Feeling Pain and Being in Pain - Uni Oldenburg

Hanse-Studien / Hanse Studies Hanse-Wissenschaftskolleg Delmenhorst

Hanse Institute for Advanced Study

Band 1 / Volume 1

Nikola Grahek

Feeling Pain and Being in Pain

bis

Bibliotheks- und Informationssystem der Universit?t Oldenburg 2001

Hanse-Studien / Hanse Studies Hanse-Wissenschaftskolleg Delmenhorst

Hanse Institute for Advanced Study

herausgegeben von Prof. Dr. Dr. Gerhard Roth und Uwe Opolka

In der Reihe Hanse-Studien / Hanse Studies erscheinen ? in deutscher oder englischer Sprache ? unver?ffentlichte Forschungsarbeiten, die am Hanse-Wissenschaftskolleg (HWK) in Delmenhorst entstanden sind, sowie Berichte ?ber vom HWK durchgef?hrte Konferenzen. Das Hanse-Wissenschaftskolleg ist eine gemeinn?tzige Stiftung privaten Rechts der L?nder Bremen und Niedersachsen sowie der Stadt Delmenhorst. Es wurde 1995 gegr?ndet und nahm 1997 seine Arbeit auf. Seine Hauptaufgabe besteht in der St?rkung des ?berregional und international anerkannten Forschungspotentials der umliegenden Universit?ten und Forschungseinrichtungen, insbesondere der Universit?ten Oldenburg und Bremen. Seine derzeitigen Arbeitsschwerpunkte liegen auf den Gebieten Meeres- und Klimaforschung, Neuro- und Kognitionswissenschaften, Sozialwissenschaften / Sozialpolitik sowie auf interdisziplin?ren Projekten. In diesen Bereichen beruft es Fellows und f?hrt Tagungen durch.

Anschriften der Herausgeber:

Prof. Dr. Dr. Gerhard Roth Hanse-Wissenschaftskolleg Lehmkuhlenbusch 4 27753 Delmenhorst Telefon: 0 42 21/91 60-108 Telefax: 0 42 21/91 60-199 e-mail: gerhard.roth@h-w-k.de

Uwe Opolka Hanse-Wissenschaftskolleg Lehmkuhlenbusch 4

27753 Delmenhorst Telefon: 0 42 21/91 60-109 Telefax: 0 42 21/91 60-199

e-mail: uopolka@h-w-k.de

Verlag/Druck/ Vertrieb

Bibliotheks- und Informationssystem der Carl von Ossietzky Universit?t Oldenburg (BIS) ? Verlag Postfach 2541, 26015 Oldenburg Telefon: +49-4 41-7 98-22 61 Telefax: +49-4 41-7 98-40 40 e-mail: verlag@uni-oldenburg.de

ISBN 3-8142-0780-7

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Contents

Acknowledgments

1.

Introduction

7

2.

The Biological Function and Importance of Pain

12

3.

Dissociation Phenomena in Human Pain Experience 31

4.

Pain Asymbolia

42

5.

How Is Pain Without Painfulness Possible?

51

6.

Conceptual and Theoretical Implications of

Pain Asymbolia

70

7.

Pain Quality and Painfulness Without Pain

89

8.

Not Caring for Pain

105

9.

C and All That Fibers

131

References

153

Index

160

4

For Ana, Ivan and Nela and

to the memory of Aleksandar Kron

5

Acknowledgments

This book was conceived and written while I was fellow of the Hanse-Wissenschaftskolleg (Hanse Institute for Advanced Study) in Delmenhorst (Germany). I am grateful to the Rector of Hanse Institute, Gerhard Roth, for support, encouragement and understanding. My special thanks go to my host, Hans Flohr, for his interest, friendship and fruitful discussions that we had. I am indebted to the staff of the Hanse Institute and to all fellows for the wonderful time that I had during my twelve months stay. I am particularly grateful to Mechthild Harders-Opolka and to Uwe Opolka for their friendship and support. For long-term support and lasting interest in my work I am indebted to Daniel Dennett, Boris Velichkovsky, Jay Rosenberg, David Rosenthal, Helmut Hildebrandt, Peter Bieri, Milos Arsenijevic, Zivan Lazovic, Jovan Arandjelovic and Leon Kojen.

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1. Introduction

This book is principally devoted to the thorough consideration and general theoretical appreciation of the two most radical dissociation syndromes to be found in human pain experience. The first syndrome is related to the complete dissociation between sensory and affective, cognitive and behavioral components of pain, while the second one has to do with absolute dissociation that goes into opposite direction: the full dissociation of affective components of human pain experience from its sensory-discriminative components. The former syndrome can be called pain without painfulness and the latter one painfulness without pain. In the first case, one is able to feel pain but is not able to be in pain, while in the second case one is able to be in pain but not able to feel pain. Taking into account our common experience of pain, it might well seem to us that the two syndromes just described are inconceivable and, thus, impossible. In order to make them more intelligible and, thus, less inconceivable, the crucial distinction between feeling pain and being in pain is introduced and explained on conceptual and empirical grounds. But the main point is that pain without painfulness as well as painfulness without pain are, however bizarre or outlandish, nonetheless possible, for the simple reason that ample clinical evidence conclusively shows that they can be found in human pain experience. So, the question is not whether they exist or can exist, but what they can teach us about the true nature and structure of human pain experience. Accordingly, the major theoretical aim of this book will be to appreciate what lessons are to be learned from the consideration of these syndromes as far as our very concept or, more importantly, our very experience of pain is concerned.

The first lesson being that pain, although appearing to us as simple, homogenous experience, is actually a complex experience comprising sensory-discriminative, emotional-cognitive and behavioral components which commonly go together, but may well be disconnected and thus exist, to our great astonishment, separately. The second lesson being that pain, once deprived of all its affective, cognitive and behavioral components, loses all its representational and motivational

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force: that it is no longer a signal of threat or damage and doesn't move ones mind and body in any way. The third lesson being that pain, when deprived of its sensory-discriminative components, comes to such sensory indeterminacy that it cannot be distinguished from other unpleasant sensations or sensations of other quality, and looses all informational power with regard to the location, intensity, temporal profile and nature of harmful stimuli. Thus, the two most radical dissociation syndromes in human pain experience may well reveal to us the really complex nature of pain; its major constitutional elements; the proper role that they play in overall pain experience; the way that they work together as well as the basic neural structures and mechanisms that subserve them.

Pain without painfulness is to be found in patients who suffer from the so-called pain asymbolia, and it is characteristic for these patients that they feel pain upon harmful stimulation, but that it doesn't in any way represent for them the sign of threat or danger: that they do not care for it at all and even smile or laugh at it. But as I will try to show, this pain which doesn't represent any threat or danger to the subject, poses gross threat both to the subjectivist and to the objectivist conceptions or interpretations of the true nature and structure of human pain experience. That is, to the subjectivist view that the sensation of pain with its distinctive phenomenal content or quality ? the what-itis-likeness of pain ? is the essential component of our total pain experience and plays the central or fundamental role in it. And also to the objectivists claim that the feeling of pain is to be understood just as the awareness of objective bodily state of affairs: as the perception or sensory representation of bodily or tissue damage. Actually, the consideration of pain asymbolia syndrome might well help us to clearly see the rights and wrongs of the subjectivist and objectivist conceptions of pain. In other words, it may help us to see what is the proper role of pain sensation or pain quality in overall pain experience as well as to understand the proper mode in which pain represents physical damage to the body part or at least threat to the physical well-being.

Pain asymbolia syndrome or pain without any painfulness is yet in another conceptual and theoretical respect important for the proper

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