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A CLASH OF MILITARY CULTURES: GERMAN & FRENCH APPROACHES TO TECHNOLOGY

BETWEEN THE WORLD WARS

A Paper for the USAF Academy Symposium September 1994

By James S. Corum USAF School of Advanced Airpower Studies

Introduction

The First World War was a period of extraordinarily rapid technological development. Military technology had changed dramatically in the decades before World War I, but even the most perceptive pre-war military thinkers of 1914 were unable to predict the pace of wartime technical development. The militaries of World War I had to adapt to the emergence of the airplane, motor vehicle, tank and poison gas as major new weapons. Commanders, general staffs and war departments had to try to master the variety of new technology and adapt technology to operations. The period in between the world wars was a time of extraordinary technological development for the world's militaries. World War I had proven to be a technological catalyst. Such weapons as the tank, which was introduced in the war, enjoyed rapid development in the 1920s and 1930s. Accelerated by the war, motor vehicle development progressed, while every army engaged in motorization experiments. Radios and electronics passed out of their infancy as Britain and Germany developed radar. Most dramatic of all was the evolution of the airplane from a useful auxiliary weapon into a very powerful and decisive arm of the military. The French military was extremely successful in adapting to technology during World War I. In many respects, the French effort in this regard equalled, and in several instances surpassed, the German. Deficient in heavy artillery at the start of the war, by 1917-1918 the French Army had created a superb heavy artillery arm.1 French vehicle production exceeded the German, and by 1918, the French Army was more advanced in motorization.2 The most dramatic difference

'in 1917, the French Army deployed the Canon de 155mm GPF as the standard heavy gun. With a range of 19,500 meters and a 43kg shell, it was highly respected by the Germans and the Allies. See Peter Chamberlain and Terry Gander, Heavy Artillery, N.Y.: ARC (1975), p. 17. On other French guns, see pages 14-19. 2Werner Oswald, Kraftfahrzeuge und Panzer der Reichswehr, Wehrmacht und Bundeswehr, Stuttgart: Motorbuch Verlag

between the two armies was in the development of armored forces. The French General Staff initiated development of a French tank program in 1914.3 During the war, the French produced 4,3 00 tanks, more than any other power.4 In contrast, the Germans never deployed more than a few dozen tanks, and of these, only 20 were of German manufacture.5 Another French success story was their effectiveness in designing and producing high-quality aircraft. The military leadership and civilian industrialists demonstrated a high degree of innovation in effectively standardizing aircraft types and engines. France led the world in aircraft engine production and quality.6 By 1918, the French had designed and built the first supercharged engine.7 In design, the French equalled the Germans, with such rugged, effective and swift aircraft as the Spad VII, Spad XIII fighters and the Breguet 14 bomber.8 Indeed, the quality and quantity of French aircraft design and production enabled the Allies to gain air superiority in the latter part of the war. Due to the inefficiency of British aircraft design and production, the British had to rely upon the French for many aircraft and engines. As late as 1918, British squadrons on the Western Front flew Spads and Nieuports into action.9 By the final year of the war, the French military demonstrated considerable skill in utilizing new technology

(1975), pp. 10-11. In 1918, the French Army employed 100,000 motor vehicles, not including tanks, on the West Front, The German army motor vehicle total during the war did not exceed 40,000 in use. 30n Col. Estienne, See Kenneth Macksey, ed., The Guinness Book of Tank Facts, Enfield: Guinness Publishing (1980), p. 28. 4Ibid., p. 45. 5Werner Oswald, Kraftfahrzeuge und Panzer, pp. 3 6-3 9. 6John Morrow, The Great War in the Air, Wash., D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press (1993), pp. 369-371. In World War I, the French built 52,000 planes and 88,000 engines. The Germans built approximately 48,000 planes and 43,000 engines. 7Charles Christienne and Pierre Lissarrague, A History of French Military Aviation, Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institute Press (1986), p. 117. 8On French aircraft at the end of the War, see John Morrow, The Great War in the Air, pp. 363-371, and Charles Christienne and Pierre Lissarrague, History of French Military Aviation, pp. 117-122 and 155-157. 9In 1918, Squadrons 1, 19, 23, 29 and 60 of the Royal Flying Corps and RAF flew Nieuport 17s, Spad VIIs and Spad XIIIs on the Western Front. See Christopher Shore and Norman Franks, Above the Trenches, London: Grub Street Publishers (1990), pp. 30-36.

