Women, Ecology and the Law



Women, Ecology and the Law

In every known society, the male’s need for achievement can be recognised. Men may cook, or weave, or dress dolls or hunt hummingbirds, but if such activities are appropriate occupations of men, then the whole society, men and women alike, votes them as important. When the same occupations are performed by women, they are regarded as less important.

Margaret Mead, Male and Female

The treatment of environmental issues by traditional law and legal theory is not gender neutral. Examining this notion, this essay considers how feminist jurisprudence may further contribute to influencing the legal traditions that validate our current exploitative relationship with our environment. By reference to a growing literature on ecofeminism I have made observations and suggestions as to how I see feminist jurisprudence may provide an enhanced critique of the manner in which the law validates our present exploitative demeanour. Premised on the belief that a continuation of our contemporary relationship with ecological systems is likely to increase scarcity and competition for resources, and thus exacerbate existing inequalities, I believe the legal advances achieved to date by feminist jurisprudence may become threatened by cultures experiencing increasing stress.

Given the enormous task society has in addressing legal inequalities between genders, it is perhaps unsurprising that the areas of women, the law, and the environment appear not to have crossed into the other two disciplines respectively. Whilst a growing ecofeminist movement is establishing a literature dealing with human exploitation of women under a male hegemony legitimised through ‘legalised means’, and the developing area of environmental law has increasingly challenged the role of ‘man’s dominion over the Earth’, there doesn’t appear to be any appreciable bridge so far formed between the two areas of legal critique. This is a pity, as the manner in which men as the dominant group within societies have interacted with other entities within their environment, be they women, the underprivileged or the non-human world, has largely followed a pattern of arrogant diffidence to the needs of the other. If, as Catherine MacKinnon suggests, feminist epistemology views the mind and world as interpenetrated[1], by bridging the connection between the way we interact with our environment and the incorporation of inequality into our legal framework, I think the influence of feminist jurisprudence may facilitate and encourage reform of environmental and other law that will have far reaching benefits.

Achieving equality within the Enlightenment tradition appears to have consumed so much of feminist legal theorist’s energy for reform, that they appear to have taken little opportunity to establish a critique of women as part of the human species that seeks to dominate and exploit the biosphere. In a crude sense, I describe this as replacing male domination over women and nature, by male and female domination over nature. Whilst many people would argue that human culture and intelligence afford us that opportunity, and some might say ‘right’, the increasing degradation of the biosphere suggests this is a power relationship that will not continue indefinitely.

The desire of ‘mankind’ to subdue and control nature has prefaced the modernity project, and continues as a strong theme in contemporary jurisprudence. Rather than seeking to ‘set the record straight’, I believe feminist aspirations concerning ecology and law are more likely to be realised by challenging the nature of legal theory itself. Building on Foucault’s notion that truth itself has become a means by which a variety of regimes have been able to assert themselves, I believe feminist desires will be more valuably expressed through honest concerns about domination and exclusion[2], rather than being constrained by arguing within the existing framework of rational ‘proof’ and truth seeking. Employing the consciousness raising tradition that Catherine MacKinnon considers distinguishes feminism[3], I believe feminist jurisprudence has an opportunity to establish a critique of the male dominated notions of exploitation and domination that influence the way legal theory and practice relates to the environment. Whilst I agree with Carol Smart’s criticism of MacKinnon’s proposition that radical feminism as such, represents an ultimate truth[4], given the complex nature of the issues I have sought to consider and the surprising lack of material dealing with the relationships between women, ecology and the law, it is both beyond my ability and desire to announce any such notions as superior or more insightful than those of other theorists.

The Legitimation Of Domination By Men

Feminism turns theory into itself, the pursuit of a true analysis of social life, into the pursuit of consciousness, and turns an analysis of inequality into a critical embrace of its own determinants. The process is transformative as well as perceptive, since thought and thing are inextricable and reciprocally constitutive of women’s oppression, just as the state is coercion and the state as legitimating ideology are indistinguishable, and for the same reasons.

Catherine MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of State, 84.

