Corruption, Clientelism, and the Degradation of Stable ...



Corruption, Clientelism, and the Degradation of Stable Democracy

William Andrewes

PLCP 1010

TA: Michael Poznansky: Friday, 1PM

18 November, 2011

The path to stable democracy for developing countries is one that is rife with hurdles and challenges for even the most competent of governments. Given their studies over the past decades, numerous political scientists have focused on the issues of ethnic cleavages, economic inequality, and corruption and clientelism as degenerative forces that can stunt the development of a stable democracy or smother it altogether. The issues of corruption and clientelism are the most serious challenge to democratic stability in that they undermine its interlinked tenets: state legitimacy, governmental responsiveness, the existence of a civic community, and a competent bureaucracy that exhibits both embedded autonomy and corporate coherence.

The issue of ethnic diversity is sometimes overestimated regarding its negative effects on political stability. Just before its independence from Britain, political infighting between Hindus and Muslims in India was such a burden on its colonial rulers that it, “…ultimately led to the partition of the country in August, 1947,” (Wilkinson, p. 773). Despite the apocalyptic stigma of partition, there is little evidence that India’s colonial political structures were seriously altered beyond what lands and governments were devoted to the creation of Pakistan. After India’s independence and its consequent transition to true representative democracy, the rise of Nehru led to successful policies in creating a “color blind” India. These policies reduced ethnic and religious conflict by abolishing controversial minority quotas in the legislature and in federal job pools (Wilkinson, 774). This case illustrates the impact that ethnic tensions can have, but more importantly, it exemplifies the idea that democracy can overcome ethnic issues with effective and well-composed policies. The Federative Republic of Brazil also has a racially diverse population, consisting of a white majority and significant black and multiethnic minorities due to its heritage as a Portuguese colony (Kesselmen, Kreiger, & Joseph, p. 199). It would not be unreasonable to assume that such significant minorities groups would mobilize along racial lines in order to compete politically with the white majority similarly to post-independence India. However, this assumption is incorrect. In fact, according to Kesselmen, Kreiger, and Joseph, racial issues have almost never played a major role in political mobilization in Brazil (p. 238). To the contrary, the three political scientists note the development of a, “singular racial consciousness…of the Brazilian,” that has withstood even the most difficult times that would lead to racial persecution in other states with diverse populations (p. 238). In Brazil, like in India, the effects of ethnic tensions can be regarded as only a minor influence, although still influential when coupled with other serious social problems.

Similarly to the problem of ethnic tensions, the pervasiveness of economic inequality is over exaggerated as a threat to democratic stability. In The White Tiger, the protagonist depicts a hyperbolic “Great Rooster Coop….of perpetual servitude” (Adiga, p. 150). He describes a socio-economic dilemma in which elites wield economic leverage over their underprivileged employees, holding their job security and even the safety of their families over their heads as a deterrent against acting dishonestly or soliciting a more fair salary. This depiction of inequality in India is becoming more so as foreign direct investment and development have led to a vast expansion of its middle class. Subsequently, increased economic inequality is leading to increased demands for land reform and welfare programs to which the government is responding (Kesselmen, Kreiger, & Joseph, p. 274). Besides skewing constituent access to politicians, as is illustrated in the novel, India’s integral democratic functioning and stability, beyond commonplace reform protest, do not appear to be seriously impeded by issues of economic inequality. Likewise in Brazil, as Kesselmen and his colleagues noted, the process of democratization since the 1980’s has not led to more equal distributions of wealth; they cite Brazil as having one of the world’s highest income inequality rates. Nevertheless, compulsory voting keeps voter turnout rates near eighty percent as the poor and others have joined the political process to petition government leaders to expand welfare and agrarian reform programs (Kesselmen, Kreiger, & Joseph, p. 218). Ultimately, in India and Brazil, the singular issue of high economic inequality has translated into a social controversy as opposed to a concrete threat to democratic stability. These states’ impoverished populations have attempted to utilize established linkage institutions in their governments, such as national elections, to promote their interests. In a way, their participation is a reinforcement of democratic institutions. All in all, the issue of socio-economic inequality is not a serious threat to democracy, although it is still a factor of destabilization that exacerbates more serious problems, like corruption.

In contrast to the overstated controversies of ethnic conflict and socio-economic inequality, the issue of clientelism and corruption, in itself, is a serious political threat that has the potential to erode state legitimacy, a crucial tenant of democratic functioning and stability. In The White Tiger, the narrator ironically exclaims, “I am India’s most faithful voter and I still have not seen the inside of a voting booth” (Adiga, p. 86). A similar concept, coronelismo, exists in modern Brazil in which wealthy landowners use their authority to pledge their workers’ votes for their favored politicians (Kesselmen, Kreiger & Joseph, p. 202). In the novel and in reality, voter fraud is utilized by political groups, like the Great Socialists, to elevate their allies to positions of power where they can partake in corrupt rent-seeking activities and reward supporters rather than acting in the interests of all of their constituents. In Brazil and India, voter fraud prevents ordinary citizens from having a voice. Eventually citizens (in the novel and in real life) realize that they do not truly elect their governments and at this stage, social scientists like Leonard Binder predict that the state loses legitimacy and its vested powers to levy taxes and impose laws (Schoppa, Leonard. “The Comparative Method.” 8/29/2011). Ultimately, once a democratic state like India is severely corrupted, it is left bereft of its authority to impose laws and may teeter on the brink of anarchy. The Indian government has never reached the point of completely loosing legitimacy at the federal level, but it at times has come close. An example of Indian’s state legitimacy in peril occurred in the early 1970’s when Prime Minister Indira Gandhi declared an executive state of emergency—allowing her to suspend freedoms, jail political opponents, rig elections, and prolong her rule by inciting ethnic conflict (Varshney p. 159). At the moment when Gandhi declared a state of emergency to stay in power, the Indian government became authoritarian in nature, which led to widespread, ethnically motivated violence, and a destabilizing effect on the Indian state. The two-year emergency period was the only time since 1947 that, “India was not a fully-functioning democracy,” and it took free and honest elections to remove her from power (Kesselmen, Kreiger, & Joseph, 262). Ultimately, the cases of Brazil and India exemplify the importance of legitimacy in sustaining democratic stability.

