Keohane, D.:



A Stronger European Union?The Unexpected Security Consequences of BrexitFederiga Bindi, PhDIntroductionWill Brexit reinforce or weaken EU security and defence policies? Opinions are divided. A nation with substantial military and diplomatic resources, the UK has traditionally played a prominent role in European defence. Despite cuts in recent years, the UK remains Europe’s largest defence spender and had planned before Brexit to further increase spending in coming years. This includes a commitment to meet the NATO target of spending 2 per cent of GDP on defence, increasing the defence budget by 0.5 per cent annually to 2020–21. In addition, the UK plans to spend ?178 billion over 10 years on new military equipment, with a 1 per cent yearly rise in the procurement budget. Britain is also among the biggest spenders on defence R&D in Europe, with France, Germany and the UK accounting for 92 per cent of the EU’s total €2 billion of funding. The question is further complicated by the fact that it is impossible to talk about European defense - even EU defense - without also taking into consideration the other side of the Atlantic. European security and defense policies are intrinsically connected to Transatlantic security cooperation, which in turn means NATO. Progress in EU integration in foreign and defense policies appears to be inversely proportional to the highs and lows in the transatlantic relationship. Europeans generally progressed toward more integration in the foreign and defense cooperation at times of friction with the US. In fact, ever since Nixon - and even more so since the end of the Cold War - the various US administration have on one side insisted the Europeans should contribute more in transatlantic defense, meaning however with this more investments and defense expenditure in NATO (aka increase purchase of US defense hardware), certainly not more EU autonomy in defense and security. In that there is no difference between Democrats and Republicans, including Donald Trump and his predecessor Barack Obama. In advocating for more NATO rather than more EU security, the US has always found an ally in the United Kingdom. In fact, we can better understand the EU-US relationship as a triangle, rather than a bilateral EU-US relation. It is not by chance that Washington pushed London to join the EEC ever since it creation and that the Obama administration lobbied furiously in favor of the UK remaining into the EU, effectively campaigning against Brexit. However, things have changed with Trump. For the first time, there is a genuine disinterest from the part of the US administration about the EU, which is reflected in the general US national foreign debate which - like it or not - is heavily influenced by the preferences of the Administration in office. In other times, an initiative such as PESCO would have made Americans cry wolf, just the Single Market and the Euro did. Today in Washington the debate about PESCO is inexistent and even the defense industry seems not to be worried about the potential negative effects it will have on them.So, if two sides of the triangle disappear, what will be of the remaining side? Will it disappear, too, or will it be reinforced? This last is the question this chapter is addressing. The chapter will proceed as following. We will first briefly how EU security and defense policies developed and the role the UK played in the them. We will look at developments since the Brexit referendum. In the conclusions we will make hypothesis for the future.The path to EU security and the British role in itAfter WWII, London took the lead in European defense: the Treaty of Brussels was signed on March 17, 1948, including France, the UK and the three Benelux countries. It called for military cooperation and mutual defense, though it also included clauses for economic, social, and cultural cooperation. Slowly, the idea of a defense system bringing Western Europe and the United States together started to develop. The Pentagon Talks thus began between Britain, the United States, and Canada, later to be joined by France, Holland, Belgium, and Luxembourg. Numerous difficult questions emerged: Would the aim of the treaty be? What kind of responsibilities would members have? Which states should be included? For instance, England strongly opposed Italy’s participation due to its fragile economic and political landscape. Eventually, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed on April 4, 1949, in Washington, D.C., with Italy part of it, due to French pressures, alongside the UK, the three Benelux countries, Canada, the US, Iceland, Denmark, Norway and Portugal.After a successful start of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC, 1951) - of which Britain refused to be part - France launched the idea of a European Defense Community - including a European army - as a way to reinstate Germany’s military sovereignty, while at the same time embedding it into a European framework. However, following a change in government, in 1954, France (and Italy) failed to ratify the European Defense Community (EDC) Treaty. Defense hence became a taboo word in Brussels; it