IMET AFF - PBworks
IMET AFF
IMET AFF 1
Inherency 1AC 3
Democracy Advantage – 1AC 4
Democracy Advantage – 1AC 5
Democracy Advantage – 1AC 6
Democracy Advantage – 1AC 7
Democracy Advantage – 1AC 8
Democracy Advantage – 1AC 9
CMR Advantage – 1AC 10
CMR Advantage – 1AC 11
CMR Advantage – 1AC 12
CMR Advantage – 1AC 13
CMR Advantage – 1AC 14
CMR Advantage – 1AC 15
CMR Advantage – 1AC 17
CMR Advantage – 1AC 18
CMR Advantage – 1AC 19
1AC Solvency 1/2 20
1AC Solvency 2/2 21
***Inherency*** 22
IMET Cuts Now 1/2 22
Top Officials are Soviet Trained 1/3 24
Top Officials are Soviet Trained 2/3 25
Top Officials are Soviet Trained 3/3 26
Top Officials Block Transition 1/2 27
Top Officials Block Transition 2/2 28
***CMR Advantage*** 29
CMR Low Now 29
CMR Low Now 31
CMR Low Now 32
CMR Low Now 33
CMR Low Now 34
CMR Spills Over 35
CMR Spills Over 36
CMR Spills Over 37
A2: CMR Fails – No Public Support 38
Solvency – IMET Solves CMR 39
Solvency – IMET Solves CMR 40
Solvency – IMET Solves CMR 41
Solvency – IMET Solves CMR 42
Pakistan – CMR Low Now 43
Pakistan – A2: CMR in Pakistan cyclical 44
Pakistan – A2: IMET training spillover won’t help Pakistani CMR 45
Impact – Egyptian Stability 46
Impact – Egyptian Stability 47
Impact – Democratic Transition 1/3 48
Impact – Democratic Transition 2/3 49
Impact – Democratic Transition 3/3 50
Impact – Democratic Transition EXT 51
Impact – Democratic Transition EXT 52
Impact – Democratic Transition EXT 53
Impact – Middle East Stability 1/2 54
Impact – Middle East Stability 2/2 55
Impact – Middle East Stability EXT 56
Impact – Middle East Stability EXT 57
Impact – Middle East Stability EXT 58
Impact – Terrorism EXT 64
***Elections Advantage*** 67
Uq. – Military Screws up Elections Now 67
Uq. – Military Screws up Elections Now 68
Uq. – Military Screws up Elections Now 69
Uq. – Egyptian Democracy on the Brink 1/2 70
Uq. – Egyptian Democracy on the Brink 1/2 71
Uq. – Egyptian Democracy on the Brink 1/2 72
Uq. – Egyptian Democracy on the Brink 2/2 73
Military K2 Transition 74
Solvency – Stabilizes Egypt 75
Solvency – Stabilizes Egypt 76
Solvency – Stabilizes Egypt 77
Solvency – Stabilizes Egypt 78
Solvency – Stabilizes Egypt 79
Solvency – A2: Dem Fails – Islamic Beliefs 80
Solvency – A2: Dem Fails – No Public Support 81
Impact – Regional Stability/Oil 82
Democracy Spills Over 83
Democracy Spills Over 84
Democracy Spills Over 85
Democracy Spills Over 86
AT: Saudi DA 87
Democracy Spills Over 88
Democracy Spills Over 89
Egypt Modeling/Spillover 90
Egypt Modeling/Spillover 91
Impact – Terrorism 1/2 92
Impact – Terrorism 2/2 93
Impact – Terrorism EXT 94
Impact – A2: Dem Bad – Israeli Conflict 95
Impact – A2: Dem Bad – Muslim Brotherhood Gets Elected 96
Egyptian Economy – Uq. 97
Dem Solves Egyptian Economy EXT 98
Dem Solves Egyptian Economy EXT 99
Dem Solves Egyptian Economy EXT 100
Dem Solves Egyptian Economy EXT 101
Egyptian Economy – Economy Impact EXT 102
Egyptian Economy – Food Wars Impact 1/2 103
Egyptian Economy – Food Wars Impact 2/2 104
Egyptian Economy – Regional Stability Impact 105
Egyptian Economy – Terrorism/Muslim Brotherhood Impact 1/2 106
Egyptian Economy – Terrorism/Muslim Brotherhood Impact 2/2 107
Egyptian Economy – Terrorism Impact EXT 108
***Solvency*** 109
Solvency – IMET Solves CMR 109
Solvency – Egyptian IMET Effective 110
Solvency – IMET Expansion Necessary EXT 111
Solvency – Cuts Bad 112
Solvency – A2: No Civilian Training 113
Solvency – A2: Squo Training Solves 114
Solvency – In-Country Training Key 115
Solvency – IMET Teaches Democratic Values 116
Solvency – IMET Teaches Democratic Values 117
Solvency – IMET Teaches Democratic Values 118
Solvency – IMET Teaches Democratic Values 119
Solvency – IMET Teaches Democratic Values 120
Solvency – IMET Teaches Democratic Values 121
Solvency – IMET Teaches Democratic Values 122
Solvency – IMET Teaches Democratic Values 123
CAFD MET Solvency 132
IMET Spills Over 1/2 133
IMET Spills Over 2/2 134
***Add-Ons*** 135
U.S.-Egypt Relations Add-On 1/2 135
U.S.-Egypt Relations Add-On 2/2 136
U.S.-Egypt Relations EXT 137
Readiness Add-On 1/2 138
Readiness Add-On 2/2 139
Middle East Stability Add-On 1/2 140
Middle East Stability Add-On 2/2 141
Naval Power Add-On 142
Terrorism Add-On 1/2 143
Terrorism Add-On 2/2 144
Terrorism Add-On EXT 145
***A2: Politics DA*** 146
A2: Politics – Popularity L/T 146
A2: Politics – Bipart L/T 147
A2: Politics – Republicans L/T 148
A2: Politics – Israel/Defense Lobbies L/T 149
A2: Politics – Defense Lobby L/T EXT 150
A2: Politics – Israel Lobby Supports the Plan EXT 151
A2: Politics – Israel Lobby k2 Agenda EXT 152
***A2: Iran DA*** 153
A2: Iran DA – No Internal Link 153
A2: Iran DA – Internal Link Turn- Brotherhood 154
A2: Iran DA – Internal Link Turn- Brotherhood 155
***A2: Saudi DA*** 156
AT: Saudi DA – Egyptian Stability Solves 156
AT: Saudi DA – No Prolif 157
AT: Saudi DA – No Prolif 158
*** A2: Spending DA*** 159
A2 Spending DA – Cuts Coming Now 159
A2 Spending DA – Link Turn 160
***A2: Israel DA*** 161
No Link – Israel Fine With Military Aid 161
***A2: Arab Spring DA*** 162
A2: EU CP – US Military Best for CMR 164
A2: EU CP – US Military Best for CMR 165
A2: EU Solvency—EU Ineffective CMR 166
A2: EU CP – Perm 167
A2: EU CP – Perm EXT 168
***A2: Conditions CPs*** 169
Political Conditionality – Fails 169
A2: Economic Reforms 170
***K Answers*** 171
Generic K Offense – Solves “Military Bad” Links 171
***T Answers*** 172
No Consensus on DA 172
A2: Only USAID = DA 173
AT: USAID Only 174
AT: USAID Only 175
AT: IMET ≠ DA 176
AT: IMET ≠ DA 177
AT: IMET ≠ DA 178
AT: IMET = Extra-T 179
IMET = DA – Good Governance Reform 180
IMET = DA – GJD 181
CMR = DA 182
Inherency 1AC
Egyptian IMET funds will be cut now
Cordesman 11 (Anthony, Chair in Strategy at CSIS. 6/1, “Panel 1 “Reform, Revolution, or Repression? Finding Positive Paths Forward for a Region in Transition” Transcript,” ) gw
ANTHONY CORDESMAN: I think within the resources we have available, this is an issue we really need to remember, because we already have put in an FY 2012 budget submission, which is going to cut those resources. And the guidance for 2013, which you may already have seen, is a great deal more draconian. In other words, you are cutting your resources in direct proportion to the increase in the need for them. But what I would say is, within the problems we face, there are areas where FMF could ease the economic situation in a few countries like Morocco. The IMET program is very inexpensive and has produced consistently good results in introducing foreign military officers to the kind of civil military structures that are going to be critical for success. But I frankly do not believe that there is more of a margin or need for arms sales. I don’t think we need larger use – (inaudible). What I do think is missing that has begun to be pioneered in Saudi Arabia and a few other areas is trying to provide that kind of advisory effort to deal with the internal security and counterterrorism forces. The problems is, if that is not a Department of Defense mission, the State Department has 50 years of failure in trying to come to grips with police training. Its example in Iraq and Afghanistan is all too clear. And the question is, is the Department of Defense at this point in time going to be able to deal with that? Because it is not so much the competence of people at State: It is the fact there aren’t any people at State. The entire mission is turned over the contractors. And to be honest, contracting in this area has a reputation roughly equivalent to a nine-month-old carp. The smell is, shall we say, totally memorable.
More IMET funding needed in Egypt
Mattis and Inhofe 11 (General James, Commander, US Central Command and Senator Inhofe, Hearing to Receive Testimony on US Special Operations Command and US central command review of the defense authorization request for fiscal year 2012 and the future years defense program,” Committee on Armed Services, March 1, 2011, ) KJS
Yes, I would say that is true. And when we talk to these individuals, they want to be career and all of that. I looked at the—when I saw the position that the Egyptian military is going to be in this new transition or whatever we are going into right now, I was somewhat pleased with it. And one reason is that I have been a staunch supporter up here, probably the most staunch supporter, of the IMET program and what it has meant. Well, with Egypt, it even goes further because we are talking about three decades now that they have done this. And so, my feeling was that one of the great benefits of the IMET program is that it develops a relationship between the military of other countries. And I have seen this throughout Africa and elsewhere. And that is why we have been wanting to expand it. So I felt pretty good about that. And I would like to—you know, I noticed that in 2010, our Egypt IMET program was at about $2 million and dropped down to about $1.5 million in 2011. I am trying to get the figure now as to what is requested for 2012. But I would like just to get you on the record on your feelings about that program—and both of you, actually—the IMET program and how much that has benefited us, particularly with the situation right now as it is in Egypt. General MATTIS. Senator, I think the IMET program is a strategic asset to us, where we bring those officers to our country. They go through training and education here. We then go on joint exchanges with them back in their country, exercises and all, and we see it pay off there. But there is a longer-term payoff, and that payoff is when I walk into a room as a brigadier general back in 2001, and the first discussion I have with a half dozen officers is them telling me the best year of their life was in Maxwell Air Force Base or in Leavenworth—Fort Leavenworth—and we immediately start from a position of common understanding. I think this is a strategic asset to us that we should certainly maintain full support for. Senator INHOFE. All right. I appreciate that. Do you echo those sentiments, Admiral Olson?
Democracy Advantage – 1AC
Egypt’s military can’t and won’t conduct successful elections now
Christian Science Monitor 7/21 (2010, Kristen Chick Correspondent, “Egypt's military rulers ban foreign election observers;
Egypt's ruling military council said foreigners won't be allowed to monitor Egyptian elections, scheduled for November. That has some local activists worried about the credibility of the vote.” Lexis) MV
Egyptian rights activists are raising strong concerns after the country's military rulers banned international observers for the first elections of the post-Mubarak era. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, the military junta that took over after President Hosni Mubarak was pushed out, said Wednesday that elections will be delayed to November, two months later than originally expected. International monitors will not be permitted on the grounds of national sovereignty, said Maj. Gen. Mamdouh Shahin, the military council's legislative adviser "This is a very terrible development," says Bahey El Din Hassan, director of the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies. "It was usual to hear this from the Mubarak regime because the elections were always fraudulent. But for the military to take the same position, citing the same excuse the Mubarak regime used, "raises serious questions about the credibility of the coming election," he says A fair vote is vital to establishing both domestic and international trust in Egypt's new government, and international monitors would be a natural way to ensure one, says Mr. Hassan. Election fraud was rife throughout the 30 years of Mubarak's rule. Parliamentary elections held in November and December of last year were widely seen as some of the most fraudulent in Egypt's modern history. Mohamed Mahmoud, an Egyptian from the Nile Delta who is camped out in Cairo's central Tahrir protesting the military rulers' slow pace of reform, says he's suspicious about the ban on foreign observers "Why would they not allow the international observers unless they have something to hide?" he asks. "This should be our first free election in Egypt. But maybe they don't want it to be free." Shahin said that Egyptian civil society organizations will be free to monitor the vote. The Mubarak regime said the same, but then went to great lengths to restrict those organizations' efforts. Some activists wonder if they will experience a similar obstacles this fall, says Hassan. "This raises questions of what they are looking to cover up," he says. "Even Egyptians won't buy it because of their long experience with Mubarak."
IMET funding will provide training and preserve U.S. leverage – key to successful elections
Shenker 11 (David, Fellow at the Washington Institute, “Egypt’s Enduring Challenges – Policy Recommendations” ) CLS
Facing unprecedented deficits and a Republican Congress sworn to financial discipline, cutting U.S. foreign assistance programs is gaining appeal in Washington. Yet a drastic move in that direction vis-à-vis U.S. assistance to the Middle East could fuel cynicism in the region about U.S. commitment to democracy, weaken a presumably fragile new government, and cause an already wary Egyptian population to turn fundamentally against the United States. Of particular importance in this regard is continued U.S. funding for the Egyptian military, which at present stands at $1.3 billion per year. Clearly, the past thirty years of U.S. funding did not provide Washington with the kind of insight into the inner workings and sentiments of the army that would have been useful in February 2011. But according to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, the military’s “restraint [during the demonstrations] was a dividend from decades of U.S. investment in training and mentoring Egyptian military officers.” Given the uncertainties related to the transition— and the military’s role in it—continuing to invest in the military-to-military relationship is a must. The revolution is far from consolidated, and preserving influence at a time when few have any leverage to speak of is critical to ensuring a smooth landing for Egypt both politically and economically. Also, despite economic hardships at home, Washington should be prepared to offer immediate humanitarian and economic assistance for the people of Egypt that exceeds the $250 million appropriated last year.
Democracy Advantage – 1AC
Successful transition to democracy will spillover to other Middle Eastern countries
Kagan and Dunne 11 (Robert, senior fellow at Brookings, Michele, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, , “Why Egypt has to be the U.S. priority in the Middle East”) MV
With the horrific carnage in Libya, the flames of revolution burning in Yemen and Bahrain, and protests for political change in Jordan and Morocco, there's a danger that the United States and Europe may lose sight of what still has to be our highest priority in the region: helping the people of Egypt complete their transition to democracy and a new chance at prosperity. Why is Egypt so important? Because it is the heart of the Arab world. It was the birthplace of pan-Arabism under Gamal Nasser, the linchpin of Middle East peace under Anwar Sadat. With more than 80 million people - as many as Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Syria combined - it has a large and vigorous civil society, feisty, independent media, a broad array of political forces, and a well-respected judiciary. If Egypt can make the transition to democracy, it will lead the way to a new era for the Arab world. If Cairo falls back to dictatorship of one variety or another, it is unlikely the rest of the region will move on without it. The Arab Spring will live or die in Egypt.
Democracy key to peace in the Middle East
Kirkup 11 (James Kirkup, Democracy is route to peace in Middle East, says David Cameron, The Telegraph, Feb 21, 2011, )
Freedom and democracy are the best way to bring peace and prosperity to the Middle East, David Cameron will proclaim in a speech. With popular uprisings flaring in countries across the Middle East and North Africa, Mr Cameron will today insist that regional leaders must respond with “reform not repression.” On Monday, the Prime Minister became the first Western leader to visit Egypt since a popular uprising ousted Hosni Mubarak. He urged Egypt’s interim military rulers to ensure a “genuine transition” to civilian rule and declared: “Greater openness can lead to greater stability.” He also strongly condemned the Gaddafi regime’s violence against civilian protesters in Libya as “quite appalling”. Mr Cameron has asked his officials to investigate whether any British-made weapons have been used in the “vicious repression”. He also faced Labour criticism after it emerged he is being accompanied on his Middle East tour by executives from major British companies, including several defence manufacturers. Mr Cameron flew on to Kuwait, where he will deliver a speech making a “liberal conservative” call for widespread political reform in the region. Since democracy often goes hand-in-hand with open markets, more freedom in the Middle East could deliver commercial opportunities for Britain, the Prime Minister will argue on Tuesday. Discussing the thinking behind the speech, Mr Cameron insisted that more democracy in the Middle East is in Britain’s best interests. “We’ve got a very important trading relationship that we want to expand and we’ve got a very important security relationship, not least in terms of combating extremist terror, that we need to sharpen,” he said. “A process of political and economic reform doesn’t run counter to those other two objectives. It goes with those objectives.” He told reporters in Cairo: “I believe in a liberal conservative approach rather than a neo-conservative approach. “Democracy is a process not just an event. “We who want to see a more stable world, and stronger trading relationships, we should be arguing for the building blocks of democracy.” Simply holding elections, he said, was not a guarantee of freedom. That requires the full range of institutions, from an independent judiciary to a free press and healthy political parties.
Democracy Advantage – 1AC
The Middle East is on the brink of a nuclear war
Blake 11 (Heidi Blake, WikiLeaks: tension in the Middle East and Asia has 'direct potential' to lead to nuclear war, The Telegraph, Feb 2, 2011, )
Tension in the Middle East and Asia has given rise to an escalating atomic arms and missiles race which has “the direct potential to lead to nuclear war,” leaked diplomatic documents disclose. Rogue states are also increasing their efforts to secure chemical and biological weapons, and the means to deploy them, leaving billions in the world's most densely populated area at risk of a devastating strike, the documents show. States such as North Korea, Syria and Iran are developing long-range missiles capable of hitting targets outside the region, records of top-level security briefings obtained by WikiLeaks show. Long-running hostilities between India and Pakistan – which both have nuclear weapons capabilities – are at the root of fears of a nuclear conflict in the region. A classified Pentagon study estimated in 2002 that a nuclear war between the two countries could result in 12 million deaths. Secret records of a US security briefing at an international non-proliferation summit in 2008 stated that “a nuclear and missile arms race [in South Asia] has the direct potential to lead to nuclear war in the world's most densely populated area and a region of increasing global economic significance”. The same briefing gave warning that development of cruise and ballistic missiles in the Middle East and Asia could enable rogue states to fire weapons of mass destruction into neighbouring regions. The leaked documents also disclose alarming details of the chemical and biological weapons programmes being pursued by rogue states such as Syria and North Korea. Syria - which backs the Lebanese terrorist group Hezbollah – is believed to be developing chemical weapons using the lethal nerve agents sarin and VX, which shut down the nervous system in under a minute if inhaled or absorbed through the skin.
Middle East war goes Global
London 10 (Herbert I. London, President of the Hudson Institute, a New York University based political think tank, and professor of Humanities at New York University, Hudson New York, 6/28/10, )
The coming storm in the Middle East is gaining momentum; like conditions prior to World War I, all it takes for explosive action to commence is a trigger. Turkey's provocative flotilla, often described in Orwellian terms as a humanitarian mission, has set in motion a gust of diplomatic activity: if the Iranians send escort vessels for the next round of Turkish ships, which they have apparently decided not to do in favor of land operations, it could have presented a casus belli. [cause for war] Syria, too, has been playing a dangerous game, with both missile deployment and rearming Hezbollah. According to most public
accounts, Hezbollah is sitting on 40,000 long-, medium- and short-range missiles, and Syrian territory has been serving as a conduit for military materiel from Iran since the end of the 2006 Lebanon War. Should Syria move its own scuds to Lebanon or deploy its troops as reinforcement for Hezbollah, a wider regional war with Israel could not be contained. In the backdrop is an Iran, with sufficient fissionable material to produce a couple of nuclear weapons. It will take some time to weaponize the missiles, but the road to that goal is synchronized in green lights since neither diplomacy nor diluted sanctions can convince Iran to change course. From Qatar to Afghanistan all political eyes are on Iran, poised to be "the hegemon" in the Middle East; it is increasingly considered the "strong horse" as American forces incrementally retreat from the region. Even Iraq, ironically, may depend on Iranian ties in order to maintain internal stability. For Sunni nations like Egypt and Saudi Arabia, regional strategic vision is a combination of deal-making to offset the Iranian Shia advantage, and attempting to buy or develop nuclear weapons as a counterweight to Iranian ambition. However, both of these governments are in a precarious state; should either fall, all bets are off in the Middle East neighborhood. It has long been said that the Sunni "tent" must stand on two legs: if one, falls, the tent collapses.
Democracy Advantage – 1AC
Continued instability will collapse Egyptian economy
Egyptian News, 11 (, “Continued Strikes Threaten Egypt,” July 12, 2011, ) KJS
Continued strikes in Cairo's Tahrir Square and other governorates across Egypt have prompted many Arab and foreign investors to suspend of delay their investments in the Egyptian market. Foreign trade dropped to three percent of the market on Sunday, while it used to be 30 to 40 percent. The reluctance of Arabs and other foreigners to invest in Egypt has reflected on Egypt s stock market. Speculative and small shares prices have risen, while the prices of leading shares, related to businessmen facing trial, have decreased. The shares that suffered most in Sunday s drop were Hermis, Talaat Mustafa, Orascom Telecom, Commercial Industrial Bank, the Egyptian Company for Resorts, and Pioneers. Stock marked expert Wael al-Nahas warned that there are attempts to destroy Egypt s economy through spreading the country s unstable atmosphere, which leads to increased losses during this current critical stage. Al-Nahas said the current atmosphere affected Egyptian investors, so it is normal that foreign investors fear continued investment in Egyptian markets or beginning new investments. If the trend continues, it could threaten not only the stock market but Egypt s entire economy. Egypt s political and security instability will destroy its economy, al-Nahas added. Companies inability to discharge their products will lead to an inability to pay loans from banks, which will threaten the banking sector and consequently many of Egypt s other economic sectors.
Democracy Advantage – 1AC
Egypt’s economy is key to global economic recovery
Schuman 11 (Michael, TIME Magazine, 2/2, “Does the turmoil in Egypt threaten the global recovery?” )gw
At first glance, the upheaval on the Nile might seem far removed from the world of Wall Street and Main Street. Egypt is not a major participant in global manufacturing networks, nor is Cairo a significant financial hub. But Egypt's political crisis could have implications for the global economy nevertheless. That's because the economic and political role Egypt plays in the Middle East gives it economic power beyond the easy-to-measure statistics. The turmoil in Egypt is putting a glaring spotlight on the fragility of political stability in the entire Arab world. That, in turn, is giving already-nervous investors yet another reason to worry about the questionable strength of the global recovery. Here's how Mohamed A. El-Erian, chief executive officer of Pimco, explained it recently: How Egypt evolves in the next few days and weeks matters a great deal -- and not just for Egyptians but also for the world economy. It matters in ways that are unusual and, for many, unfamiliar. Unlike China, Egypt is not a major source of global demand nor is it a major exporter. Unlike commodity-rich countries, Egypt does not directly influence world prices. But Egypt is a critical enabler and, as such, indirectly touches many other nations. With its control over the Suez Canal, Egypt is a major gatekeeper of global trade. Even more important, its role and standing in the Middle East makes it a critical participant in promoting geo-political stability in an area prone to volatility. Where the country goes from here will have an impact on the wellbeing of the global economy and stability of the world's financial markets. Here's why: The main way Egypt can impact the global economy is through oil. Though Egypt does produce oil, it is not a major exporter, and the country isn't a member of OPEC. But the Suez Canal, which runs through Egypt, is a crucial waterway for transporting oil from the oil-rich Persian Gulf to Europe and elsewhere, and any disruption in the operation of the canal due to Egypt's political crisis could quickly produce bottlenecks in oil markets that might cause prices to spike. And as the protests in Egypt spread to Jordan, Yemen and other parts of the Middle East, they raise the alarm that super oil exporters like Saudi Arabia could eventually find themselves facing similar unrest, which could have major implications for oil production and prices. Just those fears alone pushed oil prices upward as Egypt unraveled, with Brent even reaching $100 a barrel. Further increases in oil prices could become a serious problem for the global economy. Higher oil prices fuel inflationary pressures in emerging markets like China and India that are already fighting rapidly rising prices, forcing them to take measures to slow down their economies. They can also sap the spending power of consumers and companies in the developed world, just when such demand is badly needed to sustain the recovery from the Great Recession. Even before the Egypt crisis, the International Energy Agency warned that oil prices were reaching a “dangerous zone” for the global economy. Economist Nouriel “Dr. Doom” Roubini said in The Financial Times that the result of Egypt's political crisis could end up being a double-dip recession for oil-importing countries in the developed world: The upheaval in Tunisia and now Egypt has important economic and financial implications. About two-thirds of the world's proven oil reserves and almost half of its gas reserves are in the Middle East; geopolitical risk in the region is thus a source of spikes in oil prices that have global consequences. Three out of the past five global recessions have followed a Middle East geopolitical shock that led to a spike in oil prices…This rise – and the related increase in other commodity prices, especially food – pushes up inflation in already overheating emerging market economies where oil and food prices represent up to two-thirds of the consumption basket; it is also a negative terms of trade and disposable income shock for advanced economies that are barely out of the recent recession and experiencing an anemic recovery…If oil prices were to rise much further, these economies would slow down sharply and some might even experience a double-dip recession. The political upheaval in Egypt is also having an amplified impact on world economic sentiment simply because investors are already in a jittery mood. Sure, the global economy is in better shape than many had expected, with some strong data coming out of important economies like the U.S. and Germany. The International Monetary Fund upgraded its forecasts for global growth recently. But a long list of threats to the recovery remain, from the European debt crisis to the weak U.S. housing market to persistent unemployment. The last thing the world needs is a new, unforeseen shock from an unexpected source. Egypt could prove to be just such an unwelcome surprise
Democracy Advantage – 1AC
Economic recovery key to prevent nuclear World War III
O'Donnell 9 (Sean, writer and Marine Corps Reserve squad leader, Feb 26, 3108-Baltimore-Republican- Examiner~y2009m2d26-Will-this- recession-lead-to-World-War- III)
Could the current economic crisis affecting this country and the world lead to another world war? The answer may be found by looking back in history. One of the causes of World War I was the economic rivalry that existed between the nations of Europe. In the 19th century France and Great Britain became wealthy through colonialism and the control of foreign resources. This forced other up-and-coming nations (such as Germany) to be more competitive in world trade which led to rivalries and ultimately, to war. After the Great Depression ruined the economies of Europe in the 1930s, fascist movements arose to seek economic and social control. From there fanatics like Hitler and Mussolini took over Germany and Italy and led them both into World War II. With most of North America and Western Europe currently experiencing a recession, will competition for resources and economic rivalries with the Middle East, Asia, or South American cause another world war? Add in nuclear weapons and Islamic fundamentalism and things look even worse. Hopefully the economy gets better before it gets worse and the terrifying possibility of World War III is averted. However sometimes history repeats itself.
CMR Advantage – 1AC
Egyptian CMR is low now – the military is disconnected from society
Krieg 11 (Andreas, Egyptian Civil-Military Relations and Egypt’s Potential Transition to Democracy, , Andreas Krieg, PhD King’s College London, War Studies Department / Department of Defence Studies) JSM
Egypt constitutes are very distinctive case of civil-military relations; a reality with considerable repercussions to the outcome of the anti-Mubarak protests in early 2011. Egypt presents a distinct civil-military relationship due to the fact that for almost six decades the Egyptian military apparatus has functioned as the backbone of any Egyptian regime. The oftentimes clear distinction between military and civil affairs has been absent in a country where the military has occupied political offices as well as maintained internal and external security. While the Egyptian army has governed the country in symbiosis with political leaders from 1952 until the 1970s, Mubarak’s attempt to position a counterweight to military dominance has created a reality where the military though remaining a key actor in the affairs of the Egyptian state, had to give way to a more powerful state authority vested in the president. In spite of varying direct involvement in state affairs, the Egyptian military has nonetheless developed into a powerful economic actor dominating production in several rather civilian sectors. In addition, due to the fact that the Egyptian military has served as a ‘kingmaker’ to various regimes since 1952, most civilian leaders have remunerated the military with privileges, key political positions and economic power. Thus, the military in Egypt has taken over not only the traditional military function to provide security for the Egyptian state, but also has been highly involved into the civil sphere of the state apparatus. The Egyptian military has been a rather isolated institution with little or no connection to society. Due to the fact that the military leadership has only been accountable to the Egyptian state and the state in turn has not been held accountable by society, there has never been a direct link of popular scrutiny over the military affairs in Egypt. The state-soldier contract obliges the Egyptian military to serve the state in loyalty and guarantee its security. As a mere agent of the civilian leadership, the Egyptian military had never build a strong connection to society and has not build a strong affiliation to their needs and desires. Despite some 80,000 conscripts a year from mostly rural not Western-oriented parts of society, the Egyptian military apparatus has been primarily an agent of the state with considerable influence and power in civil state affairs.
Expanding IMET assistance is key – exposes top Egyptian officers to the importance of civilian relations
Dunne 6 (Michele, editor of the Carnegie Endowment’s Arab Reform Bulletin and professor at Georgetown, “Evaluating Egyptian Reform,” part of the Carnegie Papers series, number 66, January 2006.) KJS
Although the United States has taken steps to use its economic assistance more effectively to promote democratization, the military assistance relationship remains an untried avenue. The EgyptU.S. military partnership is of significant strategic value to both countries, and the main purpose of the $1.3 billion in annual U.S. military assistance is to modernize the Egyptian military’s equipment, doctrine, and training to facilitate interoperability of U.S. and Egyptian forces in the Middle East. While the strategic relationship does not undermine prospects for democratization in any direct way, it is also possible to leverage the close military relationship more effectively to help build support in the Egyptian military and civilian bureaucracy for political reform. Programs such as International Military Education and Training, currently funded at only $1.2 million annually, could be expanded to help expose senior and mid-level military officers to critical concepts such as civilian control of the military in democratic systems.
CMR Advantage – 1AC
Must act now - Transition periods are key to promoting CMR
Frazer 95 (Jendayi, Harvard school of public policy professor, “Conceptualizing Civil-Military Relations During Democratic Transition, ) CLS
Major institutional change is facilitated during transitional periods. Transitions are marked by open political expec- tations and fluid alliances; the rules of the game are in flux, institu- tional expectations relaxed, and change acceptable.6 Such periods provide a unique window of opportunity for restructuring army- state relations. However, it is not always evident at what stage in the transition-before, during or after-efforts should be made to reor- ganize security matters. Better clarifying this question requires ex- plicitly addressing the analytical problem of how we define or de- limit transitional moments. The clearest indicators of democratic transition are the initiation of constitutional negotiations and a change of government under new regime rules. Determining the be- ginning and ending points of transition is more difficult. For example, one might place the beginning of South Africa's transition in the mid- 1980s with P.W. Botha's failed constitutional reforms that led to wide- spread and sustained opposition under the umbrella of the United De- mocratic Front (UDF). Alternately, the initiation of transition can be located in the early 1990s when F.W. de Klerk more decisively moved toward political reform.7 Moreover, many regarded the 1994 major- ity rule elections as the completion of South Africa's transition; yet, the constitutional reform process will continue over the next five years under the Transitional Government of National Unity. Thus, an important theoretical problem is identifying those benchmark expe- riences, and appropriate criteria, that distinguish substantive transi- tion from simple conflict. In hindsight, the significant events marking real change may ap- pear self-evident but during the process they are seldom so clear. Few actors can accurately decipher the future significance of current events. Analysts must accordingly guard against theories that im- pose transparency and order where there was none at the time for the actors involved. The transition process shapes choices and future outcomes. A seemingly insignificant event during founding or tran- sitional moments can profoundly change the political path taken. Thus, building theory that models complex political transitions re- quires a conceptualization that explicitly brings history and process into the analysis of political outcomes. Path-dependent perspectives recognize that critical events make a difference to future outcomes. Conceptions of path-dependent processes can range from "forks in history" caused by episodic events like war, to "policy martingales" explained by March and Olsen (1984) as the chance fluctuations of history that slightly shift the focus of political pressure or change the baseline of the next step of the transition process. In either case, the first steps taken are often more important than subsequent ones or, put differently, past choices limit future available options. The analytical issue of how we define transitional moments is closely related to the pragmatic policy problem of when it is best to reorganize security affairs. If early decisions have an inordinate ef- fect, then the wise leader will not wait to restructure security rela- tions until after the transition. In the post-transition scenario, the new regime risks successful coups having inherited non-reformed and possibly disloyal security forces from the ancient regime. Negotiations to reorganize military affairs are best during transition when previous government officials who are committed to change have not been entirely delegitimized and still have some influence and leverage over the state security apparatus. This is especially impor- tant when the security forces are prone to resist a new political order that holds them responsible for past human rights abuses. Civil-mili- tary relations are primary on the negotiating agenda when political change is initiated by an episodic event, especially the end of civil or interstate war. When there is a clear victor, reorganizing the armed forces is likely to precede transformation of other state institutions. The timing of reform can be theoretically modeled in a manner consis- tent with an institutionalist conception of temporal order. Specifically, the time of arrival of a problem is critical for how it is solved, or even if it will be solved. The early restructuring of available security forces is critical to the stabilization of post-transition civil-military relations and must be handled delicately by knowledgeable policymakers.
CMR Advantage – 1AC
Only US can help shape the Egyptian military
Kitfield 11 (James, national security and foreign affairs correspondent for National Journal magazine, an independent and non-partisan newsweekly on politics and government published by Atlantic Media Company, “Ghosts of the ‘Arab Spring,”’National Journal Magazine, February 12, 2011, found on Academic Search Premier) MNC
"Arab regimes tend to politicize their militaries, destroying their professional ethos and making it hard for them to develop a corporate identity distinct from that of the ruler," Pollack said. In Egypt's case, he pointed out, the military has become deeply imbedded in the economy, running numerous business enterprises that give the officer corps a huge stake in the status quo and the regime's survival. "So we have to help get these militaries out of the corruption business, and develop a different military culture that shifts loyalty from the ruler to the political system and constitution. The good news is the U.S. military has an unusually close relationship with both the Egyptian and Iraqi armies, and it teaches them those values." Indeed, the heavy reliance of the Egyptian military on roughly $1.3 billion in U.S. aid annually, and its close ties to the U.S. military, constitute Washington's most powerful trump card in the high-stakes game in Egypt.
CMR Advantage – 1AC
Egypt civil military relations are modeled by the entire region and vital to maintain Spring
Takeyh 3/29 (, The Key Is Not in Libya, By RAY TAKEYH, March 29, 2011) JSM
A league of autocrats and despots is part of the problem and not the solution to the region’s difficulties. Though the Arab League provides a political umbrella that Western leaders seem to think they need, it is important not to scale back the calls for reform. The cause of anti-Libya alliance should not diminish the more significant challenge of pressing the Arab states toward adjustment of their national compacts. The key to sustaining the momentum of the Arab Spring is still in Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Egypt is the epicenter of the Arab world, and developments in Cairo have historically resonated throughout the region. The task is to continuously press the Egyptian military on its existing path of gradually yielding authority to a civilian government. The fact that the Egyptian army maybe called upon to police Libya’s borders and skies should not dissuade the United States from pressuring it to abide by its declared commitments. Throughout the post-colonial period, Egypt has established the political template that has been widely emulated throughout the region. From pan-Arabism to Islamism, Egypt’s model has always defined Arab politics. The sight of the military peacefully yielding to a democratically elected civilian government will have an enduring impact on the region’s struggling reformers. Should Egypt establish a governing system that is representative and accountable, it can lead the Arab world in a progressive direction.
Building CMR in the Middle East is key to dismantling terrorist networks
Bensahel and Byman 4 (Nora and Daniel, Fellow at RAND, and US Air Force Consultants, “The Future Security Environment in the Middle East Conflict, Stability, and Political Change,” ) CLS
The analysis also has implications for the success of the U.S. war on terrorism. Many of the United States’ authoritarian allies have mutual interests in neutralizing religiously inspired opposition movements active in the region, because radical groups that oppose the United States also often oppose rule by the region’s secular, repressive regimes. In addition, the proliferation of security and intelligence agencies in these regimes means that they have an indigenous capability to pursue radical movements. Strong central authorities, with efficient monitoring and repressive apparatuses, benefit the United States in prosecuting the war on terrorism. Yet the political power of the armed forces and security services also poses some risks. If radical elements succeed in winning the sympathy of key factions of the armed forces, these countries’ support for U.S. policy could be jeopardized. Political leaders will have to appease their officers or potentially risk their positions in office. Regional tensions such as those stemming from the PalestinianIsraeli conflict and U.S. administration of Iraq are also potentially destabilizing to civil-military relations. Opposition within local populations in the Middle East to the policies of their government, the United States, or other states may force these regimes to rely more heavily on repressive policies. On a regular basis, security services police demonstrators and activists and root out opposition. But in the event security services prove incapable of managing a mass outpouring of opposition, military authorities could be called upon. This, in turn, could indirectly destabilize the delicate balance of power between civil and military authorities, and in the worst case, prompt the military to refuse to act in defense of these regimes. Instability in governing regimes and a breakdown in central authority would pose even graver risks to the United States in its effort to apprehend and dismantle terrorist networks, promote stability in Iraq, and advance peace between Palestinians and Israelis.
CMR Advantage – 1AC
Global terrorism on the rise
Coker 5/3/11 (Margaret, Middle East Correspondent for the Wall Street Journal, “As Al Qaeda Adapts Its Tactics, Threat From Splinter Group Persists, ), LC
Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden was killed 40 miles outside Pakistan's capital - a telling location that could impact regional security in the days ahead. Bin Laden spent the last decade on the run following the al Qaeda-mounted terrorist attacks in the U.S. on Sept. 11, 2001. But his fugitive status didn't render the network impotent. Instead, it forced an evolution: The original group splintered, popping up in new places with new leaders who, in addition to attempting high-profile attacks, encouraged their radicalized followers to strike on their own if the opportunity presented itself. Strong al Qaeda offshoots exist not just in hot spots such as Yemen, Somalia and Indonesia, but increasingly in more far-flung locations, such as Sweden and Norway. The leaders of these groups consider bin Laden a religious and philosophical guide, but have worked independently from his command for years. The expansion of al Qaeda affiliates comes against a backdrop of political upheaval in the Middle East that is disrupting counterterrorism cooperation by onetime key U.S. allies such as Egypt and Yemen and giving terrorists potentially more operational breathing space."We've struck a substantial blow at part of the [radical Islamic] movement, but this is far, far from over," said James Woolsey, a former director of the Central Intelligence Agency. However, in recent years, other high-profile jihadis—from Abu Musab al Zarqawi in Iraq to Anwar al-Awlaki in Yemen—threatened to eclipse bin Laden as the global jihadist movement's most powerful spokesman. His death, especially since it came in close-quarters combat with U.S. troops, could change that."His martyrdom has the potential to reinvigorate al Qaeda's brand among those already radicalized to the cause," said Leah Farrall, an Australian counterterrorism expert. Bin Laden's command largely moved out of Afghanistan in 2001, after the fall of the Taliban, and many core players were caught or killed after the U.S.-led invasion. As the old guard was decimated, bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, his second in command, were isolated. But their absence only served to diffuse operations over a wider collection of groups and individuals that carried on al Qaeda's mission around the Middle East, Africa, Southeast Asia and Europe. The most active offshoot group is al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, or AQAP, led by Nasir al Wahishi, bin Laden's former secretary in Afghanistan who escaped to Iran, was arrested, and subsequently extradited to Yemen in 2003. He escaped from prison in 2006 and spearheaded the merger of the Saudi and Yemeni branches of al Qaeda in 2009. More than any other group, AQAP serves as connective tissue between al Qaeda branches in other regions. Mr. Wahishi was buttressed in that regard by Anwar al-Awlaki, a U.S.-born radical cleric who gained a following via his Internet sermons and who has become a key recruiter. The new al Qaeda leaders in Yemen have surpassed their godfather by adapting their message for Western audiences. AQAP is adept at using technology: It publishes an online magazine called "Inspire"—part fanzine, part recruiting tool, offering advice and instruction for would-be bombers. The subliminal message from AQAP is that new recruits don't need to seek military training in Pakistan or Yemen to score a hit against the "far enemy," the phrase al Qaeda uses for the U.S. and other Western countries. Radicalized converts don't seek permission from headquarters before acting. AQAP's profile has risen in lockstep with that of Mr. Awlaki, who gained a wide following on the Internet thanks to his flawless English and heated sermons. He inspired Maj. Nidal Hasan, who went on a shooting spree at Fort Hood in Texas in 2009, and prepared Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the underwear bomber who attempted to blow up a U.S.-bound passenger plane on Christmas Day that year. Mr. Awlaki has been singled out by U.S. counterterrorism officials as one of al Qaeda's most dangerous leaders. AQAP's ability to attempt fresh attacks against the U.S. has increasingly worried U.S. officials because of the instability in Yemen. While current President Ali Abdullah Saleh has been a less-than-perfect ally in the fight against AQAP, some U.S. officials worry about the future of cooperation there if he steps down. Some terror experts think AQAP may inherit al Qaeda central's mantle as the focal point of resistance to the U.S. In Africa, al Qaeda and its affiliates have found refuge in lawless pockets of the continent, from Somalia in the east to Mali in the west. The cells appear to have little connection, but have provided ominous glimpses of what they may be capable of—as in the failed airline attack involving the Nigerian, Mr. Abdulmutallab, and the three suicide bombings in July 2010 at restaurants in the Ugandan capital, Kampala, as patrons watched the World Cup soccer tournament. The groups include Algeria-based al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, or AQIM, which has been linked to several killings and kidnappings of Westerners in recent years. In Southeast Asia, veterans of al Qaeda's Afghanistan operation helped establish franchises in places like Indonesia. As time passed, these disparate groups became increasingly autonomous, often working with minimal funding or sourcing funds from sympathizers independently from the main al Qaeda leadership. In some ways this increased their effectiveness, security analysts say. And there are numerous Islamic terror outfits not allied with al Qaeda that could gain in prominence following bin Laden's death, including the Pakistani Taliban, behind the May 2010 plot to explode a car bomb in New York's Times Square. Other groups include Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba, which carried out the deadly 2008 assault in Mumbai, India. Daniel Benjamin, the State Department's coordinator for counterterrorism, last week highlighted the group's "continued menace."
CMR Advantage – 1AC
Terrorism causes extinction – draws in Russia and China
Ayson 10 (Robert, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington, “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7, July, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via InformaWorld)
A terrorist nuclear attack, and even the use of nuclear weapons in response by the country attacked in the first place, would not necessarily represent the worst of the nuclear worlds imaginable. Indeed, there are reasons to wonder whether nuclear terrorism should ever be regarded as belonging in the category of truly existential threats. A contrast can be drawn here with the global catastrophe that would come from a massive nuclear exchange between two or more of the sovereign states that possess these weapons in significant numbers. Even the worst terrorism that the twenty-first century might bring would fade into insignificance alongside considerations of what a general nuclear war would have wrought in the Cold War period. And it must be admitted that as long as the major nuclear weapons states have hundreds and even thousands of nuclear weapons at their disposal, there is always the possibility of a truly awful nuclear exchange taking place precipitated entirely by state possessors themselves. But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important … some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington’s relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washington’s early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country’s armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response. As part of its initial response to the act of nuclear terrorism (as discussed earlier) Washington might decide to order a significant conventional (or nuclear) retaliatory or disarming attack against the leadership of the terrorist group and/or states seen to support that group. Depending on the identity and especially the location of these targets, Russia and/or China might interpret such action as being far too close for their comfort, and potentially as an infringement on their spheres of influence and even on their sovereignty. One far-fetched but perhaps not impossible scenario might stem from a judgment in Washington that some of the main aiders and abetters of the terrorist action resided somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what Allison claims is the “Chechen insurgents’ … long-standing interest in all things nuclear.”42 American pressure on that part of the world would almost certainly raise alarms in Moscow that might require a degree of advanced consultation from Washington that the latter found itself unable or unwilling to provide. There is also the question of how other nuclear-armed states respond to the act of nuclear terrorism on another member of that special club. It could reasonably be expected that following a nuclear terrorist attack on the United States, both Russia and China would extend immediate sympathy and support to Washington and would work alongside the United States in the Security Council. But there is just a chance, albeit a slim one, where the support of Russia and/or China is less automatic in some cases than in others. For example, what would happen if the United States wished to discuss its right to retaliate against groups based in their territory? If, for some reason, Washington found the responses of Russia and China deeply underwhelming, (neither “for us or against us”) might it also suspect that they secretly were in cahoots with the group, increasing (again perhaps ever so slightly) the chances of a major exchange. If the terrorist group had some connections to groups in Russia and China, or existed in areas of the world over which Russia and China held sway, and if Washington felt that Moscow or Beijing were placing a curiously modest level of pressure on them, what conclusions might it then draw about their culpability? If Washington decided to use, or decided to threaten the use of, nuclear weapons, the responses of Russia and China would be crucial to the chances of avoiding a more serious nuclear exchange. They might surmise, for example, that while the act of nuclear terrorism was especially heinous and demanded a strong response, the response simply had to remain below the nuclear threshold. It would be one thing for a non-state actor to have broken the nuclear use taboo, but an entirely different thing for a state actor, and indeed the leading state in the international system, to do so. If Russia and China felt sufficiently strongly about that prospect, there is then the question of what options would lie open to them to dissuade the United States from such action: and as has been seen over the last several decades, the central dissuader of the use of nuclear weapons by states has been the threat of nuclear retaliation. If some readers find this simply too fanciful, and perhaps even offensive to contemplate, it may be informative to reverse the tables. Russia, which possesses an arsenal of thousands of nuclear warheads and that has been one of the two most important trustees of the non-use taboo, is subjected to an attack of nuclear terrorism. In response, Moscow places its nuclear forces very visibly on a higher state of alert and declares that it is considering the use of nuclear retaliation against the group and any of its state supporters. How would Washington view such a possibility? Would it really be keen to support Russia’s use of nuclear weapons, including outside Russia’s traditional sphere of influence? And if not, which seems quite plausible, what options would Washington have to communicate that displeasure? If China had been the victim of the nuclear terrorism and seemed likely to retaliate in kind, would the United States and Russia be happy to sit back and let this occur? In the charged atmosphere immediately after a nuclear terrorist attack, how would the attacked country respond to pressure from other major nuclear powers not to respond in kind? The phrase “how dare they tell us what to do” immediately springs to mind. Some might even go so far as to interpret this concern as a tacit form of sympathy or support for the terrorists. This might not help the chances of nuclear restraint.
CMR Advantage – 1AC
Pakistan’s CMR is low now
Bajoria 11 (Jayshree, 2/8, MA international relations, Senior Staff Writer for the Council on Foreign Relations “Will Pakistan Follow Egypt's Example?” ) JJN
As in Egypt, where the army remains a dominant institution (FT), Pakistan's army is also the country's most powerful institution, as this Crisis Guide explains. This limits civilian capacity to bring change in Pakistan, say some analysts. In fact, the specter of a military takeover looms large in Pakistan where the army has ruled for half of its history. Ian Bremmer and David Gordon of the Eurasia Group argue in Foreign Policy that "further social and ethnic turmoil in the heart of the country might push the military to argue that urban unrest and terrorism are undermining national unity -- and that political change has become an urgent necessity." However, CFR's Senior Fellow for Pakistan, Daniel Markey, cautions that the "Egypt example reaffirms the fallacy that repressive governments are more capable of bringing stability to countries over the long term, including in Pakistan."
Pakistan and Egypt collaborate on military posture
Xinhua 7 (News service, 2/7, Egypt, “Pakistan seek to boost military production cooperation,” ) JJN
Pakistani Minister of Defense Production Habibullah Khan Warraich arrived in Cairo on Tuesday for a visit aimed at boosting cooperation in military production, Egypt's official MENA news agency reported. Warraich is scheduled to meet with Egyptian Minister of State for Military Production Sayyed Meshal to discuss means to boost cooperation and exchange technological expertise in this regard, the report said. During his visit, Warraich and his accompanying delegation will inspect some projects established by the Egyptian Ministry of Military Production, MENA said. Warraich's visit followed Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf's recent Mideast tour, which took him to Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria and the United Arab Emirates besides Egypt. Talks between Musharraf and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Egypt's Red Sea resort of Sharm el-Sheikh on Jan. 22 focused on Mideast issues, especially the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
CMR Advantage – 1AC
Increasing Pakistan CMR is key to prevent military takeover and war with India
Weitz 08 (Richard, Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute, Pakistan: Analyzing Civil-Military Relations in Islamabad, ) CLS
Even though Pakistan has restored a civilian government, the country's military establishment will retain considerable influence, experts agreed during a recent panel discussion in Washington. Complicating efforts to define their new relationship, Pakistan's civil and military leaders must also manage pressure from Washington to contain Islamic radicalism. Shuja Nawaz, author of Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within, was one of the featured speakers at the October 22 discussion, which was co-hosted by the Asia Society and the Atlantic Council. Nawaz said Pakistan's civil and military leaders have a long history of contentious relations, and, as a result, the country is caught in a cycle of "conflict between the coercive power of the army and the constitutional and legal authority of the state." Decades of formal and de facto military rule have instituted a problematic political pattern. "Whenever the civilian government has taken over from an autocratic government," Nawaz maintained, "it has found it extremely difficult to get rid of the autocratic powers that the previous government had." "The military is watching and waiting and, when it feels that things have gotten out of hand," it decides that "it is time for us to save the country" and seizes power again, Nawaz continued. Now is a time that the vicious cycle could finally be broken, Nawaz contended. "The ball is in the court of the civilian administration to assert itself," Nawaz said. "We have a great opportunity, yet again, with an army chief who is saying, yet again, that he wants to be professional and keep the army out of politics." Another featured speaker, Lisa Curtis, a Senior Research Fellow at the Heritage Foundation, stressed historical continuities in the Pakistani-American defense relationship. Curtis suggested that while the threats perceived by Washington have changed over time - moving from Soviet expansionism during the Cold War to Islamic radicalism in the post-9/11 era - the attention of Pakistan's generals has remained fixed on India throughout the past few decades. Another unwelcome continuity that Curtis pointed out is "the lack of accountability and transparency" in US-Pakistani assistance programs, which prompts members of the US Congress and of the Pakistani public alike to wonder "where is all this assistance from the United States is going?" [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. At the same time, Curtis warned that recent history shows that making an abrupt turn away from Pakistan can have "extremely negative repercussions." To highlight her point, Curtis noted that in the 1990s, when Washington abruptly withdrew from Afghanistan and sanctioned Pakistan for its nuclear weapons tests, Pakistani leaders created the Taliban and transferred nuclear technology to Iran. "We need to engage in more serious and frank dialogue with Pakistani civilian and military leaders about the situation around the Pakistani border, as well as the situation inside Afghanistan," Curtis said. "This has to be a conversation. The United States needs to listen to Pakistan's geo-strategic concerns and demonstrate that it supports Pakistan's long-term success and prosperity." In tandem with substantive give-and-take, Washington "will have to use discretion in carrying out [unilateral] strikes" against suspected militants in Pakistan's tribal areas, since such attacks can "undermine longer-term US objectives of building partnership with Pakistan and preventing radical forces from strengthening in the country," Curtis said. The event's third featured speaker, Walter Andersen, associate director of the South Asia Studies Program at the John Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, cautioned that while Pakistan's current military leaders might want to remain outside of the nation's politics, adhering to that aim will be challenging "in a country in which you have a well-organized army that operates in an underdeveloped political system." According to Anderson, what Pakistan most needs is "civil-military consultation to head off a confrontation." In particular, the two interest groups need to find accord on the role of the Inter-Services Intelligence and on parliament's oversight functions concerning defense issues. Without institutionalized cooperation, the political process stands to suffer "a loss of trust between civilian and military leaders that could slow down, and maybe even set back the transition to democracy that they all say that they want," Anderson said.
CMR Advantage – 1AC
And Indo-Pak war leads to extinction
Caldicott 2 – (Helen, Founder of Physicians for Social Responsibility, The New Nuclear Danger: George W. Bush’s Military-Industrial Complex, p. X) CLS
The use of Pakistani nuclear weapons could trigger a chain reaction. Nuclear-armed India, an ancient enemy, could respond in kind. China, India's hated foe, could react if India used her nuclear weapons, triggering a nuclear holocaust on the subcontinent. If any of either Russia or America's 2,250 strategic weapons on hair-trigger alert were launched either accidentally or purposefully in response, nuclear winter would ensue, meaning the end of most life on earth.
Increasing global CMR improves conflict management and reduces the risk of war
Holmes 97 (H. Allen, U.S. assist sec for defense for special ops, July, “Civil Affairs: Reflections of the Future,’ Issues of Democracy 2:3 p. 6-7) JJN
Nevertheless, the world remains a highly uncertain place, with increasingly complex and dangerous national security threats. We continue to face a variety of grave regional dangers in Southwest Asia, the Middle East, and East Asia. Moreover, as we saw in Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, and Zaire, failed or failing states threaten to create instability, internal conflict and humanitarian crises. In some cases, governments will lose their ability to maintain public order and provide for the needs of their people, creating the conditions for civil unrest, famine, massive flows of migrants across international borders, and aggressive actions by neighboring states. In this context, the work of our civil affairs forces has grown more and more salient. In four short years, we have seen an increasing importance of civil affairs in military operations other than war. Moreover, recognizing the value of civil affairs, the staff officers and planners of our conventional forces are becoming increasingly involved in planning the civil dimensions to military operations. For example, in Bosnia, the planning for military support to elections was accomplished by operations and strategic and policies staffs, while our civil affairs personnel served as critical links between military and civilian planners.
1AC Solvency 1/2
Expanding IMET aid is key to teach the Egyptian military governance and electoral skills
Cook 9 (Stephen, Council on Foreign Relations Center for Preventive Action “Political Instability in Egypt” Contingency Planning memorandum no. 4, August) i.content/publications/attachments/CPA_contingencymemo_4.pdf
A different strategy would be necessary if U.S. officials believe that the status quo cannot be preserved and instead want to encourage democratic change in Egypt. A strategy that sought to promote democratic change would begin by making clear both publicly and privately to the present Egyptian leadership that Washington believes it is essential that the succession process in Egypt be regarded both at home and abroad as legitimate—i.e., Egyptians are provided an opportunity to choose their next leader in an environment where the outcome is not pre- or post-determined. American officials should also make it clear that the continuation of parts of the U.S. aid program would be contingent on benchmarks relating to the transparency and fairness of the leadership transition. An additional way to build support for a legitimate transition would be to expand Egypt’s participation in the International Military Education Training (IMET) Program. Currently, the United States devotes approximately $1.3 million to the IMET program, which has been geared toward “providing technical development” to the Egyptian armed forces, “building mutual understanding between the United States and Egypt,” and helping Egypt develop the competencies necessary for peacekeeping missions around the world. The curriculum should—as the United States has done with a small police training program—emphasize human rights and democratic governance and the budget should be expanded to accommodate the participation of additional Egyptian officers. Further, Washington should continue to work with both the Egyptian government and nongovernmental organizations on strengthening Egypt’s electoral practices, in particular increasing the capacity of the Egyptian judiciary and independent observers to monitor Egypt’s presidential elections.
