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A2 AffA2 ChinaA2: Economic Coercion1. We would contend the reason that countries tend to be sucked into coercive tactics is because they don’t have stable economies in the first place, so at best this is non-unique because THAAD hurts the South Korean economy and keeps them in this cycle.2. If South Korea doesn’t want to be perceived as weak, China doesn’t either. They perceive themselves as a world superpower and will not back down to South Korea meaning standing up will make further sanctions more likely.3. We solve best for sanctions through negotiation. Ben Blanchard of Reuters reports that China wants to open negotiations with South Korea but James Griffiths of CNN states that THAAD is the biggest obstacle to that. Get rid of THAAD you open avenues to negotiation.Ben Blanchard, 5/18/17, “China says willing to put South Korea ties back on track, urges THAAD resolution”, Reuters, //BBChina wants to put ties with South Korea back on a “normal track”, President Xi Jinping said on Friday, but Beijing also urged Seoul to respect its concerns and resolve tensions over the deployment of a U.S. anti-missile system that it opposes. Relations between Beijing and Seoul, strained by disagreement over South Korea’s hosting of the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, have taken on a more conciliatrory tone with the election earlier this month of President Moon Jae-in.James Griffiths, 5/18/17, “Can South Korea and China patch things up over THAAD?”, CNN, //BBKim Sung-hee, a restaurant owner in Wudaokao -- another area of Beijing popular with Korean residents -- was also optimistic Moon could patch things up. She told CNN her business had seen a 50% drop in customers since the THAAD issue first began. But analysts warned that Moon will have a difficult path to weave, with THAAD already near fully operational. "Both countries want to improve relations," said Tong Zhao, an analyst at the Carnegie Tsinghua Center for Global Policy. "But THAAD is still the most critical barrier for the relationship to go forward." Walking a tightrope Throughout the election campaign, Moon called for deployment of THAAD to be halted and the decision about its future to be taken by the new government and the country's parliament.A2: Bad Mediator1. The United States is a far worse mediator. According JJ Suh of the Asia-Pacific Journal in April, Pyongyang justifies its nuclear weapons development in terms of security threats it alleges it has received from the United States. US presence threatens North Korea. On the other hand, they are willing to cooperate with China. 2. China is needed to reign in North Korean action. There is precedence for Chinese sanctions being effective in changing North Korean behavior. Alex Lockie of Business Insider writes on June 9th that “After a provocative North Korean missile launch in 2003, China cut off its supply of oil to North Korea for three days. In no time, the Kim regime caved to international demands and sat down for the six-party talks on nuclear disarmament.”Jae-Jung Suh, 4/27/17, “Missile Defense and the Security Dilemma: THAAD, Japan’s “Proactive Peace,” and the Arms Race in Northeast Asia”, The Asia-Pacific Journal, //BBIt is notable—and directly relevant to our discussion of the security dilemma—that it conducted its first nuclear test in 2006 when it was singled out as one of the countries in the “axis of evil” with an unveiled threat of a preemptive strike by the George W. Bush administration and that it conducted the four subsequent tests during the Obama administration that implicitly excluded North Korea from its no-first strike policy.4 Pyongyang indeed justifies its nuclear weapons development in terms of security threats it alleges it has received from the United States. Whatever the merit of its justifications, its actions and capabilities concern its adversaries.Alex Lockie, 6/9/17, “China could stop North Korea’s nuclear threat in a heartbeat without firing a shot”, Business Insider, //BBBut Gordon Chang, the author of "The Coming Collapse of China," writes in The Cipher Brief that 90% of North Korea's trade is done with China, accounting for 90% of its oil and, in some years, 100% of its aviation fuel. After a provocative North Korean missile launch in 2003, China cut off its supply of oil to North Korea for three days. In no time, the Kim regime caved to international demands and sat down for the six-party talks on nuclear disarmament. "China can disarm North Korea in the blink of an eye," Chang wrote. And it could do so by crippling North Korea's economy — but at a huge cost to North Koreans.A2: Bargaining Chip with ChinaTHAAD can’t be used as a bargaining chip with China because relations with China aren’t functionally non-existent when South Korea has THAAD. However, Mel Gurtov of the Asia-Pacific Journal writes in March that sidelining THAAD would have reassured China and might have even provided a bargaining chip to freeze Chinese weapons deployments in the South China Sea.Mel Gurtov, 3/15/17, “Diplomatic Remedies for THAAD Madness: The US, China and the Two Koreas”, The Asia-Pacific Journal, //BBDiplomacy with North Korea is much more cost-effective. If Washington were in more experienced hands, it would indefinitely delay full deployment of THAAD or, if requested by a new South Korean president, decide not to operationalize it. Secretary Tillerson might, as a result of discussions with ROK leaders, announce on his current trip that future US-ROK exercises would depend on the security situation on the peninsula—a half-step toward Wang Yi’s proposal. These moves would not resolve the nuclear issue with North Korea or turn around contentious relations with China. But sidelining THAAD would reassure China—it might even provide a bargaining chip to freeze Chinese weapons deployments in the South China Sea. It would certainly remove a volatile issue from South Korean politics at a time of a national leadership crisis.A2: Incentivize China(3 responses)1. Delink, the US-China Security Commission explains that Beijing views North Korea’s provocations as triggers for a strengthened US-South Korean alliance which bolsters US military presence in the region. Insofar as this is true, China should have always had an incentive to pressure North Korea, the deployment of missile defense isn’t unique. 2. Delink, the US-China Security Commission explains that China’s largest incentive to peruse negotiations is the North Korean threat, not missile defense. They further that China began attempting to restart multilateral talks with North Korea after their fourth nuclear launch in January of 2016. Several months before South Korea began discussing the deployment of additional Missile Defuse.3. Delink, Wright of the Union of Concerned Scientists 2017 explains that efforts to get China to negotiate with and pressure North Korea won’t solve the problem because China doesn’t have as much leverage as the U.S. thinks it has over North Korea. Furthermore, China also views this as an issue between the U.S. and North Korea must negotiate between themselves.4. Turn, the Irish Examiner 17 explains in August that China fears both a refugee crisis and US troops on its border, and thus seeks to prop up the Kim regime.5. Turn the argument, THAAD means that China doesn’t have any more leverage over North Korea. Julie Makinen of the LA Times writes in 2016 that THAAD causes China to be less strict North Korea and it will be less receptive to the idea of sanctioning the North.Cards:U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. “SECTION 4: CHINA AND NORTH KOREA.” United States Government Publishing Office. 2017. // AAFrom North Korea’s perspective, while it needs Chinese support—particularly economic assistance—for the survival of the Kim Jong-un regime, Pyongyang resents this near complete dependence and has longstanding frictions with Beijing.11 North Korea distrusts China, which it feels has abandoned Marxist-Leninist principles and become morally corrupted by capitalism and its relations with South Korea and the United States.12 For its part, China views North Korea as a backward country.13 Beijing resents the accumulation of Pyongyang’s provocations—particularly nuclear and ballistic missile tests violating UN resolutions—which it fears will lead to further instability on the Korean Peninsula and could heighten the risk of a major conflict in the region.14 Relatedly, Beijing likely views North Korea’s continued belligerence against South Korea as strengthening Seoul’s alliance with Washington and bolstering the U.S. military presence in Northeast Asia.15 While these frictions persist, Beijing’s aversion to punishing Pyongyang—even in the face of increasing provocations—conveys China’s perception that the preservation of the North Korean state and the Kim dynasty is essential to China’s interests.U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. “SECTION 4: CHINA AND NORTH KOREA.” United States Government Publishing Office. 2017. // AAChina’s preferred method to accomplish this goal is through restarting the Six-Party Talks.? In the aftermath of North Korea’s January 2016 nuclear test, a spokesperson for China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said, ‘‘All relevant parties should return to the right track of resolving the Korean nuclear issue through the SixParty Talks as soon as possible with the larger picture of regional peace and stability in mind.’’ 97 President Xi himself has made numerous calls for resuming the Six-Party Talks, the most recent of which was on the sidelines of the September 2016 G20 summit in Hangzhou, China.98 Pursuing this dialogue is beneficial to Beijing for many reasons: (1) it portrays China as a responsible stakeholder in the international community, and, if the talks can actually be revived, China will be able to take credit for it; (2) dialogue is preferable to instability and conflict (even in the event the SixParty Talks are unsuccessful); and (3) it absorbs U.S. pressure for change in North Korea.99David Wright [co-director and senior scientist with the Union of Concerned Scientists’ Global Security Program] & Larry Greenemeier [associate editor of technology for?Scientific American]. July 6, 2017. “North Korea Missile Test: Best Response May Be Surprisingly Low-Tech.” Scientific American. // AAWhat is the best path forward for the U.S.?The U.S. called for a U.N. Security Council meeting on Wednesday, which is what I would have expected them to do. The Security Council meeting is intended to marshal international forces against North Korea, but I don’t think that solves the problem. Efforts to get China to negotiate with and pressure North Korea on behalf of the U.S. won’t solve the problem either. China doesn’t have as much leverage as the U.S. thinks it has over North Korea. China also views this as an issue between the U.S. and North Korea and, while it’s happy to help, China sees this as something that the U.S. and North Korea have to negotiate between themselves.Thursday, August 10, 2017, Irish Examiner, 8-10-2017, ["Is war between the US and North Korea likely? " , 8-10-2017] // AAIf Kim somehow were targeted for removal, the ruling clique would have to go as well, making for a long kill list. China, fearing both a refugee crisis and US troops on its border, would likely seek to prop up the existing regime. Does that mean all-out war is the best US option? A full-scale invasion would be necessary to quickly take out North Korea’s artillery, as well as its missile and nuclear programmes.Julie Makinen, 7/8/16, “U.S. and South Korea agree to deploy THAAD antimissile system to counter North Korea”, LATimes, //BBThe U.S., Japan and South Korea won backing from China at the United Nations for tighter sanctions on North Korea after Pyongyang’s nuclear test and long-range rocket launch in February. But Delury said South Korea’s decision to embrace THAAD might cause China to be less strict with its unpredictable neighbor. “South Korea is always asking that China enforce sanctions [on North Korea] harder. It’s going to be difficult for them to ask that now, and China will likely be less receptive to those requests,” he said. “It also gives China an opening to try to improve ties with North Korea, which Xi Jinping wants to do even though Kim Jong Un drives him crazy. He’s likely now to seek a way to use Chinese influence more effectively in North Korea."A2: NK Threatens China(1 response)1. Turn, my oppoennts concede the link that China will act on perceived threats from the Korea peninsula. This is problematic for them as the US-China Security Commission 2017 explains that Beijing sees South Korea missile defenses as a direct threat to its national security, whereas it perceives North Korea as a manageable and limited threat. This means you can turn their link because affirming means you increase the likelihood of Chinese retaliation on South Korea.Cards:U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. “SECTION 4: CHINA AND NORTH KOREA.” United States Government Publishing Office. 2017. // AAOn the day of North Korea’s February 2016 satellite launch and the THAAD announcement, China separately summoned both the North Korean and South Korean ambassadors to China,77 seeming to suggest that Beijing views THAAD as a security threat at least on par with that of Pyongyang’s ballistic missile and nuclear programs, although China views THAAD through a different security lens than it does North Korea. Beijing sees THAAD as a direct threat to its national security, whereas it perceives North Korea as a more manageable and limited threat.78A2 NKA2: NK Will Fire Nukes1. North Korea doesn’t have an interest in firing missiles at South Korea because Kim Jong Un promotes propaganda that claims that South Korea is part of the DPRK. Bombing the South hurts his public image- it’s not in his interest. 2. North Korea isn’t a threat. George Wittman of the Washington Times explains in April that Kim is using his nuclear program as a defensive device to deter attempts to threaten Pyongyang. He is seeking to prevent an attack rather than preparing to attack. 3. North Korea has and has had artillery technology pointed at South Korea and ready to use for literally 10 years. There is no uniqueness now and THAAD doesn’t protect South Korea. At that point, they’re in a double bind- either they don’t solve with THAAD technology or there is no North Korean incentive in the first place because they would’ve destroyed South Korea without missiles already. 4. Even if North Korea threatens to bomb South Korea, they won’t follow through with it in the name of self-preservation. According to Max Fisher of the Washington Post in 2013, the North Korean regime has shown itself to be obsessed with its own self-preservation. North Korea will never attack- it’ll just make bold threats and not follow through because it knows that it’s military is inferior to the US’s, and a US led counterattack would almost certainly end with the regime’s total destruction.George Wittman, 4/18/17, “The coming war with North Korea”, The Washington Times, //BBThere can be no delay in this U.S.-ROK offense, for it is essential to preclude North Korea’s own counteroffensive against the South. Currently, there is a hopeful analytical view that Mr. Kim is using his well-announced nuclear program simply as a defensive device to deter any attempt to threaten Pyongyang into actions counter to his interest in maintaining dominance over his nation. In other words, Mr. Kim is merely seeking to prevent an attack rather than preparing to attack. That reasoning certainly hasn’t been his motivation for executing scores of ranking officers and political personalities who tended to disagree with him, including his uncle-in-law, originally thought of as his mentor.Alex Ward, 7/6/17, “Trump has 3 options for dealing with North Korea. They're all bad.”, Vox, //BBThe military option would entail a “surgical strike” on North Korea’s nuclear sites to take out the country’s missiles as well as the country’s political leadership, including Kim Jong Un. The problem is that North Korea would be certain to hit back hard, using its own large artillery arsenal to strike at America’s allies, South Korea, and Japan. That would likely kill tens or even hundreds of thousands of people — including US troops stationed in both countries — even before nuclear weapons were dropped. The diplomatic option would see the US try to come to some sort of agreement with North Korea to either give up its programs or, at a minimum, freeze their development.Max Fisher, 3/12/13, “Why North Korea loves to threaten World War III (but probably won’t follow through)”, The Washington Post, //BBA few months later, North Korea fired over 100 artillery shells at Yeonpyeong Island, killing two civilians and wounding 19. But is North Korea really an irrational nation on the brink of launching "all-out war," a mad dog of East Asia? Is Pyongyang ready to sacrifice it all? Probably not. The North Korean regime, for all its cruelty, has also shown itself to be shrewd, calculating, and single-mindedly obsessed with its own self-preservation. The regime's past behavior suggests pretty strongly that these threats are empty. But they still matter.A2: Internal Struggles WarrantDelink them because Jenny Lee of VOA News writes in January that North Korea is functioning relatively well and the country has been in much worse internal situations, yet it has not fired a missile.Jenny Lee, 1/30/17, “Analysis: Is North Korea’s Collapse Imminent?”, VOA News, //BBJoseph DeTrani, former U.S. nuclear envoy and intelligence official, said that while Thae's claims are “significant commentary” based on the diplomat's knowledge base, there is virtually “no indication that the regime's collapse is imminent.” While saying that his views are based on limited information, DeTrani said he sees “a functioning government” in the North: private markets are functioning and people have access to food. Ken Gause, who monitors the Kim regime, is also skeptical of Thae's prediction of regime change. Notwithstanding increasing international sanctions, he says, Pyongyang's economy is faring relatively well. Even with its chronic food shortage, the country is “not as in serious situation as it was in the 1990s when there was mass starvation.” Popular uprisings unlikely Gause, director of the International Affairs Group at the Center for Naval Analyses in Arlington, Virginia added that due to an extensive surveillance network of informants that covers every North Korean citizen, it is highly unlikely that information that could lead to a popular uprising will circulate among ordinary citizens.A2: NK Preemptive Strike Imminent(5 responses)1. Delink, Jannuzi of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee said in May that the likelihood of a preemptive attack by North Korea is infinitesimally small. Prefer this evidence because she is in the briefing rooms of the US congress with the most up to date information regarding North Korea.2.Delink, Kim Jong Un stated that the United States is not an imminent threat that requires preemptive action because he can withstand any psychological warfare from the United States. Take North Korea’s word for it, not my opponents.3. Delink, Lee of Tufts University explains that in the short term, the North Korean threat level is low and manageable because North Korea is not suicidal and would not initiate a conflict.4. Delink, Woolf of PRI 2017 explains that deterrence is the primary goal of the North Korean nuclear program, because Kim Jong-Un does not want to follow Saddam Hussein or Gaddafi and get invaded. 5. Delink, Friedman of Cornell University 2017 explains that North Korea has achieved its goal of being feared by the international community. Thus, he concludes that no matter how many threats the leader of North Koreas hurls, they won’t risk their positon. In short, they only want to talk the talk rather than walking the walk.Cards:Christopher Woolf [World Reporter for the BBC], Public Radio International, 5-1-2017, ["Is North Korea really a threat to the United States?," , 7-19-2017] // AA“The likelihood of a sneak attack by North Korea,” says Frank Jannuzi, “especially one with nuclear weapons, to me, is infinitesimally small.” Jannuzi was the policy director of East Asian and Pacific affairs?for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee?from 1997 to 2012. He’s now head of the Mansfield Foundation, a think tank?in Washington, DC.Christopher Woolf [World Reporter for the BBC], Public Radio International, 5-1-2017, ["Is North Korea really a threat to the United States?," , 7-19-2017] // AASung-Yoon Lee, of Tufts University's Fletcher School, agrees. “In the short term, the threat level is low and manageable,” he says. “North Korea is not suicidal, so it would not initiate a conflict.”Christopher Woolf [World Reporter for the BBC], Public Radio International, 5-1-2017, ["Is North Korea really a threat to the United States?," , 7-19-2017] // AADeterrence is the main goal of the North Korean nuclear program. Jannuzi and Lee agree that Kim Jong-un?does not want to go the way of Saddam Hussein of Iraq, or Muammar Gaddafi of Libya. He wants to deter an attack.Alexandre. Mansourov, Ph.D. Columbia University; B.A. Moscow State Institute of International Relations; Advanced Diploma, Kim Il Sung National University (DPRK); Professor at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, "Kim Jong Un’s Nuclear Doctrine and Strategy: What Everyone Needs to Know", NAPSNet Special Reports, December 16, 2014, // AAOne of the circumstances Kim Jong Un alluded to in his March speech was the notion of “imminent threat.” He allegedly said “the United States was testing my self-control and getting on my nerves (in March 2013), but there was no limit to the psychological pressure I could withstand” because “the U.S. threat was not imminent.”George Friedman (Founder, Stratfor; Cornell University), December 2013, “Ferocious, Weak and Crazy: The North Korean Strategy.” Stratfor Enterprises. // AAThe North's positioning is superb: Minimal risky action sufficient to lend credibility to its ferocity and craziness plus endless rhetorical threats maneuvers North Korea into being a major global threat in the eyes of the great powers. Having won themselves this position, the North Koreans are not about to risk it, even if a 20-something leader is hurling threats.A2: War Likely(3 responses)1. Turn the link, Even if you buy that war is likely, it is not inevitable. This is crucial as Lee of Bond University 16 explains that the deployment of missile defense increases the risk of an inter-Korean war because missile defense is having a negative impact on China’s military power, upon which North Korea depends for its protection. Thus, it is more likely to lash out with a last stand mentality.2. Mitigate, Peters of Penn State University explains that South Korean fear peaked a decade ago. That’s crucial because even when paranoia was at its highest, there was no conflict, they give you no reason to suggest that will change now.3. Mitigate, the Irish Examiner 17 explains in August that a conflict with North Korea would result in global economic turmoil. This is problematic for my opponents as Trump ran on the platform of improving the American economy, which can’t happen if the global economy is in turnoil. 4. Delink, Tures of the Observer 17 explains that North Korea has offered a de-escalation treaty, wherein both sides suspend their missile developments. This shows clear intent that North Korea is open to peace.Cards:Lee, Kim Min Tayler' (2016) "THAAD: Missile defense or diplomatic challenge?," Culture Mandala: The Bulletin of the Centre for East West Cultural and Economic Studies: Vol. 12 : Iss. 1, Article 5. Available at: As noted above, in February 2016, South Korea suspended operations at the jointly run Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC), following the North’s fourth nuclear test. This was a significant incident for the two Koreas, because it was the last remaining point of peaceful engagement between them. Analysts contend that the deployment of THAAD on top of this incident increases the risk of inter-Korean war once again, and they even go on to say [furthering] the Korean peninsula can become the ‘actual battlefield’ in a conflict between the United States and China, with South Korea being on U.S. side, and the North supporting China (Kwon, 2016). In another analysis, forwarded by Hyeon-Jun Jeon from the Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative (NAPCI), the deployment of THAAD is viewed as having a negative impact on China’s military power, upon which North Korea depends for its protection. (DailyNK, 2015) This can be very dangerous, as the North would lose the relationship with China, becoming completely isolated and alienated from the global society. This would increase the chance of an invasion of the South, and the war could even include use of nuclear weapons. Irrespective of whether a war would occur, the heightened expectation of an invasion would impact on South Korea’s political and economic stability with foreign investors reluctant to commit to a country in such peril.Ralph Peters (a retired Army lieutenant colonel, Graduate of Pennsylvania State University), New York Post, 8-9-2017, ["Here’s how to take out North Korea’s nukes," , 8-10-2017] // AAI fear we’ve forgotten what war means. That fear reached a peak a decade ago when American generals blithely repeated the indefensible claim that “counterinsurgency is warfare at the graduate-school level.” No. Counterinsurgency is Kindergarten (complete with political correctness nowadays). D-Day was a doctoral dissertation and the bombing campaign over Germany the preceding master’s thesis.Thursday, August 10, 2017, Irish Examiner, 8-10-2017, ["Is war between the US and North Korea likely? " , 8-10-2017] // AASouth Korea accounts for about 1.9% of the world’s economy and is home to Samsung Electronics and Hyundai Motor, and other large companies. A severe drop in business activity, due to war on the peninsula, would cause widespread pain regionally and globally, and that’s without deployment of North Korea’s nuclear weapons against its neighbour. Global financial markets would also suffer a tremendous shock in the short-term, with a flight to safe-haven assets, such as gold, the US dollar, and the Swiss franc. “The humanitarian crisis and economic reconstruction of the Korean peninsula, after such a nuclear conflict, would require large-scale international co-operation, led by China, the US, and the European Union and it would likely take over a decade to rebuild the economy,” according to Rajiv Biswas, chief Asia-Pacific economist for IHS Markit.John A. Tures, Observer, 3-9-2017, ["North Korea Has More Than Just Nukes—But War Is Not Inevitable," <span class="skimlinks-unlinked">, 7-20-2017] // AAOn March 8, 2017, China offered a plan where North Korea would halt missile tests in exchange for an end to joint exercises between the USA and South Korea. Such a plan might be the kind of tit-for-tat Trump needs to deescalate the tensions on the Korean Peninsula. “What Mr. Wang [China’s Foreign Minister] proposed is not new—North Korea has pitched ‘suspension for suspension’ many times and the U.S. has baled. However, this is the first time it has been raised under President Trump,” reads a piece on?The Independent.A2: Nukes = War(1 response)1. Delink, Mansourov of Johns Hopkins University explains that North Korea’s nuclear force is a tool to protect the sovereignty of the country and preserves peace, security, and a stable economy. North Korea does not intend to initiate a conflict, it intends to deter one.2. Delink, their intentions are purely defensive. Mansourov explains that North Korea observed that no state with nuclear weapons has ever suffered a foreign invasion thus, they concluded attaining nuclear capabilities will help North Korea avoid the fate of Iraq, Libya, and Syria. Cards:Alexandre. Mansourov, Ph.D. Columbia University; B.A. Moscow State Institute of International Relations; Advanced Diploma, Kim Il Sung National University (DPRK); Professor at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, "Kim Jong Un’s Nuclear Doctrine and Strategy: What Everyone Needs to Know", NAPSNet Special Reports, December 16, 2014, // AAAccording to the MOFA spokesman statement on 4 October 2014, “The DPRK’s nuclear force serves a powerful treasured?sword?to protect the sovereignty of the country and the dignity of the nation and provides a sure?guarantee?for focusing efforts on preserving peace and security, building economy and improving the standard of the people’s living.” HYPERLINK "" \l "_edn5" [5]Alexandre. Mansourov, Ph.D. Columbia University; B.A. Moscow State Institute of International Relations; Advanced Diploma, Kim Il Sung National University (DPRK); Professor at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, "Kim Jong Un’s Nuclear Doctrine and Strategy: What Everyone Needs to Know", NAPSNet Special Reports, December 16, 2014, // AAThe North Korean military theoreticians also articulated three reasons explaining why nuclear weapons could help deter war. They observed that “No nuclear weapon state has ever suffered a foreign invasion since the introduction of nuclear weapons 70 years ago, despite many small and large wars fought during this time.” HYPERLINK "" \l "_edn15" [15]They also believe that “nuclear weapons will help DPRK avoid the fate of Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, and Syria.” HYPERLINK "" \l "_edn16" [16]And, lastly, they insist that since their country loves peace, it must prepare for war, even a nuclear war in defense of world peace. HYPERLINK "" \l "_edn17" [17]A2: PS on NK Likely(2 responses)1. Delink, former Secretary of Defense William Perry explains in 2017 that a preemptive strike is unlikely because the US would have to be granted approval by the liberal President Moon as South Korea would face the brunt of any retaliatory action, and he concludes that the risk is too great for Moon to accept. 