would be forty years before the EEC would start talking about defense again.Anthony Eden, the British foreign minister, then came to the rescue of the continent, proposing that Italy and Germany sign the Brussels Pact, which in turn transformed into the Western European Union (WEU). However, as the WEU was merely a talk shop without military capability, European security was exclusively left in NATO’s hands. In 1955, Germany was also admitted into NATO.By the 1970s, the United States - which had supported the creation of both the ECSC and the 1957 EEC - started to perceive the Community as an economic competitor, holding it responsible for the US trade deficit. U.S. behavior vis-à-vis the EEC became rather contradictory. Under Richard Nixon the United States started to ask the Europeans to spend more in defense and contribute more to NATO expenses - a request that it has since never stopped asking, despite at the same time reiterating the principle of American leadership over the organization. The US had also long been pushing for their most loyal ally to be included into the EEC. That finally happen in 1973, when the UK joined the EEC alongside Ireland and Denmark. Contrary to the US expectations, however, initially that did not bring the two sides of the Atlantic closer. In December 1973, the EEC foreign ministers adopted in Copenhagen a “Declaration on European Identity.” The objective was to better define the EEC’s relations and responsibilities to the rest of the world and the place they occupied in world affairs. According to the declaration, the nine were to play an active role in world affairs. The most significant outcome was the progressive development of the so-called European Political Cooperation (EPC) - which was then formally included in the EEC treaties with the 1987 Single European Act. EPC established the principle of mutual consultation among Europeans and paved the way for an ever closer cooperation in foreign affairs. It however always came short of creating a cooperation in the security field. The year 1989 brought dramatic and unexpected changes in Europe, whose symbol remains the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989. In December 1989, the European Council in Strasbourg had no choice but seconding Germany’s desire to reunite. Yet, the prospective of a possible German dominance in both monetary and security policies worried many. Lead by the Chancellor Helmut Kohl and by the French President Francois Mitterrand, the Europeans decided that German unification was to be counterbalanced by a more integrated European Community. This was done by negotiating and approving a new Treaty: the 1992 Maastricht Treaty or Treaty on European Union (TEU). The Maastricht Treaty set the course for a European single currency and created the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). And this is where our story really begins. The initial idea was to lay the conditions for a proper European defense. This idea was however strongly opposed by the UK. Margaret Thatcher had already lost her Premiership during the pre-negotiations phase, in November 1990, over the European Monetary Union. London’s ally - Washington - was equally suspicious of possible development in the field of defense outside of NATO. As Operation Desert Storm (1991) divided the Europeans, their differences spilled over the negotiations for the Maastricht Treaty, in particular opposing London to the others. The negotiators disagreed on the voting majorities, on how to integrate foreign policy into the EU, and on whether the philosophical distinction made between security and defense could be abandoned. Different views were also expressed over whether the WEU should be merged with the EU. The United States and the more pro-NATO member states were extremely worried about this possibility and what they saw as an impediment to NATO and Western security. As a result, CSFP was far from the EU foreign and defense policy initially envisaged. It nonetheless established systematic cooperation between member states in adopting “common positions” in foreign policy matters; coordinating their actions within international organizations and conferences; engaging in joint actions; and refraining from any action that is contrary to the EU. The WEU was to be closely associated with the CSFP, acting as a bridge to NATO, and the CFSP was finally permitted to address the previously taboo question of “defense,” with the possibility held out in the Maastricht Treaty of gradually moving toward a common defense system. The council presidency was to represent the EU in CFSP matters. Abroad, member-state diplomatic missions and European Commission delegations were to cooperate, and the European Parliament (EP) was to be consulted. Soon, the Europeans began talking of a European security and defense identity (ESDI). This idea, however, was not so well received in the United States. President Bill Clinton, like his predecessors, was eager for the Europeans to bear more of the financial defense burden, but not if this was to mean a EU defense pact rivalling NATO. As a result, in the June 1996 NATO ministerial meeting in Berlin, EU defense