Key decisionmakers in the Egyptian military received training from the Russians
Cook 9 (Steven Cook, Senior fellow for middle eastern studies at the council on foreign relations and an expert on Arab and Turkish politics as well as U.S.-Middle East policy, December 11th, “U.S. Military Assistance: Obstacle or Opportunity for Reform?”, ) MV
Responding to a question from Graefe, Cook explained that following September 11th, security became the overwhelming concern for military-to-military relations and as a result there has been little cooperation on human rights. He joined in Hokayem support of the IMET program, saying that the U.S. sense of professionalism sought to make the military always subordinate to civilians. But in Egypt, decision-makers in key positions generally received their training from the Russians, and those officers that participate in U.S. training programs like IMET are often discriminated against professionally within the Egyptian military.
1AC Solvency 2/2
IMET directly responsible for Egyptian stability during the Arab Spring – more funding is key
Roberts 11 (James, research fellow for Economic Freedom and Growth in the Center for International Trade and Economics at the Heritage Foundation, “Not All Foreign Aid is Equal,” ) KJS
The value of U.S. international security assistance was illustrated most recently during the crisis in Egypt. The U.S. and Egyptian militaries have worked together closely for more than 30 years through such programs as the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs. When rioters on Tahrir Square demanded the overthrow of the Mubarak government last month, it was Egypt’s military—and only the military—that succeeded in holding the line against virulently anti-U.S. elements. U.S. international security assistance has made direct and short-term contributions to America’s national security and should continue to be funded. This assistance includes the FMS program to subsidize sales of U.S. military equipment, services, and training to friendly developing countries; IMET grants for training foreign military professionals; and some funding of international peacekeeping operations.
***Inherency***
IMET Cuts Now 1/2
IMET funding is on the chopping block due to budget cuts
Rogin 11 (Josh, writer for Foreign Policy online, “State Department budget request may be dead on arrival on Capital Hill,” Foreign Policy Cable, February 11, 2011, ) KSJ
The administration eliminated or scaled back requested funding for dozens of small foreign assistance programs around the world. The request would eliminate funding for bilateral programs for six countries: North Korea, Tonga, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, for a total savings of $4.5 million. The funds allocated for North Korea -- which was being used to fund non-governmental organizations, not the North Korean government -- could still come out of general funds. International Military Education and Training (IMET) program funding in the budget was abandoned for nine countries: Equatorial Guinea, Iceland, Kuwait, Madagascar, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, and the UAE. These cuts represent a savings of under $1 million. Foreign Military Financing was eliminated in the request for Chile, Haiti, East Timor, Malta, and Tonga, for a savings of about $5 million. "We're trying to move our budget toward less very small programs, because we are going to have less money down the road to allocate and we want to make sure we allocate it to the highest priorities," a State Department official said. "So the savings from these cuts are very small but you have to start somewhere." Inside the regular budget, the State Department eliminated foreign aid to several countries and slashed requested 2012 funding for assistance to Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia by $115 million from the fiscal 2011 request.
IMET funding subject to heavy cuts due to changing priorities
Rogin 11 (Josh, writer for Foreign Policy online, “Obama cuts foreign assistance to several countries in new budget request,” Foreign Policy Online, February 11,2011 ) KJS
"Although not subject to a freeze in funding, the department is committed to finding efficiencies, cutting waste, and focusing on key priorities. Accordingly, foreign assistance to several countries has been eliminated," the summary sheet on the State Department's request stated, adding that the cuts were made "in order to focus funding on regions with the greatest assistance needs." The cuts will not only affect development aid, but also the United States' military-to-military relationships across the globe. If the president's budget is enacted, five countries will no longer receive Foreign Military Financing and nine countries will no longer receive support for joining the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, which is where foreign military officers receive training in the United States and forge bonds with their American counterparts. The countries for which the State Department will no longer seek funding will be made public when the full State Department budget request is released Monday afternoon. "Several countries will no longer receive bilateral security assistance funding, as resources are being focused on countries with strategic significance," the document stated. "Requested security assistance funds will become more focused on key priorities including program funding for Israel, Pakistan, and other coalition partners and allies, as well as programs that are critical to containing transnational threats including terrorism and trafficking in narcotics, weapons, and persons."
IMET Cuts Now 2/2
Funding uncertainty undermines IMET effectiveness. More frequent funding key to success
Bruneau, Peggar, and Wright 8 (Researchers at the Center for Civil-Military Relations, “IMET Assessment Project,” pg 52-54, 2008) KJS
One suggestion for improvement to the IMET program is to examine opportunities to increase the continuity, timeliness and predictability of IMET funding. It became clear in a most of the qualitative interviews that continuity and predictability are serious problems. IMET funds are authorized on an annual basis, and the eligibility of nations and the amount allocated to each are also determined annually. However, it is often the case, due to the failure of the legislative and executive branches of the U.S. government to agree on the federal budget in a timely fashion, that the release of IMET funds does not take place until well after the beginning of the federal fiscal year (October 1). This causes problems on several levels. First, delays in funding impact the ability of countries to create reasonable and accurate spending plans for their IMET budgets. Without reasonable knowledge of when funds will be released, countries are reluctant to program courses that start in the first quarter (Oct – Dec) of the fiscal year. This has the effect of compressing the calendar, causing strain on resources and personnel during the remaining nine months of the year. Second, delays in funding also negatively impact IMET education and training providers. These providers face similarly strained resources during the latter part of the fiscal year in which most countries program their requirements. These providers also face hardship when courses must be delayed or cancelled altogether due to funding delays. This has a negative financial impact on the provider, and can cause significant budget and resource problems. Additionally, the uncertainty about when funds will be released each year has the tendency to generate disappointment when significant delays ensue, as is the case in the current fiscal year. The FY08 FOAA was not signed by President Bush until December 26, 2007, and by the end of January 2008 a substantial portion of the authorized IMET funding had yet to be released. This led to numerous course cancellations, and significant disappointment on the part of individual students, armed forces, ministries of defense, and recipient nations. When this happens repeatedly, as has been the trend in recent years, it can also have the effect of generating misunderstanding and mistrust, which is the opposite of the impact that IMET intends. Further, the unpredictability of funding levels from year to year makes long-range planning difficult. The amount allocated to individual countries can vary significantly from year to year. The amount allocated to each country is determined by the DoS and may be impacted by strategic and policy considerations as well as other factors. To address these serious problems, it is recommended that Congress, DoS and DoD consider the possibility of authorizing IMET, determining eligibility and allocating funds on a biennial basis instead of an annual basis. This would extend the planning horizon for recipient countries as well as ODCs, facilitating improved planning and resource management. Additionally, it is recommended that all parties involved work to authorize and release the IMET funding in a timely fashion. Finally, it is recommended that the IMET budget and individual country IMET allocations be set at some minimum level, and also adjusted for increased costs (tuition, travel, per diem, etc.) on an annual or biennial basis.
Top Officials are Soviet Trained 1/3
Soviet trained officers hold back American trained from promotion despite a huge IMET budget
Kechichian and Nazimek 11 (Joseph and Jeanne, writer for the American Middle East Policy Council, “Challenges to the Military in Egypt,” ) CLS
If the 1973 war imbued the Egyptian military with a sense of honor and accomplishment, the Camp David accords were the conduit to a reliable source of modem weaponry as well as substantial financial assistance. Washington has provided an average of $1.3 billion in yearly defense-procurement credits since 1979. To some extent, the Egyptian military are better equipped and trained, although the transition from Soviet hardware to Western sources has been slow and often difficult. In the mid-1990s, an estimated 50 percent of Army equipment was still of Soviet design, much of it over 20 years old.4 This shortcoming aside, the transition meant that Egyptian officers had to relearn their craft. Given that U.S. training, maintenance and repair requirements are radically different from those of their Soviet counterparts, it is not difficult to conclude that major hurdles remain. Still, today young military officers are eager to familiarize themselves with Western technology. Moreover, the $1.3 billion annual package provides International Education and Training (IMET) opportunities, generously used since the early 1980s to send soldiers and sailors to U.S. service academies, graduate schools and command and staff colleges. In-country training and assistance teams were also available under the IMET program in support of new equipment purchases. Undeniably, Soviet equipment and strategy were partial reasons for Egyptian military losses to Israel; as the Jewish state repeatedly demonstrated, Western goods were better. For the Egyptian leadership, the obvious became embarrassing and, if not Nasser, at least Sadat began to lose faith in the USSR. This shift was so abrupt that by 1990, Western tactical concepts were beginning to take hold in military training courses. As Egyptian officers graduated from U.S. and European military academies, they gradually institutionalized newly acquired expertise.5 Despite such training opportunities and the first-hand experience of the "Soviet failure," a cadre of Egyptian military leaders remained primarily Soviet-trained. Consequently, and for political reasons, including the desire to limit U.S. influence in the armed forces, the brightest officers are constantly tested for loyalty to the regime. As a result, U.S.-trained officers see their promotions to high-ranking positions held back or begrudgingly allocated.
Senior military officials were Soviet trained
Bannerman 11 (Graeme, PhD, Scholar at the Middle East Institute. 2/9, “Inside The Egyptian Military” )gw
Outsiders really do not know the military leadership. Thus, all the current speculation related to the ongoing crisis is based on limited knowledge. The most senior level of the military is the equivalent of the American World War II generation. Its officers fought in Egypt’s great wars: the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, the war of attrition and the 1973 war. Their entire lives have been devoted to the security and stability of Egypt. If they have personal ambitions, these are not openly displayed. They work long hours and expect others to work equally as hard. They are disciplined and professional. Order and structure are important to them. These are serious men who will not act precipitously. While listening to foreign views, they will not give in to foreign pressure and absolutely do not want to be seen as giving into foreign pressure. They are first and foremost Egyptian nationalists. For a time, senior Egyptian military personnel worked closely with their counterparts in Soviet bloc countries. This relationship soured when the Soviet military overplayed its hand in Egypt, compelling Sadat to expel Soviet advisors from the country, despite the risk of compromising Egyptian military capabilities in the process. By contrast, the American military, well aware of the reasons for Soviet failure in Egypt, has been careful not to be seen as trying to control the Egyptian armed forces. The Americans respect Egyptian national sensitivities and have been largely successful in conveying this to the Egyptian military leadership. Unlike the senior officers, the younger cadre of Egyptian officers does not share the same battlefield experience and has little or no recollection of the Soviet experience. They do know the American military and have trained with them. They know the United States and feel comfortable with Americans. As such, they are more willing than the senior officers to engage in wide ranging political discussions with their American counterparts. They are more comfortable being critical of American Middle East policy and do not consider this as being anti-American. They are above all Egyptian nationalists.
Top Officials are Soviet Trained 2/3
Young, American officers are on-board with the revolution while Soviet trained senior officials remain hesitant
Friedman, 11 (George, policy analyst at STRATFOR, “Egypt: the Distance Between Enthusiasm and Reality,” Real Clear Politics, 2-16-2011, more_questions_than_answers_99399.html)KJS
The demonstrators never called for the downfall of the regime. They demanded that Mubarak step aside. This was the same demand that was being made by many if not most officers in the military months before the crowds gathered in the streets. The military did not like the spectacle of the crowds, which is not the way the military likes to handle political matters. At the same time, paradoxically, the military welcomed the demonstrations, since they created a crisis that put the question of Mubarak's future on the table. They gave the military an opportunity to save the regime and preserve its own interests. The Egyptian military is opaque. It isn't clear who was reluctant to act and who was eager. We would guess that the people who now make up the ruling military council were reluctant to act. They were of the same generation as Hosni Mubarak, owed their careers to him and were his friends. Younger officers, who had joined the military after 1973 and had trained with the Americans rather than the Soviets, were the likely agitators for blocking Mubarak's selection of Gamal as his heir.
Tantawi leads a cautious old-school Egyptian military pack trained by the Soviets
Westervelt, 11 (Eric, analyst for NPR, “For Egyptians, Trust is Key as Army Takes Lead,” NPR Online, )
Over the weekend the military rulers won praise from protesters when they announced the abolition of a parliament widely seen as illegitimate and suspended a constitution seen as little more than a convenient tool for a dictator. The army also pledged to turn over power in a matter of months to a democratically elected, civilian government. But the army also has vested interests and in the past has shown no fondness for democracy. There are serious concerns that the military will abuse its near-absolute power, given its entrenched political and economic stakes in the country. "During the crisis, they [the military] have been involved in arresting dissidents, some of the democracy protesters, bloggers, human rights activists and journalists," said Peter Bouckaert, the emergencies director for Human Rights Watch. It's likely that 76-year-old Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, the head of the military council now running Egypt, does not tweet, has little use for an iPad and embraces few of the social media tools that helped bring down Mubarak. A leaked U.S. diplomatic cable described Tantawi as deeply resistant to change, intolerant of intellectual freedom and singularly focused on regime stability. Tantawi and other senior Egyptian officers, that cable said, "simply do not have the energy, inclination or world view to do anything differently." It also said junior officers mocked Tantawi as "incompetent" and "Mubarak's poodle." "It was also said of [ex-President Anwar] Sadat that he was the poodle of [his predecessor, Gamal Abdel Nasser]," notes Egyptian analyst and historian Mahmoud Sabit. Tantawi was shaped by his military experience in Egypt's 1956 war against Britain, France and Israel as well as the wars with Israel in 1967 and 1973. Like several of the older military leaders on the council now running the country, Tantawi was groomed in a Soviet style of military leadership before Egypt's rapprochement with the West. He is a career military man more used to monologue than political dialogue. Yet Sabit thinks the "poodle" portrait is short-sighted. "Men within a system like that have to, to a degree, be 'yes' men," Sabit says. "But once they're their own men, it's a different story, and I think we're seeing some of that now." A Trusted Institution Despite a lower public profile in the past two decades, the Egyptian military is still seen as the most respected, trusted and efficient institution in the country. Because of conscription, it is also seen as representative of the nation. Since the 1952 military coup that toppled the monarchy, all of the country's leaders have come from the military. But Mubarak worked hard to keep his commanders out of politics and out of the public light. He frequently fired generals and reshuffled their commands so no one general grew too powerful or popular. Egyptian historian Sabit says mixing with old warriors like Tantawi are younger generals such as Lt. Gen. Sami Anan who have cultivated American and European military connections and training and hold a more expansive, modern world view. When the recent protests broke out, Anan raced home from Washington, where he had been meeting with senior Pentagon officials.
Top Officials are Soviet Trained 3/3
High-level Egyptian commanders are Soviet trained
Dreazen 11 (Yochi, senior correspondent for National Journal Group, Feb. 11, "WASHINGTON WEEK WITH GWEN IFILL" Lexis)gw
MS. IFILL: Yes, I've heard that the U.S. has quite a tight relation -- U.S. military has quite tight relationship with the Egyptian military, it's a lot of its training of its officers. MR. DREAZEN: Although -- that's true kind of at the lower ranks. We have an Egyptian military which is fascinating as a generational split. You have the elder ranks, Mubarak, Suleiman, who was a general, Tantawi, who's the defense minister, Mohammed Tantawi who now effectively -- to answer Dan's question -- is running Egypt. These are all people who were trained under the Soviet Union. They did military training in what had been the Soviet Union. Since the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt, younger officers come to the U.S. So you have a split now, where the kind of old guard, including the guys who are still in power, have this kind of Soviet training, and the young guard have training with us. But it's going to be fascinating because yes, I think this was a coup. It was a bloodless coup. It was a peaceful coup.
High-level Egyptian commanders are Soviet trained
Dreazen 11 (Yochi, senior correspondent for National Journal Group, Feb. 11, "WASHINGTON WEEK WITH GWEN IFILL" Lexis)gw
MS. IFILL: Yes, I've heard that the U.S. has quite a tight relation -- U.S. military has quite tight relationship with the Egyptian military, it's a lot of its training of its officers. MR. DREAZEN: Although -- that's true kind of at the lower ranks. We have an Egyptian military which is fascinating as a generational split. You have the elder ranks, Mubarak, Suleiman, who was a general, Tantawi, who's the defense minister, Mohammed Tantawi who now effectively -- to answer Dan's question -- is running Egypt. These are all people who were trained under the Soviet Union. They did military training in what had been the Soviet Union. Since the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt, younger officers come to the U.S. So you have a split now, where the kind of old guard, including the guys who are still in power, have this kind of Soviet training, and the young guard have training with us. But it's going to be fascinating because yes, I think this was a coup. It was a bloodless coup. It was a peaceful coup.
Top Officials Block Transition 1/2
Senior leadership blocks reforms that make democracy possible
Korski 11 (Daniel, Senior Policy Fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, 7/8, “Without Military Reform, Egypt Can't Democratize” )gw
The creation of this Military Inc dates back to the military factories that sprang up in the 1820s to produce uniforms and small arms. Their role expanded with the state-led economy from the early 1950s. But it really began to grow after the 1967 war between Israel and Egypt, when Egypt's camouflage-clad leadership worried that demobilisation would create a large number of unemployed, weapons-trained youths. So they transformed the military into a peacetime employment-generator while giving real estate developers, often retired officers or people connected to the military, the right to exploit land owned by the military - for example along the Red Sea. The choice must have come natural to a generation of officers who were trained in the former Soviet Union, and learnt first-hand about of what the economist Murray Newton Rothbard called the "welfare-warfare" state. Dealing with the military's economic role is difficult and at the same time critical if Egypt is to develop into a fully-fledged democracy and create the kind of rules-based, free-market economy that can help the country grow by some 5% annually - the figure needed to keep unemployment stable. Under a baseline scenario of no economic growth, the Egyptian unemployment rate will more than triple during the period 2011-2030 implying an increase of 10 million jobless people. Military reforms are necessary for several reasons. The first is financial. The country's budget gap will widen to the highest level in more than a decade next year, as tourists have fled or cancelled long-planned trips for fear of further violence. Economic growth may slow to 1 percent this year, the International Monetary Fund has predicted. And the nation had its credit rating lowered to Ba3 at Moody's Investors Service and to BB at Standard & Poor's, the third- and second-highest non-investment grades. To service its billion dollar debts, the Egyptian state needs all the revenue it can raise. But with billions - nobody knows how much - diverted to the defence budget and up to forty percent of the economy controlled by military-run companies that do not pay taxes and use conscripted labour, the Egyptian state will struggle to service its debts in the medium-term. So the military stands in the way of creating jobs in the private sector and reforming the public sector. But the real reason why military reform cannot be avoided is political. Given the extent of Military Inc, thousands of civilians are bound in predatory partnerships with the military, in turn strengthening it institutionally and increasing its appetite for power and profit while creating an undemocratic over-class. Upon retirement, senior officers are given considerable retirement packages and appointed as provincial governors or head of municipalities. Until now, however, everyone has skirted around the issue. A few weeks ago, sitting in his wood-panelled, air-conditioned office outside of central Cairo, I put to General Murad Mowafi, Egypt's intelligence chief, that most transitions from authoritarianism have led to some form of military reform. He smiled and answered an entirely different question I had not asked. The Tahrir Square activists are not much better, hoping that the Egyptian military will help to safeguard the revolution they have begun. But as an Egyptian proverb has it: "Because we focused on the snake, we missed the scorpion". Military reform may be difficult, but it cannot be avoided if Egyptians want a democracy. How, then to proceed? Everyone knows what military reforms look like - they include constitutional reforms, legislative changes, budget oversight, professionalisation, the retirement of the senior leadership etc etc. Such reforms start from a different kind of assessment of threats and challenges, such as the Internal Security Sector Review that Kosovo undertook, and a process to reshape the military to address these. But the Egyptian military is unlikely, at this stage at least, to accept a process, which leads to this kind of reform. A more circumspect process is needed.
Top Officials Block Transition 2/2
Expansion of IMET training among upper-level officers in Egypt is vital
Burton 11 (Brian, Bacevich fellow at the Center for a New American Security, March 28, “Refocus Mideast Presence U.S. Should Emphasize Training, Reduce Footprint,” ) JJN
The popular upheavals shaking the established political order in the Middle East may throw U.S. defense strategy in the region into disarray. In the span of barely two months, political and security relationships that had prevailed for decades have been overturned or challenged. The alliance with Egypt, cultivated to maintain regional stability and Arab peace with Israel, will be tested in the course of the country's uncertain political transition. Other governments regarded as key counterterrorism partners appear to be on the verge of collapse. The level of violence used to suppress protesters in Bahrain makes it less politically attractive for American leaders to maintain such a close friendship with that government. Furthermore, the direct participation of U.S.-allied Emirati, Qatari and Saudi forces in violently suppressing Bahraini protests could create deeper strains in America's defense relationships in the gulf. Still, the key U.S. interests in the region remain largely unchanged. Foremost among them are to ensure the unimpeded export of critical energy resources from the Middle East and continued free access to the critical economic transit waters of the Persian Gulf. Second, the U.S. seeks to prevent the proliferation of nuclear capabilities, particularly with respect of Iran, to forestall a destabilizing regional arms race. The U.S. also aims to contain Iranian influences counterproductive to regional stability, specifically its support for militant groups in other countries. Finally, it must counter transnational terrorist organizations based in the region. American defense strategy in the Middle East should focus on these objectives while demonstrating sensitivity to an environment in which traditional partnerships are more uneasy, historic U.S. support for the old regional order is less politically desirable, and Middle Eastern governments are likely to be less stable and less amenable to U.S. interests. Against this backdrop, the United States should adopt a regional defense strategy. The strategy would: ■ De-emphasize its established bases in the region. Permanent bases are vulnerable to disruption by both military attack (think Iran's surface-to-surface missile arsenal) and political circumstance. The U.S. military can maintain smaller, bare-bones facilities for use when needed, but major air forces should be stationed either at bases in Europe or Diego Garcia, while the U.S. 5th Fleet should be provided a flagship to avoid relying on the Bahrain station. ■ Focus on longer-range and more mobile military capabilities rather than short-range ones tied to land bases. Particularly for purposes of deterrence and precision strikes, missiles and bombers operating from beyond the range of regional adversaries are less provocative and less vulnerable than regional bases. Counterterrorism and counterproliferation operations with aerial and small- to medium-scale ground components, including special operations forces and Marines, can be deployed from ships. Sea-based missile defenses will be desirable for deterring Iran and reassuring regional partners without becoming tied to them. ■ Maintain security ties to traditional partners, but emphasize training and mentorship. If U.S.-provided weapons are employed in bloody repressive actions against civilian protesters, America's long-standing security assistance and foreign military sales programs may become political liabilities. Yet curtailing military-to-military ties with the countries of the Middle East is also not desirable. Therefore, American policymakers should design security cooperation programs that focus on the development of competent and responsible field-grade and senior officers and ministry-level officials. Future security cooperation programs, particularly International Military Education and Training, should emphasize the cultivation of the mid- to upper-echelons of regional security leaders, maintaining some level of U.S. influence while encouraging responsible behavior like that demonstrated by the Egyptian military during the mostly peaceful unraveling of the Mubarak regime.
***CMR Advantage***
CMR Low Now
The military won’t respect civilian control
Karon 11 (Tony, senior editor at TIME Magazine, 7/19, “Will Egypt's Military Hijack its Revolution?” )gw
Turkey, with its pluralistic democracy and booming economy under the stewardship of a moderate Islamist party, is hailed as the model for post-Mubarak Egypt by many leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood. But the latest initiatives by the 25-man military junta that has ruled since February's ouster of President Hosni Mubarak suggests that the generals are guided by their own Turkish model, of an earlier era -- a military autonomous of civilian political control, claiming veto power over the democratic process and intervening at will as self-appointed guardian of secularism and the national interest. Having played their cards cautiously in the months following Mubarak's resignation as they took the measure of a turbulent political situation, the generals appear to have grown in confidence: They're now openly demanding complete autonomy from civilian political oversight in any new constitution -- and even even claiming an interventionist role in the political process. And Saturday's clashes in Tahrir Square highlight a growing confrontation between the military and the protest movement there, each side appearing to bet they can best the other in the battle to steer Egypt's transition from the Mubarak era. (PHOTOS: Inside Egypt's State Security Headquarters) "The Army and the people are one hand!" had been a key slogan of the Tahrir Square protests that forced out Mubarak, but it was wishful thinking rather than a statement of fact. In reality, the military had always been the foundation of a regime that had existed since 1952, when Lieutenant Col. Gamal Abdel Nasser led the Free Officers Movement in a coup that overthrew the monarchy. All of the presidents that have ruled Egypt since have come through the senior command echelon of the military. Even while he appointed his generals, former Air Force commander Mubarak was reminded in February that he ruled at their pleasure. And the junta that replaced him is hardly some contemporary iteration of the Free Officers; it's led by his former Defense Secretary Field Marshal Muhammad Tantawi, and comprised of the same officer echelon that answered to Mubarak. Last winter's revolutionary crisis prompted the generals to oust Mubarak in order to restore stability and protect their own vital institutional interests -- from the military's massive stake in the civilian economy and its $1.5 billion annual U.S. stipend for keeping the peace with Israel, to the legitimacy required for it to play its central role in society. Most importantly, the military requires stability, and restoring stability had become impossible while Mubarak remained on the throne. Many of the generals also welcomed the opportunity to confound Mubarak's plan to break with tradition and appoint his businessman son, Gamal, rather than a military elder, as his own successor. The junta's immediate goal was to quell the rebellion, even while proclaiming themselves "guardians of the revolution" -- of which they now claim to have been co-authors. The military has discouraged, sometimes violently, further protest and strike action, and more than 7,000 Egyptians have been detained -- with many credible reports of torture -- since Mubarak's ouster. Some arms of the state security system have been reorganized and renamed, and some officials have been ousted or prosecuted. But there's hardly been any kind of wholesale remaking of Mubarak's security structures to serve the needs of a democratic society; instead, there are gestures to appease popular anger. The generals, in fact, govern in the familiar style of Arab autocrats facing a restive citizenry -- they constantly fire and reshuffle the cabinet, inadvertently affirming that the cabinet holds little real authority. But the Supreme Council had originally promised to rule only for six months -- a deadline that expires in August. But it was July 19 before they appointed an electoral commission to begin preparing for a new parliamentary poll. Originally scheduled for September and then postponed until November, no smart money should bet on the election being held before next year. (PHOTOS: Mubarak: The Man Who Stayed Too Long) Postponing the election may have angered the Muslim Brotherhood, which would likely prevail at the polls, but it's in keeping with the wishes of the liberal parties, who fear being trounced by the far better organized and more popular Islamists if the voting were held in the fall. The military has also taken advantage of liberal complaints to revise its thinking on how a new constitution would be drawn up: Originally, the task was to be left to the new parliament, which alarmed liberals because they expected the Brotherhood to have a dominant role in that institution; instead the junta has appointed its own experts to lay down "a declaration of basic principles" that will govern the writing of a new constitution. And those principles are looking set to include protecting the military from civilian oversight, and assigning it an interventionist role in "protecting" Egyptian democracy. "We want a model like Turkey, but we won't force it" one general of told the Washington Post last week on condition of anonymity. "Egypt as a country needs this to protect our democracy from the Islamists. We know this group doesn't think democratically." Nor does the military, of course. It's simply doing what comes naturally to an institution that has been the very foundation of six decades of authoritarian rule. The protestors who took to Tahrir Square last winter, braving the thuggery of Mubarak's enforcers, were demanding regime-change. But as things stand, what they've achieved so far are a series of changes -- of personnel, practice and style -- within the regime. Left up to the military, the legacy of the rebellion that ousted Mubarak will be a reformed version of his military-based regime rather than a genuine democracy based on the sovereignty of the popular will. But neither the Islamists, nor many of the liberals and other democrats who fought to bring down Mubarak are willing to see the army have the same power over Egypt's elected government as the authority claimed by unelected clerics in Iran over that country's parliament and presidency. Rather than its denouement, however, Mubarak's ouster in February may have been simply the first act of the Egyptian revolution.
CMR Low Now
Officers need more training in the area of CMR
Springborg and Henry 11 (Robert, professor in the Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, and Clement M., Dept of Political Science, American University in Cairo. May-June 2011, “Army Guys,” )gw
The United States also needs to rebalance its training of the Egyptian officer corps, which has heretofore emphasized technical subjects associated with major warfare more than equivalent militaries do. Training regimens should include such areas as peacekeeping, disaster relief, search and rescue, and border surveillance. It should also emphasize the broader content of standard professional military education, especially with regard to civil-military relations.
CMR low after opposition to authoritarian leaders – Egypt Proves
Bensahel and Byman 4 (Nora and Daniel, Fellow at RAND, and US Air Force Consultants, “The Future Security Environment in the Middle East Conflict, Stability, and Political Change,” ) CLS
When dissatisfaction with a regime results in overt opposition, the consequences for civil-military relations can be even more destabilizing. Opposition invites repression, which increases the public profile of military leaders, and reinforces a leader’s dependence on them for his position; consequently it tips the political-military balance of power in the military’s favor. Hence, in the aftermath of the suppression of the 1986 CPF riots in Egypt, the political stature of Minister of War Field Marshal Abdel al-Halim Abu Ghazala (the top military officer in Egypt) increased substantially. Overt demonstrations against a regime can destabilize civil-military relations in another way. As discussed below, they test the loyalties of the military, especially junior officers and rank and file who are called upon to fire on their social equals, with whom they may identify heavily. Although leaders may call on military forces to repress public opposition, doing so is not without risks and cost.
Egypt CMR low – allegiance issues
MacFarquhar 11 (Neil, Writer for the New York Times, Egypt’s Military Is Seen as Pivotal in Next Step, , Jan 2011) CLS
Even as armored military vehicles deployed around important Egyptian government institutions on Friday for the first time in decades, it remained difficult to predict what role the armed forces might play in either quelling the disturbances or easing President Hosni Mubarak from power.“Are they on the side of the nation or are they on the side of the regime?” a former senior Western diplomat with long service in Cairo asked. “That distinction had been blurred. We are now seeing a modern test of whether there is a separation between the two.” The Egyptian military, the world’s 10th largest, is powerful, popular and largely opaque. The military carried out the 1952 coup that overthrew the monarchy and has considered itself the shepherd of the revolution ever since; all four presidents in the ensuing years have been military generals. But Mr. Mubarak, who led the Air Force before rising to prominence when President Anwar el-Sadat appointed him vice president in 1975, worked hard to keep the army out of overt politics and under his control. In one famous incident, he dismissed Field Marshal Abdel-Halim Abu Ghazala, a popular, charismatic war hero, from his post as defense minister in 1989. The general had been tied to a smuggling scandal, but most analysts thought he had been fired because his public profile was too high. No general has sought to curry public favor since. The current defense minister, Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, an unpopular man in his late 70s, is considered unlikely to challenge Mr. Mubarak.
CMR Low Now
Egypt CMR Low
Press TV 11 (International News Organization, “Egyptians Remain Camped Out in Cairo,” July 23, 2011, ) KJS
Thousands of angry Egyptian demonstrators have vowed to remain in Cairo’s landmark Liberation Square until their demands are met. The demonstrations have now entered their 15th day. The protesters have camped out in Liberation Square and other major squares across the country to demand more freedom and a civilian government. Reports say the coastal city of Alexandria has been the scene of some of the most violent clashes between military troops and protesters over the past 24 hours. The developments come as tensions are escalating between Egyptian youths and the country’s ruling military council. On Saturday, the head of Egypt’s ruling military council Field Marshall Mohammed Hussein Tantawi said in a recorded speech that his interim government was committed to democracy. Experts say such gestures have failed to appease growing anti-military sentiments across the North African country. The protesters are calling on Tantawi, the de facto president, to step down. The demonstrators want an immediate end to the military rule and the appointment of a democratically elected government. They also seek the trial of ousted president Hosni Mubarak and members of his regime who are responsible for the killing of hundreds of demonstrators during the revolution. Following Mubarak’s downfall, the military council took over in Egypt. Many Egyptians believe the council is trying to derail the revolution. Demonstrators call for an end to the military council’s rule and want the military to go back to their barracks and hand over power to a civilian government.
CMR Low--Military elite too old to understand their demands
Economist 11 (“Revolution Spinning in the Wind,” July 14 2011, ) KJS
Six months after the giant street protests that shook central Tunis and Cairo, both cities still witness periodic shows of mass people-power. On July 8th hundreds of thousands of Egyptians again filled Tahrir Square, and a fervent few have again pitched camp there. The immediate catalysts for these protests differ, and in the new atmosphere of freedom in both countries the demands that are voiced vary widely. But their overall intent is the same. The protesters mean to signal sharp dissatisfaction with the depth and pace of change, and to remind the older men who still hold the reins of power that the public will consider them guilty of backsliding from revolutionary aims until they prove themselves innocent. The generals who now ostensibly rule Egypt and its vast, lumbering administrative machine are products of six decades of autocratic rule. So is the clubby coastal elite that continues to dominate Tunisia (see article, which reports a reasonably hopeful situation there). Even with the best of intentions these old guards find it hard to absorb the challenge presented by a newly empowered citizenry, backed by a feisty press and the streetwise zeal of bold young revolutionaries. These contrasts are starkest in Egypt. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, a body of 19 generals that serves as a temporary executive branch, often seems bewildered by the demands besieging it. The generals have tried to be accessible via a Facebook page and meetings with critics. But their communiqués are woolly or bullying, and their “dialogues” sound more like sermons. The council’s decisions reflect a faintly alarming mix of deep conservatism and hypersensitivity. After nationalist rumblings, for instance, the army vetoed help from the IMF and the World Bank, despite the offer of unprecedentedly lenient terms and the urgent need to kick-start Egypt’s stalling economy. Haphazard attempts to prosecute crimes committed under the pre-revolutionary regime have generated further discomfort. Judges have passed draconian sentences for minor cases of corruption and abuse of power, frightening much of a business class that almost universally submitted during Mr Mubarak’s long reign to rapacious demands for bribes. Yet so far Egypt’s courts have largely shielded the biggest fish from punishment, including Mr Mubarak himself and the security officers responsible for widespread torture, as well as the killing of hundreds of people during the revolution. “In 1952 we had a coup that turned into a revolution,” grumbles a young activist in Cairo, referring to the army putsch that overthrew King Farouk and then replaced his liberal democracy with a socialist dictatorship. “This time we seem to have had a revolution that turned into a coup.”
CMR Low Now
CMR low now—violence against protestors and military rhetoric
Breaking News 7/26 (Breaking News is an Irish news source, “Protestors at Loggerheads with Egyptian Army,” July 27, 2011, ) KJS
At the same time, the military is cultivating ties with the powerful Muslim Brotherhood, which joined liberal and leftist youth in the 18-day uprising that toppled Mr Mubarak but has since split with them on multiple issues. By cultivating the Brotherhood, the generals can take advantage of their large popular support base to counter the young protesters’ influence. Major General Mohammed al-Assar, a member of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, the body of generals that have taken over from Mr Mubarak, praised the Brotherhood, saying they were playing a constructive role in post-Mubarak Egypt. “Day by day, the Brotherhood are changing and are getting on a more moderate track,” he said in a speech in Washington at the United States Institute of Peace. “They have the willingness to share in the political life ... they are sharing in good ways.” The generals have also encouraged street protests by pro-military groups. Dozens of army supporters have held daily rallies the past two weeks in a square in north eastern Cairo, getting heavy TV coverage, aimed at counterbalancing a tent camp by the youth activists at Tahrir Square, the centre of the anti-Mubarak uprising. If the tension between the two camps boils over, it could plunge Egypt deeper into chaos, even sparking clashes. That could derail the country’s transition to democratic rule, a failure that could have wider implications on a region that is looking to Egypt to provide a role model for pro-democracy uprisings elsewhere in the Arab world. A sign of the dangers came on Saturday, when thousands of protesters made a peaceful march on the Defence Ministry in Cairo to push demands that police officers responsible for the killing of some 850 protesters during the anti-Mubarak uprising be brought to justice and that military trials of civilian protesters be stopped. They were attacked by bands of men armed with sticks, knives and firebombs. Hundreds of military police backed by anti-riot policemen stood by without intervening as the two sides fought for several hours. At least 300 people were wounded in the clashes. The protest movement began to hike up pressure on the military earlier this month, launching their sit-in protest in Tahrir. One of their top demands is that the killers of protesters be brought to justice, but they also complain that the generals have mismanaged the transition to democratic rule, operating without transparency and dragging their feet in weeding out Mubarak loyalists from the judiciary, the civil service and the police force. Their ultimate fear is that the military will allow much of Mr Mubarak’s authoritarian regime to stay in place. The generals have countered by doing some revision of history, aiming to restore their long-time status as the ultimate authority in Egypt. For example, they have sought to depict themselves as equal partners with the Tahrir protesters in the popular uprising that toppled Mr Mubarak’s 29-year regime. Over the weekend, the military took its rhetoric against the protesters into a dramatically higher gear. A military statement accused a key youth group, April 6, of driving a wedge between the armed forces and Egyptians and of receiving foreign funding and training.
CMR Low Now
CMR promotes civil responsibility amongst the troops preventing military takeover
Krieg 11 (Andreas, Egyptian Civil-Military Relations and Egypt’s Potential Transition to Democracy, , Andreas Krieg, PhD King’s College London, War Studies Department / Department of Defence Studies) JSM
Whilst the military leadership in Egypt has full decision-making authority in regards to determining the future of Egypt after Mubarak’s resignation, the ordinary soldier will remain a recipient of orders from a superior. Like other military men, the ordinary soldier has to obey the order of the civilian leadership. However, unlike the military leadership that occasionally has the ability to influence military decision-making in a close cooperative decision-making environment with the civilian leadership, the ordinary soldier finds himself on the bottom of the decision-making hierarchy and will receive orders through the military leadership. Thus, the ordinary soldier is a subordinate to the military leadership anyway and receives orders from the state in an indirectly way via the military leadership. Thus, for the ordinary soldier in the Egyptian military, the decision making authority has not changed with the Supreme Military Council attaining political power in February 2011. The ordinary soldier will remain a recipient of orders from the military leadership. Nonetheless, as the ordinary soldiers are to a great extent conscripts, they can identify with the demands and feelings of the Egyptian society at large. Their closer connection to society may put the ordinary soldier in a dilemma when instructed to follow potential military leadership’s orders to take action against the will of the people. The state-soldier contract, however, commits the ordinary soldiers as well as any other military men to loyalty and faithfulness to his superiors. Hence, ordinary soldiers might find themselves in a predicament when ordered to protect a military decision-making apparatus that might act against the interests of society. Regardless of this predicament, the sense of loyalty to the superior is stronger than any individual affiliation with the cause of society. As the Egyptian military is an isolated structure of its own and since many conscripts are of rural origin with little education, the ordinary Egyptian soldier constitutes a willing follower of military leadership decisions. Apart from few conscripts that might try to evade the execution of decisions made against the will of society, the majority of ordinary soldiers will be at the disposal of the military leadership’s authority.
CMR Spills Over
Egyptian civil military relations and democratic engagement spills over the rest of the Middle East
Daraghi 11 (Borzou Daragahi, Beirut Bureau Chief for the LA Times, Two Time Pulitzer Prize finalist, “UNREST IN EGYPT; NEWS ANALYSIS; Scale tilts away from Mubarak; Heart of Arab world stirs; A resurgent Egypt, once looked to by the vast region, could again occupy a pivotal position.” February 5, lexis) MV
For centuries, before its steady decline of recent decades, Egypt was the center of the Arab world; Cairo its focus of learning, culture and political power. Now, the country suddenly is changing again in ways likely to reshape the region for years to come. The implications encompass religion, the role of the military and the meaning of citizenship in authoritarian societies. The changes will complicate relations with Israel and pose challenges for U.S. foreign policy. They will affect rising non-Arab powers such as Turkey and Iran. "Egypt is the heart of our world," said Ebrahim Sharif ElSayed, an opposition activist in the Persian Gulf state of Bahrain. "It's either the sick man of the Arab world, or it could be the healthy man that could take us to new heights." The overthrow of President Zine el Abidine ben Ali in Tunisia last month lighted a tinderbox of political grievance and economic frustration now burning across the region. But Francophone, secular and middle-class Tunisia has long been an anomaly in the Arab world. Egypt is different. It's not just that the nation of more than 80 million is the most populous of the world's 22 Arabic-speaking countries and broadly reflective of all their major trends, from the increasing outward piety of its young women to the growing alienation of its young men. It is the site of Al Azhar University, ethe Islamic world's most influential religious institution, and the headquarters of the Arab League. It has long been the incubator of the Arab world's greatest talents in the arts, media, law and science. Arabs joke that "we are all half-Egyptian" in reference to the movies, music and television series on which many were raised. "What happens in Egypt happens in Yemen," said Abdullah Faqih, a political scientist in Sana, the Yemeni capital. Egypt was the first Arab nation to begin building a modern state in the 19th century. Col. Gamal Abdel Nasser's overthrow of the monarchy in the middle of the 20th century inspired similar uprisings elsewhere in the Arab world.
Egypt is a global model
Sabry 7/20 (, Egypt's military postpones first post-Mubarak elections, Mohannad Sabry)
Egypt's military rulers pledged Wednesday that new election and parliamentary laws would ensure fairness and transparency, but they put off setting a date for the country's first post-revolution parliamentary vote. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces also said that the new laws it had signed would outlaw religious propaganda in elections, an attempt to defuse allegations by many Egyptians that the military has aligned with Islamist political parties such as the Muslim Brotherhood. The first elections since President Hosni Mubarak resigned in February had been scheduled for September, but the military council said they'd be delayed. Gen. Mamdouh Shahin, speaking for the council, said a committee would announce the date by the end of September. Egypt's powerful military — which is running the country on an interim basis — has been fiercely criticized for being slow to enact reforms. Shahin said the generals decided to postpone the elections "after comprehensive dialogue and agreement with Egypt's political powers, youth and community movements," some of which had warned that September was too soon for parties to organize. "Our coming elections will be an example of fairness and transparency that will be taught around the world," Shahin said. The election laws — which underwent vast changes from the days of Mubarak's regime, which was famous for rigging votes in favor of his ruling party — say the judiciary will be the only executive authority in charge of administering elections. "Members of the police force and the Interior Ministry will have absolutely no role in running the election process," the military council said. The new laws scrap a quota implemented under Mubarak that guaranteed 64 parliamentary seats for women. But they continue to reserve 50 percent of the seats for farmers and laborers in an effort to make the legislature more representative of Egypt's estimated 84 million people. The laws also preserve rules that guarantee half of the 504 parliament seats for independent candidates, with the remaining half to be filled with candidates selected by political parties.
CMR Spills Over
Other nations will look to Egypt’s military
Bolton 11 (John R., Senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, “How to Make Egypt Safe for Democracy,” American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, February 25, 2011, ) MNC
Fourth, Egypt's military must restore and extend stability, setting an example throughout the Middle East, thereby allowing whatever progress toward a truly democratic culture to emerge. Egypt's military will require political space in the months ahead. The Pentagon's continuing close relationship with Egypt's military should give us confidence that the right message about civilian control over the military is getting through. One of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces' first announcements was that it would honour Egypt's international obligations, presumably including Camp David. This is important and reassuring internationally, but hardly dispositive of what future governments will do.
The 1990s were filled with visions of a "new Middle East" that would transform the "cold peace" Israel had achieved with Egypt and Jordan into broader economic and security ties, and that would extend to other Arab countries too. That vision was stillborn, but there is little doubt that we are now going to see a new Middle East whether we like it or not, and whether or not it will be better than what it replaces. Alea iacta est--"the die has been cast"--and it may be long years before it comes to rest.
All eyes are on Egypt after coup – Now is key
Guardian 1/27 (, Egypt's Day of Rage goes on. Is the world watching?, Amira Nowaira, 1/27/11)
The so-called free world that prides itself on championing the causes of liberty and democracy seemed rather bewildered at what was happening and official statements took time to appear, if they did at all. The American and European governments' endorsement of the Mubarak government meant that they systematically turned a blind eye to its violation of human rights and its repression of dissidents. All Barack Obama could say in his comment on Egyptian elections was to say that he was concerned at the situation. He expressed no shock, condemnation or blame for the blatant violations of the most basic of democratic principles. Hillary Clinton has reiterated her belief in the stability of the regime and has asked all parties concerned for restraint. She was probably too busy to follow the news closely. Otherwise she would have learned that peaceful demonstrators were attacked with rubber bullets, electric batons and tear gas, all incidentally made in the US. This is not to mention the new invention by the Egyptian security apparatus, which was reported to have used sewage water in dispersing demonstrators. But to give Clinton her due, she has politely asked Egyptian authorities to unblock Facebook and Twitter, which they did for a couple of hours. The young people who have succeeded in rallying people around a common cause are out on the streets, reinventing themselves and the whole country. Their voices are loud and clear. The regime is now forced to listen. And the whole world will have to take heed.
Increasing CMR in Egypt is a model for the region
Cook 4 (, Steven A. Cook, “The Unspoken Power: Civil-Military Relations and the Prospects for Reform” Sep. 2004)JSM
The new U.S. agenda towards the Muslim world claims to be centered on how best it can support change in prevailing political structures, as a means towards undercutting the causes of and support for violent radicalism. However, little strategy has been developed for how this U.S. policy of change plans to deal with a key bulwark of the status quo, the present imbalance in civil-military relations in much of the region. Until an understanding is made of the central role of militaries and a proper response built, the talk of reform and democratization will remain pure rhetoric.
CMR Spills Over
Plan makes Egypt a model for democracy and CMR in the Arab World
Springborg and Henry 11 (Army Guys, , Robert Springborg is professor of national security affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School and program manager for the Middle East at the Center for Civil-Military Relations, Clement Henry, May-June 2011) JSM
As for Egypt, the Obama Administration needs to signal that in the future it will prefer to interact with civilians at least as much as it has with military and security officials in the past. This does not require ostentatious, clumsy interventions into Egyptian politics, which the military could then use to discredit “disloyal” civilians. Among other things, the Administration could use[;] presidential rhetoric to emphasize Egypt’s new role in leading a democratic Arab world, high-level meetings with Egyptian civilian figures, appropriate assistance by the U.S. Agency for International Development, and inclusion of the parliament in the bilateral relationship. This sort of diplomatic body language would give heart to Egypt’s newly emerging civilian political elite.
Egypt is modeled in the Arab world
Cohen 2k (WILLIAM COHEN HOLDS NEWS EVENTS IN EGYPT, ISRAEL AND NIGERIA, APRIL 4, 2000, William Cohen, Lexis) JSM
COHEN: Good morning. President Mubarak and I just finished our third meeting in the last eight days. We met last week in the White House with President Clinton and then again at the Pentagon. Today, as always, I've found President Mubarak's counsel knowledgeable and wise and we discussed a wide range of world, regional, and bilateral issues. President Mubarak, Minister Tantawi -- who was my gracious host for this visit -- and I agreed that the relationship between Egypt and the United States has never been stronger. Egypt is an important leader in the Arab world, a regional power with unrivaled influence. In addition, Egypt is an important force for peace. In our meeting, I recalled the key role that Egypt had played in resolving tensions between Syria and Turkey last year, and the steady leadership Egypt is currently providing in the Middle East peace process. I just came from Israel, where Prime Minister Barak stressed the contribution that Egypt is making to the efforts to reach agreement between Israel and Syria, and to promote progress between Israel and the Palestinian authority. The Camp David accords have been a model for resolving disputes, but as Israel and Egypt both know, peace does not just happen. It must be constantly nurtured. Egypt and Israel have an opportunity to expand their dealings in ways that will benefit both countries, while improving understanding and stability throughout the region.
A2: CMR Fails – No Public Support
Public strongly supports Civilian Military Relations
Hanson 7 (Victor Davis, senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, “Armies for Democracy,” The American Spectator, July/August 2007, p. 35) MNC
It would thus appear that, to the degree the military has an active consultative role in picking and choosing America's fights, it would not oppose but might indeed support the concept of promoting democracy as an expression of the national interest. Nor does the broader public oppose such a role for our military. Even in controversial cases like Iraq and Afghanistan, the public is strongly supportive of military efforts to birth consensual government in the wake of the removal of dictators, notwithstanding the difficulties of doing so. Most Americans understand that the alternative—restoring order by imposing a friendly strongman—would only sharpen the charge of cynical colonialism, imperialism, and corporatism. If it is true that the spread of democracy around the world will make wars less likely and less frequent, then the military might see democratization as a means of reducing the likelihood of its own deployment in dangerous foreign wars to come.
As a consequence, for a full generation now the all-volunteer American military has trained an entire cadre of officers who have received advanced degrees in our finest academic institutions and thus possess proconsul skills that far exceed those necessary to command men in battle. “Winning hearts and minds" is now deemed just as important to the training of military officers as mastering GPS bombing techniques or the proper uses of the Abrams tank.
Solvency – IMET Solves CMR
International leaders agree: IMET fosters civil-military relations in five ways
Rhame 97 (Lieutenant General Thomas G. Rhame, Director, Defense Security Assistance Agency, Statement before the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade Promotion, Senate Foreign Relations Committee March 12, 1997) KJS
IMET is our single most cost-effective security assistance program. IMET fosters military-to-military relations, promotes military professionalism, and, via the Expanded IMET program, addresses issues of military justice, respect for internationally recognized human rights, effective defense resources management, and improved civil-military relations. The Commanders in Chief of the unified commands have consistently identified IMET as a key tool for enhancing political/military relations with the various countries in their regions. Since 1991, we have broadened the reach of the IMET program to 28 new countries, primarily in Central Europe and the Newly Independent States of the former Soviet Union (NIS). Increasingly, our IMET program in this region has come to focus on preparing these countries for full participation in the Partnership for Peace, and, in some cases, NATO membership. Accordingly, we continue to work towards restoring the level of IMET funding to a level commensurate with the program's global utility and the new requirements for training in these new democracies. This year we are asking for $50 million, an increase of $6.525 million, of which $3.550 million is for countries in Europe and the NIS. Of this, $1.5 million is for three countries, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic .
IMET instills value of good CMR
Bruneau, Peggar, and Wright 8 (Researchers at the Center for Civil-Military Relations, “IMET Assessment Project,” pg 48-49, 2008) KJS
IMET exposes participants to the importance and benefits of civilian control of the military and a strong civil-military relationship at the institutional level. Exposure to democratic values was lauded, by national leaders and IMET graduates, as a strong benefit of IMET. Throughout the IMET focus group meetings, graduates echoed a strong level of exposure to civil-military relations at the international level. The opportunity to interact with peers from various countries provided rich opportunities to understand and to discuss complex civil-military issues that affect not only national level operations but international operations as well. For example, the military doctrine adopted in 2006 by the Slovene Parliament, is based on the system in use in the US army. The adoption of “bottom up changes” is also perceived as a benefit of IMET. However, as pointed out by BG Boli (HDF) bottom up and top down initiatives must be harmonized in order to balance top level support for change. (Note: This is confirmed in the quantitative survey responses to question 22.)
IMET effectively raises knowledge of US practices, increasing cooperation and relations
Bruneau, Peggar, and Wright 8 (Researchers at the Center for Civil-Military Relations, “IMET Assessment Project,” pg 32-33, 2008) KJS
Participants were asked to rate, on a scale of one to five, any change in these areas resultant from their IMET experience. The scale was set as follows: One: Significantly decreased, Two: Somewhat decreased, Three: Neither increased nor decreased, Four: Somewhat increased, Five: Significantly increased. For these three questions, the responses were remarkably positive. 94% of respondents reported that their IMET experience either significantly or somewhat increased their knowledge within their specialty. 88% of respondents reported that their IMET experience either significantly or somewhat increased their knowledge outside of their specialty. 95% of respondents reported increased knowledge of U.S. systems and practices. The question addressing the knowledge of U.S. systems and practices is important for several reasons. First, the U.S. has a vibrant liberal democratic system, and promotion of U.S. ideals and values is an important component of the IMET program. As noted previously, many international IMET participants are also offered the opportunity to participate in programs designed especially to promote these values. Second, improved knowledge of U.S. systems and practices by military and civilian personnel in allied and friendly nations is likely to facilitate cooperation and interoperability with U.S. or other coalition forces, including NATO or U.N. peacekeeping forces. Finally, improved familiarity with U.S. systems and practices arguably facilitates greater reciprocal understanding.
Solvency – IMET Solves CMR
IMET effectively trains participants to influence their home country’s civil society and government
Bruneau, Peggar, and Wright 8 (Researchers at the Center for Civil-Military Relations, “IMET Assessment Project,” pg 33-34, 2008) KJS
The next three questions addressed the impact of the IMET experience on organizations in the recipient country, as assessed by the IMET graduates. These questions also relate to the program’s legislative objectives in the areas of improved resource management and maximized effectiveness as well as increasing partner capacity, in that many IMET courses are designed specifically to address these objectives. These questions, to which respondents could select yes or no, providing additional information as necessary, were: After completion of IMET were you able to apply what you learned? After completion of IMET, were you able to influence others? Can you attribute positive changes in your organization to what you learned through IMET, or as a result of your influence on others? Again, the results as reported by the participants were extremely positive: 87% of respondents reported being able to apply what they learned through IMET upon completion of the experience. 13% reported being unable to apply this knowledge. 90% reported being able to influence others upon completion of IMET, while 10% reported not being able to do so, or being unsure. 79% of respondents attributed positive changes in their organization to their IMET experience or their influence on others. 19% reported no positive changes in their organization, and 2% were unsure. It is noteworthy that the weakest of these positive responses is that of positive change in organizations that may be attributed to IMET. Organizational or systemic change is the most difficult to create, for several reasons. First, many organizations, particularly militaryorganizations, are arguably structured in such a way as to be inherently resistant to change. Second, broad organizational or systemic change often takes place over time, in many cases over years or even decades, in an incremental rather than revolutionary manner. Third, none of the broad objectives posited by the legislation or as interpreted by DSCA are achievable by a single person alone. It is only over time, and likely through the development of a cadre of officials, that the types of change envisioned in the legislation and program guidance will occur. Finally, as noted previously, many of the IMET participants are young or mid-career, and are not likely to yet be in a position in which they are able to themselves drive change. It was in recognition of this last factor that the question about IMET participants’ ability to influence others was included in the survey.