2. (WE will ususally never read this @ben) Delink, South Korean brigadier General Lee Jung Wong 2017 explains that South Korea’s democratic and market driven society is resilient to uncertainty.Cards:William J. Perry, the former secretary of defense under the Clinton administration; a senior fellow of the Hoover Institution, is the Michael and Barbara Barbarian Professor at Stanford University, with a joint appointment at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and the School of Engineering, [Diplomacy,?Not Doomsday, DOA: 24 July 2017] Hoover Digest, Spring 2017 // AAWhat can we do to mitigate that danger? During the time I was defense secretary, I considered a pre-emptive conventional strike on the Yongbyon nuclear facility. We rejected that option in favor of diplomacy. Such a strike could still destroy the facilities at Yongbyon but probably would not destroy nuclear weapons, likely not located there. In 2006, Ashton B. Carter (who would become President Obama’s last secretary of defense) and I recommended that the United States consider striking North Korea’s ICBM launch facility. I would not recommend either of those strikes today because of the great risk for South Korea; at the very least, any suck plan would have to be agreed to by South Korea’s leadership, since their country would bear the brunt of any retaliatory action.David Wright [co-director and senior scientist with the Union of Concerned Scientists’ Global Security Program] & Larry Greenemeier [associate editor of technology for?Scientific American]. July 6, 2017. “North Korea Missile Test: Best Response May Be Surprisingly Low-Tech.” Scientific American. // AAThere’s a window of opportunity for the U.S. to try to engage with North Korea before they have the capability to reach the United States mainland with their missiles. If people think North Korea crossed a real red line in being able to reach U.S. territories, then reaching the west coast is an even bigger red line, and you have to think outside the box in terms of how you stop that. Everyone, including [Secretary of Defense James] Mattis, seems to agree that there are no good military options. China’s not going to solve this. Sanctions can ramp up pressure, but I don’t see how you get out of this without the two countries finding a way to talk to one another.Colin Clark (Editor; BA from Drew University), Breaking Defense, 7-27-2017, ["North Korea Won’t Give Nukes Up ‘At Any Price:’ Top Korea Intel Officer," , 7-28-2017] // AA[Brig. Gen. Lee Jung Wong] spoke in his prepared remarks of “bringing the Kim regime to its senses rather than its knees,” and stressed that South Korea’s democratic and market-driven society is “more resilient to uncertainty” than its northern brothers.A2: Irrational(3 responses)1. Delink, Friedman of Geopolitical Features 2016 explains that Kim Jong Un is enjoying playing God too much to seek becoming embroiled in a war he can’t win.2. Delink, Perry, the former Secretary of Defense during the 90’s negotiations with North Korea explains that the North Korean government is not irrational as they as they make rational decisions to maintain the Kim dynasty and gain international respect.3. Delink, Mansourov of Columbia University 14 explains that Afghanistan, Libya, and Syria were invaded by the United States because they gave up in pursuit of a nuclear deterrent. Thus, its historical precedence telling North Korea, “the only way to avoid invasion is through nukes.” This seems pretty rational to me.Cards:George Friedman [Founder]. May 2016. “Ballistic Missile Defense and Reality.” Geopolitical Features. // AAThe madman scenario is the only coherent explanation for starting a nuclear war, but it confronts a hard reality. Since World War II, no nation has used nuclear weapons for any purpose. For the U.S. in Vietnam and the Soviets in Afghanistan, nuclear weapons had no utility. Even if they had, both countries would have accepted defeat rather than use them. The empirical reality is that of all the nations that have nuclear capability, and wish ill toward their neighbor, none have used it. You would have to be crazy to use it. It is always posited that the current enemy doesn’t value human life as we do. Thus,?Iran?and?North Korea?might launch attacks. Kim Jong Un is clearly enjoying playing God too much to spoil that. In Iran, the sheer corruption is comforting. People who love accumulating money are rarely suicidal. The madman theory doesn’t work.William J. Perry, the former secretary of defense under the Clinton administration; a senior fellow of the Hoover Institution, is the Michael and Barbara Barbarian Professor at Stanford University, with a joint appointment at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and the School of Engineering, [Diplomacy,?Not Doomsday, DOA: 24 July 2017] Hoover Digest, Spring 2017 // AACertainly this is dangerous, but we should try to understand the nature of the danger. During my discussion and negotiations with members of the North Korean government, I have found that they are not irrational, nor do they want to achieve martyrdom. Their goals, in order of priority, are: preserving the Kim dynasty, gaining international response, and improving their economy.Alexandre. Mansourov, Ph.D. Columbia University; B.A. Moscow State Institute of International Relations; Advanced Diploma, Kim Il Sung National University (DPRK); Professor at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, "Kim Jong Un’s Nuclear Doctrine and Strategy: What Everyone Needs to Know", NAPSNet Special Reports, December 16, 2014, // AAThe North Korean military theoreticians also articulated three reasons explaining why nuclear weapons could help deter war. They observed that “No nuclear weapon state has ever suffered a foreign invasion since the introduction of nuclear weapons 70 years ago, despite many small and large wars fought during this time.”[15]They also believe that “nuclear weapons will help DPRK avoid the fate of Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, and Syria.”[16]And, lastly, they insist that since their country loves peace, it must prepare for war, even a nuclear war in defense of world peace.[17]A2: Missile Tests Scary(1 response)1. Mitigate, Callahan of CNN 2017 explains that North Korea’s latest missile launch was a misleading pop-up launch which flew high but not far. Thus, he concludes that North Korea will not have the technology to successfully launch a nuclear missile that poses major damage for another 5 years.Cards:Joshua Berlinger and Michael Callahan, Cnn, CNN, 7-11-2017, ["US successfully tests missile defense system," , 7-24-2017] // AAThere is controversy about how to characterize the missile the North Koreans tested — was it truly an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), capable of reaching the United States? The missile North Korea launched flew for 37 minutes, but it was fired at a very steep angle in a pop-up trajectory, which is easier than shooting for distance. And the North Koreans likely do not yet have the technology to mount a miniaturized nuclear payload on the missile and shield it sufficiently for re-entry. But they will likely be able to develop these technologies in the next five years (they are not that complicated and have been around for half a century).A2: NK won’t negotiate(2 responses)1. Turn, Cha of the Center for Strategic International Studies explains in 2016, recently Pyongyang has shown a greater willingness to negotiate with South Korea over smaller issues. This means either you can turn their argument because negotiations were becoming more likely before THAAD 2. Delink, Mansourov of Johns Hopkins University explains that North Korea was willing to come to the negotiating table without THAAD. We don’t need missile defense to solve a threat that could have been dealt with through diplomacy.Victor Cha, Na Young Lee, and Andy Lim, “DPRK provocations and US-ROK Military Exercises 2005 to 2016,” CSIS Beyond Parallel, // AAReports common in the media and in North Korean propaganda statements suggest that the annual U.S.–South Korean military exercises have a provocative effect on Pyongyang’s behavior. To critically test this proposition, Beyond Parallel gathered and compared data on the relationship between the United States Republic of Korea (ROK) military exercises and North Korean provocations. Findings from the original qualitative study of U.S.-ROK spring military exercises over the last twelve years (2005–2016) were published on Beyond Parallel in July 2016. This study was recently expanded to include the fall exercises and their effect on North Korean provocations. The findings of this study are summarized below. 3. All Politics are Local (Original Findings Not Impacted) Domestic ROK politics plays a role in shaping DPRK responses, irrespective of U.S.-ROK joint military exercises. Extending the analysis of spring exercises to include fall exercises does not impact the study’s third finding since the ROK ruling party has not changed since 2008. A notable point is that Pyongyang has shown much more willingness to come to talks with Seoul over a range of issues (Kaesong, leaflets, and loudspeaker broadcasts) other than the nuclear issue, unlike the past when they would insist on bilateral talks with the U.S.Alexandre. Mansourov, Ph.D. Columbia University; B.A. Moscow State Institute of International Relations; Advanced Diploma, Kim Il Sung National University (DPRK); Professor at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, "Kim Jong Un’s Nuclear Doctrine and Strategy: What Everyone Needs to Know", NAPSNet Special Reports, December 16, 2014, // AAThe DPRK government has stated recently that it is willing to return to the nuclear negotiation table without any preconditions. However, careful study of its emerging nuclear doctrine leaves no doubt that North Korea will not relinquish its nuclear weapons even for a meaningful package of credible incentives. Kim Jong Un stated that “our nuclear arsenal is not a bargaining chip and cannot be negotiated away, regardless of the price.”A2: Regime Collapse Imminent(2 responses)1. Delink, Su of Seoul National University 2017 explains that the Kim regime has stabilized under Kim’s rule, making collapse unlikely.2. Mitigate probability, Saalman of UChiacago17 explains that North Korea’s stability remains a high priority for China, because regime collapse would destabilize the whole region. Thus, even if collapse is possible, China will take drastic measures to ensure that the Kim regime maintains power.Fei su (Research Assistant with SIPRI’s China and Global Security Programme and is based in Beijing and a Graduate of Seoul National University), and Lora Saalman, (PhD in International Relations, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China; MA in International Policy Studies and Certificate in?Non-proliferation, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, CA; BA with Honors in Anthropology, University of Chicago; Director of and a Senior Researcher with SIPRI’s China and Global Security Programme), February 2017. “CHINA’S ENGAGEMENT OF NORTH KOREA: Challenges and Opportunities for Europe.” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. 's-engagement-North-Korea.pdf // AAIn contrast, the international community continues to discuss the unlikelihood of resuming the Six-Party Talks and implications of regime change or collapse in North Korea. In response to these debates, Chinese experts tend to argue that since the current regime has stabilized under Kim’s rule, collapse is unlikely. Moreover, they maintain that North Korea’s stability remains a high priority for China. Since a shock to the regime could substantially increase the instability of the whole region, most Chinese analysts do not consider it to be a practical or desirable option.53Fei su (Research Assistant with SIPRI’s China and Global Security Programme and is based in Beijing and a Graduate of Seoul National University), and Lora Saalman, (PhD in International Relations, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China; MA in International Policy Studies and Certificate in?Non-proliferation, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, CA; BA with Honors in Anthropology, University of Chicago; Director of and a Senior Researcher with SIPRI’s China and Global Security Programme), February 2017. “CHINA’S ENGAGEMENT OF NORTH KOREA: Challenges and Opportunities for Europe.” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. 's-engagement-North-Korea.pdf // AAIn contrast, the international community continues to discuss the unlikelihood of resuming the Six-Party Talks and implications of regime change or collapse in North Korea. In response to these debates, Chinese experts tend to argue that since the current regime has stabilized under Kim’s rule, collapse is unlikely. Moreover, they maintain that North Korea’s stability remains a high priority for China. Since a shock to the regime could substantially increase the instability of the whole region, most Chinese analysts do not consider it to be a practical or desirable option.53A2: Bad Econ = Collapse(1 response)1. Delink, Mansourov of Johns Hopkins University explains that there has been a visible departure from the military first policy, and a shift towards the parallel construction of the economy and nuclear weapons. Thus, Steger 17 indicates that North Korea’s economy is now growing at its fastest rate in 17 years.Cards:Alexandre. Mansourov, Ph.D. Columbia University; B.A. Moscow State Institute of International Relations; Advanced Diploma, Kim Il Sung National University (DPRK); Professor at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, "Kim Jong Un’s Nuclear Doctrine and Strategy: What Everyone Needs to Know", NAPSNet Special Reports, December 16, 2014, // AADespite what many Western analysts believe, development of nuclear weapons does not take precedence over economic development in Kim Jong Un’s North Korea. In a visible departure from the military-first policy, as envisioned and practiced by his father Kim Jong Il, the Workers’ Party of Korea under Kim Jong Un’s leadership adopted at the March 2013 Plenum of its Central Committee the so-called?Pyongjin Line?, i.e. the strategic course on parallel construction of economy and nuclear weapons (????? ?????? ????? ?? ?????). HYPERLINK "" \l "_edn6" [6]Notwithstanding the?Songun?imperatives, both are regarded as parallel tracks of the overall national development strategy designed to fulfil the supreme interests of the Korean people and Juch’e revolution. According to the DPRK foreign ministry spokesman’s statement on 4 October 2014, “The DPRK’s line of simultaneously developing the two fronts serves as a banner for bolstering nuclear deterrence for self-defence to cope with the reckless nuclear threat and aggression by the U.S. and its followers and, on its basis, winning a decisive victory in building a thriving nation… The DPRK’s line of simultaneously pushing forward economic construction and the building of nuclear force is the strategic line which should be permanently maintained to meet the supreme interests of the Korean revolution.” HYPERLINK "" \l "_edn7" [7]Isabella Steger, Quartz, July 21, 2017, ["North Korea’s economy is booming, ", 7-21-2017] // AAData released today by South Korea’s central bank (link in Korean) showed that in 2016 North Korea’s economy grew by 3.9% from a year earlier, the fastest pace in 17 years, and bouncing back from 2015 when its economy contracted by 1.1% largely because of drought. North Korea’s trade volume also increased 4.6% from a year earlier; one estimate says that North Korean mineral exports to China accounted for 54% (paywall) of trade with China in the first half of 2016. (North Korea has vast mineral resources.) As China is Pyongyang’s largest trading partner, the latest figures will likely lead to more vocal calls from the international community for Beijing to do more to pressure its increasingly belligerent neighbor. Last week, China said that trade with North Korea grew over 10% to $2.55 billion in the first six months of 2017 from a year ago, but maintained that its trade relationship with North Korea does not violate any sanctions. China in February said it would suspend coal imports from North Korea.A2: Famine Collapse(1 response)1. Delink, Miere of Newsweek 2017 indicates that Russia is delivering food aid to North Kroea as in mid-July, Russia provided North Korea with 5,200 tons of food aid according to the World Food Program.Cards:Jason Le Miere. July 24, 2017. Newsweek. "NORTH KOREA FACES FAMINE AS KIM JONG UN BUILDS NUCLEAR MISSILES TO ATTACK THE U.S." // AAStill, North Korea does still retain some key sources of assistance. President Donald Trump has criticized China for its failure to do more to isolate North Korea. And, last week, Russia delivered part of its promised 5,200 tons of flour via the World Food Programme.A2: NK Miscalc1. Mitigate, Mansourov of Johns Hopkins University explains that the North Korean government has strict operating procedures for the authorizing the employment of nuclear weapons including receiving approval from five top military officials. Thus, the probability of a miscalculation is small. 2. Delink, the longer we wait without deploying THAAD, the less of a chance miscalculation becomes because North Korea will be developing their technology, logistics, and training. Thus, make my opponents give you a time table as to when this miscalculation is going to occur.3. Delink, historical precedence suggests the miscalculation won’t occur. Even during the largest arms race in history, between the two most powerful powers in history, which the highest tension in history, miscalculation did not result in armed conflict. Make my opponents tell you why North Korea is different. Cards:Alexandre. Mansourov, Ph.D. Columbia University; B.A. Moscow State Institute of International Relations; Advanced Diploma, Kim Il Sung National University (DPRK); Professor at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, "Kim Jong Un’s Nuclear Doctrine and Strategy: What Everyone Needs to Know", NAPSNet Special Reports, December 16, 2014, // AADuring the nuclear crisis in spring 2013, the DPRK official media alluded to the fact that the North Korean government has already developed a set of standard operating procedures for the authorization of the employment of nuclear weapons in wartime. According to Rodong Sinmun, “the nuclear weapons of the DPRK can be used only by a final order of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army.” The key military officials to be involved in the final decision-making process appear to be Chief of KPA General Staff Department, Director of the KPA General Staff Operations Bureau, Director of General Reconnaissance Bureau, and Commander of Strategic Rocket Forces.A2 US A2: Troop Removal Bad1. Even if you believe that US troops would leave South Korea, turn the impact because that’s a really good thing. Kyle Mizokami writes in 2014 that US troops in the region act as a tripwire, serving only to create a larger and more powerful conflict. A) F2 SK can’t defend itself: Doug Bandow of the National Interest in February writes that with twice the population, and forty times the GDP, South Korea could do whatever is necessary to contain their neighbors from the north.2. Turn again, Jonathan Pollack of the Washington Studies Quarterly writes in 2009 that US withdrawal is the only way that North Korea will denuclearize. Kyle MIzokami, 12/19/14, “It’s Time for the U.S. Military to Leave South Korea”, Medium, //BBWashington keeps 28,500 troops in South Korea, including a division headquarters, an armored brigade, an aviation brigade and an artillery brigade. The U.S. Air Force has four squadrons of F-16 and A-10 jets at South Korean bases. U.S. forces act as a tripwire on the peninsula. If North Korean troops moves south, they will run headlong into American units and trigger a massive response, as fighters, bombers and ground combat units from Japan, Hawaii, and the continental United States rush into battle. According to former secretary of defense Leon Panetta, the U.S. could respond to North Korean aggression with nuclear weapons.Doug Bandow, 2/3/17, “Secretary Mattis Should Stop Babying South Korea”, The National Interest, //BBThe U.S.-ROK alliance is “obsolete” as the president referred to NATO. The former was created at the end of the Korean War in 1953, necessary to protect a ravaged country ruled by an unpopular authoritarian system from conquest by a totalitarian state backed by the Soviet Union and People’s Republic of China. That world is gone. South Korea has raced past the North and enjoys 40 times the GDP, twice the population, and vastly more foreign friends. Russia’s relationship with Pyongyang is distant; the PRC and Democratic People’s Republic of Korea are frenemies at best. Both Moscow and Beijing do far more business with the South than with the DPRK and would not back the latter in war. Only in military terms is the North ahead. However, its conventional forces, though larger, are decrepit. Seoul is well able to construct a force capable of deterring and, if necessary, defeating North Korea’s military. It makes no sense for Americans to have to create a bigger military to protect a de facto welfare client capable of creating a larger military for the same purpose.Jonathon D. Pollack, October 2009, “Kim Jong-il’s Clenched Fist”, The Washington Quarterly, //BBNorth Korea, however, was already laying down new policy markers, suggesting that the DPRK had decided to seek explicit political assent by the United States and others that the DPRK would resume negotiations as a state in possession of nuclear weapons. Pyongyang characterized the North’s 2006 test and its accumulation of weaponized plutonium as a fundamental strategic turning point that diminished the importance the DPRK had previously attached to diplomatic relations with the United States.28 According to senior North Korean diplomats, ‘‘the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula’’ would require the United States to disengage from its security commitments in Northeast Asia, remove its nuclear umbrella from South Korea, withdraw U.S. military forces from the peninsula, and develop a U.S.—DPRK ‘‘strategic relationship’’ paralleling the U.S.—ROK alliance.A2: China War Improbable(5 responses)1. Turn, Cheng of NYU 2017 explains that the probability of war increases with rising tensions around North Korea. Which is exacerbated by the deployment of missile defense systems which is causing Chinese retaliation. 2. Turn, Guoshun of China’s Central Military Commission writes that China expects a war to break out within Trumps presidential term. Prefer this evidence because it is from an official from the Chinese military who is in the decision room not just reporting on it.3. Delink, Zhen of the China Moring Post 2017 explains that China is stepping up preparedness for a military conflict with the US as Donald Trump has increased the risk of hostilities breaking out.4. Turn, Allison of Harvard 2017 explains that China’s growing sense of self-importance leads to expectations of respect and a demand for an increased impact which established powers like the United States and South Korea view as disrespectful and provocative. Which leads to unreasonable paranoia that is a prerequisite to conflict.Cards:Evelyn Cheng [NYU]. 2017. “US-China war increasingly a 'reality,' Chinese army official says.” CNBC. // AAChina is preparing for a potential military clash with the United States, according to an?article on the Chinese army's website.Evelyn Cheng [NYU]. “US-China war increasingly a 'reality,' Chinese army official says.” CNBC. // AA"The possibility of war increases" as tensions around North Korea and the South China Sea heat up, Liu Guoshun, a member of the national defense mobilization unit of China's Central Military Commission, wrote on Jan. 20—the same day as President Donald Trump's inauguration. "'A war within the president's term', 'war breaking out tonight' are not just slogans, but the reality," Liu said in the Chinese commentary piece.Liu Zhen. January 2017. “China ‘steps up preparedness for possible military conflict with US’.” South China Morning Post: Defense and Diplomacy. // AAChina is stepping up preparedness for a possible military conflict with the US as the Donald Trump presidency has increased the risk of hostilities breaking out, state media and military observers said.Graham Allison [Professor; Harvard University]. April 12, 2017. “How America and China Could Stumble to War.” The National Interest. // AAThe rising power syndrome highlights the upstart’s enhanced sense of itself, its interests, and its entitlement to recognition and respect. The ruling power syndrome is essentially the mirror image: the established power exhibiting an enlarged sense of fear and insecurity as it faces intimations of “decline.” As in sibling rivalries, so too in diplomacy one finds a predictable progression reflected both at the dinner table and at the international conference table. A growing sense of self-importance (“my voice counts”) leads to an expectation of recognition and respect (“listen to what I have to say”) and a demand for increased impact (“I insist”). Understandably, the established power views the rising country’s assertiveness as disrespectful, ungrateful and even provocative or dangerous. Exaggerated self-importance becomes hubris; unreasonable fear, paranoia.A2: SK-US Alliance Breaks1. Turn this against them because this is good for South Korea. The issue right now is that other regional actors see THAAD as a flex in U.S. power and a step away from diplomacy. The U.S. stepping away is actually good, as it’d let South Korea to show good faith in its relationships with other regional actors. And that’s especially true because after THAAD was halted, Moon was able to send an envoy to China, which resulted in the lowering of sanctions. Less THAAD and U.S. presence means more cooperation from more important countries.2. But if we’re worried about South Korean safety, remember that the U.S. still has a ton of bases in the region, and South Korea is still under the U.S.’s iron umbrella. What we’re arguing, is that the U.S. explicitly getting involved in the Korean conflict is when problems occur. A2 JapanA2: Proliferation1. Non-unique- Shinzo Abe has been threatening to remilitarize since 2006, THAAD isn’t the tipping point. Furthermore, Abe’s entire platform has revolved around changing the constitution, whether it’s trying to allow him to run for a third term or get Japan to proliferate, so in either world he’s going to want nukes. 