FUTURE OF THE RAAC : Does the ADF Need Armoured …



FUTURE OF THE RAAC : Does the ADF Need Armoured Fighting Vehicles (AFVs)? If so, What Type and How Many?

“Armour and the Australian Army must be one of the most uninformed policy and capability debates in recent Australian defence history…”. Michael Clifford, ‘The Strategist’, Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) Blog, 2 March 2015

Hugh White (Professor of Strategic Studies, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, ANU) has suggested that Australia needs “…. a lighter army, with lighter, more readily deployable vehicles and more soldiers … would be much better suited to the demands they are most likely to face in our immediate neighbourhood”. Is this the operational requirement that the 2015 Defence White Paper will set out?

Last week Karl Claxton, an ASPI analyst, stated that “Most commentators have been hostile toward the project [LAND 400] from its inception a decade ago. The key complaint arises from a disconnect between strategic guidance in the 2000, 2009 and 2013 white papers, directing that equipment acquisitions be prioritised around what’s needed to prevent attacks against Australia and contribute to stability in our immediate region, and LAND 400’s focus on platforms for high-intensity contemporary and future operations including amphibious assault”.

An alternative assessment was recently offered by Michael Clifford (ASPI senior fellow):“Let me state up front: the heavy/light and high-intensity/low-intensity debate is complete rot! Disconnected from strategic guidance? Again rot!”.

The fundamental questions governing the future of the RAAC are:

(i) Why is a ‘standing’ Army needed?

(ii) Should AFVs be part of this capability?

(iii) If so, what are the natures and characteristics of AFVs are required?

(iv) What AFV equipped units are needed in the Army’s force structure?

(v) What capabilities does the ARES (RAAC) require to support ADF contingency plans?

Why is a ‘standing’ Army needed?

The Army, as part of the ADF, is needed to provide a safeguard against threats to Australia’s national interests. (Definitions of ‘threat’ and ‘national interest’ are subjects to be considered separately.) The most important issue here is warning time, i.e. how much time will be available for the ADF to respond to, and successfully counter, what is assessed to be the most likely threat?

Of course, history shows us that threats are often unable to be anticipated. This adds another dimension, one for which lead times are crucial. How much time is needed to obtain/manufacture equipment, to train personnel to operate it, to train a competent force to successfully employ it; and, following on from this, what amount of contingency stocks must be held and what level of proficiency has to be maintained by the ADF to ensure that a capability gap in Australia’s defensive preparedness does not occur?

The nature of the perceived ‘threat’ or ‘threats’ is important here. If only a single threat existed, contingency planning (which is why the ADF exists) would be relatively easy. But this will never be the case as long as there are unforeseeable threats. History can inform this consideration to some degree, however, technological advances mean that warning times are reducing. Paradoxically, some lead times are increasing. Relatively simple military arms of even a few years ago, have now been replaced with much more complex equipment, resulting in very different recruiting and training lead times.

What is it that is essential when the nature of a ‘threat’ is unpredictable? A standing force that is flexible, one that can respond quickly to a range of different scenarios. The ‘enemy’ might be sophisticated or might comprise a less capable force. Today, however, even insurgents have access to sophisticated weapons. While operations might be either high or low intensity, history tells us that they likely to be protracted.

Australian soldiers must be equipped, organized and trained to effectively counter and defeat the assessed ‘threat’. Australian APC crew commanders trained for Vietnam with string tied to their drivers’ shoulders because no IC capability was available (radios were not fitted until after the vehicles arrived in the theatre). Similar ‘on the job’ training applied to Centurion crews; they only learnt how to operate their modified tanks after they got to Vietnam. If the threat assessment is wrong, so too is the contingency plan.

Should AFVs be part of this capability [ie. the ‘Standing’ Army]?

It’s been argued above, that the Army must be organised, trained and equipped to respond to threats ranging from a sophisticated enemy to a less capable force, albeit one with access to sophisticated weapons.

The most flexible and responsive capability on the battlefield is that provided by armoured vehicles. Ever since Cambrai, shock action has been the mantra of armoured forces. They provide a commander with combat power which can be quickly deployed in all weather, to capitalise on opportunities. Armour can be concentrated quickly and can attack with speed. AFVs can deliver infantry onto an objective and support them with direct fire weapons.