IMET bolsters countries CMR and human rights promotion
Department of State 10 (“Security Assistance in the Near East,” 12/3/2010) JSM
In the Near East region, increased levels of funding reflect the requirements of individual countries and their capacity to absorb additional training as part of their efforts to help support our global counterterrorism efforts. Military-to-military contacts afforded by the IMET program are particularly important in this region, paying dividends far into the future as students rise up the military and political ranks of their respective countries. Strong IMET and military training programs in Jordan, Egypt, Morocco, Oman, Tunisia, Algeria, Bahrain, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Yemen have demonstrated the importance of IMET in fostering one-to-one relationships with the U.S., enabling countries to obtain technical training necessary to maintain U.S.-origin equipment and increasing awareness of international norms of human rights and civilian control of the military. An IMET program in Iraq supports professional military education and enhanced English language capabilities.
Solvency – IMET Solves CMR
Field Studies Program ensures IMET success
CCMR 8 (IMET Assessment Project, Center for Civil Military Relations, public/library_file_proxy.cfm/lid/5586, 2008) JSM
Finally, an additional component of the IMET program is the Informational Program, now known as the Field Studies Program (FSP). Many students who attend education or training offered under the IMET program may also participate in FSP activities. The FSP aims “to ensure the international students return to their homelands with an understanding of the responsibilities of governments, militaries, and citizens to protect, preserve and respect the rights of every individual.” FSP activities are intended to provide IMET participants with an awareness and understanding of democratic ideals and concepts like respect for human rights, the role of a free press, the importance of political, economic and social pluralism, representative government, civilian and military justice systems, democratic political processes, respect for ethnic and other minorities, public and social welfare, labor and labor management relations, environmental protection, transparency and the rule of law, educational opportunities, and other concepts in a similar vein.
IMET solves CMR and regional stability
FAS 2 (The Federation of American Scientists, , 2002)
In short, IMET is designed to accomplish two primary goals. The first is to help strengthen foreign militaries through the provision of skills (and exposure to values) that are necessary for the proper functioning of a civilian controlled, apolitical, and professional military. Secondly, IMET is an 'instrument of influence' through which the U.S. shapes the doctrine, operating procedures, values, choice in weaponry of foreign militaries, and occasionally the policies of the recipient governments. Foreign students - many of whom will occupy the upper echelons of their country's military and political institutions - are taught infantry tactics and operations by American instructors, learn how to operate and maintain American weapons systems, and establish ties with American officers. The resulting doctrinal and operational commonalities, and institutional and individual ties that form between the U.S. armed forces and their foreign counterparts, lead to more interaction and thus, in theory, to stronger relations between the two militaries. Additionally, the U.S. government claims that more interaction translates into more U.S. access to foreign military facilities and bases, which in turn allows the U.S. to establish a military presence in more regions and facilitates the use of military force, or the threat of military force, to address regional threats. After interviewing representatives of the Defense Department, U.S. Army and the U.S. European Command, Rand Analyst William McCoy arrived at a similar conclusion. "Military officers," asserts McCoy, "believe that the primary reason the United States trains foreign military personnel is to establish military-to-military relationships that may be useful in times of crises [and] gives the United States a certain freedom of action in other countries, whether through overflight rights or basing agreements.”
Solvency – IMET Solves CMR
IMET improves home-country human rights
Lipton 98 (David, former undersecretary of international affairs for the Department of the Treasury, Testimony before Congress, “Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations for 1999,” Wednesday February 11, 1998, )
I would like to pose a question about the fundamental benefits of the IMET program: The Administration has testified time and again that the IMET program, and especially the Expanded IMET component, is intended to teach human rights, civilian control of the military, and democracy building. We have been providing IMET and Expanded IMET to Indonesia for many years, but that country's military is still categorized by atrocious human rights violations. When will we see this predicted pay-off for our military assistance? When can we expect the millions of dollars we have put into the IMET program to result in a greater respect for human rights in Indonesia? And I might add that Indonesia is just one of several countries that this question can apply to. Answer. As you note, greater respect for human rights, professionalism, and proper conduct are among the many benefits that we see flowing from the IMET program. While it is impossible to quantify the human rights ``pay-off'' from IMET, we believe that engagement with the Indonesian military through IMET has produced some progress in this regard. IMET provides the opportunity for Indonesian military personnel to be educated in the United States, to observe our commitment to rule of law and American values, and to acquire additional skills. IMET graduates are more professional, more committed to improving their own armed forces, and more likely to be at the forefront in reforming their own services. Indonesian IMET graduates return home with an understanding of what we Americans stand for and what we stand against. IMET graduates have been prominent in investigating and punishing the failures of discipline that cause human rights abuses. We would neither claim that the Indonesian military's human rights record is spotless, nor that IMET is responsible for all improvements. However, there have been some significant steps in the right direction. Citing just a few examples, Indonesian graduates of the IMET program have: Chaired the Military Honor Council that disciplined officers involved in shooting civilians in East Timor in 1991; Drafted and disseminated rules of behavior for Indonesian soldiers confronting civil disturbances; Drafted the ``Basic Human Rights and Respect for Law'' handbook for officers serving in Irian Jaya; and Instituted training programs on international law.
E-IMET instills human rights values
Reynolds 3 (Dr. Ron, Doctorate of Public Administration, DISARM Commandant, “Is Expanded International Military Education and Training reaching the right Audience?,” Defense Institution of Security Assistance Management publications, ) KJS
Other questions are important in relating the impact and quality of the training they received as they recall and use the topics of discussion in their daily activities. Over three out of four, regardless of country, stated that they recalled human rights discussions during their course. Even better than that, four of five, considered the concepts of human rights and personal freedom more than they had previously. A similar percentage concluded that the course they attended had brought a positive impact on their personal leadership abilities or duty performance.
Pakistan – CMR Low Now
Pakistan CMR is low now
Bajoria 9 (Jayshree, Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, “Pakistan’s Fragile Foundations,” ) CLS
Relations between Pakistan's military and civilian governments have always been tenuous. Successive military coups have weakened political institutions. On the other hand, corrupt civilian governments have repeatedly provided the rationale for military coups, in which generals offered order in the midst of chaos.Military intelligence agencies, such as the ISI, have also played a highly controversial role, frequently blamed for meddling in the country's domestic politics. Frederick Grare of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace writes that all of Pakistan's military governments, and some civilian governments, like that of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in the 1970s, have used the intelligence agencies (PDF) for political purposes. Civilian governments have also been victims of the agencies' manipulations in the past.
Pakistan – A2: CMR in Pakistan cyclical
Pakistani CMR historically fragile
Rizvi 98 (Hasan, writer for the peer-etied journal Defense, “Civil-Military Relations in Contempory Pakistan,” ) CLS
Governance in Pakistan is a delicate balancing act between the military chiefs and the elected civilian government. It is a power-sharing arrangement whereby the military has important influence over foreign, security and key domestic issues, and mediates confrontations among feuding political leaders, parties or state institutions- if such confrontations are deemed threatening to political order and stability. Although the civilian government enjoys considerable autonomy for political and economic management and exercise of state authority, it is expected always to consider the military's sensibilities. The military has repeatedly demonstrated that it can and will influence the nature and direction of political change without necessarily assuming power. How to cope with this kind of 'soft' military intervention is a common dilemma for civilian leaders of states that have experienced prolonged military rule. The civilian regimes that succeed military rule face serious identity crises. On the one hand, these governments want to prove that they are not under the tutelage of the military and can act autonomously. On the other hand, they cannot afford to alienate the military leadership, whose support is crucial to their survival. Their task is complicated by the fact that the top brass are loath to surrender the power and privileges that they enjoyed during the years of military rule. The military ensures that there are sufficient constitutional and political safeguards to sustain their entrenched position in the period after their withdrawal from direct rule. Extended military rule in a multi-ethnic and diversified society also increases political fragmentation and creates vested interests supporting authoritarian and non-democratic political arrangements. These conditions make the task of political management difficult for any post-martial law civilian regime aiming to establish its credentials as a genuine democratic government while not alienating the senior commanders.
Pakistan – A2: IMET training spillover won’t help Pakistani CMR
Military cause of CMR problems in Pakistan
Kronstadt 5 (Alan, Asian Analyst for Congressional Research Service, “Pakistan’s Domestic Political Developments,” Pakistan’s Domestic Political Developments) CLS
The military appears to have increased its control over Pakistan; as articulated by a Pakistani authority on civil-military relations, “The corporate interests of the military have expanded so much under General Musharraf that the army is now overwhelming all the major sectors of the state, the economy, and the society.” 19 Military agencies are blamed for abusing human rights and some critics have suggested that Musharraf’s “Faustian bargain” with Islamists serves to strengthen the very extremism that he publicly opposes. 20 One senior Western observer contends that “the generals cannot govern Pakistan, but they will not let anyone else govern it;” a Pakistani commentator sees the problem as “a military that wants to control things without being overtly seen to be doing so.” 21 Although a civilian Parliament has been seated for three years, most of Islamabad’s policy making process is opaque; an absence of transparency may be most noticeable with Pakistan’s defense budget, which appears as a single line in the federal budget. Numerous opposition figures have complained that removing the details of military spending from public scrutiny is nondemocratic and allows the country’s intelligence services, in particular, to remain unaccountable to the people. 22 Although it is possible to argue that Pakistan is more democratic since October 2002 elections, many analysts note that the country’s democratic institutions and processes are inflexible and unaccommodating of dissent, and they see Pakistan’s political parties seriously weakened in recent years, with the military’s influence correspondingly more profound. 23 Moreover, numerous commentators reject the 9/11 Commission’s “best hope” label for Musharraf himself as myopic and repetitive of past U.S. reliance on Pakistani military regimes, especially in light of signs that Pakistan’s seemingly decreasing political stability is rooted in Musharraf’s policies and in his patronage by the United States. 2
Impact – Egyptian Stability
The Egyptian military is in a delicate balance between Mubarak loyalists and revolutionary. Good CMR is key to maintaining military leadership stability
Curry 11 (Tom, National affairs writer for MSNBC News, “New Challenges for US-Egyptian military ties,” February 11, 2011, ) KJS
Steven Cook, a Council on Foreign Relations specialist on Egypt who returned from Cairo two weeks ago, said Thursday, “I would go so far as to say President Mubarak retains the loyalty of the senior command even though he is transferring power to Vice President Omar Suleiman. ... The military remains committed to defending the Egyptian state. I can’t emphasize enough how deeply intertwined they are” with the Mubarak regime. Middle East expert Anthony Cordesman at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington cautioned in a memo Thursday that, “There is no one military, and a careful distinction needs to be made between the real military” which is under the Defense Ministry, and the security forces that are under Ministry of the Interior. “These latter forces are the primary source of the oppression documented in the annual U.S. State Department human rights report, and of the growing authoritarianism and abuses that Egyptians are now protesting,” he said. But some regular military officers, he said, “do have every reason to be loyal to the status quo. There are significant numbers of retired senior military officers in Mubarak's inner circle who have been given sinecures and senior posts in the civil government and state industries, and who will want to continue to benefit from the regime,” he said. But the bulk of retired senior officers “don't enjoy these privileges.” The implication is that a division could exist in the Egyptian military, both active and retired, between those who backed Mubarak and those who supported change. In fact, U.S. officials told NBC News that Egyptian military officials turned on President Hosni Mubarak Thursday night, when some senior military officials threatened to take off their uniforms and join the protesters. Asked if this was a military coup, an official said, "Call it clear military pressure." The most dramatic action Obama and Congress could take to break with the new military regime would be to cut off the $1.3 billion the United States has given Egypt annually under the Foreign Military Financing program to allow it to purchase U.S.-made jets, helicopters, missiles and other hardware. Haas counseled against that step Thursday. “I think the administration is wise to not be talking any longer about potentially threatening aid cutoffs,” he said. “The Egyptian military is obviously the pivotal institution. Why do you want to cut off, or in any way threaten to cut off, one of your ties to that institution?” Jason Brownlee, an Egypt expert at the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at the University of Texas, points out that if the Obama administration threatened the Egyptian government —either the current one or a future one — with a cutoff of military hardware, the Egyptians could respond by saying, “You know your nuclear-powered aircraft carriers that we’ve been letting pass through the Suez Canal without any inspections? We’re going to have start inspecting those now, because we’re always worried about a nuclear accident happening in the Suez Canal.” That could cause U.S. Navy movement from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf to grind to a halt, Brownlee said. Any advice Defense Secretary Robert Gates or U.S. officers are giving to the Egyptians is now being given in private, said Haas, “and that’s exactly the way it should be. ... But the bigger reality is the limits of U.S. influence and the limits of U.S. knowledge.” Haas said he worries that “the longer this drags on, the more the army ‘gets out of the barracks.’ I see two fundamental risks: the more the army becomes a political actor, it loses some of its ‘above politics’ or ‘beyond politics’ legitimacy. Secondly, it could be forced into situations where it needs to takes sides and that could ultimately mean the use of force against one (side) or another.” On Tuesday, Gates lavished praise on Egyptian officers, saying “I think that the Egyptian military has conducted itself in an exemplary fashion during this entire episode. They have acted with great restraint. Frankly, they have done everything that we have indicated we would hope that they would do. ... They have made a contribution to the evolution of democracy and what we're seeing in Egypt.”
Impact – Egyptian Stability
CMR key to Egypt’s stability
Su 11 (Alastair, writer for the Harvard Political Review, Unmasking Egypt’s True Villain, February 20, 2011) CLS
The removal of Murbarak from power does not guarantee a transition to a properly functioning democracy, and many have been guilty of romanticizing the recent events in Egypt. In his op-ed for Project Syndicate, Chris Patten called it “a glorious example of the indefatigable courage of the human spirit”– an example of lofty rhetoric that ignores Egypt’s fundamental problems. The basic fact is this: Egypt’s military still commands too much power for the revolution to effect any genuine or significant changes. For a democracy to function effectively, there needs to be a formal separation in civil-military relations. If this does not happen, the institutions of a country will become inherently instable, as the country’s reins will ultimately be in the hands of the military, not its civilians. Currently, the relationship between Egypt’s military and the state can best be described as a parasitic one. While Egypt’s military provides the country stability, it undermines the state’s long-term interests by refusing privatization of the economy, and withholding political power from its citizens. Egypt’s military currently remains deeply embedded, but it was not always intended to be this way. Writing for Political Science Quarterly, Georgetown’s Mehran Kamrava outlines the genesis of “ideological military states” like Egypt, tracing their historical roots: Beginning with Iraq’s 1936 coup and lasting through the 1960s, the middle classes and other educated groups in the Middle East considered it almost natural for the military to take over the reins of power in order to start the process of political development… Apart from Algeria, where the movement for national liberation started from below and had a truly national component, all of the other early revolutions in the Middle East – excluding Iran’s – started from above and were led and orchestrated by highly ideological officers. To consolidate power, many of these militaries relied on ideological platforms to gain popular legitimacy, casting their promises in nationalistic overtones. Nasser, for instance, was one such example of an officer-turned-visionary, renowned for standing up to the colonialists powers and inventing his own brand of Arab nationalism.
Impact – Democratic Transition 1/3
Egypt’s democratic transition relies on civilian military trust
Khatab 11(Professor Sayed, Senior Research Fellow @ School of Political and Social Inquiry & Global Terrorism Research Centre Monash University, Australia, July, “Egyptian Revolution and its Impact on the Stability in the Middle East”
Having successfully and peacefully found a way through this delicate period thus far, the military Council must have an understandable degree of public trust. This trust is key to protecting Egyptian democracy. In this context, there are a series of promising signals from the transitional military rulers. For example, when the people protested against General Dr Shafiq‘s interim government, which was appointed by Mubarak, the Military Council dissolved Shafiq‘s government and called on Esam Sharaf to form a new one. Dr Sharaf‘s name was on the list that the revolutionaries provided to the Military Council. Sharaf is a professor of civil engineering at Cairo University and a former Minister who resigned in July 2004 when he saw corruption. He was with these angry crowds in Tahrir Square in the early days but left for work. When the Military Council called Dr Esam, he was in a conference in UAE but he came and received his appointment from the Military Council. He, however, went to Tahrir Square to speak to the crowds who were waiting for him. He told them that ―I take my legitimacy from you…I will work to fulfil your demands and if I couldn‘t do it; I will resign…‖ It was the first time that a Prime Minster was carried on the shoulders of the people of Egypt. The trust between the army and the people is the key to protecting the demands of the people and the transition to true democracy. As a caretaker, the Council of the Military Forces fulfilled its promises in many areas and reaffirmed the military‘s commitment to transfer the power to a democratically elected civil government. Among the many examples of the military‘s accomplishments are the following: • Dissolved the Two Houses • Dissolved the notorious ―Security of State Apparatus‖ • Dissolved the previous regime‘s political Party • Destroyed the previous regime‘s idea of towrith (inheriting the throne; transferring power to one of the president‘s Sons). • Established a road-map to manage the country‘s affairs and the change to true Democracy • Established a Care-Taking Government accepted by the people • Reformed the Constitution to guide the transitional period • Held a referendum on the constitutional amendments • Unveiled corruption and dealt with it according to the Law • Persecuted officials of the previous regime for corruption and misuse of public funds • Annihilated terrorism • Strengthened national unity • Returned personal ―freedoms‖ to individuals and groups • Dismantled the wall of fear • Issued the Law of the Parliament (June 01, 2011) for public discussion • Built a new Republic based on Democracy and Human Rights • Returned Egypt to its leading Role in the Middle Eastern, African and world circles of politics • Returned Egypt to play its role in the sphere of Human Rights • Successfully brought an end to the division between Palestinian factions • Released the political prisoners and the prisoners of opinion. • Prepared for the parliamentary election in September (2011) • Prepared for the presidential election to be in November (2011) • Intention to draft a new Constitution
Impact – Democratic Transition 2/3
Successful transition to democracy will spillover to other Middle Eastern countries
Kagan and Dunne 11 (Robert, senior fellow at Brookings, Michele, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, , “Why Egypt has to be the U.S. priority in the Middle East”) MV
With the horrific carnage in Libya, the flames of revolution burning in Yemen and Bahrain, and protests for political change in Jordan and Morocco, there's a danger that the United States and Europe may lose sight of what still has to be our highest priority in the region: helping the people of Egypt complete their transition to democracy and a new chance at prosperity. Why is Egypt so important? Because it is the heart of the Arab world. It was the birthplace of pan-Arabism under Gamal Nasser, the linchpin of Middle East peace under Anwar Sadat. With more than 80 million people - as many as Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Syria combined - it has a large and vigorous civil society, feisty, independent media, a broad array of political forces, and a well-respected judiciary. If Egypt can make the transition to democracy, it will lead the way to a new era for the Arab world. If Cairo falls back to dictatorship of one variety or another, it is unlikely the rest of the region will move on without it. The Arab Spring will live or die in Egypt.
Democracy key to peace in the Middle East
Kirkup 11 (James Kirkup, Democracy is route to peace in Middle East, says David Cameron, The Telegraph, Feb 21, 2011, )
Freedom and democracy are the best way to bring peace and prosperity to the Middle East, David Cameron will proclaim in a speech. With popular uprisings flaring in countries across the Middle East and North Africa, Mr Cameron will today insist that regional leaders must respond with “reform not repression.” On Monday, the Prime Minister became the first Western leader to visit Egypt since a popular uprising ousted Hosni Mubarak. He urged Egypt’s interim military rulers to ensure a “genuine transition” to civilian rule and declared: “Greater openness can lead to greater stability.” He also strongly condemned the Gaddafi regime’s violence against civilian protesters in Libya as “quite appalling”. Mr Cameron has asked his officials to investigate whether any British-made weapons have been used in the “vicious repression”. He also faced Labour criticism after it emerged he is being accompanied on his Middle East tour by executives from major British companies, including several defence manufacturers. Mr Cameron flew on to Kuwait, where he will deliver a speech making a “liberal conservative” call for widespread political reform in the region. Since democracy often goes hand-in-hand with open markets, more freedom in the Middle East could deliver commercial opportunities for Britain, the Prime Minister will argue on Tuesday. Discussing the thinking behind the speech, Mr Cameron insisted that more democracy in the Middle East is in Britain’s best interests. “We’ve got a very important trading relationship that we want to expand and we’ve got a very important security relationship, not least in terms of combating extremist terror, that we need to sharpen,” he said. “A process of political and economic reform doesn’t run counter to those other two objectives. It goes with those objectives.” He told reporters in Cairo: “I believe in a liberal conservative approach rather than a neo-conservative approach. “Democracy is a process not just an event. “We who want to see a more stable world, and stronger trading relationships, we should be arguing for the building blocks of democracy.” Simply holding elections, he said, was not a guarantee of freedom. That requires the full range of institutions, from an independent judiciary to a free press and healthy political parties.
Impact – Democratic Transition 3/3
The Middle East is on the brink of a nuclear war
Blake 11 (Heidi Blake, WikiLeaks: tension in the Middle East and Asia has 'direct potential' to lead to nuclear war, The Telegraph, Feb 2, 2011, )
Tension in the Middle East and Asia has given rise to an escalating atomic arms and missiles race which has “the direct potential to lead to nuclear war,” leaked diplomatic documents disclose. Rogue states are also increasing their efforts to secure chemical and biological weapons, and the means to deploy them, leaving billions in the world's most densely populated area at risk of a devastating strike, the documents show. States such as North Korea, Syria and Iran are developing long-range missiles capable of hitting targets outside the region, records of top-level security briefings obtained by WikiLeaks show. Long-running hostilities between India and Pakistan – which both have nuclear weapons capabilities – are at the root of fears of a nuclear conflict in the region. A classified Pentagon study estimated in 2002 that a nuclear war between the two countries could result in 12 million deaths. Secret records of a US security briefing at an international non-proliferation summit in 2008 stated that “a nuclear and missile arms race [in South Asia] has the direct potential to lead to nuclear war in the world's most densely populated area and a region of increasing global economic significance”. The same briefing gave warning that development of cruise and ballistic missiles in the Middle East and Asia could enable rogue states to fire weapons of mass destruction into neighbouring regions. The leaked documents also disclose alarming details of the chemical and biological weapons programmes being pursued by rogue states such as Syria and North Korea. Syria - which backs the Lebanese terrorist group Hezbollah – is believed to be developing chemical weapons using the lethal nerve agents sarin and VX, which shut down the nervous system in under a minute if inhaled or absorbed through the skin.
Middle East war goes Global
London 10 (Herbert I. London, President of the Hudson Institute, a New York University based political think tank, and professor of Humanities at New York University, Hudson New York, 6/28/10, )
The coming storm in the Middle East is gaining momentum; like conditions prior to World War I, all it takes for explosive action to commence is a trigger. Turkey's provocative flotilla, often described in Orwellian terms as a humanitarian mission, has set in motion a gust of diplomatic activity: if the Iranians send escort vessels for the next round of Turkish ships, which they have apparently decided not to do in favor of land operations, it could have presented a casus belli. [cause for war] Syria, too, has been playing a dangerous game, with both missile deployment and rearming Hezbollah. According to most public
accounts, Hezbollah is sitting on 40,000 long-, medium- and short-range missiles, and Syrian territory has been serving as a conduit for military materiel from Iran since the end of the 2006 Lebanon War. Should Syria move its own scuds to Lebanon or deploy its troops as reinforcement for Hezbollah, a wider regional war with Israel could not be contained. In the backdrop is an Iran, with sufficient fissionable material to produce a couple of nuclear weapons. It will take some time to weaponize the missiles, but the road to that goal is synchronized in green lights since neither diplomacy nor diluted sanctions can convince Iran to change course. From Qatar to Afghanistan all political eyes are on Iran, poised to be "the hegemon" in the Middle East; it is increasingly considered the "strong horse" as American forces incrementally retreat from the region. Even Iraq, ironically, may depend on Iranian ties in order to maintain internal stability. For Sunni nations like Egypt and Saudi Arabia, regional strategic vision is a combination of deal-making to offset the Iranian Shia advantage, and attempting to buy or develop nuclear weapons as a counterweight to Iranian ambition. However, both of these governments are in a precarious state; should either fall, all bets are off in the Middle East neighborhood. It has long been said that the Sunni "tent" must stand on two legs: if one, falls, the tent collapses.
Impact – Democratic Transition EXT
Increased CMR through US efforts key to ensure a stable transition to democracy – failure leads to backlash
Schenker 7/25 (David, “Egypt After Mubarak” Egypt’s Enduring Challenges—Policy Recommendations, Schenker is the Aufzien fellow and director of the Program on Arab Politics at The Washington Institute,) JSM
Mubarak’s departure provides an opportunity to emerge from the morass and reestablish the state as a dynamic regional actor. Yet even as the transition holds the promise of democratic reform for Egypt, it also threatens to retard if not reverse some of the hard-won economic reforms of recent years. It is not difficult, for example, to imagine how perceptions of inequity during the previous regime might dissuade a new leadership in Cairo from pursing necessary, if controversial, subsidy reforms. Regardless of who inherits the Mubarak mantle, Egypt’s next government will face a host of regional and domestic policy dilemmas. And the pressure for the new government to solve these problems will be intense. In this context, pursuing any policies of the ancien régime, particularly those related to Washington or Israel, may spark a backlash. Should Cairo respond to such challenges with increased authoritarianism or with populism—à la Erdoğan’s Turkey—it would exacerbate the problems at home and undermine U.S.-Egyptian bilateral ties. The new Egypt will face enduring challenges. Mubarak may be gone, but a series of other debilitating problems remain that, unless remedied, will continue to prompt public dissatisfaction, anger, and, potentially, instability. Given the present situation, the trajectory of Egyptian politics remains unclear. The military’s transition plan could fail or it could seek to impose a modified version of the old system. More likely, the military will seek to conduct elections and return to the barracks as soon as possible, leaving the task of governing to civilians. If the liberal opposition prevails over the Islamists and a recalcitrant NDP political machine, Washington will need to embrace the new government and invest heavily and quickly in its success, lest the Islamists exploit its failure. In such a scenario, U.S. policy should look to capitalize on the change in leadership to improve Egyptian governance at home and reinvigorate Cairo’s traditional regional role. Despite deep political and continuing military ties, U.S. leverage with Cairo remains modest. Nevertheless, Washington can help stabilize the new regime while simultaneously encouraging positive change for the Egyptian people. As Egypt approaches this crossroads, Washington must take steps to nudge Egypt toward a better future in tandem with its U.S. partner.
Impact – Democratic Transition EXT
Healthy Egyptian CMR is key to a stable and democratic Egypt
Krieg 11 (Andreas, Egyptian Civil-Military Relations and Egypt’s Potential Transition to Democracy, , Andreas Krieg, PhD King’s College London, War Studies Department / Department of Defence Studies) JSM
Looking at Egypt and its military apparatus one has to be careful when speaking about ‘the soldier’ or ‘the military’. Since the army came to power during the Free Officer’s overthrow of the royal regime in 1952, the Egyptian military and political institutions have been deeply intertwined and military as well as political leaders have been eager to create a dense security grid reaching to every layer of society. Therefore, when referring to the Egyptian military one has to distinguish between the actual armed forces that total around 470,000 men under arms and about the same amount of reservists, subordinate to the command of the Ministry of Defence, and the Central Security Services or the National Guard. The Central Security Services commanding approximately 325,000 men and the National Guard having 60,000 subordinates work both under the supervision of the Ministry of Interior. All three institutions can be commonly referred to as a being a part of the military organization of the state of Egypt[39]. The actual state-soldier contract in the case of Egypt, applies however merely to the military leadership and the ordinary soldier serving in the actual armed forces. The Egyptian army is a typical modern army characterized by a relatively great number of armed servicemen and the lack of civil-military integration. Despite the fact that the arm of the Egyptian military reaches far into the civilian population through its ownership and governance of institutions relevant to the civilian sector, the Egyptian army nonetheless remains a state within the state. Living and working within more than 17 military cities largely independent from the civilian population in the vicinity, the Egyptian army tries hard to isolate the soldier from civilian life[40]. Thus, the Egyptian army can hardly be compared to other post-modern armies identified by increasing civil-military integration and a small highly professional volunteer force. The Egyptian army is still largely comprised of roughly 80,000 conscripts entering the army service annually and serving three years of compulsory service. As a result, analysts oftentimes refer to the Egyptian army as a citizen army[41]. Apart from this solid foundation of citizens serving in the army, the military leadership in Egypt ensures that the education and training of its soldiers takes place detached from any civilian influence. Therefore, the claim that the Egyptian army is not an isolated elite is not entirely true since upon entrance to the military service many of the young conscripts or university graduates seeking an economically viable career in the armed forces leave their civilian identity behind. In addition to that, the recruits entering army services cannot be described as being representative of the Egyptian society at large due to the fact that most of the young recruits do not come from Egypt’s urban and Westernized elite but to a great extent from the less-educated rural population[42].The main purpose of the Egyptian armed forces is comparable to the purpose of most Middle Eastern armies, i.e. primarily serving as the defender of the state and the nation in a region where most actors see themselves constantly confronted with military conflicts that affect existential national interests. Apart from its essentially defensive role, the Egyptian military has a range of other important objectives: “[…]: deterrence, support for Egypt’s regional role, military modernization, achieving military self-sufficiency, maintaining a positive image with Egypt’s population, effectively employing soldiers idled by a diminished defense requirements in an era of peace, and serving as an engine for Egypt’s economic growth and development.”[43] Most importantly, the Egyptian military has great stakes in Egyptian daily life since its seize of power in 1952. Despite the fact that the Egyptian military’s influence and dominance of domestic politics has decreased in recent decades in comparison to the time of President Nasser’s rule between 1956 and 1970, the Egyptian army nonetheless remains one of the most important institutions in society, economics and politics. Being the major driving force behind the overthrow of the royal regime in 1952, the military remained the most influential actor in Egyptian politics through the direct participation of military men in the government in the years to come.
Impact – Democratic Transition EXT
CMR key to transition – Africa proves
Frazer 95 (Jendayi, Harvard school of public policy professor, “Conceptualizing Civil-Military Relations During Democratic Transition, ) CLS
Civilian control of the military is necessary to establish account- able political systems in which citizens determine who governs. A stable democratic process is not possible when the military is a lin- gering threat to overturn elections or overthrow civilian leaders. Re- markably, given Africa's repeated coups, democratization efforts have largely focused on constitutional reform of electoral rules, rather than institutionally minimizing military power. Increasing po- litical participation through multi-party politics does not guarantee civilian control of the military. The previous period of political lib- eralization led by the 1950-1960s decolonization movement was marked by constitutional talks, referenda, transitional governments and elections to legitimize the process and outcome of regime change. Nevertheless, successful coups d'etat occurred within the first years of independence in two-thirds of all African countries. Clearly, though important, constitutional processes alone are un- likely to lead to democratic consolidation. Civil-military relations must be restructured as a key element for successful transition from war to peace and authoritarianism to democracy in Africa. This article identifies important conceptual and analytical issues that arise in the study of African civil-military relations during peri- ods of major political transition. It presents a set of conceptual tools appropriate for analyzing highly contingent, historically complex, and indeterminate processes of transition. The goal is to identify generalizable or predictable patterns and issues of civil-military re- lations that emerge despite the uniqueness of each political transition. The article concludes by offering three policy prescriptions that can help to stabilize civilian control in newly democratic regimes. In particular, the role of timing, statecraft, and structural resources strongly condition the negotiating agenda of civil-military relations during transition, and the strength of new institutional arrange- ments intended to shore up civilian control.
Impact – Middle East Stability 1/2
CMR key to Middle East stability
Cook 5 (Stephen, fellow at the Brookings Institute, “Shift in civil-military relations key to Middle East reform,” June 2005) CLS
Civil-military relations are a critical, but often overlooked area, in the discussion of political reform in the Arab and Islamic worlds. In a variety of key countries stretching across North Africa, the Levant, South Asia, and Southeast Asia, militaries have played important roles in modernization and institutionalization. Yet, while military establishments may have at one time been the appropriate organizations to carry out state-building, they have often become conservative elements clinging to the authoritarian status quo. Case studies of Egypt, Pakistan, and Syria demonstrate how military leaderships benefit from the largely authoritarian political regimes of their respective countries. While political reform is possible, their officers are likely to resist efforts to undertake any meaningful reform that will alter prevailing power relations and political institutions. Rather, the commanders will probably, as they have in the past, seek marginal political change that instills greater legitimacy and credibility to their regimes. While taking account of demands for change from below, the officers and their civilian allies will resist efforts to undermine critical means of political control. Put simply, there may be greater freedom of expression, relatively freer elections, and increased opportunities to establish political parties, but the critical linkage between the Egyptian presidency and the army, the broad domain of Pakistan's National Security Council, and the civil-military compact encompassed in the Baathist regime and Syria's state of emergency will remain powerful means through which the military and its civilian allies can ensure political control. Reform in military-dominated states will thus be difficult.While political change is ultimately an internal political process, the United States can take to help create conditions more conducive to progressive political development in Egypt, Pakistan, and Syria specifically, as well as in other states of the Islamic world where militaries have played key political roles. These include: ¥ Stand Up For Local Reformers: In general, beyond the rhetorical commitments of senior policymakers, Washington must make a strong policy stance on the importance of human rights and democracy in Egypt, Pakistan, and Syria. There is a sense among intellectuals, activists, and even leaders in the Middle East that the U.S. is not serious about promoting political reform given it's overriding security concerns in the region. This has allowed Egyptian, Pakistani, and Syrian officials - who have become adept at the discourse of reform - to deflect and diffuse demands for change. U.S. policymakers should press them to live up to their rhetorical commitments to political and social reform. One way the U.S. can demonstrate its own interest in political change in the region is through an emphasis on human rights. The Egyptian, Pakistani, and Syrian national security states have taken a heavy toll on political dissidents. Efforts must be made on behalf of dissidents and activists in the region, who crucially have local credibility. ¥ Support Civilian Control Over the Military: In their broad discussions about reform with Presidents Mubarak, Musharraf, and Assad, U.S. policymakers and diplomats must stress the importance of civilian control over the military. Altering the deep-rooted national security states of Egypt, Pakistan, and Syria is no easy task and will require significant institutional change. Moreover, achieving a shift in civil-military relations in favor of civilians is no guarantee of political change. After all, civilians are not immune from predatory policies. Still, as cases from Latin America and Asia suggest, civilian superiority provides the best chance for political liberalization and economic reform. Washington would thus need to encourage changes that 1) close channels through which Egyptian, Pakistani, and Syrian officers have been able to influence politics; 2) prevent the officers from engaging in activities not strictly related to defense and national security; 3) provide civilians with the means to override the officers, and 4) alter the prevailing ethos held within the officer corps that justifies their intervention.
Impact – Middle East Stability 2/2
The Middle East is on the brink of a nuclear war
Blake 11 (Heidi Blake, WikiLeaks: tension in the Middle East and Asia has 'direct potential' to lead to nuclear war, The Telegraph, Feb 2, 2011, )
Tension in the Middle East and Asia has given rise to an escalating atomic arms and missiles race which has “the direct potential to lead to nuclear war,” leaked diplomatic documents disclose. Rogue states are also increasing their efforts to secure chemical and biological weapons, and the means to deploy them, leaving billions in the world's most densely populated area at risk of a devastating strike, the documents show. States such as North Korea, Syria and Iran are developing long-range missiles capable of hitting targets outside the region, records of top-level security briefings obtained by WikiLeaks show. Long-running hostilities between India and Pakistan – which both have nuclear weapons capabilities – are at the root of fears of a nuclear conflict in the region. A classified Pentagon study estimated in 2002 that a nuclear war between the two countries could result in 12 million deaths. Secret records of a US security briefing at an international non-proliferation summit in 2008 stated that “a nuclear and missile arms race [in South Asia] has the direct potential to lead to nuclear war in the world's most densely populated area and a region of increasing global economic significance”. The same briefing gave warning that development of cruise and ballistic missiles in the Middle East and Asia could enable rogue states to fire weapons of mass destruction into neighbouring regions. The leaked documents also disclose alarming details of the chemical and biological weapons programmes being pursued by rogue states such as Syria and North Korea. Syria - which backs the Lebanese terrorist group Hezbollah – is believed to be developing chemical weapons using the lethal nerve agents sarin and VX, which shut down the nervous system in under a minute if inhaled or absorbed through the skin.
Middle East war goes Global
London 10 (Herbert I. London, President of the Hudson Institute, a New York University based political think tank, and professor of Humanities at New York University, Hudson New York, 6/28/10, )
The coming storm in the Middle East is gaining momentum; like conditions prior to World War I, all it takes for explosive action to commence is a trigger. Turkey's provocative flotilla, often described in Orwellian terms as a humanitarian mission, has set in motion a gust of diplomatic activity: if the Iranians send escort vessels for the next round of Turkish ships, which they have apparently decided not to do in favor of land operations, it could have presented a casus belli. [cause for war] Syria, too, has been playing a dangerous game, with both missile deployment and rearming Hezbollah. According to most public
accounts, Hezbollah is sitting on 40,000 long-, medium- and short-range missiles, and Syrian territory has been serving as a conduit for military materiel from Iran since the end of the 2006 Lebanon War. Should Syria move its own scuds to Lebanon or deploy its troops as reinforcement for Hezbollah, a wider regional war with Israel could not be contained. In the backdrop is an Iran, with sufficient fissionable material to produce a couple of nuclear weapons. It will take some time to weaponize the missiles, but the road to that goal is synchronized in green lights since neither diplomacy nor diluted sanctions can convince Iran to change course. From Qatar to Afghanistan all political eyes are on Iran, poised to be "the hegemon" in the Middle East; it is increasingly considered the "strong horse" as American forces incrementally retreat from the region. Even Iraq, ironically, may depend on Iranian ties in order to maintain internal stability. For Sunni nations like Egypt and Saudi Arabia, regional strategic vision is a combination of deal-making to offset the Iranian Shia advantage, and attempting to buy or develop nuclear weapons as a counterweight to Iranian ambition. However, both of these governments are in a precarious state; should either fall, all bets are off in the Middle East neighborhood. It has long been said that the Sunni "tent" must stand on two legs: if one, falls, the tent collapses.
Impact – Middle East Stability EXT
CMR key to Middle Eastern stability – Loyalties, war on terror, and fundamentalism
Bensahel and Byman 4 (Nora and Daniel, Fellow at RAND, and US Air Force Consultants, “The Future Security Environment in the Middle East Conflict, Stability, and Political Change,” ) CLS
In Egypt, as elsewhere in the region, a secure hold on the military’s allegiance is essential to maintaining control over the succession and preventing elite conflicts from splintering into overt power struggles. A second potentially destabilizing force stems from the variety of tensions and conflicts among the states in the region. The link between regional instability and civil-military relations is indirect but is potentially critical for the internal stability of key Arab allies. Among the critical issues is the unresolved Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which since the fall of 2000 has worsened considerably. Poor Palestinian Israeli relations increase popular alienation in Muslim capitals, especially in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt, which are U.S. allies, and in the latter cases maintain unpopular peace treaties with Israel. These regimes are forced to resort to increased repression, which on a regular basis involves their security and intelligence services. However, the prospect of military involvement in the repression of widespread demonstrations is of real concern. In addition to destabilizing the regime’s political-military balance of power, such a potentiality might test the loyalties of junior officers and soldiers forced to fire on family, friends, and communities with which they identify. 66 If military support for these regimes is jeopardized, they become more vulnerable to opposition elements from within the regime, and beyond. The U.S. war on terrorism and the reconstruction of Iraq also are potential sources of instability within Arab states. To the extent U.S. activities increase resentment toward status quo regimes and provoke anti-American demonstrations, these activities potentially undermine key allies’ civil-military relations. Such regimes as Jordan have been forced to clamp down on social opposition and demon-strators opposed to U.S. policy in the region. 67 This pits the security services and the conventional armed forces that back them against mainstream opinion. Thus far, pivotal U.S. allies such as Egypt and Jordan have successfully contained social opposition. But it is difficult if not impossible to anticipate when these domestic tensions could shift the political-military balance of power. Security forces and military leaders could act against demonstrators, or perhaps more likely, there could be behind-the-scenes pressure to relax proU.S. positions and appease popular opinion. These are potentially important considerations for how the United States crafts policy in the region. In short, controversies over the prosecution of the war on terrorism, U.S. policy toward the reconstruction of Iraq, and the stalemate in Palestinian-Israeli peace could have ramifications far beyond their immediate domains. A final threat to stability in civil-military relations comes from factionalism and religious fundamentalism in the armed forces. There is very little reliable information available in the public arena that would indicate the extent of fundamentalist penetration of the armed forces in these regimes. These issues are nonetheless vital to assessing civil-military relations for two reasons. Factionalism can be a precursor to military intervention in politics. A faction that commands a substantial following in the armed forces is a prerequisite to building an effective coup coalition. Coups are born from secret cells in the armed forces and depend largely on cultivating a core group of supporters and then expanding its horizontal and vertical linkages in the armed forces. Although it is difficult to plot in secrecy, the potential remains that a disaffected unit might, without notice, succeed in removing a leader in a key Arab capital, such as Syria or Egypt. Factionalism in the armed forces is all the more worrisome when militant fundamentalist sentiment is high within the officer corps. The latter can provide the ideological glue for a disaffected group, and the motivation to move against a regime, despite the substantial personal risks involved to the conspirators. Fundamentalist “infiltration” remains a stated objective of militant groups battling the Egyptian regime since the 1990s. 68 The fact that the regime has now largely broken the militant organizations does not fully alleviate the concern that they may succeed in courting sections of the officer corps
Impact – Middle East Stability EXT
CMR is key to managing conflicts and encouraging stable political reform
Rana 4 (Raj, Unit for Relations with Armed and Security Forces at the International
Committee of the Red Cross, September, “Contemporary challenges in the civil-military relationship: Complementarity or incompatibility,” IRRc, 86:855, p 567-568) JJN
Humanitarian operations have become a mainstream, non-combat function of armed forces, employed equally in combat, stabilization operations or as part of nation-building agendas. Providing assistance to the civilian population, or influencing the humanitarian and reconstruction efforts of others, is considered as a means of “force multiplication” or “force protection”. 5 Political authorities expect their armed forces to have improved their civil-military capacities so as to meet their obligations under international humanitarian law, in addition to becoming part of the integral post-conflict political and reconstruction efforts of local authorities, State civilian agencies, humanitarian organizations and others. • The phenomenon of armed forces engaging in humanitarian action in the 1990s was a new and evolving concept without a road map, and there was room for humanitarian agencies to contest the perceived “militarization” of humanitarian assistance. Today, military and political actors are more certain of how they want to intervene, and consider every armed intervention as a fresh opportunity to test new integrated approaches to conflict management. Humanitarian organizations that fail to align themselves with these integrated approaches are perceived as being entrenched behind the inflexibility of their mandates, or simply out of step with the times. • At both national and regional levels, there are active efforts to streamline and merge State and military capacities in carrying out future armed interventions. The concept of the latter is one in which the military is able to jump from waging war to peacekeeping to humanitarian assistance on the same day, at times within the same city. Civilian experts will be embedded into military structures to provide support for policing, civil administration and political reform, and to act as advisors to military forces and even as donors to humanitarian, reconstruction and private sector actors.
CMR assistance solves regional and domestic threat perceptions preventing conflict
Bruneau and Trinkunas 6 Thomas, Distinguished professor of National Security Affiars, Naval Postgraduate School, Harold, Associate Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School
[Democratization as a Global Phenomenon and its Impact on Civil-Military Relations, ]cs
Once we take democratization seriously as a global phenomenon with an impact on civil-military relations, we are led to explore an important set of new phenomena. First, the empowering of civilian political leaders, who often have little or no background on security issues and may be suspicious of the armed forces, is likely to alter the ways states approach security issues. In particular, this change in authority and control over budgets and resources produces shifts in national defence strategies, military capabilities, and defence spending, with their consequent impact on neighbouring states’ threat perceptions.9 Similarly, to the extent democracies are indeed unlikely to fight each other, as seems the case among the members of well-established security communities such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), in the European Union (EU), and the economic community that is the Mercado Comu´n del Sur (Mercosur), democratization is likely to foster a search for new roles and missions for the armed forces. For example, the emergence of South America as a major source of peacekeeping forces gives additional international status and credibility to Mercosur partners and associates Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina, and Chile. Most importantly, the US and Europe have launched and sustained a major effort to export their characteristically liberal understanding of civil-military relations to new democracies around the world. Although largely uncoordinated, the emphasis on civilian control is remarkably consistent, but it has not previously been systematically studied.
Impact – Middle East Stability EXT
Civil Military Relations are necessary for stability in the Middle East
Bensahel and Byman 4 (Nora and Daniel, Deputy Director of Studies and Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security and Professor at Georgetown University’s Security Studies Program, “ The Future Security Environment in the Middle East Conflict, Stability, and Political Change,” paper prepared for the RAND Corporation, , p. 129) MNC
Military establishments are among the most—if not the most— important domestic constituencies in the states of the Middle East. Despite periodic experiments with political and economic liberalization, the region’s Arab states in particular remain solidly nondemocratic. 1 Political leaders rely ultimately on coercive power to maintain their positions and depend upon their armed forces to defend against challengers and opponents. For this reason, military organizations are constituencies no authoritarian leader can afford to ignore. In fact, political leaders have proven quite successful in managing relations with their armed forces. Throughout the Middle East, leaders have attained and retained political control over their militaries, even as they continue to depend on their officers’ loyalty to maintain office. Analyzing the bases of this political control provides crucial insight into the internal logic of the region’s authoritarian regimes. Civil-military relations are essential for evaluating the past and future stability of the key U.S. adversaries and allies in the region
Middle East stability important for the US and rest of the world
Bensahel and Byman 4 (Nora and Daniel, Deputy Director of Studies and Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security and Professor at Georgetown University’s Security Studies Program, “ The Future Security Environment in the Middle East Conflict, Stability, and Political Change,” paper prepared for the RAND Corporation, , p. 305) MNC
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Middle East has played a more prominent role in U.S. policy than ever before. The United States relies on Middle Eastern partners such as Israel, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Egypt, and others to fight terrorism and to halt the proliferation of WMD by rogue states. The loss of key partners due to hostile regime changes or increasing anti-Americanism could limit the United States’ ability to fight terrorism within the region. In addition, the United States has an interest in maintaining stable energy prices and reliable supplies. Given the West’s dependence on Middle East oil, political instability in the region could hurt economies around the world.
Impact – Terrorism 1/2
CMR key for counter-terrorism
Witzig 5 (Jurgen, Military Colonel, and Director of the Civilian-Military Center for Cooperation and Exellence, Counter Terrorism Seminar, ) CLS
Nations have different policies concerning CIMIC both inside their own territory and when participating in international operations. Terrorism does not know any geographical or organisational boundaries and lives on its opponent’s lack of responsibilities and structures. Terrorists “love” these gaps, they hide in them, and there is a clear need for closing these gaps by working together. The doctrinal issue must be addressed, in particular the NATO doctrine which is obviously not as comprehensive as required, i.e. it should be made clear that “CIMIC is in support of the mission”. In the fight against terrorism, civil-military co-operation is the mission. A good example on how not to organise interagency co-operation is a number of effective agencies being placed under the command of one body. This compromises the effectiveness of each body involved. The key is to integrate the involved agencies in a network. At the moment, CIMIC is a purely military concept. The problem is to change it into a practicable solution serving the fight against terrorism.
Impact – Terrorism 2/2
Terrorism causes extinction – draws in Russia and China
Ayson 10 (Robert, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington, “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7, July, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via InformaWorld)
A terrorist nuclear attack, and even the use of nuclear weapons in response by the country attacked in the first place, would not necessarily represent the worst of the nuclear worlds imaginable. Indeed, there are reasons to wonder whether nuclear terrorism should ever be regarded as belonging in the category of truly existential threats. A contrast can be drawn here with the global catastrophe that would come from a massive nuclear exchange between two or more of the sovereign states that possess these weapons in significant numbers. Even the worst terrorism that the twenty-first century might bring would fade into insignificance alongside considerations of what a general nuclear war would have wrought in the Cold War period. And it must be admitted that as long as the major nuclear weapons states have hundreds and even thousands of nuclear weapons at their disposal, there is always the possibility of a truly awful nuclear exchange taking place precipitated entirely by state possessors themselves. But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important … some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington’s relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washington’s early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country’s armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response. As part of its initial response to the act of nuclear terrorism (as discussed earlier) Washington might decide to order a significant conventional (or nuclear) retaliatory or disarming attack against the leadership of the terrorist group and/or states seen to support that group. Depending on the identity and especially the location of these targets, Russia and/or China might interpret such action as being far too close for their comfort, and potentially as an infringement on their spheres of influence and even on their sovereignty. One far-fetched but perhaps not impossible scenario might stem from a judgment in Washington that some of the main aiders and abetters of the terrorist action resided somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what Allison claims is the “Chechen insurgents’ … long-standing interest in all things nuclear.”42 American pressure on that part of the world would almost certainly raise alarms in Moscow that might require a degree of advanced consultation from Washington that the latter found itself unable or unwilling to provide. There is also the question of how other nuclear-armed states respond to the act of nuclear terrorism on another member of that special club. It could reasonably be expected that following a nuclear terrorist attack on the United States, both Russia and China would extend immediate sympathy and support to Washington and would work alongside the United States in the Security Council. But there is just a chance, albeit a slim one, where the support of Russia and/or China is less automatic in some cases than in others. For example, what would happen if the United States wished to discuss its right to retaliate against groups based in their territory? If, for some reason, Washington found the responses of Russia and China deeply underwhelming, (neither “for us or against us”) might it also suspect that they secretly were in cahoots with the group, increasing (again perhaps ever so slightly) the chances of a major exchange. If the terrorist group had some connections to groups in Russia and China, or existed in areas of the world over which Russia and China held sway, and if Washington felt that Moscow or Beijing were placing a curiously modest level of pressure on them, what conclusions might it then draw about their culpability? If Washington decided to use, or decided to threaten the use of, nuclear weapons, the responses of Russia and China would be crucial to the chances of avoiding a more serious nuclear exchange. They might surmise, for example, that while the act of nuclear terrorism was especially heinous and demanded a strong response, the response simply had to remain below the nuclear threshold. It would be one thing for a non-state actor to have broken the nuclear use taboo, but an entirely different thing for a state actor, and indeed the leading state in the international system, to do so. If Russia and China felt sufficiently strongly about that prospect, there is then the question of what options would lie open to them to dissuade the United States from such action: and as has been seen over the last several decades, the central dissuader of the use of nuclear weapons by states has been the threat of nuclear retaliation. If some readers find this simply too fanciful, and perhaps even offensive to contemplate, it may be informative to reverse the tables. Russia, which possesses an arsenal of thousands of nuclear warheads and that has been one of the two most important trustees of the non-use taboo, is subjected to an attack of nuclear terrorism. In response, Moscow places its nuclear forces very visibly on a higher state of alert and declares that it is considering the use of nuclear retaliation against the group and any of its state supporters. How would Washington view such a possibility? Would it really be keen to support Russia’s use of nuclear weapons, including outside Russia’s traditional sphere of influence? And if not, which seems quite plausible, what options would Washington have to communicate that displeasure? If China had been the victim of the nuclear terrorism and seemed likely to retaliate in kind, would the United States and Russia be happy to sit back and let this occur? In the charged atmosphere immediately after a nuclear terrorist attack, how would the attacked country respond to pressure from other major nuclear powers not to respond in kind? The phrase “how dare they tell us what to do” immediately springs to mind. Some might even go so far as to interpret this concern as a tacit form of sympathy or support for the terrorists. This might not help the chances of nuclear restraint.
Impact – Terrorism EXT
IMET counterterrorism, CMR and human rights in Egypt
Dept. of State 4 (, “MILITARY ASSISTANCE International Military Education and Training Foreign Military Financing Peacekeeping Operations”) JSM
In the Near East region, increased levels of funding reflect the requirements of individual countries and their capacity to absorb additional training as part of their efforts to help support our global counterterrorism efforts. Military-to-military contacts afforded by the IMET program are particularly important in this region, paying dividends far into the future as students rise up the military and political ranks of their respective countries. Strong IMET and military training programs in Jordan, Egypt, Morocco, Oman, Tunisia, Algeria, Bahrain, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Yemen have demonstrated the importance of IMET in fostering one-to-one relationships with the U.S., enabling countries to obtain technical training necessary to maintain U.S.-origin equipment and increasing awareness of international norms of human rights and civilian control of the military. An IMET program in Iraq supports professional military education and enhanced English language capabilities.
IMET solves terror
Roth et al 3 (SECURITY ASSISTANCE IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM LTC Dino Roth LTC Mary Gillam CDR Vic Mattes, 9 June 2003
The use of security assistance as an instrument of foreign policy to combat terrorism is crucial. However, the United States cannot afford to continue its current distribution of security assistance dollars and expect to execute a successful campaign against terrorism. The distribution must be based on the threats to the national interests. Since the War on Terrorism is the nation’s highest priority, the government must now determine which countries will benefit most from its security assistance dollars.
US Key to Civil Military Relations in Egypt
Increasing Egyptian CMR will spill over to the rest of the Middle East – U.S. influence is key
Bolton 2/25 (How to Make Egypt Safe for Democracy, John Bolton, , 2/25/11)
Third, the West should provide material assistance to those truly committed to a free and open society. In days of yore, the United States supplied extensive clandestine assistance to prevent communist takeovers in post-World War II elections in France, Italy and elsewhere. Undoubtedly, the Obama Administration is too fastidious for such Cold War-style behaviour, but perhaps overt, democratic institution-building assistance is not too much to ask. Advocates of doing nothing will argue that Western assistance, overt or covert, will "taint" the real democrats, and should therefore be avoided. Of course, there are always excuses for doing nothing. At a minimum, we should let Egyptians themselves decide whether they will be "tainted" with outside assistance; if they can live with the taint, so should we. Fourth, Egypt's military must restore and extend stability, setting an example throughout the Middle East, thereby allowing whatever progress toward a truly democratic culture to emerge. Egypt's military will require political space in the months ahead. The Pentagon's continuing close relationship with Egypt's military should give us confidence that the right message about civilian control over the military is getting through. One of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces' first announcements was that it would honour Egypt's international obligations, presumably including Camp David. This is important and reassuring internationally, but hardly dispositive of what future governments will do.
