The Latin American Economic Recovery



The Latin American Economic Recovery

John B. Taylor

Under Secretary of Treasury for International Affairs

Remarks at the Group of 50

Washington, DC

October 15, 2004

Thank you very much for inviting me to be here today. I look forward to a good discussion. I always enjoy the opportunity to discuss Latin American economic issues with financial experts and business people from the region. I particularly enjoy it when the economic news is good, as it is in so much of the region today.

The Bleak Situation Several Years Ago

To put this good news in perspective, I would like to begin by noting how different the current economic situation is from the bleak situation just a few years ago. I vividly remember my very first days on the job in early 2001 at the start of the Bush Administration. I remember being briefed about the crisis in Argentina and the latest IMF $14 billion rescue package approved on January 12, 2001. I remember being visited by Mexico's economic team to get the bad news about the sinking Mexican economy. I remember getting many calls from my friends in Brazil about the knife-edge situation there. And I will never forget the fears of contagion expressed by nearly everyone.

The Remarkable Improvement

Consider how different things are now. Economic growth this year in Latin America is estimated to be about 4-1/2 percent--much higher than the measly 1/2 percent growth in 2001 and a big improvement over the 2-3/4 percent average of the past two decades. Growth rates in Brazil and Mexico are expected to come in at 4 percent and Argentina at 7 percent.

And there are now no countries in the region in a recession or a financial crisis, except for our unfortunate friends on the island of Hispaniola. They have been hit by severe shocks ranging from hurricanes to bank fraud to armed conflict. I visited the Dominican Republic and Haiti over the summer. I am pleased to see how the Fernandez government is working to formulate an economic strategy. The situation in Haiti is clearly a difficult one. We are working closely with the LaTortue government to effectively coordinate donor assistance.

And I am happy to say that there is little talk of contagion. Many have noticed how little contagion there was following the Argentina default in 2001 compared with the Asian and Russian defaults in 1997-98.

Another improvement observed across the region is the low interest rate spread. Investors and credit rating agencies have taken note of policy improvements. Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Paraguay and Uruguay--among others--received ratings upgrades during 2003 and 2004. Despite the increase in the federal funds rate in the United States, the Latin America average spread is now only about 415 basis points over U.S. Treasuries.

Latin American countries are tapping capital markets with notable success. Mexico recently obtained its lowest-ever yield and spread on a 30-year global bond, and Guatemala issued a 30-year bond at 400 bps over Treasuries. Several large countries, such as Mexico, Brazil, and Peru, have already met their financing needs for the entire year. Some have begun pre-financing obligations for next year.

Another improvement, which is the culmination of continuing progress for many years, is the decline in inflation. Inflation in the region in 2004 is now estimated to be about 6.5 percent. That compares with average annual inflation of 196 percent in the ten years from 1986 to 1995. That low inflation bodes well for continued expansion with fewer recessions and crises in the region in the future.

The highlights of this recovery are the rapid growth of exports and strengthened external balances. Export growth is up across the board in the region, and is projected to be 21 percent for the region as a whole this year after 10 percent growth in 2003. This not just a commodity price phenomenon: export volume growth is up and is actually accelerating. The strong performance of exports has helped reverse current account deficits, which have historically been a source of vulnerability for Latin American economies. In 2003, for the first time in 35 years, the current account as a share of GDP for the region swung into surplus.

The improved economic situation in Latin America is important not only for the people of Latin America but also for the whole hemisphere, including people of the United States. Stronger economies in Latin America create jobs in the United States by increasing demand for U.S. exports, with exports to Latin America representing about one-seventh of total U.S. exports. Stronger economies in Latin America reduce the incentives for illegal migration and reinforce popular support for market-oriented policies that create opportunity and enhance economic freedom. Stronger economies in Latin America also help strengthen democracies, which become better allies in the war on terror, the fight against international narcotics trafficking, and initiatives to combat money laundering and terrorist financing.

Of course, this greatly improved economic situation should not be a time for complacency. Oil prices are high and are a drag on economic growth in many countries. And there is still a need for structural reform to strengthen and lengthen the economic expansion in the region as a whole and thereby take a bigger bite out of poverty. Nevertheless, we should note the improvements and consider the factors that led to those improvements.

Better Economic Policies throughout the Hemisphere

In my view, better economic policies explain much of the improvements that we have seen in the region. First, the economic recovery in the United States is a huge factor in the Latin American recovery. Every finance minister and central bank governor from the region we meet tells us that. And the U.S. economic recovery was based on timely changes in monetary and fiscal policy including President Bush's tax cuts in 2001, which resulted in one of the shortest recessions in U.S. history, and his tax cuts of 2003, which solidified the recovery.

