Elections and Authoritarian Rule: Causes and Consequences ...

ELECTIONS AND AUTHORITARIAN RULE: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF ADOPTION OF GRASSROOTS ELECTIONS IN CHINA Wei-Feng Tzeng

Dissertation Prepared for the Degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

UNIVERSITY OF NORTH TEXAS August 2017

APPROVED: T. David Mason, Major Professor John Ishiyama, Committee Member Ko Maeda, Committee Member Jae-Jae Spoon, Committee Member Matthew Eshbaugh-Soha, Chair of the

Department of Political Science David Holdeman, Dean of the College of Arts

and Sciences Victor Prybutok, Dean of the Toulouse

Graduate School

Tzeng, Wei-Feng. Elections and Authoritarian Rule: Causes and Consequences of Adoption of Grassroots Elections in China. Doctor of Philosophy (Political Science), August 2017, 167 pp., 18 tables, 12 figures, references, 231 titles.

This dissertation investigates the relationship between elections and authoritarian rule with a focus on the case of China's adoption of elections at the grassroots level. In this dissertation, I look at the incentives facing Chinese local governments in choosing between holding competitive elections or state-controlled elections, and how the selection of electoral rules shapes the public's preferences over political institutions and influences the citizens' political behaviors, especially voting in elections and participation in contentious activities. The overarching theme in this dissertation proposes that the sources and consequences of Chinese local elections are conditioned on the state-owned resources and the governing costs. When the amount of state-owned resources to rule the local society is limited, the paucity of resources will incentivize authoritarian governments to liberalize grassroots elections to offset the governance costs. The various levels of election liberalization will lead to different consequences in the public's political behavior. An abundance of state-owned resources not only discourages rulers from sharing power with the local society, but also supplies the rulers with strong capacity to obtain loyalty from voters when elections are adopted. As a result, elections under authoritarian governments with an abundance of state-owned resources will see more loyalist voters than elections with authoritarian governments with fewer state-owned resources. In addition, the varieties of election practices will exert impacts on public opinion toward the authoritarian government: awareness of elections will enhance public trust in the government and decrease the public's intention to challenge the incumbents' authority while at

the same time increasing the public's faith in the institutions, thereby encouraging the public to adopt official channels to air their grievances. The analysis of the village-level as well as individual-level survey data and cases lends empirical supports to the argument. First, I find that the governing costs--measured by the size of labor force--are significantly and positively associated with the likelihood that local officials allow the villagers to freely nominate candidates. Second, I find that party members are more likely to vote in rural elections than urban elections while urban elections attract citizens with higher levels of democratic consciousness. The rural-urban divide in voter type indicates that the possession of economic resources by rural grassroots governments helps mobilize rural loyalist voters to participate in village committee elections, whereas the lack of such resources by urban governments discourages regime loyalist but encourage democratic voters to turn out to vote in urban elections. Third, I find significant evidence that citizens who are aware of grassroots elections are less likely to engage in contentious activities such as protest, strikes or demonstrations. Yet, the awareness of elections also encourages citizens to more frequently adopt, shangfang (petition), a government-sponsored conflict resolution mechanism, than those who are not aware of such elections. The implications of these findings suggest that the capability of state in controlling resources is vital to the success or failure of elections in stabilizing authoritarian regimes. The findings also provide an assessment on the substantial influence of the rural and urban grassroots elections in China's subnational democratization.

Copyright 2017 By

Wei-Feng Tzeng

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I am deeply grateful to the advisory committee members, colleagues, friends and family for their assistance in different stages of the dissertation writing. My deepest gratitude goes to my advisor, Dr. Mason. Without him carefully reading of my every draft, offering insightful comments, and patiently walking me through the steps of dissertation writing, this dissertation would still be an incomplete manuscript with immature and unorganized thoughts. Dr. Ishiyama is always inspiring and encouraging. The original idea in this dissertation stemmed from a research design I developed in his seminar of comparative politics, where he encouraged me to further explore the topic about elections in authoritarian regimes. Dr. Maeda generously shared with me the experiences in research, teaching and academic life, all of which have been invaluable lessons to me in scheduling my study. Dr. Spoon read the drafts and gave many discerning and constructive criticisms that helped me to structure my thoughts clearly. I am also thankful for the supports from many of my colleagues. Amalia and Melissa dedicated the time and energy to our group meetings every week. They have provided useful comments to my drafts and unwavering helps to the life in Denton. Chris and Nick read the early drafts of chapters and helped correct errors in my writing. Their timely assistance has made the writing process less painful and less frustrating. Finally, my mother and uncle have been a source of endless love and energy throughout my entire Ph.D. career. Their trust has encouraged and spurred me to complete this dissertation with confidence. I thank them, once again, for their unending and unconditional supports and tolerance along the way.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...................................................................................................................iii

LIST OF TABLES...............................................................................................................................vii