2. Abe isn’t going to be able to militarize Japan for two reasons. A) First, because of public opposition. Andrea Berger from CNN found that after the 2011 Fukushima crisis, the Japanese people have become increasingly opposed to the use of nuclear technology. This is important because Shinzo proliferating would result in mass opposition from his people.B) Second, because the US wants to make sure that Japan doesn’t proliferate at all costs. Berger furthers that Washington has vowed to respond to any threats or aggression against Japan in order to stop them from growing their military. This is exactly why we have troops on Okinawa.3. They need to give you some probability that THAAD completely solves Japan's feeling of vulnerability. Pesek of Forbes reports that Japan is already committed to militarization going forward as they have boosted their military spending and are now acquiring more missiles bombs and warships. There’s no reason THAAD, a defensive system solves it if these other things have not.4) The causality within this argument is wrong. The reason why North Korea is militarizing isn’t because of Japan as North Korea have been rapidly increasing their capabilities since the late 20th century. Thus, stopping Japan's militarization doesn’t stop North Korea’s proliferation.Will Ripley, 3/11/16, “Fukushima: Five years after Japan's worst nuclear disaster”, CNN, //BBPublic opinion is still firmly against nuclear and many Japanese politicians and commentators have criticized the government's decision to restart the reactors. Prior to the disaster, around 70% of people supported nuclear energy, according to an official poll. That level dropped to below 36% after the Fukushima meltdown, with opposition to nuclear energy growing to up to 50 or even 70%, according to polls by Japanese media. Former Prime Minister Naoto Kan, in office during the crisis, is one of the highest-profile voices to come out against nuclear power, calling repeatedly on the government to change its course.Andrea Berger, 5/20/15, “Pacifism bill: Why Japan won't build a nuclear weapon quickly”, CNN, //BBChina and the International Atomic Energy Agency are not the only ones following Japan's nuclear activity closely. Two other audiences are noteworthy. The first is Japan's public, who have become increasingly wary of the risks and dangers associated with nuclear technology -- whether for civilian or military applications -- following the disaster at Fukushima in 2011. The second is the country's closest ally, the United States, who is similarly attentive to the state of Japan's nuclear program. In fact, it is because of Japan's alliance with the United States that the former has even less of an incentive to build a nuclear weapon. In order to guarantee the security of Japan against major threats in its region, whether a militarily assertive China or a belligerent and nuclear-armed North Korea, Washington has vowed to respond to any serious armed aggression against Japan using whatever means necessary, including nuclear weapons. By demonstrating the depth of its resolve to defend Japan, the U.S. hopes to deter any potential aggressors from attacking in the first place. U.S. troops stationed in Okinawa are a visible reminder of the alliance and the commitment that underpins it. As long as Japan believes in the strength of the U.S.'s so-called "extended deterrence" guarantee it is unlikely to see any merit in having its own nuclear weapons capability. For this reason, both countries work tirelessly to ensure the credibility and durability of their defence partnership -- an immeasurably important aim.William Pesek, 6/13/17, “North Korea Should Be Careful Trolling Resurgent Japan”, Forbes, //BBThe government is working up contingency plans after 10 missile tests so far this year: building bomb shelters, massive evacuation drills of office buildings, schools, shopping centers and even entire cities; and an increased military presence in the Sea of Japan. Ironically, Xi’s tolerance of Kim’s behavior could backfire in ways that irk the Community Party. Historically, Japan has relied on the U.S. security umbrella. Rising threats have Tokyo buzzing about even greater military spending. Since taking office in 2012, Abe steadily boosted defense expenditure to the 5 trillion yen ($45 billion) mark this year. Yet his ability to send Japan’s nearly 250,000 troops, dozens of warships and hundreds of fighter jets abroad are constrained by law -- one Abe may now have a greater chance of overturning. Rewriting the war-renouncing post-World War II constitution so that Tokyo can exert military might abroad is a key Abe ambition. The more Kim -- with Xi’s tacit tolerance -- tests Tokyo’s patience, the more lawmakers might authorize Abe to play the war games he craves and China dreads.A2: SK-Japan Relations1. This is non-unique as Jesse Johnson of the Japan Times explains in 2016 that South Korea and Japan have an intelligence sharing pact that is signed in ink. 2. Further, even if there is hostility between Japan and South Korea, Lee Jee-eun of the VOA News writes in January that they will still cooperate because they feel like they need bilateral relations to deal with regional issues.Jesse Johnson, 11/23/16, “South Korea, Japan ink intelligence-sharing pact on North Korea threat”, The Japan Times, //BBJapan and South Korea formally signed an agreement Wednesday to share military intelligence on North Korea amid Pyongyang’s ramped-up nuclear and missile programs and a swirling influence-peddling scandal threatening to oust South Korean President Park Geun-hye. The contentious pact, known as the general security of military information agreement (GSOMIA), comes despite growing momentum that could see Park impeached. The final deal was also reached less than a month after talks resumed following a four-year suspension.Lee Jee-eun, 1/18/17, “South Korea-Japan Row Could Hurt Cooperation on North Korea”, VOA News, //BBKlingner called on President-elect Trump to actively get involved, but work “quietly and behind the scenes.” “I think it was most effective when the Obama administration was sending private and sometimes quite stern messages to both Tokyo and Seoul to try to move forward on the issues,” the former intelligence official said. As the North appears to be advancing its nuclear weapons program, the U.S. is seeking to enhance cooperation with Japan and South Korea. The three countries have not only launched a new trilateral missile defense exercise last year but also stepped up political consultations through numerous meetings between high level diplomats. At a recent meeting, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Antony Blinken said the three allies have established “a rock-solid foundation for long-term trilateral cooperation that remains central to the defense of our shared interests.”A2 SKA2: Kill Chain1. Delink them, Jeff Nesbit of U.S. News tells you in June 2017 that South Korea could never implement Kill Chain unless they had the scientific and technical support of the United States. At the point at which negating means pushing the US away, negating does not cause South Korea to implement Kill Chain.2. Delink again, Kosuke Takahashi of the Business Insider writes in June that South Korea will never strike first against North Korea, Kill Chain only exists to deter North Korean aggression which we would contend is a nonexistent threat.3. Furthermore, turn the argument, because Nesbit continues that President Moon is reserved about such a militaristic approach and instead wants diplomacy towards North Korea, while Trump keeps pushing him towards a military solution. Negating insures that the US doesn’t continue to push South Korea towards Kill Chain and all the negative impacts they tell you, especially because Nesbit says it would almost certainly lead to regional nuclear war.4. Just because SK gets THAAD doesn’t mean they are going to stop using the preemptive strike strategy. For example, within the kill chain they have a missile defense system called KAMD. If their argument was true, then KAMD would mean SK would not be considering preemptive strikes in the status quo.5. We solve for the root cause of the Kill Chain. The only reason it is in place is to defend from a belligerent NK but without US troops on the Korean peninsula, Jonathan Kaiman of the LA Times explains in May that NK would not have a motive to act aggressively. Jeff Nesbit, 6/30/17, “Could ‘Kill Chain’ Kill Any Chance at Peace?”, US News, //BBIf U.S. and South Korean leaders are seriously considering taking pre-emptive military action against North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile facilities – known as the "Kill Chain" strategy – is such a move scientifically and technically feasible for South Korea? Yes – but likely not in the next two years. According to experts, only the United States has the scientific and technical capability to launch "Kill Chain" right now. The potential for pre-emptive military action against North Korea, which has continued to test its nuclear capabilities despite repeated warnings from both the United States and China, has taken on new urgency in recent weeks. "Kill Chain" is the first pillar of the new, pre-emptive military strategy designed to meet North Korea's nuclear missile ambitions that was first referenced in a South Korean government strategy paper released late last year. It involves using satellite reconnaisance to identify when and where North Korea is manufacturing missiles and nuclear warheads, and a pre-emptive strike capability to destroy those facilities before they go operational.Kosuke Takahashi, 6/8/17, “'There is no South Korean leader who thinks a first strike by the US is okay': Experts in Asia weigh in on North Korea”, Business Insider, //BB“North Korea will show a very strong reaction against [a preemptive strike] because it would be an attack against its national security,” Suh Choo-suk, a Senior Research Fellow at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA), said at a symposium at Keio University in Tokyo in March. Suh agreed with Morimoto that North Korea would retaliate against a preemptive strike. “Even if the US and South Korean military capabilities of the first strike are superior, they cannot destroy all of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities all at once,” Suh said. “In response, North Korea will surely conduct a nuclear attack against South Korea and the US. It will use all of its various methods of attack such as long-range artillery.” It is well known that the Clinton administration considered the military option during the so-called “first nuclear crisis” of the early 1990s. It estimated a surgical attack against North Korean nuclear facilities could lead to the death of more than one million South Koreans and more than 100,000 Americans in Seoul. Since then, Suh said that North Korea’s military capabilities have developed further, leaving the potential for more casualties. “There is no South Korean leader who thinks the first strike by the US is okay,” Suh said. According to the Japanese government’s 2016 Defense White Paper, the North Korean Army comprises about 1.02 million personnel, and roughly two-thirds of them are believed to be deployed along the demilitarized zone (DMZ).Jeff Nesbit, 6/30/17, “Could ‘Kill Chain’ Kill Any Chance at Peace?”, US News, //BBIt involves using satellite reconnaisance to identify when and where North Korea is manufacturing missiles and nuclear warheads, and a pre-emptive strike capability to destroy those facilities before they go operational. Moon Jae-In, however, South Korea's new president has publicly expressed reservations about such a pre-emptive military approach, and has indicated a preference for a diplomatic approach to North Korea. President Donald Trump, on the other hand, continues to hint at the need for a military solution. The two men met at the White House on Friday, and the "Kill Chain" was almost certainly discussed. During joint remarks in the Rose Garden, Trump said he has lost patience with North Korea. The second and third prongs of South Korea's defense strategy include missile defense and retaliatory strikes from aircraft in the event North Korea launches a missile.Jonathan Kaiman, 5/1/17, “Here's what's driving North Korea's nuclear program — and it might be more than self-defense “, LA Times, //BBNorth Korea is gradually developing the capability to fit a nuclear device on an intercontinental ballistic missile, a technology that could one day enable it to launch a nuclear strike on the U.S., and any other nation that might threaten the survival of the Kim family dynasty. Yet a close reading of the country’s propaganda suggests that its goals may be more ambitious — and more aggressive in nature — than foreign observers often assume. One longtime analyst of the secretive country’s murky ideology says it’s become clear that North Korea’s rulers have come to consider nuclear capability not just a means of defense, but the only way of achieving their most important goal: to rid South Korea of U.S. troops, and reunite the Korean peninsula on their own terms. “North Korea is a radical nationalist state and it’s committed to anything that anybody in North Korea’s position would be — which is the reunification of the [Korean] race, and the reunification of the homeland,” said B.R. Myers, a professor at Dongseo University in South Korea who has spent years studying North Korean propaganda and ideology.A2: KAMD1. KAMD is a weak system. According to Rahul Raj of the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies in August of 2016, even if upgraded, the Korean system isn’t sophisticated enough to counter a North Korean missile threat. Regardless, he furthers that it won’t be ready until 2023. At that point, KAMD doesn’t affirm. Rahul Raj, 8/2/16, “THAAD and South Korea-China-US Dynamics”, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, //BBAfter Seoul and Washington decided to initiate official discussions about THAAD, the response from Beijing was predictably harsh. China’s ambassador to South Korea, Qiu Guohong, warned that there would be instant fallout in bilateral relations. For China, opposition to THAAD has become a bigger issue than controlling North Korea because it feels that the missile defence system will upset the balance of power in the region. China also fears that the AN/TPY-2 radar used in THAAD, which has a range of about 1,800 km, could snoop on its military installations and missile locations, posing a threat to its national security. In order to assuage Beijing’s security concerns, both Seoul and Washington have reiterated that the sole focus of the THAAD system in South Korea would be North Korean nuclear and missile threats and would not target any other countries. Although there have been suggestions of alternatively deploying the South Korean made Korea Advanced Missile Defence (KAMD) in order to deflect Chinese ire, a recent study by Hannam University in Daejeon suggests that the Korean system would not be sophisticated enough to counter a North Korean missile threat even if it were upgraded. In any case, KAMD would not be ready until 2023.A2 THAAD SolvesA2: General EffectiveTHAAD is super ineffective at shooting missiles down for five reasons (any of these but not all)We would contend that North Korea’s nuclear posture is for deterrence but even if they do attack, THAAD wouldn’t stop the attack. Couple Reasons:THAAD doesn’t have the capability to stop missiles in the ascent phase, so damage would be done in both worlds. There is no guarantee North Korea would pause to let THAAD reload; given North Korea’s massive weapon arsenal, THAAD would do little to nothing to prevent a large-scale attack.Theodore Postol of MIT that THAAD doesn’t provide South Korea with any useful defense capacity. The North can counter THAAD by cutting ballistic missiles into pieces during its powered flight, propelling its warhead towards the South. THAAD’s infrared kill vehicle would not be able to distinguish between warhead and debris. In fact, the North has already demonstrated this capability. Postol concludes that South Korea will therefore get no military benefit.Coyle finds that THAAD’s radar can only cover 120 degrees at a time which is problematic because he concludes that North Korea has Submarines that can launch missiles off of them. This means that North Korea can literally just bypass THAAD by shooting missiles off of submarines. The Institute for Security & Development Policy finds that North Korea has missiles that THAAD physically can’t shoot down due to irregular trajectories meaning the missiles would just fly past THAAD. Mitigate, the Irish Examiner explains in August that the most likely North Korean attack is one with artillery because they can be activated faster than ballistic missiles and can target South Korea, Japan, and all US bases in the region.8. Delink, Elich of the Korean Policy Institute 2016 explains that the THAAD requires 3.5 minutes to detect and launch a counter missile, and by that time, the missile would be too low for the system to work, rendering the THAAD system useless. Gregory Elich. August 2016. “THAAD Comes to Korea, But At What Cost?” Korean Policy Institute. // AAThe missiles in a THAAD battery are designed to counter incoming ballistic missiles at an altitude ranging from 40 to 150 kilometers. Given North Korea’s proximity, few, if any, missiles fired by the North would attain such a height, given that the point of a high altitude ballistic missile is to maximize distance. Even so, were the North to fire a high altitude ballistic missile from its farthest point, aimed at the concentration of U.S. forces in Pyeongtaek, it would require nearly three and a half minutes for THAAD to detect and counter-launch. In that period, the incoming missile would have already fallen below an altitude of 40 kilometers, rendering THAAD useless.? HYPERLINK "" \l "_edn1" [i]?In a conflict with the South, though, North Korea would rely on its long-range artillery, cruise missiles, and short-range ballistic missiles, flying at an altitude well below THAAD’s range.Cards:Thursday, August 10, 2017, Irish Examiner, 8-10-2017, ["Is war between the US and North Korea likely? " , 8-10-2017] // AAThe most immediate reaction would likely be massive artillery fire on Seoul and its surroundings. North Korean artillery installations along the border can be activated faster than air or naval assets and faster than larger ballistic missiles, which can target South Korean, Japanese, or American bases in the region with nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. Those countries have ballistic-missile-defense systems, but can’t guarantee they will shoot down everything. Japan has begun offering advice to its citizens on what to do in the event a missile lands near them — essentially, try to get under ground — and US firms are marketing missile shelters. While it’s unclear if North Korea can successfully target US cities, like Denver and Chicago, with a nuclear ICBM, it’s similarly unknown if US defence systems can strike it down, adding to American anxieties.George Friedman (Founder, Stratfor; Cornell University), December 2013, “Ferocious, Weak and Crazy: The North Korean Strategy.” Stratfor Enterprises. // AASo long as the North Koreans remained ferocious, weak and crazy, the best thing to do was not irritate them too much and not to worry what kind of government they had. But being weak and crazy was the easy part for the North; maintaining its appearance of ferocity was more challenging. Not only did the North Koreans have to keep increasing their ferocity, they had to avoid increasing it so much that it overpowered the deterrent effect of their weakness and craziness. ?[Scarborough, Rowan; The Washington Times; "North Korea tests missiles designed to defeat..."; May 3, 2017; Accessed June 26, 2017; ]North Korea has tailored its spate of ballistic missile tests to defeat the U.S.-stationed defense systems ready to protect the South and Japan from descending warheads, a report to Congress says. The bellicose North regularly flight-tests a panoply of ballistic missiles that could, in war, be capped with miniaturized nuclear warheads and strike its two democratic neighbors and U.S. allies. The U.S. military has matched this threat by first stationing Patriot anti-missile batteries and then announcing that the wider-range, mobile THAAD system is now in place to shoot down incoming warheads. Pyongyang, the North's capital, has been watching The Congressional Research Service reported that the regime launched test missiles last year in flights precisely designed to avoid interception by rocketing them into much higher altitudes. The result: The re-entry warhead will descend at a steeper angle and faster speed, “making it potentially more difficult to intercept with a missile defense system,” the CRS said. In another maneuver, the CRS said, “North Korea has also demonstrated an ability to launch a salvo attack with more than one missile launched in relatively short order.” The Hankyoreh, 7/11/16, “[Interview] Expert says THAAD needlessly raises tension, hurts security”, //BBThe THAAD defense can be expected to provide South Korea with essentially no useful defense capacity, but it will infuriate the Chinese who are worried about THAAD being used by the US against them to aim the US National Missile Defense at China. The North Koreans can counter THAAD by simply cutting ballistic missile into pieces after the missile has completed its powered flight - propelling its warhead and the pieces of the empty rocket towards a target in South Korea. THAAD’s infrared homing kill vehicle would not be able to distinguish between the warhead and pieces of debris when fed interceptors attempt to engage the warhead and decoy cloud at high altitudes. This capability has already been demonstrated by the North. The pieces of the rocket would act as credible decoys down to an altitude of 65 to 70 km before atmospheric drag causes them to slow up relative to the warhead. If THAAD interceptors were launched at the warhead at that time, the interceptors would not be able to reach their minimum intercept altitude before the warhead had passed on to the ground.Philip Coyle, 3/18/17, “US builds missile defense system for South Korea, causing more tension”, The Hill, //BBAnd if these missiles carried chemical or nuclear weapons, even one missile that evaded the defense systems would cause catastrophic damage. Furthermore, THAAD has blind spots that an adversary could exploit. The U.S. has agreed to provide South Korea with one THAAD battery, whose radar, if north-facing, would cover the North Korean mainland. However, because THAAD’s radar can only cover 120 degrees at a time, North Korea could circumvent the system by launching a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), a weapon it successfully tested last year, from any point not covered by the radar. Nor would THAAD be useful as a deterrent measureNovember 2016, Institute for Security & Development Policy, “THAAD in the Korean Peninsula”, //BBImpact on the Region: North Korea’s Response: North Korea has viewed the decision to deploy THAAD as both a provocation and an act of aggression. Their response has been to continue missile development and invest in technologies that could bypass systems like THAAD. Correspondingly, one day after the announcement of THAAD deployment, North Korea tested a Pukkuksong-1 (KN-11) SLBM.41 This was followed by three shortrange missiles that were fired six days after the announcement and another two intermediate-range missiles in early August 2016.42 North Korea has also stated that they will retaliate with a “physical response.”4 The continuous missile development by North Korea could be seen as tests for bypassing THAAD’s abilities, as it is possible to launch more missiles than a missile defense can intercept.44 So far, only one THAAD battery is planned to be deployed which could be a critical weakness. THAAD’s difficulty in intercepting missiles with irregular trajectories could also be used; in theory, North Korea's medium-range Rodong missiles would be able to bypass THAAD as they have an irregular trajectory.45 Recent analysis suggests that North Korea is developing a new submarine that would be larger than the previous GORAE-class experimental ballistic missile submarine.46 The improvement of SLBMs, could be considered another weakness of THAAD and would give a critical advantage to North Korea. In any case, North Korea have continued their nuclear development, conducting a fifth nuclear test in September 2016.A2: Defensive(2 responses)1. Turn the link, Dastjerdi of Harvard University 2015 explains that China views its relationship with the US through a security dilemma model wherein it perceives the deployments of missile defense as offensive tactics. He concludes that this perception increases the likelihood that China responds aggressively. This means that even if South Korea intends the missile defense system to be defensive, China and North Korea aren’t interpreting it as that way.2. Turn, Wright of the Global Security Program 2017 explains that military exercises like the deployment of missile defense systems justify further developments and aggression from North Korea’s nuclear program.Cards:Ali Dastjerdi [Harvard University]. 16 December 2015. “The Case for Credible Chinese Deterrence.” Harvard Political Review. // AAMany have argued that China does not respond to deterrence and instead interprets its relationship with the US through a?security dilemma model. The argument stipulate[ing] that China perceives expansion of US?defensive?capabilities, like deployments of ballistic missiles, defense systems, and troops as?offensive?tactics. This perception changes Chinese risk calculus when deciding whether to back down or respond with aggressive countermeasures, resulting in an escalating arms race.David Wright [co-director and senior scientist with the Union of Concerned Scientists’ Global Security Program] & Larry Greenemeier [associate editor of technology for?Scientific American]. July 6, 2017. “North Korea Missile Test: Best Response May Be Surprisingly Low-Tech.” Scientific American. // AAWhy has North Korea poured so much of its scarce resources into building such a lethal arsenal? What North Korea wants most is to preserve its regime. They look at what happened to [former Libyan leader Muammar] Gaddafi, and the invasion of Iraq, and they see that they’re surrounded by countries allied with the U.S. The big military exercises that the U.S. and South Korea conduct together to simulate an invasion of the North probably only add to the paranoia. In that case, it seems that the worst thing you could do is what the U.S. and South Korea did shortly after the North’s latest missile test, which was to run new military exercises. That just gives North Korea the ability to justify the missile test in the first place. Another motive for North Korea’s nuclear buildup is that it wants to use that capability as a negotiating chip with South Korea, maybe to force the U.S. out of South Korea—although I don’t think that’s going to happen.A2: Preemptive Probable (1 response)1. Mitigate the probability, Mansourov of Johns Hopkins University explains that North Korea is developing mobile launch platforms, constructing a major ICBM launch facility near its Chinese border, and is developing a submarine-launched ballistic missile force to ensure a preemptive strike can’t take out all of North Korea’s second strike capabilities. The probability of a successful preemptive strike is decreasing as we speak. Make my opponents give you a probability that the US-ROK alliance will conduct a strike it knows will be unsuccessful while risking definite retaliation.Cards:Alexandre. Mansourov, Ph.D. Columbia University; B.A. Moscow State Institute of International Relations; Advanced Diploma, Kim Il Sung National University (DPRK); Professor at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, "Kim Jong Un’s Nuclear Doctrine and Strategy: What Everyone Needs to Know", NAPSNet Special Reports, December 16, 2014, // AANorth Korea’s decision to field mobile land-based missile launch platforms, construction of a major ICMB launch facility near the border with China, and its interest in the development and deployment of an operational submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) force suggest that Pyongyang wants to increase the survivability of its nuclear forces and acquire the second strike capability that will ensure that at least some of its nuclear units will survive the preemptive attack in order to retaliate. ?In the future, this may impact the nuclear command and control system and complicate the nuclear weapons use authorization procedures because the KPA Supreme Commander will have to entrust the captain of a submarine or a commander of a road-mobile missile unit with the authority to launch an operational nuclear-armed missile at the time of crisis when they will most likely be cut off from the national leadership.A2: Replace Offensive(3 responses)1. Non-unique, Lyon of the National Interest writes on July 24th that South Korea will continue to attain offensive capabilities because it wants to threaten North Korea’s leadership as a deterrent to potential provocations. In other words, they believe offense is the best defense whether or not we have missile defense.2. Turn, Lee of the Wall Street Journal Reports in 2017 that an internal White House review of strategy on North Korea includes military force or regime change to blunt the country’s nuclear-weapons threat. Causing some leaders to brace for a shift in American policy in East Asia. Insofar, as the US is becoming more assertive, the threshold required to launch an attack plummets.3. Turn, Robert Kelley of Pusan National University writes that as North Korea continues to develop more sophisticates nuclear and missile technology, pressure on South Korea to take preemptive military action will rise because South Korea considers North Korean nuclear capabilities to be the greatest long-term risk to security and stability in Korea.4. Delink, realize that we have missile defense in south Korea right now. However, Lockie of Georgia State University explains in 2017 that South Korea’s main opposition party is calling for South Korea to scrap its nonproliferation treaty.Cards:Rod Lyon, National Interest, 7-24-2017, ["Japan and South Korea Want More Military Firepower (Thanks to China and North Korea)," , 7-24-2017] // AASouth Korea has recently been working on building its own ballistic-missile capabilities. It test-fired an 800-kilometre-range missile—a Hyunmoo-2B—on 6 April, and again on 23 June, albeit not to the missile’s nominal full range. Officials say the missile will be ‘ready to use after two additional tests’. South Korea apparently intends to deploy its own indigenous capabilities at least partially to offset the growing North Korean ballistic-missile arsenal. But it also seems to want to threaten Pyongyang—and in particular the North Korean leadership—as a deterrent to any North Korean attack on the South.Carol E. Lee [New York University], Alastair Gale [Japanese Editor; New York Times]. March 2017. “White House Options on North Korea Include Use of Military Force.” Wall Street Journal. // AAAn internal White House review of strategy on North Korea includes the possibility of military force or regime change to blunt the country’s nuclear-weapons threat, people familiar with the process said, a prospect that has some U.S. allies in the region on edge. While President Donald Trump has taken steps to reassure allies that he won’t abandon agreements that have underpinned decades of U.S. policy on Asia, his pledge that Pyongyang would be stopped from ever testing an intercontinental ballistic missile—coupled with the two-week-old strategy review—has [leading] some leaders bracing for a shift in American policy.Robert E. Kelly [Professor; Pusan National University]. March 2015. “Will South Korea Have to Bomb the North, Eventually?” The Diplomat. // AAAs North Korea continues to develop [more sophisticated] both nuclear weapons and the missile technology to carry them, pressure on South Korea to take preemptive military action will gradually rise. At some point, North Korea may have so many missiles and warheads that [Because] South Korea considers that [North Korean Nuclear] capability[ies]y to be an existential threat to its security. This is the greatest long-term risk to security and stability in Korea, arguably more destabilizing than a North Korean collapse.Alex Lockie (Georgia State University), Business Insider, 8-9-2017, ["North Korea's nuclear posturing could spur the next arms race — which Pyongyang would lose badly," , 8-10-2017] // AASouth Korea's main opposition party took the calls a step further, saying that Seoul should scrap the?1991 Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula which forbids it?from creating its own nuclear weapons.A2: MAD Deter PS1. Turn, Former Army Lieutenant Colonel Ralph Peters explains that first target of a preemptive strike would be the North’s air defenses and command, control, and communications infrastructure to mitigate any response. Thus, the US government thinks it can reduce the impact of retaliation and is more likely to conduct an attack.Cards:Ralph Peters (a retired Army lieutenant colonel, Graduate of Pennsylvania State University), New York Post, 8-9-2017, ["Here’s how to take out North Korea’s nukes," , 8-10-2017] // AAInitially, we’d launch a surprise air and naval campaign, with ground forces deployed only in defense of South Korea. Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile-development facilities and arsenals wouldn’t be in the initial target set. First, we’d have to overwhelm and destroy North Korea’s air defenses, while simultaneously degrading Pyongyang’s military command, control and communications to cripple any response.A2: Deep Facilities1. Delink, Peters of the US Army indicates that if North Korea’s nuclear program is tunneled far underground, the US would use nukes to remind the world how terrible such weapons can be.2. Delink, we solve back, Lockie of Georgia State University explains in 2017 that South Korea is in talks with the United States to double the explosive power of its missiles to target facilities buried deep underground. Cards:Ralph Peters (a retired Army lieutenant colonel, Graduate of Pennsylvania State University), New York Post, 8-9-2017, ["Here’s how to take out North Korea’s nukes," , 8-10-2017] // AAOh, and if North Korea’s nuclear program has tunneled so far underground that conventional weapons can’t destroy the infrastructure, use nukes. It may be time to remind the world just how terrible such weapons can be.Alex Lockie (Georgia State University), Business Insider, 8-9-2017, ["North Korea's nuclear posturing could spur the next arms race — which Pyongyang would lose badly," , 8-10-2017] // AAMeanwhile, Seoul has asked to talk to the US about revisiting a missile control agreement that limits the payload of its weapons to 500 kilograms, seeking to double it to 1 ton. This would bolster the South's already formidable ability to hit hardened, underground targets like bunkers where Kim Jong Un may hide out in the event of an attack.?A2: China War Deter(1 response)1. Delink, Bader of the Brookings Institute explains in August 2017 that the alliance between North Korea and China is a thing of the past. North Korea understands that there is almost no scenario in which Chinese troops save North Korea as they did in 1950. The two enjoy at best a cold relationship that is likely to worsen.2. Turn, Channel News Asia explains in August 2017 that China is conducting military exercises adjacent to North Korea to send a message that it condemns proliferation. Why would they be helping the US and South Korea if they were retaliating.Cards:Jeffrey A. Bader, Brookings, 8-8-2017, ["Why deterring and containing North Korea is our least bad option," , 8-9-2017] // AATreating North Korea as a problem for China to solve.?President Trump seems to believe that China could easily solve the North Korean problem, presumably by exerting intolerable economic and/or military pressure on Pyongyang: “I am very disappointed in China. Our foolish past leaders have allowed them to make hundreds of billions of dollars a year in trade, yet they do NOTHING for us with North Korea, just talk. We will no longer allow this to continue. China could easily solve this problem!” While there is no doubt that China could exert greater pressure on North Korea, and indeed should do so, that will not end development of the North’s WMD programs. North Korea has built its programs substantially on its own, with some technology and parts acquired illicitly from abroad and some funding provided by its limited exports. The alliance between North Korea and China is a thing of the past. North Korea understands that there is almost no scenario in which Chinese troops save North Korea as they did in 1950. The two enjoy at best a cold relationship that is likely to worsen. North Korea ranks among the lowest countries in the world in terms of foreign trade. Chinese pressure should be part of any solution, but it will not by itself be decisive.Channel News Asia, 8-1-2017, ["China holds wargames as North Korea tensions spike," , 8-10-2017] // AASHANGHAI: The Chinese navy and air force flexed their muscles in live-fire drills in seas adjacent to the Korean Peninsula, the defence ministry said, amid regional tensions over North Korea's pursuit of nuclear weaponry. The "large-scale" exercises were being conducted in the seas and skies off China's east coast in the Yellow Sea and Bohai Gulf, and included the firing of dozens of missiles, a notice posted late Monday on the Ministry of Defence website said. Naval and air force assets including dozens of ships, more than 10 aircrafts, submarines and an unspecified number of coastal defence personnel took part in the drills, which the ministry said were aimed at testing weapons and honing the military's abilities in conducting coastal assaults and intercepting air targets.A2: Replace KC(1 response)1. Delink, CNN explains the because it is much easier to hit the missile right at launch or right before it launches than when it’s in the air, Kill chain will ways be the first option.Cards:GANTnews, CNN Affiliate, 7-11-2017, ["Missile defense wouldn’t shield US from North Korean attack," , 7-24-2017] // AAIt is much easier to hit the missile right at launch or right before it launches. But North Korea has developed too many mobile launchers and hardened fixed launch sites for the United States to take them all out, even if they don’t yet have a submarine launch capacity. This is very different from 1994, when the United States last seriously contemplated a missile strike against the North Korean nuclear program. At that time, it was conceivable that a strike hitting only a handful of sites would have done the trick.A2: Mitigate Impact(2 response)1. Mitigate, Even if one missile contacts South Korea, Bruce Bennett of the RAND Corporation explains that it would result in up to 900,000 deaths and would create 1.5 trillion in economic damage. Thus, we need to solve for the intent to attack because even if one missile lands, the impacts would be so devastating and demoralizing that another would have a marginal impact.2. Link Turn, Even if you buy that missile defense will mitigate the damage of a missile, prefer the world that does have a missile launched at all. Cards & Picture:Bruce Bennett [California Institute for Technology, RAND Corporation, July 17, 2017, ["North Korea's Continuous Provocations," , 8-4-2017] // AA **Video: 8 minutes 30 seconds.Picture^^A2: Increase Threshold for attack(1 response)1. Delink, realize that if North Korea wanted to initiate a conflict, it would attempt to wipe South Korea off the map. Unfortunately, according to Berls of Georgetown University 17, North Korea has over 850 missiles variants. While 38North 16 Finds that each THAAD battery can handle 20 missiles per hour before failing. Deploying missile defense will have a negligible impact on North Korea’s decision-making calculus Cards:Robert E. Berls, Jr. [PhD - Georgetown University]. July 2017. “North Korea.” Nuclear Threat Initiative. // AANorth Korea possesses significant ballistic missile capabilities, and since the collapse of the Soviet Union has been one of the most active exporters of complete ballistic missile systems, components, and technology. Pyongyang received foreign assistance over the years, most notably from the Former Soviet Union and China, but the complete details of all foreign assistance remain vague. Considering North Korea's long-standing interest in advancing its missile capabilities, its missile program is notable in that it has undertaken relatively few flight tests compared to missile programs in countries like the United States and Russia. U.S. sources estimate that North Korea has deployed over 600 Scud missile variants, about 200 Nodong (Rodong) missiles, and fewer than 50 Musudan and Taepodong missiles, while South Korean sources estimate even fewer. [1]A2: Deter(9 responses)1. Turn the Link, North Korea will interpret the deployment of missile defense as an offensive deployment. This is critical because, Rief of St. Andrews University 17 explains that missile defense system sends the signal to North Korea that Trump is preparing for a preemptive strike and that he doesn’t respect North Korea’s nuclear power. This will entrench North Korea in its isolationist mentality which is problematic as Jones of Stanford quantifies that when states feel weaker, the probability of conflict initiation increase by 225%. We win on probability of impacts.2. Turn the link again, Gady of the Diplomat 2015 explains that militarized solutions, like deploying missile defense, discourages diplomatic solutions to conflicts. From the perspective of China, missile defense near their borders are a threat that encourage war. This gives you the comparative advantage in affirming with because negating prevents diplomacy but Bandow says affirming forces South Korea to have better diplomatic strategies. 3. Mitigate their strength of link, because deterrence historically fails. Fearon of Stanford ’02 empirically quantifies that 3% of deterrence crises actually work. Meaning our opponents’ offense is most probably going to fail. That means we outweigh on probability of impacts. 4. Turn, Zhen of Defense and Diplomacy 2017 explains that larger American military presence in the region will inevitable increase the risk of military confrontation because it encourages rising powers to flex their military strenth. Increasing the likelihood of miscalculation.5. Turn, Yoon of Cambridge 2016 indicates that deterrence strategies have weak empirical support. In fact, Wheeler quantifies that 70% of the time that a nation attempts to take a hardline approach to deterrence, its results in war.6. Turn their link, Yoo of Cambridge 2016 explains that deterrence is an ineffective strategy because it results in the entrenchment of a narrative that the other is a threat. Thus, further polarizing the two parties and hindering any chance at negotiations.7. Turn, Etzioni of American University explains on August 10th that the eroded deterrence that stems from deploying missile defense will prompt nations like China and North Korea to put its nuclear forces on a hair trigger alert, ready to strike preemptively on any perceived military threats. This is problematic as it greatly increases the probability for miscalculation which cannot be deterred.8. Delink, Scarborough 2017 reports that NK has tailored its ballistic missile tests to defeat the US stationed defense systems. CRS furthers that NK has also tested missiles designed to avoid interception by US anti-missile systems. There is no deterrence if there is literally no threat to North Korea. Delink.9. Turn, Armstrong of Columbia University writes that deterrence can be perceived as provocation, which causes miscalculation. This is crucial because Armstrong furthers that there is a real danger of East Asian escalating into a shooting war when miscalculation turns into aggression.Cards:Kingston Reif [St. Andrews University]. May 2017. “MISSILE DEFENSE CAN’T SAVE US FROM NORTH KOREA.” War on Rocks. // AAMisplaced overconfidence in missile defense could prompt Trump think he can escalate in response to another North Korean nuclear or missile test or other provocation without having to worry about a potential North Korean nuclear response. This would greatly increase the risk of conflict on the Korean Peninsula.Zach Jones, 2011, “Risk Propensity & Conflict Initiation in Asymmetric Dyads”, UGA, To demonstrate the power of frame effects on whether or not a militarized interstate dispute will be initiated in a given dyad year we can look at manipulated dyad years. In cases in which state A has less than 35% of the material capabilities of state B, state B is a major power, and state A is coded as being in a losses frame, there is a 225% increased probability of conflict initiation by state A when ?compared to an identical situation in which state A is coded as being in a gains frame. All other covariates are held at their mean values. When comparing instances in which the specifications are the same except that state B is not a major power, the predicted probability of conflict initiation by state A is actually significantly lower. This may perhaps be due to the fact that major power by definition are more active in the international system, and as such perhaps may create more points of conflict with minor ?powers. This is all in comparison to the mean predicted value of .0005, the baseline probability of conflict for all asymmetric dyads. Gady of The Diplomat “Are U.S. Military Bases Abroad Harming the United States?” August 26, 2015 bases also tend to heighten military tensions and discourage diplomatic solutions to conflicts. From the perspective of China, Russia and Iran, United States bases near their borders are a threat that encourages increased military spending. United States bases overseas can actually make war more likely and America less secure. Vine also deals with the argument that giving up military bases abroad could signal to U.S. allies that the United States will once more embrace isolationism, which particularly in Asia and Europe – given Russia’s revisionist foreign policy and the growing military power of China – could undermine peace and stability since bases serve as a deterrent to aggression in these regions. He outlines that military studies indicates that “advances in moving forces by air and sea have largely erased the advantage of forward stationing of troops; the military can generally deploy troops just as quickly from domestic bases as it can from bases abroad. And little if any empirical research proves the effectiveness of overseas bases as a form of long-term deterrence.”James Fearon, 2002, “Selection Effects and Deterrence”, Stanford University, // AAThis is the result of a selection effect. Rational challengers select themselves into crises according to their prior beliefs about the defender’s willingness to resist with force. To the extent that this occurs, the crises in which the defenders’ immediate deterrent threats are most credible will tend to be crises in which the challenging states are relatively strongly motivated to change the status quo, and thus willing to accept an appreciable risk of conflict. Hence despite their greater credibility compared to immediate deterrent threats in other cases, defender threats in this subset are less likely to succeed.James Fearon, 2002, “Selection Effects and Deterrence”, Stanford University, often and under what conditions do threats issued in the course of an international dispute successfully deter aggressive action by the state challenging the status quo? This important and apparently straightforward empirical question pro- voked a heated debate in the field of international relations in the late 80s and early 90s. On one side, Paul Huth and Bruce Russett argued that deterrent threats succeeded in 34, or almost 60 percent, of the 58 “extended immediate deterrence” crises they identified. On the other side, Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein forcefully disputed this assessment. By their reading, only 10 of Huth and Russett’s cases were properly regarded as “deterrence encounters” and at most two of these contained instances of successful deterrent threats.1Liu Zhen. January 2017. “Will Donald Trump aggravate the China-US arms race?” South China Morning Post: Defense and Diplomacy. // AA “Inevitably the countries in the Asia-Pacific region will keep investing in their military, largely on weapons,” Zhang said. “But until Chinese military power keeps growing and reaches a certain level, the neighbours’ participation in the arms race would turn out to be unnecessary.” Li said bigger Chinese and American military presences in the region would inevitably increase the likelihood of military friction. “But no one wants war, and with proper communication the frictions would not escalate into big problems,” he said.Jong-Han Yoon, Cambridge Core, 8-1-2011, ["The Effect of US Foreign Policy on the Relationship Between South and North Korea: Time Series Analysis of the Post-Cold War Era," , 7-22-2017] // AAThe main problem with employing a hard-line strategy is that it presents the risk of escalating a conflict into a situation that could eventually yield low payoffs to both sides, especially when both sides have roughly equal strength (Patchen 1987, 167). Studies have revealed that there is at best weak empirical support for the notion that a hard-line approach, particularly a bullying strategy, fosters cooperation, especially when compared to the effects of other strategies for promoting cooperation. Regarding interstate relations, R. J. Leng and H. G. Wheeler (1979) find that nine out of thirteen cases where a bullying strategy was employed resulted in war between nations. This finding partially confirms the negative effect of the use of bullying if eliciting cooperation from an adversary is the goal.Jong-Han Yoon, Cambridge Core, March 2016, ["The Effect of US Foreign Policy on the Relationship Between South and North Korea: Time Series Analysis of the Post-Cold War Era," , 7-22-2017] // AAHowever, there are some limits to the applicability and effectiveness of a reciprocal strategy in international politics. First, the prisoner's dilemma situation is not as common a situation in international politics as is often thought (Russett 1983, 115), and the evolution of cooperation only works under a specific form of prisoner's dilemma that is rarely found in an international conflict situation (Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992, 95-144; Goldstein et al. 2001). Second, the use of a reciprocal strategy is limited when there is power asymmetry between states. It is difficult to develop cooperation if power between states is imbalanced because more powerful states do not fear the adversary's retaliation (Rubin and Brown 1975; Zartman 1997; Goldstein et al. 2001). Third, it is difficult to change the image ofthe enemy, and international cooperation does not easily evolve even with reciprocal strategies (Larson 1988; Tetlock 1998 ; Goldstein et al. 2001). Fourth, when cooperative initiatives are absent, reciprocity might become "locked in"-but locked in on mutual competition or "defection" that generates an endless arms race (Patchen 1987, 176; Goldstein et al. 2001,591). Therefore, the question arises of how to develop reciprocal positive action if a pattern ofmutual resistance or hostility has already been established (Boyle and Lawler 1991; Osgood 1962).Amitai Etzioni (Amitai Etzioni is a University Professor and professor of international relations at The George Washington University. He is the author of?Avoiding War with China, just published by University of Virginia Press). The Diplomat, Diplomat, 8-10-2017, ["THAAD: Best a Bargaining Chip," , 8-10-2017] // AAOpinions differ among experts as to how effective these systems are. Jeffrey Lewis, an arms control analyst at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey, notes that THAAD can defend against short- and medium-range missiles, but would not against ICBM. Anyhow, so far South Korea allowed only the positioning of one battery, which has a limited effect. However, even if these anti-missile batteries are much less valuable than advocates claim, we need to pay more mind to the high costs they exact. They are very destabilizing, because there is reason to hold that THAAD surveillance could be marshaled in the tracking, identification, and destruction of not just North Korean but also Chinese missiles. Those quick to exclaim “Great, two for the price of one” should recall that nuclear powers hold each other at bay; that mutually assured destruction seems to be a major reason why the big powers have avoided war since 1945. To remind: The logic of nuclear deterrence presumes that if either China or the U.S. launches a nuclear attack, they must expect to be paid back in kind, to be devastated, making any major strike virtually suicidal. However, if one nuclear power can prevent a retaliatory strike (by an anti-missile defense system, for instance), the other nation must fear the possibility of a devastating attack without the ability to respond. As a result, mutual destruction is no longer assured, and the deterrence effect breaks down. Further, such concerns may well lead the newly vulnerable nation to put its nuclear forces on a hair trigger alert, ready to strike preemptively at any sign of preparation of an attack by the other. In short, if THAAD batteries are effective, they are highly destabilizing. [Scarborough, Rowan; The Washington Times; "North Korea tests missiles designed to defeat..."; May 3, 2017; Accessed June 26, 2017; ]North Korea has tailored its spate of ballistic missile tests to defeat the U.S.-stationed defense systems ready to protect the South and Japan from descending warheads, a report to Congress says. The bellicose North regularly flight-tests a panoply of ballistic missiles that could, in war, be capped with miniaturized nuclear warheads and strike its two democratic neighbors and U.S. allies. The U.S. military has matched this threat by first stationing Patriot anti-missile batteries and then announcing that the wider-range, mobile THAAD system is now in place to shoot down incoming warheads. Pyongyang, the North's capital, has been watching The Congressional Research Service reported that the regime launched test missiles last year in flights precisely designed to avoid interception by rocketing them into much higher altitudes. The result: The re-entry warhead will descend at a steeper angle and faster speed, “making it potentially more difficult to intercept with a missile defense system,” the CRS said. In another maneuver, the CRS said, “North Korea has also demonstrated an ability to launch a salvo attack with more than one missile launched in relatively short order.”[Armstrong 10 (Charles, May 26, 2010, CNN, “The Korean War never ended” )]New York (CNN) -- The Korean War began 60 years ago on June 25, 1950, and it still hasn't ended. Fighting on the Korean Peninsula may have stopped with a cease-fire in July 1953, but North and South Korea have remained in a tense state of armed truce ever since, with open warfare just a hair-trigger away. The sinking of the South Korean navy vessel Cheonan on March 26 -- which an international investigation team concluded last week to be the result of a North Korean torpedo attack -- shows how volatile the situation remains between North and South. There is a real danger of the current war of words escalating into a shooting war, which would be a catastrophe for Korea and the surrounding region. But if all sides, including the United States, pull back from the brink, this tragedy may also present an opportunity to defuse tensions with North Korea and resume talks that have been on hold for the last two years. The Cheonan disaster caused an outcry of grief and anger in South Korea. On May 24, South Korea's President Lee Myung-bak gave a forceful speech to his countrymen, asserting that South Korea would not tolerate any provocation from the North and would pursue "proactive deterrence." On the other hand, there is a real danger of this war of words escalating into a shooting war. With well over a million Korean troops facing each other across the Demilitarized Zone separating North a3nd South, along with 29,000 U.S. troops in the South, and North Korea now armed with nuclear weapons, the consequences of a renewed Korean War would be catastrophic for the Korean peninsula and the entire Northeast Asia region. The Cheonan incident has reinforced U.S.-South Korean and U.S.-Japanese cooperation in deterring the North. But deterrence can look like provocation from the other side, and in such a tense and volatile environment, a slight miscalculation can lead to disaster. A2: Early Warning(2 responses)1. Delink, Elich of the Korean Policy Institute 2016 explains: First, the THAAD missile defense system is ineffective due to the short-range nature of the missiles that Korea would launch combined with it being designed for long range. Secondly, the THAAD required 3.5 minutes to detect and launch a counter missile, and by that time, the missile would be too low, rendering the THAAD system useless. 2. Non-Unique, Starr of CNN reports on July 20th that current early warning systems are already good enough. As they could predict a North Korean missile launch two weeks in advance. Make my opponents tell you why we aren’t solving in the status quo.Cards:Gregory Elich. August 2016. “THAAD Comes to Korea, But At What Cost?.” Korean Policy Institute. // AAThe missiles in a THAAD battery are designed to counter incoming ballistic missiles at an altitude ranging from 40 to 150 kilometers. Given North Korea’s proximity, few, if any, missiles fired by the North would attain such a height, given that the point of a high altitude ballistic missile is to maximize distance. Even so, were the North to fire a high altitude ballistic missile from its farthest point, aimed at the concentration of U.S. forces in Pyeongtaek, it would require nearly three and a half minutes for THAAD to detect and counter-launch. In that period, the incoming missile would have already fallen below an altitude of 40 kilometers, rendering THAAD useless.?[i]?In a conflict with the South, though, North Korea would rely on its long-range artillery, cruise missiles, and short-range ballistic missiles, flying at an altitude well below THAAD’s range.Barbara Starr and Ryan Browne, Cnn, CNN, 7-20-2017, ["US intelligence shows North Korean preparations for a possible missile test," , 7-22-2017] // AACNN has learned that US intelligence indicates that North Korea is making preparations for another intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) or intermediate range missile test. Two administration officials familiar with the latest intelligence confirm there are indicators of test preparations that could lead to a potential launch in about two weeks. US satellites have detected new imagery and satellite-based radar emissions indicating North Korea may be testing components and missile control facilities for another ICBM or intermediate launch, officials say.A2: Reduce Paranoia(6 responses)1. Delink, Kelly of Pusan National University explains it’s the progress of North Korea’s nuclear program that drives paranoia not the amount of defense South Korea possesses. 2. Delink, even after Japan deployed a missile defense system, Lyon of the National Interest writes on July 24th that they are in the process of arming themselves with long-range offensive weapons under the pretext of national urgency. If it didn’t work in Japan, make my opponents prove to you why it would work in South Korea.3. Turn, Rief of St. Andrews University 2017 explains that missile defense system sends the signal to North Korea that Trump is preparing for a preemptive strike and that he doesn’t respect North Korea’s nuclear power.4. Turn, Brenner of NYU 2017 explains that a combination of relying on missile defense systems and the uncertainty regarding their effectiveness increases paranoia among the populations because they feel the US and South Korea will become more aggressive in their foreign policy. Thus, risking conflict escalation.5. Turn, Brenner of NYU 2017 explains that when facing the immediate threat of nuclear war, illusions of total security and an impermeable defense can drive a country to utter destruction.6. Delink, South Korean brigadier General Lee Jung Wong 2017 explains that South Korea’s democratic and market driven society is resilient to uncertainty.Cards:Robert E. Kelly [Professor; Pusan National University]. March 2015. “Will South Korea Have to Bomb the North, Eventually?” The Diplomat. // AAPyongyang does not need, for example, the ICBM it is supposedly working on. In this context, my greatest fear for Korean security in the next two decades is North Korean nuclearization continuing apace, generating dozens, perhaps hundreds of missiles and warheads, coupled to rising South Korean paranoia and pressure to preemptively strike. There is no possible national security rationale for Pyongyang to keep deploying beyond what it has now, and if it does, expect South Korean planners to increasingly consider preemptive airstrikes. North Korea with five or ten missiles (some of which would fail or be destroyed in combat) is a terrible humanitarian threat, but not an existential one to South Korea (and Japan). Rod Lyon, National Interest, 7-24-2017, ["Japan and South Korea Want More Military Firepower (Thanks to China and North Korea)," , 7-24-2017] // AAMeanwhile, some in Japan have begun to show new interest in strike capabilities. Back in March, a policy research group in the Liberal Democratic Party recommended that Japan arm itself with long-range offensive weapons. The group, headed by former defence minister Itsunori Onodera, argued that the country faces a new level of threat from North Korea, making the acquisition of those capabilities a matter of national urgency. Bringing such a proposal to fruition in Japan—a country which has shied away from deploying bomber aircraft—requires the successful clearing of many hurdles. Still, the broader discussion has clearly begun.Kingston Reif [St. Andrews University]. May 2017. “MISSILE DEFENSE CAN’T SAVE US FROM NORTH KOREA.” War on Rocks. // AAMisplaced overconfidence in missile defense could prompt Trump think he can escalate in response to another North Korean nuclear or missile test or other provocation without having to worry about a potential North Korean nuclear response. This would greatly increase the risk of conflict on the Korean Peninsula.Grant H. Brenner M.D. (New York University Postdoctoral Program in Psychoanalysis, Specialization in Trauma and Disasters), Psychology Today, 8-11-2017, ["How Facing Nuclear Destruction Could Make Us Wiser.," , 8-16-2017] // AAIt doesn't help that Trump has been referencing using nuclear weapons for years, including more recently on the campaign trail. It's not clear, again, whether this is strategic posturing and part of a grand scheme, a distraction to draw attention from other issues and/or the comments of a man who appears to have a cavalier attitude about using nuclear weapons on fellow human beings, potentially placing the whole planet on the chopping block. It is not clear that U.S. missile defense systems would be capable of destroying incoming warheads, heightening anxiety. Whether we trust our leaders to be good shepherds is a key part of the equation, at least regarding Trump, depending on how one sees it he is either a savvy negotiator who is just what the U.S. needed, or a is indifferent to the fate of billions and will lead us all to our doom. How to make sense of the mixed messages coming from different people in his administration and other governmental agencies is a thorny question, but one thing is clear: the lack of cohesive messaging leads to uncertainly, mistrust and confusion.Grant H. Brenner M.D. (New York University Postdoctoral Program in Psychoanalysis, Specialization in Trauma and Disasters), Psychology Today, 8-11-2017, ["How Facing Nuclear Destruction Could Make Us Wiser.," , 8-16-2017] // AALikewise, when facing the immediate threat of nuclear war, illusions of and belief in literal as well as symbolic immortality can drive us to utter destruction. Their use to alleviate death anxiety, to shift