G8 Research Group, Compliance Assessment, 1996- web
G7, Napoli Summit 1994: The Record, Key Players, Preliminaries and Expectations, Agenzia ANSA, Roma, 1994.
Independent NGO Evaluations of National Plans for Climate Change Mitigation: G7 Countries – Summit Meeting, Halifax, June 1995. Report Coordinated by the United States Climate Action Network and Climate Network Europe. 1995.
Ikenberry, John (1988), “Market Solutions for State Problems: The International and Domestic Politics of American Oil decontrol,” International Organization 42 (Winter): 151-178.
Juricevic, Diana, "Controlling For Domestic-Level Commitments: An Analysis of the Authoritative National Commitments Made in Canada and the United States from 1995-2000", November 7, 2000.
Juricevic, Diana, "Compliance with G8 Commitments: Ascertaining the degree of compliance With Summit debt and international trade commitments For Canada and the United States 1996-1999", June 24, 2000.
Kirton, John and Ella Kokotsis (2004), “Keeping Faith with Africa: Assessing Compliance with the G8’s Commitments at Kananaskis and Evian,” in Princeton Lyman and Robert Browne, eds., Freedom,Prosperity and Security: The G8 Partnership with Africa, (Council on Foreign Relations: New York, September).
Kirton, John, Ella Kokotsis and Diana Juricevic (2002), “Okinawa’s Promises Kept: The 2001 G8 Compliance Report,” in John Kirton and Junichi Takase, eds., New Directions in Global Political Governance, (Ashgate: Aldershot), pp. 269-280.
Kirton, John, Ella Kokotsis and Diana Juricevic (2003), “G7/G8 Commitments and Their Significance”, in John Kirton, Michele Fratianni and Paola Savona, eds. Governing Global Finance: New Challenges, G7 and IMF Contributions, (Ashgate, Aldershot), pp.227-231.
Kirton, John, Ella Kokotsis and Diana Juricevic (2002), “Okinawa’s Promises Kept: The 2001 G8 Compliance Report” in John Kirton and Junichi Takase, eds. New Directions in Global Political Governance: The G8 and International Order in the 21st Century, (Ashgate, Aldershot), pp 269-282.
Kirton, John, Ella Kokotsis, Gina Stevens with Diana Juricevic (2004), “The G8 and Conflict Prevention: Commitment, Compliance and Systemic Contribution”, in The G8, the United Nations and Conflict Prevention, (Ashgate, Aldershot), pp. 59-84.
Kokotsis, Ella (2002), “Compliance with G8 Commitments,” G8 Online 2002
Kirton, John and Ella Kokotsis (2001), “Compliance with G8 Commitments: The Peace and Security and Conflict Prevention Agenda, Okinawa-Genoa”, Paper prepared for the DFAIT’s Policy Planning Division in Preparation for the Canadian Presidency of the G8 Foreign Ministers’ Process in 2002, for June 26.
Kokotsis, Ella (1999), Keeping International Commitments: Compliance, Credibility and the G7, 1988-1995, (New York: Garland).
Kokotsis, Ella and Joseph Daniels (1999), “G8 Summits and Compliance,” in Michael Hodges and John Kirton, The G8’s Role in the New Millennium, (Ashgate: Aldershot), pp. 75-94.
Kokotsis, Ella (1995), "Keeping Sustainable Development Commitments: The Recent G7 Record," in John Kirton and Sarah Richardson, eds., The Halifax Summit, Sustainable Development and International Institutional Reform, (Ottawa: National Round Table on the Environment and the Economy, 1995), pp. 117-133. on web
Kokotsis, Ella and Joseph Daniels (1999), “G8 Summits and Compliance,” in The G8’s Role in the New Millennium, Michael Hodges, John Kirton and Jospehy Daniels eds. (Ashgate, Aldershot), pp. 75-91.
Kokotsis, Ella and John Kirton (1997), “National Compliance with Environmental Regimes: The Case of the G7, 1988-1995,” Paper prepared for the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Toronto, March 18-22, 1997.
Kokotsis, Ella (2004), “Explaining G8 Effectiveness: The Democratic Institutionalist Model of Compliance with G8 Commitments”, Paper prepared for the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Montreal, March 18, 2004.
Kirton, John and Ella Kokotsis, “Producing International Commitments and Compliance without Legalization: G7/8 Performance from 1975 to 2002”, Paper prepared for the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Portland, Oregon, March 1, 2003.
Koremenos, Barbara (1996), “On the Duration and Renegotiation of International Agreements,” Paper for the International Studies Association, San Diego, April 1996.
Labonte, Ronald and Ted Schrecker, The G8, Africa and Global Health: A Platform for Global Health Equity for the 2005 Summit. London: Nuffield Trust, forthcoming 28 February 2005; .
Labonte, Ronald and Ted Schrecker, “Committed to Health for All? How the G7/G8 Rate,” Social Science and Medicine 59 (2004): 1661-1676.
R. Labonte, T. Schrecker, D. Sanders and W. Meeus. Fatal Indifference: The G8, Africa and Global Health Cape Town: University of Cape Town Press/IDRC Books, January 2004.
Labonte, Ronald, Ted Schrecker and A. Sen Gupta, “A Global Health Equity Agenda for the G8 Summit,” British Medical Journal, in press.
Labonte, Ronald, Ted Schrecker and D. McCoy, “Health and HIV/AIDS: Fine words and fatal indifference” in G. Hubbard and D. Miller, eds., Arguments Against G8 (London: Pluto Press, in press): 182-197.
Labonte, Ronald, David Sanders and Ted Schrecker (2002). "Health and development: How are the G7/G8 doing?" Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health 56(5) (2002): 322-322.
Li, Quan (2001), “Commitment Compliance in G-7 Summit Macroeconomic Policy Coordination,” Political Research Quarterly 54 (June): 355-378.
Schrecker Ted and Ronald Labonte, “What’s Politics Got to Do with It? Health, the G8 and the Global Economy” in I. Kawachi and S. Wamala, eds., Globalisation and Health (Oxford: Oxford University Press, in press).
The Halifax Initiative. First Annual G7 Report Card on Bretton Woods Reform: Report on the Commitments Made by the G7 Leaders at the Halifax Summit, June 1995. Canadian Coalition for Global Economic Democracy. Ottawa, June 25, 1996.
Von Furstenberg, George (1995), "Accountability and a Metric for Credibility and Compliance," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 151 (June): 304-25.
Von Furstenberg, George and Joseph Daniels (1992), "Can You Trust G-7 Promises?" International Economic Insights 3 (September/October): 24-27.
Von Furstenberg, George and Joseph Daniels (1992), Economic Summit Declarations, 1975-1989: Examining the Written Record of International Co-operation, Princeton Studies in International Finance 72, Princeton, N.J., Department of Economics.
Von Furstenberg, George and Joseph Daniels (1991), "Policy undertakings by the seven "Summit" countries: ascertaining the degree of compliance," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series of Public Policy 35: 267-308, North Holland.
Appendix B:
G8 Summit Performance Indicators by Function
1. The Domestic Political Summit
A. Media Coverage at Home
B. Elite Editorial Consensus
C. Public Opinion Poll Change
D. Election Record During and After
E. Civil Society Participation and Protest
F. Societal Behaviour Changed
2. The Deliberative Summit
A. Length of Leaders Participation
B. Length of Summit in Days
C. Length of Summit in Hours
D. Length of Summit Working Sessions
E. Location of Summit
F. Level of Spontaneity
3. The Directional Summit
A. Number of Words in Leaders’ Collective Summit-Released Documentation
B. Number of Separate Summit Released Collective Documents by Leaders
C. Number of Priority Values Identified and Affirmed in Communiqué Chapeau
D. Number of Linkages Identified and Affirmed in Communiqué Chapeau
4. The Decisional Summit
A. Number of Commitments
B. Breadth of Commitments (by domain, and issue area)
C. Ambition-Significance of Commitments
D. Money Mandated
5. The Delivery Summit
A. Compliance
B. Money Mobilized and Disbursed
C. Member Behaviour Reinforced, Constrained and Altered
D. Member’s Conception of Interests and Identities Changed
C. Outside Country Behaviour Altered
6. The Development of Global Governance Summit
A. Remit Mandates
B. G8 Ministerial Institutions Created, Adjusted Affirmed
C. G8 Official Institutions Created, Adjusted, Affirmed
D. Instructions to Outside Intergovernmental Institutions
7. Overall Assessments
A. Bayne Grades (1987, 2000, 2001-) and Grid (2001-)
B. Sherpa Consensus (Kirton 1989)
C. G8 Research Group Summit Performance Assessment, 1996-)
Appendix C:
Causal Models of Summit Performance
1. American Leadership (Putnam and Bayne, 1984, 1987)
Decisional Performance, Occasionally High, due to:
A. U.S. able and willing to lead with support of a strong second;
B. Reigning ideas and historical lessons as interpreted by leaders;
C. Electoral certainty
D. Transnational actors alliances
2. Concert Equality (Wallace 1984, Kirton 1989)
Comprehensive Performance, High, Low, then Very High, due to:
A. Collectively predominant and internally equal capabilities
B. Equal vulnerability activated by shocks
C. Common principles of open democracy, individual liberty, social advancement
D. Constricted participation
E. Domestic political capital and control
3. False New Consensus (Bergsten and Henning 1996)
Decisional Performance, Declining During 1990’s, due to:
A. False new consensus that economic globalization makes governments impotent;
B. American economic and political decline due to cold war’s end and poor policy;
C. Traditional differences between the U.S. and Germany
4. Democratic Institutionalism (Ikenberry 1993, Kokotsis 1998)
Delivery Performance, Increasing into 1990’s, due to:
A. Effective multilateral organizations controlled by G7/G8;
B. G7 institutionalization at ministerial and official level;
C. Strong G8 bureaucratic units in domestic governments;
D. Leader’s commitments to international co-operation, G7/G8 institutions, individual issue;
E. Popular support for leaders and issue
5. G8 Nexus (Gill 1998)
Directional and Decisional Performance, Increasingly Effective but Contested, due to:
A. Marketization, globalization and liberalization, producing a global concentration of wealth and power
D. Similar political outlook and congruent political/economic principles of elite
D. Dominance of financial-asset (bond-currency) market interests in leading states
6. Collective Management (Bayne 2000, 2001, 2002)
Comprehensive (Five Function) Performance, Increasingly Effective, due to:
A. Complexity of new and unexpected global problems;
B. Inadequacy of other global institutions;
C. Globalization constraint on independent major power action;
D. G8 iteration, agenda focus, leaders-only format; institutionalization;
7. Ginger Group (Baker 2000, Hodges 1999)
Deliberative Performance, Increasingly Effective, due to:
A. Financial market globalization;
B. Small private club of governmental agents:
C. Common worldview
8. Group Hegemony (Alison Bailin 2002, 2003)
Decisional Performance, Constantly High, due to:
A. Concentration of power > small group size >designate K-Group
B. Group Identity > small group size > designate K-Group
C. Economic Liberalism > mutual interests > reach mutual agreements
D. Preparatory Process > mutual interests > reach mutual agreements
E. System of Interaction > shadow of the future> develop trustworthy relations
F. Documentation > shadow of the future > develop trustworthy relations
9. Meta Institution (Pentilla, 2003)
Decisional Performance, Increasingly High, due to:
A. Concerted power of G8 members;
B. Failure of established international organizations
Appendix D:
Indicators of Major Causal Variables
Relative Capability
Collective Predominance:
• G7/8 GDP per World Total (current US$)
• G7/8 GDP per World Total (1995 base US$)
Internal Equality:
• GDP Inequality Within the G7/8 (current $, sigma GDP)
• GDP Inequality within the G7/8 (1995 base sigma)
• US GDP Share of G7/8 Total GDP
• Average US$ Depreciation
• Cumulative US$ Depreciation
Relative Vulnerability
Collective Vulnerability:
• Energy Dependence (NEI/DEC)
• Terrorist Attacks by Number, Global Total
• Deaths from Human-Induced Ecological Disasters
• Annual Average Change in NYSE, NIKKEI, and LSE Indexes
Internal Equality of Vulnerability:
• US Bank Failures by Number
Interdependence
• G7-bound Trade as % of total (average for G7)
Common Principles (Shared Social Purpose)
• Freedom House Democratization Index
• Ideological Consensus
Political Control and Capital
Years Since Last Election
Appendix E:
Summary of Variables, Methods and Sources
Bayne Grade – Numerical equivalent of the letter-grade assessment of Summit performance compiled by the G8RG and Sir Nicholas Bayne (source: )
Summit Length (days) – Length of the G7/8 Summit in days (source: Fact Sheet at )
Number of Summit Communiqués – Number of official documents issued at the Summit (source: Internal G8RG compilation available by request from g8info@library.utoronto.ca)
Number of Words in Summit Documents – Length of the official documents produced at the Summit measured in words (source: Internal G8RG compilation; available by request from g8info@library.utoronto.ca).
Number of Commitments – Number of total commitments identified in the Summit documents (for methodology see Kokotsis, Ella. Keeping International Commitments: Compliance, Credibility, and the G7, 1988-1995. Transnational Business and Corporate Culture series. New York: Garland Pub., 1999; source: Internal G8RG compilation available by request from g8info@library.utoronto.ca).