***Elections Advantage***
Uq. – Military Screws up Elections Now
Military crackdowns on activists and internal divisions are threatening democracy in Egypt
LA Times 11 (April 12, Jeffrey Fleishman, “Egyptian protesters lose faith in their army heroes;
Military crackdown turns activists against a revered institution that helped them depose a president.” Lexis) MV
The Egyptian military is learning a dangerous political truth: A revolution unfinished turns bitter and its heroes can be quickly recast as villains. Soldiers were swooned over two months ago when they rolled into Cairo's Tahrir Square and stood guard over protesters rallying to overthrow President Hosni Mubarak. But the allure of the long-revered military has faded as the generals running the country face accusations that they are threatening the dreams of a new democracy by cracking down on dissent and failing to bring former government officials to justice. The so-called Arab Spring has settled into a blur of troubling developments in Egypt. Army doctors forcing detained female protesters to take virginity tests. Labor strikes and sit-ins banned. Dozens of demonstrators missing. A protester dead and 71 injured during an army raid Saturday. Mubarak unpunished and unrepentant while under house arrest in a Red Sea resort. And on Monday, a blogger sentenced to three years in prison for criticizing generals. "They're playing a dirty game," said Mohamed Abbas, an activist and youth movement leader. "It's our revolution. Yes, the military helped us achieve it. But it's ours and that spirit is coming back. The period of truce between us and the army is over." The deadly raid Saturday to disperse demonstrators in Tahrir Square was the most pointed indication yet of deepening distrust between the military and the public. The army called protesters agitators. Demonstrators hung in effigy Field Marshall Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, head of the ruling military council, and chanted that he was no better than Mubarak, a former air force commander. "We've given the army time, but they haven't fulfilled our wishes," said Essam Refaat, sitting, sweaty-faced, with a rolled flag at the edge of a protest in the square last week. "We need to pressure the military to get rid of the remnants of the old regime so there can be no counterrevolution. We don't want the generals ruling from behind anymore." The military is also encountering pressure from current and former junior officers who have joined the protests and posted YouTube videos accusing the army of protecting former government officials and abandoning the ideals of the revolution. Progressive officers have criticized the 75-year-old Tantawi and the old guard as too inflexible to meet the demands of a changing Middle East. "The military is concerned and worried about officers dissenting from within," said Ammar Ali Hassan, an analyst and former military officer. "Any divisions from within the military establishment might result in a military coup that would sweep away the legitimacy of our civilian revolution."
Uq. – Military Screws up Elections Now
Egypt is an autocracy, controlled by the military, not an emerging democracy
Jonas 11 (George, Senior Policy Advisor to the Aurea Foundation, Feb 11, National Post (Canada), “A land without Freedom; In times ancient and modern--whether styled king, sultan, colonel, wali, khedive, pasha or viceroy--Egypt's rulers have been autocrats” lexis) MV
Last week, a military dictatorship replaced a civilian dictatorship in Egypt. This may have opened the door to something good (democracy) or something bad (theocracy) or, very likely, more of the same (autocracy). Nevertheless, it's hailed everywhere as a triumph for freedom. Why? Perhaps because when people don't like what they see, they see what they like. Egypt has traditions of several great civilizations, none remotely democratic. The ancient land of the pharaohs and pyramids was an autocracy. So was the Egypt of Ptolemaic rulers and Roman times that bequeathed us the story of Antony and Cleopatra. The Byzantine period that followed the Hellenistic period was famously autocratic. When the Arab/Muslim tide washed over the early Coptic Christian Church between the 7th and 13th centuries, the Islamic caliphate's rule was just as autocratic as Byzantine Christianity's. And after the Ottoman Turks took over Egypt in 1517, literally making it a province of Turkey, autocracy matured into Oriental despotism. As the Turkish porte's power declined in the late 18th century, the great seafaring nations of Western Europe began flexing their muscles. They may have been an influence for democracy, but unfortunately, their taste for enlightenment and imperialism developed at the same time. As they became less autocratic at home, Europeans became more autocratic when projecting their power abroad. One champion-of-liberty-turned-emperor, Napoleon Bonaparte, even made a brief foray into Egypt as Europeans began snatching up Ottoman possessions. In the turmoil of the Napoleonic era, it was a Napoleonic figure that emerged victorious among the contenders. Muhammad Ali, often viewed as the founder of modern Egypt, started out as commander of an Ottoman regiment. Just as Napoleon, a Corsican, ended up establishing a French dynasty, Ali Pasha, an Albanian, ended up establishing an Egyptian one. Actually, the Albanian Napoleon's dynasty lasted longer than the Corsican Napoleon's. Although eventually enfeebled by British tutelage, Ali Pasha's dynasty didn't end until the 1952 abdication of King Farouk, followed by the declaration of the Egyptian Republic in the summer of 1953. Modern Egypt's founder was an autocrat. So were Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser and his nationalist officers who put an end to his dynasty. Ali Pasha's heirs let Europeans build the Suez Canal; Nasser and his officers turned it from Europe's swimming pool into Egypt's waterway. Nasser's successor, Anwar Sadat, signed a historic peace agreement with Israel in 1979 and was assassinated for it two years later. Otherwise he was just as autocratic as his predecessor -- or his successor, Hosni Mubarak, the strongman deposed last week. The point of this hasty historical bulletin is that the rulers of Egypt, in times ancient and modern, whether styled king, sultan, colonel, wali, khedive, pasha or viceroy, were autocrats. Autocracy sucks -- but doesn't stand in the way of great civilizations. The mere fact that a nation's past consists of nothing but autocracy doesn't mean that there can't be democracy in its future, but transforming autocracy into democracy is a long process, and for spontaneous assemblies of unorganized demonstrators to change millennia of history in two weeks would be miraculous. I don't think Cairo's protesters worked miracles. What they did was lay down a smoke screen. They camouflaged a coup d'etat by Egypt's military. The armed forces, de facto rulers of the country since Colonel Nasser's days, last Friday took back the powers they delegated to Mubarak 30 years ago. The 82-year-old president had outlived his usefulness. The feebler he became, the more he was developing illusions of grandeur, manifested in dynastic ambitions for an inadequate and unpopular offspring. Mubarak had to go. Having him deposed by popular demand, cheered on by a deluded world media and a naive White House, was preferable to a palace revolution. If initiated by a military putsch, the Mubarak ouster might have had the international elites protest and the media scream bloody murder. Even some street mobs that called for Mubarak's head might have marched in his support if they thought he was being pushed. Israel's expressions of dismay, though wisely subdued, fuelled the flames. Words of praise for Mubarak by Israeli President Simon Peres and others were the kiss of death. They had little effect on Cairo mobs, but galvanized Western media simpletons and Arabists in the U.S. State Department into supporting the putsch. From the army's point of view, ousting Mubarak now means his succession could be planned instead of having to be improvised. Why wait for the old man to die in office? It's when everybody makes a grab for a dictator's mantle that Muslim Brotherhood-types get their hands on it. Free-for-alls are for civilians. Military minds prefer synchronizing watches for history to begin at 0500. Questions: Have we confused a changing of the guard, Egyptian style, with the birth of democracy? Yes. Did the army plan the events of the last two weeks? No. Did spontaneous demonstrations inspire quick-thinking officers to take advantage of events as they unfolded? Probably. Now that the generals have mounted Egypt's great Arabian of protest, can they ride it or will it run away with them? That's one for the sphinx.
Uq. – Military Screws up Elections Now
The military won’t facilitate a democratic transition
Diamond 11 (Larry, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution and Director of Stanford University’s Center on Democracy, 6/4, , “Democracy After the Arab Spring: A Fourth Wave or False Start?”)gw
If Tunisia still provides grounds for cautious optimism, the Egyptian situation is already deeply worrying. Its senior officer corps, which currently controls the government, does not want to facilitate a genuine democratic transition. It will try to prevent it by generating conditions on the ground that discredit democracy and make Egyptians (and U.S. policymakers) beg for a strong hand again. The ruling officers have turned a blind eye to mounting religious and sectarian strife (and an alarming explosion in crime). The military has spent enormous effort arresting thousands of peaceful protesters in Tahrir Square and trying them in military tribunals over the last two months. (In April, one such detainee, a blogger named Maikel Nabil, was sentenced to three years in prison for “insulting the military establishment.”) Yet it claims that it cannot rein in rising insecurity. Many Egyptians see this as part of the military’s grand design to undermine democracy before it takes hold.
Uq. – Egyptian Democracy on the Brink 1/2
Egypt hangs in the balance—democracy solves
Goldstein 11 (Joshua, professor of International Relations at American University, “Arab Spring struggles through summer,” July 22, 2011, ) KJS
Trouble is, it’s not clear how things will turn out there. The people’s uprising in Egypt made an extraordinary move by putting their faith in the military to protect society and bring about changes. In the short term, it worked. The military turned against President Mubarak, refused to shoot the protesters, and then took control of the country when Mubarak stepped down. A coup d’etat in the name of democracy. Since then, the military government has made progress in organizing elections and setting up a process to write a new constitution. Parliamentary elections are expected in October or November, though foreign observers will not be allowed. The Cabinet was just reshuffled in response to street protests. But the government continues to arrest and torture people. Women have been largely pushed aside after taking a big role in the anti-Mubarak protests. And it’s not clear how much power the military will reserve for itself in the new Egypt. The military runs a major segment of the economy and makes a lot of money doing so (money it probably will not want to stop making). And speaking of the economy, it is still in shambles, with tourism way down. Egyptians who put trust in the military were either brilliant or stupid, but it’s not really clear which one yet. So there we have it on this Friday — the most important phenomenon in the world, the most important country in that phenomenon, but no clear picture of how it’s going to turn out. Protesters are still camping out in Tahrir Square to demand follow-through on real democracy. Their newest enemy is the heat, which regularly tops 100 degrees Fahrenheit. That’s even hotter than Massachusetts today. Democracy is empowering citizens, harmonizing norms across the world, and making war less likely than ever. It’s been an amazing 25 years since People Power swept Ferdinand Marcos from power in the Philippines. Eastern Europe threw off communism; Latin America gave up military government; big players like Indonesia and Nigeria joined in. Now, the Arab Spring. It’s big, and it’s far from finished. Let’s hope it ends well.
Egyptian democracy hangs in the balance
Economist 11 (“Revolution Spinning in the Wind,” July 14 2011, ) KJS
Perhaps with time all Arab regimes will indeed head the way of Egypt’s and Tunisia’s, or at any rate feel obliged to surrender big chunks of power to their people as a price for survival. The sense of having reached a watershed runs deep among Arabs, particularly the young. For weeks in February and March the ubiquitous Al Jazeera channel flashed a slick montage of images between hourly news bulletins, showing beleaguered autocrats succumbing to popular outrage and ending with the jaunty caption, “Who’s Next?”. Yet for all their drama, and despite the satisfaction of seeing hated rulers fall, the revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia have had to struggle to maintain momentum. The bloodier would-be revolutions in Libya (see article) and Syria (see article) and Yemen have dragged on for months, generating ever more destruction, with no resolution plainly in sight. Other Arab states, especially the monarchies, have so far parried calls for change with seeming success, using the familiar mix of coercion, co-option and promises. So the pertinent question is perhaps not so much who will be next to fall but rather, what follows? The answer is not at all clear. The universal inclination of the revolutionary ferment is to create the more open, pluralist, democratic societies that have emerged in much of the world. But after two generations in a political deep freeze, Arabs face special challenges in getting there. Among these are such essential questions as how to frame relations between Islam and the state, how to incorporate ethnic and religious minorities and how to share oil revenues. Many Arab countries also face burdensome administrative legacies. Years of unaccountable rule have left hugely swollen, often venal bureaucracies, creaky courts, nasty security services spoiled by privilege, and publics addicted to unsustainable subsidies for such things as food and energy.
Uq. – Egyptian Democracy on the Brink 1/2
Transition now is key – Egypt is on the brink of backsliding into authoritarianism
Keeler 11 (Chris, journalist specializing in Middle Eastern politics, July 27, “Imposing Security Services By Any Other Name,” ) JJN
Almost six months after the Egyptian people shocked the world by forcibly ending the 30 year reign of Hosni Mubarak, the Egyptian revolution is still murky and far from complete. Indeed, the removal of Mubarak from power was only the beginning of the struggle for the Egyptian people. Currently, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) is charged with running the country and managing its transition to democracy. Unfortunately, however, SCAF has done little to meet the needs and demands of the Egyptian people. Consequently, Egypt is experiencing a stalled revolution and is risking sliding back into authoritarianism under a difference façade. After the initial shock of Mubarak’s removal wore off, it became increasingly easy to understand that SCAF has few intentions of proactively meeting the demands of the millions of protesters. Indeed, the Egyptian armed forces seem to be more inclined to act as a manager of an Egyptian transition not to democracy, but rather to a different sort of authoritarian rule. The decision of SCAF to keep the brutal and hated security apparatus of Mubarak immune from real reform is a clear indication that the ruling force has not made any effort to promote democratic change. Indeed, true reform of the security sector in Egypt will be the most important revolutionary step for the country.
Now is the key time to transition – the Egyptian people are starting to lose faith
Coskun 11 (Gamze, USAK Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, 7/27, “Time To Determine Priorities in Egypt,” ) JJN
Along with all these debates, the streets run out of patience as the transitional government is not transparent and accountable enough. Many regulations are made by not caring about the will and support of the people at all and they are not open to the discussions of the streets. This creates the worry that the Egyptian people’s efforts will go down the drain, in addition to shaking their confidence in the army. Before this atmosphere becomes worse, convincing steps must be taken. Considering that satisfactory steps have not been taken for either the preparation of the constitution or elections, it is worrying that the transition period is not being managed sufficiently. There are many uncertainties and the transition process does not follow the path demanded by the people. Thus, it is necessary for more concrete steps to be taken in consultation with the owners of the revolution, the Egyptian people.
Uq. – Egyptian Democracy on the Brink 1/2
Plan must happen now – waiting to begin a transition in Egypt ensures failure and violence
National Editorial 11 (The National, July 26, “Egypt's difficult task of stability ahead of ballot,” ) JJN
There is much to like about the election law that Egypt's ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces unveiled this week. But legislative elections are just one part of the country's post-revolutionary rebirth, and many hard questions still must be answered before the new Egypt takes shape. The first thing to like is that elections will proceed on a reasonable schedule. Early complaints that hasty elections would unduly favour Islamist opposition groups, who were better organised, were part of the reason for a delay from September. The current plan calls for a month-long process to be completed by the end of the year. Any further delay would have risked reaching the boiling point in relations between the army and a sizeable section of the public. Even now it will be a challenge to keep the lid on, as violence this week suggests. The law cuts the eligibility age for the People's Assembly, the lower house, to 25, down from 30. There will be both individual candidacies and party lists. Judges will supervise polling places. That's all fine. But how can the military explain banning outside election observers, as Hosni Mubarak did? There has been some confusion about observers among opposition groups, but decades of stolen elections seem to be building a consensus in their favour. If this election is suspect, it could do more harm than good. There are also some deeper concerns. However fair the elections, they are just part of the process of creating a new Egypt. Any road to this goal should reduce the military's eminent, not to say pre-eminent, role in Egypt's governance and economy. Since 1952, when General Muhammad Naguib and Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser overthrew the monarchy, Egypt's presidents have all been from the military. The armed forces are in many ways a state within a state, and there is a long tradition of a civilian facade masking the real power. Legislative elections will start a busy process: new lawmakers will name a 100-member assembly to draft a new constitution; already the military council is manoeuvring to keep the armed forces above civilian control. Then a presidential election is expected for early next year. Any reformist president and prime minister will have to cope with the army's entrenched power somehow, and any who are not committed to reform will find Tahrir Square reflecting public anger again. Egypt has so many challenges ahead. It cannot confront any of them if society degenerates into violence before these elections.
Acting now is key – stalling risks failure in the transition
Ullman 11 (Harlan, 2/16, phD, Senior Advisor at the Atlantic Council, Senior Fellow at the National Defense University, “Egypt and Pakistan: Is Time Friend or Foe?” ) JJN
For very different reasons, extraordinary events in Egypt and Pakistan could dramatically redefine global politics. The unanswerable first question is whether any such tectonic change, if it occurs, will be for good or for ill? A more nagging concern is given the excitement, outrage and expectations generated by these very different events, are the effects being exaggerated? Last, is time friend or foe in affecting any resolution? In Egypt, huge public demonstrations ended the nearly 30 year rule of Hosni Mubarak. But what has changed beyond the dramatic resolve and courage displayed by many Egyptians? An 82 year old ex Air Force general has been replaced by a 75 year old former infantry officer turned Field Marshall—Mohammed Tantawi and a ruling defense council that declared martial law, disbanded Parliament, suspended the constitution and promised free and fair elections. To the untrained eye, is this not some form of a popularly inspired coup? Clearly, the senior Egyptian army leadership is not anxious to run a nation with the absence of timely solutions to the economic and political crises it confronts. The government has been more or less left in place. Free and fair elections have been promised assuming a political infrastructure can be put in place over six months to include organizing political parties and identifying qualified candidates for elective office. Yet, the public mood for more change and for speedy redress to its grievances now that Mubarak is gone cannot be understated. Unfortunately, rectifying decades of rot will take time. And time may be the one factor that any Egyptian government----army or civilian---does not have.
Uq. – Egyptian Democracy on the Brink 2/2
Now is crucial—tiny window of opportunity
Zewail 11 (Ahmed, Linus Pauling Chair Professor of Chemistry and professor of physics at the California Institute of Technology. He also serves on President Barack Obama’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology and is the US Science Envoy to the Middle East, “How to Jump-Start the Post-Revolutionary Era in Egypt”, New Perspectives Quarterly, Spring, 28(2))RAA
In history, recurrences do occur. If Egyptians are ready to take advantage of this unique moment, it can recover the greatness, which made it a cradle of civilization and the intellectual and industrial center of the Arab world. It is in the best interests of everyone—the Chinese, the Americans, the Europeans, the other Arab states—who want long term stability in the Middle East that the peaceful democratic revolutions in Egypt and elsewhere succeed. Revolutions seeking to create a new order are at most risk in their infancy. If we don’t act now when the window is open, the consequence of not rapidly consolidating the benefits of change will haunt the Middle East for decades to come. Time is of the essence!
Military K2 Transition
Military’s relationship with civilians may hurt transition
Oxford Analytica 11 (Staff, “Egypt's military rulers face transition challenge”, Global Strategic Analysis, July 22,, )
Protests are continuing in Cairo's Tahrir Square today despite this week's cabinet reshuffle and the announcement of preparations for parliamentary polls in the autumn. Egypt's military rulers, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), are facing growing frustration with their gradualist approach to managing the transition to democratic government, and with their failure to address the concerns of the January 25 movement. SCAF has the tacit support of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and similar groups with an Islamic political agenda, inspiring fears among some secular revolutionaries that the SCAF and the MB are learning to live with each other. The SCAF's primary challenge is public presentation style as much as substantive policy -- a failure to communicate on an emotional level with protesters who want to see action to punish those responsible for killing and injuring demonstrators.
Checking Military power key to transition
Dworkin et al 11 (Anthony, “EGYPT’S HYBRID REVOLUTION: A BOLDER EU APPROACH” European Council on Foreign Affairs, Anthony Dworkin, Daniel Korski and Nick Witney, May 2011, Online)RAA
The biggest uncertainty is whether the military will honour its commitment to hand over to the new civil power after the parliamentary election in September and the presidential election in November. So far, it is widely believed that it will do so because it has no desire to continue to suffer the stresses, indignities and eroding prestige inevitably associated with governing and would much prefer to get back to military life as it was before. As Hisham Ezz Al Arab, one of the country’s most prominent bankers, notes, 2011 is not 1952. When the Free Officers overthrew King Farouk, Egypt was rich and powerful; today it is poor and weak. By staying in the background, the military will be able to escape any blame. Nevertheless, it is likely to want to retain some sort of hand – if not on the steering-wheel, then at least on the brake lever. It will be a delicate task to accommodate this conception of the military’s role within a democratic system based on popular sovereignty and the rule of law. At the same time, the army will also want to maintain its privileges and perks. One might indeed characterise its ambition as a return to “business as usual”. Egypt’s military is a state within a state and an economy within an economy. Estimates of the share of GNP it controls vary between 5 and 30 percent. Invoking the “security of supply” argument beloved of militaries everywhere, it runs everything from its own bakeries to Jeep manufacturing plants. US military aid has financed a fleet of nine executive Gulfstreams and the best hospitals in the country. With the Sinai a “security zone”, the military, along with former President Mubarak and his allies, effectively owns the Red Sea tourist industry. It also literally owns the skies of Egypt: anyone wanting to build above six storeys has to pay the air force a fee per storey for encroaching on its domain. Slimming this military down to the sort of political and economic weight acceptable in a true democracy is likely to be one of the most serious mediumterm challenges in the new Egypt.
Solvency – Stabilizes Egypt
Plan key to ensure civilian control of the military and fair elections
Economist 2/14 (, Feb 14th 2011, by W.W., IOWA CITY, A coup for democracy?)
My sense is that many Westerners were celebrating because masses of Egyptians were celebrating. Perhaps it is a measure of how strange the situation has become that Egyptians have responded with delirious rejoicing to what would otherwise be called a military coup. All the same, there are some hopeful signs. The New York Times reports this morning that Egypt's Supreme Military Council has informed certain opposition leaders of their "plan to convene a panel of distinguished jurists to submit a package of constitutional amendments within 10 days for approval in a national referendum within two months, setting a breakneck schedule for the transition to civilian rule." Whether the generals really mean it remains to be seen. But, again, there are reasons for hope. Erik Voeten, a professor of government at Georgetown, points to new research by political scientists Hein Goemans and Nikolay Marinov indicating that post-coup military rulers have become increasingly likely to make the transition to democracy. Here's the abstract from their interesting working paper: In this paper, we use new data on coup d'etats and elections to uncover a striking change in what happens after the coup. Whereas the vast majority of successful coups before 1990 installed their leaders durably in power, between 1991 and 2001 the picture reverses, with the majority of coups leading to competitive elections in 5 years or less. We argue that with the end of the Cold War, outside pressure has produced a development we characterize as the "electoral norm"—a requirement that binds successful coup-entrepreneurs to hold reasonably prompt and competitive elections upon gaining power. Consistent with our explanation, we find that post-Cold War those countries that are most dependent on Western aid have been the first the embrace competitive elections after the coup. Our theory is also able to account for the pronounced decline in the non-constitutional seizure of executive power since the early 1990s. While the coup d'etat has been and still is the single most important factor leading to the downfall of democratic government, our findings indicate that the new generation of coups have been considerably less nefarious for democracy than their historical predecessors. What is most captivating here is Messrs Goemans and Marinov's hypothesis that "outside pressure" has helped establish an "electoral norm" to which post-coup military regimes feel at least somewhat bound. Here's a bit more on what they have in mind in this regard: With the end of the Cold War, the West has begun to promote free elections in the rest of the world. While elections have not always been free and fair, nine of every ten countries in the world today hold regular elections that are significantly more competitive than the forms of political contestation most of these countries had before 1990.
Providing IMET training to senior Egyptian officers is key to solving stability
Cook 9 (Steven, GWU prof, Brookings institute fellow, Council of Foreign Relations, “Political Instability in Europe,” i.content/publications/attachments/CPA_contingencymemo_4.pdf, p. 6) JJN
Should U.S. efforts fail to reduce the likelihood of an Islamist push for power and the instability that would likely follow, Washington will have two options for managing the crisis. First, Washington can advise the senior officers of the Egyptian armed forces to take matters into their own hands to prevent an Islamist takeover. The result as noted above would likely be bloody, but the military’s intervention would preserve a regime that has been critical to U.S. interests in the Middle East. American policymakers should be aware, however, that the military’s actions may not buy Egypt much longterm stability as it risks a public backlash and radicalization of Egyptian politics that would portend the reemergence of extremist groups targeting the state and possibly its primary patron, the United States. Second, the United States should work with Egypt’s armed forces and internal security services to prevent bloodshed and further instability. The investment in outreach through the IMET program and military-to-military exchange is critical to mitigating instability. These programs often provide an important reservoir of goodwill between American officials/officers and their foreign counterparts. In the event of acute instability in Egypt, these relationships will be critical channels of communication through which Washington can provide advice to the Egyptians and offer assistance in deescalating the situation and preventing more bloodshed.
Solvency – Stabilizes Egypt
IMET intervention is key to stabilizing Egypt
Peters 11 (Anne Mariel, govt prof @ WU, Jan 31, “Protests in Egypt: the real reason for Obama’s two-handed game,” ) JJN
On the other hand, the US values the services of the Egyptian military: preferential passage of US warships through the Suez Canal, Egyptian intermediation with Hamas, and intelligence cooperation in the “War on Terror.” Since 1979, the US has provided Egypt with roughly $1.3 billion in military aid annually. Weapons acquisitions, joint training, and the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program have cultivated close relations between the Pentagon and the Egyptian Armed Forces. The Egyptian military maintains its own permanent representation in Washington, and the US Defense Attache in Cairo is traditionally a two-star general. Commentators have castigated the Obama administration for not demanding the resignation of Mubarak and the institution of democratic elections. Yet this “passivity” may not be a function of support for Mubarak’s dictatorship but rather a desire to retain the Egyptian military as a reliable partner throughout rapidly changing political circumstances. The administration should counsel the Egyptian military to avoid violence and focus on stabilization, keep its officer corps unified, and preserve the institution’s popular appeal. At the same time, the US should review its policies toward Egypt and remove provisions that might repress the popular will. Two elements of military aid, IMET and Foreign Military Financing, however, should stay. In training Egyptian officers and funding the acquisition of advanced weapons systems, these programs do not support the reviled Ministry of the Interior, and are essential to the cohesion and morale of the military. Terminating these programs would not only antagonize the military before we know how this story ends, but also logistically undermine the core of Egyptian statehood – its ability to defend its own borders.
Solvency – Stabilizes Egypt
IMET should be expanded to stabilize post-revolution Egypt
US Egyptian Embassy 6 (News Cable to American Embassy, “Next Steps for Advancing Democracy in Egypt,” March 6, 2006, WikiLeaks, ) KJS
Sometime in the next six years, Egypt will undergo a leadership succession. The United States' goals for this succession should be to promote an opening to establish a representative government that will secure Egyptian stability, prosperity, and friendship for a generation. There is scant movement in that direction now. Whether or not 77-year old Hosni Mubarak survives his six-year term, his regime is ossifying and increasingly out of touch. His enlightened economic cabinet has a negligible political base and gets little credit outside of elite circles. The National Democratic Party's popularity is in decline. The military still expects to inherit the Presidency. But the Muslim Brotherhood's confidence is growing. ¶2. (C) Egyptians want reform, or at least an end to stagnation. The disagreements arise over breadth and speed. Egyptians care more deeply about reforms that will improve their living standards--and they are growing less patient. But the GOE insists on its own pace: moderately slow for economic reforms, glacial for political opening. With no elections for the next fifteen months, the high visibility focus of our democracy strategy needs replacement. President Mubarak's proposed reform program, as stated in his campaign promises and subsequent speeches, although modest, provides the starting point for USG engagement. In addition, we should: --Urge the regime to broaden its agenda to include electoral, media, police, and anti-corruption reform--and at least begin planting the seeds of transformation within the military. --Continue to help the legal political parties through IRI and NDI, with a focus on the ruling NDP. --Continue USG support through USAID and MEPI to Egyptian civil society, including advocacy for structural reforms through key legislation and technical assistance. --Ensure the political success of the economic reform program and review our military assistance program with a focus on IMET. --Broaden our diplomatic strategy to build support for the democracy agenda among regime elites, including the First Lady. End introduction and summary. Assumptions ¶3. (C) Proposed next steps are based on the following assumptions: --Mubarak remains our indispensable regional ally but will move too slowly on the reform agenda. Reforms not blessed by Mubarak will not be achievable during the remainder of his rule. --The NDP will remain the dominant political party in Egypt with control over the parliament through 2011. The party leaders themselves recognize that its "popularity" is -four months; the parliament will continue to work on a replacement anti-terror law ostensibly modeled on western statutes that will stress state security requirements rather than the protection of individual liberties. --The security apparatus will resist change on the grounds that it is de-stabilizing. The military will be a drag on reform but will not actively engage unless its economic equities are threatened or it perceives a serious threat to stability. Next Steps ¶4. (C) Extend ESF-funded technical assistance to GOE ministries and the parliament to sustain and, if possible, to accelerate and expand the Mubarak political reform program. Stated GOE goals include the following: -- Replace emergency law with anti-terror legislation, modeled on western anti-terror statutes. -- Seek Parliamentary input on constitutional reform. -- New judicial authority law. -- Amending the press law, including eliminating the imprisonment penalty for defamation (to protect journalists). -- New law amending criminal procedures, including provisional detention. -- New law aimed at supporting decentralization and strengthening elected local councils' supervisory roles. We currently have no direct cooperation with the Parliament. Previous support has foundered on Egyptian efforts to use assistance as patronage. Assistance should be low-key; emphasis should be on the technical. We can provide much information assistance through normal mission resources, at minimal cost, outside of USAID programs. We should also ensure coordination between technical assistance and pilot programs already underway in the field. For example, efforts on decentralization legislation should benefit from USAID's existing work with governorate-level councils. We can use normal advocacy measures to support reformers pressing for higher-end reforms than Mubarak now seems to envision, e.g., supporting Governors who advocate constitutional change to permit local election of Governors. ¶5. (C) Pressing the GOE to expand its reform agenda to include major electoral, media, and police reform, and anti-corruption: --On elections, we favor establishment of an independent electoral commission, based on the Iraqi model. Given GOE ambivalence, we should use speakers programs, IVs and other indirect messaging to promote this idea, until it is adopted as "Egyptian." IFES also proposes an ambitious civil society focused project to build domestic support for electoral reform. --USAID has already embarked on a $16 million program to support private media and encourage media privatization. This effort was dealt a setback when Mubarak himself told journalists on March 1 that state-owned newspapers would not be privatized. Nonetheless we should engage the cabinet and the parliamentary leaders on public sector media reform, even as we find ways to support private media. --On police reform, DS and S/CT have presented a proposal for counter-terrorism training that would expand our in-country cooperation. Post has also solicited an INL proposal for a Strategic Leadership Course for senior police commanders aimed at promoting community policing, regard for human based almost entirely on patronage and control of the security apparatus; internal reforms are needed, but breaking with old habits and entrenched interests will be slow and difficult. --The Muslim Brotherhood's appeal will grow as long as it continues to fill the void in public services left by government, and the void in political space left by the absence of any other meaningful opposition. --The Brotherhood's parliamentary election success--which confirmed both its organizational skills and popular appeal--has entrenched GOE resistance to electoral reform. --Civil Society elites will remain engaged in reform discussions but without influence or capacity to effect meaningful systemic change before Mubarak leaves office. --The economic cabinet will remain in place but will be reluctant to tackle aggressively painful steps, such as rationalizing subsidies. Economic reform has not yet benefitted the Egyptian "street." --The Emergency Law will be extended in May 2006 for twentyrights and developing a more professional police corps. Deployment of in-country police and Justice attaches could promote new levels of law enforcement cooperation. The Ministry of Interior and perhaps the Presidency are opposed to what they regard as a covert intelligence effort, but Mrs. Mubarak has pressed MOI to accept more U.S. "transformational police training." We should continue to seek an arrangement that will address their concerns. --The GOE needs to pursue a meaningful anti-corruption program if it wishes to take this cudgel away from the MB. We can provide technical assistance and public affairs programming. Global metrics are readily available. ¶6. (C) Technical support to legal political parties through IRI and NDI: Having assessed the elections, the institutes now recognize what the parties need. The NDP will likely not participate with other parties in the room, so it may be necessary to develop separate tracks in the program for the ruling party and the opposition. Even with the NDP on board, we can expect blowback by anti-reform elements. The institutes should keep their programs low-key and the USG apprised. Their programs should incorporate the full range of Egypt's civil rights priorities, such as bringing more women and Christians into the political process. The 2007 Shura elections and the 2008 local council elections--and the development of the legislation promised to reform the later--will be the key medium-term tests. In addition to continued support for international implementers like NDI and IRI, we should also proceed with supporting additional engagement on Egypt by additional international NGOs such as Transparency International, Freedom House, and the American Bar Association. ¶7. (C) Continue USAID's and MEPI's work with civil society organizations: The Ibn Khaldun Center and others produced impressive results on domestic monitoring during the parliamentary elections and merit continued support. With no elections for fifteen months, these groups need a new focus. The next phase should bring civil society into a process for identifying new priorities and concerted action. This must be an Egyptian process, but we should advocate our priorities, such as human rights, religious freedom, women's and children's rights (including female education), and involvement by the citizenry in local education policy. USAID's new Family Justice Program will engage NGOs to raise public awareness about the legal rights of women and children, as well as the legal services available to these disadvantaged groups. These efforts will also face reactionary criticism of "bribery" and "meddling." ¶8. (C) Recognize that economic reforms complement democratic reform: We should revitalize the Free Trade Agreement and move forward with notification to Congress at the earliest possible political opening. Failing that, we should develop new programs to maximize the benefits of the QIZs. The biggest challenge facing Egyptian manufacturers in the QIZ program is finding Israeli content. Expanding outlets for Israeli content would create Egyptian jobs and exports. USAID could usefully study how to optimize the QIZ benefit. USAID should also continue work with the Egyptian economic cabinet on tackling subsidies in a politically sensitive manner. The current initiative to shift USAID economic support to "sectoral reform programs" linked to several benchmarks, including democratization, can play a key role. ¶9. (C) Initiate an internal long-range review of U.S. military assistance: This issue requires much further discussion but we need to define the linkages between our military assistance program and Egypt's progress towards representative government. At a minimum, this review should expand IMET programs--the most purposefully "transformative" form of U.S. military assistance--to bring more Egyptian officers for training in the United States.
Solvency – Stabilizes Egypt
Military not trained to lead – ensures democratic failure
Kreig 11(Andreas, PhD, King’s College London, War Studies Department / Department of Defence Studies, “EGYPTIAN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AND EGYPT’S POTENTIAL TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY” ) CLS
The military under the state-soldier contract is conceived as a mere instrument of the state enabling the civilian leadership to satisfy its demand arising from the Social Contract regarding the provision of security mainly from external threats. In this respect the military is only indirectly serving society as the state is believed to bundle the general will and channel it towards the military. Therefore, the military is primarily an agent obedient to the will of the state. Regarding the Egyptian military whose outlook is predominantly towards external threats and not so much towards internal threats, the core function was to secure Egypt’s borders, preserve the independence of the state and the safety of its territory[68]. The lack of any existential external threat since the Israeli Peace Agreement in 1979, however, left the Egyptian military apparatus with few assignments regarding the external security of the state. Therefore, the Egyptian military became a quasi-civilian actor by taking over entrepreneurial functions in Egypt’s economy. Nonetheless, the Egyptian military based on the state-soldier contract, remained a servant of the state, namely Mubarak’s regime and its institutions. Its primary function remained the protection of a state that in turn did not honour its agreement with the people. Being directly accountable to the civilian leadership rather than civil society at large, the Egyptian military remained exclusively accountable to Mubarak’s state apparatus and lacked any form of public scrutiny[69]. With a state cutting any links to the people by governing a country with emergency legislation and without any oppositional supervision, the indirect link of accountability between society and the military via the state as the intermediary, was destroyed. That is to say, that in case the state would turn against its people, the military would have to follow the demands of the state to which it is accountable. The only connection of the Egyptian military to the Egyptian society is the annual recruitment of 80,000 conscripts that to a limited extent might be able to retain a civilian mentality. But, albeit conscripts not being professional military men, the isolation of the Egyptian army from civilian life and the sworn loyalty of the conscripts to their superiors makes it difficult for the conscripts to actually follow the will of society rather than state order.
Training key to transition to constitutional democracy
Kreig 11(Andreas, PhD, King’s College London, War Studies Department / Department of Defence Studies, “EGYPTIAN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AND EGYPT’S POTENTIAL TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY” ) CLS
With the Supreme Military Council having absorbed state control entirely after Mubarak’s resignation on 11 February 2011, the military is only accountable to itself as the former principle, the civil state, has dissolved. Due to the fact that society is only an indirect principle executing control over the military solely through the state as its agent, the military has no direct contractual obligation to respond to society. With the former civilian leadership disappearing, the military, which has been appointed by the state, has lost its principle to be accountable to. To be exact, a military leadership that has been eager to consolidate its power within the Egyptian state was able to centralize state power within its own ranks. Bearing in mind that the Egyptian military has been an important elite within the Egyptian state with considerable privileges regarding economic and political activities, the military leadership lead by former Defence Minister Tantawi is aware of its interests at stake when initiating a transition towards a political future for Egypt[75]. A transition towards a multi-party democracy would mean that the Egyptian military will be governed by a strict system of checks and balances that would prohibit many of its extra-military activities. Since the Egyptian military can be described as a rather self-interested elitist group whose aim was to maintain a status-quo that is supportive of military development and activities ensuring military profit-maximization, it appears to be insensible for Tantawi’s military leadership to completely abolish itself as the core pillar of the Egyptian state system. In addition, Tantawi has been repeatedly referred to as an old-timer resistant to any form of change, suggesting that he presides over a “[…] hidebound institution with little appetite for reform”[76]. It is essential to understand that the Egyptian military leadership is an elitist group that has always been exclusively responsible to a state regime if at all, and that has been devoted to one core function: ensuring and maintaining national security as well as law and order. In the immediate post-Mubarak era, the Egyptian military will predominantly divert its attention and assets to restoring civilian order[77]. In order to do so, it is important for the Egyptian military to satisfy the pressing minimal demands of the protesters in order for them to return home and to allow for normal life to resume. The mere announcement of the military leadership to envisage the revision of the country’s constitution is a first step of the military to restore a sense of normality in Egypt[78]. By promising to act upon the demands of the Egyptian society, the military leadership does not only satisfy the demands of the international community and its strongest ally the United States, but also restores confidence in foreign investors and tourists that Egypt is on a steady way to internal stability. Foreign Direct Investment and foreign aid are indispensable for any Egyptian regime and it is therefore within the interests of the military to restore confidence and domestic stability.
Solvency – Stabilizes Egypt
IMET funding should be increased to stabilize democracy in Egypt
Farr 11 (Sam, Congressman for California’s 17th District, Testimony at the State, Foreign Operations, & Related Programs FY12 Testimony , 2011, ) KJS
The State Department’s IMET program has not been adequately funded to meet the critical needs to develop military-to-military relationships with regions of the world that are integral to our national security, and I believe that $150,000,000 for IMET would enable the program to more fully address shifting stability and security conditions in the Middle East, North Africa, and South and Central Asia. This increase would also help to ensure that foreign militaries in Pakistan, Iraq, Egypt, and Tunisia are exposed to democratic values that can only contribute to strengthening their nascent democratic aspirations.
More IMET is key to establishing democracy
Ricciardone 11 (Francis J., US ambassador to Turkey and former ambassador to Egypt. 6/8, “Next Steps For Advancing Democracy In Egypt” )gw
¶9. (C) Initiate an internal long-range review of U.S. military assistance: This issue requires much further discussion but we need to define the linkages between our military assistance program and Egypt's progress towards representative government. At a minimum, this review should expand IMET programs--the most purposefully "transformative" form of U.S. military assistance--to bring more Egyptian officers for training in the United States.
Military to military contacts are the lynchpin of CMR and democracy in Egypt.
Johnston 11 (Matt Johnston, , . February 12, 2011 Military May Be the Most "Democratic" Egyptian Institution, Bachelors in Government & Politics University of Maryland, The Catholic University of America, JD Law, Navy Veteran.) JSM
The historic and fascinating events unfolding in Egypt, the birth of more freeedom and perhaps even a fledgling democracy created not by an outside agent, but through internal pressure, are things to behold. What has been more impressive has been the role of the military, one of the most respected institutions in that country. The military has been a model of professionalism in a region of the world where the military is often as corrupt as the civilian leadership. Instead of cracking down violently on protesters, the military did what they should do, make sure everyone is safe and otherwise stay out of the way. In many way, the professional Egyptian military may be the most democratic institution in that nation in transition. Of course, no military is in any way a "democratic" institution in that there is very much a top-down command style that cannot and does not tolerate dissent toward orders. But the manner in which the Egyptian military leadership, both its office corps and its non-commissioned officers, are trained--through America and other Western nations, is an important factor in a nation that is inherently unstable right now. One of the most fascinating aspects of the events in Egypt has been the military--who appears to have if not cooperated in the protests at least approved of them in many ways, both express and tacit. Such participation may have to do largely with the manner in which the Egyptian officer corps is trained--in America. America’s best hope for democracy in Egypt and the ouster of President Hosni Mubarak may not be the protesters in the streets. It could be mid-level officers in Egypt’s Army. Thousands of them have received official training and education in the United States, where they were exposed to the values of a democratic society, such as human rights and civilian rule over the military. That last is an important relation that is important at this critical juncture. Civilian control of the military is a facet of American government and military that we often don't think of as particularly important, given that it has been a hallmark of our political system since the Declaration of Independence. But such a feature is not the norm outside of modern democratic states. But Egypt, despite its trappings under Hosni Mubarak, was not a democracy. Yet the Egyptian officer corps and its senior non-commissioned officers have been trained, through the deep exposure to the American political-military relationship, to accept the notion of civilian control of the military--a true feature of a western democracy and one that is part and parcel of the mindset among the Egyptian military--I hope. Combined with strict but orderly control of the junior enlisted personnel, the middle grade officers and non-coms have the respect of the people AND control of the military hardward that could be used to brutally put down a protest that might scare senior leadership. The combination of control and training to accept civilian authority holds the best hope for a peaceful transition to true democracy. The fears of a take over by the Muslim Brotherhood is real and should not be discounted, but given the respect that the Egyptian people have for the military might lead some of those middle grade officers to run for elective office and carry the discipline they have learned (and earned) into the civilan leadership side. Having been trained through formal American contacts and the informal contacts that result with American officers, The Egyptian military has the most exposure of any facet of Egypian society to the practical functioning of a Democracy. The training may be the best hope for a true Democracy in the Muslim world.
Solvency – A2: Dem Fails – Islamic Beliefs
Islamic beliefs can exist within a democracy
Khatab 11(Professor Sayed, Senior Research Fellow @ School of Political and Social Inquiry & Global Terrorism Research Centre Monash University, Australia, July, “Egyptian Revolution and its Impact on the Stability in the Middle East”
Now Egypt is on the right track to full and true democracy in which human rights is respected and individuals, including Islamists, are free to participate and have their voices heard. This is confirmed by a number of signals including the participation of Islamists in the Tahrir revolution, their participation in writing the constitutional amendments; they also continued to enjoy the establishment of their licensed political parties and participation in this peaceful transition to democracy. In this context, there is about ten political parties with Islamist backgrounds and the gate still open for more parties to come. The Islamists‘ involvement in Egypt‘s democratic transition confirms that their Islamic beliefs allow them to participate in democracy and democratic life. Thus, the change to true democracy through largely peaceful means indicates that the revolution in Egypt has demolished the argument lines for radicalism and demonstrated that there is no room for radicalism in this fifth Republic which was brought about by the Tahrir Revolution.
Solvency – A2: Dem Fails – No Public Support
Majority of Egypt supports the transition
Sharp 11 (Jeremy M., Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs, June 17th, “Egypt in Transition”) Congressional Research Service
Egypt’s “January 25 Revolution” has not only overthrown a government, but it has remarkably reinvigorated Egyptian political life. Numerous press reports over the last six months have recounted feelings of popular empowerment and pride inspired by the exploits of Egypt’s young protestors. Even after former President Hosni Mubarak’s resignation on February 11, protests in Cairo’s Tahrir Square have continued on issues ranging from women’s rights to fair wages. Pamphlets, public service ads, bumper stickers, and posters litter Cairo with the platforms of new political parties and messages urging fellow citizens to “change.” For the first time, public polling on most sensitive issues can be conducted in Egypt in a relatively free environment. One U.S. State Department opinion poll in the spring of 2011 revealed that 70% of Egyptians say their country is generally better off now compared to before the uprising, a complete reversal from prerevolution Egypt, when 71% said Egypt was headed in the wrong direction. Optimism has been in short supply for decades, and the revolution has unleashed a participatory desire that had been pent up during the stagnant years of Mubarak rule.\
Impact – Regional Stability/Oil
Successful democracy transition in Egypt is essential for peace in the region and the world’s energy supply
Zewail 11 (Ahmed, Pres Obama’s Council of Advisors-Science & Tech and US Science Envoy to the ME, “The Arab Revolution,” New Perspectives Quarterly April)
As I was leaving Cairo after Hosni Mubarak stepped down, I asked Esraa, a young woman who was one of the leaders of the revolution, “what was your objective?” She said, “taghier al nezam”—a change of the system. The Egyptians brought down the head of the system, but not yet the system itself. That is the challenge now. The Egyptian revolution, like that in Tunisia, represents a unique model for change in the Middle East. Because of history and traditions, these societies are not fragmented by tribal or sectarian conflicts. Despite differences of people’s faith or even the occasional collisions between them, Egypt is united. It is not so much in the nationalist way as we have understood it in modern times, but in a civilizational way as “Umm al- Donia,” meaning Egypt is “the mother of the cosmos.” In contrast, the second model for revolutions is that of Yemen, Libya and others in the making. In these cases, unfortunately, tribal and sectarian conflicts may lead to chaos and civil war, ultimately dragging the Middle East backward into conflict and fanaticism, not forward. To avoid this outcome, the revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia cannot be allowed to fail. Egypt is the key. With 85 million people, it is the largest country in the Middle East and the heart of the Arab world. Making sure Egypt succeeds is essential for the stability of world’s energy supply as well as for peace in the region. The West in particular must show its support for these peaceful uprisings for democracy, the reason that was claimed to have been behind the war in Iraq.
Democracy Spills Over
Egypt could help democratize and moderate Palestinians and the Middle East
BBC 11 (Feb 13th, , “Egypt could bring democracy to Middle East - Tony Blair”) MV
Former Prime Minister Tony Blair has described events in Egypt as a "pivot" that could move the "whole of the Middle East" towards democracy. Mr Blair, who is now a UN Middle East peace envoy, said deposed President Hosni Mubarak had been "a force for stability in the region". But events in Egypt were a "huge opportunity" for change. It comes as Vince Cable warned UK banks against "improperly" helping Mr Mubarak protect his personal fortune. Mr Blair used an interview with BBC1's Andrew Marr Show to call for greater "engagement" by Western powers in the Middle East and to warn against "hysteria" about the Muslim Brotherhood. Some US conservatives have warned that the Islamist group, which is Egypt's largest opposition party, could take over the country and end its peace treaty with Israel, with consequences for the whole region. 'Huge benefit' But Mr Blair said the "sensible" approach to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt was "not to be hysterical about them," adding "they are not terrorists or extremists". Continue reading the main story “ The government should immediately request the Serious Fraud Office investigate what assets Mubarak holds in Britain” End Quote Douglas Alexander Shadow foreign secretary But he also said the international community should "not be complacent" about the Muslim Brotherhood either, adding they are "not the type of political party that you or I would recognise". Above all, he said the West had to move from "commentating on this situation" to "engaging" with what he said was a wider process of change across the Middle East. Mr Blair, who along with the US, was a close ally of President Mubarak when he was in power, said that although he had been a force for stability who had boosted Egypt's economy, forces for change in Egypt had been "held back" under his rule. Mr Blair told Andrew Marr: "This is a moment of huge opportunity, not just for Egypt, and ... although I see all the uncertainties, you have to manage this process of change very carefully, I think the military council will do that, by the way. "Despite all those challenges, this is a moment when the whole of the Middle East could pivot and face towards change and modernisation and democracy and that would be a huge benefit for all of us." He acknowledged the situation in Egypt had been "fantastically destabilising" for the Palestinian Authority but added that if a "benign" new administration was established in Cairo it could help to support modernising elements within Palestinian politics. Mr Blair said the Middle East "can either go towards an open-minded, modern type of democracy, let's hope that it does, or it could be swung into something narrow and extreme and closed-minded". He added: "I think there's every possibility that we get the first and not the second and our purpose as the West should be to engage insofar as possible to bring about that more benign scenario." Speaking later to the BBC News channel, Mr Blair said it was "conceivable" that Egypt could now end its peace treaty with Israel but the judgement of the "majority" of people he had spoken to in Egypt was that it would remain as it had delivered peace.
MENA countries will model Egypt’s democratic transition
Khatab 11(Professor Sayed, Senior Research Fellow @ School of Political and Social Inquiry & Global Terrorism Research Centre Monash University, Australia, July, “Egyptian Revolution and its Impact on the Stability in the Middle East”
The revolution has restored Egypt to its regional and global position. In a model that has never happened before, the Egyptian revolution has generated comprehensive discussions worldwide and occupied a higher rate in the world news coverage. A large number of the world‘s great writers, of varying languages and cultural backgrounds, have written about the Egyptian Revolution not only from their countries, but have also come to Cairo and spent long hours in Tahrir Square to write their articles from there.22 Consulting many of their articles one can see the spirit of the revolution in their words and phrases whether in their tributes to the revolution or in their unprecedented respect and appreciation for the Egyptian people. An eye-catching phrase indicated that the arteries of the peoples in the region pulsate by the power of the Egyptian revolution. It is admittedly akin to a volcano that is centered in Egypt and the impact of which began to shake the entire Arab region. That is just what we have witnessed in the explosive demonstrations that are calling for change and the resignation of regimes in Yemen, Libya, Syria, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Lebanon and others. What is happening in Egypt is filled with a lot of meaning for the surrounding area and not only Egypt. The peoples of the region saw the Egyptian revolution as the model that might bring an end to their dictatorial and oppressive regimes.23
Democracy Spills Over
Egypt’s democratic transition increases stability in the Middle East
Sharp 11 (Jeremy M., Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs, June 17th, “Egypt in Transition”) Congressional Research Service
On February 11, 2011, President Hosni Mubarak resigned from the presidency after 29 years in power. For 18 days, a popular peaceful uprising spread across Egypt and ultimately forced Mubarak to cede power to the military. How Egypt transitions to a more democratic system in the months ahead will have major implications for U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East and for other countries in the region ruled by monarchs and dictators. This report provides a brief overview of the transition underway and information on U.S. foreign aid to Egypt. U.S. policy toward Egypt has long been framed as an investment in regional stability, built primarily on long-running military cooperation and sustaining the March 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. Successive U.S. Administrations have viewed Egypt’s government as a moderating influence in the Middle East. U.S. policy makers are now grappling with complex questions about the future of U.S.-Egypt relations, and these debates are likely to influence consideration of appropriations and authorization legislation in the 112th Congress. The United States has provided Egypt with an annual average of $2 billion in economic and military foreign assistance since 1979. For FY2012, the Obama Administration has requested $1.551 billion in total aid to Egypt.
Democracy in Egypt enhances stability and peace in the Middle East
Khatab 11(Professor Sayed, Senior Research Fellow @ School of Political and Social Inquiry & Global Terrorism Research Centre Monash University, Australia, July, “Egyptian Revolution and its Impact on the Stability in the Middle East”
After the long suffering of the Egyptian people we should consider that true democracy; freedom and justice might enhance stability and peace in the Middle East. According to a popular former parliamentarian, ―any regime that comes to Egypt will not come to launch a war‖ with this or that country ―but to enjoy the outcome of the revolution and to launch a war on poverty, corruption and injustice‖.1
The democratic transition will stabilize the region—better Egypt-Iran relations
Khatab 11(Professor Sayed, Senior Research Fellow @ School of Political and Social Inquiry & Global Terrorism Research Centre Monash University, Australia, July, “Egyptian Revolution and its Impact on the Stability in the Middle East”
Consequently, the ―Revolution‖ in Egypt changed not only the Head of the State but the whole Egyptian System and established a new Republic; the Second Republic of Egypt. This Republic started fresh with fresh thoughts. Therefore, Egypt has opened a new page in its relations with all countries around the world. The relation between the new republic of Egypt and Iran is not out of this context of change.29 The political relationship between the two countries was left in the cold since the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, but trade relations continued. Now, the Revolution has paved the way for the establishing of relations between the two countries. Just a few weeks ago a public delegation of 40 people including Journalists, former diplomats, religious leaders, actors, business men, academics and others were warmly welcomed in Iran and met with Iranian officials. The new Republic in Egypt does not hold Iran as an enemy. The closest allies of the United States have relations with Iran. Only the US, Egypt and Israel have not had relations with Tehran for about three decades. Thinking of Iraq,30 Syria, Hamas, Hizbullah and their relations with the Gulf countries (GCC) or with so-called moderate and non-moderate countries in the region one might conclude that Iran is one of the major players in the Middle East. Therefore, Egypt considers that its relationship with Iran will serve the interest of the region and its stability.
Democracy Spills Over
Egypt is the linchpin of Middle East geopolitics
Miami Herald 11 (Feb 1st, “Democracy's promise for Egypt”, ) MV
The political upheaval that began in Tunisia a few weeks ago has reached the streets of Cairo and Alexandria, pillars of the Arab world, with the potential to scramble the politics of the Middle East. The old order appears to be crumbling, putting into play the future of the most volatile region on the globe and creating a major test for American diplomacy and the Obama administration. Egypt is the linchpin of Mideast geopolitics. It has long been a chief beneficiary of American military and economic aid because it has the largest population in the Arab world and radiates influence across the Islamic Crescent of nations. Under President Mubarak, it has been a bulwark against fundamentalist terrorism, a peacemaker with Israel, and an indispensable U.S. military ally, guarantor of access to the vital Suez Canal. In short, Egypt matters, not only to Washington but to every country with a stake in the future of the Middle East.
Egyptian is the linchpin of the Arab Spring
Omaha World-Herald 11 (March 14th, “Egypt is seen as 'linchpin' of democracy movement,” ) MV
Forget the war drama of Libya for a moment. The real show — the more important one, in the long run — is playing out in Egypt, the epicenter of the Arab world, where the adrenaline of revolt is fading to the nitty-gritty of building democracy, said an Omaha college professor whose specialty puts him in the thick of it. “Egypt really is the linchpin” of this winter surprise — the Arab Revolution, as some call it — “a transformative moment in the Middle East, the end of the American order,” said John Calvert, a Creighton University historian who specializes in the roots of radical Islamism. Much of the future remains murky. How far will the revolts spread? What other rulers will be unseated? Can the power that citizens seize in the streets be translated into functioning democracies? But one basic seems clear, Calvert said: Rulers in the region never again can take people’s support for granted. The Egyptians’ Feb. 11 overthrow of President Hosni Mubarak and his police state “is one of the great moments of our time,” Calvert said. “And a nonviolent revolution — my God!”
