Future of Air power - musketmedia



FUTURE OF AIRPOWER

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1. INTRODUCTION 3

2. AIRPOWER, WHERE ARE WE NOW? 4

3. DOCTRINE 8

4. TACTICAL MISSIONS 10

- Air Superiority 11

- Air Interdiction 14

- Close Air Support 16

5. THE FAR FUTURE 18

6. CONCLUSION 22

INTRODUCTION

What is the future of airpower? Can there be a topic more near and dear to the heart of the airmen? Airpower was born of the technological revolution at the beginning of the 20th century. Its entire (relatively short) history is so fundamentally tied to technology as to be inseparable. Airmen more than any other military service look to the future, for their basic tool, the aircraft is a product of forward thinking. Airpowers effect on the battlefield since its inception has been tremendous; perhaps it has been more significant than any other weapon in the history of warfare. Opening the third dimension to military operations changed the way wars were, and will be fought. Yet, while airmen have been champions of technology and weapons development, their track record in developing coherent doctrine is spotty. Additionally, the roles and responsibilities debate that airpower's rise sparked among the various military branches has at times inhibited its potential. Airpower has now been used for almost a century in warfare. What is its future at the threshold of the 21st century? In the last 100 years many prophets, proponents and theories about airpowers capability have emerged. However, it is only recently that airpower has truly matured as a weapon in war. Where to go now? Not all the doctrine and theories of the early years was off the mark. Airpower is a military weapon and the rules of war apply to its employment, just as they apply to the army or navy. In fact, the doctrinal lessons of the past are very much applicable today. Priorities of operations such as were developed in North Africa for example are as valid today as then. But will the very nature of airpower be changed by the security environment of the early 21st century? Airpower prophets such as Mitchell and Douhet wondered the same thing in the early years of airpower. And though some of their ideas were not correct, or perhaps a bit premature, it was their forward thinking that helped shape the direction of airpower. Attempting to look forward and assess airpowers role in the future is of vital importance. As Sun Tzu put it.

"The art of war teaches us to rely not on the likelihood of the enemy's not coming, but on our own readiness to receive him; not on the chance of his not attacking, but rather on the fact that we have made our position unassailable."[1]

What is airpower's current and future capability to ensure we are ready for the threats in the next century? This paper will address four areas in an attempt to look forward to airpower's potential future. First, where are we now? What is the world situation airpower is faced with, and are there fundamental changes in perceptions of airpowers uses? Second, how will airpower doctrine be affected by the early 21st century, will it change significantly or essentially remain per the status quo? Third, what are the specific future challenges and possibilities for the three tactical airpower missions, air superiority, Air Interdiction (AI) and Close Air Support (CAS)? Lastly, if one attempts to look forward and auger the future, what of the longer term? What are some possible airpower challenges of the far future? Before the future of airpower can be discussed it serves to reference where we are now.

AIRPOWER, WHERE ARE WE NOW?

There is an elemental question to ask and answer if one is to asses what airpower's status is in the present time. It is one that must constantly be asked by military leaders and politicians. Does the present day geo-political situation fundamentally alter current airpower theory and doctrine? Every new generation of airmen from airpowers beginnings in warfare has asked and attempted to answer this question. Their accuracy has of course never been spot on. But that is not the point. The exercise is to limit as much as feasible any surprises, and to prepare as best as possible for the future. Col John Warden is a contemporary airpower theorist and has this to say of the current world situation and airpower.

"The world is currently experiencing what may be the most revolutionary period in all of human existence with major revolutions taking place simultaneously in geopolitics, production, technology, and military affairs. The pace of change is accelerating and shows no sign of letting up. If we are to succeed in protecting our interests in this environment, we must spend more time than ever in our past thinking about war and developing new employment concepts. Attrition warfare belongs to another age, and the days when wars could be won by sheer bravery and perseverance are gone. Victory will go to those who think through the problem and capitalize on every tool available—regardless of its source. Let us begin laying the intellectual framework for future air operations."[2]

The question then, where is airpower now? Many factors must be considered to answer this question, but several can be concentrated on for both their deep-seated and historical record of importance. At the very base of the issue, who are our likely adversaries? As best as we can determine, who are they, and what are their capabilities? Second, what are our capabilities? Specifically, what is our strategic position?[3] What can history teach us of the importance for these issues?