Compliance – Average standardized compliance with the commitments undertaken by Summit members (for methodology see Kokotsis, Ella. Keeping International Commitments: Compliance, Credibility, and the G7, 1988-1995. Transnational Business and Corporate Culture series. New York: Garland Pub., 1999; source: Internal G8RG compilation at ).
Remit Mandates - Remit mandates are formal instructions contained in the documents the leaders collectively issue at the annual G7/8 Summit, specifying that they will deal with an item at their Summit the following year or in subsequent years. (source: Fact Sheet at ).
Ministerial Bodies Created – Number of ministerial bodies created at the Summit. Inter-Summit ministerials and equivalents are meetings of G7/8 ministers or heads or equivalents from these actors (collective statements issued in the name of the G7/8, conference calls) between the end of one year’s annual Summit and the start of the Summit the regularly scheduled annual following year. (source: Fact Sheet at ).
Leadership Bodies Created, Approved or Adjusted (source: Internal G8RG compilation available by request from g8info@library.utoronto.ca).
Average Depreciation of the US$ and Cumulative Depreciation of the US$ - Denotes the average depreciation of the US$ against the basket of G8 currencies between the end of a Summit and the start of the next one. The formula used is: AVERAGE([Et+1$/i – Et$/i]/ Et$/i), where i iterates through all 7 other currencies, and t and t+1 are the days on which the Summit ends and the next one starts, respectively. (source: The UBC Pacific Exchange Rate Service located at ).
U.S. Bank Failures – Number of U.S. Commercial and Savings Banks and Insurance Trusts Failures, as defined by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. For methodology and data see the “Historical Banking Statistics” series at )
G7/8 GDP as percentage of total world GDP (in current US$ and in 1995-base year US$) – Denotes the ratio of the cumulative G7/8 GDP to the total world GDP as reported by the World Development Indicators Database of the World Bank. The two variables measure GDPs in current and real (1995 base-year) US dollars. (complete methodology and source: ). Methodological note: Because base-year deflation uses a fixed consumption pattern (an assumption likely to introduce distortions for years significantly removed from the 1995 base-year), the “real US$” deflated numbers should be interpreted with caution.
Inequality of G7/8 GDP composition (in current US$ and in 1995-base year US$) – This is the standard deviation of the set of the individual G7/8 members GDP shares in the G7/8 cumulative GDP in each year. The two variables measure GDPs in current and real (1995 base-year) US dollars. (complete methodology and source: ). Methodological note: Because base-year deflation uses a fixed consumption pattern (an assumption likely to introduce distortions for years significantly removed from the 1995 base-year), the “real US$” deflated numbers should be interpreted with caution.
Terrorist Attacks – Total terrorist attacks worldwide (series covers 1981-2002 only) as reported by the U.S. Department of State in its Patterns of Global Terrorism report in 2003 (source: , Statistical Appendix).
Ideological Consensus of G7/8 Leaders – This number signifies the ideological likeness of the leaders of the G7/8 countries defined as the ratio of leaders of same or similar ideological/political persuasion to the total number of Summit leaders. (source: Internal G8RG compilation available by request from g8info@library.utoronto.ca).
Average Years since Last Election – Average of the years since the last election of each of the leaders attending the Summit. (source: Internal G8RG compilation available by request from g8info@library.utoronto.ca).
Freedom House Democratization Index – An index of global democratization developed by the Freedom House Foundation (methodology and source: )
Energy Dependence – Measures the dependence of the G7/8 on outside (non-G7/8 produced) energy imports. The data used for the compilation of this time-series covers tradable energy (oil, natural gas and coal) measured in Mtoe (millions of tons of oil equivalent). The following formula is used to arrive at the aggregate annual ratio: Total G7/8 energy consumption [Mtoe] – Total G7/8 energy production [Mtoe] = Net G7/8 Energy Imports [NEI in Mtoe] —> Energy dependence = [ (NEI) / (Total G7/8 energy consumption) ]. Data source: British Petroleum Database, ; UNCTAD TRAINS Database, ; Euromonitor Database, .
G7/8-Bound Trade as Percentage of Total Trade of G7/8 Members – The share of G7/8-bound trade in the total trade of G7/8 members (annual average for the G7/8; trade measured in customs-reported value). Source: UN Common Database, ; Euromonitor Database, .
Deaths and Injuries from Human-Induced Ecological Disasters Worldwide – Total number of deaths and injuries from human-precipitated ecological disasters; annual aggregate. Data source: The UNEP GEO Data Portal,
Average Change in Major Stock Indexes (NYSE, NIKKEI and London Stock Exchange) – Data is compiled for value of transactions, annual averages. Data source: Wren Research Database, http:// .au/
US GDP as percentage of G7/8 Total GDP – Calculated in current US$. Source: World Development Indicators Database,
Appendix F:
2005 Gleneagles Summit – Core Commitments Selection
1. Peacekeeping
2005:3. (Chairman’s Summary) “The G8 in return agreed a comprehensive plan to support Africa’s progress. This is set out in our separate statement today. We agreed:
to provide extra resources for Africa's peacekeeping forces so that they can better deter, prevent and resolve conflicts in Africa.”
2. Good Governance (Africa)
2005:24. (Africa) “We will work vigorously for early ratification of the UN Convention Against Corruption and start discussions on mechanisms to ensure its effective implementation.”
3. Global Health (HIV/AIDS)
2005:42. (Africa) “We will work to meet the financing needs for HIV/AIDS, including through the replenishment this year of the Global Fund to fight AIDS, TB and Malaria; and actively working with local stakeholders to implement the ‘3 Ones’ principles in all countries.”
4. Health (Polio Eradication)
2005:44. (Africa) “Supporting the Polio Eradication Initiative for the post eradication period in 2006-8 through continuing or increasing our own contributions toward the $829 million target and mobilising the support of others.”
5. Official Development Aid (ODA)
2005:8. (Chairman’s Summary) “We have agreed to double aid for Africa by 2010. Aid for all developing countries will increase, according to the OECD, by around $50bn per year by 2010, of which at least $25bn extra per year for Africa.”
6. Debt Relief (Africa)
2005:12. (Chairman’s Summary) “The G8 has also agreed that all of the debts owed by eligible heavily indebted poor countries to IDA, the International Monetary Fund and the African Development Fund should be cancelled, as set out in our Finance Ministers agreement on 11 June.”
7. Promoting Growth (Africa)
2005:60. (Africa) “We agree to support a comprehensive set of actions to raise agricultural productivity, strengthen urban-rural linkages and empower the poor, based on national initiatives and in cooperation with the AU/NEPAD Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) and other African initiatives.”
8. Education (Africa)
2005:36. (Africa) “As part of this effort, we will work to support the Education for All agenda in Africa, including continuing our support for the Fast Track Initiative (FTI) and our efforts to help FTI-endorsed countries to develop sustainable capacity and identify the resources necessary to pursue their sustainable educational strategies.”
9. Trade (Africa)
2005:6. (Chairman’s Summary) “The G8 in return agreed a comprehensive plan to support Africa’s progress. This is set out in our separate statement today. We agreed:
to stimulate growth, to improve the investment climate and to make trade work for Africa, including by helping to build Africa's capacity to trade and working to mobilise the extra investment in infrastructure which is needed for business .”
10. Trade (Export Subsidies)
2005:14. (Chairman’s Summary) “We reaffirmed our commitment to open markets more widely to trade in agricultural goods, industrial goods and services, and in agriculture to reduce trade distorting domestic subsidies and eliminate all forms of export subsidies by a credible end date.”
11. Trade (Least Developed Countries)
2005:15. (Chairman’s Summary) “We also committed to address products of interest to Least Developed Countries in the negotiations, and to ensure Least Developed Countries have the flexibility to decide their own economic strategies.”
12. Middle East Reform
2005:1. (Middle East Peace Process) “We support Mr Wolfensohn’s intention to stimulate a global financial contribution of up to $3bn per year over the coming three years. Domestic and international investors should be full partners to this process. We are mobilising practical support for Mr Wolfensohn’s efforts and look forward to further development of his plans and their presentation to the Quartet and the international community in September.”
13. Debt relief (Iraq)
2005:2. (Iraq) “We reaffirm our intention to reduce Iraq’s debt by implementing the terms of the November 2004 Paris Club agreement. We call on other creditors to provide debt relief on generous terms comparable to or even better than those agreed by the members of the Paris Club in November 2004.”
14. Sudan
2005:2. (Statement by the G8 and AU on Sudan) “We commend and will continue to support the African Union’s mission in Sudan (Darfur), just as we are contributing to UNMIS’s operation in southern Sudan.”
15. Terrorism
2005:1. (G8 Statement on Counter-Terrorism) “We have carried forward initiatives to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction to terrorists and other criminals, reinforce international political will to combat terrorism, secure radioactive sources and — as announced at Sea Island — ensure secure and facilitated travel. Today we commit ourselves to new joint efforts. We will work to improve the sharing of information on the movement of terrorists across international borders,”
16. Non-Proliferation
2005:11. (G8 Statement on Non-Proliferation) “We renew our pledge to raise up to $20 billion over ten years to 2012 for Global Partnership priorities, initially in Russia.”
17. Transnational Crime
2005:4. (Reducing IPR Piracy and Counterfeiting Through More Effective Enforcement) “We are deepening these efforts at home and abroad, with the aim of reducing substantially global trade in pirated and counterfeit goods, and efficiently combating the transnational networks that support it. In particular, we will take further concrete steps to:
Improve co-ordination of anti-counterfeiting and anti-piracy crime strategies, and ensure closer co-operation among enforcement officials, including through shared risk analysis, exchange of best practice, enhanced existing cooperation at international borders, and between governments and the private sector;”
18. Renewable Energy
2005:1. (Chairman’s Summary) “We resolved to take urgent action to meet the challenges we face. The Gleneagles Plan of Action which we have agreed demonstrates our commitment. We will take measures to develop markets for clean energy technologies, to increase their availability in developing countries, and to help vulnerable communities adapt to the impact of climate change.”
19. Climate Change
2005:2. (Chairman’s Summary) “We will advance the global effort to tackle climate change at the UN Climate Change Conference in Montreal later this year. Those of us who have ratified the Kyoto Protocol remain committed to it, and will continue to work to make it a success.”
20. Tsunami
2005:16. (Chairman’s Summary) “Six months on from the enormous tragedy of the Indian Ocean disaster on 26 December 2004, we have underlined our support for UN work on post-tsunami humanitarian aid and reconstruction, as well as confirming our commitment to reduce the risk from future disasters and to encourage reform of the humanitarian system.”
21. Surface Transportation
2005:9. (Gleneagles Plan of Action: Climate Change, Clean Energy, and Sustainable Development) “We will encourage the development of cleaner, more efficient and lower-emitting vehicles, and promote their deployment, by:
Adopting ambitious policies to encourage sales of such vehicles in our countries, including making use of public procurement as appropriate to accelerate market development;”
Appendix G:
Sample Interim/Final Compliance Report
2005 Gleneagles Interim Compliance Report
Trade: Export Subsidies
Commitment
“We reaffirmed our commitment to open markets more widely to trade in agricultural goods, industrial goods and services, and in agriculture to reduce trade distorting domestic subsidies and eliminate all forms of export subsidies by a credible end date.”
-Chairman’s Summary (final press conference)[1]
Background
At the Doha Ministerial Conference held in November 2001, participants implemented the Doha Declaration launching a new trade round to establish a fair and market-oriented trading system by preventing restrictions and distortions in world agricultural markets. The Fifth WTO Ministerial Conference was held in September 2003 in Cancun, Mexico. The Ministerial ultimately collapsed after the QUAD countries (US, EU, Japan and Canada) failed to reach an agreement with the G-20 bloc of developing countries (including Brazil, India and China). Nevertheless, the leaders of the G8 countries understand the importance of assisting less developed countries in their trade capabilities in order to promote economic growth and alleviate poverty.
On 1 August 2004, WTO members adopted a General Council decision on the Doha Work Programme, informally known as the July Package which established a framework for placing the DDA back on track for completion by 2006. Under the package, industrialized countries agreed to major concessions that they had previously resisted in Cancun: wealthy states, in particular the EU, agreed to place all agricultural subsidies on the table for discussion and committed to making significant cuts; wealthy countries agreed to a ‘down payment’ on this deal in the form of an immediate 20% reduction in total current agricultural subsidies; LDCs (including approximately 25 African states) received an agreement in principle to receive increased market access while maintaining the right to shelter their domestic industries; and three Singapore Issues (foreign investment, competition policy, and government procurement) were dropped from the DDA with the fourth (trade facilitation) kept on in the understanding it would only result in a clarification and simplifying of current agreements. In exchange, developing countries agreed to further open their markets to manufactured imports and agreed to continue negotiations on a deal in trade in services.