Western political philosophy implies a model of universal human nature and experience, with the universal imposition of the Enlightenment idea of modernisation seen as an improvement typically proffered by the West to developing countries. Traditional views of the state as the guarantor of welfare has meant that movements by women to attain the same opportunities to engage in the activities of the state as men have provided a basic source of division and definition in political society.[5] Human interaction with the biosphere has typically been subjugated to the hegemony of ‘man’s dominion over the Earth’, with women and the biosphere treated by the law as man’s chattels, whereby the facility provided by each in turn was viewed as a contribution towards what Francis Bacon described as the “relief of the inconveniences of man’s estate.”[6] Given the enormous burden that reform measures have placed on feminists wishing to redress the inequalities and injustices foisted upon them by the men who dominate the legal bureaucracy that coercively guide our lives, it appears there has been relatively little attention focussed within legal theory concerning the interaction of women, ecology and the law.

In this essay I wish to consider the suggestion by Gilligan that women have a unique degree of access to potential nurturing roles, and contrast it with the view of Catherine MacKinnon who focuses on women’s experiences and views for guiding a critique of legal reasoning.[7] I also wish to explore the notion that as the application of formal justice principles within law reinforce discrimination and substantive inequality, the overcoming or at least recognition of the alienation that persists in the isolation of suburban women (and men) who, even though they may live in materially rich conditions, suffer exploitation through marriage, parenthood, psychiatry and consumerism.[8]

Law And The Environment

For environment a traditional lawyer reads property. Establish ownership or possession and the armoury of the English legal cupboard is yours to command.

The Challenge of the Environment in English Law - the New Dimension, 59.

Legal consideration of the natural environment has been very unsophisticated. Common law treatment of ecological interaction is typified by a utilitarian ethic such as that espoused in Property Law which gives the environment a value according to its utility. The case of Rylands v Fletcher[9] which considered the implications of careless ‘management’ of resources deemed to be under one party’s control affecting another party, simply limited the extent of its implications to the damage and inconvenience it brought human habitants. Environmental law has not enjoyed acceptance as a legitimate classification of legal concern[10], in much the same way that women’s concerns about formal and substantive inequalities have seen the resistance of the legal profession as a whole to incorporate feminist legal theory critique. Whilst environmental law is by no means a new area of legal concern[11], it has only recently gained greater credence as an inter-disciplinary area of significance in its own right, and although the growth in environmental law reflects an increasingly growing area of legal concern, issues of environmental law continue to meet the same issues of establishing ‘legitimacy’ that feminist legal theory has experienced in its own development. The connection between the two is not simply coincidental.

Our legal framework has been constructed on a partial account of the world. Australian legal theory and practice have developed within a society that has constructed the social categories of ‘man’ and ‘woman’ as unequal, with the legal process having been an integral part of both the construction and maintenance of this inequality. As utilitarian views expressed in legislation, land use planning and management policies have dominated traditional evaluation methods of economic and environmental impact, assessments of the consequences of our activity have typically failed to reflect ecological values.[12] As law tends to assume in a self proclaimed fashion its role as the ‘administrator’ of the environment, similar issues arise as for women facing subjugation as the ‘other’ in the way patriarchal social networks have assumed the control of women’s lives. The notion of social ecology, associated strongly with the thoughts of Murray Bookchin, and the growing voices of ecofeminists such as Ariel Salleh and Carol Merchant, question and challenge these processes in calling for a greater social involvement in addressing power inequalities realised in the representation of interests in the way we conduct our activities.

Feminism And Ecology

“We have got to the stage where women are finally saying ‘the emperor has got no clothes’. You can’t whitewash women any more. Our arguments are too sophisticated and have gone way beyond what are ordinarily considered feminist issues.”

Peggy Antrobus, speaking at the Global Forum, Rio de Janiero, June 1992.[13]

Feminist debate of ecological issues tends to agree that important connections exist between women’s oppression and the oppression of nature[14], but they often disagree about the nature of those connections and whether those connections may be “potentially liberating or simply a rationale for the continued subjugation of women.”[15] Therefore, whilst many feminists agree that ecology is a feminist issue, there is disagreement about the nature and desirability of environmental feminism, of which the best known perspective is ecofeminism, as a legitimate form of critique.[16] The underlying thesis of ecofeminism is that irrespective of our awareness of it, each of us operates from a socially constructed conceptual framework which shape, reflect and explain our self perception and worldview, whilst a patriarchal conceptual framework is one that takes traditionally male-identified beliefs, values, attitudes and assumptions as the only, or the standard or superior ones. This gives those notions supporting patriarchy higher status to entities traditionally identified as male than to what have been traditionally identified as female.[17] The relatively recently articulated notions of ecofeminism, derived mainly from a fusion of radical cultural feminism and ecological environmentalism add a vital element to the construction of an understanding of how patriarchal systems of domination have both evolved and been reinforced through the legal mechanisms we subscribe to.