The United States potential adversaries in conflict are perhaps the single most important factor in determining where our airpower capabilities are now. The dawn of the 21st century has brought yet another 'new' type of conflict to the United States. Having fought two large general wars in the first half of the century, and many smaller 'Limited' wars in the latter half, an entirely new type of conflict has emerged. The 'War on Terrorism' has provided a serious challenge for the use of airpower. It is a war without borders, without armies, even less so than previous guerilla conflicts such as Vietnam. However, this is not the only threat as there are other likely adversaries with very conventional capabilities. China comes to mind, as does North Korea, Iraq until recently, and several countries in the Gulf Region pose a quite conventional threat as well. The answer to who is the likely threat in the early 21st century perhaps then runs the entire gamut of 'terrorists' to rogue states with both conventional and non-conventional forces to large nations with traditional strategic power bases and large conventional forces. Indeed, the current threat environment may just about cover every conceivable military type threat for airpower to employ against with the possible exception of a domestic insurgency. The implications for airpower are enormous. There is much uncertainty, and airpower must be flexible enough to answer all threats. Current capabilities versus these myriad threats bear some investigation.

First the most remote threat, which is a large-scale conventional war against a nation like China. America's airpower position in respect to such a threat is good. Airpower's development up to this point has largely been geared toward this kind of foe. The large military establishment created to counter the Soviet Union, though drawn down considerably, is doctrinally, organizationally and technologically aimed to counter such a threat.[4] Arguments over our strategic positioning in such an event not withstanding, the airpower capability, with specific doctrine, required to fight such a conflict exists.[5] Though, perhaps not in the numbers that might be required to fight a decisively quick war.

Likewise, America's current airpower positioning to effectively fight smaller 'rogue' nations or regional powers with airpower is also sufficient. The recent history (10-15 years) of U.S. airpower development has both been geared toward this type of adversary, and has benefited from the direct transfer of the focus on larger scale wars. Iraq was defeated, twice, largely with forces designed and prepared to fight the Soviet Union. Two limited wars in Korea and Vietnam laid foundations for the 'limited' aspects and lessons learned positively shaped the doctrinal issues. The two Gulf Wars marked a transition to airpowers concentration on the regional rogue power. We have, for all intents and purposes been fighting this type of conflict non-stop for 12 years. The efforts of Northern and Southern Watch, and the Balkans air war were all of this type. All helped shape airpowers capability and use versus the 'rogue nation' or regional power. Though one must wonder if these wars are significant to airpowers use in the new century, or are they a parallel to airpower lessons in Spanish Civil War? Interesting but not of significant importance to the newest threat.

The newest threat, terrorists such as Al Quaeda, and the myriad other trans-national terrorist organizations poses a serious challenge to airpowers use in the next century. One could even ask if airpower has a primary role at all in such a conflict, or is it more of a supporting force. There are no borders for the enemy, no infrastructure that can be attacked by air. On the limited occasions such infrastructure can be identified, can airpower react in time, or even have the effect desired? The war in Afghanistan provided an arena for airpowers use, and it continues to be of use there. However, the war on terrorism provides a severely limited target set, and especially in tactical aviation's situation severely limits its usefulness.

So, where are we now? Airpower in the latter half of the 20th century was built largely on the nation state threat. It was technologically and doctrinally designed to fight foes such as the Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, and later the Soviet Union. However, while the two former were actually fought and defeated, the Soviet Union was never directly engaged and it was the preparation for the war that actually defeated them. The wars fought during the Cold War were not large conventional types; they were limited wars, wars between the super powers by proxy. Airpower had to flex, and did so admirably, to fight wars for which it was not specifically designed. Now, America is faced with the nebulous enemy of terrorism, further challenging traditional thoughts of airpower employment. In North Africa, airmen were faced with an enemy that lacked strategic targets, negating a large precept of their doctrine and forcing a doctrinal shift to interdiction and close air support. In the war against terrorists, another doctrinal shift may be needed. Tactical airpower must become increasingly timely, precise, and integrated with real time intelligence. Strategically and doctrinally then, we are at a crossroads, with the question being how to apply airpower to the new threat while maintaining the capability to counter the more traditional threats. Never in the history of airpower has one nation possessed such an overwhelming superiority in airpower capability. How the U.S. employs that advantage will determine, to a large extent, her success in the wars of the 21st century.