Reaffirmed at Gleneagles, the G8 commitment to open markets more widely to trade in agricultural goods, industrial goods and services, and in agriculture to reduce trade distorting domestic subsidies and eliminate all forms of export subsidies by a credible end date was carried out in part at the most recent WTO Ministerial in Hong Kong. Though the meeting was not considered a resounding success, a decision was reached committing to the end of Export Subsidies by 2013.[2]
Assessment
|Country |Lack of Compliance |Work in Progress |Full Compliance |
| |-1 |0 |+1 |
|Canada | |0 | |
|France |-1 | | |
|Germany | |0 | |
|Italy | |0 | |
|Japan | |0 | |
|Russia | |0 | |
|United Kingdom | | |+1 |
|United States | |0 | |
|European Union | | |+1 |
|Overall Score | | |0.11 |
Individual Country Compliance Breakdown
1. Canada: 0
Canada has partially complied with its Gleneagles commitment on export subsidies. By publicly supporting the elimination of all forms of agricultural subsidies, and by signing the World Trade Organization (WTO) Ministerial Agreement, Canada made progress toward compliance with the Gleneagles commitment. Yet through it efforts to protect its own export state trading enterprise mechanism and its system of price and quota controls, Canadian officials resisted implementing important domestic reforms.
At the conclusion of WTO discussions held in Zurich, Switzerland On 10 October 2005, Canadian Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada Minister, Mr. Andy Mitchell, and International Trade Minister, Mr. Jim Peterson, reaffirmed the long-standing Canadian objective of eliminating all forms of agricultural subsidies.[3] On 9 November 2005, following WTO discussions in Geneva, the same two ministers issued a statement in advance of the ministerial meeting in Hong Kong, confirming the Canadian government’s desire for the quickest possible elimination of agriculture export subsidies.[4] They made it clear that Canada is working aggressively to negotiate for “fundamental change, real reform, not just modest improvements” in this round.[5] As part of the Commonwealth meeting in Malta, on 26 November 2005 Canadian officials again called for a WTO agreement on “the elimination of all forms of export subsidies by 2010".[6]
At the World Trade Organization meeting in Hong Kong, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand were accused by European Union (EU) and United States (US) for unfair marketing practices. In particular, they criticized the practice of selling farm produce to a single marketing board, thus creating an unfair monopoly.[7] Canadian officials publicly responded to these criticisms prior to the Hong Kong meeting. For example, in the statement issued by Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Peterson on 10 October 2005, the Ministers explained that Canada believes that such fair export state trading enterprises as the Canadian Wheat Board should not be disciplined.
According to Canadian Wheat Board (CWB) Chairperson, Mr. Ken Ritter, the Board is a “single desk that does not distort trade” and should not be part of negotiations.[8] Although the CWB and its practices were not on the agenda of the Hong Kong meetings, Mr. Ritter expressed concerns that Canadian farmers might lose their government guarantees of initial payments, resulting in the need for a new deal between the CWB and farmers.[9] Canadian officials, therefore, both challenged farm subsidies within other countries, while fighting to maintain its own system of price and quota controls on dairy, eggs and poultry products during the Hong Kong negotiations.[10]
2. France: -1
France has resisted compliance with the Gleneagles commitment to open markets more widely, and to reduce domestic and export subsidies. The French government created substantial obstacles to European Union (EU) commitments to reduce agricultural subsidies, thereby delaying the process of liberalizing trade.
The French government strongly opposes efforts at reducing agriculture subsidies by the EU. During talks in Geneva on October 20, 2005, French officials expressed the government’s refusal to permit new cuts in European farm supports that were needed to advance global trade talks, creating serious obstacles to completing a blueprint to lower trade barriers around the world. The French stance put Mr. Peter Mandelson, the EU’s chief trade negotiator, under intense pressure to find a way to open European farm markets after the United States offered to cut agricultural subsidies to restart the round of trade talks known as the Doha round. French officials repeatedly caused problems for Mr. Mandelson, accusing him of overstepping his negotiating mandate and demanding that his negotiations be overseen by a supervisory committee.[11] These actions drew strong rebuke from U.S. trade representative Rob Portman, while Australian trade minister Mark Vaile, lashed out at the French stance, expressing concern that it would cause the collapse of the trade talks.[12]
The French government also played a vital role in the EU's opposition to endorsing a 2010 date, proposed by the U.S. and Brazil, for ending farm export subsidies. This led to extending this date to 2013 as the date to end all farm export subsidies. While this result was welcomed by France, many say it fell short of expectations.[13] For their part, French officials argued that the WTO proposals are counterproductive and do not really serve the interests of the countries most in need. [14]
France's opposition to reducing agricultural subsidies also created problems in other areas of trade. This impasse between EU and U.S. negotiators over agriculture subsidies has prevented progress in negotiations to open up trade in manufactured goods and services.[15]
3. Germany: 0
The German government, under the leadership of the newly elected Chancellor, Ms. Angela Merkel, has partially complied with the trade commitments on export subsidies made at Gleneagles.
In the Chancellor’s policy statement presented to the German Bundestag on 30th November 2005, Ms. Merkel carefully points out the need to balance national interest with German trade commitments: “The need for freer global trade must be reconciled also with the interests of our agriculture.”[16] Earlier in the year, in her address to the UN General Assembly in September 2005, Federal Minister for Economic Cooperation and Development, Ms. Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul, echoed these concerns, adding “external support will bear fruit only if it is accompanied by ownership and good governance in the developing countries.”[17]
Despite these concerns, Merkel has played a key role in the recently passed EU framework budget for 2007-2013.[18] In particular, Merkel agreed review the Franco-German deal on agricultural subsidies in return for concessions on Britain’s £2.7 billion annual budget rebate.[19]
In a renewed effort to fulfil the Doha Round mandate before its 30 April 2006 deadline, Germany, along with its EU partners and other members of the WTO, met in Hong Kong for a Ministerial Meeting. The Ministerial Declaration reaffirms the Doha Round commitments and stipulates an end to export subsidies in article 6: “We agree to ensure the parallel elimination of all forms of export subsidies and disciplines on all export measures with equivalent effect to be completed by the end of 2013.”[20] Members also agreed to reduce tariffs on non-agricultural products.[21]
In his statement at the Ministerial Conference, Mr. Bernd Pfaffenbach, German State Secretary for the Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology, highlighted Germany’s key role in EU agricultural reform, but cautioned: “The intensive discussion of our offer within the European Union shows that the EU's threshold of pain has been reached. And we hope that this is acknowledged by our partners.”[22] He warned that the Doha agenda cannot be reduced to agricultural reform, but required an equivalent and parallel opening of markets for industrial goods and services.[23] Although he maintains that Doha should above all benefit least developed countries, he argues that the Round's most important contribution toward development can be achieved through progress on market access topics.[24]
Ms. Wieczorek-Zeul welcomed the elimination of all agricultural export subsidies, but was unsatisfied with the decisions on cotton: "the decisive point is to eliminate internal subsidies for cotton farmers in industrialized countries [for which] no date has been set". The comment was clearly directed at the United States, which pays some 4 billion US dollars a year in subsidies to 25,000 large-scale cotton farmers while millions of African countries farmers are on the verge of bankruptcy.[25] Ms. Wieczorek-Zeul concerns are echoed by the comments of EU trade commissioner, Mr. Peter Mandelson, who ruled out unilateral concessions on the part of the EU and which accused the United States, Canada, and Australia of dragging their feet in the talks on ending agricultural subsidies.[26]
While Germany has partially complied with its Gleneagles commitments by signing on to the WTO Ministerial Agreement, critics have argued that this agreement was largely symbolic as export subsidies, one type of agricultural subsidies, make up less than 2% of total subsidies.[27] These figures show that while progress has been made, Germany is far off from its goal “to open markets more widely to trade in agricultural goods.”
4. Italy: 0
The Italian government has partially complied with its Gleneagles commitments on export subsidies. The Italian Republic, together with the United Kingdom, Germany and France, has delegated most of its trade policy to the European Commission, which represents the 25 members of the European Union at the World Trade Organization (WTO).[28] As such, the Italian government did not directly participate in the Hong Kong Ministerial of the WTO in December, 2005, but was represented by EU Trade Commissioner Mr. Peter Mandelson and the EC Representatives. The European Communities’ official policy on export subsidies is that the EU-25 will only begin to open their markets to freer trade in agricultural and industrial goods when other nations, specifically Canada, the US, Japan and Australia, do the same.[29] Commissioner Mandelson believes that any form of unilateral action on the subsidies would be “pointless”.[30] His statement was made after the American rejection of the European Union’s original offer to slash “trade distorting subsidies” to agriculture by 70% and to reduce the average agricultural tariff level from 23% to 12%, the current average tariff in the United States.[31] Action on these issues, however, had been tied to an agreement on industrial goods that would reduce applied tariffs prior to the Ministerial in Hong Kong.[32] Such an agreement was not reached. All parties, however, did agree in Hong Kong to substantially reduce export subsidies by 2013.[33] Commissioner Mandelson rejected an earlier proposal for phase-out of subsidies by 2010, categorizing such an agreement as not being “economically sustainable”.[34]
Despite the European Union’s mandate at the World Trade Organization, the Italian government has also been somewhat active in pursuing global agreement on export subsidies. In December 2005, Finance Minister Tremonti joined other G7 Finance Ministers in their declaration that “urge[d] all participants to maintain a high level of ambition and to make significant progress on market access in agriculture, industrial products and services; reducing trade distorting domestic support; eliminating all forms of export subsidies in agriculture; making significant progress on services, including financial services as liberalisation in financial services is linked to increased growth”.[35] Earlier, Productive Activities Vice-Minister Mr. Adolfo Urso noted the importance of not allowing agreement on agriculture to eclipse discussions on other aspects of market access.[36] In particular, while speaking to the Committee of Commercial Agreements in Geneva, he called on the negotiating parties to focus not only on agriculture, but also on industrial goods, geographical denominations and sensitive goods.[37] Italian persistence on the need for reform and liberalization in non-agricultural sectors is not, however, mirrored in the opinions of the Minister of Agricultural and Forestry Policies, Mr. Gianni Alemanno. On 16 December 2005, Minister Alemanno called on non-EU parties to the WTO to work towards an agreement on agriculture on their own, as it was not the prerogative of the EU to destroy a “painstakingly” constructed proposal.[38] Nevertheless, the Vice-Minister of Agricultural and Forestry Policies, Mr. Paolo Scarpa, qualified the final deal reached by the parties at the Hong Kong Ministerial as “positive”, as it phased-out Europe’s, and specifically Italy’s, ability to support agricultural producers with subsidies while not placing restrictions on the more controversial Common Agricultural Policy of the EU-25.[39]
Therefore, despite concrete steps taken at the European level, Italy has earned a score of 0 for its lack of enthusiasm in pursuing solid progress on market access for agricultural and industrial goods.
5. Japan: 0
While World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations leave room for Japan to exclude “sensitive products” such as rice, a lack of some concession in this area does not reflect full compliance with the commitment made at Gleneagles in July 2005.[40] The Doha Development Agenda, a key component of the WTO negotiations, specifically seeks to minimize the use of such special status provisions.[41] Japan, however, faces a great deal of domestic pressure to resist the elimination of export subsidies and has thus made limited progress on this commitment.[42] Japan has, therefore, registered only partial compliance with its Gleneagles commitment to trade export subsidies.
Some progress was made at the WTO Ministerial Meeting when a deadline of 2013 was agreed upon for the elimination of agricultural export subsidies.[43] This may be considered a step toward fulfilling the commitments made in this issue-area, as one of the goals was to eliminate export subsidies by a “credible end date.”[44] Japan, however, did not concede in some key industries, and was reluctant to take the lead in eliminating trade-distorting subsidies.[45]
Taking these factors into account, Japan registers only partial compliance with its Gleneagles commitment on export subsidies.
6. Russia: 0
The Russian Federation has partially complied with its Gleneagles commitment on export subsidies. As the only member of the G8 not currently party to the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreements, the Russian Federation has thus far been excluded from the Doha Round of negotiations between WTO members.[46] Nevertheless, given that the Russian Federation is currently negotiating the terms of its accession to the WTO, it is keenly following developments in the sphere of trade in agricultural goods and industrial goods and services. Russia is also excluded from meetings of the G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bankers, and thus did not participate in the 3 December 2005 statement urging all parties to the WTO Hong Kong Ministerial to take concerted action on subsidies and liberalization.[47]
The Russian Federation’s exclusion from negotiations at the WTO level (it has observer status), in addition to its current concentration on reforming its own economic structures to meet the definition of a “market economy”, have left it few means of making a concerted effort to pursue market opening policies in the same manner as the other members of the G8. Furthermore, the Ministry for Agricultural Production has announced that it will seek to provide greater subsidies for agricultural producers in the coming year in order to: (1) mitigate the effects of volatile fuel prices[48]; and (2) cheapen credit and encourage the modernization of farming techniques and animal husbandry.[49] The Russian Federation hopes to increase private investment in the agricultural sector by employing these methods.[50] The preservation of subsidies to agriculture, according to the International Monetary Fund, remains a source of discord with current trends in international trade and may negatively influence the accession of the Russian Federation to the World Trade Organization.[51] Thus far, Minister of Finance Aleksei Kudrin has only suggested that reduction in subsidies on agricultural products be linked to increased development aid, but has made no specific proposals with respect to implementation of such schemes within the Russian Federation.[52]
Thus, the Russian Federation has been awarded a score of zero for its timid steps on joining the global movement to reduce subsidies and its relative inability to take significant actions on the matter while negotiating accession to the WTO.
