Portfolioprojecthc.files.wordpress.com



Cybersecurity AFFTrump is in Inherency 1ACAdvantage 1 – Cybersecurity1. Chinese attacks prevalent — now is key because technologies are advancingGertz 16 — Bill Gertz, senior editor of the Washington Free Beacon. Prior to joining the Beacon he was a national security reporter, editor, and columnist for 27 years at the Washington Times. senior editor of the Washington Free Beacon. Prior to joining the Beacon he was a national security reporter, editor, and columnist for 27 years at the Washington Times, 2016 ("China Continuing Cyber Attackson U.S. Networks," Washington Free Beacon, March 18th, Available Online at , Accessed 06-30-2016, MEW)Six months after China pledged to halt cyber espionage against the United States, Beijing’s hackers continue to conduct cyber attacks on government and private networks, the commander of U.S. Cyber Command told Congress. Despite a formal pledge made by Chinese leader Xi Jinping in September, “cyber operations from China are still targeting and exploiting U.S. government, defense industry, academic, and private computer networks,” Adm. Mike Rogers, the Cybercom chief, said in prepared testimony to a House Armed Services subcommittee on Wednesday. Rogers echoed comments on continued Chinese cyber attacks made by Director of National Intelligence James Clapper in February. Clapper said in Senate testimony that “it remains to be seen” if China will abide by the informal pledge made during a summit meeting in Washington with President Obama. Rogers said he agreed with Clapper that China’s commitment to halt cyber espionage attacks remains an open question. China has been linked by U.S. intelligence agencies to wide-ranging cyber attacks aimed at stealing information and mapping critical computer networks for future attacks in a crisis or conflict. Despite the Chinese hacking activity, the Obama administration has taken no action against China for years of large-scale cyber attacks that officials say have cost the nation billions of dollars in stolen intellectual property and compromised networks. Rogers also warned that nation states with advanced cyber warfare capabilities are taking steps to mask their cyber attacks by cooperating with non-government hackers. Unspecified nation states are expanding cooperation “with a much broader range” of hackers in a bid to hide the source of sophisticated cyber attacks. “I think this is in no small part an attempt to obscure what the real originator of the activity is,” he said. The use of surrogate hackers makes it more difficult for the U.S. government to confront foreign states about cyber attacks. “And they say, ‘It’s not us. It’s some criminal group; we don’t control all that,’” Rogers said. Rogers also disclosed new details about cyber attacks against the email system used by the military’s Joint Chiefs of Staff, an attack that officials have blamed on Russia. The July attack shut down an unclassified email server for 10 days and disrupted an email system used by 4,000 users on the network. Pentagon officials believe the attack came from Russian government hackers. “Ultimately we were able to defeat the [intrusion] attempt in almost 60 other networks simultaneously except in this one particular network,” Rogers said, noting that the final defense against cyber attacks is the user of a computer. “In this case we had a user who clicked on a link that I said ‘What would lead you to do this? Read this. It doesn’t make any sense.’” Because computer users in the Joint Staff clicked on an email link that downloaded a virus, the Pentagon was forced to spend time and money and limit use of the system. “We can’t afford to have this sort of thing,” Rogers said. Under questioning from Rep. Elise Stefanik (R., N.Y.), Rogers said he is “comfortable” that Cyber Command has enough military capabilities to counter cyber threats from Russia, China, and other states and entities. “I’ve yet to run into a threat scenario that we couldn’t deal with,” he said. But Rogers voiced worries about his command having enough forces to deal with the threats. “What concerns me is capacity—how much of it do you have and as the threats proliferate, our ability to deal with high-end, simultaneous complicated threats, that’s probably the biggest limiting factor right now,” he said.2. A CERT compliance framework paves the way for strong cooperation on cybersecurity and decreases the risk of cyber-catastrophe. Gady 15 — Franz-Stefan Gady, Senior Fellow and Foreign Policy Analyst at the East-West Institute, Editor at The Diplomat, M.A. in International Relations from John Hopkins University, B.A. in International Relations from Weber University, 2015 (“Can the US and China Cooperate on the First (and Last) Line of Cyber Defense?,” The Diplomat, October 30th, Accessible Online at , Accessed On 06-22-2016, MA) *CERT - Computer Emergency Response TeamsTo avoid past mistakes, the rather vague September agreement needs to be followed up as soon as possible by bilateral meetings to more clearly define specific venues of cooperation between China and the United States. And while the September agreement talks about a meeting of a new joint China-U.S. high-level government-to-government working group to combat cybercrime to be held before the end of the 2015 and biannually in subsequent years, other initiatives to deepen cooperation between the two countries need to happen. One possible way to do so is to strengthen cooperation between the Chinese and U.S. Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs). In general, CERTs are the first (and last line) of defense in protecting a country’s critical information infrastructure from cyberattacks and are tasked with coordinating responses to network intrusions across the nation and beyond. China’s CERT is specifically tasked with “building up the national monitoring, warning, emergency response, evaluation and public opinion centers for network security.” It serves as the coordinating body for other CERTs in China and also engages with CERTs in other countries. Of particular note here is the cooperation between the CERTs of China, Japan, and South Korea. The CERTs meet annually, share information including threat data, have established a 24/7 technical hotline, and purportedly have a protocol for crisis escalation in place in the event of major cyberattacks. Representatives of the three countries recently met in Seoul to better coordinate their cyber policies when it comes to fighting cybercrime and terrorism. China and the United States have also been cooperating on a CERT level over the last couple of years, but at a rather ad-hoc and impromptu level, which has substantially undermined collaboration. For example, up until now no joint protocol exists for how to handle requests for information or what type of information needs to be provided for one side to take action when an incident occurs.3. Cyber-attacks on the power grid shut down the military, economy, and society. Damages are irreparable.Lovins 10 Amory B, Chairman and Chief Scientist of Rocky Mountain Institute, "DOD's Energy Challenge as Strategic Opportunity", Issue 57, 2nd Quarter 2010, ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq-57/lovins.pdfThe Resilience Capability Resilience “combines efficient energy use with more diverse, dispersed, renewable supply—turning the loss of critical missions from energy supply failures (by accident or malice) from inevitable to near-impossible.” 37 This capability is vital because the: [a]lmost complete dependence of military installations on a fragile and vulnerable commercial power grid and other critical national infrastructure places critical military and Homeland defense missions at an unacceptably high risk of extended disruption. . . . [Backup generators and their fuel supplies at military installations are generally sized] for only shortterm commercial outages and seldom properly prioritized to critical loads because those are often not wired separately from non-essential loads. DOD’s approach to providing power to installations is based on assumptions that commercial power is highly reliable, subject to infrequent and short term outages, and backups can meet demands. [These assumptions are] . . . no longer valid and DOD must take a more rigorous risk-based approach to assuring adequate power to its critical missions. 38 The 2008 DSB Task Force found that the confluence of many risks to electric supply— grid overloads, natural disasters, sabotage or terrorism via physical or cyberattacks on the electric grid, and many kinds of interruptions to generating plants—hazards electricitydependent hydrocarbon delivery, the national economy, social stability, and DOD’s mission continuity. The U.S. electric grid was named by the National Academy of Engineering as the top engineering achievement of the 20 th century. It is very capital-intensive, complex, technologically unforgiving, usually reliable, but inherently brittle. It is responsible for ~98–99 percent of U.S. power failures, and occasionally blacking out large areas within seconds—because the grid requires exact synchrony across subcontinental areas and relies on components taking years to build in just a few factories or one (often abroad), and can be interrupted by a lightning bolt, rifle bullet, malicious computer program, untrimmed branch, or errant squirrel. Grid vulnerabilities are serious, inherent, and not amenable to quick fixes; current Federal investments in the “smart grid” do not even require simple mitigations. Indeed, the policy reflex to add more and bigger power plants and power lines after each regional blackout may make the next blackout more likely and severe, much as suppressing forest fires can accumulate fuel loadings that turn the next unsuppressed fire into an uncontrollable conflagration. Power-system vulnerabilities are even worse in-theater, where infrastructure and the capacity to repair it are often marginal: “attacks on the grid are one of the most common and effective tactics of insurgents in Iraq, and are increasingly seen in Afghanistan.” 39 Thus electric, not oil, vulnerabilities now hazard national and theater energy security. Simple exploitation of domestic electric vulnerabilities could take down DOD’s basic operating ability and the whole economy, while oil supply is only a gathering storm.We isolate 2 impacts First is EconomyGrid overload would crash the economyJagdfeld 8/6 Aaron Jagdfeld, is president and chief executive officer of Generac Power Systems in Waukesha, WI. people in the United States were affected by power outages last year than at any time in the industrial age. Yet what we faced during the past year pales in comparison to the largest electrical outage in world history that knocked out power to nearly 700 million people last week in India, crippling their economy.? The U.S. is one of the most developed nations in the world. Our day-to-day interactions are guided by technologies and innovations that rely upon the power grid. But as we continue to develop technological mastery, our power grid is aging and fragile, and its susceptibility to outages means our way of life could break down in an instant.? Unlike generations past, our lives and businesses are now connected through a vast network of computers and data centers that consume enormous amounts of electricity. Our homes are bigger, with more luxuries and appliances than ever. We count on power in ways our parents couldn’t imagine.Power quality is the measure of reliable power in our homes and businesses, and it has been declining steadily since 1990. During this time, demand for power has increased by 25%, but the infrastructure needed to transmit power to homes has increased by a mere 7%. We have become a digital society, but are burdened with an analog power grid—one that is inefficient and susceptible to weather, surging demand, and even terrorist attack.? Each outage comes at a cost; the average cost of a one-second outage among industrial and digital firms is about $1,477. That means the U.S. economy loses between $104 billion and $164 billion each year to power outages. Losses like that affect all of us. An outage lasting days, as in India, would represent hundreds of billions of dollars lost, taxing our already fragile economy.? Fixing our power grid is no simple feat. The best estimates put the price tag for a new grid at two trillion dollars, or about 14% of our current gross domestic product. There is no legitimate national plan to create a new grid, nor are there public funds available to fix the grid we have.? American utility companies are as constrained as the government when it comes to meaningful investment in grid improvement. The 3,200 utility companies that touch the power grid are regulated by an equal number of agencies, many of which exist solely to minimize cost to consumers. This is undeniably good for consumers in most cases, but it has left us with a broken power grid that no one is responsible for (or capable of) fixing.Economic collapse causes global Chaos- leads to a laundry list of problemsAuslin 9 (Michael, Resident Scholar – American Enterprise Institute, and Desmond Lachman – Resident Fellow – American Enterprise Institute, “The Global Economy Unravels”, Forbes, 3-6, )What do these trends mean in the short and medium term? The Great Depression showed how social and global chaos followed hard on economic collapse. The mere fact that parliaments across the globe, from America to Japan, are unable to make responsible, economically sound recovery plans suggests that they do not know what to do and are simply hoping for the least disruption. Equally worrisome is the adoption of more statist economic programs around the globe, and the concurrent decline of trust in free-market systems. The threat of instability is a pressing concern. China, until last year the world's fastest growing economy, just reported that 20 million migrant laborers lost their jobs. Even in the flush times of recent years, China faced upward of 70,000 labor uprisings a year. A sustained downturn poses grave and possibly immediate threats to Chinese internal stability. The regime in Beijing may be faced with a choice of repressing its own people or diverting their energies outward, leading to conflict with China's neighbors. Russia, an oil state completely dependent on energy sales, has had to put down riots in its Far East as well as in downtown Moscow. Vladimir Putin's rule has been predicated on squeezing civil liberties while providing economic largesse. If that devil's bargain falls apart, then wide-scale repression inside Russia, along with a continuing threatening posture toward Russia's neighbors, is likely. Even apparently stable societies face increasing risk and the threat of internal or possibly external conflict. As Japan's exports have plummeted by nearly 50%, one-third of the country's prefectures have passed emergency economic stabilization plans. Hundreds of thousands of temporary employees hired during the first part of this decade are being laid off. Spain's unemployment rate is expected to climb to nearly 20% by the end of 2010; Spanish unions are already protesting the lack of jobs, and the specter of violence, as occurred in the 1980s, is haunting the country. Meanwhile, in Greece, workers have already taken to the streets. Europe as a whole will face dangerously increasing tensions between native citizens and immigrants, largely from poorer Muslim nations, who have increased the labor pool in the past several decades. Spain has absorbed five million immigrants since 1999, while nearly 9% of Germany's residents have foreign citizenship, including almost 2 million Turks. The xenophobic labor strikes in the U.K. do not bode well for the rest of Europe. A prolonged global downturn, let alone a collapse, would dramatically raise tensions inside these countries. Couple that with possible protectionist legislation in the United States, unresolved ethnic and territorial disputes in all regions of the globe and a loss of confidence that world leaders actually know what they are doing. The result may be a series of small explosions that coalesce into a big bang. Second is Nuclear MeltdownCyber threat and grid meltdown is feasible — empirically provenPry 15 — Peter Pry, Executive Director of the Task Force on National and Homeland Security and Director of the U.S. Nuclear Strategy Forum, both Congressional Advisory Boards, and served on the Congressional EMP Commission, the Congressional Strategic Posture Commission, the House Armed Services Committee, and the CIA, author of the books "Blackout Wars", "Apocalypse Unknown", and "Electric Armageddon,” 2015 (“Cyber Hype?” The Mackenzie Institute, October 28th, Available Online at , Accessed June 29, 2016//AW)Tomorrow’s cyber super-threat, that with computer viruses and hacking alone can blackout the national electric grid for a year or more, and so destroy an entire nation, may already be upon us today. Admiral Michael Rogers on November 20, 2014, warned the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence that sophisticated great powers like China and Russia have the capability to blackout the entire U.S. national electric grid for months or years by means of cyber attack, according to press reports. Admiral Rogers, as Chief of U.S. Cyber Command and Director of the National Security Agency, is officially the foremost U.S. authority on the cyber threat. “It is only a matter of the when, not the if, that we are going to see something traumatic,” Admiral Rogers testified to Congress, as reported on CNN (November 21, 2014). However, Jonathan Pollett, a cyber-security expert, in an article challenged Admiral Rogers’ warning as wrong, or misunderstood and exaggerated by the press: “No, hackers can’t take down the entire, or even a widespread portion of the US electric grid. From a logistical standpoint, this would be far too difficult to realistically pull off,” writes Pollett in “What Hackers Can Do To Our Power Grid,” Business Insider (November 23, 2014). Yet, on March 31, 2015, Turkey’s national electric grid was temporarily blacked-out, briefly causing widespread chaos to businesses and society in a member of NATO and crucial U.S. ally in the Middle East. Reportedly, Iran caused the blackout by a cyber attack. But Turkey has not officially confirmed that Iran was the culprit. If so, it will be the first time in history that a nationwide blackout is confirmed as resulting from cyber warfare.Blackouts cause nuclear reactor meltdowns—guarantees extinctionHodges 14 Dave, an established award winning psychology, statistics and research professor as he teaches college and university classes at both the undergraduate and graduate level, an established author as his articles are published on many major websites, citing Judy Haar, a recognized expert in nuclear plant failure analyses, "Nuclear Power Plants Will Become America's Extinction Level Event", April 18 2014, 2014/04/18/nuclear-power-plants-will-become-americas-extinction-level-event/Fukushima is often spoken of by many, as a possible extinction level event because of the radiation threat. Fukushima continues to wreak havoc upon the world and in the United States as we are being bathed in deadly radiation from this event. Because of Fukushima, fish are becoming inedible and the ocean currents as well as the prevailing ocean winds are carrying deadly radiation. Undoubtedly, by this time, the radioactivity has made its way into the transpiration cycle which means that crops are being dowsed with deadly radiation. The radiation has undoubtedly made its way into the water table in many areas and impacts every aspect of the food supply. The health costs to human beings is incalculable. However, this article is not about the devastation at Fukushima, instead, this article focuses on the fact that North America could have a total of 124 Fukushima events if the necessary conditions were present. A Festering Problem Long before Fukushima, American regulators knew that a power failure lasting for days involving the power grid connected to a nuclear plant, regardless of the cause, would most likely lead to a dangerous radioactive leak in at least several nuclear power plants. A complete loss of electrical power poses a major problem for nuclear power plants because the reactor core must be kept cool as well as the back-up cooling systems, all of which require massive amounts of power to work. Heretofore, all the NERC drills which test the readiness of a nuclear power plant are predicated on the notion that a blackout will only last 24 hours or less. Amazingly, this is the sum total of a NERC litmus test. Although we have the technology needed to harden and protect our grid from an EMP event, whether natural or man-made, we have failed to do so. The cost for protecting the entire grid is placed at about the cost for one B-1 Stealth Bomber. Yet, as a nation, we have done nothing. This is inexplicable and inexcusable. Our collective inaction against protecting the grid prompted Congressman Franks to write a scathing letter to the top officials of NERC. However, the good Congressman failed to mention the most important aspect of this problem. The problem is entirely fixable and NERC and the US government are leaving the American people and its infrastructure totally unprotected from a total meltdown of nuclear power plants as a result of a prolonged power failure. Critical Analyses According to Judy Haar, a recognized expert in nuclear plant failure analyses, when a nuclear power plant loses access to off-grid electricity, the event is referred to as a “station blackout”. Haar states that all 104 US nuclear power plants are built to withstand electrical outages without experiencing any core damage, through the activation of an automatic start up of emergency generators powered by diesel. Further, when emergency power kicks in, an automatic shutdown of the nuclear power plant commences. The dangerous control rods are dropped into the core, while water is pumped by the diesel power generators into the reactor to reduce the heat and thus, prevent a meltdown. Here is the catch in this process, the spent fuel rods are encased in both a primary and secondary containment structure which is designed to withstand a core meltdown. However, should the pumps stop because either the generators fail or diesel fuel is not available, the fuel rods are subsequently uncovered and a Fukushima type of core meltdown commences immediately. At this point, I took Judy Haar’s comments to a source of mine at the Palo Verde Nuclear power plant. My source informed me that as per NERC policy, nuclear power plants are required to have enough diesel fuel to run for a period of seven days. Some plants have thirty days of diesel. This is the good news, but it is all downhill from here. The Unresolved Power Blackout Problem A long-term loss of outside electrical power will most certainly interrupt the circulation of cooling water to the pools. Another one of my Palo Verde nuclear power plant sources informed me that there is no long term solution to a power blackout and that all bets are off if the blackout is due to an EMP attack. A more detailed analysis reveals that the spent fuel pools carry depleted fuel for the reactor. Normally, this spent fuel has had time to considerably decay and therefore, reducing radioactivity and heat. However, the newer discharged fuel still produces heat and needs cooling. Housed in high density storage racks, contained in buildings that vent directly into the atmosphere, radiation containment is not accounted for with regard to the spent fuel racks. In other words, there is no capture mechanism. In this scenario, accompanied by a lengthy electrical outage, and with the emergency power waning due to either generator failure or a lack of diesel needed to power the generators, the plant could lose the ability to provide cooling. The water will subsequently heat up, boil away and uncover the spent fuel rods which required being covered in at least 25 feet of water to remain benign from any deleterious effects. Ultimately, this would lead to fires as well and the release of radioactivity into the atmosphere. This would be the beginning of another Fukushima event right here on American soil. Both my source and Haar shared exactly the same scenario about how a meltdown would occur. Subsequently, I spoke with Roger Landry who worked for Raytheon in various Department of Defense projects for 28 years, many of them in this arena and Roger also confirmed this information and that the above information is well known in the industry. When I examine Congressman Franks letter to NERC and I read between the lines, it is clear that Franks knows of this risk as well, he just stops short of specifically mentioning it in his letter. Placing Odds On a Failure Is a Fools Errand An analysis of individual plant risks released in 2003 by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission shows that for 39 of the 104 nuclear reactors, the risk of core damage from a blackout was greater than 1 in 100,000. At 45 other plants the risk is greater than 1 in 1 million, the threshold NRC is using to determine which severe accidents should be evaluated in its latest analysis. According to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 1, in Pennsylvania has the greatest risk of experiencing a core meltdown, 6.5 in 100,000, according to the analysis. These odds don’t sound like much until you consider that we have 124 nuclear power generating plants in the US and Canada and when we consider each individual facility, the odds of failure climb. How many meltdowns would it take in this country before our citizens would be condemned to the hellish nightmare, or worse, being experienced by the Japanese? The Question That’s Not Being Asked None of the NERC, or the Nuclear Regulatory tests of handling a prolonged blackout at a nuclear power plant has answered two critical questions, “What happens when these nuclear power plants run out of diesel fuel needed to run the generators”, and “What happens when some of these generators fail”? In the event of an EMP attack, can tanker trucks with diesel fuel get to all of the nuclear power plants in the US in time to re-fuel them before they stop running? Will tanker trucks even be running themselves in the aftermath of an EMP attack? And in the event of an EMP attack, it is not likely that any plant which runs low on fuel, or has a generator malfunctions, will ever get any help to mitigate the crisis prior to a plethora of meltdowns occurring. Thus, every nuclear power plant in the country has the potential to cause a Chernobyl or Fukushima type accident if our country is hit by an EMP attack. CAN YOU EVEN IMAGINE 124 FUKUSHIMA EVENTS IN NORTH AMERICA HAPPENING AT THE SAME TIME? THIS WOULD CONSTITUTE THE ULTIMATE DEPOPULATION EVENT. …And There Is More… The ramifications raised in the previous paragraphs are significant. What if the blackout lasts longer than 24 hours? What if the reason for the blackout is an EMP burst caused by a high altitude nuclear blast and transportation comes to a standstill? In this instance, the cavalry is not coming. Adding fuel to the fire lies in the fact that the power transformers presently take at least one year to replace. Today, there is a three year backlog on ordering because so many have been ordered by China. This makes one wonder what the Chinese are preparing for with these multiple orders for both transformers and generators. In short, our unpreparedness is a prescription for disaster. As a byproduct of my investigation, I have discovered that most, if not all, of the nuclear power plants are on known earthquake fault lines. All of California’s nuclear power plants are located on an earthquake fault line. Can anyone tell me why would anyone in their right mind build a nuclear power plant on a fault line? To see the depth of this threat you can visit an interactive, overlay map at this site. Conclusion I have studied this issue for almost nine months and this is the most elusive topic that I have ever investigated. The more facts I gather about the threat of a mass nuclear meltdown in this country, the more questions I realize that are going unanswered. With regard to the nuclear power industry we have the proverbial tiger by the tail. Last August, Big Sis stated that it is not matter of if we have a mass power grid take down, but it is a matter of when. I would echo her concerns and apply the “not if, but when” admonition to the possibility of a mass meltdown in this country. It is only a matter of time until this scenario for disaster comes to fruition. Our collective negligence and high level of extreme depraved indifference on the part of NERC is criminal because this is indeed an Extinction Level Event. At the end of the day, can anyone tell me why would any country be so negligent as to not provide its nuclear plants a fool proof method to cool the secondary processes of its nuclear materials at all of its plants? Why would ANY nuclear power plant be built on an earthquake fault line? Why are we even using nuclear energy under these circumstances? And why are we allowing the Chinese to park right next door to so many nuclear power plants?PlanThe United States Federal Government should increase its diplomatic and economic engagement with the People’s Republic of China by expanding cooperation between U.S. and Chinese Computer Emergency Response Teams thus achieving deeper bilateral cybersecurity negotiations, a concrete compliance framework and establishing cyber norms for the entire worldAdvantage 2 – Relations1. Halted cyber talks has heighted tensions between China and the USGady 16 (Franz-Stefan, Senior Fellow, EastWest Institute, "China-US Relations in Cyberspace: A Half-Year Assessment," June 16, accessed DDI –TM)Nevertheless, major stumbling blocks remain. First, while there may be a slowdown in Chinese state-sponsored attacks on the private sector, U.S. President Barack Obama extended a national state of emergency due to continued cyberattacks against U.S. critical information infrastructure in April 2015. “Significant malicious cyber-enabled activities originating from, or directed by persons located, in whole or in substantial part, outside the United States continue to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy and economy of the United States,” Obama wrote in a letter justifying the state of emergency extension this March. As a result, the United States can still impose economic sanctions and travel restrictions on foreign nationals thought to be behind cyberattacks—hardly a vote of confidence for the Chinese government. Second, progress during recent talks has been slow, leaving both the U.S. private sector and the U.S. military (along with U.S. intelligence agencies) [are] dissatisfied with the Obama administration’s approach to reducing Chinese state-sponsored attacks. Time and again, U.S. defense officials, along with private sector representatives, have leaked to the media the possibility of cyber counterattacks against Chinese critical information infrastructure. Neither, the Pentagon nor private sector is happy with the current U.S. cyber deterrence strategy. In particular, the U.S. State Department’s concepts of “deterrence by denial” as well as “voluntary norms of responsible state behavior in cyberspace” are seen as too weak in the face of persistent Chinese attacks. As a result, there is a chance that bilateral talks might collapse given the apparent disunity among stakeholders in the United States. Third, fundamental differences between China and the United States remain when it comes to Internet governance issues, China’s new anti-terror law, and military-to-military relations in cyberspace, among other things. Both the China and the United States continue building up their cyber weapons arsenals and probing each other’s networks. In a number of speeches Chinese President Xi Jinping vowed to improve China’s cyberwarfare capabilities and strengthen“cyber defense and deterrence capabilities.” As I noted previously, the U.S. Department of Defense published a new Law of War Manual, in which the pre-emplacement of “logic bombs” in an adversary country’s networks and information systems is advocated, which can further fuel competition and bred mistrust. Neither side accepts limitations in the development neither of cyber weapons nor to the overall militarization of cyberspace. However, analysts of China-U.S. relations in cyberspace have to take into account the ultimate objective of talks. That is, it is important to understand that the end goal of Sino-U.S. deliberations will not be an end to state-sponsored hacking and any other form of cyberattacks including cyber espionage, but [is] to put a framework in place that will not only help prevent disagreements in cyberspace from spilling over into other parts of the bilateral relationship, but also help both sides to get closer to an understanding of what constitutes strategic stability, i.e., peace, in cyberspace. On that front, we may expect some progress in the months ahead.2. A framework for CERT cooperation would prevent hiccups in relations and bolster cyber defense. Mussington 15 — David Mussington, Adjunct Professor in Political Science at Georgetown University, Fellow at the RAND Corporation, Ph.D. in Political Science from Carleton University, M.A. in Economics and Political Science from the University of Toronto, 2015 (“The Missing Compliance Framework in the 2015 U.S.-China Cybersecurity Agreement,” Institute for Defense Analysis, November 18th, Accessible Online at , Accessed On 06-22-2016, MA)A concrete compliance framework would be a significant diplomatic and political breakthrough – indicating that both sides had considered the costs of continuing the status quo – selecting instead an alternate course with agreed facts, definitions, and dispute discussion (if not resolution) procedures. Further, such a bilateral framework might partially insulate the relationship from temporary hiccups – caused by the discovery of ongoing activities (legacy) that had yet to be reined in consistent with the new rules of the game. CERT-to-CERT-type contacts would further deepen the linkage between bilateral agreements to refrain from proscribed actions in cyber and operational exchanges on data that support non-controversial investigations of cyber-crime. Lastly, such a framework could provide a mechanism for discussion of IP rights holder injury and remediation options. In this way the compliance framework would provide added support to law enforcement cooperation on cyber-crime already established, as well as aligning well with norms emerging from the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) process\]3. Unclear norms ensure escalation — arms races and false flag attacks. Rosenzweig 9 — Paul Rosenzweig, Professor of Law at Georgetown University, Senior Advisor to the Chertoff Group on National Security, Deputy Assistant Secretary for policy at the US Department of Homeland Security, 2009 (“National Security Threats in Cyberspace," American Bar Association Standing Committee on Law and National Security, September, Accessible Online at utexas.edu/law/journals/tlr/sources/Issue%2088.7/Jensen/fn137.Rosenwieg.pdf, Accessed On 01-26-2016, MA)Offensive dominance creates a great risk of cyber arms races. State and non-state actors are likely to view the prevalence of offensive cyber threats as a legitimate rationale for bolstering their own capabilities, both defensive and offensive, thus fueling an action-reaction dynamic of iterative arming. Experts believe that at least 20 nations are engaged in a cyber arms competition and possess the type of advanced capabilities needed to wage cyber war against the United States.121 As Michael Nacht, Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs, told us, “An arms race is already going on in cyberspace and it is very intense.”122 Conflict in cyberspace is uniquely predisposed to escalation given uncertainties about what constitutes an act of war and the growing number of state and non-state actors seeking offensive capabilities. Actors are more likely to misperceive or miscalculate actions in cyberspace, where there is no widely understood strategic language for signaling intent, capability and resolve.123 Uncertainty will encourage states to prepare for worst-case contingencies, a condition that could fuel escalation. Furthermore, “false flag” attacks, in which an actor purposefully makes an attack look like it came from a third party, could also ignite a conflict.1244. Cyberattacks escalate and provoke retaliation — misattribution undermines checks on conflict.Dycus 10 — Stephen Dycus, Professor of Law at the University of Vermont, Visiting Professor of National Security at the United States Military Academy, M.A. in Legal Studies from Harvard University, 2010 (“Congress’s Role in Cyber Warfare,” Journal of National Security Law & Policy, Vol. 4, No. 155, August 11th, Accessible Online at , Accessed On 06-29-2016, MA)The term “cybersecurity” might be understood to refer to defense against cyber attacks. “Cyber attack” suggests offensive use, but the label is inexact and might be misleading. A preemptive strike to ward off an imminent enemy attack is considered defensive. Digital espionage might be part of the preparation for an attack, or it might be perceived that way by the target, which might then be provoked to defend itself by responding with a preemptive attack, either cyber or kinetic. The important point here is that any use of cyber weapons, offensive or defensive, could have enormous consequences for the security and other interests of the United States. The effect of such use, actual or potential, matters more than the labels. And if the effect – on human life or property, for example, or diplomatic relations or compliance with the law of armed conflict – is substantial, Congress has a role to play in adopting policy for that use. Congress has not thus far adopted measures suited to the regulation of cyber warfare. The War Powers Resolution, for example, is concerned with sending U.S. troops into harm’s way, rather than with clicking a computer mouse to launch a cyber attack, although the strategic consequences might be similar. And the WPR’s relatively relaxed timetable for executive notice and legislative response is unrealistic for war on a digital battlefield. Similarly, if cyber warfare is regarded as an intelligence activity, the intelligence oversight measures just described cannot, for reasons already indicated, ensure that Congress will be able to play a meaningful role. In the words of the National Research Council study cited above, “Today’s policy and legal framework for guiding and regulating the use of cyberattack is ill-formed, undeveloped, and highly uncertain.” Our experience with nuclear weapons may point to needed reforms. Since the beginning of the Cold War, the United States has had a fairly clear nuclear policy (albeit one that deliberately includes an element of ambiguity) – one known generally to Congress, the American public, and potential enemies.46 Congress has approved or disapproved the purchase of the weapons and delivery systems. It has been briefed on the policy, and it has debated that policy vigorously.47 While Congress has not articulated U.S. nuclear policy in any coherent form, it has collaborated closely with the executive branch in the development and execution of that policy. Cyber weapons bear a striking resemblance to nuclear weapons in some important ways. An enemy’s cyber attack would, like a nuclear strike, probably come without a clear warning. There are as yet no reliable defenses against either a cyber attack or a nuclear attack. Collateral damage from a nuclear attack would almost certainly be very extensive and would linger for an extended period.48 The direct and indirect effects of a cyber attack, while different in kind and degree, still could be widespread and indiscriminate.49 In other ways, cyber weapons are critically different from their nuclear counterparts. For one thing, the time frame for response to a cyber attack might be much narrower. A nuclear weapon delivered by a land-based ICBM could take 30 minutes to reach its target. An electronic attack would arrive instantaneously, and leave(ing) no time to consult with or even inform anyone outside the executive branch before launching a counterstrike, if that were U.S. policy. What most distinguishes digital warfare, however, is the potential difficulty in identifying the source of a cyber attack. It is always possible, of course, that an enemy might covertly deliver a nuclear device to the U.S. homeland in a shipping container or a Cessna. But the apparent ease with which a cyber attack may be carried out without attribution could make it impossible to fight back at all. If an attacker made it appear that the source was an innocent neutral state or perhaps another enemy of the attacker, a misdirected U.S. response might provoke a wider conflict. The potential difficulty in tracking the source also makes a policy of deterrence based on a threat of retaliation far less credible. Given these characteristics of cyber warfare, and the continuing refinement of cyber weaponry, we approach a state of extreme strategic instability, with each nation on hair-trigger alert. The execution of an ill conceived cyber war policy calling for a prompt response – or any response – to an attack or threatened attack could have disastrous, unanticipated consequences. It also might, depending on the circumstances, violate the law of armed conflict. Solvency/Inherency US-China cooperation solves cyber norms. Lieberthal and Singer 14 — Kenneth Lieberthal, a senior fellow in Foreign Policy and Global Economy and Development at Brookings, former professor at the University of Michigan, has a bachelor’s from Dartmouth College, and a master’s and doctorate in political science from Columbia University, and Peter W. Singer, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, Director of the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence at the Brookings Institution, received his Ph.D. in Government from Harvard University and an A.B. from Princeton's Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, 2014 (“Cybersecurity and U.S.-China Relations,” John L. Thornton China Center and 21st Century Defense Initiative at Brookings, February, 06-29-2016, MA)But the United States and China are the two most significant national players in this sphere. Moreover, these two leading states represent very different views on the proper use and future of the Internet. We therefore feel that thinking through these issues in a U.S.-China context can provide a useful way to develop approaches that should then be discussed more broadly, with the goal of ultimately establishing global norms and implementing mechanisms to bring greater order and security to those parts of the cyber realm where this is feasible. More importantly, the spillover effect of cybersecurity on the broader U.S.-China relationship is also perhaps more critical than for any other bilateral relationship. This is both because of the enormous importance of U.S.-China relations in the emerging world order and, in turn, the growing role of cyber issues in eroding strategic trust and poisoning public and elite attitudes. If this trend can be reversed through improved engagement by the U.S. and China on cybersecurity, the outcome would be a “triple win.” It would bolster U.S.-China bilateral relations, serve as a crucial building block for multilateral efforts in the cyber arena, and also aid in broader US-Chinese engagement on other issues of importance, like global finance and the environment, where the two nations must learn to work better together. 2. Strong incentives for cyber security cooperation but dialogue is neededLindsay 15(Lindsay, Jon R. "Exaggerating the Chinese Cyber Threat. _cyber_threat.html Policy Brief,? Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, May 2015_)The rhetorical spiral of mistrust in the Sino-American relationship threatens to undermine the mutual benefits of the information revolution. Fears about the paralysis of the United States' digital infrastructure or the hemorrhage of its competitive advantage are exaggerated. Chinese cyber operators face underappreciated organizational challenges, including information overload and bureaucratic compartmentalization, which hinder the weaponization of cyberspace or absorption of stolen intellectual property. More important, both the United States and China have strong incentives to moderate the intensity of their cyber exploitation to preserve profitable interconnections and avoid costly punishment. The policy backlash against U.S. firms and liberal internet governance by China and others is ultimately more worrisome for U.S. competitiveness than espionage; ironically, it is also counterproductive for Chinese growth.The United States is unlikely to experience either a so-called digital Pearl Harbor through cyber warfare or death by a thousand cuts through industrial espionage. There is, however, some danger of crisis miscalculation when states field cyberweapons. The secrecy of cyberweapons' capabilities and the uncertainties about their effects and collateral damage are as likely to confuse friendly militaries as they are to muddy signals to an adversary. Unsuccessful preemptive cyberattacks could reveal hostile intent and thereby encourage retaliation with more traditional (and reliable) weapons. Conversely, preemptive escalation spurred by fears of cyberattack could encourage the target to use its cyberweapons before it loses the opportunity to do so. Bilateral dialogue is essential for reducing the risks of misperception between the United States and China in the event of a crisis.3. US-China cyber cooperation leads to global cascade-empirics proveChuanying 15 (Lu Chuanying, Research Fellow, Shanghai Institute For Int'L Studies, 12-14-2015, "Cyber Strategies of Great Powers: US-China Interactions and CooperationCHINA US Focus," No Publication, )Ensuring cyber security is a spotlight on the outcome list of US-China cooperation. The two sides have reached a consensus on six important areas for enhanced collaboration with respect to cyber security, namely, tackling malicious cyber-attacks, opposing commercial cyber espionage, cyber rule-making, combating cyber crimes, information technology trade, and security reviews of foreign investment. For the first time, the United States and China have reached a broad-based consensus on cyber issues with a view to managing discords and promoting cooperation. Its significance is manifold. To begin with, the summit meeting between President Xi and President Obama has created a cordial context for consensus building. For quite some time, the efforts by both sides to build a major power relationship have been hampered by such issues as disagreement over cyber issues and the escalating tensions in the South China Sea. Even so, the agreement reached between the two sides has sent a strong signal that both side will make every effort to overcome the Thucydides trap by forging a new pattern of US-China relations premised on no confrontation and no conflict, mutual respect, and win-win cooperation. Second, confidence-building measures with regard to cyber issues also convey symbolic meanings. After the Snowden revelations, cyber cooperation between major powers has become increasingly difficult. In particular, cyber cooperation between the United States and Russia was soon called off. The Sino-American consensus on cyber cooperation has serves as a demonstration of the global push for cyberspace governance. Soon after the two cyber powers publicized the outcome list, cooperation agreements between the United States and South Korea and between China and the United Kingdom were signed. Comparing these agreement texts, one can easily conclude that the Sino-American agreement has become the prototype agreement on cyber cooperation. Third, the Sino-American consensus could help to improve global governance in cyberspace. A UN report released in July on the code of conduct in cyberspace has laid out a general agreement on cyber infrastructure protection, confidence-building measures and international cooperation. China-US cooperation in cyberspace is a joint effort to implement the recommendations2ACCybersecurityAT: Alt CausesThough cybersecurity isn’t the only cause for the declining relations, it is the main cause and we solve for that The alts are big enough to actually cause bad things***Cyber cooperation spills over to solve alt causesNoori et al 15 (August 2015, Maral Noori is a program specialist at USIP. Daniel Jasper is the public education and advocacy coordinator for Asia at the AFSC. Jason Tower is the East Asia Quaker International Affairs representative a the AFSC., United States Institute of Peace, Peace Brief 192, p.3, )Points of tension should not prevent the United States and China from overcoming their challenges, enhancing cooperation, and fostering deeper mutual understanding and strategic trust. The private sectors and nongovernmental organizations on both sides could launch this process by enhancing their own cooperation. Ultimately, Washington and Beijing need to compartmentalize early on and hope that positivity on some ends—such as cooperation in Myanmar—will spill over to others—such as cyber security and the South China Sea. Both sides will need to commit to greater transparency so that in a moment of crisis, chances are minimal for misunderstanding to lead to a major conflict.***The plan’s enhanced cyber cooperation prevents an erosion of US-China relations generally. Chuanying 15 (12-14-2015, Lu Chuanying is a research fellow at Shanghai Institute for International Studies. He currently is a visiting fellow at CSIS. "Cyber Strategies of Great Powers: US-China Interactions and Cooperation," China US Focus, , accessed: 6-20-2016, JH)Cyber cooperation as a strong case for major-power relations Cyber issues have increasingly acquired strategic importance for the US-China relationship. But if handled properly, cyber cooperation makes a strong case and a template for major power relations in the 21st century. If handled roughly or even left unattended, its negative effects may spill over into other areas in the bilateral relationship, such as economic and political security. Therefore, the two sides have no other choice but to broaden and deepen cyber cooperation.Cyber cooperation over areas of mutual concern is effective and overcomes ideological barriersAdelson et al, 2014 (June 2014. Ian Adelson, Mellissa Z. Ahmed, Vivian Coyne, Han Lim, Zhifan Jia, L.C. Paisley, Kim Truong. U.S.-China Cybersecurity Cooperation. Capstone Report for theColumbia University School of International and Public Affairs. Faculty Advisor: Roy D. Kamphausen. )The issue of cybersecurity between China and the United States has been heavily discussed due to its criticality in maintaining the stability of each country’s respective economies and cultures. As China and the United States are increasingly interconnected and interdependent in many ways, it is crucial that the two states maximize their potential in securing their cyber networks by cooperating and working toward mutual goals. China’s current recognition of the importance of international cooperation in cyber realms provides the impetus for a partnership based on mutual respect and mutual benefit. Our team proposed three specific areas that are minimally contentious in terms of national security with the highest incentives for cooperation – namely, protecting financial systems, commercial ports, and civilian nuclear energy systems from third-party threats. Despite evident barriers, identifying mutually beneficial and non-threatening areas that do not endanger national security interests would help facilitate cooperation between the U.S. and China. Cyber crime, third party threats, and the Internet of Things may serve as such areas. Cooperating in such areas requires the two governments to engage in confidence building that runs parallel with a limited information sharing. As a gradual, incremental measure, joint cybersecurity exercise might also be deemed helpful. As the U.S. is pointed as in a position to take the initiative in building cyber cooperation with China, it is important that the U.S. understands China’s cybersecurity agenda and is able to offer benefits in exchange for China’s cooperation. Future dialogue and cooperation between the U.S. and China will improve mutual understanding in challenging key technical, economic, and strategic areas, clarify national and industrial perspectives, and lead to the sharing of ideas on how to improve the domestic and global management of cyberspace. Cooperation on cybersecurity key to US-Sino relations — spills over Jong-Chen 14 — Jong-Chen, Jing De, senior director and domain expert on global cybersecurity policy and strategy at Microsoft Corporation, 2014 ("U.S.-China Cybersecurity Relations: Understanding China’s Current Environment," Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, September 15th, Available Online at , Accessed 6-29-2016, MW)Recommendations U.S.-China relations are facing a challenging period. How do the United States and China move away from the mistrust that currently governs the relationship? How could the U.S. and China find common ground when there are clearly disagreements over cyber sovereignty and Internet use? With fundamentally different political and social systems, how would the U.S. and China align their national security interests with global benefits to protect cyber infrastructure and trade? What security policies and legal frameworks are needed to promote global collaboration and supply chain trust? The following recommendations are provided from an industry perspective as potential common areas for both sides to consider, while recognizing the different political and economic structures and cybersecurity goals of each country. Establish a leadership and relationship model. A cybersecurity leadership and relationship model is needed to normalize the communication and conflict resolution between both countries. It should involve U.S. and Chinese stakeholders from both the public and private sectors, including policy makers, senior domain experts from technical, legal, trade and diplomatic fields with security expertise. The goal is to identify activities that are considered threatening for both countries and keep government-to-government and government-to-industry communication channels open. There are many existing international models for such working partnerships that could be used to create a structure for dialogue and to work through the complex challenges of cybersecurity. Develop and adopt globally recognized best practices to address supply chain trust. These would help both Chinese and U.S. industries participate and innovate in the broader global ICT economy. Governments and industry could better secure their networks by establishing a proper security assurance model, operational procedures and protections. Further, the use of widely available security technologies such as public and well vetted commercial encryption and authentication management would make it harder for hackers to compromise confidential data, providing a higher level of security for governments, businesses and individuals alike. Expand the role of industry in cyber norms and cybersecurity solutions. Expanding public-private partnerships and leveraging private sector expertise is critical to improve global cybersecurity. For the past decades, the global technology industry has been a major driving force and contributor to the Internet economy and the development of security standards and best practices, regardless country of origin. The technology industry should be trusted to carry out the future innovations to boost productivity, connect people and improve quality of life worldwide. Most of all, the industry should become partner to protect global critical infrastructures. Build international partnerships to combat cybercrime. Law enforcement collaboration across international borders is critical for addressing global cybercrime. Judicial exchanges and specialized legal training and partnerships with law enforcement would increase the effectiveness of prosecuting cybercrime based on national and international laws, and would identify gaps in the legal process of both countries that may hinder prosecution. Industry should also be encouraged to deliver services and innovation to reduce user risks and minimize the damages of cybercrime. (Don’t Use)The plan’s offer is a good starting point even if it doesn’t address everything. Harold, RAND Center for Asia Pacific Policy associate director, 2016 (Scott, “Getting to Yes with China in Cyberspace”, )Were such a three-part agreement—including a norm of not targeting or intruding into each side’s critical infrastructure—combined with an offer to help China improve its attribution capabilities in exchange for a deal to actually follow through on, investigate, and maybe even prosecute cyber intrusions originating in China (or the United States) come into existence, it might change the nature of the two sides’ relations in cyberspace across an important swath of issues. To be sure, the two countries would still disagree strongly over such issues as freedom of access to information (United States) versus information control and cyber sovereignty (PRC), efficiency and effectiveness of the current international backbone architecture of the Internet (United States) versus cyber hegemony (PRC), whether both would still engage in cyber-enabled national security espionage, and differences over a host of other issues in cyberspace and beyond. But such a deal, if it could be credibly committed to and followed through on in practice, would represent a substantial improvement of the U.S.-China relationship in cyberspace, for which reason we argue it is worth consideration and additional research. In conclusion, Chinese and U.S. views of cybersecurity overlap only on a few points, and even where they do, the two sides will find it difficult to make progress on such issues as avoiding targeting of critical infrastructure if the two sides struggle to maintain the progress hinted at in the September 2015 summit agreement on cyberspace. With respect to reaching a broad, meaningful, and lasting agreement on norms about legitimate targets in cyberspace, much work remains to be done, and it is unclear that such a result will indeed be possible. Perhaps the most promising area where we might see some prospect of negotiating a set of norms in the years ahead lies in avoiding targeting or carrying out espionage on critical infrastructure. This could be supported by efforts to create common standards of evidence, define how attribution is to be done, and prosecute those who commit such actions.***US-China cooperation is key to solve climate change, nuclear prolif, disease, terrorism, drugsJianmin 15 (Wu Jianmin, Former President of China Foreign Affairs University, 4-16-2015, "Cooperation on Curbing Nukes and Climate Change Strengthens U.S.-China Link," Huffington Post, DDI - JT)The common challenges facing mankind have never been so daunting as they are today — climate change, nuclear weapons proliferation, terrorism, pandemics, natural disasters, drug trafficking, just to name a few. No country, no matter how powerful it is, is able to meet these challenges alone. Common challenges bring people together. Mankind is bound to unite for its survival. When China and the US, two largest economies in the world, cooperate, it makes a difference. In November 2014, President Xi Jinping and President Obama made a joint pledge on reducing pollution and carbon-gas emissions. As a result, the upcoming United Nations conference on climate change to be held in Paris from Nov. 30th to Dec. 10th this year looks much more promising. Nuclear weapons proliferation also poses a serious threat to international peace and security. Of all the global challenges it is the most complicated. The North Korean nuclear issue is the other major concern along with Iran. The Six-Party Talks on this issue have so far stalled for six years and at present show no sign of resuming any time soon. Even so, the fact that China and the US have agreed to pursue the goal of denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula has kept the issue from getting out of control. The year 1950 witnessed violent confrontation between China and the US in the Korean theater, but 2015 is not 1950. China-US cooperation has been a significant factor in keeping the lid on this conflict. Such cooperation, whether on Iran, North Korea or climate change, is an important building block for the new model of the major countries relationship. The way to conceive of this relationship is as a big house. It has to be built gradually block by block. The more building blocks laid, the faster that house will be built. As President Xi Jinping has put it: ”A sound China-US cooperation can become a ballast stone of world stability and a booster of world peace. ”Resolving cyber issues is a prerequisite to cooperation on other issues Harold 2016 (RAND Center fodr Asia Pacific Policy associate director, Scott, “Getting to Yes with China in Cyberspace”, )Chinese interlocutors recognize that the cyber issue is an irritant in relations between the two countries and that it erodes strategic trust (as the Chinese put it). A reduction in strategic trust, in turn, may fircomplicate the resolution of other issues (e.g., trade, environment, geostrategic matters). It may also increase the odds of future conflict, either accidental or intentional. Thus, even if one believes that little in cyberspace makes much difference compared with controversies in the physical world (e.g., South China Sea), resolving issues in that medium could have a knock-on effect outside it and vice versa.***AT: “CERTs Don’t Solve Cyber Cooperation”***CERTs foster cooperation and de-escalate tensions — cyber “hotline”Hathaway et. al. 15 — Melissa Hathaway, Senior Advisor for the Cyber Security Project for the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the John F. Kennedy School of Government of Harvard University, has a B.A. degree from The American University in Washington, D.C., has completed graduate studies in international economics and technology transfer policy and is a graduate of the U.S. Armed Forces Staff College, with a special certificate in Information Operations, and Chris Demchak, co-director of the NWC Center for Cyber Conflict Studies (C3S), holds a PhD in Political Science from UC Berkeley and a MPA in Economic Development from Princeton, and Jason Kerben, a subject-matter expert on the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies’ Cyber Readiness Index project, also serves as senior advisor to multiple Departments and Agencies in matters related to information security and cyber security, and Jennifer McArdle, a Fellow in the Center for Revolutionary Scientific Thought at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, a PhD candidate at King’s College London in the War Studies department, and Francesca Spidalieri, Senior Fellow for Cyber Leadership at Salve Regina University, earned her B.A. in political science and international relations from the University of Milan and a M.A. in international affairs and security studies from Tufts University, 2015 (“Cyber Readiness Index 2.0: A Plan For Cyber Readiness: A Baseline and An Index,” Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, November, Available Online at , Accessed 06-27-2016, p. 12, AS)National CSIRTs can also be used as a mechanism to build confidence between countries and foster cooperation. For example, China, Japan, and Korea—three countries that have historically experienced tensions—have developed a trilateral annual CSIRT meeting to discuss cyber incident response mechanisms. The meetings have helped instill confidence and trust resulting in the development of a cyber “hotline” to communicate on significant cyber incidents.40Cyber incident response capabilities, joint meetings, and exercises are just a few of the basic mechanisms that can help a country proactively prepare for and mitigate the ripple effects of a major cyber incident. CSIRTs increase a country’s speed, recovery, and resilience against cyber threats, reducing the likely overall economic and operational impact of nationally significant attacks or campaigns. Some of the key preconditions for the successful deployment of these incident response teams are a well trained staff, and effective rapidly deployable tools. This facilitates an incident response team’s ability to foster cooperation and coordination in incident prevention, enable rapid reaction to incidents, and promote information sharing among stakeholders, both domestically and internationally.CERT Cooperation is possible and both countries benefitGady 15 — Franz-Stefan Gady, Senior Fellow and Foreign Policy Analyst at the East-West Institute, Editor at The Diplomat, M.A. in International Relations from John Hopkins University, B.A. in International Relations from Weber University, 2015 (“Can the US and China Cooperate on the First (and Last) Line of Cyber Defense?,” The Diplomat, October 30th, Accessible Online at , Accessed On 06-22-2016, MA) That China is willing to cooperate more closely with other countries can be seen with Beijing’s participation in yearly joint cyber exercises – the Cyber Exercise Drill – organized by the Asia Pacific Computer Emergency Response Team (APCERT). The aim of these “blind drills” is to coordinate international responses to cyberattacks. The exercises specifically deal with improving communication protocols, information sharing, and crisis response times of the CERTs participating. As an initial first step, the United States could join the drill and apply the lessons learned on the multilateral level to the Sino-U.S. bilateral level. (In the past, APCERT has extended invitations to the Organization of the Islamic Cooperation-Computer Emergency Response Team and the European Government Computer Security Incident Response Teams). Cooperation between countries is possible, and this has been exemplified in the field of cybercrime. There, Beijing and Washington have cooperated on multiple occasions in the past. The last time, a few weeks prior to the Obama-Xi meeting in Washington D.C. in September, the Chinese government has agreed to arrest a number of Chinese hackers at the request of the Chinese government. Deeper China-U.S. CERT cooperation will be beneficial for both countries. However, in order for it to work in the long run, steps will need to be taken to isolate this relationship at the technical level from bilateral political considerations. Thus, the current Sino-U.S. rapprochement on cyberspace-related issues on the political level can only serve as an impetus for deeper cooperation at the technical level of both countries. Once that is established, politics will need to recede and experts on both sides left alone to help safeguard the global cyber commons.CERT can combat cyberattacks Adelson et. al. 14 (Ian Adelson, Columbia School of International and Public Affairs June 14 “U.S.-China Cybersecurity Cooperation,” Capstone Report School of International and Public Affairs Columbia University )China is now recognizing the importance of international cybersecurity cooperation. Rapid international response enabled the Estonian government to combat the attacks. The government’s CERT relied on assistance from its Finnish, German, Israeli and Slovenian CERT counterparts to restore normal network operations. NATO CERTs and the EU’s European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) also supported Estonia in providing technical assessments and other assistance during the attacks. International cooperation, along with cooperation with private sector banks and Internet providers, was essential to strengthening Estonia’s cyber infrastructure, for example to incrementally increase its throughput capacity. Notably, the international responses to aid Estonia happened within established security communities and strong transnational relationships. China refrained from involvement, viewing the incidents as an internal matter of Estonia and also did not take part in the international cybersecurity discussions that followed. However, China’s stance is changing as evidenced by a recent high-level discourse and policy approaches calling for renewed cooperation with the entities such as the U.S. and European Union. Analysts stated that this new direction is intended to boost Chinese capabilities and hamper notions of a “China threat.” International cooperation and preparedness are now on the Chinese cyber agenda to move its strategic interests in technology development, global reputation, and economic growth.AT: “Doesn’t Solve Cyberattacks”US CSIRT is key to cyber readiness and national securityHathaway et. al. 15 — Melissa Hathaway, Senior Advisor for the Cyber Security Project for the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the John F. Kennedy School of Government of Harvard University, has a B.A. degree from The American University in Washington, D.C., has completed graduate studies in international economics and technology transfer policy and is a graduate of the U.S. Armed Forces Staff College, with a special certificate in Information Operations, and Chris Demchak, co-director of the NWC Center for Cyber Conflict Studies (C3S), holds a PhD in Political Science from UC Berkeley and a MPA in Economic Development from Princeton, and Jason Kerben, a subject-matter expert on the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies’ Cyber Readiness Index project, also serves as senior advisor to multiple Departments and Agencies in matters related to information security and cyber security, and Jennifer McArdle, a Fellow in the Center for Revolutionary Scientific Thought at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, a PhD candidate at King’s College London in the War Studies department, and Francesca Spidalieri, Senior Fellow for Cyber Leadership at Salve Regina University, earned her B.A. in political science and international relations from the University of Milan and a M.A. in international affairs and security studies from Tufts University, 2015 (“Cyber Readiness Index 2.0: A Plan For Cyber Readiness: A Baseline and An Index,” Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, November, Available Online at , Accessed 06-27-2016, p. 9, AS) 2. INCIDENT RESPONSEThe second essential element that indicates a country’s cyber readiness involves establishing and maintaining an effective national incident response capability. Often, this capability takes the form of one or more National Computer Security Incident Response Teams (National CSIRTs) or Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs)—hereinafter referred to collectively as CSIRTs—responsible for managing incident response in the event of natural or manmade cyber-related disasters that affect critical services and information infrastructures.22 At present, one hundred and two national CSIRTs have been established worldwide and another four CSIRTs are under development.23 CSIRT teams usually consist of a blend of IT security experts and practitioners from academia, the private sector, and government. In addition to providing the specifc technical competence to respond to cyber incidents of national interest, these incident response teams strengthen the ability of a national government to understand and combat cyber threats. Operating a National CSIRT, therefore, forms a core component of a country’s overall strategy to secure and maintain the services and infrastructures that are vital to national security and economic growth.24National CSIRTs, unlike strictly governmental ones, serve a broad constituency ranging from government departments to private and public entities to citizens. A well-established National CSIRT provides reactive services above all else—i.e., the ability to respond to incidents by containing and mitigating incidents as they occur.25 Although the specifc organizational form of National CSIRTs may vary, and not every country may have the same needs and resources, these specialized and dedicated units should provide a series of both proactive and reactive functions, as well as preventive, educational, and security quality management services. These services include, but are not limited to: establishing shared understanding of the threats facing the country; publishing alerts and advisories on cyber vulnerabilities and threats; promoting cyber security awareness and best practices; identifying, detecting, containing, and managing security threats and preparing for potential incidents; coordinating incident response activities; analyzing computer security incidents and providing feedback and lessons learned (for shared learning); promoting activities that increase resilience; and supporting the national cyber security strategy.CERT cooperation resolves cyberattacks while creating stable inter-state communication channelsMaurer 15 — Tim Maurer, Former Director of the Global Cybersecurity Norms and Resilience Project and Head of Research, Cybersecurity Initiative, holds a Master in Public Policy concentrating on international and global affairs from the Harvard Kennedy School, 2015 ("The Challenges Facing Computer Security Incident Response Teams," Council on Foreign Relations, July 20th, Available Online at , Accessed 06-27-2016, AS)CSIRTs have been a cornerstone of cyber incident response for decades. Also known as Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs), CSIRTs are teams of technical experts with the mission to maintain and protect the security of their customers’ computer networks and systems that rely on it. For example, when the OpenSSL Heartbleeed vulnerability was discovered last year, which security expert Bruce Schneier called a “catastrophic bug,” US-CERT issued an alert and a white paper containing an overview of the systems affected, a description of the threat, and recommendations for solutions and mitigation. US-CERT worked with private sector partners, the FBI, Financial Services Information Sharing and Analysis Center, and Canadian Cyber Incident Response Center to prepare and disseminate alerts. CSIRTs, can be based at private companies, governments, universities or other organizations. While their primary mission is technical in nature, they are under growing pressure to accommodate various policy and political objectives of the countries in which they are located.growing number of governments have been setting up national CSIRTs to coordinate CSIRT activity within their borders. Additionally, CSIRTs are increasingly referenced in cyber norm discussions at the United Nations and the Organization for American States. Cybersecurity capacity building efforts now routinely include programming aimed at creating national CSIRTs and strengthening cooperation between existing ones. All of these activities raise a number of important policy questions: What constitutes a national CSIRT? How is it institutionalized? How should it function in countries with existing CSIRTs? Should it coordinate a national response to a major cyber incident and if so, how? These are some of the questions we put to the CSIRT representatives at the FIRST conference[*] as part of our CSIRT project. During the discussion, we explored ways to improve the policy and technical communities’ understanding on the role of CSIRTs. It became clear that cooperation between national CSIRTs can serve as a communication channel for countries with otherwise strained diplomatic relations and can help build confidence between them to improve network security. An example for collaboration is APCERT, a coalition of CSIRTs from thirteen economies across the Asia Pacific region, including the Japanese, Korean and Chinese national CSIRTs.*Note to debaters: the FIRST conference — The Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST) conferenceAT: “Cyberattacks Declining” September agreement didn’t stop cyber espionage — more to come Gady 16 — Franz-Stefan Gady, Senior Fellow and Foreign Policy Analyst at the East-West Institute, Editor at The Diplomat The Diplomat, 2016 ("Top US Spy Chief: China Still Successful in Cyber Espionage Against US," The Diplomat, February 16th, Available Online at , Accessed 06-30-2016, MW)Last week, the Director of National Intelligence, James R. Clapper, delivered his annual threat briefing to the Senate Armed Forces Committee noting that China remains engaged in malicious activities in cyberspace against the United States, despite a U.S.-Chinese bilateral agreement to refrain from conducting or knowingly supporting commercial cyber-espionage. “China continues to have success in cyber espionage against the U.S. government, our allies, and U.S. companies,” Clapper emphasized. “Beijing also selectively uses cyberattacks against targets it believes threaten Chinese domestic stability or regime legitimacy.” Clapper goes on to say that U.S. intelligence agencies will monitor China’s compliance with the September 2015 bilateral agreement to refrain from conducting or knowingly supporting cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property with the intent of providing competitive advantage to companies or commercial sectors.“Private-sector security experts have identified limited ongoing cyber activity from China but have not verified state sponsorship or the use of exfiltrated data for commercial gain,” he added. Clapper remains skeptical however: “Russia and China continue to have the most sophisticated cyber programs. China continues cyber espionage against the United States. Whether China’s commitment of last September moderates its economic espionage remains to be seen.” During a September 2015 testimony in front of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Clapper noted that the agreement was “good first step,” but unequivocally answered the question whether it would eliminate Chinese state-sponsored cyberattacks with a resounding “No.” “Such malicious cyber activity will continue and probably accelerate until we establish and demonstrate the capability to deter malicious state-sponsored cyber activity,” Clapper said back in September. During his February testimony, Clapper emphasized that Chinese cyber attacks are continuing: “It’s our responsibility to ensure that our policymakers and particularly the Department of Defense are aware of this hemorrhage, if you will, of technological information that the Chinese purloined.” According to Clapper, foreign actors in cyberspace “remain undeterred from conducting reconnaissance, espionage, and even attacks in cyberspace because of the relatively low costs of entry, the perceived payoff, and the lack of significant consequences.”AT: “Treaties Solve (Norms)”***Norms provide the best mechanism for cyber cooperation – treaties fail Eichensehr 15 - Visiting Assistant Professor, UCLA School of Law. (c) 2015, Kristen E. Eichensehr. The author thanks Raechel Anglin, Jack Balkin, Sarah Cleveland, Ashley Deeks, Oona Hathaway, Harold Hongju Koh, David Koplow, Richard M. Re, W. Michael Reisman, Michael N. Schmitt, Phil Spector, Peter Trooboff, Stephen Zamora, and participants in the American Society of International Law Southeast Interest Group Junior-Senior Workshop for helpful conversations and comments. The author is grateful for the assistance of Clay Greenberg, Sean Quinn, Justin Simeone, and the editors and staff of The Georgetown Law Journal for their suggestions and assistance. This Article reflects developments through November 2014 when it was finalized for publication, and any errors are the author's alone. January, 2015 The Cyber-Law of Nations Copyright (c) 2015 Georgetown Law Journal 103 Geo. L.J. 317 Available Online on Lexis Nexis If the absence of a governance regime is unacceptable, but a broad multilateral treaty is impossible, development of norms to govern behavior in the cyber domain may be the best--or only--option. Unlike a meticulously negotiated treaty text, norms are general principles, not precise rules. n245 However, norm development is attractive for several reasons. First, norms are easier to develop than a treaty and therefore may provide a faster route to establishing at least a partial governance system. Unlike a treaty, which requires broad agreement and may take years to negotiate, norms can arise through states acting individually, bilaterally, regionally, or multilaterally and without agreement of all states. n246 Norms may develop through unilateral policy declarations, such as states' issuance of cyberspace policies or speeches by government officials. n247 Norms may also arise through actions and statements of groups of states or simply between two states. Bilateral declarations might include joint communique's n248 or, for example, the addition of cyber attacks as triggers for the provisions of the U.S.-Australia mutual defense treaty. n249 On a regional level, NATO in 2011 issued a "Policy on Cyber Defence," which makes clear that "NATO will defend its territory and populations against all threats, including emerging security challenges such as cyber defence" and that NATO will provide assistance if its members suffer a cyber attack. n250 In a declaration accompanying a meeting of heads of state in September 2014, NATO further clarified its position that "international law, including international humanitarian law and the UN Charter, applies in cyberspace." n251 Such declarations have the potential to emerge from groups that are not [*362] simply composed of like-minded allies. For example, in June 2013, the U.N. Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security achieved consensus on the very general principle that "[i]nternational law, and in particular the Charter of the United Nations," applies in cyberspace. n252 Although the generality of the agreed statement leaves much unclear about the application of international law in practice, the declaration is significant because it represents agreement by all fifteen of the GGE member states, n253 including Russia and China, which had not previously conceded that international law applies to cyberspace at all. n254 The informality and multistage process of norm emergence also has the potential to provide a greater voice to developing countries and to non-governmental actors. In bilateral interactions with, for example, the United States, United Kingdom, or China, developing countries may be able to exert a stronger influence on norm development than they would at a single conference to develop a broad cyber treaty. n255 Enfranchisement of developing countries in norm creation may promote buy-in to the resulting norms and avoid later problems, like those surrounding the Budapest Convention, n256 whereby developing countries are pressed to accept a fait accompli. Of course, efforts to recruit developing and other as yet undecided countries to one set of norms or another may provide an additional arena of competition for the United States and its allies, and China, Russia, and their allies. n257 Second, norms can develop through and evolve with state practice. Much remains unknown about states' capabilities, which change with technological advances. A treaty aimed at current capabilities risks becoming out-of-date, but [*363] norms provide a more nimble mechanism to account for changes in technology and improved knowledge about states' capacities in cyberspace. For example, state practice in responding to cyber events will help to develop customary international law regarding what constitutes a use of force or an armed attack. n258 Such state practice will help to establish how states will treat similar future incidents. Also, states acting rationally in their own self-interest over time may come to the same conclusion about acceptable behavior. n259 For example, the United States currently advocates rule-of-law norms prohibiting intellectual property theft and other criminal actions in the cyber domain, including by supporting broad adherence to the Budapest Convention. n260 As China, Russia, and other countries become increasingly dependent on cyber infrastructure and innovation, harms to their own citizens and businesses from cyber intrusions and cybercrime may cause them to shift toward the U.S. position of rule of law in cyber. n261 Independent discovery or "independent learning" of norms by individual states may pave the way for future formal agreement. n262 Finally, norms can fulfill some of the same purposes as a treaty, including coordinating state behavior, promoting stability and order in the international system, and decreasing the risk of unintended conflict. n263 The potentially decentralized nature of norm formation, described above, raises the possibility that [*364] conflicting norms may emerge. But even in that circumstance, norms have the potential to serve a coordinating function and foster valuable clarity about states' actions. The U.S. International Strategy for Cyberspace advocates norm development for this reason. The Strategy notes that the world's growing dependence on cyberspace has "not been matched by clearly agreed-upon norms for acceptable state behavior in cyberspace." n264 It explains that "[i]n other spheres of international relations, shared understandings about acceptable behavior have enhanced stability" and brought "predictability to state conduct, helping prevent the misunderstandings that could lead to conflict." n265 The Strategy further asserts that norms "will diminish misperceptions about military activities and the potential for escalatory behavior." n266 The United States has recently taken bilateral steps with China and Russia that explicitly focus on decreasing misperceptions. In June 2013, the United States and Russia announced an agreement "to reduce the risk of conflict in cyberspace through real-time communications about incidents of national security concern." n267 The agreement provides for communications and information sharing between U.S. and Russian computer emergency-response teams, a direct channel for urgent communications about cyber exercises and incidents, a direct communications link between the U.S. cyber coordinator and his Russian counterpart (a repurposing of the Cold War nuclear "hotline"), and a working group "on issues of threats to or in the use of" information and communications technologies (ICTs) that will discuss emerging threats and coordinate joint exercises in order to "strengthen confidence." n268 The United States and China also established a working group to discuss cybersecurity issues, though China suspended its participation in the wake of the May 2014 U.S. indictments of Chinese military officials for hacking U.S. companies. n269***AT: “Cybersecurity Not Important”***Cybersecurity is of central importance- experts agreeJontz 2/23 (9Sandra Jontz, 2-23-2017, "Cybersecurity Must Take Front and Center National Attention, Experts Say," SIGNAL Magazine, , Accessed: 2/23/17)-Coronado ARLCybersecurity can no longer be viewed as a technology-only problem and segmented into stovepipes where the U.S. Defense Department carries out one set of tasks; the civilian government another; and industry does its own thing, said Adm. Michael Rogers, USN, director of the National Security Agency (NSA) and commander of U.S. Cyber Command. “It must be viewed more broadly and must be tackled from a national security perspective,” Adm. Rogers said during a morning West 2017 conference presentation Thursday with Adm. James Stavridis, USN (Ret.), former NATO commander and dean of Tufts University’s Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. It has to be a more inclusive team sport, and going forward, the military will rely on industry solutions to defend national assets in cyberspace. In the near-term, the Defense Department needs solutions in three disruptive and key areas: machine learning, automation and work force, Adm. Rogers said. “We have got to get to machine learning at speed,” he offered during the final day of the naval West 2017 conference that concluded Thursday in San Diego. “We have got to get to automation and you’ve got to help me free up human capital." What does Adm. Rogers need from industry? Machine learning at speed & automation technologies #WEST2017 — Sandra Jontz (@jontz_signalmag) February 23, 2017 The event is co-sponsored by AFCEA International and the U.S. Naval Institute. Cybersecurity remains at the center of the national political stage and is set to be among the flurry of “energetic” executive orders coming out of the White House, Adm. Stavridis offered. Adm. Rogers, tapped to offer insight for the administration’s draft, suggested leaders “take a step back and look at [cybersecurity] with a new set of eyes from the ground up.” He added, “Don’t get trapped by the bureaucracy.” The two formidable men touched on a number of salient topics during their discussion, including the military’s critical shift in its approach to conducting combat operations with the dawning of this new cyber domain. The services are moving from the physical domain to fighting “some, a lot, maybe all at times, of our operations in this virtual domain. What does that shift mean and how’s it going?” Adm. Stavridis asked of Adm. Rogers. “Cyber is an operational domain in which we do a variety of missions and functions, many of which are very traditional,” Adm. Rogers said. “We do reconnaissance, we do fires, we do maneuvers. The same things I was used to as a surface [warfare] officer … I’m constantly going back to that.” If Adm. Rogers had that proverbial blank sheet of paper to sketch out the way in which the Defense Department ought to be structured, in the immediate near-term, he would elevate Cyber Command to a combatant command status, he said. But over the next five to 10 years, he would like to see an integration of cyber, both offensively and defensively, down to the operational tactical level. Shaping an elevated Cyber Command has a tried-and-true blueprint, Adm. Rogers added. He’d like to create the command in the image of the successfully integrated Special Operations Command. “How do we treat any high-demand, low-density resource in the department?” Adm. Rogers asked. “We traditionally tend to centralize it, then prioritize its applications by risk and operational priority. I would argue that we need to do the same exact thing in cyber.” #cybercommand should be created in the image of Special Operations Command, Adm. Rogers #WEST2017 — Sandra Jontz (@jontz_signalmag) February 23, 2017 A follow-on critical step is building the work force, in a stiff competition with industry, which wants the same people, Adm. Stavridis offered. Pushing #cyber to tactical levels 'sounds like the journey of special forces' @stavridisj #WEST2017 — Sandra Jontz (@jontz_signalmag) February 23, 2017 Cyber Command is made of 80 percent military, 20 percent civilian; on the NSA side, almost the the opposite is true, with 60 percent of the jobs held by civilians, Adm. Rogers said. Attracting civilians is more difficult than active duty, the latter of which are drawn by the same attributes that motivate young people to become riflemen or deck seamen. “The self image of this work force is that they are the digital warriors of the 21st century.” The two also discussed the solutions needed to avoid what Adm. Stavridis called a “Snowden event” to safeguard against insider threats. The answers can be found in industry, Adm. Rogers offered, which already is working to protect themselves from the same threat. “I’ve come to the conclusion that there are several aspects to this,” Adm. Rogers continued. “There is a human dimension to this. How do we gain insight on individual and ensure that we’ve got the right person in the right position? At the same time, there is a technical piece. The other dimension crosses between the two of them.” Countering #InsiderThreats meshing of understanding humans, technology and where the 2 meet, Adm. Rogers- #WEST2017 — Sandra Jontz (@jontz_signalmag) February 23, 2017 A talk about national security could not take place without mention of threats posed by nations such as Russia, China, North Korea and Iran. Though the two men did not shed much new information in that arena, the discussion did spur Adm. Rogers to share that the U.S. government must rethink how it defines critical infrastructure in this digital age. “I don’t think we thought to ourselves: What about information, data and fundamental processes?” Adm. Rogers said. “Data increasingly now has a value all its own.”