worldview, and to bolster self-esteem goes terribly wrong when it comes to securing collective safety and well-being.?Belief in an afterlife can mollify fears of death by providing an out — for the righteous — a belief that many major religions teach but which appear to serve essentially group-specific and nationalistic interests.Colin Clark (Editor; BA from Drew University), Breaking Defense, 7-27-2017, ["North Korea Won’t Give Nukes Up ‘At Any Price:’ Top Korea Intel Officer," , 7-28-2017] // AA[Brig. Gen. Lee Jung Wong] spoke in his prepared remarks of “bringing the Kim regime to its senses rather than its knees,” and stressed that South Korea’s democratic and market-driven society is “more resilient to uncertainty” than its northern brothers.A2: KC Good(2 responses) 1. Mitigate, Tures of the Observer 2017 explains that realistically, without nuclear weapons or an invasion and occupation, the United States and South Korea cannot completely remove the threat of a North Korean nuclear attack.2. Turn, Former assistant Defense Secretary Long explains in 2017 that kill chain is able to destroy any missile larger than a SCUD, before liftoff. Thus, kill chain is a comprehensive missile defense system that can rid of any risk of a missile harming South Korea.Cards:John A. Tures, Observer, 3-9-2017, ["North Korea Has More Than Just Nukes—But War Is Not Inevitable," <span class="skimlinks-unlinked">, 7-19-2017] // AACould we destroy all of North Korea’s nukes in an attack? The respected Stratfor team reveals that while America had plenty of tools, it would have no guarantee it could destroy every North Korean nuclear weapon, unless the intelligence was perfect. “Realistically, absent the use of nuclear weapons or the invasion and occupation of North Korea, the United States and its allies are already at a point where they cannot guarantee theA2: 100% Success Rate(2 response)1. Delink, Elich of the Korean Policy Institute explains that the THAAD missile defense system has not been tested against “complex” short and medium range missiles which are the most likely to be launched in the event of a conflcit. Moreover, Elich finds that the Department of Defense reported deficiencies in all natural environmental testing. This means that there may be high levels of success where everything is perfect and controlled for, but in the real world that isn’t the case.2. Delink, GANT News explains in 2017 that THAAD’s 100% is misleading because the shooter typically had an advanced notice of when and where the missile is launched.3. Delink, The Scientific American 2017 finds in a comprehensive study of missile defense that even under controlled test circumstances missile defense had a 50 percent failure rate because it’s difficult to hit a bullet with a bullet.4. Delink, The Pentagon’s main tester has said that missile defense has demonstrated no operational capability.Cards:Gregory Elich. August 2016. “THAAD Comes to Korea, But At What Cost?.” Korean Policy Institute. // AAThe U.S. Department of Defense’s 2014?Assessment of the Ballistic Missile Defense System?reports that while all simple non-separating target missiles were successfully intercepted during testing, THAAD had yet to be tested against “more complex” short-range and medium-range ballistic missiles requiring the use of advanced radar algorithms. Furthermore, the test phase found deficiencies in all categories of natural environment testing aside from the wind factor. Nor was testing performed against targets launching electronic countermeasures.? HYPERLINK "" \l "_edn2" [ii]?In short, although billed as a success, the reality is that the tests failed to replicate real-world scenarios, so claims made about THAAD’s effectiveness are unproven.GANTnews, CNN Affiliate, 7-11-2017, ["Missile defense wouldn’t shield US from North Korean attack," , 7-24-2017] // AAIt is very hard to shoot down a ballistic missile. This is true even of a short-range ballistic missile with a relatively flat trajectory, much less a long-range missile with many more possible trajectories and a far greater speed. Field test accuracy is not a good indicator, because the shooter typically has advance notice of when and where the missile is launched.David Wright [co-director and senior scientist with the Union of Concerned Scientists’ Global Security Program] & Larry Greenemeier [associate editor of technology for?Scientific American]. July 6, 2017. “North Korea Missile Test: Best Response May Be Surprisingly Low-Tech.” Scientific American. // AACould the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system (THAAD) that the U.S. is installing in South Korea protect the country from an attack by the North?The problem with relying on missile defenses is that they are not good enough to replace efforts to solve the problem directly through diplomacy. You might think a missile defense system is an insurance policy, but it’s hard to have a lot of confidence in that technology. We did a study a year ago of the U.S. Ground-Based Midcourse Defense system based in California, and found that even under controlled test circumstances it has a 50 percent failure rate. That’s a reflection of several things: One is that it’s a very hard technical problem to hit a bullet with a bullet. Also, the program behind the system has not been run very well. It was exempted by former Pres. George W. Bush from the standard fly-before-you-buy oversight and testing rules, and so it’s been able to go forward without jumping through the hoops that Congress finds—again and again—are important to make these things work. And these intercept tests are incredibly expensive, about $2 million each. The Pentagon’s main tester has said the missile defense system has no demonstrated operational capability, which we agree with. And yet people are saying that they could shoot down North Korean missiles, they have a 90 percent chance of success. I worry about political leaders who don’t understand the technical issues, thinking that they have capability that they don’t actually have. If Pres. Trump thinks that we could launch an attack on North Korea and then defend ourselves using THAAD or the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense system, then it could lead to bad decisions.A2: Protect Seoul(2 Reponses)1. Delink, Griffin of Global Research 2017 indicates that the THAAD system would not protect half of the South Korean population because the Pentagon deployed it to protect the Southern have of the country where most U.S. troops are deployed.2. Turn, Bennett of RAND Corporation 2016 explains that North Korean officials recognize THAAD’s capabilities and will shift missiles away from targeting China to targeting South Korea.Cards:William Griffin. February 2017. “How U.S. Missile “Defense” Destabilizes the World.” Global Research Center for Globalization. //AAThe THAAD system would not protect Seoul, where half the South Korean population resides, says Suh. The Pentagon plans to deploy it in the southeastern part of Korea, and it would only be able to protect the southern half of the country, where most U.S. forces are stationed. The THAAD radar, according to Suh, would most likely be used to detect North Korean missiles headed for the United States. It would relay the information to the U.S. THAAD system in Alaska, from where interceptors can be launched to destroy the incoming missile. In other words, the THAAD system doesn’t benefit South Koreans although they will bear the burden of hosting it.Bruce W. Bennett [California Institute of Technology]. April 2016. “THAAD's Effect on South Korea's Neighbors.” RAND Corporation. // AAEven then, China does not seem to understand the regional implications of the THAAD missile defense system. One fully-deployed THAAD battery is capable of destroying perhaps 50 North Korean ballistic missiles. North Korean planners, recognizing the THAAD capabilities, would need to shift missiles away from targeting China to rebalance its attacks once THAAD is deployed in Korea. Thus THAAD would likely reduce the number of North Korean ballistic missiles targeted on China, a significant improvement in Chinese and regional security.A2: Patriot Good(2 responses)1. Delink, Kaplan of MIT indicates that when simulating real conditions the Patriot Missile defense system has a success rate of under 50%.2. Delink, Maeda of Tokyo International University explains that North Korean missiles will travel at an altitude 18.5 times higher than the Patriot Missile Defense can handle.Cards:Fred Kaplan, MIT, Slate 3-24-2003, "How good are those Patriot missiles?," Slate Magazine, // MCHowever, the evidence is mixed on whether the PAC-3 can actually perform this complex task. In "development tests," which are designed to see if the technology works on the most basic level, the new Patriot did very well, hitting 10 out of 11 targets. However, in "operational tests," which are supposed to simulate real combat, the missile did much less well, slamming into the target in fewer than half the engagements, due mainly to computer glitches. (These figures come from a knowledgeable Pentagon official, but see also this.)Jun Hongo, 4-10-2012, "Vaunted missile shield more for show than protection," Japan Times, // MCThe PAC-3 missiles, meanwhile, will be ineffective unless an object flies directly within their 20-km range and in a straight trajectory. Setting up the missile shield is more about “giving local residents some sense of safety” than actually shooting down any debris, Kamiura said. Tetsuo Maeda, a former professor at Tokyo International University and an expert on military and national security, agrees. Maeda noted that when North Korea launched an alleged satellite in April 2009, the first booster fragmented into more than 50 pieces of different shapes and sizes that scattered randomly across the Pacific Ocean. SM-3s are designed to intercept a target at an altitude of approximately 300 km, while the North Korean rockets will likely be traveling at an altitude of 370 km.A2: No Submarines(1 response)1. Turn, Starr of CNN reports on July 20th that North Korea is carrying out an unusual level of submarine activity and testing the critical components of a submarine missile launch. Cards:Barbara Starr and Ryan Browne, Cnn, CNN, 7-20-2017, ["US intelligence shows North Korean preparations for a possible missile test," , 7-22-2017] // AASelva, who is deeply involved in the US nuclear weapons and missile defense programs, noted a parallel line of effort is underway to "provide for the defense of the United States with a suitable ballistic missile defense system that can handle the low volume at this point of missiles that he (Kim Jong Un) might be able to deploy that could strike us here across all of US territory, Alaska, Hawaii and the lower 48." The preparations for a potential new launch come as the US military has observed North Korea carrying out an "unusual level" of submarine activity as well as testing a critical component of a missile that could potentially be launched from a submarine. Two US defense officials told CNN that that a North Korean Romeo-class submarine is currently engaged in "unusual deployment activity" in the Sea of Japan/East Sea and has been under way for about 48 hours. The US is observing the sub via reconnaissance imagery and the officials said the submarine's patrol had taken it farther that it has ever gone, sailing some 100 kilometers out to sea in international waters. The submarine's activity was different than the typical training activity usually observed closer to shore, according to the officials.A2: Space Interceptors(1 response)1. Mitigate their strength of link, Dorell of Temple University explains in 2017 that to have space based interceptors, there would need to be at least 30 satellites. Make my opponents give you a probability and a timeframe.Oren Dorell, Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, 7-17-2017, ["U.S. missile defense plans to zap North Korean threats," , 7-22-2017] // AASpace-based interceptors The military is researching the use of chemical rockets or lasers that would fire at missiles from orbiting satellites. According to a study by the Center for International and Security Studies, such a scheme would require at least 30 satellites for an area the size of North Korea because the satellites would only be in range for a short while on each low-altitude orbit. Each satellite could be configured to carry multiple rockets and to defend itself from anything North Korea would use to try counter it, Obering said. “Eventually these space-based interceptors can be replaced with a laser,” he said.A2 Security ImpactsA2: Deter Escalation(3 responses)1. Turn, Security Dilemma.2. Turn, Etzioni of American University explains on August 10th that the eroded deterrence that stems from deploying missile defense will prompt nations like China and North Korea to put its nuclear forces on a hair trigger alert, ready to strike preemptively on any perceived military threats. This is problematic as it greatly increases the probability for miscalculation.3. Turn, Armstrong of Columbia University writes that deterrence can be perceived as provocation, which causes miscalculation. This is crucial because Armstrong furthers that there is a real danger of East Asian escalating into a shooting war when miscalculation turns into aggression.Amitai Etzioni (Amitai Etzioni is a University Professor and professor of international relations at The George Washington University. He is the author of?Avoiding War with China, just published by University of Virginia Press). The Diplomat, Diplomat, 8-10-2017, ["THAAD: Best a Bargaining Chip," , 8-10-2017] // AAOpinions differ among experts as to how effective these systems are. Jeffrey Lewis, an arms control analyst at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey, notes that THAAD can defend against short- and medium-range missiles, but would not against ICBM. Anyhow, so far South Korea allowed only the positioning of one battery, which has a limited effect. However, even if these anti-missile batteries are much less valuable than advocates claim, we need to pay more mind to the high costs they exact. They are very destabilizing, because there is reason to hold that THAAD surveillance could be marshaled in the tracking, identification, and destruction of not just North Korean but also Chinese missiles. Those quick to exclaim “Great, two for the price of one” should recall that nuclear powers hold each other at bay; that mutually assured destruction seems to be a major reason why the big powers have avoided war since 1945. To remind: The logic of nuclear deterrence presumes that if either China or the U.S. launches a nuclear attack, they must expect to be paid back in kind, to be devastated, making any major strike virtually suicidal. However, if one nuclear power can prevent a retaliatory strike (by an anti-missile defense system, for instance), the other nation must fear the possibility of a devastating attack without the ability to respond. As a result, mutual destruction is no longer assured, and the deterrence effect breaks down. Further, such concerns may well lead the newly vulnerable nation to put its nuclear forces on a hair trigger alert, ready to strike preemptively at any sign of preparation of an attack by the other. In short, if THAAD batteries are effective, they are highly destabilizing.[Armstrong 10 (Charles, May 26, 2010, CNN, “The Korean War never ended” )]New York (CNN) -- The Korean War began 60 years ago on June 25, 1950, and it still hasn't ended. Fighting on the Korean Peninsula may have stopped with a cease-fire in July 1953, but North and South Korea have remained in a tense state of armed truce ever since, with open warfare just a hair-trigger away. The sinking of the South Korean navy vessel Cheonan on March 26 -- which an international investigation team concluded last week to be the result of a North Korean torpedo attack -- shows how volatile the situation remains between North and South. There is a real danger of the current war of words escalating into a shooting war, which would be a catastrophe for Korea and the surrounding region. But if all sides, including the United States, pull back from the brink, this tragedy may also present an opportunity to defuse tensions with North Korea and resume talks that have been on hold for the last two years. The Cheonan disaster caused an outcry of grief and anger in South Korea. On May 24, South Korea's President Lee Myung-bak gave a forceful speech to his countrymen, asserting that South Korea would not tolerate any provocation from the North and would pursue "proactive deterrence." On the other hand, there is a real danger of this war of words escalating into a shooting war. With well over a million Korean troops facing each other across the Demilitarized Zone separating North a3nd South, along with 29,000 U.S. troops in the South, and North Korea now armed with nuclear weapons, the consequences of a renewed Korean War would be catastrophic for the Korean peninsula and the entire Northeast Asia region. The Cheonan incident has reinforced U.S.-South Korean and U.S.-Japanese cooperation in deterring the North. But deterrence can look like provocation from the other side, and in such a tense and volatile environment, a slight miscalculation can lead to disaster.A2: Deter Missile Strike(2 responses)1. Non-Unique, Arbatov of the Center for International Security 2013 explains that unlike other regimes, North Korea does not seek regional hegemony. This is crucial as if North Korea does not wish to invade which means there is nothing to deter.2. Non-Unique, Arbatov of the Center for International Security 2013 indicates that North Korea does not need a nuclear program to successfully invade South Korea. The threat exists in both worlds. 3. Turn, Etzioni of American University explains on August 10th that the eroded deterrence that stems from deploying missile defense will prompt nations like China and North Korea to put its nuclear forces on a hair trigger alert, ready to strike preemptively on any perceived military threats. This is problematic as it greatly increases the probability for miscalculation.Cards:Alexey Arbatov [Head of the Center for International Security]. 2013. “Missile Defense: Confrontation and Cooperation.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. // AABoth North Korea’s missile and nuclear programs should be viewed through its foreign policy priorities when determining how it will respond to U.S. missile defense initiatives. Much like Iran, North Korea fears military confrontation with the United States and seeks a means of ensuring regime security. Unlike Iran, North Korea has a key regional ally – China – and does not seek regional hegemony. Therefore, it does not actually need nuclear weapons to provide an existential deterrent to protect against a U.S.-South Korean invasion. As laid out by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), North Korea’s conventional forces are forward-deployed in a fashion suggesting an offensive doctrine aimed at invading and punishing South Korea. These forces, as argued, would likely capture the South Korean capital quickly before reinforcements could arrive.9 It is unlikely, then, that the North would employ nuclear weapons and risk a retaliatory nuclear strike by the United States. Alexey Arbatov [Head of the Center for International Security]. 2013. “Missile Defense: Confrontation and Cooperation.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. // AABoth North Korea’s missile and nuclear programs should be viewed through its foreign policy priorities when determining how it will respond to U.S. missile defense initiatives. Much like Iran, North Korea fears military confrontation with the United States and seeks a means of ensuring regime security. Unlike Iran, North Korea has a key regional ally – China – and does not seek regional hegemony. Therefore, it does not actually need nuclear weapons to provide an existential deterrent to protect against a U.S.-South Korean invasion. As laid out by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), North Korea’s conventional forces are forward-deployed in a fashion suggesting an offensive doctrine aimed at invading and punishing South Korea. These forces, as argued, would likely capture the South Korean capital quickly before reinforcements could arrive.9 It is unlikely, then, that the North would employ nuclear weapons and risk a retaliatory nuclear strike by the United States. Amitai Etzioni (Amitai Etzioni is a University Professor and professor of international relations at The George Washington University. He is the author of?Avoiding War with China, just published by University of Virginia Press). The Diplomat, Diplomat, 8-10-2017, ["THAAD: Best a Bargaining Chip," , 8-10-2017] // AAOpinions differ among experts as to how effective these systems are. Jeffrey Lewis, an arms control analyst at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey, notes that THAAD can defend against short- and medium-range missiles, but would not against ICBM. Anyhow, so far South Korea allowed only the positioning of one battery, which has a limited effect. However, even if these anti-missile batteries are much less valuable than advocates claim, we need to pay more mind to the high costs they exact. They are very destabilizing, because there is reason to hold that THAAD surveillance could be marshaled in the tracking, identification, and destruction of not just North Korean but also Chinese missiles. Those quick to exclaim “Great, two for the price of one” should recall that nuclear powers hold each other at bay; that mutually assured destruction seems to be a major reason why the big powers have avoided war since 1945. To remind: The logic of nuclear deterrence presumes that if either China or the U.S. launches a nuclear attack, they must expect to be paid back in kind, to be devastated, making any major strike virtually suicidal. However, if one nuclear power can prevent a retaliatory strike (by an anti-missile defense system, for instance), the other nation must fear the possibility of a devastating attack without the ability to respond. As a result, mutual destruction is no longer assured, and the deterrence effect breaks down. Further, such concerns may well lead the newly vulnerable nation to put its nuclear forces on a hair trigger alert, ready to strike preemptively at any sign of preparation of an attack by the other. In short, if THAAD batteries are effective, they are highly destabilizing.A2: Deter Preemptive(2 responses)1. Turn, Lee of the Wall Street Journal Reports in 2017 that an internal White House review of strategy on North Korea includes military force or regime change to blunt the country’s nuclear-weapons threat. Causing some leaders to brace for a shift in American policy in East Asia. Insofar, as the US is becoming more assertive, the threshold required to launch an attack plummets.2. Turn, Robert Kelley of Pusan National University writes that as North Korea continues to develop more sophisticates nuclear and missile technology, pressure on South Korea to take preemptive military action will rise because South Korea considers North Korean nuclear capabilities to be the greatest long-term risk to security and stability in Korea.Cards:Carol E. Lee [New York University], Alastair Gale [Japanese Editor; New York Times]. March 2017. “White House Options on North Korea Include Use of Military Force.” Wall Street Journal. // AAAn internal White House review of strategy on North Korea includes the possibility of military force or regime change to blunt the country’s nuclear-weapons threat, people familiar with the process said, a prospect that has some U.S. allies in the region on edge. While President Donald Trump has taken steps to reassure allies that he won’t abandon agreements that have underpinned decades of U.S. policy on Asia, his pledge that Pyongyang would be stopped from ever testing an intercontinental ballistic missile—coupled with the two-week-old strategy review—has [leading] some leaders bracing for a shift in American policy.Robert E. Kelly [Professor; Pusan National University]. March 2015. “Will South Korea Have to Bomb the North, Eventually?” The Diplomat. // AAAs North Korea continues to develop [more sophisticated] both nuclear weapons and the missile technology to carry them, pressure on South Korea to take preemptive military action will gradually rise. At some point, North Korea may have so many missiles and warheads that [Because] South Korea considers that [North Korean Nuclear] capability[ies]y to be an existential threat to its security. This is the greatest long-term risk to security and stability in Korea, arguably more destabilizing than a North Korean collapse.A2: Deterrence Impact(1 response)1. Delink, Former assistant Defense Secretary Long 2017 explains that over the past 60 years the US and South Korea have tried to deter the North from starting their nuclear program, hiding their program, operating their program outside the parameters of the Nonproliferation treaty, and proliferating. All of which have failed. Historically, deterrence has failed specifically with North Korea.Cards:Colin Clark (Editor; BA from Drew University), Breaking Defense, 7-27-2017, ["North Korea Won’t Give Nukes Up ‘At Any Price:’ Top Korea Intel Officer," , 7-28-2017] // AA “Which side has been most successful at getting what they wanted over the last 60 years of our strategic deterrence and assurances?” Long asked. “We tried to deter North Korea from having a nuclear program. That didn’t work. We tried to deter North Korea from having a nuclear program outside the NPT. That didn’t work” she said. “We tried to deter North Korea from hiding. That didn’t work.” We couldn’t stop them proliferating, either.A2: Prevent China Conflict(2 responses)1. Turn, Reif of St. Andrews University 2017 explains that missile defense provides Trump with the overconfidence to think he can strike North Korea. This is problematic as a strike on north Korea would legally oblige China to engage according to a 1950 treaty.2. Turn, Bremmer of the Eurasia Group 2017 explains that because it is an election year, Chia’s president Xi will view any external challenge as an unwelcome distraction from his domestic political machinations. Thus, he concludes, China will likely act forcefully to potential challengers.Cards:Kingston Reif [St. Andrews University]. May 2017. “MISSILE DEFENSE CAN’T SAVE US FROM NORTH KOREA.” War on Rocks. // AAMisplaced overconfidence in missile defense could prompt Trump think he can escalate in response to another North Korean nuclear or missile test or other provocation without having to worry about a potential North Korean nuclear response. This would greatly increase the risk of conflict on the Korean Peninsula.Scott Stossel. 2005. “North Korea: A War Game.” The Atlantic. // AAThere are still other dangers. If we did successfully invade, our troops would be likely to eventually find themselves near North Korea's Chinese border. The last time that happened, in 1950, the Chinese counterinvaded. (A 1961 treaty obliges China to do so again in the event of an attack on North Korea.) Meanwhile, other nations—most notably Iran—are watching carefully to see whether North Korea will be allowed to become an official nuclear power without reprisal.Ian Bremmer [NYU Professor]. January 2017. “Geopolitical Recession: The Top 10 Political Risks of 2017.” Eurasia Group. // AAFirst, Xi’s sense that he will have to respond resolutely to any foreign challenge to national interests—in a year during which popular and elite perception of his leadership matter more than ever—means foreign policy tensions will escalate. At the least, Xi will view any external challenge as an unwelcome distraction from his focus on domestic political machinations. At worst, he will fear such threats could undermine his standing at home. Consequently, the president is likely to react more forcefully than his potential challengers expect. And unfortunately for global stability, the list of triggers that could rattle the president is long: a newly-empowered Trump and his China policy, Taiwan, Hong Kong, North Korea, as well as the East and South China Seas.A2: Sends Signal(2 response)1. Turn, North Korea doesn’t know South Korea’s true intentions thus, they will assume the worst. Rief of St. Andrews University 2017 explains that deploying missile defense sends the signal to North Korea that the US and South Korea are preparing for a preemptive strike forcing the North to accelerate their nuclear program and arms development in preparation for an attack. Thus, the signal deployment sends inly exacerbates the threat North Korea poses to the South. 2. Delink, Friedman of Cornell University 2013 explains that because North Korea is an irrational overaggressive actor, the best thing to do is not to irritate them.Cards:Kingston Reif [St. Andrews University]. May 2017. “MISSILE DEFENSE CAN’T SAVE US FROM NORTH KOREA.” War on Rocks. // AAMisplaced overconfidence in missile defense could prompt Trump think he can escalate in response to another North Korean nuclear or missile test or other provocation without having to worry about a potential North Korean nuclear response. This would greatly increase the risk of conflict on the Korean Peninsula.George Friedman (City College of New York City; Cornell University; Founder of Stratfor & Geopolitical Features) Stratfor’s Senior, Stratfor Enterprises, 12-24-2013, ["Ferocious, Weak and Crazy: The North Korean Strategy," , 8-27-2017] // AASo long as the North Koreans remained ferocious, weak and crazy, the best thing to do was not irritate them too much and not to worry what kind of government they had. But being weak and crazy was the easy part for the North; maintaining its appearance of ferocity was more challenging. Not only did the North Koreans have to keep increasing their ferocity, they had to avoid increasing it so much that it overpowered the deterrent effect of their weakness and craziness. ?A2: NK Collapse(1 response)1. Delink, Rosenblum of Politico writes on July 18th that despite small steps taken by China to rein in North Korea, it will not waver from its view that a unified Western oriented Korea would be far more threatening to its core national security interests than anything North Korea could or would do. This is because China thinks a unified Korea would mean the US military would end up on its border. Thus, China will do whatever it takes to prevent a North Korean collapse.Cards:Todd Rosenblum (a delegate to the U.S.