7. United Kingdom: +1
The British government has publicly maintained a strong commitment to the goals laid out at the Gleneagles Summit in July 2005, and has presented a strong policy agenda to register full compliance with its Gleneagles commitment to export subsidies. Prime Minister Tony Blair, on 14 July 2005, expressed that the British government hoped that the World Trade Organization (WTO) would agree upon an end date of 2010 for agricultural export subsidies.[53] On 17 November 2005, Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Gordon Brown, denounced the European Union’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), calling for the reduction of “agricultural protectionism in Europe”.[54] Mr. Brown also said that “the test of success at Hong Kong will be substantially cutting tariffs and trade-distorting subsidies, and fulfilling our commitment of setting a timetable to end agricultural export subsidies”.[55] European Union Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson criticised Mr. Brown’s demands, calling them “over the top”.[56]
Britain held the presidency of the European Union in 2005, and from this position Mr. Blair sought a “fundamental review of EU farm policy.”[57] However, the British government faces opposition in the EU regarding the CAP, particularly from France.[58] British officials were, nevertheless, successful in completing a deal in Brussels on 17 December 2005 that calls for a review of the EU budget, including “farm policy.”[59]
At the WTO Ministerial Meeting in Hong Kong, British ministers continued to urge the EU to increase access to its agricultural markets.[60] The WTO also requested that political leaders work together to move negotiations along, with a view to making further progress by the end of next April. Commonwealth Secretary, General Don McKinnon, stated that he “strongly support[s]” this action.[61] The British government thus clearly supports the Gleneagles commitment, and has pursued a policy agenda that seeks to achieve goals consistent with this obligation.
8. United States: 0
Since the Gleneagles G8 Summit the United States (US) government has partially complied with its commitment regarding export subsidies by extending concessions in trade of agricultural goods: including the provision of broader market access, and the elimination of some export subsidies. At the Hong Kong meeting of the World Trade Organization (WTO), American officials also attempted to persuade other members to offer greater concessions for developing nations. The US government was, however, less successful in fulfilling its commitment regarding in manufactured goods and services.
US negotiators took substantial measures to end subsidies in agricultural goods at the Hong Kong meeting of the WTO. They supported a measure to end all export subsidies to farmers by 2010; a position which was rejected by EU officials resulting in an end date of 2013.[62] This demonstrates a real commitment on the part of US officials to end export subsidies in agriculture by a credible end date. The US government has also urged the EU to go further in cutting food import tariffs.[63]
The biggest concession of the US government was deemed, by US officials, to be in the cotton sector, offering duty-free access for West African states to the US cotton market. Under this agreement, free market access would be provided for 97% of all goods from the poorest nations by 2008.[64] The US also agreed to end all export subsidies on cotton by 2006, although this is not a mandatory commitment.[65]
In spite of these concessions, some US representatives continue to obstruct efforts to lower barriers to textile imports for some less developed countries. US Trade Representative Rob Portman indicated that his government was not yet willing to allow textile producers in countries like Bangladesh full access to the US market; that such concession would only come as part of an overall trade package.[66] For the same reason, US officials have expressed some concern with "Trade for Aid", which aims to give money to less developed countries to help them improve their trade infrastructure and to compensate them for losses from free trade. American officials have, however, signaled a willingness to accept the package in principle, and have announced an increase in the American own "Trade for Aid" package.[67]
The concessions themselves have also faced criticism. While the ending of export subsidies in cotton is seen as a big step, some have argued that this measure is not a concession by the US, but simply a response to a WTO cotton panel ruling. Some also suggest this concession falls well short of the WTO ruling.[68] This impasse between EU and US negotiators has also inhibited progress on issues relating to trade in manufactured goods and services.[69]
The US government has been, therefore, less successful with regards to liberalizing trade in services and manufactured goods at Hong Kong; only commitments for further negotiations were secured. A commitment was made to intensify market access negotiations to achieve higher levels of liberalization in key service sectors such as financial services, telecommunications, and computer services with several deadlines established for further rounds of negotiations on these issue areas.[70]
9. European Union: +1
The European Union (EU), having made a sustained effort to open markets and to eliminate export subsidies; and, having assuming a leadership role in trade negotiations relating to export subsidies, has registered a high level of compliance with the trade commitment made at Gleneagles.
Ahead of the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong, EU officials announced a willingness to reduce agricultural subsidies by as much as 70%, and import tariffs on agricultural products by between 35 and 60% if, in exchange, industrial tariffs are reduced and market access for services improved. However, EU trade commissioner, Mr. Peter Mandelson, ruled out any “unilateral concessions”, accusing the United States, Canada, and Australia of failing to carry out significant reform to their current policies on agricultural subsidies.[71] His statement was made after the American government rejected the EU’s original offer to slash “trade distorting subsidies” to agriculture and to reduce the average agricultural tariff level from 23% to 12%, the current average tariff in the United States.[72] No agreement on industrial goods that would reduce applied tariffs was made prior to the Ministerial in Hong Kong.[73]
In Hong Kong, however, the EU along with other WTO members, agreed to eliminate farm export subsidies by 2013.[74] Members also agreed to reduce tariffs on non-agricultural products.[75] In his address to the Ministers, Mr. Mandelson reaffirmed the EU’s commitment to the Doha Development Round. Highlighting the importance of agriculture, Mr. Mandelson maintains that “trade distorting subsidies must be cut back”, and that “substantial improvements in market access must take place”.[76] Although some critics have cautiously praised the agreement on farm export subsidies, most have called it the Ministerial Conference as a whole, disappointing. Mr. Phil Bloomer, Head of Oxfam International’s Make Trade Fair campaign, stated that “small progress on some aspects of agriculture is more than cancelled out by extremely damaging proposals on services and industry.” Oxfam points out that the pledge to eliminate export subsidies and equivalent payments by 2013 is three years later than originally proposed, and that EU export subsidies account for only 3.5% of its overall agricultural support.[77]
In addition to commitments made in Hong Kong, however, the EU has made significant progress in other aspects of its trade policy. On 12 September 2005, the European Commission announced new regulation to clear blocked Chinese textile imports.[78] On 23 December 2005, the European Commission additionally adopted regulations to eliminate export refunds for live cattle for slaughter.[79] The EU has also lead the way on the issue of cotton, offering duty and quota free access to all cotton imports from West Africa. The EU called on others, in particular the United States, to make similar commitments in Hong Kong.[80] EU Commissioner Mandelson has also called for progress in trade in services, urging the creation of “a platform for genuine multilateral negotiation.”[81]
On 13 December 2005, the EU announced further substantial commitments to providing Trade Related Assistance (TRA) to developing countries, earmarking €1 billion a year in TRA from 2010. This represents a substantial increase from the €400 million per year currently provided and matches the €1 billion per year from 2007 pledged by the European Commission at the Gleneagles Summit this year. It means that total EU Trade Related Assistance will increase to €2 billion from 2010.[82]
Table A:
2005 Gleneagles Interim Compliance Scores*
| |
|World Economy |
|Energy |
|East/West Relations |
|Asia |
|UN Reform I ($) |+0.14 |
|96-Macroeconomic |(8) - "While recognizing that our individual circumstances may vary, we share a common commitment to a |
| |medium-term economic strategy: credible fiscal consolidation programs, successful anti-inflationary |
| |policies and as a consequence low interest rates and strengthened structural reform."-The Economic |
| |Communique |
|96-Microeconomics |(29) - " we pledge to carry out practical reforms, consistent with the specific situation in each of our|
| |countries, aimed at achieving a high level of employment and widely-shared prosperity: these include tax|
| |and social system reforms to ensure that 'work pays,' particularly the least well-off,- lowering social |
| |security charges which place a burden on low-skilled jobs, in countries with high indirect labour costs;|
| |and improving public employment agencies."-The Economic Communique |
|96-Trade |(22) - "We will ensure full and effective implementation of the Uruguay Round results according to the |
| |agreed timetables."-The Economic Communique |
|96-Development |(36) - "We renew our commitment to secure substantial flows of official aid and to improve the quality |
| |of this aid. The whole international community should be mobilized in this effort and new donors should |
| |assume growing responsibility, so that the burden is more equally shared;"-The Economic Communique |
|96-IFI Reform |(44) "UNCTAD IX was a major milestone in the renewal of UNCTAD. In close partnership with the other |
| |member States, we succeeded in reforming UNCTAD's intergovernmental machinery and in refocusing its work|
| |on a small number of priorities to promote development through trade and investment with the aim of |
| |facilitating the integration of developing countries in the international trade system. We are committed|
| |to the implementation of these reforms."-The Economic Communique |
|96-UN Reform I ($ |(1) - "Conscious of the risks that the present financial crisis poses to the United Nations' ability to |
|obligations) |function, we are resolved to promote in parallel and as soon as possible a long-term solution based on |
| |the adoption of a more equitable scale of contributions, on scrupulous respect by Member States for |
| |their financial obligations, and on the payment of arrears."-Chairman's Statements |
|96-UN Reform II (devt |(3) - "We will continue and reinforce our efforts to improve the functioning of the UN in the economic |
|agenda) |and social fields and its impact on development. We will continue to work in partnership with other |
| |members to complete processes underway, including Agenda for Development, and initiate further processes|
| |as required. "-Halifax Summit follow-up |
|96-Terrorism |"We rededicate ourselves and invite others to associate our efforts in order to thwart the activities of|
| |terrorists and their supporters, including fund-raising, the planning of terrorist acts, procurement of |
| |weapons, calling for violence, and incitement to commit terrorist acts."-Declaration on Terrorism |
|96-Human Rights |(2) - "We will take care to ensure that women as well as men benefit fully and equally from the |
| |recognition of human rights and fundamental freedoms, which were reiterated on the occasion of the |
| |Beijing Conference, and that the rights of children be respected."-Chairman's Statements |
|96-Nuclear Safety |(4) - "We stress the necessity of further progress in the establishment of relevant domestic legislation|
| |and in the enhancement of the international regime of nuclear liability as well as in the preparation of|
| |an international convention on the safety of radioactive waste management."-Chairman's Statements |
|96-Environment |(5) - "It is important to ensure adherence to environmental agreements. International crime in areas |
| |such as illegal trade in CFCs, endangered species and hazardous waste is of particular concern. We will |
| |assess compliance with international environmental agreements and consider options for enhancing |
| |compliance."-Chairman's Statements |
|96-Global Information |(6) -"We will support public and private efforts to increase the use of information and communication |
|Society |technologies for development and encourage international organizations to assess the appropriate role |
| |which they can play."-Chairman's Statements |
|96-Crime |(10) - "Therefore we commit ourselves to: ... Resist the enormous threat posed by narcotic traffickers, |
| |by implementing the UN conventions against drugs, and intensifying efforts to put traffickers behind |
| |bars and prevent them from laundering their money."-Chairman's Statements |
|96-Arms Control |(3) - "We reiterate the importance we attach to the entry into force of the Convention on Chemical |
| |Weapons. We will continue to work hard to implement the Convention on Prohibition of Biological and |
| |Toxin Weapons, including the establishment of an effective verification mechanism."-Chairman's |
| |Statements |
|96-Proliferation (land |(3) - "We call upon all States to spare no effort in securing a global ban on the scourge represented by|
|mines) |the proliferation and the indiscriminate use of anti-personnel landmines and welcome the moratoria and |
| |bans already adopted by a number of countries on the production, use and export of these weapons, |
| |unilateral reductions in stockpiles as well as initiatives to address this urgent -Chairman's Statements|
|96-East-West Relations |(2) - "We actively support the process of economic and political transition under way for over five |
| |years in Central and Eastern Europe."-Regional Situations |
|96-Middle East |(3) - "We reaffirm our determination to enforce full implementation of all UN Security Council |
| |resolutions concerning Iraq and Libya only full compliance with which could result in the lifting of all|
| |sanctions."-Regional Situations |
|96-Asia |(4) - "We urge the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) to develop the dialogue and cooperation |
| |with the Republic of Korea (ROK), this being the only means of achieving permanent peace on the Korean |
| |Peninsula and ensuring a more stable and more secure future for the Korean People."-Regional Situation |
|96-Conflict in Europe |"We support the High Representative in his work of preparation with the Parties of the establishment of |
| |the new institutions: the collective Presidency, the Council of Ministers, the Parliament, the |
| |Constitutional Court and the Central Bank. We shall provide the future authorities with the necessary |
| |constitutional and legal assistance."-Decisions Concerning Bosnia and Herzegovina |
|97-Transnational |"We will combat illegal firearms trafficking, by considering a new international instrument. We will |
|Organized Crime |seek to adopt standard systems for firearms identification and a stronger international regime for |
| |import and export licensing of firearms". |
|97-Development |"We will work with African countries to ensure adequate and well-targeted assistance for those countries|
| |which have the greatest need and carry out the necessary broad-based reforms. The assistance will |
| |include support for democratic governance, respect for human rights, sound public administration, |
| |efficient legal and judicial systems, infrastructure development, rural development, food security, |
| |environmental protection, and human resource development including health and education of their |
| |people". |
|97-Employment |"Measures that expand the availability of high quality education and training and increase the |
| |responsiveness of labor markets to economic conditions will aid the ability of our people to adjust to |
| |all types of structural changes". |
|97-Environment |"At the Third Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change in Kyoto, we |
| |must forge a strong agreement that is consistent with the Berlin Mandate and contains quantified and |
| |legally-binding emission targets that will result in reductions of greenhouse gas emissions by 2010". |
|97-Antipersonnel |"We reaffirm the UN General Assembly resolution, approved overwhelmingly, calling for concluding an |