DOCTRINE

Few new weapons in history have sparked the intense doctrinal debate over employment airpower has. From the beginning airpower proponents considered it something 'different' in war, a 'revolutionary' military force, forever changing the face of conflict. This basic notion has colored the debate from the beginning. In the main this prophecy proved true with some qualifications. While the 'battlespace' changed dramatically (war fighting changed from two a dimensional arena to three). The airplane and airpower remains a weapon of war. A tool used in whichever manner military leaders decide, dependant on their imagination and flexibility, traits that are not exactly synonymous with military doctrine. A lack of imagination and flexibility combined with little to no precedent hamstrung airpower's doctrinal evolution.

"It has often been said that there was little realistic conception of how air power might be used-what air forces like to call doctrine. This is true, but also understandable. The air weapon was after all distinctive, indeed unique. Of all the “new” weapons of the Great War, it alone had no predecessor and no precedent."[6]

Humble beginnings notwithstanding, what began as a supporting unit quickly flexed its muscles and struggled for an independent status. An independent status that early air leaders felt would best use its inherent abilities. And so, the doctrinal debate has raged. Old school army and navy men argued airpower was a supporting unit to the true, traditional, military branches. Conversely, early airmen struggled to put together a doctrine that considered the airplanes potential, if not its actual capability. The argument being, airpower could save lives, and was a war winner itself. Even more controversially, the army and navy might be supporting units to airpower.

"What self interest and strategy made compelling, the nation’s mood made politic. America’s response to the bloodletting and disillusionment of World War I ruled out dispatch of another great army to fight abroad. In the 1920s it had been neither prudent nor especially compelling for airmen to offer their bombers as a substitute for the expeditionary armies of the past. In the 1930s, as crises abroad imperiled American interests, airmen guardedly advanced the case for a bomber force that could strike across the seas."[7]

A quick synopsis of airpower doctrine serves to establish the current situation.

As noted, airpower started as a supporting force to the army and navy in World War I. During the interwar years airmen proponed the strategic power of air forces. Airpower, they argued is inherently offensive and should be a separate (independent at least) force. During World War II, this crusade to gain independence gained momentum, as airmen, under the overall strategic direction of FDR sought to use airpower to win the war. Several important doctrinal achievements came from World War II. Strategic airpower gained dominance within the Army Air Corps. And on the strength of its reported strategic contribution to the victory, the Air Corps gained independence shortly after. Tactical airpower established three doctrinal ‘priorities’. These priorities were in order, air superiority, air interdiction and close air support. Airpower doctrine as established in World War II changed again as airmen applied it to the limited engagements born of the Cold War. Additionally, the advent of nuclear weapons brought further significance to the strategic side of airpower, solidifying in the minds of airmen the U.S. Air Force’s lead in defending the United States. However, airpower’s limitations in the small wars, and the lack of attention paid to tactical aviation eventually came home to roost, as the experience in Vietnam highlighted shortcomings in U.S. tactical airpower doctrine. Currently, U.S. forces enjoy something of a renaissance in tactical airpower doctrine brought on by the lessons learned in Vietnam, and employed, upgraded and proven in two Gulf Wars. But this ‘proof’ is against the local regional power and employed against conventional forces. Yet, the tactical airpower priorities arrived at during World War II appears as valid today as then. Will they remain valid in the future? A look at the three missions will serve to answer this question.

TACTICAL MISSIONS

The three missions of tactical aviation, as spelled out during World War II remain largely unchanged. Definitions have changed somewhat through the years but the basic doctrine is solid. Establish air superiority first, for this will allow air forces to operate without undue enemy interference. Once air superiority is established, interdiction of the enemy's military strength and supplies becomes the priority. Lastly, if both air superiority and significant interdiction are achieved, carefully considered close air support may be employed. Through airpower’s history these three priorities, or missions, for tactical airpower have flexed in different situations. For example, if an operation is deemed important enough or if a contingency arises, CAS can quickly become the priority mission. Such is the flexibility of airpower. Past performance aside, where are we currently with the tactical airpower priorities and “How will air superiority, interdiction and close air support manifest themselves in the 21st century?”[8]

AIR SUPERIORITY

Air superiority is probably the least controversial role/mission and priority for tactical airpower. It is readily apparent, and backed by every experience in aerial warfare, that air superiority[9] is required to facilitate all other aerial missions. It is the first tactical mission priority. Indeed, if resources are limited, it may be the only mission flown. For example, Germany, limited in resources for a variety of reasons in World War II was reduced to an almost purely defensive air superiority war over the Reich. With this mission obviously being of such importance militaries have allotted considerable resources to attain it. What is the state of air superiority for the United States and what are the possibilities for the future?