ministers agreed to build ESDI within NATO, while simultaneously stressing the supremacy of the principle of transatlantic cooperation within the alliance. In parallel, the U.S. administration pushed for speedy NATO enlargement: on July 8, 1997, the North Atlantic Council in Madrid invited the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland to begin accession talks with a view to joining NATO by its fiftieth anniversary in 1999. At a meeting in Saint-Malo in December 1998, British Prime Minister Tony Blair and French President Jacques Chirac, the leaders of the EU’s two nuclear powers, agreed to establish European military cooperation within NATO. The declaration stated the following aims: “The European Union needs to be in a position to play its full role on the international stage. To this end, the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises. In strengthening the solidarity between the member states of the European Union, in order that Europe can make its voice heard in world affairs, while acting in conformity with our respective obligations in NATO, we are contributing to the vitality of a modernised Atlantic Alliance which is the foundation of the collective defence of its members.”Washington promptly with Madeline Albright’s “three Ds”: no decoupling (of European Security and Defense Policy from NATO); no duplication (of capabilities); and no discrimination (against non-NATO members). NATO members formally endorsed European defense cooperation at its fiftieth anniversary summit (April 25, 1999). In June 1999, at the Cologne summit the EU heads of government announced their decision to absorb the WEU into a new European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), renamed by the Lisbon Treaty as “Common Security and Defense Policy”. The former NATO general secretary, Javier Solana, was appointed Secretary General of the WEU, and High Representative for the CFSP. At the Helsinki European Council in December 1999, it was then agreed that by 2003 the EU would be able to deploy up to 60,000 troops within sixty days for at least one year. In December 2002, NATO and the EU negotiated a set of agreements, called “Berlin Plus,” that govern the sharing of assets between the EU and NATO for crisis management and peacekeeping operations.9.11 were to have lasting effects on transatlantic relations. The George W. Bush administration went quickly at odds with its European allies on issues such as missile defense, climate change, and relations with Russia and the Balkans. The Anglo-American attack on Iraq in 2003, was supported by some EU member states while others strongly opposed it, leading to deep divisions among Europeans - in particular between French President Jacques Chirac and British Prime Minister Tony Blair. Trying to bring reconciliation, the European Council agreed at the Thessaloniki Summit in December 2003 on a European Security Strategy (ESS) entitled “A Secure Europe in a Better World.” The text identified a list of key threats Europe needed to deal with: terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflict, failed states, and organized crime. Central to the ESS was the promotion of regional stability in Europe and its “neighborhood,” with the EU’s strategic priorities identified as Europe (Balkans, Eurasia, Russia), the Mediterranean, and the Middle East.In 2000, the Nice European Council had agreed the creation of permanent political and military structures within the EU for CSDP purposes. In 2003 was thus created an EU civil-military planning cell, which would operate in parallel with a European cell based with NATO’s operational planning HQ (SHAPE). Initially France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg had proposed the creation of an entirely independent EU military planning cell, outside of the NATO framework. It was only UK opposition and influence that led to the proposals being watered down. The resulting compromise was a small EU operational planning cell of 30-40 people established within the existing EU Military Staff in Brussels, rather than as an independent entity, and subject to an operational planning hierarchy that would give first refusal to NATO and then to any national operational HQ before the EU planning cell would play a role. The Civil-Military cell achieved full operational capability (FOC) on 1 January 2007. Still, as this included the capacity to generate an Operations Centre in order to run an autonomous EU operation as and when required, The Economist argued: “a large oak [will] grow from the acorn being planted in Brussels”. Indeed, the idea of an entirely independent military HQ for the EU has never been far off the agenda. It was proposed again during the French presidency of the EU in the latter half of 2008 and by the Polish presidency in 2011. Both times those proposals were dropped due to the UK veto. One of the outcomes of the Strategy, was the creation, in 2004, of the European Defense Agency (EDA). The same year, was first concept of the EU Battlegroup was also launched, as a result of a Franco-British proposal, and designed to allow the EU to rapidly respond, in a military capacity, to a crisis or urgent