Ecofeminists generally believe that patriarchal value-hierarchical thinking supports the generation of normative dualisms, where higher value is attributed to one entity over another. The connections between oppression of women and oppression of nature are therefore conceptual, and what ecofeminism encourages us to do is to think about the ways we construct our lives and to think ourselves out of “patriarchal conceptual traps.”[18] Patriarchal conceptual frameworks, characterised by value-hierarchical thinking, typically lead to a logic of domination that explain, justify and maintain the subordination of an ‘inferior’ group by a ‘superior’ group, whilst denying that oppression is accompanied by this regime.[19] This blindness to the presence of domination is reflected in ‘official’ perspectives on the traditional role of women and their interactions with their environment, such as the 1992 United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development. Whilst women compose 53% of the world’s population, but carry out an estimated 65% of the world’s work for 10% of the world’s pay[20], the continued ‘official’ blindness of large legal bureaucratic organisations such as the U.N. to the role women seems to only exacerbate the widespread misconception that men continue to ‘manage’ the Earth. Although the role of women in environmental management is frequently appreciated locally, recognition that women’s contributions were equal, if not greater in value to men, only really emerged in the late 1980’s[21], and as I infer, is yet to be meaningfully reflected in policy.

Ecofeminist Critiques of Feminism Legal Theory Frameworks

Politics traditionally is about domination, of one ideology over another. Ecofeminism is about ending domination - social, economic, racial, environmental and sexual. Ecofeminists don’t want to reform, they want to change the very rules by which society operates.

Virginia Westbury, Ecofeminising Australia, 90.

Ecofeminist critiques of how instruments of coercion such as the law oppress both women and nature centre around four elements.[22] These are i) that there are important connections between the oppression of women and the oppression of nature; ii) that understanding the nature of these connections is necessary to an adequate understanding of the oppression of both women and nature; iii) that feminist theory and practice must include an ecological perspective; and iv) that solutions to ecological problems must include a feminist perspective.

Whilst feminists agree that the oppression of women exists, is wrong and ought to be overcome, the foundations for their beliefs and the strategies they employ for overcoming these sometimes differ widely. Although feminist streams of thought are categorised under the headings of, inter alia, liberal feminism, radical feminism, cultural feminism and Marxist and socialist feminism, more recent scholarly work such as that by Carol Gilligan suggest that “these conceptual straitjackets now conceal more than they reveal.”[23] In order to show that feminist legal theory is not a static thesis unsympathetic to reconceptualisation, in reviewing the development of feminist legal thought I have provided a brief consideration of each of these categories in relation to ecological thought. Employing Ngaire Naffine’s analysis, I conclude by suggesting that an increased legal and community awareness of ecological issues may precipitate the evolution of a fourth phase of feminist legal theory which melds the notions of ecofeminism and feminist jurisprudence in a more concrete fashion.

Liberal Feminism

Liberal feminism maintains the belief that gender equality is achievable within a liberal framework, and is premised on the assumption that past and present inequalities have developed mainly through male prejudice. As the oppression of women is based on the lack of equal legal rights and unfair disadvantages in the legal domain, the liberation of women requires the elimination of those legal and social constraints that baulk self determination. Founded on the assumption that people are essentially separate rational agents, liberal feminist epistemology sees the attainment of knowledge as an individual project that can achieve equality through a value-neutral intersubjectively verifiable development of universalisable rules.[24]