Used correctly, they have inherent potential for shock action … a psychological effect achieved when impact is maximised (e.g. by concentration of fire; speed of attack) and combined with surprise. (‘Impact’ comes as a result of the overwhelming effect imposed on the enemy at the point of attack, while ‘surprise’ is a consequence of good intelligence and deception.) When achieved, shock action has a multiplier effect that increases the strength of the attacking forces. In the same way that combat power is increased by good morale, so too is it boosted by shock action. (This is examined further in a separate article.)

Major General Craig Orme returned to Australia in December 2014 after commanding Joint Task Force 633 in the Middle East Region. He recently had this to say: “What we need to do is to learn the right lessons from our experience. To me they are simple. Mobility is crucial – only movement brings victory. However, that mobility must be protected so that the weapons of the weak such as IEDs do not kill unprotected soldiers. Firepower is critical when you fight … you have to win the fight against an armed opposition. Combat power still counts.”

Only AFVs provide the mobility, protection and firepower that affords a commander a truly flexible response capability, no matter the nature of the enemy or the battlefield.

What types and characteristics of AFVs are required by the ‘Standing’ Army’?

AFVs can be used as a supporting arm in terms of direct fire, armoured mobility and obstacle denial; they can be used to conduct battlefield reconnaissance and gain intelligence; they can be used to protect flanks and secure routes; and finally, they can be employed as a combat force in their own right. It is the flexibility, versatility and responsiveness of AFVs which enhance the combat power of the battlefield commander.

Before going further, it is necessary to consider the often raised idea that tanks are only needed to fight other tanks, and ‘heavy’ forces are only needed to counter other ‘heavy’ forces. Before Vietnam there was debate in the Federal Parliament along the lines that Australia might have to deploy forces to Asia and therefore light AFVs were required (there were a number of offers to sell light tanks to Australia at this time). Fortunately, serving officers had the wisdom to conduct soil tests and prove that ‘heavy’ vehicles would be able to operate successfully (as was subsequently proven by the 53 tonne Centurion tanks in Vietnam).

Then there were those who argued that only light tanks could provide the required operational mobility; again serving officers argued that tanks must not only be able to support infantry attacks, but also able to withstand enemy fire while doing so. This was exactly the role of Centurion tanks in Vietnam and Canadian Leopard 2s in Afghanistan, their direct fire support saving many lives in the process. The debate is not, therefore, about light or heavy; rather it is about the level of protection required to enable AFVs to fulfill their roles on the battlefield.

Protection is not just provided by armour; it is also a function of mobility (speed and agility) and firepower (the ability to provide protective or neutralising fire). The proliferation of manportable anti-armour weapons with their increasing ability to penetrate armour, dictates AFV designs which maximise survivability of the crew.

This characteristic is given even greater priority with the rapidly increasing use of remotely detonated IEDs to attack AFVs from the bottom, side and top. IEDs will often be employed to restrict the tactical employment of AFVs, ie. sited on routes to deny responsiveness and shock action. A supporting AFV, capable of facilitating rapid armoured deployment, i.e. clearing IEDs, is essential to success on the battlefield. AFV operations in both Vietnam and Afghanistan support this. (This aspect is also examined further in a separate article.)

Of course clearing IEDs is not the only means that armoured vehicles can enhance force mobility, they can also provide an obstacle crossing and breaching capability. Whether they are operated by engineers or armoured corps personnel is not relevant here. Of significance is the fact that, like the route clearance vehicle, they require similar characteristics to enable them to close with the enemy. These characteristics also apply to armoured vehicles needed to recover damaged AFVs from the battlefield.

The characteristic underpinning all the above is that of maintainability. Not only must the AFVs have a very high ‘availability’ factor, they must also be able to be returned to operations quickly after battlefield repair.

If one was to look at the battlefields on which the ADF is likely to be deployed, what AFVs would we see? Reconnaissance vehicles, equipped to stealthfully gain battlefield intelligence; cavalry vehicles securing flanks and clearing routes; tanks, leading an armoured thrust or supporting infantry; other AFVs delivering infantry onto objectives or deploying them elsewhere on the battlefield; manoeuvre support vehicles facilitating shock action; as well as other support vehicles enabling obstacles to be crossed, casualties to be collected, and damaged AFVs to be recovered.

What AFV equipped units are needed in the Army’s force structure?

As discussed above, Army’s force structure is a part of a capability plan to provide and sustain the response required by an identified ‘threat’. This includes not only an initial deployment force, but also a nucleus of skills on which to base a complete response (possibly involving an expansion of the ‘Standing’ Army).