The Middle East will model Egypt’s transition—stability in the region depends on it
Schenker 11 (David, Dir-Program on Arab Politics “Egypt’s Enduring Challenges: Shaping the Post-Mubarak Environment” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy; Policy Focus #110, April) WorldCat
Egypt is a regional bellwether—the most populous Arab state and formerly the most influential. If the democratic experiment succeeds there, other states in transition will fall into place. The Papyrus Revolution was a remarkable achievement for the people of Egypt, but the hard work of consolidating democracy remains to be completed. Washington has a strong interest in the outcome and should not pretend otherwise. Its influence should be used to help Cairo manage change while maintaining stability. The fate of more than 80 million Egyptians, and quite possibly the region as a whole, depends on it.
Democracy Spills Over
Egypt is an influential bellwether in the MENA region
Ezzat 11 (Dina, Journalist Ahram Online “Egypt poised to become region’s model of democracy” Policymic March)
The expected visit of the Luis Ocampo, the prosecutor general of the International Criminal Court (ICC) on Wednesday will be groundbreaking. It will be the first visit of its kind in Egypt, which had previously shrugged off the ICC upon the direct orders of toppled President Hosni Mubarak. During his talks in Cairo with Nabil El-Arabi, foreign minister, and Amr Moussa, secretary general of the Arab League, Ocampo will address the situation in Libya, as the ICC continues its investigation of war crimes allegedly committed by Libyan ruler, Muammar Gaddafi against his own people in order to quell a movement to oust his regime. The ICC prosecutor general will also examine Egypt and possibly other Arab states with an eye on encouraging a wider subscription of Arab countries to his court. An ICC source speaking to Ahram Online from The Hague headquarters said that there is a sense that the democratisation process currently underway in the Arab world could prompt a new eagerness on the side of Arab capitals to join the ICC mechanism. So far only Jordan, Mauritania and Comoros have joined the ICC. Considering Egypt is proven an influential bellwether in the MENA region, the ICC is particularly keen to gain Cairo’s interest so as to set a model for other Arab countries to follow. Indeed, many other foreign officials have been and will continue to visit Egypt with the same hopes, in a post 25 January Revolution setting. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov and US Democratic Senator John Kerry all told their interlocutors during the Sunday and Monday meetings as well as the press that they wish to see Egypt as a model for a peaceful democratisation process. The same sentiment resonates among the Western diplomats, who watch in the background. The diplomats, based in Cairo, or those joining the delegations of foreign visitors, speak carefully of a fear, which is not very conspicuous – at least not yet, of the Islamisation of Egypt. Should this happen, they say, it would be a defeat to the call of democratisation around the Arab world. Clearly, neither the West nor Israel are willing to put up with a radicalised Arab world. "What we hope to see is a truly flourishing democracy that, of course, would accommodate all sorts of political trends, including the Muslim Brotherhood," said one Cairo-based Western diplomat. He added that the accommodation of Islamist trends should not at all bring about the exclusion of any other political trends or, for that matter, minorities.
AT: Saudi DA
Egyptian stability guarantees regional stability
Aymerich 11(Olga, MA-International and Intercultural Relations (ME) “Stability Trumps Religion in Saudi Arabia's Arab Spring Policies” May)
When the Arab Spring reached Egypt after blossoming in Tunisia, Saudi Arabia’s first reaction was to support then-President Hosni Mubarak and lobby President Barack Obama to do the same. Even when the U.S. started to pressure Mubarak to leave, Saudi King Abdullah continued supporting the old regime and described the protesters as “infiltrators” whose aim was to “destabilize [Egypt’s] security and stability.” He even warned that Saudi Arabia would finance Mubarak’s Egypt if the U.S. decided to withdraw their aid. However, after the revolution, Saudi Arabia decided to allocate monetary aid to the country and jettisoned the religious aspect of its foreign policy in order to ensure Egypt’s stability and, consequently, its own stability. During the revolution, Abdullah clung to Mubarak because of Saudi Arabia’s interests in regional, gulf, and national areas. In its Middle Eastern policy, Saudi Arabia has always sought regional stability. Traditionally, having close relationships with pro-western rulers stopped confrontation with regimes like Libya. Thus, ties with long-term rulers in the Arab Gulf, Yemen, Jordan, and especially Egypt were a crucial part of Saudi Arabia’s strategy to maintain regional stability. Saudi Arabia feared the Arab Spring spreading to the Gulf States, as it did in Bahrain. More than the economic, political, or social demands, the Saudis were concerned about the Shi’a character of the demonstrations. In Bahrain, the Shi’a community led a majority of the protests because they are underrepresented in government. Saudi Arabia’s alarm can be easily measured by its decision to send troops to Bahrain in order to curtail the revolution in the neighboring kingdom. At the national level, there are increasing demands for minority rights. There is also increasing national pressure for political reform, which the kingdom tried to quell with initiatives such as the 2005 municipal elections. However, neither the elections not the promised reforms brought any structural change to the country. For these reasons, Abdullah tried to limit Egypt’s revolution and repeatedly expressed his support for Mubarak’s regime. However, in the period after Mubarak, Saudi Arabia needs a strong Egypt. With growing internal security threats since the 2003 terrorist attacks and debates over the king’s succession, Saudi Arabia needs stability. A strong post-revolution Egypt is crucial to Middle Eastern stability and, consequently, to Saudi Arabia’s stability. Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy has always been comprised of financial support and religious influence. In Egypt’s case, this financial support was clear from the beginning. A week after Mubarak stepped down, Saudi Arabia announced the establishment of a development bank in Egypt to help the economy recover and orient it towards long-term investments. One month later, Saudi Arabia agreed to lend $4 billion in emergency funding, including a $1 billion deposit at Egypt’s Central Bank.
Democracy Spills Over
Democratic transition fosters democracy in the region
Task Force 11 (Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies “The Future of U.S. Democracy Promotion” March)
The success of Egypt‘s revolution and the subsequent protests that have begun in other Middle Eastern countries illustrate the need for the U.S. to move forward in a way that actively supports democratic transitions in the region. By considering each country‘s local complexities, providing support for civil society, and maintaining multilateral efforts in order to avoid a patronizing tone in which the U.S. appears to dictate its values, a strategy that supports the establishment of democracy in Egypt could potentially foster the same results throughout the region.
Democracy and Stability will spillover to the entire region from Egypt
Hamid 11 (Shadi, Director of Research, Brookings Doha Center and Fellow, Saban Center for Middle East, “In Egypt, Democracy Is The Only Avenue To Economic Stability” Forbes, )RAA
But this isn't just about Egypt. This is about a regional architecture that is crumbling, and more rapidly than anyone had imagined. There have been unprecedented protests in Yemen and rejuvenated opposition in Jordan, another close U.S. ally and the second-largest per-capita recipient of American assistance. In other words, Tunisia and Egypt are part of a broader regional trend. If Egypt--considered to have a robust security apparatus--falls, then all bets are off elsewhere. Egyptians, after all, drew inspiration and energy from Tunisia's "Jasmine Revolution." Other countries will now draw inspiration from what has been the largest pro-democracy mobilization in the history of Egypt and perhaps the Arab world. It would be premature to predict a pan-Arab revolution. Revolutions, even in the best of times, are incredibly difficult to stage. But, for the first time, a region-wide movement toward democracy is within the realm of possibility. The other regimes in question are important U.S. allies that have opened themselves up to Western business and investment, sometimes with impressive results. More important, with the world's largest reserves, they play a critical role in ensuring the free flow of oil. Saudi Arabia figures most prominently in such calculations. Its stock market, the region's largest, experienced a one-day drop of 6% in response to events in Egypt. And that was without any internal agitation. How much will it dip if Saudis start holding sit-ins? Investors should be worried. And most of them already are. Accordingly, where the people have made clear their desire for change, the international community should do what it can to facilitate successful--and peaceful--democratic transitions. Tunisia, the country that provided the spark for the events of the past month, may very well still fall into chaos. Pro-democracy revolutions don't necessarily lead to democracy. So the current phase of re-building the country's political institutions is crucial. In a country like Egypt, full-scale violence initiated by a fragile regime would undermine the little stability that remains. It may be the case that many in the business community, along with the Obama administration, would prefer to see the Egyptian regime remain in power, but under better behavior. This, however, does not seem to be a path the Egyptian people, led by a diverse and peaceful protest movement, are willing to take. Democracy--with the accountability, popular legitimacy and peaceful resolution of conflict it so often brings--is the only avenue to long-term stability. Otherwise, authoritarian regimes will appear stable--until they're not. And, by then, it's too late.
Democracy Spills Over
Egyptian democracy encourages others in the region to model
AlJazeera 11 (“Activists rally for 'unity' in Egypt” January 25, )
Tens of thousands of people have packed Cairo's Tahrir Square on a day that representatives from Egypt's political parties have dubbed "The Friday of Unity and the People's Will". The rally comes as part of efforts by political parties to show a united front and the country's political forces recently agreed on a common set of demands to ensure a peaceful, high turnout at Friday's rally. The demands include ending military trials for civilians, seeking justice for families of those killed during the revolution, raising the minimum wage, and ensuring quick trials for former government officials. "Most of our demands are the same but of course there are differences and everybody has a right to their opinion and to protest," Abdel Aal, a member of the Islamic Group party, told Al Jazeera in advance of the rally. However, disagreements have arisen over some issues, and some groups have boycotted the weekly Friday protests in the last two weeks because of a call by some to remove the military council from power. Al Jazeera's Sherine Tadros, reporting from Cairo, said: "This is the biggest rally turnout since former President Mubarak's ouster in February. "Friday's rally would be the first test of how committed Egypt's parties were to the principle of unity, for the sake of the country," Tadros said. Shadi Hamid from the Brookings Doha Center told Al Jazeera that the high turn out at the rally shows that Egyptians are not going home. "They will keep coming until their demands have been met. "This sends a message to other protest movements in the region that this is an ongoing process that no matter what the military does to stifle that, Arabs are empowered and they will increase in numbers. "More importantly, it is crucial that Islamists and liberals come together and avoid divisions that have plagued them in the past," Hamid said.
Instability in the region means conflicts, spread of neolib, and state collapse
Colombo 10 (Silvia, Researcher and a specialist in Mediterranean and Middle East issues at the
Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) in Rome, “The Southern Mediterranean: Between Changes and Challenges to its Sustainability” (Mediterranean Prospects) Silvia Colombo MEDPRO Technical Report No. 1/November, )RAA
Given our hypothesis of the overall unsustainability of the southern Mediterranean region in the next 20 years, we begin by describing the first scenario of unsustainability through decline and conflict (internal and external). This scenario is characterised by the continuation or even radicalisation of regional conflicts and the persistence of authoritarianism, both impacting on the political, economic and social dimensions described in section 2. In this scenario, the Mediterranean region would neither be integrated in multilateral frameworks of cooperation with the EU nor experience improvements in good governance and sustainable development. The prospects for a radicalisation of the Israeli–Palestinian and the Arab–Israeli conflicts and for a demise of the initiatives of dialogue and cooperation between the two shores of the Mediterranean seem rather plausible given, on the one hand, the continuous difficulties encountered by the regional and international players in reviving the peace process, and on the other the international community’s neglect of (or opposition to) intra-Palestinian reconciliation. As for the EU, in this scenario the UfM would reach a stalemate, precisely because of the general situation of conflict in the region. This scenario could also feature the protraction and possibly the extension of the neo-liberal, globalisation-driven growth model. Some countries in the region, for example Egypt, Syria and Tunisia, are continuing with the modernisation effort at an even faster pace than in previous decades. This effort tends to be led by new business elites that have flourished and gained more power and leverage in state affairs. Still, as in the past this form of economic governance will not contribute to redressing the grim situation in which the populations of the region live and thus will not remove the main sources of their discontent and frustration. Furthermore, this scenario is also assumed to be unsustainable from another vantage point, namely that without investments in education, renewable energy and urbanisation the region would suffer from the increasing depletion of human and natural capital. Another factor that needs to be taken into account by the analysis is the possible continuing deterioration of the global economy, notably in the Western developed economies but also in the Asian continent, due to the current phase of recession and its impact on the southern Mediterranean region. As much as this may seem a catastrophic scenario – certainly it is a dystopian one – it is not entirely unrealistic in a 2030 time horizon. The consequences for the countries of the region could be decline and even total breakdown and state failure. The prospect of a total collapse of state structures and the ability to function may materialise in the case of external military interventions or when certain domestic conditions reach the tipping point.
Egypt Modeling/Spillover
Other nations will look to Egypt’s military
Bolton 11 (John R., Senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, “How to Make Egypt Safe for Democracy,” American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, February 25, 2011, ) MNC
Fourth, Egypt's military must restore and extend stability, setting an example throughout the Middle East, thereby allowing whatever progress toward a truly democratic culture to emerge. Egypt's military will require political space in the months ahead. The Pentagon's continuing close relationship with Egypt's military should give us confidence that the right message about civilian control over the military is getting through. One of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces' first announcements was that it would honour Egypt's international obligations, presumably including Camp David. This is important and reassuring internationally, but hardly dispositive of what future governments will do.
The 1990s were filled with visions of a "new Middle East" that would transform the "cold peace" Israel had achieved with Egypt and Jordan into broader economic and security ties, and that would extend to other Arab countries too. That vision was stillborn, but there is little doubt that we are now going to see a new Middle East whether we like it or not, and whether or not it will be better than what it replaces. Alea iacta est--"the die has been cast"--and it may be long years before it comes to rest.
Egypt wants to set an example for other nations
Elliot 11 (Michael, writer for TIME magazine, “Learn to Love the Revolution,” TIME Magazaine, March 7, 2011, article found on Academic Search Premier) MNC
Egypt receives enormous quantities of U.S. aid, and the leaders of its armed forces have close ties with their counterparts in the Pentagon. That combination gives U.S. interests a salience in Egypt that they do not have in many other nations in the region. As the revolutions play out, memories, resentments and social fractures specific to each country will shape their outcome. Egypt, for example, was long the natural leader of the Arab world. Humiliated by its decline in standing (this is a nation that once led the nonaligned movement), many Egyptians would doubtless like to see their country regain its place and revive the sense of cultural and political dynamism that elements within their society demonstrated after World War I and again after Gamal Nasser and his colleagues overturned the monarchy in 1952. In no other Arab nation is the desire to retrieve lost stature likely to be so significant.
Other Middle East nations will want to follow Egypt
Elliot 11 (Michael, writer for TIME magazine, “Learn to Love the Revolution,” TIME Magazaine, March 7, 2011, article found on Academic Search Premier) MNC
But the key thing about the Arab revolution--the reason we can dream that even Libya may turn out fine--is that Arabs are doing it for themselves. This revolution is a regional one, a movement in which each nation's young people have learned tactics, technological fixes and slogans from one another. A local TV channel--al-Jazeera, not the BBC or CNN--has been a principal megaphone. The unplanned system of mutual support that has developed may turn out to have done more to bind the region together than the top-down attempts to create pan-Arabism in the 1950s. This year, says Rogan, "Arabs have been inspired by the example of fellow Arabs. What matters in the Arab world matters to Arabs." For that reason, it matters to us all.
Egypt Modeling/Spillover
Egypt historically sets a model for the Arab world
Rogan 11 (Eugene, director of the Middle East Center at Oxford University and author of The Arabs: A History, “Arab Wave,” National Interest, May/June 2011, article found on Academic Search Premier, p. 48) MNC
Indeed, the Arab world is now re-embarking on a journey of reform as old as the European Enlightenment. For contrary to so much commentary—and common wisdom— the search for democratic government is not new in the Middle East. What most people in the West don’t realize is that the events of 2011 have deep historical roots stretching back to the early nineteenth century. Arab reformers have debated the merits of constitutional government since the 1830s and have sought to constrain absolutism with elected assemblies since the 1860s. Even in the nineteenth century, it was Egypt and Tunisia that led the reform agenda in the Arab world. Following the examples of Cairo and Tunis, liberal political-reform movements emerged in the broader Middle East, with constitutional revolutions in Iran in 1906 and in the Ottoman Empire in 1908. In the end, the past six decades of autocracy might well be remembered as but a setback in two centuries of popular pressure for constitutional rule and democratic rights.
Arab Spring demonstrations followed Egypt’s example
Rogan 11 (Eugene, director of the Middle East Center at Oxford University and author of The Arabs: A History, “Arab Wave,” National Interest, May/June 2011, article found in Academic Search Premier, p. 56) MNC
Emboldened by the fall of Egypt’s strongman, popular demonstrations have followed across the Arab world: in Jordan, Bahrain, Yemen and Libya. The crowds repeat the same Arabic four-word slogan as their North African brethren: al-shaab yurid isqat al-nizam—“The people want the fall of the regime.” Long after Western analysts had dismissed Arab nationalism as a spent force—a bankrupt ideology ever since the Arabs were defeated by Israel in 1967 and the death of Nasser in 1970— the events of 2011 reveal a new and potent form of Arabism. It is clear that what happens in one part of that world is incredibly influential across the rest of the region. Bound by a common language and historic experience, citizens of different Arab states are inspired by each other’s methods and goals. And a crucial part of that historic experience is the struggle to constrain absolutism, resumed in 2011 with a vigor that puts to rest once and for all the myth that the Arabs as a people, or Muslims more generally, are somehow incompatible with democratic values.
Egypt’s reform will be a model for global democratic change
Khalidi 11(Rashid, Edward Said Professor of Arab Studies at Columbia University, “The Arab Spring,” The Nation, March 21, 2011, article found in Academic Search Premier) MNC
Suddenly, to be an Arab has become a good thing. People all over the Arab world feel a sense of pride in shaking off decades of cowed passivity under dictatorships that ruled with no deference to popular wishes. And it has become respectable in the West as well. Egypt is now thought of as an exciting and progressive place; its people’s expressions of solidarity are welcomed by demonstrators in Madison, Wisconsin; and its bright young activists are seen as models for a new kind of twenty-first-century mobilization. Events in the Arab world are being covered by the Western media more extensively than ever before and are being talked about positively in a fashion that is unprecedented. Before, when anything Muslim or Middle Eastern or Arab was reported on, it was almost always with a heavy negative connotation. Now, during this Arab spring, this has ceased to be the case. An area that was a byword for political stagnation is witnessing a rapid transformation that has caught the attention of the world.
Impact – Terrorism 1/2
Egyptian democratic success is key to stopping Al Qaeda
Miami Herald 11 (Feb 11, ) MV
WASHINGTON — Egypt's revolution, a secular popular revolt that used nonviolent means to humble an entrenched autocrat, will remake the Middle East — and could mark the end of the era that began on Sept. 11, 2001, according to U.S. officials, former officials and analysts here and in the Middle East. If the Egyptian revolution delivers on its promise of a march toward democracy, the protesters in Tahrir Square will have dealt a stunning blow to al Qaida and other radical groups, whose propagandists argue that their way — violence and a puritan form of Islam — is the only way to save the Muslim world. If the most populous Arab state slips back into a new dictatorship or anarchy, however, extremists could find a fresh foothold and a new lease on life in an Arab population that polls show has largely rejected them. The stakes for the U.S. in a region that has long bedeviled it are stratospheric. "The Egyptian revolution could be a huge defeat or a huge victory for al Qaida. It depends what happens," said Kenneth Pollack, a former CIA and White House official who's now director of the Brookings Institution's Saban Center for Middle East Policy. If things turn out well, "It could destroy their narrative," he said. CIA Director Leon Panetta told Congress Thursday, before Mubarak's departure was official, that the events in Egypt "will have tremendous impact. If it's done right, it will help us a great deal in trying to promote stability in that part of the world. If it happens wrong, it could create some serious problems for us and for the rest of the world."
Impact – Terrorism 2/2
Terrorism causes extinction – draws in Russia and China
Ayson 10 (Robert, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington, “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7, July, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via InformaWorld)
A terrorist nuclear attack, and even the use of nuclear weapons in response by the country attacked in the first place, would not necessarily represent the worst of the nuclear worlds imaginable. Indeed, there are reasons to wonder whether nuclear terrorism should ever be regarded as belonging in the category of truly existential threats. A contrast can be drawn here with the global catastrophe that would come from a massive nuclear exchange between two or more of the sovereign states that possess these weapons in significant numbers. Even the worst terrorism that the twenty-first century might bring would fade into insignificance alongside considerations of what a general nuclear war would have wrought in the Cold War period. And it must be admitted that as long as the major nuclear weapons states have hundreds and even thousands of nuclear weapons at their disposal, there is always the possibility of a truly awful nuclear exchange taking place precipitated entirely by state possessors themselves. But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important … some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington’s relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washington’s early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country’s armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response. As part of its initial response to the act of nuclear terrorism (as discussed earlier) Washington might decide to order a significant conventional (or nuclear) retaliatory or disarming attack against the leadership of the terrorist group and/or states seen to support that group. Depending on the identity and especially the location of these targets, Russia and/or China might interpret such action as being far too close for their comfort, and potentially as an infringement on their spheres of influence and even on their sovereignty. One far-fetched but perhaps not impossible scenario might stem from a judgment in Washington that some of the main aiders and abetters of the terrorist action resided somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what Allison claims is the “Chechen insurgents’ … long-standing interest in all things nuclear.”42 American pressure on that part of the world would almost certainly raise alarms in Moscow that might require a degree of advanced consultation from Washington that the latter found itself unable or unwilling to provide. There is also the question of how other nuclear-armed states respond to the act of nuclear terrorism on another member of that special club. It could reasonably be expected that following a nuclear terrorist attack on the United States, both Russia and China would extend immediate sympathy and support to Washington and would work alongside the United States in the Security Council. But there is just a chance, albeit a slim one, where the support of Russia and/or China is less automatic in some cases than in others. For example, what would happen if the United States wished to discuss its right to retaliate against groups based in their territory? If, for some reason, Washington found the responses of Russia and China deeply underwhelming, (neither “for us or against us”) might it also suspect that they secretly were in cahoots with the group, increasing (again perhaps ever so slightly) the chances of a major exchange. If the terrorist group had some connections to groups in Russia and China, or existed in areas of the world over which Russia and China held sway, and if Washington felt that Moscow or Beijing were placing a curiously modest level of pressure on them, what conclusions might it then draw about their culpability? If Washington decided to use, or decided to threaten the use of, nuclear weapons, the responses of Russia and China would be crucial to the chances of avoiding a more serious nuclear exchange. They might surmise, for example, that while the act of nuclear terrorism was especially heinous and demanded a strong response, the response simply had to remain below the nuclear threshold. It would be one thing for a non-state actor to have broken the nuclear use taboo, but an entirely different thing for a state actor, and indeed the leading state in the international system, to do so. If Russia and China felt sufficiently strongly about that prospect, there is then the question of what options would lie open to them to dissuade the United States from such action: and as has been seen over the last several decades, the central dissuader of the use of nuclear weapons by states has been the threat of nuclear retaliation. If some readers find this simply too fanciful, and perhaps even offensive to contemplate, it may be informative to reverse the tables. Russia, which possesses an arsenal of thousands of nuclear warheads and that has been one of the two most important trustees of the non-use taboo, is subjected to an attack of nuclear terrorism. In response, Moscow places its nuclear forces very visibly on a higher state of alert and declares that it is considering the use of nuclear retaliation against the group and any of its state supporters. How would Washington view such a possibility? Would it really be keen to support Russia’s use of nuclear weapons, including outside Russia’s traditional sphere of influence? And if not, which seems quite plausible, what options would Washington have to communicate that displeasure? If China had been the victim of the nuclear terrorism and seemed likely to retaliate in kind, would the United States and Russia be happy to sit back and let this occur? In the charged atmosphere immediately after a nuclear terrorist attack, how would the attacked country respond to pressure from other major nuclear powers not to respond in kind? The phrase “how dare they tell us what to do” immediately springs to mind. Some might even go so far as to interpret this concern as a tacit form of sympathy or support for the terrorists. This might not help the chances of nuclear restraint.
Impact – Terrorism EXT
If democracy fails, Al Qaeda will be strengthened
Byman 11 (Daniel L. Byman, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Feb 11th, “Yes, Democracy in Egypt Poses a Threat...to Al Qaeda,” ) MV
Although Al Qaeda has long sought the fall of the Mubarak regime in Egypt, the regime's potential collapse through peaceful protest rather than violent jihad is a body blow to the narrative of Osama bin Laden and his followers. (For more of my musings on this topic, see my article in Slate.) Egypt is the intellectual home of the modern jihadist movement. Sayyid Qutb, a leading thinker of the Muslim Brotherhood whom the Egyptian regime killed in 1966, inspired a generation of jihadists with his idea that Arab leaders are not true Muslims and that Arab societies are in a state of pre-Islamic ignorance (jahiliyya) and thus do not deserve obedience. Inspired by Qutb and like-minded thinkers, a range of activists began organizing in the 1970s against the Sadat regime, which they opposed not only due to his peace treaty with Israel but also because the regime did not implement Islamic law—and their activities provoked arrests and abuse. Sadat’s assassination in 1981 at the hands of some of these jihadists provoked a far more widespread and brutal crackdown. In the early 1990s, groups like Egyptian Islamic Jihad and the Islamic Group would attempt a revolt in Egypt, which the regime crushed by the end of the decade. Several key al Qaeda figures were part of this struggle against the Mubarak regime. After the crackdowns, they fled Egypt to find refuge in Afghanistan during the anti-Soviet struggle, and then with Bin Laden when the Saudi was in Sudan, and then later Afghanistan. Bin Laden’s deputy, Ayman Zawahiri, led Egyptian Islamic Jihad and initially tried to exploit Bin Laden to help his cause in Egypt. Over time, failure in Egypt and perhaps a genuine ideological shift led Zawahiri and others to embrace Bin Laden’s emphasis on the United States as the primary enemy. But Egypt still looms large in the jihadist imagination. Zawahiri and others have not forgotten the torture they suffered at the hands of the Mubarak regime, and of course al Qaeda still devotes much of its effort to fighting U.S. allies in the Middle East. So why isn’t Al Qaeda rejoicing? One reason is that al Qaeda’s rival will benefit from this victory. The Muslim Brotherhood, the most important Islamist organization in the Arab world, was founded in Egypt, and the Egyptian branch remains the most influential of this organization’s many affiliates. Although the Brotherhood and al Qaeda both see Islam as a political as well as religious ideology, the two differ in many fundamental ways. In his book The Bitter Harvest, Zawahiri bitterly criticizes Brotherhood leaders because they rejected violence and participate in politics. Hamas, a Brotherhood spinoff, has quarreled bitterly with Al Qaeda and repressed Al Qaeda-inspired jihadists in the Gaza Strip. (See Barak Mendelsohn, “Al Qaeda’s Palestinian Problem,” Survival, Vol 51, No. 4 (2009), pp. 71-86.) If Brotherhood figures gain influence in a new Egyptian government, as seems likely, they will carry this feud with them. The Brotherhood, of course, is only one part of the opposition to Mubarak. The rest of the opposition, however, is even farther from al Qaeda. Egyptians demonstrating in Tahrir Square and elsewhere seek good governance and an end to corruption, not an Islamic state. Al Qaeda in theory might endorse those goals, but the type of government it wants—a hardline Islamic one like the Taliban in Afghanistan—would be anathema to most Egyptians. Even more important, the Egyptian people’s success in forcing political change—if it indeed happens—would undermine al Qaeda’s message. Bin Laden and his followers have long stressed that change only comes through force and bloodshed. Peaceful protest producing profound change suggests an alternative model to the many frustrated Arab citizens, one that is much closer to their own desires. Bin Laden could still turn this potential defeat into victory in at least two ways. First, if reform fails and a dictatorship continues, whether under Mubarak or under a new military leader, it vindicates his message that peaceful change cannot work. Second, if the Brotherhood is artificially excluded from power it may alienate many within the movement, particularly young hotheads who might find al Qaeda’s call to arms compelling. So success in Egypt is vital not only for the future well-being of the Egyptian people, but also to deal another blow to Bin Laden and his organization.
Democracy in Egypt deters Jihadist violence against the state—Solves Terrorism
Khatab 11(Professor Sayed, Senior Research Fellow @ School of Political and Social Inquiry & Global Terrorism Research Centre Monash University, Australia, July, “Egyptian Revolution and its Impact on the Stability in the Middle East”
Abboud who owes his freedom to the peaceful revolt against Mubarak stated that, ―The revolution created a new mechanism: the mechanism of strong, peaceful protests…Public squares around the Arab world are ready to receive millions who can stop any ruler and expose him…The coming period does not at all require armed struggle with the ruler‖. 18 Now a free man, Abboud believes that democracy will prevent Jihadists from ever again taking up their guns against the State. He reassured the Jihad‘s support for the rights of all Egyptian people, including the Christian minority, and outlined the past militancy as a result of State oppression: ―Violence breeds violence… Islamists merely want to enjoy the same freedoms as everyone else…In the 1980s, the Mubarak regime turned away our initiative to halt violence…We loved Egypt and we wanted good for it. Today, we love Egypt and want good for it.‖ In the same interview Abboud‘s cousin Tariq al-Zumur who has a Doctorate in law stated that, ―The climate for armed action is finished and the main reason is the atmosphere of freedom we are now establishing‖. 19 Both Abboud and Tariq are leading figures in the Jihad movement in Egypt. While in prison the two cousins co-authored a document entitled al-Badil al-Thalith bayna al-Istibdad wa-al-Istislam: The Third Alternative between Despotism and Surrender which was published by the Egyptian newspaper al-Shuruq in late August and early September 2009.
Impact – A2: Dem Bad – Israeli Conflict
A democratic Egypt won’t lead to conflict with Israel
Khatab 11(Professor Sayed, Senior Research Fellow @ School of Political and Social Inquiry & Global Terrorism Research Centre Monash University, Australia, July, “Egyptian Revolution and its Impact on the Stability in the Middle East”
Both Egypt and Israel have enjoyed a good relationship in the past three decades of peace. The trade between the two countries has grown by 144% between the years 2004-2005. All signs indicate that the bilateral relations between Egypt and Israel will continue and the Peace Treaty will remain in place. No government that establishes in Egypt would abolish the peace treaty with Israel. Both the military leadership and the presidential candidates have voiced support for the Pact. Egypt‘s foreign Minister Nabil al-Arabi reaffirmed that ―Egypt is going to comply with every agreement and abide by every treaty it has entered into.‖ ―Egypt was the first Arab country that established diplomatic relations with Israel, in 1979, but Israel remains deeply unpopular with many Egyptians because of its policies towards Palestinians.‖ As one that helped negotiate the Camp David peace accords al-Arabi noted that the negotiations were difficult in the beginning: ―it was difficult to negotiate with Israel, but once it was done and everything was signed, both sides abide and comply faithfully.‖28
Impact – A2: Dem Bad – Muslim Brotherhood Gets Elected
Only 17% want the Muslim Brotherhood to lead the next government
Sharp 11 (Jeremy M., Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs, June 17th, “Egypt in Transition”) Congressional Research Service
An estimated two dozen parties have been formed since February 11, including the recently recognized Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), the party of the Muslim Brotherhood. The FJP has an Egyptian Copt, Rafiq Habib, as its vice president and plans to contest between 45% and 49% of parliamentary seats. According to a public opinion poll conducted by the Pew Research Center, only 17% of respondents (surveyed 1,000) said they would like to see the Muslim Brotherhood lead the next government, though the same poll revealed that 50% of respondents also said it was “very important” for religious parties to be part of a future government and 37% have a “very favorable” view of the Muslim Brotherhood. Other notable parties include the Free Egyptians Party (FEP), founded by Egyptian billionaire businessman and Coptic Christian Naguib Sawiris, and the Al Adl Party (Justice) party founded by supporters of Egyptian activist and former International Atomic Energy Association Chief Mohammad El Baradei. Most analysts anticipate that over the course of the next few months, parties with similar platforms will either merge or form coalitions, particularly secular parties wishing to compensate for their relative anonymity and organizational weakness and counter the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood. In mid-June, the FJP surprised many by forming a coalition with the Wafd Party, Egypt’s oldest nationalist party and sometimes political rival of the Muslim Brotherhood.
Egyptian Economy – Uq.
Egyptian economy will collapse by the end of 2011 without stabilization—low funds and capital flight prove
Arab Times 11 (“When will Egypt go Broke?” July 23, 2011, ) KJS
A May 19 report by the Middle East News Agency, an agency of the Egyptian government, allowed that the country’s hard currency reserves had fallen to just US$25 billion, from $36 billion in February, an alarming decline that described a course towards bankruptcy by late in 2011. The country’s central bank immediate denied the report in the official news outlet, averring that the real total was $28 billion. Emergency loans from Arab oil producers probably explain the discrepancy. After the May Group of 20 (G-20) summit, where the world’s largest economies pledged $40 billion in assistance for the floundering Egyptians, it is clear that the industrial nations and the Arab oil-producers want to prevent Egypt from turning into a failed state, although it is far from clear who will pay how much and when. In June, the Egyptians rebuffed an offer of $3 billion from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), evidently because the fragile ruling coalition could not accept even the suggestion that a foreign agency might dictate loan conditions. The IMF protested that no strings were attached to the funds, but even the smell of conditionality was too much for the military junta. Just after spurning the IMF, Egypt announced a $2.34 billion package from the Gulf states. Saudi Arabia meanwhile offered an additional $4 billion. No matter how much aid the Egyptians obtain, it is not clear that much of it will stick to Egypt’s financial system. Jordan’s Finance Minister Mohammed Abu Hammour warned in Rome June 24, “There is capital flight and $500 million a week are leaving the Arab world.” Although Hammour did not mention countries in his talk before the Arab Banking Summit last month, most of the capital flight is coming from Egypt, and at an annual rate roughly equal to Egypt’s remaining reserves. The Egyptian government has told the international organizations and G-20 governments that it can get by with $13 billion in assistance this year, but capital flight could erase that amount in a matter of months. It is hard to get accurate information on capital flight, and the fog of war is thickened by wild assertions.
Dem Solves Egyptian Economy EXT
Political uncertainty and continued protests hurt economy
Reuters 11 (“Political tension drags Egypt, most Gulf mkts fall,” July 27, 2011, ) KJS
Egypt's bourse fell for a seventh session on mounting political tension on Wednesday ahead of former President Hosni Mubarak's trial, and most Gulf markets fell amid global uncertainty. In Egypt, the latest in a series of mass protests, has been scheduled for Friday, adding to the tension in the country. "We are still waiting for next Friday's protest, and no one knows how it will turn out," said investment and capital market analyst Nader Khedr. The benchmark index closed 0.7 percent lower. Ezz Steel dropped 3 percent, down for a second day after the exchange on Tuesday briefly suspended trading in its shares until the Egypt's top steel producer submits its consolidated results for 2010 and the first quarter of 2011. Cairo-based private equity firm Citadel Capital tumbled 3.9 percent after talks with Abraaj Capital ended without the Dubai-based firm agreeing to buy a stake in its Egyptian rival. Investors across the Gulf reduced positions ahead of the Islamic fasting month of Ramadan amid an uncertain global scenario. Gold soared to a record high for the sixth time in two weeks on Wednesday and the dollar slumped to another record low against the Swiss franc as investors sought safety from a possible U.S. debt default. Equities were weaker globally, particularly in Europe and Japan. "Unfortunately, we're approaching Ramadan in times of uncertainty in international markets," said Marwan Shurrab, vice-president and chief trader at Gulfmena Investments. In Abu Dhabi, telecoms operator Etisalat dragged Abu Dhabi's benchmark to an eight-week low. Etisalat fell 3.3 percent after paying out dividend. Banks saw profit-taking from Tuesday's gains. First Gulf Bank slipped 0.6 percent, Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank shed 0.7 percent and Union National Bank declined 0.3 percent. The index dropped 1.2 percent to its lowest close since May 31. "We will see bluechips drifting down despite strong Q2 numbers generally. Real estate stocks are lagging behind, which is one of the main drivers of UAE markets. This will cause a lag in positioning from institutional which will negatively affect our markets," Shurrab added. Dubai's Emaar Properties ended 0.7 percent lower after the company posted a 69 percent drop in quarterly net profit on Tuesday and missed estimates. The benchmark lost 0.3 percent to a four-week low. In Oman, the index ended 0.4 percent lower, after gaining for two days. Five of the ten largest stocks fell with Renaissance Services falling 2.1 percent and Nawras slipping 0.4 percent. "On second-quarter numbers, we are comfortable with the Oman banking sector," said Kanaga Sundar, Gulf Baader Capital Markets head of research. "Industry sector earnings came out as a mixed bag for Q2." Telecoms operator Nawras posted a quarterly net profit drop of 13 percent to 10 million rials ($26 million) after the close of trading, missing forecasts. In Kuwait, Gulf Finance House dragged the index 0.4 percent lower, down for second day in four. GFH tumbled 5.1 percent to take its July losses to 14.5 percent despite its gains this week. Investors have been booking profits in the stock after it soared when its chairman sold his $1.4 million stake in the firm last week
Democracy will save the Egyptian economy
Reuters 11 (“Investors see opportunity in post-Mubarak Egypt,” 2/12/11, ) KJS
Despite the political uncertainty of what lies ahead in the short-term, investors see the Egyptian "White Revolution," as many citizens are calling it, an opportunity to grab market-share in the region's most populous country. "There will be democracy and transparency and these changes will lead to more economic growth," said Larry Seruma, managing principal at Nile Capital Management. "It's a great opportunity to invest in Egypt." Prior to the revolution, Nile Capital's exposure to Egypt was 5 to 10 percent of its $4.79 million portfolio. Under the 30-year rule of Mubarak, Egypt had been a critical ally of the United States and the main stability force in the Middle East. But now that his rule is over, many worry that a power vacuum could lead to a new regime that will oppose Western capitalism and be antagonistic toward Israel, the main U.S. ally in the region. The outcome is yet to be seen. But government officials and investors in general, as well as the majority of Egyptians, are hopeful for a more open government and market. "I think investment in Egypt itself could increase, say, a year from now as a new government comes in. If that government ends up being democratic in nature, then you could certainly see some improvement," said Bryant Evans, investment advisor and portfolio manager at Cozad Asset Management, in Champaign, Illinois. Even the most powerful and wealthy businessmen in Egypt have been beating the drums of democracy and free markets as the best form of insurance for their investments. "When you have less than, say, 10 percent of the population with checking accounts, there is potential for growth," said Karim Baghdady, managing director of Egyptian-based investment bank Beltone in New York. "When you have a gray economy that is almost as large as the official GDP, if you are able to institutionalize that economy, then people will start securitizing their debts, able to borrow more, buy more. So there is a big domino effect."
Dem Solves Egyptian Economy EXT
Egyptian economy and government is unstable—military education solves
Henry and Springborg 11 (Clement professor of government and middle east studies at the University of Texas at Autstin, and Robert, professor of national security affairs at the naval post graduate school and program manager for the middle east at the Center for Civil-Military Relations, “A Tunisian Solution for Egypt’s Military, Foreign Affairs Online, February 21, 2011, ) KJS
But Egypt faces dire economic conditions, and the military may already be jeopardizing the country’s future and discouraging foreign direct investment by targeting some of the old regime’s liberal economic elite, such as the former minister of trade and industry, Rachid Mohamed Rachid. The military high command may try to counter the lack of investment by calling for renewed economic nationalism, but that will condemn Egypt to economic stagnation, similar to that which it experienced in the mid-1960s. In addition to mobilizing the middle class seeking freedom and jobs, the revolution energized the poor, who joined in the protests to demand dignity, justice, and bread. If the economy worsens and the military overstays its welcome, the Egyptian people may well return to the streets. Established military rule in Egypt is certainly not in the Egyptian people’s interest, but neither is it in the United States’ or any other country’s interest. It would be politically unstable in the short term, and over the longer haul would likely lead to a repetition of this past month’s events. The United States must encourage the institutionalized political participation of those who drove -- and are still driving -- the revolution. And rather than continuing to support the military, as the Obama administration has promised to do, the United States needs to signal that an overgrown, overfed, and largely useless Egyptian military is not acceptable. Aid the United States does send should be geared toward helping the Egyptian military deal with real national security interests, such as disaster relief, air and sea rescue, and cooperative engagement with allied military forces. And, as in the case of Tunisia, U.S. training certainly has a role to play. Through professional military education, the United States can assist Egypt’s military in developing professional norms, which are supportive of civil-military relations within a democratic framework. To recall a chant inciting Cairo’s January 25 movement: “Tunisia is the solution.”
Dem Solves Egyptian Economy EXT
Military unable to lead Egypt—additional training needed
Henry and Springborg 11 (Clement professor of government and middle east studies at the University of Texas at Autstin, and Robert, professor of national security affairs at the naval post graduate school and program manager for the middle east at the Center for Civil-Military Relations, “A Tunisian Solution for Egypt’s Military, Foreign Affairs Online, February 21, 2011, ) KJS
It appears that the Egyptian military has won the cake, at least for the time being, but eating it is going to be difficult. Although its size and strength are widely recognized, the Egyptian army is not the tight professional force that many consider it to be. It is bloated and its officer core is indulged, having been fattened on Mubarak’s patronage. Its training is desultory, maintenance of its equipment is profoundly inadequate, and it is dependent on the United States for funding and logistical support. But even weapons systems the United States has given the Egyptian army, such as F-16s and M1A1 tanks, are underutilized. Many are also comparatively ineffective, in part because Minister of Defense Muhammad Tantawi, acting on behalf of Mubarak, denied them vital, state-of-the-art communication capacities. He did so to impede lateral communications within the officer corps and to prevent interoperability with nominally allied forces, including those of friendly Arab countries. The raison d’être of the military was always to support the Mubarak regime, not defend the nation. As presently constituted, the military will also not be able to meet many of the protesters’ demands. It cannot allow the core of the anti-Mubarak movement, such as the National Association for Change associated with Muhammad El Baradei, to play a leading role in forming a new government. Nor can it allow a parliament to have real power. The anti-Mubarak opposition and an empowered legislative branch would seek at least an oversight role and ultimately try to subordinate the military to the civilian government. This would be unacceptable to the military, which knows that its patronage network and economic influence would dry up if civilians took control. It will also try to deny calls for a full-scale investigation into the “economic crimes” of the ancien régime, for it has been involved in many of them.
Democracy key to economic recovery
Egypt News 11 (Egyptian news online news source, “Egyptian financial experts urge foreign investment, not loans, in uncertain climate,” July 27 2011, )
The report expected the withdrawal in capital flows to Egypt in 2011 of U.S. $17 billion. It said Egypt s economy is characterized by variety and activity, unlike Eastern and Central European countries in the early 1990s, and that the economy significantly developed in the period before the revolution. The report called on the new government in Egypt to renew its commitment to improving the business environment and modifying the fiscal deficit, which will lead to the continuity of rapid development rates. The report criticized western actions to help the Egyptian economy, saying that what the big countries have done, especially the United States and the European Union and other international forces, is not enough to boost the Egyptian economy and support reforms, which in turn will support the process of political transition to democracy. The report called on the international forces to reinforce trade and the private investments in Egypt, to direct assistance to encourage direct investment through the private sector, and the participation between both sectors, private and public, in infrastructure projects, which are more important to the Egyptian economy than facilitating loans from international institutions. The economic expert Ahmed el-Ghandor said the resolution of the investigation with members of the former regime reflects confidence in the Egyptian economy. He described this resolution as a start to consolidating the rule of law and building democracy, which encourages the arrival of foreign capital. He pointed out that this should be quick to refresh economic activity in this difficult transition period. El-Ghandor said the repercussions of the revolution on economic activity are normal, but what is important is to bring the situation back to its normal state, especially the sources of foreign change in tourism and exports.
Dem Solves Egyptian Economy EXT
Egypt’s economy will only recover with successful democratic reforms
Mubasher 11 (Stock Market Analysis Company, 4/14 “Egypt’s economy faces challenges but has potential, economists say” )gw
A group of economists and business leaders speaking at a conference on Sunday affirmed that Egypt’s economy faces serious challenges but expressed optimism that a more democratic Egypt could lead to a strong economic recovery. The conference, “Together Supporting Egypt’s Economy,” was organized by GlaxoSmithKline Consumer Healthcare (GSK CH), a London-based multinational pharmaceutical and healthcare company, to announce its initiative to expand investments in Egypt’s healthcare industry. “The revolution had negative impact on Egypt’s economic sector with an estimated $3 to 4 million lost,” said Samir Makary, an economics professor at the American University in Cairo. Egypt’s unemployment rate reached 26 percent in 2010 with a total of around 23 million people unemployed, according to Makary, who expects unemployment to remain stable for at least a year due to deteriorating investment conditions. Despite these challenges, most speakers were optimistic. “Egypt now is at political crossroads, so if the country passes through this critical phase, our economy will recover,” said Gamal al-Din al-Bayoumi, secretary general of the Arab Investors Union. Moreover, he said, the revolution might result in less corruption, which could encourage investment in Egypt. Makary echoed this statement, saying Egypt’s “economic fundamentals could provide a solid and sustainable base for stronger growth in the future if we eliminate corruption and support democracy.”
Military aid provided by the plan key to save the economy
Korski 11 (Daniel, European Council on Foreign Relations, “Without Mlitary Reform Egypt cannot democratize,” 7-5, ) KJS
Military reforms are necessary for several reasons. The first is financial. The country’s budget gap will widen to the highest level in more than a decade next year, as tourists have fled or cancelled long-planned trips for fear of further violence. Economic growth may slow to 1 percent this year, the International Monetary Fund has predicted. And the nation had its credit rating lowered to Ba3 at Moody’s Investors Service and to BB at Standard & Poor’s, the third- and second-highest non-investment grades. To service its billion dollar debts, the Egyptian state needs all the revenue it can raise. But with billions – nobody knows how much – diverted to the defence budget and up to forty percent of the economy controlled by military-run companies that do not pay taxes and use conscripted labour, the Egyptian state will struggle to service its debts in the medium-term. So the military stands in the way of creating jobs in the private sector and reforming the public sector. But the real reason why military reform cannot be avoided is political. Given the extent of Military Inc, thousands of civilians are bound in predatory partnerships with the military, in turn strengthening it institutionally and increasing its appetite for power and profit while creating an undemocratic over-class. Upon retirement, senior officers are given considerable retirement packages and appointed as provincial governors or head of municipalities. Until now, however, everyone has skirted around the issue. A few weeks ago, sitting in his wood-panelled, air-conditioned office outside of central Cairo, I put to General Murad Mowafi, Egypt’s intelligence chief, that most transitions from authoritarianism have led to some form of military reform. He smiled and answered an entirely different question I had not asked. The Tahrir Square activists are not much better, hoping that the Egyptian military will help to safeguard the revolution they have begun. But as an Egyptian proverb has it: “Because we focused on the snake, we missed the scorpion”. Military reform may be difficult, but it cannot be avoided if Egyptians want a democracy. How, then to proceed? Everyone knows what military reforms look like – they include constitutional reforms, legislative changes, budget oversight, professionalisation, the retirement of the senior leadership etc etc. Such reforms start from a different kind of assessment of threats and challenges, such as the Internal Security Sector Review that Kosovo undertook, and a process to reshape the military to address these. But the Egyptian military is unlikely, at this stage at least, to accept a process, which leads to this kind of reform. A more circumspect process is needed. The key consideration is to cajole and persuade Egypt’s military leadership not to block the initial steps towards reform. That will first of all require a unified international community. There is no chance of reforms happening if the United States, European governments and the likes of Turkey and Saudi Arabia sending different signals. Egypt’s security can no longer be bought through the comfortable kleptocracy of Military Inc.
Egyptian Economy – Economy Impact EXT
Regional instability threatens catastrophic oil shocks
Ziemba and Ayah 11 (Rachel, senior analyst covering oil-exporting economies, and El Said, research analyst covering the Middle East and North Africa, 2/2, “Unrest In Egypt, Uncertainty In The Region” )gw
Regarding wider implications, the oil market remains the key link between instability in the Middle East and the global economy. Although we see very little risk of an oil-supply shock through the Suez Canal--the canal and adjoining pipeline appear to be under the control of the armed forces--prolonged uncertainty could further pressure oil market sentiment in the short term, which more OPEC production could only partly offset. Further increases in the oil price above the $100 per barrel mark could pose a significant risk to the global economy, as RGE Chairman Nouriel Roubini recently reiterated.
Oil prices will rise due to unrest, even if the Suez remains open
VOA News (Voice of America News, 5/13, “Egypt Not Alone in Its Economic Problems” )gw
Description: I’m Alex Villarreal with the VOA Special English Economics Report, from | http Egypt is the biggest of the nations hit by recent protests in North Africa and the Middle East. One of the causes of this spreading wave of popular dissatisfaction is a lack of economic progress.Egypt is not a major oil exporter. Its economy is not big enough to affect world economic growth. But important pipelines cross Egypt. And Egypt controls the Suez Canal. About eight percent of world shipping passes through this link between Europe and Asia. That includes two million barrels of oil each day, mainly to Europe. Many experts say they expect the canal to remain open. Still, concerns about the Suez have pushed oil prices to their highest levels since two thousand eight. Fariborz Ghadar heads the Center for Global Business Studies at Penn State University. He says poverty in Egypt remains high — up to forty percent in some areas.Yet Egypt is not alone. Foreign investors worry about corruption, mismanagement and security problems across North Africa and the Middle East. Every year millions of young people enter the job market. Populations are young and growing fast. In Egypt, the economy grew about five percent last year — too little growth to create enough jobs. Fariborz Ghadar says the United States in a good year creates fewer than two million jobs. He says Europe and the US together generate three million jobs. Middle Eastern countries have to generate up to eight …
Egyptian Economy – Food Wars Impact 1/2
Stabilizing Egypt’s economy is key to prevent food wars
Goldman 11 (David P., economist, 5/10, “The Hunger to Come in Egypt” )gw
Egypt is running out of food, and, more gradually, running out of money with which to buy it. The most populous country in the Arab world shows all the symptoms of national bankruptcy - the kind that produced hyperinflation in several Latin American countries during the 1970s and 1980s - with a deadly difference: Egypt imports half its wheat, and the collapse of its external credit means starvation. The civil violence we have seen over the past few days foreshadows far worse to come. The Arab uprisings began against a background of food insecurity, as rising demand from Asia priced the Arab poor out of the grain market (Food and failed Arab states, Asia Times Online February 2, 2011). The chaotic political response, though, threatens to disrupt food supplies in the relative near term. Street violence will become the norm rather than the exception in Egyptian politics. All the discussion about Egypt's future political model and its prospective relations with Israel will be overshadowed by the country's inability to feed itself. Egypt's political problems - violence against Coptic Christians, the resurgence of Islamism, and saber-rattling at Israel, for example - are not symptoms of economic failure. They have a life of their own. But even Islamists have to eat, and whatever political scenarios that the radical wing of Egyptian politic might envision will be aborted by hunger. The Ministry of Solidarity and Social Justice is already forming "revolutionary committees" to mete out street justice to bakeries, propane dealers and street vendors who "charge more than the price prescribed by law", the Federation of Egyptian Radio and Television reported on May 3. According to the ministry, "Thugs are in control of bread and butane prices" and "people's committees" are required to stop them. Posters on Egyptian news sites report sharp increases in bread prices, far in excess of the 11.5% inflation reported for April by the country's central bank. And increases in the price of bottled propane have made the cost of the most widely used cooking fuel prohibitive. The collapse of Egypt's credit standing, meanwhile, has shut down trade financing for food imports, according to the chairman of the country's Food Industry Holding Company, Dr Ahmed al-Rakaibi, chairman of the Holding Company for Food Industries. Rakaibi warned of "an acute shortage in the production of food commodities manufactured locally, as well as a decline in imports of many goods, especially poultry, meats and oils". According to the country's statistics agency, only a month's supply of rice is on hand, and four months' supply of wheat. The country's foreign exchange reserves have fallen by US$13 billion, or roughly a third during the first three months of the year, Reuters reported on May 5. The country lost $6 billion of official and $7 billion of unofficial reserves, and had only $24.5 billion on hand at the end of April. Capital flight probably explains most of the rapid decline. Egypt's currency has declined by only about 6% since January, despite substantial capital flight, due to market intervention by the central bank, but the rapid drawdown of reserves is unsustainable. At this rate Egypt will be broke by September. Egypt imported $55 billion worth of goods in 2009, but exported only $29 billion of goods. With the jump in food and energy prices, the same volume of imports would cost considerably more. Egypt closed the 2009 trade gap with about $15 billion in tourist revenues, and about $8 billion of remittances from Egyptian workers abroad. But tourism today is running at a fraction of last year's levels, and remittances are down by around half due to expulsion of Egyptian workers from Libya. Even without capital flight, Egypt is short perhaps $25 billion a year. Price controls and currency depreciation have made it more profitable for wholesalers - including some employees of state companies - to export rice and cooking oil illegally. According to the daily al-Ahram, hoarding of rice by wholesalers has pushed up the price of the grain by 35% this year, while 200 containers per day are sold to Turkey and Syria. "What is happening," the newspaper claims, is that that traders are storing basic items such as rice and barley, hoarded in barns and in large quantities, and are reluctant to send it to the rice mills in order to raise the price of this strategic commodity". The al-Ahram report, headlined, "Conspiracy to Monopolize Rice," demands physical inspection of containers leaving Egyptian ports. The rest of the story is predictable. Once the government relies on young men with guns to police its merchants, hoarding will only get worse. The Egyptian revolution has cracked down on the commercial elite that ran the country's economy for the past 60 years, and the elite will find ways to transfer as much of its wealth to safety as it can. The normal chain of distribution will break down and "revolutionary committees" will take control of increasingly scarce supplies. Farmers won't get fuel and fertilizer, and domestic supplies will fail. The Egyptian government will go to the International Monetary Fund and other aid agencies for loans - the government reportedly will ask for $7 billion to tide things over - and foreign money at best will buy a few months' respite. The currency will collapse; the government will print IOUs to tide things over; and the Egyptian street will reject the IOUs as the country reverts to barter. It will look like the Latin American banana republics, but without the bananas. That is not meant in jest: few people actually starved to death in the Latin inflations. Egypt, which imports half its wheat and a great deal of the rest of its food, will actually starve. Revolutions don't only kill their children. They kill a great many ordinary people. The 1921 famine after the Russian civil war killed an estimated five million people, and casualties on the same scale are quite possible in Egypt as well. Half of Egyptians live on $2 a day, and that $2 is about to collapse along with the national currency, and the result will be a catastrophe of, well, biblical proportions.