request from the UN. They achieved full operational capability in 2007 although no EU battlegroup has ever been deployed on operations. The UK has been a consistent contributor to EU-led operations, often as lead nation, and since the Battlegroups concept was launched the UK has provided, or led, a Battlegroup five times. The UK had been provisionally scheduled to provide an EU battlegroup in the second half of 2019. However, in March 2018, the UK has reportedly withdrawn that offer, citing the uncertainties of Brexit.Then, in December 2007, the Lisbon Treaty was signed. The new treaty finally entrusted the EU with legal personality and introduced a series of important innovations both in the fields of EU foreign policy and defense, now an integral part of CFSP. Most notably, the Lisbon Treaty created the High Representative for European Union Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, a double-hatted position combining the existing portfolios of the CFSP High Representative and the EU Commissioner for external relations. Barack Obama was sworn into office in January 2009. In December of the same year, the new Lisbon Treaty also entered into force. The new treaty was seen in Europe and abroad as a substantial upgrade in the field of European foreign policy. The British EU Commissioner and former Minister in the Blair government, Lady Catherine Ashton, was appointed as the first EU High Representative (EUHR) in November 2009. While initially relatively unknown, Ashton was able to develop a close personal relationship with Secretary Hillary Clinton first and Secretary John Kerry afterwards, thus managing to substantially raise Brussels’ voice in Washington. As the Conservative David Cameron too the helm of the government, Ashton did not, however, have her own country support, who would not even pass her the national security briefings. Instead, London chose to sign the Lancaster House Treaties with Paris (2010). Both France and Britain had faced defence spending cuts since the end of the Cold War, which accelerated with the economic crisis starting in 2008. Bilateral cooperation was thought as a way to make savings, especially on new armament programs and the pooling of existing equipment and of support resources, and the sharing of training infrastructures. However, a key rationale for the British government was to develop regional defense ties outside the EU. Indeed, British governments had been gradually disengaging from the CSDP (especially CSDP operations and the EDA) since the mid-2000s, while at the same time constantly recalling the centrality of NATO and the “Special Relationship” with Washington as the cornerstones of the UK’s security. The UK and France have achieved significant results in cooperation since 2010: in armaments, nuclear cooperation and operational cooperation. In the field of armaments, cooperation has been thriving in the missile sector. The French and British governments developed a strategy to integrate their missile industries around the already half-integrated firm MBDA. Another key industrial sector for Anglo-French cooperation has been unmanned aerial vehicles, around the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) programme. France and the UK have also developed on Maritime Mine Countermeasures, consisting of an unmanned underwater vehicle. Cooperation in the nuclear field has been on the rise since 2010, too, as part of the specific relating to Joint Radiographic/Hydrodynamics Facilities. On the operational side, France and the UK have been cooperating over the development of a non-permanent Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (CJEF) as well as during recent military interventions. The CJEF rapidly became the flagship project for cooperation between French and British armed forces and it has gone hand in hand with the densification of institutional links, as there are now 50 Exchange Officers of each country swapping positions every year.In 2011, Nicolas Sarkozy and David Cameron took the lead on the intervention in Libya, though cooperation on the ground was limited, due to different command channels and different rules of engagement. The case of Libya is also controversial. Both the European Union and the United States failed to foresee the coming of the Arab Spring. The response was slow, fuzzy, and not deprived of contradictions. The 2011 Libyan uprising occurred in the context of popular protest movements and political change in other countries in North Africa and the Middle East. In mid-February 2011, confrontations between opposition activists and government security forces in the eastern cities of Benghazi and Bayda resulted in the death of some unarmed protestors. Security forces used military force to subdue subsequent funeral gatherings and protests in incidents that reportedly killed or wounded dozens, if not hundreds, of civilians. Opposition groups seized several police and military facilities and took control of some eastern cities. In the weeks that followed, counterattacks on opposition-controlled areas by supporters of Muammar Qaddafi, and opposition advances toward Qaddafi strongholds, pushed Libya to the brink of civil