As a framework for understanding the complexity of issues involved in environmental issues, liberal feminist epistemology is limited. A major shortcoming of liberal feminism is that it’s premises tend to rest upon notions of equal rights and equal opportunities for women, and possess an implied demarcation line delineating humans from nonhumans alongside claims to moral consideration of both groups on the alleged rights or interests of solely humans. This means that liberal feminists who articulate a stance on ecological issues such as protection of endangered species, animal experimentation, and anti-nuclear and peace movements amongst others, tend to be grounded in the notion of the rights, interests of present or future human populations.[25] A second implication is that moral consideration extended to qualified nonhumans, as rational sentient interest carriers, deserve moral consideration. This theme surfaces frequently in debates over animal liberation, fitting roughly under two umbrellas. Firstly, those typified by the rights based theory of Tom Regan which postulates that nonhuman animals have moral rights against humans who have obligations to treat them in particular ways[26], and secondly, the utilitarian based version of proponents such as Peter Singer who see human obligations to nonhuman entities as based in the belief that failure to acknowledge in theory and practice the likelihood that these nonhuman entities feel pleasure and pain is an undesirable expression of ‘speciesism’ analogous to, inter alia, sexism.[27]

Kathyrn Pyne Addelson, in criticising the liberal feminist ethical tradition, argues that biases in our worldview such as these “allow moral problems to be defined from the top of various hierarchies of authority in such a way that the existence of authority is concealed, and so the existence of alternative definitions that might challenge that authority and radically change our social organisation is also concealed.”[28] Continued subscription to a patriarchal conceptual framework based on value-hierarchical thought and oppositional normative dualisms within liberal feminism and the extreme individualism it embodies tend to conflict with the holistic interconnected frameworks typifying ecofeminist perception of human involvement in the biosphere. Suggesting that this conceptual framework will require a revolutionary change in ethics to remedy, Addelson says as liberal feminist ethical tradition makes the assumption that defining moral problems from the top of the hierarchy is the ‘official’, ‘correct’ or ‘legitimate’ point of view[29], it fails to recognise that “dominant-subordinate social structures are the creators of inequality.”[30]

Cultural Feminism

Cultural feminism is a broad category of jurisprudence that has in large evolved from a belief that legal systems have traditionally been fashioned by men in their own image.[31] Ecofeminist critiques of hierarchical rights and rules-based ethical models can be seen reflected in the work of Carol Gilligan comparing individualised rights oriented ethics with the interconnected and contextual ethics of care and reciprocal responsibility, such as is outlined in the well known story of Amy and Jake.[32] In contrast to Catharine MacKinnon who disputes the notion of a female ethical style as the “convenient artefact of men”[33], Carol Gilligan thesis of In a Different Voice is that male and female legal and ethical styles have developed from the socialisation of different groups of people in different ways.[34] Gilligan argues that the different ethical orientations she identifies between men and women reflect important differences in moral reasoning.[35] For MacKinnon, gender is not a question of difference but one of dominance propagated by a system of law that “sees and treats women the way men see and treat women.”[36] The parallel in MacKinnon’s dominance theory between men as the people occupying the dominant power positions in society oppressing women, and the dominance of the non-human world by the human world is a clear example of the operation of the substantive inequality that liberal democratic theory so often fails to adequately address.

Radical Feminism

Radical feminism sees women’s oppression as being founded in a patriarchal system which oppresses women in sex-specific ways by defining them as having either the primary functions of bearing or raising children, or to satisfy male sexual desires. As the oppression of women is based on male control of women’s fertility and women’s sexuality, radical feminists believe that patriarchy must be dismantled to end male control of women’s bodies.[37] Typically subscribing to the notion that ‘the person is political’, radical feminist epistemology seeks to explore and implement strategies such as consciousness raising to correct the imbalances wrought by patriarchal ideology.[38] Perhaps providing the most attention to ecological issues of the varieties of feminism described here, some radical feminists such as Mary Daly and Susan Griffin claim that women are closer to nature than males. This is neither a belief I subscribe to nor one accepted universally by radical feminists. The shortcomings I see in radical feminism’s treatment of ecological issues is its lack of theoretical construction of a framework that succinctly explains oppression of women and nature. Furthermore, radical feminism’s tendency to use essentialism to mystify women’s experiences as being closer to nature than men’s reinforces the dualist notion of patriarchy that women and men are separate and irreconcilable categories.