***Cybersecurity Exploits RisingForemski 2/23 (Tom Foremski, 2-23-2017, "RSA and the expanding hole in cybersecurity," ZDNet, , Accessed: 2/23/16)- Coronado ARL*(RSA?is an?algorithm?used by modern computers to encrypt and decrypt messages. It is an asymmetric cryptographic?algorithm.)The recent RSA conference drew more than 43,000 people — a record number as the cybersecurity hole continues to widen with new exploits. There were record numbers of people, exhibitors, talks and awards at the recent RSA Security show in San Francisco. Yet we have widening security holes in enterprise systems that continue to be discovered and exploited. You could buy every product and service at the RSA show from hundreds of security vendors and still have no peace of mind. In fact going to RSA show will likely cause your mind to race in panic at all the vectors of malice that the security vendors will happily tell you about. To paraphrase George Bernard Shaw, if you lined up all the 43,000 computer professionals that attended RSA they would not reach a conclusion on the best approach to security. Yet enterprises are to asked to shore up security amidst a cacophony of advice. "I haven't seen so many people, so loudly complaining about a problem they aren't solving," said Ethan Ayer, CEO of Resilient Network Systems. Not only are the security vendors not solving the problem but they are expanding the security hole by discovering new exploits. It seems that you can always spend more but you'll never spend enough because there are more undiscovered threats to plug. s new laws come into play such as the upcoming European Union Data Protection Law which requires businesses to use appropriate protective measures or face very expensive fines if there's a data breach -- enterprises are in a tough spot. What is the right level of security? Ray Rothrock, a veteran Silicon Valley VC last year called cybersecurity a burdensome tax on business that is unsustainable. He called on the industry to get ahead of the problem. Peter Tran does try and get ahead of the problem. He heads RSA's Advanced Global Threats group. "We get ahead of the problem by carefully monitoring online discussions and exploits and predicting where attacks might come from." Tran says buying everything at the show won't work. Educating staff on security and having a process are the best defenses. "Technology is not enough."***Conflict In Cybersecurity Is Rising In Importance-CEO Getting involvedPletz 2/23 (John Pletz, 2-23-2017, "War against hackers is one of attrition," Crain's Chicago Business, , Accessed: 2/23/16)-Coronado ARLAll the hacking and cyberattacks that keep CEOs and information technology managers up at night is good for business, if you're the one they call when things go wrong. Cybersecurity is one of the fastest-growing parts of KPMG's business in Chicago, where the audit, tax and consulting firm plans to add 500 jobs by 2020. "It's a hub for us nationally," said Tony Buffomante, who leads the U.S. cybersecurity practice from Chicago. The city is home to KPMG's cyber-incident response lab, and headcount in the cybersecurity group has more than doubled in the past three years. Spending on security is growing at twice the rate of overall IT spending, according to International Data, a researcher based in Framingham, Mass. IT security will be a $100 billion-a-year business by 2020, with the bulk of that being spent on services rather than hardware and software. Hacking incidents—from Russians spear-phishing the Democratic National Committee to the pair of incidents that cost Yahoo $350 million—are no longer rare. "There was shock and awe around Target and Sony," Buffomante said. "Corporations have come to the realization it's a question of not if, but when." But the ground has shifted as it does in any cat-and-mouse game. Companies are concerned as much with internal data thefts as external attacks. Government-sponsored hacking now seems more focused on political mayhem than corporate espionage. "There's less of the FBI calling and saying your data has been sent to China," Buffomante said. "As far as nation-state actors continuing to attack governmental agencies, they feel the targets are richer with their ability to modify political outcomes or military activities." Computer security remains a board-level concern, but it's clear the battle will be a war of attrition. "What I'm seeing now is cyberfatigue," said Buffomante, who worked at Sears for eight years before joining KPMG in 2004. "It's not that people aren't saying cyber isn't important anymore. The board is saying: 'We started to talk about this three years ago. You've told us we need to spend more money. Aren't we secure yet?' " Companies are rethinking their approaches to managing their risk of a hack or breach, talking about cyber insurance as well as cyber defense. That sounds a lot like accounting fraud in the early 2000s. Some problems never go away completely: You just learn to live with them.***AT: “China Not Target for Cyberattack”China is target to cyberattacksAdelson et al 14 (Ian Adelson, Columbia School of International and Public Affairs June 14 “U.S.-China Cybersecurity Cooperation,” Capstone Report School of International and Public Affairs Columbia University )The Chinese are just as concerned about sovereignty in virtual arenas as they are in physical ones. Cyberspace is seen as a collection of jurisdictions, rather than a common, global space to be jointly used and controlled. Consequently, although China has demonstrated its willingness to cooperate with the EU on creating a joint task force and a code of conduct, the Chinese government reserves certain rights to itself.9 The Chinese government punishes citizens for online dissent, and has not reciprocated the recent U.S. briefing on cyberwar methods and priorities. The Chinese government sees its population as especially vulnerable to cyber threats.10 China sees itself as primarily a victim of hacking, which often originates in the U.S. Widespread use of pirated software, sometimes unknowingly, is a major vulnerability since such software lacks protections from hackers.11 Identity theft and malware attacks on computers are common; meanwhile, protective measures on websites are inadequate.12 The rate of increase of internet connected people in China, who now outnumber the population of the U.S., has outpaced the speed of adoption of proper security measures.Cyberattacks on China are extremely high- 969 percent increasePelissier 11/29(Reuters, 11-29-2016, "Chinese firms hit by huge increase in cyber attacks," NBC News, , Accessed: 3/4/17)-Coronado ARLCyber attacks on Chinese companies have soared in the past two years, according to a survey, with new technologies that connect household items to the internet and allow them to receive and send data seen as particularly vulnerable. The average number of cyber attacks detected by companies in mainland China and Hong Kong grew 969 percent between 2014 and 2016. The number of attacks averaged more than 7 a day for each of the survey's 440 China-based respondents — around half of the global average of 13. However, the average number of attacks fell by 3 percent globally over the last two years, and 30 percent since 2015, in contrast to the rise in China. China's rapid adoption of new consumer and industrial technology for the 'Internet of Things (IoT)' era may be part of the reason. PwC said such connected devices are the leading targets of cyber-attacks. "IoT devices in general have not paid attention to cyber security," said Marin Ivezic, a partner on cyber security at PwC in Hong Kong. "In China and Hong Kong ... we have more adoption than anywhere else in the world," he said, noting China was also one of the biggest manufacturers of these items. Chinese-made connected home devices such as webcams with security loopholes that gave way to botnet malwares were blamed by security researchers for a massive cyber attack in the US last month that temporarily paralyzed major internet sites. The Chinese companies surveyed had cut their cybersecurity budget by 7.6 percent in 2016 compared with flat global spending. Thirty four percent of them identified competitors as a source of attacks, a rate higher than anywhere else in the world. The PwC survey does not track the country of origin of the attacks, which Ivezic said is "almost impossible." The drop in the global number of cyber attacks did not reflect a safer environment, he said, but was rather the result of more sophisticated cyber criminals who more selective in who they targeted. China is also effected by cyberattacksAdelson et al 14 (Ian Adelson, Columbia School of International and Public Affairs June 14 “U.S.-China Cybersecurity Cooperation,” Capstone Report School of International and Public Affairs Columbia University )China’s Computer Emergency Response Team (国家互联网应急中心, CNCERT) plays an important coordination role within China and in its relations with other actors. Founded in 1999, CNCERT works on “building up the national monitoring, warning, emergency response, evaluation and public opinion centers for network security.” It produces a weekly English and Chinese language overview of the threat landscape and statistics on how this compares to prior periods. It coordinates relations with other CERTs and with subordinate bodies in China, as seen in its organization chart (Figure 1). One example of ongoing cooperation is with Japanese and Korean CERTs: the three described a recent history of information sharing (including a 24/7 technical hotline) and crisis de-escalation in a statement to the media after their first annual trilateral meeting last August. The Chinese version of the site regularly updates a set of articles about international issues in cyberspace. The English version of the website is not quite as extensive, but it is more developed, frequently updated, and well-translated than many comparable Chinese government websites. CNCERT will most likely toe the party line. Its representatives have been quoted as criticizing the United States for being the biggest host for cyber attacks against China, while also objecting to U.S. reports that China launches a large number of cyber attacks against the U.S. It is not a government body, but does not have the autonomy to deviate from official policy lines and expectations. The Director General of CNCERT is Huang Chengqing, who is also a Vice President of the Internet Society of China (formerly Deputy Secretary, then Secretary General). As with many Chinese officials in similar positions, he has commented on the hypocrisy of the United States’ condemnation of China for instigating cyber attacks against China given the volume of attacks on China originating from the U.S., warning that his team had “mountains of data” implicating the U.S. in such attacks. However, his words on that occasion were relatively restrained, given his emphasis on practical matters like cooperation over accusation. Zhou Yonglin is the Secretary General of CNCERT and its former deputy director. He has participated in efforts to cooperate on cybersecurity with the United States in the past. Two of the obstacles he highlighted in discussing this exchange in 2011 were the lack of knowledge about safety in cyberspace among the Chinese public and a language barrier between U.S. and Chinese officials. He has spoken out about the number of Chinese websites defaced and the volume of other hacking attacks each year, calling China the most frequent victim of cyber attacks in the world.AT: “Cooperation Now/Cyber Agreement Solves”***No effective US-China cyber cooperation nowLieberthal and Singer 14 — Kenneth Lieberthal, a senior fellow in Foreign Policy and Global Economy and Development at Brookings, former professor at the University of Michigan, has a bachelor’s from Dartmouth College, and a master’s and doctorate in political science from Columbia University, and Peter W. Singer, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, Director of the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence at the Brookings Institution, received his Ph.D. in Government from Harvard University and an A.B. from Princeton's Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, 2014 (“Cybersecurity and U.S.-China Relations,” John L. Thornton China Center and 21st Century Defense Initiative at Brookings, February, 06-24-2016, p. 13-14, AS)In short, U.S. concern about cybersecurity has reached a fever pitch— to the extent that the U.S. government’s 2011 Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive report specifically names China as the “most active and persistent” perpetrator of cyber intrusions into the United States.8 In the press, the mood is best captured by the depiction of a cyberattack as a massive pixilated mushroom cloud looming over every American city (as the cover of the July 2010 Economist magazine had it). Similarly, in senior policy circles, malware has been described as “like a WMD [weapon of mass destruction]” (Sen. Carl Levin, chair of Senate Armed Services Committee), able to “destroy our society” [end page 4] (former national security advisor Brent Scowcroft), meaning it should be looked at as “an existential threat” (Adm. Mike Mullen, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff).9 Indeed, many are now framing the U.S.-China relationship in this space as a digital echo of the Cold War between the U.S. and USSR of a past generation.10While the Cold War metaphor is certainly a flawed parallel, as scholars at Brookings have recently argued,11 concern has grown to view the cyber threat on that scale. President Barack Obama’s 2011 Cyberspace Policy Review declared that “cybersecurity risks pose some of the most serious economic and national security challenges of the 21st century.”12 And, in turn, there have been a host of new U.S. legislative initiatives and the launch of a new cyber deterrence strategy by the U.S. military to accompany the creation of its U.S. Cyber Command. While it did not specify any individual nation, the Pentagon Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace was clearly keyed to China as among the many threats it foresaw in this realm.13 It sought to lay out a cyber deterrence doctrine clearly targeting state actors, including leaving open the option for escalation to traditional military means in the physical realm if the U.S. ever felt it suffered too dearly in the cyber realm. Critical InfrastructureAnd, even if there are initially only short term outages, attacks on critical infrastructure are tantamount to cyber war which escalates quickly – total system shutdown, including accidental nuclear warNolan?15 (Andy, Legislative Attorney at the Congressional Research Service, “Cybersecurity and Information Sharing: Legal Challenges and Solutions” CRS Report to Congress, March 16th,?)Introduction Over the course of the last year, a host of cyberattacks 1 have been perpetrated on a number of high profile American companies. In January 2014, Target announced that hackers, using malware,2 had digitally impersonated one of the retail giant’s contractors,3 stealing vast amounts of data—including the names, mailing addresses, phone numbers or email addresses for up to 70 million individuals and the credit card information of 40 million shoppers.4 Cyberattacks in February and March of 2014 potentially exposed contact and log-in information of eBay’s customers, prompting the online retailer to ask its more than 200 million users to change their passwords.5 In September, it was revealed that over the course of five months cyber-criminals tried to steal the credit card information of more than fifty million shoppers of the world’s largest home improvement retailer, Home Depot.6 One month later, J.P. Morgan Chase, the largest U.S. bank by assets, disclosed that contact information for about 76 million households was captured in a cyberattackearlier in the year.7 In perhaps the most infamous cyberattack of 2014, in late November, Sony Pictures Entertainment suffered a “significant system disruption” as a result of a “brazen cyber attack”8 that resulted in the leaking of the personal details of thousands of Sony employees.9 And in February of 2015, the health care provider Anthem Blue Cross Blue Shield [end page 1] disclosed that a “very sophisticated attack” obtained personal information relating to the company’s customers and employees.10 The high profile cyberattacks of 2014 and early 2015 appear to be indicative of a broader trend: the frequency and ferocity of cyberattacks are increasing,11 posing grave threats to the national interests of the United States. Indeed, the attacks on Target, eBay, Home Depot, J.P. Morgan-Chase, Sony Pictures, and Anthem were only a few of the many publicly disclosed cyberattacks perpetrated in 2014 and 2105.12 Experts suggest that hundreds of thousands of other entities may have suffered similar incidents during the same period,13 with one survey indicating that 43% of firms in the United States had experienced a data breach in the past year.14 Moreover, just as the cyberattacks of 2013—which included incidents involving companies like the New York Times, Facebook, Twitter, Apple, and Microsoft15—were eclipsed by those that occurred in 2014,16 the consensus view is that 2015 and beyond will witness more frequent and more sophisticated cyber incidents.17 To the extent that its expected rise outpaces any corresponding rise in the ability to defend against such attacks, the result could be troubling news for countless businesses that rely more and more on computers in all aspects of their operations, as the economic losses resulting from a single cyberattack can be extremely costly.18 And the resulting effects of a cyberattack can have effects beyond a single company’s bottom line. As “nations are becoming ever more dependent on information and information technology,”19 the threat posed by any one cyberattack [end page 2] can have “devastating collateral and cascading effects across a wide range of physical, economic and social systems.”20 With reports that foreign nations—such as Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea—may be using cyberspace as a new front to wage war,21 fears abound that a cyberattack could be used to shut down the nation’s electrical grid,22 hijack a commercial airliner,23 or even launch a nuclear weapon with a single keystroke.24 In short, the potential exists that the United States could suffer a “cyber Pearl Harbor,” an attack that would “cause physical destruction and loss of life”25 and expose—in the words of one prominent cybersecurity expert—“vulnerabilities of staggering proportions.”26Cyber attack on US infrastructure would have multiple devastating effects including destruction of the US economy. Navarro, 2015 (Peter, professor @ the University of California, December 9, “China’s Undeclared Cyber War on the U.S.,” accessed ddi-tm)Still a third major cyber warfare front involves attacking critical infrastructure such as America’s electricity grid, water purification plants, air traffic control, subway systems, and telecommunications. The twin goals here are to sow chaos among the US populace as well as to bring our economy to its knees in time of war – or perhaps the goal is to simply blackmail the US into inaction should a revanchist China move on Taiwan or the Senkaku Islands or Second Thomas Reef. Finally, the Pentagon is now being forced to increasingly defend against Chinese attempts to implant “Trojans” and other malware into the computer and electronic circuitry of American’s weapons and logistics systems. Now that China has become the world’s factory floor, this has become far too easy to do. However, as defense analyst James Lewis has warned: “If you mess with that software, the airplane won’t fly, the missile will miss its target, and the ship might not get to where it was intended to go.”***Chinese cyber-attack on US critical infrastructure is possible. Backdoors, miscalculation, and misattribution make escalation likely. Harold et al., 2016 (Senior Policy Analyst @ RAND Corporation, [Scott Warren Harold, Martin C. Libicki, Astrid Stuth Cevallos, April 2016 “Getting to Yes with China in Cyber Space” Rand accessed DDI -TM)Separately, a third U.S. concern is over the prospect that China might be prepared to use a cyberattack to take down U.S. critical infra - structure during a crisis. The current NSA director, ADM Michael S. Rogers, has testified that China has compromised the U.S. power grid through intrusions that left behind software implants (often referred to as back doors ) that could be used to wreak havoc in a crisis. 20 There are also concerns that the United States and China could misread each oth - er’s actions and signals in cyberspace during a crisis in ways that could lead to escalation. Due to the relatively opaque nature of cyberspace, it is also possible that the two sides could misattribute signals from each other or misattribute actions taken by a third party as coming from each other, especially if a malicious or self-interested actor were to route attacks on the other side through U.S. or Chinese servers during a par - ticularly tense period in the bilateral relationship. The United States and China are concerned about how each side would use cyberattacks in warfare and the escalation risks that such use may entail.Grid meltdown creates chaos and has huge death tolls Noory 15 — George Noory, host of Coast to Coast AM, previously the director of news planning and development at KSTP-TV in Minneapolis, 2015 (“EMP Grid Meltdown Could Destroy America,” Coast to Coast AM, September 23rd, Available Online at , Accessed June 29, 2016//AW)As C2C previously reported, a recent Congressional study prepared by former Rep. Bartlett stated that 90 percent of all Americans might be dead within a year following an EMP generated grid meltdown. The federal government has finally introduced a bill, the Critical Infrastructure Protection Act, to toughen up the grid. But that may meet opposition, Fortschen warned, citing the last time a grid protection law was attempted it was killed by a lone Senator. And, not only are we vulnerable from the unpredictable forces of the sun, but America's enemies are said to be plotting a major EMP attack that could be "100 times worse than 9/11," Fortschen told George. Enemies with long range ICBM missiles could detonate a nuclear device in the upper atmosphere at key strategic locations, knocking out the grid with an EMP, Fortschen said. And a military response would be very slow to respond with "computerized planes falling from the skies," he said.Cyber talks have stalled fueling mutual suspicion. Lack of action in verification incentivizes U.S. and China cyber arms race. Attacks on U.S.’s critical infrastructure remain an immanent threat.Gady, 2016 (Franz-Stefan, Senior Fellow, EastWest Institute, “China-US Relations in Cyberspace: A Half-Year Assessment,” June 16, accessed DDI –TM)Nevertheless, major stumbling blocks remain. First, while there may be a slowdown in Chinese state-sponsored attacks on the private sector, U.S. President Barack Obama extended a national state of emergency due to continued cyberattacks against U.S. critical information infrastructure in April 2015. “Significant malicious cyber-enabled activities originating from, or directed by persons located, in whole or in substantial part, outside the United States continue to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy and economy of the United States,” Obama wrote in a letter justifying the state of emergency extension this March. As a result, the United States can still impose economic sanctions and travel restrictions on foreign nationals thought to be behind cyberattacks—hardly a vote of confidence for the Chinese government. Second, progress during recent talks has been slow, leaving both the U.S. private sector and the U.S. military (along with U.S. intelligence agencies) dissatisfied with the Obama administration’s approach to reducing Chinese state-sponsored attacks. Time and again, U.S. defense officials, along with private sector representatives, have leaked to the media the possibility of cyber counterattacks against Chinese critical information infrastructure. Neither, the Pentagon nor private sector is happy with the current U.S. cyber deterrence strategy. In particular, the U.S. State Department’s concepts of “deterrence by denial” as well as “voluntary norms of responsible state behavior in cyberspace” are seen as too weak in the face of persistent Chinese attacks. As a result, there is a chance that bilateral talks might collapse given the apparent disunity among stakeholders in the United States. Third, fundamental differences between China and the United States remain when it comes to Internet governance issues, China’s new anti-terror law, and military-to-military relations in cyberspace, among other things. Both the China and the United States continue building up their cyber weapons arsenals and probing each other’s networks. In a number of speeches Chinese President Xi Jinping vowed to improve China’s cyberwarfare capabilities and strengthen “cyber defense and deterrence capabilities.” As I noted previously, the U.S. Department of Defense published a new Law of War Manual, in which the pre-emplacement of “logic bombs” in an adversary country’s networks and information systems is advocated, which can further fuel competition and bred mistrust. Neither side accepts limitations in the development neither of cyber weapons nor to the overall militarization of cyberspace. ***Attacks compromise US grid Navarro, 5-30-2016, (Peter Navarro is a professor of Economics and Public Policy at The Paul Merage School of Business, University of California-Irvine.Peter, "China's State-Sponsored Cyber Attacks Must Stop," Globalist, )Still a third major form of cyber threat now being refined by China, along with other nations like Russia, Iran, and North Korea, involves attacking the “industrial control systems” of critical infrastructure such as electricity grids, water purification plants, air traffic control, subways, and telecommunications. The twin goals here are to paralyze the American economy by crippling our infrastructure and to sow chaos among our population – and thereby weaken our will to fight.***Cybersecurity is a growing challenge on the power gridHahn 2/2 (Adam Hahn, 2-23-2017, "Cybersecurity of the power grid: A growing challenge," Conversation, , Accessed: 2/23/17)-Coronado ARLCalled the “largest interconnected machine,” the U.S. electricity grid is a complex digital and physical system crucial to life and commerce in this country. Today, it is made up of more than 7,000 power plants, 55,000 substations, 160,000 miles of high-voltage transmission lines and millions of miles of low-voltage distribution lines. This web of generators, substations and power lines is organized into three major interconnections, operated by 66 balancing authorities and 3,000 different utilities. That’s a lot of power, and many possible vulnerabilities. The grid has been vulnerable physically for decades. Today, we are just beginning to understand the seriousness of an emerging threat to the grid’s cybersecurity. As the grid has become more dependent on computers and data-sharing, it has become more responsive to changes in power demand and better at integrating new sources of energy. But its computerized control could be abused by attackers who get into the systems. Until 2015, the threat was hypothetical. But now we know cyberattacks can penetrate electricity grid control networks, shutting down power to large numbers of people. It happened in Ukraine in 2015 and again in 2016, and it could happen here in the U.S., too. As researchers of grid security, we know the grid has long been designed to withstand random problems, such as equipment failures and trees falling on lines, as well as naturally occurring extreme events including storms and hurricanes. But as a new document from the National Institute of Standards and Technology suggests, we are just beginning to determine how best to protect it against cyberattacks. Understanding the Ukraine attacks On Dec. 23, 2015, a cyberattack penetrated electricity distribution control centers in Ukraine using software vulnerabilities, stolen credentials and sophisticated malware. The attackers were able to open dozens of circuit breakers and shut off power to more than 200,000 customers for several hours. A year later, the country’s electricity transmission facilities were attacked. That attack also cut off electricity service, though to a much smaller geographic area, and for only about an hour. In both cases, it is widely reported that hackers aligned with the Russian government were responsible. How can we prevent this sort of attack in the U.S.? Protecting the American electricity grid from cyberattacks is challenging not just because it is made up of so many physical and computerized elements connecting nearly every building in the country. It’s difficult because the grid has to continue to operate in real time, making adjustments to ensure the right amount of electricity gets where it needs to go at every moment. And it’s especially hard because the electricity industry is used to a slower pace of technological advance: While computer technologies like smartphones and servers are updated every two to three years, grid infrastructure typically must operate for over a decade. Over time, though, older traditional electricity meters have given way to digital smart meters. Similarly, power substations that are crucial for converting electricity from high-voltage transmission lines to lower voltage for household use, are increasingly controlled via internet-enabled networks and software. Security standards can help ensure utility companies keep their protection strong. The North American Electric Reliability Corporation, which oversees the grid in the U.S. and Canada, has rules, known as Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) compliance, for how electric companies must protect the power grid both physically and electronically. This includes monitoring the grid for attacks, as well as requiring safeguards such as multi-factor user authentication to keep unauthorized intruders from accessing control networks. NERC also hosts regular tabletop simulation exercises, where electricity companies can practice defending against major attacks. The U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology has its own recommendations, though they are not mandatory for utilities. A draft version of a new set of guidelines was just released, adding both urgency and detail for utility companies. These standards, guidelines and exercises have significantly improved the security of the larger elements of the power system, such as power plants and high-voltage transmission networks. But they have done little to protect the low-voltage distribution networks that supply power directly to our homes and workplaces. Attacks on these low-voltage parts of the overall system cover less territory than intrusions at higher levels, but they can still cause large-scale power outages, like in Ukraine in 2015. Defending the edges of distribution system is much more complicated than protecting its center. Not only are there many more physical locations to safeguard, but there are also many more companies involved in operating them. Municipal governments and utility cooperatives, for example, are significant distributors of electricity, and yet have limited security requirements. In addition, they may not have the money or expertise to protect their systems against cyberattacks. Joining forces The grid depends on a number of key control systems and algorithms, each of which presents its own unique vulnerabilities. The growing scale of this problem requires techniques to manage and reduce the number of vulnerable points the grid has. Research into grid security is moving away from investigating ways to better handle equipment failures and natural disasters, and toward creating a well-defended power grid for the future. One approach could be to add more redundancy – additional equipment that can fill in when an attack takes out a power plant or a transmission line. That is very expensive, though. The other approach involves systematically analyzing the risks inherent in critical systems and methodically defending against each of them. Key elements of this approach involve developing techniques that can prevent attacks, detect and respond to them when they happen, and allow us to investigate what happened after an attack has ended. That will help us to improve protection for the future. This approach will require the industry to ensure each new device it connects to the grid is protected, no matter how small or how big. We’ll also have to develop new systems that can detect anomalous grid communications and create more secure network architectures for critical grid control systems. In addition, regulators will need to keep updating the rules governing the industry to raise minimum security standards over time. Schools and universities will need to teach people to be not only electricity experts but cybersecurity defenders. Our ability to flip a switch and turn on the lights depends on it. Economy***Link – China is target of attacks from US military assets Navarro, 5-30-2016, (Peter Navarro is a professor of Economics and Public Policy at The Paul Merage School of Business, University of California-Irvine.Peter, "China's State-Sponsored Cyber Attacks Must Stop," Globalist, )Of course, it’s not just the American economy under relentless cyber attack. On the military front, defense agencies like the Pentagon and National Nuclear Security Administration (which is in charge of America’s nuclear weapons stockpile) each report up to 10 million probes a day. 10 million a day! Here again, China is at the epicenter of the attacks. As documented in Crouching Tiger: What China’s Militarism Means for the World,” the People’s Liberation Army has stolen the designs for virtually every major US weapons system. This list includes the F-22 and F-35 fifth-generation fighters America relies on to establish air dominance in theater; critical missile defense systems like the Navy’s Aegis and the Army’s THAAD; vital combat aircraft like the F/A-18 fighter, the V-22 Osprey, and Black Hawk helicopter; and virtually the entire family of American drones. Many U.S. weapons systems have also been severely compromised by what the U.S. Armed Services Committee has described as a “flood” of counterfeit parts. Here, again – and like a very broken record and relationship – the main culprit is China. In tracking “over 100 cases of suspect counterfeit parts back through the supply chain,” this Committee found China responsible for over 70% of the problem.Corporate espionage causes economic decline – perception of CFIUS ineffectiveness is sufficient to trigger the linkLukas 13 – (Carrie L. Lewis is a graduate of Princeton University and Harvard's Kennedy School of Government; currently is the managing director of the Independent Women's Forum, writes for Forbes, and is the vice president for policy and economics at the Independent Women's Voice; 6/4/13, “It's Time for the U.S. to Deal with Cyber-Espionage,” , Accessed 6/28/16, HWilson)Cyberwarfare and corporate espionage sound like the basis of a good summer beach read: the perfect escape from the too-gloomy realities of an economy that continues to sputter, leaving millions of Americans out of work and millions more underemployed. Yet Americans should be aware that far from fiction, industrial espionage has become a common occurrence and one that adds heavily to our economic woes.The numbers involved are staggering. The director of the National Security Agency, Gen. Keith Alexander, called cybercrime "the greatest transfer of wealth in history." The price tag for intellectual property theft from U.S. companies is at least $250 billion a year. That's far more than what businesses pay in federal corporate income taxes.Imagine what recouping those lost billions would mean to our economy and American workers: More jobs, higher pay, and lower prices would be the immediate result. It would also mean more innovation and a higher standard of living in the future. Today, business leaders have reason to be reluctant to invest scarce resources on research and development since that information and innovation may be stolen before they can bring new products to market. Without the specter of this crime, more money would be invested in identifying new technologies and medical breakthroughs that would make our lives healthier and richer.Of course, there is no way that America can identify, let alone stop, every cyberhacker. Yet cyber-espionage isn't primarily just the work of entrepreneurial, tech-savvy criminals. Much of the dirty work is done by state-sponsored cyberspies, who are purposefully draining information from vital U.S. infrastructure systems and businesses.The Virginia-based cyber security firm Mandiant recently released a report detailing one source of persistent cyber attacks, the Chinese People's Liberation Army. Mandiant estimates that since 2006, a single Chinese army cyberattack unit has compromised "141 companies spanning 20 major industries, from information technology and telecommunications to aerospace and energy," using a "well-defined attack methodology, honed over years and designed to steal large volumes of valuable intellectual property."Mandiant explains that once these hackers have infiltrated an organization's system, they "periodically revisit the victim's network ... and steal broad categories of intellectual property, including technology blueprints, proprietary manufacturing processes, test results, business plans, pricing documents, partnership agreements, and emails and contact lists". On average, access to a victimized network is maintained for nearly a year.Unsurprisingly, it's not just businesses that are hemorrhaging proprietary information and losing vast amounts of wealth as a result of these attacks. The United States government is a frequent victim, and national security, rather than just dollars, is often a casualty.The General Accounting Office found that in 2012 federal agencies reported 46,562 cyber security incidents. That's a big uptick from 5,503 incidents in 2006. GAO concludes that such attacks "have placed sensitive information at risk, with potentially serious impacts on federal and military operation; critical infrastructure; and confidentiality, integrity, and availability of sensitive government, private sector, and personal information." GAO also details how federal agencies across the board have been insufficient in creating plans to deter, detect and address such cyber threats.Shared Vulnerabilities (Cyberattacks affect both China and US Economies) (Extend Inherency)Adelson et. Al 14(Ian Adelson, Columbia School of International and Public Affairs June 14 “U.S.-China Cybersecurity Cooperation,” Capstone Report School of International and Public Affairs Columbia University , Accessed: 2/15/17)-Coronado ARLThe economic and financial interdependence between China and the U.S. is remarkable. China owns nearly 1.3 trillion dollars of U.S. treasury bonds. The U.S. is also one of China’s largest trading partners, with trading between the two nations reaching over half a trillion dollars each year. Furthermore, financial market operations centered in the United States are increasingly electronically connected around the world. The SWIFT interbank system and the U.S. CHIPS system process trillions of dollars of payments daily. With China’s increasingly globalized economy, China has strong incentives to ensure the stability of these systems. Equally importantly, impacts of financial events sometimes cannot be contained regionally (for example, the Global Financial Crisis in 2008 and the Southeast Asian Crisis in 1998). Cyber attacks on the complex and interdependent global financial system could damage the orderly functioning of the global economy and undermine investor confidence. Given this interdependence, both countries have a significant stake in ensuring the stability and safety of the other’s financial cybersecurity and have important incentives to share information regarding threats from third-party malicious actors such as rogue states, terrorist groups, and the like. The majority of interviewees agreed that the financial sector serves as the platform with one of the greatest opportunities for cybersecurity cooperation between the U.S. and China. However, these interviewees also believed that the most effective and sustainable mechanism for encouraging . The remainder of this section identifies several approaches designed to spur cooperation. ***Cybersecurity intersects with all other issues — economics and intellectual propertyRobledo 16 — Christian Robledo, International studies scholar, under the guidance of David Bachman, professor of International Studies at Washington University, 2016 (“Balancing Cooperation and Competition: A New Era In U.S.-China Relations,” The Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies at University of Washington, March, Available Online at , Accessed on 6/29/16, MEW) Cybersecurity has been and continues to be among the most pivotal issues that influence United States relations with China. Over the past few years, numerous private and public sector networks have been the target of Chinese hacking which has resulted in the theft of intellectual property, personal data, military information and other invaluable assets, costing billions of dollars in damage. A recent report, sponsored by Hewlett Packard Enterprise, estimated that the annual average cost of cyber crimes to 58 benchmark U.S. public and private organizations was $15.4 million per company.1 The study analyzed a diverse group of industries that ranged from those in the financial services, to those in hospitality. The report also concluded that the U.S., compared to other countries, continues to rank highest in costs associated with cyber crime. Reports such as the one mentioned above highlight the vulnerability of private and public networks and illustrate the need to fortify cyber defenses. The nature of cyberspace, specifically cyber attacks, however, pose a variety of challenges that makes them extremely difficult to deal with. Those challenges include, but are not limited to: lack of agreement over critical terminology (e.g. what constitutes a “cyber crime,” “cyber attack,” “cyber threat,” etc.), matters of attribution (i.e. where a threat or attack emanates from and whether it involves state or nonstate actors), and challenges associated with time, i.e. the ability of policymakers to develop and pass cyber defense legislation or budgets lag far behind the rapid rate at which cyber attack capabilities evolve.Cyber attacks on the economies are getting more complexMoy 15 (Ed Moy, 5-08-2015, "Cyber Attacks Pose Biggest Unrecognized Threat to Economy," Newsmax, )There is no shortage of threats to the U.S. economy: fragile growth, increasing regulation, the timing of the Fed’s raising interest rates, White House and congressional inaction, out-of-control entitlements, and a punitive and complicated tax system. Yet the biggest threat may be one that is least mentioned: cyber attacks. Cyber attacks have been expanding quickly from criminal gain to corporate espionage to ideological warfare. And these attacks have been increasing in frequency, scale, sophistication and severity. The primary reason for cyber attacks has been financial gain. Criminals go where the money is and there is easy money using personal data to commit fraud. Credit card data are sold to other criminals who use them to make purchases. Medical data are used to create new personal identities for credit card and bank fraud. Health insurance information is used to make false claims, access addictive prescription drugs and get free medical treatment. As a result, stealing personal data has reached epidemic proportions. The numbers from recent data breaches are staggering: credit card information from 56 million Home Depot and 70 million Target customers, 145 million login credentials from eBay, contact information for 76 million J.P. Morgan Chase customers and 80 million Anthem customers. Even small companies are not immune to these cyber attacks. From card skimmers to point-of-sale intrusions, data theft rings have targeted relatively unprotected small businesses as a new and vast profit center. The economic costs are monumental. It costs the breached organization an average of $200 per compromised record, mostly from business disruption and revenue loss. That does not include intangible costs like losing customer loyalty or hurting a company’s brand. To add insult to injury, corporate espionage attacks are increasing. Stealing intellectual property and spying on competitors comprises a growing number of attacks and come at huge costs to the company that has been hacked. And the big difference with corporate spying is that the attacker usually does not give up until they are successful. Finally, and most dangerous, are ideologically and politically motivated attacks. Cyber attacks have proven that computers are very vulnerable. But like any profit-driven enterprise, criminals and corporations are adverse to killing the goose that lays their golden eggs. Even nation states like China and Russia may be too co-dependent on the U.S. But the growth of ideologically driven movements is changing the risk. It is not a huge leap of imagination to envision a radical environmental group hacking into our energy infrastructure. Or terrorist groups like ISIS, Boko Haram and al Qaeda wanting to bring down our banking system. Ideological or political enemies can exploit the same vulnerabilities but have no remorse about maiming or killing the goose. In the recent annual threat assessment delivered to Congress, the National Director of Intelligence said that cyber attacks by politically and criminally motivated actors are the biggest threat to U.S. national security. In this brave new world, the good guys are playing catch up to the bad guys, who seem to always be one step ahead.Economy - SolvencyCybersecurity is economic relations between U.S and ChinaDe 14 (Jing De, 9-15-2014, "U.S.-China Cybersecurity Relations: Understanding China’s Current Environment," No Publication, )All policy issues have their own unique origins and political imperatives. Reconciling the cybersecurity policies of the United States and China is particularly challenging due to the different views on national security, foreign policy, and social and economic interests, which are increasingly critical in terms of national cybersecurity policy and strategy. If the cybersecurity confrontations between the United States and China are not resolved, this problem could damage the progress and friendly relationship that has been established between the citizens of China and the United States. It could also undermine the social and economic interdependencies between the two countries. It will also limit the ability to achieve the global collaboration required to combat massive cybercrimes and the spread of terrorism. The technology industry and the private sectors at large have an important role to play in this process. Given the increasing damages and complexity of cyber threats, the contribution of the global ICT industry should be considered essential for the protection of critical infrastructure, as well as the promotion of global trade relations, economic prosperity, and public safety.***There are three reasons why China would want to maintain cyber cooperation with US: economic costs, operational vulnerabilities, and landlord portsAdelson et al 14 (Ian Adelson, Columbia School of International and Public Affairs June 14 “U.S.-China Cybersecurity Cooperation,” Capstone Report School of International and Public Affairs Columbia University )The Chinese government has at least three compelling reasons to want to initiate and maintain some form of cyber cooperation with the United States vis-à-vis commercial port cybersecurity: [1]Economic costs. The potential consequences of even a minimal disruption in the flow of goods between the U.S. and China would be high and would have ripple effects for the global supply chain. For example, if there were a serious cyber attack on a major Chinese port, the zero-inventory, just-in-time flow of goods that sustains commerce in the U.S. would halt, and, depending on which port is attacked and for how long, there would be major impacts for China’s export-driven economy as traffic is re-routed to other ports creating delays. China and the U.S. jointly have a $440 billion reason to work together to prevent this kind of disruption to trade. [2]Personnel vulnerabilities at the operational level and systemic security issues. Chinese and U.S. ports use similar industrial control systems (ICS) to manage their day-to-day operations. Regardless of whether the software for these systems originates in China, the U.S., or elsewhere, Chinese and American ports are also made vulnerable by the staff accessing and running these systems daily. According to some experts, the average level of Chinese cybersecurity awareness is well below that of the United States, especially outside larger cities51. This leads to the possibility that, like in U.S. ports, the staff running Chinese ports may not possess a comprehensive understanding or even awareness of the potential harm from common cyber threats to their port operations networks. The cost of sharing information, for example against third-party threats such as organized crime elements, and discussing best practices such as how to conduct thorough port cyber vulnerability assessments, is relatively low compared to what the costs of a successful cyber attack could be. [3]Landlord ports. Many of the larger ports in the United States contain a commercial port facility that may include areas leased to “tenants” who are leasing space but have no role in the port’s overall management. These tenants often have access to the SCADA systems or other logistics software that are used to run the port, but are not subject to the same IT oversight that is required of the port “landlord” staff. This introduces a cyber vulnerability as landlord ports often have little awareness of what systems are being run by their tenants, if these tenant systems are being networked to larger port systems, or what cybersecurity measures tenants may or may not have in place. While operation of Chinese ports tends to fall under the purview of the local municipal government or other government-related holding companies, many also have tenant operators that are non-government affiliated and thus may share similar vulnerabilities.US China cooperation key to cyber deterrence- directly affects economic stabilityAdelson, 2014 (Ian, School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University, June 2014, “U.S.-China Cybersecurity Cooperation Capstone Report” ddi -tm) Cybersecurity is a global challenge within the international political economy. In August 2012, the business and administrative systems of the Saudi Arabian Oil Company (Saudi Aramco) and Qatar’s RasGas, were hit by the Shamoon computer virus. Saudi Aramco is the world’s largest energy company in the world, holding nearly 10% of the world’s oil supply, meanwhile, RasGas is the world’s second largest producer of liquefied natural gas.35 Shamoon demonstrates that the targeted attack of one entity has the potential to shake the underpinnings of the world economy. Fortunately, Shammon did not penetrate systems governing operations. Had that been the case, any disruption of production would have immediately impact on oil supply and prices, leading to far reaching effects on multiple levels and sectors of the global economy. China and the U.S. are the top oil consumers in the world. Since Shamoon, Saudi Arabian telecommunications companies and Western technology companies have increased efforts to secure Saudi data and systems. China is now recognizing the importance of international cybersecurity cooperation. Rapid international response enabled the Estonian government to combat the attacks. The government’s CERT relied on assistance from its Finnish, German, Israeli and Slovenian CERT counterparts to restore normal network operations. NATO CERTs and the EU’s European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) also supported Estonia in providing technical assessments and other assistance during the attacks.36 International cooperation, along with cooperation with private sector banks and Internet providers, was essential to strengthening Estonia’s cyber infrastructure, for example to incrementally increase its throughput capacity.37 Notably, the international responses to aid Estonia happened within established security communities and strong transnational relationships. China refrained from involvement, viewing the incidents as an internal matter of Estonia and also did not take part in the international cybersecurity discussions that followed.38 However, China’s stance is changing as evidenced by a recent high-level discourse and policy approaches calling for renewed cooperation with the entities such as the U.S. and European Union.39 Analysts stated that this new direction is intended to boost Chinese capabilities and hamper notions of a “China threat.”40 International cooperation and preparedness are now on the Chinese cyber agenda to move its strategic interests in technology development, global reputation, and economic growth. Proposed Infrastructure Sectors for Cooperation. The previous sections provided background information, tools, and themes for negotiating with China’s cybersecurity counterparts. The second area of focus drills down into tangible areas for information sharing and coordination. The following section details three infrastructure areas where cybersecurity cooperation is most promising and beneficial to U.S.-China shared interests: Financial Services, Commercial Port Security, and Civilian Nuclear Energy. Each sector examines five categories of research: Sector Priorities, Past and Potential Attack Examples, Shared Vulnerabilities, Chinese Partners and Key Actors, and Recommendations. Cooperation in Financial Systems Sector Priorities The soundness, efficiency and stability of securities markets rely on the quality of information provided and the robustness of the supporting technological infrastructure. In recent years, cybersecurity in relation to financial markets, both domestically and internationally, has become a top priority. The cornerstone of financial services is the maintenance of trust. The industry is built upon trust with clients, trust between firms, and trust to ensure the proper function of markets, executions of transactions and protection of information. Any loss or integrity failure in financial infrastructure could impact a national economy in significant ways, including the loss of credit and liquidity to the marketplace, and the loss of confidence in the operational effectiveness of the marketplace, which would impact other critical infrastructures. Examples of Past or Potential Attacks In recent years, cyber attacks on the financial services sector have been increasingly prevalent. In 2012, some of the largest banks in the United States came under cyber attack.41 In 2012 alone, 53% of securities exchanges around the world experienced a cyber attack.42 In 2013, cyber attacks brought down systems and some of South Korea’s major banks, paralyzing bank machines across the country.43 Operation High Roller, discovered in 2012, siphoned up to $2.5 billion from bank accounts in Europe, the U.S. and Latin America.44 Numerous stock exchanges around the world have faced DDoS cyber attacks, which in some cases have forced trading to halt for brief periods. It is estimated that 60% of cyber crime occurring in China is financerelated. Some Chinese banks are subject to extortion by cyber criminals, including third party actors from Eastern Europe.45 The economic and financial interdependence between China and the U.S. is remarkable. China owns nearly 1.3 trillion dollars of U.S. treasury bonds. The U.S. is also one of China’s largest trading partners, with trading between the two nations reaching over half a trillion dollars each year. Furthermore, financial market operations centered in the United States are increasingly electronically connected around the world. The SWIFT interbank system and the U.S. CHIPS system process trillions of dollars of payments daily. With China’s increasingly globalized economy, China has strong incentives to ensure the stability of these systems. Equally importantly, impacts of financial events sometimes cannot be contained regionally (for example, the Global Financial Crisis in 2008 and the Southeast Asian Crisis in 1998). Cyber attacks on the complex and interdependent global financial system could damage the orderly functioning of the global economy and undermine investor confidence. Given this interdependence, both countries have a significant stake in ensuring the stability and safety of the other’s financial cybersecurity and have important incentives to share information regarding threats from third-party malicious actors such as rogue states, terrorist groups, and the like. The majority of interviewees agreed that the financial sector serves as the platform with one of the greatest opportunities for cybersecurity cooperation between the U.S. and China. However, these interviewees also believed that the most effective and sustainable mechanism for encouraging such cooperation has yet to be identified. The remainder of this section identifies several approaches designed to spur cooperation. Economy – Impact Ext***US economic decline will cause a global depression, trade wars, and shooting warsJudis, 2011, (John, “Liberals’ Strange Retreat on Government Spending” The New Republic, August 8, is at stake goes beyond an abstract rate of unemployment, or the prospect of a Republican White House in 2012, or even the misery of the long-term unemployed. From the beginning, this recession has been global. Germany has to take leadership in Europe, but the United States is still the world’s largest economy, the principal source of consumer and investment demand, and the banking capital of the world. If the United States fails to revive its economy, and to lead in the restructuring of the international economy, then it’s unlikely that other economies in the West will pull themselves out of the slump. And as the experience of the 1930s testified, a prolonged global downturn can have profound political and geopolitical repercussions. In the U.S. and Europe, the downturn has already inspired unsavory, right-wing populist movements. It could also bring about trade wars and intense competition over natural resources, and the eventual breakdown of important institutions like European Union and the World Trade Organization. Even a shooting war is possible. So while the Obama administration would face a severe challenge in trying to win support for a boost in government spending, failing to do so would be far more serious than the ruckus that Tea Party and Republican opposition could create over the next year.Economic collapse causes chaos – empirics proveAustin & Lachman 9 (Michael, Resident Scholar @ American Enterprise Institute, and Desmond, Resident Fellow @ American Enterprise Institute, “The Global Economy Unravels,” Forbes, March 6, 2009, )What do these trends mean in the short and medium term? The Great Depression showed how social and global chaos followed hard on economic collapse. The mere fact that parliaments across the globe, from America to Japan, are unable to make responsible, economically sound recovery plans suggests that they do not know what to do and are simply hoping for the least disruption. Equally worrisome is the adoption of more statist economic programs around the globe, and the concurrent decline of trust in free-market systems. The threat of instability is a pressing concern. China, until last year the world's fastest growing economy, just reported that 20 million migrant laborers lost their jobs. Even in the flush times of recent years, China faced upward of 70,000 labor uprisings a year. A sustained downturn poses grave and possibly immediate threats to Chinese internal stability. The regime in Beijing may be faced with a choice of repressing its own people or diverting their energies outward, leading to conflict with China's neighbors. Russia, an oil state completely dependent on energy sales, has had to put down riots in its Far East as well as in downtown Moscow. Vladimir Putin's rule has been predicated on squeezing civil liberties while providing economic largesse. If that devil's bargain falls apart, then wide-scale repression inside Russia, along with a continuing threatening posture toward Russia's neighbors, is likely. Even apparently stable societies face increasing risk and the threat of internal or possibly external conflict. As Japan's exports have plummeted by nearly 50%, one-third of the country's prefectures have passed emergency economic stabilization plans. Hundreds of thousands of temporary employees hired during the first part of this decade are being laid off. Spain's unemployment rate is expected to climb to nearly 20% by the end of 2010; Spanish unions are already protesting the lack of jobs, and the specter of violence, as occurred in the 1980s, is haunting the country. Meanwhile, in Greece, workers have already taken to the streets. Europe as a whole will face dangerously increasing tensions between native citizens and immigrants, largely from poorer Muslim nations, who have increased the labor pool in the past several decades. Spain has absorbed five million immigrants since 1999, while nearly 9% of Germany's residents have foreign citizenship, including almost 2 million Turks. The xenophobic labor strikes in the U.K. do not bode well for the rest of Europe. A prolonged global downturn, let alone a collapse, would dramatically raise tensions inside these countries. Couple that with possible protectionist legislation in the United States, unresolved ethnic and territorial disputes in all regions of the globe and a loss of confidence that world leaders actually know what they are doing. The result may be a series of small explosions that coalesce into a big bang.Economic decline causes global nuclear war Stein T?nnesson 15, Research Professor, Peace Research Institute Oslo; Leader of East Asia Peace program, Uppsala University, 2015, “Deterrence, interdependence and Sino–US peace,” International Area Studies Review, Vol. 18, No. 3, p. 297-311Several recent works on China and Sino–US relations have made substantial contributions to the current understanding of how and under what circumstances a combination of nuclear deterrence and economic interdependence may reduce the risk of war between major powers. At least four conclusions can be drawn from the review above: first, those who say that interdependence may both inhibit and drive conflict are right. Interdependence raises the cost of conflict for all sides but asymmetrical or unbalanced dependencies and negative trade expectations may generate tensions leading to trade wars among inter-dependent states that in turn increase the risk of military conflict (Copeland, 2015: 1, 14, 437; Roach, 2014). The risk may increase if one of the interdependent countries is governed by an inward-looking socio-economic coalition (Solingen, 2015); second, the risk of war between China and the US should not just be analysed bilaterally but include their allies and partners. Third party countries could drag China or the US into confrontation; third, in this context it is of some comfort that the three main economic powers in Northeast Asia (China, Japan and South Korea) are all deeply integrated economically through production networks within a global system of trade and finance (Ravenhill, 2014; Yoshimatsu, 2014: 576); and fourth, decisions for war and peace are taken by very few people, who act on the basis of their future expectations. International relations theory must be supplemented by foreign policy analysis in order to assess the value attributed by national decision-makers to economic development and their assessments of risks and opportunities. If leaders on either side of the Atlantic begin to seriously fear or anticipate their own nation’s decline then they may blame this on external dependence, appeal to anti-foreign sentiments, contemplate the use of force to gain respect or credibility, adopt protectionist policies, and ultimately refuse to be deterred by either nuclear arms or prospects of socioeconomic calamities. Such a dangerous shift could happen abruptly, i.e. under the instigation of actions by a third party – or against a third party.Yet as long as there is both nuclear deterrence and interdependence, the tensions in East Asia are unlikely to escalate to war. As Chan (2013) says, all states in the region are aware that they cannot count on support from either China or the US if they make provocative moves. The greatest risk is not that a territorial dispute leads to war under present circumstances but that changes in the world economy alter those circumstances in ways that render inter-state peace more precarious. If China and the US fail to rebalance their financial and trading relations (Roach, 2014) then a trade war could result, interrupting transnational production networks, provoking social distress, and exacerbating nationalist emotions. This could have unforeseen consequences in the field of security, with nuclear deterrence remaining the only factor to protect the world from Armageddon, and unreliably so. Deterrence could lose its credibility: one of the two great powers might gamble that the other yield in a cyber-war or conventional limited war, or third party countries might engage in conflict with each other, with a view to obliging Washington or Beijing to intervene.***Cyber-attacks on the power grid shut down the military, economy, and society. Damages are irreparable.Lovins 10 Amory B, Chairman and Chief Scientist of Rocky Mountain Institute, "DOD's Energy Challenge as Strategic Opportunity", Issue 57, 2nd Quarter 2010, ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq-57/lovins.pdfThe Resilience Capability Resilience “combines efficient energy use with more diverse, dispersed, renewable supply—turning the loss of critical missions from energy supply failures (by accident or malice) from inevitable to near-impossible.” 37 This capability is vital because the: [a]lmost complete dependence of military installations on a fragile and vulnerable commercial power grid and other critical national infrastructure places critical military and Homeland defense missions at an unacceptably high risk of extended disruption. . . . [Backup generators and their fuel supplies at military installations are generally sized] for only shortterm commercial outages and seldom properly prioritized to critical loads because those are often not wired separately from non-essential loads. DOD’s approach to providing power to installations is based on assumptions that commercial power is highly reliable, subject to infrequent and short term outages, and backups can meet demands. [These assumptions are] . . . no longer valid and DOD must take a more rigorous risk-based approach to assuring adequate power to its critical missions. 38 The 2008 DSB Task Force found that the confluence of many risks to electric supply— grid overloads, natural disasters, sabotage or terrorism via physical or cyberattacks on the electric grid, and many kinds of interruptions to generating plants—hazards electricitydependent hydrocarbon delivery, the national economy, social stability, and DOD’s mission continuity. The U.S. electric grid was named by the National Academy of Engineering as the top engineering achievement of the 20 th century. It is very capital-intensive, complex, technologically unforgiving, usually reliable, but inherently brittle. It is responsible for ~98–99 percent of U.S. power failures, and occasionally blacking out large areas within seconds—because the grid requires exact synchrony across subcontinental areas and relies on components taking years to build in just a few factories or one (often abroad), and can be interrupted by a lightning bolt, rifle bullet, malicious computer program, untrimmed branch, or errant squirrel. Grid vulnerabilities are serious, inherent, and not amenable to quick fixes; current Federal investments in the “smart grid” do not even require simple mitigations. Indeed, the policy reflex to add more and bigger power plants and power lines after each regional blackout may make the next blackout more likely and severe, much as suppressing forest fires can accumulate fuel loadings that turn the next unsuppressed fire into an uncontrollable conflagration. Power-system vulnerabilities are even worse in-theater, where infrastructure and the capacity to repair it are often marginal: “attacks on the grid are one of the most common and effective tactics of insurgents in Iraq, and are increasingly seen in Afghanistan.” 39 Thus electric, not oil, vulnerabilities now hazard national and theater energy security. Simple exploitation of domestic electric vulnerabilities could take down DOD’s basic operating ability and the whole economy, while oil supply is only a gathering storm.Extend: Attack on Grid Likely***US-China cooperation checks cyberattacks against critical infrastructureAdelson, 2014 (Ian, School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University, June 2014, “U.S.-China Cybersecurity Cooperation Capstone Report” ddi -tm) China and the U.S. should begin cooperating on several areas related to financial cybersecurity—identifying threats, establishing processes for disseminating information, coordinating crisis responses, and improving abilities in detecting and forecasting threats. The timely sharing of threat information is critical in developing and deploying protective measures against malicious cyber activity. Gaps or lags in information sharing and analysis necessitates that the industry deploys faster and more effective electronic tools for detection and intelligence collection in relation to security attacks and incidents. In particular, there is an increased need for capabilities to assimilate multiple sources of threat data to better identify threat activity and produce threat profile identification, which might be difficult to obtain. The U.S. and Chinese governments should create a formal system to cooperate against cyberattacks, but as this might take time (as there would be initial sensitivity to establishing this system), it would be best to encourage the big banks and financial exchanges in each country to start sharing information first. Interviewees expressed concern surrounding information sharing and U.S. privacy laws. They recommended that the focus of information sharing be directed toward information involving globalized financial utilities such as financial exchanges and clearinghouses. Defending against third parties. China undoubtedly has an independent incentive in U.S. financial cybersecurity, as it has so much invested a great deal of capital in the U.S. and the global financial system. It would therefore be in China’s best interest to cooperate with the U.S. in preventing other countries, such as Iran, from damaging the U.S. financial system. Agree that certain areas are sacred. The governments of the U.S., China, and other nations should find ways to cooperate and agree to maintain the sanctity of certain critical infrastructure in the financial sector, therefore implicitly discouraging these areas of infrastructure from becoming targets of attack. In the financial services sector, the important prohibitions would be no probing, surveillance, or malicious activity by governments or government entities against this infrastructure. Again, the two most relevant areas of infrastructure are exchanges and clearinghouses. Not only are these infrastructures extremely important, but there is nothing to be gained by governments from attacking them. Cooperation between states will make it easier for them to target non-state actors wishing to cause damage or steal money in these areas. Cyberattacks are happening and causing damage- The US is vulnerable Dougherty 15 (Usafeaturesmedia, 10-9-2015, "Cyber attacks have already targeted critical infrastructure around the world and the U.S. could be next," No Publication, )Cyberattacks have already targeted critical infrastructure around the world and the U.S. could be next. As the modern world increasingly becomes “wired,” more critical systems and infrastructure are being linked via the Internet. And while that has given rise to incredible new technologies that boost efficiency and capability, it has also meant that countries are more vulnerable to hacking and cyber attack. Most nations do their best to defend their critical networks against hackers, DDoS (denial of service) attacks and outright cyber assaults. But not all systems are well-protected; some, in fact, are incredibly vulnerable. In recent months a report by Tripwire listed some of the most recent cyber attacks on various infrastructure in several countries: — In December 2014, amid the uproar over the massive hack of Sony Pictures, allegedly by North Korea in retaliation for a movie whose central theme was the assassination of North Korea leader Kim Jong Un, the German government released a report describing a successful cyberattack that infiltrated the industrial controls of a German steel mill that was not specifically identified. The report (in German) said that the attack caused “massive” damage by making it impossible to shut off a blast furnace. — Also in December, a report by Bloomberg News noted that a cyber attack in 2008 caused a gas pipeline to explode in Turkey. At the time, the BP-owned Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline was thought to be one of the most secure pipelines in the world. Still, hackers were able to use a wireless network to hack into the system controlling the pipeline and cause massive damage. — In November 2014, NSA Director Navy Adm. Michael Rogers told the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence that a number of foreign governments had already managed to penetrate U.S. energy, water and fuel distribution systems, which has potential to damage essential services. “This is not theoretical,” Rogers said. “This is something real that is impacting our nation and those of our allies and friends every day.” — And in May 2014, the Department of Homeland Security and its Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT) said in a report that several known attacks had occurred against U.S. utilities during the first quarter of 2014. The report cited details of an unnamed utility that had been breached while warning other U.S. utilities to be on the lookout for additional breaches. “Is your control system accessible directly from the Internet? Do you use remote access features to log into your control system network? Are you unsure of the security measures that protect your remote access services? If your answer was yes to any or all these questions, you are at increased risk of cyber attacks including scanning, probes, brute force attempts and unauthorized access to your control environment,” the ICE-CERT report said. Vulnerable systems Every bit of U.S. infrastructure – from power grids to dams to air and ground traffic control to water treatment plants and our financial institutions – are all accessible online. And while these systems are defended, some are still more vulnerable than others. As Tripwire noted, some 48 percent of U.S. utilities surveyed said they needed additional cyber protection; 20.1 percent said they “didn’t know” (an alarming figure in and of itself). In August 2012 Natural News reported that a cyber security specialist discovered a flaw in the software that allows hackers to spy on and attack the communication of critical infrastructure operators of power plants, water systems, dams and more, and gain access to the credentials of computer systems which control those critical systems . Justin W. Clarke, an expert in securing industrial control systems, said a conference in Los Angeles earlier that month he had discovered a way to spy on traffic moving into and out of networking equipment manufactured by RuggedCom, a division of Siemens. Clarke said his discovery is disturbing to the extent that hackers who are able to spy on communications of infrastructure operators could then also gain credentials allowing access to computer systems that control power and water plants, as well as electric grids and other critical infrastructure. “If you can get to the inside, there is almost no authentication, there are almost no checks and balances to stop you,” Clarke told Reuters.China will retaliate by attacking critical infrastructure-they have the means. Brenner, MIT Center for International Studies fellow, 2015 (Joel, “Debating the Chinese Cyber Threat”, International Security, Summer, project muse)In “The Impact of China on Cybersecurity: Fiction and Friction,” Jon Lindsay asserts that the threat of Chinese cyber operations, though “relentlessly irritating,” is greatly exaggerated; that China has more to fear from U.S. cyber operations than the United States does from China; and that U.S.