Gender, Nation, and Multiculturalism



Paper prepared for a presentation at

Pacific World in Motion

Green College/St.John's College

The University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada

March 13 -15, 2008

Marriage Migration and Changing Gender-Nation Relations in South Korea

Abstract

The Korean’s state gendered antinatalist economic development project has become one of the most significant causes of the marriage migration. The previous antinatalist policies resulted in two intended consequences: below replacement level fertility rate and involuntary bachelors due to imbalanced sex-ratio. The first consequence signifies the biological reproduction of the Korean nation in being challenged. The presence of marriage migrants and their children implies the cultural reproduction of the Korean nation is in danger as well. To meet both cultural and biological reproduction of the Korean nation, Korean state adopts pronatalist assimilation policies towards marriage migrants.

Hui-Jung Kim

hjkim@ssc.wisc.edu

Department of Sociology

University of Wisconsin-Madison

8128 Sewell Social Science Building

1180 Observatory Drive

Madison, WI 53706-1393

Marriage Migration and Changing Gender-Nation Relations in South Korea

Feminists have long argued that women are objects of national policy as the biological and cultural reproducers of the nation (Krishnarj, Sudarshan and Shariff 1998; Orloff 1996; Puri 2004; Yuval-Davis 1997, 1998; Yuval-Davis and Anthias 1989). What ideal women are to do for the nation changes across time as the needs of the nation changes (Chong 2006). In addition, national policies differentiate women and expect different roles from them depending on their race, ethnicity, class, and age (Yuval-Davis and Anthias 1989).

This paper examines how marriage migration shapes, and are shaped by, the gender-nation relations in South Korea. Female marriage migrants form a unique group whose status is differentiated by their ethnicity, immigration status, and marital status as well as gender. In the Korean context, there is a tension between concerns about the aging society/low fertility rates and the loss of national identity with the inflow of marriage migrants. To address this tension, ethnically homogeneous Korea is trying to assimilate and incorporate immigrant women married to Korean men, and especially their children, as real Koreans, under the rhetorical rubric of multiculturalism. The Korean case helps to illuminate both the ways in which states use women and images of women to promote nation-building and the ways in which women’s ethnicity, not just their gender, is itself important in this gendered nation-building process.

Gender, Nation and the State

Feminist scholars have noted the importance of gender and images of women in nation-building.

First of all, women are biological reproducers of the nation. Women are called upon to rear more or fewer children depending on the needs of the nation. National women are often kept “pure” to preserve the nation. In addition, women are expected to reproduce the nation culturally. They transmit cultural traditions and values to their children. In this sense, women are crucial in drawing the biological and cultural boundaries of a nation (See, inter alia,; Gingras 1995; Jayawardena 1986; Kim and Choi 1998; Kim and Puri 2005; Yuval-Davis 1997, 1998; Yuval-Davis and Anthias 1989). Another significant form in which women relate to nation is national development. Women are instruments and symbolic indicators of national (primarily economic) development (Krishnarj, Sudarshan and Shariff 1998; Puri 2004).[1] Indeed, many developing countries rely on women’s cheap and docile labor for economic development.

The state plays a significant role in configuring specific forms of how women relate to the nation (Chong 2006; Yuval-Davis and Anthias 1989; Yuval-Davis 1997). National population policies and immigration policies both reflect and influence the gendered nation-building processes.

Gender, Nation, and State in Population Policies

In most developing countries, population polices are a significant part of economic development packages. Through institutions such as International Conference on Population and Development, the Western countries have spread the Malthusian prophecy of population and economic growth to the global South (Correa 1994; Dixon-Mueller 1993; Hartmann 1987; Krishnarj, Sudarshan and Shariff 1998). With help of funding and know-how from the Western countries, states of developing countries have tried, and in many cases succeeded in, curtailing their fertility rates (Mauldian and Ross 1991; McNicoll 2006). The gendered nature of these population polices-cum-development polices is well documented. The burden of birth-control usually falls upon women (Chatterjee and Riley 2001; Correa 1994; Greenhalgh 1995; Hartmann 1987). In addition, women can provide much-needed cheap, docile labor in labor-intensive industries, which is crucial for economic development for most developing countries. That women with fewer children are more able, and willing to, participate in the labor market provides another rationale for antinatalist policies among developing countries (Bauer 1990; Manson 2001). Women are encouraged to have fewer children for the national economic development.