Socialist And Marxist Feminisms

Socialist and Marxist feminists view society as being based on two antagonistic classes based on gender. As the sexual division of labour formalises women’s oppression by excluding women from the public realm of production, liberation of women requires the abolition of the traditional family as the economic unit. As Engels said, “The first condition of the liberation of the wife is to bring the whole female sex into public industry.”[39] Praxis, in contrast to liberal feminist reliance on thought and reason is seen as the key to overcoming the inequities in class societies.

Marxist feminists epistemology is based on the premise that humans exist in a dialectical relationship with each other, according to the realities espoused by the precepts of historic materialism which implies that “all forms of knowledge are historically determined by the prevailing mode of production.”[40] Whilst there is an ongoing debate as to the ecological credentials of Marxist interpretations, it is important for feminist legal theorists wishing to overcome these inherent conflict to not allow a substitution of domination of man over woman and nature for the domination of man and woman over nature.

Socialist feminism considers an expanded Marxist notion of praxis and production to encompass procreation and child bearing, arguing that economic and sex-gender systems are dialectically reinforced in historically specific ways.[41] Both Marxist and socialist feminists recognise that whilst nonhuman nature is the material basis for providing sustenance through the transformation of nature through science and technology, a continuation of the male-dominated mechanistic treatment of nature as passive must be stopped.[42] Socialist feminism extends this to the desire that the socially constructed categories of ‘women’ and ‘men’ will disappear.[43]

The Evolution of Feminist Jurisprudence

Ngaire Naffine in Law and the Sexes[44] has chronologically outlined three phases of feminist legal thought. Corresponding very loosely as First Phase being typified by liberal feminism, Second Phase by radical and cultural feminism, and Third Phase by socialist and marxist feminism, Naffine’s thesis describes an evolution away from acceptance of a traditional male framework of domination and popular subservience towards a greater emancipation of women. Taking the most recent developments in feminist jurisprudence as a priority, I wish to concentrate here on what Ngaire Naffine describes as Third Phase feminism.

Third Phase feminism accepts the possibility that law is both biased and male oriented, whilst in contrast to Second Phase feminism, rejects the notion that such inequities arise in a coordinated or uniform fashion. Using the work of Carol Gilligan, Ann Scales believes that boys and girls are raised to interact with the social world in different ways, and in doing so develop different styles of moral reasoning. My schema for explaining the manner in which patriarchal, exploitative and dominating ethics values are likely to be accumulated is best described by Michel Foucault. In Discipline and Punishment [45] and The History of Sexuality [46], Foucault challenged earlier Grand Theory propositions of control and overt coercion of people with the notion that the propagation of norms through society has a very persuasive effect on its members. In describing the judges of normality as being everywhere[47], Foucault’s ideas ally closely with what is described as third phase feminism.

Carol Smart’s notion that male bias is not an overt conspiracy has a strong parallel with those people and groups seeking to change the views of the law and society in its interactions with the environment. In arguing that the law intervenes most directly in our personal lives, Smart says that we must engage with the law to challenge its patriarchal relations. As women have been posited in a subordinate role within the traditional nuclear family, non-human concerns and likewise the concerns of those who tend to be most closely connected with the health of the environment have allowed patriarchal ‘leaders’ to guide the modernity project to its current dilemma. It so happens that the mix of biological intimacy arising from birth and the socialisation of women as nurturers has meant that those people most often concerned appear to be women. Just as in Smart’s analysis of Family Law she suggests that the paramount principle of the welfare of the child has “driven a wedge into the old legal stronghold”[48] if feminist legal theorists choose to do so, they may extend this analysis and action to mould a jurisprudence that incorporates an enlarged humanitarian concern for the environmental systems which help sustain our life.

Ecofeminist Legal Theory As A Fourth Phase in Feminist Jurisprudence?

Carolyn Merchant’s most recent work Ecological Revolutions[49], in considering the role of nature, gender and science in society suggest to me that feminist legal theory may increasingly involve itself more directly and closely with issues of ecological concern. Merchant’s examination of the historical development of New England outlines how the notion of unexploited land as being ‘waste’ was applied and reinforced by a legal-political system dominated by males. Examining the development of law by using a study of American law carried out by Horwitz[50], Merchant shows how the instrumentalist conception of law removed much of women’s common law rights to develop property, leaving the benefit from any increased value with men.[51]

Expanding her thesis, Merchant believes that capitalist relations of production and patriarchal relations of reproduction supporting mechanistic consciousness must give way to new socioeconomic forms, new gender relationships, and an ecological ethic. Suggesting that such a global ecological revolution may have already begun, the vital role that feminist legal theory and practice may provide in reducing the domination ethic embodied in ‘male-constructed’ law is obvious.