There are also better economic policies pursued by Latin American governments.

Last year, six of Latin America's seven largest economies improved their fiscal policies by increasing their primary surpluses to bring down debt levels. Primary fiscal balances have continued to strengthen this year, helping to further reduce debt levels.

We have also seen a movement toward better monetary policies based on price stability goals and clear systematic procedures for adjusting the instruments of monetary policy to achieve these goals, frequently helped by flexible exchange rates. Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Peru all have well-established monetary policies based on inflation-targeting frameworks. Mexico, Chile, Peru and Colombia have independent central banks. Finance Minister Palocci of Brazil has declared his intention of taking up the issue of central bank independence in 2005.

The results of more effective monetary policies were clearly displayed in the wake of financial crises in Brazil and Argentina. Both countries experienced large currency depreciations in 2002. All too often in the past, such depreciations produced out-of-control inflation. However, prudent monetary management prevented these depreciations from turning into inflationary spirals. The pattern that we saw in both countries is strikingly similar: a bulge in inflation as the effects of the depreciation worked their way into consumer prices, followed by a sharp and sustained reduction in inflation resulting from prudent and effective monetary restraint.

Perhaps the clearest single example of how sound economic policies and management have paid dividends in the form of robust economic growth is Brazil under the Lula administration. When President Lula took office, he reiterated his commitment to sound fiscal and monetary policies. Given Brazil's high debt levels, the Lula administration established an ambitious fiscal surplus target for 2003 with the objective of lowering the debt over time--then went on to beat the target. In light of the strong fiscal performance, the Lula administration recently announced that it will build on this progress by increasing the target for 2004.

These fiscal and monetary policies have helped underpin an increase in economic growth in Brazil. Real GDP has grown at rates of more than 6 percent for the last three consecutive quarters. Real interest rates have fallen to roughly 10 percent today, after being as high as 19 percent in the summer of 2003. The real and inflation are relatively stable and external borrowing spreads are below 500 basis points. Brazilian authorities are focused on consolidating these gains by locking-in improvements in fiscal policy through steps like pension reform. They are also focused on advancing microeconomic reforms critical for sustaining growth such as streamlining the process of starting a business and working to expand credit to small businesses. And they are working to find ways to invest in high-return infrastructure projects within responsible fiscal constraints.

There are many examples of improved policies in the region. In Mexico, the government has been successful at achieving fiscal deficit targets. In Colombia, President Uribe is pursuing policies to reduce inflexible government spending and streamline the pension system. In Peru, the government has increased its efforts to improve its tax administration and fight tax evasion. In Uruguay, the primary surplus has nearly tripled in the first half of this year compared to last year.

Support from the United States

The Bush Administration's basic economic strategy for the region is to provide strong support to countries that are pursuing sound economic policies. From my own perspective and that of the U.S. Treasury, I can say that under President Bush's leadership we have maintained a sustained and intense focus on the region, even if that does not always get newspaper headlines. Our strategy is based on our firm belief that without sound policies on the part of the country itself, international assistance cannot yield successful results. With this philosophy in mind, we have worked aggressively along multiple fronts to prevent and contain financial crises and to bolster economic growth in the region.

An early focus of the Bush Administration was to deal with financial contagion--the spread of crises from one country to another--and define clearly when a response from the international policy community is appropriate and desirable. We emphasized early on that contagion was not automatic, and that policy responses had to take this into account. This is important because reacting to false alarms about contagion can lead to support of countries that are not following strong and sustainable policies.

At the same time, it is important to recognize instances where countries are pursuing strong policies but are hit by external shocks beyond their control that damage their economies. This was the case in Uruguay in the aftermath of the Argentine crisis. The Uruguayan government had a record of market-oriented economic policies when the crisis in Argentina caused a bank run in the Uruguayan banking system. The Uruguayan authorities launched strong policy steps, including floating the currency and a complete restructuring of the banking system. The United States responded swiftly, providing a short-term $1.5 billion loan to bolster Uruguay's reserves until further support from the IMF, World Bank, and Inter-American Development Bank could be mobilized to assist. This timely financial support ended the bank run, and allowed the Uruguayan government to keep its economic policies on track. The result has been a period of strong economic growth in Uruguay.