-China-South Korea-North Korea Four Party Peace Talks in the 1990s. He was a senior official at the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security for the Obama administration from 2009 to 2015. He is a nonresident fellow at The Atlantic Council and serves on the Defense Science Board Task Force on Homeland Defense), Agenda, 7-18-2017, ["How to persuade China to abandon North Korea," , 7-23-2017] // AAChina has taken a few steps toward reining in North Korea, such as cutting off coal exports earlier this year. But it has not wavered in its view that a unified, Western-oriented peninsula would be far more threatening to its core national security interests than anything the North Korean state has done or will do. Unification, China believes, likely would end with the U.S. military on its border, an unacceptable risk. In turn, China has refused to take the necessary steps to really damage the North Korean regime, such as closing its border, blocking the flow of North Korean worker remittances, or enforcing a blockade against North Korean shipping.A2: Independence from China(2 responses)1. Delink, realize that China doesn’t seek to make South Korea a puppet state, rather they are advocating for their national interests. Thus, in a con world, South Korea is merely respecting the sovereignty of its neighbor, not conceding to its will.2. Turn, Soumil and I would contend that deploying more American defenses is South Korea moving closer to becoming an American puppet state. This is comparatively worse because China has a stronger national and economic interest in regional stability than the USA. Thus, not deploying missile defenses and working closer with China will be beneficial to the ROK. A2: Denuke General(1 response)1. Mitigate, Mansourov of Columbia University explains that North Korea publicly announced that it will only denuclearize when two preconditions are met. First, the US must fully withdraw from South Korea. Second, global denuclearization. Make my opponents give you a probability of both if they are to garner any offense off of this contention. Cards:Alexandre. Mansourov, Ph.D. Columbia University; B.A. Moscow State Institute of International Relations; Advanced Diploma, Kim Il Sung National University (DPRK); Professor at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, "Kim Jong Un’s Nuclear Doctrine and Strategy: What Everyone Needs to Know", NAPSNet Special Reports, December 16, 2014, // AAAccording to the DPRK’s authoritative pronouncements, in the future, Pyongyang may contemplate peaceful denuclearization on the Korean peninsula only when two preconditions are met: (1) The “U.S. hostile policy” is terminated, as evidenced by the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea, lifting of all sanctions and embargoes, and normalization of bilateral relations. According to the MOFA spokesman statement on 4 October 2014, “The nuclear deterrence of Songun Korea can never be given up and bartered for anything unless the U.S. hostile policy and nuclear threat are fundamentally terminated.” HYPERLINK "" \l "_edn64" [64] According to the MOFA spokesman statement on 4 October 2014, in the past, the DPRK agreed to work for the denuclearization of the peninsula because the U.S. expressed its will to respect the DPRK’s sovereignty, stop the nuclear threat against it and coexist in peace. HYPERLINK "" \l "_edn65" [65] But now, the discussion of denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula will be meaningless as the U.S. is set to bring down the DPRK’s state system at any cost. (2) “Global nuclear disarmament is achieved,” as evidenced by “the abolition of nuclear weapons worldwide.” HYPERLINK "" \l "_edn66" [66] Since neither of the two preconditions are likely to be met, the international community should be ready either to compel the North’s nuclear disarmament or to live with a nuclear North Korea in the foreseeable future. In the meantime, it is important to continue to probe Kim Jong Un’s nuclear intentions, to prod Pyongyang to be more transparent with respect to its nuclear doctrine and plans, and to try to negotiate some caps on North Korea’s growing nuclear capabilities, while devising a mutually acceptable formula for the DPRK’s reTurn to the Non-proliferation Treaty and international nuclear safeguards and inspections, encouraging the DPRK government to reaffirm its “no first use” commitment, and deterring Pyongyang from nuclear provocations in crisis situations.A2: MD Key to Denuke(1 response)1. Turn the link, deploying missile defense creates a security dilemma wherein North Korea perceives the deployment of anti-missile systems in South Korea to be offensive deployments. This is problematic, as this perception causes North Korea to respond by bolstering its offensive capabilities, mainly its nuclear arsenal.A2: SK Prolif is Alternative1. Terminal Defense, realize that South Korea can’t nuclearize because of the Non-proliferation treaty is in place. Moreover, they would never violate the treaty because they would risk their alliance with the United States. And Snyder 17 explains that South Korea relies on the United States. For their defense. A2: PS Good(7 responses)1. Mitigate, The Irish Examiner explains in August that a preemptive strike would fail because North Korea’s missile and facilities are scattered underground throughout its mountainous terrain. Thus, its improbable and you can mitigate their strength of link. However, even if it was conducted, you can turn the argument because it would leave 10’s of millions of people vulnerable to missile and artillery strikes.2. Turn, Bader of the Brookings Institute explains in August that a U.S. preemptive strike to take out North Korea’s nuclear weapons would invite devastating retaliation by North Korea against South Korea. Moreover, with 15,000 conventional artillery launchers within 50 miles of Seoul, North Korea is capable of causing mass casualties in the South.3. Turn, If the United States initiated a conflict, Bader of Brookings 17 explains that there would be angry calls in South Korea for terminating the US-ROK alliance which would risk having a new and vastly more capable Korea foe.4. Delink, because there’s no regional support. China’s foreign minister, Wang Yi stated in February 2016 that one of the fundamental principles China will adhere to when addressing the Korean Peninsula is that a military option would be unacceptable.5. Delink, Chinese acts as a deterrent, Jai Qinguo of Paking University 2017 warned the US and South Korea that China would not be complacent in the event of military actions on North Korea because it would be directly impacted by the fallout of a preemptive strike. Chinese involvement will act as a deterrent to any preemptive action, don’t let them garner any offense off of this.6. Delink, Delury of Yale 2016 explains that a preemptive strike would likely drive Beijing to side with the North in accordance with their 1961 treaty wherein China would militarily support North Kroea.7. Delink, because retaliation will deter. Delury of Yale 2016 explains that a preemptive strike would incite furious military retaliation from Pyongyang. Which is problematic as he furthers that South Korea and the United States could not count on Beijing’s support and would face Chinese intervention on the peninsulaFor all these reasons, Delury concludes that a preemptive strike would rapidly descend into a bloodbath, reigniting a war.Cards:Thursday, August 10, 2017, Irish Examiner, 8-10-2017, ["Is war between the US and North Korea likely? " , 8-10-2017] // AAIt probably wouldn’t work. North Korea’s missiles and nuclear facilities are dispersed and hidden throughout the country’s mountainous terrain. Failing to hit them all would leave 10m people in Seoul, 38m people in Tokyo, and tens of thousands of US military personnel in northeast Asia vulnerable to missile attacks — either by conventional or nuclear warheads. Even if the US wiped out everything, Seoul would still be vulnerable to attacks from North Korea’s artillery.Jeffrey A. Bader, Brookings, 8-8-2017, ["Why deterring and containing North Korea is our least bad option," , 8-9-2017] // AAA U.S. preemptive strike to take out North Korea’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles.?Such a strike would invite devastating retaliation by North Korea against South Korea and perhaps Japan. With some 15,000 conventional artillery launchers within 50 miles of Seoul, North Korea is capable of causing mass casualties in the South, even without resorting to nuclear missiles. An all-out war in the Korean peninsula would likely produce large-scale American casualties. Additionally, even if such a war were successful, there would be angry calls in South Korea for terminating the alliance with the United States in the wake of a U.S.-triggered conflict; there could be a risk that we would have traded a dysfunctional North Korean enemy for a vastly more capable Korean foe.Fei su (Research Assistant with SIPRI’s China and Global Security Programme and is based in Beijing and a Graduate of Seoul National University), and Lora Saalman, (PhD in International Relations, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China; MA in International Policy Studies and Certificate in?Non-proliferation, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, CA; BA with Honors in Anthropology, University of Chicago; Director of and a Senior Researcher with SIPRI’s China and Global Security Programme), February 2017. “CHINA’S ENGAGEMENT OF NORTH KOREA: Challenges and Opportunities for Europe.” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. 's-engagement-North-Korea.pdf // AAAt the official level, the Chinese Government remains opposed to a kinetic response to North Korea’s nuclear tests. China’s foreign minister, Wang Yi, made a clear statement during an interview in February 2016 that one of the principles adhered to by China in addressing issues on the Korean peninsula is that a military option would be unacceptable.43 Nonetheless, Chinese experts such as Jia Qingguo, dean of the School of International Studies at Peking University, warn that China cannot afford to be complacent, particularly since it would be directly affected by a surgical strike against North Korea by the USA.44Fei su (Research Assistant with SIPRI’s China and Global Security Programme and is based in Beijing and a Graduate of Seoul National University), and Lora Saalman, (PhD in International Relations, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China; MA in International Policy Studies and Certificate in?Non-proliferation, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, CA; BA with Honors in Anthropology, University of Chicago; Director of and a Senior Researcher with SIPRI’s China and Global Security Programme), February 2017. “CHINA’S ENGAGEMENT OF NORTH KOREA: Challenges and Opportunities for Europe.” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. 's-engagement-North-Korea.pdf // AAAt the official level, the Chinese Government remains opposed to a kinetic response to North Korea’s nuclear tests. China’s foreign minister, Wang Yi, made a clear statement during an interview in February 2016 that one of the principles adhered to by China in addressing issues on the Korean peninsula is that a military option would be unacceptable.43 Nonetheless, Chinese experts such as Jia Qingguo, dean of the School of International Studies at Peking University, warn that China cannot afford to be complacent, particularly since it would be directly affected by a surgical strike against North Korea by the USA.44John Delury (a senior fellow of the Center on U.S.-China Relations and an Assistant Professor of International Studies at Yonsei University. He has taught Chinese history and politics at Columbia, Brown, and Peking University, and received a PhD in Chinese history at Yale), 38 North, October 31, 2016, ["The "China Factor"," 38North, School of Advanced International Studies, , 7-28-2017] // AATo be sure, North Korea would be on its own if it were to attack US allies or assets in the region, let alone US territory. But if the United States launches a pre-emptive strike not to prevent a specific, imminent missile attack, but rather to prevent North Korea from perfecting an intercontinental nuclear strike capability, it is unlikely to meet Beijing’s standard for jus ad bellum. On the contrary, a strike of this nature could likely drive Beijing to side with the North in accordance with their 1961 treaty. In the furious military retaliation that Pyongyang would muster after a US strike, South Korea and the United States could not count on Beijing’s support and indeed may face Chinese intervention on the peninsula, as in October 1950. “Surgery” would rapidly descend into a bloodbath. “Pre-emption” would start a war.A2: Collapse Good(2 responses)1.Turn, Kazanias of the National Interest 2016 explains that if the current regime collapses factions would develop to take control of the country. All of which would purposefully attack South Korea with ballistic, chemical, and even nuclear, weapons to retaliate. 2. Turn, Isaac Fish Foreign Policy concludes that the collapse of North Korea is the South greatest fear for three reasons:1. hundreds of thousands of refugees that would destabilize the region. 2. China would be threatened by the idea of unification and democracy creeping closer to its doors so it would militarily intervene. 3. possible American troops entering North Korea would provoke China potentially leading to a major conflict.Cards:Harry Kazanias, 1/7/2016, “Asia's Worst Nightmare (or World War III): What If North Korea Fell?”, National Interest, “The alternative kind of collapse would be a government collapse. In this case, the Kim family regime would fail or be [is] overthrown, and no single individual or group would be able to form a new central North Korean government. Most likely, factions would develop, each trying to control parts of the country, with some possibly having very weak control even over their own areas. Many central government functions would fail, including much of the control system. “A civil war in North Korea and especially the use of WMD could spill over into the ROK and cause serious damage. Factional forces could cause considerable damage with artillery and special forces attacks on the ROK, especially if nuclear and/or biological weapons are used. In addition, one or more North Korean factions could purposefully attack [South Korea] the ROK, potentially as a form of revenge if they perceive themselves unlikely to survive. Thus, [with] ballistic missile attacks against [South Korean] ROK cities—especially ones using nuclear weapons or even chemical or biological weapons—could cause damage across the ROK. Besides the physical damage done, the ROK economy and society could be significantly affected. All these consequences could make it difficult for the ROK to pay for and manage unification. From a [South Korean] ROK perspective, the worst outcome could be destabilization of all of Korea, including the ROK, as crime and insurgency spread, if the ROK is unable to contain and defeat them.”Isaac Fish [Columbia University & Editor of Foreign Policy], 2017, “Is THAAD the Start of a U.S.-China Arms Race?”, China File, North Korea as a robber who pulls out a gun, points it at his own head, and says, “Stop or I’ll shoot.” Surprisingly for many in the United States, the biggest threat that Pyongyang poses [to] is not the extremely unlikely eventuality of a North Korean missile attack on the United States or its allies South Korea and Japan. Rather, the greatest threat Pyongyang poses is that the government, and perhaps even the country, will collapse, leaving other countries to contain the chaos.Isac Stone Fish [Editor; Foreign Policy], Graham Webster [The China Center at Yale Law School], Sheila Smith [Fellow for Japan studies at the Council on Foreign Relations], Sheena Greitens [Center for East Asian Policy]. March 2017. “Is THAAD the Start of a U.S.-China Arms Race?” China File. // AAPicture North Korea as a robber who pulls out a gun, points it at his own head, and says, “Stop or I’ll shoot.” Surprisingly for many in the United States, the biggest threat that Pyongyang poses is not the extremely unlikely eventuality of a North Korean missile attack on the United States or its allies South Korea and Japan. Rather, the greatest threat Pyongyang poses is that the government, and perhaps even the country, will collapse, leaving other countries to contain the chaos. Besides the North Korean people, it is China, not the United States, that has the most to lose from the collapse of the North Korean state. There are three main reasons: refugees, unification, and American troops. Total state collapse would likely see hundreds of thousands of North Korean refugees fleeing into China, leading to China’s biggest refugee crisis in its history. Moreover, a failed North Korea would likely unify under Seoul, bringing another Western-leaning democracy to China’s border. And finally, Beijing already disapproves of the roughly 28,500 U.S. troops stationed in South Korea. Many influential Chinese thinkers seem to think that Washington views China like the Soviet Union and, as such, schemes for the collapse or the splintering of the ruling Chinese Communist Party. Consequently, Beijing would view American troops on the unified Korean peninsula as a serious provocation. Yes, North Korea’s standing army—estimated at more than 1.2 million soldiers—threatens South Korea, and Japan is a far easier target for its missiles than the United States. That’s why Trump should publicly and privately express support for those two allies. And yes, South Korea would face heavy casualties from a North Korean invasion. But Pyongyang almost certainly knows that invading the South would be suicide. And while Japan’s involvement in rebuilding after a North Korean collapse could be quite limited, depending on the geopolitical situation at the time, South Korea’s involvement would make West Germany’s integration of East Germany seem simple. South Korea’s economy, government, and social fabric would struggle with repatriating North Koreans. A2: Collapse Bad(1 response)1. Turn, Smith of the Council on Foreign Relations explains that in the long-term South Korea would gain has it would double its territory, increase its population by roughly 50 percent, gain access to vast unmined deposits of natural resources, and Greater Korea would be linked overland with Eurasia.Cards:Isac Stone Fish [Editor; Foreign Policy], Graham Webster [The China Center at Yale Law School], Sheila Smith [Fellow for Japan studies at the Council on Foreign Relations], Sheena Greitens [Center for East Asian Policy]. March 2017. “Is THAAD the Start of a U.S.-China Arms Race?” China File. // AABut unlike Beijing, Seoul would gain handsomely after the dust settled. Not only would it more than double its territory, increase its population by roughly 50 percent, and gain access to vast unmined deposits of natural resources, but Greater Korea would be linked overland with Eurasia.A2: Troop Tradeoff Good(2 responses)1. Turn, Snyder of the Business Insider 2016 explains that South Korea is wholly reliant on the United States for its defense. Pulling out troops would signal to China and North Korea that South Korea is weak which will significantly increase the probability conflict initiation.2. Turn, recognize that when the United States pulls out of South Korea, it will create a power vacuum wherein another power will have to replace our presense. This means that either a.) china will step in and garner more power over South Korea in attempt to take a stand against the United States or b.) South Korea will begin building up their military. This is problematic because North Korea will perceive a Southern build up as preparation for attack.A2: Troop withdrawal Bad1. Turn, withdrawing troops solves back for the North Korean nuclear threat. Mansourov of Johns Hopkins University explains that all North Korea’s publicly stated targets are of US origin because the United States is the sole threat to North Korea’s sovereignty. Thus, he furthers that a withdrawal from South Korea will rid of the nuclear threat to South Korea because North Korea has no motive in striking the South.Cards:Alexandre. Mansourov, Ph.D. Columbia University; B.A. Moscow State Institute of International Relations; Advanced Diploma, Kim Il Sung National University (DPRK); Professor at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, "Kim Jong Un’s Nuclear Doctrine and Strategy: What Everyone Needs to Know", NAPSNet Special Reports, December 16, 2014, // AA1. U.S. military bases in South Korea (????? ????) 2. U.S. military bases in the Asia-Pacific operational theater (????????? ???????) 3. U.S. military bases in Guam (???? ????) 4. U.S. military bases in Hawaii (????? ????) 5. U.S. military bases in the U.S. mainland (?????? ????) (as indicated in the notorious map of the alleged KPA targets on the U.S. mainland). Several characteristics of the above target list are worth mentioning. First, all potential targets are of the U.S. origin, which lends credence to the DPRK public assertion that its nuclear weapons target only the nuclear weapons states threatening the DPRK. Second, the above list does not include any South Korean targets, except U.S. military bases in the South, thereby sending an unambiguous message to Seoul that the North does not plan to employ nuclear weapons against its compatriots in the South, whether they are military or civilian. Third, although some of the targets are clearly located in Japan, the North Koreans never mention Japan by name, making only veiled references to their neighbor, probably because of their sensitivity about Japan’s tragic past experience with the nuclear war.A2: Sovereignty(3 responses)1. Delink, realize that agreeing with China isn’t the same thing as being extorted by China nor does it establish any precedence for the future.2. Turn, Chinese influence in South Korea isn’t bad. Tweed of Bloomberg 2017 writes that as long as the US and South Korea cooperate, China will not help out. This is crucial because Sungwon of VOA 2017 furthers that if you negate, China will use its leverage to force North Korea in a corner. This is more effective than US assistance becausea. Starone indicates that North Korea is becoming increasingly economically dependent on China for its regime survival,b. *Revere 2017 empirically confirms that Chinese involvement in negotiations without the US successfully resulted in North Korean concessions and a large reduction in military tensions3. Turn, the United States is increasingly stripping South Korea of its autonomy. Sang-Hun of VOA 2017 explains, the Defense Ministry failed to inform President Moon regarding the deployment of four additional THAAD launchers. Ahn of The Nation 2017 corroborates that the United States is increasingly sidestepping South Korea in its military persurits. Thus, affirming only decreases the say South Kroea has in their own political arena. Cards: [Bloomberg Politics; David Tweed; 6 March 2017; Explaining THAAD and Why It So Bothers China: Quick Take Q&A; o-bothers-china-quicktake-q-a ]Not really. China’s longer range intercontinental ballistic missiles targeting the continental U.S. would still be in their ascent phase when they pass by Thaad installations in South Korea. The same would be true if North Korea acquires an operational ICBM. 5. So what is China worried about? It’s concerned that Thaad’s surveillance capabilities might be able to offer early tracking data to parts of the American ballistic missile defense system, eroding China’s ability to target the U.S. in the event of war, Lyon said. The Global Times, a Communist Party-affiliated newspaper, accused Seoul of “tying itself to the U.S. chariot and turning into an arrogant pawn of Washington in the latter’s military containment against China.” 6. So Thaad could give the U.S. an advantage against China Perhaps. The U.S. already has a Thaad battery deployed in Guam, two radars in Japan, space assets, plus a range of ship-borne radars and larger land based radars in other parts of the Pacific, according to Lyon. Thaad would perhaps improve early tracking of some Chinese missiles but might not make interception of the missiles much easier. [Sungwon, Baik. "China Walks Thin Line Between North Korea and US." VOA. VOA, 26 Apr. 2017. Web. 24 July 2017. <;.]Cheng Xiaohe, an associate professor of international relations at Renmin University in Beijing, pointed out that the Chinese leadership has described Sino-North Korean relations several times as “normal state-to-state relations,” adding such a perception intimates that the 1961 alliance treaty, which guarantees Chinese military support for the North Korean regime, has become outmoded. China has made it clear that should South Korea take back the THAAD deployment, it will be more than willing to resume the partnership and take action against North Korea. A recent editorial in the Chinese Communist Party newspaper, the Global Times, suggests that if Washington conducts a pre-emptive strike against North Korean nuclear facilities, Beijing would not militarily intervene. The editorial set forth a red line, however, stating that if South Korean and U.S. troops cross the inter-Korean border and try to topple the Kim Jong Un regime, Beijing would get involved militarily. [By CHOE SANG-HUN MAY 30, 2017 South Korea Leader Orders Investigation Into Unreported U.S. Launchers ]SEOUL, South Korea — President Moon Jae-in of South Korea ordered an investigation on Tuesday into why the Defense Ministry had failed to inform him that four additional launchers for a contentious American missile-defense battery had been brought into his country. The United States hurried to deploy the antimissile system, called the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, or Thaad, in late April despite protests from Mr. Moon, a presidential candidate at the time, who demanded that the deployment be delayed until after the new government in Seoul reviewed whether it was in the country’s best interest. The president’s move came as tensions on the Korean Peninsula were rising. On Monday, Pyongyang launched what South Korean officials called a Scud-type missile that flew 280 miles before falling into waters near Japan. Hours after the missile test, two United States supersonic B-1B Lancer bombers conducted a drill over South Korea, the second such mission this month. As a candidate, Mr. Moon had called for a parliamentary review of the Thaad system. Two interceptor-rocket launchers were first put in place in Seongju, 135 miles southeast of Seoul, during the April deployment , although a Thaad battery normally operates with six launchers. Mr. Moon had accused both Washington and the government of the impeached President Park Geun-hye of trying to make the Thaad deployment a fait accompli.That changed on Tuesday, when he learned that the remaining four Thaad launchers had also arrived in South Korea — although not put in place in Seongju — and that his office has been kept in the dark about it. “President Moon called it a great shock,” said his spokesman, Yoon Young-chan. “He ordered a probe on how the four launchers were brought into the country, whose decision it was and why it has not been made public to the people and why it has not been reported to the new government until now.” [The Nation; Christine Ahn; 10 February 2017; In South Korea, Women Are Leading the Resistance to US-Backed Militarization ; cked-militarization/ ]These women—including farmers and mothers with little to no experience in political activism—have been conducting daily candlelight vigils and protests in front of Lotte stores nationwide. According to Ahn-Kim Jeong-ae of South Korea’s Women Making Peace, the women of Seongju and Gimcheon also organized 10,000 women’s signatures and took out a full-page ad in H ankyoreh , a leading South Korean newspaper. Yoon Geum-soon, a melon farmer from Seongju, reports that “the sales of Lotte have decreased recently due to our daily protest.” “The deployment of THAAD will increase tensions between South and North Korea,” said Ham Soo-yeon, a resident of Gimcheon who has been publishing newsletters about their resistance. In a phone interview, Ham said THAAD would “make the unification of Korea more difficult,” and that it would “place the Korean peninsula at the center of the US drive for dominant power over Northeast Asia. Indeed, many of these Korean women view their fight against THAAD as part of a larger struggle against the militarization of Korea driven by the United States .“Weapons can’t produce peace,” Ham says. “Rather, diplomacy and talk with North Korea has a far greater chance to bring about peace and stability in the Korean peninsula.” The Korean women’s boycott really got going when civic groups in Beijing and other major cities in China joined in. “China’s stance over the THAAD deployment is clear,” explained the secretary of a civic group in Beijing. “If the Lotte Group does not care about our position and makes the final decision on the provision of the site, we have no choice but to fight.” The Lotte boycott is the latest target by China of South Korean exports, a broader effort which spans from banning cosmetics and dramas to denying K-pop stars visas. [Wicker, McDaniel. Wilson Center. April 2016. “Security in unity between the United States, South Korea, and Japan. ]South Korea likewise has a distinctive national identity. A strong sense of vulnerability has developed after centuries of being caught between the regional powers of Japan and China, which have frequently interfered with Korean sovereignty. There is also the everpresent fact that Korea remains divided and technically at war. The Koreans therefore seek to been seen as independent and to be treated as equals on the international stage, especially as South Korean economic influence continues to rise worldwide.12 This sense of independence partly explains the ROK push to develop an indigenous defense industry; while economics play an important part, national pride remains a major motivation for building its own advanced fighter aircraft and missile defense system. Concerns over sovereignty have also hindered previous attempts at trilateralism, with ROK officials routinely balking at the idea of Japanese cooperation in security planning or exercises on the Korean Peninsula. [Rinehart, Ian E. Ballistic Missile Defense in the Asia-Pacific Region: Cooperation and Opposition. CRS. April 3, 2015. ]Although U.S.