-China relations are reasonably stable.1 He claims that “[o]verlap across political, intelligence, military, and institutional threat narratives . . . can lead to theoretical confusion” (p. 44). In focusing almost exclusively on military-to-military operations, however, where he persuasively argues that the United States retains a significant qualitative advantage, Lindsay underemphasizes the significance of vulnerabilities in U.S. civilian networks to the exercise of national power, and he draws broad conclusions that have doubtful application in circumstances short of a full-out armed conflict with China. In addition, he does not discuss subthreshold conflicts that characterize, and are likely to continue to characterize, this symbiotic but strife-ridden relationship. To begin, Lindsay argues that American infrastructure is safe from nation-state cyberattack. For support, he cites a similar conclusion by Desmond Ball, who touts the supposed “sophistication of the anti-virus and network security programs available” in advanced Western countries.2 The notion that Western-made anti-virus and network security programs are effective against sophisticated cyberattacks would astonish any group of corporate security officers. Anti-virus programs are flimsy filters designed to catch only some of the malware that their designers know about. They miss a great deal. New malware enters the market at the rate of about 160,000 per day.3 Filters, whether employed by the military or not, are unable to keep up. “Network security programs” vary in quality, are insufficiently staffed, and are often not implemented at all across the economy. The Pentagon is expending huge sums to build its own power grids, even as its budget shrinks, precisely because the civilian grid cannot be relied [End Page 191] upon in a crisis. On this subject, Lindsay says only that China’s ability to attack the U.S. grid “cannot be discounted.” In contrast, Adm. Michael Rogers, director of the National Security Agency (NSA) and commander of U.S. Cyber Command, testified in 2014 that China and “one or two” other countries could shut down the power grid and other critical systems in the United States.4 Lindsay’s article also fails to address the relationship between nonmilitary vulnerabilities and the exercise of national power. For example, when Russian intruders penetrated JPMorgan Chase Bank’s computer system in 2014 during tensions over Ukraine, no one could tell President Barack Obama whether Russian President Vladimir Putin was sending him an implied threat.5 Taking down a major bank would have enormous economic repercussions, and Chase’s vulnerability was there for all to see. When evaluating his options, could the president ignore the possibility that exercising one of them carried the palpable risk that a major U.S. bank could be taken down? Whatever the source and objective of the intrusion in the Chase case, the incident demonstrates the way in which a critical vulnerability in the civilian economy could constrain the exercise of national power, including military power, in a crisis. Lindsay speculates skeptically about the increase in the reporting of commercial network exploitation since 2010 and wonders whether it may be spurred by self-interested disclosures by network defense firms seeking to scare up demand for their services. He does not mention that the Securities and Exchange Commission issued guidance in 2011 stating that public companies “should review, on an ongoing basis, the adequacy of their disclosure relating to cybersecurity risks and cyber incidents.”6 And despite Lindsay’s claim that commercial network exploitation is overreported, virtually every private-sector lawyer and consultant I know in this field believes that publicly disclosed information understates the severity and frequency of attacks on corporate networks. The reasons are well known: companies resist disclosure for fear of harm to their brands and stock prices and to avoid shareholder derivative class-action lawsuits and regulatory action by the Federal Trade Commission. Lindsay is on better footing when he denies that a network penetration, even when it results in the theft of intellectual property (IP), necessarily results in lost profit or market share. The absorption and application of stolen intellectual property are complicated processes; they require know-how as well as a recipe. This is one reason why IP theft and reverse engineering do not necessarily produce market share for the thief and the copy-cat. Thus China still cannot produce a jet engine, even though it has plenty of American and Russian engines to study, because it cannot master the fabrication process. These are not contested propositions, however. Insurance carriers certainly understand them, which is largely why IP cannot be insured against theft. It is incorrect, however, to imply from this, as Lindsay does, that IP theft is not a significant issue for many of its victims. China has no difficulty using stolen IP about, say, oil and gas exploration data and materials testing research. Both are prime targets. [End Page 192] Chinese intruders have also stolen negotiation strategies to good effect, as more than a few companies could testify (but will not). And in the case of solar-power technology, Chinese IP thieves had no trouble absorbing stolen secrets and penetrating Western markets.7 Some descriptions of the economic losses have been hyperbolic, no doubt; and the losses have eluded persuasive quantification. Nevertheless, the problem is real and substantial. The overall state of American networks and of private-sector capabilities simply is drastically different from the picture Lindsay paints. Take attribution. Public reports that the NSA can often—though not always—do very good attribution does not mean that private companies can do it. Attribution has three levels: (1) identifying the device from which an intrusion was both launched and commanded; (2) identifying the actor at the keyboard; and (3) identifying the actor’s affiliation. Even the NSA cannot always get to the second and third levels, as the Chase Bank incident demonstrated. The most basic difference between the military-to-military situation and the corporate reality, however, is that militaries and intelligence agencies fight back. In contrast, companies are exposed to attack without the legal right to retaliate (for mostly good reasons) even when they have, or could buy, the ability to do so. In this environment, offense is unquestionably dominant. According to Lindsay, since 2010 “Western cyber-security defenses, technical expertise, and government assistance to firms have improved” (p. 23). In fact, very few companies receive government help with intrusions. If he means that private-sector defenses have improved when measured against themselves, then that is true but irrelevant. Attacks have also increased in sophistication, and when measured against the offense, defenses have not improved. All defenses are versions of Whac-A-Mole, and there are too many moles to whack them all.8 In sum, Lindsay and I agree that the current and foreseeable state of cyber technology “enables numerous instances of friction to emerge below the threshold of violence” (p. 9). This is what I have called “the gray space between war and peace.” If this environment is showing signs of strategic stability, it is partly, as Lindsay argues, because mutual vulnerability is creating mutual restraint among nation-states. But the vulnerabilities remain, and they could be exploited by China or Russia in a crisis and by a growing number of second-tier cyber players that are not so constrained. Cyber attacks on critical infrastructure are a credible threat – and risk quick escalation Warren et al ‘15(Scott Warren Harold is associate director of the RAND Center for Asia Pacific Policy, Martin Libicki is a senior management scientist at the RAND Corporation, a professor at the Pardee RAND Graduate School, and a Distinguished Visiting Professor at the U.S. Naval Academy, Astrid Cevallos is a Project Associate at the RAND Corporation. “Getting to Yes with China in Cyberspace”, , the RAND Corporation, Accessed July 14th 2016; DDI-RF)Separately, a third U.S. concern is over the prospect that China might be prepared to use a cyberattack to take down U.S. critical infrastructure during a crisis. The current NSA director, ADM Michael S. Rogers, has testified that China has compromised the U.S. power grid through intrusions that left behind software implants (often referred to as back doors) that could be used to wreak havoc in a crisis.20 There are also concerns that the United States and China could misread each other’s actions and signals in cyberspace during a crisis in ways that could lead to escalation. Due to the relatively opaque nature of cyberspace, it is also possible that the two sides could misattribute signals from each other or misattribute actions taken by a third party as coming from each other, especially if a malicious or self-interested actor were to route attacks on the other side through U.S. or Chinese servers during a particularly tense period in the bilateral relationship. The United States and China are concerned about how each side would use cyberattacks in warfare and the escalation risks that such use may entail.Grid meltdown creates chaos and has huge death tolls Noory 15 — George Noory, host of Coast to Coast AM, previously the director of news planning and development at KSTP-TV in Minneapolis, 2015 (“EMP Grid Meltdown Could Destroy America,” Coast to Coast AM, September 23rd, Available Online at , Accessed June 29, 2016//AW)As C2C previously reported, a recent Congressional study prepared by former Rep. Bartlett stated that 90 percent of all Americans might be dead within a year following an EMP generated grid meltdown. The federal government has finally introduced a bill, the Critical Infrastructure Protection Act, to toughen up the grid. But that may meet opposition, Fortschen warned, citing the last time a grid protection law was attempted it was killed by a lone Senator. And, not only are we vulnerable from the unpredictable forces of the sun, but America's enemies are said to be plotting a major EMP attack that could be "100 times worse than 9/11," Fortschen told George. Enemies with long range ICBM missiles could detonate a nuclear device in the upper atmosphere at key strategic locations, knocking out the grid with an EMP, Fortschen said. And a military response would be very slow to respond with "computerized planes falling from the skies," he said.An EMP attack on the grid is likely and causes massive death tollsCooper and Pry 15 — Henry Cooper, former director of the Strategic Defense Initiative, Peter Pry, executive director of the EMP Task Force on National and Homeland Security and served in the EMP Commission, the House Armed Services Committee, and the Central Intelligence Agency, 2015 (“The Threat to Melt the Electric Grid,” The Wall Street Journal, April 30th, Available Online at , Accessed on June 29, 2016//AW)The Pentagon is moving the headquarters for the North American Aerospace Defense Command (Norad) back into Cheyenne Mountain near Colorado Springs, Colo., a decade after having largely vacated the site. Why the return? Because the enormous bunker in the hollowed-out mountain, built to survive a Cold War-era nuclear conflict, can also resist an electromagnetic-pulse attack, or EMP. America’s military planners recognize the growing threat from an EMP attack by bad actors around the world, in particular North Korea and Iran. An EMP strike, most likely from the detonation of a nuclear weapon in space, would destroy unprotected military and civilian electronics nationwide, blacking out the electric grid and other critical infrastructure for months or years. The staggering human cost of such a catastrophic attack is not difficult to imagine.***Chinese cyber-attack on the grid is likelyCrawford 14 — Jaime Crawford, CNN national security reporter who covers the Pentagon, 2014 (“The U.S. government thinks China could take down the power grid,” CNN News, November 21st, Available Online at , Accessed on June 29, 2016//AW)China and "probably one or two other" countries have the capacity to shut down the nation's power grid and other critical infrastructure through a cyber attack, the head of the National Security Agency told a Congressional panel Thursday. Admiral Michael Rogers, who also serves the dual role as head of U.S. Cyber Command, said the United States has detected malware from China and elsewhere on U.S. computers systems that affect the daily lives of every American. "It enables you to shut down very segmented, very tailored parts of our infrastructure that forestall the ability to provide that service to us as citizens," Rogers said in testimony before the House Intelligence Committee. Rogers said such attacks are part of the "coming trends" he sees based on "reconnaissance" currently taking place that nation-states, or other actors may use to exploit vulnerabilities in U.S. cyber systems. A recent report by Mandiant, a cyber-security firm, found that hackers working on behalf of the Chinese government were able to penetrate American public utility systems that service everything from power generation, to the movement of water and fuel across the country. "We see them attempting to steal information on how our systems are configured, the very schematics of most of our control systems, down to engineering level of detail so they can look at where are the vulnerabilities, how are they constructed, how could I get in and defeat them," Rogers said. "We're seeing multiple nation-states invest in those kinds of capabilities." Grid collapse causes existential blackouts – AQAP already has the capabilityPry 15 – PhD, Executive Director of the Task Force on National and Homeland Security and Director of the U.S. Nuclear Strategy Forum (Peter, “TERRORISM–AN EXISTENTIAL THREAT”, )Terrorists do not need a nuclear missile to pose an existential threat to the United States, however. Technology has so evolved since World War II and the Cold War that the U.S. and the West have become an electronic civilization. Our prosperity and very lives depend upon a complex web of high-tech information, communications, financial, transportation, and industrial critical infrastructures, all supported by the keystone critical infrastructure–the electric power grid. Admiral Michael Rogers, Director of the National Security Agency and U.S. CYBERCOMMAND, in November 2014, warned that China and other actors could make a cyber attack that would blackout the U.S. national electric grid for 18 months, with catastrophic consequences for society. The Congressional EMP Commission warned that a nationwide blackout lasting one year could kill up to 9 of 10 Americans from starvation and societal collapse. Terrorists and hostile nations are probing U.S. cyber defenses every day and are working hard to develop the cyber equivalent of a nuclear warhead. Terrorists can also pose an existential threat to the United States by attacking its technological Achilles’ Heel the old fashioned way, using bullets and bombs. A study by the U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the government agency responsible for grid security, warns that a terror attack that destroys just nine (9) key transformer substations, out of 2,000, could blackout the entire nation for over a year. Terrorists have learned that the electric grid is a major societal vulnerability. Terrorist attacks have already caused large-scale blackouts of 420,000 people in Mexico (October 2013), the entire nation of Yemen (by Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in June 2014), and 80 percent of the grid in Pakistan (January 2015)–this last a nuclear weapons state. And if terrorists steal a nuclear weapon from Pakistan, buy one from North Korea, or are given one by Iran, they could loft the warhead by balloon or missile to high-altitude over the U.S. to make the ultimate cyber attack–a nuclear electromagnetic pulse (EMP). EMP could blackout the national electric grid and other life sustaining critical infrastructures, perhaps permanently.Cyberattacks Throughout HistoryCyberattacks in historyNATO (Nato Review, xx-xx-xxxx, "The history of cyber attacks," NATO Review, , Accessed: 3/4/17)-Coronado ARL1988 The Morris worm - one of the first recognised worms to affect the world's nascent cyber infrastructure - spread around computers largely in the US. The worm used weaknesses in the UNIX system Noun 1 and replicated itself regularly. It slowed down computers to the point of being unusable. The worm was the work of Robert Tapan Morris, who said he was just trying to gauge how big the Internet was. He subsequently became the first person to be convicted under the the US' computer fraud and abuse act. He now works as a professor at MIT. DECEMBER 2006 NASA was forced to block emails with attachments before shuttle launches out of fear they would be hacked. Business Week reported that the plans for the latest US space launch vehicles were obtained by unknown foreign intruders. APRIL 2007 Estonian government networks were harassed by a denial of service attack by unknown foreign intruders, following the country's spat with Russia over the removal of a war memorial. Some government online services were temporarily disrupted and online banking was halted. The attacks were more like cyber riots than crippling attacks, and the Estonians responded well, relaunching some services within hours or - at most - days. JUNE 2007 The US Secretary of Defense’s unclassified email account was hacked by unknown foreign intruders as part of a larger series of attacks to access and exploit the Pentagon's networks. OCTOBER 2007 China’s Ministry of State Security said that foreign hackers, which it claimed 42% came from Taiwan and 25% from the US, had been stealing information from Chinese key areas. In 2006, when the China Aerospace Science & Industry Corporation (CASIC) intranet network was surveyed, spywares were found in the computers of classified departments and corporate leaders. SUMMER 2008 The databases of both Republican and Democratic presidential campaigns were hacked and downloaded by unknown foreign intruders. AUGUST 2008 Computer networks in Georgia were hacked by unknown foreign intruders around the time that the country was in conflict with Russia. Graffiti appeared on Georgian government websites. There was little or no disruption of services but the hacks did put political pressure on the Georgian government and appeared to be coordinated with Russian military actions. JANUARY 2009 Hackers attacked Israel’s internet infrastructure during the January 2009 military offensive in the Gaza Strip. The attack, which focused on government websites, was executed by at least 5,000,000 computers. Israeli officials believed the attack was carried out by a criminal organisation based in a former Soviet state, and paid for by Hamas or Hezbollah. JANUARY 2010 A group named the "Iranian Cyber Army” disrupted the service of the popular Chinese search engine Baidu. Users were redirected to a page showing an Iranian political message. The same “Iranian Cyber Army” had hacked into Twitter the previous December, with a similar message OCTOBER 2010 Stuxnet, a complex piece of malware designed to interfere with Siemens industrial control systems, was discovered in Iran, Indonesia, and elsewhere, leading to speculation that it was a government cyber weapon aimed at the Iranian nuclear programme. JANUARY 2011 The Canadian government reported a major cyber attack against its agencies, including Defence Research and Development Canada, a research agency for Canada's Department of National Defence. The attack forced the Finance Department and Treasury Board, Canada’s main economic agencies, to disconnect from the Internet. JULY 2011 In a speech unveiling the Department of Defense’s cyber strategy, the US Deputy Secretary of Defense mentioned that a defense contractor was hacked and 24,000 files from the Department of Defense were stolen. OCTOBER 2012 The Russian firm Kaspersky discovered a worldwide cyber-attack dubbed “Red October,” that had been operating since at least 2007. Hackers gathered information through vulnerabilities in Microsoft’s Word and Excel programmes. The primary targets of the attack appear to be countries in Eastern Europe, the former USSR and Central Asia, although Western Europe and North America reported victims as well. The virus collected information from government embassies, research firms, military installations, energy providers, nuclear and other critical infrastructures. MARCH 2013 South Korean financial institutions as well as the Korean broadcaster YTN had their networks infected in an incident said to resemble past cyber efforts by North Korea. JUNE 2013 In their first-ever meeting dedicated to cyber defence on Tuesday (June 4), NATO Defence Ministers agreed that the Alliance’s cyber-defence capability should be fully operational by the autumn, extending protection to all the networks owned and operated by the Alliance. OCTOBER 2013 NCIRC Upgrade - The NATO Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC) upgrade project, a 58 Million euro enhancement of NATO cyber defences, is on track for completion by the end of October 2013. This major capability milestone will help NATO to better protect its networks from the increasing number of cyber attacks against the Alliance's information systems.Cyberattack on China would tank the world’s economyWaterman 11(Washington Times Http, 3-17-2011, "China open to cyber-attack," Washington Times, , Accessed: 3/4/17)-Coronado ARLDams, oil and gas pipelines, factories and other computer-controlled infrastructure are more vulnerable to cyber-attacks in China than in other countries, security specialists say. The effectiveness of such an attack was demonstrated last year when the Stuxnet computer worm slowed Iran’s nuclear program by taking control of and disabling hundreds of uranium-enriching centrifuges. A cyber-attack on China’s computer-controlled infrastructure would imperil the world’s second-largest economy, which likely would affect the economies of Beijing’s trading partners, including the United States. China’s vulnerability lies in its fledgling domestic software industry, which Beijing nurtures and promotes, and in the lack of transparency in its computer-defense organizations, which makes hacking into its systems easier than gaining unauthorized access to Western systems, security specialists say. Coincidentally, China is widely viewed as an aggressor in cyberspace. The U.S. and other Western nations have identified Beijing as being behind cyber-espionage attempts against their infrastructure computer systems. Factories, dams, utilities and other industrial operations rely on computers that use special software to run, maintain and troubleshoot their machinery — Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems. Malicious computer programs such as the Stuxnet worm allow hackers to hijack SCADA controls. China’s premier domestic producer of SCADA software is Beijing-based WellinTech Inc., which boasts on its website that its Kingview SCADA package is the most widely used in China and has customers in the aerospace and national defense industries. When a security researcher discovered a critical flaw in Kingview and reported it to the company and Chinese authorities last year, he met a wall of denial that raises grave doubts about Chinese cybersecurity procedures. The vulnerability would enable a hacker to gain control of any industrial machinery operated by Kingview SCADA software, security researcher Dillon Beresford said. “Exploiting this bug correctly would allow the attacker to gain remote control of the machine” that the software was running, he told The Washington Times. Mr. Beresford, who looks for flaws in Chinese software as a hobby alongside his day job for a U.S. computer security firm, said he identified the vulnerability last year and immediately notified both the company and China’s Computer Emergency Response Team, CN-CERT. Neither ever acknowledged his communication nor moved to deal with the flaw for 3? months. “I never got any response at all until I put some proof-of-concept data on the Internet, and the computer security press picked it up,” he said. By putting proof-of-concept data on the Web, Mr. Beresford raised the stakes significantly. He made the vulnerability public — and in a way that would allow any programmer to use the code he had written to develop malicious software to attack Kingview. CN-CERT posted a fix for the vulnerability within a few days. In an e-mail to its American counterpart, U.S.-CERT, a few days later, the center said Mr. Beresford’s e-mail “had been missed by the duty staff,” which deals with “thousands of emails every day. It’s a big pity, as well as a mistake that our duty staff [did] not notice such an important email,” CN-CERT concluded. “Did it really slip through the cracks?” Mr. Beresford said. “I think there was a bit of embarrassment, and they were concerned about the implications.” Mr. Beresford said it was not the first time he had found flaws in Chinese software. “When it comes to vulnerabilities in software produced by domestic manufacturers, they’re not exactly transparent or open,” he said of CN-CERT and China’s other official computer security organizations. That lack of transparency is a problem because, in order to patch a vulnerability effectively, it must be done publicly so that everyone who owns the software knows they need to download and apply the patch. China’s infrastructure is “just as vulnerable [as anyone else’s] and probably more because of the lack of transparency,” Mr. Beresford said. “The Chinese are very vulnerable to being compromised, but we haven’t seen a lot of work on this by U.S. or other Western researchers.” James A. Lewis, a cybersecurity scholar at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, agreed, saying there are other reasons why China’s infrastructure is more vulnerable to cyber-attack. Several surveys show that the great majority of computers used in China run pirated software, he said. “So your software sector is stunted” because no one can make any money selling a product that will be so quickly and easily pirated.” Moreover, “If you use pirated software, you have no idea where it comes from,” he said, adding that much of China’s has come from the Russian mafia. Pirated software cannot be patched or updated and might have flaws or “back doors” deliberately inserted into it to allow easy, unauthorized access. “If you use pirated software, you’re gonna be vulnerable,” Mr. Lewis said. “The Chinese don’t have the same problems we do,” he said. “But they have their own, and theirs may sometimes be worse.”National Cybersecurity PolicyYuxiao 12, Director of the China Internet Governance Research Center (UCSD, 08-xx-2012, “,” IGCC Workshop Report on China and Cybersecurity , Accessed: 3/4/17)-Coronado ARLExperts have predicted that in the mobile Internet era, the most terrible problem will be security, and this prophecy is now becoming a reality. In recent years, Internet websites, as well as the related value-added telecommunications business, are booming, and the business scale, the number of users, and social influence are increasing. Because of a lack of risk awareness, sense of responsibility, and necessary protective measures, the disclosure of users’ information, website attacks, and other incidents have occurred casually. Some of them have even caused serious harm and negative effects. In 2011, about 8.531 million computers in China were attacked by rogue programs every day, which accounted for 5.7 percent of daily networked computers, reaching a growth rate of 48 percent compared with the year of 2010. According to an assessment report recently published by China’s Software Test Center, a sample of bank websites got only 31.98 points (the full mark is 100 points) in an evaluation survey, which was the lowest score. In addition, another survey showed that 60 percent of 2500 persons had their personal information stolen; more than 66 percent of them agreed that we should intensify efforts to combat the illegal behavior. Accordingly, we can see that China’s situation of Internet information security is quite severe. The phenomenon of information leakage under the environments is serious, so the protection of privacy and personal data should be strengthened. Internet abuses are unscrupulous. There is a lack of protection for privacy and data. There are legal loopholes in public information safety, and China lacks an effective management mechanism. The deep reasons for the situation are as follows. China’s current emphasis on information security is not enough. Its institutions and the legal system are incomplete. Information security strategies and plans are insufficient. Internet technologies need further development. General public education is barely satisfactory. Further international cooperation is really needed. Cyberspace security is an common, international problem. We need to face and solve it together. However, there are differences between countries, so it is impossible for all countries to do everything in the same style. Every country has its own problems on Internet security. It is unfair for one country to criticize others according to its own policies. Because the topic of cyberspace security is very sensitive, the discussion is not thorough enough. Governments cannot reach a consensus in some questions. So we need to open “track II” academic cooperation between different countries. Through such cooperation, we can define the basic principles and rules and establish the mechanism to work. Topics we focus on could include cyber security, privacy, and business data protection. There is an old Chinese saying: Make much of what is common and minimize differences. Cyberspace is boundless, and different countries and nations have tremendous benefits and opportunities in it. We should take measures based on mutual respect and make common developments. When we humans become a whole by using the Internet, our intelligence could work together for developing humanity. We need open exchanges and cooperation to create a win-win situation. We also need to ensure each other’s interests and rights in cyberspace. In this process, academic cooperation is very important now, so we need to help to bring about a consensus between academic institutions on the way ahead.Chinese Civilian Cybersecurity: Stakeholders, Strategies, and PoliciesGoodrich 12, Global Policy Director Information Technology Industry Council(UCSD 08-xx-2012, “,” IGCC Workshop Report on China and Cybersecurity , Accessed: 3/4/17)-Coronado ARLWhat motivates China’s thinking on civilian national cyber security issues (i.e., on industrial policy rather than military strategy, diplomacy, and information control issues)? Who are the key actors? What are the primary policy initiatives? There is virtually no English language research in this critical area, but information can be found through publicly available Chinese sources. In Beijing many cyber policies are in “deadlock” while senior leadership is focused on “more pressing matters” and a fragmented constellation of bureaucratic actors aggressively protect their turf. The civilian cybersecurity apparatus is dominated by a professional technically-oriented cadre without deep economic or international relations expertise. The current lack of coordination and leadership has led to a stagnation in policy and calls for a senior coordinator. This state of affairs might remind some readers of U.S. cybersecurity policy. Chinese stakeholders include the Communist Party, government agencies, the PLA, academia, critical infrastructure operators, and ICT industrial suppliers. Within the Party and State Council, various Leading Small Groups touch cyber issues. The State Informatization Leading Small Group (SILG) for national IT development policy was formed in 1993 and reconstituted in 2001 under Zhu Rongji, but it received less emphasis under Hu Jintao. Its routine work was handled by the State Council Informatization Office (SCITO), but this appears to have been disbanded in 2008, leading to high degrees of uncertainty for many players. For cybersecurity in particular, the National Network and Information Security Coordination Small Group (NNISCSG) was created in 2002 as sub-group under SILG, although previous ruminations have existed since 1996. The NNISCG is chaired by Li Keqiang, with deputies Zhang Dejiang, Liu Yunshan, Ling Jihua, Meng Jianzhu, and Chen Bingde. This body drafted China’s national civilian cyber security strategy (“Document 27”) and approved major cybersecurity related policies and national strategies (e.g., the Multi-Level Protection Scheme, China Compulsory Certification, disaster recovery, incident management, e-government security, trusted networks, infosec standards, and the infosec five-year plan). After completing strategy formulation and policy planning in the first part of the decade, this body was disbanded in 2008 and reconstituted in 2009, but there is no public record of meetings since then, and various ministries have a hand in implementation. The four primary security agencies managing information security are wryly referred to as “Kung Pao Chicken” (宫爆鸡丁), a pun on their names (公安, 保密, 机要, 兵丁). There is little oversight or executive-level review of the security agencies. The Ministry of Public Security is responsible for cybercrime and critical infrastructure protection and has a nationwide network of research labs. The State Encryption Bureau, also known as the CCP Central Office Confidential Bureau and Central Cryptography Commission, is responsible for party, military, and civilian encryption management (but not intelligence cryptology). The State Secrets Bureau, also known as the CCP Secretariat Secrets Protection Office, manages all classified networks and has been very active since the 2009 revision to the state secrets law. The military (PLA) is also a key player in the civilian sphere, through front end elements of General Staff Department units (3/PLA, 4/PLA, PLA Encryption Bureau, and the PLA State Secrets Office). Slightly less important since the 2008 ministry reorganization which disbanded SCITO, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) has an information security coordination department and is responsible for telecom and Internet security. The Ministry of State Security prefers a low public profile, but is understood to be the most technically capable, especially in the area of information assurance (administered through the 13th bureau, the science and technology bureau, and CNITSEC). The Politburo Standing Committee for Propaganda is also important. China’s civilian cybersecurity elite is a professional, technically-versed group of individuals. The “first generation” of cybersecurity officials still hold power, with much representation from CAE academicians and CAS fellows. Many current officials have been under the tutelage of these senior scholars/officials. Most cyber policymakers have spent time doing technical research in academia, with little experience in economics or international affairs. Patriarchal relationships lead to difficult situations for junior officials. China’s civilian national cybersecurity strategy, released in 2003 and initially classified but later promulgated more widely, is known as “Document 27: Opinions for Strengthening Information Security Assurance Work.” It enshrines a principle of “active defense” and sets policy foundations for critical infrastructure protection, cryptography, dynamic monitoring, indigenous innovation, talent development, leadership, and funding. Specific policy initiatives launched through Document 27 have led to an antagonistic system of policy spaces vigorously defended by bureaucratic owners. Any incursion by other agencies or newcomers has led to conflict. Although SILG/SCITO aided initial policy formulation, its disbanding in 2008 led to “chaos” in China’s civilian cybersecurity policy arena. These separate policy initiatives include: The multi-level protection scheme (MLPS), China’s critical information infrastructure protection regulation, which has had tremendous resources invested into implementation and has led to what might be called an MLPS “industrial complex.” ? Product assurance is security testing for IT products. Each security agency runs its own certification schemes (CNITSEC/TRIMPS/ISCCC/SSB/PLA), leading to the perverse result that some economic actors forego security assurance altogether. For example, there is widespread non-use of transport layer security—“https”—for Chinese Internet applications. The Certification and Accreditation Administration (CNCA), a newcomer to the infosec space, tried from 2004 to 2008 to create a unified scheme but met opposition at home and abroad. ? Encryption policy predates Document 27 to 1999 under the “State Encryption Management Commission” and includes a number of regulatory schemes to promote domestic encryption for e-signatures, certificate authorities, etc., focusing primarily on government/CCP systems. ? Risk assessment is not a component of other existing policies but instead is implemented in isolation by the relatively underfunded NDRC State Information Center (a former manifestation of SCITO). ? China’s infosec standards are run by a committee co-chaired by representatives from the security agencies, known as the China National Information Security Standards Technical Committee (TC260). It is opaque and closed to foreign participants. It has turf issues with CCSA. ? IT security research and development is managed through MOST/NDRC/CAS programs like projects 863/973, the Megaprojects, and the NDRC Industry Development Fund. There is a State Key Laboratory for Information Security under CAS. Following the 2008 disbandment of SCITO there has been continued implementation of existing initiatives as well as a number of new initiatives that appear to be uncoordinated passive response policies (somewhat like the U.S. approach) for: SCADA security, e-government systems compliance, trusted network connectivity, and botnet/telecoms security. There is a serious lack of progress in CCCi/Product Assurance where interagency cooperation is most needed. Classified systems information assurance is a new focus, with expanded activity from the SSB which seeks to expand its power by keeping other agencies away from “classified systems.” The SSB gained vice-ministerial ranking in 2009 and started opening university “state secrets institutes” in 2011 focusing on computer security. U.S.–China engagement must take into account China’s fractured cybersecurity space. Without a central Chinese focal point, dialogue may also be fractured. Focused, issue-based discussions need to be coordinated with the appropriate organizations. The lack of a state council level office complicates MIIT’s ability to effectively coordinate and organize a robust dialogue.Chinese Perception of and Strategic Response to Threats in CyberspaceCooper III 12, RAND Corporation(UCSD, 08-xx-2012, “,” IGCC Workshop Report on China and Cybersecurity , Accessed: 3/4/17)-Coronado ARLHow do Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders perceive cyberspace threats, and what is the influence of PRC national development strategy and security policy on them? China’s national development strategy is formally promulgated in Hu Jintao’s “Scientific Development” dictum, which sets an objective goal for China to achieve the status of a mid-level developed country across its breadth and depth by 2050. The strategy encompasses a whole-of-government approach to building comprehensive national power under CCP control—focused on enhancing and protecting “core interests” related to national sovereignty, security, territorial integrity, and peaceful domestic development. Scientific Development provides a general blueprint for maintaining social stability through steady, widely-distributed economic growth; and for ensuring the diplomatic and military capacity to protect the expanding global presence and interests on which this growth depends. Developments and trends in cyberspace play a key role across the spectrum of Scientific Development tenets, addressing automation and information needs for economic, political, public security and military progress; and providing means for information dominance in both domestic and international security arenas. This dominance corresponds to a general PRC strategic bent toward re-emerging as Asia’s essential, or preeminent, actor on the road to mid-century objectives; it requires capabilities to both secure China’s cyberspace capacity, and to hold at bay that of domestic and external competitors or adversaries. Authoritative Chinese sources paint a cyber threat picture with three general components: hacking and cyber crime; Internet information management and propaganda; and military vulnerabilities. Concerning hacking and crime in cyberspace, Chinese media have published articles purporting that China is the “number one victim of cyber-attacks in the world.” These articles largely define “hacking” and “cybercrime” as domestic and international law enforcement issues. Sources claim many attacks originate abroad, while others stress that bank fraud, gambling, and other cybercrimes are often perpetrated by domestic actors. Chinese authorities have identified social media platforms where Chinese citizens are able to rapidly gain access and exchange information as the primary source of “misinformation, dissemination of rumors, popular discontent, chaos, political destabilization, and terror that can cause panic, lead to social crisis and turmoil, and overthrow the regime.” Sources indicate that these threats emanate from both internal and external actors, and Chinese authorities continue to view efforts at Internet control and management as essential to protect the sovereignty and integrity of the Party and state. In the military vulnerabilities arena, People’s Liberation Army (PLA) leaders and strategists are keenly aware of the many military applications of information technology and systems networking, and have closely observed U.S. doctrine and practice in these areas. Most PLA writing and thinking about cyber threats is couched in the PLA doctrine of “informatization” and reflected in the PLA’s task of preparing “to win local wars under informatized conditions.” Many PLA writings view U.S. dominance in cyberspace as the key vulnerability of China’s security and military systems. Strategies to address domestic threats include Internet and social media control to address individual “rumor-mongers,” “revisionist organizations,” and separatists, while maintaining outlets for approved social discourse and propaganda. Regarding external threats, strategies focus on both defensive and offensive capabilities to counter advanced information operations by the United States, Japan, and other technically advanced actors. To enhance active cyberspace defense, China also has clearly developed cyberspace espionage and counter-intelligence tools to “shape the battlefield” at home and abroad. Among the organizations responsible for threat response and conflict preparation are the Ministries of Public Security, Industry and Information Technology, and State Security; the Propaganda Department; the Third and Fourth Departments of the PLA General Staff; PLA Technical Reconnaissance Bureaus; state-affiliated hackers; and a number of research institutes. China’s “active defense” strategy in cyberspace is characterized as focused on information dominance in modern conflict. PRC cyber capabilities are designed to enable a broad range of PLA command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) operations; the counter-C4ISR operations needed to achieve information dominance over an adversary; and advanced weapons system employment. In addition to serving as enablers or “combat multipliers,” cyber operations also provide a distinct line of operations under a broader “integrated network electronic warfare” framework. The Third and Fourth Departments of the PLA General Staff likely are the key actors in the development of capabilities in this area; and evolving military strategy and doctrine for conducting information operations “campaigns” is a current focus on strategic discussion and debate. Issues of war control and deterrence in cyberspace also feature prominently in this debateRelations AT: “Cooperation Solves Cyber Norms”***Cooperation decreases cyber tensionsSegal and Lan 16 (Adam and Tang, “Reducing and Managing U.S.-China Conflict in Cyberspace”, April, publications/specialreport/pdf/Free/06192016/SR57_US-China_April2016.pdf)There are, however, shared interests on which to develop cooperative projects and reduce tensions in cyberspace. Both sides rely on digital infrastructure for economic and national security and share a number of concerns. The Chinese and U.S. markets are tightly linked, and both economies rely on the security and availability of global supply chains. Globally, cyberattacks are growing in frequency and becoming more sophisticated. As non-state actors that are not easily deterred gain better cyberattack capabilities, it puts critical infrastructure in both China and the United States at risk, The growth of the Internet has brought immense economic, [and] political, social, and cultural benefits to both sides. Strategic cooperation in cyberspace could result in further gains for China, the United States, and the rest of the world. In order to manage conflict in cyberspace, China and the United States should pursue the following actions: follow up on the September 2015 agreement on fighting cybercrime and cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property with concrete cooperation; ensure that discussions on norms of behavior in cyberspace continue at the highest level and are not suspended during times of tension; discuss joint measures to prevent the spread of cyber capabilities to non-state actors; and build cybersecurity capacity and expand cooperative research in universities and civil society. The 2015 agreement on cybersecurity was a significant symbolic step forward for China and the United States, but trust will be built and sustained through implementation. Both countries will test whether the high-level dialogue mechanism will successfully assist in cooperation and better incident response. While it is good that Washington and Beijing have agreed to further the discussion on the norms of cyberspace, the dialogue must be formalized, routinized, and insulated from political point scoring. Without practical progress, cybersecurity could quickly rise to the top of the bilateral agenda and threaten to undermine the U.S.-China relationship again.U.S.-China cyber cooperation is key to international rules and oversight mechanismXinbo 14 — Wu Xinbo, Professor and Director of the Center for American Studies at Fudan University, Shanghai, China, an editorial board member of The Washington Quarterly, 2014 (“Agenda for a New Great Power Relationship,” The Washington Quarterly, Spring, Available Online at , Accessed 06-24-2016, AS)The United States has long accused China of launching cyber attacks against its national security as well as commercial targets, while China has repeatedly denied such accusations and claims itself also a victim of cyber attacks from other countries, among which the United States ranks first. The Snowden revelation suggests that the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) conducted many cyber attacks against Chinese targets,12 confirming Chinese complaints. While neither Beijing nor Washington would openly acknowledge their cyber espionage on each other, the Snowden episode could provide an opportunity to convert a cause for conflict into the basis for a dialogue that takes place on a more equal footing. In July 2013, China and the United States held the first meeting of the bilateral Cyber Working Group. The two sides discussed issues of mutual concern and decided to take practical measures to enhance dialogue on international norms and principles in order to guide action in cyberspace, and to strengthen the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT), a mechanism that deals with computer security incidents. With the first meeting of the Cyber [end page 75] Working Group described as “candid, in-depth, and constructive,” the two sides agreed to hold sustained dialogue on cyber issues.13 Given the fact that cyberspace is a new field in which international rules and an international oversight mechanism do not exist, many state and non-state actors have taken advantage of the situation to pursue their respective goals. This not only hurts the national interests of many countries, China and the United States alike, it also undermines the stability of cyberspace—a new but increasingly important global commons in the 21st century. It is therefore desirable that Beijing and Washington not only exercise self-restraint in their respective cyber activities, but also help promote the establishment of international rules and international oversight mechanisms, a vital public good that the great powers should provide in the era of information. US-China Co-op solves a litany of impacts-turns your disadsGarrett 10?(Dr. Banning Garrett is the Director of the Asia Program at the Atlantic Council. This essay was previously published at The Globalist, “U.S.-China Relations: Gone Fishin’” December 02, 2010,?, Accessed Date: 6-12-13)Criticizing China is as easy as landing a rainbow trout at the fish farm. What’s not to dislike? China does so many things that are lamentable, if not outrageous, to Western sensibilities. The list ranges from human rights violations, threats to Taiwan and repression in Tibet and Xinjiang, to the increasingly assertive actions of its ever-modernizing military and “indigenous innovation” policies that tilt the playing field against foreign competitors. The fact that China is governed by an opaque, one-party regime obscured by secrecy only bolsters sinister Western interpretations of China's intentions and ambitions. Voicing our concerns about our policy differences is essential as we continue to struggle with China on a wide range of bilateral and international issues. But we also must try to keep the larger strategic picture in the forefront and try to land the elusive “big one” — a more cooperative U.S.-China relationship to deal with the great strategic challenges of the 21st century. While China and the United States will always be reluctant partners at best, leaders of both countries have acknowledged that we are in the same boat when it comes to critical 21st century challenges. We are compelled to pull together to maintain a growing and stable global economy, mitigate climate change and adapt to its effects, ensure energy security and transition to a global, low-carbon economy, move to more sustainable economic models as resource scarcities loom as billions of people seek to join the global middle class — and combat terrorism, proliferation, piracy, international crime, pandemics, failing states and a host of other non-traditional threats. This summer's unprecedented heat and forest fires in Russia and the massive, destructive floods in Pakistan may be the most recent warning signs that global warming is already altering our planet’s climate, causing extreme weather and other first-order effects that will have cascading impacts on virtually all countries. The implications for the global economy, societies and governments and the security of nations and peoples are potentially destabilizing and even catastrophic. The United States and China — the two largest economic powers — will not be immune from the impact of climate change. Nor, as the biggest energy consumers and producers of greenhouse gases, will they escape blame from the rest of the world if they fail to act and to cooperate. In the United States, there is growing anxiety about the pace of shifting power and a range of Chinese behaviors that are perceived as Beijing seeking to challenge a wide range of U.S. interests. The Chinese leadership, for its part, and especially elements of the People’s Liberation Army, is flush with a sense of their country’s rapidly rising power, which has been turbo-boosted in the last two years by its superior performance in the global financial crisis.AT: Cyber Norms Don’t SolveNorm-building enhances cooperationYuxiao 2015 (Li Yuxiao, director of Internet Governance and Law Research Center at Beijing University. China and cybersecurity: Espionage, strategy and politics in the digital domain. Chapter 9. NY: Oxford U. Press.) The establishment of common standards and norms requires the cooperation of all countries. The "virtual society" is closely linked with social reality, so it is inevitable for it to be associated with existing social organizational structures. It is necessary to rely on existing social norms while establishing new social rules for cyberspace. Therefore, in this field, all countries need to cooperate with each other; particularly, developed countries and countries with high Internet use should cooperate to allow cyberspace to truly become a platform for all of mankind's growth and development. In addition, the healthy development of a networked society requires countries to carry out effective cooperation. Network security is a fundamental part of networked society and even an indispensable part of human development. People should try their best and fully use the limited funds and abilities they have to enhance their own capacity and to further develop human society. Thus network attacks should be strictly prohibited. Due to the increasing complexity of cyberspace, cybersecurity problems are becoming similarly complicated. For example, cybercrime is not limited by a country's border. One country's citizens can use servers in other countries to execute Internet fraud against a third country's residents. It is almost impossible to solve such cases without some basis for international cooperation. To build this foundation, it is necessary to strengthen the power of relevant international organizations and consider transferring necessary powers to those organizations to resolve these problems. However, the perception of what rights are fundamental ones differs between countries and thus serves as an obstacle to delegating authority to these organizations. It is possible to imagine a scenario where a cybercrime investigation violates a citizen's constitutional rights in one country, but not in another. This implies that international cooperation on cybersecurity may violate a country's sovereignty, so China and the United States must work together to determine how to the ensure rights and interests of all countries, while also promoting the security of their own networks. The United States and China have strong complementary Internet technologies and applications that could form a huge testing ground for network attack and defense. The two countries should consider working together to carry out cooperation, experiments, and exchanges in academia, industry, and government to establish a long-term, effective mechanism for dialogue that faces the challenges of network security. Cooperation on network security will promote global informatization. THE FORMATION OF A CONSENSUS ON THE BASIC LEVEL OF CYBERSECURITY Differences in ideology and political system between the United States and China have resulted in different understandings of basic concepts of cybersecurity and have impeded effective communication and cooperation. Examples Of issues that could be readily clarified include basic principles Of bilateral communication on network security, the definition and recognition of network security hazards, the classification of cyberattacks, the definition and punishment of network crimes, and the understanding of network attacks that are unrelated to national security. Therefore, the United States and China should first establish effective academic communication in order to study these basic concepts Of network security and reach a consensus on a set of terms suitable for the communication and decision-making process between the two govemments. Although cooperation on cybersecurity issues may not seem as vital as, say, nuclear disarmament negotiations, establishing a China-US cybersecurity communication mechanism is important to improve mutual trust and enhance research and defense capabilities. Chinese defense minister Liang Guanglie emphasized the importance of bilateral military ties and stated, "The two sides should, within the framework of building a China- US cooperative partnership, advance a new type of military tie featuring equality, reciprocity, and win-win cooperation in an active and pragmatic way."2 Therefore, China and the United States should establish an agenda for cybersecurity cooperation and a complete multilevel communication mechanism, on both govemmental and civilian levels. Exchanges at the civilian level, particularly between academic institutions, could smooth communication and cooperation between the two countries, as well as support the construction of a mechanism for a China-US cybersecurity dialogue. First, China should establish a mechanism for cybersecurity coordination with the highest institutional authority, similar to the US National Cybersecurity Committee and the White House Cybersecurity Coordinator mechanism. This mechanism is necessary to ensure that cybersecurity events can be handled quickly, comprehensively, and effectively. At the same time, the cybersecurity communication channel for the govemment should be kept smooth in order to increase mutual trust between China and the United States. Second, China and the United States should clarify basic principles and the basis for a bilateral cybersecurity communication. Wlthin bilateral discussions, the two govemments need to standardize the criteria for judgments of network attacks and set an approved attack state buffer zone in order to determine accurately whether the attacks are from each other or terrorist Organizations. ***Establishing a set of norms is necessary to dismantle the ambiguity and hostility in the status quo - allows for dialogue to happenLindsay et. al 15 Lindsay, Jon R., Tai Ming Cheung, and Derek S. Reveron. China and Cybersecurity: Espionage, Strategy, and Politics in the Digital Domain. Print., Jon R. Lindsay is an assistant research scientist at the University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation and an assistant adjunct professor at the University of California, San Diego School of International Relations and Pacific Studies,The Sino-American relationship is one of the most important bilateral relationships in the world. Both countries play a leading role in major global issues such as peace and security, finance and trade, and the environment. Whether the two countries can achieve progress in cybersecurity cooperation will have great influence, not only on each country’s national interests, but also on global network security as a whole. However, due to the lack of mutual trust and the inconsistency of network regulation mechanisms, thus far China and the United States have not had effective communication or cooperation with respect to cybersecurity issues China and the United States suspect each other of committing major cyberattacks against their domestic networks. In reality, many of these attacks may originate from third-party hackers who abuse IPs in China and the United States in order to commit further attacks. When facing such attacks from third parties, both sides make judgments that might compromise the interests of the other due to the lack of mutual trust and communication mechanisms. It appears that US concerns about China’s threat to US cybersecurity are at an all-time high. A 2011 Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive report stated that China is the “most active and persistent” perpetrator of cyberattacks against the United States.18 In its report “Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace” the US Department of Defense also named China as the source of network security threats, although without detailing specific evidence.19 This kind of distrust in the field of cybersecurity has even spread to international trade. In 2008, Huawei attempted to purchase the American telecom company 3Com, but gave up due to the US government’s “national security” concerns. In August 2010, eight US senators, all Republicans, wrote to President Barack Obama asking him to investigate Huawei’s sale of equipment to an American telecom operator, Sprint Nextel, in order to evaluate a possible threat to national security. In the same year, Huawei again tried to purchase some American telecom enterprises like 3Com and the network equipment department of Motorola, but was impeded by similar security concerns.20 On October 8, 2012, the US House of Representatives Intelligence Committee started an investigation against Huawei and ZTE because of their alleged ties to the Chinese military, which they claimed could have threatened US national security.21 At the same time, China names the United States as a source of its cyber insecurity because of cyberattacks originating in the United States.22 China also feels insecure about US dominance in the field of global network infrastructure and its influence on network science and technology. For example, the entire Internet depends on thirteen root servers, most of which are managed by entities in the United States. We have already mentioned Edward Snowden’s disclosure of NSA and FBI cyber espionage in China, which is a very serious concern. The government of China is also seriously concerned about the influence of companies like Microsoft and Oracle and is considering curtailing their use for government applications. The first step after putting cybersecurity cooperation on the international agenda is to reconcile differences between Chinese and American terminology. China and the United States must reach a consensus on various terms involved in cybersecurity issues ranging from basic terms and concepts to highly technical aspects. Because the two countries lack a common vocabulary for key terms, they can take on different meanings in different political and cultural situations. Therefore, definitions and terminology are extremely important in policy discussions, as the actors may use in the same words but with completely different meanings.23 In the China-US Track II Bilateral on Cybersecurity in 2013, the network working group had published a report titled “Frank Communication and Sensible Cooperation to Stem Harmful Hacking.” In this report, some key concepts are defined, such as “hack,” “hacker,” and “compromise.”24 However, achieving consensus on these key concepts is not enough. A common, extensive vocabulary list should be built to strengthen future Sino-US dialogue and further joint research on cybersecurity, especially on what kind of “network attack” constitutes a “use of force” and what amounts to a “military attack.” These issues should be discussed by both countries in earnest to build a consensus. There is too much ambiguity in cybersecurity management mechanisms, and cooperation mechanisms are largely absent. Because of the sensitivity and ambiguity of cybersecurity, the two countries lack communication at the national level. Although there are many US government departments that are responsible for network security, the leads are the Department of Defense and the White House Cybersecurity Coordinator. As a leading department, the Department of Defense is able to organize, manage, and investigate cybersecurity issues. The Cybersecurity Coordinator ensures the coordination of the various departments in special periods, including the increasingly important Department of Homeland Security. In China, the departments involved in Internet security management are the State Internet and Information Office (also known as the Cyberspace Administration of China), the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, the Ministry of Public Security, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the military. However, there is no clear coordination mechanism for network security between these different agencies, nor is there an effective means of transnational communication when network security events occur. This internal ambiguity makes it difficult for the United States and China to cooperate reliably in every case.Cyber security should be a top priority as threat of cyberattacks looms, China-US Cooperation is keyChen 16 (Jing de Jong-Chen, Senior Director, Global Security Strategy and Diplomacy in the Cloud and Enterprise Division at Microsoft Corp, Wilson Center, “US-China Security cooperation needs to move more rapidly”, 2016)When U.S. President Barack Obama and Chinese President Xi Jinping joined other world leaders at the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit, controlling proliferation wasn’t the only global issue on their minds. During the summit, Presidents Xi and Obama also held side meetings to discuss cybersecurity, identifying ways that China and the United States can continue working together to address the threat of cyberattacks and cybercrime—both within their own borders and across the entire global community.The meeting was no outlier; the two countries consider cybersecurity a top priority for bilateral relations. In recent years, state-sponsored cyberattacks, along with those carried out by terrorists and increasingly sophisticated criminal groups, have escalated to such a degree that they now pose a serious global threat to national security, public safety, and economic stability. As societies adopt even more technology-based services to help manage interpersonal and business communications, industrial control systems, the Internet of Things, and critical infrastructure, the risk posed by targeted and persistent cyber threats will continue to grow. No wonder so many informed observers, including world leaders from China, Russia, the European Union and the United States, have compared the challenge of managing cybersecurity to that of negotiating nuclear arms-control treaties. US-China Cybersecurity Cooperation Needs to Move More Rapidly Of course, despite a few key similarities between the threats of nuclear and cyber warfare, there are distinct differences that make achieving consensus on cybersecurity uniquely complex: While nuclear weapons remain state-owned and state-controlled, anyone with suf?cient knowledge and the right technology, which is relatively inexpensive and easy to obtain, can launch a cyberattack. Nuclear attacks are devastating but never secret; cyberattacks can be both. And because they can take many different forms, they are sometimes hard to identify and may do serious damage before they are discovered. The idea of an anonymous nuclear attack is unthinkable, but it is often impossible to tell where cyberattacks are coming from, especially if the aggressors use proxies to hide their identities. On top of those issues, cybersecurity is so challenging because of the diverse perspectives from which nations view underlying questions of Internet governance and sovereignty. China, for example, believes that governments should have absolute control over the Internet and its use within their borders. Conversely, the United States sees the Internet as a global network without borders, which enables the free ?ow of information and provides for unrestricted cross-border commerce and communication. Yet there are two unassailable facts that transcend these political and philosophical differences, offering a foundation for shared progress: 1) the Internet is an economic engine that is now an integral component of the global economy, and 2) it is in every nation’s best interest to keep the Internet working ef?ciently, without unnecessary restrictions that would hamper global economic growth. What’s needed is a set of cybersecurity policies and international norms that enable all countries to protect their citizens and critical infrastructure from cyberattacks, defend against economic and military espionage, and safeguard their national security. That said, we should be wary of laws that grant government powers that could isolate users, violate privacy, increase the cost of delivering information and services, restrict innovation, disrupt global trade, or prevent sustained economic growth. President Barack Obama speaks at the Nuclear Security Summit Plenary 1, Washington, DC, April 1, 2016. Prime Minister of the Netherlands Mark Rutte is at left; Prime Minister of Japan Shinzo Abe is at right. Archive As two of the world’s most in?uential nations, China and the United States share responsibility for leading the effort to establish such policies and norms—work that began in earnest when the two countries agreed in 2015 to neither conduct nor condone the cyber theft of intellectual property or business secrets, and to abide by what President Xi called “norms of behavior” in cyberspace. President Obama, who called the agreement a “work in progress,” said that China and the United States can now work with other world powers to develop a clear and enforceable “architecture to govern behavior.” As the nations of the world work to strengthen cybersecurity, both nationally and internationally, ?ve key considerations can guide policy makers: Collaboration: As governments develop policies to address cybersecurity concerns, they would bene?t from consulting and collaborating with the private sector and academia. Private-sector companies produce many of the innovations that make the cyber world possible; they want to protect their intellectual property and keep their customers’ information private and secure. Nations may always take the lead on establishing a global cybersecurity framework, but the private sector has a real stake in the outcome and can contribute to strategies and solutions. Harmonization: The Internet is global in scope and must remain ubiquitous to realize its full potential. Jurisdictions and national sovereignty are important considerations in protecting cyberspace, but borders can neither contain nor control cyberattacks. That’s why the global community needs a common set of rules under which cyber incidents and cybercrimes can be swiftly addressed. Technology companies that operate globally must obey the laws—and respect the rights of consumers and companies—in the countries where they do business. Yet such companies often ?nd themselves dealing with laws that con?ict with each other, and so in seeking to comply with one law they may violate another. Harmonized standards will promote understanding, enhance predictability, and enable better public/private collaboration. Best practices: In developing effective cybersecurity policies, governments don’t have to start from scratch. By partnering with the private sector, they can build on existing best practices for mitigating cyber threats and take advantage of tested frameworks, advanced security strategies, and innovative technology solutions. Risk reduction: Reducing geopolitical risk is an essential aspect of diplomacy. Because risks are not usually managed on a global scale, however, it is a concept rarely addressed by public policy or international law. Yet because of the widespread availability of the Internet, geopolitical risk reduction must become a core component of nations’ cybersecurity work. Trust and transparency: Governments can build trust, among their own citizens and throughout the global community, by demonstrating greater transparency in their cybersecurity practices. As nations work to make cyberspace more secure without restricting economic growth, it is vital that the public and private sectors work together to ?nd solutions, and that technology companies continue to play a central role in safeguarding the cyber****Norms establish a “bright line”, key to prevent large scale conflictLonergan 16, Shawn W. Lonergan is an active-duty major in the United States Army and a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Political Science at Columbia University where he researches state interaction in cyberspace, Internet governance, cyber security, cyber arms control, and cyber ethics USMA, a Cyber Arms Control Regime In this context, the comparison of cyber arms to nuclear weapons has utility, despite the conceptual differences between the two, for understanding how arms control could be achieved and offering insights for what a realistic agreement could look like. At the macro level, arms control agreements are designed to reduce the likelihood of war by establishing norms of behavior between potential adversaries subject to specified constraints. Put differently, these agreements establish “red lines” that delineate the conditions under which acceptable conduct becomes an intolerable action. Beyond establishing norms of appropriate behavior, arms control seeks to foster cooperation between two or more potential rivals with respect to the development, testing, stockpiling, and use of capabilities that could destabilize the status quo. Central themes in the study of successful arms control agreements include the composition of an agreement, monitoring for compliance, and punishing defection. Much of the literature addressing the bargaining aspect of arms control agreements underlines differences in the level of formality (e.g. Schelling and Halperin 1985, May and Harvey 1987). Some agreements, such as the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (a.k.a. the SALT Accords), are 14 Examples include the 1925 Geneva Protocol concerning chemical weapons, the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Biological Weapons Convention, and the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty. 9 highly complex instruments that explicitly state the terms of the accord. Others, however, are much less formal and indeterminate (e.g. the 1958 Limited Test Ban Treaty). Yet, other agreements have been forged that avoid any sort of official document and instead depend on tacit understanding between all parties.15 Therefore, an important initial issue for policymakers to consider is the level of formality of a potential cyber arms control agreement and potential risks and tradeoffs. A highly formalized treaty has many benefits, such as the ease with which defection can be identified and punished.***Shared interests in cybersecurity transcend political disagreementsJong-Chen 2016 (Jing de Jong-Chen is Senior Director, Global Security Strategy and Diplomacy Group in the Corporate, External and Legal Affairs Division at Microsoft Corp. She has 20 years of industry experience and domain expertise in cybersecurity policy, technology and strategic partnership development. April 2016. US-China Cybersecurity Cooperation Needs to Move More Rapidly. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Digital Futures Project.) Yet there are two unassailable facts that transcend these political and philosophical differences, offering a foundation for shared progress: 1) the Internet is an economic engine that is now an integral component of the global economy, and 2) it is in every nation’s best interest to keep the Internet working efficiently, without unnecessary restrictions that would hamper global economic growth. What’s needed is a set of cybersecurity policies and international norms that enable all countries to protect their citizens and critical infrastructure from cyberattacks, defend against economic and military espionage, and safeguard their national security. That said, we should be wary of laws that grant government powers that could isolate users, violate privacy, increase the cost of delivering information and services, restrict innovation, disrupt global trade, or prevent sustained economic growth. As two of the world’s most influential nations, China and the United States share responsibility for leading the effort to establish such policies and norms—work that began in earnest when the two countries agreed in 2015 to neither conduct nor condone the cyber theft of intellectual property or business secrets, and to abide by what President Xi called “norms of behavior” in cyberspace. President Obama, who called the agreement a “work in progress,” said that China and the United States can now work with other world powers to develop a clear and enforceable “architecture to govern behavior.” As the nations of the world work to strengthen cybersecurity, both nationally and internationally, five key considerations can guide policy makers: ? Collaboration: As governments develop policies to address cybersecurity concerns, they would benefit from consulting and collaborating with the private sector and academia. Private-sector companies produce many of the innovations that make the cyber world possible; they want to protect their intellectual property and keep their customers’ information private and secure. Nations may always take the lead on establishing a global cybersecurity framework, but the private sector has a real stake in the outcome and can contribute to strategies and solutions. ? Harmonization: The Internet is global in scope and must remain ubiquitous to realize its full potential. Jurisdictions and national sovereignty are important considerations in protecting cyberspace, but borders can neither contain nor control cyberattacks. That’s why the global community needs a common set of rules under which cyber incidents and cybercrimes can be swiftly addressed. Technology companies that operate globally must obey the laws— and respect the rights of consumers and companies—in the countries where they do business. Yet such companies often find themselves dealing with laws that conflict with each other, and so in seeking to comply with one law they may violate another. Harmonized standards will promote understanding, enhance predictability, and enable better public/private collaboration. ? Best practices: In developing effective cybersecurity policies, governments don’t have to start from scratch. By partnering with the private sector, they can build on existing best practices for mitigating cyber threats and take advantage of tested frameworks, advanced security strategies, and innovative technology solutions. ? Risk reduction: Reducing geopolitical risk is an essential aspect of diplomacy. Because risks are not usually managed on a global scale, however, it is a concept rarely addressed by public policy or international law. Yet because of the widespread availability of the Internet, geopolitical risk reduction must become a core component of nations’ cybersecurity work. ? Trust and transparency: Governments can build trust, among their own citizens and throughout the global community, by demonstrating greater transparency in their cybersecurity practices. As nations work to make cyberspace more secure without restricting economic growth, it is vital that the public and private sectors work together to find solutions, and that technology companies continue to play a central role in safeguarding the cyber environment they are helping to create. When the citizens of all nations feared nuclear annihilation during the Cold War, the global community came together to make the world more secure. The threats from cyberattacks that we face today may be less apocalyptic, but making the world safer from those threats is no less challenging. Once again, it will take common action to find the answer.Solving attribution issues is critical to strategic trust-otherwise any deal is met with suspicion. Mussington 2015 (Institute for Defense Analyses Information Technology and Systems Division assistant director and PhD; B. David A., “The Missing Compliance Framework in the 2015 U.S.-China Cybersecurity Agreement” )A concrete compliance framework would be a significant diplomatic and political breakthrough – indicating that both sides had considered the costs of continuing the status quo – selecting instead an alternate course with agreed facts, definitions, and dispute discussion (if not resolution) procedures. Further, such a bilateral framework might partially insulate the relationship from temporary hiccups – caused by the discovery of ongoing activities (legacy) that had yet to be reined in consistent with the new rules of the game. CERT1 -to-CERT-type contacts would further deepen the linkage between bilateral agreements to refrain from proscribed actions in cyber and operational exchanges on data that support non-controversial investigations of cyber-crime. Lastly, such a framework could provide a mechanism for discussion of IP rights holder injury and remediation options. In this way the compliance framework would provide added support to law enforcement cooperation on cyber-crime already established, as well as aligning well with norms emerging from the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) process. Summing Up – Compliance as a Metaphor for Muddling Through In recent days the United Kingdom (UK) reached an agreement with China on cyber norms closely paralleling that reached by the United States. In this case the UK Government seems to be seeking a deeper relationship with China for economic purposes, and as a political engagement driven by the practicalities of global politics – emphasizing pragmatism. Narrow compliance judgments or mechanisms for minimizing cyber-enabled IP theft are absent from public pronouncements. The economic stakes in play are significant and suggest a hedging strategy where – unsure that the United States will persist in a disciplined and nuanced approach to cyber differences – the UK may be seeking its own way with a rising power – achieving concrete benefits in the near term, taking advantage of the aversion to escalated cyber conflict that China and the United States ostensibly share. UK success in this approach might make this route attractive to other Western nations, further diminishing the likelihood of collective action against what some perceive as a long-standing strategic technology and scientific data exfiltration campaign supporting China’s macroeconomic development. Absent a specific compliance management approach, cyber risk mitigation actions in national policy may appear to be de-linked from actual threat actor behavior proscribed in the agreement. This weakens potential deterrence, reducing incentives to avoid restricted activities due to the continuing small likelihood of successful and “objective” attacker attribution. In turn, basic data on risks, losses, and attacker identity will be less available (from government sources) and arguably of lower quality. Private Cyber threat information providers may, however, be able to document a baseline on risks, costs, and behavior. Note that definitions of “attack,” “vulnerability,” and cyber norms remain uncertain in this situation – again preventing clearer understanding of whether violations of nascent norms are actually occurring. Also clear in such a situation is a growing dissonance between public reporting of cyber intrusions and risk activity and the risks posed by state or state sponsored cyber-attacks on critical infrastructures and sensitive data. Accurate data on attacker behavior, cyber campaign plans, and targeting of vital services and critical infrastructures should enable better cyber risk decisions and investments. Absent a compliance framework such data will be less rich, less easily shareable, and less useful for shaping cyber protections and resilience responses. Cyber risk disputes between the United States and China will continue. An explicit compliance framework offers benefits in terms of transparency, data availability and improved attacker attribution. This information might assist in bilateral risk management between the two countries. More generally, enhanced information availability will enable improved alignment of incentives for commercial IP owners to invest in protections capable of matching changes in cyber risk conditions. Better information quality might lead to more effective asset, critical infrastructure, and sensitive data cyber protection options in the market place. A compliance framework might produce a novel and useful extra benefit: a bootstrap for improved cyber risk data availability and quality – leading to more accurate calculation of cyber risk exposures and mitigation effectiveness. In turn, such a development might accelerate broader and deeper improvements in planning – facilitating better management of legacy and emerging cyber risks. Elaborating on a cyber-risk compliance framework in the U.S.–China bilateral agreement may seem like expecting too much. Far from it. China is a leading source of cyber intrusion activity targeting U.S. Government and private sector institutions. Narrowing differences through discussion and diplomatic interchange can facilitate risk management and transparency. By leaving compliance unaddressed, the agreement fails to clarify not only the risks posed to U.S. interests by China-directed or -sponsored cyber activity, but it also misses an opportunity to enrich the data upon which cross-infrastructure cyber risk management decisions might be made.