LIST OF FIGURES............................................................................................................................viii

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................... 1 1.1 An Overview............................................................................................................ 1 1.2 Elections and Political Regimes............................................................................... 3 1.3 Elections under Authoritarian Rule ........................................................................ 8 1.4 The Causes and Consequences of Adopting Elections by Authoritarian Rulers... 10 1.5 Why China? ........................................................................................................... 13 1.6 Map of the Dissertation ........................................................................................ 20

CHAPTER 2. CHOOSING DEMOCRACY IN CHINA? EXPLAINING WHY LOCAL OFFICIALS ALLOW ELECTORAL UNCERTAINTY IN THE CHINESE VILLAGE COMMITTEE ELECTIONS ........................... 23

2.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................... 23 2.2 The Choice of Electoral Institutions in Authoritarian Countries and China.......... 25

2.2.1 Elections in Authoritarian Countries......................................................... 25 2.2.2 Village Elections in Rural China................................................................. 26 2.2.3 The Variety of Village Electoral Institutions.............................................. 28 2.3 Rural Party Elites' Rational Choice of Electoral Rule ............................................ 31 2.3.1 Public Resources, Patronage and the Choice of Electoral Institutions..... 31 2.3.2 The Interaction between Non-Party Elites and Party Elites ..................... 36 2.4 The Case of Wukan ............................................................................................... 43 2.5 Statistical Analysis................................................................................................. 48 2.5.1 Dependent Variable .................................................................................. 48 2.5.2 Independent Variables.............................................................................. 49 2.5.3 Control Variables....................................................................................... 51 2.6 Empirical Results ................................................................................................... 53 2.7 Conclusion............................................................................................................. 56

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CHAPTER 3. PATRONAGE CAPACITY AND ELECTORAL PARTICIPATION UNDER AUTHORITARIANISM: ASSESSING VOTING IN CHINESE VILLAGERS' COMMITTEE AND RESIDENTS' COMMITTEE ELECTIONS ............................................................................................................... 59

3.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................... 59 3.2 Village Committee and Residents' Committee Elections ..................................... 61 3.3 Explaining Voting in China .................................................................................... 63 3.4 State Patronage and Voting Under Authoritarianism .......................................... 66 3.5 Rural-urban Divide after Economic Reform.......................................................... 69

3.5.1 The Decline of Resource Control in Urban China ..................................... 69 3.5.2 The Resurgence of Patronage Power in Rural Area.................................. 71 3.5.3 Rural-Urban Divide and Elections ............................................................. 72 3.6 Data ....................................................................................................................... 75 3.6.1 Voter Turnout ........................................................................................... 76 3.6.2 Electoral Control ....................................................................................... 77 3.6.3 Loyalist Voters........................................................................................... 80 3.6.4 Democratic Voters .................................................................................... 81 3.6.5 Control Variables....................................................................................... 83 3.7 Empirical Analysis.................................................................................................. 84 3.8 Conclusion............................................................................................................. 91

CHAPTER 4. THE BALLOT OR THE BULLET? PUBLIC AWARENESS OF GRASSROOTS ELECTIONS AND REGIME STABILITY IN CHINA................................................................................................. 94

4.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................... 94 4.2 4.2 Elections and Regime Sustainability ............................................................... 96 4.3 Elections and Regime Sustainability in China ..................................................... 100 4.4 4.4. Awareness of Elections and Social Stability in China................................... 103 4.5 Data and Variables .............................................................................................. 109

4.5.1 Dependent Variables .............................................................................. 110 4.5.2 Independent Variable ............................................................................. 113 4.5.3 Control Variables..................................................................................... 114 4.6 Empirical Analysis................................................................................................ 116 4.6.1 Statistical Models.................................................................................... 116 4.6.2 Awareness of Elections and Trust in Government ................................. 118

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4.6.3 Awareness of Grassroots Elections and Involvement in Contentious Collective Activities ................................................................................. 121

4.6.4 Awareness of Grassroots Elections and Involvement of Collective Contentious Activities ............................................................................. 123

4.6.5 Endogeneity Test for the Relationships .................................................. 125 4.7 Conclusion........................................................................................................... 127 CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION........................................................................................................... 130 5.1 Summary of the Major Findings ......................................................................... 130 5.2 Policy Suggestions from the Findings ................................................................. 137 5.3 Suggestions for Future Research ........................................................................ 139 APPENDIX A. SOLUTION OF THE EXTENSIVE FORM GAME......................................................... 142 APPENDIX B. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR VOTER TURNOUT ANDCROSS-TAB OF PARTY MEMBERSHIP AND DEMOCRATIC ANALYSIS .............................................................................. 146 APPENDIX C. ROBUSTNESS CHECK MODELS FOR CLUSTERED STANDARD ERRORS AND RARE EVENT LOGIT ............................................................................................................................... 148 REFERENCES ................................................................................................................................ 152

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