Fertility rate is often served as “indicators” of various kinds. First, international funding agencies considered fertility rate in deciding whether to provide economic aids. Fertility decline rate was considered as an indicator of the state’s seriousness of achieving economic development (Hartmann 1987). Moreover, women who are aware of birth control and have fewer children are praised as being modernized and enlightened. Such women then symbolize the modernized and developed nation (Chatterjee and Riley 2001; Glosser 2003; Meyers 2001).

The significance of modernized and enlightened women is not limited just to a symbolic representation of the modernized nation. It is believed that civilization of women would lead to improvement of the nation, by producing more able and physically stronger (often male) national members (Glosser 2003; Michaels 2001). In this sense, population policies touch also upon women as reproducer of the nation, both biologically and culturally. Women are often encouraged to have more children to secure national reproduction. States with low-fertility rates encourage women to more children to secure reproduction of the nation (Brown and Ferree 2005; Hamilton 1995; King 1998; Maroney 1992). As Yuval-Davis aptly points out, women need not only to reproduce the nation biologically but also raise the children in a certain way so that the characters of the nation can be preserved and sometimes modified towards the direction envisioned by state elites. Thus states adopt both anti- and pro-natalist policies at the same time, encouraging certain groups of women having more children while discouraging others having fewer. Most dramatic and draconian cases of selective birth control policies can be found in Fascists Italy and Nazi Germany (Michaels 2001). However, softer versions of such policies are still practiced in Canada (Maroney 1992), France (King 1998), China (Wong 1997), Singapore (Heng and Devan 1992) and U.S. (Roberts 1997).

Gender, Nation and the State in Immigration Policies

Accepting immigrants has become a viable option for many countries with declining fertility rates and aging society. Indeed, the 2000 UN population report projected that replace migration would be needed in several European countries, U.S., Japan and South Korea (Grant 2001). The state exercises its power as “demography-shaping institution”[2] by shaping certain inflow of immigrants (Massey 1999; Robinson 2007) and gender is an important factor in national immigration policies (see, e.g., Kofman et al 2000; Mahler and Pesar 2006; Oishi 2005). Cheng, for example, argues that the state mediates the globalization of domestic services and reproductive, thus channeling Asian females as domestic workers (Cheng 2003; see, also, Truong 1996). Similarly Oishi (2005) points out how export-oriented economic development policies among East Asian state conditioned female migration inflow by creating the needs for cheap and docile labor.

Immigrant policies are gendered as well (Dua 2007; Piper 1997; Tuori 2007). First, controlling migrant women’s biological reproduction is an important concern for many labor-receiving states. Some states take rather extreme measures. The Singaporean state, for example, prohibits female migrants from getting married to a Singaporean citizen (Yeoh and Huang 2003). Second, immigrant incorporation policies focus on female, rather than male, migrants. Underlying immigrant incorporation policies is the association between femininity and assimilability; women can assimilate into a new culture more easily than their male counterparts and wives tend to assimilate to their husbands’ culture. However, female-oriented assimilation policies are not just a matter of women being more malleable than males are. Female migrants’ assimilation is an acute concern for the state because it is women through which traditions and cultures are transmitted to the next generation. Thus, to ensure cultural reproduction of the nation, it is crucial to assimilate migrant women to the country.

Female marriage migration from less developed to relatively more developed countries of Asia is becoming more prevalent (see, e.g., Constable 2005; Piper and Roces 2003; Robinson 2007). As women and as migrants, marriage migrants are subject to both population and immigration polices.