***US-China cooperation on international cybersecurity norms is essential to global cybersecurityJong-Chen 16 — Jing de Jong-Chen, a Senior Director for Global Security Strategy and Diplomacy in the Cloud and Enterprise Division at Microsoft, Board Advisor at Executive Women Forum, has a Bachelor of Science (B.S.), Computer Science and Engineeing from Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 2016 (“US-China Cybersecurity Cooperation Needs to Move More Rapidly,” Digital Futures Project at The Wilson Center, April, Available Online at , Accessed 06-22-2016, AS) When U.S. President Barack Obama and Chinese President Xi Jinping joined other world leaders at the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit, controlling proliferation wasn’t the only global issue on their minds. During the summit, Presidents Xi and Obama also held side meetings to discuss cybersecurity, identifying ways that China and the United States can continue working together to address the threat of cyberattacks and cybercrime—both within their own borders and across the entire global community. The meeting was no outlier; the two countries consider cybersecurity a top priority for bilateral relations. In recent years, state-sponsored cyberattacks, along with those carried out by terrorists and increasingly sophisticated criminal groups, have escalated to such a degree that they now pose a serious global threat to national security, public safety, and economic stability. As societies adopt even more technology-based services to help manage interpersonal and business communications, industrial control systems, the Internet of Things, and critical infrastructure, the risk posed by targeted and persistent cyber threats will continue to grow. No wonder so many informed observers, including world leaders from China, Russia, the European Union and the United States, have compared the challenge of managing cybersecurity to that of negotiating nuclear arms-control treaties. [end page 1] Of course, despite a few key similarities between the threats of nuclear and cyber warfare, there are distinct differences that make achieving consensus on cybersecurity uniquely complex:While nuclear weapons remain state-owned and state-controlled, anyone with suf?cient knowledge and the right technology, which is relatively inexpensive and easy to obtain, can launch a cyberattack.Nuclear attacks are devastating but never secret; cyberattacks can be both. And because they can take many different forms, they are sometimes hard to identify and may do serious damage before they are discovered.The idea of an anonymous nuclear attack is unthinkable, but it is often impossible to tell where cyberattacks are coming from, especially if the aggressors use proxies to hide their identities.On top of those issues, cybersecurity is so challenging because of the diverse perspectives from which nations view underlying questions of Internet governance and sovereignty. China, for example, believes that governments should have absolute control over the Internet and its use within their borders. Conversely, the United States sees the Internet as a global network without borders, which enables the free ?ow of information and provides for unrestricted cross-border commerce and communication. Yet there are two unassailable facts that transcend these political and philosophical differences, offering a foundation for shared progress: 1) the Internet is an economic engine that is now an integral component of the global economy, and 2) it is in every nation’s best interest to keep the Internet working ef?ciently, without unnecessary restrictions that would hamper global economic growth. What’s needed is a set of cybersecurity policies and international norms that enable all countries to protect their citizens and critical infrastructure from cyberattacks, defend against economic and military espionage, and safeguard their national security. That said, we should be wary of laws that grant government powers that could isolate users, violate privacy, increase the cost of delivering information and services, restrict innovation, disrupt global trade, or prevent sustained economic growth. [end page 2] As two of the world’s most in?uential nations, China and the United States share responsibility for leading the effort to establish such policies and norms—work that began in earnest when the two countries agreed in 2015 to neither conduct nor condone the cyber theft of intellectual property or business secrets, and to abide by what President Xi called “norms of behavior” in cyberspace. President Obama, who called the agreement a “work in progress,” said that China and the United States can now work with other world powers to develop a clear and enforceable “architecture to govern behavior.” As the nations of the world work to strengthen cybersecurity, both nationally and internationally, ?ve key considerations can guide policy makers:Collaboration: As governments develop policies to address cybersecurity concerns, they would bene?t from consulting and collaborating with the private sector and academia. Private-sector companies produce many of the innovations that make the cyber world possible; they want to protect their intellectual property and keep their customers’ information private and secure. Nations may always take the lead on establishing a global cybersecurity framework, but the private sector has a real stake in the outcome and can contribute to strategies and solutions.Harmonization: The Internet is global in scope and must remain ubiquitous to realize its full potential. Jurisdictions and national sovereignty are important considerations in protecting cyberspace, but borders can neither contain nor control cyberattacks. That’s why the global community needs a common set of rules under which cyber incidents and cybercrimes can be swiftly addressed. Technology companies that operate globally must obey the laws—and respect the rights of consumers and companies—in the countries where they do business. Yet such companies often ?nd themselves dealing with laws that con?ict with each other, and so in seeking to comply with one law they may violate another. Harmonized standards will promote understanding, enhance predictability, and enable better public/private collaboration.Best practices: In developing effective cybersecurity policies, governments don’t have to start from scratch. By partnering with the private sector, they can build on existing best practices for mitigating cyber threats and take advantage of tested frameworks, advanced security strategies, and innovative technology solutions.Risk reduction: Reducing geopolitical risk is an essential aspect of diplomacy. Because risks are not usually managed on a global scale, however, it is a concept rarely addressed by public policy or international law. Yet because of the widespread availability of the Internet, geopolitical risk reduction must become a core component of nations’ cybersecurity work.Trust and transparency: Governments can build trust, among their own citizens and throughout the global community, by demonstrating greater transparency in their cybersecurity practices.As nations work to make cyberspace more secure without restricting economic growth, it is vital that the public and private sectors work together to ?nd solutions, and that technology companies continue to play a central role in safeguarding the cyber [end page 3] environment they are helping to create. When the citizens of all nations feared nuclear annihilation during the Cold War, the global community came together to make the world more secure. The threats from cyberattacks that we face today may be less apocalyptic, but making the world safer from those threats is no less challenging. Once again, it will take common action to ?nd the answer.US-led cyber norms deter Chinese cyber riseKihara 14 [Stacy, BA, candidate for MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES (HOMELAND SECURITY AND DEFENSE), Naval Postgraduate School, “A rising China: shifting the economic balance of power through cyberspace”, December 2014, ]//DBIThe use of information power by the United States against China is not limited to traditional economic issues. With cyberspace enabling foreign economic espionage activities against U.S. enterprises and government agencies, risking long-term economic growth, the United States has a vested interest in leveraging information power to shape its interests in the cyber domain. “If a state can make its power legitimate in the eyes of others and establish international institutions that encourage others to define their interests in compatible ways, it may not need to expend as many costly traditional economic or military resources,” state Keohane and Nye.252 As China continues its cyber- enabled economic espionage campaign against the United States, the United States works diligently with other nations to develop an international consensus on acceptable behavior in cyberspace that reflects U.S. interests and normative principles. “The U.S. Government Accounting Office (GAO) states that U.S. involvement in developing international agreements and standards on cyberspace security and governance is essential to promoting U.S. national and economic security to the rest of the world.”253? With the United States and China holding very different views on the rights and obligations of states in cyberspace, cyber security initiatives with a heavy U.S. influence could give the United States a significant source of power. Of the 19 organizations identified by the GAO as “key entities and efforts whose international activities significantly influence the security and governance of cyberspace,” the United States is either the lead or a key member.254 A U.S. led cyber security initiative leveraging international institutions benefits the United States in three ways: first, it shows a U.S. willingness to adhere to internationally established rules, adding legitimacy to its position as a global leader; second, it allows the United States to encourage China’s participation in international forums on cyber security as a show of U.S. good faith and acceptance of China as a rising power; and third, it makes China accountable for adhering to normative behavior in cyberspace heavily influenced by the United States. “As this effort [to create norms and agreement on state behavior in cyberspace] progresses and there is international consensus on responsible behavior in cyberspace, China’s cyber espionage will be difficult to sustain,” states Lewis.255Establishing mutual forbearance prevents accidental conflict from cyber espionageHarold 16, Libicki is an American scholar and Professor at the Frederick S. Pardee RAND Graduate School in Santa Monica, California, Harold is associate director of the RAND Center for Asia Pacific Policy, Cevallos is a political scientist at the RAND Corporation (Scott Warren, Martin C. Libicki, Astrid Stuth Cevallos, Getting to Yes with China in Cyberspace, Kindle, Introduction)Given that the United States and China would like to reduce mutual suspicion in cyberspace, one option might be the negotiation of agreement on a set of norms. Since both sides express concern over the possibility of the other side targeting its critical infrastructure, the core of the deal would be for the United States and China to abjure cyberattacks on each other’s critical infrastructure.30 This proposal was well received by the respondents, with interviewees from across academic, think tank, military, and state organizations all responding positively to this proposal.31 Respondents appeared to hold relatively similar views of the definition of critical infrastructure to those of their U.S. counterparts—such things as the electrical power grid and the banking system. One respondent noted that there is precedent for such a deal; in early May 2015, just days before we conducted our field interviews, Russia and China announced a general agreement to cooperate with and not attack each other in cyberspace.32 The first component of any mutual forbearance proposal is that progress has been made on not attacking critical infrastructure since our interviews in Beijing. In July 2015, the Chinese signed a UN report that called for such attacks to be abjured.33 There are also indications that the United States and China mutually agree not to attack each other’s critical infrastructure—or at least not be the first to do so.34 As of this writing, however, there is little indication that these agreements have evolved from the trust-us-not-to stage to something that is verifiable. This is why two more components to such an agreement are crucial to fulfill the purposes of the first component. As a second, and logically entailed, component of any mutual forbearance proposal, the United States and China could also agree not to carry out cyber espionage on each other’s critical infrastructure. The rationale for this step is that cyber espionage is almost always a prerequisite for a cyberattack and that it is impossible to distinguish intrusions for the purposes of cyber espionage from an imminent attack if detected by the target. If the two sides have no intent to attack each other’s critical infrastructure, they have no need to compromise each other’s critical infrastructure systems either, particularly if carried out by inserting malicious code into the target infrastructure. Indeed, both cyber espionage and cyberattack typically entail the prior implantation of computer code in target systems, which then periodically calls back (beacons) to the attacker for further instruction. Implants make subsequent penetrations much easier because the attackers are already inside the target’s systems. Banning cyber espionage against critical infrastructure would make it much more difficult to quickly carry out cyberattacks on such infrastructure. Without preplanning and cyber espionage, it could take weeks, months, or even years to carry out such attacks, but if potential adversaries are already inside each other’s critical infrastructure, attacks can be carried out almost instantaneously. Such a ban, if enacted by the two sides, would have several advantages. First, if successfully executed, a ban would enhance stability, since it would remove critically important systems from being targeted. Second, a ban would raise the costs of targeting such systems (since, if China were discovered doing so, it would violate the country’s given word, potentially affecting its ability to credibly negotiate on other issues in the future), while simultaneously addressing the problem of time that cyberattacks prepared in advance can pose. Third, such an agreement, if fully realized, would reduce the prospect of accidental conflict by committing the two sides not just to not attacking each other’s critical infrastructure but to staying away from it completely, thereby eliminating the possibility of misunderstanding a cyber espionage effort as an imminent attack. Discussing redlines helpHarold 16, Libicki is an American scholar and Professor at the Frederick S. Pardee RAND Graduate School in Santa Monica, California, Harold is associate director of the RAND Center for Asia Pacific Policy, Cevallos is a political scientist at the RAND Corporation (Scott Warren, Martin C. Libicki, Astrid Stuth Cevallos, Getting to Yes with China in Cyberspace, Kindle, Introduction)Discuss[ing] the “red lines” that could provoke major conflict if crossed Cyber war, like cyber crime, is a realm in which there may be real gains for all players to come to agreement on what actions might risk generating a wider conflict. This is useful not only for each side to know, so as to avoid investing in and using capabilities that would unintentionally escalate a crisis, but also to try to generate certain norms and implementing mechanisms to take such risky actions “off the table.” Any such agreements—and even the process of negotiating them— can increase mutual understanding, decrease distrust, and make each country less inclined to react precipitously to any indication of danger. The Cold War provides examples of the problem of lack of clarity in such “red lines” of behavior. In 1962, the U.S. and USSR had not effectively communicated to each other their red lines on where nuclear weapons might be located and what behavior would trigger escalation. That is, neither side was happy about the other developing such capabilities, but each side unintentionally deployed them in a manner (the U.S. putting missiles into Turkey and the Soviets into Cuba) that raised the level of tension and provoked a reaction well past what they Cybersecurity and U.S.-China Relations 30 expected. The outcome was the Cuban Missile Crisis, where competition moved into destabilization and near thermonuclear war. Today, the U.S. and Chinese doctrines in cyber space are quite similar in their deliberate vagueness and, indeed, quite parallel to the situation in the late 1950s and 60s. For example, the U.S. Defense Department cyber strategy published in 2011 announced a new doctrine, arguing that harmful action within the cyber domain can be met with a parallel response in another domain.73 This has come to be known as “equivalence.”74 Aiming for such flexibility is certainly sensible from one angle, but problems emerge when it is weighed through the lens of a competition between two states. Substitute the words “conventional” and “nuclear” for “cyber” and “kinetic” and the new doctrine is fundamentally similar to the 1960s nuclear deterrence doctrine of “flexible response” that possibly helped lead to the Cuban crisis. The Chinese cyber strategy is even more opaque, much like the Soviet nuclear strategy was to U.S. leaders at the time. Coming to such agreements on red lines of behavior is surprisingly possible even in the most contentious realms. For example, much of the pernicious state-sponsored activity in the cyber realm today is related in some way to espionage. But even at the height of the Cold War, the CIA and KGB were able to come to an informal set of agreements to avoid certain types of behavior. Neither side liked the other stealing secrets from it, but the two agencies were able to communicate a set of activities and targets that were to be avoided by both in order to keep their competition in the espionage realm from escalating into something more serious.75 In short, no one should expect all disagreements to be easily resolved or the two sides to give up their core interests or values, nor that certain codes of conduct won’t change as situations evolve. Rather, the goal is to communicate one’s interests and values effectively. Many believe that this will actually be in each party’s own interest, as it will aid their respective deterrence strategies. As General James Cartwright (ret.), former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and one of the key Cybersecurity and U.S.-China Relations 31 figures in the development of U.S. cybersecurity strategy, notes, “You can’t have something that’s a secret be a deterrent. Because if you don’t know it’s there, it doesn’t scare you.”For cyber deterrence to occur, there needs to be normsSinger 2015?– (P.W., director of the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence at Brookings, December 18, "How the United States Can Win the Cyberwar of the Future",?)During the Cold War nations like Switzerland and China had “active defense” models (another terms that has been wrongly appropriated in cyber debates), based on deterring attack not by massive retaliation but by mobilizing their citizenry for broader national defense . The United States was in a unique position in the Cold War, so it had little to learn from other nations then. But today there is much to learn from others, past and present, as they wrestle with similar problems. The Estonian Defence League’s Cyber Unit, for example, is a particularly good model. Akin to the U.S. Civil Air Patrol, where citizens can not only build up their own aviation skills, but also volunteer to aid government in aviation-related emergencies, Estonian citizens volunteer their expertise for cybersecurity. They aid in everything from “red teaming” — finding vulnerabilities in systems and activities before the bad guys can exploit them — to serving as rapid response teams to cyberattacks. Notably, the members are not just technical experts: The needed expertise that lies outside of government is about far more than just computer coding. To defend the national banking system from cyberattack, a mix of hackers and bankers is better than just bankers or hackers. These efforts have helped turn Estonia from one of the first victims of a state-level cyberattack, when Russian hackers partially shut down the country in 2007, to perhaps the best-equipped nation in the world to weather one now. Estonia may not have the same capabilities as the NSA and Cyber Command, but it does have deterrence by denial and an involved populace — giving it arguably better cybersecurity than the United States. The lesson from Cold War deterrence that best holds true today is that the most dangerous period was when both the new technology and the new competition were not well understood — which made bluster and escalation seemingly easy remedies to complex problems. Fortunately, cooler heads prevailed and both sides built up a system that delivered actual deterrence. The United States can build a new set of approaches designed to better its cybersecurity position, while reshaping adversary attitudes and options. Or, it can keep talking tough and simple about cyber-deterrence, and continue to be a victim.***AT: “Cyber Not Key”***Cybersecurity is the main tension in Sino-U.S RelationsSCMP 15 (South China Morning Post, 9-23-2015, "From cybersecurity to South China Sea territorial disputes: 5 big challenges and outcomes in Sino-US relations," , Accessed: 3/4/17)-Coronado ARLCybersecurity Cybersecurity is one of the main tensions between the two countries, with the United States accusing China of waging an online campaign to steal business information and trade secrets, a claim China denies. The US put sanctions against China over the alleged cybercrimes on the back burner prior to the visit. Outcomes: China and the US pledged to not commit or knowingly support cybertheft, yet US President Barack Obama said penalties against companies or individuals remained on the table. The two agreed to establish a mechanism for dialogue, creating a hotline between officials in both countries. The talks will take place twice a year, with the first meeting later this year.***Cybersecurity intersects with all other issues — economics and intellectual propertyRobledo 16 — Christian Robledo, International studies scholar, under the guidance of David Bachman, professor of International Studies at Washington University, 2016 (“Balancing Cooperation and Competition: A New Era In U.S.-China Relations,” The Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies at University of Washington, March, Available Online at , Accessed on 6/29/16, MEW) Cybersecurity has been and continues to be among the most pivotal issues that influence United States relations with China. Over the past few years, numerous private and public sector networks have been the target of Chinese hacking which has resulted in the theft of intellectual property, personal data, military information and other invaluable assets, costing billions of dollars in damage. A recent report, sponsored by Hewlett Packard Enterprise, estimated that the annual average cost of cyber crimes to 58 benchmark U.S. public and private organizations was $15.4 million per company.1 The study analyzed a diverse group of industries that ranged from those in the financial services, to those in hospitality. The report also concluded that the U.S., compared to other countries, continues to rank highest in costs associated with cyber crime. Reports such as the one mentioned above highlight the vulnerability of private and public networks and illustrate the need to fortify cyber defenses. The nature of cyberspace, specifically cyber attacks, however, pose a variety of challenges that makes them extremely difficult to deal with. Those challenges include, but are not limited to: lack of agreement over critical terminology (e.g. what constitutes a “cyber crime,” “cyber attack,” “cyber threat,” etc.), matters of attribution (i.e. where a threat or attack emanates from and whether it involves state or nonstate actors), and challenges associated with time, i.e. the ability of policymakers to develop and pass cyber defense legislation or budgets lag far behind the rapid rate at which cyber attack capabilities evolve.***Cooperation on cybersecurity key to US-Sino relations — spills over Jong-Chen 14 — Jong-Chen, Jing De, senior director and domain expert on global cybersecurity policy and strategy at Microsoft Corporation, 2014 ("U.S.-China Cybersecurity Relations: Understanding China’s Current Environment," Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, September 15th, Available Online at , Accessed 6-29-2016, MW)Recommendations U.S.-China relations are facing a challenging period. How do the United States and China move away from the mistrust that currently governs the relationship? How could the U.S. and China find common ground when there are clearly disagreements over cyber sovereignty and Internet use? With fundamentally different political and social systems, how would the U.S. and China align their national security interests with global benefits to protect cyber infrastructure and trade? What security policies and legal frameworks are needed to promote global collaboration and supply chain trust? The following recommendations are provided from an industry perspective as potential common areas for both sides to consider, while recognizing the different political and economic structures and cybersecurity goals of each country. Establish a leadership and relationship model. A cybersecurity leadership and relationship model is needed to normalize the communication and conflict resolution between both countries. It should involve U.S. and Chinese stakeholders from both the public and private sectors, including policy makers, senior domain experts from technical, legal, trade and diplomatic fields with security expertise. The goal is to identify activities that are considered threatening for both countries and keep government-to-government and government-to-industry communication channels open. There are many existing international models for such working partnerships that could be used to create a structure for dialogue and to work through the complex challenges of cybersecurity. Develop and adopt globally recognized best practices to address supply chain trust. These would help both Chinese and U.S. industries participate and innovate in the broader global ICT economy. Governments and industry could better secure their networks by establishing a proper security assurance model, operational procedures and protections. Further, the use of widely available security technologies such as public and well vetted commercial encryption and authentication management would make it harder for hackers to compromise confidential data, providing a higher level of security for governments, businesses and individuals alike. Expand the role of industry in cyber norms and cybersecurity solutions. Expanding public-private partnerships and leveraging private sector expertise is critical to improve global cybersecurity. For the past decades, the global technology industry has been a major driving force and contributor to the Internet economy and the development of security standards and best practices, regardless country of origin. The technology industry should be trusted to carry out the future innovations to boost productivity, connect people and improve quality of life worldwide. Most of all, the industry should become partner to protect global critical infrastructures. Build international partnerships to combat cybercrime. Law enforcement collaboration across international borders is critical for addressing global cybercrime. Judicial exchanges and specialized legal training and partnerships with law enforcement would increase the effectiveness of prosecuting cybercrime based on national and international laws, and would identify gaps in the legal process of both countries that may hinder prosecution. Industry should also be encouraged to deliver services and innovation to reduce user risks and minimize the damages of cybercrime.***Cyber undermines the whole bilateral trade relationship Segal 2015 , NBR China Studies senior fellow, (Adam, “Stabilizing Cybersecurity in the U.S.-China Relationship”, 9-14, ) U.S.-China Relations in the Cyber DomainCyberspace is an especially contentious issue in the Sino-U.S. relationship. According to Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel Russel, cyberspace has the “potential to drive strategic mistrust in the relationship” between the two nations. [1] Beijing and Washington have been unable to find common ground on cyberattacks, the security of information and communications infrastructure, and Internet governance. Cyberattacks constitute a threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States, and many of these attacks emanate from China. Some of these attacks are conducted by state actors or by hacker groups sponsored by Chinese government actors. Other attacks are conducted by criminals working on their own. These attacks fall into three categories. The majority are the cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property, business strategies, and trade secrets. There is also a widespread campaign of political and military espionage such as the hack of the U.S. Office of Personnel Management, which may have exposed the records of over twenty million current and former federal employees. In addition, the members of the People’s Liberation Army Unit 61398 have reportedly penetrated the networks of natural gas pipelines and electric utilities, possibly to map the potential future battlefield or prepare for a destructive attack. The cybersecurity issue has also spilled over into trade relations. In part motivated by disclosures of U.S. cyberespionage against Chinese targets made by the former National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden and in part a reflection of a long-held techno-nationalism, Chinese policymakers have introduced a number of regulations designed to reduce dependence on foreign suppliers for critical technologies. New banking regulations, for example, and the draft antiterrorism and national security regulations in China require companies to share source code and build backdoors into encrypted products in an effort to make technology “secure and controllable.” Although the bank regulations were suspended in April, protectionism remains tightly linked to cybersecurity concerns. Beijing has also stepped up efforts to shape the governance of cyberspace. In November 2014, China hosted the World Internet Conference in Wuzhen, a clear signal that it intends to take a more active role in defining the international agenda. In particular, Beijing has stressed the norm of Internet sovereignty—the idea that every state has the right to make rules and regulations covering cyberspace—and has argued that this right should be recognized internationally. In other words, the global Internet should be subject to local controls. Beijing recently extended its vision of the Chinese Internet to the United States. In April 2015, researchers at the Citizen Lab at the University of Toronto and the International Computer Science Institute at the University of California, Berkeley, discovered what they called the “great cannon,” a program that hijacked traffic and directed it at , a site that runs mirrors of other sites blocked in China, and GitHub, a software coding site that was also hosting content Beijing found objectionable, in order to overload and crash both sites’ servers. The Great Cannon attack knocked GitHub offline for five days and was an unacceptable interference to Internet access and free speech within the United States. During the June 2015 Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED), senior U.S. officials warned their Chinese counterparts that the theft of intellectual property undermines trust and threatens the economic foundations of the bilateral relationship. Recent press reports suggest that Washington is considering sanctioning individuals or entities that benefit from cybertheft. [2] If such a move comes after the conclusion of the summit, President Obama should clearly explain to President Xi when the two meet how the sanctions will be implemented and what evidence the United States has of the hacking. President Obama will want to stress that the United States is getting better at attribution and that it is willing to make some types of evidence public to support its claims. Recommendations While the two sides are unlikely to close the gap on cyberespionage, they should broaden and deepen the discussions on cybersecurity and cyberconflict. Beijing suspended the U.S.-China cyber working group after the indictment of five alleged PLA hackers in May 2014, but the discussions to manage disagreements do not have to be housed within one formal structure and should continue in the S&ED and military-to-military contacts. The announcement of a new dialogue between the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and Chinese Ministry of Public Security is a useful step, though it will focus on cybercrime. Attribution remains a point of contention, with Beijing calling the United States’ claim that China was behind the attacks on the U.S. Office of Personal Management “irresponsible and unscientific.” Yet a shared understanding of what types of evidence can be used to attribute an attack and how that information is presented would be an important first step to defining norms of behavior. At the June 2015 S&ED, State Councilor Yang Jiechi called for China to work with the United States to develop an “international code of conduct for cyber information sharing.” While the Chinese side has not offered any specifics, Washington and Beijing could establish a joint forensics team, made up of experts from the government, private sector, and academia, to investigate an attack on a third party and identify types of information to be shared. Beijing and Washington have a common interest in preventing escalatory cyberoperations—attacks that one side sees as legitimate surveillance but the other views as prepping the battlefield. The two sides could consider conducting formal discussions on acceptable norms of behavior and possible thresholds for use of force as well as greater transparency on doctrine. These cooperative measures can reduce the chance of misperception and miscalculation and thus diminish the likelihood that a conflict in cyberspace will become kinetic.***That’s the biggest issue for future relations-outweighs geopolitical conflict Wyne 2015, Project for the Study of the 21st Century global fellow, (Ali, “The Strategic Importance of U.S.-China Trade Ties”, 6-3, )Given these developments, it is natural to fear that a miscalculation at sea could spiral into an armed confrontation between the United States and China; some observers, such as the University of Pennsylvania's Avery Goldstein, have even ventured that such a clash could involve nuclear weapons. To their credit, the two countries are taking steps to preempt destabilizing contingencies. In November 2014, for example, the U.S. Department of Defense and the Chinese Ministry of National Defense signed a memorandum of understanding on "rules of behavior for safety of air and maritime encounters" and another on "notification of major military activities." While the escalatory potential of China's maritime disputes is foremost on many observers' minds, the greatest long-term threat to U.S.-China relations may be something far less vivid: the gradual weakening of economic, and especially trade, interdependence between the two countries. Aside from the sobering historical record—conflicts between leading powers and rising ones have often culminated in disaster—that interdependence has arguably done more than any other phenomenon to furnish a rationale for sustained cooperation between the United States and China, whose relationship lacks the sorts of organic factors that dissuade many other pairs of countries from contemplating conflict: shared values, comparable systems of governance, and compatible understandings of history, to name a few.China US cyber cooperation key to everythingGady 14 (Franz-Stefan Gady, Senior Fellow, Eastwest Institute, 3-18-2014, "The New Chinese Working Group on Cybersecurity and the Need for Sino-US Cooperation in Cyberspace," No Publication, )The exact mechanism, mission and scope of this new body are unclear. However, the two deputy heads of the group, Li Keqiang and Liu Yunshan, the former the leading figure behind China’s economic policy, the latter the director of the Propaganda Department of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, suggest that a principal emphasize will be placed on streamlining content control (e.g., internet censorship) and to ramp-up cyber security in the ever modernizing Chinese private sector. This new body reconfirms emphatically the strategic importance of cybersecurity to the Chinese leadership. Diplomats and foreign policy makers in both the United States and China can no longer deny that this issue will be of the utmost importance in the years ahead (Coincidentally, in the US State Department, a new function has been added to the post of Under Secretary of State for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment, Catherine A. Novelli, as the Department’s Senior Coordinator for International Information Technology Diplomacy.) It also confirms that even in the high echelons of power, leaders agree that cybersecurity can no longer be viewed in isolation, merely confined to the technical level and technical experts. Cybersecurity permeates all spheres of the China-US relationship in one way or the other, whether it is the relationship with Taiwan, human rights, trade negotiations, or military to military dialogues. With regard to the China-Us relationship in cyberspace in particular, impaired by the NSA scandal and accusations of Chinese industrial espionage, this new body should be seen as an incentive to more than ever push China-US cooperation on a selective number of cybersecurity issues such as the protection of mutually beneficial critical information infrastructure from cyber attacks and better ways to cooperate on jointly combatting cyber crime. Ostensibly, this may seem difficult. The report of the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission bluntly stated that China has not cut down on its industrial espionage activities in the United States. Conversely, China has not stopped pointing out the alleged double standard of the United States on this subject, perennially citing the Snowden revelations as a backup. During the China-US Summit in June 2013 in California, Xi Jinping insisted that China was also a victim of “cyber theft”. President Obama characterized the discussions on cybersecurity “very blunt”. Even progress of the official China-US Working Group on cybersecurity, hailed as a step in the right direction, has also been very slow. Yet, given the volatile nature of the current world economy and the importance of both the United States and China within it, ways have to be found where both countries can cooperate on certain mutually beneficial issues, while circumventing their disagreements in other domains. For example, my colleague Dr. Greg Austin, in a keynote delivered at the 2014 Canada-US Cybersecurity Conference: Securing Our Financial Infrastructure proposes that China and the United States cooperate on the international protection for exchanges and clearing houses in cyberspace.***Cybersecurity is integral to US China relations and a set of norms is the first step Lindsay et. al 15 Lindsay, Jon R., Tai Ming Cheung, and Derek S. Reveron. China and Cybersecurity: Espionage, Strategy, and Politics in the Digital Domain. Print., Jon R. Lindsay is an assistant research scientist at the University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation and an assistant adjunct professor at the University of California, San Diego School of International Relations and Pacific Studies,China and the United States maintain an important and complex relationship that spans diplomatic, economic, and military spheres. Cyberspace cuts across all levels of the bilateral relationship, and it is important to understand both the new challenges it introduces as well as the opportunities to improve relations. As China’s ambassador for disarmament affairs Wang Qun has said, Information and cyber networks have linked all of us closely together, making distance among countries a matter of microseconds in many cases. Let us work together to intensify our exchanges and cooperation in the field of information and cyberspace security and reach an early consensus on the Code [of Conduct] with the objective of building a peaceful, secure, and equitable information and cyber space.1 Today, cyberspace serves an important role in China’s continued development efforts. Interconnecting basic infrastructures such as electric power, telecommunications, transportation, water supply, financial, disaster relief, education, and government service, cyberspace has become the fifth domain of human activity, joining land, sea, air, and outer space, and has an increasingly profound influence on every aspect of human life. Despite similarities in terms of technological production and allocation, cyberspace is very different from the other four domains. First, unlike its natural counterparts, the development of cyberspace as a domain is nearly completely free of time and space constraints. Furthermore, in the cyber domain, there are virtually no limitations on the distribution, transmission, and exchange of information. Technological innovation continues to overcome barriers in storage, bandwidth, and processing times. These unique characteristics require that cyberspace be treated with a newer and more comprehensive perspective in order to establish policies, legislation, and regulation. Although cybersecurity awareness has increased over time, many countries still lack a comprehensive understanding of cybersecurity at the government, business, and social levels. The considerable degree of resistance to cooperation among countries leads to the persistence of various cybersecurity issues. The United States, where the Internet was developed, still holds major power with respect to Internet technology, while China has developed significant influence in the realm of Internet applications. Given the important roles these two countries play in the future of cyberspace development, promoting cooperation on cybersecurity is increasingly significant. As Chinese president Xi Jinping stated during the 2013 Sino-US summit, “China and the United States must find a new path, one that is different from the inevitable confrontation and conflict between the major countries of the past.”2 By discussing and analyzing current cybersecurity issues, this chapter explores the importance of Sino-US cooperation on cybersecurity and proposes recommendations to promote cooperation.Cyber issues are key to larger US-China RelationsLiberthal and Singer 12 (Kenneth Lieberthal and Peter W. Singer, Brookings, Kenneth Lieberthal is a senior fellow emeritus in the Foreign Policy program at Brookings )There is perhaps no relationship as significant to the future of world politics as that between the U.S. and China. No other two nations play such dominant roles in critical global issues from peace and security to finance, trade, and the environment. How these two powers manage their relationship will likely be a key determinant of not only their own political and economic futures, but also wider global stability and prosperity. In the web of relationships that have built up between the U.S. and China, no issue has emerged of such importance, and generated such friction in so short a time span, as cybersecurity. Just a generation ago, “cyberspace” effectively did not exist beyond the nascent links among a limited number of university labs’ computer networks. Today, the centrality of cyberspace to our entire global pattern of life is almost impossible to fathom. There are some 4 billion people behind the roughly 50 billion devices that connect to the Internet. They send more than 90 trillion emails a year, and conduct more than two trillion transactions.1 Domains that range from commerce to communication to the critical infrastructure that powers and protects our modern day civilization all depend on the safe and secure operation of this globalized network of networks. And yet, concerns over this domain have rapidly moved to the forefront of U.S.-China relations. While both senior policymakers and general publics are struggling to understand the cyber realm’s basic dynamics and implications, the issue of cybersecurity is looming ever larger in Cybersecurity and U.S.-China Relations 2 U.S.-China relations and is seriously affecting threat perceptions on both sides.2 Indeed, despite it being such a new issue, the cyber realm is proving to be as challenging as the more traditional concerns that have long dominated the U.S.-China agenda (such as trade, human rights, cross-Strait relations, and regional territorial disputes).***Cybersecurity is the most important issue for relations and effects the entire relationship. Lieberthal and Singer 14 — Kenneth Lieberthal, a senior fellow in Foreign Policy and Global Economy and Development at Brookings, former professor at the University of Michigan, has a bachelor’s from Dartmouth College, and a master’s and doctorate in political science from Columbia University, and Peter W. Singer, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, Director of the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence at the Brookings Institution, received his Ph.D. in Government from Harvard University and an A.B. from Princeton's Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, 2014 (“Cybersecurity and U.S.-China Relations,” John L. Thornton China Center and 21st Century Defense Initiative at Brookings, February, 06-29-2016, MA)But the United States and China are the two most significant national players in this sphere. Moreover, these two leading states represent very different views on the proper use and future of the Internet. We therefore feel that thinking through these issues in a U.S.-China context can provide a useful way to develop approaches that should then be discussed more broadly, with the goal of ultimately establishing global norms and implementing mechanisms to bring greater order and security to those parts of the cyber realm where this is feasible. More importantly, the spillover effect of cybersecurity on the broader U.S.-China relationship is also perhaps more critical than for any other bilateral relationship. This is both because of the enormous importance of U.S.-China relations in the emerging world order and, in turn, the growing role of cyber issues in eroding strategic trust and poisoning public and elite attitudes. If this trend can be reversed through improved engagement by the U.S. and China on cybersecurity, the outcome would be a “triple win.” It would bolster U.S.-China bilateral relations, serve as a crucial building block for multilateral efforts in the cyber arena, and also aid in broader US-Chinese engagement on other issues of importance, like global finance and the environment, where the two nations must learn to work better together. ***U.S. and China should have some type of agreement over cyberHarold et al., 2016 (Senior Policy Analyst @ RAND Corporation, ~Scott Warren Harold, Martin C. Libicki, Astrid Stuth Cevallos, April 2016 "Getting to Yes with China in Cyber Space" Rand? DDI -TM)Recommendations The United States should negotiate with China over cyber rules by linking the issue more directly to the broader health of the overall relationship between the two countries. China and the United States could possibly achieve progress in cybersecurity negotiations by means of an agreement that would have both countries refrain from attacking each other's critical infrastructure or carrying out cyber espionage that could leave behind implants that could facilitate such attacks. The United States might consider assisting China by sharing insights into attribution if, in exchange, China would to agree to common evidentiary standards and credibly commit to prosecuting those found to have violated them. Such an agreement would require some mutually approved method of determining when one or the other side had violated its part of the bargain in ways that would have the guilty party accord legitimacy to such findings and admit what it has done.2AR***Cybersecurity is the most important dispute hurting U.S.-China relations—erodes mistrust and spills over to other issues—our evidence is reverse-causal that engagement solves?Lieberthal and Singer, 2012 (Kenneth Lieberthal, a senior fellow in Foreign Policy and Global Economy and Development at Brookings, and Peter W. Singer, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, “Cybersecurity and U.S.-China Relations,” John L. Thornton China Center and 21st Century Defense Initiative at Brookings, February,? ddi - tm)? U.S.-China relationship is among the most important in the world. Both sides draw great benefit from the smooth functioning of the Internet. But the issue of cybersecurity threatens to become a major source of friction. The danger is that the technology that so connects the world will instead drive these two nations apart. Given what is playing out, it is especially important that Washington and Beijing begin to build the bases for greater mutual understanding, cooperation, and development of common norms in how they deal with the many issues emerging in cybersecurity. Such bilateral efforts certainly should not stand in the way of various multilateral initiatives along similar lines, but focused bilateral dialogue is of great potential value. Establishing greater mutual understanding and trust will be a difficult process. It will require consistent efforts over time, common approaches to structuring the discussion, and selection of topics that hold the most promise for permitting increasing understanding of perceptions, goals, and mutually acceptable approaches and methods. The path will be a challenging one for both U.S. and Chinese experts and officials, but important things cannot be accomplished without a dedicated effort. And, it is an effort that must begin soon. In Chinese there is a proverb, “Ice does not freeze three inches thick from one day’s cold.” This adage is akin to the proverb in English that “ancient Rome was not built in a day.” These old sayings still hold true, even more so in the fast-moving world of cybersecurity. The U.S. and China relationship is critical both to the Internet and its billions of users, as well as to overall global order beyond the world of cyberspace. If these two nations are to set both realms towards a more positive future, then facing the challenges of cybersecurity is an imperative today.***U.S and China are key to stable cybersecurity norms Lieberthal and Singer, 2012 (Kenneth Lieberthal, a senior fellow in Foreign Policy and Global Economy and Development at Brookings, and Peter W. Singer, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, “Cybersecurity and U.S.-China Relations,” John L. Thornton China Center and 21st Century Defense Initiative at Brookings, February,? ddi - tm)?But the United States and China are the two most significant national players in this sphere. Moreover, these two leading states represent very different views on the proper use and future of the Internet. We therefore feel that thinking through these issues in a U.S.-China context can provide a useful way to develop approaches that should then be discussed more broadly, with the goal of ultimately establishing global norms and implementing mechanisms to bring greater order and security to those parts of the cyber realm where this is feasible. More importantly, the spillover effect of cybersecurity on the broader U.S.-China relationship is also perhaps more critical than for any other bilateral relationship. This is both because of the enormous importance of U.S.-China relations in the emerging world order and, in turn, the growing role of cyber issues in eroding strategic trust and poisoning public and elite attitudes. If this trend can be reversed through improved engagement by the U.S. and China on cybersecurity, the outcome would be a “triple win.” It would bolster U.S.-China bilateral relations, serve as a crucial building block for multilateral efforts in the cyber arena, and also aid in broader US-Chinese engagement on other Cybersecurity and U.S.-China Relations v issues of importance, like global finance and the environment, where the two nations must learn to work better together. This is not a technical paper for cyber specialists, but rather is intended to be read by a wider audience. Our goal was to craft a work that will be useful to both American and Chinese readers who are interested in the cyber security issue but are not technical specialists in it. We have written this to be of interest to people in the policy world and in the private sector, as well as the wider public. ***Cyber security is the most important issue in U.S China relationsLieberthal and Singer, 2012 (Kenneth Lieberthal, a senior fellow in Foreign Policy and Global Economy and Development at Brookings, and Peter W. Singer, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, “Cybersecurity and U.S.-China Relations,” John L. Thornton China Center and 21st Century Defense Initiative at Brookings, February,? ddi - tm)?There is perhaps no relationship as significant to the future of world politics as that between the U.S. and China. And in their relationship, there is no issue that has risen so quickly and generated so much friction as cybersecurity. Distrust of each other’s actions in the cyber realm is growing and starting to generate deeply negative assessments of each country’s long term strategic intentions.AT: “Co-Op Doesn’t Solve Relations”***Cooperation on cybersecurity makes or break long-term Chinese relationsLieberthal and Singer 14 — Kenneth Lieberthal, a senior fellow in Foreign Policy and Global Economy and Development at Brookings, former professor at the University of Michigan, has a bachelor’s from Dartmouth College, and a master’s and doctorate in political science from Columbia University, and Peter W. Singer, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, Director of the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence at the Brookings Institution, received his Ph.D. in Government from Harvard University and an A.B. from Princeton's Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, 2014 (“Cybersecurity and U.S.-China Relations,” John L. Thornton China Center and 21st Century Defense Initiative at Brookings, February, 06-24-2016, p. 16, AS)In sum, distrust of each other’s actions in the cyber realm is growing between the U.S. and China, and such distrust easily spills over into broader assessments of the other country’s long term intentions. It is heightened by the link between the cyber domain and key values like individual privacy on the U.S. side and concerns with internal stability on the Chinese side. Even more, the potentially poisoning effect of cybersecurity on the relationship is occurring at a time when there is genuine uncertainty about the degree and speed of changes in the global balance of power. The disagreements feed into the anxieties on all sides as to whether America and China will have a basically cooperative or antagonistic relationship over the coming several decades.25In traditional relations between two powers, the intersection of capability, vulnerability, and intention directs whether the states look at each other as partners or threats. Thus, the stakes in this fundamental issue could hardly be higher. Policymakers and publics on both sides must face the fact that, at this point, developments in the cyber realm are contributing to tensions rather than enhancing confidence in each side’s ability to find ways to cooperate with the other to handle the major issues we collectively face in a changing world.Lack of cooperation spills overLiberthal and Singer 12 (Kenneth Lieberthal and Peter W. Singer, Brookings, Kenneth Lieberthal is a senior fellow emeritus in the Foreign Policy program at Brookings )Whichever position one takes, what is even more worrisome is that such tensions and concerns are inexorably growing. The last year has amplified all of these trends. On top of this, both the scale and sophistication of attacks in cyber space has grown, notably in the Stuxnet episode. In this situation, a specially designed computer worm targeted Siemens Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems used to run the centrifuges at five Iranian nuclear research facilities. The episode was viewed as a success for counter-proliferation efforts Cybersecurity and U.S.-China Relations 6 (in that it hampered illegal nuclear weapons research in a highly focused way), but also was described in both American and Chinese circles as an indicator of a new level of threat.23 Indeed, two scholars at the Chinese Academy of Military Sciences released a report whose tone effectively captured the perceived level of tension and confusion this issue has generated in such a short period: “Of late, an Internet tornado has swept across the world ... massively impacting and shocking the globe. Behind all this lies the shadow of America. Faced with this warm-up for an Internet war, every nation and military can’t be passive but is making preparations to fight the Internet war.”24 In sum, distrust of each other’s actions in the cyber realm is growing between the U.S. and China, and such distrust easily spills over into broader assessments of the other country’s long term intentions. It is heightened by the link between the cyber domain and key values like individual privacy on the U.S. side and concerns with internal stability on the Chinese side. Even more, the potentially poisoning effect of cybersecurity on the relationship is occurring at a time when there is genuine uncertainty about the degree and speed of changes in the global balance of power. The disagreements feed into the anxieties on all sides as to whether America and China will have a basically cooperative or antagonistic relationship over the coming several decades.25 In traditional relations between two powers, the intersection of capability, vulnerability, and intention directs whether the states look at each other as partners or threats. Thus, the stakes in this fundamental issue could hardly be higher. Policymakers and publics on both sides must face the fact that, at this point, developments in the cyber realm are contributing to tensions rather than enhancing confidence in each side’s ability to find ways to cooperate with the other to handle the major issues we collectively face in a changing world.***AT: “Cyberattacks Don’t Escalate”***Cyber conflicts go kinetic — loss of communications networks causes SCS conflictSegal and Lan 16 — Adam Segal, Maurice R. Greenberg Senior Fellow for China Studies and Director of the Program on Digital and Cyberspace Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, Tang Lan, Deputy Director at the Institute of Information and Social Development, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, 2016 (“Can the United States and China de-conflict in cyberspace,” War on the Rocks, April 27th, Available Online at , Accessed 06-27-2016, AW)It is not hard to imagine cyber issues becoming intertwined with a crisis that spirals out of control. For example, U.S. and People’s Republic of China (PRC) forces are in close contact in the South China Sea, and cyberattacks could cause an incident to escalate rapidly. Hackers could target communication, computer, and transportation networks, degrading not only Beijing’s and Washington’s ability to control their forces in the field, but also their ability to signal to the other side their intentions to escalate or de-escalate the conflict. Non state actors, often known as patriotic hackers, could further confuse the situation as policy makers would have a difficult time differentiating between official and independent attacks. Additionally, a cyberattack that causes physical damage or widespread economic disruption could create domestic pressure for action that leaders in Washington and Beijing would have a hard time ignoring.Cyber warfare will lead to an uncontrollable escalation- empirics proveFutter 15 Dr Andrew Futter is a Senior Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Leicester. His research is primarily concerned with contemporary nuclear weapons issues, Hacking the Bomb: Nuclear Weapons in the Cyber Age, February 2015, ISA Conference are essentially four key areas that cyber weapons might impact crisis stability between nuclear-armed actors100: (1) they can potentially disrupt or destroy communications channels, 96 Steve Andreasen & Richard Clarke, “Cyberwar’s threat does not justify a new policy of nuclear deterrence”, The Washington Post, (14 June 2013), 826d299ff459_story.html 97 In an interview with the author, a former senior UK MoD official remarked, “Nukes have a limited role in deterring that form of asymmetric warfare, but never say never, if nukes were a proportionate response to a verified, attributed cyber assault.” 98 The use of cyber alongside other forms of attack is increasingly being labeled as “hybrid warfare”. 99 As the US Defense Science Board has pointed out, “The DOD should expect cyber attacks to be part of all conflicts in the future, and should not expect competitors to play by our version of the rules, but instead apply their rules (e.g. using surrogates for exploitation and offense operations, sharing IP with local industries for economic gain, etc.).” United States Department of Defense, Defense Science Board, “Task force report: resilient military systems and the advanced cyber threat”, (January 2013) p.5 100 This list of adopted from that used by Stephen Cimbala. Stephen Cimbala, “Nuclear weapons in the information age”, (London, Continuum International Publishing: 2012) pp.56-7 Draft working paper for ISA Annual Conference, New Orleans February 2015 – Please do not quote 23 making it difficult to manage forces during a conflict and reducing commanders’ confidence in their systems, because “only a small number of attacks would have to be successful to plant seeds of doubt in any information coming from a computer”101 – or they might include Distributed Denial of Service attacks (DDoS)102; (2) they can increase perceived time pressures to act/ respond or to act pre-emptively, as Stephen Cimbala explains: A nuclear-armed state faced with a sudden burst of holes in its vital warning and response systems might, for example, press the preemption button instead of waiting to ride out the attack and retaliate.103 Or as David Gompert and Martin Libicki have warned, In a situation where countries believe that they cannot afford to strike second, cyber-warfare options augment conventional first strike capabilities with the means to paralyse the enemy’s forces at the outset, by either retarding their flow into the theatre of war or impairing their operation and facilitating their defeat once they arrive.104 (3) They may reduce the search for viable alternatives, and; (4) they may cause flawed images of intentions and capabilities, exacerbate concerns of “strategic surprise, and create considerable problems for successful “signaling.”105 Taken together these dynamics raise the likelihood of (unintended) and potentially uncontrollable escalation and make the management of such crises more complicated and dangerous. 106 In fact, an Israeli war game held in 2013 showed how a regional conflict involving cyber attacks could very quickly escalate, in this case bringing the US and Russia to the brink of war. Haim Assa, the designer of the game, later remarked “What we all learned was how quickly localized cyber events can turn dangerously kinetic when leaders are illprepared to deal in the cyber domain.”107 This new cyber-nuclear security dilemma seems most likely to play out in the near future between the United States and NATO, Russia and China. Perhaps the most likely future cybernuclear dilemma is between the United States and China in the Asia-Pacific, where both nations have been pretty open about the importance of cyber capabilities and attacks on information systems. As David Gompert and Martin Libicki explain, “China and the US both recognize that an armed conflict with the other would include cyber warfare.”108 More specifically, the US “Air-Sea battle plan “makes no bones about conducting cyber warfare against Chinese kill-chain networks in the event of a conflict,” 109 while at the same time, Many analysts now believe that the PLA has already acquired, through its development of strong cyberwar force capabilities, the means to asymmetrically challenge the United States in the event of a kinetic conflict between the two states.110Cyberattacks escalate conflicts - Emprics ProveHanrahan 15 (Mark Hanrahan @Markdhanrahan, 8-1-2015, "US Decides To Retaliate Against China For Cyberattack: Report," International Business Times, )The Obama administration has decided to retaliate against China for a huge cyberattack that targeted a government agency, but has yet to find a method that would deter future attacks, while not provoking an escalating cyber conflict, according to a New York Times report. Senior officials told the paper that they felt cyberattacks targeting the U.S. would continue to escalate unless the government was able to create costs for attackers, which would curb future security breaches, and that the scope of the most recent attack demanded a response. The administration has reportedly considered a range of options for retaliation, including diplomatic protests, actions against Chinese agents in the U.S., economic sanctions, and retaliatory cyberattacks on Chinese networks. The retaliatory attacks reportedly discussed included actions to steal data similar to that breached when the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) was hacked in June this year. The personal information of 21 million U.S. federal employees, many of whom have access to sensitive information, was stolen. Concerns among officials that retaliation could escalate the conflict between the two countries mean that thus far, the exact nature of the U.S. response has not been finalized, the paper reported. U.S. national security officials have recently stepped up public warnings about the dangers of cyberattacks, and urged the importance of developing cyber weapons that are powerful enough to deter future attacks. “Just as we fashioned a formidable nuclear capability that served us through the Cold War and beyond, I am confident in our ability to keep pace with adversaries,” Adm. Mike Rogers, who is both the military’s top commander for cyber operations as head of U.S. Cyber Command and director of the National Security Agency, said, referring to the need to develop cyber weapons, according to the Los Angeles Times. Whatever form the U.S. response takes, it is possible that the public may not even be aware of it, officials cited by the Times said. The administration has also reportedly decided against publicly accusing China of responsibility for the OPM hack, as doing so could require exposing details of the United States’ own espionage and cyberspace capabilities, officials told the Washington Post. In an apparent effort to de-escalate the cyber conflict between them, the U.S. and China agreed to a cybersecurity code of conduct at a summit last month.China will be forced to retaliate to a perceived U.S. attack without proper attributionHarold et al 16– Libicki is an American scholar and Professor at the Frederick S. Pardee RAND Graduate School in Santa Monica, California, Harold is associate director of the RAND Center for Asia Pacific Policy, Cevallos is a political scientist at the RAND Corporation (Scott Warren, Martin C. Libicki, Astrid Stuth Cevallos, Getting to Yes with China in Cyberspace, Kindle, Introduction//JC)We interpreted these reactions as evidence that China does not yet have an explicit cyber-deterrence posture. The classic notion of deterrence has four prerequisites: thresholds, attribution, credibility, and capability (to respond). Furthermore, an effective deterrence policy requires that these prerequisites be met in the view of potential attackers. For example, even if the target thinks it has a capability to attribute, if the potential attacker thinks that the target of the attack lacks confidence in its own attribution, deterrence suffers. If the Chinese had a serious cyber-deterrence posture, the rest of world would not have to guess what it is; it would know. Note that this is different from saying that China’s cyber-deterrence posture is simply reflective of China’s overall deterrence posture. Overall, China maintains a substantial degree of ambiguity as a strategy to magnify its influence and ability to compel respect. Nonetheless, China has made clear that its “forbearance has limits”24 —it simply declines to specify their exact location, instead favoring an approach of hinting at direction and proximity and allowing the target of deterrence to infer that it is running increasing risks of a kinetic Chinese reaction. In the cyber domain, in contrast, China has not clarified to any meaningful extent its ability to detect actions that cross its (unstated) red lines, declaims a nigh-absolute degree of doubt about the possibility of attribution in cyberspace, and has expressed no clear statement about its own willingness to respond to cyberattacks. Indeed, China has gone far as to lay down somewhat costly markers that it may have to walk back from if it ever decides that it does want to respond to a cyberattack either through a cyber or kinetic response. As noted earlier, if China doubts its ability to definitively attribute an attack but perceives an intrusion as having originated from the United States, it will have to carefully weigh several factors in its response, such as weighing its its lack of confidence in its own attribution capabilities and its weaker power vis-à-vis the United States against its concerns that U.S. actions might be oriented toward affecting a qualitative change in the overall balance of power. Additionally, CPC leaders would have to consider any possible consequences for domestic regime stability. Several additional considerations are likely to shape China’s cyber-deterrence posture: ? China’s leaders are acutely aware of the vulnerable state of the country’s network infrastructure. ? Compared with the everyday risks to China’s infrastructure (entire provinces have been knocked offline because of the misadventures of computer games),25 risks originating from overseas may appear less pressing than they do in the United States. ? At the same time, if China is perceived to have suffered a cyberattack, the political pressures that the CPC leadership may find themselves under could be equal to or even greater than those that the United States experiences, since the regime depends more heavily on nationalism and because the risks to any leader for not acting could imperil his or her own position (since authority is more personalized and less institutionalized in China than in the United States).26Cybersecurity tensions stress Us-Sino RelationsGordon Corera 15,( 9-24-15 Cyber-suspicion strains US-China relations Security correspondent, BBC News)In Cold War days, nuclear arms control might have topped the agenda of a major summit - but now when leaders meet, they are looking at how to avoid an escalating cyber-arms race. Tension has grown in recent years and is the sign of a wider struggle over establishing the rules of the road for the internet as the US and other countries battle to define what constitutes acceptable behaviour and how to deter actions that cross those lines. American officials have been making their views about Chinese state-sponsored cyber-espionage clear in the run up to this week's meetings. "This isn't a mild irritation, it's an economic and national security concern to the United States," US national security adviser Susan Rice said. "It puts enormous strain on our bilateral relationship, and it is a critical factor in determining the future trajectory of US-China ties." President Xi Jinping, meanwhile, denied such activity was taking place and the Chinese media have stressed how "regrettable" it is that the US has taken on antagonistic position, arguing that Washington's criticism reflects an arrogance and "hegemonic mentality", especially when the US spies on the world. Both sides argue that developing consensus between the country that founded the internet and the one that now contains the most users is vital - but what that consensus looks like is highly contested. Arms control Reports suggest the US and China are negotiating some form of "arms control" for cyberspace - for instance agreeing not to be first to target the other's critical infrastructure in peacetime. But that is a relatively easy step - more important is the attempt to establish norms of behaviour. China is keener on norms that facilitate certain forms of state control over the internet, to deal with its concerns about US dominance and the subversive nature of unregulated flows of information. The US would like to say it is not just certain kinds of destructive attacks that are unacceptable but also economic espionage, as it defines it. The message from Washington is that governments spying on governments in cyberspace is fine but they should not spy on companies for commercial gain. However, that is a definition that China and others may see as suiting America's interests and not theirs. America's annoyance is based on the activities of certain units of China's People's Liberation Army alleged to be stealing intellectual property and business-sensitive information from US companies. Snowden factor Just over two years ago, President Obama was preparing to confront the Chinese leader at a previous summit in California over this issue: cyber-spying was top of the agenda. "We were spring-loaded," says one former US intelligence official. But then something went wrong. The Snowden revelations put the US on the back foot Two days before the summit opened, the first stories emerged based on documents taken from the US National Security Agency by Edward Snowden. This completely threw Washington's plans and switched the focus onto US - and not Chinese - espionage in cyberspace. It took Washington a year after the Snowden disclosures to summon the energy for another push. In May 2014, US Department of Justice issued charges against five Chinese hackers for carrying out cyber-espionage against US companies. These hackers all worked for the Chinese military, and some were even pictured in their military uniform. So far though, the signs are that US attempts at deterrence - first by pointing the finger and then by issuing indictments - have not altered Chinese behaviour. That has led to questions about what to do next. US accused Chinese officials argue that when it comes to cyber-spying, they are more sinned against than sinning and that it is the US that is the greatest problem because of the way it uses its dominant position to control the internet and facilitate its preferred forms of espionage. They also chafe at definitions that allow US spying on foreign companies and governments for national economic gain (for instance trade positions) but say other forms of commercial espionage are wrong. The Chinese elite sees economic growth as a national security issue, given that underpins the survival of the current political order. The cyber-tensions over espionage have also spilled out into issues for US tech companies trying to operate in China. They are facing pressure both to prove there are no backdoors secretly placed in their products to aid the NSA, while also, in other cases, being asked to ensure there are backdoors to help the Chinese government get round strong encryption. This year, cyber-tensions ratcheted up another level as US officials were left reeling by the breach of 22 million records from the Office of Personnel Management (OPM). These details were of potentially enormous value for another country's intelligence service either looking for vulnerabilities of employees that could be exploited or trying to identify undercover intelligence operatives (by a process of elimination because their details would not be on this database even though they might pose as regular federal employees). Top US intelligence officials express sneaking admiration for a great intelligence operation and say that given the chance they would have done the same thing. This is because by the US's own "norms" of behaviour, this kind of activity is classical espionage and therefore permitted. As they debate further action against China (including perhaps sanctions against companies), US officials are careful to stress that these would only be in response to commercial espionage and not the kind of state-on-state spying involved in the OPM breachCyberattacks are proven to be as dangerous as nuclear weaponsSinger 2015?– (P.W., director of the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence at Brookings, December 18, "How the United States Can Win the Cyberwar of the Future",?)Nothing above argues against building up offensive capabilities for cyberspace. Cyberweapons have proven their value in espionage, sabotage, and conflict. And the digital domain will be as crucial to warfare in the 21st century as operations on land, air, and sea. Indeed, the cyber front of any war between the United States and China would feature not just military units like Cyber Command or the PLA’s Unit 61398, but also nonstate actors that might range from Chinese university cyber militias to Anonymous hackers joining in the fight with their own goals and modes, much as what has happened in the online Islamic State battles. This is a good illustration of another misperception: Cyberweapons are increasingly useful tools of espionage and war, but they are not comparable to “weapons of mass destruction,” where the fear of a single big thermonuclear tit for tat maintained the nuclear balance. Offensive cyber capabilities, by contrast, are a key part of the toolkit to be used in both hot and cold conflicts. They are not the only tools of deterrence, nor will a fear of them make attacks cease. That a cyberweapon is not like a WMD doesn’t mean the United States has no options for exacting costs on would-be attackers to change their calculations. Indeed, it may even have more. Just as the timeline is stretched out and the players are proliferated as compared to the Cold War, true deterrence-building responses can come after the fact and in other realms. For instance, responding to IP theft by stealing back is not the only option: The defender can also go after other assets valued by the attacker or even those valued by third party actors, such as by sanctioning companies benefiting from stolen fruit. This dynamism complicates things to a degree that even the most brilliant Cold War strategist would find frustrating. The United States will have to game out not merely the first two moves of the response — the simple “shoot and shoot back” dynamic that was the whole of a nuclear exchange — but also multiple stages after that by multiple actors. For instance, anyone advocating for trade sanctions should walk their argument through the process of not just how the sanctions for past attacks would stop future attacks, but also what the United States would do in response to a loss of overall market access were China, say, to respond in kind against some U.S. firms.AT: “Status Quo Sufficent”***The status quo cyber arrangement lacks any benchmark-means it can’t be enforced. Steinberg, Secure My Social CEO, 2015 (Joseph, “10 Issues With the China-US Cybersecurity Agreement”, 9-27, )6. In order to verify that the parties are honoring their commitments, the US and China are supposed to "establish a high-level joint dialogue mechanism on fighting cybercrime and related issues" and "this mechanism will be used to review the timeliness and quality of responses to requests for information and assistance with respect to malicious cyber activity of concern identified by either side" In other words, the determination of whether the Chinese are adhering to the agreement will be a subjective decision based on conversations and communications; no objective metrics have been established by the agreement. This deficiency in the agreement is serious--as one of the arguments that has been made for supporting an agreement with China, as noted by Jason Healey, Senior Research Scholar at Columbia University's School of International and Public Affairs and Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council, has been that if China violates the agreement the United States "will be in a much stronger position to respond to Beijing over its commercial espionage" (perhaps by levying sanctions and/or gaining international support for sanctions). If there is no objective way to measure compliance, why would anyone support a US contention that China has violated the agreement? Measuring the number of arrests made by China at the request of the US, and calculating how much cooperation was received when aid was requested, are also poor methods to determine compliance; the US's primary need is not for China to arrest hackers, but to curtail the hacking. Under this agreement China can arrest hackers who are identified by the United States, and appear to be compliant, but simultaneously continue to tolerate or actively carry out attacks through other parties. Also, keep in mind that the most dangerous and damaging attacks are often those that have not been identified, and, therefore, for which no requests for assistance or arrests have been made.Need to sort out attribution firstBanerjee, State Policy and Armed Conflict PhD student, 2015 (Brinda, “Is The U.S.-China Cyber Security War Ending?”, 11-2, )Even as the Sino-American cyber security arrangement is welcomed as a much-needed step forward, experts caution against excessive optimism: the arrangement faces several challenges, the bulk of which arise out of the anonymous nature of cyberspace. Conclusively tracking a sophisticated cyber attack to its source is believed to be virtually impossible- a fact that has made it difficult for states to corroborate their allegations against one another. Advanced hacking technologies and skills allow malicious parties to ‘bounce off’ their cyber activities off several servers situated in several countries. This makes narrowing down the origins of the attack to a single place nearly impossible. When the number of actors involved in a particular cyber attack is increased, it makes triangulating the source that much harder. As such, most states ultimately fall back on preventing cyber attacks by investing in advanced cyber security defense systems instead of actively fighting them. Even if a cyber attack is successfully traced back to a particular computer, determining the complicity of the state in the attack can prove to be both difficult and fraught with political risks. Most governments choose not to publicly accuse one another of cyber security breaches because of the ensuing diplomatic crises and political hostilities that are sure to follow in the wake of unverified claims. And so, the second challenge that the China-U.S. cyber security agreement faces is the fact that even if the governments possess a genuine aim to cooperate, they cannot guarantee the compliance of their people; if a private citizen is to direct a cyber security attack against the other country, its people or businesses, separating the home government from the independently-acting individual may prove to be challenging.Too many loopholes Gady, Diplomat associate editor, 2015(Franz-Stefan, “What Does the Future Hold for China-US Relations in Cyberspace?”, 10-16, )Conversely, it is important to understand that the agreements reached are only a starting point and need to be followed up by more concrete and more clearly defined documents specifically addressing issues that have plagued Sino-U.S. bilateral relations in cyberspace from the start—issues such as questions over verification, terminology, and norms. Without this, real progress will not be likely. The most talked about section of the joint statement outlines that both countries will refrain from engaging or “knowingly” supporting “cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property, including trade secrets or other confidential business information, with the intent of providing competitive advantages to companies or commercial sectors.” This is an important diplomatic breakthrough. Curtailing Chinese state-sponsored cyber espionage activities has been the top priority of the Obama administration in the Sino-U.S. bilateral relationship in cyberspace for some time. Overall, in the past year, the U.S. assumed a tougher stance on alleged Chinese state-sponsored cyberespionage activities. For example, in April 2015, U.S. President Barack Obama signed an executive order establishing the first-ever sanctions program specifically designed to deter state-sponsored malicious activities in cyberspace on a strategic scale, declaring such activities a “national emergency.” In a separate analysis a few weeks back, I noted that by threatening sanctions, the Obama White House intends to elevate the subject of cyber espionage to a more strategic level between the two sides during bilateral discussions. Thus, the Chinese concession to agree to a joint statement on this subject can be construed as a diplomatic victory for the Obama administration. However, in order to yield more concrete results, the Xi-Obama statement needs to be immediately followed up by a more comprehensive agreement. For one thing, Chinese President Xi Jinping still maintains that his state is not collecting commercial intelligence and does not engage in cyber espionage. Therefore, it is fair to assume that Xi could claim that the agreement does not apply to ongoing Chinese state-sponsored activities in cyberspace. Thus, it is easy for Beijing to support a new norm that the Chinese government insists it is following already. Moreover, the statement contains the loophole that both sides only refrain from “knowingly” supporting the collection of commercial intelligence—a position that both countries had already agreed to in past meetings. This provision permits plausible deniability for both sides when caught: commercial espionage is often outsourced to quasi-independent (“patriotic”) hackers over which both governments can claim that they have no control. Lastly, the agreement only talks about refraining from collecting trade secrets rather than curtailing the passing on of intelligence to third parties (private companies) in order for them to gain a competitive advantage. However, practically every state in the world, including the United States, is engaged in collecting commercial intelligence and there is no agreed upon international norm against it. This could potentially undermine the larger legal principle behind the agreement to abstain from cyber-enabled intellectual property theft as outlined in the White House Fact Sheet.AT: “Economics K2 Relations”***Cybersecurity accesses trade in the U.S.-RelationshipSegal 15 — Adam Segal, Maurice R. Greenberg Senior Fellow for China Studies and Director of the Digital and Cyberspace Policy Program at the Council on Foreign Relations, 2015 ("Stabilizing Cybersecurity in the U.S.-China Relationship," The National Bureau of Asian Research, September 14th, Available Online at , Accessed 06-27-2016, AW)These attacks fall into three categories. The majority are the cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property, business strategies, and trade secrets. There is also a widespread campaign of political and military espionage such as the hack of the U.S. Office of Personnel Management, which may have exposed the records of over twenty million current and former federal employees. In addition, the members of the People’s Liberation Army Unit 61398 have reportedly penetrated the networks of natural gas pipelines and electric utilities, possibly to map the potential future battlefield or prepare for a destructive attack. The cybersecurity issue has also spilled over into trade relations. In part motivated by disclosures of U.S. cyberespionage against Chinese targets made by the former National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden and in part a reflection of a long-held techno-nationalism, Chinese policymakers have introduced a number of regulations designed to reduce dependence on foreign suppliers for critical technologies. New banking regulations, for example, and the draft antiterrorism and national security regulations in China require companies to share source code and build backdoors into encrypted products in an effort to make technology “secure and controllable.” Although the bank regulations were suspended in April, protectionism remains tightly linked to cybersecurity concerns.Cyberattacks Stress RelationsCybersecurity tensions stress Us-Sino RelationsGordon Corera, 9-24-15 Cyber-suspicion strains US-China relations Security correspondent, BBC NewsIn Cold War days, nuclear arms control might have topped the agenda of a major summit - but now when leaders meet, they are looking at how to avoid an escalating cyber-arms race. Tension has grown in recent years and is the sign of a wider struggle over establishing the rules of the road for the internet as the US and other countries battle to define what constitutes acceptable behaviour and how to deter actions that cross those lines. American officials have been making their views about Chinese state-sponsored cyber-espionage clear in the run up to this week's meetings. "This isn't a mild irritation, it's an economic and national security concern to the United States," US national security adviser Susan Rice said. "It puts enormous strain on our bilateral relationship, and it is a critical factor in determining the future trajectory of US-China ties." President Xi Jinping, meanwhile, denied such activity was taking place and the Chinese media have stressed how "regrettable" it is that the US has taken on antagonistic position, arguing that Washington's criticism reflects an arrogance and "hegemonic mentality", especially when the US spies on the world. Both sides argue that developing consensus between the country that founded the internet and the one that now contains the most users is vital - but what that consensus looks like is highly contested. Arms control Reports suggest the US and China are negotiating some form of "arms control" for cyberspace - for instance agreeing not to be first to target the other's critical infrastructure in peacetime. But that is a relatively easy step - more important is the attempt to establish norms of behaviour. China is keener on norms that facilitate certain forms of state control over the internet, to deal with its concerns about US dominance and the subversive nature of unregulated flows of information. The US would like to say it is not just certain kinds of destructive attacks that are unacceptable but also economic espionage, as it defines it. The message from Washington is that governments spying on governments in cyberspace is fine but they should not spy on companies for commercial gain. However, that is a definition that China and others may see as suiting America's interests and not theirs. America's annoyance is based on the activities of certain units of China's People's Liberation Army alleged to be stealing intellectual property and business-sensitive information from US companies. Snowden factor Just over two years ago, President Obama was preparing to confront the Chinese leader at a previous summit in California over this issue: cyber-spying was top of the agenda. "We were spring-loaded," says one former US intelligence official. But then something went wrong. The Snowden revelations put the US on the back foot Two days before the summit opened, the first stories emerged based on documents taken from the US National Security Agency by Edward Snowden. This completely threw Washington's plans and switched the focus onto US - and not Chinese - espionage in cyberspace. It took Washington a year after the Snowden disclosures to summon the energy for another push. In May 2014, US Department of Justice issued charges against five Chinese hackers for carrying out cyber-espionage against US companies. These hackers all worked for the Chinese military, and some were even pictured in their military uniform. So far though, the signs are that US attempts at deterrence - first by pointing the finger and then by issuing indictments - have not altered Chinese behaviour. That has led to questions about what to do next. US accused Chinese officials argue that when it comes to cyber-spying, they are more sinned against than sinning and that it is the US that is the greatest problem because of the way it uses its dominant position to control the internet and facilitate its preferred forms of espionage. They also chafe at definitions that allow US spying on foreign companies and governments for national economic gain (for instance trade positions) but say other forms of commercial espionage are wrong. The Chinese elite sees economic growth as a national security issue, given that underpins the survival of the current political order. The cyber-tensions over espionage have also spilled out into issues for US tech companies trying to operate in China. They are facing pressure both to prove there are no backdoors secretly placed in their products to aid the NSA, while also, in other cases, being asked to ensure there are backdoors to help the Chinese government get round strong encryption. This year, cyber-tensions ratcheted up another level as US officials were left reeling by the breach of 22 million records from the Office of Personnel Management (OPM). These details were of potentially enormous value for another country's intelligence service either looking for vulnerabilities of employees that could be exploited or trying to identify undercover intelligence operatives (by a process of elimination because their details would not be on this database even though they might pose as regular federal employees). Top US intelligence officials express sneaking admiration for a great intelligence operation and say that given the chance they would have done the same thing. This is because by the US's own "norms" of behaviour, this kind of activity is classical espionage and therefore permitted. As they debate further action against China (including perhaps sanctions against companies), US officials are careful to stress that these would only be in response to commercial espionage and not the kind of state-on-state spying involved in the OPM breachCyber threats are causing the animosityErmito 15 Daniele Ermito Is A London-Based Analyst. He Is Also A Gri Analyst and Regular Contributor For The Foreign Policy Association, He Holds A Ba (Hons) In International Relations From The University Of Bologna And A Msc In Asian Politics From The School Of Oriental And African Studies. 