Currently, the U.S. enjoys an unprecedented air superiority capability. In the last two gulf wars, there was not one confirmed air-to-air kill against American air forces. While there were several kills made by AAA and SAMs, even these numbers were low. Granted, the quality of the opposing force had as much to do with this as the quality of the allied forces. However, in warfare one makes his own luck, and the forces created to gain air superiority for the United States are highly effective. What is the formula? It is a 'combined arms' effect of air power. First, there is the detection capability, outstanding radars and other sensors, both airborne and ground based. Second, highly trained aircrews pilot superior aircraft. The U.S. enjoys an unrivaled capability for air superiority with its F-15C fighters and the considerable ability of its fighter-bombers to self protect. This protection extends to defeating enemy SAMs as well with wild-weasels performing the SEAD/DEAD[10] mission. The mature technology of western air-to-air missiles gives aircrews a decided weaponry edge over adversaries. All these advantages are brought together with superior intelligence, realistic training and highly tuned tactics. The result is a current situation where the U.S. possesses one of the greatest air superiority teams in aerial combat history. Additionally, periphery air superiority capabilities such as the capable Patriot SAM give a second tier defensive ability. While the U.S. relies on fighters as the main air superiority weapon, SAMs are quite capable, defensively, in that mission as well. Of course, they are less flexible though they are a cheaper and very effective alternative. Will the U.S. advantage continue into the future?

The future of any aerial mission is a popular topic of speculation, and many predictions fail to come true. However, there are emerging technologies that are already coming on line and are sure to affect air superiority in the future. On the defensive side, the SAM threat is increasing dramatically. The newest generation of SAMs is extremely capable forcing the resulting counter measures to become more complex and effective. As most nations are unable to compete in the air with the U.S., the proliferation of SAMs, and the development of new types have increased as a cost effective counter to U.S. superiority. As a result the continued proliferation of new SAM systems is assured. For the US several new and emerging technologies will be important to aircraft. Stealth is foremost amongst them. As a counter to SAMs, the ability to limit radar cross-section or any number of other signatures is critical to survivability. New aircraft designs will increasingly incorporate the developing 'stealth' technology.[11] Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) are also an emerging technology. Removing the pilot from the aircraft design equation can accomplish several things. It decreases weight and size for a vehicle that can carry the same amount of ordnance. It takes the human factors out of performance considerations, for example a UAV could turn harder, or 'pull more Gs', where a human might black out, the machine is unaffected.[12] UAVs could penetrate higher threat areas (SAM concentrations) without exposing a human to the threat. There are of course drawbacks, as the craft must be controlled somehow by remote, which can be jammed, blocked, compromised, etc. There are some 'critical thinking' functions that a human can currently do better than a machine. UAVs may be 'inherently' less flexible than manned aircraft. In the end, whatever ones opinion of the unmanned crafts scope of usefulness; UAVs will likely be part of the air superiority team in one form or another. More capable weapons are also on the horizon, with improved air-to-air weapons that are faster, have longer range and are more reliable. Sensor technology is also improving with aircraft able to 'see' and 'hear', while fusing all the various inputs together for the pilot to make decisions.[13] Further down the road are directed energy weapons. Lasers and particle cannons, the stuff of science fiction, are in development. The implications of this type of weapon for air superiority are immense and could drive significant changes in doctrine, tactics and training. The performance of aircraft/weapons will dramatically increase by using space and near space. Near space will allow speeds to increase dramatically and project force around the globe in short time frames unthinkable to this point. Col John Warden and other contemporary air prophets call it ‘Hyper-War’, in reference to the speed at which the information and units will maneuver and react. The U.S. will continue to rely on the aircraft[14] to provide air superiority in the future. And, barring any unforeseen circumstance will continue its air superiority dominance at least through the first half of the century. The second and third priorities for tactical air power are increasingly more controversial.