Egyptian Economy – Food Wars Impact 2/2
Conflict over food leads to World War III
Calvin 98 (William H.; Professor of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences – University of Washington) January “The Great Climate Flip-Flop” Atlantic Monthly 281:1 EBSCO)gw
The population-crash scenario is surely the most appalling. Plummeting crop yields would cause some powerful countries to try to take over their neighbors or distant lands – if only because their armies, unpaid and lacking food, would go marauding, both at home and across the borders. The better-organized countries would attempt to use their armies, before they fell apart entirely, to take over countries with significant remaining resources, driving out or starving their inhabitants if not using modern weapons to accomplish the same end: eliminating competitors for the remaining food. This would be a worldwide problem – and could lead to a Third World War – but Europe’s vulnerability is particularly easy to analyze. The last abrupt cooling, the Younger Dryas, drastically altered Europe’s climate as far east as Ukraine. Present-day Europe has more than 650 million people. It has excellent soils, and largely grows its own food. It could no longer do so if it lost the extra warming from the North Atlantic.
Egyptian Economy – Regional Stability Impact
Egypt’s economy is key to regional stability
Kirkpatrick 11 (David, Cairo bureau chief for the New York Times, 6/9,“Egypt’s Economy Slows to a Crawl; Revolt Is Tested” )gw
In a region where economic woes enraged an entire generation, whether and how Egypt can fix its broken economy will be a crucial factor in determining the revolution’s success. It could also influence the outcome of the revolts across the Arab region, where economic troubles are stirring fears of continued instability, authoritarian crackdowns, or even a backlash against what had appeared to be a turn toward Western-style market reforms.
Egyptian Economy – Terrorism/Muslim Brotherhood Impact 1/2
Stabilizing the economy is key to prevent takeover by the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafi extremism
Sulivan 11 (Paul J., Professor at Georgetown University and National Defense University, 5/21, “Helping Egypt’s economy before it gets much worse” )gw
Egypt needs jobs now and investment now, not sometime in the future when the bean counters in government auditing groups from the EU, the IMF, The World Bank, US and others can get around to putting the aid and loans into the money streams needed in Egypt. Egypt may be the showcase of the end of the old aid regime. There is a great need for a rapid, and really rapid, economic recovery and for a repair team to be developed globally to help countries such as Egypt not fall into the abyss. And by rapid I mean really fast. If the jobs and economic situation gets worse—and I expect it to if some of the right things are not done quickly—then the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafis will start to get much better traction. The angry youth, especially the unemployed and underemployed with a lot of free time on their hands, will hit the street more regularly to vent against the “grievance de jour.” The time to act and to get people to work and give them hope was really months ago, but there still may be time to hold off on what could be worse to come.
Salafi extremism presents the greatest risk of terrorist attacks
Gartenstein-Ross 8 (Daveed,Director of the Center for the Study of Terrorist Radicalization, Foundation for Defense of Democracies, “The Globalization of Martyrdom: Al Qaeda, Salafi Jihad, and the Diffusion of Suicide Attacks” )gw
In contrast to Pape’s analysis, which relegates religion to virtual irrelevance—Pape remarkably, and in defiance of all available evidence, contends that though religion matters to al-Qaeda, it matters “mainly in the context of national resistance to foreign occupation”—Moghadam’s major thesis is that the rise of al-Qaeda, and the growing appeal of salafi jihadi ideology, is producing a “globalization of suicide missions.” (p. 2) Based on such factors as conflict type, ideology, geographic scope of actors, targets, and goals, Moghadam distinguishes localized suicide attacks from globalized suicide attacks—which often occur in areas “not identified by all parties as zones of conflict,” (p. 57) are overwhelmingly associated with salafi jihadi groups, and are often connected to transnational militancy.
Egyptian Economy – Terrorism/Muslim Brotherhood Impact 2/2
Terrorism causes extinction – draws in Russia and China
Ayson 10 (Robert, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington, “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7, July, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via InformaWorld)
A terrorist nuclear attack, and even the use of nuclear weapons in response by the country attacked in the first place, would not necessarily represent the worst of the nuclear worlds imaginable. Indeed, there are reasons to wonder whether nuclear terrorism should ever be regarded as belonging in the category of truly existential threats. A contrast can be drawn here with the global catastrophe that would come from a massive nuclear exchange between two or more of the sovereign states that possess these weapons in significant numbers. Even the worst terrorism that the twenty-first century might bring would fade into insignificance alongside considerations of what a general nuclear war would have wrought in the Cold War period. And it must be admitted that as long as the major nuclear weapons states have hundreds and even thousands of nuclear weapons at their disposal, there is always the possibility of a truly awful nuclear exchange taking place precipitated entirely by state possessors themselves. But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important … some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington’s relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washington’s early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country’s armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response. As part of its initial response to the act of nuclear terrorism (as discussed earlier) Washington might decide to order a significant conventional (or nuclear) retaliatory or disarming attack against the leadership of the terrorist group and/or states seen to support that group. Depending on the identity and especially the location of these targets, Russia and/or China might interpret such action as being far too close for their comfort, and potentially as an infringement on their spheres of influence and even on their sovereignty. One far-fetched but perhaps not impossible scenario might stem from a judgment in Washington that some of the main aiders and abetters of the terrorist action resided somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what Allison claims is the “Chechen insurgents’ … long-standing interest in all things nuclear.”42 American pressure on that part of the world would almost certainly raise alarms in Moscow that might require a degree of advanced consultation from Washington that the latter found itself unable or unwilling to provide. There is also the question of how other nuclear-armed states respond to the act of nuclear terrorism on another member of that special club. It could reasonably be expected that following a nuclear terrorist attack on the United States, both Russia and China would extend immediate sympathy and support to Washington and would work alongside the United States in the Security Council. But there is just a chance, albeit a slim one, where the support of Russia and/or China is less automatic in some cases than in others. For example, what would happen if the United States wished to discuss its right to retaliate against groups based in their territory? If, for some reason, Washington found the responses of Russia and China deeply underwhelming, (neither “for us or against us”) might it also suspect that they secretly were in cahoots with the group, increasing (again perhaps ever so slightly) the chances of a major exchange. If the terrorist group had some connections to groups in Russia and China, or existed in areas of the world over which Russia and China held sway, and if Washington felt that Moscow or Beijing were placing a curiously modest level of pressure on them, what conclusions might it then draw about their culpability? If Washington decided to use, or decided to threaten the use of, nuclear weapons, the responses of Russia and China would be crucial to the chances of avoiding a more serious nuclear exchange. They might surmise, for example, that while the act of nuclear terrorism was especially heinous and demanded a strong response, the response simply had to remain below the nuclear threshold. It would be one thing for a non-state actor to have broken the nuclear use taboo, but an entirely different thing for a state actor, and indeed the leading state in the international system, to do so. If Russia and China felt sufficiently strongly about that prospect, there is then the question of what options would lie open to them to dissuade the United States from such action: and as has been seen over the last several decades, the central dissuader of the use of nuclear weapons by states has been the threat of nuclear retaliation. If some readers find this simply too fanciful, and perhaps even offensive to contemplate, it may be informative to reverse the tables. Russia, which possesses an arsenal of thousands of nuclear warheads and that has been one of the two most important trustees of the non-use taboo, is subjected to an attack of nuclear terrorism. In response, Moscow places its nuclear forces very visibly on a higher state of alert and declares that it is considering the use of nuclear retaliation against the group and any of its state supporters. How would Washington view such a possibility? Would it really be keen to support Russia’s use of nuclear weapons, including outside Russia’s traditional sphere of influence? And if not, which seems quite plausible, what options would Washington have to communicate that displeasure? If China had been the victim of the nuclear terrorism and seemed likely to retaliate in kind, would the United States and Russia be happy to sit back and let this occur? In the charged atmosphere immediately after a nuclear terrorist attack, how would the attacked country respond to pressure from other major nuclear powers not to respond in kind? The phrase “how dare they tell us what to do” immediately springs to mind. Some might even go so far as to interpret this concern as a tacit form of sympathy or support for the terrorists. This might not help the chances of nuclear restraint.
Egyptian Economy – Terrorism Impact EXT
Egypt’s economy is unstable now – that increases extremism
Coleman 11 (Isobel, Council on Foreign Relations Senior Fellow for U.S. Foreign Policy, 5/20, “Egypt’s Economic Woes” )gw
Egypt in particular is staggering economically, and an economic meltdown would throw the country into further turmoil, opening the door to dangerous populism and extremism. Since the protests began in Cairo in January, tourism receipts and foreign exchange reserves have declined significantly and are expected to continue doing so throughou8t this year. The economy contracted 7 percent between January and March; although it has now stabilized, it is expected to grow by only about 1 percent this year—not a catastrophe, but well below recent growth rates of 5-8 percent and certainly below what is needed to put a dent in its high level of unemployment.
***Solvency***
Solvency – IMET Solves CMR
International leaders agree: IMET fosters civil-military relations in five ways
Rhame, 97 (Lieutenant General Thomas G. Rhame, Director, Defense Security Assistance Agency, Statement before the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade Promotion, Senate Foreign Relations Committee March 12, 1997) KJS
IMET is our single most cost-effective security assistance program. IMET fosters military-to-military relations, promotes military professionalism, and, via the Expanded IMET program, addresses issues of military justice, respect for internationally recognized human rights, effective defense resources management, and improved civil-military relations. The Commanders in Chief of the unified commands have consistently identified IMET as a key tool for enhancing political/military relations with the various countries in their regions.
Since 1991, we have broadened the reach of the IMET program to 28 new countries, primarily in Central Europe and the Newly Independent States of the former Soviet Union (NIS). Increasingly, our IMET program in this region has come to focus on preparing these countries for full participation in the Partnership for Peace, and, in some cases, NATO membership. Accordingly, we continue to work towards restoring the level of IMET funding to a level commensurate with the program's global utility and the new requirements for training in these new democracies. This year we are asking for $50 million, an increase of $6.525 million, of which $3.550 million is for countries in Europe and the NIS. Of this, $1.5 million is for three countries, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic .
IMET instills value of good CMR
Bruneau, Peggar, and Wright 8 (Researchers at the Center for Civil-Military Relations, “IMET Assessment Project,” pg 48-49, 2008) KJS
IMET exposes participants to the importance and benefits of civilian control of the military and a strong civil-military relationship at the institutional level Exposure to democratic values was lauded, by national leaders and IMET graduates, as a strong benefit of IMET. Throughout the IMET focus group meetings, graduates echoed a strong level of exposure to civil-military relations at the international level. The opportunity to interact with peers from various countries provided rich opportunities to understand and to discuss complex civil-military issues that affect not only national level operations but international operations as well. For example, the military doctrine adopted in 2006 by the Slovene Parliament, is based on the system in use in the US army. The adoption of “bottom up changes” is also perceived as a benefit of IMET. However, as pointed out by BG Boli (HDF) bottom up and top down initiatives must be harmonized in order to balance top level support for change. (Note: This is confirmed in the quantitative survey responses to question 22.)
IMET should be expanded to aid civil military relations and democratic institutions
Dunne 6 (Michele, editor of the Carnegie Endowment’s Arab Reform Bulletin and professor at Georgetown, “Evaluating Egyptian Reform,” part of the Carnegie Papers series, number 66, January 2006.) KJS
Although the United States has taken steps to use its economic assistance more effectively to promote democratization, the military assistance relationship remains an untried avenue. The EgyptU.S. military partnership is of significant strategic value to both countries, and the main purpose of the $1.3 billion in annual U.S. military assistance is to modernize the Egyptian military’s equipment, doctrine, and training to facilitate interoperability of U.S. and Egyptian forces in the Middle East. While the strategic relationship does not undermine prospects for democratization in any direct way, it is also possible to leverage the close military relationship more effectively to help build support in the Egyptian military and civilian bureaucracy for political reform. Programs such as International Military Education and Training, currently funded at only $1.2 million annually, could be expanded to help expose senior and mid-level military officers to critical concepts such as civilian control of the military in democratic systems.
Solvency – Egyptian IMET Effective
Egyptian IMET is effective
State Department and DoD 8 (“Foreign Military Training Joint Report to Congress”, documents/organization/152761.pdf) MV
The United States has a vital interest in enhancing Egypt's national defense and in supporting its role as a vital U.S. coalition partner and regional leader - one that is secure in its own borders and at peace with its neighbors. In 1996, the President designated Egypt a Major Non-NATO Ally, recognizing Egypt's critical regional role and support for U.S. policies in the Middle East. Egypt is one of the largest recipients of U.S. security assistance. Therefore, providing military training to Egypt's armed forces through both the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program and Foreign Military Finance (FMF) funded programs is a crucial element of broader U.S. support for Egypt and its military. The technical expertise and exposure to U.S. doctrine and personnel that U.S.-funded training provides enhances Egypt's counterterrorism (CT) capability, improves the military's professionalism and readiness, and strengthens ties between the U.S. and Egyptian militaries. Professional Military Education (PME) courses give the future leaders of Egypt's armed forces opportunities to refine their leadership skills and improve cross-cultural communication between our respective militaries. The George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies (NESA), and the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS) seminars offer Egypt's senior civilian and military leaders practical instruction in civil- military relations, national security strategy, and defense economics and create opportunities for further exchange and strategic regional cooperation. The full range of FMF and IMET supported training will enhance U.S.-Egyptian military ties and cooperation.
Solvency – IMET Expansion Necessary EXT
IMET should be expanded to aid civil military relations and democratic institutions
Dunne 6 (Michele, editor of the Carnegie Endowment’s Arab Reform Bulletin and professor at Georgetown, “Evaluating Egyptian Reform,” part of the Carnegie Papers series, number 66, January 2006.) KJS
Although the United States has taken steps to use its economic assistance more effectively to promote democratization, the military assistance relationship remains an untried avenue. The EgyptU.S. military partnership is of significant strategic value to both countries, and the main purpose of the $1.3 billion in annual U.S. military assistance is to modernize the Egyptian military’s equipment, doctrine, and training to facilitate interoperability of U.S. and Egyptian forces in the Middle East. While the strategic relationship does not undermine prospects for democratization in any direct way, it is also possible to leverage the close military relationship more effectively to help build support in the Egyptian military and civilian bureaucracy for political reform. Programs such as International Military Education and Training, currently funded at only $1.2 million annually, could be expanded to help expose senior and mid-level military officers to critical concepts such as civilian control of the military in democratic systems.
Expanding E-IMET to train multiple officer levels—including high level officers--key to improving CMR and stability
Smitson 8 (Scott A., professor of political science at Indiana University, “BUILDING ARMIES FOR THE PEOPLE, NOT AGAINST THE PEOPLE: MILITARY INSTITUTION BUILDING IN DEVELOPING AND POSTCONFLICT STATES,” presented at the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis Mini-Conference, Spring 2008, ) KJS
Without a doubt, the Special Forces, MiTT, and Unit to Unit models are led and commanded by capable and intelligent members of the Armed Forces that are technical and tactical experts in the art and science of modern warfare. But as the analysis of these models demonstrated, there is a glaring absence of civil-military affairs training (the “doctrinal dissonance”); though E-IMET has this training, few foreign personnel attend this training in appreciable numbers. Breaching this gap could be accomplished by focusing on the following policy implementation planning factors: 1. Make E-IMET more affordable, nested into other models: The educational aspects of the E-IMET program are important and valuable, but too few military personnel can or choose to attend the training. Aspects of the E-IMET program should be incorporated into the Special Forces, MiTT, and Unit to Unit models. Those that attend E-IMET now are high ranking (lieutenant colonel and above) officers or upper level defense ministerial appointees. Spreading E-IMET to all echelons would allow all ranks of developing armies, not just the high ranking officers, to receive civil-military affairs training. 2. Make the civil-military training nexus more of an interagency, rather than a standalone, endeavor: Though the US military’s efforts to teach civil-military affairs are an important aspect of “army building”, the process needs to be much more of an interagency effort. Organizations such as USAID have both the expertise and capability to assist in this training, and more importantly, approaching civil military training from a fused Department of Defense/USAID perspective brings credibility to the concepts of objective civilian control that are attempting to be implemented in developing states. 3. Train security organizations at all levels, not just state level organizations: US efforts at “army building” focus solely on national level security organizations. Training and enabling security bodies at all levels, from the local level to the state level, would help differentiate domestic and foreign defense responsibilities, thereby creating the foundation for a polycentric approach to security and defense. Empowering local and domestic security bodies would decrease the potential enticement of army commanders leveraging too much power on internal affairs. 4. Develop civil-military institutions simultaneously, in a nested manner: Creating and rebuilding armies should not occur in a vacuum. It is imperative that foreign central governments play an active role in shaping the strategic architecture of their own military force, and that these forces are tailored to the needs of the civilian central government. Throughout the process, military commanders and their civilian superiors must maintain and nurture a dialogue that ensures that the civilian government provides clear guidance and direction for the developing forces, while at the same time the military understands their role in the developing state, as directed by the central government. 5. Ensure that oversight mechanisms exist and are understood by both elements in the civil-military affairs nexus: Related to previous recommendation, it is imperative that constitutional oversight mechanisms are adopted and understood throughout the army building process. Doing so not only empowers the civilian government, but helps define the limits of the power of the military, legally creating “power niches” for both the military and the government. Though there is no guarantee that all “army building” endeavors will be entirely successful, it is imperative that the concepts of objective civilian control be infused in the army and national building process, as early as possible, and at all echelons. If civilian control of the military is a necessary requirement for a stable and successful democracy, it is a fundamental principle that both the “army builders” and the nations they are rebuilding must keep in mind and exercise throughout the “army building” process.
Solvency – Cuts Bad
Cutting aid to Egypt will prevent a successful transition
Malka (Haim, Senior Fellow, Middle East Program, CSIS. 2/4, “Military Aid to Egypt: A Critical Link”
)gw
Calls in Washington to suspend military aid to Egypt are fueling an already blazing fire. Although a serious review of the $1.3 billion in U.S. military aid to Egypt is long overdue, raising the threat in the midst of a burning crisis is dangerous. The Egyptian military, the primary beneficiary of U.S. aid, will play a significant role in shaping the contours of the post-Mubarak system. The United States' ability to influence that system is already limited. Freezing military aid now undermines what leverage the U.S. government does have to promote a post-Mubarak system that is more than just a reconfiguration of the status quo. The challenge is to convince the generals in and out of uniform that their interests are best served by a more inclusive and transparent political system once Mubarak leaves the stage. That is a difficult case to make. It requires that the U.S. government maintain the trust and cooperation of the military leadership. The ongoing verbal barbs between Washington and Cairo are eroding that trust by the day, and Cairo's turmoil may get worse before it gets better. Regardless of how events unfold, the military will aim to preserve its unique position within the Egyptian governing system. The question then is not so much when Mubarak steps down, but what kind of post-Mubarak political system the military brass seeks to shape. That is the subject of intense internal debate and could evolve over time. The outcome is unlikely to satisfy the millions of Egyptians who have risen up against the Mubarak regime. It may also fall short of U.S. expectations of a rapid transition to a more representative Egyptian political system. In balancing its own interests with the expectations of other actors, the Egyptian military faces a range of challenges that defy easy resolution. The debate over the future role of the Muslim Brotherhood is a prime example. No representative system can take root in Egypt without the Brotherhood's participation. But, after spending the last half century battling Islamist political forces, the military leadership will have trouble overcoming its deep disdain for the Brotherhood. Other examples abound and confront the military with difficult choices. In all of this, the threat of abandoning the U.S.-Egypt military relationship will only complicate those calculations and preclude the United States from any chance of influencing possible outcomes. Granted, the military aid relationship requires a serious debate, which the dramatic uprising in Egypt has helped spark. The imbalance between military and economic aid over the last several decades may have been short-sighted. But cutting military aid in the face of such uncertainty to fix the imbalance would be equally myopic. Today that aid serves as a critical link between the U.S. government and an important constituency that will help shape the destiny of Egypt. Cutting that link at such a critical juncture heightens the risk that the next Egyptian regime will be no different than the last.
Continued IMET funding is key to stabilizing Egypt
Roberts 11 (James, Research Fellow at the Heritage Foundation, 3/1, ”Not All Foreign Aid Is Equal” )gw
Military Aid Enhances U.S. National Security The value of U.S. international security assistance was illustrated most recently during the crisis in Egypt. The U.S. and Egyptian militaries have worked together closely for more than 30 years through such programs as the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs. When rioters on Tahrir Square demanded the overthrow of the Mubarak government last month, it was Egypt’s military—and only the military—that succeeded in holding the line against virulently anti-U.S. elements. U.S. international security assistance has made direct and short-term contributions to America’s national security and should continue to be funded. This assistance includes the FMS program to subsidize sales of U.S. military equipment, services, and training to friendly developing countries; IMET grants for training foreign military professionals; and some funding of international peacekeeping operations.
Solvency – A2: No Civilian Training
IMET is a state department program for training military officers and civilians
Adams and Williams 11 (Gordon Adams, Professor in the US Foreign Policy Program at the School of International Service, American University, Distinguished Fellow at the Stimson Center, and Rebecca Williams, Research Associate for the Henry L. Stimson Center's Budgeting for Foreign Affairs and Defense program, “A New Way Forward: Rebalancing Security Assistance Programs and Authorities,” March, images/uploads/A_New_Way_Forward_Final.pdf) MV
The following accounts provide funding for the programs and activities discussed in this report: •• Foreign Military Financing (FMF): The State Department account that provides grants and loans to friendly and allied countries for the acquisition of US defense equipment, services, and training; •• International Military Education and Training (IMET): The State Department account that provides grant support for the military education and training of foreign military officers and related civilian personnel.
IMET training exposes civilians and military leaders
Riley 99 (U.S. Marine Corps Major, D.J. Riley, DIILS Country Program Officer, “SEMINARS IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE SPOTLIGHT RULE OF LAW, MILITARY JUSTICE”, bbf/ej/ijpe1299.pdf) MV
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING (IMET) The IMET program has a particularly significant impact on shaping peacetime engagement between U.S. and foreign militaries. A relatively low cost program, IMET is a highly efficient component of U.S. security assistance that provides training on a grant basis annually to over 8,000 students from allied and friendly nations. Principally, IMET establishes military-to-military relationships that are beneficial in coordinating regional stability activities with recipient nations. It does so by exposing foreign students to U.S. professional military organizations and procedures. An important element within IMET is the “Informational Program” that introduces students to the vast cultural and civic aspects of American life. Another important element is the IMET English language prerequisite. The IMET program alone has been responsible for teaching tens of thousands of foreign students English language skills. English language proficiency not only provides the basis for our militaries to communicate in peacetime and wartime, but also is widely viewed as a fundamental element in advancing U.S. ideals on democracy, human rights, and civil-military relations. From a broad perspective, English language proficiency goes well beyond comprehension of subject material in a particular course. The net result facilitates understanding of U.S. values, institutions, and political processes. The key to IMET’s success has been the opportunity for foreign military students to learn advanced military leadership concepts arm in arm with their U.S. counterparts. Foreign military students also learn a variety of tactical and strategic force employment concepts consistent with U.S. military doctrine that can result in effective international operation partnerships. For example, foreign students may learn how to support and maintain ships used in maritime protection missions or how to employ the principles of U.S. military airpower doctrine. As a result, they are better equipped to participate, alone or with U.S. forces, in peacekeeping activities. Of equal significance are the personal relationships forged during these courses. Students are encouraged to work closely with their U.S. military counterparts to comprehend better the course material. The resulting close friendships have played an instrumental role in how the U.S. has dealt with foreign militaries in times of unrest. Numerous examples exist where former students have been able to work beyond political differences to resolve difficult problems under exceptional conditions. Often overlooked, but also important, is how former U.S. and foreign students have collaborated to introduce important civil-military and justice reforms to other militaries. EXPANDED IMET Notwithstanding the success of the IMET program, in 1991 Congress expanded the program to address concerns about human rights abuses by some military officers, civil-military conflicts, and better management of military resources. The Expanded IMET (E-IMET) program was developed to provide training in such areas as defense resource management, civilian-military roles and responsibilities, and military justice. A key component of this training is the provision for civilian leaders to attend E-IMET classes. This offers civilian leaders and their military counterparts the opportunity to have candid discussions on sensitive subjects — often for the first time. Many E-IMET courses are specifically tailored for the country in question and presented in the host country. One of the most important impacts of E-IMET has been improving the foreign military students’ understanding of their role and responsibilities within a democratic government. The results of these courses can be measured by the number of foreign military justice laws and codes of conduct passed, the greater respect for civilian control that has been engendered, and the benefits of cooperative and mutually supportive civil-military institutions. Although E-IMET initially got off to a rocky start, its acceptance and utility have since grown immeasurably. Over 30 percent of IMET funds are used for E-IMET courses and over 25 percent of the students are civilian leaders. As acceptance for E-IMET has grown, so has the range of courses offered. Foreign nations have actively solicited development of courses specifically designed to solve some of their more compelling problems. Examples include courses in environmental cleanup, medical resource management, and disaster preparedness. THE WAY AHEAD Through these types of security assistance programs, the U.S. gains critical regional access and develops alliances absolutely essential to our national security. Incidental to the assistance is the promotion of U.S. cultural and political ideals on democracy, internationally-recognized human rights, and civil- military reforms. The success of security assistance to help address the rise of new challenges will be reliant upon our continued foreign policy leadership and assistance. If we are to be resolute in our commitment to enhance military-to-military cooperation, to promote the values of democracy and respect for human rights, and to ensure that capable, trained allies are able and willing to support us when needed, then Congress must be equally resolute in providing the resources needed to continue to use these “tools” to promote our foreign policy goals and protect U.S. national security. We believe there is no better investment than contributing to the vitalization of allies and friends in order to achieve U.S. foreign policy objectives.
Solvency – A2: Squo Training Solves
SQ CMR programs fail -- No clear mission of democratization goals
Ulrich 2 - Marybeth, Professor at the University of Michigan
[A Survey of Overall U.S. Democratization Programs and Military Democratization Efforts in the Postcommunist States]cs
The result is a survey of missed opportunities at every level to assist the transitioning states. The evidence will show that the military effort was plagued by the dual challenge of adapting Cold War era programs to post–Cold War contingencies and creating new military democratization programs with an incomplete conceptualization of the problems associated with transitioning from authoritarian to democratic political systems. It will be demonstrated that incomplete coordination between programs and confusion over mission areas have constrained the effectiveness of U.S. military democratization programs. Finally, the case will be made that the idea of the interoperability of existing democratic forces with the partner states of NATO has been narrowly focused on the achievement of strategic professionalism issues. Not enough attention has been paid to ensuring that partner states develop norms of democratic accountability. Though widely stated, democratization objectives at every level of assistance—political, economic, and military—have been poorly conceptualized and, consequently, ineffectively carried out.
Solvency – In-Country Training Key
IMET training must take place in-country to be effective
Marks 97 (Major Paul C, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, “Security Assistance Training for Emerging
Democracies: An Approach” )gw
The armed forces of Third World emerging democracies often share common problems which inhibit the transition to a fully functioning democracy: they are larger then they need to be and hence a drain on limited national resources, they are poorly trained and disciplined, they have poor human rights records, they manage resources poorly, they are often involved with crime or other non-military activities, and they lack loyalty to their constitution as opposed to their immediate chain of command. United States DoD military schools are often too sophisticated to teach practical solutions to some of these issues. In fact our system is so advanced that an IMET student can become overwhelmed and discouraged when he has to return to what we would characterize as a broken system. Some IMET graduates see the situation as so hopeless that they choose not to return. The economical answer is in-country training. In-country training requires funds.
Solvency – IMET Teaches Democratic Values
IMET trains military personnel to respect democratic values
Defense Security Cooperation Agency 10 (November 15, “International Military Education & Training (IMET), ) MV
The International Military Education and Training (IMET) program is a low cost, key funding component of U.S. security assistance that provides training on a grant basis to students from allied and friendly nations. Authority for the IMET program is found pursuant to Chapter 5, part II, Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) 1961. Funding is appropriated from the International Affairs budget of the Department of State. It is a key component of U.S. security assistance that provides U.S. training on a grant basis to students from allied and friendly nations. The IMET program is an investment in ideas and people which has an overall positive impact on the numerous students trained under the program. For a relatively modest investment, it presents democratic alternatives to key foreign military and civilian leaders. The IMET program exposes students to the U.S. professional military establishment and the American way of life, including amongst other things, U.S. regard for democratic values, respect for individual and human rights and belief in the rule of law. Students are also exposed to U.S. military procedures and the manner in which our military functions under civilian control. They may receive as examples of types of training: Professional Military Education (PME) as well as technical training. Additionally, our EIMET program, a significant part of the overall IMET program, exposes students to the civilian community and its important democratic institutions. Overall objectives of the IMET program are: To further the goal of regional stability through effective, mutually beneficial military-to-military relations which culminate in increased understanding and defense cooperation between the United States and foreign countries; and To increase the ability of foreign national military and civilian personnel to absorb and maintain basic democratic values and protect internationally recognized human rights. The IMET objectives are achieved through a variety of military education and training activities conducted by the DoD for foreign military and civilian officials. These include: formal instruction involving over 2,000 courses taught at approximately 150 military schools and installations; on-the-job training; orientation tours for key senior military and civilian officials; and mobile education teams which takes the curriculum to the host country.
IMET fosters respect for democratic values which preserves regional stability
Armed Forces News Service 11 (7/5, “Education program promotes relationships, partnerships,” ) MV
IMET students who attend classes side-by-side with their U.S. counterparts get exposure to the U.S. professional military establishment, from military procedures to how the armed forces operate under civilian control. This, Judkins explained, forms the foundation for strong military-to-military relations, increased understanding and closer defense cooperation that enhance regional stability.
But IMET education extends beyond the classroom as students get exposure to the American way of life and ideals: democratic values, respect, individual and human rights, and belief in the rule of law, among them, Judkins said.
"It's one thing to say, 'Here's what we do in the United States,'" said Navy Vice Adm. William E. Landay III, the DSCA director. "It's another thing to say, 'Come to a war college for a year and sit through that and talk to people and go out in town and understand our values and how we apply them -- from our democratic principles to our civilian control of the military."
Solvency – IMET Teaches Democratic Values
DIILS seminars instill democratic ideals – Eastern European countries show
Newsom 99 (Eric D. Newsom, December, “SECURITY ASSISTANCE: THE BRIDGE BETWEEN DIPLOMACY AND USE OF FORCE,” fmr. Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs, bbf/ej/ijpe1299.pdf) MV
Originally founded in 1992 as the International Training Department (ITD) of the Naval Justice School in Newport, Rhode Island, DIILS has grown from a one-person office to an 11-member staff, including military lawyers from each of the U.S. Armed Services. All of the attorneys on the staff possess the desire to assist other countries in developing the “rule of law,” as well as a willingness to travel to remote, often unfamiliar, places to carry out this mission. Created in support of the U.S. commitment to assist new and developing democracies, ITD quickly gained attention as a result of its success in addressing difficult problem in difficult situations. In October 1997, ITD was renamed DIILS to reflect more accurately the joint service nature of its mission. The permanent 11-member staff, representing both U.S. military and civilian personnel, serve in the U.S. Defense Department’s lead agency for providing professional legal education and training to international military officers and civilian government officials in furtherance of U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives. As of November 1999, DIILS had conducted seminars in 69 countries with over 11,200 participants worldwide. DIILS has been recognized by the U.S. secretary of defense as one of the most successful programs under the Expanded International Military Education and Training (E-IMET) program, launched by Congress in 1991. According to DIILS Academic Director Walter W. Munroe, “[DIILS] respond(ed) to a world which had changed dramatically in a few years. The U.S. government had to initiate new relationships with the many emerging democracies that included the new independent states of the former Soviet Union, the former Warsaw Pact countries of Central and Eastern Europe...that were redefining themselves. In particular, the militaries in these foreign countries presented special legal training challenges, including: ill-defined military justice systems, human rights abuses, and a need to redefine the historic relationships between the military and civilian population.” DIILS initiates each program with an assessment trip to the partner country where a two-member team meets with U.S. Embassy staff and members of the partner country’s military, press, and non-governmental organizations, and also lawyers and civilian officials. Following the initial assessment, a delegation from the partner country attends a planning phase in the United States, during which the details for the follow-on seminars are worked out. As an integral part of the planning process, the delegation is introduced to the civilian and military justice systems in the United States. Following the U.S. visit, the seminars are scheduled in the partner country. The seminars focus on topics that enhance international security and foster bilateral trust and confidence by emphasizing human rights, military justice, the rule of law, and civilian control of the military. Mobile Education Teams (METs) conduct the in- country seminars. A typical DIILS MET consists of a permanent staff member, referred to as the Country Program Manager (CPM), and three adjunct faculty members who are either military lawyers themselves or have expertise in the seminar topic. Adjunct faculty members are selected from active duty and reserve military officers and from the civilian sector. Adjunct faculty members are usually senior officers or officials such as judges, professors, or senior legal advisers. When possible, MET members have a proficiency in the language of the partner country, and their selection is based on their ability to develop and maintain professional relationships. Since 1993, DIILS has worked with 18 Eastern and Central European countries in developing more than 100 programs. Most of these contacts have been as follow-on visits after the initial seminars. DIILS has returned annually to many of the countries to conduct seminars, which become more and more sophisticated as the programs evolve. In Hungary, for example, the seminars focused mainly on military justice for the first few years. However, the need arose to address the concept of Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs) because Hungary was participating in the Partnership for Peace Program before being admitted into NATO. The most recent seminar in Hungary — “Legal Aspects of Military and Media Relations” — was related to issues that arose during the recent events in Kosovo, and the Hungarian military’s need to work effectively with the press. In fact, DIILS developed the seminar in conjunction with the U.S. Embassy in Budapest in response to requests from the Hungarian government. DIILS has the ability to respond to the requirements of the different Eastern and Central European nations that have a great deal of knowledge and sophistication in certain areas, but lack the necessary infrastructure or institutions to develop the programs on their own. In addition to conducting seminars, DIILS also has assisted various nations that are trying to develop military codes. Since 1995, DIILS has worked closely with military lawyers in Albania to develop a military code that reflects changes in the country’s government and its more open view of the outside world. A delegation from Albania will travel to Newport early next year to complete the project. While the United States is the world’s oldest continuous democracy, it is one of the world’s youngest cultures. Keeping that in mind, DIILS METs try to create seminars that provide opportunities for dialogues, DIILS team at conference site in Brasov, Romania. From left to right are Major Thomas Murrey, U.S. Air Force, Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, U.S. European Command; Major D.J. Riley, U.S. Marine Corps, DIILS Program Country Manager; Professor Jerry Dillon of the Naval War College; Colonel Ion Didoiu, Ministry of Defense of Romania; Major Jeffrey Palmer, U.S. Air Force, Deputy Staff Judge Advocate, Vandenberg Air Force Base, California; and Commander Shackley Raffetto, U.S. Navy (reserve), Circuit Court Judge from Maui, Hawaii. rather than monologues, on ideas related to the U.S. legal system, civilian control of the military, and the rule of law. Representing a democracy that has had to learn many difficult lessons on its own, the teams offer the lessons learned over 200 years of U.S. history, often acknowledging that there have been mistakes along the way. The instructors also are keenly aware that what has worked for the United States may not work in every country. Indeed, the exchanges during these seminars have forced some DIILS team members to reexamine how they view the legal systems in the United States. Ultimately, these seminars are an excellent forum for the kind of exchange of ideas that leads to a mutual understanding between nations and helps to foster bilateral trust and confidence. One of the ways that discussion is encouraged is through the use of discussion problems in which the team asks the seminar participants to work through a problem and answer questions using their own domestic law or procedures. The participants are divided into groups that separately develop answers. Later, during a debriefing period, each group presents its solutions. In this manner, different ideas about law and democracy are discussed by the participants and the DIILS team members. As a result of these discussion problem-solving exercises, all of the participants and DIILS team members gain a broader appreciation of the concepts of the rule of law and civilian control of the military. DIILS METs have traveled to Central and Eastern European countries including Albania, Belarus, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, and Ukraine. During the year 2000, several other nations in the region have expressed interest in the seminars. DIILS stands ready to support any country in the region to develop programs that build on the foundation of the rule of law. The institute recognizes that these programs create the mutual trust and confidence that lead to international peace and security. On that rainy night in Romania, Colonel Didoiu said something I have heard in many other countries: “So, now we can make plans for a seminar next year.” Once more, important relationships had been maintained, U.S. foreign policy goals had been advanced, and a developing democracy had been given assistance through the efforts of an organization that prides itself on making a difference in a changing world.
Solvency – IMET Teaches Democratic Values
IMET effectively trains foreign soldiers
Ulrich 2 (Marybeth, Professor at the University of Michigan, A Survey of Overall U.S. Democratization Programs and Military Democratization Efforts in the Postcommunist States, ]cs
Since 1950 IMET and its predecessor programs have provided education and training for over 500,000 international military students. 90 “The training ranges from basic technical skills to professional military education and is designed to advance the efficiency, professional performance, and readiness of the recipient armed forces.” 91 In recent years the United States has funded the education and training of over 5,000 students annually from over 100 countries at funding levels ranging from a high of $56 million in FY 1987 to a low of $21.25 million for FY 1994. 92 The cut of 50 percent in the funding for FY 1994 was the result of Congress’s perception of duplication in military assistance programs. In fiscal years 1996 and 1997 $39 million and $43.5 million was allocated respectively to IMET activity in over 100 countries. In fiscal years 1998 and 1999, IMET’s funding level has held steady at $50 million. 93 The 23 postcommunist states of the former Eastern bloc have received between 32 and 34 percent of the total IMET budget in recent years. 94 The philosophy behind IMET is that through participation in U.S. military training and education courses designed for members of the U.S. military, foreign students will be exposed to U.S. military professionalism within the context of American life and culture. 95 The hope is that these individuals will eventually rise to prominence within their own militaries and will positively influence public policy and foreign relations decisions that favor U.S. interests. 96 Program administrators admit that it is impossible to rigorously prove that such influence actually takes place and that there have been a few instances in which IMET graduates rose to prominent positions and followed policy courses that were disloyal to civilian governments. Overall, though, analysts agree that IMET participation has positively predisposed many foreign officers to U.S. values and interests.
Solvency – IMET Teaches Democratic Values
Egyptian response to uprisings and IMET alumni confirm program effectiveness
AFNS 11 (“Education program promotes relationships, partnerships,” The Disarm Journal, July 5, 2011, ) KJS
Last year, IMET provided training to more than 7,000 students from 130 countries. "That is building a lot of influence," Judkins said. "And that is really what this program is all about: influencing minds and hearts. It's about cooperation, forming relationships and building partnership capacity." Because most students who receive the highly coveted IMET training slots are rising stars within their respective militaries or governments, Judkins said the impact of the program runs far deeper than the numbers might indicate. With an annual budget of about $110 million, IMET provides a great return on investment, she said. Nations that can afford it pay their students' education costs, and the U.S. picks up the tab for those that can't. For some of these nations, IMET represents their only source of professional military education. This education has a more lasting impact than any weapons system or military hardware ever could, Judkins said. "You could give a military a helicopter, but how much is that helicopter going to make an influence on that country?" she said. "That helicopter will come and go. But education and training could influence someone who becomes the next president of that country... and remembers his relationships with the United States and with other countries." Among the thousands of IMET alumni around the world are Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Jordanian King Abdullah II bin al-Hussein. Yudhoyono attended the Army's Airborne and Ranger schools, as well as the Infantry Officer Advanced Course at Fort Benning, Ga., and the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kan. Abdullah attended the Defense Resource Management Course at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, Calif. Other IMET graduates have gone on to become leaders in their armed forces. "IMET is an investment," Judkins said. "It's not one of those things where you can always see the rewards after the very first course." Sometimes the payoff takes time, as students who first participate in IMET as young lieutenants return for more advanced courses as they rise through the ranks to become military and government leaders in their home countries. "We have an investment that takes years to develop and mold, but generally pays off in dividends," Judkins said. Those dividends demonstrate themselves in ways big and small. Judkins pointed to the responsible way the Egyptian military -- a longtime participant in the IMET program -- has responded to protest movements there, as one indicator.
IMET effectively raises knowledge of US practices, increasing cooperation and relations
Bruneau, Peggar, and Wright 8 (Researchers at the Center for Civil-Military Relations, “IMET Assessment Project,” pg 32-33, 2008) KJS
Participants were asked to rate, on a scale of one to five, any change in these areas resultant from their IMET experience. The scale was set as follows: One: Significantly decreased, Two: Somewhat decreased, Three: Neither increased nor decreased, Four: Somewhat increased, Five: Significantly increased. For these three questions, the responses were remarkably positive. 94% of respondents reported that their IMET experience either significantly or somewhat increased their knowledge within their specialty. 88% of respondents reported that their IMET experience either significantly or somewhat increased their knowledge outside of their specialty. 95% of respondents reported increased knowledge of U.S. systems and practices. The question addressing the knowledge of U.S. systems and practices is important for several reasons. First, the U.S. has a vibrant liberal democratic system, and promotion of U.S. ideals and values is an important component of the IMET program. As noted previously, many international IMET participants are also offered the opportunity to participate in programs designed especially to promote these values. Second, improved knowledge of U.S. systems and practices by military and civilian personnel in allied and friendly nations is likely to facilitate cooperation and interoperability with U.S. or other coalition forces, including NATO or U.N. peacekeeping forces. Finally, improved familiarity with U.S. systems and practices arguably facilitates greater reciprocal understanding.
Solvency – IMET Teaches Democratic Values
IMET effectively trains participants to influence their home country’s civil society and government
Bruneau, Peggar, and Wright 8 (Researchers at the Center for Civil-Military Relations, “IMET Assessment Project,” pg 33-34, 2008) KJS
The next three questions addressed the impact of the IMET experience on organizations in the recipient country, as assessed by the IMET graduates. These questions also relate to the program’s legislative objectives in the areas of improved resource management and maximized effectiveness as well as increasing partner capacity, in that many IMET courses are designed specifically to address these objectives. These questions, to which respondents could select yes or no, providing additional information as necessary, were: After completion of IMET were you able to apply what you learned? After completion of IMET, were you able to influence others? Can you attribute positive changes in your organization to what you learned through IMET, or as a result of your influence on others? Again, the results as reported by the participants were extremely positive: 87% of respondents reported being able to apply what they learned through IMET upon completion of the experience. 13% reported being unable to apply this knowledge. 90% reported being able to influence others upon completion of IMET, while 10% reported not being able to do so, or being unsure. 79% of respondents attributed positive changes in their organization to their IMET experience or their influence on others. 19% reported no positive changes in their organization, and 2% were unsure. It is noteworthy that the weakest of these positive responses is that of positive change in organizations that may be attributed to IMET. Organizational or systemic change is the most difficult to create, for several reasons. First, many organizations, particularly militaryorganizations, are arguably structured in such a way as to be inherently resistant to change. Second, broad organizational or systemic change often takes place over time, in many cases over years or even decades, in an incremental rather than revolutionary manner. Third, none of the broad objectives posited by the legislation or as interpreted by DSCA are achievable by a single person alone. It is only over time, and likely through the development of a cadre of officials, that the types of change envisioned in the legislation and program guidance will occur. Finally, as noted previously, many of the IMET participants are young or mid-career, and are not likely to yet be in a position in which they are able to themselves drive change. It was in recognition of this last factor that the question about IMET participants’ ability to influence others was included in the survey.
IMET presence creates a spill-over effect by encouraging host countries to establish similar training programs
Bruneau, Peggar, and Wright 8 (Researchers at the Center for Civil-Military Relations, “IMET Assessment Project,” pg 43-44, 2008) KJS
A common observation among interviewees in the countries visited was that IMET “fills the gap” between education and training at the national level and allied requirements. For countries with small IMET budgets, this is of particular importance. IMET sets a standard for both education and training- that countries strive to adopt and implement in country. BG Furlan, Slovene Armed Forces, stated that his US Army War College experience forms the basis for all his decisions and implementations. Historically, some interviewees noted that initial IMET participation in courses was one of “passive acceptance” i.e. the country would accept whatever was being offered. This model has evolved to one in which countries are linking their IMET requirements to high priority international operational commitments, and national level operational and strategic goals.
IMET training is linked to fast promotion—IMET graduates become leaders
Bruneau, Peggar, and Wright 8 (Researchers at the Center for Civil-Military Relations, “IMET Assessment Project,” pg 45-46, 2008) KJS
IMET course attendance is linked to promotion and career advancement. One of the clear advantages of IMET noted by graduates was the link to promotion and career advancement. This is evidenced as well by the quantitative data illustrated above. In Poland, for example, IMET directly affects promotion. General officers must attend the strategic leadership courses such as those offered at the Army War College and National Defense University. However, while IMET completion does not always guarantee a promotion, IMET graduates are viewed as more competitive for promotion and career advancement. For example, in Slovenia, to achieve two star status, the candidate must have completed a program in one of the US or UK senior staff colleges. In the Malaysian Armed Forces, participation in IMET is seen as a “stepping stone for progress,” with top performers frequently selected for participation in U.S. programs, while second tier individuals might instead be sent to pursue education or training in Australia or other nations. IMET officers are generally viewed as “fast lane” officers.
Solvency – IMET Teaches Democratic Values
IMET training spills over to the rest of government and military
Bruneau, Peggar, and Wright 8 (Researchers at the Center for Civil-Military Relations, “IMET Assessment Project,” pg 46, 2008) KJS
IMET has a cross fertilization, pollination effect. Once they return to their units, IMET graduates use what they have learned and also teach what they have learned to their colleagues, producing a multiplying effect. Ability to utilize comparative analysis techniques toward problem solving within headquarters and field operations is one of the benefits. For example, the Slovene army mirrored its field manuals to those of the US Army. A good technical example of “pollination” effect is within Slovenia. The US trained Slovenes in how to build and load pallets into C-17s so equipment could accompany troops to Afghanistan. The Slovenes in turn taught the Croats. Hungary has a strong “train the trainer” program. LTC Larry Kinde notes that HDF is a good example of the “pollination” effect in that the seeds of knowledge are dispersed at the unit level thus benefiting the unit as a whole. The Sergeant Major of the Hungarian Defense Force spent nineteen months in Iraq as a training advisor at the Iraq Military Academy and a subsequent twelve months conducting infantry training in a British led mission. Related to this benefit is the fact that a significant majority of IMET graduates stay in contact with US and other international IMET colleagues. Interviews in Mongolia also validated IMET as an important tool with which nations learn capacity building, e.g. Defense Resource Management Institute (DRMI). Graduates have returned to Mongolia and taught others. This “train the trainer” approach has also been employed in a number of other IMET benefiting nations, allowing these nations to further amplify the impact of the IMET funds that they receive. To maximize the return on investment, Turkey requires that four years be added to service time as compensation for attending a US graduate program.
Solvency – IMET Teaches Democratic Values
IMET is comparatively more effective at spreading pro-democracy attitudes
Atkinson 10 (Carol, professor of international affairs at Vanderbilt University, “Does Soft Power Matter? A Comparative Analysis of Student Exchange Programs 1980-2006,” Foreign Policy Analysis, Volume 6, Issue 1, pg 15, January 2010) KJS
When we think of US-hosted student exchange programs what most often comes to mind are the young students from a wide range of countries that come to study at US universities. However, not as visible, are the thousands of foreign military personnel who receive training and education within the United States. Although, the US Congress has continued to fund these programs on the assumption that they will have a positive influence on the development of democratic institutions and practices, systematic evidence of their impact is lacking.3 Within academia, research has focused on the coercive use of military force rather than the normative influence of military organizations. The few existing studies are mostly anecdotal, or suffer from selection bias by focusing narrowly on one school or a small sample of cases. For example, scholars often point to the US Army’s School of the Americas as a negative influence on states’ human rights practices. However, in practice the US military has developed a wide array of programs, most notably by routinely incorporating large numbers of foreign officers from a vast variety of countries into its professional military schools. Recent empirical work has started to show how attendance at these military schools influences liberal political socialization. Cope (1995) is the most comprehensive qualitative research to date. Investigators used extensive process tracing techniques to learn the extent to which military exchange students were influenced by their experience in the United States; both how their ideas about democracy were shaped and how this affected political transitions in their home countries. Another qualitative study, Miller (2006), used extensive interviews of participants in several US government-funded person-to-person contact programs in Georgia, Ukraine, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kazakhstan. He found that while foreign aid funding does not promote democratic values and behaviors per se, one military educational exchange program, International Military Education and Training Program (IMET), produced significantly more pro-Western attitudes and increased transnational communication. These qualitative results have been supported by recent large-n empirical research that found participation in military educational exchanges increased the chances that nondemocratic states would transition toward more liberal political institutions (Atkinson 2006). While these studies have contributed valuable insights, there has been no attempt to empirically evaluate whether the exchange programs influence human rights practices.
IMET increases cooperation and US interests—5 ways
Lipton 98 (David, former undersecretary of international affairs for the Department of the Treasury, Testimony before Congress, “Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations for 1999,” Wednesday February 11, 1998, )
Additionally, implementation of both the FMF and IMET programs involves coordination and contact between the U.S. and the recipient government during all phases--from senior level visits, to developing a request for a particular defense article, service or training program to actually training the foreign military in a wide range of technical and professional issues. As a result, not only will the foreign government's systems and standard operating procedures be compatible with ours during times of crisis, but the relationships established at all levels between our military and that of the foreign government builds and strengthens alliances beyond the formal, official ties. It is not uncommon for the U.S. to rely on these personal and professional contacts in times of crisis to provide support critical to our own military--such as access to ports and airfields. Even in times of peace, our security assistance programs help give the U.S. military access to a host of unique training environments that would otherwise be unavailable. Finally, by helping teach other militaries how to conduct successful peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, our programs help reduce the likelihood that our own troops will be called into action--thereby protesting U.S. lives and resources. Together, the spectrum of tangible and intangible benefits derived from the range of international security assistance programs support U.S. diplomatic objectives and strengthen the security of the American people.
Solvency – IMET Teaches Democratic Values
IMET most cost-effective way to spread international cooperation
Walsh 2 (Stephen, naval analyst at the Center for Security Strategy and Operations, “The Interoperability Issue,” the Navy League of he United States, ) KJS
The transfer of platforms and systems is only half the battle. The receiving navies must be able to operate the equipment transferred. For that reason, the Coast Guard, Marine Corps, and Navy also train over 15,000 international students, from more than 150 countries, annually under DON's security assistance training programs. Dollar for dollar, senior Navy officials say, the most leveraged and cost-effective DON international program investment is in the International Military Education and Training (IMET) and Extended IMET (E-IMET) programs. Rear Adm. Robert Sutton, former director of Navy IPO, said that IMET provides the highest return of any DON security assistance program. The IMET program also assists partner countries in developing the skills to manage their own defense, security, and military training establishments. Congress has directed that the extended IMET program include professional-level management training that emphasizes civilian control of the military, resource management, the protection of human rights, and the development and implementation of military justice systems and codes of conduct.
IMET increases government effectiveness in graduates’ host countries
Bruneau, Peggar, and Wright 8 (Researchers at the Center for Civil-Military Relations, “IMET Assessment Project,” pg 50, 2008) KJS
IMET promotes building partner institutional capacity. While obviously subsumed within several of the categories listed above, many of the interviewees highlighted the direct impact of increased institutional capacity arising from IMET. In Mongolia IMET training led to UN roles in Sierra Leone and supported defense reform, and in El Salvador aided their ability to work with coalition forces in Iraq. Train the trainer programs are indicative of national level initiatives to develop institutional capacity. For example, in Indonesia, several IMET graduates reported sharing the knowledge and concepts that they learned through IMET with their colleagues in both formal and informal settings. In this way the effect of IMET may be multiplied many times over – an approach that helps a nation like Indonesia, with 313,000 members in its armed forces, make the most of its IMET budget. Further examples of such programs are noted in several of the qualitative findings.
E-IMET Solvency 1/4
E-IMET improves CMR in both civilian and military officials
Grimmnett, 4 (Richard F., Specialist in National Defense for the Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, “International Military Education and Training Program,” CRS Report for Congress, ) KJS
The Foreign Operations Appropriations Act for FY1991 (H.R. 5114, P.L. 101-513, signed November 5, 1990) directed the Defense Department to establish a program within IMET focused, in particular, on training foreign civilian and military officials in managing and administering military establishments and budgets; creating and maintaining effective military judicial systems and military codes of conduct, including observance of internationally recognized human rights; and fostering greater respect for the principle of civilian control of the military. Congress earmarked $1 million of the FY1991 IMET Appropriation to be used to establish this program. This initiative is called Expanded IMET, or E-IMET, and each year the Defense Department has broadened the program. Although Congress did not earmark IMET funds to support this program after FY1991, it has in report language noted an expectation that the financial investment in E-IMET be increased. Congress further broadened the program to include participation by members of national legislatures who are responsible for oversight and management of the military, and "individuals who are not members of a government." Because E-IMET is a sub-element of the overall IMET program, it is funded as part of the annual IMET appropriation. The E-IMET initiative is accomplished through educational programs in the United States offered by U.S Defense Department and U.S. military Service schools, by Mobile Education Teams visiting host countries, and by funding military participation in overseas conferences, such as the African American Institutes' seminar on "The Role of the Military in a Democracy" (a joint USAID, World Bank and IMET funded initiative). Although IMET funding can be used for such an initiative (overseas seminars) under the auspices of the E-IMET program when such activities are deemed appropriate, the emphasis and preference is for a longer training experience in the United States that maximizes the students' exposure to the American way of life.
E-IMET influences top policy and military officials
Reynolds 3 (Dr. Ron, Doctorate of Public Administration, DISAM Commandant, “Is Expanded International Military Education and Training reaching the right Audience?,” Defense Institution of Security Assistance Management publications, ) KJS
The most telling data from the student survey came from very few questions, while others provided additional support. The data will be displayed in Table 2, and elaborated upon in dialogue below. The table not only shows relevant survey questions by number and basic question content, but also provides the ability to compare the cumulative frequency of response regardless of home country of the respondent. This demonstrates that in a number of cases, the responses did not differ substantially between countries, making the results more comprehensive than this researcher envisioned at the outset of the conduct of the survey. Note that 91 percent overall were still with the same organization (with only slight variation between countries); while in each of the three countries about one-third, or more, had already moved to a higher-level position since attending their course. Combined with the fact that virtually two-thirds from each country anticipated a future move to a higher-level position, a good number within the next five years, it would appear that the upwardly mobile are attending the courses. In a related question, approximately three-fourths of the respondents across the board see themselves as having the ability to influence policy. Similarly, over half of them impact in the areas of general military, military justice or human rights issues. Over half from each country, and 63 percent overall, envision future positions that influence policy as well. Again, reaching the audience of those that can have an impact on future governmental decisions appears to be on target.