9-23-2015, "Cyber breaches undermine delicate US-China relations," Global Risk Insights, has emerged as the spearhead of the new strategic capabilities strongly supported under the leadership of President Xi Jinping. However, extensive cyber-attacks launched from China targeting U.S. core economic, military, and strategic interests pose a major threat to this delicate phase in U.S.-China relations. In the last few weeks, the controversial issue of cyber-attacks allegedly sponsored by Beijing has created a great deal of concern for the Obama Administration. First, the upcoming visit of President Xi Jinping to Washington looms on the horizon. Secondly, the Administration called for immediate sanctions against Chinese individuals and companies involved in the recent massive cyber attacks against the Office of Personnel Management networks that has compromisedthe private data of 22 million people. If a response were authorised by the Obama Administration, a cyber counterattack would surely give origin to a silent but dreadful confrontation targeting mutual strategic interests in the region whose unpredictable outcomes could seriously affect the fragile relations between China and the U.S. Nevertheless, China has repeatedly denied any involvement in the cyber attacks, expressing concern that these frictions could undermine Chinese efforts to establish constructive relations with Washington. In the 6th Century BC, Chinese philosopher and strategist Sun Tsu (孫子) elaborated a military treatise that is still considered a cornerstone of modern military strategy, based on information dominance, unrestricted warfare and asymmetrical capabilities. Despite the 2,500 year gap, Sun Tsu’s lessons still maintain a strong appeal for Chinese leadership, whose efforts are focused on expanding intelligence capabilities harmonised with the rise of China as a cyber-power nation. In February 2014, the establishment of the Internet Security and Informatisation Leading Small Group (ISILSG) showed the strong emphasis President Xi places on the cyber security issue. For Xi’s administration, cyber is crucial in pursuing a national security strategy as well as facilitating China’s path toward modernity. Technological dimension of the Chinese modernisation The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has massively invested in enhancing its cyber strategic capabilities in order to adapt itself to the challenges coming from deep changes in the international strategic scenario, and to the rise of domestic threats able to destabilise the Chinese Communist Party’s political power and legitimacy. Under these conditions, the PLA has launched deep changes aimed at improving its combat capabilities through the development and acquisition of technology, transforming its military from a man-power intensive to a high-tech intensive apparatus. Expanding and increasing the sophistication of cyber-warfare capabilities has a strategic importance in modern conflicts, not only when neutralising the military capabilities of technologically superior enemies, but also in damaging vital infrastructures such as energy, transport, and finance. Moreover, cyber intrusions coming from China have reportedly stolen confidential documents from hundreds of governments and private companies around the world. The rising numbers of China’s silent cyber army have created mistrust about Beijing’s cyber power. Recent attacks aimed at gathering sensitive information and data against the U.S. administration and Taiwan have proven that Chinese hackers have reached an advanced level of sophistication. According to many analysts, any attempt of reclaiming Taiwan would be anticipated by extensive cyber attacks, in order to disrupt Taipei’s communication lines and strategic infrastructure. Yet, compared to conventional military power, Beijing’s cyber power represents a formidable threat to the U.S. security umbrella in the Asia Pacific region. Beijing and Washington are experiencing a difficult phase of their relations, and an additional fracture over the issue of the cybersecurity could compromise their balance of power. Further development of Chinese cyber activities could lead to a more problematic standoff between the two countries. Despite Beijing’s willingness to make some concessions, given the upcoming visit of President Xi in Washington, we should not expect strong changes in the Chinese Network Security Strategy. ***U.S.-China relations are in a downward spiral- things are bleakMayeda and Mohsin 16. (Andrew Mayeda, Global economy reporter for Bloomberg News. Saleha Mohsin, MA Journalism, reporter for Bloomberg. Complicated U.S.-China Dance Could Be Headed for Rough Turn. May 23, 2016. )Complicated in the best of times, economic relations between the U.S. and China may be poised to enter a new period of turbulence. American presidential candidates are pledging a tougher stand against the Communist-controlled nation, China’s top central banker is approaching retirement and the nation’s leaders are struggling to manage a shift to a new growth model. A daunting set of challenges awaits the next American president, whether it’s Hillary Clinton or Donald Trump: questions about China’s commitment not to devalue its currency amid persistent capital outflows, stalled negotiations on a trade deal that would make it easier for U.S. companies to invest in China, and concern about Chinese piracy of U.S. intellectual property. That’s not to mention hostility toward China among both Republicans and Democrats in Congress, and tensions on foreign-policy issues such as cyber-security and the military balance of power in the South China Sea. ‘Wrong Direction’ “There’s definitely a clear momentum in the wrong direction,” said Scott Kennedy, a China scholar at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. “The level of trust is somewhere near scraping the bottom.” That’s the backdrop for the Obama administration’s last major bilateral confab with China. Lew and Secretary of State John Kerry will travel to Beijing for talks June 6-7 under the Strategic and Economic Dialogue, a forum for discussions between the two powers. Former president George W. Bush and then-Chinese leader Hu Jintao started the dialogue in 2006, with a focus on economic relations. In 2009, Obama and Hu added a separate foreign-policy track to the talks, led by State Department officials and their Chinese counterparts. Some observers say the talks appear to be drifting. “There’s no clear leader in the U.S. administration on U.S.-China relations,” said David Loevinger, a former China specialist at the Treasury and now an analyst at fund manager TCW Group Inc. in Los Angeles. “Lew’s done a good job, Kerry’s done a good job, but there’s no point person.” Such an assertion is wrong, said Wally Adeyemo, President Barack Obama’s deputy national security adviser for international economics. The dialogue has established Lew and Kerry as leaders of their respective tracks, and various people have helped “put us in a position to make progress with regard to the bilateral relationship,” Adeyemo said in an interview.South China Sea***South China Sea Cyber attacks are destroying relationsPiiparien 7/22 (Anni Piiparinen, The Diplomat, 7-22-2016, "China's Secret Weapon in the South China Sea: Cyber Attacks," Diplomat, , Accessed: 3/4/17)-Coronado ARLDespite China’s great power aspirations, its cyber warriors threw a fit after losing a legal battle to the Philippines in The Hague. Within hours of the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s unanimous rebuke of China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea last week, at least 68 national and local government websites in the Philippines were knocked offline in a massive distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack. This is not the first time the landmark legal dispute over the South China Sea has flared up in cyberspace. Last summer, Chinese hackers allegedly breached the court’s servers during a hearing on the territorial dispute, leaving anyone interested in the landmark legal case at risk of data theft. Last fall, Jason Healey and I predicted that “the Philippines (and its U.S. allies) should […] start preparing now for a massive digital tantrum by Chinese patriot hackers if the ruling […] goes against the Middle Kingdom.” And while the Philippine government has not yet publicly assigned blame for the most recent attacks, context and timing serve as damning evidence. The crippling DDoS attacks against Filipino government networks began in the afternoon of July 12, as the court in The Hague announced its sweeping ruling rejecting China’s historic territorial claims in the case brought by the Philippines. The attacks that ensued spanned over several days and targeted key government agencies, including the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Department of National Defense, the Central Bank, and the Presidential Management Staff, along with a medical center and smaller local government units. In addition, some local government portals were defaced with popular Anonymous insignia and a message signed by “the Chinese Government.” The breach of these networks follows a string of Chinese cyber attacks targeting Southeast Asian claimants to the disputed waters, coinciding with times of heightened geopolitical tensions. The first major cyber campaign against the Philippines in connection to the territorial dispute occurred in April 2012, following a tense standoff between Chinese and Filipino vessels at the Philippine-claimed Scarborough Shoal. A Chinese cyber unit breached government and military networks in the island nation, stealing military documents and other highly sensitive communications related to the conflict. In addition to the Philippines, Vietnam has been a popular target for Chinese cyber units; in 2014 it became the most targeted country in cyberspace. That year, two notable upticks occurred in Chinese cyber attacks: In May, following an international incident surrounding a Chinese oil rig in Vietnam-claimed waters that escalated into deadly anti-China protests around the country, Chinese hackers gained access to sensitive information about Vietnam’s diplomatic and military strategy by compromising an intelligence agency network. In October the same year, similar attacks were observed, a likely response to Vietnamese arms acquisitions boosting the country’s maritime security capabilities. While the most recent cyber attacks against the Philippines were certainly not difficult to anticipate or predict, it remains unclear to what extent they were directed, encouraged, or merely tolerated by the Chinese government. During territorial disputes, patriotic hackers often engage in attacks that are almost indistinguishable from organized government cyber units. In this case, the use of Anonymous’ trademarks further blurs the line between government and independent action: it may point toward an independent attack by the group to accompany the DDoS campaign, overlap between members of Anonymous and hackers on the government’s payroll, or simply a false flag planted by the perpetrators. Patriotic hackers on both sides of the Filipino-Chinese territorial conflict have a long history of launching attacks against each other. With nationalist sentiments running high in the Philippines in celebration of the “David vs. Goliath” victory in court, and with local branches of Anonymous, LulzSec, and others highly active in the country, retaliation originating from the island nation is to be expected. Last week’s DDoS attacks show that while reports by the U.S. government and private sector have recently noted a staggering drop in cyber attacks by Chinese-linked groups in the United States, China’s Southeast Asian neighbors should do anything but rest easy. The countries with competing claims to the disputed waters – the Philippines, Vietnam, Taiwan, Malaysia, and Brunei – remain willfully unprepared to counter Chinese cyber units, and need to begin seriously investing in sophisticated cyber defenses through increased national investments, regional initiatives, and strengthened international alliances. With China dismissing the arbitration ruling, the Philippines turning down bilateral talks, and the newly-elected Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte yet to offer more than offhanded comments or puzzlingly conflicting policy proposals on the dispute, the situation in the region will remain inflammatory for the foreseeable future. Regardless of the level of the Chinese government’s involvement in last week’s cyber attacks, the fallout from The Hague tribunal’s decision is unlikely to end here.***Cyberattacks will escalate conflict in the SCSPiiparinen 15 (Anni Piiparinen, The Diplomat, 9-18-2015, "The Chinese Cyber Threat in the South China Sea," Diplomat, )As China expands its foothold in the Spratly islands, piling sand and building airstrips on the contested reefs in the middle of the South China Sea, the world has turned its attention back to the territorial disputes that have lingered in the region for decades. While naval strategies and broader military doctrine have dominated the recent headlines, one crucial element of modern conflict has been surprisingly missing from the debate over the South China Sea: cyberspace. If the past is any guide, however, future escalation in the disputed waters is likely to spill over to the cyber realm regardless of where it starts. According to reports by?FireEye, Kaspersky Lab’s?Securelist, and?CrowdStrike, the Southeast Asian claimants to the South China Sea, along with private companies doing business in the region, have been popular targets of advanced intrusion operations originating from China. Chinese cyber units and malware variants have successfully infiltrated public networks in the region, primarily targeting top-level government agencies and civil and military organizations in the Philippines and Vietnam. China’s activities in cyberspace are a means to achieve its goals in the physical world and carry serious potential for escalating lingering tensions into a full-on battle, both on- and offline. Beijing has used its cyber capabilities to accompany other, often diplomatically risky, moves. Indeed, the volume of cyberattacks has significantly increased at times of heightened tensions, with China seeking to gather sensitive security details to gain a strategic edge over its regional rivals. For example?in May 2014, China dragged an oil rig into waters claimed by Vietnam, sparking an international incident. Vessels from both countries engaged in water-cannon battles and deadly anti-China protests erupted in Vietnam. China took the conflict from land and sea to cyberspace,?targeting?Vietnamese government and military agencies via spear-phishing campaigns that spread documents containing malware. The threat actors likely succeeded in?compromising a network?belonging to a Vietnamese intelligence agency, gaining access to sensitive information about the country’s security strategy. A notable?uptick?in China-based cyberattacks against Vietnamese networks also occurred in October 2014, possibly in response to Vietnamese arms acquisitions meant to boost its maritime security capabilities. These incidents pushed Vietnam to become the?most targeted country in cyberspace?in 2014, surpassing even the United States. Vietnam hasn’t been the only South China Sea claimant targeted by Chinese cyberattacks.?In April 2012, Chinese patrol vessels docked in waters near the Philippine-claimed Scarborough Shoal. After a tense standoff, the Philippines was forced to withdraw its ships. At the same time, hackers from both sides launched extensive?defacement campaigns?of government, media, and university websites. A Chinese cyber unit succeeded in?infiltrating?Philippine government and military networks, stealing military documents, internal communications, and other sensitive materials related to the dispute. With the Chinese island-building spree intensifying and the preliminary decision of the arbitral tribunal in the Philippines’ legal challenge against China expected by the end of the year, the tensions in the South China Sea will continue to run high. And as the past disputes in the region clearly show, conflicts in the physical world will undoubtedly also play out in cyberspace. Strong cyber defenses are crucial for a nation’s ability to protect sensitive national security information and ensure the operability of many of its core functions. However, the cyber capabilities of Vietnam and the Philippines, along with other Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members bordering the South China Sea, range from weak to nonexistent. Should the tensions escalate into an active conflict and move from cyber espionage and relatively harmless website defacements into causing real damage to critical infrastructure or government networks, the countries of ASEAN would have practically no way of stopping the attacks. And although the United States is geographically far removed from the territorial disputes, its regional alliances – particularly its mutual defense treaty with the Philippines, reaffirmed in 2014 – and its broader strategic interests in the Asia-Pacific would inevitably drag the U.S. into the dispute. It is therefore past time to start taking the cyber threat in the South China Sea seriously. The Philippines and Vietnam, along with other targeted countries, should direct increasing resources to developing more sophisticated cyber defense architectures to protect military systems and other sensitive networks. This should include providing sufficient funding for national Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) and creating units under the armed forces to centralize the command of cyberspace operations, similar to the U.S. Cyber Command. On a regional level, ASEAN needs to fast-track its dormant efforts to create a more resilient cybersecurity regime to mitigate the Chinese cyber threat against its members. The organization should take concrete steps to create a permanent coordinating and information-sharing mechanism, either under the ASEAN secretariat or as a stand-alone ASEAN-CERT under the umbrella of the Asia-Pacific CERT. And while the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting does not yet address cybersecurity as a separate topic, it would be a natural forum to better coordinate regional military efforts. Additionally, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which the Chinese also participate in, would serve as a suitable venue for establishing regional codes of conduct and confidence building measures for cyberspace, furthering transparency and complementing the ASEAN-only efforts. ARF should work towards a concrete framework for dealing with cyber conflict, similar to its efforts to enhance maritime security, and establish a communications network that could be activated during cyber crises. The United States, echoing the sentiment of the recently released U.S. Department of Defense?Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy, should make it a priority to enhance the cybersecurity capabilities of its regional allies and partners, “both to respond to threats within their own territories as well as to provide [security] more broadly across the region.” This can occur through provision of tools, technologies, and training, joint cyber incident response exercises, or information sharing initiatives.***Cyberattacks cause rapid conflict escalation in the South China SeaSegal & Lan, 16 (4-27-2016, Adam Segal is the Maurice R. Greenberg Senior Fellow for China Studies and Director of the Program on Digital and Cyberspace Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations. Tang Lan is Deputy Director at the Institute of Information and Social Development, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations. "Can the United States and China De-Conflict in Cyberspace?," War on the Rocks, , accessed: 6-15-2016, JH)It is not hard to imagine cyber issues becoming intertwined with a crisis that spirals out of control. For example, U.S. and People’s Republic of China (PRC) forces are in close contact in the South China Sea, and cyberattacks could cause an incident to escalate rapidly. Hackers could target communication, computer, and transportation networks, degrading not only Beijing’s and Washington’s ability to control their forces in the field, but also their ability to signal to the other side their intentions to escalate or de-escalate the conflict. Non state actors, often known as patriotic hackers, could further confuse the situation as policy makers would have a difficult time differentiating between official and independent attacks. Additionally, a cyberattack that causes physical damage or widespread economic disruption could create domestic pressure for action that leaders in Washington and Beijing would have a hard time ignoring. There are, however, shared interests on which to develop cooperative projects and reduce tensions in cyberspace. Both sides rely on digital infrastructure for economic and national security and share a number of concerns. The Chinese and U.S. markets are tightly linked, and both economies rely on the security and availability of global supply chains. Globally, cyberattacks are growing in frequency and becoming more sophisticated. As non-state actors that are not easily deterred gain better cyberattack capabilities, it puts critical infrastructure in both China and the United States at risk, The growth of the Internet has brought immense economic, political, social, and cultural benefits to both sides. Strategic cooperation in cyberspace could result in further gains for China, the United States, and the rest of the world In order to manage conflict in cyberspace, China and the United States should pursue the following actions: follow up on the September 2015 agreement on fighting cybercrime and cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property with concrete cooperation; ensure that discussions on norms of behavior in cyberspace continue at the highest level and are not suspended during times of tension; discuss joint measures to prevent the spread of cyber capabilities to non-state actors; and build cybersecurity capacity and expand cooperative research in universities and civil societySouth China Sea conflicts with China go nuclearChristensen, Princeton world politics professor, 2015 (Thomas, “China's Rising Military: Now for the Hard Part”, 6-5, reason for this is that no consensus exists in East Asia on the territorial status quo, as there did between the two Cold War camps in most regions of the world. The People’s Republic of China, in the center of a region of great importance, has maritime sovereignty disputes with several of its neighbors, including two formal U.S. allies (Japan and the Philippines) and one security partner (Taiwan). Laboratory research on prospect theory, a psychological exploration of risk-based decision-making, demonstrates that most actors accept much bigger risks and are willing to pay larger costs to defend what they believe is rightfully theirs than to obtain new gains at others’ expense. In a world in which conventional conflict could conceivably escalate to nuclear war, this human tendency is a force for stability; attacks across recognized boundaries by either side would be risky, and deterrence against such attacks is relatively credible. But in East Asia today, governments draw competing maps about the maritime domain. There are significant differences between mainland China and Taiwan about the sovereign status of the government on the island, and between China and Japan over who owns the islands known as Senkaku in Japan and Diaoyu in China. There is also disagreement among China, Taiwan, the Philippines, Vietnam, Brunei and Malaysia over ownership of islands, rocks and reefs in the South China Sea. We should take no comfort in the apparent sincerity of all the claimants. If all actors truly feel they are defending rightful claims against the revisionism of others, the chicken game of international security politics is more likely to lead to a deadly collision. These disputes are fueled by historical victimhood narratives and postcolonial nationalism. For the countries involved, defending sovereignty claims and recovering allegedly stolen territories are core missions. China is no exception. Since the 2008 financial crisis, China has been more confident abroad and more afraid at home. The country's elite and its citizens feel that its power position on the international stage has improved drastically. But the foundations of its export-led and investment-fueled growth model were shaken at the same time. Top leaders worry about rising social discontent. It isn't a good time for Chinese leaders to look weak on defense. And China doesn't have to be the actor that sparks a dispute for tensions to escalate. In 2010, for example, China often reacted sharply to events initiated by others, such as Japan’s arrest of a Chinese fishing boat captain and crew near the Senkaku Islands. Since then we have seen a mix of Chinese assertiveness -- such as its placement and then removal last year of an oil rig in waters disputed with Vietnam and its continuing land reclamation projects on South China Sea reefs -- and its abrasive reactions to others’ actions, such as an upgraded Chinese maritime presence near the Senkakus since the Japanese central government purchased some of the islands from a private Japanese family in 2012. The Chinese leadership could use its conventional military power to threaten U.S. partners and to impose high costs on U.S. forces if they intervened to assist their allies. The ability to conduct such asymmetric warfare against the U.S. can potentially affect how disputes are managed in peacetime and who might prevail politically if a fight were to occur. The U.S. has ways to reduce a threat posed by China’s ability to wage asymmetric warfare. But a future U.S. president might be reluctant to use some of the more effective methods the American military has at its disposal -- such as destroying or disabling military targets on the Chinese mainland -- especially early in a conflict when such measures would be most effective. For example, attacking China's potent ballistic missiles, their launchers and their command-and-control systems before the missiles strike U.S. bases and surface ships would be an efficient way to reduce the threat. Chinese submarines, which can fire torpedoes and cruise missiles or lay sea mines, pose another potential threat. The U.S., all things being equal, might be tempted to attack submarine ports and naval command-and-control systems on Chinese soil. But all things are not equal. No U.S. president has ever launched robust conventional attacks against the homeland of a nation with nuclear retaliatory capability. Moreover, the conventional mobile ballistic missiles and submarines China has developed to counter superior U.S. forces overlap dangerously with the land-based missiles and submarines that China is developing to provide a secure nuclear retaliatory capability. If the U.S. were to attack missile systems and submarines for the purpose of protecting against conventional attack early in a conflict, Washington could unintentionally compromise portions of China’s nuclear arsenal as well. Chinese leaders could mistakenly view this as an attempt to eliminate China’s nuclear deterrent, risking escalation. China adheres publicly to a no-first-use doctrine on nuclear weapons, a position that would seem to mean that no amount of conventional firepower leveled against it would cause it to resort to a nuclear response. But internal Chinese military writings suggest that no-first-use is more of a guideline than a rule and doesn't necessarily apply under conditions in which a technologically superior foe attacks crucial targets with conventional weapons.Specifically in the South China Seavan der Meer, Clingendael research fellow, 2015 (Sico, “US Deterrence against Chinese Cyber Espionage”, September, )A major US cyber operation aimed at threatening key interests of the Chinese government, even if covert and well calibrated, could have serious consequences. In the short term, it would carry the risk of provoking Chinese counter-attacks that would destabilize the already complex Sino–US relationship. In addition to the existing risk of an (inadvertent) military incident in the South or East China Sea, further insecurity and volatility would result from even a limited and covert cyber conflict. Moreover, if other countries observe that the United States is likely to be conducting covert cyber operations against China as a retaliatory measure, in the longer run the use of covert cyber attacks by states against other states may become a de facto accepted norm. Both developments are dangerous and would contribute to less stability and more insecurity in the international system. While it is questionable whether cyber deterrence can actually be achieved in this instance, except perhaps at a very high cost, it seems clear that retaliation carries major risks. This makes it more difficult for the United States to act, thereby undermining the credibility and effectiveness of its cyber security strategy***Declining Relations = SCS War Kazianis 16 By National Interests (Harry J., 3-4-2016, "Hell Cometh to Earth: Is a U.S.-China War Really Possible?," National Interest, )Is a war between the United States and the People’s Republic of China really possible? On the surface, the idea seems quite silly. Washington and Beijing sport two-way trade equal to over a half a trillion dollars. China holds trillions more in U.S. debt. America educates scores of Chinese students in our public and private universities—over 300,000 young and scholarly minds. Chinese immigrants have become a rich part of American culture. How could such a conflict really occur considering such interwoven connections that span in some instances centuries? My snap reaction: whoever said war was always the most logical of choices? Indeed, despite countless areas of mutual interest(s), relations between Beijing and Washington are clearly on the decline. Some of this is easily explained—both sides during the Cold War feared the Soviet Union more than each other and worked together to contain Moscow. Losing a common enemy was certainly going to create a challenge. However, with what can only be described as a ring of tensions running from the East China Sea all the way to the very ends of the South China Sea, from allegations of cyber espionage on both sides to comments from high-level military officials that seem more menacing by the day, it seems a clash of some sorts is increasingly possible. As someone who has been interested in this topic for almost a decade and being an editor/executive editor of not one but two of the world’s best foreign policy publications around, I have been able to work with scholars who have a variety of thoughts on the subject. While I could recommend multiple articles on the subject, the best for sheer readability that has stood the test of time is Robert Farley’s work back in 2014 in this very publication titled Asia’s Greatest Fear: A U.S.-China War. Last week the Chinese state-run Xinhua News Agency announced that Chinese President Xi Jinping is personally presiding over a newly founded government body entitled the Central Internet Security and Informatization Leading Group. A similar and less senior group, in the past headed by the Chinese Premier, has been in existence since 1993. The purpose of the new group is to “lead and coordinate Internet security and informatization work among different sectors, as well as draft national strategies, development plans and major policies in this field.”Conflict in the South China Sea goes nuclearKapila 2015 Dr Subhash, graduate of the Royal British Army Staff College, Camberley, currently Consultant International Relations & Strategic Affairs with South Asia Analysis Group, June 16 2015, "South China Sea Headed towards US-China Military Showdown", South Asia Analysis Group, node/1799*ADIZ = Air Defense Identification ZoneSouth China Sea seems inevitably headed towards witnessing a military showdown with a revisionist and strategically arrogant China rigidly insistent on altering the status quo in the South China Sea in defiance of United States advisories to halt construction of artificial islands to enforce its sovereignty claims in disputed waters. China seems to be politically and strategically over-reaching itself buoyed by its new-found military strength and misreading United States military intentions in terms of its resolve to enforce its national security interests in the South China Sea region. The United States itself is to blame for leading China down this path of challenging the unipolar superpower by being permissive on China’s military adventurism in the South China Sea at the expense of its relatively militarily weaker neighbours. South China Sea has been witnessing a ‘Gathering Storm’ as reflected in a recent SAAG Paper of mine and the imperatives of the United States to pre-empt China’s destabilising moves. Recent United States official statements and military moves indicate that the United States has finally woken up to the reality that China by its military brinkmanship in the South China Sea was imposing its dubious claims on Vietnam and the Philippines but in effect was all out to challenge United States supremacy in the Western Pacific as a prelude to pushing out the United States out of the Pacific. United States rhetoric on the ‘freedom of the seas’ through the ‘global commons’ implying the freedom of navigation through the South China Sea made no sense to an arrogant China as the United States had made no definitive declarations on its national security interests in the South China Sea. The United States has finally woken up to the stark reality that China’s construction of seven artificial islands with US surveillance photographs showing military hardware being emplaced is an adverse game-changer for the United States. Analyses of these military developments betray China’s military intentions and its two-pronged strategy in the South China Sea to establish Chinese full-spectrum dominance of the South China Sea. The first prong is to extend China’s sovereign spread over the South China Sea by claiming the 12 mile- territorial limit around each of these newly constructed islands and an extended EEZ. This is not tenable under international laws as such territorial limits only apply to natural landforms and not artificial man-made islands. The second prong of China’s strategy is that the Chinese artificially constructed islands would serve as mini-bases for emplacing air defence missile, anti-ship missiles, and surveillance radars sand naval attack craft with the prime aim of denying the United States access to Western Pacific and deter USA from any military intervention. Such platforms could enable China to prevent USA from sending its naval ships and aircraft to South Chinese islands under Chinese occupation. This also has to be read as a precursor to China declaring a Chinese ADIZ over the South China Sea. Surely this is a strategic challenge to the United States and a blatant attempt to change the status quo in the South China Sea with the end aim of converting the South China Sea into an Inland Sea of China. The United States in the last few months has commenced issuing statements challenging China’s sovereignty over the South China Sea. The US President is reported to have declared that the United States does not accept China’s logic of sovereignty over the entire South China Sea and cautioned China not to indulge in an endless creation of artificial islands in disputed waters. US Assistant Secretary of State in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee stated “US pressure is needed in South China Sea to ensure everyone with an interest in the area follows international law. No matter how much sand you pile on reefs, you can’t manufacture sovereignty.” More significantly, Russel told the Committee that US must use in his words “all instruments of power” to push back what he called “problematic behaviour” The Pentagon is planning to send US Navy ships and US Air Force aircraft over the disputed areas both for surveillance and more importantly enforcing the right of passage over international waters and air space. Now shifting to China’s responses carried in the Chinese official organ-The Global Times, to the above, undoubtedly they reflect belligerence and provocative stances against the United States. These are quoted verbatim below: “For China, the most important bottom line is to make the construction on the reefs continue until they are completed.” “If the United States bottom line is that China has to shut down its construction on the reefs, then a US-China war is inevitable. The intensity of the conflict will be higher than what people usually think of as friction.” Concluding all that can be said is that China is spoiling for a military conflict with the United States over the South China Sea. The United States has to take a call sooner or later that a US-China war is inevitable and that China in its present belligerent mood may resort to an “Electronic Pearl Harbour” attack combined with a pre-emptive missile attacks, maybe nuclear possibly. Far- fetched, maybe, but yet within the realms of possibility when China’s propensity to resort to armed conflict when challenged.Nuclear War***Economic decline causes global nuclear war T?nnesson, Oslo Peace Research Institute professor, 2015 (Stein, “Deterrence, interdependence and Sino–US peace”, International Area Studies Review, 18.3, Wiley)Several recent works on China and Sino–US relations have made substantial contributions to the current understanding of how and under what circumstances a combination of nuclear deterrence and economic interdependence may reduce the risk of war between major powers. At least four conclusions can be drawn from the review above: first, those who say that interdependence may both inhibit and drive conflict are right. Interdependence raises the cost of conflict for all sides but asymmetrical or unbalanced dependencies and negative trade expectations may generate tensions leading to trade wars among inter-dependent states that in turn increase the risk of military conflict (Copeland, 2015: 1, 14, 437; Roach, 2014). The risk may increase if one of the interdependent countries is governed by an inward-looking socio-economic coalition (Solingen, 2015); second, the risk of war between China and the US should not just be analysed bilaterally but include their allies and partners. Third party countries could drag China or the US into confrontation; third, in this context it is of some comfort that the three main economic powers in Northeast Asia (China, Japan and South Korea) are all deeply integrated economically through production networks within a global system of trade and finance (Ravenhill, 2014; Yoshimatsu, 2014: 576); and fourth, decisions for war and peace are taken by very few people, who act on the basis of their future expectations. International relations theory must be supplemented by foreign policy analysis in order to assess the value attributed by national decision-makers to economic development and their assessments of risks and opportunities. If leaders on either side of the Atlantic begin to seriously fear or anticipate their own nation’s decline then they may blame this on external dependence, appeal to anti-foreign sentiments, contemplate the use of force to gain respect or credibility, adopt protectionist policies, and ultimately refuse to be deterred by either nuclear arms or prospects of socioeconomic calamities. Such a dangerous shift could happen abruptly, i.e. under the instigation of actions by a third party – or against a third party. Yet as long as there is both nuclear deterrence and interdependence, the tensions in East Asia are unlikely to escalate to war. As Chan (2013) says, all states in the region are aware that they cannot count on support from either China or the US if they make provocative moves. The greatest risk is not that a territorial dispute leads to war under present circumstances but that changes in the world economy alter those circumstances in ways that render inter-state peace more precarious. If China and the US fail to rebalance their financial and trading relations (Roach, 2014) then a trade war could result, interrupting transnational production networks, provoking social distress, and exacerbating nationalist emotions. This could have unforeseen consequences in the field of security, with nuclear deterrence remaining the only factor to protect the world from Armageddon, and unreliably so. Deterrence could lose its credibility: one of the two great powers might gamble that the other yield in a cyber-war or conventional limited war, or third party countries might engage in conflict with eachThe spread of nuclear weapons results in nuclear war, nuclear terrorism, instability, and a constrained US military Kroenig 15 – Matthew, Associate Professor and International Relations Field Chair in the Department of Government and School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and a Senior Fellow in the Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security at The Atlantic Council, “THE HISTORY OF PROLIFERATION OPTIMISM: DOES IT HAVE A FUTURE?” this chapter, I argue that the spread of nuclear weapons poses a grave threat to international peace and to U.S. national security. Scholars can grab attention by making counterintuitive arguments about nuclear weapons being less threatening than power holders believe them to be, but their provocative claims cannot wish away the very real dangers posed by the spread of nuclear weapons. The more states that possess nuclear weapons, the more likely we are to suffer a number of devastating consequences, including nuclear war, nuclear terrorism, global and regional instability, constrained U.S. freedom of action, weakened alliances, and the further proliferation of 47 nuclear weapons. While it is important not to exaggerate these threats, it would be an even greater sin to underestimate them and, as a result, not take the steps necessary to combat the spread of the world’s most dangerous weapons.That goes nuclear – it’s unbound by global rules which dampen other conflicts – China’s cooperation is vitalThe Economist 5/26. (The Economist Data Team. The clear and present danger of a nuclear North Korea. May 26, 2016. )NORTH KOREA is not bound by any global rules. Its hereditary dictator, Kim Jong Un, imposes forced labour on hundreds of thousands of his people and threatens to drench Seoul, the South’s capital, in “a sea of fire”. Nuclear weapons are central to his regime’s identity and survival. It has always been tempting for America and other countries to put North Korea’s nuclear ambitions on the back burner, in large part because of a chronic absence of good options for dealing with them. The history of unsuccessful responses to North Korea’s nuclear ambitions began in 1993, when Mr Kim’s father, Kim Jong Il, threatened to pull out of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) (see timeline). So when in 2010 President Barack Obama made an impassioned plea for a world without nuclear weapons, there were grounds for optimism. Although Mr Obama has made progress in many areas, from non-proliferation deals with Russia and Iran, to international summits on nuclear security, on North Korea, his failure is glaring. Under his watch the country’s nuclear-weapons and missile programme has become steadily more alarming. It is now thought to have a stockpile of around 20 devices. Every six weeks or so it adds another. And this year the pace of ballistic missile testing has been unprecedented. An underground nuclear detonation in January, claimed by the regime to be an H-bomb (but more likely a souped-up A-bomb), has been followed by tests of the technologies behind nuclear-armed missiles. American and South Korean officials are convinced that North Korea can already make a warhead small enough to fit on the Nodong, which can reach targets in Japan and South Korea, including American bases (see map). And there are worrying signs of progress in the development of its longer-range missiles. Although three tests of an intermediate-range 4,000-kilometre (2,500-mile) Musadan missile failed in April, North Korean engineers learn from their mistakes. Flight testing of the KN-08 intercontinental ballistic missile could begin soon and sometime during the second term of Mr Obama’s successor, these are likely to be able to strike New York. America needs worked-out plans to seize or destroy North Korea’s nuclear missiles before they can be used. China’s co-operation, or at least acquiescence, will be vital. So clear and present is the danger that even rivals who clash elsewhere in Asia must urgently find new ways to work together.***Declining relations causes war in Asia, ruin climate change solutions, and tanks the world economyAsh 2015 (Timothy, “If US relations with China turn sour, there will probably be war”, 10-16, )What is the biggest challenge facing the next president of the United States? How to deal with China. The relationship between the emerging and the enduring superpower is the greatest geopolitical question of our time. If Washington and Beijing do not get it right, there will probably be war somewhere in Asia some time over the next decade. Vladimir Putin’s neo-imperialist Russia and the brutality of Islamic State are medium-sized regional challenges by comparison. Climate change and the world economy cannot be managed without American-Chinese cooperation. All this demands a bipartisan American grand strategy for the next 20 years, but US politics seems incapable of generating anything more than a partisan soundbite for the next 20 minutes.Attacks Cause Trade WarConflict over cyber issues escalates into a trade warDyer 2013 - Geoff, Financial Times Staff, June 3, "Cyber theft: A hard war to wage", is angry. Really angry. It is just not sure what to do about it. US officials have accused Chinese hackers of stealing corporate trade secrets since the mid-2000s but during the past few months the outrage has reached a political tipping point. Cyber security has been thrust to the top of the agenda in US-China relations. The Obama administration, members of Congress and the think-tanks that advise them have cast around for ways to punish hackers from China and elsewhere. Washington is considering a series of unilateral trade and other sanctions against Chinese entities and individuals. “We will start sending a message to countries, especially China, that there is a consequence to your economic espionage,” says Mike Rogers, the chairman of the House intelligence committee who is preparing a bill to penalise hackers. “We should have a dial we can turn up and a dial we can turn down. That means adding some teeth.” When Barack Obama welcomes Xi Jinping for their first presidential meeting on Friday, he will press his Chinese counterpart on the issue of cyber theft. Yet while political pressure is building for Washington to find ways to do something about the theft of trade secrets, it faces two big problems. First, it is not clear if any of the suggested remedies are workable. Moreover, given that China denies the US allegations, American attempts at retaliation risk escalating into a broader trade war between the world’s biggest economies. John Veroneau, a former deputy US trade representative, worries that the mounting tensions over cyber theft could cause deep damage to the global trading system. “The great recession did not cause a surge in protectionism despite many predictions,” he says. “But cyber theft is changing things.” China has pushed back vigorously against growing US complaints about hacking. “As we all know, the United States is the real ‘hacking empire’,” said a commentary last month in the People’s daily, the Chinese Communist party mouthpiece. All governments conduct espionage on both friends and rivals, focusing on their political plans and military capabilities. But in Washington’s view, there is a crucial difference between trying to get hold of sensitive military information and the theft of trade secrets that are then handed to companies. Former and current US officials describe a Chinese enterprise that goes well beyond conventional espionage – a deliberate, co-ordinated and well-resourced strategy to steal the intellectual property of American companies that has been going on for years and is gathering pace. Among a broader political audience, the tipping point came with the publication in March of a report in which Mandiant, a security consultancy, for the first time named a specific unit of the People’s Liberation Army in central Shanghai that it claimed was stealing US companies’ trade secrets. Within the administration, minds have been concentrated by a new intelligence assessment that details the threat to the country’s economic competitiveness from cyber theft. Pointing a finger publicly at Beijing for the first time, Tom Donilon, White House national security adviser, complained in March of cyber attacks “emanating from China on an unprecedented scale”. Having tried quiet diplomatic pressure, apparently to no avail, Washington is looking for other tools. “We have got to establish some form of leverage in dealing with the Chinese on this issue,” says Jon Huntsman, the former US ambassador to China who led a high-level panel called the Commission into the Theft of American Intellectual Property. “Otherwise, are we really prepared to pay the price of another 20 years of jawboning?” ***Cyber disputes with China spill to trade—causes protectionismSegal 2015 - Adam, Maurice R. Greenberg Senior Fellow for China Studies and Director of the Digital and Cyberspace Policy Program at the Council on Foreign Relations, September, "Stabilizing Cybersecurity in the U.S.-China Relationship", is an especially contentious issue in the Sino-U.S. relationship. According to Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel Russel, cyberspace has the “potential to drive strategic mistrust in the relationship” between the two nations.1 Beijing and Washington have been unable to find common ground on cyberattacks, the security of information and communications infrastructure, and Internet governance. Cyberattacks constitute a threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States, and many of these attacks emanate from China. Some of these attacks are conducted by state actors or by hacker groups sponsored by Chinese government actors. Other attacks are conducted by criminals working on their own. These attacks fall into three categories. The majority are the cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property, business strategies, and trade secrets. There is also a widespread campaign of political and military espionage such as the hack of the U.S. Office of Personnel Management, which may have exposed the records of over twenty million current and former federal employees. In addition, the members of the People’s Liberation Army Unit 61398 have reportedly penetrated the networks of natural gas pipelines and electric utilities, possibly to map the potential future battlefield or prepare for a destructive attack. The cybersecurity issue has also spilled over into trade relations. In part motivated by disclosures of U.S. cyberespionage against Chinese targets made by the former National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden and in part a reflection of a longheld techno-nationalism, Chinese policymakers have introduced a number of regulations designed to reduce dependence on foreign suppliers for critical technologies. New banking regulations, for example, and the draft antiterrorism and national security regulations in China require companies to share source code and build backdoors into encrypted products in an effort to make technology “secure and controllable.” Although the bank regulations were suspended in April, protectionism remains tightly linked to cybersecurity concerns. Conflict over cyber issues escalates into a trade warDyer 2013 - Geoff, Financial Times Staff, June 3, "Cyber theft: A hard war to wage", is angry. Really angry. It is just not sure what to do about it. US officials have accused Chinese hackers of stealing corporate trade secrets since the mid-2000s but during the past few months the outrage has reached a political tipping point. Cyber security has been thrust to the top of the agenda in US-China relations. The Obama administration, members of Congress and the think-tanks that advise them have cast around for ways to punish hackers from China and elsewhere. Washington is considering a series of unilateral trade and other sanctions against Chinese entities and individuals. “We will start sending a message to countries, especially China, that there is a consequence to your economic espionage,” says Mike Rogers, the chairman of the House intelligence committee who is preparing a bill to penalise hackers. “We should have a dial we can turn up and a dial we can turn down. That means adding some teeth.” When Barack Obama welcomes Xi Jinping for their first presidential meeting on Friday, he will press his Chinese counterpart on the issue of cyber theft. Yet while political pressure is building for Washington to find ways to do something about the theft of trade secrets, it faces two big problems. First, it is not clear if any of the suggested remedies are workable. Moreover, given that China denies the US allegations, American attempts at retaliation risk escalating into a broader trade war between the world’s biggest economies. John Veroneau, a former deputy US trade representative, worries that the mounting tensions over cyber theft could cause deep damage to the global trading system. “The great recession did not cause a surge in protectionism despite many predictions,” he says. “But cyber theft is changing things.” China has pushed back vigorously against growing US complaints about hacking. “As we all know, the United States is the real ‘hacking empire’,” said a commentary last month in the People’s daily, the Chinese Communist party mouthpiece. All governments conduct espionage on both friends and rivals, focusing on their political plans and military capabilities. But in Washington’s view, there is a crucial difference between trying to get hold of sensitive military information and the theft of trade secrets that are then handed to companies. Former and current US officials describe a Chinese enterprise that goes well beyond conventional espionage – a deliberate, co-ordinated and well-resourced strategy to steal the intellectual property of American companies that has been going on for years and is gathering pace. Among a broader political audience, the tipping point came with the publication in March of a report in which Mandiant, a security consultancy, for the first time named a specific unit of the People’s Liberation Army in central Shanghai that it claimed was stealing US companies’ trade secrets. Within the administration, minds have been concentrated by a new intelligence assessment that details the threat to the country’s economic competitiveness from cyber theft. Pointing a finger publicly at Beijing for the first time, Tom Donilon, White House national security adviser, complained in March of cyber attacks “emanating from China on an unprecedented scale”. Having tried quiet diplomatic pressure, apparently to no avail, Washington is looking for other tools. “We have got to establish some form of leverage in dealing with the Chinese on this issue,” says Jon Huntsman, the former US ambassador to China who led a high-level panel called the Commission into the Theft of American Intellectual Property. “Otherwise, are we really prepared to pay the price of another 20 years of jawboning?” Attacks Cause Trade WarCyber disputes with China spill to trade—causes protectionismSegal 2015 - Adam, Maurice R. Greenberg Senior Fellow for China Studies and Director of the Digital and Cyberspace Policy Program at the Council on Foreign Relations, September, "Stabilizing Cybersecurity in the U.S.-China Relationship", is an especially contentious issue in the Sino-U.S. relationship. According to Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel Russel, cyberspace has the “potential to drive strategic mistrust in the relationship” between the two nations.1 Beijing and Washington have been unable to find common ground on cyberattacks, the security of information and communications infrastructure, and Internet governance. Cyberattacks constitute a threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States, and many of these attacks emanate from China. Some of these attacks are conducted by state actors or by hacker groups sponsored by Chinese government actors. Other attacks are conducted by criminals working on their own. These attacks fall into three categories. The majority are the cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property, business strategies, and trade secrets. There is also a widespread campaign of political and military espionage such as the hack of the U.S. Office of Personnel Management, which may have exposed the records of over twenty million current and former federal employees. In addition, the members of the People’s Liberation Army Unit 61398 have reportedly penetrated the networks of natural gas pipelines and electric utilities, possibly to map the potential future battlefield or prepare for a destructive attack. The cybersecurity issue has also spilled over into trade relations. In part motivated by disclosures of U.S. cyberespionage against Chinese targets made by the former National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden and in part a reflection of a longheld techno-nationalism, Chinese policymakers have introduced a number of regulations designed to reduce dependence on foreign suppliers for critical technologies. New banking regulations, for example, and the draft antiterrorism and national security regulations in China require companies to share source code and build backdoors into encrypted products in an effort to make technology “secure and controllable.” Although the bank regulations were suspended in April, protectionism remains tightly linked to cybersecurity concerns. LinkAnd, US China relations pivotal to geopolitical stability – must have good relations to manage potential for war Ash 2015 (Timothy Garton Ash ““If US relations with China turn sour, there will probably be war” 16 October 2015 accessed DDI ND)What is the biggest challenge facing the next president of the United States? How to deal with China. The relationship between the emerging and the enduring superpower is the greatest geopolitical question of our time. If Washington and Beijing do not get it right, there will probably be war somewhere in Asia some time over the next decade. Vladimir Putin’s neo-imperialist Russia and the brutality of Islamic State are medium-sized regional challenges by comparison. Climate change and the world economy cannot be managed without American-Chinese cooperation. All this demands a bipartisan American grand strategy for the next 20 years, but US politics seems incapable of generating anything more than a partisan soundbite for the next 20 minutes. And, independently, disagreements over cyber-security spills over to the broader cooperative relationship Harold et al., 2016 (Senior Policy Analyst @ RAND Corporation, [Scott Warren Harold, Martin C. Libicki, Astrid Stuth Cevallos, April 2016 “Getting to Yes with China in Cyber Space” Rand accessed DDI -TM)Chinese interlocutors recognize that the cyber issue is an irritant in relations between the two countries and that it erodes strategic trust (as the Chinese put it). A reduction in strategic trust, in turn, may complicate the resolution of other issues (e.g., trade, environment, geostrategic matters). It may also increase the odds of future conflict, either accidental or intentional. Thus, even if one believes that little in cyberspace makes much difference compared with controversies in the physical world (e.g., South China Sea), resolving issues in that medium could have a knock-on effect outside it and vice versa. As noted, the United States has at least three cyberspace-related issues with China: its EMCE, its potential threat to the U.S. criti - cal infrastructure, and the mutual risk of strategic misunderstand - ing. They would seem to call for negotiations, mutual assurance, and mutual understanding, respectively.***And, continued suspicion of Chinese cyber attacks increases likelihood of sanctions which would destroy US-China relations and increase the risk of US-China conflictPickrell, 2015 (Ryan "A Dangerous Game: Responding to Chinese Cyber Activities," 9-29-2015The Diplomat, DDI – CT Is it necessary for the United States to find a way to deal with Chinese criminal activity in cyberspace? Absolutely. But, this is a very dangerous game. It is important that the United States have no illusions about what it is getting itself into. Some have suggested that punishing China for its unwillingness to adhere to international norms will encourage China to get in line and follow the rules. Considering Chinese culture and past Chinese reactions, this is highly unlikely. Sanctions may very well lead to a serious deterioration of Sino-American relations and increased confrontation and, possibly, conflict between China and the United States. American officials need to approach this situation with the understanding that the end result may be very problematic. For nearly two decades now, China and the United States have maintained a superficial friendship; that era is likely to end if the United States puts sanctions on China. Anyone who thinks that sanctions will bring about a stronger relationship between these two countries and further integrate China into the international system needs to abandon idealism and look at this situation for what it is, a major spark which could start a very serious fire.Solvency***Cooperation works – Ideologies don’t prevent Murdock, 16 Jason Murdock is a journalist for IBTimes UK reporting on technology and cybersecurity. Beat covers data breaches, encryption, surveillance legislation and hacking. May 12, 2016. “From hacking to cyber espionage: US and China discuss security in the digital age” International Business Times and espionage have long been a problem between the two rival nations – at least one that simmers under the surface of diplomacy. Both countries boast sophisticated intelligence agencies and hacking techniques. The US is renowned for its surveillance operations under the aegis of the NSA while, on Chinese shores, PLA-affiliated hackers have long been sanctioned by the government to single out foreign targets from whom to steal intellectual property for economic gain. The fresh rounds of discussions was led on the US side by Christopher Painter, coordinator for cyber issues at the State Department. Officials from the Department of Justice (DoJ), Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Defence (DoD) were also present. Meanwhile, the Chinese delegation was led by Wang Qun, director-general of arms control at the nation's foreign ministry alongside officials from the public security ministries as well as the Cyberspace Administration of China. Writing on The Huffington Post following the meeting, Chinese official Qun said it was in the 'shared interests' of both superpowers to cooperate on cybersecurity issues. He wrote: "While it is true that the US and China may sometimes be at odds with each other on some of the cyber issues, it shouldn't affect the cooperation between them. To fling accusations at each other is not a solution. Only through cooperation, can the US and China forge a unified and prosperous cyberspace. Otherwise, the cyberspace will divide and wither." He continued: "The digital economy is taking up an increasingly large share of GDP in both the US and China, two of the world's key players in cyberspace. In the meantime, the two countries have evolved towards a community of shared interests with each having a stake in the other."*****US-China cyber cooperation leads to global cascade-empirics proveChuanying 15 (Lu Chuanying, Research Fellow, Shanghai Institute For Int'L Studies, 12-14-2015, "Cyber Strategies of Great Powers: US-China Interactions and CooperationCHINA US Focus," No Publication, )Ensuring cyber security is a spotlight on the outcome list of US-China cooperation. The two sides have reached a consensus on six important areas for enhanced collaboration with respect to cyber security, namely, tackling malicious cyber-attacks, opposing commercial cyber espionage, cyber rule-making, combating cyber crimes, information technology trade, and security reviews of foreign investment. For the first time, the United States and China have reached a broad-based consensus on cyber issues with a view to managing discords and promoting cooperation. Its significance is manifold. To begin with, the summit meeting between President Xi and President Obama has created a cordial context for consensus building. For quite some time, the efforts by both sides to build a major power relationship have been hampered by such issues as disagreement over cyber issues and the escalating tensions in the South China Sea. Even so, the agreement reached between the two sides has sent a strong signal that both side will make every effort to overcome the Thucydides trap by forging a new pattern of US-China relations premised on no confrontation and no conflict, mutual respect, and win-win cooperation. Second, confidence-building measures with regard to cyber issues also convey symbolic meanings. After the Snowden revelations, cyber cooperation between major powers has become increasingly difficult. In particular, cyber cooperation between the United States and Russia was soon called off. The Sino-American consensus on cyber cooperation has serves as a demonstration of the global push for cyberspace governance. Soon after the two cyber powers publicized the outcome list, cooperation agreements between the United States and South Korea and between China and the United Kingdom were signed. Comparing these agreement texts, one can easily conclude that the Sino-American agreement has become the prototype agreement on cyber cooperation. Third, the Sino-American consensus could help to improve global governance in cyberspace. A UN report released in July on the code of conduct in cyberspace has laid out a general agreement on cyber infrastructure protection, confidence-building measures and international cooperation. China-US cooperation in cyberspace is a joint effort to implement the recommendationsThe plan creates a mutual ban on critical infrastructure attacks and improves China’s attribution capabilities. This reduces the frequency of spying, enhances stability and solves issues of trust and verification by putting China and the US on the same technological level. Harold 2016 , RAND Center for Asia Pacific Policy associate director, (Scott, “Getting to Yes with China in Cyberspace”, )Given that the United States and China would like to reduce mutual suspicion in cyberspace, one option might be the negotiation of agreement on a set of norms. Since both sides express concern over the possibility of the other side targeting its critical infrastructure, the core of the deal would be for the United States and China to abjure cyberattacks on each other’s critical infrastructure.30 This proposal was well received by the respondents, with interviewees from across academic, think tank, military, and state organizations all responding positively to this proposal.31 Respondents appeared to hold relatively similar views of the definition of critical infrastructure to those of their U.S. counterparts—such things as the electrical power grid and the banking system. One respondent noted that there is precedent for such a deal; in early May 2015, just days before we conducted our field interviews, Russia and China announced a general agreement to cooperate with and not attack each other in cyberspace.32 The first component of any mutual forbearance proposal is that progress has been made on not attacking critical infrastructure since our interviews in Beijing. In July 2015, the Chinese signed a UN report that called for such attacks to be abjured.33 There are also indications that the United States and China mutually agree not to attack each other’s critical infrastructure—or at least not be the first to do so.34 As of this writing, however, there is little indication that these agreements have evolved from the trust-us-not-to stage to something that is verifiable. This is why two more components to such an agreement are crucial to fulfill the purposes of the first component. As a second, and logically entailed, component of any mutual forbearance proposal, the United States and China could also agree not to carry out cyber espionage on each other’s critical infrastructure. The rationale for this step is that cyber espionage is almost always a prerequisite for a cyberattack and that it is impossible to distinguish intrusions for the purposes of cyber espionage from an imminent attack if detected by the target. If the two sides have no intent to attack each other’s critical infrastructure, they have no need to compromise each other’s critical infrastructure systems either, particularly if carried out by inserting malicious code into the target infrastructure. Indeed, both cyber espionage and cyberattack typically entail the prior implantation of computer code in target systems, which then periodically calls back (beacons) to the attacker for further instruction. Implants make subsequent penetrations much easier because the attackers are already inside the target’s systems. Banning cyber espionage against critical infrastructure would make it much more difficult to quickly carry out cyberattacks on such infrastructure. Without preplanning and cyber espionage, it could take weeks, months, or even years to carry out such attacks, but if potential adversaries are already inside each other’s critical infrastructure, attacks can be carried out almost instantaneously. Such a ban, if enacted by the two sides, would have several advantages. First, if successfully executed, a ban would enhance stability, since it would remove critically important systems from being targeted. Second, a ban would raise the costs of targeting such systems (since, if China were discovered doing so, it would violate the country’s given word, potentially affecting its ability to credibly negotiate on other issues in the future), while simultaneously addressing the problem of time that cyberattacks prepared in advance can pose. Third, such an agreement, if fully realized, would reduce the prospect of accidental conflict by committing the two sides not just to not attacking each other’s critical infrastructure but to staying away from it completely, thereby eliminating the possibility of misunderstanding a cyber espionage effort as an imminent attack. While our respondents generally declined to explicitly agree with this second aspect of our proposal, they did not explicitly push back either. They understood the logic that linked attacks to espionage and that, if one foreswears attacking a system, the rationale for spying on it is that much weaker. Yet, the respondents did not feel quite so comfortable with the notion of foreswearing all espionage against U.S. critical infrastructure. The third component of a mutual forbearance pact would focus on attribution and an agreement to impose consequences.35 Yet, in some ways, the problem is not merely or even mostly technical,36 but political: What arrangements would persuade China to accept evidence (without, at the same time, making it difficult to draw reasonable conclusions from such evidence)?37 If there were a mutually agreed process for attribution and if China could be counted on to respond appropriately when the process indicates that an attack on the critical infrastructure were traced to China, the threat from China to U.S. critical infrastructure (and vice versa) would be correspondingly reduced. Part of the political problem is that the United States catches China spying far more often than the other way around. China claims that it experiences frequent attacks from the United States (which remains, for instance, the leading source of bots and botnet command-and-control servers), but has forwarded no evidence that the U.S. government protects hackers (or at least private hackers) or carries out specific intrusions.38 China’s reluctance to accept U.S. accusations of Chinese hacking may reflect the fact that China cannot detect and attribute U.S. cyber espionage as well as the United States can detect and attribute China’s cyber espionage. This fact is based on three differences: China’s operational security lags U.S. capabilities; China’s ability to detect intrusions lags U.S. capabilities; China’s ability to attribute detected intrusions lags U.S. capabilities.39 As long as China’s attribution capabilities substantially lag U.S. capabilities, it may be hard to convince China that such a deal would be fair. Worse, until China gains confidence in its own attribution capabilities, it may not believe that U.S. attribution capabilities are particularly good either.40 Several respondents indicated that it would be difficult to have a meaningful agreement without improvements in China’s attribution capabilities. There are several potential approaches to developing a trustworthy attribution mechanism. However, none of them uncontestably solves the problem, and many would be politically difficult for one or both sides to adopt. One option would be to develop a standing, bilateral fact-finding body to investigate claims of cyberattack. The advantages to this approach would be that both sides, having participated in the deliberations, would be more likely to accept the outcome of any joint investigation. Such an approach would encounter some risk. A concern for the United States would be that China’s participation in any such body would be beholden to its government and would there- fore be unlikely to be free to conclude that an attack had indeed been carried out by the Chinese government or PLA. China, for its part, may fear that U.S. capabilities are so superior that such a standing body would turn into a U.S.-dominated forum in which China would be reduced to spectator status. Alternately, if China’s cyber espionage is indeed sloppier and more broad gauge than U.S. cyber espionage, the cases that are brought to such a body may overwhelmingly or even exclusively be Chinese in origin, which could be both humiliating and disadvantageous for China. Shifting such a body from a bilateral to a multilateral forum might assuage some of these concerns (since both U.S. and China representation would be diluted). One respondent proposed the International Atomic Energy Agency as a model, but another said it was inappropriate because far more people touch the Internet than interact with their respective country’s nuclear establishment. Additionally, it is unclear whether China would perceive a difference if U.S. experts were replaced by experts (many of whom have ties to the United States) from countries seen by China as friends of the United States. Might these obstacles be lowered if the United States offered to share its insights into attribution techniques with China in return for China’s willingness to credit such techniques as evidence of verification and then move to prosecute those who carried out such intrusions? At first glance, such a proposal appears implausible: Under most circumstances, countries do not share strategic technology or operating concepts with potential adversaries. Yet, there have been exceptions to this general pattern. For example, the United States, in pursuit of nuclear stability, encouraged other countries to adopt permissive action links for their nuclear weapons (a technology that prevents such weapons from being used accidentally or at the instigation of unauthorized users). An added benefit is that stronger Chinese attribution capabilities could reduce the chances of a catalytic conflict if China is attacked by someone masquerading as a U.S. source. As a practical matter, the United States need not share what normally would be classified intelligence sources and methods; it can leverage recent improvements in private attribution capabilities (most, but not all, of which are associ- ated with U.S.-based companies) to give China more confidence in its own attribution capabilities. It is worth clarifying that an offer to help bring Chinese attribution capabilities closer to those available in the United States does not mean that the United States would be teaching China how to detect cyber espionage intrusions, how to improve its defenses, or how to keep its own penetrations from being detected by the United States, to say nothing of it having no relationship to improving the efficiency of PRC cyberintrusion or attack capabilities. Granted, an offer to help bring China’s attribution capabilities up to the level of the United States would probably help China mask its attacks. Inasmuch as the United States has yet to use such attribution to curb Chinese cyber espionage (and cyberattacks), it is unclear exactly how great a loss that would be.41 Even if it becomes harder to attribute attacks to China, it would only make a modest difference because China does not admit complicity in the face of considerable evidence today as is. Our Chinese respondents reacted favorably to this proposition, even when coupled with the implication that the United States would therefore expect China to give more credence to evidence that a particular intrusion set originated in China. Given the sensitivities associated with how attribution is done in the United States, a deal to get China to sign up to an attribution regime in possible return for the United States showing China how it does attribution would likely require substantial additional research and caveating prior to any possible adoption as policy. For China, an agreement to foreswear attacking critical infrastructure would need to be introduced clearly and officially, probably incrementally, and with clear consequences for cheating. Still, this proposal carries some prospect of raising the costs of cyber espionage to the point that lower-grade, nonstrategic (i.e., economic) actions are reduced or eliminated. It also reduces the risk of misattribution due to malicious third-party actors seeking to route their attacks on one or another side through U.S. or Chinese servers. And it appears to be one area where it might be possible to gain meaningful buy-in and payoffs from the two sides. For such reasons, it may be worth further exploration.CERT Cards***CERT cooperation exists but is largely undefined — no categorization of CSIRT functions.Morgus et. al 15 — Rober Morgus, a policy analyst with New America’s Cybersecurity Initiative, a member of the Global Commission on Internet Governance's Research Advisory Network, received his B.A. with honors in Diplomacy and World Affairs from Occidental College, and Isabel Skierka, a research associate with the Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi), was a Carlo Schmid fellow at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, where she worked on the Alliance’s Smart Defence Initiative, has a master’s in international conflict studies at the war studies department of King’s College London and holds a bachelor’s degree in European studies from Maastricht University, and Mirko Hohmann, a research associate with the Global Public Policy Institute, holds a Master of Public Policy from the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin and a Bachelor of Arts in international affairs from the University of St. Gallen, Switzerland, and Tim Maurer, Former Director of the Global Cybersecurity Norms and Resilience Project and Head of Research, Cybersecurity Initiative, holds a Master in Public Policy concentrating on international and global affairs from the Harvard Kennedy School, 2015 (“National CSIRTs and their Role in Computer Security Incident Response,” New America Foundation, November, Available Online at , Accessed 06-27-2016, p. 11-12, AS)Though some coordination in the operations of nCSIRTs has occurred, there remains a great deal of uncertainty regarding the standardization of the role of nCSIRTs. When building CERT-UK, the United Kingdom’s nCSIRT, the UK Cabinet Office identified 47 possible functions of an nCSIRT, but it ultimately prioritized only four of these functions in the creation of CERT-UK.32 Nonetheless, the defining feature of an nCSIRT [end page 11] – similar to operationally focused CSIRTs in the private sector and elsewhere that primarily remediate damage and recover and rebuild systems – is its incident response function. Exceptions to this are nCSIRTs that double as governmental CSIRTs and are responsible for remediation, recovery and rebuilding of government networks. But most nCSIRTs focus much more on the coordination of response and information sharing and dissemination, unlike smaller CSIRTs in the private sector or government. In this coordinating function, an nCSIRT does not have a direct, operational role, but more of an advisory role. It receives, analyzes and synthesizes incident and vulnerability information disseminated by other CSIRTs. It then re-distributes this processed information to its constituency through bulletins or a shared database. In the US, US-CERT is operationally responsible for federal government networks and has a coordinating role as the national point of contact for domestic and international stakeholders. It operates alongside the Industrial Control Systems CERT, which coordinates incident response among critical infrastructure owners and operators. Germany’s national information security agency (BSI) operates the national governmental CSIRT that serves as an authorized national point of contact, and also runs Bürger-CERT, which provides citizens and small enterprises with email updates on IT-related threats and vulnerabilities. Luxembourg, on the other hand, splits governmental and national tasks and operates GOVCERT.LU, which is responsible for governmental networks only, and CIRCL, which is responsible for private sector and non-governmental entities in Luxembourg and serves as the nCSIRT. Additionally, some nCSIRTs serve as the “response team of last resort,” either redirecting a case to the CSIRT responsible for handling it or providing some degree of support itself. The service portfolio of CSIRTs has been described in detail in a number of publications,33 but the categorization of CSIRT functions was being reconsidered in a FIRST committee at the time of writing this report,34 and a clear delineation of functions specific to nCSIRTs does not exist.FYI: CERT = CSIRT = nCSIRTMorgus et. al 15 — Rober Morgus, a policy analyst with New America’s Cybersecurity Initiative, a member of the Global Commission on Internet Governance's Research Advisory Network, received his B.A. with honors in Diplomacy and World Affairs from Occidental College, and Isabel Skierka, a research associate with the Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi), was a Carlo Schmid fellow at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, where she worked on the Alliance’s Smart Defence Initiative, has a master’s in international conflict studies at the war studies department of King’s College London and holds a bachelor’s degree in European studies from Maastricht University, and Mirko Hohmann, a research associate with the Global Public Policy Institute, holds a Master of Public Policy from the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin and a Bachelor of Arts in international affairs from the University of St. Gallen, Switzerland, and Tim Maurer, Former Director of the Global Cybersecurity Norms and Resilience Project and Head of Research, Cybersecurity Initiative, holds a Master in Public Policy concentrating on international and global affairs from the Harvard Kennedy School, 2015 (“National CSIRTs and their Role in Computer Security Incident Response,” New America Foundation, November, Available Online at , Accessed 06-27-2016, p. 10, AS)In addition to residing in governmental ministries, some nCSIRTs are part of a national cybersecurity center, like US-CERT, which resides in the National Cybersecurity and Communication Integration Center (NCCIC) or CERT Australia, which is co-located with other Australian government organizations' cyber security capabilities in the Australian National Cyber Security Center. Other governmental nCSIRTs are part of a government institution but have public–private governance structures and participation, like NCSC.nl in the Netherlands and CERT.at in Austria.