Ann Scales has examined the presence of gender oppression which militaristic worldviews tend to impose. Believing that “we can’t overcome gender oppression without demilitarizing ourselves and our world”[52], Scales cites the 1981 Greenham Common Women’s Peace Camp and the movement it promoted as “a successful story of contemporary feminist history-making.”[53] While I want to avoid an arrogance in suggesting that feminist legal theory to date has been inadequate in addressing issues concerning women, the environment and law, I do believe the further exploration of themes of legally created and sanctified domination of the environment provide a necessary and worthwhile development for feminist jurisprudence to pursue.

Women’s Involvement in Regulation of Interaction With The Environment

Despite their poor representation within formal policy and decision-making structures, women’s concern for the environment has empowered women in Australia, as in other countries, to take action.

Office of the Status of Women, June 1992, Women and the Environment, 3.

Given the recent evolution and interdisciplinary nature of environmental law, information concerning women’s direct involvement in advocacy seems to be non-existent. Whilst the role of women as ‘nurturers’ tends to allow women to be stereotyped as having motherly qualities associated with caring, I think this is largely a misconception of both the potential and actual experience of women. Assuming arguments that biological differences between women and men make women less disposed to formal engagement in the demands of regulation, such as argued in Re Goodell [54] have little, if any, substance to them as I believe, it is interesting to see how women have been involved in other areas of regulation.

Val Brown and Margaret Switzer’s extensive gender analysis of the Australian Government’s Ecological Sustainable Development (ESD) process[55], made a number of interesting observations. Premised on their observation that women’s positions in society typically differ from men, Brown and Switzer looked at the gender blindness applicable to the role of sustainable development as a concept for environmental management. Noting that almost all gender analysis concerning human relationships with the environment have to date been undertaken in developing countries, these typically found that where women’s activities and interests were ignored, environmental degradation was reported as having increased.[56] Switzer and Brown suggest that having received the same training as men, women working in professional fields have often failed to notice the missing observations of gender difference.[57] This suggests that one of the major advances to be made in overcoming gender blindness within legal practice is not only in overcoming those areas identified as exhibiting bias, but by applying efforts to illuminate those areas not yet widely recognised as having such a bias. Switzer and Brown conclude that the contributions of women in the area of environmental management and sustainable development are both “major” and “unrecognised”, and that whilst “women’s skills of practical solutions, seeing issues as a whole and of conflict management are becoming emphasised in environmental management programs … women, however, are unlikely to be present to help develop the male level of expertise in these areas.”[58]

In Conclusion

“…feminism demonstrates that radical legal critique requires self-reflective attention to one’s own perspective and to the perspective of the marginalised other. It is not that “thinking makes it so”, but that thinking without attention to perspective can make it seem so. Our perspectives are overdetermined and constrained by sexuality, race, class, ideology, and historical structure. But, through attentive and empathetic communication with those who are situated differently from ourselves, we can think our way into perspective, and that is half the battle in a world where justice is blind. It is in the perspective of the other that we begin to see ourselves.”

David Cole, Getting There: Reflections on Trashing from Feminist Jurisprudence and Critical Theory, 90.[59]

My belief is that whilst many people in Australian society possess an intimate understanding of how we as humans interact with our environment, the likelihood that these differences have arisen from socialisation means this outlook need not be exclusively available to women in the future. If those people socialised as males grasp the opportunities that feminist jurisprudence provide in reducing the estrangement that their ‘objective rationalist’ world imposes upon them as legal actors, the law and society in general would very likely advance in their appreciation of their social and environmental setting, and in a synergistic fashion, so likely would our interactions with the environment.