AFV equipped units operate primarily with infantry and aviation, the three arms that close with and engage the enemy. Artillery and engineers are essential supporting arms.

There are three ARA multi-role combat brigades in the Australian Army; 1st Bde (Darwin); 3 Bde (Townsville); and 7th Bde (Brisbane). Under Plan BEERSHEBA, they rotate though a three year ‘readiness’ cycle; each phase lasts a year, the sequence being: reset, readying and ready. Each brigade includes an armoured cavalry regiment comprising a tank squadron, a cavalry squadron and an APC (armoured mobility) squadron, together with an artillery regiment and a combat engineer regiment.

Theoretically this structure provides a balanced allocation of assets, one capable of 'surge' augmentation, if required. Should the ready brigade be deployed, the readying brigade should be capable of backing up (within a set period). This is a much better structure than that which existed prior to the Australian Army’s deployment to Vietnam.

The optimum composition of each of the armoured cavalry regiments must not be assumed, however. How many tank, cavalry or APC troops are required for successful brigade operations in each of the different threat scenarios? How many AFVs, and of what type, are required in each troop? These are questions which must be constantly addressed during training; having to draw on the readying brigade to ‘top up’ the ready brigade will limit the effectiveness of Plan BEERSHEBA.

As tactics are modified to keep abreast of the changing ‘threat’, so too must the force structure be modified; this includes groupings within the armoured cavalry regiment organisation and its supporting elements, particularly those essential to rapid manoeuvre, i.e. shock action. In this respect, the availability of manoeuvre support and obstacle crossing/breaching vehicles is crucial. Whether the capabilities are located within the combat engineer regiment or armoured cavalry regiment, they must be able to facilitate a commander’s need for timely and flexible response.

The missing element from the divisional (three brigade) force structure is an RAAC forward delivery squadron. This unit holds AFVs and crews ready to replace those needed to maintain the combat effectiveness of the armoured cavalry regiments. No armoured regiment will ever be fully ‘ready’ unless it is supported by a forward delivery squadron (or at least a forward delivery troop to maintain the skills and provide a basis for expansion). This is an essential capability, the importance of which was proven in Vietnam.

What capabilities does the ARES RAAC require to support ADF contingency plans?

This is what Army says about the ARES in terms of Plan BEERSHEBA:“Under Plan BEERSHEBA, the Army Reserve will consist of six brigade-sized formations within the2nd Division with units, sub-units, teams and individuals integrated within Army’s Combat Support and Combat Service Support brigades. The 2nd Division formations will be paired, with each pair aligned to, and on the same Force Generation Cycle as its partnered full-time Multi-role Combat Brigade. In order to fulfil the enduring annual Army Reserve capability requirements, the generic structure of the 2nd Division formations developed for Plan BEERSHEBA include … the re-roling of all Army ReserveRoyal Australian Armoured Corps units to the production of Bushmaster crews…..”.

There are currently five ARES RAAC units; two in NSW and one each in WA, SA, and Vic. These unit locations are matched by ARES brigades, apart from 11 Bde in Qld.  In accordance with the Plan, B Sqn, 3/4 Cav Regt is to be re-raised as an ARES unit to provide this capability. Or is it?

It’s been suggested that Support Sqn at the School of Armour Puckapunyal is to be renamed B Sqn 3/4 Cav Regt. If this were to happen, the ARES structure as announced under Plan BEERSHEBA would no longer be viable. Possibly a revised ARES organisation is to be announced as part of the 2015 Defence White Paper??

Leaving that aspect aside, rather than providing Bushmaster crews as per the above, it seems that ARES units are being tasked as light cavalry regiments. What’s a light cavalry regiment, you ask? Army advises that:

“The Light Cavalry Regiments/Units are Army Reserve units that can operate either in a mounted or dismounted role. Light Cavalry unit’s manning and equipment enable it to conduct a variety of tasks including reconnaissance, surveillance, offensive, defensive, security, peace keeping and support operations.”

Confusingly, given Army’s public information above, ARES RAAC regiments and units are being organised on the basis of a headquarters and three sub-units: protected mobility; mounted reconnaissance: and dismounted reconnaissance … using Bushmaster Protected Mobility Vehicles and Land Rover, Regional Force Surveillance Vehicles. Protected mobility is a role undertaken by Combat Service Support Battalions (CSSBs), not the RAAC. The Bushmaster is not an AFV.