INTERDICTION

Air interdiction is something of an airpower doctrine hot potato lately. At the root is the argument over where the lines between strategic airpower, interdiction and CAS exist, or if they exist at all. Regardless of how one defines air interdiction, the U.S. posses an exceptional capability in relation to the rest of the world. Literally, there are few targets[15] U.S. air power of some type cannot attack at any time. Much like air superiority, aircraft are the preferred tool for the interdiction role. Currently, the F-16, F-18, and F-15E are all highly capable, combat proven air interdiction platforms. Global Positioning System (GPS) aided and laser guided munitions have dramatically increased the effectiveness of targeting. These types of weapons and the new generation of munitions coming on line are especially suited to the air interdiction mission. It took many large bombers in the past to attack and destroy a bridge. Now a single bomb from a single aircraft can accomplish the task. Other current and emerging technologies have positively impacted AI. Intelligence capabilities from space borne systems, airborne systems, and a myriad of other sources have aided the effectiveness of targeting. The very same aerial 'combined arms team' that ensures air superiority also ensures air interdiction success. Truly, the two missions go hand in hand in U.S. Air Force operations. Large 'packages’ combining air superiority fighters, stealth bombers, air interdictors, wild weasels, airborne radar, and other specialized systems contribute to both missions concurrently. In reality, American airpower accomplishes the first two tactical airpower missions as one combined effort. What are the possibilities for the future of air interdiction? Some of the same technologies, which benefit the air superiority mission, will transfer directly to the interdiction mission. Further development of stealth and Electronic Counter Measures (ECM) will be of vital importance. UAV development and employment will impact future interdiction potential. UAVs are probably best employed, under our current concept of the technology, in the interdiction mission. Used against targets beyond the FSCL (or inside it, properly de-conflicted) a UAV can penetrate highly defended areas and strike interdiction targets without exposing men to the danger. The greatest future challenge to the interdiction mission will be the continuing doctrinal debate over where air interdiction stops and where CAS begins. Army capabilities are pushing their weapons systems[16] to longer ranges, which has important doctrinal effects. The battlespace a ground commander can engage with indigenous fire support has pushed to an area historically in the air interdiction realm. The result of which is a further complication of the roles and responsibilities debate between the Air Force and the Army. The Army tends to think of air interdiction as a ‘range’ from the front, while the Air Force tends to think of it as a target set. This doctrinal debate will continue into the future as new and emerging systems such as UAVs are deployed by both services and will invariably compete to target the same areas in the battlespace. It is the same dispute the services have had over CAS for the last 100 years.

CAS

CAS has gone through significant changes in the recent past. It has become a potent force and is poised for interesting possibilities in the near future. Only recently has the historical struggle of abandonment in peacetime and painful re-organization in wartime been somewhat overcome. The joint atmosphere in the armed services[17] has provided a decent breeding ground for CAS doctrine, organization and employment. Building on the strength of the first Gulf War and shining during the second, American CAS capability is unmatched. However, it is still a very controversial mission amongst the services.

Coordination is one of the most difficult CAS employment problems, both at the staff and operational level. Currently, the U.S. Air Force and Army enjoy a successful organization. Air Force ASOS (Air Support Operations Squadrons) units are attached, and based with army divisions. The concept is not new, similar organizations existed in World War II, Korea and Vietnam. The difference today is they are well organized, manned and afforded a decent amount of peacetime priority. This is especially true in the last ten years, as the new threat has increased the visibility of the CAS mission. There is, to some extent, confidence (and recent proof in Iraq) that painful re-organizing and re-learning of lessons has been mitigated. Today, moving operations from peacetime to wartime is as seamless a process as the CAS mission has ever seen. Developments in operational capability and coordination on the battlefield have increased effectiveness as well. And there’s more on the horizon. Examples are recent enhancements in communications, targeting and identification of enemy and friendly forces. New radios (PRC-117), blue force trackers, UAVs with sensors that can give a FAC ‘eyes on’, Laser Range Finders (LRF), GPS and laser designators are among equipment that has come together to aid the air-ground team. Periphery equipment for the CAS mission has improved dramatically, what about the aircraft?

The battle over building either multi-role or more specialized aircraft continues. The usual economic considerations are as important today as ever. Currently the U.S. Air Force is playing both sides of the fence. Two examples of specialized aircraft in the Air Force inventory are the F-15C, purely air-to-air, and the A-10, a purely CAS platform. The U.S. also employs multi-role aircraft in the CAS mission such as the F-16/F-18 and F-15E. The A-10 has been scheduled to phase out several times, yet its worth on the battlefield and lack of a suitable substitute keeps it on the active rosters. This aircraft is the least technologically advanced of any front line U.S. fighter. Some things have not changed, though the CAS mission has received increased funding, doctrinal thought and support, it is still solidly third place in the U.S. Air Force list of tactical air priorities. But the overall result is an impressive ability to put ordnance on target while minimizing fratricide.[18]