Marriage Migration and Changing Gender-Nation-State Relations in South Korea

South Korea is a particularly interesting case to study how marriage migration influences gender-nation relations because of its strong myths of ethnic homogeneity. South Korea has been considered as one of the few ethnically homogenous nation-states in the world (Connor 1994; Shin 2006). It is notorious for its strong ethnic definition of nationhood and obsession with the purity of blood. For instance, in August 2003, an actress, the child of a Korean mother and a white father, had to hold a press conference to ‘confess’ that she was not a ‘pure Korean”. She cried from shame during the entire press conference. This incident strongly illustrates the power of ‘ethnic purity’ in Korea.

However, recent years have witnessed an increasing number of marriage migrants in Korea to extent that the myth of ethnic homogeneity nation is being challenged. In 2005, for instance, a third of marriages in rural areas, and ten percent of all Korean marriages were international, mainly between marriage migrants (from China, Philippines and Vietnam) and Korean males. Starting in the early 1990s among unwilling rural bachelors, the mirage migrant phenomenon is now common among lower class urban Korean males as well. The proportion of marriage between foreign female and a Korean male as the percentage of total marriage increased from 3.4 percent in 1990, 9.9 per cent in 2004 and 13.6 per cent in 2005. In terms of the nationality of foreign wives, Vietnamese make up 53.2 per cent of total foreign wives, followed by Chinese (34.1%), the Philippines (6.9%) and others (5.8%). Accompanied by the declining fertility rates among Korean women, it is projected that marriage migrants and their children will significantly transform the ethnic composition of Korea. Indeed, the proportions of foreigners (which usually non-ethnic Koreans) as percentage of the Korean population reached 1per cent in 2006 and 2 per cent in 2007. Korea, one of the most ethnically homogenous nation-states in the world, is experiencing significant changes in its ethnic composition for the first time in its history.

Gender Regime I: Ethnic Purity and Economic Development

Since 1960s, that Korean state launched an intensive economic growth projects, relying on large cohort of baby boomers after the Korean War (Bauer 1990, 1995). Labor demands in labor-intensive, exported oriented manufacturing industries pulled surplus workers from rural areas. Indeed, 11 million South Koreans made rural-to-urban migration during 1957 and 1980 (Mason et al. 1980). In addition to the rural surplus labor force, the South Korean economic growth largely relied on women’s economic participation (Bauer 1990). The female share of total manufacturing in South Korea increased from 27 per cent in 1960 to 36 per cent by 1980.

To facilitate the women’s participation in the state-initiated economic development project, the Korean state encouraged rural women to migrate to cities. In 1961, Planned Parenthood Federation of Korea was established to administer both public and private sectors on the issues of family planning (Mason et al. 1980). Women were encouraged to have fewer children, initially to limit the number of children to three in 1960s, to two in 1970s, and finally to only one child in 1980s.

The following illustration is a Family-plan camping poster issued and distributed jointly by the Department of Health and Social Welfare and the Planned Parenthood Federation of Korea in 1974. As shown in the illustration, the poster associated having only two children with a shortcut to achieving GNP 1,000 dollars. Birth control will lead to more exports, as indicated by factories and merchant cargos on the upper left side of the poster, and in turn will lead to improved material conditions for the family, as symbolized by the house furnished in western style and equipped with electronics and a car. Thus, Korean women with one or two children are indicators and at the same time instrument of national development.

[Illustration 1 goes here]

Political mobilization of women relies also on the ethnic nationalism. The “ethnic purity” is maintained by controlling women’s sexuality. Women who have sexual relations with non-Korean men and their mixed-race children are looked down upon (Kim, H. 1998), as the actress’s news conference testifies. Mixed raced Koreans have been in Korea for at least four decades without being acknowledged as legitimate members of the Korean nation. For example, they have been exempt (or excluded) from conscription since early 1970s and were excluded even from the census and family registries until 1980.