|Landmines |effective, legally binding international agreement to ban anti-personnel landmines as soon as possible".|
|97-Russia |We support the goal of early Russian accession to the WTO on the basis of conditions generally |
| |acceptable to newly acceding members." |
|98-Active Aging |The rapidly ageing populations of the G8 countries pose major challenges for their governments in the |
| |next few decades. The G8 governments will be faced with economic, social and political strains and must |
| |now, in preparation, develop policies to address the double-barreled demographic challenges of ageing |
| |baby boomers living longer and declining birth rates. In the final communique of the 1998 Birmingham |
| |Summit each country "confirmed its determination to pursue the concept of active ageing." It also stated|
| |that "Measures on active ageing should explore what forms of work are appropraite to the needs of older |
| |workers and adapt work to suit them accordingly." Several international organizations followed the G8's |
| |focus on older persons and active ageing. The United Nations declared 1999 "International Year of the |
| |Older Person" while the World Health Organization made "active ageing" the focus of World Health Day |
| |(April 7, 1999). While most of the G8 countries recognized these events with websites, postage stamps |
| |and the like far fewer of the "8" had economies healthy enough to support substantive policies or |
| |initiatives to expand employment opportunities for older people. |
|98-Climate Change I |11. "...[we] confirm the intention of the rest of us to sign it [the Kyoto Protocol] within the next |
| |year" |
|98-Climate Change II |11. "[we] resolve to make an urgent start on the further work that is necessary to ratify and make Kyoto|
| |a reality." To this end: "...we will work further on flexible mechanisms such as international |
| |market-based emissions trading, joint implementation and the clean development mechanism, and on sinks. |
| |We aim to draw up rules and principles that will ensure an enforceable, accountable, verifiable open and|
| |transparent trading system and an effective compliance regime." |
|98-Debt of the Poorest |"We will work with the international institutions and other creditors to ensure that when they qualify, |
| |countries get the relief they need, including interim relief measures whenever necessary, to secure a |
| |lasting exit from their debt problems." |
|98-Employment | NA |
|98-International Trade |"we reaffirm our strong commitment to continue trade and investment liberalization within the |
| |multilateral framework of the WTO". |
|98-Illegal Trafficking of|" We are deeply concerned by all forms of trafficking in human beings including the smuggling of |
|Human Beings |migrants. We agreed to joint action to combat trafficking in women and children, including efforts to |
| |prevent such crimes, protect victims and prosecute the traffickers. We commit ourselves to develop a |
| |multidisciplinary and comprehensive strategy, including principles and an action plan for future |
| |cooperation amongst ourselves and with third countries, including countries of origin, transit and |
| |destination to tackle this problem. We consider the future comprehensive United Nations organized crime |
| |convention an important instrument for this purpose." |
|99-Exchange Rate |"The challenge is to promote financial stability through national action as well as through enhanced |
|Mechanism |international cooperation…(I)t requires that all countrsume their responsibility for global stability by|
| |pursuing sound macroeconomic and sustainable exchange rate policies….(I)t requires the adoption and |
| |implementation of internationally-agreed standards and rules…(I)t also requires the right structure of |
| |incentives for all participants in the in the international financial system" |
|99-Macroeconomics |"…we need to pursue balanced macroeconomic policies supportive of domestic demand and investment while |
| |preserving price stability." |
|99-Trade |“Intend to step up work with developing countries and multilateral institutions to improve developing |
| |country capacity to exercise their rights and meet obligations in global trading system so as to ensure |
| |derivation of full benefit of liberalized trade and then contribute to global economic growth; |
| |Underscore commitment to sustainable development... agree that environmental standards should be taken |
| |fully into account in upcoming round of WTO negotiations, include clarification of relationship between |
| |both multilateral environment agreements and key environmental principles, and WTO rules; Renewed |
| |Commitment to strongly support the WTO and commitment to open trade and investment environment. - call |
| |on all nations to resist protectionist pressures and encourage non-WTO members to join; Pledge to work |
| |for successful WTO ministerial meeting, seek more effective way in WTO for addressing trade and |
| |environment relationship, promote sustainable development and social and economic welfare world wide; |
| |Encourage all members to make proposals in areas where developing countries can gain; Reaffirm |
| |Birmingham commitment to least developed countries on improved market access; Urge greater cooperation |
| |and policy coherence among international, financial, economic, labour and environmental organizations; |
| |Must be death with consequences of development of biotech in all for a; Commitment to science-based, |
| |rule-based approach to these issues; From 33rd quadrilateral trade minister's meeting -- some specific |
| |ones are: We agreed that the forthcoming negotiations should cover all service sectors, including those |
| |of interest to developing countries; The quad reaffirmed the commitments on agriculture that they |
| |undertook at the conclusion of the Uruguay round; We agreed that the next round of negotiations should |
| |include negotiations regarding non-agricultural tariffs and non-tariff barriers including those of |
| |interest to developing countries; We agreed that work on investment should proceed on a progressive |
| |basis, including the development of objectives toward negotiations of WTO rules on investment, as |
| |appropriate, as part of a forward workplan; We reaffirmed our commitments in the May 1998 ministerial |
| |declaration that established a comprehensive work program to examine trade-related issues relating to |
| |global electronic commerce and that continued the current practice of not imposing custom duties on |
| |electronic transmissions.” |
|99-Köln Debt Initiative |We therefore call for an expanded initiative that will provide faster, broader, and deeper debt relief; |
| |We welcome and endorse the Report of our Finance Ministers on the Köln Debt Initiative (after |
| |verification, these guidelines are taken directly from the Report of G7 Finance Ministers on the Köln |
| |Debt Initiative to the Köln Economic Summit); We also ask the Paris Club and other bilateral creditors |
| |to forgive commercial debt up to 90% and more in individual cases if needed to achieve debt |
| |sustainability, in particular for the very poorest among these countries; In addition to these amounts, |
| |we call for full cancellation on a bilateral basis, through various options, of Official Development |
| |Assistance (ODA) debt. |
| | |
|99-Financial Action Task | NA |
|Force | |
|99-Terrorism | NA |
|00-World Economy |Para. 8: “Reform efforts must now focus on maintaining and strengthening social safety nets to ensure |
| |strong, sustainable growth and avoid future instability.” |
|00-ICT |Para. 12: “We will set up a Digital Opportunities Task Force (dot force), which will be asked to report |
| |to our next meeting its findings and recommendations on global action to bridge the international |
| |information and knowledge divide.” This commitment focus specifically on the following aspects: 1. |
| |Fostering policy, regulatory and network readiness; 2. Improving connectivity, increasing access, and |
| |lowering cost; 3. Building human capacity by focusing on education and lifelong learning with emphasis |
| |on IT skills; 4. Encouraging participation in global e-commerce networks. |
|00-Health |Para. 29: “We therefore commit ourselves to working in strengthened partnership with governments, the |
| |World Health Organization (WHO) and other international organisations, industry (notably pharmaceutical |
| |companies), academic institutions, non-governmental organizations and other relevant actors in civil |
| |society to deliver three critical UN targets”: a) Reduce the number of HIV/AIDS-infected young people by|
| |25% by 2010; b) Reduce TB deaths and prevalence of the disease by 50% by 2010; c) Reduce the burden of |
| |disease associated with malaria by 50% by 2010 |
|00-Trade |Para. 36: “We are firmly committed to a new round of WTO trade negotiations with an ambitious, balanced |
| |and inclusive agenda, reflecting the interests of all WTO members. We agree that the objective of such |
| |negotiations should be to: a) Enhance market access; b) Develop and strengthen WTO rules and |
| |disciplines; c) Support developing countries in achieving economic growth and integration into the |
| |global trading system; d) Ensure that trade and social policies, and trade and environmental policies |
| |are compatible and mutually supportive. We agree to intensify our close and fruitful co-operation in |
| |order to try together with other WTO members to launch such a round during the course of this year.” |
|00-Cultural Diversity |Para. 41: “We shall strive to promote the digitalization of cultural heritage through, for example, |
| |fostering international links between national museum systems, with a view to enhancing public access.” |
|00-Crimes and Drugs |Para. 45: “We reaffirm our concern at the increasing global threat posed by the trafficking and use of |
| |illegal drugs. We remain committed to reducing demand in our own countries, and to countering the threat|
| |from the production and trafficking of illicit drugs globally. We will work with other countries, the UN|
| |system and other groups to reduce both supply and demand. We will support regional initiatives to end |
| |narcotics production and trafficking. We urge universal implementation of the conclusions of the 1998 UN|
| |Special Session on countering the world drugs problem. We are also committed to strengthening |
| |international co-operation to: a) Combat the illicit diversion of precursor chemicals for the production|
| |of illegal drugs; b) Address the growing new threat from amphetamines and other synthetic drugs, and |
| |will convene an ad hoc meeting of drugs experts by the end of this year; c) Accelerate the pace of work |
| |on asset confiscation; d) Examine, by means of an international conference hosted by the United Kingdom,|
| |the global economy of illegal drugs. |
|00-Aging |Para. 52. “The central challenge is to promote a culture that values the experience and knowledge that |
| |come with age. To this end, we will make further efforts to remove inappropriate disincentives for |
| |people below retirement age to stay in the labour market.” |
|00-Biotech |Para. 56. “We attach strong importance to the work of the CODEX Alimentarius Commission (CAC), the |
| |principal standard-setting body in food safety, and encourage its Ad Hoc Intergovernmental Task Force on|
| |Foods Derived from Biotechnology to produce a substantial interim report before completion of its |
| |mandate in 2003.” |
|00-Human Genome | NA |
|00-Conflict Prevention |Para. 73: “We express special concern that the proceeds from the illicit trade in diamonds have |
| |contributed to aggravating armed conflict and humanitarian crises, particularly in Africa. We therefore |
| |call for an international conference, whose results shall be submitted to the UN, building on the UN |
| |Security Council Resolution 1306 and inter alia the ‘Kimberley’ process launched by the Government of |
| |South Africa, to consider practical approaches to breaking the link between the illicit trade in |
| |diamonds and armed conflict, including consideration of an international agreement on certification for |
| |rough diamonds.” |
|00-Arms Control |Para. 74: “We are determined to implement the conclusions reached at this Conference, including the |
| |early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the immediate |
| |commencement and the conclusion within five years of negotiations for the Fissile |
| |Material Cut-Off Treaty. We remain committed to promoting universal adherence to and compliance with the|
| |Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT).” |
|00-Terrorism |Para. 79: “We renew our condemnation of all forms of terrorism regardless of their motivation. We are |
| |determined to combat them. … We call for all states to become parties to the twelve international |
| |counter-terrorism conventions to enhance international co-operation against terrorism. |
|01-Fighting Terrorism |We have asked our Foreign, Finance, Justice and other relevant Ministers as appropriate, to draw up a |
| |list of specific measures to enhance our counter terrorism cooperation, including: Expanded use of |
| |financial measures and sanctions to stop the flow of funds to terrorists; Aviation security; The control|
| |of arms exports; Security and other services cooperation; The denial of all means of support to |
| |terrorism; and The identification and removal of terrorist threats. |
|01-Bridging the Digital |Information and Communications Technologies (ICT) hold tremendous potential for helping developing |
|Divide |countries accelerate growth, raise standards of living and meet other development priorities. We endorse|
| |the report of the Digital Opportunity Task Force (DOT Force) and its Genoa Plan of Action that |
| |successfully fulfilled the Okinawa mandate. The direct participation of representatives from public, |
| |private and non-profit sectors, as well as that of developing countries’ governments, presents a unique |
| |formula for ensuring that digital technologies meet development needs. 1. We will continue to support |
| |the process and encourage all stakeholders to demonstrate ownership, to mobilize expertise and resources|
| |and to build on this successful cooperation. 2. We will review the implementation of the Genoa Plan of |
| |Action at our next Summit on the basis of a report by the G8 Presidency. 3. We also encourage |
| |development of an Action Plan on how e-government can strengthen democracy and the rule of law by |
| |empowering citizens and making the provision of essential government services more efficient. |
|01-Infectious Disease |At Okinawa last year, we pledged to make a quantum leap in the fight against infectious diseases and to |
| |break the vicious cycle between disease and poverty. To meet that commitment and to respond to the |
| |appeal of the UN General Assembly, we have launched with the UN Secretary-General a new Global Fund to |
| |fight HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis. We are determined to make the Fund operational before the end |
| |of the year. We have committed $1.3 billion. The Fund will be a public-private partnership and we call |
| |on other countries, the private sector, foundations, and academic institutions to join with their own |
| |contributions - financially, in kind and through shared expertise. We welcome the further commitments |
| |already made amounting to some $500 million. |
|01-Genoa African Action |“To take this process forward, each of us will designate a high level personal representative to liase |
|Plan |with committed African Leaders on the development of a concrete Action Plan to be approved at the G8 |
| |Summit next year under the leadership of Canada.” |
|01-Universal Primary |Para. 18: “…We reaffirm our commitment to help countries meet the Dakar Framework for Action goal of |
|Education |universal primary education by 2015… We will help foster assessment systems to measure progress, |
| |identify best practices and ensure accountability for results…” Drawing on the World Declaration on |
| |Education for All made in Jomtien in 1990, the universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Convention |
| |on the Rights of the Child, the Dakar Framework, adopted at the World Education Form in Senegal in April|
| |2000, embodies a ‘revitalized collective commitment to achieve Education for All (EFA) by 2015.’ This |
| |commitment puts particular emphasis on the fulfillment of the goals and strategies of EFA, in practice, |
| |through multi-sectoral participation and through the use of existent structures, institutions and |
| |infrastructures. Since the 2001 Genoa Summit, relevant institutions which have advanced the goals of EFA|
| |have included the Working Group on EFA, the High-Level Group meeting on EFA (both of which are |
| |subsidiary bodies of the United Nations) and the G8’s Education Task Force. Further to this, forums |
| |which have addressed |
| |EFA include the International Conference on Education in Geneva (September, 2001), the International |