***FYI: US-CERT functions as a national CERT, not just a governmental CERT — it protects the civilian and private sectorUS-CERT — United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team, a part of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, no date ("About Us," US-, Available Online at , Accessed 06-27-2016, AS)In early 2000, Federal Government networks began to experience an alarming number of cyber breaches. In response, Congress created the Federal Computer Incident Response Center (FedCIRC) at the General Services Administration as a centralized hub of coordination and information sharing between federal organizations. With the creation of the Department of Homeland Security in 2002, Congress transferred these responsibilities to the new Department. In 2003, FedCIRC was renamed “US-CERT,” and its mission was expanded to include providing boundary protection for the federal civilian executive domain and cybersecurity leadership. This shared responsibility has evolved over time to make US-CERT a trusted partner and authoritative source in cyberspace for the Federal Government; SLTT governments; private industry; and international organizations. Engagement Best OptionEngagement best strategy to avert a cyber Cold War (Containment DA)Lewis, CSIS senior fellow, 2015 (James, “Moving Forward with the Obama-Xi Cybersecurity Agreement”, 10-21, )The United States had unique leverage at the Summit and with the Summit over, White House officials expect some backsliding. Even with the best intentions, it will be hard for Xi to deliver on his promises. This means we should expect more tension over cybersecurity in the future, not less. Sanctions are “still on the table” as one U.S. negotiator put it, and Chinese hacking is so extensive it cannot be turned off overnight. The United States may decide that a few timely sanctions against private Chinese individuals and companies who have benefited from cyberespionage can reinforce agreement. Like any serious agreement, the language is imprecise and there is wiggle room. Trade agreements define processes and penalties for noncompliance, but this kind of strategic understanding usually does not. So it is not a useful criticism to point out the absence of such measures in the Xi - Obama agreement. There will be backsliding and the Chinese will watch how we respond. This informal process of action and response will define the boundaries for compliance. Agreements of this kind are always met with complaints that the other side will cheat. Cheating has been a problem in every arms control agreement since the 1922 Washington Naval Convention. Ikle's piece remains the best discussion of this. When democracies negotiate with authoritarians, the other side usually cheats. There is always a risk of cheating, and it is no brilliant insight to point this out, nor is it a reason not to move forward. An agreement is the first chapter and the following chapters are about compliance and consequences if the agreement is not observed. The White House says the United States is prepared to act if China does not observe its agreement on cyber espionage. The questions for this next chapter are what level of noncompliance justifies a punitive response, what format should that response take, how do we avoid delays in responding, and what actions would reinforce the agreement. In considering the latter, we need to say where we are willing to make concessions, a difficult topic but one that is being discussed when it comes to norms. This may not be enough to only think about norms, as we may have to consider constraints on U.S. action, but this is a larger debate. Other parts of the agreement also mean continued tension. Negotiations in the UN are difficult. The United States and its allies face strong opposition from China and Russia over rules for cyber war and the place of human rights in cybersecurity. The Russia-China partnership is no love match, but the two countries unite in opposition to America, and the Chinese are skilful in playing Russia against the U.S. in law enforcement cooperation. In 2013, the FBI made eleven requests for aid to China’s Ministry of Public Security. China responded to only two. When asked for help with the Sony hack, the Chinese said they had no information, even though North Korea uses known front companies in China for hacking. China might turn the tables by requesting assistance it knows it will not get against dissidents living in the United States. But it is misleading to emphasize the difficulties. There is no credible alternative to the agreement. Sermons and chest-beating, while pleasing to a domestic audience, do not work. Some say better cyber defenses – we’ve been saying that for twenty years and it hasn’t worked because the internet cannot be made defensible. Building a Maginot line in cyberspace is pointless. Some say we should deter China - another failed approach, in good measure because espionage isn’t deterreable. We couldn’t deter Soviet espionage with the threat of nuclear war and we should not expect to deter China with comparatively puny cyber threats. We are not going to start a war with China over cyber espionage - as with the Iran deal, there is no serious military option. Covert action requires a different discussion of risk. These answers might not please everyone, but when Washington politics and international realities collide, reality wins. There are dangers with the current course, but these are manageable. We need to see what comes of the bilateral talks on norms and law enforcement before we succumb to more hand wringing. An outcome to avoid is a debate that encourages hesitation or timidity. Cooperating between the United States and China on cybersecurity will be difficult. The Americans knew this going into the agreement and the Chinese probably knew it as well. Like any agreement between two powers suspicious of each other, implementation is complicated, verification is essential, and there must be consequences for noncompliance. The agreement on cybersecurity is the first agreement in a new U.S.-China relationship shaped by competition, even hostility. We are not friends, nor should we expect to be friends any time soon. There are deep tensions between one party rule and democracy, and between a would-be regional hegemon and a global superpower. Strategic competition does not mean, however, that we cannot cooperate. The summit showed that while there are serious differences, there are also common interests. The United States can build on these common interests to get a relationship that is more stable if not more friendly. This relationship will not be a Cold War, nor an alliance, but something new, where both countries will have to feel their way forward with cautious steps. Agreement on cybersecurity agreement is the first step. The new relationship is not a Cold War, nor is it an alliance, but something new where both countries will have to feel their way forward with cautious steps, and agreement on cybersecurity is the first.***Information sharing creating transparency and predictability in the relationship. Austin and Gady 2012 (EastWest Institute professorial fellow and foreign policy analyst; Greg and Franz-Stefan, “Cyber Detente Between The United States And China: Shaping The Agenda”, )Third, cyber espionage, especially against intellectual property and critical infrastructure, is now too big a problem to ignore or to dismiss as a necessary evil. The U.S. and China need to take stock of the negative impacts and establish some limits. Both countries need some common understanding of the limits of cyber espionage. There are two main problems to be dealt with on that third point. The first is the blurred boundaries between national security espionage and theft of intellectually property for commercial gain. The second involves the often equally blurred distinctions between critical infrastructure of an exclusively civilian or humanitarian character and that of a military or strategic one. But to deal with such issues officials from each side would require more information-sharing than their government has so far been willing to permit. Quite understandably, both sides feel that they can’t discuss anything that is secret without breaking their own laws. A first step may be to create a new domestic legal foundation to allow authorities in both countries to share information and to conduct joint assessments of that part of the problem that lies clearly in the intellectual property domain or civil domain.40 Most Western governments underestimate China’s stakes in international collaboration that derive from its vulnerability to large-scale disruptions and crime in cyberspace. Speaking about the United States, Admiral Mike McCullen observed in 2010: “We now need a dialogue among business, civil society and government on the challenges we face in cyberspace—spanning international law, privacy and civil liberties, security and the architecture of the Internet. The results should shape our cybersecurity strategy.”41 This approach is now also needed at the international level. So far, in U.S.-China relations, the conversations are still in their infancy and are characterized as strongly adversarial. The challenge is to deepen the conversations and reduce mistrust through enhanced transparency and predictability.***AT: “China Says No”***The plan Solves- China will say yesHarold et al. 16 (Scott Warren Harold, Martin C. Libicki, Astrid Stuth Cevallos, Associate Director, Center for Asia Pacific Policy; Political Scientist; Faculty Member, Pardee RAND Graduate SchoolGetting to Yes with China on Cyber Space, Rand Corporation, )Given that the United States and China would like to reduce mutual suspicion in cyberspace, one option might be the negotiation of agreement on a set of norms. Since both sides express concern over the possibility of the other side targeting its critical infrastructure, the core of the deal would be for the United States and China to abjure cyberattacks on each other’s critical infrastructure. This proposal was well received by the respondents, with interviewees from across academic, think tank, military, and state organizations all responding positively to this proposal. Respondents appeared to hold relatively similar views of the definition of critical infrastructure to those of their U.S. counterparts—such things as the electrical power grid and the banking system. One respondent noted that there is precedent for such a deal; in early May 2015, just days before we conducted our field interviews, Russia and China announced a general agreement to cooperate with and not attack each other in cyberspace.32 The first component of any mutual forbearance proposal is that progress has been made on not attacking critical infrastructure since our interviews in Beijing. In July 2015, the Chinese signed a UN report that called for such attacks to be abjured.33 There are also indications that the United States and China mutually agree not to attack each other’s critical infrastructure—or at least not be the first to do so. As a second, and logically entailed, component of any mutual forbearance proposal, the United States and China could also agree not to carry out cyber espionage on each other’s critical infrastructure. The rationale for this step is that cyber espionage is almost always a prerequisite for a cyberattack and that it is impossible to distinguish intrusions for the purposes of cyber espionage from an imminent attack if detected by the target. If the two sides have no intent to attack each other’s critical infrastructure, they have no need to compromise each other’s critical infrastructure systems either, particularly if carried out by inserting malicious code into the target infrastructure. Indeed, both cyber espionage and cyberattack typically entail the prior implantation of computer code in target systems, which then periodically calls back (beacons) to the attacker for further instruction. Implants make subsequent penetrations much easier because the attackers are already inside the target’s systems. Banning cyber espionage against critical infrastructure would make it much more difficult to quickly carry out cyberattacks on such infrastructure. Without preplanning and cyber espionage, it could take weeks, months, or even years to carry out such attacks, but if potential adversaries are already inside each other’s critical infrastructure, attacks can be carried out almost instantaneously. Such a ban, if enacted by the two sides, would have several advantages. First, if successfully executed, a ban would enhance stability, since it would remove critically important systems from being targeted. Second, a ban would raise the costs of targeting such systems (since, if China were discovered doing so, it would violate the country’s given word, potentially affecting its ability to credibly negotiate on other issues in the future), while simultaneously addressing the problem of time that cyberattacks prepared in advance can pose. Third, such an agreement, if fully realized, would reduce the prospect of accidental conflict by committing the two sides not just to not attacking each other’s critical infrastructure but to staying away from it completely, thereby eliminating the possibility of misunderstanding a cyber espionage effort as an imminent attack. ***China will agree – it signed a similar ban on cyberattacks with Russia.Razumovskaya 15 (Olga; reporter for The Wall Street Journal; 5/8/16; “Russia and China Pledge Not to Hack Each Other”; ; accessed 7/15/16)MOSCOW—If the U.S. intelligence community believes that Russia poses a greater cyber spying threat than China, what will it make of this? Russia and China signed a cyber-security deal on Friday, which experts say could firm up Russia’s ties with the east and may become a foundation for binding cyber security ties in the future. According to the text of the agreement posted on the Russian government’s website on Wednesday, Russia and China agree to not conduct cyber-attacks against each other, as well as jointly counteract technology that may “destabilize the internal political and socio-economic atmosphere,” “disturb public order” or “interfere with the internal affairs of the state.” The two countries agreed to exchange information between law enforcement agencies, exchange technologies and ensure security of information infrastructure, the document says. Western sanctions against Russia over the crisis in Ukraine have caused Russian officials to re-evaluate areas of critical dependency on Europe and the U.S., and increasingly turn to the east. Russian lawmakers have also campaigned for tighter control over the Internet following the revelations by former US National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden. President Vladimir Putin, meanwhile, has called for moving key online infrastructure into Russia from overseas, complaining publicly last year that the Internet began as “a CIA project.” Friday’s agreement is the latest sign that Beijing and Moscow favor changes to global Internet governance that would reduce the traditional role of the U.S. Russia is also preparing an action plan in case the Russian segment of the Internet was shut down from the outside, Russian minister of communications Nikolai Nikiforov said last year. China, meanwhile, this week cited “cyberspace sovereignty” to propose an update to its national security law that would make it illegal to launch network attacks, conduct cyber theft or disseminate material deemed unlawful and harmful. “For Russia the agreement with China to cooperate on cyber security is an important step in terms of pivoting to the East,” said Oleg Demidov, a cyber-security consultant at the PIR Center, an independent think tank focusing on international security. “The level of cooperation between Russian and China will set a precedent for two global cyber security powers,” Mr. Demidov said.China is willing to cooperate on cybersecurity Adelson et. al. 14 (Ian Adelson, Columbia School of International and Public Affairs June 14 “U.S.-China Cybersecurity Cooperation,” Capstone Report School of International and Public Affairs Columbia University )China is now recognizing the importance of international cybersecurity cooperation. Rapid international response enabled the Estonian government to combat the attacks. The government’s CERT relied on assistance from its Finnish, German, Israeli and Slovenian CERT counterparts to restore normal network operations. NATO CERTs and the EU’s European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) also supported Estonia in providing technical assessments and other assistance during the attacks. International cooperation, along with cooperation with private sector banks and Internet providers, was essential to strengthening Estonia’s cyber infrastructure, for example to incrementally increase its throughput capacity. Notably, the international responses to aid Estonia happened within established security communities and strong transnational relationships. China refrained from involvement, viewing the incidents as an internal matter of Estonia and also did not take part in the international cybersecurity discussions that followed. However, China’s stance is changing as evidenced by a recent high-level discourse and policy approaches calling for renewed cooperation with the entities such as the U.S. and European Union. Analysts stated that this new direction is intended to boost Chinese capabilities and hamper notions of a “China threat.” International cooperation and preparedness are now on the Chinese cyber agenda to move its strategic interests in technology development, global reputation, and economic growth.US-China have shared interests in cybersecurity Segal & Lan 16(Adam Segal and Tang Lan, 04-27-2016, "Can the United States and China De-Conflict in Cyberspace?," War on the Rocks, , Accessed: 3/4/17)-Coronado ARLIt is not hard to imagine cyber issues becoming intertwined with a crisis that spirals out of control. For example, U.S. and People’s Republic of China (PRC) forces are in close contact in the South China Sea, and cyberattacks could cause an incident to escalate rapidly. Hackers could target communication, computer, and transportation networks, degrading not only Beijing’s and Washington’s ability to control their forces in the field, but also their ability to signal to the other side their intentions to escalate or de-escalate the conflict. Non state actors, often known as patriotic hackers, could further confuse the situation as policy makers would have a difficult time differentiating between official and independent attacks. Additionally, a cyberattack that causes physical damage or widespread economic disruption could create domestic pressure for action that leaders in Washington and Beijing would have a hard time ignoring. There are, however, shared interests on which to develop cooperative projects and reduce tensions in cyberspace. Both sides rely on digital infrastructure for economic and national security and share a number of concerns. The Chinese and U.S. markets are tightly linked, and both economies rely on the security and availability of global supply chains. Globally, cyberattacks are growing in frequency and becoming more sophisticated. As non-state actors that are not easily deterred gain better cyberattack capabilities, it puts critical infrastructure in both China and the United States at risk, The growth of the Internet has brought immense economic, political, social, and cultural benefits to both sides. Strategic cooperation in cyberspace could result in further gains for China, the United States, and the rest of the world In order to manage conflict in cyberspace, China and the United States should pursue the following actions: follow up on the September 2015 agreement on fighting cybercrime and cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property with concrete cooperation; ensure that discussions on norms of behavior in cyberspace continue at the highest level and are not suspended during times of tension; discuss joint measures to prevent the spread of cyber capabilities to non-state actors; and build cybersecurity capacity and expand cooperative research in universities and civil society The 2015 agreement on cybersecurity was a significant symbolic step forward for China and the United States, but trust will be built and sustained through implementation. Both countries will test whether the high-level dialogue mechanism will successfully assist in cooperation and better incident response. While it is good that Washington and Beijing have agreed to further the discussion on the norms of cyberspace, the dialogue must be formalized, routinized, and insulated from political point scoring. Without practical progress, cybersecurity could quickly rise to the top of the bilateral agenda and threaten to undermine the U.S.-China relationship again***AT: “Both say no”***China and the US back new cybersecurity policy (CERT) between the two countriesChowdhry 16 [Aisha Chowdhry is a staff writer covering Congress, the State Department, the Department of Veteran Affairs and the Department of Homeland Security, “U.S.-China still at odds on cybersecurity issues”, FWC: The Business of Federal Technology, 3/31/16, ] President Barack Obama said he will continue to discuss matters of cybersecurity with the Chinese president on the sidelines of the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington. But some lawmakers and experts think he should be doing more. "We have deep concerns about our ability to protect the intellectual property of our companies," Obama said in a bilateral meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping on March 31 while kicking off the fourth and final Nuclear Security Summit. Obama said the two leaders will have a "candid exchange about areas where we have significant differences -- issues like human rights, cyber and maritime issues." In the fall of 2015, the two countries agreed that they will not "conduct or knowingly support cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property, including trade secrets or other confidential business information, with the intent of providing competitive advantages to companies or commercial sectors," according to the White House. But it remains to be seen if China has followed through on that promise. "It doesn’t seem like much has really happened since the agreement in September," Sarah Granger, a fellow at the Truman National Security Project, told FCW. "I haven’t seen any evidence of increased arrests in China for 'cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property' outlined in the agreement, even though the idea was for more cooperation on investigating crimes. The number of incidents reported in recent months looks to be similar to those before the agreement, so we have no real evidence of any changes yet." China has been unofficially tagged as the country responsible for the massive Office of Personnel Management hack that compromised the personal information of more than 22 million Americans, including federal employees. "I think China has not let up on cyberattacks, and this is Obama's silent war," Jason Maloni, leader of the data security and privacy team at LEVICK, told FCW. "I think Obama will be pressing them harder to curtail the cyberattacks coming from the region, and that’s just not China -- it's [also] North Korea." Maloni said one of the reasons why it's difficult for China to restrain those activities is because many hackers' livelihoods depend on it. "They are not doing the minimum, and I'm sure that’s what President Obama is going to press Xi on," Maloni said. Rep. Chris Smith (R-N.J.), whose computer and committee networks were hacked by someone traced back to Beijing, told FCW that "not even a little bit" has been done when it comes to the cybersecurity agreement. Smith is a senior member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and co-chairman of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China. "There is a deep concern that if the Chinese government penetrates [the Pentagon], as we think they are trying to do, can they turn off a water supply?" Smith said. "What mischief can be unleashed?" Despite the skepticism, Obama and Xi both had positive outlooks. "On the basis of respecting each other's core interests and major concerns, we should seek active solutions through dialogue and consultation," Xi told members of the press at the Walter E. Washington Convention Center. "Even when this is not possible, for the time being, we should manage them constructively and avoid misunderstanding and misperception or escalation, and prevent big disruptions to the overall interests of China-U.S. cooperation."***Neither side thinks the current agreement goes far enough—both want more developmentPainter 16 (Christopher, the Coordinator for Cyber Issues in the U.S. Department of State, “International Cybersecurity Strategy: Deterring Foreign Threats and Building Global Cyber Norms”, Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asia, the Pacific, and International Cybersecurity Policy”, 05/25/2016, Online: , accessed 07/18/2016, CP)Chairman Gardner, Ranking Member Cardin, members of the Subcommittee on East Asia, the Pacific, and International Cybersecurity Policy, it is a pleasure to appear again before your Subcommittee to provide an update on key developments in our cyber foreign policy efforts. Since I testified before your Subcommittee one year ago, the Department of State (the Department) has continued to work closely with other Federal departments and agencies and has made significant progress in a number of areas. It is also important to note that last month, as required by the Consolidated Appropriations Act for 2016, the Department submitted to Congress the Department of State International Cyberspace Policy Strategy (the Strategy) that included a report on the Department’s work to implement the President’s 2011 International Strategy for Cyberspace, as well as a discussion of our efforts to promote norms of responsible state behavior in cyberspace, alternative concepts for norms promoted by certain other countries, threats facing the United States, tools available to the President to deter malicious actors, and resources required to build international norms. I appreciate the opportunity today to provide an update on our progress as well as the challenges we face in a number of areas. As reflected in the Strategy we provided to Congress last month, the Department of State structures its cyberspace diplomacy in close cooperation with our interagency partners – including the Departments of Justice, Commerce, Defense, Homeland Security, and Treasury, and the Intelligence Community – around the following interrelated, dynamic, and cross-cutting policy pillars drawn from the President’s International Strategy for Cyberspace: digital economy; international security; promoting cybersecurity due diligence; combating cybercrime; Internet governance; Internet freedom; and international development and capacity building, as well as cross-cutting issues such as countering the use of the Internet for terrorist purposes. In addition, as we noted, the Department actively is mainstreaming cyberspace issues into its foreign diplomatic engagements and building the necessary internal capacity. I am happy to answer any questions regarding the Strategy, which discusses all of these policy priorities in greater detail, including specific accomplishments from our robust bilateral and multilateral diplomatic engagements and highlights from the roles and contributions of other Federal agencies. In spite of the successes outlined in the Strategy, the U.S. vision for an open, interoperable, secure, and reliable Internet faces a range of policy and technical challenges. Many of these challenges were described in my testimony last year, and they largely remain. I would like to focus my time today delving specifically into our efforts to promote a broad international framework for cyber stability, as well some of the alternative views regarding the Internet that some governments are promoting. I will also spend some time discussing the technical challenges and threats posed by continuing malicious cyber activity directed at the United States, as well as our allies, and the tools we have at our disposal to deter these actions. Diplomatic Efforts to Shape the Policy Environment Building a Framework for International Stability in Cyberspace The Department of State, working with our interagency partners, is guided by the vision of the President’s International Strategy for Cyberspace, which is to promote a strategic framework of international cyber stability designed to achieve and maintain a peaceful cyberspace environment where all states are able to fully realize its benefits, where there are advantages to cooperating against common threats and avoiding conflict, and where there is little incentive for states to engage in disruptive behavior or to attack one another. This framework has three key elements: (1) global affirmation that international law applies to state behavior in cyberspace; (2) development of an international consensus on and promotion of additional voluntary norms of responsible state behavior in cyberspace that apply during peacetime; and (3) development and implementation of practical confidence building measures (CBMs), which promote stability in cyberspace by reducing the risks of misperception and escalation. Since 2009, the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security (UN GGE) has served as a productive and groundbreaking expert-level venue for the United States to build support for this framework. The consensus recommendations of the three UN GGE reports in 2010, 2013, and 2015 have set the standard for the international community on international cyberspace norms and CBMs. The UN GGE process will continue to play a central role in our efforts to fully promulgate this framework when it reconvenes in August 2016. Applicability of international law. The first and most fundamental pillar of our framework for international cyber stability is the applicability of existing international law to state behavior in cyberspace. The 2013 UN GGE report was a landmark achievement that affirmed the applicability of existing international law, including the UN Charter, to state conduct in cyberspace. The 2013 report underscored that states must act in cyberspace under the established international obligations and commitments that have guided their actions for decades – in peacetime and during conflict – and states must meet their international obligations regarding internationally wrongful acts attributable to them. The 2014-2015 UN GGE also made progress on issues related to international law by affirming the applicability of the inherent right to self-defense as recognized in Article 51 of the UN Charter, and noting the law of armed conflict’s fundamental principles of humanity, necessity, proportionality, and distinction. Norms of responsible state behavior. The United States is also building consensus on a set of additional, voluntary norms of responsible state behavior in cyberspace that define key areas of risk that would be of national and/or economic security concern to all states and which should be off-limits during times of peace. If observed, these stability measures – which are measures of self-restraint – can contribute substantially to conflict prevention and stability. The United States was the first state to propose a set of specific peacetime cyber norms, including the cybersecurity of critical infrastructure, the protection of computer security incident response teams (CSIRTs), and cooperation between states in responding to appropriate requests in mitigating malicious cyber activity emanating from their territory. In May 2015, Secretary of State Kerry highlighted these norms in his speech in Seoul, South Korea, on an open and secure Internet. The 2015 UN GGE report’s most significant achievement was its recommendation for voluntary norms of state behavior designed for peacetime, which included concepts championed by the United States. Confidence Building Measures. Together with our work on law and voluntary norms, cyber CBMs have the potential to contribute substantially to international cyber stability. CBMs have been used for decades to build confidence, reduce risk, and increase transparency in other areas of international concern. Examples of cyber CBMs include: transparency measures, such as sharing national strategies or doctrine; cooperative measures, such as an initiative to combat a particular cyber incident or threat actor; and stability measures, such as committing to refrain from a certain activity of concern. Cyber CBMs are being developed, and are in the first stages of implementation, in two regional venues – the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the ASEAN Regional Forum where agreement was reached in 2015 on a detailed work plan with a proposed set of CBMs for future implementation. Although many of the elements of the framework I have described above may seem self-evident to an American audience, it is important to recognize that cyber issues are new to many states, and as I describe later in my testimony, there are also many states that hold alternative views on how we should promote cyber stability. Notwithstanding these headwinds, as well as the fact that diplomatic negotiations on other issues can take many years, if not decades, the United States and its allies have made substantial progress in recent years towards advancing our strategic framework of international cyber stability. At this point, I would like to highlight examples from last year that reflect our progress. U.S.-China Cyber Commitments The United States strongly opposes the use of cyber technology to steal intellectual property for commercial advantage, and has raised this concern with Chinese interlocutors for several years. In 2014, the U.S. indicted five members of the Chinese military for hacking, economic espionage, and other offenses directed at six U.S. entities. This led China to suspend the U.S.-China Cyber Working Group. The U.S. and China, however, reached agreement during President Xi Jinping’s state visit in September 2015 on several key commitments on cyber issues. These commitments are: (1) both governments agreed to cooperate and provide timely responses to requests for information and assistance regarding malicious cyber activity emanating from their territories; (2) neither country’s government will conduct or knowingly support cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property for commercial advantage; (3) both governments will work together to further identify and promote appropriate norms of state behavior in cyberspace and hold a senior experts group on international security issues in cyberspace; and (4) both governments will establish a Ministerial-level joint dialogue mechanism on fighting cybercrime and related issues. Two weeks ago today – on May 11 – the United States hosted the first meeting of the senior experts group in Washington on international security issues in cyberspace, which provided a forum to further engage China on its views and seek common ground regarding norms of state behavior in cyberspace and other topics. The Department of State led the U.S. delegation that included participation from the Department of Defense and other U.S. government agencies. The senior experts group helps us advance the growing international consensus on international law and voluntary cyber norms of state behavior. We also have encouraged China to join us in pushing for other states to affirm these principles in international forums like the Group of Twenty (G20), and will continue to do so. To implement other commitments reached during President Xi’s visit, the United States and China held the first ministerial level dialogue on cybercrime and other related issues in Washington on December 1, 2015. Attorney General Loretta Lynch and Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson, together with Chinese State Councilor Guo Shengkun, co-chaired the first U.S.-China High-Level Joint Dialogue on Cybercrime and Related Issues to foster mutual understanding and enhance cooperation on law enforcement and network protection issues. The second dialogue is scheduled to occur next month in Beijing, China. Moreover, regarding the commitment that neither government will conduct or knowingly support cyber-enabled theft for commercial gain, Deputy Secretary of State Blinken testified last month before the full Committee on Foreign Relations that the United States is “watching very closely to ensure this commitment is followed by action.” The outcomes of last year’s Xi-Obama summit focus on concrete actions and arrangements that will allow us to hold Beijing accountable to the commitments they have made. These commitments do not resolve all our challenges with China on cyber issues. However, they do represent a step forward in our efforts to address one of the sharpest areas of disagreement in the U.S.-China bilateral relationship. Group of Twenty (G20) Antalya Summit In November 2015, the leaders of the G20 met in Antalya, Turkey, to discuss and make progress on a wide range of critical issues facing the global economy. At the conclusion of the Antalya Summit, the strong final communique issued by the G20 leaders affirmed the U.S.-championed vision of international cyber stability and its pillars. Among other things, the G20 leaders affirmed in their statement that “no country should conduct or support the ICT-enabled theft of intellectual property, including trade secrets or other confidential business information, with the intent of providing competitive advantages to companies or commercial sectors.” They also highlighted the “key role played by the United Nations in developing norms” and the work of the UN GGE and its 2015 report. Addressing our overall framework, the G20 leaders stated that they “affirm that international law, and in particular the UN Charter, is applicable to state conduct in the use of ICTs and commit ourselves to the view that all states should abide by norms of responsible state behavior in the use of ICTs… .” The G20 leaders’ communique represents a remarkable endorsement of our approach to promoting stability in cyberspace. But there is still more to do. The United States will continue to work within the G20 and in other bilateral and multilateral engagements to promote and expand these policy pronouncements regarding responsible state behavior in cyberspace. Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe As a result of the leadership by the United States and like-minded countries, the 57 member states of the OSCE, which includes not only Western allies but also Russia and other former Soviet states, reached consensus in March 2016 on an expanded set of CBMs. This expanded set, which includes five new CBMs, builds upon the 11 CBMs announced by the OSCE in 2013 that member states are already working to implement. The initial 11 CBMs were primarily focused on building transparency and putting in place mechanisms for de-escalating conflict. For example, there were CBMs calling upon participating states to identify points of contact that foreign governments could reach out to in the event of a cyber incident emanating from the state’s territory and put in place consultation and mediation mechanisms. The additional five CBMs focused more on cooperative measures focusing on issues like cybersecurity of critical infrastructure and developing public-private partnerships. Secure and resilient critical infrastructure, including in the communications sector, requires the integration of cyber, physical, and human elements. Since most critical infrastructure is privately owned, public-private partnerships are essential for strengthening critical infrastructure. Given the distributed nature of critical infrastructure, these efforts also require international collaboration. Work will continue this year to strengthen implementation of the previous CBMs and to begin implementing the new ones as well. This will build on the cooperation we have underway with many international partners in this and other similar fora. We also hope that this further success within the OSCE context can serve to strengthen CBMs as a model that other regional security organizations can adopt. In addition to our work with governmental organizations, the Department of State engages extensively with a range of stakeholders outside of government, who play critical roles in helping to preserve and promote the same vision of cyberspace held by the United States. Non-government stakeholders are often part of our delegations to key meetings, for which there is intensive consultation, and we often engage with our stakeholders before and after key events to hear their views and to inform them of our activities. We also engage extensively with the stakeholder community ahead of and immediately following major cyber conferences, such as the Global Conference on Cyberspace, most recently in The Hague, the Netherlands, and previously in Seoul, South Korea. Policy Challenge: Alternative Views of the Internet A challenge to the implementation of our cyberspace strategy is a competing and alternative view of the Internet. The United States and much of the broader international community support the open flow and movement of data on the Internet that drives economic growth, protects human rights, and promotes innovation. The United States believes in a multistakeholder approach whereby governments, private sector, civil society, and the technical and academic communities cooperate to address both technical and policy threats through inclusive, transparent, consensus-driven processes. China’s approach to cyberspace in the international context is propelled by its desire to maintain internal stability, maintain sovereignty over its domestic cyberspace, and combat what it argues is an emerging cyber arms race and ‘militarization’ of cyberspace. China has been willing to consider cyber confidence building measures, and has affirmed that international law applies in cyberspace, but has not been willing to affirm more specifically the applicability of the law of armed conflict or other laws of war, because it believes it would only serve to legitimize state use of cyber tools as weapons of war. This has led to a set of external policies that reinforces traditional Chinese foreign policy priorities of non-interference in internal affairs, national sovereignty over cyberspace, and “no first use” of weapons. China views its expansive online censorship regime – including technologies such as the Great Firewall – as a necessary defense against destabilizing domestic and foreign influences, and it has promoted this conception internationally. China also urges creation of new “cyber governance” instruments, which would, inter alia, create new binding rules designed to limit the development, deployment, and use of “information weapons,” promote speech and content controls, seek to replace the framework of the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime (Budapest Convention), elevate the role of governments vis-à-vis other stakeholders, and likely give the United Nations authority for determining attribution and responding to malicious cyber activity. While the United States and its partners seek to focus our cyber policy efforts on combatting threats to networks, cyber infrastructure, and other physical threats from cyber tools, China also emphasizes the threats posed by online content. In addition, some of these policies stand in sharp contrast to the U.S. view that all stakeholders should be able to contribute to the making of public policy regarding the Internet. Russia’s approach to cyberspace in the international context has focused on the maintenance of internal stability, as well as sovereignty over its “information space.” While Russia co-authored the Code of Conduct, with China and other Shanghai Cooperation Organization members, Russia’s ultimate goal is also a new international cyber convention, which they pair with criticism of the Budapest Convention. Russia has nonetheless found common ground with the United States on our approach of promoting the applicability of international law to state conduct in cyberspace as well as voluntary, non-binding norms of state behavior in peacetime. Russia has also committed to the first ever set of bilateral cyber confidence building measures with the United States, as well as the first ever set of cyber CBMs within a multilateral institution, at the OSCE in 2013 and 2016 that I previously discussed. We counter these alternative concepts of cyberspace policy through a range of diplomatic tools that include not only engagement in multilateral venues, but also direct bilateral engagement and awareness-raising with a variety of state and non-state actors. I now would like to discuss some of the technical challenges and threats the U.S. faces and some of the tools we have to respond to and prevent cyber incidents. Responding to and Preventing Cyber Incidents Continuing Cyber Threats Cyber threats to U.S. national and economic security are increasing in frequency, scale, sophistication, and severity. In 2015, high profile cyber incidents included the breach of health insurance company Anthem, Inc.’s IT system that resulted in the theft of account information for millions of customers; an unauthorized breach of the Office of Personnel Management’s systems that resulted in the theft of approximately 22 million personnel files; and hackers launching an unprecedented attack on the Ukraine power grid that cut power to hundreds of thousands of customers. Overall, the unclassified information and communications technology networks that support U.S. government, military, commercial, and social activities remain vulnerable to espionage and disruption. As the Department noted in the Strategy we submitted last month, however, the likelihood of a catastrophic attack against the United States from any particular actor is remote at this time. The Intelligence Community instead foresees an ongoing series of low-to-moderate level cyber operations from a variety of sources, which will impose cumulative costs on U.S. economic competitiveness and national security, pose risks to Federal and private sector infrastructure in the United States, infringe upon the rights of U.S. intellectual property holders, and violate the privacy of U.S. citizens. In February, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper testified before Congress on the 2016 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community, and stated: “Many actors remain undeterred from conducting reconnaissance, espionage, and even attacks in cyberspace because of the relatively low costs of entry, the perceived payoff, and the lack of significant consequences.” He highlighted the malicious cyber activities of the leading state actors, non-state actors such as Da'esh, and criminals who are developing and using sophisticated cyber tools, including ransomware for extortion and malware to target government networks. The Intelligence Community continues to witness an increase in the scale and scope of reporting on malicious cyber activity that can be measured by the amount of corporate data stolen or deleted, personally identifiable information compromised, or remediation costs incurred by U.S. victims. The motivation to conduct cyber attacks and cyber espionage will probably remain strong because of the gains for the perpetrators. Tools Available to Counter Cyber Threats The United States works to counter technical challenges through a whole-of-government approach that brings to bear its full range of instruments of national power and corresponding policy tools – diplomatic, law enforcement, economic, military, and intelligence – as appropriate and consistent with applicable law. The United States believes that deterrence in cyberspace is best accomplished through a combination of “deterrence by denial” – reducing the incentive of potential adversaries to use cyber capabilities against the United States by persuading them that the United States can deny their objectives – and “deterrence through cost imposition” – threatening or carrying out actions to inflict penalties and costs against adversaries that conduct malicious cyber activity against the United States. It is important to note that there is no one-size-fits-all approach to deterring or responding to cyber threats. Rather, the individual characteristics of a particular threat determine the tools that would most appropriately be used. The President has at his disposal a number of tools to carry out deterrence by denial. These include a range of policies, regulations, and voluntary standards aimed at increasing the security and resiliency of U.S. government and private sector computer systems. They also include incident response capabilities and certain law enforcement authorities. With respect to cost imposition, the President is able to draw on a range of response options from across the United States government. Diplomatic tools provide a way to communicate to adversaries when their actions are unacceptable and to build support and greater cooperation among, or seek assistance from, allies and like-minded countries to address shared threats. Diplomatic démarches to both friendly and potentially hostile states have become a regular component of the United States’ response to major international cyber incidents. In the longer term, U.S. efforts to promote principles of responsible state behavior in cyberspace, including peacetime norms, are intended to build increasing consensus among like-minded states that can form a basis for cooperative responses to irresponsible state actions. Law enforcement tools can be used to investigate crimes and prosecute malicious cyber actors both within the United States and abroad. International cooperation is critical to cybercrime investigations, which is why the United States has promoted international harmonization of substantive and procedural cybercrime laws through the Budapest Convention, created an informal channel for data preservation and information sharing through the G7 24/7 network, and promoted donor partnerships to assist developing nations. Economic tools, such as financial sanctions, may be used as a part of the broader U.S. strategy to change, constrain, and stigmatize the behavior of malicious actors in cyberspace. Since January 2015, the President has provided guidance to the Secretary of the Treasury to impose sanctions to counter North Korea’s malicious cyber-enabled activities. Executive Order 13687 was issued, in part, in response to the provocative and destructive attack on Sony Pictures Entertainment, while Executive Order 13722 targets, among others, significant activities by North Korea to undermine cybersecurity, in line with the recently-signed North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016. Aside from these North Korea-specific authorities, in April 2015, the President issued Executive Order 13694, Blocking the Property of Certain Persons Engaging in Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities, which authorizes the imposition of sanctions against persons whose malicious cyber-enabled activities could pose a significant threat to the national security, foreign policy, or economic health or financial stability of the United States. Military capabilities provide an important set of options for deterring and responding to malicious cyber activity. The Department of Defense continues to build its cyber capabilities and strengthen its cyber defense and deterrence posture. As part of this effort, the Department of Defense is building its Cyber Mission Force, which is already employing its capabilities to defend Department of Defense networks, defend the Nation against cyberattacks of significant consequence, and generate integrated cyberspace effects in support of operational plans and contingency operations. In addition, Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter announced earlier this year that U.S. forces are using cyber tools to disrupt Da'esh’s command and control systems and to negatively impact its networks. Intelligence capabilities are also an important tool at the President’s disposal in detecting, responding to, and deterring malicious activities in cyberspace, particularly given the unique challenges associated with attributing and understanding the motivation behind such malicious activities. Even with this broad range of tools, deterring cyber threats remains a challenge. Given the unique characteristics of cyberspace, the United States continues to work to develop additional and appropriate consequences that it can impose on malicious cyber actors. Capacity Building In addition to the tools that I have just outlined, the ability of the United States to respond to foreign cyber threats and fight transnational cybercrime is greatly enhanced by the capabilities and strength of our international partners in this area. Therefore, the Department of State is working with departments and agencies, allies and multilateral partners to build the capacity of foreign governments, particularly in developing countries, to secure their own networks as well as investigate and prosecute cybercriminals within their borders. The Department also actively promotes donor cooperation, including bilateral and multilateral participation in joint cyber capacity building initiatives. In 2015, for example, the United States joined the Netherlands in founding the Global Forum on Cyber Expertise, a global platform for countries, international organizations, and the private sector to exchange best practices and expertise on cyber capacity building. The United States partnered with Japan, Australia, Canada, the African Union Commission, and Symantec on four cybersecurity and cybercrime capacity building initiatives. The Department also provided assistance to the Council of Europe, the Organization of American States, and the United Nations Global Program on Cybercrime to enable delivery of capacity building assistance to developing nations. Many traditional bilateral law enforcement training programs increasingly include cyber elements, such as training investigators and prosecutors in the handling of electronic evidence. Much of our foreign law enforcement training on combating intellectual property crime focuses on digital theft. In another example of capacity building, the Department of State, through its Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, manages five International Law Enforcement Academies (ILEAs) worldwide, and one additional Regional Training Center. These six facilities provide law enforcement training and instruction to law enforcement officials from approximately 85 countries each year. The ILEA program includes a wide variety of cyber investigation training courses, from basic to advanced levels, taught by subject matter experts from the U.S. Secret Service and other agencies and policy-level discussions with senior criminal justice officials. This serves as a force multiplier to enhance the capabilities of the international law enforcement community to collaborate in the effort to fight cybercrime. The Department of State is committed to continuing its capacity building initiatives as another effective way to counter international cyber threats and promote international cyber stability. Looking ahead Cybersecurity will continue to be a challenge for the United States when we take into consideration the rapidly expanding environment of global cyber threats, the increasing reliance on information technology and number of “smart devices,” the reality that many developing nations are still in the early stages of their cyber maturity, and the ongoing and increasingly sophisticated use of information technology by terrorists and other criminals. Thus, the Department of State anticipates a continued increase and expansion of our cyber-focused diplomatic and capacity building efforts for the foreseeable future. The Department will continue to spearhead the effort to promote international consensus that existing international law applies to state actions in cyberspace and build support for certain peacetime norms through assisting states in developing technical capabilities and relevant laws and policies, to ensure they are able to properly meet their commitments on norms of international cyber behavior. The Department of State remains appreciative of this Subcommittee’s continued support. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I am happy to answer your questions. AT: “2015 Agreement Solves”***The US-China agreement was weak – it only banned cyber espionage, ignoring attribution and differing definitions of cybersecurity. Bernard ’15 (Doug; writer for Voice of America; 10/6/15; Voice of America; “US, China Have Dueling Definitions of Cybersecurity”; ; accessed 7/11/16)One of the most-anticipated outcomes of the president of China's recent state visit to the United States was an agreement between the two countries on beefing up cybersecurity and putting a halt to economic espionage. But analysts question whether the deal actually can deliver. In a September 25 ceremony on the White House lawn, Chinese President Xi Jinping pledged that China would not participate in cyber espionage. U.S. President Barack Obama announced that both leaders had promised their respective countries' increased cooperation in fighting corruption, money laundering and terrorist financing online. "This is progress," Obama said of the agreement, "but I have to insist that our work is not yet done." Yet less than a week after Xi's departure, James Clapper, the top U.S. intelligence official, appeared to throw cold water on the agreement. When asked at a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing whether the framework agreement could prevent Chinese hacking, Clapper gave a one-word answer: "No." A growing number of analysts are questioning whether the framework is substantive enough to improve cybersecurity cooperation between China and the U.S. - or whether any such agreement is even possible, particularly when it comes to the theft of intellectual property. Dueling definitions of cybersecurity "I think it was a broad statement of generalities, which is not necessarily a bad thing," said Dean Cheng, senior Chinese affairs research fellow at the Heritage Foundation (), a nonprofit think tank. "But is that enough? Depends who you ask." While there are no specifics in the framework cybersecurity agreement - or "common understanding," as it's officially known - Obama said it affirms the principle that "governments don't engage in cyber espionage for commercial gain against companies." But that, according to Cheng, is unlikely in the extreme. "Deterring economic espionage is hard," he said. "OK, the Chinese agreed not to engage is cyber espionage, which they've always said they never did anyway. Especially on economic issues, which, again, they've always denied. So what have we really got?" China and much of the West, he said, have very different definitions of what constitutes cybersecurity. In the U.S., the term usually applies to hacking attacks and the basic integrity of computer networks, he said. However, in China, "cybersecurity" applies to nearly any activity that bolsters the nation or threatens Communist Party rule. "China just passed a new national security law, which has a very broad and expansive view of what constitutes national security," he said. "Economics is part of Chinese national security under the new law, which directly touches on economic cyber espionage." "In the U.S., the government sees itself as a partner to private industry, and not in the lead in safeguarding the Web," said Tristan Reed, security analyst at Stratfor Global Intelligence (). "This contrasts greatly with a country like China, where everything serves the state." China and Chinese industry, he said, has every incentive to continue economic espionage against the United States. "The U.S. has far more to lose than China in intellectual property," Reed said, "so while this agreement is probably the most significant step yet made, it's not the solution and it's not likely to end or even slow attacks coming from China." As long as Chinese industry continues to benefit from intellectual property stolen from U.S. firms, Reed told VOA, there's not much the U.S. government can do in the short term except to help the private sector defend its data networks. "This agreement is a move for the U.S. to find an effective long-term policy," he added. Cyber's attribution problem International agreements on cyber espionage also present a unique challenge: that of attribution, or proving that a particular individual or government is responsible for a hack. Attribution, the first step in determining a response, "is particularly challenging," said Reed. "Though there are a lot of attacks from China, they're all not necessarily going to be state-sponsored. Remember, it's the economic incentive [of Chinese industry] that's driving this." Cheng agreed. "Attribution can take a lot of time, and that raises the issue of how quickly you can retaliate. Cyber's a cheap game. It's not quite anyone with a laptop, but it's very close, so you have to be very careful before you start retaliating," he told VOA. While governments are traditionally leery of publicly revealing and possibly compromising their intelligence assets, the U.S. Department of Justice last year took the unusual step of indicting five Chinese army officers for infiltrating computer networks of six large U.S. corporations, making their attribution evidence public. However, such measures are rare as they can compromise other valuable national intelligence assets.The 2015 Summit agreement did not include the plan – it focused on specific areas of cybersecurity, not a broad ban on attacking critical infrastructure.White House ’15 (White House; 9/25/15; “FACT SHEET: President Xi Jinping’s State Visit to the United States”; ; accessed 7-12-2016)The United States and China agree that timely responses should be provided to requests for information and assistance concerning malicious cyber activities. Further, both sides agree to cooperate, in a manner consistent with their respective national laws and relevant international obligations, with requests to investigate cybercrimes, collect electronic evidence, and mitigate malicious cyber activity emanating from their territory. Both sides also agree to provide updates on the status and results of those investigation to the other side, as appropriate. The United States and China agree that neither country’s government will conduct or knowingly support cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property, including trade secrets or other confidential business information, with the intent of providing competitive advantages to companies or commercial sectors. Both sides are committed to making common effort to further identify and promote appropriate norms of state behavior in cyberspace within the international community. The United States and China welcome the July 2015 report of the UN Group of Governmental Experts in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International security, which addresses norms of behavior and other crucial issues for international security in cyberspace. The two sides also agree to create a senior experts group for further discussions on this topic. The United States and China agree to establish a high-level joint dialogue mechanism on fighting cybercrime and related issues. China will designate an official at the ministerial level to be the lead and the Ministry of Public Security, Ministry of State Security, Ministry of Justice, and the State Internet and Information Office will participate in the dialogue. The U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security and the U.S. Attorney General will co-chair the dialogue, with participation from representatives from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the U.S. Intelligence Community and other agencies, for the United States. This mechanism will be used to review the timeliness and quality of responses to requests for information and assistance with respect to malicious cyber activity of concern identified by either side. As part of this mechanism, both sides agree to establish a hotline for the escalation of issues that may arise in the course of responding to such requests. Finally, both sides agree that the first meeting of this dialogue will be held by the end of 2015, and will occur twice per year thereafter.The agreement was fundamentally ineffective – it was vague, ignored non-economic agencies, and overlooked the Great Firewall.Cook ’15 (Sarah; senior research analyst for East Asia at Freedom House; 11/9/15; Freedom House; “Obama-Xi Agreement Will Not Resolve China Cybersecurity Threat”; ; accessed 7/11/16)One of the most touted takeaways from Chinese president Xi Jinping’s visit to the United States last month was an agreement by the two leaders on the contentious issue of cyberattacks—and especially cyberespionage—against American targets. Particular attention has been given to a commitment Xi and U.S. president Barack Obama made to avoid engaging in or knowingly supporting acts of cybertheft for economic gain. But while the commitment signals bilateral goodwill, there are a number of reasons to doubt its effectiveness in curbing commercial espionage and the broader problem of intrusive, destructive cyberattacks against a range of U.S. targets by entities tied to the Chinese government: Absence of clear standards or verification mechanisms: Security experts analyzing the agreement noted its vague wording and lack of definitions for what constitutes acceptable or unacceptable activity, meaning further negotiation would be required to render the agreement effective. Similarly, no objective metrics were identified for determining whether one side or the other has followed through on its commitments. These challenges, along with the near impossibility of tracing who is responsible for most cyberattacks, will make enforcement difficult. Omission of politically motivated attacks: More problematic from the perspective of privacy and freedom of expression was the cybertheft agreement’s focus on the economic realm. By framing the pact in this way, Obama and Xi ignored the increasingly aggressive, sophisticated, and widespread cyberattacks apparently committed by Chinese state actors against American media companies, human rights groups, individual activists, and government bodies. Thus, even if an agreement like this one had been in place for the past five years, it arguably would not have prevented attacks on Google in 2010 (which hacked rights defenders’ accounts, among other targets), media outlets like the New York Times in 2012 (seeking information on the sources for the paper’s investigation of former premier Wen Jiabao’s family wealth), or a massive denial-of-service attack against the code-sharing platform GitHub in March of this year. Nor would it have helped stem routine phishing attacks that target overseas Chinese, Tibetan, and Uighur activists and, increasingly, U.S. government personnel. Failure to address vulnerabilities created by China’s Great Firewall: More indirectly, any agreement that depoliticizes the Chinese government’s internet policies is overlooking the general security problems created by the Great Firewall (GFW)—Beijng’s system for monitoring and filtering internet communications between China and the outside world. Over the past month, this issue was highlighted by two incidents in which malware infected applications on Apple’s mobile operating system. On September 17, some of China’s most popular apps—including Tencent’s WeChat and NetEase—were found to be carrying malware, affecting hundreds of millions of smartphones and marking the largest such incident to date in Apple’s history. The apps were susceptible to intrusions because they used an alternative to Apple’s standard XCode. Analyzing why app developers might have used a less secure code, Oiwan Lam of Global Voices points out that due to the slow international internet connections in China (a direct result of the GFW’s real-time filtering), downloading XCode takes a very long time. Some programmers have consequently turned to alternatives that are more accessible from within the firewall, but also more vulnerable to malware. In the second incident, a malicious program targeting Apple devices was reported on October 4 by researchers at Palo Alto Networks. This time, a Chinese marketing company took advantage of internet users’ desire tocircumvent censorship to convince them to download an infected application. The malware essentially allowed the marketers to take control of users’ phones and execute certain actions, such as opening their Safari web browser to a page showing clients’ products or advertisements. Both of the above incidents were resolved quickly without long-term harm to consumers, but future attacks that exploit the same incentives may not prove as innocuous. Moreover, security analysts have found that the March 2015 attack on GitHub was carried out with a tool they labeled the “Great Cannon.” This weapon, which is co-located with the GFW, worked by redirecting large volumes of bystander traffic—mostly from Hong Kong and Taiwan—that was headed for search engine Baidu’s China servers and using it to swamp and paralyze the U.S.-based code-sharing website. Ultimately, actions will speak louder than words. Over the next six months, security experts will closely track and investigate reports of cyber intrusions from China against American companies and other targets, hopefully providing evidence on whether the pace of attacks has slowed, if not ceased. Meanwhile, the Obama administration will have two avenues—a bilateral dialogue and an ongoing response system—through which to press the Chinese government for answers and prosecutions of those found responsible for violations. The United States will also continue to consider imposing sanctions on Chinese companies found to have benefited from cyberespionage. The threat of sanctions appears to have had at least a short-term impact: On October 12, the Washington Post reported that Chinese officials had for the first time arrested hackers identified by U.S. officials. A White House fact sheet states that these new communication channels could address “malicious cyberactivities” generally. This leaves space for U.S. officials to expand the scope of inquiries beyond commercial espionage. American and Chinese internet users, civil society, and media outlets would be well served if politically driven attacks were covered, beginning with the first bilateral dialogue expected before the end of this calendar year. In the meantime, though, security experts who have analyzed the Obama-Xi agreement appear to agree that they will not be out of work anytime soon. On September 29, security firm KnowBe4 offered a stark warning to those seeking protection from detrimental cyber intrusions originating in China: “You are still mostly on your own.”The 2015 cyber agreement is flawed and will create a major letdown between the US and China. Building on the 2015 agreement is necessary to build strategic trust. Mattis, Jamestown Foundation China Program fellow, 2015(Peter, “Lingering Questions Over The U.S.–China Cyber Affirmation”, 10-7, )Action rather than words will define what happens next. For PLA watchers, its obedience to the party’s commands is axiomatic. The PLA stood by and saluted as a succession of leaders made decisions that sacrificed military modernization for other political objectives. Deng Xiaoping actually cut the defense budget steadily through the 1980s. Jiang Zemin initiated the PLA’s exit from business that, while partially compensating for defense budget shortfalls, personally enriched military officers. If Xi Jinping and the Chinese government intend to stand by the cyber affirmation, then a dramatic drop-off in Chinese cyber espionage should be visible within weeks because the PLA would be the first of the Chinese agencies involved to draw down systematically and redirect its resources — unless foreign observers have profoundly misread the party–PLA relationship. If such a drop-off is not seen, then the most likely explanation is that Xi had no intention of abiding by the affirmation. I would welcome being proven wrong on these potential problems with the U.S.–China statement. In the best case, China blinked and accepted the nearly unique U.S. understanding that there are distinctions between intelligence collection for companies’ commercial benefit and for the governments’ national security. Moreover, Washington effectively deterred China from continuing to operate on a different set of rules and restored some credibility in an area where the threats of action against China leaked repeatedly to the press never materialized. Unfortunately, it appears both the sides may be setting each other up for another broken promise, and broken promises have undermined the pragmatic but optimistic atmosphere of the U.S.–China relationship as it matured in the 1970s and 1980s. Here are just three examples of significant promises broken over the years. First, Henry Kissinger promised Zhou Enlai a nearly complete withdrawal of the U.S. security presence in Asia and keeping the U.S.–Japan alliance in place to restrain Tokyo’s security options, but the 1990s saw Washington use the alliance to push Tokyo to “normalize” its defense policy and play a greater security role internationally. Second, Beijing made numerous agreements to protect intellectual property in the 1990s, not the least of which were World Trade Organization commitments, but Chinese theft only seems to have gotten steadily worse. Third, Washington reneged on its commitments to decrease and eventually cease arms sales to Taiwan in the Third Joint Communique issued in 1982: Arms sales have increased slowly but steadily since the early 1990s. Both sides have overpromised, seemingly choosing expediency in dealing with each other rather than thinking through the implications of broader policies. These broader views of appropriate policy seem to make the cyber affirmation untenable, as both sides will continue to collect intelligence with potential commercial value. As others have noted, China views its activities in cyberspace in the commercial, economic, and national security realm as a part of comprehensive national power and protecting China’s developmental path. Accepting the U.S. interpretation requires Beijing to disaggregate its policy toolkit in unprecedented ways. Additionally, the vast scientific and industrial information complex in China serves to promote national development, not Chinese companies’ competitive advantage. Such a distinction probably will not find open ears in Washington, nor will China’s acquisition of dual-use technologies in strategic fields, like telecommunications, for national defense modernization. DNI Clapper says the United States should “trust but verify;” however, verification almost certainly would demand the use of invasive intelligence methods to access Chinese corporate networks — or, at least, their communications. This would require Beijing to trust that the United States will not pass on that information to American companies. Moreover, the fine distinctions that Americans want to draw between supporting commercial companies and collecting intelligence on foreign scientific developments and their related economic base also ask Beijing to accept U.S. government support to defense-industrial companies that now increasingly compete internationally, including with some Chinese firms. This seems like a little too much trust to ask of two governments that increasingly mistrust the intentions of one another — or at least of a Chinese government fearful that the United States secretly intends to subvert and change the regime. Strategic distrust may be a popular buzzword for discussions of the U.S.–China relationship, but the way some experts have characterized it suggests misunderstanding. Both sides justifiably think the other made promises, and both sides have broken some of these promises. They do not misunderstand each other; broken promises mean legitimate grievances. If the affirmation not to use national intelligence assets to steal intellectual property fails to be a signal success, then the consequences of this broken promise may be difficult if not impossible to amend. Probably more than any other issue, cyber has poisoned the well of U.S.–China relations as reports and leaks confirmed each side’s worst suspicions of the other’s activity in cyberspace.Solvency – Dialogue ***Expanded cooperation on cybersecurity creates constructive relationsLi and McElven 2015 (Cheng Li ; Ryan Mcelveen, director of the? HYPERLINK "" \t "_blank" John L. Thornton China Center?and a senior fellow in the? HYPERLINK "" \t "_blank" Foreign Policyprogram at Brookings.?Assistant Director of The Brookings Institution John L. Thornton China Center."A new type of cyber relations?," Brookings Institution, October Date accessed 7/12. ch/articles/2015/10/new-type-cyber-relations-li-mcelveen /DDI-AC)<Prior to Xi’s visit, the atmosphere surrounding bilateral relations was hardly conducive to productive discussions during his time in the United States. Expectations were low—characteristic of most US state visits by Chinese leaders—and the relationship was probably at its most tense point since Xi assumed the presidency in 2012. China’s recent stock market crisis, activities in the South China Sea and purported attempts at cyberespionage all had sown deep mistrust among the American public. But unlike the previous meetings between presidents Obama and Xi at Sunnylands in 2013 and at Zhongnanhai in 2014, Xi’s 2015 state visit to the United States was far more successful at deftly defusing concerns and changing the dynamics of the relationship. While this visit brought progress in several important areas, including China’s commitments on climate change and UN Peacekeeping support, it also left many unanswered questions on the South China Sea, Chinese market access and human rights issues. But one area saw progress and a potential breakthrough: the issue of cybercrime. The Sunnylands summit in June 2013 marked the beginning of the effort of both countries to address cyber issues, or “uncharted waters,” as President Obama referred to them at the time. US leaders had been prepared to enter that summit with the upper hand on cyber issues: The meeting would occur only four months after the release of a US report revealing that the Chinese government had infiltrated almost 150 major US corporations and agencies over the previous seven years. Unfortunately for the US, two days before the summit was to begin, the initial account of National Security Agency espionage was published in the British newspaper The Guardian, marking the beginning of America’s Edward Snowden-induced diplomatic nightmare. Instead of providing President Obama with the perfect opportunity to confront China about its years of intellectual property theft from US firms, the Sunnylands meeting forced him into a defensive posture. Both sides agreed at the time that international law applies to cyberspace; and they set up a bilateral, cybersecurity working group. But the progress was short lived—the working group was later disbanded. The progress on cyber issues during Xi’s 2015 state visit seems more promising. For the first time, China has agreed that the theft of intellectual property for commercial use is unacceptable, stating that “neither country’s government will conduct or knowingly support cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property…with the intent of providing competitive advantages to companies or commercial sectors.” To ensure they actually live up to this promise, both countries also agreed to respond in a timely manner to requests for information about malicious cyberactivities, and to help mitigate such actions that occur on their territory. If concerns arise, there will be two new mechanisms by which to address them: a high-level joint dialogue that will meet biannually beginning in 2015 to review the processing of requests for information on malicious cyberactivities; and a new cyber-incident hotline. While these actions may be considered small steps, they provide a crucial starting point for future dialogue. A positive sign came soon after President Xi’s visit, when several hackers identified by US officials were arrested in China for stealing US commercial secrets on behalf of Chinese state-run corporations. In the coming months, the United States will need to monitor whether China shows any willingness to prosecute these and other known hackers, whether responses to other concerns about China’s cyberactivities are received, and—most critically—whether there is an appreciable decrease in the overall number of cyberattacks,. If progress remains elusive, the US still holds in its arsenal—as a result of an executive order signed by President Obama in April 2015—the ability to implement economic sanctions against Chinese companies and persons accused of cybercrimes targeting companies or US citizens. In the long term, the US should continue to push for the development of and agreement to international cybernorms, a détente-like cyberarms agreement, and the gradual expansion of internet freedom in China. Although progress on these issues will take significant time and effort, the result will be a far more constructive political and economic US-China relationship. networks began to experience an alarming number of cyber breaches. In response, Congress created the Federal Computer Incident Response Center (FedCIRC) at the General Services Administration as a centralized hub of coordination and information sharing between federal organizations. With the creation of the Department of Homeland Security in 2002, Congress transferred these responsibilities to the new Department. In 2003, FedCIRC was renamed “US-CERT,” and its mission was expanded to include providing boundary protection for the federal civilian executive domain and cybersecurity leadership. This shared responsibility has evolved over time to make US-CERT a trusted partner and authoritative source in cyberspace for the Federal Government; SLTT governments; private industry; and international organizations. ***Solves MiscalcLack of communication makes miscalc likely- communication and norms solve relationsHarold et al., 2016 (Senior Policy Analyst @ RAND Corporation, ~Scott Warren Harold, Martin C. Libicki, Astrid Stuth Cevallos, April 2016 "Getting to Yes with China in Cyber Space" Rand? DDI -TM)Since the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949, the U.S.-China relationship has been characterized by conflict, confrontation, and strategic mistrust. The tensions that divide the two countries have been growing in importance in recent years. Unfortunately, they apply just as much to cyberspace as to relations in the physical world. Indeed, of all the areas where the relationship between the two sides is troubled, cyberspace has been one of the most contentious. The United States and China began formal negotiations in 2013 to resolve such differences only to see them abruptly suspended in 2014, when China broke them off in response to the U.S. indictment of several Chinese military officers on charges related to cyber-espionage activities. This study explores U.S. policy options for managing relations with China over this critical policy area through the use of agreements and norms of behavior. It looks at two basic questions: Can the United States and China achieve meaningful outcomes through formal negotiations over norms and rules in cyberspace? And, if so, what areas are most likely to yield agreement and what might be exchanged for what? This analysis should be of interest to two communities: those concerned with U.S. relations with China, and those concerned with developing norms of conduct in cyberspace, notably those [things] that enhance security and freedom.Attribution and critical infrastructure provisions create norms on behavior and allows for transparency that prevents miscalculationSegal 2015 - Adam, Maurice R. Greenberg Senior Fellow for China Studies and Director of the Digital and Cyberspace Policy Program at the Council on Foreign Relations, September, "STABILIZING C YBER SECURIT Y IN THE U.S.-CHINA RELATIONSHIP", the two sides are unlikely to close the gap on cyberespionage, they should broaden and deepen the discussions on cybersecurity and cyberconflict. Beijing suspended the U.S.-China cyber working group after the indictment of five alleged PLA hackers in May 2014, but the discussions to manage disagreements do not have to be housed within one formal structure and should continue in the S&ED and military-to-military contacts. The announcement of a new dialogue between the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and Chinese Ministry of Public Security is a useful step, though it will focus on cybercrime. Attribution remains a point of contention, with Beijing calling the United States’ claim that China was behind the attacks on the U.S. Office of Personal Management “irresponsible and unscientific.” Yet a shared understanding of what types of evidence can be used to attribute an attack and how that information is presented would be an important first step to defining norms of behavior. At the June 2015 S&ED, State Councilor Yang Jiechi called for China to work with the United States to develop an “international code of conduct for cyber information sharing.” While the Chinese side has not offered any specifics, Washington and Beijing could establish a joint forensics team, made up of experts from the government, private sector, and academia, to investigate an attack on a third party and identify types of information to be shared. Beijing and Washington have a common interest in preventing escalatory cyberoperations—attacks that one side sees as legitimate surveillance but the other views as prepping the battlefield. The two sides could consider conducting formal discussions on acceptable norms of behavior and possible thresholds for use of force as well as greater transparency on doctrine. These cooperative measures can reduce the chance of misperception and miscalculation and thus diminish the likelihood that a conflict in cyberspace will become kinetic. Additionally, Beijing and Washington have a common interest in preventing extremists and other third parties from attacking critical infrastructure. Terrorist groups have so far shown greater dexterity in the use of the web for recruitment, fundraising, and propaganda than in launching destructive attacks, but that will change over time. The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), for example, has a stated desire to develop cyberweapons and has reportedly recruited hackers from Western Europe. To respond to emerging challenges, the United States and China should discuss joint measures to prevent the proliferation of capabilities.China’s military strategy guarantees cyber escalation. VornDick,US Navy lieutenant commander,2013 (Wilson, “The Real U.S.-Chinese Cyber Problem”, 7-30, )Cyber in China’s Recent Defense White Paper These pronouncements come at the heels of China’s recently published defense white paper that publicly promulgates its military’s intentions. “Cyber” is mentioned only twice in the entire paper. China did recognize however, that “changes in the form of war from mechanization to informationization are accelerating,” while “major powers are vigorously developing new and more sophisticated military technologies so as to ensure that they can maintain strategic superiorities in international competition in such areas as . . . cyber space.” China also unequivocally stated in the document that it would “counterattack” if attacked. Troubling Prospects for U.S.-Chinese Cyber Operations This is particularly troubling for Chinese and American authorities because it is unclear whether or not they could manage their cyber responses in a measured and proportional way if an unofficial or official outbreak of digital force, intentional or not, were to occur. The severity of this issue is intensified by the lack of official Chinese pronouncements or transparency on their cyber operations. Clandestine cyber units, such as the PLA-sponsored Unit 61398 in Shanghai, operate with destructive global reach, adding a layer of uncertainty to an illicit cyber response. After a thorough analysis of the defense white paper, it is clear that the Chinese leadership is reticent to articulate their intentions in cyber warfare. For defense purposes, this is troublesome for Washington. There is a variety of political and military reasons for this course of action. Perhaps this Chinese reluctance in setting the guidelines of response stems from the lack of pressure from the United States and other nations. In any case, it is doubtful that the leadership would state a different course of action than its professed desire to conduct only defensive and nonaggressive operations. Despite this, there is a distinct possibility that if push came to shove, Chinese leadership may be ill-equipped to bring its digital forces to bear or reign in these forces in a responsive, proportional manner once they are released. This is precisely because the Chinese lack LOAC doctrine, training and first-hand experience. The Chinese leadership could make a disastrous miscalculation if it were to mismatch capability or response with the objective or threat at hand, thus risking more confusion and escalation. The recent summit in June may be step toward some sort of digital détente or cyberwar norm. The two states should work to form one sooner rather than later, lest they push each other over the digital edge.Lack of rule in cyberspace is the cause of instability and uncertainty Vinik 15 Danny Vinik is the assistant editor of The Agenda at Politico. He previously was a staff writer at The New Republic and his work has appeared in the Washington Monthly and Business Insider. 