Another example was the IMF program for Brazil during the election in 2002, based on the strong commitment of the Brazilian government to economic policies aimed at strengthening Brazil's public finances and restoring economic stability. Thanks to these policies, Brazil was able to overcome pre-election financial market uncertainty that had caused the Brazilian real to drop precipitously and pushed risk spreads on Brazilian bonds to almost 2,400 basis points over U.S. Treasuries. It allowed incoming President Lula to take office and have the space to implement a disciplined economic policy program that has restored market confidence and boosted economic growth.

Helping to prevent and contain financial crises is not the only way the United States has supported economic growth in Latin America. It is equally important to pursue deep economic reforms that are aimed at addressing the impediments to the development of a vibrant private sector. Bilateral policy dialogues focused on these very issues are a vital component of our engagement in the region.

One example is the U.S.-Brazil Group for Growth, established at the first summit meeting between Presidents Bush and Lula in June 2003. The Group's main purpose is to advance policies that raise economic growth and create jobs in both countries by focusing on areas such as increasing credit to small businesses, streamlining business registration to encourage entrepreneurs, and improving public investment. The Group for Growth has already yielded concrete results: our Brazilian counterparts tell us that the Group's discussion of small businesses helped shape recent legislation submitted to the Brazilian Congress that reduces taxation and streamlines labor and pension regulations for Brazilian small businesses.

The U.S.-Mexico Partnership for Prosperity is another important bilateral forum, the goal of which is to promote economic development on both sides of the border with a particular focus on the most impoverished parts of Mexico. Launched in 2001, the Partnership activities encompass several agencies of both governments.

At Treasury, our major area of focus in the Partnership has been on lowering the costs of remittances from workers in the United States to their families in Mexico. Our hard work to foster competition in the remittances industry and increase access to the formal financial system under the Partnership has borne fruit: the cost of remittance transfers from the United States to Mexico has been halved since 1999, and a range of new financial products have been introduced. This means more options and more money in the pockets of families.

The Bush Administration's development assistance policy also emphasizes support for countries that pursue responsible policies. This administration has sought to reorient U.S. development assistance by creating the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) and its Millennium Challenge Account (MCA). The MCC channels aid funds to countries that invest in people, pursue good governance and the rule of law, and promote economic freedom. The U.S. Congress has appropriated $1 billion to the MCA in fiscal year 2004 and the Bush Administration is requesting $2.5 billion in 2005, ramping up to $5 billion by 2006. Three countries from Latin America--Bolivia, Nicaragua and Honduras--have been selected by the MCC Board of Directors to submit proposals. After the countries have developed their own proposals, the MCC will evaluate and select the highest quality proposals that also have a strong likelihood of success and measurable results.

We have also used multilateral fora to promote sound economic policies that encourage growth. At the Special Summit of the Americas meeting held in Monterrey this January, President Bush secured agreement among the Hemisphere's leaders to take steps necessary to cut the time needed to start a business and to triple bank credit to small business by 2007 with the help of the Inter-American Development Bank.

At the Summit, we also sought to expand to the rest of the region the success that has been achieved with Mexico in reducing the cost of remittance transfers. Leaders agreed to work together to halve the average cost of remittance transfers in the region by 2008. I cannot emphasize enough how significant this commitment is. Annual remittance flows are roughly five times annual official development assistance and are a considerable share of the economy for many countries. Remittance flows are becoming increasingly important as a source of funds that support economic development, new businesses, alleviate poverty and provide opportunities for children to stay in school and thus build human capital in the region.

Under President Bush's leadership the United States has also been committed to expanding free trade in Latin America. This entails, first of all, strengthening the global trading system and a successful outcome to the WTO Doha negotiations. We are very pleased with the progress at the Geneva meetings this summer and optimistic that we are again on the right track in these negotiations. At the same time, the Bush Administration has pursued an aggressive trade agenda through bilateral and regional free trade agreements within Latin America. In addition to pursuing the 34-country FTAA, we have concluded FTAs with Chile and with five Central American countries and the Dominican Republic. Panama talks are progressing nicely, and we anticipate that our dialogue with Andean countries will deepen and accelerate now that both sides have tabled proposals in most areas.

Conclusion

As we take stock of the amazing progress to date, we should emphasize the work that remains. Priorities are to: (1) continue sound macroeconomic policies to keep inflation and debt levels down and keep the expansion going, and (2) focus more on microeconomic reforms to raise growth performance and poverty reduction over the long run. Governments need to strengthen the rule of law, streamline regulation, combat corruption, and develop infrastructure.

President Bush has demonstrated his commitment to the region over the past four years by supporting countries that follow sound economic policies and open their economies to the world. I am confident that the United States will continue to play a constructive role in helping the region to sustain growth and raise living standards in the years ahead.

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