on the battlefield. The French Army demonstrated operational finesse in the successful counterattack at Soissons on July 18 and 26, 1918. French forces, supported by 571 tanks and masses of aircraft, drove a deep wedge into the German drive on Paris.10 French infantry and tanks also took part in the attack at Amiens on August 8, 1918: the Allied Offensive that decisively broke the German Front. During the last two months of World War II, the American offensive at St. Mihiel and the Meuse Argonne relied upon the French for tank, air and artillery support.11 Twenty-two years later, the French had lost the technological edge they had enjoyed in 1918. The French ground forces were well-equipped, but their commanders' inability to effectively use the weapons was apparent. In the field of aviation, the technological disparity was significant, with the Germans fielding a force which was both qualitatively and quantitatively superior. In numerous aspects of technology, the German military had shown itself far more innovative and effective in the development and employment of equipment. My purpose in this paper is to explore the background of two contrasting military cultures, the French and the German, and compare their approaches to the development and adaptation of technology. I will first outline the state of comparative technological development of the French and German armies and their forces in 1939-1940, and investigate some of those factors that brought those forces to their relative positions. The specific lines of investigation will follow: first will be the influence of doctrine upon technology; second, the influence of military organizational systems upon technology; finally, the influence of the general staff cultures upon technical development.

The State of French and German Military Technology in 1940.

In the 1920s, the French had a clear lead in motorization and tank development. The French motor industry was one of the larger motor industries, and was highly innovative.12

10Kenneth Macksey, The Guinness Book of Tank Facts, p. 37. 11 At the St. Mihiel Offensive of the U.S. Army in September 1918, the French provided 185 tanks and the U.S., 174 tanks. The French supported the U.S. Offensive in the Meuse-Argonne in September/October 1918 with 750 tanks. See Kenneth Macksey, The Guinness Book of Tank Facts, p. 231. 12See Patrick Fridenson, "Les relations entre les industries automobiles frangaise et allemande des annees 1880 aux annees 1960", in Frankreich und Deutschland; Forschung, Technologie und industrielle Entwicklung im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, Yves Cohen and Klaus Manfrass, eds. Munich: C.H. Beck'sehen Verlag (1990), pp. 334-342, especially

For example, in the 1920s, Citroen produced the world's first practical half-track vehicles.13 The military, following the success of French motor production and employment in the World War, had numerous commissions devoted to studying and implementing motorization.14 In tank development, the French capitalized upon their advantage gained in World War I, and several commissions were given a mandate to develop tanks. French tank design in the 1920s was clearly at the cutting edge, with the design for the Char B heavy tank. The Char B would eventually be deployed in the 1930s, carrying a 75mm and a 47mm gun.15 In the air, the French also enjoyed a significant technological advantage. In the 1920s, the French air force was the largest in the world.16 The French air motor industry led the world, and in the mid-1920s, the French held many world records in aviation. The National Aeronautical Institute, founded in 1909, was nationalized and put under the direction of the Air Ministry in 1928. The Institute continued to produce highly qualified aeronautical engineers.17 Both in ground forces motorization and in aviation technology, the French lost their edge in the late 1920searly 1930s. In Germany, the auto industry--which had been far smaller than the French auto industry of the 192 0s-forged ahead. By the early 1930s, with subsidies and incentives from the new Nazi regime, the German auto