I think it is important to stress again that my desire to more closely link the notions of feminist legal theory and environmental concerns is not to suggest that women intrinsically possess biological predisposition towards these issues. They may do, but my instinct suggests this is not so. For me, it is rather that feminist legal theory is a valid filter for critiquing the way in which traditional legal theory and our traditional modes of interacting with our laws have led us towards a situation that potentially threaten gains our culture has already made, if not our survival as we know it. The road to social change begins with mutual respect and ends with the conditions that make mutual respect possible.[60] As for any movement concerned with equality and substantive justice, and in the tradition of the struggle for equality already begun, I believe feminist legal theory will likely experience a compromise in its ideals if whilst, being aware of the impropriety implicit in our exploitation of the environment, it becomes divorced from an intimate concern for the plight of other sentient beings.

Though severe social and environmental stresses already exist within most modern Western societies, the extent to which they currently impinge on aspirations for equity between different groups, whether they be based on gender, race or otherwise may be approaching insignificance in comparison to the challenge we are likely face if extreme widespread environmental stress occurs. The history of struggle for women’s equality suggests that the likelihood of recognition by legal theorists and practitioners of the validity of nonhuman interests will remain long and arduous. Nevertheless, the parlous state of our current relationship with our ecology indicates that an inability to respond to this may threaten the future of the environment we rely upon and the cultural advances it has so far afforded us. Both women and men.

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MacKinnon describes the pursuit of a true analysis of social life as becoming the pursuit of consciousness.

Warren defines ecofeminism as being based on the four following claims that; 1/ there are important connections between the oppression of women and the oppression of nature; 2/ understanding the nature of these connections is necessary to an adequate understanding of the oppression of women and the oppression of nature; 3/ feminist theory and practice must include an ecological perspective, and 4/ solutions to ecological problems must include a feminist perspective.

By concentrating on the gulf between traditional perceptions of objectivity and the substantive inequities propounded by legal instruments, I wish to show both how women are often subjugated by the law to be less than equal. I then, and to consider how the contributions of feminist legal theory may improve our interactions with our environment.

The degree of inequality expressed within human society and between humans and other elements of the biosphere Environmental degradation is strongly influenced by t.

By examining the manner in which the law has viewed issues relating to the environment I wish to challenge claims of traditional law and legal theory to objectivity and neutrality in its interactions both amongst the human species and between human and non-human elements.

While I am not calling for a ‘religious’ ethic that reifies inorganic entities, I am alluding to the important observation that human endeavour is highly dependent on the health of the biosphere that supports us.

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[1] MacKinnon, C., Toward a Feminist Theory of State, Harvard University Press, 1989 98.

[2] Rothfield, P., ‘Jurisprudence and Feminism: Displacing the Analytic Mise-En-Scene’ (1991) Law in Context, 92.

[3] MacKinnon, C., Towards a Feminist Theory of State, Harvard University Press, 1989 98.

[4] Smart, C., Feminism and the Power of Law, Routledge, 1989 70.

[5] Grant, R., and Newland, K., 1991, Gender and International Relations, Open University Press, 93.

[6] Leiss, W., The Limits to Satisfaction: An Essay on the Problem of Needs and Commodities, University of Toronto, 1976 37.

[7] Lacey, N., ‘Feminist Legal Theory’ (1989) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 9, 392.

[8] MacKinnon, C., Towards a Feminist Theory of State, Harvard University Press, 1989 98.

[9] Rylands v Fletcher (1868) LR 3 HL 330.

[10] Grinlinton, D., ‘The “Environmental Era” and the Emergence of “Environmental Law” in Australia - A Survey of Environmental Legislation and Litigation 1967-1987” (1990) Environmental and Planning Law Journal, Vol. 7, 76.

[11] Fisher, D., ‘An Overview of Environmental Law in Australia’ (1978) Ecology Law Review, Berkeley Law School, Vol. 5, 47.

[12] Boer, B., ‘Social Ecology and Environmental Law’ (1984) Environmental and Planning Law Journal, Vol. 9, No. 2, 233.

[13] Peggy Antrobus, 29/6/1992, speaking at the Global Forum, Rio de Janiero, June 1992, cited in Women’s new world order in summit Truth Tent, The Age Newspaper, Melbourne: The Age.

[14] Warren, K., ‘Feminism and Ecology: Making Connections’ (1987) Environmental Ethics, Vol. 9, 4.