E-IMET Solvency 2/4
E-IMET aids CMR better than IMET
Smitson 8 (Scott A., professor of political science at Indiana University, “BUILDING ARMIES FOR THE PEOPLE, NOT AGAINST THE PEOPLE: MILITARY INSTITUTION BUILDING IN DEVELOPING AND POSTCONFLICT STATES,” presented at the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis Mini-Conference, Spring 2008, ) KJS
A quick survey of the models used by the US military to “build armies” illustrates that there is a large emphasis on small unit, tactical training, and less emphasis on civilmilitary relation issues. The figure above helps illustrate the doctrinal scopes and limitations specific to each type of “army building” model discussed in the previous section: Special Forces, Unit to Unit (Task Forces), MiTTs, and the IMET/E-IMET system. I have arranged the model so that “units to be trained” is on the X-Axis; as one moves from left to right on the X-axis, the units of analysis increase in size (for example, 3-4 companies make up a battalion, 3-5 battalions make up a brigade, etc). I have placed, in increasing order of complexity, levels of war/war planning/political-military affairs on the Y-axis. The triangles on the model cover both the doctrinal breadth occupied by each model as well as the types of units typically trained by each model. The Special Forces model has an obvious orientation towards tactical, small unit counterinsurgency and security training. Interactions with local actors tend to focus on “soft power” instruments of nation building (i.e. digging wells, veterinary assistance, medical assistance). Training foreign forces within the context of the Special Forces model should create tactically capable small units able to defend smaller geographic areas (villages, small cities, etc), but the doctrine does not state explicitly how civil-military relations and the subordination of the military to civilian authority is nested into this model’s training doctrine. When looking at the Unit to Unit model, the scope and unit size to be trained increases, largely due to the fact that the task force conducting the training is larger than a Special Forces A Team; quite simply, this model has the ability to train units up to the operational level, utilizing entire battalions to assist in the training. However, just as in the Special Forces model, the Unit to Unit model still tends to focus on tactical and operational tasks, less so on civil-military relations. The most frequently used model, Military Transition Teams (MiTTs), have the largest doctrinal scope of all the force generating models being considered. Unlike the previous two models that tend to be preemptive in nature and are usually utilized in nonhostile/low intensity conflicts, MiTTs are directly imbedded with fighting forces; in essence, the forces be trained by MiTTs are in combat and being trained and advised simultaneously. Because of the size and doctrinal capabilities internalized and organic to the MiTT model, civil-military relations become increasingly relevant for the higher ranking officers in the divisions and brigades being trained. But just as in the previous models, actual hostilities tend to dictate the “army building” priorities of the MiTT model, and civil-military relations are relegated to secondary importance. At the opposite end of the “army building” spectrum is the Expanded International Military Education Training system (E-IMET). Because the E-IMET model is more academic than hands on, there is virtually zero attention paid to the small to medium unit levels of war and doctrine; rather here, E-IMET heavily emphasizes education related to governance and civil-military relations in the mold of the US. Though this model addresses the important issue of civil-military relations, very few members of the armies being “built” attend E-IMET training, and those that do are upper level brigade, division, and army commanders or upper level defense ministerial appointees. Looking at the Army Building Models figure, it is obvious that a “doctrinal dissonance” exists between the Special Forces/MiTT/Unit to Unit models and the EIMET, especially when looking at the absence or presence of civil-military relations training. Accepting tactical proficiency in the short run could lead to military autocracy in the long run, a prospect that neither the host nation civilian government nor the US wants or desires. That being said, why does this “doctrinal dissonance” exist, and what could be done to address this shortcoming in the army building process?
E-IMET Solvency 3/4
Training soldiers in country prevents increased instability
Smitson 8 (Scott A, professor of political science at Indiana University, , “BUILDING ARMIES FOR THE PEOPLE, NOT AGAINST THE PEOPLE: MILITARY INSTITUTION BUILDING IN DEVELOPING AND POSTCONFLICT STATES,” presented at the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis Mini-Conference, Spring 2008, ) KJS
Approaching civil-military relations from the USAID perspective tends to focus on areas that are not a large concern to the Special Forces, MiTT, and Unit to Unit models previously discussed. For example, USAID emphasizes understanding the boundaries between armed forces and civil society, variables that affect the “nature and scope” of the military’s participation in politics, the balance between “legitimacy and coercion found in individual political systems”, and lastly the successful implementation of effective means of government control. In essence, it is not so much that the majority of the “army building” models are not teaching relevant doctrine, but that agencies such as USAID could assist in bridging the “doctrinal dissonance” gap discussed earlier. Another shortcoming in the aforementioned models is that they tend to only pertain to existing state military structures, structures that may have an adverse if not hostile relationship with their own citizenry. There are two organizational insights that may help address this problem, both of which fall under the concept of polycentricity within the context of security/military structures. First, most of the models in this research tend to train and focus on what could be called “active duty” soldiers, in that the soldiers that comprise the forces are full time professionals, and tend to be based and operate within the existing military infrastructure in the nation, usually on bases or posting away from their hometowns or areas where they grew up. Being “outsiders”, separated from the communities from which they operate, could increase the chances that the military could be used against citizens that are not necessarily their kin. Contrasting this type of organizational setup is the “citizen-soldier” concept, in which soldiers have alternative careers but occasionally serve in a military capacity to help out in their own local areas and communities. This concept of the “citizen soldier” is evident in many Western states, but especially in the United States with the National Guard, and in the United Kingdom with the Territorials, and it is a echo back to the time where organized militias occupied the doctrinal space that was yet to be filled by young, developing countries that had yet to create the institution of standing armies. Building and training units that have a local mission may not only be practical in a financial sense, but it also decreases that likelihood that a group of “citizen-soldiers” would abuse their own population, since they would be operating in their own villages, cities, and towns.
IMET increases government effectiveness in graduates’ host countries
Bruneau, Peggar, and Wright 8 (Researchers at the Center for Civil-Military Relations, “IMET Assessment Project,” pg 50, 2008) KJS
IMET promotes building partner institutional capacity. While obviously subsumed within several of the categories listed above, many of the interviewees highlighted the direct impact of increased institutional capacity arising from IMET. In Mongolia IMET training led to UN roles in Sierra Leone and supported defense reform, and in El Salvador aided their ability to work with coalition forces in Iraq. Train the trainer programs are indicative of national level initiatives to develop institutional capacity. For example, in Indonesia, several IMET graduates reported sharing the knowledge and concepts that they learned through IMET with their colleagues in both formal and informal settings. In this way the effect of IMET may be multiplied many times over – an approach that helps a nation like Indonesia, with 313,000 members in its armed forces, make the most of its IMET budget. Further examples of such programs are noted in several of the qualitative findings.
E-IMET Solvency 4/4
Egypt doesn’t have E-IMET programs now
Beutel 7 (Alejandro J., Minaret of Freedom Institute, April 27,
“The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt: A Preliminary Assessment of its Positions onReligious Freedom, Women and Religious Minorities”)gw
.Furthermore, regardless of the level military aid to Egypt, a certain part of any such aid should be dedicated to Expanded International Military Education and Training (E-IMET) and International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program(ICITAP) training for Egyptian army and police officers–training that teaches soldiers and police officers how to effectively do their jobs while respecting the rule of law and human rights. Currently no such programs to Egypt exist
E-IMET is the subset of IMET that focuses on CMR
DSCA 9 (Defense Security Cooperation Agency, 12/22, “Expanded IMET” )gw
Why Expanded IMET? The E-IMET program was established in FY90 for the purposes of educating U.S. friends and allies in the proper management of their defense resources, improving their systems of military justice in accordance with internationally recognized principles of human rights and fostering a greater respect for, and understanding of, the principle of civilian control of the military. The program is based upon the premise that active promotion of democratic values is one of the most effective means available for achieving U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives and fostering peaceful relationships among the nations of the world. The current international environment affords a unique opportunity for us to share our democratic principles with other countries. Through our E-IMET courses, we can achieve an enhanced level of understanding, trust, and confidence between nations that will contribute significantly to the maintenance of peace and stability in the post-cold war era. Program Objectives Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations, FY 1999 IMET is expanding and taking new directions in response to the changing global political scene. In the past few years, significant changes, in the program have taken place to better align program objectives with U.S., foreign policy interests in the post-Cold War environment. For example, a number of new and meaningful courses have been added to meet U.S. foreign policy objectives as important bilateral relations are developed with emerging democracies around the world. In addition, civilians who are not members of a government are encouraged to participate if it would contribute to, " accomplishment of program objectives, especially those involving the principles of, civil-military relations," civilian control of the military, and respect for human rights. Some specific objectives of these programs are: • To foster greater respect for and understanding of the principle of civilian control of the military; • To improve military justice systems and procedures in accordance with internationally recognized human rights; • To introduce military and civilian participants to the U.S. judicial system, the two-party system, the role of a free press and other communications media, minority problems, the purpose and scope of labor unions, the U.S. economic system, educational institutions, and the way in which all of these elements of American democracy reflect the U.S. commitment to the basic principles of internationally recognized human rights; • To resolve the civil-military conflict that a country actually confronts, and bring together key military and civilian leaders in order to break down barriers that often exist between armed forces, civilian officials, and legislators of competing political parties; and • To modify existing civil-military mechanisms used by democracies to meet a country’s own unique circumstances.
CAFD MET Solvency
CAFD MET solves
CCMR 11 (Center for Civil-Military Relations, COURSE CATALOGUE 2011, public/library_file_proxy.cfm/lid/2049, 2011) JS
Civilian Control of the Armed Forces in a Democracy: Methods, Techniques and Application, MET (MASL #P309152) CCMR custom-designed Expanded International Military Education and Training (EIMET) approved workshop course, entitled “Civilian control of the Armed Forces in a Democracy: Methods, Techniques and Application,” is tailored specifically for those countries that either have weak institutional controls over the armed forces or wish to improve existing structures and procedures. The intended audience is mid- to senior civilian defense and military officers in the ranks of major to Major General and their civilian equivalents from the Ministry of Defense, Chancelleries, and Parliament involved in the decision-making process to oversee the management and operation of the armed forces. The key objectives of the course are to provide education in: principles of civilian control over the armed forces; using case studies, identifying potential problem areas in control structures and procedures; review of national “decision points” (i.e. procedures and documents) that affect control over the armed forces; and ascertaining which procedures, structures and practices found to be effective in democracies can be adapted for implementation in the recipient country. CMR’s approach to teaching “Civilian control of the Armed Forces in a Democracy: Methods, Techniques and Application” is to focus delivery wherever possible to the specific conditions and requirements of the recipient country and its governing structures. In keeping with CCMR’s approach to delivering instruction, priority is placed on the educational component of the assistance, reinforced by its practical application in the form of producing draft procedures and arrangements, which is provided to the recipient country’s political and defense leadership for action and the ODC/SAO as a status report. The course objectives are achieved through the rigorous application of problem solving with particular emphasis on working with civilian and military officials in a collaborative group setting to develop draft procedures and arrangements for implementation. In the development of draft procedures and arrangements, CCMR stresses the importance of: The need for their integration with existing processes and systems, and the concurrent development of implementation techniques. At the end of this course, the recipient country’s Ministry of Defense and Defense HQ will be better prepared to ensure requisite transparent oversight of the armed forces. Participants will understand the nuanced character of control techniques and procedures, thereby allowing them to implement acceptable principles and procedures within their own national governing structures. Moreover, participants will understand how to adapt these procedures and arrangements to meet changing operational requirements.
IMET Spills Over 1/2
IMET presence creates a spill-over effect by encouraging host countries to establish similar training programs
Bruneau, Peggar, and Wright 8 (Researchers at the Center for Civil-Military Relations, “IMET Assessment Project,” pg 43-44, 2008) KJS
A common observation among interviewees in the countries visited was that IMET “fills the gap” between education and training at the national level and allied requirements. For countries with small IMET budgets, this is of particular importance. IMET sets a standard for both education and training- that countries strive to adopt and implement in country. BG Furlan, Slovene Armed Forces, stated that his US Army War College experience forms the basis for all his decisions and implementations. Historically, some interviewees noted that initial IMET participation in courses was one of “passive acceptance” i.e. the country would accept whatever was being offered. This model has evolved to one in which countries are linking their IMET requirements to high priority international operational commitments, and national level operational and strategic goals.
IMET training spills over to the rest of government and military
Bruneau, Peggar, and Wright 8 (Researchers at the Center for Civil-Military Relations, “IMET Assessment Project,” pg 46, 2008) KJS
IMET has a cross fertilization, pollination effect. Once they return to their units, IMET graduates use what they have learned and also teach what they have learned to their colleagues, producing a multiplying effect. Ability to utilize comparative analysis techniques toward problem solving within headquarters and field operations is one of the benefits. For example, the Slovene army mirrored its field manuals to those of the US Army. A good technical example of “pollination” effect is within Slovenia. The US trained Slovenes in how to build and load pallets into C-17s so equipment could accompany troops to Afghanistan. The Slovenes in turn taught the Croats. Hungary has a strong “train the trainer” program. LTC Larry Kinde notes that HDF is a good example of the “pollination” effect in that the seeds of knowledge are dispersed at the unit level thus benefiting the unit as a whole. The Sergeant Major of the Hungarian Defense Force spent nineteen months in Iraq as a training advisor at the Iraq Military Academy and a subsequent twelve months conducting infantry training in a British led mission. Related to this benefit is the fact that a significant majority of IMET graduates stay in contact with US and other international IMET colleagues. Interviews in Mongolia also validated IMET as an important tool with which nations learn capacity building, e.g. Defense Resource Management Institute (DRMI). Graduates have returned to Mongolia and taught others. This “train the trainer” approach has also been employed in a number of other IMET benefiting nations, allowing these nations to further amplify the impact of the IMET funds that they receive. To maximize the return on investment, Turkey requires that four years be added to service time as compensation for attending a US graduate program.
IMET Spills Over 2/2
IMET increases government effectiveness in graduates’ host countries
Bruneau, Peggar, and Wright 8 (Researchers at the Center for Civil-Military Relations, “IMET Assessment Project,” pg 50, 2008) KJS
IMET promotes building partner institutional capacity. While obviously subsumed within several of the categories listed above, many of the interviewees highlighted the direct impact of increased institutional capacity arising from IMET. In Mongolia IMET training led to UN roles in Sierra Leone and supported defense reform, and in El Salvador aided their ability to work with coalition forces in Iraq. Train the trainer programs are indicative of national level initiatives to develop institutional capacity. For example, in Indonesia, several IMET graduates reported sharing the knowledge and concepts that they learned through IMET with their colleagues in both formal and informal settings. In this way the effect of IMET may be multiplied many times over – an approach that helps a nation like Indonesia, with 313,000 members in its armed forces, make the most of its IMET budget. Further examples of such programs are noted in several of the qualitative findings.
***Add-Ons***
U.S.-Egypt Relations Add-On 1/2
IMET crucial to US-Egypt relations and US national security
Roberts 11 (James, researcher for the Heritage Foundation, “Not All Foreign Aid is Created Equal,” Backgrounder, No 2523, March 1, 2011, pg 2.) KJS
The value of U.S. international security assistance was illustrated most recently during the crisis in Egypt. The U.S. and Egyptian militaries have worked together closely for more than 30 years through such programs as the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs. When rioters on Tahrir Square demanded the overthrow of the Mubarak govern- ment last month, it was Egypt’s military—and only the military—that succeeded in holding the line against virulently anti-U.S. elements. U.S. international security assistance has made direct and short-term contributions to America’s national security and should continue to be funded.This assistance includes the FMS program to subsi- dize sales of U.S. military equipment, services, and training to friendly developing countries; IMET grants for training foreign military professionals; and some funding of international peacekeeping operations.
U.S. – Egyptian relations solve terrorism, Middle Eastern stability, access to oil, and war with Israel
CFR 2 (Council on Foreign Relations, May, “Strengthening the U.S.-Egyptian Relationship” )gw
The U.S.-Egyptian relationship is rooted in strategic calculation. It bolsters peace between Egypt and Israel and makes possible broader peace in the region. The U.S.-Egyptian relationship has helped Egypt modernize its military and has added weight to its position as a stabilizing regional force. America's support has also strengthened Egypt's economy. As has been true for the past two decades, a moderate Egypt is the key to peace and stability in the Middle East and a strong U.S.-Egyptian relationship is essential to securing American presence in the region. The U.S.-Egyptian relationship has served the two sides well. Two decades of military cooperation and training have moderated Egypt's military establishment, the most powerful institution in Egypt, and made it a reliable U.S. partner. During the Gulf War, Egypt's support was central to Arab participation in the war against Iraq; Egypt's willingness to keep open its canal in crisis and allow overflight and refueling cannot be taken for granted. These ties remain central to the U.S. ability to project and protect its strategic interests in the world's most volatile region. Washington has lost sight of what the Middle East would look like without a strong U.S.-Egyptian relationship. A nuclear-inclined or -armed Egypt, ambiguous on the issue of terror, uncertain on peace with Israel, and disinclined to negotiate would drastically recast the management of the Middle East.
U.S.-Egypt Relations Add-On 2/2
Egypt-Israeli conflict escalates to nuclear war
Eldar 3 (Dan Eldar, adjunct research fellow at the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv University, former senior analyst at the Israeli prime minister's office, “Egypt and Israel: A Reversible Peace,” The Middle East Quarterly, Fall 2003, pp. 57-65)
In addition, there is a risk that relations could deteriorate from cold peace to low-intensity military tension. This could follow an Egyptian violation of the demilitarized status of the Sinai Peninsula or as a result of an Egyptian strategic decision to build up a nuclear deterrent.[30] The Egyptian minister of defense and war production, Muhammad Hussein at-Tantawi, was reported to have told a closed forum a few years ago that Egypt should prepare for a future war with Israel. He later denied the reports and praised the importance of "strategic peace" with Israel.[31] However, explaining his concept of peace, Tantawi was quoted as saying: "Peace does not mean relaxation … Any threat to any Arab or African country is a threat to Egypt's national security."[32] Even though a strong army is a tradition in the Arab world and a status symbol for a powerful regime, Egypt has so far refrained from providing a reasonable and unequivocal explanation as to why and for what purpose the great part of U.S. aid has been invested in building one of the most modern and powerful armed forces in the Middle East.[33] In fact, this is one of the few areas in which the Egyptian state is more capable than it was two decades ago—thanks to U.S. assistance. Although Mubarak clearly has excluded war with Israel as an option, the capabilities he has built will outlast him, into the uncertainty of the post-Mubarak era. The risk of a reversion to intensified conflict between Israel and Egypt could increase in the immediate post-Mubarak era, should the transition to a successor be marked by instability. Mubarak's successor might be forced to indulge Egypt's Islamists, at least initially, in order to consolidate power. The Islamist radicalization of the already religiously-awakened vast middle class could turn hostility toward Israel into the lowest common denominator between the regime and the Muslim Brethren. Collaboration between the Egyptian army and the militant Islamic organizations cannot be ruled out, because the Egyptian military (unlike the Turkish) is not the guardian of a secular ethos. Unfortunately, there is no guarantee of an eternal peace between peoples, cultures, and states. But the spectrum between an all-out war and the peaceful utopia of the Biblical prophets is wide. Israel's former foreign minister, Abba Eban, encapsulated his insight of international relations and the role of diplomacy: "A prevented war is a kind of peace, the one and only kind of peace to prevail as long as states exist on earth." Eban later asserted that potential armed conflicts existing in our world outnumber the wars that have actually broken out.[34] From this vantage point, the Israeli-Egyptian peace did break the one-war-a-decade cycle that characterized the period between 1948 and 1973. It has been a strategic asset for Israel and the United States. The problem is that it rests on foundations that Egypt's leaders are loath to maintain. Amin al-Mahdi, a courageous Egyptian intellectual and writer, in an interview to an Israeli journalist, was quoted as saying: Israel believed that as a democracy it could make peace with dictatorial regimes. This is an illusion. Sadat for example completed the road to peace but not to democracy. Israel was glad with that peace but it is paying for the misunderstanding of the illusion … A regime that does not consider peace as a tool in service for its public but as a means for promoting its own political interests or to please the West or to gain some economic points, will retreat from peace once its expectations from that peace do not materialize.[35] The prospect of such a retreat is not far-fetched. Nor is planning for the possibility unduly pessimistic. But that planning is not underway. Israeli leaders and the public, both left and right, have by and large adjusted to the parameters of peace as dictated by Egypt. Indeed, some of them can be heard paying fawning tribute to the regional importance of Egypt and to Mubarak's ambitious pretensions. This is a poor substitute for what is more necessary than ever: a probing public debate over relations with Egypt. Egypt's policy toward Israel may be a function of Egypt's problems, which are growing still deeper. But in the blame game for those problems, Egypt's leaders mislead their own people, by avoiding serious introspection and pointing an accusing finger at the peace with Israel (and the pax Americana of which it is a part). It is not clear what it would take to discourage and deter the habitual Israel-bashing of Egypt's ruling elite (so often accompanied by America-bashing among the intellectuals). What combination of incentives and disincentives might work better? Debate over this question often has been stifled, because Israel has so few peace partners, and the United States does not have a surfeit of Arab governments on which it can rely. But if Cairo's own policy is a prime reason that the circle of peace and friendship is so small, perhaps the time has come for another approach. But beyond the issue of Egyptian rhetoric are larger questions about the long-term trajectory of Egypt's regional policy. Is Egypt effectively only in a state of temporary truce with Israel while it builds up its own military capabilities and incites others to erode Israel's strategic, political and economic assets? Is Egypt one more obstacle on the obstacle-strewn path to securing Palestinian and Arab acceptance of Israel? If the answer is yes, or maybe yes, how should Israel and the United States respond? These questions are not unrelated to questions Washington is already asking itself about whether Egypt under Mubarak is a liability or an asset in the U.S. effort to open the Arab Middle East to democracy and free markets.[36] These questions must be asked with greater frequency, and with less complacency, right now. Later may be too late. Continued U.S. support for the Egyptian military is not the best guarantee of peace, which requires deeper roots in Egyptian society if it is to last. As the United States considers the mix of aid for a post-Mubarak Egypt, it would do well to ask whether its resources would be better applied to education for peace and democracy. Without a change in attitudes, there will be little to prevent a future ruler of Egypt from reversing the country's course as dramatically and suddenly as Sadat did with dire consequences for the entire region.
U.S.-Egypt Relations EXT
IMET improves perceptions of American society and government
Bruneau, Peggar, and Wright 8 (Researchers at the Center for Civil-Military Relations, “IMET Assessment Project,” pg 34, 2008) KJS
The next significant question producing quantifiable results relates to the first legislative objective of the IMET program: to encourage effective and mutually beneficial relations and increased understanding between the U.S. and foreign countries. The question, to which respondents could select yes or no, providing additional explanation as necessary, was: As a result of your IMET [experience], did your views and perceptions of the U.S. change? As reported by the survey respondents, IMET does have a substantial impact on views and perceptions by foreign officers and civilians of the U.S. 84% of respondents reported that their views and perceptions of the U.S. did change; while 16% reported no change in their views and perceptions of the U.S. And, in examining the open – ended answers, virtually all of this knowledge was positive in the sense that they better understood the reality, vs. the fiction, of American society and government.
Readiness Add-On 1/2
IMET is key to deterrence, readiness, and peacetime engagement
DoD 96 (, “APPENDIX J: MILITARY ASSISTANCE”,) JSM
Military assistance is a valuable instrument of U.S. national security and foreign policy. It helps friends and allies deter and defend against aggression and contributes to sharing the common defense burden. Military assistance is a range of programs that enable friends and allies to acquire U.S. equipment, services, and training for legitimate self-defense and for participation in multinational security efforts, such as coalition warfare and peacekeeping operations. Military assistance promotes overseas presence and peacetime engagement by improving the defense capabilities of U.S. allies and friends, while demonstrating U.S. commitment to defend common interests. Adequate military capability among allies decreases the likelihood that U.S. armed forces will be necessary if conflict arises and raises the odds that U.S. armed forces will find a relatively favorable situation should a U.S. response be required. As an integral part of peacetime engagement, military assistance programs contribute to U.S. national security by enhancing deterrence, encouraging defense responsibility sharing among allies and friend, supporting U.S. readiness, and increasing interoperability among potential coalition partners. Programs under military assistance include Foreign Military Sales (FMS), Foreign Military Financing (FMF), International Military Education and Training (IMET), emergency drawdowns of defense inventories, and grants of Excess Defense Articles (EDA). The structure of each program provides the capability to respond to the needs of foreign friends and allies by addressing their security concerns, while supporting U.S. armed forces and promoting U.S. foreign policy and national security interests.
It’s not about the size of our military lead, but how we use it. A weakened American military invites counter-balancing and aggressive enemies
Spencer 2k (Jack - policy analyst for defense and national security at the Heritage Foundation, The Facts About Military Readiness, p. )
U.S. military readiness cannot be gauged by comparing America's armed forces with other nations' militaries. Instead, the capability of U.S. forces to support America's national security requirements should be the measure of U.S. military readiness. Such a standard is necessary because America may confront threats from many different nations at once. America's national security requirements dictate that the armed forces must be prepared to defeat groups of adversaries in a given war. America, as the sole remaining superpower, has many enemies. Because attacking America or its interests alone would surely end in defeat for a single nation, these enemies are likely to form alliances. Therefore, basing readiness on American military superiority over any single nation has little saliency. The evidence indicates that the U.S. armed forces are not ready to support America's national security requirements. Moreover, regarding the broader capability to defeat groups of enemies, military readiness has been declining. The National Security Strategy, the U.S. official statement of national security objectives,3 concludes that the United States "must have the capability to deter and, if deterrence fails, defeat large-scale, cross-border aggression in two distant theaters in overlapping time frames."4 According to some of the military's highest-ranking officials, however, the United States cannot achieve this goal. Commandant of the Marine Corps General James Jones, former Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jay Johnson, and Air Force Chief of Staff General Michael Ryan have all expressed serious concerns about their respective services' ability to carry out a two major theater war strategy.5 Recently retired Generals Anthony Zinni of the U.S. Marine Corps and George Joulwan of the U.S. Army have even questioned America's ability to conduct one major theater war the size of the 1991 Gulf War.6 Military readiness is vital because declines in America's military readiness signal to the rest of the world that the United States is not prepared to defend its interests. Therefore, potentially hostile nations will be more likely to lash out against American allies and interests, inevitably leading to U.S. involvement in combat. A high state of military readiness is more likely to deter potentially hostile nations from acting aggressively in regions of vital national interest, thereby preserving peace.
Readiness Add-On 2/2
Perception of American strength is critical to prevent aggressive nuclearization strategies that result in first-strikes and nuclear war
Talent and Hall 10 (Jim - distinguished fellow in government relations at the Heritage Foundation, and Heath, Sowing the Wind, March, p. )
There is a reason that regimes like Iran and North Korea go to the time and expense, and assume the risks of developing nuclear weapons programs; nuclear capability empowers them to achieve their ends, and thereby poses challenges to the United States, for several reasons. First, there is a danger that rogue regimes with nuclear material may assist terrorists in developing weapons of mass destruction.[36] Even the possibility that such regimes may do so gives them leverage internationally. Second, these regimes have ambitions in their regions and around the world.[37] Some of their leaders are fanatical enough to actually consider a first strike using nuclear weapons; for example, high-ranking officials of the Iranian government have openly discussed using a nuclear weapon against Israel.[38] Whether a first strike occurs or not, the possession of nuclear capability frees aggressive regimes to pursue their other goals violently with less fear of retaliation. For example, North Korea’s nuclear capability means that it could attack South Korea conventionally with a measure of impunity; even if the attack failed, the United States and its allies would be less likely to remove the North Korean regime in retaliation. In other words, nuclear capability lessens the penalties which could be exacted on North Korea if it engages in aggression, which makes the aggression more likely. The same logic applies to Iran, which is why the other nations in the Middle East are so concerned about Iran’s nuclear program. A nuclear attack by Iran is possible, but the real danger of Iranian nuclear capability is that it would make conventional aggression in the region more likely.[39] Finally, the more nations that get nuclear weapons, the greater the pressure on other nations to acquire them as a deterrent, and this is particularly true when a government acquiring the capability is seen as unstable or aggressive. North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons has tended, for obvious reasons, to make the South Koreans and Japanese uncomfortable about having no deterrent themselves. The possibility of uncontrolled proliferation—what experts call a “nuclear cascade”[40]—is tremendously dangerous; it increases the possibility that terrorists can get nuclear material from a national program, and it raises the prospect of a multilateral nuclear confrontation between nations.[41] Many of the smaller nuclear nations do not have well-established first strike doctrine or launch protocols; the chance of a nuclear exchange, accidental or intentional, increases geometrically when a confrontation is multilateral. The antidote to proliferation is American leadership and power. The reality and perception of American strength not only deters aggressive regimes from acquiring weapons of mass destruction; it reassures other countries that they can exist safely under the umbrella of American power without having to develop their own deterrent capability.[42]
Middle East Stability Add-On 1/2
IMET funding directly improves international peace keeping
Coulter 6 (ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS FOR EGYPT FDCH Congressional Testimony, May 17, 2006, Military & Government Collection, Statement of Michael Coulter Deputy Assistant Secretary, EBSCO) JSM
While much of our focus is necessarily on FMF, I would like to also say a few words about the IMET program in Egypt. IMET funds allow Egypt to send military officers to professional military education courses in the United States. Since 1995, over 6,600 Egyptian military students have participated in U.S.-based training, supported with FMF and IMET funds. IMET training goes beyond professional training. IMET funds support technical, maintenance, logistics, and specialist training which enables Egyptian military personnel to gain the skills needed to maintain Egypt`s stocks of U.S.-origin equipment, as well as enhances their ability to participate with the U.S. as a training and coalition partner. Overall, it is clear that Egyptian attendance at U.S. training fosters mutual understanding, exposure to U.S. values, doctrines and concepts, and one-to-one relationships that ultimately improve U.S.-Egyptian military interoperability and capacity to perform, for example in international peacekeeping operations. Egyptian officers attending training at U.S. military schools learn about U.S. professional military organizations and procedures, how military organizations function under civilian control, about military justifice systems, and the development of strong civil-military relations. These essential concepts and skills will contribute to Egypt`s stability, and reinforce the concept of civilian rule. U.S. military training is reinforced by joint exercises. Egypt continues to host CENTCOM`s largest multinational military exercise - Bright Star. In 2005, Iraq and Afghanistan were invited to participate as observers to the exercise for the first time. Over 30,000 participants from 12 countries participated in Bright Star 2005. Military assistance is critical to the development of a strategic partnership with Egypt and has contributed to a broad range of U.S. objectives in the region.
Military to military contacts are key to diplomacy and security in both nations
Weitz 11 (Egypt-US Security Ties Provide Possible Anchor for Stability, Richard Weitz, , 2/7/11, )
Perhaps the main tool of influence available to the United States in the current crisis in Egypt is the decades-long relationship that Washington has cultivated with that country’s military and intelligence services. The recent experience reminds us that military-to-military relationships have important diplomatic and security functions when pursued with friendly nations. Perhaps the main tool of influence available to the United States in the current crisis in Egypt is the decades-long relationship that Washington has cultivated with that country’s military and intelligence services. The recent experience reminds us that military-to-military relationships have important diplomatic and security functions when pursued with friendly nations.
Middle East Stability Add-On 2/2
The Middle East is on the brink of a nuclear war
Blake 11 (Heidi Blake, WikiLeaks: tension in the Middle East and Asia has 'direct potential' to lead to nuclear war, The Telegraph, Feb 2, 2011, )
Tension in the Middle East and Asia has given rise to an escalating atomic arms and missiles race which has “the direct potential to lead to nuclear war,” leaked diplomatic documents disclose. Rogue states are also increasing their efforts to secure chemical and biological weapons, and the means to deploy them, leaving billions in the world's most densely populated area at risk of a devastating strike, the documents show. States such as North Korea, Syria and Iran are developing long-range missiles capable of hitting targets outside the region, records of top-level security briefings obtained by WikiLeaks show. Long-running hostilities between India and Pakistan – which both have nuclear weapons capabilities – are at the root of fears of a nuclear conflict in the region. A classified Pentagon study estimated in 2002 that a nuclear war between the two countries could result in 12 million deaths. Secret records of a US security briefing at an international non-proliferation summit in 2008 stated that “a nuclear and missile arms race [in South Asia] has the direct potential to lead to nuclear war in the world's most densely populated area and a region of increasing global economic significance”. The same briefing gave warning that development of cruise and ballistic missiles in the Middle East and Asia could enable rogue states to fire weapons of mass destruction into neighbouring regions. The leaked documents also disclose alarming details of the chemical and biological weapons programmes being pursued by rogue states such as Syria and North Korea. Syria - which backs the Lebanese terrorist group Hezbollah – is believed to be developing chemical weapons using the lethal nerve agents sarin and VX, which shut down the nervous system in under a minute if inhaled or absorbed through the skin.
Middle East war goes Global
London 10 (Herbert I. London, President of the Hudson Institute, a New York University based political think tank, and professor of Humanities at New York University, Hudson New York, 6/28/10, )
The coming storm in the Middle East is gaining momentum; like conditions prior to World War I, all it takes for explosive action to commence is a trigger. Turkey's provocative flotilla, often described in Orwellian terms as a humanitarian mission, has set in motion a gust of diplomatic activity: if the Iranians send escort vessels for the next round of Turkish ships, which they have apparently decided not to do in favor of land operations, it could have presented a casus belli. [cause for war] Syria, too, has been playing a dangerous game, with both missile deployment and rearming Hezbollah. According to most public
accounts, Hezbollah is sitting on 40,000 long-, medium- and short-range missiles, and Syrian territory has been serving as a conduit for military materiel from Iran since the end of the 2006 Lebanon War. Should Syria move its own scuds to Lebanon or deploy its troops as reinforcement for Hezbollah, a wider regional war with Israel could not be contained. In the backdrop is an Iran, with sufficient fissionable material to produce a couple of nuclear weapons. It will take some time to weaponize the missiles, but the road to that goal is synchronized in green lights since neither diplomacy nor diluted sanctions can convince Iran to change course. From Qatar to Afghanistan all political eyes are on Iran, poised to be "the hegemon" in the Middle East; it is increasingly considered the "strong horse" as American forces incrementally retreat from the region. Even Iraq, ironically, may depend on Iranian ties in order to maintain internal stability. For Sunni nations like Egypt and Saudi Arabia, regional strategic vision is a combination of deal-making to offset the Iranian Shia advantage, and attempting to buy or develop nuclear weapons as a counterweight to Iranian ambition. However, both of these governments are in a precarious state; should either fall, all bets are off in the Middle East neighborhood. It has long been said that the Sunni "tent" must stand on two legs: if one, falls, the tent collapses.
Naval Power Add-On
IMET key to naval power
Walsh 2 (Stephen, naval analyst at the Center for Security Strategy and Operations, “The Interoperability Issue,” the Navy League of he United States, ) KJS
The range of skills that IMET training programs provide is a broad one, and addresses more than simply "big Navy" concerns. For instance, the U.S. Coast Guard's experience as the world's premier interdict-at-sea, board, and search armed force is highly valued--and imitated. Port control, maritime safety, fisheries security, smuggling, and illegal migration are issues in many parts of the world where multiagency cooperative engagement is the key to success. The unified CINCs are unanimous in their praise for IMET and E-IMET not only as the tools needed to achieve essential operational and maintenance training (which ensures equipment interoperability in a tactical sense), but also because both programs reflect and embody the doctrine, operational concepts, and strategic education provided at the U.S. war colleges and Naval Postgraduate School. Many foreign chiefs of service and other senior military leaders are, in fact, graduates of U.S. service schools. The long-term understanding and one-on-one personal relationships that E-IMET and IMET provide, facilitate, and enhance are the true interoperability intangibles and can overcome many issues resulting from the incompatibility of equipment.
Naval power solves global WMD conflicts
Peele 97 (Reynolds B., Lieutenant, USMC, The Importance of Maritime Chokepoints, Parameters, Summer)
There are presently six significant regional economic and military concerns that require constant strategic focus on free access to sea lines of communication. . In the Middle East, Saddam Hussein's hegemonic activities remain a threat to regional economic and political stability. State-sponsored terrorism originating in Libya and Iran contributes to concerns about regional, as well as European, stability. . In Northeast Asia, North Korea's pursuit of a nuclear capability exacerbates regional tension. For nearly 50 years, the United States has been committed to the defense of South Korea, helping to maintain the balance of power and stability on the Korean peninsula. Also, the growth of Asia as a trading partner requires the United States to discourage prospective regional hegemons.[37] . Stability within the Western Hemisphere is an enduring concern. Examples include the need for stable democracies in Haiti and Cuba, while stability remains important if El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Guatemala are to emerge from recent insurgencies with reasonable prospects for economic growth. Problems posed by the international drug trade are addressed below. . Unrest in Bosnia and elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia continues to disrupt regional stability. The United States remains committed to ongoing peacekeeping operations in the search for peace in the Balkans. . Interventions in Africa to prevent or end genocide (Rwanda and Somalia), support of UN efforts to reduce tensions between warring states (Angola and Mozambique), and efforts to calm civil strife (South Africa and Namibia) can preclude second- or third-order effects of massive population shifts that have plagued the region for nearly a decade. SLOCs are important if the United States is to shape favorable outcomes in such circumstances. . The United States remains concerned about the regional dispute over the Spratly Islands. While it seems unlikely at present that a direct threat to free access to the regional SLOCs will emerge, the statistics above demonstrate the importance of the South China Sea to our own trade as well as that of our allies and trading partners. The foregoing list of US security and economic foreign policy interests is neither exhaustive nor prioritized. The underpinning in each statement is an immediate or potential requirement to deploy and sustain substantial military force in the interest of free access to SLOCs or in response to threats to US interests or those of its allies. The effects of disruptions within the associated SLOCs range from significant in the Middle East and Southeast Asia to minimal around the coastal areas of Africa. However, all six would likely require the movement of land or naval forces and equipment to crisis areas along key SLOCs to ensure that US security and economic interests can be protected.
Terrorism Add-On 1/2
IMET should be expanded so counterterrorism training can be more effective
Johnson and Payne 10 (Andy Johnson, Director, National Security Program at Third Way, former Staff Director of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Scott Payne, Senior Policy Advisor, National Security Program at Third Way, publications/317, July 27) MV
Funding for training programs in countries dealing with terrorist threats has not been sufficient since 9/11. While the Pentagon’s Building Partnership Capacity program has ramped-up quickly since 2006, training funds under the State
Department’s International Military Education and Training (IMET) program have grown marginally and have been widely dispersed, diluting the impact of counterterrorism training. Using the findings of the targeted assessment proposed above, Congress should work with the administration to increase funding of the IMET program to bolster counterinsurgency and counterterrorism capabilities overseas. Congress also should roll the Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program into the IMET program and expand it as a way of increasing both unity and strength of effort in this area. Both State and Defense need to strengthen oversight to ensure that capabilities are improving in the recipient nations and report regularly to Congress the efficacy of the targeted training.
Terrorism Add-On 2/2
Terrorism causes extinction – draws in Russia and China
Ayson 10 (Robert, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington, “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7, July, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via InformaWorld)
A terrorist nuclear attack, and even the use of nuclear weapons in response by the country attacked in the first place, would not necessarily represent the worst of the nuclear worlds imaginable. Indeed, there are reasons to wonder whether nuclear terrorism should ever be regarded as belonging in the category of truly existential threats. A contrast can be drawn here with the global catastrophe that would come from a massive nuclear exchange between two or more of the sovereign states that possess these weapons in significant numbers. Even the worst terrorism that the twenty-first century might bring would fade into insignificance alongside considerations of what a general nuclear war would have wrought in the Cold War period. And it must be admitted that as long as the major nuclear weapons states have hundreds and even thousands of nuclear weapons at their disposal, there is always the possibility of a truly awful nuclear exchange taking place precipitated entirely by state possessors themselves. But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important … some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington’s relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washington’s early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country’s armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response. As part of its initial response to the act of nuclear terrorism (as discussed earlier) Washington might decide to order a significant conventional (or nuclear) retaliatory or disarming attack against the leadership of the terrorist group and/or states seen to support that group. Depending on the identity and especially the location of these targets, Russia and/or China might interpret such action as being far too close for their comfort, and potentially as an infringement on their spheres of influence and even on their sovereignty. One far-fetched but perhaps not impossible scenario might stem from a judgment in Washington that some of the main aiders and abetters of the terrorist action resided somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what Allison claims is the “Chechen insurgents’ … long-standing interest in all things nuclear.”42 American pressure on that part of the world would almost certainly raise alarms in Moscow that might require a degree of advanced consultation from Washington that the latter found itself unable or unwilling to provide. There is also the question of how other nuclear-armed states respond to the act of nuclear terrorism on another member of that special club. It could reasonably be expected that following a nuclear terrorist attack on the United States, both Russia and China would extend immediate sympathy and support to Washington and would work alongside the United States in the Security Council. But there is just a chance, albeit a slim one, where the support of Russia and/or China is less automatic in some cases than in others. For example, what would happen if the United States wished to discuss its right to retaliate against groups based in their territory? If, for some reason, Washington found the responses of Russia and China deeply underwhelming, (neither “for us or against us”) might it also suspect that they secretly were in cahoots with the group, increasing (again perhaps ever so slightly) the chances of a major exchange. If the terrorist group had some connections to groups in Russia and China, or existed in areas of the world over which Russia and China held sway, and if Washington felt that Moscow or Beijing were placing a curiously modest level of pressure on them, what conclusions might it then draw about their culpability? If Washington decided to use, or decided to threaten the use of, nuclear weapons, the responses of Russia and China would be crucial to the chances of avoiding a more serious nuclear exchange. They might surmise, for example, that while the act of nuclear terrorism was especially heinous and demanded a strong response, the response simply had to remain below the nuclear threshold. It would be one thing for a non-state actor to have broken the nuclear use taboo, but an entirely different thing for a state actor, and indeed the leading state in the international system, to do so. If Russia and China felt sufficiently strongly about that prospect, there is then the question of what options would lie open to them to dissuade the United States from such action: and as has been seen over the last several decades, the central dissuader of the use of nuclear weapons by states has been the threat of nuclear retaliation. If some readers find this simply too fanciful, and perhaps even offensive to contemplate, it may be informative to reverse the tables. Russia, which possesses an arsenal of thousands of nuclear warheads and that has been one of the two most important trustees of the non-use taboo, is subjected to an attack of nuclear terrorism. In response, Moscow places its nuclear forces very visibly on a higher state of alert and declares that it is considering the use of nuclear retaliation against the group and any of its state supporters. How would Washington view such a possibility? Would it really be keen to support Russia’s use of nuclear weapons, including outside Russia’s traditional sphere of influence? And if not, which seems quite plausible, what options would Washington have to communicate that displeasure? If China had been the victim of the nuclear terrorism and seemed likely to retaliate in kind, would the United States and Russia be happy to sit back and let this occur? In the charged atmosphere immediately after a nuclear terrorist attack, how would the attacked country respond to pressure from other major nuclear powers not to respond in kind? The phrase “how dare they tell us what to do” immediately springs to mind. Some might even go so far as to interpret this concern as a tacit form of sympathy or support for the terrorists. This might not help the chances of nuclear restraint.
Terrorism Add-On EXT
IMET curbs terrorism in the Middle East and North Africa
AFNS 7/25 (, Education program promotes relationships, partnerships, Armed Forces News Service, 7/25/11) JSM
During the 1990s, IMET reached out to former Soviet bloc countries, offering new courses on defense resource management, military justice, civil-military relations and internationally-recognized human rights. This led to the establishment of some of IMET's specialty schools, including the International Defense Acquisition Resource Management program and Center for Civil-Military Relations at the Naval Postgraduate School; the Defense Institute of International Legal Studies in Newport, R.I.; and the Defense Institute for Medical Operations at Lackland Air Force Base in San Antonio. Today IMET's focus has extended increasingly to the Middle East and northern Africa. Judkins called this outreach a way to address vulnerabilities to terrorism and other regional threats. "The emphasis is on the Middle East and Africa because we know that terrorism will grow, and we know that vulnerable countries are the most targeted," she said. In addition, IMET is expanding its scope to provide more noncommissioned officer education and training, particularly for countries working to build professional NCO corps. Mobile IMET education teams also have begun deploying to other countries to provide training tailored to their specific needs. The impact can be significant, because a single team can train 50 to 100 students at a time, Judkins said. Last year, mobile training teams provided about half of all IMET training. Landay called IMET an important program that's almost universally recognized for its contribution to U.S. national defense.
***A2: Politics DA***
A2: Politics – Popularity L/T
IMET is popular – growth proves
DISAM 3 (The DISAM Journal of International Security Assistance, Spring, “Fiscal year 2003 security assistance legislation and funding allocations” Lexis)
* With foreign military financing program (FMFP) funding for FY2003 remaining essentially unchanged from FY2002, the ever-popular international military education and training (IMET) program continues its growth, realizing a fourteen (14) percent increase of $9,480,000 after rescission over prior year funding.
A2: Politics – Bipart L/T
E-IMET has bipartisan support
Moskowitz 8( Elisa, works in the Policy Planning Office, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy December “The Creation of Expanded International Military Education and Training (E-IMET)” DISAM Journal )
The catalyst for the initiative was the Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the SAC. (It is not unusual for an initiative to start in an appropriations committee, especially if there is an existing law that can accommodate it.)10 The proposal was welcomed by the SAC Chairman at the time, Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT); and there was general bipartisan support within Congress (the SAC staffers on the majority side who came up with the idea cultivated support among their Republican counterparts). First of all, E-IMET was not perceived as controversial; it was seen as way for the U.S. to work with governments who needed help to reform their militaries, which, it was hoped, could cascade to other types of reform. Secondly, no additional funding was being requested; the SAC proposed allocating a portion of the existing IMET budget for specific E-IMET programs.11 Thirdly, the proposed legislative language clearly spelled out the parameters of the program; there was no ambiguity about what the program could provide and to whom. Finally, the Congressional report language stated that DoD (specifically the Defense Security Assistance Agency) had to report to the Senate on E-IMET’s implementation; close Congressional oversight was an element of the program during its first few years to ensure that it met the intent of Congress.12
A2: Politics – Republicans L/T
Cutting Egyptian aid unpopular – security concerns
The New Republic 11 (2/2, “Egypt Complicates US Foreign Aid” )gw
Of all the cuts conservatives want to make in government spending, foreign aid should be the easiest — at least politically. After all, most voters seem to have a wildly inflated view of how much we actually give to other countries (it's a microscopic slice of the overall budget), and the aid itself tends to be unpopular. Except every now and again a big foreign crisis comes up — tumultuous protests in Egypt, say — and suddenly that aid no longer seems quite so abstract or dispensable. On Tuesday, in a scrum with reporters, Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-SC) chastised a proposal by the Republican Study Committee in the House to eliminate $250 million in economic assistance to Egypt. "All I would say to my colleagues is that we live in a dangerous world, and foreign aid is in our national security interests," he said. "There are people in my party, in the Senate, who are talking about eliminating aid to the state of Israel — over my dead body!" (He's referring to Rand Paul's proposal to zero out aid to Israel — not surprisingly, Democrats are already pouncing on that.) Graham went on to make a forceful case for foreign aid — the protests in Egypt, he suggested, were caused by a mix of "oppressive governance with a bad economy," and added that "Jordan is economically disadvantaged, so I worry about this moving to Jordan." What's more, he argued, the Egyptian army was a bulwark against radicalism in the country: "If you cut that aid, you'll be cutting your own throat." If anything, Graham seemed to be making a case for greater assistance to foreign countries (for a brief second, he noted that providing aid to a repressive dictator did have its downsides, but then stopped himself: "The fact that we provided aid to the military is not something we should be ashamed of"). Granted, he's going further than many of his Republican colleagues, but even House Republicans are sounding a little more circumspect. Earlier today, Rep. Kay Granger (R-TX), who chairs the House appropriations subcommittee that deals with the State Department, said, "While there are calls for eliminating Egypt's economic and military aid, I urge caution in deciding what the U.S. response will be." At the very least, Republican proposals to cut State Department funding by one-third suddenly seem like a much tougher sell.
A2: Politics – Israel/Defense Lobbies L/T
Defense lobbies and the pro-Israel lobby support IMET
Deen 11 (Thalif, UN Bureau Chief & IPS Regional Director – North America, 2/11 “Egypt’s US-Armed Military in Transitory Commanding Role” )gw
The hefty 35 billion dollars in gratis military aid to Egypt over the last 32 years – under the U.S. Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and International Military Education and Training (IMET) programmes – was lavishly bestowed on the armed forces which sustained and protected the Mubarak regime since October 1981. The State Department describes FMF, currently at 1.3 billion dollars annually, as “the backbone” of Egypt’s military procurement budget. According to the latest 2011 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations released by the State Department, U.S. aid to Egypt includes funding for international narcotics control and law enforcement; non- proliferation, anti-terrorism and de-mining; combating weapons of mass destruction; counter-terrorism and security sector reforms. Over the past decade, about 85 percent of the arms in Egypt’s military arsenal originated in the United States, says Dan Darling, Europe and Middle East Military Markets Analyst at Forecast International, a U.S. based defence market research firm. The U.S. assistance, however, came with a condition attached to it, ensuring that virtually all of those funds be ploughed back into the U.S. economy, according to the State Department. The funds could be utilised only to purchase U.S. equipment, thereby indirectly subsidising the U.S. defence industry, one of the most powerful political lobbies in the United States. The U.S. aid agreement, both with Egypt and Israel, was an integral part of the historic 1979 peace treaty following the 1978 U.S.-brokered Camp David peace accords. While the Egyptians were hamstrung, the Israelis were not. After strong lobbying by the Israeli government, the United States granted an exception to the Jewish state: it could use a sizeable part of the U.S. funds to buy equipment made in Israel. For Egypt it was a “one-way street”, Pieter Wezeman, senior researcher in the Arms Transfers Programme at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), told IPS. But for Israel, it was a “two-way street,” he noted. Currently, Israel receives between 2.5 billion and 3.0 billion dollars in non-repayable U.S. military aid annually – more than twice the allocation earmarked for Egypt. Darling pointed out that under the current arrangement, Israel is allowed to spend up to about 25 percent of U.S. military aid on Israeli manufactured arms and support equipment, which would come out to 750,000 dollars annually. “Israel is, I believe, the only country granted this exception regarding U.S. Foreign Military Financing,” Darling told IPS. This is granted by Washington in recognition of the amount of arms Israel buys from the U.S. and the small Israeli domestic market for weaponry. Because of its small home market, Israeli defence industrials must look abroad to the export market for revenue, he said. Thus Washington’s exemption of a quarter of its FMF to Israel is an acknowledgement of Israeli concerns towards the need to grow and sustain their own indigenous defence industry, Darling pointed out. The administration of President Barack Obama, which has welcomed Mubarak’s decision to step down, has to cautiously navigate the role the military will play in the future of a democratic Egypt. When Mubarak remained adamant, refusing to quit last week, there were demands that Washington should cut off aid to Egypt. But that’s unlikely to happen then – and even in the future, particularly if the military decides to hijack the democratic process. “If the U.S. cuts off military aid to Egypt,” says one defence analyst, “it will be like cutting off one’s nose to spite one’s face.” According to arms sales notifications compiled by the U.S. Defence Security Assistance Agency, and cited by William Hartung, director of Arms and Security Initiative at the New America Foundation, the U.S. Defence Department has brokered over 11.0 billion dollars in arms sales to Egypt over the last decade. The U.S. suppliers include Lockheed Martin, General Dynamics, Boeing, Raytheon, United Defence and General Electric – most of them described as powerful constituents of U.S. senators and congressmen. If the United States reconsiders aid to Egypt at any given time, “it is possible this gravy train for contractors could come to an end,” says Hartung. But judging by multi-million dollars arms deals between Egypt and U.S. defence contractors, it is very unlikely there will be a cutoff. According to reports out of Washington, the pro-Israel lobby is also opposed to any cuts in U.S. military aid to Egypt – which has been liaising closely with the Israelis since the 1989 peace treaty.
A2: Politics – Defense Lobby L/T EXT
Defense lobbies support the plan and are higly influential
Knickerbocker 11 (Brad, Jewish World Review, 2/4, “Obama will never cut foreign aid to Egypt” )gw
Also, aid to Egypt (exceeded only by aid to Israel, Afghanistan, and Pakistan) is a politically entrenched part of the "military-industrial complex" and high-powered lobbying. "It's worth noting that [Egypt] employs some of the most powerful and high-profile lobbyists in the District of Columbia," writes Chris Good, associated editor at The Atlantic. "Since 2007, the government of Egypt has contracted Tony Podesta, president of the Podesta Group and brother of former Bill Clinton chief of staff John Podesta; former representative Bob Livingston (R) of Louisiana, who nearly succeeded Newt Gingrich as speaker of the House [but for a sex scandal]; and former representative Toby Moffett (D) of Connecticut." FOREIGN-AGENT LOBBYISTS FOR EGYPT "All remain active agents for Egypt, according to the US Department of Justice," writes Good. "Among the top lobbyists in D.C., the three signed a one-year contract to work for Egypt through their joint venture, the PLM lobbying group, in October 2007. That contract had the option of a one-year extension, and the three went on to register independently as foreign-agent lobbyists for Egypt in March 2009." "Egypt agreed to pay them a total of $1.1 million per year to 'provide assistance and advice, as requested, to the Embassy in the task of securing and further enhancing the interests of Egypt in the United States in the political, economic, military and other fields'…," according to the contract cited by Good. "The three were employed to give Egypt strategic advice, assist with requests for military aid, make contacts with US government officials, assist in Egyptian officials' visits to the US, utilize corporate contacts, and work within the US business community's Washington offices to improve Egypt's image for investment."
A2: Politics – Israel Lobby Supports the Plan EXT
US Israeli pushes Egypt military aid
Deen 11 (Thalif, writer for , “Egypt’s US-Armed Military in Transitory Commanding Role,” Anti-, ) KJS
If the United States reconsiders aid to Egypt at any given time, "it is possible this gravy train for contractors could come to an end," says Hartung. But judging by multi-million dollars arms deals between Egypt and U.S. defense contractors, it is very unlikely there will be a cutoff. According to reports out of Washington, the pro-Israel lobby is also opposed to any cuts in U.S. military aid to Egypt — which has been liaising closely with the Israelis since the 1989 peace treaty. SIPRI’s Wezeman told IPS: "Yes, Israel has a very special relationship with the United States, which is also reflected in the U.S. military aid to Israel."