-South Korea alliance relations have been closely coordinated in recent years, Seoul resisted cross-national integration of BMD systems. The two countries share intelligence and sensor data and in 2013-2014 deepened their bilateral missile defense discussions. Reportedly, the United States has urged South Korea to develop advanced BMD capabilities that are more integrated with U.S. and allied BMD systems in the region.63 Seoul has announced its intention to develop its indigenous KAMD system instead, but—in a compromise that could enhance alliance capabilities and regional security—South Korean BMD systems will be interoperable with U.S. systems.64 It appears that this basic agreement will enable efficient bilateral BMD cooperation without infringing on South Korean sensitivities. For years, Seoul has been resistant to the concept of an integrated BMD system for several reasons: the desire, especially strong among progressive Koreans, for more strategic autonomy; a reluctance to irritate China, which has consistently voiced opposition to U.S. BMD deployments; and a disinclination to cooperate with Japan. A2 Diplomacy ImpactsA2: Diplomacy Ineffective(4 responses)1. Turn, Perry of the United States Institute for Peace explains that historically, negotiations have shown success in dealing with North Korea.2. Turn, now is an optimal time for negotiations. Armstrong of Columbia University explains that unlike the Middle East, the Korean problem is straightforward and not embedded in complex national and sectarian conflicts because of the immense amount of common interest among Northeast Asian countries to find a peaceful, long term solution to the current crisis.3. Turn, diplomacy is historically effective. Armstrong of Columbia University explains that the Agreed Framework on October 1994 halted North Korea’s plutonium processing for nine years.4. Turn, Armstrong of Columbia University 2016 explains that unlike the Middle East, the Korean problem is straightforward and not embedded in complex national and sectarian conflicts because of the immense amount of common interest among Northeast Asian countries to find a peaceful, long term solution to the current crisis.5. Turn, diplomacy is historically effective. Armstrong of Columbia University explains that the Agreed Framework on October 1994 halted North Korea’s plutonium processing for nine years.Cards:William J. Perry [Professor; Stanford University]. 2009. “America’s Strategic Posture The Final Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States.” United States Institute of Peace. // AAThe efforts to keep other nations from going nuclear are obviously multinational. The 6-party talks have had limited success to date in dealing with North Korea but may ultimately be successful. However, there is no similarly comprehensive diplomatic approach to Iran, which has constructed a major facility for enriching uraniumCharles K Armstrong, a Professor of Korean studies at Columbia university, Guardian, 1-7-2016, ["Diplomacy alone will defuse North Korea. The US must lead the way," , 7-26-2017] // AACompared to the Middle East, the Korean problem is relatively straightforward, not embedded in complex national and sectarian conflicts across a wide region. There is a great deal of common interest among the countries in Northeast Asia – including South Korea, Japan, China, Russia, and yes, North Korea – to find a peaceful, long-term solution to the current crisis. Charles K Armstrong, a Professor of Korean studies at Columbia university, Guardian, 1-7-2016, ["Diplomacy alone will defuse North Korea. The US must lead the way," , 7-26-2017] // AACritics will argue that agreements with North Korea have never worked in the past, but in fact the US-DPRK Agreed Framework of October 1994 halted North Korea’s plutonium processing for nine years.?Charles K Armstrong, a Professor of Korean studies at Columbia university, Guardian, 1-7-2016, ["Diplomacy alone will defuse North Korea. The US must lead the way," , 7-26-2017] // AACompared to the Middle East, the Korean problem is relatively straightforward, not embedded in complex national and sectarian conflicts across a wide region. There is a great deal of common interest among the countries in Northeast Asia – including South Korea, Japan, China, Russia, and yes, North Korea – to find a peaceful, long-term solution to the current crisis. Charles K Armstrong, a Professor of Korean studies at Columbia university, Guardian, 1-7-2016, ["Diplomacy alone will defuse North Korea. The US must lead the way," , 7-26-2017] // AACritics will argue that agreements with North Korea have never worked in the past, but in fact the US-DPRK Agreed Framework of October 1994 halted North Korea’s plutonium processing for nine years.?A2: Diplomacy Historically Fails(2 response)1. Delink, Su Ge of the China Institute of International Relations 2017, indicates that the framework of the Six-Party Talks, is the best solution to the North Korean nuclear issue. Even if you think that the probability of success is low, it’s the best chance we have.2. Turn, diplomacy is historically effective. Armstrong of Columbia University 2016 explains that the Agreed Framework on October 1994 halted North Korea’s plutonium processing for nine years.Cards:Fei su (Research Assistant with SIPRI’s China and Global Security Programme and is based in Beijing and a Graduate of Seoul National University), and Lora Saalman, (PhD in International Relations, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China; MA in International Policy Studies and Certificate in?Non-proliferation, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, CA; BA with Honors in Anthropology, University of Chicago; Director of and a Senior Researcher with SIPRI’s China and Global Security Programme), February 2017. “CHINA’S ENGAGEMENT OF NORTH KOREA: Challenges and Opportunities for Europe.” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. 's-engagement-North-Korea.pdf // AAIn February 2016, Wang Yi advocated a new approach to get the relevant parties back to the negotiating table. The essence of this proposal involves denuclearizing North Korea, while holding talks on a peace agreement between the US and North Korea. Wang Yi suggested setting minor goals at different stages of the negotiation, with this point receiving a positive response in China.51 Su Ge, director of the China Institute of International Relations, among other Chinese experts, has argued that this approach should be conducted under the framework of the Six-Party Talks, which he still considers the best solution to the North Korean nuclear issue.52Charles K Armstrong, a Professor of Korean studies at Columbia university, Guardian, 1-7-2016, ["Diplomacy alone will defuse North Korea. The US must lead the way," , 7-26-2017] // AACritics will argue that agreements with North Korea have never worked in the past, but in fact the US-DPRK Agreed Framework of October 1994 halted North Korea’s plutonium processing for nine years.?A2: Diplomacy Solves(7 responses)1. Turn, Moon’s desperation will inevitably lead to exploitation. Kim of the Associated Press reports on July 21st that South Korea is desperate for talks right now, while the north is going to exploit the South’s desperation because it has an incentive to maximize its nuclear ability to alter current political and security dynamics in the region.2. Mitigate Impact, Kim of the Business Insider reports on July 21st that ROK-North Korean talks wouldn’t produce any major breakthroughs because the South is unwilling to give up military drills with the U.S. or the conducting of major weapons tests. 3. Mitigate, Kim of the Business Insider writes on July 21st that North Korea has higher expectation for what it can get from president Moon. 4. Delink, Kim of the AP 2017 writes that South Korea may be overly cautious in approaching negotiations as it worries about possible weakening international pressure.5. Delink, Noland of the Council on Foreign Relations explains, despite the north agreeing to reopen talks, they were just attempting to buy time and signal to the world that they weren’t the bad guys. Despite, abruptly ending the negotiations after one day.6. Delink, Mansourov of Johns Hopkins University explains that the Kim family views its survival to be intimately linked to North Koreas nuclear weapons program. In fact, Kim Jong Un stated in 2013 that “Nuclear weapons guarantee peace, economic prosperity, and his people’s happy life.” Denuclearization isn’t an option. Diplomacy won’t work.7. Delink, Mansourov of Johns Hopkins University explains that it was the dying wish of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il that we should never give up the pursuit of nuclear weapons because doing so would be national treason and would dishonor his forbearers and their revolutionary inheritance.Cards:Hying-Jin Kim and Kim Tong-Hyung, Associated Press, Business Insider, 7-21-2017, ["North Korea has been silent after South Korea offered rare face-to-face talks — here's what that may mean," <span class="skimlinks-unlinked">;, 7-22-2017] // AAAnalyst Park Hyung-joong at Seoul's Korea Institute for National Unification is skeptical about the prospects of talks. "It's South Korea that is desperate for talks right now, not the North. Pyongyang's goal is to maximize its nuclear ability so that it could alter political and security dynamics in the region — it wants to create more tension, while the South wants to reduce it," Park said.Hying-Jin Kim and Kim Tong-Hyung, Associated Press, Business Insider, 7-21-2017, ["North Korea has been silent after South Korea offered rare face-to-face talks — here's what that may mean," <span class="skimlinks-unlinked">;, 7-22-2017] // AAIf held, the talks would likely start with rounds of working-level meetings between colonel-level officers. And if they continue, general-grade officers would later meet to try to work out steps to reduce tensions. But they won't likely produce any major breakthrough if North Korea sticks to its demand for the end of South Korea-U.S. drills or conducts major weapons tests. The outlook for family reunion talks is more pessimistic unless North Korea stops demanding the return of a dozen women who worked for a North Korean-run restaurant in China.Hying-Jin Kim and Kim Tong-Hyung, Associated Press, Business Insider, 7-21-2017, ["North Korea has been silent after South Korea offered rare face-to-face talks — here's what that may mean," <span class="skimlinks-unlinked">;, 7-22-2017] // AAThe prospects for Moon's efforts to improve ties with North Korea don't appear bright. The North has higher expectations for what it can get from Moon, the first liberal leader in South Korea in about 10 years, and an elevated assessment of its own status as a nuclear weapons state. Moon will also be cautious about reaching out, because there are worries that his overture might weaken international pressure on the North. The North's state media on Thursday described Moon's overall North Korea policy as "nonsense," noting that South Korea also supports U.S.-led efforts to strengthen sanctions against the North.Hying-Jin Kim and Kim Tong-Hyung, Associated Press, Business Insider, 7-21-2017, ["North Korea has been silent after South Korea offered rare face-to-face talks — here's what that may mean," <span class="skimlinks-unlinked">;, 7-22-2017] // AAThe prospects for Moon's efforts to improve ties with North Korea don't appear bright. The North has higher expectations for what it can get from Moon, the first liberal leader in South Korea in about 10 years, and an elevated assessment of its own status as a nuclear weapons state. Moon will also be cautious about reaching out, because there are worries that his overture might weaken international pressure on the North. The North's state media on Thursday described Moon's overall North Korea policy as "nonsense," noting that South Korea also supports U.S.-led efforts to strengthen sanctions against the North.Marcus Noland, Council on Foreign Relations, 8-14-2013, ["Are North and South Korea Back in Business?," , 7-23-2017] // AAThe North Koreans said in June they were open to talks to reopen the complex, but when the South Koreans reached the meeting in July, the North Koreans behaved obstreperously, and the meetings closed after one day with nothing accomplished. There was a lot of discussion at the time whether the South Koreans were blowing this up out of a fit of diplomatic pique, but in retrospect, the more plausible explanation is that the North Koreans felt compelled to show they were doing something positive before President Obama and Chinese president Xi Jinping met in California—so when Obama and Xi walked into that meeting together on June 7, the last news they had heard from the Korean peninsula was that the North Koreans were behaving more responsibly.Alexandre. Mansourov, Ph.D. Columbia University; B.A. Moscow State Institute of International Relations; Advanced Diploma, Kim Il Sung National University (DPRK); Professor at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, "Kim Jong Un’s Nuclear Doctrine and Strategy: What Everyone Needs to Know", NAPSNet Special Reports, December 16, 2014, // AAThe principal purpose of the DPRK’s nuclear weapons program is?to ensure the favorable environment for regime survival and national development?by deterring external threats against the country’s sovereignty and leadership and by freeing internal resources for economic growth and individual consumption. The survival of the ruling Kim family is intimately linked to the nuclear weapons development program because nuclear arms help legitimize Kim Jong Un’s hereditary rule, keep his foreign foes at bay, and allow the DPRK government to prop up the civilian economy with the additional resources previously spent on conventional military arms. On March 31, 2013, Kim Jong Un said, “Nuclear weapons guarantee peace, economic prosperity, and people’s happy life.” HYPERLINK "" \l "_edn4" [4]Alexandre. Mansourov, Ph.D. Columbia University; B.A. Moscow State Institute of International Relations; Advanced Diploma, Kim Il Sung National University (DPRK); Professor at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, "Kim Jong Un’s Nuclear Doctrine and Strategy: What Everyone Needs to Know", NAPSNet Special Reports, December 16, 2014, // AAInternal political and economic considerations obviously play an important role in providing the domestic rationale for continued development of nuclear weapons. As Kim Jong Un said on a number of occasions, it was the dying wish and eternal legacy of both Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il,[18][19]?and he would never give it up because it would be tantamount to national treason, the repudiation of his forebearers and their revolutionary inheritance. In addition, Kim asserted that the development of nuclear weapons should help DPRK avoid the costly arms race, reduce military spending and foster economic development.[20]A2: Diplomacy Solves Short Term(1 response)1. Delink, Su of Seoul National University 2017 explains that at best, even if North Korea were to return to the negotiating table it would take decades to achieve denuclearization.Cards:Fei su (Research Assistant with SIPRI’s China and Global Security Programme and is based in Beijing and a Graduate of Seoul National University), and Lora Saalman, (PhD in International Relations, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China; MA in International Policy Studies and Certificate in?Non-proliferation, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, CA; BA with Honors in Anthropology, University of Chicago; Director of and a Senior Researcher with SIPRI’s China and Global Security Programme), February 2017. “CHINA’S ENGAGEMENT OF NORTH KOREA: Challenges and Opportunities for Europe.” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. 's-engagement-North-Korea.pdf // AAIn terms of negotiations, an overwhelming majority of Chinese experts emphasize that multilateral talks are the best means of achieving denuclearization. Despite this fact, many of the Chinese experts interviewed admitted that the chances of convincing North Korea to surrender its nuclear weapons are minute.49 Further, they argued that even if North Korea were to return to the negotiation table and agree to denuclearization, it would take decades to achieve this goal. Instead, many Chinese analysts have returned to discussing the potential for a nuclear freeze or interim steps, rather than analysing the potential for complete denuclearization.50A2: Diplomacy Historically Successful(3 responses)1. Delink, Perry of Stanford University 2017 explains that we can’t look to the past to predict how negotiations would pan out in the status quo because it is easier for leaders to forgo weapons they do not yet have than ones they do.2. Delink, Kim is different. Garlauskas, the North Korea officer for the Director of National Intelligence explains that Kim Jong Un has diverged from the policies of his predecessors and is unwilling to make any concessions on the North Korean nuclear program.3. Delink, Mazza of the American Enterprise Institute explains in 2017 that Pyongyang sees obtaining nuclear weapons as an indispensable instrument for achieving their historical ambition. Thus, Kim Jong Un cannot give up his nukes without threatening the legitimacy of his rule. Cards:William J. Perry, the former secretary of defense under the Clinton administration; a senior fellow of the Hoover Institution, is the Michael and Barbara Barbarian Professor at Stanford University, with a joint appointment at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and the School of Engineering, [Diplomacy,?Not Doomsday, DOA: 24 July 2017] Hoover Digest, Spring 2017 // AAThe regime has demonstrated—over and over again—that it is willing to sacrifice its economy to ensure that the dynasty is preserved. During negotiations in 1999 and 2000, we found a way to achieve all three of their goals without nuclear weapons. I believe that the North Korean government was ready to accept out proposal (it is easier for leaders to forgo weapons they do not yet have), but we can never be certain of that—nor that Pyongyang in fact would have compiled with an agreement—because the Georgie W. Bush administration cut off the talks in 2001.Colin Clark (Editor; BA from Drew University), Breaking Defense, 7-27-2017, ["North Korea Won’t Give Nukes Up ‘At Any Price:’ Top Korea Intel Officer," , 7-28-2017] // AAMarkus Garlauskas, the North Korea officer for the Director of National Intelligence, told the Strategic Command’s annual deterrence conference that the tubby young leader has diverged from the policies of his predecessors. They were willing to make concessions on their nuclear program — without ever giving it up — in exchange for economic concessions from the international community.Michael Mazza (research fellow in foreign and defense policy studies at the American Enterprise Institute), Inside Asia, Forbes, 7-4-2017, ["Neither Negotiation Nor Nuclear Strike: How The U.S. Can Disable The North Korean Threat," , 8-10-2017] // AAThe administration made an early error in concluding that Kim Jong Un could be coaxed or coerced into giving up his nuclear weapons. He cannot. My AEI colleague Nicholas Eberstad?explains?why: "In Pyongyang’s thinking, the indispensable instrument for achieving the DPRK’s grand historical ambitions must be a supremely powerful military: more specifically, one possessed of a nuclear arsenal that can imperil and break the foreign enemies who protect and prop up the vile puppet state in the south, so that the DPRK can consummate its unconditional unification and give birth to its envisioned earthly Korean-race utopia." Put simply, Kim can’t give up his nukes without threatening the very legitimacy -- such as it is -- of his rule. The only way to divorce North Korea of its nuclear weapons is to divorce it of it of its ruler.A2: Start Negotiations(3 responses)1. Turn, Push China away. Yonhap News 2017 reports that China has taken 43 economic, political, and cultural retaliatory actions against South Korea. This is important because is the materialization of Chinese isolation which is detrimental to negotiations because if China is unwilling to cooperate with South Korean and the United States, there won’t be any negotiations. Because China is the only country with enough influence over North Korea to have a chance of success.2. Turn, Lee of the Center for East West Studies explains that the deployment of THAAD would be devastating for the Korea’s who would then be at a high risk for never recovering the positive potential for their relationship. He furthers, that the deployment of missile defense will push relations over the brink.3. Turn, Daniels of Cal St. 17 explains that China has called of plans for top level talks with South Korea because of its outrage at the THAAD missile deployment. This is a clear example of deploying missile defense hindering diplomacy.Yonhap News. February 2017. “China takes 43 retaliatory actions over S. Korea's THAAD deployment plan.” YonHap News. // AASEOUL, Feb. 3 (Yonhap) -- China has taken a total of 43 retaliatory actions against the South Korean entertainment sector and trade goods in reprisal for Seoul's plan to deploy the U.S.-made Terminal-High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, a national think tank said Friday. The number was tallied by the state-run Korea Institute for National Unification for the seven-month period following South Korea and the U.S.' official announcement on July 8 to deploy the defense system by the end of 2017. Of the total retaliatory actions taken last year, 23 cases involved cultural areas, followed by economic transactions totaling 15 cases. The remaining 5 cases pertained to diplomatic, political and military matters between the two countries. Beijing's retaliation is spilling over into more sectors and Turning more aggressive, the institute said. "There's a high likelihood of Chinese boycott of South Korea goods or protest rallies against South Korea, caused by nationalist sentiment in China." China has relentlessly protested that the THAAD deployment would undermine its security interest in the region despite Seoul and Washington's assurances that the deployment is only intended to guard against North Korea's ballistic missile threats. In apparent retaliation, China has banned South Korean entertainers from performing in China and applied prohibitively stricter import standards on popular South Korean trade goods including cosmetics and batteries for electric cars. Ahead of the Chinese New Year holiday season last month, China banned chartered flight service linking the two countries, affecting South Korea's tourism industry.Lee, Kim Min Tayler' (2016) "THAAD: Missile defense or diplomatic challenge?," Culture Mandala: The Bulletin of the Centre for East West Cultural and Economic Studies: Vol. 12 : Iss. 1, Article 5. Available at: is also important to highlight how this would impact the unification of the two Koreas. It has commonly been argued that unification would result in a Unified Korea becoming a huge military power, and although there would be an economic burden to the South, associated with unification at the initial stage. However, Rolf Mafael, Germany’s Ambassador to South Korea noted the economic potential of a reunified Korea: a market of more than 75 million people and complementary economic factors, which will clearly exceed the initial costs (Dominguez, 2014). So by deploying the THAAD now, the two Koreas will be at high risk of never recovering the positive potential of their relationship. This would be devastating for Koreans as they would miss out on the significant benefits arising from unification.Jeff Daniels (California State University), CNBC, 6-29-2017, ["China talks with South Korea, Japan a no-go due to THAAD controversy," , 7-21-2017] // AAChina has called off plans for top-level talks with South Korea and Japan, according to reports. The trilateral summit was expected to take place in late July. Beijing notified Tokyo that that time won't work, although the controversy over the U.S.-supplied THAAD missile shield system appears to be the main reason, according to Japan's Asahi Shimbun. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe had been expected to host the summit. China has put economic pressure on Seoul to abandon the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system, designed to defeat nuclear-armed North Korean missiles. The Chinese are concerned THAAD's powerful radar gives the U.S. and South Korea the ability to peer deep inside China to monitor military activities. The last time the leaders of China, South Korea and Japan met for three-way talks was in 2012. There's a chance the meeting could be rescheduled for early 2018. The talks would have marked an opportunity for newly elected South Korean President Moon Jae-in to meet face to face with Chinese Premier Li Keqiang and begin repairing fractured ties with China, its largest trading partner. Moon is currently in Washington for talks with President Donald Trump to discuss North Korea, THAAD and U.S.-South Korea trade issues. A2: Bargaining Chip(3 responses)1. Non-Unique, The United States has 30,000 troops stationed in North Korea and failed to use it as leverage against the North. Make my opponents tell you why the presence of missile defense will be any different.2. Delink, Fish of Foreign Policy explains that using missile defense as a bargaining chip was never going to work because if U.S. strategists saw THAAD as a bargaining tactic, China’s government nullified its value by publicly declaring that THAAD deployment was unacceptable for China’s security, leaving no room to back down. Meanwhile, the U.S. government couldn’t back down without being seen to be rewarding North Korean behavior.3. Terminal Defense, Fontaine of Johns Hopkins University writes on July 7th that negotiations won’t work with North Korea because North Korean representatives fear turning up like Gaddhafi and Hussein, both of whom gave up nuclear programs which ultimately resulted in their deaths.Cards:Isac Stone Fish [Editor; Foreign Policy], Graham Webster [The China Center at Yale Law School], Sheila Smith [Fellow for Japan studies at the Council on Foreign Relations], Sheena Greitens [Center for East Asian Policy]. March 2017. “Is THAAD the Start of a U.S.-China Arms Race?” China File. // AAIn addition to its military dimensions, THAAD deployment had become in part a bargaining chip. The threat (and now actuality) of deployment could be seen as a tool for the U.S. government to pressure Chinese counterparts to take more extreme measures against North Korea. If Chinese officials could somehow coax or coerce Kim Jong-un’s government to become less threatening, the argument goes, the U.S. justification for THAAD would fall away and deployment would be unnecessary. This kind of dealing was never going to work. If U.S. strategists saw THAAD as a bargaining tactic, China’s government effectively nullified it by repeatedly and publicly declaring that THAAD deployment was unacceptable for China’s security, leaving no room to back down. Meanwhile, the U.S. government couldn’t back down without being seen to be rewarding North Korean behavior, making eventual deployment a near certainty unless South Korea disagreed.Richard Fontaine, War on the Rocks, 7-July-2017, ["Time to Lose Your Illusions on North Korea," , 7-21-2017] // AAMany in Washington still seem to believe that a longstanding U.S. desideratum – North Korea’s full denuclearization, to which we can now add the elimination of its long-range missile capability – is attainable with the right mix of sticks and carrots. This belief rests on a misreading of the North’s longstanding pattern of behavior and its repeatedly stated intentions. Confident of its ability to put down any domestic uprising through brutal force, Pyongyang fears only the intervention of outside actors. Threatening a nuclear response to any American or South Korean attempt to capitalize on domestic instability represents its irreducible security imperative. North Korean representatives have reportedly cited, in Track II dialogues, the fates of Muammar Gaddhafi and Saddam Hussein – each of whom abandoned weapons of mass destruction programs and met less-than-desirable ends. The Kim regime thus considers nuclear weapons its fundamental security guarantee and will not be induced into trading them away. Nor will it give them up in response to economic pressure or military shows of resolve. While the public objective of U.S. policy will and should be full de-nuclearization, policymakers should privately acknowledge that the realistic goal is a freeze in North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs and, more ambitiously, some rollback of them.A2: Incentivized Chinese Sanctions(1 response)1. Delink, Su of Seoul National University 2017 indicates that China’s implementation and enforcement of sanctions against North Korea are based on its own national interests and its obligations as a UN member state, not a tradeoff with the USCards:Fei Su (Research Assistant with SIPRI’s China and Global Security Programme and is based in Beijing and a Graduate of Seoul National University), and Lora Saalman, (PhD in International Relations, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China; MA in International Policy Studies and Certificate in?Non-proliferation, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, CA; BA with Honors in Anthropology, University of Chicago; Director of and a Senior Researcher with SIPRI’s China and Global Security Programme), February 2017. “CHINA’S ENGAGEMENT OF NORTH KOREA: Challenges and Opportunities for Europe.” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. 