[15] King, Y., ‘Feminism and the Revolt of Nature’ (1981) Heresies #13: Feminism and Ecology, Vol. 4, 12.

[16] Taylor, S., ‘Women and Environments’ (1989) Changing Directions: The Proceedings of Ecopolitics IV, University of Adelaide, 603.

[17] Warren, K., op cit., 6.

[18] Gray, D., Green Paradise Lost, Roundtable Press, 1981 16.

[19] Id., 20.

[20] Salleh, A, Paper: Second Thoughts of Rethinking Ecofeminist Politics, Australian National University, 1991 4.

[21] Brown, V., and Switzer, M., Paper: Where Have All The Women Gone? The Role of Gender in Sustainable Development, Centre for Resource and Environmental Studies, 1991 2.

[22] Warren, K., ‘Feminism and Ecology: Making Connections’ (1987) Environmental Ethics, Vol. 9, 4.

[23] Smart, C., ‘Law’s Power, the Sexed Body and Feminist Discourse’ (1990) Journal of Law and Society 194.

[24] Warren, K., op cit., 9.

[25] Warren, K., ‘Feminism and Ecology: Making Connections’ (1987) Environmental Ethics, Vol. 9, 9.

[26] Regan, T., All That Dwell Therein: Essays on Animal Rights and Environmental Ethics, University of California Press, 1982.

[27] Singer, P., Animal Liberation, Random House, 1975.

[28] Addelson, K., ‘Moral Revolution’ in Women and Nature, Harper and Row, 1978 306.

[29] Id. 307.

[30] Ibid.

[31] Bottomley, S., Law in Context, Federation Press, 1991 257.

[32] Gilligan, C., In A Different Voice, Harvard University Press, 1982 25-32.

[33] Naffine, N., ‘Law and the Sexes’, cited in Bottomley, S., Law in Context, Federation Press, 1991 262.

[34] Gilligan, C., op cit., 1982.

[35] Warren, K., ‘Feminism and Ecology: Making Connections’ (1987) Environmental Ethics, Vol. 9, 9.

[36] MacKinnon, C., ‘Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State: Towards a Feminist Jurisprudence’ (1983) Signs 534.

[37] Jaggar, A., Feminist Politics and Human Nature, Rowman and Allanheld, 1983 266.

[38] Warren, K., op cit., 14.

[39] Engels, F., The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State, International Publishers, 1972 137.

[40] Jaggar, A., Feminist Politics and Human Nature, Rowman and Allanheld, 1983 358.

[41] Id., 124.

[42] Merchant, C., Ecological Revolution: Nature, Gender and Science in New England, University of North Carolina Press, 1989 270.

[43] Jaggar, A., op cit., 132.

[44] Naffine, N., 1990, Law and the Sexes, Sydney: Allen and Unwin.

[45] Foucault, M., Discipline and Punishment: The Birth of the Prison, Penguin, 1977.

[46] Foucault, M., The History of Sexuality, Pantheon, 1980.

[47] Foucault, 1977, op cit., 304.

[48] Smart, C., The Ties That Bind: Law, Marriage and the Reproduction of Patriarchal Relations, Routledge, 1984 238.

[49] Merchant, C., Ecological Revolution: Nature, Gender and Science in New England, University of North Carolina Press, 1989.

[50] Horwitz, M., The Transformation of American Law: 1780-1860, Harvard University Press, 1977.

[51] Merchant, C., op cit., 244.

[52] Scales, A., ‘Militarism, Male Dominance and Law: Feminist Jurisprudence as Oxymoron? (1989) Harvard Women’s Law Journal, Vol. 12, 28.

[53] Id., 29.

[54] Re Goodell (1875) 39 Wisc 232.

[55] Brown, V., and Switzer, M., Paper: Where Have All The Women Gone? The Role of Gender in Sustainable Development, Centre for Resource and Environmental Studies, 1991.

[56] Id., 2.

[57] Id., 30.

[58] Ibid.

[59] David Cole, Getting There: Reflections on Trashing from Feminist Jurisprudence and Critical Theory, (1985) Harvard Women’s Law Journal, Vol. 8, 90.

[60] Id., 91.

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