pp. 335-33 6. 13The French half-track technology of the 1920s was so admired by the Germans that the German Maffei Company licensed the French half-track system in 1927, and produced a German model by 1930. See Walter Spielberger, Die Motorisierung der deutschen Reichswehr 1920-1935, Stuttgart: Motorbuchverlag (1979), pp. 145-151. 14For a detailed review of French motorization efforts 19191939, see Ministere de la Defense, Les Programmes d'Armament de 1919 a. 1939, Chateau de Vincennes (1982), pp. 260-329. 15By 1940, 3 65 Char B Tanks were built. See Christopher Foss, ed., An Illustrated Guide to World War II Tanks and Fighting Vehicles, N.Y.: Arco Publishing (1981), pp. 16-19. 16 In 1923, France was rated as the strongest aeronautical power. It had an Air Force of 123 squadrons, with 1,050 modern aircraft. See Aeronautical Chamber of Commerce of America, Aircraft Year Book 1924, N.Y. (1924), pp. 185-193. 17The National Aeronautics Institute produced about 100-150 aeronautical engineers a year in the 1920s and 1930s, although many only had a 2-year course in engineering. See l'Ecole Nationale Superieure de 1'Aeronautique, Livre d'Or de l'Ecole Nationale Superieure de 1'Aeronautigue; Cinguante annees d'existence (1909-1959), pp. 59-60 and 65-66.

industry became larger than the French.18 The French were, however, able to keep a high standard in developing tank technology. For example, the French tanks of the mid-193Os were fitted with the world's first cast turrets, and the French tanks of the 1930s had the most sophisticated steering systems of the era.19 The Germans, however, were able to match the level of French tank technology. For example, in 1936 the Panzer II and III were designed with the world's first torsion-bar suspension system.20 In artillery, both countries demonstrated a rough parity in gun quality by 1940. In the post-World War I era, both the French and the German armies had developed medium and heavy guns which were efficient and effective upon the battlefield in 1940.21 In other aspects of motorization, the French fell behind. Having once led the world in half-track production, the French virtually ended development of the half-track in 1933. Starting behind the French, the Germans licensed their technology and then forged ahead with their own, innovative designs. By 1940, a wide variety of halftrack vehicles was assigned to their armored and motorized divisions.22 The Germans took the lead in other areas, as well, including armored cars, armored command vehicles, and tracked assault guns, while French development in these areas remained relatively static. The greatest disparity in ground forces equipment between the French and the Germans was in communications equipment. The French developed relatively few radio systems in the interwar period, and devoted very little money to developing

18Maurice Larkin, France Since the Popular Front, Oxford: Clarendon Press (1988), p. 389. Between 1925-1929, France produced an average of 207,000 motor vehicles per year to Germany's 90,000. Between 1930-1934, France produced 193,000 per year to Germany's 101,000. From 1935-1939, the French produced 200,000 motor vehicles per year to Germany's 304,000. I9R.M. Ogorkiewicz, Armoured Forces, N.Y.: Arco Publishing (1970), pp. 177-178 and 336. 20Ibid., p. 343. 21 On German and French artillery of the interwar period, see Peter Chamberlain and Terry Gander, Light and Medium Field Artillery, N.Y.: Arco Publishing (1975), pp. 13-30, also Peter Chamberlain and Terry Gander, Heavy Artillery, N.Y.: Arco Publishing (1970), pp. 14-26. 22The German Army began development of half-tracked vehicles in 1926. By 1937, mass production of the highly-effective Sdkfz 250 and Sdkfz 251 had begun. See Duncan Crow, ed., Armored Fighting Vehicles of Germany, N.Y.: Arco Publishing (1978), pp. 161-172, and John Milsom, German Half-Tracked Vehicles of World War II, N.Y.: Hippocrene Books (1975), pp. 6-7.

communications equipment.23 Yet, a high priority was assigned to the development of communications equipment which would be set in fixed installations along the Maginot Line.24 The Germans, on the other hand, placed a very high priority upon developing communications equipment, and produced a wide variety of effective radios for ground forces, infantry, artillery, aviation and tanks.25 As of 1940, only French heavy tanks had radios, whereas all German tanks had radios, and numerous other armored cars and vehicles, as well. With the exception of communications, however, the French Army was not badly equipped in 1940. In fact, they possessed good guns, good tanks for the era, and several armored and motorized divisions. The French Army of 1940 can be said to have had a modern level of motorization. In their approach to motorization, the German and French armies were actually very similar. Both armies were supportive of motorization, and studied it intensively. Both were influenced by national strategic considerations, for both countries were net importers of oil, and were concerned about assuring a supply of oil in case of war.26 This