war. The French airstrike on March 20, 2011, marked the beginning of the allied operations in Libya. In the first week of Libya operations, the United States dropped bombs from B-2 stealth planes flown from Missouri and roughly 200 missiles launched from submarines in the Mediterranean, causing alarm that any extended campaign would quickly cost billions of dollars more. But after the U.S. military ramped up the operation, other NATO countries shouldered most of the air burden. Americans took a supporting role, providing aerial refueling tankers, electronic jamming, and surveillance. Hence, for the first time since the Cold War, the United States decided to neither exercise leadership nor fully share risks in a war in which it was otherwise participating. However, the United States provided intelligence, refueling, and more precision bombing assistance than Paris or London want to acknowledge.A majority of NATO and EU members, including Germany, Poland, and Turkey, refused to support the war, notwithstanding an explicit UNSC resolution. Even jointly owned assets such as NATO’s fleet of AWACS radar aircraft were deprived of German personnel, although these were not strike aircraft. In addition, the EU played no identifiable part in the war, exposing EU structural insufficiencies and flaws in the defense field.In September 2012, eleven EU Member States (excluding the UK), published a communiqué on “The Future of Europe” which called for, among other things, a new model defense policy, designed to create a “European Army” and more majority based decisions in defense and foreign policy, in order to “prevent one single member state from being able to obstruct initiatives”. The proposals were supported in a further communiqué issued by France, Germany, Italy, Poland and Spain in November 2012, which also called for a “new military structure” for EU-led operations to be established. But once again, this time by the hand of Prime Minister David Cameron, the UK announced it would block any attempts to give the European Union a bigger role in coordinating the bloc’s defense policy. As the Trump administration took office in the United States, the new EUHR Federica Mogherini was among the first to arrive in Washington and to invite Vice President Mike Pence to Brussels. However, as it became increasingly clear that the United States would no longer be the trustable partner of the past, the EU decisively pushed on the integration accelerator. That meant, first of all, a new EU Security Strategy.The Global StrategyThe work for the EU Global Strategy (EUGS) began in September 2015 and ended a few days before the Brexit referendum. Mogherini had hence laid down two strategies: in the event of a Remain vote in the UK on 23 June 2016, the EUGS would have been circulated the following day, and formally presented by the HRVP to the European Council on 28 June 2016. If instead the British public would have voted Leave, the EUGS launch would have been postponed to a later date. As Nathalie Tocci wrote: “When the devastating news of Brexit hit home around 5 am on the 24th, I assumed it would all be called off. Indeed, this was the HRVP’s first inclination that day. Yet as the hours went by, it became increasingly clear that presenting the EUGS in September was not an option as the European Council would have informally debated Brexit at 27 Member States on that occasion. The alternative would have been October or December 2016. But the magnitude of the Brexit earthquake risked being so great that in all likelihood the project would have been dropped altogether.” The EUHR Federica Mogherini thus finally decided to stick to the original plan. As she wrote in the Foreword: “The purpose, even existence, of our Union is being questioned. […] In challenging times, a strong Union is one that thinks strategically, shares a vision and acts together. This is even more true after the British referendum.”On June 28, 2016, EUHR Federica Mogherini officially presented the Global Strategy at the European Council. The EUGS advocated for the European Union to play a major role, including as a global security provider. In the drafting of the EUGS, defense, immigration and relations with Russia had proved the three most contentious points. According to Nathalie Tocci, “there was a critical mass of Member States that were keen to press the accelerator on European security and defence. This was complemented by the security and defence community within and beyond official institutions, which, having seen to their dismay a ESS being ‘diluted’ into a broader EUGS, wanted to make sure their baby was not entirely stolen from them. They wanted to make sure the EUGS would have strong hooks on defence. The Commission, traditionally reluctant to name the ‘D’ word was also on board, partly due to the personal views of Commission President Juncker on European defence and the broader evolution of the defence debate within the Commission as a whole. This, however, had to be reconciled with a set of dissenting voices. Some Member States, while keen on security and defence in general, wanted to ensure that in no way would the EUGS challenge NATO’s supremacy on