12-9-2015, "America’s secret arsenal," Agenda, “I think the policy that goes along with the employment of cyber is still in its early stakes,” Alexander said. “So having the rules of engagement, the policy out there when to act—you’re more into an early stage than you are people really having a concrete set of decision points.” In one sense, specifying rules of engagement is even more important for cyber weapons than for kinetic ones, he said, because attacks occur so rapidly in the cyber realm. Alexander used the example of a missile flying at a city in the U.S. while the North American Aerospace Defense Command was unable to get in touch with key decision makers—the secretary of Defense and president—about whether to shoot it down. Under that scenario, U.S. rules of engagement dictate that NORAD can shoot it down. “Now, if someone is attacking our infrastructure and they’re doing it at network speed, Cyber Command should probably defend the nation,” he said. But, he added, “We haven’t gotten, in my opinion, to that point yet. But I think they’re getting close. The reason is people don’t understand how bad cyber can be.” "We are still, as are all governments, thinking through how do you actually employ these capabilities in a way that make sense and how do you fit them into your larger strategic context," said Daniel, who leads the White House's development of its cyber strategy. "You don't just carry out a cyber operation for the sake of carrying out a cyber operation." WHILE THE DEBATE over U.S. offensive cyber strategy may be happening quietly in the federal government, it’s playing out quite publicly among outside experts. In early November, Himes and four other lawmakers sent a letter to Secretary of State John Kerry and National Security Adviser Susan Rice proposing a cyber convention like the Geneva Convention, to lay out rules of the road for cyber. “Now is the time for the international community to seriously respond again with a binding set of international rules for cyberwarfare: an E-Neva Convention,” they wrote. One key concern they have is what actually constitutes an act of war in the digital realm, versus a smaller crime or nuisance. “What is cyber war?” Rep. Lynn Westmoreland (R-Ga.), the chair of the House Intelligence subcommittee on NSA and Cybersecurity who also signed the letter, said in an interview. “What is it?” “What if Iran melted down one server at Florida Power and Light? They do $5,000 worth of damage. That sounds to me like a crime,” Himes said. “But what if they melt down a whole bunch of servers, a network goes down and a bunch of people die? That feels to me like an act of war.” He added: “But these lines aren’t drawn. Because they're not drawn, is our response to have the FBI investigate and file a diplomatic démarche? Or is our response to do a cyber reprisal? Or is our response to do a kinetic reprisal? We don't know. I think that's a real problem.” Another key question in the cyber realm is if any specific infrastructure is off limits, the way hospitals are supposed to be off-limits in kinetic war. Is an electrical grid a valid target? Knocking out the Internet or the power can cause immense damage to civilians, particularly in advanced countries like the United States whose economies depend heavily on the Internet. Forging consensus on these questions is hard but not impossible. Already, the international community is coalescing around an agreement that states cannot conduct cyber espionage for commercial purposes. Whether countries such as China will actually abide by that is unclear, but countries have at least agreed on that norm in principle. Even among cyber experts, crafting a cohesive rules of engagement is proving to be a challenge. “I don’t know if you could come up with a set policy,” Westmoreland said. “I think it would have to be some type of living document that would allow it to change when technology changes.” Daniel said that coming out with a specific case-by-case framework was not possible. "The idea that we are going to be able to spell out in detail exactly how we would respond to any particular incident or activity, I think doesn’t fully account for how we are going to have to act in the real world," he said. When I asked Himes how the U.S. government should craft a cyber strategy if it can’t prepare for every possible scenario, he responded: “The laws of war, if you will, aren’t about describing every possible scenario. They are about articulating principles.” This top-level guidance needs to come not from cyber experts but from elected leaders—and, observers say, so far that direction has not been forthcoming. “Part of the problem is that there are so many senior people in the government, especially coming out of the political world, that just don’t understand enough about the technology,” Borg said. “They really are remarkably uninformed.” You can see this in New Jersey Gov. Chris Christie’s comments about cyber in the last Republican debate. “If the Chinese commit cyberwarfare against us, they are going to see cyberwarfare like they have never seen before,” he said. Saber-rattling against the Chinese is nothing new for a U.S. presidential election, but it’s hard to imagine Christie making a similar claim about conventional war. In one sense, that’s because it’s hard to imagine Christie ever being confronted with that scenario. No one is foreseeing an imminent kinetic attack from China. But that’s precisely what makes cyber so difficult: What exactly would qualify as cyberwarfare? And what type of Chinese cyber attack would result in “cyberwarfare like [China has] never seen before”? It seems superfluous to mention, perhaps, but cyberwar with China is war with China. And a war that starts out in the cyber realm can quickly migrate to other realms. “I consider the current state of affairs to be extremely volatile and unstable because one could escalate a cyberwar pretty quickly,” said Sami Saydjari, the founder of the Cyber Defense Agency consulting firm, who has been working on cyber issues for more than three decades. “You can imagine a scenario where a country instigates a cyberwarfare-like event but does it in such a way to blame another country, which causes an escalation between those countries, which accidentally causes a kinetic escalation, which accidentally reaches the nuclear level. This is not an implausible scenario.” Not implausible, but perhaps not likely either. At the moment, cyber experts say, the world is at a tenuous moment of cyber peace. For all the constant theft and hacking, nobody is waging overt attacks on infrastructure and assets. But they also say this relative stability masks the underlying threats in the cyber world. “I would say we’re in a cold war, not a peace,” Alexander said. “If you paint a picture of the world above, people are shaking hands. And then below the water, they’re kicking like crazy. I think in cyber there’s so much going on in cyber that it’s invisible to most people.” If a major cyber incident occurred in the U.S.—one that actually hurt or even killed Americans—the public would quickly want some answers, and likely a plan for defense and retaliation. In the absence of more specific rules of engagement, it’s clear to many experts what’s going to happen at this point: We’re going to improvise. “If there were a cyber incident in the United States, we’d do it from scratch,” said Martin Libicki, a senior scientist and cyberwarfare expert at the RAND Corporation. “I don't care what's been written. That's just the nature of the beast.”This retaliation to perceived attacks causes cascading retaliation and ramps up tensions with the USAdam 15, Digital Shadows analyst, (“Raising The Stakes - U.S. Retaliation For Chinese Cyber Espionage Has The Potential For Escalation”, 8-18, )Studies of Chinese military and geopolitical activity and Chinese strategic publications such as The Science of Military Strategy (SOMS), a PLA strategy document, indicate that challenging the balance of power by adopting a more assertive strategic posture is currently a key Chinese strategy. This has brought it into conflict with the U.S., which has frequently voiced objections to China’s behaviour but is yet to mount any serious public opposition. Despite this, China perceives the U.S. as a significant threat and is deeply concerned that the U.S., which China knows is militarily superior, will act to contain China. China also perceives the U.S. as a significant espionage threat and prioritises improving its defensive and counterintelligence capabilities very highly. These concerns receive significant attention in SOMS, indicating that they are likely to be relatively high priorities for the Chinese Government. According to SOMS, cyber espionage operations are an important part of this strategy and because the Chinese state sees the U.S. as a significant threat, it is therefore likely that the U.S. is a major target for such operations. Although China’s current line is that it never engages in any form of offensive network operation or cyber espionage, these claims are contradicted by the extensive discussion of the importance of such operations in SOMS. In addition to operations conducted by the PLA, which are likely to primarily focus on military, government and industrial targets, the Ministry of State Security (MSS) is also strongly suspected of conducting cyber espionage operations against foreign targets. These operations are likely to focus on gathering intelligence on potential threats to China’s internal security. Additionally, there are strong indications that multiple Chinese state organisations, including PLA units, conduct extensive operations against a wide range of commercial organisation for the purposes of economic espionage and intellectual property theft. While these actors’ operations likely service a wide range of objectives, intelligence which might provide China with a strategic advantage over the U.S. is likely to be considered particularly valuable. The OPM breach is therefore consistent with current assessments of China’s intelligence gathering objectives and broader strategic goals. THE RISK OF ESCALATION The core significance of this development lies in the potential for escalation. The U.S. Government has publicly stated that it intends to pursue a range of options in retaliating against China and, in response, China firmly asserted that it would match any U.S. measures taken against it. If the Obama administration merely intends to make symbolic gestures in order to appease those in Congress who want to see the U.S. take a harder line on China, then this confrontation is unlikely to escalate significantly. However, if the intention is to take more drastic measures, such as the reported suggestion of compromising the Great Firewall and thereby compromising the Chinese Government’s ability to censor the Internet, then escalation is highly likely, particularly if the U.S. does so publicly. The Chinese population tends to be relatively nationalistic and a hugely important aspect of modern Chinese nationalism is based around never allowing past “national humiliations”, such as the Opium Wars, the western intervention following the Boxer Rebellion, and the Japanese occupation, to be repeated. Furthermore, the current Chinese Communist Party (CPC) line is that the CPC “rescued” China from a “century of humiliation” when it took power in 1949 and the party derives much of its legitimacy from its self-ascribed role as the protector of China’s sovereignty from outside threats. In the minds’ of the CPC’s leaders any failure by the state to protect this sovereignty, real or perceived, constitutes a direct threat to the party’s legitimacy. Any U.S. retaliation, which could be perceived as an infringement of Chinese sovereignty, is therefore likely to face a robust response from the Chinese Government, which could potentially impact the two countries’ economic interactions and the delicate military situation in the South China Sea. CONCLUSIONS Although the U.S. has frequently accused China of espionage in the past without causing a serious escalation of tensions, the intention to retaliate has never before been publicly stated. If the U.S. conducts a major operation against China, such as compromising the Great Firewall, then escalation and Chinese retaliation is highly likely. In such a scenario there is a realistic possibility that Chinese actors would conduct attacks against U.S. organisations such as central and local government, military organisations and financial institutions. Furthermore, there is a realistic possibility that an escalation of tensions may lead Chinese hacktivists to independently target the U.S. Such actors are likely to be relatively indiscriminate in their targeting and could potentially direct attacks against a wide range of U.S. organisations. Therefore, if the U.S. intends to engage in a public show of dominance, as multiple prominent U.S. politicians have recommended, there is the potential for the number of attacks against the U.S. by both state and non-state Chinese actors to increase, along with the likelihood of unintended consequences.Chinese cyber attribution improvements are key distinguishing US cyber espionage from other actors – it’s a prerequisite to China agreeing to mutual forbearance and saying yes to the planHarold et al 16 – Libicki is an American scholar and Professor at the Frederick S. Pardee RAND Graduate School in Santa Monica, California, Harold is associate director of the RAND Center for Asia Pacific Policy, Cevallos is a political scientist at the RAND Corporation (Scott Warren, Martin C. Libicki, Astrid Stuth Cevallos, Getting to Yes with China in Cyberspace, Kindle, Introduction//JC)The Chinese we talked to rarely bothered to make even a pro forma denial that China conducts cyber espionage in general or economically motivated cyber espionage in particular. Chinese interviewees believe that the United States has militarized cyberspace—and they are determined not to be left too far behind in what they view as a competition (albeit one they regret taking place). The Chinese see cybersecurity talks as a way to appease U.S. irritation more than to achieve anything specific. In contrast, the United States places a much higher emphasis on using such dialogues to resolve cybersecurity issues. The Chinese do not appear to have a well-formed set of demands—not even a diminution of U.S. cyber espionage—that they would be willing to trade for any significant cessation of economically motivated cyber espionage (much less all categories of cyber espionage). Thus, it is difficult to see such cyber espionage as falling within the cyber trade space. The Chinese do not accept the U.S. proposition that a country has a right to unilaterally respond to cyberattacks qua the Law of Armed Conflict. One idea we mooted was for both countries to abjure attacks on each other’s critical infrastructure. There was considerable receptivity to this proposal, even when coupled with the proviso that both sides would also have to abjure cyber espionage on such targets. The sticking point was attribution. The United States believes it can catch China cheating and would like some process by which cheating, once discovered, is acknowledged so that some consequences (other than merely reputational ones) would follow. China believes it cannot catch the cheating by the United States and is apprehensive of any agreement that would put them at a corresponding disadvantage. Thus, any serious agreement would need a process that both sides could trust and/or some way to increase China’s confidence in its own attribution capabilities. This is a very difficult challenge but not, in our opinion, an absolutely hopeless one, provided that both sides were to agree to work on it in good faith. Were the United States and China to do so, we provide an initial set of thoughts that could be explored about how to move forward in this area. It is not clear, however, that China wants to get to yes on the issue—i.e., truly resolve it by establishing mutually agreed-upon and respected norms with respect to targeting in cyberspace—so much as it wants simply to get away from the issue. If that assessment is correct, then the United States is not likely to see its recently negotiated agreement with China on cyberspace lead to lasting changes in Chinese actions in cyberspace.InherencyAT: “Summit Solved” Summit could not resolve Cyber Security issues, but opened up an opportunity for further cyber negotiation Lewis, 15 (James Andrew Lewis? Senior Vice President and Director, Strategic Technologies Program, “Measuring the Cyber Security Success at the Summit,” CSIS, 11/21/15, doa 7/15/16, DDI, NB)If press reports are accurate, it is a welcome development that the United States and China (in response to the threat of sanctions) have begun negotiations on cybersecurity in preparation for the upcoming summit. The Obama administration has a unique moment of leverage on cyber security with China and must be careful not to squander it. We cannot expect the summit to “fix” the problem – this will be a long process if it is serious – but we can look for certain outcomes that can demonstrate whether these presidential talks point to progress or are just another gesture.? —If the only thing to emerge is an endorsement of the 2015 UN Group of Government Experts Report, hold your applause. The United States and China agreed to this report in June and presidential endorsement does not greatly improve the situation. The norms in the report, while useful, do not deal with the principle source of tension with China – espionage and theft of intellectual property – and the UN Report includes annoying language proposed by Russia and aimed at the United States that any accusation of hacking must be “substantiated.”? —An agreement not to attack critical infrastructure in peacetime is of symbolic value only. Neither China nor the United States intends to attack the other’s critical infrastructure in peacetime. This language is already in the June UN Report.? —A Summit endorsement of a ‘Code of Conduct” for cyberspace would be a major U.S. concession to the Chinese that the United States should not give without some significant and verifiable benefit in return. The code was drafted by Russia and China and its principle aim is to diminish the application of human rights and free access to information. If a reference to the Code of Conduct appears, the United States could try to argue that it meant some other code, but this nuance will be lost on most of the world which will perceive that the initiative in cybersecurity is shifting to Russia and China.? —If there is no reference to cyber espionage and no process to work on it, any summit agreement has not addressed the most important source of tension between the two countries. The Chinese will likely not want any reference to espionage in any document – no country would – but language that talks about the need to continue discussions to address other significant issues between the two counties and which identifies a process to do so would indicate success.? —If the summit agrees to simply restart the bilateral cybersecurity working group, it will indicate a lack of seriousness on China’s part. The working group was seen by China as a concession to the United States intended to channel American discontent into harmless exchanges. It was not senior enough to reach agreement and not connected to any larger negotiation that could have produced agreement. A working group is useful only if it is subsidiary to political-level talks.? —The Summit would be successful if it was able to define and initiate a political level negotiation (e.g. at the sub-cabinet level), like the arms control negation with the Soviets in the 1970s and 1980s. These talks should be open ended. A corollary would be to create regular military-to-military talks on cybersecurity between the Peoples Liberation Army and senior U.S. military officials. The Chinese have resisted such talks even though it is the PLA that is largely responsible for hacking. The Foreign Ministry has not been a serious interlocutor on cybersecurity. Given the difficulty of the problem, the lack of trust, and the importance of cyber espionage to powerful constituencies in China, the most tangible result would involve agreement on process since there is really no near-term “fix.”? —Cybersecurity can’t be addressed in a vacuum. It is not sui generis but a product of the larger security and trade issues that dog the evolving bilateral relationship. At a minimum, there should be a recognition that China’s new, restrictive laws and rules that apply to American tech companies are as important a part of the cybersecurity problem as critical infrastructure protection and a serious negotiation must address them. This means that anything that emerges from the summit must create linkages (another term from the arms control lexicon) among issues that the United States currently keeps separate – critical infrastructure, intellectual property protection, governance and trade. This broad approach runs counter to the bureaucratic division in the U.S. government, but it will be more difficult to reach a sustainable agreement if they are not included in any agenda. This, of course, argues for a senior, political level negotiator who can transcend bureaucratic stovepipes.? There is always a temptation at summits to focus on deliverables and to prefer good news to bad, but this gives the other side an advantage and settling on a “good news” deliverable means the problem of cybersecurity will continue to be a source of tension and any agreement will be ineffective and unsustainable. The best outcome would be to begin a serious, senior level negotiating process that addresses the full range of issues. The worst outcome would be one that endorsed already-agreed report language and restarted unproductive working level discussions. The summit will not solve the cybersecurity problem, but if it is done right, it can be the beginning of a solution.The 2015 agreement is insufficient – cyberattacks will continue.Sarah Cook Senior Research Analyst For East Asia, 15 (11-9-2015, "Obama-Xi Agreement Will Not Resolve China Cybersecurity Threat," No Publication, , accessed: 6-12-2016, JH)One of the most touted takeaways from Chinese president Xi Jinping’s visit to the United States last month was an agreement by the two leaders on the contentious issue of cyberattacks—and especially cyberespionage—against American targets. Particular attention has been given to a commitment Xi and U.S. president Barack Obama made to avoid engaging in or knowingly supporting acts of cybertheft for economic gain. But while the commitment signals bilateral goodwill, there are a number of reasons to doubt its effectiveness in curbing commercial espionage and the broader problem of intrusive, destructive cyberattacks against a range of U.S. targets by entities tied to the Chinese government: Absence of clear standards or verification mechanisms: Security experts analyzing the agreement noted its vague wording and lack of definitions for what constitutes acceptable or unacceptable activity, meaning further negotiation would be required to render the agreement effective. Similarly, no objective metrics were identified for determining whether one side or the other has followed through on its commitments. These challenges, along with the near impossibility of tracing who is responsible for most cyberattacks, will make enforcement difficult. Omission of politically motivated attacks: More problematic from the perspective of privacy and freedom of expression was the cybertheft agreement’s focus on the economic realm. By framing the pact in this way, Obama and Xi ignored the increasingly aggressive, sophisticated, and widespread cyberattacks apparently committed by Chinese state actors against American media companies, human rights groups, individual activists, and government bodies. Thus, even if an agreement like this one had been in place for the past five years, it arguably would not have prevented attacks on Google in 2010 (which hacked rights defenders’ accounts, among other targets), media outlets like the New York Times in 2012 (seeking information on the sources for the paper’s investigation of former premier Wen Jiabao’s family wealth), or a massive denial-of-service attack against the code-sharing platform GitHub in March of this year. Nor would it have helped stem routine phishing attacks that target overseas Chinese, Tibetan, and Uighur activists and, increasingly, U.S. government personnel. Failure to address vulnerabilities created by China’s Great Firewall: More indirectly, any agreement that depoliticizes the Chinese government’s internet policies is overlooking the general security problems created by the Great Firewall (GFW)—Beijng’s system for monitoring and filtering internet communications between China and the outside world.2015 Summit was a necessary step but not sufficient to stopping Chinese Cyber Attacks Segal, 16 (Adam Segal Maurice R. Greenberg Senior Fellow for China Studies and Director of the Digital and cyberspace Policy Program, “The Top Five Cyber Policy Developments of 2015: United States- China Cyber Agreement,” Council on Foreign Relations, 1/6/16, doa 7/15/16, DDI, NB)Was the agreement a real breakthrough, or just a tactical maneuver by China, an effort to prevent Washington from levying sanctions and disrupting a summit that was important politically for President Xi? There was positive follow up in the first round of cyber talks between the Department of Homeland Security and Chinese Ministry of Public Security in December 2015. The two sides agreed on guidelines for requesting assistance on cybercrime or other malicious cyber activities, as well as to conduct “tabletop exercises” in spring 2016 and to define procedures for use of the hotline also reported that China arrested some hackers before the summit, but the arrests were not publicized in China and the United States government has not confirmed. Security experts outside of China with connections to Chinese hackers have suggested that those arrested supplied malware to the PLA, but are not PLA operators.? In addition, after years of promoting the norm against cyber industrial espionage, the U.S. announcement was followed by a similar agreement between the UK and China, and a report that Berlin would sign a “no cyber theft” deal with Beijing in 2016. In November 2015, China, Brazil, Russia, the United States, and other members of the G20 accepted the norm against conducting or supporting the cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property.? This diplomatic effort is important progress, but early reports on whether these statements have had any affect on the scope and scale of cyberattacks on U.S. companies have been mixed at best. Just three weeks after the agreement, cybersecurity companies reported new attacks on pharmaceutical companies. Unnamed officials told the Washington Postthat the May 2014 indictment of five PLA hackers has had the effect of shifting much of the activity to the Ministry of State Security, but National Counterintelligence Executive Bill Evanina has said there is “no indication” from the U.S. private sector “that anything has changed.”? If during the first few months of 2016 there is no noticeable decline in the hacking, or if there is a major attack against a private firm, then pressure will rise on the Obama administration to levy sanctions on China. Even if it is a quiet year in terms of breaches, and that is a big if, China and the United States remain divided over Internet governance and policies designed to secure supply chains and information and communication technology equipment. U.S. technology companies will continue to find themselves squeezed by Chinese efforts to make the technology used in critical infrastructure “secure and controllable.” Cyberspace will continue to be an area of conflict and competition.Fall 2015 Cyber Security Summit did not curb Chinese Cyber attacks, plan is still necessary Chowdhry, 16 (Aisha Chowdhry is a staff writer covering Congress, the State Department, the Department of Veteran Affairs and the Department of Homeland Security, “U.S. China Still At Odds on Cyber Security Issues,” The Business of Federal Technology , 3/31/16, doa 7/15/16, , Buchholz)In the fall of 2015, the two countries agreed that they will not "conduct or knowingly support cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property, including trade secrets or other confidential business information, with the intent of providing competitive advantages to companies or commercial sectors," according to the White House.? But it remains to be seen if China has followed through on that promise.? "It doesn’t seem like much has really happened since the agreement in September," Sarah Granger, a fellow at the Truman National Security Project, told FCW. "I haven’t seen any evidence of increased arrests in China for 'cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property' outlined in the agreement, even though the idea was for more cooperation on investigating crimes. The number of incidents reported in recent months looks to be similar to those before the agreement, so we have no real evidence of any changes yet."? China has been unofficially tagged as the country responsible for the massive Office of Personnel Management hack that compromised the personal information of more than 22 million Americans, including federal employees.? ? "I think China has not let up on cyberattacks, and this is Obama's silent war," Jason Maloni, leader of the data security and privacy team at LEVICK, told FCW. "I think Obama will be pressing them harder to curtail the cyberattacks coming from the region, and that’s just not China -- it's [also] North Korea."? Maloni said one of the reasons why it's difficult for China to restrain those activities is because many hackers' livelihoods depend on it. "They are not doing the minimum, and I'm sure that’s what President Obama is going to press Xi on," Maloni said.***SQuo lack focus on building dialogue over cybersecurity despite opportunities for private connections, government to government connections lacking Warren et al ’15 (Scott Warren Harold is associate director of the RAND Center for Asia Pacific Policy, Martin Libicki is a senior management scientist at the RAND Corporation, a professor at the Pardee RAND Graduate School, and a Distinguished Visiting Professor at the U.S. Naval Academy, Astrid Cevallos is a Project Associate at the RAND Corporation. “Getting to Yes with China in Cyberspace”, , the RAND Corporation, Accessed July 14th 2016; DDI-RF)This report is a response to the absence of a formal dialogue and explores U.S. policy options for managing relations with China over this critical policy area. It looks at two basic questions: Can the United States and China return to meaningful formal negotiations over norms and rules in cyberspace? And if so, what areas are most likely to yield agreement and what might be exchanged for what? In a previous generation, when nuclear weapons atop intercontinental ballistic missiles guided by space-based overhead reconnaissance and targeting architectures were coming into being, U.S. experts rarely had an opportunity to engage directly with their Soviet counterparts to understand how they defined the problems associated with deterrence, their thinking about global norms, their assessments of how to communicate signals, or their insights into how best to approach cooperation and de-escalation. While the parallels between cyber and nuclear issues are often exaggerated and inexact, one area of commonality is in the fact that perceptions of vulnerability in both arenas have had and are continuing to have a substantial negative impact on bilateral stability between leading world powers. Fortunately, unlike in the Cold War, researchers in the United States and China can and regularly do exchange views on important issues of the day, creating the prospect for greater understanding and more accurate mutual assessments of the security challenges associated with managing their bilateral relationship. Despite these opportunities for information exchanges about cybersecurity, the prospects of cooperation over cyberspace have not been promising to date. To provide (but not necessarily endorse) two approaches toward cooperation, we note that Karl Rauscher and Yonglin Zhou of the EastWest Institute have proposed “fighting spam to build trust,” while Kenneth Lieberthal and Peter W. Singer of the Brookings Institution have proposed an entire set of cooperative measures.5 In the years since these studies were published, however, the relations between the two countries have only worsened over the cyber issue. As China cyber specialist Amy Chang argued, “the two nations continue to face substantial obstacles in developing cooperative efforts and improving mutual understanding” on the issue of cyberspace, to the point that “relations have devolved to near-complete distrust of each other’s motives, actions, and agendas, affecting other facets of the bilateral relationship.” Chang further points out that China’s network security policies are motivated . . . by the Chinese Communist Party’s goal of maintaining its own governing power . . . [by ensuring] domestic stability, territorial integrity, modernization, and economic growth, while simultaneously preparing for the possibility of militarized cyber conflict in the future.6 Similarly, cyber specialist James Lewis has noted that “political differences, competition for regional influence, and a general desire to undermine the U.S. position in Asia” are characteristic of Chinese policy toward cybersecurity, and these hamper the prospects of U.S.China cooperation.7 Chang agrees, noting that “there currently exist few incentives for China to cooperate meaningfully with more developed nations on curbing intellectual property theft [or] cybercrime.”82015 was a starting point for US-China cybersecurity, but loopholes still exist that the US needs to closeGady 2015 (Franz-Stefan Gady is a Senior Fellow at the EastWest Institute (ewi.ngo) and Associate Editor at The Diplomat magazine ()), 10-15-2015, "What Does the Future Hold for China-U.S. Relations in Cyberspace?," ICAS, <The September 25 joint statements issued in parallel by the Chinese government and the White House on how to strengthen bilateral relations in cyberspace is the most positive development between the two countries in this field since the June 2013 Sunnylands summit. Although not groundbreaking in its substance, the agreements—based on a Fact Sheet released by the White House—nevertheless establish a long-term framework for cooperation that may help reduce tensions in cyberspace between the two countries and furthermore solidify cyber-related issues as a top priority on the Sino-U.S. bilateral agenda. Conversely, it is important to understand that the agreements reached are only a starting point and need to be followed up by more concrete and more clearly defined documents specifically addressing issues that have plagued the Sino-U.S. bilateral relations in cyberspace from the start—issues such as questions over verification, terminology, and norms—otherwise real progress will not be likely. The most talked about section of the joint statement outlines that both countries will refrain from engaging or “knowingly” supporting “cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property, including trade secrets or other confidential business information, with the intent of providing competitive advantages to companies or commercial sectors.” This is an important diplomatic breakthrough. Curtailing Chinese state-sponsored cyber espionage activities has been the top priority of the Obama White House in the Sino-U.S. bilateral relationship in cyberspace for some time. Overall in the past year, the U.S. assumed a tougher U.S. stance on alleged Chinese state-sponsored cyberespionage activities. For example, in April 2015, U.S. President Barack Obama signed an executive order establishing the first-ever sanctions program specifically designed to deter state-sponsored malicious activities in cyberspace on a strategic scale declaring such activities a “national emergency.” In a separate analysis a few weeks back, I noted that by threatening sanctions, the Obama White House intends to elevate the subject of cyberespionage to a more strategic level between the two sides during bilateral discussions. Thus, the Chinese concession to agree to a joint statement on this subject can be construed as a diplomatic victory for the Obama administration. However, in order to yield more concrete results, the Xi-Obama statement needs to be immediately followed up by a more comprehensive agreement. For one thing, Chinese President Xi Jinping still maintains that his state is not collecting commercial intelligence and does not engage in cyberespionage therefore it is fair to assume that Xi could claim that the agreement does not apply to ongoing Chinese state-sponsored activities in cyberspace. Thus, it is easy for Beijing to support a new norm that the Chinese government insists it is following already. Moreover, the statement contains the loophole that both sides only refrain from “knowingly” supporting the collection of commercial intelligence—a position that both countries had already agreed to in past meetings. This provision permits plausible deniability for both sides when caught: Commercial espionage is often outsourced to quasi-independent (“patriotic”) hackers over which both governments can claim that they have no control. Last, the agreement only talks about refraining from collecting trade secrets rather than curtailing the passing on of intelligence to third parties (private companies) in order for them to gain a competitive advantage. However, practically every state in the world, including the United States, is engaged in collecting commercial intelligence and there is no agreed upon international norm against it. This could potentially undermine the larger legal principle behind the agreement to abstain from cyber-enabled intellectual property theft as outlined in the White House Fact Sheet.>***Although the US and China have recently reached a cybersecurity agreement, cyberattacks persist. Deeper engagement prevents attacks on critical infrastructure and the erosion of US-China relations.Chowdhry 16 (3-31-2016, Aisha Chowdhry is a staff writer covering Congress, the State Department, the Department of Veteran Affairs and the Department of Homeland Security for FCW. "U.S.-China still at odds on cybersecurity issues," FCW, , accessed: 6-21-2016, JH)President Barack Obama said he will continue to discuss matters of cybersecurity with the Chinese president on the sidelines of the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington. But some lawmakers and experts think he should be doing more. "We have deep concerns about our ability to protect the intellectual property of our companies," Obama said in a bilateral meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping on March 31 while kicking off the fourth and final Nuclear Security Summit. Obama said the two leaders will have a "candid exchange about areas where we have significant differences -- issues like human rights, cyber and maritime issues." In the fall of 2015, the two countries agreed that they will not "conduct or knowingly support cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property, including trade secrets or other confidential business information, with the intent of providing competitive advantages to companies or commercial sectors," according to the White House. But it remains to be seen if China has followed through on that promise. "It doesn’t seem like much has really happened since the agreement in September," Sarah Granger, a fellow at the Truman National Security Project, told FCW. "I haven’t seen any evidence of increased arrests in China for 'cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property' outlined in the agreement, even though the idea was for more cooperation on investigating crimes. The number of incidents reported in recent months looks to be similar to those before the agreement, so we have no real evidence of any changes yet." China has been unofficially tagged as the country responsible for the massive Office of Personnel Management hack that compromised the personal information of more than 22 million Americans, including federal employees. "I think China has not let up on cyberattacks, and this is Obama's silent war," Jason Maloni, leader of the data security and privacy team at LEVICK, told FCW. "I think Obama will be pressing them harder to curtail the cyberattacks coming from the region, and that’s just not China -- it's [also] North Korea." Maloni said one of the reasons why it's difficult for China to restrain those activities is because many hackers' livelihoods depend on it. "They are not doing the minimum, and I'm sure that’s what President Obama is going to press Xi on," Maloni said. Rep. Chris Smith (R-N.J.), whose computer and committee networks were hacked by someone traced back to Beijing, told FCW that "not even a little bit" has been done when it comes to the cybersecurity agreement. Smith is a senior member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and co-chairman of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China. "There is a deep concern that if the Chinese government penetrates [the Pentagon], as we think they are trying to do, can they turn off a water supply?" Smith said. "What mischief can be unleashed?" Despite the skepticism, Obama and Xi both had positive outlooks. "On the basis of respecting each other's core interests and major concerns, we should seek active solutions through dialogue and consultation," Xi told members of the press at the Walter E. Washington Convention Center. "Even when this is not possible, for the time being, we should manage them constructively and avoid misunderstanding and misperception or escalation, and prevent big disruptions to the overall interests of China-U.S. cooperation."AT: “Attacks are Down”***Despite the signing of agreements, Chinese hacks continue to increase in scale and extremityUSAFEATURESMEDIA 16 [Writer for cyberwar.news and , “Despite Cyber Agreement, State Dept. Says China Is Continuing To Launch Attacks At U.S. Systems”, July 4, 2016, , Cyber War News, Yvonne Fondrevay]Chinese cyber attacks against U.S. IT systems are “ongoing,” according to the State Department, and increased use of covert cyber tools and methods by Beijing hackers has produced a statistical decline in cyber activities. As reported by the Washington Free Beacon, an internal State Department security report by the department-led Overseas Security Advisory Council, or OSAC, which is a public-private partnership, is challenging the conclusions of a recent study by FireEye, a private cybersecurity firm, that said China had refrained from large-scale cyber attacks.“While media reporting has emphasized this alleged decrease in malicious activity, cases of Chinese espionage campaigns against the U.S. private sector are ongoing,” the report said, adding that “OSAC constituents should remain aware that China is still considered a highly capable and motivated cyber threat actor.” The three-page report detailing Chinese cyber activity and threats is another foreign policy hit against the White House, which is attempting to portray a September 2015 deal between President Obama and President Ji Xinping of Chian to limit cyber economic espionage as a breakthrough in diplomacy. Since the deal was inked, several private security firms have offered differing analyses regarding whether China has actually limited or cut back on large scale cyber attacks, the OSAC report said. The report further notes that Chinese hacks and attacks last year were especially damaging, the WFB noted. “At a higher level, paramount attacks against various U.S. organizations continued in 2015 and Chinese hackers exceeded other nation-state actors for consistency, volume, and severity of cyber attacks during the past year,” the June 27 report said. “This included intrusions into healthcare systems Anthem and Premera, and the Office of Personnel Management, collectively compromising the sensitive data of over 100 million U.S. citizens.” Until the release of this latest report, U.S. intelligence officials have not said unequivocally that China had or had not curbed it cyber activities. The OSAC report noted that the large-scale attacks in 2015 “suggests some China-based hacking groups may have shifted their focus from data theft for economic gain to national security interests and personally identifiable information (PII).”According to the State Department-affiliated group, Chinese cyber attacks also have been focused on “continuously leveraging U.S. network infrastructure for offensive operations”. “Actors have been observed using servers of small businesses in the U.S. to plan and execute attacks against manufacturing firms, financial organizations, and the technology sector,” the report said. Rick Fisher, an expert on Chinese affairs and defense, said China’s Communist leaders see no positive or negative inducement to curbing the use of cyberspace for global intelligence gathering, which can also be utilized to prepare attacks on cyber-electronic infrastructures. “American verbal argument or political pressure is not going convince the [Chinese Communist Party] leadership to stop waging its global cyber war,” Fisher, a senior fellow at the International Assessment and Strategy Center, told the WFB. “Washington has been trying to engage the Chinese on its cyber war for nearly 20 years and has basically gotten nowhere,” he added.China continuing cyber attacks on U.S. networks despite agreement made in SeptemberGertz ’16 - Bill Gertz is senior editor of the Washington Free Beacon. Prior to joining the Beacon he was a national security reporter, editor, and columnist for 27 years at the Washington Times. Bill is the author of six books, four of which were national bestsellers. His most recent book was The Failure Factory, a look at an out-of-control government bureaucracy that could have been a primer for the Tea Party. Bill has an international reputation.” China Continuing Cyber Attacks on U.S. Networks” – The Washington Free Beacon – 03/18 - months after China pledged to halt cyber espionage against the United States, Beijing’s hackers continue to conduct cyber attacks on government and private networks, the commander of U.S. Cyber Command told Congress. Despite a formal pledge made by Chinese leader Xi Jinping in September, “cyber operations from China are still targeting and exploiting U.S. government, defense industry, academic, and private computer networks,” Adm. Mike Rogers, the Cybercom chief, said in prepared testimony to a House Armed Services subcommittee on Wednesday. Rogers echoed comments on continued Chinese cyber attacks made by Director of National Intelligence James Clapper in February. Clapper said in Senate testimony that “it remains to be seen” if China will abide by the informal pledge made during a summit meeting in Washington with President Obama. Rogers said he agreed with Clapper that China’s commitment to halt cyber espionage attacks remains an open question. China has been linked by U.S. intelligence agencies to wide-ranging cyber attacks aimed at stealing information and mapping critical computer networks for future attacks in a crisis or conflict. Despite the Chinese hacking activity, the Obama administration has taken no action against China for years of large-scale cyber attacks that officials say have cost the nation billions of dollars in stolen intellectual property and compromised networks. Rogers also warned that nation states with advanced cyber warfare capabilities are taking steps to mask their cyber attacks by cooperating with non-government hackers. Unspecified nation states are expanding cooperation “with a much broader range” of hackers in a bid to hide the source of sophisticated cyber attacks. “I think this is in no small part an attempt to obscure what the real originator of the activity is,” he said. The use of surrogate hackers makes it more difficult for the U.S. government to confront foreign states about cyber attacks. “And they say, ‘It’s not us. It’s some criminal group; we don’t control all that,’” Rogers said. Rogers also disclosed new details about cyber attacks against the email system used by the military’s Joint Chiefs of Staff, an attack that officials have blamed on Russia. The July attack shut down an unclassified email server for 10 days and disrupted an email system used by 4,000 users on the network. Pentagon officials believe the attack came from Russian government hackers. “Ultimately we were able to defeat the [intrusion] attempt in almost 60 other networks simultaneously except in this one particular network,” Rogers said, noting that the final defense against cyber attacks is the user of a computer. “In this case we had a user who clicked on a link that I said ‘What would lead you to do this? Read this. It doesn’t make any sense.’” Because computer users in the Joint Staff clicked on an email link that downloaded a virus, the Pentagon was forced to spend time and money and limit use of the system. “We can’t afford to have this sort of thing,” Rogers said. Under questioning from Rep. Elise Stefanik (R., N.Y.), Rogers said he is “comfortable” that Cyber Command has enough military capabilities to counter cyber threats from Russia, China, and other states and entities. “I’ve yet to run into a threat scenario that we couldn’t deal with,” he said. But Rogers voiced worries about his command having enough forces to deal with the threats. “What concerns me is capacity—how much of it do you have and as the threats proliferate, our ability to deal with high-end, simultaneous complicated threats, that’s probably the biggest limiting factor right now,” he said. The four-star admiral testified before the House Armed Services subcommittee on emerging threats and capabilities, which oversees the command. The command spends around $500 million annually and is in the process of creating cyber mission teams that are deployed with warfighting commands and other military units. The teams conduct both defensive and offensive cyber operations. The command is based at Fort Meade, Md., and works closely with the National Security Agency, the electronic spy agency that Rogers also leads. Separately, Defense Secretary Ash Carter testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee on Thursday and revealed the Pentagon is adding $900 million for cyber defenses and operations in fiscal 2017. Much of that sum is focused on countering advanced threats from states like China and Russia. “Reflecting our renewed commitment to deterring even the most advanced adversaries, the budget also invests in cyber deterrence capabilities, including building potential military response options,” Carter said. Rogers said he is concerned that evolving cyber attacks are being used to acquire large databases that can be used for future cyber attacks or for foreign intelligence operations. Two recent examples were the cyber attacks against the Office of Personnel Management, which obtained records on more than 22 million federal workers, and the Anthem Healthcare cyber attacks that obtained some 80 million health records. “OPM, Anthem, those are good examples to use of data now [being] a commodity that have value for a variety of purposes, whether that be counterintelligence, whether it be social engineering and helping to refine cyber activity. You’ll see increased attacks against Big Data concentrations in the future,” Rogers said. Ransomware attacks—malicious cyber attacks that encrypt data on a targeted computer and then extort the owners of the data to have it decrypted—also pose a growing threat. Security researchers this week traced ransomware attacks to China, Reuters reported on Tuesday, noting that cyber tools used in the attacks were associated with earlier Chinese-linked cyber attacks. “If you watch over the next year, you’ll see a lot more ransomware activity,” Rogers said. In his prepared testimony to the subcommittee, Rogers said cyber attacks by a range of nations and non-state actors are intensifying. While North Korea has not conducted a repeat of its November 2014 cyber attack against Sony Pictures Entertainment, “we have seen a wide range of malicious cyber activities aimed against American targets and victims elsewhere around the world, and thus we are by no means sanguine about the overall trends in cyberspace,” he said. Cyber attacks are ubiquitous. “Literally every American who has connected to a network has been affected, directly or indirectly, by cyber crime,” Rogers said. “By this point millions of us have had personal information stolen, or seen our accounts or credit compromised.” Some 300 American companies involved in critical infrastructure, such as electrical power, finance, communications and transportation, are working with Cybercom to study ways to protect against major cyber attacks, Rogers noted. “We remain vigilant in preparing for future threats, as cyber attacks could cause catastrophic damage to portions of our power grid, communications networks, and vital services,” he said. Coordinated cyber attacks in Ukraine last December disrupted the power grid and damaged electricity control systems. “If directed at the critical infrastructure that supports our nation’s military, cyber attacks could hamper our forces, interfering with deployments, command and control, and supply functions, in addition to the broader impact such events could have across our society,” Rogers said, adding that the major cyber threats remain Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea. Rogers said cyber attackers from several nations have explored computer networks used to control critical infrastructure and “can potentially return at a time of their choosing” to disrupt or damage the infrastructure. AT: “Current Relations Solve”***Current US/China cybersecurity agreements are unsuccessful Sengal ’16 [Adam Segal is the Ira A. Lipman Chair in Emerging Technologies and National Security and Director of the Digital and Cyberspace Policy Program at the Council on Foreign Relations, “The Top Five Cyber Policy Developments of 2015: United States-China Cyber Agreement”, 1/4/16, ] For much of 2015, cyber espionage was an especially contentious issue in the U.S.-China relationship as Washington pushed for a norm against cyberattacks on private companies designed to steal intellectual property, trade secrets, or business strategies. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel Russel warned that cyberspace had the “potential to drive strategic mistrust in the relationship,” and Beijing called U.S. hacking charges “irresponsible and unscientific.” Claims that China-based hackers were behind the attacks on the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and the theft of the data of 22 million individuals further exacerbated tensions, even though the administration was careful to distinguish between legitimate political and military espionage, which the OPM hack would seem to be, and cyber industrial espionage (leading to a weird sort of professional admiration, with Director for National Intelligence James Clapper speaking on China and the OPM hack saying he “kind of salutes them for what they did“). In the weeks before President Xi Jinping’s visit to Washington, press leaks suggested that the White House was considering sanctioning Chinese individuals or entities that benefit from cyber theft. The threat seemed to have worked. In September 2015, at a joint press conference in the Rose Garden, President Obama announced that the United States and China had agreed that neither government “will conduct or knowingly support cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property, including trade secrets or other confidential business information for commercial advantage.” Washington and Beijing would also provide timely responses to requests for assistance in cybercrime investigations; cooperate in conducting investigations and collecting evidence; identify and endorse norms of behavior in cyberspace; and establish two high level working groups and a hotline between the two sides. Was the agreement a real breakthrough, or just a tactical maneuver by China, an effort to prevent Washington from levying sanctions and disrupting a summit that was important politically for President Xi? There was positive follow up in the first round of cyber talks between the Department of Homeland Security and Chinese Ministry of Public Security in December 2015. The two sides agreed on guidelines for requesting assistance on cybercrime or other malicious cyber activities, as well as to conduct “tabletop exercises” in spring 2016 and to define procedures for use of the hotline. The Washington Post also reported that China arrested some hackers before the summit, but the arrests were not publicized in China and the United States government has not confirmed. Security experts outside of China with connections to Chinese hackers have suggested that those arrested supplied malware to the PLA, but are not PLA operators. In addition, after years of promoting the norm against cyber industrial espionage, the U.S. announcement was followed by a similar agreement between the UK and China, and a report that Berlin would sign a “no cyber theft” deal with Beijing in 2016. In November 2015, China, Brazil, Russia, the United States, and other members of the G20 accepted the norm against conducting or supporting the cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property. This diplomatic effort is important progress, but early reports on whether these statements have had any affect on the scope and scale of cyberattacks on U.S. companies have been mixed at best. Just three weeks after the agreement, cybersecurity companies reported new attacks on pharmaceutical companies. Unnamed officials told the Washington Post that the May 2014 indictment of five PLA hackers has had the effect of shifting much of the activity to the Ministry of State Security, but National Counterintelligence Executive Bill Evanina has said there is “no indication” from the U.S. private sector “that anything has changed.” If during the first few months of 2016 there is no noticeable decline in the hacking, or if there is a major attack against a private firm, then pressure will rise on the Obama administration to levy sanctions on China. Even if it is a quiet year in terms of breaches, and that is a big if, China and the United States remain divided over Internet governance and policies designed to secure supply chains and information and communication technology equipment. U.S. technology companies will continue to find themselves squeezed by Chinese efforts to make the technology used in critical infrastructure “secure and controllable.” Cyberspace will continue to be an area of conflict and competition. The recent agreement between the US and China referring to cybersecurity will failSteinberg ’15 Joseph Steinberg is a cybersecurity expert and entrepreneur. He is CEO of SecureMySocial, which recently brought to market the world's first system to warn people in real time if they are making inappropriate social media posts. He is also the inventor of several popular cybersecurity technologies, and the author of books and articles on information security and business-related topics.-“ 10 Issues With the China-US Cybersecurity Agreement”-Inc-Sept 27- While, at first glance, this pact may seem like a big victory for the United States--some experts estimate that over 80% of all information thefts targeting American businesses currently emanate from China--it actually appears to be more political posturing than a substantive agreement, and, in fact, in some ways may aggravate matters. While it may provide some hope that the ball of change has begun to roll, China still has a strong incentive to hack American people, businesses, and the government, and the present agreement seems to do little to change that situation. Here are ten problems with the agreement: 1. The agreement as explained by the White House prohibits hacking for commercial advantage, but other forms of hacking, including government on government spying, are allowed. Considering the recently discovered massive breach of the Office of Personnel Management--which led to millions of Americans having their private details and fingerprints stolen, and which many in the government believe was perpetrated by China--an agreement not addressing inter-governmental spying is severely deficient. The Chinese government could literally steal every American citizen's tax returns from the IRS and use the information within them for all sorts of nefarious purposes without violating the current agreement. (It is true that the US and many of its allies cyber-spy on one another, but, that is a separate issue with risk levels of a different magnitude.) 2. The agreement does not define any standards. What is considered hacking, and what is considered acceptable activity? What constitutes an attack? What is considered commercial--especially considering that the 12 largest Chinese companies are owned by its government? Is it acceptable for a business or government to counter-attack against a commercial party attacking it--when perhaps that party has been infected by malware and is the unwilling agent of someone else? Most international agreements use internationally-accepted or mutually-agreed-upon understandings of terms, standards, and the like. In the world of "cyber" these clarifications do not yet exist, and, without them, any agreement is subject to misinterpretation, misunderstanding, and abuse. 3. Based on the text of the Presidential statement, the agreement does not prohibit hacking individuals or businesses for purposes other than commercial gain. Taking out a public utility or financial network in order to inflict political harm? Using people's personal data or photos in order to blackmail them into spying for China? Both might be perfectly acceptable under this agreement. Furthermore, if Chinese agents were caught hacking an American cybersecurity business, defense contractor, or supplier of equipment don't you think they'll find a way to explain their actions as having governmental purposes? 4. Even if it were more comprehensive, the agreement is essentially unenforceable. There are no "inspections" or any other clear methods of implementing a "trust, but verify" strategy. One cannot simply prevent a country from launching cyberattacks by inspecting facilities as would be done to verify that a nation is not building nuclear weapons or the like. Hackers can be anywhere; it is a lot easier for them to hide--even in plain sight--than to hide thousands of centrifuges and a nuclear reactor. Chinese hackers don't even need to be in China in order to carry out their attacks. Furthermore, much as Iran sponsors terror through proxies--Hezbollah and the like--China could easily hack through third parties; it is often impossible to determine who is paying a hacker to carry out attacks, or if an attack is emanating from its true source or has been routed through another party. 5. Contrary to the perception that many people develop from fictional stories, experts often cannot identify with certainty the source of a professionally-executed cyberattack; to this day, experts disagree as to who carried out various high profile breaches. Furthermore, even when the culprit of an attack is identified, that party often has a great deal of plausible deniability. As Stewart Draper, Director of Insider Threats for Securonix, noted: "China has always denied involvement in data theft by its government, or encouraging Chinese companies to perform espionage." Practically speaking, should the need arise, how is the United States going to substantiate any perceived violations by China? 6. In order to verify that the parties are honoring their commitments, the US and China are supposed to "establish a high-level joint dialogue mechanism on fighting cybercrime and related issues" and "this mechanism will be used to review the timeliness and quality of responses to requests for information and assistance with respect to malicious cyber activity of concern identified by either side" In other words, the determination of whether the Chinese are adhering to the agreement will be a subjective decision based on conversations and communications; no objective metrics have been established by the agreement. This deficiency in the agreement is serious--as one of the arguments that has been made for supporting an agreement with China, as noted by Jason Healey, Senior Research Scholar at Columbia University's School of International and Public Affairs and Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council, has been that if China violates the agreement the United States "will be in a much stronger position to respond to Beijing over its commercial espionage" (perhaps by levying sanctions and/or gaining international support for sanctions). If there is no objective way to measure compliance, why would anyone support a US contention that China has violated the agreement? Measuring the number of arrests made by China at the request of the US, and calculating how much cooperation was received when aid was requested, are also poor methods to determine compliance; the US's primary need is not for China to arrest hackers, but to curtail the hacking. Under this agreement China can arrest hackers who are identified by the United States, and appear to be compliant, but simultaneously continue to tolerate or actively carry out attacks through other parties. Also, keep in mind that the most dangerous and damaging attacks are often those that have not been identified, and, therefore, for which no requests for assistance or arrests have been made. 7. Even if China desired to deliver on its promises, it is not clear that the country has the resources to do so. Chinese hackers are believed to commonly hack businesses within China, making one wonder whether the nation's government truly has the capability to curtail hacking. Furthermore, as Ken Westin, Senior Security Analyst at Tripwire noted, the Chinese government has "taken a stance of complete innocence when it comes to cyber war and espionage to the point of claiming naivety." This deal is "sort of like having two parties agree to not hit each other in the face, but one of the parties says he cannot agree because he doesn't have the ability to punch." 8. There is nothing in this agreement that addresses Chinese censorship or abuse of human rights. While some might argue that those are not issues related to hacking, a government that shuts off access to portions of the Internet that allow free communication is essentially no different than a party that executes denial-of-service attacks. And human rights cannot be left off the table. 9. The agreement states that two nations will not "conduct or knowingly support cyber-enabled theft." The term knowingly is troublesome. It is not hard to imagine that if the Chinese government were caught violating the agreement in the future its officials would simply deny knowing about the offending hacking. Seem implausible? Consider how many American politicians from both major parties have denied knowledge of inappropriate actions despite overwhelming evidence that they either knew or should have known? Classified emails on a personal server? A bridge illegally blocked? Why would the Chinese act any differently?China and the US have initial agreements on cyber security but brokering a more verifiable framework is necessary and would reduce mutual suspicion Harold et al., 2016 (Senior Policy Analyst @ RAND Corporation, [Scott Warren Harold, Martin C. Libicki, Astrid Stuth Cevallos, April 2016 “Getting to Yes with China in Cyber Space” Rand accessed DDI -TM)Given that the United States and China would like to reduce mutual suspicion in cyberspace, one option might be the negotiation of agreement on a set of norms. Since both sides express concern over the possibility of the other side targeting its critical infrastructure, the core of the deal would be for the United States and China to abjure cyberattacks on each other’s critical infrastructure. 30 This proposal was well received by the respondents, with interviewees from across academic, think tank, military, and state organizations all responding positively to this proposal. 31 Respondents appeared to hold relatively similar views of the definition of critical infrastructure to those of their U.S. counterparts—such things as the electrical power grid and the banking system. One respondent noted that there is precedent for such a deal; in early May 2015, just days before we conducted our field inter - views, Russia and China announced a general agreement to cooperate with and not attack each other in cyberspace. 32 The first component of any mutual forbearance proposal is that progress has been made on not attacking critical infrastructure since our interviews in Beijing. In July 2015, the Chinese signed a UN report that called for such attacks to be abjured. 33 There are also indications that the United States and China mutually agree not to attack each other’s critical infrastructure—or at least not be the first to do so. 34 As of this writing, however, there is little indication that these agree - ments have evolved from the trust-us-not-to stage to something that is verifiable. This is why two more components to such an agreement are crucial to fulfill the purposes of the first component.Despite talks, US-Sino cybersecurity relations are not improving.Chin ’16 (Josh Chin; 6/15/16; Politics reporter in The Wall Street Journal’s Beijing Bureau; “Inside the Slow Workings of the U.S.-China Cybersecurity Agreement”; The Wall Street Journal; )Getting the world’s two largest powers to work together on a subject as touchy as cybersecurity was always bound to be difficult. How difficult? Nine months after Barack Obama and Xi Jinping announced a surprise series of cyber agreements at the Rose Garden press conference, it appears China and the U.S. are still figuring out how to talk about it. Speaking to reporters at a high-level U.S.-China dialogue on cybercrime held in Beijing this week, Department of Homeland Security Undersecretary Suzanne Spaulding said the two sides were busy setting up lines of communication to share information on cyber threats. Progress has evidently not been swift. “We are very pleased to have temporary email addresses,” Ms. Spaulding said, adding that efforts were underway to establish permanent email addresses. The comments didn’t escape the notice of analysts, some of whom were left wondering what cyber authorities in Beijing and Washington did to talk with each other before the temporary email addresses came into being: The Department of Homeland Security and Department of Justice, the agencies representing the U.S. in the dialogue, didn’t immediately respond to written requests for an answer to that question sent Wednesday during the day in China. Considerable doubt hovers over the U.S.-China rapprochement on cyber security, which aims to transform an issue that once bitterly divided the two countries into an area of cooperation. Security researchers disagree over whether China has made good on its key promise to stop state-sponsored hacking of U.S. companies for commercial gain. And while the threat of sanctions may keep China coming to meetings, some researchers and U.S. officials say, it’s not clear that Beijing is willing to do much more than talk. The Chinese side at least made a show of taking the meeting seriously on Tuesday. Meng Jianzhu, the country’s security czar, and Guo Shengkun, its minister of public security, both attended the dialogue even after their U.S. counterparts, Department of Homeland Security chief Jeh Johnson and Attorney General Loretta Lynch, cancelled to contend with the mass shooting in Orlando, Fla. “We do this to demonstrate the sincerity of the Chinese side to engage in dialogue with the U.S.” Mr. Meng told reporters, saying Beijing wanted both to help burnish Mr. Obama’s legacy and establish a framework for cooperating with his successor. “We know that the current administration has six months left in office. We must work until the very end.” Foreign Ministry spokesman Lu Kang denied suggestions that little had been accomplished during the gathering, saying at a regular press briefing on Wednesday that “it was a substantial meeting.” According to statement released Wednesday by the Department of Justice, the two sides agreed to implement plans to set up a cyber hotline developed at an inaugural dialogue in Washington in November. They also agreed to conduct seminars on network security and the misuse of technology to commit acts of terrorism. The two countries are holding a separate series of dialogues to hash out differences over what laws and rules should apply in cyberspace. China believes the internet should be divided up and governed according to national borders — an idea most Western governments say would kill the free flow of information and stifle innovation. Adam Segal, an expert on cybersecurity at the Council on Foreign Relations, and Tang Lan, an information researcher at the China Institutes of Contemporary China Relations, warned in a recent essay (pdf) that building on Mr. Xi’s agreement with Mr. Obama would not be easy. “Trust is currently a rare commodity in the Sino-U.S. bilateral relationship, and it is especially difficult to sustain in cyberspace,” they wrote, adding that trust could only be built if the agreement is actually implemented. Next up on the implementation list: Figuring out how to set up permanent email addresses.AT: “Trump”***Trump is working to boost cybersecurity effortsReuters 1/31 (Thomson Reuters, 1-31-2017, "Trump to order cyber security boost," Reuters, , Accessed: 3/1/17)-Coronado ARLPresident Donald Trump said on Tuesday that he wanted to boost cyber security by requiring the heads of government agencies to play a more direct role in reviewing and managing risks to networks under their control. Trump, at a White House event with top officials to discuss an executive order originally due to be signed on Tuesday, said that he would "hold my Cabinet secretaries and agency heads accountable, totally accountable, for the cyber security of their organizations." The White House later said Trump would not sign the order Tuesday, but provided no additional details. "We must defend and protect federal networks," he said. The order will give the White House budget office a central role in assessing cyber risks for the entire executive branch, and will require agency heads to develop plans to modernize aging information technology systems, a White House official told reporters, speaking on condition of anonymity. Cyber breaches featured in the run-up to the Nov. 8 election, which Trump won over Democratic rival Hillary Clinton, most notably with the hacking and leaking of Democratic National Committee emails. Trump said hackers tried to penetrate the Republican National Committee as well but that they failed. Trump vowed his administration will work with the private sector to ensure owners and operators of critical infrastructure to make sure they have the support they need from the federal government to guard against cyber threats. Trump said he would take steps to ensure cyber security is central to the U.S. military.***Trump Calls to modernize Cybersecurity functionsFrazao 2/2 (Kristine Frazao, Sinclair Broadcast Group, 02-02-2017, "Trump calls on government agencies to modernize cyber security," KOMO, , Accessed: 3/1/17)-Coronado ARLPresident Donald Trump is expected to sign an executive order aimed at strengthening cyber security in the U.S. According to experts, some government agencies still need to catch up on the ability to protect against cyber threats. "I will hold my cabinet secretaries accountable, fully accountable, for the cybersecurity of their organizations," Trump said last month. It's a move that some cyber experts say is long overdue - like Adam Isles with the Chertoff Group - a global security firm in Washington. "Cyber risk isn’t an IT issue it’s not an issue for the chief information security officer. It’s an’ issue for senior management and the board," he said. “You can have a cutting edge advanced malware detection tool but if you don’t have the people in place to operate it how much are you achieving.” One private security firm graded various industries' cyber readiness. The highest grade - a "C" - went to the retail industry, the lowest grade went to the U.S. government. “Government agencies have a lot of personal data on the American people they have a lot of financial data not to mention of course national security secrets,” said Peter Schweizer with The Government Accountability Institute.Trump doesn’t approve of current cybersecurity squoKorte 1/31 – (Gregory Korte, 1-31-2017, "Despite talk, Trump postpones cybersecurity order," USA TODAY, )President Trump postponed the signing of an executive order on cybersecurity Tuesday, despite a White House messaging blitz on the issue and a signing ceremony on the schedule. Trump even talked up action on cybersecurity during a "listening session" with experts in the Roosevelt Room, saying he was fulfilling a campaign promise to secure the nation's computer networks from malicious hacking. "I will hold my Cabinet secretaries and agency heads accountable, totally accountable for the cybersecurity of their organizations," he said. The canceled signing ceremony is an indication that after an unprecedented blitz of executive action in his first 10 days, Trump has begun to hit road blocks in his attempts to govern by executive order. In addition to the cyber order, the White House has postponed an announced order to the Justice Department to investigate Trump's unfounded allegations of voter fraud in the 2016. And on Tuesday, the White House announced that Trump would not reverse President Obama's executive order on workplace discrimination against gays and lesbians working for federal contractors. The White House did not immediately explain why the signing was canceled, but press secretary Sean Spicer had signaled that it may not be ready. "I just want to caution what we may or may not do today," he told reporters earlier in the day. "I think the president's got a pretty good idea where he's gonna go, but I think he wants to hear what [former New York] Mayor [Rudy] Giuliani and some of these other experts have to say about the steps that we can take in terms of executive action that will help secure further these critical infrastructures." Trump seemed to have some thoughts on cybersecurity, even highlighting the role that it played in the 2016 presidential election. "I think a pretty good example of this is, despite having spent hundreds and hundreds of millions of dollars more than we did, the Democratic National Committee was hacked, successfully," he said. U.S. intelligence agencies have fingered Russian hackers for that breach, which they said was directed by top Russian government officials in an attempt to get Trump elected.China is willing to work with Trump in areas of cybersecuritySCMP 2/10 (South China Morning Post, 2-10-2017, "China ‘willing to work with Trump on cybersecurity’," )China’s top security official has informed Washington that Beijing is looking forward to working with the Trump administration on cybersecurity, a delicate and thorny issue in China-US ties, state media reported. The olive branch was extended in Washington on Wednesday by Guo Shengkun, a State Councillor and China’s public security minister, when he was meeting US Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh Johnson and Attorney General Loretta Lynch for the third round of cybercrime talks, a dialogue agreed by President Xi Jinping and US President Barrack Obama in September last year. US panel makes urgent recommendations for better cybersecurity to Trump Beijing and Washington have been pointing the finger at each other for years over cybersecurity, accusing each other of hacking and stealing trade secrets. Beijing suspended the two nations’ only cybersecurity working group in 2014 after Washington indicted five People’s Liberation Army officers for allegedly stealing trade secrets. It is still unclear whether president-elect Donald Trump will raise concerns with China over cybersecurity while in office. Trump wrote on Twitter four years ago that “the Chinese are now hacking White House computers. Why not? They already own the place.” In a debate with Hillary Clinton on the presidential election trail, Trump dismissed her claims of Russian hacking, saying “She’s saying Russia, Russia, Russia. Maybe it was. It could be Russia but it could be China ...it could be somebody that sits on their bed that weighs 400 pounds.” A file picture of China’s Public Security Minister Guo Shengkun. Photo: SCMP Pictures Public Security Minister Guo said cybersecurity cooperation had become “a new highlight in bilateral relations” between the US and China after Xi and Obama created a mechanism for the two nations to discuss crimes in cyberspace. “Both sides should treat this dialogue mechanism as the chief channel for communication over cyber issues to focus on cooperation, manage disputes and respond to each other’s concerns in a timely and effective way,” Guo was quoted as saying by the state-run Xinhua news agency. “China is willing to make continuous efforts with the current administration and the new administration team to seek further development in bilateral cooperation over cybersecurity,” he added. China pushes through cybersecurity law despite foreign business fears Allegations of hacking, however, still remain. In the latest case, the US magazine Fortune reported on Wednesday that a series of security breaches that struck prestigious law firms last year was carried out by people with ties to the Chinese government. Beijing has repeatedly stated that China is a “victim” of hacking and the Chinese authorities always oppose “cyber attacks in any form”.Trump wants better cybersecurity but doesn’t approve of status quoFN 1/31 (Fox News, 1-31-2017, "Trump pledges beefed up cybersecurity but doesn't sign order," )President Donald Trump pledged Tuesday to strengthen the government's ability to protect its computer networks, but then canceled plans to sign an executive order on cybersecurity without explanation. A White House official said that morning the order would put the Office of Management and Budget in charge of cybersecurity efforts within the executive branch and direct federal agency directors to develop their own plans to modernize their infrastructure. "We must defend and protect federal networks and data," Trump said during a meeting on cybersecurity. "We operate these networks on behalf of the American people and they are very important and very sacred." The executive order had been scheduled for signing after the meeting. It was unclear when it would be signed. Such a review has become standard for incoming administrations wanting to put their own stamp on cybersecurity. But this year, the push follows allegations of election-season hacking by the Russian government. U.S. intelligence officials have told Trump that Moscow tried to influence voters by hacking Democratic emails and trolling social media sites. Trump has sought to downplay Russia's role in the election. "The executive order is the first step the president is taking to address new security challenges of the 21st century," White House spokesman Sean Spicer told reporters earlier Tuesday. President Barack Obama directed his own comprehensive 60-day "clean slate" cyberspace policy review in 2009. That review built on President George W. Bush's aims laid out in 2003. But in other ways, it may be another turn at reinventing the wheel. The previous administration also conducted a 30-day "cyber sprint," requiring agencies to assess their security after more than 21 million people had their personal information stolen from the Office of Personnel Management in what the U.S. believes was a Chinese espionage operation. The Office of Management and Budget also worked on an analysis of agencies' "high-value assets" in 2015. Experts say such information is still valuable. "They ought to fully leverage all of that information that's already done (to) accelerate their review," said retired Air Force Gen. Greg Touhill, who was picked by Obama to serve as the nation's first federal chief information security officer. Touhill was also previously a leading cybersecurity executive at the Department of Homeland Security. The White House official said Tuesday that no review has been done so far on any vulnerability in the system. The official said the executive order would ask the Commerce Department, Defense Department and other agencies to take steps to protect the nation's critical infrastructure. The official requested anonymity to discuss the order in advance of the signing. The order's call to have the Defense Department involved in securing infrastructure renewed an ongoing debate that has made many in government uneasy, especially at the Department of Homeland Security. U.S. critical infrastructure, such as the electrical grid, is almost exclusively privately owned and operated, and while DHS is charged with identifying threats and working with civilian and private sector groups, any private sector participation is voluntary. "I'm very uncomfortable as a retired military officer with the military being charged to protect every storefront in America and every house in America with an on-scene cyber presence," Touhill said. Officials said the order was created after a study of all commission and external reports, which is why it recommends, for example, that agencies be required to use an already existing cybersecurity framework drafted by the Commerce Department's National Institute of Standards and Technology. One of those reports included a 100-page presidential commission report delivered to Trump last month. It contained 16 urgent recommendations as well as a proposed roadmap for cybersecurity work over the next two to five years. It recommended the president create an ambassador for cybersecurity to continue efforts to create international cyberspace guidelines. Another report prepared for the incoming president and released earlier this month was conducted by a bipartisan cyber policy taskforce for the Center for Strategic and International Studies. The taskforce -- guided by Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse, D-R.I., and House Homeland Security Committee Chair Rep. Michael McCaul, R-Texas -- recommended streamlining federal cybersecurity bureaucracy but also said the Homeland Security Department needed to do better. It recommended creating a new, separate agency within it dedicated to handling cybersecurity.Trump is pro cybersecurityCondon 2/13 – (Stephanie Condon, 2-13-2017, "Former NSA chief: Trump is "the president our nation needs" on cybersecurity," ZDNet, )Retired Gen. Keith Alexander, former director of the National Security Agency (NSA) said he was left "really impressed" with President Donald Trump after the recent closed-door White House meeting on cybersecurity. "What I saw was a president who was now very focused and asked each person questions, listened to them, weighed what they said and how they said it... took in advice, commented back," Alexander said at the RSA Conference in San Francisco. "That's the president our nation needs -- somebody who is looking how to solve cybersecurity issues... He understood they're important, that we've got to fix government, got to get government and industry to work together." Alexander was at the helm of the NSA when former government contractor Edward Snowden leaked information about the NSA's sweeping surveillance programs. He stepped down from the post in 2014 and now serves as CEO of the company he founded, IronNet Cybersecurity. The White House cybersecurity meeting took place on January 31, the same day Trump was expected to sign a cybersecurity executive order. The EO signing, however, was unexpectedly canceled without explanation. Several current and former government officials with a range of viewpoints on cybersecurity were present at the meeting, including former New York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani, former Sen. Dan Coats, Trump's now-embattled national security adviser Gen. Mike Flynn and counterterrorism and homeland security adviser Tom Bossert. Alexander told ZDNet that different points of view were expressed during the meeting, but it was "not confrontational at all." In his remarks on stage, Alexander outlined some of the potential changes he'd like to see in federal cybersecurity policies. All agencies regardless of size should get sufficient resources to protect their digital assets, he said, pointing to the vulnerability of agencies like the Office of Management and Budget. A review of all federal agencies, he said, suggests "we left them on their own to defend themselves as if they were individual people out there .. but they're not." "Reading the Constitution, it says 'for the common defense,'" he continued. "It doesn't say for the defense of only those that are really big and critical -- for the rest of you, good luck."1ARCybersecurity HackingDespite recent agreements Chinese hacking will not decrease. Cyberwar News 2016 (“China’s Cyberattacks And Hacking Will Continue And Increase: Security Firm”, 2-11, )Despite a recent agreement between the U.S. and China to limit cyber espionage, hacking and other digital attacks, a security firm is warning that Beijing-based attacks are going to continue and perhaps even increase in the coming years. As reported by the Washington Free Beacon, the cyberattacks against U.S. government and private sector information systems is part of a larger intelligence-gathering mission, the firm, CrowdStrike, a cybersecurity and intelligence company, warned in an annual threat report made public last week. CrowdStrike is regularly consulted by private industry and government, The WFB reported. Some of the larger cyberattacks last year by Chinese hackers include theft of healthcare data on 80 million Americans, as well as the records of 22 million current and former federal government employees from a hack of the Office of Personnel Management. Gathering Americans’ personal data is part of a new trend in Chinese hacking. “This targeting underscores that intrusion operations associated with nation-states pose a significant risk to all data, no matter how uninteresting it may seem,” the report said. More: S. and China reach first-ever hacking agreement, but only after Beijing got nearly everything it wanted In addition the “2015 Global Threat Report” says that the U.S.