A2: Politics – Israel Lobby k2 Agenda EXT
The Israel lobby has tons of support
Business Pundit (4/26, “10 of the Biggest Lobbies in Washington” )gw
The Pro-Israel Lobby, headed by the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, has been called the NRA of foreign policy lobbies, “a hard-edged, pugnacious bunch that took names and kept score”. The almost-unilateral popular support of Israel in America, not to mention the nearly $3 billion in aid the country receives every year, did not come about by accident. It’s the result of over 50 years of hard lobbying. Politicians and pundits alike are quick to support the Jewish state, and reluctant to criticize it. Pro-Israel groups such as AIPAC spent close $4 million last year, ensuring that US-Israel ties will remain strong. The Pro-Israel lobby remains one of the strongest and most influential foreign-policy lobbies in the US.
The Israel lobby is super influential
Mearsheimer and Walt 6 (John, Dept of Poli Sci at U Chicago, Stephen M., John F. Kennedy School of Government
Harvard University, London Review of Books Vol. 28, No. 6, JOB)
The overall thrust of U.S. policy in the region is due almost entirely to U.S. domestic politics, and especially to the activities of the “Israel Lobby.” Other special interest groups have managed to skew U.S. foreign policy in directions they favored, but no lobby has managed to divert U.S. foreign policy as far from what the American national interest would otherwise suggest, while simultaneously convincing Americans that U.S. and Israeli interests are essentially identical.
***A2: Iran DA***
A2: Iran DA – No Internal Link
No Internal Link: Democracy assistance is a shift away from containment
Cohn 99 (Elizabeth, SIS Faculty Researcher on Democracy, July 1, “U.S. Democratization Assistance” Washington, DC: Foreign Policy In Focus, )
With the end of the cold war, U.S. policymakers sought a number of rationales to justify continued engagement in the world and to promote American interests. Republicans and Democrats alike were attracted to a framework developed by the Reagan administration: the U.S. promotion of democracy. The Clinton administration went further than Reagan and Bush, announcing in 1993 that all U.S. foreign policy would be guided by the doctrine of "enlargement," aimed at expanding the community of democratic states. Although this rhetoric indicated a shift in thinking from the former policy of containment (no longer necessary after the collapse of the Soviet Union), it was not backed up with significant policy initiatives designed to implement it. There were minor bureaucratic rearrangements such as the creation of the Center for Democracy and Governance at the Agency for International Development (AID) and the Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor at the State Department. Clinton’s attempt to create a position of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Democracy and Peacekeeping at the Department of Defense was thwarted by Congress, but a special Assistant for Democracy was named at the National Security Council (NSC).
A2: Iran DA – Internal Link Turn- Brotherhood
Muslim Brotherhood will dominate Egyptian elections now—Superior organization
Al-Anani 11 (Khalil Al-Anani, May 29, 2010, Scholar at Middle East Institute at Durham University and expert on Islamist Politics, “A Brotherhood Government?,” )
The only way to avoid oppression is to attain power. This what the Muslim Brotherhood has learned from history. The overwhelming presence of the Brotherhood in the post-Mubarak era reflects their fear of missing an extraordinary opportunity to reconstruct the Egyptian polity in their favor. After being banned for more than sixty years, the Brotherhood seeks not only to get official recognition, which effectively happened when former Vice President Omar Suleiman invited them for a dialogue just before Hosni Mubarak’s ouster. More importantly, the group wants to become a key player in shaping the new political system in Egypt. A few days ago, Supreme Guide Mohamed Badie inaugurated the new Brotherhood headquarter at a large ceremony attended by public figures from all over Arab and Muslim World and covered by local and international media. Moving from a humble two-floor apartment in a Nile-side suburb to a grand villa in Moqattam, one of the largest compounds in the Cairo neighborhood, exemplifies the Brotherhood’s move from marginalization and secrecy towards openness and power sharing. Brotherhood leaders now speak with a tone that reflects a new sense of empowerment and importance. With the official dissolution of the former ruling National Democratic Party by the Supreme Administrative court last April, the only force that can fill the vacuum left behind is the Muslim Brotherhood. Their leaders are evoking the rhetoric and strategies of the movement's founder, Hassan al-Banna, with the aim of establishing an Islamic state. Al-Banna laid out a sequence of three stages to achieve this goal: the popular diffusion Brotherhood doctrine, empowerment (Tamkin), and implementation (Tanfiz). Khairat al-Shater, a Brotherhood veteran and its organizational architect, has recently asserted that the Brotherhood is in the second stage and moving steadily towards the third. Other Brotherhood leaders have echoed this assessment since the ouster of Mubarak in February. In addition to the movement’s territorial and social expansion in the post-Mubarak era, the Brotherhood is preparing to dominate the Egyptian parliament after the elections next September. It has decided to contest 50 percent of the seats, though they’re expected to win up to 30 or 40 percent. Many years of campaign and negotiation experience put the Brotherhood in a privileged position to win a substantial victory in September. Moreover, if Salafis decide to participate they are likely to ally with the Brotherhood to ensure the Islamist character of Egypt’s new constitution. The Brotherhood will play all its cards to secure a plurality if not a clear majority in the next parliament. More significantly, it's proposing a unified candidates list that would encompass all political factions to contest the elections. If this happens, the Brotherhood will certainly have a strong influence on the new government. Moving forward, the crucial question is whether the Brotherhood is ready to rule the oldest and largest country in the Middle East. Several of their leaders have signaled the group’s hope to become a kingmaker in the next government. Essam al-Erian, the deputy head of the Brotherhood’s newly formed Freedom and Justice Party, recently said in a TV appearance that the Brotherhood is preparing to resolve all Egypt’s problems through a unified government, adding that the group has plans for dealing with unemployment, healthcare and education. More significantly, Sobhy Saleh, the prominent Brotherhood leader and former MP has said that the next Egyptian government will be an Islamic one.
A2: Iran DA – Internal Link Turn- Brotherhood
We control the key internal link- stopping the Brotherhood stops prolif
Sokolski 11 (Henry is executive director of The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center and editor of Nuclear Power’s Global Expansion: Weighing Its Costs and Risks, February 8, “Gimme Fuel, Gimme Fire What the Egyptian revolt means for nuclear proliferation.” The New Republic, )RAA
The United States has had formal civilian nuclear cooperation ties with Egypt since 1981, when the country ratified the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Before that, Cairo made several haphazard attempts to get the bomb. Such flirtations with nuclear weapons were supposed to come to an end with ratification, but unfortunately, they didn’t. Instead, President Mubarak made several public statements that Egypt would not hesitate to get nuclear arms if necessary. He has refused U.S. requests to forswear making nuclear fuel (a process that can bring states to the brink of acquiring nuclear weapons). And in 2005, his nuclear scientists admitted they had violated Egypt’s pledge to declare all sensitive nuclear activities to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Even more dangerously, unlike Iraq, Syria, and Libya—all of which have been caught attempting to develop a nuclear weapons option—Egypt has the technological capability to separate weapons-usable plutonium from spent reactor fuel, and it operates a research reactor large enough to make a bomb’s worth of plutonium each year. Meanwhile, the Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt’s largest political party clamoring for a say in Cairo’s future, is on record demanding that Egypt develop nuclear weapons to balance those of Israel. We can only hope that most Egyptians ignore this group. If, however, Egypt goes radical or remains politically unstable, the country’s nuclearization would be a major danger. One of Europe’s leading nuclear experts projects that if this were to happen, Algeria—which also has the technology to extract nuclear-weapons–usable plutonium and a reactor making nearly a bomb’s worth of the stuff each year—would be politically compelled to match Egypt bomb for bomb. And such a nuclear domino effect could easily occur in the context of popular revolutions spreading throughout the Middle East: According to Standard and Poor’s Jordan and Algeria are the next Arab states whose governments are likely to be destabilized. Jordan currently lacks any major nuclear facilities, but it is actively seeking French and South Korean help to build several large reactors, and it has resisted American pleas to forswear making nuclear fuel in exchange for U.S. nuclear assistance. Likewise, there is a proliferation threat from Saudi Arabia, a country that has more than hinted that it will get its own bomb if and when Iran does. It, too, is seeking “peaceful” nuclear reactors and has rejected American pleas to forswear making nuclear fuel as a condition for securing U.S. nuclear cooperation.
***A2: Saudi DA***
AT: Saudi DA – Egyptian Stability Solves
Egyptian stability guarantees regional stability
Aymerich 11(Olga, MA-International and Intercultural Relations (ME) “Stability Trumps Religion in Saudi Arabia's Arab Spring Policies” May)
When the Arab Spring reached Egypt after blossoming in Tunisia, Saudi Arabia’s first reaction was to support then-President Hosni Mubarak and lobby President Barack Obama to do the same. Even when the U.S. started to pressure Mubarak to leave, Saudi King Abdullah continued supporting the old regime and described the protesters as “infiltrators” whose aim was to “destabilize [Egypt’s] security and stability.” He even warned that Saudi Arabia would finance Mubarak’s Egypt if the U.S. decided to withdraw their aid. However, after the revolution, Saudi Arabia decided to allocate monetary aid to the country and jettisoned the religious aspect of its foreign policy in order to ensure Egypt’s stability and, consequently, its own stability. During the revolution, Abdullah clung to Mubarak because of Saudi Arabia’s interests in regional, gulf, and national areas. In its Middle Eastern policy, Saudi Arabia has always sought regional stability. Traditionally, having close relationships with pro-western rulers stopped confrontation with regimes like Libya. Thus, ties with long-term rulers in the Arab Gulf, Yemen, Jordan, and especially Egypt were a crucial part of Saudi Arabia’s strategy to maintain regional stability. Saudi Arabia feared the Arab Spring spreading to the Gulf States, as it did in Bahrain. More than the economic, political, or social demands, the Saudis were concerned about the Shi’a character of the demonstrations. In Bahrain, the Shi’a community led a majority of the protests because they are underrepresented in government. Saudi Arabia’s alarm can be easily measured by its decision to send troops to Bahrain in order to curtail the revolution in the neighboring kingdom. At the national level, there are increasing demands for minority rights. There is also increasing national pressure for political reform, which the kingdom tried to quell with initiatives such as the 2005 municipal elections. However, neither the elections not the promised reforms brought any structural change to the country. For these reasons, Abdullah tried to limit Egypt’s revolution and repeatedly expressed his support for Mubarak’s regime. However, in the period after Mubarak, Saudi Arabia needs a strong Egypt. With growing internal security threats since the 2003 terrorist attacks and debates over the king’s succession, Saudi Arabia needs stability. A strong post-revolution Egypt is crucial to Middle Eastern stability and, consequently, to Saudi Arabia’s stability. Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy has always been comprised of financial support and religious influence. In Egypt’s case, this financial support was clear from the beginning. A week after Mubarak stepped down, Saudi Arabia announced the establishment of a development bank in Egypt to help the economy recover and orient it towards long-term investments. One month later, Saudi Arabia agreed to lend $4 billion in emergency funding, including a $1 billion deposit at Egypt’s Central Bank.
AT: Saudi DA – No Prolif
No-Link- US-Saudi Non-prolif agreement now
AFP 11 (“US, Saudi Arabia to discuss nuclear cooperation” )RAA
WASHINGTON — The United States plans talks with Saudi Arabia on civilian nuclear cooperation, people familiar with the plans said, in a step that has already set off fierce criticism on Capitol Hill. With the United States hoping to head off an arms race in response to Iran's nuclear program, officials from President Barack Obama's administration plan to head to Riyadh in the coming week for nuclear talks, the sources said. A congressional aide, who requested anonymity as the trip has not been publicly announced, said the visit would be a "preliminary" step to "discuss the possibility of moving forward on a nuclear cooperation agreement."
Saudi Arabia hates Iran and doesn’t want nuclear weapons in the Middle East
Zogby 11 (Dr. James is director of the Arab American Institute, “Poll: Sharp drop in Iran's popularity in Arab world” Newsmax, )RAA
When asked whether Iran plays a positive, negative or neutral role in the region, majorities in all countries but Lebanon saw Iran as influencing the region negatively. “It really was rather shocking I thought,” the director of the Arab American Institute, Dr. James Zogby, told the American news site Newsmax. “Even a couple of years ago, people would say, 'Oh, Arab leaders are against Iran, but their people aren’t.'" Zogby believes Iran's popularity has plummeted largely due to the Tehran regime's meddling in sectarian politics in Arab states and its opposition to peace in the Middle East. In 2006, Iran's positive rating stood at 68-82%, while today it stands at 6% in Saudi Arabia, 14% in Morocco, 22% in the United Arab Emirates, 23% in Jordan, 37% in Egypt, but 63% in Lebanon. (It should be noted though that the rating of the United Nations is even lower in all six countries, with an average rating of 24%). Overall, the poll showed that Arabs would prefer to see the Middle East free of nuclear weapons - 62% in Morocco, 53% in Egypt, 88% in Jordan, 94% in Saudi Arabia, 76% in the United Arab Emirates. But again, in Lebanon only 23% want to see the Middle East as a nuclear-free zone - whereas 39% of the Lebanese think the region will be more secure if Iran had a nuclear bomb, with 75% of Shi'ites supporting this view. When asked which country they would prefer to have nuclear weapons in the Middle East, the favored option appeared to be Egypt - 61% of Moroccans would rather see it nuclear, as do 89% of Egyptians, 52% of Jordanians, 12% of Saudis, and 52% of the residents of the United Arab Emirates. The second country preferred by Arab states to have nuclear weapons was Turkey, with 13% of support in Morocco, 3% in Egypt, 26% in Lebanon, 16% in Jordan, 7% in Saudi Arabia, and 20% in the United Arab Emirates. Zogby said the results of the poll do not mean the U.S. should try to exploit the public opinion in the region toward Iran by raising its level of rhetoric or threats. "It shows Arab leadership is concerned with Iran - but so are Arab people, so the Arab leadership will have to take these sentiments into consideration", he said in a briefing with reporters. "It's not an exclusive American portfolio anymore, to be concerned about Iranian actions, but for the Arab public, it's not among the top priorities in the region - they are much more worried about the occupation of the Palestinian territories. It's true though that Israel is not the target of Iran, it's the lever that Iran uses in the Arab world. They know that by picking the fight with Israel, it helps them to rally support of their alienated and frustrated public. If there were a peace agreement - Iran wouldn't have any boogey man to play off with - as much as Iran is the convenient boogeyman for Israel".
AT: Saudi DA – No Prolif
No link- Arms Deal sealed relationship for years
Murphy 10 (Caryle, Pulitzer prize winning independent journalist, “US and Saudi Arabia Cement Military Ties With Massive Arms Deal” Saturday 23 October, )
Riyadh, Saudi Arabia – The bountiful package of high-end fighter jets, helicopters, radar and missiles that Washington has agreed to sell Saudi Arabia is the strongest signal yet that the two countries have recovered from the their post-9/11 meltdown in bilateral relations. The arms deal, which President Barack Obama's administration officially unveiled this week to Congress, could potentially bring the U.S. defense industry $60 billion over a decade or more, making it one of the single largest U.S. weapons sales ever. If Congress does not block the sale – which administration officials said they do not expect – it will further cement the U.S.-Saudi security relationship for years to come. The kingdom will be dependent on U.S. training and maintenance for its new weapons. The package on the table, which has been under negotiation since the Bush administration, authorizes Saudi Arabia to buy 84 new F-15 fighter jets and three types of helicopters: 70 Apaches, 72 Black Hawks and 36 Little Birds. The deal also includes an upgrade for 70 other F-15s already in the Saudi Air Force, as well as Saudi purchases of HARM anti-radar missiles, precision-guided JDAM bombs and Hellfire missiles. Such a deal could not have happened eight years ago, said Anwar Eshki, chairman of the Jeddah-based Middle East Center for Strategic and Legal Studies, because after the 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, “The United States suspected or believed that Saudi Arabia helped or didn’t block those events.” However, Saudi Arabia’s subsequent stand against terrorism “enhanced the relationship again,” Eshki said. Announcing the arms package, U.S. officials stressed that it will add jobs to the ailing U.S. economy and, by signaling U.S. commitment to Saudi Arabia’s security, help deter potential Iranian aggression. But the transfer of such state-of-the-art weaponry to Saudi Arabia is unlikely to enhance stability in the volatile Middle East or do much to keep Saudi Arabia safe from the dangers it faces, analysts said.
*** A2: Spending DA***
A2 Spending DA – Cuts Coming Now
US is cutting military spending, not increasing it
Zakheim 11 (Dov, columnist for Foreign Policy, “The Real Danger in Washington: Defense Cuts,” Foreign Policy. Com, July 25, 2011, ) MNC
There is no doubt that the administration is deadly serious about increasing the level of defense reductions in any debt ceiling deal that is finally negotiated. After all, the leadership team at the Pentagon and the Office of Management and Budget are veterans of the "peace dividend" cuts. It is up to the Congress to resist further cuts beyond the $400 billion/twelve year proposal that the president has called for and, further, to insist that the already battered acquisition accounts be shielded from significant redutions. Instead, the Congress should take a second look at defense health, the antiquated defense retirement system, and the bloated defense civilian and "staff augmentation" service contractor force, and mandate cuts in all of those accounts. The world will not stand by idly if the United States wrecks what has been the finest military force in the history of the world. Instead, nations will, as some in East Asia and the Middle East already have done, look to other powers for support and leadership. It is a prospect that should chill all of the debt-ceiling negotiators. Defaulting on defense will lead to far greater and more disastrous long term consequences for the United States than having a small clique of bond rating agencies downgrade America's paper.
US wants to cut spending, but will still aid Egypt
Warrick and Sheridan 11 (Joby and Mary Beth, writers for The Washington Post, “House Subcommittee Approves Foreign-Aid Cuts,” , July 27, 2011, ) MNC
Legislation that would sharply cut U.S. foreign aid programs and slash support for family planning advanced on Wednesday in the Republican-controlled House, drawing protests from State Department officials and relief agencies. The bill, approved by a House Appropriations subcommittee, also clamps new restrictions on aid for Pakistan as well as Middle East allies such as Egypt and Yemen, requiring the State Department to first certify that those countries are cooperating in the fight against terrorism.
A2 Spending DA – Link Turn
Turn--US needs to maintain defense spending, and it won’t hurt the economy.
Alexander and Stewart 11 (David and Phil, writers for Reuters, “General Dempsey warns against deep spending cuts,” July 27, 2011, Reuters, ) MNC
At his Senate confirmation hearing, Dempsey distanced himself from comments about the debt by current chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Mike Mullen, who has called it "the single-biggest threat to our national security." "I wouldn't describe our economic condition as the single-biggest threat to national security," he said in his written remarks. "There are a lot of clear and present threats to our security in the current operational environment." Dempsey acknowledged the U.S. debt "is a grave concern" but said the country could not afford to "neglect the other instruments of national power" -- both military and diplomatic -- as it works to solve its fiscal problems. Republican Senator John McCain, Obama's rival in the 2008 presidential election and a Vietnam war hero, criticized the rising pressure to cut military spending without first understanding the impact on strategy. "Defense spending is not what is sinking this country into fiscal crisis, and if the Congress and the president act on that flawed assumption, they will create a situation that is truly unaffordable: the hollowing out of U.S. military power and the loss of faith of our military members," McCain said.
***A2: Israel DA***
No Link – Israel Fine With Military Aid
Israel doesn’t care about US military aid to Egypt– treaty terms guarantee they receive more funding
Sharp 10 (Jeremy M., Specialist in ME affairs for CRS, Sept 16, “U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel” ) JJN
The 1979 Camp David Peace Treaty between Israel and Egypt ushered in the current era of U.S. financial support for peace between Israel and her Arab neighbors. To facilitate a full and formal cessation of hostilities and Israel’s return of the Sinai Peninsula, the United States provided a total of $7.5 billion to both parties in 1979. The “Special International Security Assistance Act of 1979” (P.L. 96-35) provided military and economic grants to Israel and Egypt at a ratio of 3:2, respectively.
Israel agreed to U.S. aid to Egypt as terms of the Camp David Peace Treaty
Williams and Kaszynski 11 (Rebecca and Mary, MA in US foreign relations and Research Associate for the Stimson Center, Journalist, 2/3, “Understanding US Aid to Egypt,” ) JJN
Dating back to the Camp David Peace Accords in 1979, the US government has provided military aid to both Egypt and Israel to assure strategic balance over the contested Sinai border region and, in turn, reinforced peace between the two countries. State justifies this military assistance as “fostering a modern, well-trained military” A Bloomberg news article is a bit more candid, stating that the Egyptian government views the $1.3 billion in annual military aid as “untouchable compensation for making peace with Israel,” according to WikiLeaks cables.
U.S. aid to Egypt is key to keeping peace with Israel
AFP 11 (New Service, 2/1, “Egypt viewed US military aid as reward,” ) JJN
Egypt's President Hosni Mubarak and his generals have viewed generous US military aid as an "untouchable" reward for keeping peace with Israel, according to leaked US documents posted by WikiLeaks. The secret diplomatic cable from 2009 underscored the deep ties between the two countries and Washington's difficult position as a week of massive street protests threatened to bring down Mubarak's regime. In a cable dated March 31, 2009, the US ambassador in Cairo writes that the annual $US1.3 billion in arms provided to Mubarak's government has proved a success over the years, preserving peace between Egypt and Israel while ensuring access for US forces. "President Mubarak and military leaders view our military assistance program as the cornerstone of our mil-mil relationship and consider the $US1.3 billion in annual FMF (foreign military finance) as 'untouchable compensation' for making and maintaining peace with Israel," said the cable disclosed by the WikiLeaks website and first reported by the British daily The Guardian. "The tangible benefits to our mil-mil relationship are clear: Egypt remains at peace with Israel, and the US military enjoys priority access to the Suez Canal and Egyptian airspace," it said.
***A2: Arab Spring DA***
A2: Arab Spring Da – Link Turn- IMET Professionalism
Link Turn—The Aff doesn’t interfere—it creates a self-restrained military that will allow democracy to flourish
POMED 11 (“U.S. Military Assistance: Obstacle or Opportunity for Reform?” Project on Middle East Democracy, )
He saw the Palestinian security force as the most successful and professional outcome of U.S. aid, but he questioned its ability to become a legitimate national force. In Lebanon, he highlighted the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, which trains officers in the U.S. and instills them with an American sense of military professionalism, but the weakness of Lebanese institutions will not support these new attitudes. In Yemen, he warned that ongoing COIN training was positive, but that the same tactics learned to fight insurgents can be used by regimes to suppress dissidents. Lastly, he argued that in the absence of security the military emphasis is much less on political reform and more on capacity building. This cannot be blamed on the U.S., but he did not have an answer on how to offer assistance to transform such situations. Responding to a question from Graefe, Cook explained that following September 11th, security became the overwhelming concern for military-to-military relations and as a result there has been little cooperation on human rights. He joined in Hokayem support of the IMET program, saying that the U.S. sense of professionalism sought to make the military always subordinate to civilians. But in Egypt, decision-makers in key positions generally received their training from the Russians, and those officers that participate in U.S. training programs like IMET are often discriminated against professionally within the Egyptian military. In the Q&A session, Cook argued that
***A2: EU CP***
A2: EU CP – US Military Best for CMR
US Military has the ability to provide the best relations for recipient nations
Mitchell and Phillips 8
(Lincoln A. and David L., Arnold A. Saltzman assistant professor in the Practice of International Politics at Columbia University’s School of International and Political Affairs and served as chief of party for the National Democratic Institute (NDI) in Georgia from 2002–200, “Enhancing Democracy Assistance,” American Foreign Policy Interests 30, p. 161) MNC
Iraq will not be the last war in which U.S. forces are deployed to a country where democracy is at stake. The military has a complex and sometimes indispensable role in democracy assistance. The U.S. military has a long history of constructive involvement in postconflict countries where the first contact with local populations is by U.S. military personnel. More must be done to define a constructive role for the U.S. military in postconflict situations when troops have been deployed. If the host government is incapacitated, the military must step in to deliver services and restore basic governance. Linking security and governance goals at the early stages of deployment can help create a positive atmosphere for future democracy work. Liaising with civilian agencies and organizations helps military personnel develop an understanding of the tactics and mechanisms of democracy assistance. Democracy assistance approaches will be different in cases in which military intervention is involved, but it is still essential lest the opportunity to shape outcomes be lost.
US best understands how to work Egypt’s civil military relations
Driver 4 (Darrel W., Professor for the United States Military Academy, “Two Theories of U.S. Civil Military Relations: the Alternative Paths of the Citizen-Soldier and the Neutral Profession,” paper presented to the Midwest Political Science Association, EBSCOhost, p. 3) MNC
Laboring in the fearful shadow of Oliver Cromwell’s New Model Army and George III’s occupying redcoat regiments, the American founding generation was forced to reconcile a radical Whiggish distrust of standing armies with the pressing imperative to form an army of its own (Cunliffe 1968; Morone 1998; Weigley 2001). This central tension between security imperatives and distrust of centralized power has been a defining element of American civil military relations. The founding generation discovered reconciliation for this dilemma in the form of the citizen-soldier. Citizens of a free republic need not fear their army when the army itself was but a smaller portion of the citizenry (Hamilton 1982; Jefferson 1903-1904). The resulting diversity of values, beliefs, and interests would, in accordance with Madisonian logic, ensure healthy civilian control of the army (Burk 2002; Huntington 1957). Thus, the ideal of the citizen-soldier emerged in the American experience as a central feature of both American civilmilitary relations and American governing logic.
A2: EU CP – US Military Best for CMR
US military helped build its own military
Feaver and Cohn 5 (Peter and Lindsay, professors at Duke University, “Civil Military Relations and Foreign Policy in the United States,” paper presented at the International Studies Association Conference, March 2005, EBSCOhost, p. 1-2) MNC
Formally the United States has assured civilian control in the Constitution by vesting the democratically elected President as a civilian commander in chief with full authority over all the armed forces. The President has sole operational authority over the military in wartime, but shares power in peacetime with a democratically elected legislative branch, Congress, that has a constitutional mandate both to “declare war” and to “raise and support” armies. As part of their oath of office, military officers swear to “support and defend the Constitution against all enemies, foreign and domestic,” and thereby pledge allegiance to the principle of civilian control. With the vantage point of post-Cold War hindsight, we can see that Huntington’s theory did not, in fact, work as he maintained. He warned that the United States would need to adopt objective civilian control in order to provide for adequate military security in the face of the daunting Soviet threat. He further warned that the United States could only do so if civilian society rejected its classical liberal bent and embraced a conservative ideology.1 However, the United States prevailed during the Cold War, despite rejecting objective civilian control, and despite embracing and indeed deepening its commitment to the classical liberal ideology of individuality, civil-rights, and anti-statism.
US has the best military
Feaver and Cohn 5 (Peter and Lindsay, professors at Duke University, “Civil Military Relations and Foreign Policy in the United States,” paper presented at the International Studies Association Conference, March 2005, EBSCOhost, p. 1) MNC
The world’s only superpower has a distinctive and in many ways enviable history of civil-military relations. The country was founded upon a military victory – an upset – and the military has played a vital role in the expansion of state power ever since. The formidable strength of the U.S. armed forces, coupled with and dependent upon vast economic strength, positions the United States as perhaps the most powerful country in human history. Yet the United States has never suffered an attempted military coup, let alone a successful coup. Even before the events of 9/11 seared the public consciousness, the military was one of the most respected institutions in society. Despite (or perhaps because of) this apparently harmonious record, the United States has been a focus of interest for theoretical development, with particularly lively debates over the nature of civilian control, the nature and meaning of the civil military “gap,” and the use of force.
A2: EU Solvency—EU Ineffective CMR
European militaries don’t long lasting civil military relations
Engell 6 (Robert, professor at the Department of War Studies, King’s College in London, UK, “Explaining US and British Performance in Complex Expeditionary Operations: The Civil-Military Dimension,” The Journal of Strategic Studies 29(6), EBSCOhost, p. 1065) MNC
The British culture of flexibility and ‘muddling through’ also has some negative aspects. One such aspect is that the lessons of past operations have not always been remembered to a large enough extent. World War II, not surprisingly, created a bias towards conventional large-scale warfare, and it took about a decade, a failure in Palestine, and a very shaky start to the counter-insurgency operations in Malaya, before the British would readjust their strategic culture to effectively deal with counter-insurgency contexts.94 Equally, Hew Strachan argues that in the wake of the WorldWars, the operations in India in 1919 and again in Palestine in 1946–48 were failures because the Army had been insufficiently politicized. It had lost its sense of understanding of the political objectives and the importance to work with civilian agencies. In military terms, the Army failed to recognize that ‘as an agent of policy its tools were not necessarily restricted to force.
A2: EU CP – Perm
Perm Do Both
Perm provides double solvency, resolves US specific image issues, and promotes EU soft power
Mitchell & Phillips 8 (Lincoln & David, The Atlantic Council, “ENHANCING DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE”, )
By offering incentives to semi-democratic regimes to become more democratic, the EU has been a magnet for reform since the end of the Cold War, as well as a generous sponsor of democracy assistance. Working with Europe not only would magnify US capabilities and effectiveness. Its focus on using soft power could help overcome the barriers resulting from America’s reduced credibility. In the context of EU enlargement, its Stabilization and Association Agreements (SAA) provide a democratization track for countries that aspire to membership. EU financial assistance tends to use a “whole of country” approach and includes state-building activities that are well-suited to weak and post-conflict states. The Council of Europe sets human rights standards and evaluates the performance of its members. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe is extensively involved in electoral assistance. NATO’s Membership Action Plans (MAP) and Partnership for Peace (PfP) provide benchmarks and incentives for political, economic and security reforms to potential members. Other regional bodies, such as the Organization of American States, monitor and evaluate the progress of members and engage in democracy assistance.
A2: EU CP – Perm EXT
The perm solves Anti-Americanism
Lugar 6 (Sen. Richard, “The Backlash against Democracy Assistance”,
)
New restrictions on democracy assistance, often accompanied by anti-American rhetoric (as in Egypt, for example), highlight the importance of promoting multilateral approaches that help reduce the “Made in U.S.A” profile of democracy assistance and also leverage additional resources. Recently, for example, leading Egyptian democrats and civil society figures joined U.S., European, and Middle Eastern democracy assistance activists to form the Egyptian Democracy Support Network in advance of the 2005 legislative election. The initiative itself was conceived at the Brussels conference of another multilateral initiative, the Transatlantic Democracy Network. An Egyptian Task Force will monitor Egypt’s democratization and the network’s international members will provide technical, financial, and other means of support as the Egyptian team requests. Significantly, a temporary disruption of the Network’s founding conference in Alexandria by individuals associated with the state security services was ended only when authorities were informed of the presence of high-level participants from Europe and the United States.
The Perm solves- only the US and EU working together will be effective
Dworkin et al 11 (Anthony, “EGYPT’S HYBRID REVOLUTION: A BOLDER EU APPROACH” European Council on Foreign Affairs, Anthony Dworkin, Daniel Korski and Nick Witney, May 2011, Online)RAA
A key final element of developing and implementing an effective foreign policy towards post-revolutionary Egypt will be EU cooperation with the US. Obama’s skilful repositioning of the US, first in his June 2009 speech in Cairo, and subsequently his decision to tell Mubarak to go, has limited the damage done by the revolution to America’s predominant position in Egypt. Links with the Egyptian military will remain strong (as long as Congress continues to vote for the aid), and Egyptians know that the US role in the search for a wider Middle East peace is indispensable. But there is no doubt that the “new Egypt” will be readier to assert its independence of US foreign policy, and in particular to take a tougher line on Israel/Palestine. There, it may find European views and policies closer to its taste. These shifts open up the prospect of the EU and the US playing usefully complementary roles in Egypt: both supporting the transition to a genuine democracy; the US holding the hand of the Egyptian military; and the EU working with the new democratic government on issues which the US will not touch, but which the US administration may tacitly recognise as crucial, such as efforts to tame Hamas.
Perm solves best – the US and EU working together provides the most stability
Carothers 9 (Thomas, vp for the Carnegie Endowment for National Peace, January, “Democracy Assistance: Political vs Developmental?” Journal of Democracy 20:1, p 6, ) JJN
This emergent argument easily aligns with another important division in the world of democracy aid—the difference between U.S. and European approaches. A simplistic view, tempting to some policy makers and political observers looking for easy generalizations, sees U.S. democracy assistance as basically political and European democracy-building efforts as largely developmental. Thus arguments over the possible drawbacks of both the political and developmental approaches can become arguments over whether U.S. or European programs are more effective. This is an unhelpful, incorrect line of analysis. The two core approaches— political and developmental—are indeed different in important ways. Understanding their differences is useful in grasping the evolving state of democracy assistance generally. Yet both approaches have multiple pluses and minuses, which depend greatly on how they are applied in specific cases. Furthermore, although identifying the two core approaches helps to shed light on some of the similarities and differences in U.S. and European democracy aid, a simple one-on-one mapping is a mistake. Both approaches are present on both sides of the Atlantic, albeit in varying proportions. The existence of two core approaches should be seen not as a cause for conflict among democracy supporters but rather as a sign of strength—evidence that democracy aid is diversifying to adapt to a more challenging international landscape.
***A2: Conditions CPs***
Political Conditionality – Fails
Political conditionality undermines aid effectiveness – delegitimizes support
Cohen and Kupcu 9 (Michael A. and Maria F. “Revitalizing U.S. Democracy Promotion: A Comprehensive Plan for Reform,” April, New America Foundation, )
Democracy promotion must be separated from both domestic and international politics. This may be the most difficult tightrope to walk when it comes to democracy assistance. For the purposes of this report, de-politicization means making institutions, not individual foreign leaders, the focal point of America’s democracy agenda, and it means separating democracy assistance from more immediate U.S foreign policy concerns. As one conference participant noted, de-politicization is akin to the “de-governmentalization” of democracy assistance. While we generally take the view that the United States should come down on the side of democracy (even when parties hostile to the United States and its allies take power), we recognize that there are times when short-term national priorities must take precedence. Bridging the gap between values and interests is not impossible, but it is certainly difficult. One way to achieve this goal is to look for ways to separate the long-term pursuit of democratization— and even development—from more immediate foreign policy concerns. This was, in part, the idea behind creation of the NED, and the clear separation that exists between of the organization and the immediate strategic interests of the U.S. government. But the need for de-politicization extends further. Consistently, short-term U.S. national interests have taken precedence over long-term democracy promotion objectives. In the 1960s and 1970s the lion’s share of development assistance funding went to Vietnam. In the last six years, Iraq and Afghanistan have received the majority of foreign assistance. As late as 2005, 80 percent of the democracy promotion budget for the Middle East went to Iraq. Today, more U.S. foreign aid is going to these post-conflict transitions—and other venues in the war on terrorism— than to peaceful and fledging democracies. Such allocations are driven by political urgency—and often rightly so. But this also means less money for those countries that are not in the headlines but may be the most likely to take important steps forward on the road to democracy. “Allocation decisions,” note the authors of a recent article in Foreign Affairs, “are determined by earmarks, presidential initiatives, or diplomatic pressures.”4 This often means that there is less money for seeding democracy in places where such funding can make a significant and immediate difference.
A2: Economic Reforms
Economic linkage backfires -- waters down DA
Carothers 10 (Thomas Carothers, Democracy Support and Development Aid, The Elusive Synthesis vice-president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 2010, Volume 21, Number 4 )
Furthermore, the push to integrate democracy work with socioeconomic aid is tempered by countervailing concerns. Some democracy promoters worry that it will result in the relatively small pond of democracy aid being drained into the much larger lake of development aid. Maintaining a clear separation between the two may be necessary, in their view, to ensure that aid providers remain committed to supporting democracy as an end in itself, regardless of its relationship to development. Some democracy promoters worry that integration efforts may end up serving as an excuse for donors to take a soft line toward governments that strangle democracy but promise to be serious about development. They fear that donors will use politically unassertive programs such as support for procedural reforms on budgetary transparency as evidence of their commitment to democracy, and that this will undercut efforts by democracy promoters to engage more robustly..
***K Answers***
Generic K Offense – Solves “Military Bad” Links
The aff is critical to softening the US military via spotlighting civilian control and liaising w humanitarian groups
Mitchell & Phillips 8 (Lincoln & David, The Atlantic Council, “ENHANCING DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE”, )
Iraq will not be the last time that US forces are deployed to a country where democracy is at stake. The military has a complex and sometimes indispensable role in democracy assistance. The US military has a long history of constructive involvement in post-conflict countries where the first contact with local populations is by US military personnel. More must be done to define a constructive role for the US military in post-conflict situations when troops have been deployed. If the host government is incapacitated, the military must step in to deliver services and restore basic governance. Linking security and governance goals at the early stages of deployment can help create a positive atmosphere for future democracy work. Liaising with civilian agencies and organizations helps military personnel develop an understanding of the tactics and mechanisms of democracy assistance. Democracy assistance approaches will be different in cases where military intervention is involved, but it is still essential lest the opportunity to shape outcomes be lost.
***T Answers***
No Consensus on DA
No consensus on definition of democracy assistance- types of programs included
Lappin 10 (“What we talk about when we talk about democracy assistance: the problem of definition in post-conflict approaches to democratization,” Central European Journal of International and Security Studies, Vol 4, Phillip, PhD Candidate: Democracy Assistance to Post-Conflict Countries (University of Leuven, Belgium), Independent Democracy and Elections Assistance Consultant, May) AJK
Furthermore, as democracy has become increasingly associated with postconflict peacebuilding, almost any international assistance effort that addresses any development or peacebuilding issues can arguably be labelled as ‘democracy assistance.’ In their study, Youngs et al. (2006: 21), note that ‘many states included in their democracy and governance categories aid projects that could not be reasonably said to have any meaningful bearing on political reform.’ Whilst Burnell (2000b: 339) has posited that some development agencies simply renamed their traditional development programmes as ‘democracy assistance’ to demonstrate that they were in tune with fashionable governance themes.
A2: Only USAID = DA
They overlimit – Kills tactical flexibility – DOD = DA
Mitchell & Phillips 8 (Lincoln & David, The Atlantic Council, “ENHANCING DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE”, )
The US Government will have spent $1 billion in 2007 on democracy assistance in 50 countries (excluding Iraq and Afghanistan). Tactical flexibility requires a variety of delivery systems that are suited to the type of assistance as well as the category and geographic location of the beneficiary country. US government agencies include USAID, the Millennium Challenge Account, the Middle East Partnership Initiative, the Office of Post-Conflict and Stabilization, the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL), the Department of Justice Rule of Law Program and Defense Department support for democratic policing.
AT: USAID Only
Tons of actors participate in democracy assistance—Their interpretation overlimits to the USAID—Heterogeneity of actors is a benefit of democracy assistance, not weakness
Carothers 9 (Thomas, Pres-Carnegie Endowment for Int’l Peace, “Democracy assistance: political vs. developmental?”, J of Democracy, web)
Efforts to analyze and compare U.S. and European approaches to democracy assistance often face a quandary. Both U.S. and European democracy-assistance efforts involve a wide array of different organizations—government agencies, government-funded nonprofit organizations, for-profit development-consulting firms, and private foundations. These different actors have varied organizational interests, philosophies, methods, and styles. On the U.S. side, the institutional heterogeneity is the result of many different parts of the U.S. foreign-policy apparatus entering the democracy-assistance domain. The diversity is even greater on the European side, where a similar cacophony of types of actors is multiplied by the many countries involved as well as multilateral pan- European actors such as the European Union. These heterogeneities mean that there is no simple, unified “U.S. approach” or “European approach” to democracy assistance. As André Gerrits argues: Given these “national” characteristics, democracy promotion is inherently pluralistic. There is no single “American” or “European” line in democracy promotion. The democratization effort is as diverse as the democratization industry is: supranational and intergovernmental institutions, states, NGOs, political parties and affiliated organizations, etc.
Their interpretation is a conflation of two terms: “agents” and “actions”—This scholarly confusion undermines debates in the literature
Tommasoli 9 (Peter, Int’l IDEA – fellow, “Assessing Democracy: Donor Rhetoric and Country-led Processes”, )
The drivers of change agenda is a way of understanding the political economy of poverty reduction in developing countries by looking at other factors that are at play in any given context. The approach forces development practitioners to focus on the understanding of the broader systemic and institutional factors that influence the possibilities for individual reformers to succeed. Drivers of changes are processes that involve three types of factor - structural features, institutions and agents - “with relationships of power, inequality and conflict at their heart” (DfID, 2003:6). Structural features include natural and human resources, economic and social structure, and other non-institutional facts; institutions consist of the frameworks of rules structuring the behaviour of agents; and agents are individual and organizations pursuing particular interests. It is interesting to note that the DfID Drivers of Change Team felt the need to specify that “drivers will not normally be specific organizations and still less individual actors” (DfID, 2003:6). The need to specify drivers in this way seems indicative of the fact that development practitioners (as well as democracy promoters) tend to confuse institutions with agents (like organizations), whose strengthening is considered as an important element of a pro-active strategy of external support to reform and change. The use of the term ‘institutions’ to refer interchangeably to abstract notions and actual organizations can create some confusion, whereas the drivers of change discourse draws a distinction between institutions intended as ‘rules of the game’ and organizations conceived as ‘agents’ or ‘players’.
AT: USAID Only
No single actor controls DA funds or operations
Melia 5 (George, Inst for Diplomacy-Georgetown, “The Democracy Bureaucracy”, democracy_bureaucracy.pdf)
There is, however, no “command and control center” of the democracy promotion community, no single place where overarching strategy is developed or coordinated, even within the sub-community that is the United States Government. This may be due to the nature of the subject, or a reflection of the character of the actors. Perhaps the unique operating environments that arise in each case mean that a new configuration of players must be assembled. Though efforts are currently underway to bring greater strategic coherence to the effort, and the bureaucratic nomenclature has been modified to underscore the intention to do so, it may well be that political development cannot be controlled or directed in the way that military or diplomatic undertakings often can be.
Single organizational authority undermines the diversity of complementary roles needed in a complex activity like DA
Melia 5 (George, Inst for Diplomacy-Georgetown, “The Democracy Bureaucracy”, democracy_bureaucracy.pdf)
While the assets available to U.S. policy-makers are not always easily corralled into a coherent country plan, as they are dispersed among many specialized NGOs, competing USG agencies, offices and budgets – and there is as yet no command and control center – there is clear value associated with this diversity, as mission-focused NGOs address complementary aspects of democratization, and different funders perceive complementary opportunities.
AT: IMET ≠ DA
IMET is DA
Bruneau & Trinkunas 6 (Thomas & Harold – Naval Postgrad School, Asst Profs, “Democratization as a Global Phenomenon and its Impact on Civil-Military Relations”, Democratization, 13(5), muse)
In the US, besides the much larger programmes supported by foreign military sales and financing, there are two main categories of programmes that are oriented specifically towards improving democratic civil-military relations. The first include those funded by the IMET programme; the second are the regional centres designed to promote democratic civil-military relations and security. The IMET programme was begun in 1976, and was revised in 1991 after the end of the Cold War. Explicit objectives of the IMET programmes include fostering civilian control of the military, promoting human rights, and helping resolve civil-military conflicts. The 2006 IMET budget was slightly less than $87 million, and supports a wide variety of democracy promotion organizations that are designed to provide education and training in the US and abroad.
Democracy assistance includes influencing CMR
Burnell 7 (Peter, Prof. of Politics @ University of Warwick, England, “Does International Democracy Promotion Work?” Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik, ISBN 978-3-88985-354-7) $FILE/BurnellPromotionWork.pdf
All things considered, however, there is a shortage of robust frameworks for comparing the effectiveness of different instruments or combinations of instruments – approaches that themselves make use of ‘inputs’ that vary so greatly in kind that it is difficult to know how even they can be compared, let alone establish and then compare the relative rates of return. Therefore, and once again to make life simple, I narrow the discussion down further, by concentrating on just democracy assistance pure and simple (DA). DA comprises nonthreatening, largely concessional, that is grant-aided transfers of support (material, technical, and financial) to pro-democracy initiatives of the sort we are all familiar with: elections observation; improving electoral management capability; capacity building in civil society, legislative strengthening, even help with building political parties, and so on. Even then, the best way to categorise some specific initiatives can be ambiguous. At the one end, in some low income countries under stress DA shades off into conflict management techniques and peace and reconciliation efforts. And in countries that are judged to be highly strategic in geopolitical terms countries attempts to influence the structure of civilian- military relations, too, can look like democracy assistance, when viewed from one angle, but may look more like ‘security assistance’ when viewed from another. And at the other end there is an equally blurry border with attempts to create better governance and, beyond that, improvements in public policy for things like managing the economy.
AT: IMET ≠ DA
Increasing CMR is DA – Their ev excludes modern changes to the scope – It overlimits b/c it is out of date
Tommasoli 9 (Peter, Int’l IDEA – fellow, “Assessing Democracy: Donor Rhetoric and Country-led Processes”, )
Democracy assistance consists of aid policies and programmes aiming at promoting and consolidating democracy in partner countries. It is “aid specifically designed to foster a democratic opening in a non-democratic country or to further a democratic transition in a country that has experienced a democratic opening” (Carothers, 1999:6). Initially considered as an important area of action by few donors, this domain has attracted a growing volume of resources as a consequence of the emphasis on democracy and good governance of the early nineties, with aid agencies less willing to support countries with poor governance. Though intuitively easy to define, the field of democracy assistance covers a wide range of activities, some of which are categorized by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) under the broader policy marker of ‘participatory development and good governance’, a general label pulling together categories ranging from public sector management to peace-building. Democracy assistance seeks to achieve a variety of goals, not necessarily related to each other and broadly felt by external actors (governmental, intergovernmental and non governmental bodies) as actions contributing to a home-grown democratization agenda. As a result the landscape is highly varied, encompassing the provision of technical assistance in more traditional areas (like election management, constitutional reform, parliaments, the judiciary, support to civil society), new and relatively more recent areas (like the strengthening of political parties and civil-military relations), and other domains overlapping with the realm of development cooperation and humanitarian aid (like post-conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction). It is therefore difficult to assess the overall volume of aid flows that can be categorised under the democracy assistance rubric. Nevertheless, according to rough estimates, over the last 15 years up to 10% of the overall volume of aid was devoted to democracy, human rights and governance (Uvin, 2004:85-86).
Flexibility is key to adaptive, effective democracy assistance – Their limited interps undermine the fleet-footed agenda of DA
Tommasoli 9 (Peter, Int’l IDEA – fellow, “Assessing Democracy: Donor Rhetoric and Country-led Processes”, )
Change has always been at the core of development policies and practices. A unifying factor of the professional identity of development specialists, irrespective of their specific sector of work, is the assumption that what they have to offer is above all an action-oriented expert knowledge, useful for bringing about change. In deploying their expert knowledge, development practitioners have been confronted with the challenge of identifying the obstacles to the change processes associated with development, as well as the individuals and institutions deemed to act as change agents, so as to meet the needs of the expected beneficiaries, by adopting new technologies, developing skills and managing resources. Beyond the project and programme level, such change agents have been identified as individual champions of reform. In the face of the failure, or unexpected results, of change processes, either ‘lack of political will’ - whatever this vague expression may mean - or vested interests against reform, or capacity and resources gaps have often been cited among the main factors affecting aid effectiveness.
AT: IMET ≠ DA
More exclusive definitions undermine controls on autocracy
Tommasoli 9 (Peter, Int’l IDEA – fellow, “Assessing Democracy: Donor Rhetoric and Country-led Processes”, )
The second and more indirect way of addressing issues relevant for democracy building is related to the recent donor interest in political change and power relations in recipient countries. Donor rhetoric widely recognizes the importance of democracy promotion. While only few donors invest substantive volumes of aid on strengthening democracy per se, there is a growing number of aid agencies involved in the field of democracy assistance, and most of them refer to democracy promotion in the context of governance discourses. In addition to the recognition of the virtues and intrinsic value of democracy, the inclusion of its promotion among the policies supported by the aid apparatus is grounded on the need to hold the state in partner countries more accountable to its citizens, and in particular to people living in poverty.
Yes, military action is Democracy Assistance
Epstein et al. 7 (Democracy Promotion: Cornerstone of U.S. Foreign Policy? Susan B. Epstein, Nina M. Serafino, and Francis T. Miko, 12/26/207 ) JSM
According to Richard Haass, former State Department official and current President of the Council on Foreign Relations, democracy is more than elections; it is a diffusion of power where no group within a society is excluded from full participation in political life. Democracy requires checks and balances within the government, among various levels of government (national, state and local), and between government and society. Elements such as independent media, unions, political parties, schools, and democratic rights for women provide checks on government power over society. Individual rights such as freedom of speech and worship need to be protected. Furthermore, a democratic government must face the check of electable opposition and leaders must hand over power peacefully.
AT: IMET = Extra-T
IMET’s central focus is on DA – The ancillary training portions are just normal means – Also, proves IMET is not security assistance
Bruneau & Trinkunas 6 (Thomas & Harold – Naval Postgrad School, Asst Profs, “Democratization as a Global Phenomenon and its Impact on Civil-Military Relations”, Democratization, 13(5), muse)
The content of the different IMET and regional centre programmes puts the emphasis overwhelmingly on civilian control. Defence efficiency (using limited resources rationally and with the least possible waste) comes in after that at a very distant second. They also give minimal attention to the promotion of effectiveness in the implementation of military roles and missions (getting the assigned job done with the resources and within the time allotted). The only programmes where effectiveness is included as a key element are those of NATO, the PfP, and in peacekeeping and counter-terrorism education and training. This highlights an important dichotomy among programmes that promote democratic civil-military relations: there are those that promote both military effectiveness and defence efficiency on an equal basis with civilian control, mostly for new NATO and PfP countries; and there are those that focus solely on civilian control. This is even stranger when we discover that the US Department of Defense guidance to combatant commanders on security assistance emphasizes all three elements of the defence trinity. It should be noted that in the nondemocratic regimes of the original PfP members, civilians did control the armed forces; they just were not democratically elected civilians.
IMET is just a civilian control program
Bruneau & Trinkunas 6 (Thomas & Harold – Naval Postgrad School, Asst Profs, “Democratization as a Global Phenomenon and its Impact on Civil-Military Relations”, Democratization, 13(5), muse)
By contrast, programmes to promote democratic civil-military relations in Africa, Asia, and Latin America focus almost exclusively on civilian control of the military. There is no overarching directive framework for the regions similar to NATO and PfP, but rather a fragmented menu of programmes. Most of the work sponsored by the four Department of Defense regional centres (excluding the Marshall Center), IMET institutions, the US National Endowment for Democracy, and the Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces also deal only with the civilian- control element of the defence trinity. This is perhaps not surprising given that the previous non-democratic regimes in these three regions were dominated by the armed forces, and we therefore should not minimize the achievement that consolidating civilian control represents. The lack of attention to efficiency and effectiveness of the armed forces, however, not only puts national security at risk, it also endangers what is likely a tenuous bond of trust between civilians, the new democratic regime and the armed forces.
IMET = DA – Good Governance Reform
SSR is intended to strengthen governance and institutions
USAID 9 ( in conjunction with the Department of State and Department of Defense, Feb, “SECURITY SECTOR REFORM” )gw
This paper is designed to guide practitioners at the Department of State, DoD, and USAID in their implementation of current foreign assistance approaches to security and development. Forces enhanced through traditional security assistance comprised of equipment and training can better carry out their responsibilities if the institutional and governance frameworks necessary to sustain them are equally well-developed. Development assistance also benefits from being fully coordinated with securityrelated assistance, as development is at risk without basic security. The increasingly complex threats facing our partners and our own nation urgently require that we address the linkages among security, governance, development, and conflict in more comprehensive and sustainable ways. In addition to building professional security forces, SSR programs support the: • Establishment of relevant legal and policy frameworks, • Improvement of civilian management, leadership, oversight, planning, and budgeting capacities, • Enhancement of coordination and cooperation among security-related and civil institutions; and, • Management of the legacies and sources of past or present conflict or insecurity.
USAID SSR is directed at good governance
USAID 9 ( in conjunction with the Department of State and Department of Defense, Feb, “SECURITY SECTOR REFORM” )gw
USAID’s primary SSR role is to support governance, conflictmitigation and response, reintegration and reconciliation, and rule of law programs aimed at civilian capacity to manage, oversee, and provide security and justice.
IMET = DA – GJD
The GJD framework for democracy assistance includes SSR
USAID 9 ( in conjunction with the Department of State and Department of Defense, Feb, “SECURITY SECTOR REFORM” )gw
The U.S. foreign assistance framework identifies SSR as a key program area in support of the Peace and Security foreign policy objective and security sector governance as a program element in support of the Governing Justly and Democratically foreign policy objective. SSR is an ongoing process and may be an appropriate engagement for countries in each of the foreign assistance country categories. SSR may include activities in support of security force and intelligence reform; justice sector reform; civilian oversight and management of military and intelligence services; community security; and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR). Program design–including sequencing and prioritization–should be undertaken with full consideration of country context and circumstance.
CMR = DA
Strengthening CMR qualifies as democracy assitance
Tommasoli 9 (Massimo, Permanent Observer to the United Nations, International IDEA. “Assessing Democracy: Donor Rhetoric and Country-led Processes” indicatorsinfo.f/Tommasoli+Assessing+Democracy.doc)gw
Democracy assistance consists of aid policies and programmes aiming at promoting and consolidating democracy in partner countries. It is “aid specifically designed to foster a democratic opening in a non-democratic country or to further a democratic transition in a country that has experienced a democratic opening” (Carothers, 1999:6). Initially considered as an important area of action by few donors, this domain has attracted a growing volume of resources as a consequence of the emphasis on democracy and good governance of the early nineties, with aid agencies less willing to support countries with poor governance. Though intuitively easy to define, the field of democracy assistance covers a wide range of activities, some of which are categorized by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) under the broader policy marker of ‘participatory development and good governance’, a general label pulling together categories ranging from public sector management to peace-building. Democracy assistance seeks to achieve a variety of goals, not necessarily related to each other and broadly felt by external actors (governmental, intergovernmental and non governmental bodies) as actions contributing to a home-grown democratization agenda. As a result the landscape is highly varied, encompassing the provision of technical assistance in more traditional areas (like election management, constitutional reform, parliaments, the judiciary, support to civil society), new and relatively more recent areas (like the strengthening of political parties and civil-military relations), and other domains overlapping with the realm of development cooperation and humanitarian aid (like post-conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction). It is therefore difficult to assess the overall volume of aid flows that can be categorised under the democracy assistance rubric. Nevertheless, according to rough estimates, over the last 15 years up to 10% of the overall volume of aid was devoted to democracy, human rights and governance (Uvin, 2004:85-86).
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