collective defence, nor would it question the national sovereignty of Member States on defence matters. Other Member States, notably some of the non-NATO Member States, felt uneasy about a strong NATO focus in the EUGS and wanted to make sure that their status and autonomy as non-NATO members was fully respected and reflected in the Strategy. Other Member States along with segments of the EEAS, the Commission, the European Parliament, as well as human rights organisations, cautioned against an excessive security focus in the EUGS”. The Global Strategy finally identified a number of defense capability priority areas in which Europe needs to invest and develop collaborative approaches: intelligence-surveillance reconnaissance, remotely piloted aircraft systems, satellite communications and autonomous access to space and permanent earth observation; high end military capabilities including strategic enablers, as well as capabilities to ensure cyber and maritime security.In parallel, the EU-NATO Joint Declaration was signed in Warsaw in July 8th, 2016 to relaunch EU-NATO cooperation. Advancements in EU security since the Brexit ReferendumStriving to relaunch after the Brexit Referendum, President Juncker stressed in his 2016 State of the Union Speech the need for a Europe that protects, empowers and defends and called for the creation of European Defence Fund. Italy, France and German also come forward with proposals to bring together the EU’s disparate military assets, spend more, develop technology and rely less on the United States.Meeting informally in Bratislava at the end of September “all 28”, the EU minister of defense agreed to work together to move forward in the field of defense, despite London’s opposition to both an EU army and to a EU common military headquarters. Consequently, HRVP Mogherini proposed an Implementation Plan on Security and Defence. The plan defined the types of civilian missions and military operations that the EU should be capable of undertaking within the context of the Global Strategy and had five specific work strands:Deepen defense cooperation – including establishing a Coordinated Annual Review on Defense to promote transparency and cooperation through joint programs among Member States; and a review of the Capability Development Plan by spring 2018 in order to identify capability shortfalls. Rapid response – identify options for more flexible, faster and targeted actions in civilian crisis management, and develop the EU battlegroups so that they are more usable and effective. Planning and conduct of missions – oversight of all EU missions (both civilian and military) needs to be enhanced and coordinated and in the short term, a new permanent operational planning and conduct capability will be established, within the EU Military Staff of the European External Action Service, for non-executive military missions. New Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) – to investigate areas for CSDP cooperation using the PESCO mechanism, as set out in the Lisbon Treaty. An agreement on the possible common commitments and projects to be implemented within the framework of PESCO will be presented to Member States for comment. CSDP partnerships – cooperation with the UN, NATO, African Union and OSCE will be enhanced. Options on a more strategic approach to engaging with third party countries in CSDP matters will be presented.PESCOAs London’s opposition was this time weakened by Brexit, Mogherini’s proposals were this time endorsed by the Foreign Affairs Council on November 14, 2016. Both the European Parliament and the European Commission followed up with reports, respective “The European Defence Union" and the “European Defence Action Plan (EDAP)”. According to the European Commission, the European defence market suffered from fragmentation and insufficient industrial collaboration. A more efficient use of public money and a stronger industrial base could be achieved by strengthening the Defence Single Market, reducing duplications and improving the competitiveness of the EU defence industry. Collectively, Europe is the world’s second largest military spender. However, it still lags behind the US and suffers from inefficiency in spending due to duplications, a lack of interoperability and technological gaps. Moreover, defence budgets in Europe have been shrinking in recent years, while other global actors (China, Russia and Saudi Arabia) have been upgrading their defence sectors on an unprecedented scale. Without a sustained investment in defence, the European industry risks lacking the technological ability to build the next generation of critical defence capabilities. Ultimately, this will affect the strategic autonomy of the Union and its ability to act as a security provider. The defence industrial sector is not only of strategic importance for Europe's security. With a total turnover of EUR 100 billion per year and 1.4 million highly skilled peopled directly or indirectly employed in Europe,11 it is also a major contributor to the European economy. The Commission had already developed strategies to support the competitiveness of the European defence industry and the creation