The state-initiated economic development project, packaged with the gendered antinatalist policies, was evidently successful to the extent that Korea achieved unprecedented increase in economic status and dramatic decrease in fertility rate. Indeed, the fertility decline from 4.53 in 1970 to 1.67 in 1980, 1.47 in 2000, and 1.08 in 2005 remains as the most rapid decrease in the world history (Chang 1997). Alarmed by the below-replacement fertility rate, the Korean government abandoned its 30-year long antinatalist policies and moved toward pronatalist policies.

This gendered population control-cum-development policies not only lowered the fertility rates but also induced a particular form of international migration—marriage migrants—into Korea in the last few decades. Export-oriented economic development projects, relying cheap labor, caused a massive rural-to-urban migration. While the living conditions of the urban areas significantly improved, that of the rural areas became relatively worsened. In addition, antinatalist policies without sufficiently addressing the deep-rooted son-preference distorted the already imbalanced gender-ratio in the Korean population even more. The sex ratio of Korean population increased from 105.8 in 1960 to 112.5 in 1990 (Park and Cho 1995).

Influenced directly from these two unintended consequences are rural bachelors whose difficulty in finding a spouse became a serious social problem in 1980s and 1990s (Ablemann and Kim 2005; Freeman 2005). This became acknowledged as a serious social problem, especially in the face of declining fertility rates. Some regional governments and civil organizations have launched “Rural Bachelors Matching Drive” campaigns. Having failed to find Korean women willing to get married and live in rural areas, a solution to this “rural bachelor problem” was to import brides from less-developed countries of Asia. In this way, the Korean state’s gendered economic development policies induced, if not intentionally, the “need” for spousal migrants (Freeman 2005; Robinson 2007).

Gender Regime II: Ensuring Biological and Cultural Reproduction of the Korean Nation

Korean Total Fertility Rate as of 2005 is 1.08, which is far below replacement level (2.1). Korea National Statistical Office projects daunting prospects: the total population size will hit its climax in 2020 and will start to decrease after then. Number of fertile women is decreasing and the pool of women at fertile age with spouses is shrinking even at a greater rate. The support dependency ratio would decline from the current ‘8 to 1’ to ‘8 to 4-5’ by 2020. The Korean state has to address the issue of ensuring biological reproduction of the Korean nation.

Facing population problems related to aging and low fertility, states usually have two options. One is accepting immigrants and the other implementing pronatalist policies (Elabor-Idemudia 2005). Unlike Western European countries, the Korean state almost exclusively relies on Korean women producing future Korean children to cope with declining/aging population problems. While the Korean state is feeling more and more pressures for accepting immigrants, it is yet to have any formal immigration policies. Instead, in May 2005, the Korean government announced “Act on Aging and Low-Birth Rate”. The Act aims “to maintain proper population composition and to improve its quality in view of maintaining the state’s growth” (Article 2) and stipulates that “the State and regional governments shall analyze proper size of population for the growth of the State/the region, and shall implement appropriate population policies on the basis of reasoned prediction on population change” (Article 7). In the following September, a Presidential committee on Aging Society and Population Policy was organized based on the Act. The Korean state copes to the challenges of ensuring the biological reproduction of the Korean nation by transiting from fertility-discouraging to fertility-encouraging policies.

As explained above, marriage migration is an unintended consequence of the previous developmental antinatalist policies. As a liberal state, it is politically impossible for the Korean state to prohibit marriage migration. After all, to whom to one marry to is ultimately individual matter of choice. While marriage migration cannot be stopped by the state authority, the Korean state finds marriage migration potentially beneficial. First, marriage migrants can help ensuring the biological reproduction of the Korean nation. Marriage migrants can contribute to population growth first by themselves becoming Koreans. To encourage marriage migrants to naturalize, the Korean state amended the Nationality Law in 2004 to ease citizenship acquisition requirements for marriage migrants.[3] Second, marriage migrants can ensure much-needed social stability in rural areas where unwilling rural bachelors can cause serious social problems such as prostitution and gambling. For this reason, regional states are more active in welcoming marriage migrants. Indeed, one regional government even announced the implementation of “Rural Bachelor International Marriage Support Ordinance”, which the regional government subsidies about 40 to 50 per cent of costs involved in bringing a marriage migrant. Yet a far more important way from the Korean state’s perspective is that marriage migrants can be beneficial is by bearing and raising children.