| |Summit on Financing for Development in Monterrey (March, 2002), and the UN Special Summit on Children |
| |(May 2002). |
|01-Economic Growth-Trade |Sustained economic growth world-wide requires a renewed commitment to free trade. Opening markets |
| |globally and strengthening the World Trade Organisation (WTO) as the bedrock of the multilateral trading|
| |system is therefore an economic imperative. It is for this reason that we pledge today to engage |
| |personally and jointly in the launch of a new ambitious Round of global trade negotiations at the Fourth|
| |WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar this November. |
|01-Economic |Looking forward, we endorse our Finance Ministers' recommendations for action to further strengthen the |
|Growth-Strengthening |international financial system and their commitment to foster international consensus in this endeavour.|
|International Financial |In particular, the international financial institutions and the G7 countries should stand ready to help |
|System |countries adopt the policies required to ensure sustained access to capital markets. We also support our|
| |Finance Ministers' suggestions to further develop the framework for private sector involvement. |
|01-Economic Growth-HIPC |We have all agreed as a minimum to provide 100% debt reduction of official development assistance (ODA) |
| |and eligible commercial claims for qualifying67 HIPC countries. We urge those countries that have not |
| |already done so to take similar steps, and we underline the need for the active and full participation |
| |of all bilateral creditors in providing timely debt relief to HIPCs. |
|01-Environment I |“Attempt to reduce greenhouse gas emissions through the Sixth Conference of the Parties in Bonn (COP6) |
| |and other relevant fora” |
|01-Environment II |“Will give money to the Global Environment Facility (GEF) so that it may continue to support |
| |environmental protection on a global scale and foster good practices to promote efficient energy use and|
| |the development of renewable energy sources in the development world” |
|01-Environment III |“Hold a G8 Energy Minister conference” |
|01-Environment IV |“Work with civil society and developing countries to make the World Summit on Sustainable Development in|
| |Johannesburg a success” |
|01-Environment V |“Promote early entry into force of the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants” |
|01-Environment VI |“Work with the OECD to produce a recommendation that fulfills the Okinawa mandate” |
|02-Africa: Good |Expanding capacity-building programmes related to political governance in Africa focusing on the NEPAD |
|Governance |priority areas of: improving administrative and civil services, strengthening parliamentary oversight, |
| |promoting participatory decision-making, and judicial reform. (31: Africa Action Plan) |
|02-Africa: Peer Review |NEPAD maintains that development is impossible in the absence of true democracy, respect for human |
| |rights, peace and good governance. We agree, and it has been our experience that reliable institutions |
| |and governance are a precondition for long-term or large-scale private investment. The task of |
| |strengthening institutions and governance is thus both urgent and of paramount importance, and for this |
| |reason, we commit to: Supporting African peer-review arrangements - including by: Encouraging |
| |cooperation with respect to peer-review practices, modalities and experiences between the Organisation |
| |for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the ECA, including the participation by the ECA in |
| |the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) peer-review process where the countries under review so |
| |agree; (37: Africa Action Plan) Encouraging, where appropriate, substantive information sharing between |
| |Africa and its partners with respect to items under peer-review; and, Supporting regional organizations |
| |in developing tools to facilitate peer-review processes. |
|02-Africa: Education |Supporting the development and implementation by African countries of national educational plans that |
| |reflect the Dakar goals on Education for All, and encouraging support for those plans particularly |
| |universal primary education by the international community as an integral part of the national |
| |development strategies; |
|02-Development: HIPC |We will fund our share of the shortfall in the HIPC initiative, recognizing that this shortfall will be |
| |up to US $ 1 billion. |
|02-Development: ODA |Assuming strong African policy commitments, and given recent assistance trends, we believe in aggregate |
| |that half or more of our development assistance commitments announced at the Monterrey could be directed|
| |to African nations that govern justly, invest in their own people and promote economic freedom. |
|02-Arms Control and |The G8 calls on all countries to join them in commitment to the following six principles to prevent |
|Disarmament |terrorists or those that harbour them from acquiring or developing nuclear, chemical, radiological and |
| |biological weapons; missiles; and related materials, equipment |
| |and technology. |
|02-Conflict Prevention |Training African peace support forces including through the development of regional centres of |
| |excellence for military and civilian aspects of conflict prevention and peace support, such as the Kofi |
| |Annan International Peace Training Centre (19: Africa Action Plan 1.2.2) |
|02-Economic Growth: |Without prejudging the outcome of the negotiations, applying our Doha commitment to comprehensive |
|Agricultural Trade |negotiations on agriculture aimed at substantial improvements in market access, reductions of all forms |
| |of export subsidies with a view to their being phased out, and substantial reductions in |
| |trade-distorting domestic support. (Africa Action Plan, 57) |
|02-Economic Growth: Free |Working toward the objective of duty-free and quota-free access for all products originating from the |
|Trade |Least Developed Countries (LDCs), including African LDCs, and, to this end, each examining how to |
| |facilitate the fuller and more effective use of existing market access arrangements; (58: Africa Action |
| |Plan) |
|02-Environment: |Supporting the development and the responsible use of tired and tested new technology, including |
|Sustainable Agriculture |biotechnology, in a safe manner and adapted to the African context, to increase crop production while |
| |protecting the environment through decreased usage of fragile land, water and agricultural chemicals; |
| |(116:Africa Action Plan) |
|02-Environment: Water |Supporting African efforts to promote the productive and environmentally sustainable development of |
| |water resources. |
|02-Fighting Terrorism |We are committed to sustained and comprehensive actions to deny support or sanctuary to terrorists, to |
| |bring terrorists to justice, and to reduce the threat of terrorist attacks. |
|02-Transnational Crime |45 (Africa Action Plan), 12 (Chair’s Summary), Working to secure the early establishment of a UN |
|and Corruption |Convention on Corruption, and the |
| |early ratification of the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime; We support the |
| |Transitional Authority of Afghanistan. |
|03-World Economy/Growth |5: “We reaffirm our commitment to strengthen investor confidence by improving corporate governance, |
| |enhancing market discipline and increasing transparency”. |
|03-ICT |69: “Developing close co-ordination of global observation strategies to minimise data gaps by improving |
| |world-wide reporting and archiving of the data on atmosphere, land, fresh water, oceans and ecosystems |
| |and build on existing work to produce reliable data by spring’s Tokyo ministerial conference”. |
|03-Trade (MTN) |47: “We are therefore committed to delivering on schedule, by the end of 2004, the goals set out in the |
| |Doha Development Agenda, and to ensure that the Cancun Ministerial Conference in September takes all |
| |decisions necessary to help reach that goal.” |
|03-Development (ODA) |15: “We welcomed the report of our Finance Ministers’ discussions on our increased resources and on |
| |financing instruments. We invite them to report back to us in September on the issues raised by the |
| |financing instruments, including the proposal for a new International Finance |
| |Facility”. |
|03-Debt (HIPC) |16: “We reaffirmed the objective of ensuring lasting debt sustainability in HIPC countries and noted |
| |that these countries will remain vulnerable to exogenous shocks, even after reaching completion point. |
| |In this context, we have asked our Finance Ministers to review by September [2003] mechanisms to |
| |encourage good governance and the methodology for calculating the amount of “topping-up” debt relief |
| |available to countries at completion point based on updated cost estimates.” |
|03-Environment (Marine) |121: “ We commit to the ratification or acceding to and implementation of the United Nations Convention |
| |on the Law of the Sea, which provides the overall legal framework for oceans.” |
|03-Health (AIDS) |10: “We agreed on measures to strengthen the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, and |
| |other bilateral and multilateral efforts, notably through our active participation in the donors’ and |
| |supporters’ conference to be hosted in Paris this July.” |
|03-Crime (Terrorist |36: “We reaffirm our commitment to fight financial abuses and to encourage wider accession to and |
|Financing) |ratification of the U.N. Convention on Transnational Organized Crime so that money laundering, |
| |corruption and other relevant crimes are universally criminalized and that all countries have the power |
| |to identify, trace, freeze or seize and ultimately confiscate and dispose of assets from the proceeds of|
| |these crimes.” |
|03-Terrorism (CTAG) |150: “The G8 will create a Counter-Terrorism Action Group, to focus on building political will, |
| |co-ordinating capacity building assistance where necessary. Other states, mainly donors, will be invited|
| |to join the group. A representative of the CTC will be invited to CTAG meetings. Representatives from |
| |relevant UN bodies, IFIs and other regional and functional organizations will be invited to relevant |
| |meetings (first meeting to be held by July 15).” |
|03-Transport Security |168: “Given the increasing number of MANPADS (Man-Portable Air Defense Systems) in world-wide |
| |circulation, we commit ourselves to reducing their proliferation and call upon all countries to |
| |strengthen control of their MANPADS stockpiles”. |
|03-WMD |186: “We reaffirm our support for the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency), which should be granted|
| |the necessary means to implement its monitoring tasks.” |
|03-Energy |75: “We commit to participating in the International Conference on Renewable Energies, spring 2004 in |
| |Bonn”. |
|04-BMENA (Democracy |“Establish with willing partners in the region a Democracy Assistance Dialogue that will, under the |
|Assistance) |auspices of the Forum for the Future, bring together in a collaborative and transparent environment |
| |willing governments, civil society groups and other organizations from the G-8, EU |
| |and others, and countries in the region to: Coordinate and share information and lessons learned on |
| |democracy programs in the region, taking into account the importance of local ownership and each |
| |country’s particular circumstances; Work to enhance existing democracy programs or initiate new |
| |programs; Provide opportunities for participants to develop joint activities, including twinning |
| |projects; Promote and strengthen democratic institutions and processes, as well as capacity-building; |
| |Foster exchanges with civil society groups and other organizations working on programs in the |
| |region.”-G8 Plan of Support for Reform |
|04-BMENA (Iraqi |“We pledge to provide support and assistance for the electoral process leading to national elections for|
|Elections) |the Transitional National Authority [of Iraq] no later than January 31, 2005.”-Partnership for Progress |
| |and a Common Future with the Region of the Broader Middle East and North Africa |
|04-World Economy |“We agreed that it was important to take advantage of the strong global economic environment to |
| |implement further reforms to accelerate growth in our countries.”-2004 Sea Island Chair’s Summary |
|04-Trade: Doha |“…we direct our ministers and call on all WTO members to finalize the frameworks by July to put the WTO |
| |negotiations back on track so that we expeditiously complete the Doha Develoment Agenda.”-G8 Leaders |
| |Statement on Trade |
|04-Trade: Technical |“The progressive integration by developing countries of trade into their development policies and |
|Assistance |poverty reduction strategies is crucial for their integration in the global economy, and will increase |
| |the benefits they derive from the multilateral trading system. We call on developing countries to |
| |further increase their efforts in this regard, and pledge to provide strong support in the form of |
| |technical assistance to build their trading.”-G8 Leaders Statement on Trade |
|04-Energy |“We recognized the need for balanced energy policies, which increase energy supplies and encourage more |
| |efficient energy use and conservation, including through new technologies.”-G8 2004 Sea Island Summit |
| |Chair’s Summary |
|04-Environment |“Held First and Second Earth Observation Summits (EOS) and adopted a Framework document on a Global |
| |Earth Observation System of Systems (GEOSS). Planning to adopt a final 10-year strategic implementation |
| |plan on GEOSS at Third EOS in 2005 and working to identify the |
| |international mechanism to provide coordination and oversight for GEOSS.”-Science and Technology for |
| |Sustainable Development: “3r” Action Plan and Progress on Implementation |
|04-WMD |“…for the intervening year [between Sea Island and Gleneagles Summits], we agree that it would be |
| |prudent not to inaugurate new initiatives involving transfer of enrichment and reprocessing equipment |
| |and technologies to additional states. We call on all states to adopt this strategy with prudence.”-G8 |
| |Action Plan on Nonproliferation |
|04-Terrorist Financing |We will develop a diplomatic strategy to urge speedy consideration of ratification of the TOC |
| |[Transnational Organized Crime] Convention and coordinate with others, including donors to the UN Office|
| |on Drugs and Crime, to provide technical assistance to promote implementation of the |
| |Convention.”-Fighting Corruption and Improving Transparency |
|04-Transnational Crime |“We support our [Home Affairs and Justice] Ministers’ determination to detect, recover and return these |
| |illicitly acquired assets, including by: |
| |establishing G8 accelerated response teams; enhancing G8 asset recovery case coordination; and holding |
| |G8 asset recovery workshops. To meet these goals, we will ensure that: each of our countries has rules |
| |in place by Summer 2005, where possible, to require due diligence for “politically exposed persons” |
| |accounts; each of our countries has rules in place, preferably by 12/31/04, to require wire transfer |
| |originator information; we create G8 best practices for modalities of disposition and return; and we |
| |explore effective measures to recover assets in corruption cases.-Fighting Corruption and Improving |
| |Transparency |
|04-Transport Security |“Accelerate development of international standards for the interoperability of government-issued smart |
| |chip passports and other government-issued identity documents. We will work for implementation by the |
| |2005 Summit.”-G8 Secure and Facilitated International Travel Initiative (SAFTI) |
|04-Debt Relief |“We are committed to fully implementing the HIPC initiative and to supporting debt sustainability in the|
| |poorest countries through debt relief and grant financing. To that end, we have asked our finance |
| |ministers to: Work with other donors and the other international financial institutions to extend the |
| |sunset date of the HIPC initiative until December 31, 2006 and to provide the necessary financing for |
| |the completion of the initiative, including topping up where appropriate. Consider further measures that|
| |can help the poorest countries further address the sustainability |
| |of their debt.”-Debt Sustainability for the Poorest |
|04-Financing Development |“In anticipation of the UN-designated “international year of micro-credit” in 2005, G8 countries will |
| |work with the World Bank-based Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) to launch a global |
| |market-based microfinance initiative.”-G8 Action Plan: Applying the Power of Entrepreneurship to the |
| |Eradication of Poverty |
|04-Infectious Diseases: |“We believe the time is right for the major scientific and other stakeholders -both public and private |
|HIV/AIDS |sector, in developed and developing countries — to come together in a more organized fashion....We |