of a more integrated defence market in Europe with the adoption, in 2009, of two defence Directives. In 2013, the Commission had already identified a list of actions to further strengthen the single market for defence and promote a more competitive defence industry. Now, for the first time, the Commission was tabling a proper European Defence Action Plan based on three main pillars: Launching a European Defence Fund; Fostering investments in defence supply chains; Reinforcing the single market for defence. These proposals were endorsed by the December European Council, which also approved a set of 42 measures to strengthen EU-NATO cooperation. Consequently, during the 60th anniversary of the Treaties of Rome (March 2017), the EU leaders announced their decision to move forward on the European Union defence and security cooperation. On June 7, 2017, the Commission launched the European Defence Fund to help Member States spend reduce duplications in military spending, by coordinating, supplementing and amplifying national investments in defence research, in the development of prototypes and in the acquisition of defence equipment and technology. Finally, in the summer of 2017, discussions started on activating PESCO, as well as on a proposal for regulation on the European Defence Industrial Development Programme (EDIDP). As Mogherini put in while presenting the first year of the implementation of the Global Strategy: “The Global Strategy has served as a springboard to relaunch the process of European integration after the British referendum […] we have moved fast—and united—on concrete implementation, starting with security and defense. In this field, more has been achieved in the last ten months than in the last ten years.”In the absence of the United Kingdom—embedded in the Brexit negotiations and unable to say anything about the EU’s future—in December 2017, twenty-five member states (all but the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Malta) agreed to step up the European Union’s work in the defense area by creating a Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) on security and defense. Through PESCO, member states will increase their effectiveness in addressing security challenges, advancing toward further integration and strengthening defense cooperation within the EU framework. By providing enhanced coordination and collaboration in the areas of investment, capability development, and operational readiness, PESCO will be a fundamental driver of integration in the European defense industry. Massive European financial investments and European-wide procurement procedures are likely to significantly affect the military industry, relaunching the European one and challenging the American one. The 25 member states made binding commitments to “enhanced coordination, increased investment in defense and cooperation in developing defense capabilities.” In March 2018, the Council thus adopted a roadmap for the implementation of PESCO and adopted a decision formally establishing the initial list of 17 collaborative projects which were agreed politically in December 2017.PESCO will gradually deepen defense cooperation within the Union framework. It will be a driver for integration in the field of defense, by making European defense more efficient and by enhancing coordination and collaboration in the areas of investment, capability development and operational readiness. It will decrease the number of different weapons' systems in Europe, and will strengthen operational cooperation among Member States, increase interoperability and European industrial competitiveness. PESCO will also reinforce the EU’s strategic autonomy to act alone when necessary and will act as a catalyst for a competitive and innovative European defense industry, including the many SMEs and mid-cap companies in the defense supply chain. In particular: CARD, to be run by the European Defense Agency, through systematically monitoring of national defense spending plans, will help identify opportunities for new collaborative initiatives. The EDF (European Defense Fund) will provide financial incentives to foster defense cooperation from research to the development phase of capabilities including prototypes, by offering grants for collaborative research in innovative defense technologies and products. For instance, the Fund will create incentives for Member States to cooperate on the joint development of prototypes. For the first time, EU budget money will be used to buy military equipment, boosting EU-wide defense procurement.Cooperation will also be fostered on specific initiatives such as: Military Mobility; Energy Operational Function; Upgrade of Maritime Surveillance; Cyber Rapid Response Teams and Mutual Assistance in Cyber Security; Development and building a prototype European Armored Infantry Fighting Vehicle / Amphibious Assault Vehicle / Light Armored Vehicles; Development of underwater autonomous vehicles.ConclusionsWith €203 billion spent on defense in 2015, EU member states are the world's second largest military spender, after the US. With PESCO injecting substantial funding in European defense procurement and