23Between 1923 and 1939, the French military devoted only 0.15% of their military budget to communications equipment. See Robert Doughty, "The French Armed Forces, 1918-40", in Military Effectiveness, vol. II, Boston: Unwin Hyman (1988), pp. 39-69, especially p. 58. The French had commercial technology which could have been exploited for the military. In 1931, a commercial UHF link was opened between Britain and France. The UHF frequencies, however, though used extensively by the Germans, were not developed by the French. See Tony Devereux, Messenger Gods of Battle, London: Brasseys (1991), p. 84. 24In the interwar period, one of the largest of the French radio procurement programs was for the OCTF, and for the R and F type radios and receivers (650 radios) for the Maginot Line fortifications. Only a handful of radios were planned for the Char B and R 35 tanks. See Ministere de la Defense, Les Programmes d'Armament, p. 416. 25During the 1920s and early 1930s, the Weapons Office and Communications Inspectorate developed a broad family of effective radios for the tactical use of the Army. See Adolf Reinicke, Das Reichsheer 1921-1934, Osnabr?ck: Biblio Verlag (1986), p. 196. 26On oil and French strategic planning in the interwar period, see R. Nayberg, "La Problematique du revitaillement de la France en carburant dans 1'Entre-deux-guerres: naissance d'une perspective geostrategique", in Revue Historique des Armees, No. 4 (1979), pp. 5-28. For a good overview of the strategic effect of the oil supply on German

concern for oil, as well as the high cost of motorization, ensured that both armies would motorize gradually, and would still use primarily horse-drawn transport for their infantry divisions in 1940. One interesting aspect of the French and German concern about oil imports was that Germany and France were the only nations in the interwar period to develop diesel aircraft engines. Neither the French nor German diesel aircraft engines were effective, though they did have the virtue of using considerably less fuel than the high-performance engines of the era.27 Both armies, employing common sense, chose the artillery branches as the first priority for army mobilization. The overall effect was a practical approach to motorization by France and Germany. While the disparity of technology between ground forces in 1940 was serious, in the air this disparity was, for the French, catastrophic. As to aircraft types, in 1940 the majority of the French aircraft in service were far inferior to their German counterparts. For example, the Bloch 152, the Mor?ne Saulnier 406, and the Curtis Hawk P 36 fighter aircraft were all inferior to the German Me 109 in 1940, and the French bomber force, the Amiot and Farman Bombers, did not come close in performance to the German bombers.28 The

motorization, see Richard DiNardo, Mechanized Juggernaut or Military Anachronism?, Westport: Greenwood Press (1991), pp. 7-9. 27By the 1930s, the Germans had developed the Mercedes-Benz DB 602, a 16 cylinder diesel aircraft engine rated at 1,320 horsepower. The French developed the Clerget 16H, a 16 cylinder diesel aircraft engine rated at 2,000 horsepower. See Paul Wilkinson, Aircraft Engines of the World: 1941; N.Y.: Paul Wilkinson (1941), pp. 104-105 and 168-169. The Germans took the world lead in diesel aircraft engines. The Ju 86 bomber, which first flew in 1934, was powered by the Jumo 205 Diesel Engine. It had a low power-to-weight ratio, but low fuel consumption. See Green, Warplanes of the Third Reich, p. 414. 28The Bloch 152 Fighter, a mainstay of the Armee de l'Air in 1940, had a maximum speed of 316 Mph., and an armament of 2, 20mm cannon and 2 machine guns. It was slower than even the German Me 110 Heavy Fighter. See Kenneth Munson, Fighters 1939-45, London: Blandford (1969), p. 39. The Amiot 143 Bomber, used by the French in 1940, was designed in the late 192 0s, and had a maximum speed of 193 Mph. and a bombload of 1,300 Kg. The Bloch 210 was designed in 1932, had a maximum speed of 200 Mph. and a bombload of 1,600 Kg. The primary German bombers of 1940 were the Heinkel He 111 and the Dornier Do 17. The Heinkel He 111 had a maximum speed of 252 Mph. and a bombload of 2,500 Kg. The Do 17 was faster, at 255 Mph. Both clearly outclassed most of the French

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