What of the future? Communications will continue to improve. Satellite communications for instance are emerging as contributors to CAS command and control operations. They have even been used in certain situations to 'control' aircraft. Improved precision weapons are also on tap. GPS bombs[19], improved laser guided, and smart, even 'brilliant' sub-munitions with increasing flexibility, destructive potential and target effects will be fielded. Increased joint training and doctrinal development will be necessary to ensure CAS type operations can contribute to the many and varied small unit operations spawned by the war on terror. Full integration of space assets and closer coordination between joint air force and army leadership will also increase. The newest crop of senior leaders is increasingly competent in the joint warfare arena, especially in relation to the CAS mission. The changes in doctrinal training in the last 10-15 years are growing better junior officers. The result for CAS will be air force and army officers who are more familiar with air and land force capabilities, and how to integrate them.

THE FAR FUTURE

Airmen have always had one eye on the future. Their weapon was born of technology and airmen always look for the next piece of hardware to employ. Unfortunately, they are military men and that perhaps limits the scope of their imagination somewhat. Practical military matters hold far more importance than far (fanciful?) thinking. An army officers 'future' is the next engagement. The airmen perhaps look forward to the next war. What of the far future? Not the next ten or twenty years but further?

The exploration and exploitation of the third dimension has always held a particularly poignant fascination with men.

"Never viewed solely as a weapon, the airplane was the instrument of flight, of a whole new dimension in human activity. Therefore it was uniquely capable of stimulating fantasies of peacetime possibilities for lifting worldly burdens, transforming man's sense of time and space, transcending geography, knitting together nations and peoples, releasing humankind from its biological limits. Flight also resonated with the deepest impulses and symbols of religious and particularly Christian mythology - nothing less than Christ's ascension. Its realization, then, served as a powerful metaphor for heavenly aspirations and even, among literal-minded, as a palpable vehicle for achieving them. Not surprisingly, prediction preceeded innovation and ran far ahead of technology even after invention occurred."[20]

Speculating what may happen in the next 100 years is of limited immediate usefulness if it is done to predict, or set a specific course toward the future. Though, if it is understood for what it is, speculation about possibilities, it can serve a very useful purpose for preparing for eventualities. Aerial warfare it must pointed out was speculated very early on, as early as the mid 1800s and Michael S. Sherry explains it well, "Fantasy followed optimistic paths in part because of certain unique properties of the airplane".[21] Space travel was also predicted and though many early, fanciful scenarios never panned out, the idea existed well before the capability. Perhaps if military men had thought a bit more about the military possibilities of flight, some of the larger doctrinal issues might have been avoided. What issues then might be in the longer view for airpower?

If mankind stays on this one planet, if space travel is not possible, then the far future of airpower is limited to this terrestrial airspace. Technology can assume to advance, and the future of airpower will be one of condensed engagement times, more precise and effective weapons, and the likely continuance of the offensive and defensive system race. Men may or may not continue to fly aircraft, but robotic units of some type will likely to gain in prominence. The blurring of the strategic/tactical aircraft designations will also continue as airframes increase in flexibility. In other words, the medium will be more fully explored; the overall effect will possibly be status quo.

On the other hand if we at least accept the possibility[22] that mankind will leave this planet, explore, exploit or colonize the solar system, or even more fancifully, beyond, there are circumstances for ‘airpower’. Surely there are many permutations of how this might happen, but if history is any indication, one can assume there will be conflict between men, even in this future. The U.S. Air Force is leading the services in the use of 'space'. We call the systems operating in our current definition of space 'weapons', but they are not weapons in the traditional sense. They are mostly information gathering units, or battlefield enhancers of some type. The historical parallel is airpower in the early years of World War I. Additionally, though they are in 'space', they actually operate in an extension of the atmosphere. Indeed, unless you are outside the orbit of our own moon, you can probably consider any 'weapon' operating in that area to be in our 'atmosphere'. Using a broad classification you could define that type of machine an, 'airplane'. Not an air breather certainly, but it is a machine flown in the local terrestrial airspace as an instrument of airpower. The point being, that unless interplanetary travel is involved, if one believes that possible, all 'local' craft in 'space' are simply an extension of the airplane. Capabilities, performance and specifications are of course very different. Bt then, an F-22 is very different from a Fokker Eindecker D.R. I. All these vehicles do the same basic thing; they exploit the third dimension, which extends very much further than the traditional upper atmosphere. For military purposes they affect warfare on the planet, and can therefore be described as aircraft, or belonging to the 'air forces' of the military. If one extends this logic further, what is the classification of an interplanetary vessel (assuming it is possible)? It is probably best described as a 'ship'. The operation and employment of which may be more accurately modeled on naval doctrine and ideas of warfare.[23] There is of course much more to this line of thought, but it serves to glance far forward, and perhaps see something of the doctrinal debates men may have over the issue of airpower in the next 100 years.