| |endorse this concept and call for the establishment of a Global HIV Vaccine Enterprise.”-G8 Action to |
| |Endorse and Establish a Global HIV Vaccine Enterprise |
|04-Infectious Diseases: |“We are pleased that the financing gap for 2004 has now been closed through our efforts and those of |
|Polio |others. We are determined to close the 2005 financing gap by the 2005 G8 Summit through the |
| |contributions of the G8 and other public and private donors.”-G8 Commitment to Help Stop Polio Forever |
|04-Peace Building in |“Therefore, we commit, consistent with out national laws, to:…Work with interested parties, before the |
|Africa |next Summit, to develop a transportation and logistics support arrangement, which will help provide |
| |countries with transportation to deploy to peace operations and logistics support to sustain units in |
| |the field. This kind of arrangement, which will take into account existing efforts, should address a key|
| |capabilities gap that often prevents timely intervention in crises.”-G8 Action Plan: Expanding Peace |
| |Support Operations in Africa |
|04-Famine and Food |“Although harvests improved in 2003-04, substantial emergency assistance will still be required for |
|Security in Africa |Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia, and Sudan, in part because of political instability and displacement of |
| |populations due to conflicts…Working with other donors, we will do our part to ensure that emergency |
| |needs, including food, are met.”-Ending the Cycle of Famine in the Horne of Africa, Raising Agricultural|
| |Productivity and |
| |Promoting Rural Development in Food Insecure Countries. |
|04-Regional Security: |“We pledge our countries’ assistance in ending the conflicts in Sudan and in providing humanitarian aid |
|Darfur |to those in need.”-G8 Statement on Sudan |
|05-Peace Keeping |“to provide extra resources for Africa's peacekeeping forces so that they can better deter, prevent and |
| |resolve conflicts in Africa.”-Chairman’s Summary (final press conference) |
|05-Good Governance |We will work vigorously for early ratification of the UN Convention Against Corruption and start |
| |discussions on mechanisms to ensure its effective implementation.-Africa Report |
|05-Health: HIV/AIDS |“We will work to meet the financing needs for HIV/AIDS, including through the replenishment this year of|
| |the Global Fund to fight AIDS, TB and Malaria; and actively working with local stakeholders to implement|
| |the ‘3 Ones’ principles in all countries”-Africa |
|05-Health: Polio |“Supporting the Polio Eradication Initiative for the post eradication period in 2006-8 through |
|Eradication |continuing or increasing our own contributions toward the $829 million target and mobilizing the support|
| |of others.”-Africa, 8 July 2005 |
|05-ODA |“We have agreed to double aid for Africa by 2010. Aid for all developing countries will increase, |
| |according to the OECD, by around $50 billion per year by 2010, of which at least $25 billion extra per |
| |year for Africa.”-Chairman’s Summary (final press conference) |
|05-Debt Relief: Africa |“The G8 has also agreed that all of the debts owed by eligible heavily indebted poor countries to IDA, |
| |the International Monetary Fund and the African Development Fund should be cancelled, as set out in our |
| |Finance Ministers agreement on 11 June.”-Chair’s Summary |
|05-Growth: Africa |“We agree to support a comprehensive set of actions to raise agricultural productivity, strengthen |
| |urban-rural linkages and empower the poor, based on national initiatives and in cooperation with the |
| |AU/NEPAD Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) and |
| |other African initiatives.”-Africa Report |
|05-Education: Africa |“As part of this effort, we will work to support the Education for All agenda in Africa, including |
| |continuing our support for the Fast Track Initiative (FTI) and our efforts to help FTI-endorsed |
| |countries to develop sustainable capacity and identify the resources necessary to pursue their |
| |sustainable strategies.”-Africa |
|05-Trade: Africa |“The G8 in return agreed to a comprehensive plan to support Africa’s progress. This is set out in our |
| |separate statement today. We agreed: to stimulate growth, to improve the investment climate and to make |
| |trade work for Africa, including by helping to build Africa’s capacity to trade and |
| |working to mobilize the extra investment in infrastructure which is needed for business.”-Chair’s |
| |Summary |
|05-Trade: Market Access |“We reaffirmed our commitment to open markets more widely to trade in agricultural goods, industrial |
|and Export Subsidies |goods and services, and in agriculture to reduce trade distorting domestic subsidies and eliminate all |
| |forms of export subsidies by a credible end date.”-Chairman’s Summary (final press conference) |
|05-Trade: LDCs |“We also committed to address products of interest to Least Developed Countries in the negotiations, and|
| |to ensure Least Developed Countries have the flexibility to decide their owneconomic |
| |strategies.”-Chairman’s Summary (final press conference) |
|05-Middle East Reform |“We support Mr Wolfensohn’s intention to stimulate a global financial contribution of up to $3bn per |
| |year over the coming three years. Domestic and international investors should be full partners to this |
| |process. We are mobilising practical support for Mr Wolfensohn’s efforts and look forward to further |
| |development of his plans and their presentation to the Quartet and the international community in |
| |September.”-Middle East Peace Process |
|05-Debt Relief: Iraq |“We reaffirm our intention to reduce Iraq's debt by implementing the terms of the November 2004 Paris |
| |Club agreement. We call on other creditors to provide debt relief on generous terms comparable to or |
| |even better than those agreed by the members of the Paris Club in November 2004”-Iraq |
|05-Sudan |“We commend and will continue to support the African Union’s Mission in Sudan (Darfur), just as we are |
| |contributing to UNMIS’s operation in southern Sudan.”-Statement by the G8 and African Union on Sudan |
|05-Terrorism |“We have carried forward initiatives to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction to terrorists |
| |and other criminals, reinforce international political will to combat terrorism, secure radioactive |
| |sources and — as announced at Sea Island — ensure secure and facilitated travel. Today we commit |
| |ourselves to new joint efforts. We will work to improve the sharing of information on the movement of |
| |terrorists across international borders.”811-G8 Statement on Counter-Terrorism |
|05-Non-proliferation |“We renew our pledge to raise up to $20 billion over ten years to 2012 for Global Partnership |
| |priorities, initially in Russia.”-Gleneagles Statement on Non-Proliferation |
|05-Transnational Crime |We are deepening these efforts at home and abroad, with the aim of reducing substantially global trade |
| |in pirated and counterfeit goods, and efficiently combating the transnational networks that support it. |
| |In particular, we will take further concrete steps to: “Improve co-ordination of anti-counterfeiting and|
| |anti-piracy crime strategies, and ensure closer co-operation among enforcement officials, including |
| |through shared risk analysis, exchange of best practice, enhanced existing cooperation at international |
| |borders, and between governments and the private sector;”-Reducing IPR Piracy and Counterfeiting Through|
| |More Effective Enforcement |
|05-Renewable Energy |We resolved to take action to meet the challenges we face. The Gleneagles Plan of Action which we have |
| |agreed demonstrates our commitment. “We will take measures to develop markets for clean energy |
| |technologies, to increase their availability in developing countries, and to help |
| |vulnerable communities adapt to the impact of climate change.”-Chairman’s Summary (final press |
| |conference) |
|05-Climate Change |“We will advance the global effort to tackle climate change at the UN Climate Change Conference in |
| |Montreal later this year. Those of us who have ratified the Kyoto Protocol remain committed to it, and |
| |will continue to work to make it a success”-Chairman’s Summary (final press conference) |
|05-Tsunami |“Six months on from the enormous tragedy of the Indian Ocean disaster on 26 December 2004, we have |
| |underlined our support for UN work on post-tsunami humanitarian aid and reconstruction, as well as |
| |confirming our commitment to reduce the risk from future disasters and to encourage reform of the |
| |humanitarian system.”-Chair’s Summary (final press conference) |
|05-Surface Transportation|We will encourage the development of cleaner, more efficient and lower-emitting vehicles, and promote |
| |their deployment, by: “Adopting ambitious policies to encourage sales of such vehicles in our countries,|
| |including making use of public procurement as appropriate to accelerate market development;” -Gleneagles|
| |Plan of Action:Climate Change, Clean Energy, and Sustainable Development |
|06-Health (Global fund to|“We will work with other donors and stakeholders in the effort to secure funds needed for the 2006-2007 |
|fight HIV/AIDS, |replenishment period and call upon all concerned to participate actively in the development of a |
|Tuberculosis, and |four-year strategy, aimed at building a solid foundation for the activities of the Fund in the years |
|Malaria) |ahead.” Fight Against Infectious Disease |
|06-Health (Global plan to|“We will also support the Global Plan to Stop TB, 2006-2015, which aims to cut TB deaths in half by the |
|Stop TB support) |year 2015 compared to 1990 levels, saving some 14 million lives over ten years, and call upon all donors|
| |and stakeholders to contribute to its effective implementation.” Fight Against Infectious Disease |
|06-Health (Polio |“We urgently call for mobilization of financial support and will continue to work collectively and with |
|Eradication) |bilateral and multilateral donors to close the funding gap for 2007-2008, and will continue to work with|
| |others towards securing the resources necessary to finish the program and declare our planet polio-free |
| |in the near future.” Fight Against Infectious Disease |
|06-Energy (Oil and Energy|“We welcome the beginning of implementation of the Joint Oil Data Initiative (JODI) and will take |
|Reserve Data Collection) |further action to improve and enhance the collection and reporting of market data on oil and other |
| |energy sources by all countries including through development of a global common |
| |standard for reporting oil and other energy reserves.”Global Energy Security |
|06-Energy Intensity |“consider national goals for reducing energy intensity of economic development to be reported by the end|
|(Reduction) |of the year” Global Energy Security |
|06-Surface Transportation|“develop programs in our respective countries, consistent with national circumstances, to provide |
|(Efficiency) |incentives for consumers to adopt efficient vehicles, including clean diesels and hybrids; and introduce|
| |on a large scale efficient public hybrid and/or clean diesel transportation systems, where |
| |appropriate;”Global Energy Security |
|06-Renewable Energy |“We will facilitate development of local energy resources, including those based on core generation |
| |technologies and on renewable energy, such as hydropower, wind power, geothermal power, biomass, and the|
| |effective use of solar energy, to contribute to poverty reduction and long-term energy sustainability in|
| |developing countries.”Global Energy Security |
|06-Climate Change and |“We reaffirm our intention to deliver on commitments made in Gleneagles in order to meet our shared … |
|Sustainable Development |objectives of reducing greenhouse gas emissions” Global Energy Security |
|06-Education (Academic |“We will promote international academic mobility at all levels, significantly increasing the mobility of|
|Mobility) |students, teachers and researchers.” Education for Innovative Society in the 21st Century |
|06-Education |“We will share information about qualification systems in our countries to increase understanding of |
|(Qualification Systems) |national academic practices and traditions.” |
| |Education for Innovative Society in the 21st Century |
|06-Education (Gender |“We regret that interim targets related to eliminating gender disparities in primary and secondary |
|Disparities) |education have not been achieved. Greater concerted action by all will be needed to fulfill these key |
| |goals by 2015. We reaffirm our commitments in this regard.” Education for Innovative Society in the 21st|
| |Century |
|06-Africa (Security, |“Continuing, in cooperation with the EU, UN and other partners, to assist the AU and African |
|Assist to the AU and |sub-regional organizations in further developing the African Standby Force including transportation and |
|Regional Organizations) |logistics support arrangements” Update on Africa |
|06-Africa (Debt Relief) |“ensuring the full implementation and financing of the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) |
| |according to our commitments made at Gleneagles and on a fair burden-share basis, and preserving |
| |long-term debt sustainability through the implementation of the IMF/World Bank debt sustainability |
| |framework for low-income countries.” Update on Africa |
|06-Transnational Crime |“We maintained our commitment to implement and promote the FATF recommendations, the UN Convention on |
|and Corruption |Transnational Organized Crime, and the UN Convention Against Corruption.” Fighting High-Level Corruption|
|06-Intellectual Property |“to create in each G8 country a website providing businesses and individuals with information on |
|Rights |mechanisms available and procedures necessary to secure and enforce their intellectual property rights |
| |in that country, on threats posed by piracy and counterfeiting to public health, safety and the national|
| |interests of countries, consumers and business communities, as well as on measures taken at the national|
| |and international levels to combat intellectual property rights violations, and on relevant legislation |
| |and law enforcement practices;” Combating IPR Piracy and Counterfeiting |
|06-Trade (Export |“In agriculture, we are equally committed to substantially reducing trade-distorting domestic support |
|Subsidies, Agriculture) |and to the parallel elimination by the end of 2013 of all forms of export subsidies, as well as the |
| |establishment of effective disciplines on all export measures with equivalent effect, as agreed in Hong |
| |Kong.” Trade |
|06-Counter-terrorism |“We announce a plan of action to secure global critical energy infrastructure, including defining and |
|(Energy) |ranking vulnerabilities of critical energy infrastructure sites, assessing emerging and potential risks |
| |of terrorist attacks, and developing best practices for effective security across |
| |all energy sectors within our countries.” G8 Summit Declaration on Counter-Terrorism |
|06-Stabilization and |“In order to facilitate the UN's rapid and efficient response to crises, G8 states commit to the UN as |
|Reconstruction (UN) |it works to establish new peacekeeping and peace support operations prepositioning equipment in |
| |Brindisi, an increase in pre-authorization funds to support DPKO's planning, and the authority to |
| |identify personnel in advance of a UNSC resolution mandating a new PKO;” G8 Declaration on Cooperation |
| |and Future Action in Stabilization and Reconstruction |
|06-Global Partnership |“We remain committed to our pledges in Kananaskis to raise up to $20 billion through 2012 for the Global|
|(Non-proliferation) |Partnership, initially in Russia, to support projects to address priority areas identified in Kananaskis|
| |and to continue to turn these pledges into concrete actions.” St. Petersburg Statement on |
| |Non-Proliferation |
|06-Middle East (Lebanon) |“We will support the economic and humanitarian needs of the Lebanese people, including the convening at |
| |the right time of a donors conference.” |
| |Statement by Group of Eight Leaders at the St. Petersburg Summit |
Appendix I:
Compliance Scores from G8 Summits: 1996-2006
Table A: Final and Interim Compliance Levels at G8 Summits: 1996-2006
[pic]
[pic]
Appendix J: Description of the 2007 Priority Commitment Selection
On October 20, 2007, 23 Priority Commitments were selected from the 2007 G8 Summit in Heiligendamm to be measured for compliance in the upcoming year. The first step in the selection of the 2007 Priority Commitments occurred months earlier, when the Senior Researcher for the G8 Research Group, Laura Sunderland, identified 329 commitments present in the communiqués from Heiligendamm that were issues there in the leaders’ name. Theses commitments were identified based on the established set of guidelines created by Ella Kokotsis, which can be found in the G8 Commitment/Compliance Coding and Reference Manual.