In conjunction with its effects on legitimacy, incessant corruption and clientelism can critically impede governmental responsiveness and the development of a civic community—making it a dire challenge to overall democratic stability. The Indian police system is independently run by each state government and is, thus, highly politicized and subject to clientelism and manipulation (Kesselmen, Kreiger, & Joseph, p. 277). Consistent with this fact, the now wealthy protagonist at the end of the novel recounts his story of bribing the Bangalore police in order to obstruct the filing of a lawsuit (Adiga, p. 266). From the point of view of the victim’s brother, the lack of competence and responsiveness in the police department in the process of seeking justice is certainly discouraging. Widespread corruption of law enforcement and the legal system in India leads to citizens’ mistrust of the government and its agencies. This leads to resentment towards the dysfunctional government, civil unrest, and instability similar to that experienced under the Indira Gandhi regime. Besides preventing responsiveness before it can occur, corruption and clientelism can also halt the execution of responsive policies after they are implemented. For example, in The White Tiger, the narrator recounts his schoolteacher’s sleeping on the job and the embezzling of municipal funds that were allocated for meals and uniforms for the young students (Adiga, p. 28). In addition, on page 41 of the novel, the protagonist describes the doctors’ forged shift ledgers, due to bribes, that led to the hospital being operated without an on-duty medical professional. In both instances, greed and poverty equate to corruption and the prevention of the delivery of social services from state governments. The combination of inadequate social services, little to no social associations, and the low level of socio-economic development as described in the “darkness” leads to a poorly-organized community of civic engagement that is based on apathetic clientelism and corruption, if such a community is able to exist at all (Putnam, p. 101). Without a strong and balanced civic community, the government apparatus becomes blind to genuine community concerns as individualistic politicians solicit favors that function to buy legislation for powerful interest groups and subsequent votes for corrupt politicians. The poor of India and Brazil cannot provide such favors and as a result, they get less of a voice in politics. As Putnam found, excessive clientelism leads to inevitable dissatisfaction with government as promised favors to interest groups begin to go unmet and as voices go unheard. With promises left fulfilled, intense outrage, opposition, and resulting instability are sure to arise without interventionist reform.

Clientelism and corruption yield deleterious effects pertaining to a state’s ability to maintain a bureaucracy founded on corporate coherence and embedded autonomy, compounding its negative influence on democratic stability. In Brazil, due to the ubiquity of coronelismo and vote pledging, pervasive clientelism has been instilled by politicians in order to reap and repay political favors. These favors are repaid by patrimonialism and the incorporation of private interests into the public policy arena (Kesselmen, Kreiger, and Joseph, p. 202). High levels of clientelism lead the government to become too embedded to the point of hyperpluralism: a “hostile stalemate” in which competitive lobbying efforts by powerful groups leads to legislative manipulation (Evans, p. 174). Amidst this predicament, politicians are practically unable to make policy (nevertheless policies that are best for the country at large) and are all too often corrupted by the prospect of satisfying lobbyists to gain bribes, campaign donations, job offers, and other incentives.

This same concept is made apparent in The White Tiger when Pinky Madam expresses discontent with driving past a statue of Mohandas Gandhi after having just bribed a minister (Adiga p. 115). As Evans theorizes, a bureaucracy of corporate coherence in which educated civil servants gain employment based on meritocratic systems and serve for the long term leads to loyalty to the state, policy expertise, and difficulty for interests trying to manipulate the system (p. 176). The interior ministers Adinga describes appear to be appointed via political favor, and as a result they proceed to rent the government coal mines out to the highest bidders for personal gain. This individualistic behavior proliferates corruption in a two-fold manner. First, other politicians seek gains from their positions of power as they observe their peers and political competitors doing the same. Second, those potentially honest politicians are discouraged from seeking office as the only way to mobilize political support begins to take the form of illegitimate favors. Both the examples in Brazil and India lead to the crippling of the government and widespread instability as excessive pork barreling can lead nations into insurmountable debt and as social needs are neglected, humanitarian crisis or mass protest of corrupt government. Both these ends have the potential to damage a state if not adequately addressed (a nearly impossible task for an excessively clientelistic and corrupted regime).

In conclusion, clientelism and corruption are, in fact, the most serious threats to democratic stability. The issues of ethnic conflict and socio-economic inequality are influential pertinent to stability, but they can be solved with well-composed government response. It is important to note that clientelism and corruption prevent this well-composed government response as self-interested politicians neglect the aforementioned issues and instead devote their energies to satisfying their supporters and favor-offering groups. With an eroded sense of state legitimacy, a failing civic community, poor responsiveness, and an easily-manipulated bureaucracy, a government can do little more than serve only a small set of interests rather than an entire population. This inevitably leads to an ever-churning cycle of widespread apathy, resentment, and political instability.

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