CONCLUSION

The future of airpower is a fascinating subject. Technological advancement is historically shown to increase at a faster and faster rate. Because the airplane, and consequently airpower is so closely tied to technological development airmen can expect their trade to change rapidly. Yet, the history of airpowers struggles in relation to its doctrinal use and operational employment are not irrelevant. The three priorities for tactical air power established in World War II are as valid today as then. The controversies remain as well. Doctrinal use of airpower, of any kind, by the various services will still require refinement. Coordination and integration with all military units, whether based in space, on the sea or on the ground will continue to be the greatest challenge for the joint warfare team. Technology will aid operational coordination problems. Nevertheless a close working relationship and understanding between the services, or possibly a further homogenization of those services will be even more imperative in the future as weapons capabilities further blur the lines between traditional missions.

Selected Bibliography

Cooling, Benjamin Franklin. Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority. Center for Air Force History, Washington D.C., 1991, 678 p.

Cooling, Benjamin F. Case Studies in the Development of Close Air Support. Office of Air Force History, Washington, D.C., 1990, 293p.

Hughes, Thomas A. Overlord, General Pete Quesada and the Triumph of Tactical Air Power in World War II. The Free Press, New York, N.Y., 1995, 380p.

Lester, Gary Robert. Mosquitos to Wolves; The Evolution of the Airborne Forward Air Controller. Air University Press, Maxwell AFB AL, 1997, 280 p.

Mark, Edward. Aerial Interdiction in Three Wars, Center for Air Force History, Washington D.C., 1994, 434 p.

Mortensen, Daniel, R., ed. Airpower and Ground Armies. Alabama: Maxwell Air Force Base, 1998, 207p.

Sherry, Michael S. The Rise of American Airpower; The Creation of Armageddon. Yale University Press, New Haven CT, 1987, 435p.

Warden, John,

Vol 3 Air Command and Staff College, Nature of War, Maxwell AFB, AL, 445 p

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[1] Vol 3 ACSC, Nature of War, p 191.

[2] Warden, John,

[3] Technologically, Sociologically, Economically, Politically

[4] Only very recently has a serious move toward lighter, leaner and an emphasis on unconventional warfare systems been made, despite all the lip service a large beauracracy takes time to make any real change.

[5] Alliances and relations in the pacific basin region are complicated and pose many difficulties for U.S. strategic positioning.

[6] Kennett, Lee. The First Air War 1914-1918, The Free Press, New York, 1991, pg 21

[7] Sherry, Michael S. The Rise of American Airpower; The Creation of Armageddon. Yale University Press, New Haven CT, 1987, pg 53

[8] Johnson, Wray. AW 505 Tactical Airpower Theory, Syllabus, p 11

[9] Overall or locally as required.

[10] Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD), Destruction of Enemy Air Defense (DEAD).

[11] F/A-22, F-35, several proposed and developmental UAVs, the Comanche helicopter are all examples. Even the Navy is getting involved with small ‘stealthy’ ship designs.

[12] Physics of course still apply, but the machine takes considerably more Gs. However, many questions are begged from this fact, does it matter? Does taking the man out of the machine for these considerations add more value to the weapon system than is lost?

[13] Fancy technology aside, the fusion of all this information is the single most important, and difficult task for aircraft designers.

[14] Airbreathing, hybrid, manned or unmanned.

[15] Strategic targets, interdiction targets, it makes little difference.

[16] ATACMs for example.

[17] This time it is being pushed from the top down, vice only mid and low-level officer efforts. The trend is well entrenched in doctrinal publications.

[18] Fratricide is a continuing challenge as evidenced by the fact that one of the single largest casualty situations in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was a blue on blue incident..

[19] Not technically 'precision' weapons but the word suffices in this context.

[20] Sherry, p 2

[21] Sherry, p 2

[22] No matter how remote it might be.

[23] A submarine is a good parallel for such a ‘ship’. Self contained in a very hostile environment, and very complicated with a relatively large crew.

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