Once the 329 commitments were identified, they were distributed to a number of interested parties, including the G8 Research Group Executive, the G8 Research Student Group, the G8 Research Group Administration, the G8 Research Group branch from the Higher School of Economics in Moscow, Russian government officials, Canadian government officials, officials from the Japanese Embassy in Canada, the Canadian Council of Churches and Green Cross, Canada branch.
From the list of 329 commitments, these parties set out to identify what they deemed Priority Commitments. Individuals from the G8 Research Group at the University of Toronto and the Higher School of Economics in Moscow chose their Priority Commitments based on the guidelines found in the G8 Commitment/Compliance Coding and Reference Manual. Individuals from government and non-government organizations chose priority commitments, it appeared, according to their specified areas of interest.
Priority Commitment lists from the interested parties were then compiled into a single spreadsheet. This spreadsheet included primary input from four individuals from the G8 Research Group at the University of Toronto and twelve individuals from the G8 Research Group at the Higher School of Economics in Moscow (who had already compiled their twelve individual lists into one). After this compilation was completed, secondary input was taken into consideration from other parties including the Russian government, the Canadian Council of Churches, and Green Gross, Canada branch.
From this compilation of Priority Commitments, a list of 23 priority commitments was selected. On the compiled lists, two commitments had the full endorsement of the G8 Research Group (227 and 327). These commitments were therefore the first to be included in the Priority Commitment list. Other commitments, that had the endorsement of at least one or more individual(s), were then taken into further consideration and deliberated on by the G8 Research Group. Eventually these commitments were either accepted or discarded based on the criteria set out in the G8 Commitment/Compliance Coding and Reference Manual’s ‘How to Select Priority Commitments.’ After an afternoon of debate and discussion, another 21 commitments were selected (See Table A below for a full list of Priority Commitments).
At this point, there was a check to ensure that some other non-G8 Research Group parties’ priority commitments were included amongst these 23 Priority Commitments. With at least one appearing from each of the participating parties’ lists, a conclusive 23 Priority Commitments to be measured for compliance had been chosen.
Table A: 23 Priority Commitments from the 2007 Summit
No. Commitment Text Document Issue Area
| 2007-21 |In partnership with certain developing countries we agree to launch |Growth and |Intellectual Property |
| |technical assistance pilot plans with a view to building the capacity|Responsibility in the |Protection |
| |necessary to combat trade in counterfeited and pirated goods to |World Economy | |
| |strengthen intellectual property enforcement. | | |
|2007-35 |[We acknowledge that the UN climate process is the appropriate forum |Growth and |Fighting Climate Change|
| |for negotiating future global action on climate change.] We are |Responsibility in the | |
| |committed to moving forward in that forum and call on all parties to |World Economy | |
| |actively and constructively participate in the UN Climate Change | | |
| |Conference in Indonesia in December 2007 with a view to achieving a | | |
| |comprehensive post 2012-agreement (post Kyoto-agreement) that should | | |
| |include all major emitters. | | |
|2007-36 |We have urgently to develop, deploy and foster the use of |Growth and |Technology |
| |sustainable, less carbon intensive, clean energy and climate-friendly|Responsibility in the | |
| |technologies in all areas of energy production and use. |World Economy | |
|2007-65 |To this end, we will promote the appropriate policy approaches and |Growth and |Energy Efficiency |
| |instruments, including inter alia economic incentives and sound |Responsibility in the | |
| |fiscal policies, minimum standards for energy efficiency, sound and |World Economy | |
| |ambitious energy performance labelling, information campaigns aimed | | |
| |at consumers and industry that enhance national awareness, | | |
| |sector-based voluntary commitments agreed with industry, investment | | |
| |in research and development and guidelines for public procurement. | | |
|2007-90 |We will make efforts to integrate renewables into the power grid, |Growth and |Energy Diversification |
| | |Responsibility in the | |
| | |World Economy | |
|2007-103 |To this end we will build capacity for good governance of mineral |Growth and |Raw materials |
| |resources consistent with social and environmental standards and |Responsibility in the | |
| |sound commercial practices by reducing barriers to investment and |World Economy | |
| |trade, through the provision of financial, technical and capacity | | |
| |building support to developing countries for the mining, processing | | |
| |and trading of minerals. | | |
|2007-115 |We are committed to full implementation of their obligations under |Growth and |Corruption |
| |existing international agreements created to combat corruption, |Responsibility in the | |
| |particularly those of the United Nations and the Organisation for |World Economy | |
| |Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). | | |
|2007-134 |We will initiate a new form of a topic-driven Dialogue in a |Growth and |Heiligendamm process |
| |structured manner based on this new partnership. |Responsibility in the | |
| | |World Economy | |
|2007-143 |These include the historic multilateral debt relief of up to US$ 60 |Growth and |A Continent on the Move|
| |billion, the implementation of which is now well underway. |Responsibility in | |
| | |Africa | |
|2007-144 |They also include increasing, compared to 2004, with other donors, |Growth and |A Continent on the Move|
| |ODA to Africa by US$ 25 billion a year by 2010. |Responsibility in | |
| | |Africa | |
|2007-183 |[This partnership should help us work together more effectively with |Growth and |Strengthening Financial|
| |a variety of new and existing initiatives such as:] developing a |Responsibility in |Markets |
| |regional Micro Small and Medium Enterprises Investment Fund (REGMIFA)|Africa | |
| |as an instrument to mobilize resources to refinance medium- and | | |
| |long-term investment credits for smaller enterprises and to | | |
| |microfinance institutions. | | |
|2007-202 |The G8 will continue to work with partners and other donors to meet |Growth and |Ensuring Sustainable |
| |shortfalls in all FTI endorsed countries, estimated by the FTI |Responsibility in |Investment |
| |Secretariat at around US$ 500 million for 2007. |Africa | |
|2007-213 |At the same time we remain firmly committed to providing the |Growth and |Promoting Peace and |
| |necessary support to the ASF for its core military capabilities, |Responsibility in |Security |
| |which require increased investment by troop contributors and donors |Africa | |
| |alike. | | |
|2007-227 |[We recognize that the level of demand to the Global Fund to fight |Growth and |Combating HIV/AIDS, |
| |AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM) will increase substantially in|Responsibility in |Malaria, TB and other |
| |the future as has been projected by the GFATM Board. In this regard, |Africa |infectious diseases |
| |noting the conclusions of the April meeting of the GFATM Board, which| | |
| |estimated an additional demand approximately of US$ 6 billion by 2010| | |
| |which might possibly reach US$ 8 billion,] G8 members pledge to work | | |
| |with other donors to replenish the GFATM and to provide long-term | | |
| |predictable funding based on ambitious, but realistic demand-driven | | |
| |targets. | | |
|2007-233 |The G8 will take concrete steps to support education programs |Growth and |Combating HIV/AIDS, |
| |especially for girls, to promote knowledge about sexuality and |Responsibility in |Malaria, TB and other |
| |reproductive health and the prevention of sexually transmitted |Africa |infectious diseases |
| |infections. | | |
|2007-264 |We will work with African states to address the different causes of |Growth and |Strengthening Health |
| |this lack of human resource capacity within the health sector, |Responsibility in |Systems in Africa |
| |including working conditions and salaries with the aim of recruiting,|Africa | |
| |training and retaining additional health workers. | | |
|2007-277 |We reaffirm our support to the early commencement of negotiations on |Heiligendamm Statement |Nonproliferation |
| |a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty. |on Nonproliferation | |
|2007-293 |In this regard we remain committed to implementing the Hague Code of |Heiligendamm Statement |Nonproliferation |
| |Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation and call upon other |on Nonproliferation | |
| |subscribing States to follow suit. | | |
|2007-295 |We reiterate our commitment to continue to provide humanitarian |G8 Statement on |Sudan |
| |assistance and will undertake, in coordination with the African Union|Sudan/Darfur | |
| |and the United Nations, to identify options for improving | | |
| |humanitarian access. | | |
|2007-314 |Furthermore, we aim to improve passenger screening programs and |G8 Summit Statement on |Improving Transport |
| |techniques, port facility security audits, security management |Counter Terrorism – |Security |
| |systems and transportation security clearance programs. |Security in the Era of | |
| | |Globalization | |
|2007-318 |We commend the efforts of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and |G8 Summit Statement on |Countering Cash |
| |reaffirm our commitment to implement and promote internationally its |Counter Terrorism – |Smuggling Used to |
| |40 Recommendations on Money Laundering and nine Special |Security in the Era of |Finance Terrorism and |
| |Recommendations on Terror Finance. |Globalization |violent extremism |
|2007-327 |We remain fully committed to the development dimension of the DDA, |G8 Trade Declaration |Trade |
| |promoting progressive trade liberalisation, helping developing | | |
| |countries to better integrate into the multilateral trading system | | |
| |and providing support to the poorest countries in order to enable | | |
| |them to benefit from the significant opportunities of globalisation. | | |
|2007-328 |We reaffirm our commitment to the Global Partnership against the |Report on the G8 Global|Global Partnership |
| |Proliferation of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction as set out|Partnership | |
| |in the 2002 Kananaskis G8 Summit documents. | | |
-----------------------
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.
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[64] WTO seals farms deal among protests", , 18 December, 2005. Date of Access: 04 January 2006. .
[65] Winners and losers in Hong Kong", BBC News Online, (London), 19 December 2005. Date of Access: 05 January 2006. .
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