Prejudgment Seizure



Prejudgment Seizure

Fuentes v. Shevin (1972)

Florida and Pennsylvania statutes authorized the summary seizure of goods or chattels in a person's possession under a writ of replevin, and neither provided for notice or hearing prior to seizure. Petitioners argued that the statutes deprived them of property in their possession in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. On review, the Supreme Court found that the statutes' prejudgment replevin provisions deprived petitioners of their property without due process insofar as they denied the right to prior notice and hearing before property was taken. The Court noted that states had the power to seize goods prior to a final judgment in order to protect creditor's security interests, but only after the creditor tested their claim to the goods through the process of a fair prior hearing.

HN: The relative weight of liberty or property interests is relevant to the form of notice and hearing required by due process, but some form of notice and hearing, formal or informal, is required before deprivation of a property interest that cannot be characterized as de minimis.

Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co. (1974)

The statute authorizing sequestration in this case sought to minimize the risk of error of a wrongful interim possession by the seller. The system, which was always under judicial control, protected the buyer's interest in every conceivable way, except allowing him to have the property to start with. Accordingly, the court held that the sequestration did not violate the buyer's constitutional rights.

HN: A hearing must be had before one is finally deprived of his property. The usual rule has been where only property rights are involved, mere postponement of the judicial enquiry is not a denial of due process, if the opportunity given for ultimate judicial determination of liability is adequate.

Questions: Did Mitchell overrule Fuentes?

Majority Answer: NO. The Court says that this is a different case for three reasons: (1) the plaintiff who seeks the seizure of the property must file an affidavit stating "specific facts" that justify the sequestration; (2) the state official who issues the writ of sequestration is a judge instead of a clerk of the court; and (3) the issues that govern the plaintiff's right to sequestration are limited to "the existence of a vendor's lien and the issue of default," and "there is thus far less danger here that the seizure will be mistaken and a corresponding decrease in the utility of an adversary hearing,"

Minority Answer: YES. The Court's opinion in Fuentes, however, explicitly rejected each of these [three] factors as a ground for a difference in decision. Under Fuentes, due process of law permits Louisiana to effect this deprivation only after notice to the possessor and opportunity for a hearing.

North Georgia Finishing v. Di-Chem Inc. (1975)

Petitioner's due process rights were violated where the statutory garnishment procedure allowed respondent to obtain a writ issuable on an affidavit containing only conclusory allegations and issuable by a court clerk without participation by a judge. Further, upon issuance of the writ, petitioner was deprived of the use of his property without notice or hearing at which respondent would be required to demonstrate at least probable cause for the garnishment. The Court explained that the probability of irreparable injury was sufficiently great so as to require some procedures to guard against the risk of initial error in issuing the writ.

Matthews v. Eldridge (1976)

Matthews Test: Identification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.

HN: At some point the benefit of an additional safeguard to the individual affected by the administrative action and to society in terms of increased assurance that the action is just, may be outweighed by the cost.

HN: An evidentiary hearing is not required prior to the termination of disability benefits. 

HN: The judicial model of an evidentiary hearing is neither a required, nor even the most effective, method of decisionmaking in all circumstances. The essence of due process is the requirement that a person in jeopardy of serious loss be given notice of the case against him and opportunity to meet it. All that is necessary is that the procedures be tailored, in light of the decision to be made, to the capacities and circumstances of those who are to be heard, to insure that they are given a meaningful opportunity to present their case.

Connecticut v. Doehr (1991)

The U.S. Supreme Court held that even the temporary or partial impairments to property rights that attachments and similar encumbrances entail were sufficient to merit due process protection and that any significant taking of property by the state was within the purview of the due process clause. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-278e(a)(1), which allowed for an attachment without notice or a hearing, was therefore in violation of the due process clause. Therefore, since the attachment of respondent's property was a one-sided determination which did not afford him notice or an opportunity to dispute, the Court remanded the case for further proceedings.

HN: For a prejudgment attachment of property the relevant inquiry requires first, consideration of the private interest that will be affected by the prejudgment measure; second, an examination of the risk of erroneous deprivation through the procedures under attack and the probable value of additional or alternative safeguards; and third, principal attention to the interest of the party seeking the prejudgment remedy, with, nonetheless, due regard for any ancillary interest the government may have in providing the procedure or forgoing the added burden of providing greater protections. 

HN: Connecticut's prejudgment remedy provision, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-278e(a)(1), violates the requirements of due process by authorizing prejudgment attachment without prior notice or a hearing.

HN: BOND issue(4 judges concur in the majority on the bond issue): neither a hearing nor an extraordinary circumstance limitation eliminates the need for a bond, no more than a bond allows waiver of these other protections. To reconcile the interests of the defendant and the plaintiff accurately, due process generally requires all of the above.

United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property (1993)

Absent exigent circumstances, the owner should have received notice and a hearing prior to the seizure.

HN: Whether the seizure of real property for purposes of civil forfeiture justifies an exception to the general rule requiring pre-deprivation notice and hearing requires an examination of the competing interests at stake, along with the promptness and adequacy of later proceedings. The court must make a three-part inquiry: to consider the private interest affected by the official action; the risk of an erroneous deprivation of that interest through the procedures used, as well as the probable value of additional safeguards; and the government's interest, including the administrative burden that additional procedural requirements would impose. 

 

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