Now to the roles of a ‘Light Cavalry Regiment’ … dismounted reconnaissance, surveillance, offensive, defensive and security tasks are all those conducted by infantry. Why should RAAC ARES units be trained in this capacity (and that of CSSBs)? (Even WWI mounted rifles units, eg VMR, had horses to get them to the point where they would dismount to fight.) Some might think that the light cavalry regiment is a politically inspired concept designed to retain RAAC ARES units at minimum cost.

Leaving this thought aside, what role should RAAC ARES units have? According to Plan BEERSHEBA, the 2 Division ‘paired’ brigade units should be able to support their multi-role ARA counterparts. As stated above, RAAC ARES units will be called upon to provide Bushmaster ‘crews’. Interestingly, the RACT who provide Bushmaster training, only qualify soldiers to drive the vehicles under command of RACT packet commanders, there is no concept of a vehicle commander in the CSSB role. If this is the case, why train anyone in ‘light cavalry’ tasks for which the multi-role brigades have no equivalent?

The ARES ‘pairing’ concept is a good one. It must, however, provide a real ability to support and sustain the ARA. The ARES must not become a politically driven organisation as it was during Vietnam, i.e. the Government would not allow the ARES members to augment the ARA because it was thought that this could impact on jobs and the economy. (Before being accepted into the ARA, an ARES member had to resign from the ARES, re-enlist, and complete all his course qualifications again … this was at a time that the ARA was crying out for qualified AFV crewmen.) The RAAC ARES must be organised on the basis of being able to support paired ARA brigade RAAC units. Given training constraints, this probably means acquiring the skills to augment cavalry and APC squadrons in armoured cavalry regiments.

The following quote is from the Defence Reserves Association (DRA) submission to the 2015 Defence White Paper:“… the DRA considers that the architects of Plan Beersheba may not have given sufficient thought to how Reserve Armoured Corps (RAAC) … units could or should be used in rounding out or supplementing Regular Army Units and capability. For example, Army Reserve RAAC units are tasked with generating a protective mobility capability using the Protected Mobility Vehicle ‘Bushmaster’. These units are not tasked or equipped to undertake a Cavalry role of conducting reconnaissance, defending vital assets, providing convoy protection, staffing listening posts and undertaking surveillance tasks. Consequently, the Army Reserve cannot properly supplement the Regular Army Cavalry capability – which is an important capability required in any operations within Australia or overseas”.

The quandary currently faced by the ARES is illustrated by this quote from the Army Newspaper, 12 March 2015: “Troopers from 4/19PWLH and 3/9LH (South Australian Mounted Rifles) got a different experience as cavalry scouts during the exercise [at Cultana, SA]. They were used in a dismounted role for close target reconnaissance, though they’re not cavalry scouts by trade … they were also an assault force for the live-fire movements and they helped with vehicle maintenance tasks as well.” How does this training equip them to supplement the ARA RAAC? Is it to provide assault troopers in cavalry squadrons? This is an important role, but is all the ARES can provide?

Having said that, there MIGHT be merit in the light cavalry regiment concept; regional force surveillance operations could well require a light cavalry like organisation. If this was the case, the ARES should be appropriately equipped and organised and the pretence of having a role to ’round out’ the ARA RAAC units should be done away with.

Conclusion

AFVs are required to enable a commander to 'get on the front foot' when opposing either a sophisticated or less capable enemy. Reconnaissance, flank security, infantry mobility, direct fire support, obstacle denial and shock action strikes are all tasks which must be able to be undertaken, no matter the nature of either the enemy or the battlefield. Without AFVs, casualties in any conflict will be unsustainable.

The current ARA force structure is suitable for the perceived threats. (Whether or not contingency stocks are satisfactory is beyond the scope of this paper.) Missing from the supporting elements, however, is the RAAC forward delivery squadron. At a minimum a forward delivery troop should be on the ground as part of each multi-role combat brigade.

The role of the RAAC ARES must be clarified: is it to augment and 'round out' the ARA RAAC multi-role brigade regiments or does it have a different role (eg. regional surveillance) within the ADF? Once the role is defined, appropriate equipment and training resources must be allocated. The current situation, i.e. neither one nor the other, must not be allowed to continue. Failure to act in this regard will be counted in lives, both as a result of training accidents and operational shortcomings.

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