However, the presence of non-ethnic Korean wives and their half-blooded Korean children implies the cultural reproduction of the Korean nation is in danger. Reflecting this concern regarding cultural reproduction of the Korean nation, incorporation policies vis-à-vis marriage migrants are geared toward maintaining families and rearing children. In 2005, the Korean Immigration Bureau added the “Marriage Migrants” category to its annual immigration report. As Foucault’s insight suggests, adding this category provided the Korean state’s with critical information for implementing policies specifically for marriage migrants. The Presidential Committee on Social Inclusion’s reports on “Social Support Measures for Mixed race and Immigrants” outlines and introduces comprehensive multicultural policies (announced on April 26, 2006). With the announcement, the Korean state eased naturalization requirements for marriage migrants and provides free Korean culture/language classes.

To reproduce “Korean” children, the present pronatalist policies not only include conventional measures such as tax incentives and child allowances but also, explicit assimilation policies to assist foreign wives to produce and rare “Korean” children. The most significant measure is the establishment of Marriage Migrants Total Support Program supervised by the Ministry of Family and Gender Equality.

This program was drafted to provide social supports for the difficulties marriage migrant women face; for example, family conflicts, language problems, and anxiety related to pregnancy and childbirth in a foreign place. Maternity protection guides containing information on Korean language courses, pregnancy and childbirth, and childcare courses will be published in Chinese, Vietnamese, English, and Russian. The content of these guides incorporates Korean family customs and culture; the guides will be used in family life and childbirth counseling (Mission Statement from MOGEF Official Website).

As the program’s mission statement makes it clear, the Korean state’s main concern lies with assisting/encouraging marriage migrants to give birth to and raise Korean children. For this purpose, the Marriage Migrant Support Center aims to provide pregnancy/birth/raising friendly environment, provides children-raising tips printed in marriage migrants’ mother tongues and door-to-door nursing assistance for those pregnant. It is not a surprise that marriage migrants with children benefit more from the Korean state programs than those who do not. Marriage migrants are, for example, entitled for Minimum Living support and Mother/Child support Act if with children even before they acquire Korean citizens. Those two social welfare programs are usually limited only to Korean citizens.[4] In addition to the providing support and incentives, the Korean state collects data on marriage migrant fertility rates by nationalities of marriage migrants. A congressman concerned with Chinese marriage migrants having relatively low fertility rate and suspected case of marriage of convenience for migrants to visa to find a job in Korea.[5]

[Illustration 2 around here]

Illustration 3 is a cover of guidebook distributed to marriage migrants at free of charge. The illustration clearly shows what the Korean state expects from a marriage migrant; first, she arrives from abroad. Has a traditional style-wedding, which is not common even among Koreans. Take care of the house. Most importantly, rear (at least!) two children. At the center of the cover illustration is a Korean traditional mask, symbolizing both the importance of Korean cultural traditions and a happy Korean husband pleased with all the roles that a marriage migrant fulfills for him and his family. In short, marriage migrants are expected to contribute to the cultural and biological continuity of the Korean nation by performing the roles as mothers, wives, and daughter-in-laws.

Marriage Migration and an Odd Embrace of Multiculturalism

The Korean state’s policies regarding marriage migrant incorporation are focused on assimilating marriage migrants into typical Korean wives and in following Korean child-rearing norms. Nonetheless, in terms of rhetoric, the Korean state uses “multiculturalism” in framing its marriage migrant and mixed-race Korean incorporation policies. For example, the preface of the Social Support Measures for Mixed-race Koreans and Immigrants, which provided the blueprint for incorporation policies, reads “[These suggestions] will facilitate Korea’s transition towards an open, multicultural society where mixed-race. The report wishes these measures “will facilitate Korea’s transition towards open multicultural society where mixed races and immigrants are not discriminated but their presence is valued.” President Noh also declared that “the trend towards multi-race/multicultural society is irresistible” and therefore “it’s a high time to take measures to incorporate immigrants and to adopt multicultural policies.” as a rhetorical device while pursuing assimilation policies towards marriage migrants.

