FRENCH GROUND FORCE ORGANIZATION AND COUNTERREVOLUTIONARY ...

FRENCH GROUND FORCE ORGANIZATION AND

COUNTERREVOLUTIONARY WARFARE 1945 ? 1962

US Army Command and General Staff College

FRENCH GROUND FORCE ORGANIZATION AND COUNTERREVOLUTIONARY WARFARE

1945 - 1962

Avertissement Dans le cadre de ses travaux de recherche consacr?s ? la contre-gu?rilla, et avec l'autorisation de l'US Army, le CDEF publie en version originale une ?tude relative ? l'adaptation de l'arm?e fran?aise ? la guerre r?volutionnaire. Cette ?tude a ?t? r?alis?e par le major Peter Drake Jackson dans le cadre de sa scolarit? ? l'US Army Command and General Staff College.

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the US Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE Military History By Peter Drake Jackson, MAJ, USA

B.A., University of Rhode Island, Kingston, Rhode Island, 1992

US Army Command and General Staff College

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 2005

CDEF/ Division recherche retour d'exp?rience/ Bureau recherche

T?l: 01 44 42 52 08 PNIA 821 753 52 08 / jerome.cario@cdef.terre.defense.gouv.fr

Table of contents

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.......................................................................................... 7

INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................. 9 THESIS ............................................................................................................................................................. 11 CURRENT RELEVANCE .................................................................................................................................... 12 KEY TERMS ..................................................................................................................................................... 12 METHODOLOGY .............................................................................................................................................. 13 SUMMARY........................................................................................................................................................ 14 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................................... 15 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................................ 15

CHAPTER 1. ORGANIZATIONAL STATUS AND INITIAL DEVELOPMENT UP TO 1946 ................................................................................................................. 19

THE COLONIAL LEGACY.................................................................................................................................. 23 THE GREAT WAR LEGACY ............................................................................................................................... 28 FRENCH GROUND FORCES IN ALGERIA, 1939-1945........................................................................................ 30 FRENCH GROUND FORCES IN INDOCHINA, 1939-1945.................................................................................... 32 ORGANIZATION TO RETURN TO THE FAR EAST .............................................................................................. 33 REOCCUPATION OF INDOCHINA...................................................................................................................... 35

CHAPTER 2. ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT DURING THE WAR IN INDOCHINA ...................................................................................................... 39

THE WAR IN INDOCHINA.................................................................................................................................. 41 THEATER TERRITORIAL ORGANIZATION........................................................................................................ 44 INFANTRY ORGANIZATION.............................................................................................................................. 48 MOBILE FORCES .............................................................................................................................................. 54 ORGANIZATION OF FIRE SUPPORT .................................................................................................................. 57 ORGANIZATION OF INDIGENOUS PERSONNEL................................................................................................. 59 BRIEF SUMMARY OF INDOCHINA ORGANIZATIONAL LESSONS....................................................................... 63

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French ground force organization and counterrevolutionary warfare

CHAPTER 3. ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT DURING THE WAR IN ALGERIA 65 BRIEF HISTORY OF THE WAR IN ALGERIA ...................................................................................................... 68 ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS IN EUROPE AND SUEZ ............................................................................ 70 TERRITORIAL ORGANIZATION........................................................................................................................ 72 INFANTRY ........................................................................................................................................................ 76 MOBILE FORCES .............................................................................................................................................. 79 FIRE SUPPORT.................................................................................................................................................. 81 INDIGENOUS PERSONNEL ................................................................................................................................ 82 CONCLUSIONS FROM THE ALGERIAN WAR ..................................................................................................... 84

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMENDATIONS ........................................................... 85 TERRITORIAL ORGANIZATION........................................................................................................................ 89 INFANTRY ........................................................................................................................................................ 91 MOBILE FORCES .............................................................................................................................................. 93 FIRE SUPPORT.................................................................................................................................................. 94 INDIGENOUS PERSONNEL ................................................................................................................................ 95 CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................................................... 96

APPENDIX ........................................................................................................ 97

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ACKNOWLEGMENTS

? Recueillir le maximum d'information afin de renseigner au mieux le Commandement sur les activit?s de l'ennemi dans leur Zone. Pour cela, monter des embuscades et ex?cuter des coups de main en territoire Vietminh. Observer les mouvements d'unit?s, surprendre des r?unions politiques, d?sorganiser et d?courager l'adversaire par des actions audacieuses permettant de r?aliser des r?cup?rations d'armes et de faire des prisonniers. Enfin, opposer la contre-gu?rilla a la gu?rilla, cr?er un climat d'ins?curit? permanente sur les arri?res de l'ennemi ?1.

Jean-Pierre Pissardy, Commandos Nord-Vietnam

1 Jean-Pierre Pissardy, Commandos Nord-Vietnam (Paris: Indo Editions, 1999), 23, mission statement for newly created commando units: "Obtain the maximum information on the enemy so as to inform the Command of enemy activities in their zone. Conduct ambushes and raids in Viet Minh territory. Observe the movements of units, surprise political meetings, disorganize and discourage the adversary by daring actions and capturing enemy weapons and prisoners. Lastly, oppose guerrillas with guerrillas, creating a climate of permanent insecurity in enemy areas."

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