-China agreement to not conduct cybertheft of commercial data has not had much of an impact on Beijing’s cyber activities. “Beneath the surface, however, China has not appeared to change its intentions where cyber is concerned,” the report noted. If there is any reduction at all in Chinese hacking this coming year it is probably only going to be temporary, the firm warned. Also, any reduction may only be the result of using more hard-to-trace methods of conducting cyber espionage after a major military reorganization of Beijing’s cyberwar capabilities. The military changes “will likely increase [China’s] reliance on its civilian intelligence agencies and associated contractors, all of which generally employ better tradecraft,” said the report. “If observed campaigns in late 2015 were any indication, it is unlikely China will completely cease its cyber operations, and 2016 will show the new direction it is headed,” it added. As Cyberwar.news reported, the U.S. government is set to hand off cybersecurity to the U.S. military in the coming year, mostly because the Pentagon is much more adept at providing security to information systems than disparate government agencies.***US retaliation to Chinese cyber hacking will escalate because China views information control as an existential issue .Adam, Digital Shadows analyst, 2015 (“Raising The Stakes - U.S. Retaliation For Chinese Cyber Espionage Has The Potential For Escalation”, 8-18, )Studies of Chinese military and geopolitical activity and Chinese strategic publications such as The Science of Military Strategy (SOMS), a PLA strategy document, indicate that challenging the balance of power by adopting a more assertive strategic posture is currently a key Chinese strategy. This has brought it into conflict with the U.S., which has frequently voiced objections to China’s behaviour but is yet to mount any serious public opposition. Despite this, China perceives the U.S. as a significant threat and is deeply concerned that the U.S., which China knows is militarily superior, will act to contain China. China also perceives the U.S. as a significant espionage threat and prioritises improving its defensive and counterintelligence capabilities very highly. These concerns receive significant attention in SOMS, indicating that they are likely to be relatively high priorities for the Chinese Government. According to SOMS, cyber espionage operations are an important part of this strategy and because the Chinese state sees the U.S. as a significant threat, it is therefore likely that the U.S. is a major target for such operations. Although China’s current line is that it never engages in any form of offensive network operation or cyber espionage, these claims are contradicted by the extensive discussion of the importance of such operations in SOMS. In addition to operations conducted by the PLA, which are likely to primarily focus on military, government and industrial targets, the Ministry of State Security (MSS) is also strongly suspected of conducting cyber espionage operations against foreign targets. These operations are likely to focus on gathering intelligence on potential threats to China’s internal security. Additionally, there are strong indications that multiple Chinese state organisations, including PLA units, conduct extensive operations against a wide range of commercial organisation for the purposes of economic espionage and intellectual property theft. While these actors’ operations likely service a wide range of objectives, intelligence which might provide China with a strategic advantage over the U.S. is likely to be considered particularly valuable. The OPM breach is therefore consistent with current assessments of China’s intelligence gathering objectives and broader strategic goals. THE RISK OF ESCALATION The core significance of this development lies in the potential for escalation. The U.S. Government has publicly stated that it intends to pursue a range of options in retaliating against China and, in response, China firmly asserted that it would match any U.S. measures taken against it. If the Obama administration merely intends to make symbolic gestures in order to appease those in Congress who want to see the U.S. take a harder line on China, then this confrontation is unlikely to escalate significantly. However, if the intention is to take more drastic measures, such as the reported suggestion of compromising the Great Firewall and thereby compromising the Chinese Government’s ability to censor the Internet, then escalation is highly likely, particularly if the U.S. does so publicly. The Chinese population tends to be relatively nationalistic and a hugely important aspect of modern Chinese nationalism is based around never allowing past “national humiliations”, such as the Opium Wars, the western intervention following the Boxer Rebellion, and the Japanese occupation, to be repeated. Furthermore, the current Chinese Communist Party (CPC) line is that the CPC “rescued” China from a “century of humiliation” when it took power in 1949 and the party derives much of its legitimacy from its self-ascribed role as the protector of China’s sovereignty from outside threats. In the minds’ of the CPC’s leaders any failure by the state to protect this sovereignty, real or perceived, constitutes a direct threat to the party’s legitimacy. Any U.S. retaliation, which could be perceived as an infringement of Chinese sovereignty, is therefore likely to face a robust response from the Chinese Government, which could potentially impact the two countries’ economic interactions and the delicate military situation in the South China Sea. CONCLUSIONS Although the U.S. has frequently accused China of espionage in the past without causing a serious escalation of tensions, the intention to retaliate has never before been publicly stated. If the U.S. conducts a major operation against China, such as compromising the Great Firewall, then escalation and Chinese retaliation is highly likely. In such a scenario there is a realistic possibility that Chinese actors would conduct attacks against U.S. organisations such as central and local government, military organisations and financial institutions. Furthermore, there is a realistic possibility that an escalation of tensions may lead Chinese hacktivists to independently target the U.S. Such actors are likely to be relatively indiscriminate in their targeting and could potentially direct attacks against a wide range of U.S. organisations. Therefore, if the U.S. intends to engage in a public show of dominance, as multiple prominent U.S. politicians have recommended, there is the potential for the number of attacks against the U.S. by both state and non-state Chinese actors to increase, along with the likelihood of unintended consequences.Chinese hacking doesn’t pose a large actual threat but the backlash will spill over into physical conflictLindsay 2015, Toronto digital media and global affairs professor, (Jon, “Inflated Cybersecurity Threat Escalates US-China Mistrust”, New Perspectives Quarterly, July, Wiley)The rhetorical spiral of mistrust in the Sino-American relationship threatens to undermine the mutual benefits of the information revolution. Fears about the paralysis of the United States’ digital infrastructure or the hemorrhage of its competitive advantage are exaggerated. Policymakers in the United States often portray China as posing a serious cybersecurity threat. In 2013 US National Security Adviser Tom Donilon stated that Chinese cyber intrusions not only endanger national security but also threaten US firms with the loss of competitive advantage. One US member of Congress has asserted that China has “laced the US infrastructure with logic bombs.” Chinese critics, meanwhile, denounce Western allegations of Chinese espionage and decry National Security Agency (NSA) activities revealed by Edward Snowden. The People’s Daily newspaper has described the US as “a thief crying ‘stop thief.’” Chinese commentators increasingly call for the exclusion of US internet firms from the Chinese market, citing concerns about collusion with the NSA, and argue that the institutions of internet governance give the United States an unfair advantage. Chinese cyber operators face underappreciated organizational challenges, including information overload and bureaucratic compartmentalization, which hinder the weaponization of cyberspace or absorption of stolen intellectual property. More important, both the US and China have strong incentives to moderate the intensity of their cyber exploitation to preserve profitable interconnections and avoid costly punishment. The policy backlash against US firms and liberal internet governance by China and others is ultimately more worrisome for US competitiveness than espionage; ironically, it is also counterproductive for Chinese growth. The US is unlikely to experience either a so-called digital Pearl Harbor through cyber warfare or death by a thousand cuts through industrial espionage. There is, however, some danger of crisis miscalculation when states field cyberweapons. The secrecy of cyberweapons’ capabilities and the uncertainties about their effects and collateral damage are as likely to confuse friendly militaries as they are to muddy signals to an adversary. Unsuccessful preemptive cyberattacks could reveal hostile intent and thereby encourage retaliation with more traditional (and reliable) weapons. Conversely, preemptive escalation spurred by fears of cyberattack could encourage the target to use its cyberweapons before it loses the opportunity to do so. Bilateral dialogue is essential for reducing the risks of misperception between the US and China in the event of a crisis.Nuclear WarNuclear warTilford 12 Robert, Graduate US Army Airborne School, Ft. Benning, Georgia, "Cyber attackers could shut down the electric grid for the entire east coast" 2012, make matters worse a cyber attack that can take out a civilian power grid, for example could also cripple the U.S. military. The senator notes that is that the same power grids that supply cities and towns, stores and gas stations, cell towers and heart monitors also power "every military base in our country." "Although bases would be prepared to weather a short power outage with backup diesel generators, within hours, not days, fuel supplies would run out", he said. Which means military command and control centers could go dark. Radar systems that detect air threats to our country would shut Down completely. "Communication between commanders and their troops would also go silent. And many weapons systems would be left without either fuel or electric power", said Senator Grassley. "So in a few short hours or days, the mightiest military in the world would be left scrambling to maintain base functions", he said. We contacted the Pentagon and officials confirmed the threat of a cyber attack is something very real. Top national security officials—including the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the Director of the National Security Agency, the Secretary of Defense, and the CIA Director— have said, "preventing a cyber attack and improving the nation~’s electric grids is among the most urgent priorities of our country" (source: Congressional Record). So how serious is the Pentagon taking all this? Enough to start, or end a war over it, for sure (see video: Pentagon declares war on cyber attacks ). A cyber attack today against the US could very well be seen as an "Act of War" and could be met with a "full scale" US military response. That could include the use of "nuclear weapons", if authorized by the President.US-China cyberwar risks nuclear escalation – cooperation prevents conflictClark & Andreasan 13 (6-14-2013, Richard A. Clarke and Steven Andreasen, Washington Post, "Cyberwar’s threat does not justify a new policy of nuclear deterrence," , accessed: 6-18-2016, JH)The Pentagon’s Defense Science Board concluded this year that China and Russia could develop capabilities to launch an “existential cyber attack” against the United States — that is, an attack causing sufficient damage that our government would lose control of the country. “While the manifestation of a nuclear and cyber attack are very different,” the board concluded, “in the end, the existential impact to the United States is the same.” Because it will be impossible to fully defend our systems against existential cyberthreats, the board argued, the United States must be prepared to threaten the use of nuclear weapons to deter cyberattacks. In other words: I’ll see your cyberwar and raise you a nuclear response. Some would argue that Obama made clear in his 2010 Nuclear Posture Review that the United States has adopted the objective of making deterrence of nuclear attacks the “sole purpose” of our nuclear weapons. Well, the board effectively reviewed the fine print and concluded that the Nuclear Posture Review was “essentially silent” on the relationship between U.S. nuclear weapons and cyberthreats, so connecting the two “is not precluded in the stated policy.” As the board noted, cyberattacks can occur very quickly and without warning, requiring rapid decision-making by those responsible for protecting our country. Integrating the nuclear threat into the equation means making clear to any potential adversary that the United States is prepared to use nuclear weapons very early in response to a major cyberattack — and is maintaining nuclear forces on “prompt launch” status to do so. Russia and China would certainly take note — and presumably follow suit. Moreover, if the United States, Russia and China adopted policies threatening an early nuclear response to cyber?attacks, more countries would surely take the same approach. It’s hard to see how this cyber-nuclear action-reaction dynamic would improve U.S. or global security. It’s more likely to lead to a new focus by Pentagon planners on generating an expanding list of cyber-related targets and the operational deployment of nuclear forces to strike those targets in minutes. Against that backdrop, maintaining momentum toward reducing the role of nuclear weapons in the United States’ national security strategy (and that of other nations) — a general policy course pursued by the past five presidents — would become far more difficult. Further reductions in nuclear forces and changes in “hair-trigger” postures, designed to lessen the risk of an accidental or unauthorized nuclear launch, would also probably stall. Fortunately, Obama has both the authority and the opportunity to make clear that he meant what he said when he laid out his nuclear policy in Prague in 2009. For decades, presidential decision directives have made clear the purpose of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy and provided broad guidance for military planners who prepare the operations and targeting plans for our nuclear forces. An update to existing presidential guidance is one of the homework items tasked by the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review. Cyberthreats are very real, and there is much we need to do to defend our military and critical civilian infrastructure against what former defense secretary Leon E. Panetta referred to as a “cyber Pearl Harbor” — including enhancing the ability to take action, when directed by the president, against those who would attack us. We also need more diplomacy such as that practiced by Obama with his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping, at their recent summit. Multinational cooperation centers could ultimately lead to shared approaches to cybersecurity, including agreements related to limiting cyberwar.***Resulting economic decline causes global nuclear war T?nnesson, Oslo Peace Research Institute professor, 2015(Stein, “Deterrence, interdependence and Sino–US peace”, International Area Studies Review, 18.3, Wiley)Several recent works on China and Sino–US relations have made substantial contributions to the current understanding of how and under what circumstances a combination of nuclear deterrence and economic interdependence may reduce the risk of war between major powers. At least four conclusions can be drawn from the review above: first, those who say that interdependence may both inhibit and drive conflict are right. Interdependence raises the cost of conflict for all sides but asymmetrical or unbalanced dependencies and negative trade expectations may generate tensions leading to trade wars among inter-dependent states that in turn increase the risk of military conflict (Copeland, 2015: 1, 14, 437; Roach, 2014). The risk may increase if one of the interdependent countries is governed by an inward-looking socio-economic coalition (Solingen, 2015); second, the risk of war between China and the US should not just be analysed bilaterally but include their allies and partners. Third party countries could drag China or the US into confrontation; third, in this context it is of some comfort that the three main economic powers in Northeast Asia (China, Japan and South Korea) are all deeply integrated economically through production networks within a global system of trade and finance (Ravenhill, 2014; Yoshimatsu, 2014: 576); and fourth, decisions for war and peace are taken by very few people, who act on the basis of their future expectations. International relations theory must be supplemented by foreign policy analysis in order to assess the value attributed by national decision-makers to economic development and their assessments of risks and opportunities. If leaders on either side of the Atlantic begin to seriously fear or anticipate their own nation’s decline then they may blame this on external dependence, appeal to anti-foreign sentiments, contemplate the use of force to gain respect or credibility, adopt protectionist policies, and ultimately refuse to be deterred by either nuclear arms or prospects of socioeconomic calamities. Such a dangerous shift could happen abruptly, i.e. under the instigation of actions by a third party – or against a third party. Yet as long as there is both nuclear deterrence and interdependence, the tensions in East Asia are unlikely to escalate to war. As Chan (2013) says, all states in the region are aware that they cannot count on support from either China or the US if they make provocative moves. The greatest risk is not that a territorial dispute leads to war under present circumstances but that changes in the world economy alter those circumstances in ways that render inter-state peace more precarious. If China and the US fail to rebalance their financial and trading relations (Roach, 2014) then a trade war could result, interrupting transnational production networks, provoking social distress, and exacerbating nationalist emotions. This could have unforeseen consequences in the field of security, with nuclear deterrence remaining the only factor to protect the world from Armageddon, and unreliably so. Deterrence could lose its credibility: one of the two great powers might gamble that the other yield in a cyber-war or conventional limited war, or third party countries might engage in conflict with eachRelationsSdfasdfsdfNorth KoreaUS-China cooperation solves nuclear proliferation – they have the leverage to pressure proliferating states Lin 11 – William, “Suppressing Nuclear Proliferation: Why China Cooperates with the United States” Applications The implications of this study are two-fold. The first implication is that China seems increasingly concerned about international stability and feel compelled to take on a leadership role in global affairs. China may participate more in global affairs but not always cooperate. China's growing economy and military strength presents the US with a new world power. The United States can either gain a potentially power ally or a potentially powerful adversary. Thus, discovering the best strategy to achieve Chinese cooperation will help America's foreign policy objectives. Second, these factors indicate how best to achieve China's cooperation. This study can contribute to the future crafting of strategies to compel China to exert influence on North Korea and Iran. Peace on the Korean Peninsula and with Iran still has not materialized and the regions could still deteriorate into war. As long as North Korea continues to act provocatively while wielding nuclear weapons and Iran still refuses to halt its research program, the United States need solutions. According to this paper, a constant reminder and emphasis of how North Korea's nuclear weapons and Iran's potential nuclear weapons threaten the stability of their regions serves as a powerful tool to convince the Chinese to act more aggressively. The practical applications of this study could go beyond stopping North Korea and Iran's nuclear weapons program. The United States would also like to see China participate more in helping the United States and its allies mediate global conflicts. China is beginning to gain considerable economic leverage over many nations either through oil trade, food imports, or commodities exports. China could use this new found influence to pressure countries that are violating human rights or stop bloody conflicts. For example, in Sudan, the US needs China to exert its economic pressure in the region to promote human rights and help refugees. The US may still be the only superpower in the world but would have to spend a lot of its resources to resolve conflicts without the help of allies. A partnership between US and China would not only serve America's interests but China's as well. Global 59 stability allows China's economy to grow as it reaches out to new markets and the US would maintain peace. The two nations may seem destined to polarize the world but they possess enough common goals to form a partnership rather than a rivalry. Strong relations solve North Korean denuclearization – prevents war and broad prolifXiyu 15. (Yang Xiyu is Senior Research Fellow at China Institute of International Studies. North Korean Nuclear Issue in China-U.S. Relations. July 10, 2015. )Cooperation and Disagreement on North Korean Nuclear Issue Between China and the United States As for their policies toward the North Korean nuclear issue, both China and the United States have demanded the complete denuclearization of North Korea, and they share the same position and policy goal of a nuclear-weapons-free Korean Peninsula. Moreover, since the Six-Party Talks were initiated by China, both countries have stated that the talks are the only feasible approach to the settlement of the issue, so they have made close communication and coordination with each other under and beyond the framework. Given that both China and the United States play unique roles in the efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement of North Korea’s nuclear issue through dialogue, the issue has become a vital subject of their presidential meetings, the China-U.S. Strategic and Economic Dialogue, as well as other diplomatic conferences and negotiations at all levels. Due to the impact of North Korea’s second nuclear test, the Cheonan incident, Yeonpyeong Island shelling and other crises, the issue has hit the gridlock. Against this backdrop, both heads of state, after meeting with each other in January 2011, made a joint statement reconfirming their further cooperation on the nuclear issue and reiterating their deep concerns over the uranium enrichment plan announced by North Korea. They called for early resumption of the Six-Party Talks through necessary measures, so as to address the issue and related ones.[17] The coordination and cooperation between China and the United States on the North Korean nuclear issue prevent it from spinning out of control, avoid nuclear nonproliferation and the outbreak of conflicts, and promise a peaceful settlement of the complicated security issue through the Six-Party Talks. If we make a comparison between China’s policies on the nuclear issue with that adopted by the three U.S. presidents, it is not hard to see that the two nations have differences not only in the consistency and stability of their policies, but also in substantive content. First, China has maintained consistency and stability on the issue throughout the past decade while the United States has adopted different policies since the Clinton administration. These changes in policy have not only hindered a smooth settlement of the issue, but also cooperation on it. Second, China has always called for increasing mutual trust, narrowing disagreement with the United States through dialogue, and gradually creating conditions for a nuclear-free peninsula through political, security, economic and diplomatic approaches; in comparison, the United States is over-dependent on imposing pressure and sanctions on North Korea, seeking to force it to give up its nuclear program unconditionally. Since the nuclear issue broke out again in October 2002, both the Republican Bush administration and the Democratic Obama administration have refused official talks with North Korea. Each time when the United States senses that it lacks measures to impose pressure on North Korea, it asks China to join the “sanction club” by taking advantage of China’s resources. Their different intentions and thinking, characterized by China’s call for dialogue and the United States’ preference for imposing pressure, have led to growing mutual suspicion between the two countries. Third, China’s advocacy of denuclearization of North Korea is part of its efforts to secure a peninsula that is free of nuclear weapons and its recognition that North Korea has the same right to peaceful use of nuclear energy as other sovereign states. However, since the Bush administration, the United States has called on North Korea to abandon its entire nuclear program, including the peaceful use of nuclear energy. This disagreement has not yet been solved. Nonetheless, the common interests and agreement between China and the United States on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula have fundamental and strategic significance. This common ground is the basis of their long-term cooperation on the issue as well as a vital field for cooperation in their joint efforts to establish a new model of China-U.S. relations. China and the United States Should Enhance Cooperation and Narrow Differences Since the end of the Cold War, it seems that the Korean Peninsula has been trapped in a “periodic” loop of a crisis every four years. When the first North Korean nuclear crisis broke out in 1994, the United States and North Korea were on the brink of war. The 1994 U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework helped ease the crisis and improved their relations, but four years later in 1998, North Korea’s test launch of a long-range ballistic missile triggered a second crisis, leaving the two countries in confrontation again. Thanks to hard but substantial negotiations, their relationship was turned around, characterized by their first high-level exchange visits: In October 2000, Jo Myong-rok, Vice Marshal of the Korean People’s Army, visited Washington as a special envoy, during which the two sides signed the U.S.-DPRK Joint Communiqué in order to establish a new model for the relationship between the two countries in the 21st century. After that, Albright, U.S. Secretary of State, paid a visit to Pyongyang and attended political meetings with Kim Jong-il.[18] Given the transfer of power in the United States, the issue of North Korea’s uranium enrichment touched off a third crisis four years later at the end of 2002, but thanks to China’s active mediation and efforts, the parties concerned initiated the Six-Party Talks. In September 2005, they signed the historic September 19 Joint Statement, which not only resolved the crisis, but also put the nuclear issue back on the right track of multilateral dialogue and negotiations. However, these efforts failed to end the “crisis loop”. In 2006, North Korea conducted its first nuclear test regardless of strong opposition from the international community, leading to the fourth crisis. Although the Six-Party Talks mechanism brought the parties concerned back onboard to resolve the crisis and facilitate the launch of substantive “disablement”, worryingly, the “crisis loop” still exists and the cycle has been shortened to a more frequent level: Three years after the fourth crisis in 2006, another crisis broke out on the Korean Peninsula; merely one year later in 2010, the Cheonan incident and Yeonpyeong Island shelling ignited military confrontation. Three years after Yeonpyeong Island shelling, the headquarters of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) suddenly made an announcement, saying, “The army groups on the front, ground forces, the navy, air and anti-air units, strategic rocket units of the KPA, the Worker-Peasant Red Guards and the Young Red Guards have launched an all-out action according to the operational plan finally signed by the dear respected Supreme Commander Kim Jong Un.” North Korean authorities also called on the staff in foreign embassies in Pyongyang and all civilians in Seoul to evacuate. This announcement intensified the tensions between North and South Korea to the brink of war. Why cannot North Korea end the “loop of crisis” more than two decades since the end of the Cold War? Though the causes of crises differ, the “loop of crisis” has persisted for a profound reason, namely two continuing abnormal situations. First, the Korean Peninsula is still at war. The Korean Armistice Agreement signed in July 1953 was only a ceasefire agreement, prescribing that the warring factions should sign a peace agreement through negotiations so as to end the state of war. However, the parties concerned failed to reach a consensus to replace Korean Armistice Agreement with a peace treaty in the 1954 Geneva Conference or the Geneva Four-Party Talks from 1997 to 1999. Therefore, the north and south of the Korean Peninsula remain in a virtual state of war from a legal perspective, and clashes between them frequently have occurred at the “provisional Military Demarcation Line”, as well as in waters off the controversial Five West Sea Islands. Moreover, as the military ally of the ROK, the United States stations large military forces there, indicating that the United States and North Korea are still at war. This is the fundamental reason why the Korean Peninsula can hardly sustain long-term peace. Given that, the September 19 Joint Statement, as an outcome of the Six-Party Talks, emphatically pointed out, “The directly related parties will negotiate a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula at an appropriate separate forum.”[19] Second, the Korean Peninsula is still in a cold war. Although the worldwide Cold War has long ended, the one on the peninsula has been exacerbated. North Korea on one side and the U.S.-ROK alliance on the other are implementing similar deterrent strategies so that a mutual deterrence structure has emerged. That is to say, the present peace and “no war” are based on “mutual deterrence” and even a “balance of threat” that assures mutual destruction. This security structure, reminiscent of the Cold War, constitutes the reason why North Korea insists on the development of nuclear weapons. The above two abnormal situations are the root causes of the peninsula’s constant state of crisis and the lack of peace and stability. If they remain unchanged, the North Korean nuclear issue will not be solved and the peninsula will not be able to escape the vicious circle of periodic crises. Thus, any attempts to promote the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the settlement of the North Korean nuclear issue must take into consideration these two root causes. As mentioned above, China and the United States have common goals and interests in the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, while their respective foreign policies are different due to their distinctive judgments on the root causes of the issue and their responses accordingly. As a matter of fact, the North Korean nuclear issue covers more than nuclear proliferation and nuclear threat; it is a product of the long-term military confrontation between North Korea and the U.S.-ROK alliance, as well as an outcome of serious imbalance in the security structure of the peninsula since the end of the Cold War. For North Korea, the issue is basically about survival and security. This complicated security issue shaped by the long-standing state of war in the form of a cold war cannot be addressed simply by carrying out the model of “denuclearization in exchange for compensation”, nor through isolation, sanctions or military strikes. Instead, the relevant parties should agree on a package of plans in accordance with the September 19 Joint Statement in order to build a new security relationship on the peninsula, realize the normalization of relations between the two sides, and establish a peace and cooperation mechanism in Northeast Asia. Only through these efforts can the North Korean nuclear issue be solved and can the peninsula become a nuclear-free area with long-term stability. Therefore, the point of departure of effective cooperation between China and the United States on the issue is how to carry out a package of plans to comprehensively resolve it and build a permanent peace regime according to the “commitment for commitment, action for action” principle[20] included in the September 19 Joint Statement. These attempts will also provide basis for China and the United States to narrow their differences and play more positive roles in achieving a peaceful settlement of the issue. In fact, the framework of the Six-Party Talks serves as a practical and effective platform for both countries to expand cooperation and narrow differences on the North Korean nuclear issue.Relations Key to Human RightsHuman Rights is a major issue that can be worked on by US and China with more cooperation.HRF 12 Human Rights First () How to Integrate Human Rights into U.S.-China Relations nonprofit, nonpartisan human rights organization When to press China’s leadership on human rights, how hard, and with what tools has been an ever-changing calculation, as successive U.S. administrations have tried to balance America’s strategic and economic interests in the expanding U.S.-China relationship with America’s leadership as an advocate for and protector of universal rights and freedoms. Today, China is not only an Asian power, but an emerging global power with the capacity to help or hinder U.S. policy on a broad range of issues. As a result, the imperative for the United States to have a cooperative, productive, stable relationship with China grows. And as it grows, so does the temptation for the U.S. government to place human rights further down the priority list on the agenda. Human Rights First recommends that the Obama Administration elevate the priority placed on the promotion of human rights in China, and maximize the potential for progress by developing a comprehensive, integrated approach built on a strategy that advances human rights through other issues on the U.S.-China agenda. The record of progress, still woefully inadequate, demands an aggressive approach that treats human rights as a mainstream issue rather than as an obstacle to the relationship. In April 2012, Chen Guangcheng, a self-taught, blind Chinese legal activist who had been confined to house arrest after four years of imprisonment, escaped from local authorities in his home province of Shandong. In need of medical treatment by the time he arrived in Beijing, Chen asked the U.S. Embassy for assistance.. The timing of Chen’s request was critical: just days before the start of the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S & ED) and some six months before a leadership change in China scheduled for November 2012. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton took the bold and unexpected step of ordering embassy officials to go out, get Chen, and bring him into the embassy compound, as Chinese agents followed. That decision propelled Chen’s case to the forefront of the U.S.-China agenda. Secretary Clinton’s decision to give Chen refuge in the embassy could have backfired. China’s leaders could have blasted the United States, refused to negotiate a solution to the case, and walked away from the upcoming dialogue, leaving a set of issues important to the United States on the table. But they did not. To the surprise of many, high-level talks continued even as the two sides negotiated a resolution to Chen’s case. Chen’s case offers important lessons for the Obama Administration as it pursues the human rights agenda with China. First, the imperative to have a working relationship exists for both sides, suggesting that the U.S.-China relationship is stronger than the differences between the two countries imply. Chinese officials dislike the American focus on human rights issues, and they come to the relationship with a fair amount of mistrust of American intentions. But they understand that, just as China is in a position to affect U.S. interests, the United States is in a position to affect theirs. And both sides recognize that maintaining a constructive relationship requires continual engagement across a host of issues, even when disagreement in one area challenges the relationship. Second, the case demonstrates that human rights issues can be pursued vigorously and simultaneously with other issues on the American agenda with China. They do not have to be sidelined, or compartmentalized, or minimized. Indeed, the Chen case illustrates the impracticality of trying to quarantine human rights from the larger relationship. Human rights cannot be ignored, but the issue does have to be argued with recognition of Chinese interests as well as those of the United States.Trade War—Econ CollapseTrade war escalates and causes global economic collapse—it shatters resiliency Wachman 2009 - Richard, reporter for the investigative news website Exaro, Staff for the Guardian, March 7, "Trade: nightmare of a US-China protectionist war", full-blown trade war between the United States and China would dislocate the global financial system. To get an idea of what would happen, consider America's 1930 Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act, which heralded the Great Depression. The legislation was brazen protectionism, introduced in the wake of the 1929 Wall Street crash, and saw the US hike tariffs on more than 20,000 imported goods to record levels. It was introduced despite a plea by leading American economists who signed a petition asking the government to have second thoughts. Within weeks of it being passed by Congress, America's trading partners retaliated with their own increased tariffs on US goods and American exports and imports plunged by more than half. In the opinion of most economists, the measure was a catalyst for the severe reduction in world trade, which crashed by 66% between 1929 and 1934. Arguably, things would be worse now because the world is even more interdependent and the financial link between America and China has become symbiotic in a way that would make a falling out between the two potentially catastrophic. Remember that during the heady days of the credit boom, America sucked in cheap Asian imports and ran up a huge current account deficit as it spent far more than it earned. But the gigantic hole in its balance sheet has been plugged largely by countries such as China and Japan, which have bought billions of US bonds, debt instruments that allow America to bankroll the shortfall, as well as to retain its credit rating and ensure that the dollar remains the global reserve currency. If things turn sour between America and China, a slump in world trade would be accompanied by a financial markets meltdown too horrible to contemplate. When America, not to mention the rest of the developed world, has run up ever larger debts in the wake of the bailout of the banks, China has become ever more important as a potential acquirer of US government bonds. If China stopped funding the US budget deficit, "the system would collapse and the US economy would be toast", according to David Williams at Capital Economics.Relations Laundry List ImpactUS-China relations are key to solve climate change, economic growth, conflict and Watkins 15 (8-21-2015. Tom Watkins, advisor to the Michigan’s Economic Development Corporation and Detroit Chinese Business Association. "U.S./China: The Most Important Bilateral Relationship in the World Today " China-US Focus. accessed: 6-22-2016, JH)Guess who’s coming to dinner? Xi Jinping, the President of China. President Xi Jinping will visit the United States in September, partaking in a high stakes, scripted, state dinner with President Obama and other dignitaries at the White House. The Chinese leader will be in the neighborhood for the celebration of the 70th anniversary of the United Nations.Our U.S.-China relationship is the most important bilateral relationship in the world today. All major global issues intersect at the corner of Beijing and Washington, D.C., and there is much for the two world leaders to discuss – conversations best done on a foundation of mutual respect, seeking win-win strategies that enhance world peace and economic growth. A few topics worthy of time and effort include: climate change, Iran’s nuclear program, cyber-spying, the South China Sea, the Chinese economic bubble, an expanding Chinese military, Chinese currency policy, global terrorism, global economic growth, environmental protection, efforts to combat the Islamic State, the situation in Ukraine, China’s global reach in Africa, the Caribbean and South America—to name a few.Perhaps even a mention about human rights and Tibet will be broached—just enough to appease America’s human rights activists. As China’s power has expanded, the U.S. has tipped-toed around these sensitive topics. Human rights activists claim that since President Xi came to power, China’s human rights record has worsened. China considers “human rights” an internal affair issue and rejects any outside interference.This is President Xi’s first official State visit to Washington as China’s leader at a time when the Chinese economy is experiencing a ‘correction’ causing significant domestic anxiety. With China’s importance to the world’s economy, what happens in China no longer stays in China. Global economic markets fear any major setback to China’s gravy train. Few expect major agreements or breakthroughs during the visit. Xi’s trip is expected to be a largely photo-op for domestic Chinese consumption, and will be used to strengthen connections in order to avoid conflicts. Many China watchers believe the visit is an attempt by both nations to take stock of their relationship and patch over any rough spots during Obama’s remaining time in office. Yet there is some momentum in this fluid relationship. Last autumn, Obama and Xi struck a major climate deal to reduce carbon admissions which environmentalist heralded as an important step towards a larger global climate deal that could be reached before year’s end.***US China Cooperation key to solve pressing global issuesAtlantic Council, 13 China-US Cooperation: Key to the Global FutureThe global future is likely to be increasingly volatile and uncertain. The rate of change is increasing, driven by the accelerating pace of technological development, unprecedented urbanization and growth of the global middle class, and a wide range of challenges beyond the control of any one country but potentially affecting the prosperity and security of all countries. Disruptive change in one geographic or functional area will spread quickly.. No country, and certainly not those with the largest populations and largest economies, will be immune. Global challenges like climate change, food and water shortages, and resource scarcities will shape the strategic context for all nations and require reconsideration of traditional national concerns such as sovereignty and maximizing the ability of national leaders to control their country’s destiny. What China and the United States do, individually and together, will have a major impact on the future of the global system. As importantly, our individual fates will be inextricably linked to how that future plays out. The three illustrative scenarios sketched out below underscore how critical the future of the US-China relationship is to each country and to the world. ? Global Drift and Erosion (the present world trajectory): In a world in which nations fail to resolve global problems and strengthen mechanisms of global cooperation, governments gradually turn inward. Each nation seeks to protect and advance its own narrow national interests or to preserve an unsustainable status quo that is rapidly changing in ways that erode the international order. The international community’s lack of ability to cooperate to meet global challenges leads to international crises and instability. ? Zero-Sum World: Unsustainable drift leads to a world of predominantly zero-sum competition and conflict in the face of severe resource constraints. The result is economic crises and internal instability as well as interstate confrontation. There is risk of military conflict between major powers, which increases global mistrust and uncertainty and fosters an “each nation for itself” mentality that further undermines the ability of states to cooperate in the face of growing common challenges. Global Revitalization and Cooperation: To escape the perils of drift or zero-sum competition, leaders in countries with the most to lose work together to manage and take advantage of global challenges and megatrends. Cooperation makes it possible to achieve win-win outcomes that avoid or mitigate negative consequences of increased demand for resources and the impact of climate change as well as to harness new technologies to improve living conditions through sustainable development. Cooperation creates and utilizes new transnational institutions to prevent conflict and enhance security for all. China and the United States become more prosperous as we work together China-US Cooperation: Key to the Global Future The possible futures sketched out above (and developed at greater length below) are intended to stimulate thinking about how current trends and uncertainties could lead to very different global and national outcomes. For many reasons, the United States and China will have greater ability and incentives than other countries to cooperate in determining and shaping developments over the next two decades. Indeed, it is very difficult to imagine a pathway to “global revitalization and cooperation” in which China and the United States do not cooperate and provide critical international leadership. Many factors will shape the future, some of which are beyond the control of any nation state, but China and the United States—and the character of the US-China relationship—will be critical. The mutual dependence on each other’s economic performance and the success of the global economy as a whole was demonstrated during the 2008 financial crisis that began in the United States but quickly spread around the world. US and Chinese leaders recognized that they were in the “same boat” strategically and engaged in a closely coordinated response to the crisis, which played a key—if not decisive—role in preventing the situation from becoming much worse. The need for joint and coordinated responses to economic crises and to mounting economic challenges and threats is certain to increase as globalization continues and interdependence deepens. China Rise AdvAT: Hacks Declining***Cyberattacks are ongoing—their ev doesn’t account for covert tools Gertz 6/29 [Bill, senior editor of the Washington Free Beacon, former national security reporter for Washington Times, “State Department Report Says Chinese Cyber Attacks ‘Ongoing’”, 6/29/16, ]//DBIBetter concealment of hacking linked to reported decline in Beijing cyber strikes? Chinese cyber attacks against American firms are “ongoing” and the use of covert cyber tools and methods by Beijing hackers led to a statistical decline in cyber activities, according to an internal State Department security report.? The report by the State Department-led Overseas Security Advisory Council, or OSAC, a public-private partnership, challenges the findings of a recent study by the private cyber security firm FireEye that says the decline in the number of Chinese-origin cyber attacks indicated China has cut back from large-scale cyber attacks.? “While media reporting has emphasized this alleged decrease in malicious activity, cases of Chinese espionage campaigns against the U.S. private sector are ongoing,” the report said, adding that “OSAC constituents should remain aware that China is still considered a highly capable and motivated cyber threat actor.”? The three-page report highlighting ongoing Chinese cyber threats is a setback for White House efforts to portray President Obama’s September 2015 deal with China to curb cyber economic espionage as a diplomatic breakthrough.? Since the deal, various private security firms offered differing assessments of whether China is curtailing large-scale cyber attacks, the report said.? The report notes that Chinese cyber attacks in 2015 were particularly damaging. “At a higher level, paramount attacks against various U.S. organizations continued in 2015 and Chinese hackers exceeded other nation-state actors for consistency, volume, and severity of cyber attacks during the past year,” the report, dated June 27, says.? “This included intrusions into healthcare systems Anthem and Premera, and the Office of Personnel Management, collectively compromising the sensitive data of over 100 million U.S. citizens.”? Until the OSAC report, senior U.S. intelligence officials have sought to hedge their conclusions about the September agreement, stating publicly that it is not clear whether China is curbing cyber intrusion activity.Cyberattacks are still happeningGertz 6/18 [Bill, senior editor of the Washington Free Beacon, former national security reporter for Washington Times, “China Continuing Cyber Attacks on U.S. Networks”, 3/18/16, ]//DBISix months after China pledged to halt cyber espionage against the United States, Beijing’s hackers continue to conduct cyber attacks on government and private networks, the commander of U.S. Cyber Command told Congress.? Despite a formal pledge made by Chinese leader Xi Jinping in September, “cyber operations from China are still targeting and exploiting U.S. government, defense industry, academic, and private computer networks,” Adm. Mike Rogers, the Cybercom chief, said in prepared testimony to a House Armed Services subcommittee on Wednesday.XT Competitiveness I/LChinese cyber espionage decks US competitivenessWilson and Drumhiller 15 [Clay, Program Director for Cybersecurity graduate studies at the American Public University, former analyst for national defense policy at the Congressional Research Service, PhD, Nicole, PhD political science, Associate Professor, Security and Global Studies, “US-China Relations: Cyber Espionage and Cultural Bias”, National Security and Counterintelligence in the Era of Cyber Espionage, 11/12/15, ]//DBIIn recent years relations between the United States and China have become strained over alleged instances of cyber related intellectual property theft and espionage. According to officials within the US Government, “The Chinese government has a national policy of economic espionage in cyberspace...”, and, “…the Chinese are the world’s most active and persistent practitioners of cyber espionage today.” (McConnell, Chertoff, & Lynn, 2012). Some government officials believe that China’s masses are simply hungry for economic advancement and that by stealing intellectual property (IP), China can quickly create products that are cheaper than similar items produced in the US and elsewhere. These officials warm that, over the next decade, cyber espionage could have a catastrophic impact on the US economy and global competitiveness (McConnell et al., 2012). Other U.S. military and business officials believe that China has a long-term goal of “preemptive reconnaissance” intended to surpass the US economy and also affect US military planning (Thomas, 2010; Dilanian, 2011).IP theft collapses US competitivenessBlair et al 13 [Dennis, former Director of National Intelligence and Commander in Chief of the U.S. Pacific Command, Jon M. Huntsman Jr., former Ambassador to China, Deputy U.S. Trade Representative, Craig R. Barrett, former Chairman and CEO of Intel Corporation, Slade Gorton, Washington Attorney General, William J. Lynn III, CEO of DRS Technologies and former Deputy Secretary of Defense, Deborah Wince-Smith, President and CEO of the Council on Competitiveness, Michael K. Young, President of the University of Washington and former Deputy Under Secretary of State, all part of the Commission on the Theft of American Intellectual Property, “????????????????????The IP Commission Report: The Report of the Commission on the Theft of American Intellectual Property”, 2013, ]//DBIThe Toll of IP Theft and Vulnerable Supply Chains? It is difficult to overstate the importance of intellectual property to U.S. economic prosperity and difficult to gauge the full extent of the damage done by IP theft. According to a figure cited in the president’s 2006 Economic Report to Congress, 70% of the value of publicly traded corporations is estimated to be in “intangible assets,” that is, IP. A 2012 study by the Department of Commerce found that protection and enforcement of IPR around the globe directly affects an estimated 27 million American jobs in IP-intensive industries, which is roughly 19% of the U.S. workforce, producing over one-third of America’s GDP. 3? Overseas, products are counterfeited on a mammoth scale or re-engineered with small changes and then patented as if they were new inventions. Because much of the theft is not counted, estimates of the total vary. In 2010, the commander of the U.S. Cyber Command and director of the National Security Agency, General Keith Alexander, stated that “our intellectual property here is about $5 trillion. Of that, approximately $300 billion [6%] is stolen over the networks per year.” 4 He later called the theft “the greatest transfer of wealth in history.”5? Intellectual property that is stolen over the Internet constitutes only a portion of total IP theft. Much of it occurs the old-fashioned way. Hard drives are either duplicated on site or physically stolen by bribed employees; employees are planted temporarily in companies or permanent employees leave and illegally share proprietary information; products are dissected, re-engineered, and sold without permission or payment of royalties; digitized products are pirated and sold illegally; phones are tapped for the purpose of obtaining trade secrets; and email accounts are compromised. The list goes on. The stories that appear in court records and occasionally appear in the media demonstrate that while there are new tools being utilized in IP theft, traditional tools continue to cause enormous damage. Totaled, it is safe to say that dollar losses from IP theft are hundreds of billions per year, which is at least in the range of total exports to Asia in 2012 (valued at $320 billion).? Indeed, IP is hugely important to the U.S. economy. Loss of revenues to the victimized inventor or owner of a trade secret is the first and most obvious cost of IP theft, but an asset is lost too. Both losses mean fewer jobs and less money to reinvest in the next generation of products. Stolen IP represents a subsidy to the party that did not have to bear the costs of developing it, and the effects can ripple across industries and companies. A prime example is the pirated software utilized in manufacturing systems and management of companies. Stolen corporate software—from basic computer and network operating systems and office technology to sophisticated design algorithms— allows companies to cut costs unfairly. The problem is rampant in many countries around the world, but in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), a country to which so many overseas supply chains extend, even ethical multinational companies find themselves complicit.? The member companies of the American Chamber of Commerce in the People’s Republic of China (AmCham China) express their concerns in annual surveys. In the most recent, conducted in late 2012, over 40% of respondents reported that the risk of data breach to their operations in China is increasing, and those who indicated that IP infringement has resulted in “material damage” to China operations or global operations increased from 18% in 2010 to 48% in 2012.6? The longer the supply line, the more vulnerable it is to IP theft. In an extensive study of the Department of Defense’s supply chain, the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee reported a “flood” of counterfeit parts. The investigation uncovered 1,800 cases of suspect electronic parts. The total number of individual suspect parts involved in those cases exceeded one million.? China is the dominant source country for counterfeit electronic parts that are infiltrating the defense supply chain..... The Committee tracked well over 100 cases of suspect counterfeit parts back through the supply chain. China was found to be the source country for suspect counterfeit parts in an overwhelming majority of those cases, with more than 70 percent of the suspect parts traced to that country.7? One of the witnesses in the investigation testified that he observed “factories in China of 10,000 to 15,000 people set up for the purpose of counterfeiting.” Electronic components can be compromised both unintentionally and intentionally and could be subject to embargoes in times of crisis. Fierce competition gives the cheating overseas supplier a cost advantage, but at the expense of American firms, American employees, American security, and future American innovation.? A 2011 study by the U.S. International Trade Commission estimated that if IP protection in just China were improved to a level comparable to that in the United States, the U.S. economy would obtain an estimated $107 billion in additional annual sales and net U.S. employment could increase by 2.1-million jobs.8 Yet as useful as it is, this study underestimated employment impacts because it did not consider “less-IP intensive industries,” likely underestimated the effects of trade-secret theft (much of which is never revealed or even known by the victims), and did not have the participation of many vulnerable U.S. companies.9? Despite the understandable reluctance of companies to publicize successful or even attempted breeches, there are many documented examples of IP theft. An American company, for example, developed at great cost a critical component in current smartphones and computers, only to have that technology illegally replicated by a Chinese company. The latter subsequently undersold the inventor and took much of the world market for the technology. In another case, one copy of an American company’s software was purchased in China and illegally copied onto 30 million Chinese computers, an act of piracy with a multibillion dollar commercial value.10 While most cases of IP theft do not end up in courts, twenty trade-secret cases involving China revealed the wide range of industries hit: automobiles, automobile tires, aviation, chemicals, consumer electronics, defense systems, electronic trading, industrial software, and pharmaceuticals.11? American scientific innovations and new technologies are tracked and stolen from American universities, national laboratories, private think tanks, and start-up companies, as well as from the major R&D centers of multinational companies. Virtually every sector and technology is attacked—from low-tech to high-tech; from agricultural machinery and biotechnology to wind- power generation; from mobile phones, computers, and televisions to chemical compounds and aeronautics.? Start-up companies are at the heart of the American innovative society. In his 2012 State of the Union address, President Obama noted the important place of start-ups when he observed that “innovation is what America has always been about. Most new jobs are created in start-ups and small businesses.”12? Start-ups rely heavily on IP protection just to get their inventions to market. As the Biotechnology Industry Organization (BIO) points out, “the vast majority of BIO’s members are small and medium sized enterprises that currently do not have products on the market. As such BIO’s members rely heavily on the strength and scope of their patents to generate investment to take their technologies to commercialization.”13 Start-ups, such as those in the biotech field, are extremely vulnerable to IP theft. Typically located in “incubator” areas near major research universities, these small operations have limited legal and technological resources to deal with the nearly relentless efforts targeting their IP. Moreover, they are often staffed by graduate students or post-degree fellows, who sometimes turn into “walking IP” and take trade secrets with them when they leave. As BIO observes, once the IP is lost, the company may simply fold because it is unable to attract any investment.Chinese IP theft undermines US economic competitivenessKlein 15 [Kris, Prospect Journal of International Affairs at UCSD, “CYBER SOVEREIGNTY: THE ECONOMIC IMPERATIVES OF A SECURE CYBERSPACE”, 11/17/15, ]//DBIThe importance of Intellectual Property to Protecting Innovation? Legal protection for those who develop new ideas and technologies encourages advances that makes the US economically competitive. When those protections are not enforced, innovation falters and so does the economy. In a report to the United States Congress, the Commission on the Theft of American Intellectual Property emphasized the economic consequences of allowing IP theft to go unpunished.? Theft of technology robs companies of their investment in developing designs for competitive technologies. When these designs are stolen the result is typically cuts to payrolls that cost the American economy jobs.? IP theft also diminishes the incentives companies have to invest in future research and development. If a company cannot be guaranteed that a potential investment in research will offer any form of competitive advantage, the company has no reason to invest in research at all. The decline of investment in research and development means slower innovation and fewer new technologies to help create economic growth.? Chinese Hacking and the Threat to Intellectual Property? The commission’s report highlights China’s cyber-attacks as a particularly potent threat to protecting innovation. The commission identified China as the world’s most persistent perpetrator of IP theft, revealing that hacking from China accounts for between fifty and eighty percent of the value stolen in commercial espionage.Chinese IP theft inflicts significant damage on the US economyNavarro 16 [Peter, PhD economics, Associate Professor of Economics and Public Policy, University of California (Irvine), “China’s State-Sponsored Cyber Attacks Must Stop”, 5/30/16, ]//DBIState-sponsored cyber espionage inflicts significant damage on the American economy. And just which nation is most actively engaged against the United States?? According to the Commission on the Theft of American Intellectual Property, America’s largest trading partner – China – accounts for as much as 70% of the losses the United States incurs.? What American citizens should find most disturbing about China’s role in what amounts to a global IP theft ring is the outsized role its government plays.? A watershed report by Mandiant reveals a military force of more than 100,000 cyber spies under the firm control of the People’s Liberation Army and under the clear direction of the Chinese Communist Party.? This state-sponsored cyber theft bureaucracy exists despite repeated denials by top government officials that China is even involved in such activities.? Stealing blueprints of American businesses? While the military may run China’s cyber espionage programs, the People’s Liberation Army nonetheless works hand-in-glove with civilian bureaucrats in charge of advancing China’s industrial policy goals.? On any given day, China’s military and civilian hackers seek to steal the obligatory blueprints and proprietary manufacturing processes of American businesses large and small.? China’s cyber spies will also vacuum up everything from emails, contact lists, and test results to pricing information and partnership agreements.? Sometimes such acts of IP theft can destroy most or all of the value of individual companies. A case in point noted by the IP Commission is American Superconductor: When it “had its wind-energy software code stolen by a major customer in China, it lost not only that customer, but also 90% of its stock value.”Extend 1ACCyber espionage fuels Chinese challenges to US hegemonyKihara 14 [Stacy, BA, candidate for MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES (HOMELAND SECURITY AND DEFENSE), Naval Postgraduate School, “A rising China: shifting the economic balance of power through cyberspace”, December 2014, ]//DBID. CHINESE RESOLVE? Recognizing the power potential in the cyber domain, China has aggressively used cyberspace to gain a competitive advantage in the economic and political domains. Lewis echoes this point when he writes: “China has integrated the use of cyber techniques into its military doctrine and economic policies far more comprehensively than any other nation in the region.”217 Through cyber-enabled economic espionage, China has not only identified a mechanism to overcome its lacking domestic innovation, but also a way to weaken the U.S. economy. If a major problem for China’s continued economic growth is the lack of innovation, and the United States is the largest innovator in the world, why expend the time and resources on domestic innovation when it can be retrieved through cyber espionage?? As China continues to syphon U.S. trade secrets and IP at an alarming rate, it races to overtake the United States as the world’s largest economy and possibly challenge U.S. hegemony. Despite international backlash, public exposure, and direct accusations from the U.S. government, China continues to maintain its persistent state-sponsored economic espionage. Rightly stated in Mandiant’s 2104 Threat Report, China’s unwillingness to discontinue its intrusive cyber operations suggests China “believes the benefits of its cyber espionage campaigns outweigh the potential costs of an international backlash.”218? This chapter’s demonstration of China’s extensive use of the cyber domain to conduct economic espionage demonstrates China’s resolve to shift the balance of economic power, given by asymmetric interdependence, away from the United States. This chapter also underscores the importance of the next chapter’s investigation on China’s use of asymmetric interdependence as a coercive political tool and potential source of power against the United States.? IV. U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS: CAN CHINA RISE PEACEFULLY?? With China’s rise as a potential great power—owing much to its significant economic growth that, in turn, has expanded its political and military power—the U.S.- China relationship has become one of the most important bilateral relationships in the world. The ascent of China is changing the international order, making global stability increasingly more dependent on U.S.-China relations.219 This relationship is not without its problems, however. “Hanging over the relationship is the larger question of whether, as China grows in economic and military power, the United States and China can manage their relationship in such a way as to avoid debilitating rivalry and conflict that have accompanied the rise of new powers in previous eras,” states Susan Lawrence.220 If the past provides any indication of the future, history does not offer a favorable outcome for U.S.-China relations. Looking solely at the rise and fall of great powers over the last 500 years, in “11 of 15 cases since 1500 in which a rising power rivaled a ruling power, the outcome was war.”221? As the United States struggles with how to address China’s massive cyber- enabled economic espionage campaign, threatening U.S. economic growth and stability, it does so in an environment in which China is emerging as a potential great power. “China’s rise has occurred within a world system still dominated by American unilateral authority. Because of these imbalances, China has naturally sought to find asymmetrical advantages, and cyberspace at first glance appears to be a dimension of national power in which the United States is asymmetrically vulnerable,” state Hannas, Mulvenon, and Puglisi.222 What is clear so far is that both the United States and China are entangled in an economically interdependent relationship that neither is comfortable maintaining in its current state.? With the United States leading the world in global innovation and China’s long- term economic growth relying on innovation and technological advancement, China continues to seek cyber-enabled economic espionage as a mechanism to create an asymmetry in the interdependent economic relationship. China’s use of cyberspace allows China to increase the global competitiveness of Chinese businesses and overcome its lacking domestic innovation in order to support sustained economic growth, all the while weakening the U.S. economy. While China has demonstrated its willingness to use cyber-enabled economic espionage to shift the balance of economic power it its favor, the larger question is whether China is willing to then use the asymmetric interdependence as a source of power to affect other areas of the U.S.-China relationship. This chapter explains why previous patterns of Chinese behavior indicate that the answer is yes.Chinese cyber espionage tanks US economic competitivenessKihara 14 [Stacy, BA, candidate for MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES (HOMELAND SECURITY AND DEFENSE), Naval Postgraduate School, “A rising China: shifting the economic balance of power through cyberspace”, December 2014, ]//DBIIII. CHINESE CYBER-ENABLED ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE? Although concerns about cyberspace and cyber security have leapt to the forefront of U.S.-China relations, China’s cyber behavior cannot be dissociated from its political and economic relations. “China poses an especially difficult problem [to the United States], given the size and importance of its economy and the interdependence of the Chinese economy with those of the United States, Europe, and Japan,” argues the IP Commission.166 As the interdependence between U.S. and China expands U.S. markets, it also provides Chinese government agencies and Chinese businesses greater opportunities to collect sensitive U.S. economic information while leapfrogging the Research and Development (R&D) phase.167 Hannas, Mulvenon, and Puglisi emphasize how important timing has been for China, reasoning that China is “emerging as a global economic power at a time when nearly every secret worth stealing sits on a computer server.”168? With the global rise of the Internet, the United States has witnessed massive intrusion and data exfiltration campaigns against U.S. public and private industries by the Chinese government and Chinese government-owned enterprises. According to McAfee, “Numerous sources of intellectual property exist inside today’s global companies...to say these intellectual property sources represent the heart and core value of companies worldwide is an understatement. When these intellectual property sources get compromised, capitalism and commerce are compromised on a global scale.”169 Economic espionage not only affects revenue and income, but undermines corporate innovation, having devastating effects on the national and global economy. “In a world where the highest-value assets are intangible and easy to transfer over networks, espionage has taken on a new dimension,” argues the IP Commission.170 China has swiftly adapted to this new environment by shifting its traditional intelligence collection operations to cyber collection operations. “Given the choice between traditional espionage and cyber espionage, it is only natural that intelligence services would increasingly pick the less risky, cheaper, and faster way of doing business,” state Hannas, Mulvenon, and Puglisi.171 China has taken economic espionage to a new level through cyberspace, stealing sensitive U.S. economic data at an unprecedented rate and with significant costs to the U.S. economy.? A. COSTS TO THE U.S. ECONOMY? Many analysts believe that trade secrets, proprietary information, copyrights, patents, and trademarks, all considered IP, represent the U.S. advantage in the global economy. Theft of IP by foreign economic competitors jeopardizes this advantage by inhibiting the business sector’s “ability to create jobs, generate revenues, foster innovation, and lay the economic foundation for prosperity and national security.”172 The IP Commission Report assesses the damage to the U.S. economy to be approximately $300 billion a year, with 50 percent to 80 percent of international IP theft originating in China (see additional information below).173? Yet the cost of cyber-enabled economic espionage includes more than the stolen property itself. James Lewis argues that “there are opportunity costs, damage to brand and reputation, consumer losses from fraud, the opportunity costs of service disruptions ‘cleaning up’ after cyber incidents, and the cost of increased spending on cyber security.”174 Moreover, IP theft slows the development of new inventions and new industries by undermining the means and the incentive for entrepreneurs to innovate, causing stagnation of innovation and inhibiting expansion of the world economy.175? To put the intellectual property loss into perspective, the U.S. Department of Commerce identified 75 of 313 U.S. industries as IP-intensive that directly accounted for 27.1 million U.S. jobs and 18.8 percent of all employment in the 2010 economy. These IP-intensive industries also accounted for 34.8 percent of U.S. GDP while indirectly supporting 12.9 million additional supply-chain jobs throughout the economy. All in all, the most IP-intensive industries either directly or indirectly accounted for 27.7 percent of all jobs (40 million jobs) in the United States and 60.7 percent of total U.S. merchandise exports ($775 billion) in 2010.176? China, however, has threatened U.S. technological competitiveness and economic prosperity for more than a decade through the use of cyberspace. In a hearing before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Lewis stated the United States has always been upfront with China that “espionage is a two-way street, something that all great powers do, and that espionage against military and political targets is legitimate” but that the United States “objects to economic espionage” and “rampant commercial cyber espionage.”177 The U.S. International Trade Commission estimates Chinese theft of U.S. intellectual property in the form of lost sales, royalties, and license fees to be $48.2 billion in 2009 alone with another $4.8 billion spent by firms to address Chinese infringement.178 Because “the entire U.S. economy relies on some form of IP,” with every industry using or producing it, the theft of IP by China directly affects U.S. strength in the global economy.179Heg solves great power conflict Kagan, 2/19/2015 (Robert, Senior fellow with the Project on International Order and Strategy in the Foreign Policy program at Brookings, Ph.D. in American history from American University, “The United States must resist a return to spheres of interest in the international system”, Brookings, )Great power competition has returned. Or rather, it has reminded us that it was always lurking in the background. This is not a minor development in international affairs, but it need not mean the end of the world order as we know it. The real impact of the return of great power competition will depend on how the United States responds to these changes. America needs to recognize its central role in maintaining the present liberal international order and muster the will to use its still formidable power and influence to support that order against its inevitable challengers. Competition in international affairs is natural. Great powers by their very nature seek regional dominance and spheres of influence. They do so in the first instance because influence over others is what defines a great power. They are, as a rule, countries imbued with national pride and imperial ambition. But, living in a Hobbesian world of other great powers, they are also nervous about their security and seek defense-in-depth through the establishment of buffer states on their periphery. Historically, great power wars often begin as arguments over buffer states where spheres of influence intersect—the Balkans before World War I, for instance, where the ambitions of Russia and Austria-Hungary clashed. But today’s great powers are rising in a very different international environment, largely because of the unique role the United States has played since the end of the Second World War. The United States has been not simply a regional power, but rather a regional power in every strategic region. It has served as the maintainer of regional balances in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. The result has been that, in marked contrast to past eras, today’s great powers do not face fundamental threats to their physical security. So, for example, Russia objectively has never enjoyed greater security in its history than it has since 1989. In the 20th century, Russia was invaded twice by Germany, and in the aftermath of the second war could plausibly claim to fear another invasion unless adequately protected. (France, after all, had the same fear.) In the 19th century, Russia was invaded by Napoleon, and before that Catherine the Great is supposed to have uttered that quintessentially Russian observation, “I have no way to defend my borders but to extend them.” Today that is not true. Russia faces no threat of invasion from the West. Who would launch such an invasion? Germany, Estonia, Ukraine? If Russia faces threats, they are from the south, in the form of militant Islamists, or from the east, in the form of a billion Chinese standing across the border from an empty Siberia. But for the first time in Russia’s long history, it does not face a strategic threat on its western flank. Much the same can be said of China, which enjoys far greater security than it has at any time in the last three centuries. The American role in East Asia protects it from invasion by its historic adversary, Japan, while none of the other great powers around China’s periphery have the strength or desire now or in the foreseeable future to launch an attack on Chinese territory. Therefore, neither Chinese nor Russians can claim that a sphere of influence is necessary for their defense. They may feel it necessary for their sense of pride. They may feel it is necessary as a way of restoring their wounded honor. They may seek an expanded sphere of influence to fulfill their ambition to become more formidable powers on the international stage. And they may have concerns that free, nations on their periphery may pass the liberal infection onto their own populaces and thus undermine their autocratic power. The question for the United States, and its allies in Asia and Europe, is whether we should tolerate a return to sphere of influence behavior among regional powers that are not seeking security but are in search of status, powers that are acting less out of fear than out of ambition. This question, in the end, is not about idealism, our commitment to a “rules-based” international order, or our principled opposition to territorial aggression. Yes, there are important principles at stake: neighbors shouldn’t invade their neighbors to seize their territory. But before we get to issues of principle, we need to understand how such behavior affects the world in terms of basic stability On that score, the historical record is very clear. To return to a world of spheres of influence—the world that existed prior to the era of American predominance—is to return to the great power conflicts of past centuries. Revisionist great powers are never satisfied. Their sphere of influence is never quite large enough to satisfy their pride or their expanding need for security. The “satiated” power that Bismarck spoke of is rare—even his Germany, in the end, could not be satiated. Of course, rising great powers always express some historical grievance. Every people, except perhaps for the fortunate Americans, have reason for resentment at ancient injustices, nurse grudges against old adversaries, seek to return to a glorious past that was stolen from them by military or political defeat. The world’s supply of grievances is inexhaustible. These grievances, however, are rarely solved by minor border changes. Japan, the aggrieved “have-not” nation of the 1930s, did not satisfy itself by swallowing Manchuria in 1931. Germany, the aggrieved victim of Versailles, did not satisfy itself by bringing the Germans of the Sudetenland back into the fold. And, of course, Russia’s historical sphere of influence does not end in Ukraine. It begins in Ukraine. It extends to the Balts, to the Balkans, and to heart of Central Europe. The tragic irony is that, in the process of carving out these spheres of influence, the ambitious rising powers invariably create the very threats they use to justify their actions. Japan did exactly that in the 30s. In the 1920s, following the Washington Naval Treaty, Japan was a relatively secure country that through a combination of ambition and paranoia launched itself on a quest for an expanded sphere of influence, thus inspiring the great power enmity that the Japanese had originally feared. One sees a similar dynamic in Russia’s behavior today. No one in the West was thinking about containing Russia until Russia made itself into a power that needed to be contained. If history is any lesson, such behavior only ends when other great powers decide they have had enough. We know those moments as major power wars. The best and easiest time to stop such a dynamic is at the beginning. If the United States wants to maintain a benevolent world order, it must not permit spheres of influence to serve as a pretext for aggression. The United States needs to make clear now—before things get out of hand—that this is not a world order that it will accept. And we need to be clear what that response entails. Great powers of course compete across multiple spheres—economic, ideological, and political, as well as military. Competition in most spheres is necessary and even healthy. Within the liberal order, China can compete economically and successfully with the United States; Russia can thrive in the international economic order uphold by the liberal powers, even if it is not itself liberal. But security competition is different. It is specifically because Russia could not compete with the West ideologically or economically that Putin resorted to military means. In so doing, he attacked the underlying security and stability at the core of the liberal order. The security situation undergirds everything—without it nothing else functions. Democracy and prosperity cannot flourish without security. It remains true today as it has since the Second World War that only the United States has the capacity and the unique geographical advantages to provide this security. There is no stable balance of power in Europe or Asia without the United States. And while we can talk about soft power and smart power, they have been and always will be of limited value when confronting raw military power. Despite all of the loose talk of American decline, it is in the military realm where U.S. advantages remain clearest. Even in other great power’s backyards, the United States retains the capacity, along with its powerful allies, to deter challenges to the security order. But without a U.S. willingness to use military power to establish balance in far-flung regions of the world, the system will buckle under the unrestrained military competition of regional powers. ................
................

In order to avoid copyright disputes, this page is only a partial summary.

Google Online Preview   Download