The use of “multiculturalism” is interesting; the substantive mode of incorporation is not much multiculturalism as assimilation. Why does the Korean state embrace multiculturalism as rhetorical rubric while the substantive policies aim to assimilating marriage migrants?

However assimilated marriage migrants and their children are, they are not ethnic Koreans from the “purity of blood” perspective, which has been a dominant cultural understanding of the Korean nation. The presence of ethnically diverse groups of women brings out the changes of cultural understanding of the Korean nation. In this sense, the Korean state’s odd embrace of multicultural Korean nation illustrates the centrality of gender in the symbolic representation of the nation.

Conclusion

The Korean’s state gendered antinatalist economic development project has become one of the most significant causes of the marriage migration. The previous antinatalist policies resulted in two intended consequences: below replacement level fertility rate and involuntary bachelors due to imbalanced sex-ratio. The first consequence signifies the biological reproduction of the Korean nation in being challenged. To address this challenge, the Korean state shifted to pronatalist policies. Just as the earlier antinatalist policies were nationalistic (having less children can contribute to the rapid national development), however, the current pronatalist policies are also nationalistic (to sustain national growth, Korean women should produce more children). In either case, women are encouraged to have fewer/more children for the sake of the Korean nation. What is different between the earlier antinatalist and the present pronatalist approaches is the addition of an “ethnic” dimension due to the increasing number of marriage migrants and mixed raced Koreans in recent years. The presence of marriage migrants and their children implies the cultural reproduction of the Korean nation is in danger as well.

The Korean state tries to secure both ‘biological’ and ‘cultural’ reproduction of the Korean nation, mainly through exerting influence over women’s body and practices. If the Korean state rejects marriage migrants, it runs the risk of jeopardizing biological reproduction of the Korean nation. If the Korean state does not intervene in assimilating marriage migrants, it runs the risk of endangering the cultural reproduction of the Korean nation. To meet both cultural and biological reproduction of the Korean nation, Korean state adopts pronatalist assimilation policies towards marriage migrants.

The Korean case is consistent with prior work that has shown that gender is important in nation building. It breaks new ground in two important respects. First, it shows that making of ethnicity is gendered. Women’s ethnicity is seen as capable of changing to match her husband’s ethnicity. In addition, it is the paternal bloodline that determines the children’s ethnicity. On the other hand, the Korean case shows the significance of gendered body in the symbolic representation of the nation. It is the inclusion of the ethnically different women that urges the Korean state to give up ethnic purity model of the Korean nation and to embrace multicultural Korea.

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[1] Although I do not discuss in this paper, women as active participants in the national liberation or national reunification movements is another important way how gender is related to the nation and the state (see, e.g., Ablemann 1993; Chong 2006; Kim, J.E. 1994; Kim, S 2000; Jayawardena 1986).

[2] Immigration polices here include both immigrant selection policies and immigrant incorporation policies.

[3] Compared to general naturalization process requirements (5 years of legal residency in Korea and the ability to speak Korean and to understand of Korean culture), marriage migrants must satisfy one of two sets of less demanding requirements: 1) 2 years of legal residency in Korea with their Korean spouses or 2) a minimum 1-year legal residency in Korea after 3 years of marriage to a Korean national (Nationality Law Article 6 Clause 2).

[4] In addition to marriage migrant support programs, recent incorporation policies include various measures regarding children of marriage migrants. Examples include: Mixed children counseling tool /Mentoring System, Provision of multicultural education for teachers, After-school classes, Introduction of Anti-discrimination law

Amendment of Conscription rules.

[5] Cited in Segeilbo, February 26, 2007

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