R&D, US military goods exports to Europe may substantially decrease in the mid and long term, while the EU will become one of the biggest defense research investors in Europe, and will foster the development of cutting-edge, fully interoperable technologies and equipment. It is therefore no surprise that the Europeans have long wanted to integrate further this field. This time several factors suggest that the EU will achieve its goals in integrating in security and defense and that PESCO will be successful. First and foremost, PESCO comes at a time of waning US influence in Europe, with the transatlantic alliance and NATO both under pressure. For the first time Europeans are facing a far less reliable American partner, implying the need – and the opportunity – to do more on their own. Likewise, President Trump has far less personal leverage on European leaders than his predecessors had.Secondly, the EU is pursuing pragmatic implementation strategies in security and defense that echo those effectively employed to create the European Single Market, in the late 1980s and 1990s: the cost on non-cooperation has been estimated at €25 to €100 billion a year; there is substantial pot of money on the table (5.5 billion € a year); the EU is creating initiatives and policies fostering intra-European cooperation in the field of defense and it is promoting the adoption of EU-wide standards in military hardware, software, procedures and in EU-wide procurement. Finally, the Brexit factor. As seen, the UK has been both an engine and a thorn in the making in European defense, but it has vocally and persistently opposed all measures of EU integration in the field, advocating on the contrary for more NATO. In fact, the UK government’s rationale on defense has been that of developping regional defense cooperation outside of the EU. The UK has mostly played its prime role in defense alongside France. Just as the Franco-German tandem has been the main engine for EU political integration, France-UK cooperation - the two European nuclear powers - has been at the core of European defense.Hence, whether the EU will be successful in the field of security and defense, it will ultimately depend on what France will do. President Emmanuel Macron has been a vocal supporter of Europe’s need to take its own security in its own hands. According to Daniel Keohane, Macron’s defense vision draws on the urgent strategic necessity for Europeans to work together infused with a strong sense of political opportunity. Macron’s main military objective is to enable Europeans to act autonomously when needed, complementing NATO’s territorial defense role with a European capacity to intervene abroad, particularly to the south of Europe. He wants EU governments to quickly implement recently agreed initiatives, such as the European Defense Fund and PESCO. At the 2018 annual conference of French Ambassadors, Macron again called on Europe to build its financial and defense autonomy in response to the shifting balance of power as partners like the U.S. “turn their back” on the current world order. “The real question for Europe is if China and the U.S. see Europe as being strategically autonomous; today they don’t,” Macron told French ambassadors in Paris on Monday during the president’s annual foreign-policy speech. “Europe can no longer rely solely on the United States for its security. We must guarantee our own security and sovereignty.”As the only EU nuclear power and UN Security Council Permanent Member after Brexit, France has a vested interest in promoting EU defense and security, as this will amplify its role and influence in world affairs, a goal France has never ceased to pursue. With Brexit, France will recuperate in the security domain the prominent role it had in the early days of European integration. Alex Lust argues that France’s defense policy under Macron reflects both a shift away from President Charles Gaulle’s focus on national independence and the continued relevance of the Gaullist idea of European military autonomy. However, just like in 1954 France destroyed its own brainchild - making discussions on EEC security and defense policies off limit for decades - one can never be sure of what Paris’ next moves will be. In fact, the next few months will tell. If France wants to have EU defense and security policy advance, and PESCO succeed, it needs to institutionally take the lead and put the hat on the next EUHR. Ultimately, both Ashton and Mogherini’s main weakness has been the lack of support from their own countries. History shows that the most successful Presidents of the Commission - those who left a mark and managed to substantially advance European integration - have been those who enjoyed the full support of their own (big) countries: the German Walter Hallestein in the first decade of the EEC, and the French Jacques Delors from the mid-80s to the mid-90s. Should France aim to get the new EUHR for one of its own in the summer of 2019, then it will be safe to say that Brexit (and the Trump administration) allowed for the EU to finally integrate in security and defense. ................
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