's-engagement-North-Korea.pdf // AAOverall, a July 2016 opinion piece by Liang Lichang, a professor at Huaibei Normal University, could be deemed representative of a prevailing view among Chinese experts.38 He stresses three main points. First, China’s implementation of sanctions on North Korea is based on China’s own national interest and its obligation as a UN member state. It is not a trade-off with the US Government. Second, regardless of the changing circumstances in East Asia, it is important for China to maintain a degree of independence on the North Korea issue to achieve effective sanctions enforcement. Third, THAAD deployment should not be linked with China’s North Korea policy. Nonetheless, Liang stresses that China should take a clear stance in opposition to THAAD deployment, including substantive measures in response to South Korea’s decision.A2: Halt Incentivized Chinese Sanctions(1 response)1. Delink, Su of Seoul National University 2017 indicates that China’s implementation and enforcement of sanctions against North Korea are based on its own national interests and its obligations as a UN member state, not a tradeoff with the USCards:Fei su (Research Assistant with SIPRI’s China and Global Security Programme and is based in Beijing and a Graduate of Seoul National University), and Lora Saalman, (PhD in International Relations, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China; MA in International Policy Studies and Certificate in?Non-proliferation, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, CA; BA with Honors in Anthropology, University of Chicago; Director of and a Senior Researcher with SIPRI’s China and Global Security Programme), February 2017. “CHINA’S ENGAGEMENT OF NORTH KOREA: Challenges and Opportunities for Europe.” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. 's-engagement-North-Korea.pdf // AAOverall, a July 2016 opinion piece by Liang Lichang, a professor at Huaibei Normal University, could be deemed representative of a prevailing view among Chinese experts.38 He stresses three main points. First, China’s implementation of sanctions on North Korea is based on China’s own national interest and its obligation as a UN member state. It is not a trade-off with the US Government. Second, regardless of the changing circumstances in East Asia, it is important for China to maintain a degree of independence on the North Korea issue to achieve effective sanctions enforcement. Third, THAAD deployment should not be linked with China’s North Korea policy. Nonetheless, Liang stresses that China should take a clear stance in opposition to THAAD deployment, including substantive measures in response to South Korea’s decision.A2: Give SK Leverage(1 response)1. Delink, it doesn’t matter if South Korea gains leverage at the negotiating table because Mansourov of John Hopkins University 14 explains that it was Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il that North Korea obtain and maintain its nuclear arsenal. Thus, North Korea will not give up its nuclear program no matter how much leverage the South obtains. Cards:Alexandre. Mansourov, Ph.D. Columbia University; B.A. Moscow State Institute of International Relations; Advanced Diploma, Kim Il Sung National University (DPRK); Professor at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, "Kim Jong Un’s Nuclear Doctrine and Strategy: What Everyone Needs to Know", NAPSNet Special Reports, December 16, 2014, // AAInternal political and economic considerations obviously play an important role in providing the domestic rationale for continued development of nuclear weapons. As Kim Jong Un said on a number of occasions, it was the dying wish and eternal legacy of both Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il, HYPERLINK "" \l "_edn18" [18] HYPERLINK "" \l "_edn19" [19]?and he would never give it up because it would be tantamount to national treason, the repudiation of his forebearers and their revolutionary inheritance. In addition, Kim asserted that the development of nuclear weapons should help DPRK avoid the costly arms race, reduce military spending and foster economic development. HYPERLINK "" \l "_edn20" [20]A2: Take away NK Leverage(2 responses)1. Delink, if North Korea threatened to launch a nuke in either world South korea wouldn’t take its chances because the leverage that exists from nuclear weapons doesn’t go away with missile defense.2. Mitigate, even if you but that missile defense reduces North Korean leverage, the deployment of missile defense merely incentivizes the North to innovate and upgrade their weapons to bypass missile defense systems so they can regain their leverage. This solution isn’t long term.A2: China Key(4 responses)1. Mitigate, Su of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 2017 explains in 2017 that many Chinese experts admit that the Chances of convincing North Korea to surrender is nuclear weapons are minute2. Delink, China is not key to sanctions enforcement – Bernt Berger at the Institute for Security and Development Policy finds in 2015 that the North Korean execution of a key figure in Chinese-North Korean relations represents China’s weak influence in North Korea.3. Delink, Fontaine of New American Security 17 explains that China isn’t willing to apply the severe pressure required to compel North Korea to denuclearize because such pressure would destabilize the Kim regime risking collapse. 4. Delink, Saalman of UChicago 2017 explains that even Chinese experts emphasize that multilateral talks present the best chance at achieving North Korean denuclearization. Cards:Fei Su (Research Assistant with SIPRI’s China and Global Security Programme and is based in Beijing and a Graduate of Seoul National University), and Lora Saalman, (PhD in International Relations, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China; MA in International Policy Studies and Certificate in?Non-proliferation, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, CA; BA with Honors in Anthropology, University of Chicago; Director of and a Senior Researcher with SIPRI’s China and Global Security Programme), February 2017. “CHINA’S ENGAGEMENT OF NORTH KOREA: Challenges and Opportunities for Europe.” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. 's-engagement-North-Korea.pdf // AAIn terms of negotiations, an overwhelming majority of Chinese experts emphasize that multilateral talks are the best means of achieving denuclearization. Despite this fact, many of the Chinese experts interviewed admitted that the chances of convincing North Korea to surrender its nuclear weapons are minute.49 Further, they argued that even if North Korea were to return to the negotiation table and agree to denuclearization, it would take decades to achieve this goal. Instead, many Chinese analysts have returned to discussing the potential for a nuclear freeze or interim steps, rather than analysing the potential for complete denuclearization.50Berger 15 (Bernt, Head of the Asia Programme and Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Security and Development Policy, July 2015, “Sanctions against North Korea: A tricky Dilemma”, European Union Institute for Security Studies, ) //BS 6-24-2017As a neighbouring country, China has a special interest in developments on the Korean peninsula. Its primary aims are centred on maintaining stability and the denuclearisation of the whole peninsula. Although China has often been accused of not sufficiently using its leverage over Pyongyang, Beijing has clearly stated its objectives and even initiated the 6PT. Yet recent internal developments – such as the execution of Jang Sung Taek, who used to be a key figure in China-DPRK relations – demonstrate the increasing limits of Beijing’s influence inside the country.Richard Fontaine [Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies is a division of Johns Hopkins University], War on the Rocks, July 7, 2017, ["Time to Lose Your Illusions on North Korea," , 7-21-2017] // AAChina simply will not apply the kind of severe economic pressure to North Korea that might compel significant de-nuclearization or the dismantling of its missile programs. Such pressure would threaten to destabilize the Kim regime, and Beijing knows as well as anyone that the peninsula, if ever reunified, will only do so under Seoul’s auspices. Losing its buffer state and risking American troops stationed just across its border is an obvious Chinese red line. Indeed, China poured its own troops across the Yalu River the last time U.S. forces approached.Fei Su (Research Assistant with SIPRI’s China and Global Security Programme and is based in Beijing and a Graduate of Seoul National University), and Lora Saalman, (PhD in International Relations, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China; MA in International Policy Studies and Certificate in?Non-proliferation, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, CA; BA with Honors in Anthropology, University of Chicago; Director of and a Senior Researcher with SIPRI’s China and Global Security Programme), February 2017. “CHINA’S ENGAGEMENT OF NORTH KOREA: Challenges and Opportunities for Europe.” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. 's-engagement-North-Korea.pdf // AAIn terms of negotiations, an overwhelming majority of Chinese experts emphasize that multilateral talks are the best means of achieving denuclearization. Despite this fact, many of the Chinese experts interviewed admitted that the chances of convincing North Korea to surrender its nuclear weapons are minute.49 Further, they argued that even if North Korea were to return to the negotiation table and agree to denuclearization, it would take decades to achieve this goal. Instead, many Chinese analysts have returned to discussing the potential for a nuclear freeze or interim steps, rather than analysing the potential for complete denuclearization.50A2: China Like THAAD(1 response)1. Delink, our evidence post-dates. Yonhap News explains on July 28th that China recently renewed its opposition to US missile defense in South Korea, further demanding Seoul withdrawal any new missile defense.Cards:Yonhap News Agency, July-28-2017, ["China repeats objection to THAAD deployment in S. Korea," , 7-28-2017] // AABEIJING, July 28 (Yonhap) -- China renewed its opposition on Friday to South Korea's move to install a U.S. missile defense system on its soil, demanding Seoul withdraw the push it sees could hurt its strategic security interest. Chinese Foreign Minister spokesman Lu Kang voiced the objection during a regular press briefing in response to a question seeking comments on South Korea's earlier decision to conduct an environmental impact assessment on the THAAD system. He said that China's stance on the THAAD issue is consistent and clear, calling on South Korea and the U.S. to stop the ongoing deployment of the weapon immediately. Seoul and Washington announced in July last year to install a THAAD battery to better counter the growing missile threat from North Korea. China has objected to its installation, saying that the missile defense system and, in particular, its strong radar system could undercut its military capabilities.A2: Sanctions Effective(1 response)1. Delink, Metzl of the Atlantic Council 17 explains that North Korea has proved it is willing to let hundreds of thousands of its people starve to death rendering economic sanctions useless.Cards:Jamie Metzl (Jamie Metzl, a Senior Fellow of the Atlantic Council, has served as a director on the U.S. National Security Council, at the State Department and on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff. He also served with the United Nations in Cambodia and is author of "Eternal Sonata" and three other books. The views expressed in this commentary are his own), CNN, 8-9-2017, ["12 things Trump should know about North Korea," , 8-10-2017] // AA4.?Although the sanctions on North Korea?announced Saturday build on previous rounds of sanctions, they will almost certainly not convince North Korea to change course in any meaningful way. The sanctions may well pinch, but North Korea's brutal leaders have shown that they are willing to let hundreds of thousands of their citizens starve to death rather than make strategic concessions.A2: China historically fails(1 response)1. Delink, the US-China Security Commission 2017 explains, despite Beijing always advocating for denuclearization, it has historically been the least important among its priorities for the Korean peninsula. If we can change China’s priorities, they can get it done.Cards:U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. “SECTION 4: CHINA AND NORTH KOREA.” United States Government Publishing Office. 2017. // AABeijing’s North Korea policy has always included advocating for denuclearization, but historically it has been least important among its three longstanding policy priorities of ‘‘no war, no instability, no nukes.’’ * 93 Beijing has increasingly emphasized denuclearization as North Korean provocations have become more frequent in recent years, possibly signaling that China seeks a larger role in realizing a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. High-level Chinese officials in meetings with their U.S. counterparts and Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs statements increasingly stress denuclearization over stability.94 According to one Chinese analyst, China’s prioritization of denuclearization was one of the main drivers compelling it to agree to a more stringent UN resolution in the aftermath of the January 2016 nuclear test.95 Nonetheless, as Renmin University professor Shi Yinhong asserts, ‘‘Beijing . . . [believes] that China must prevent the denuclearization process and its own role within it from seriously and lastingly damaging China-North Korea relations by becoming too alienated from the Pyongyang regime.’’ 96A2: China afraid of Unification (US Troops)(1 response)1. Delink, Rosenblum of Politico 2017 explains that the United States is willing to remove troops from a unified Korean peninsula in exchange for China proactively leading a transition to a unified Korea.Cards:Todd Rosenblum (a delegate to the U.S.-China-South Korea-North Korea Four Party Peace Talks in the 1990s. He was a senior official at the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security for the Obama administration from 2009 to 2015. He is a nonresident fellow at The Atlantic Council and serves on the Defense Science Board Task Force on Homeland Defense), Agenda, 7-18-2017, ["How to persuade China to abandon North Korea," , 7-23-2017] // AAIt’s a frightening possibility, one that Trump and other top U.S. policymakers must do everything to avoid. But if we really want to block the North’s nuclear program without another Korean War, it requires us to think carefully about what could actually persuade China to cut off its support for the North Korean regime. And that leads us to a previously unthinkable idea: giving real consideration to removing all American troops from a unified peninsula in exchange for China proactively leading the transition to a unified Korea. Though it has been unthinkable for years—and still may be—such a deal would also create a kind of leverage that nothing else has.A2: Chinese Pressure NK(1 response)1. Delink, Rosenblum of Politico writes on July 18th that despite small steps taken by China to rein in North Korea, it will not waver from its view that a unified Western oriented Korea would be far more threatening to its core national security interests than anything North Korea could or would do. This is because China thinks a unified Korea would mean the US military would end up on its border.Cards:Todd Rosenblum (a delegate to the U.S.-China-South Korea-North Korea Four Party Peace Talks in the 1990s. He was a senior official at the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security for the Obama administration from 2009 to 2015. He is a nonresident fellow at The Atlantic Council and serves on the Defense Science Board Task Force on Homeland Defense), Agenda, 7-18-2017, ["How to persuade China to abandon North Korea," , 7-23-2017] // AAChina has taken a few steps toward reining in North Korea, such as cutting off coal exports earlier this year. But it has not wavered in its view that a unified, Western-oriented peninsula would be far more threatening to its core national security interests than anything the North Korean state has done or will do. Unification, China believes, likely would end with the U.S. military on its border, an unacceptable risk. In turn, China has refused to take the necessary steps to really damage the North Korean regime, such as closing its border, blocking the flow of North Korean worker remittances, or enforcing a blockade against North Korean shipping.A2: China support Sanctions on NK(3 responses)1. Delink, Fontaine of New American Security 17 explains, even if Beijing embraces U.S. criticism of North Korea and UN Sanctions, it will leave the underlying political realities in China unchanged. Because they will always have a vested interest in having a belligerent North Korea between them and the western world.2. Delink, the US-China Security commissions 16 explains, when the North Korean economy runs into trouble, it’s the common people that suffer not the elites. Moreover, since the common people have no means to incite change politically, the North Korean elite will always peruse policies most conducive to their interests.3. Mitigate, the US-China Security Review 16 writes that the only China can make a difference on North Korea is to halt nearly all economic exchanges, expelling North Korean workers, and taking other measures which will provoke a grave economic crisis in North Korea. However, they further that such a hard blow is unlikely to be delivered by China because extreme pressure is more likely to bring about regime collapse than denuclearization, and regime collapse is not what Chinese leaders want to see.Cards:Richard Fontaine [Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies is a division of Johns Hopkins University], War on the Rocks, July 7, 2017, ["Time to Lose Your Illusions on North Korea," , 7-21-2017] // AATo its credit, the Trump administration seems to have finally abandoned the notion that Beijing will pressure Pyongyang into denuclearization. China’s trade with North Korea in the first quarter this year went up rather than down, and even its highly-touted suspension of coal imports proved less than meets the eye. Expect Beijing in coming days to embrace U.S. criticism of North Korea and possibly even formal responses, such as U.N. sanctions, that leave the underlying realities unchanged.U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. “SECTION 4: CHINA AND NORTH KOREA.” United States Government Publishing Office. 2017. // AAThese views speak to fundamental differences in how China and the United States perceive developments in North Korea, necessarily limiting bilateral cooperation. At the heart of this mismatch in priorities is the debate about China’s ‘‘leverage’’ over North Korea. U.S. officials and experts often refer to the leverage Beijing holds over Pyongyang by virtue of China’s role as North Korea’s primary source of economic and political support. They argue the North Korean ‘‘problem’’ can be solved if China uses its leverage to apply pressure on Pyongyang such that the regime will be forced to change its ways.167 Though this may be true, to do so would undermine Beijing’s ultimate goal: the maintenance of regime stability and the buffer state it perceives it needs between itself and the U.S.-allied South. Seoul-based scholar and long-time North Korea watcher Andrei Lankov explains China’s perceived quandary: From decades of experience China has learned that . . . when the North Korean economy runs into trouble, it is the common people, not the small hereditary elite, who pay the price. And since commoners have no way to influence the government, the North Korean elite is always willing to pursue those policies most conducive to their interests, even if such policies mean economic hardships and starvation of the population at large. . . . Hence, subtle pressures are not efficient in dealing with Pyongyang—and the Chinese know this very well. The only way to make a difference is to strike North Korea really hard, by dramatically reducing or halting nearly all economic exchanges, expelling North Korean workers, and taking other measures which will provoke a grave economic crisis in North Korea. Such a crisis might create a revolutionary situation, thus making the North Korean elite consider serious concessions on the nuclear and missile issues. However, such a hard blow is unlikely to ever be delivered by China. This is because extreme pressure is more likely to bring about regime collapse than denuclearization, and regime collapse is not what Chinese leaders want to see.168A2 AlliancesA2: Regional Stability(1 response)1. Turn, Kang of the International Area Studies Review 2015 explains that my opponents are only looking at the short term. However, he concludes that over the long term, deploying missile defense systems in the area will significantly alter the trajectory of China’s missile strategy by increasing dissatisfaction with the status quo. Thus, the long term deployment stability in East Asia will become increasingly fragile.Cards:Kyungkook Kang (Assistant Professor - University of Central Florida) & Jacek Kugler (Claremont Graduate University), International Area Studies Review, July 2015 [“Assessment of deterrence and missile defense in East Asia: A power transition perspective,” Research Gate, ] // AAThis paper explores the stability of deterrence in East Asia and the effects of missile defense on regional security. In particular, we evaluate the policy implications derived from the power transition perspective for the development of the US missile defense system in the Asia-Pacific region. Over the short term, we anticipate that the stability of deterrence in East Asia will be increased by the deployment of ballistic missile defenses that creates a power preponderance of satisfied challengers against potential regional challengers. The long-term horizon is, however, tenuous because the rapid expansion of US-led missile defense systems may significantly alter the trajectory of China’s missile strategy by increasing its dissatisfaction with the status quo. One fundamental implication is that, without further restrictions, long-term deployment stability in East Asia will become increasingly fragile. A2: Regional Cooperation(1 response)1. Turn the impact, realize that if the region united with the United States and South Korea against North Korea and its allies, China will perceive it as a massive expansion in an anti-China alliance spearheaded by the United States. This is problematic as when China is retrenched in its mindset that the world is out to get it, China will become more likely to outwardly retaliate.A2: Disarmament(1 response)1. Delink, Kang of the International Area Studies Review 2015 explains that for disarmament to work, universal regional compliance is required, because a single defection can disrupt a stable regional situation. That’s why regional disarmament hasn’t worked before, that’s why it won’t work now.Cards:Kyungkook Kang (Assistant Professor; University of Central Florida) & Jacek Kugler (Claremont Graduate University), International Area Studies Review, July 2015 [“Assessment of deterrence and missile defense in East Asia: A power transition perspective,” Research Gate, ] // AAFor disarmament to work, universal regional compliance is required, as even a single defection can disrupt a stable regional situation. This is the reason why – despite its optimistic internal logic – nuclear disarmament has not been adopted in the Middle East. Nations in the region are highly distrustful of each other, and the presence of a nuclear Israel drives its neighbors to acquire similar capabilities. Without a major change in their attitudes toward the regional status quo, all attempts to limit, delay, or forcefully prevent nuclear proliferation in this region are likely to fail. The sec- ond option to prevent nuclear war is deterrence. A2: Defense Cooperation(3 responses)1. Turn, Kenwich of UChicago 2015 explains that empirically, the formation of defensive alliances is positively associated with the initiation of militarized disputes and war. This because there is overconfidence that coincides with having the numbers. 2. Turn, an alliance will increase the likelihood of conflict initiation because Reif of St. Andrews University explains it will give the United States overconfidence which drastically increases the probability for war. In fact, after analyzing data over 186 years on the relationship between alliances and conflict, Brett Benson of Vanderbilt University quantifies there is a 249% increase in the probability of conflict.*Don’t read with other two3. Non-unique, Warden of the Asian Institute for Policy Studies explains that the Obama administration has already consulted with its allies on missile defense to promote military cooperation. Their impacts should have already materialized.Cards:Michael R. Kenwick (Pennsylvania State University), John A. Vasquez (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign), Matthew A. Powers (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign). 2015. “Do Alliances Really Deter?” University of Chicago Journal of Politics. // AAThe scholarly literature is still divided on the relationship between defensive alliances and interstate conflict. While some scholars argue that defensive alliances can deter conflict, others posit that alliances accelerate its approach. This article seeks to make headway in the debate by using a research design that examines whether the recent formation of defensive alliances leads to increases or reductions in militarized disputes and war. We find that this relationship differs in the pre and post-nuclear era. In the prenuclear era, alliance formation is positively associated with both the initiation of militarized disputes and war onset. In the nuclear era, however, forming certain types of alliances reduces the likelihood of militarized dispute initiation, but has no effect on whether war occurs. This suggests assertions that defensive alliances will consistently deter conflict should be tempered and that alliance formation can sometimes undermine efforts to preserve peace.Brett V. Benson [Vanderbilt University]. ?Unpacking Alliances: Deterrent and Compellent Alliances and Their Relationship with Conflict, 1816—2000.” University of Chicago Journal of Politics. // AADo alliances deter aggression? I develop a typology of deterrent and compellent military alliances to better define the possible conditions for intervention and use new data from 1816 to 2000 to analyze the relationship between alliances and conflict. First, unconditional compellent alliances, a category that represents a minority of alliances, are associated with a 249% increase in the likelihood of conflict when the prospective initiator is an alliance member. Such alliances are especially associated with violent conflict. Second, conditional compellent alliances exhibit no discernible relationship with conflict. Third, deterrent alliances contingent upon the adversary’s attack are associated with an 18% decrease in the likelihood a third party will initiate a conflict with an alliance member. Minor powers holding such alliances with major powers are unlikely to be attacked violently. Fourth, other categories of deterrent alliances do not deter violent conflict. In fact, deterrent alliances that permit preemptive defense can increase violent conflict.John Warden, Center for Strategic and International Studies, July-19-2011, ["[Full Summary] PL2-1: Crisis Management on the Korean Peninsula," , Asian Institute for Policy Studies, 7-22-2017] // AASecond, the United States, according to Samore, is committed to working with its allies and partners in East Asia to address nuclear and missile issues and will require their involvement if progress is to be made. The Obama administration has gone out of its way to consult with allies and to strengthen not only diplomatic leverage, but also military cooperation, such as missile defense co-development with Japan and military exercises with South Korea. The United States recognizes that it must also work with China and Russia. Though each country has slightly different interests, they share an interest in stability, conflict avoidance, and denuclearization of the peninsula. In addition, Samore argued, the broader community must cooperate to implement United Nations Security Council sanctions as North Korea tries to sell military commodities. Working together is essential, as demonstrated by the recent success of turning back the MV Light, which was likely carrying prohibited materials.A2: Strengthen US-ROK(2 responses)1. Non-unique, realize that right now the US-ROK alliance is already strong as the United States provides for national security and literally created their political institutions. Thus, any further improvements in the US ROK alliance would only yield marginal returns.2. Non-unique, the relationship will strengthen in either world as Obama’s 2011 Pivot to Asia was predicated on strengthening regional relationships, South Korea included.A2: China not Threatened(1 response)1. Turn, the US-China Security Commission explains that China views THAAD as a significant security risk for two reasons. First, it would expand U.S. radar coverage further into Chinese territory. Secondly, THAAD’s interoperability with other missile defense systems in Northeast Asia, concerns Beijing about expanding U.S.-allied missile defense radar network in the region and signifying broader strategic cooperation between the United States, South Korea, and Japan.Cards:U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. “SECTION 4: CHINA AND NORTH KOREA.” United States Government Publishing Office. 2017. // AAChina views THAAD as a significant security risk, as it would expand U.S. radar coverage well into Chinese territory and could be used by the United States and its allies in a contingency involving China.67 Moreover, given THAAD’s interoperability with other missile defense systems in Northeast Asia, Beijing is concerned about the expanding U.S.-allied missile defense radar network in the region and closer intelligence sharing and broader strategic cooperation between the United States, South Korea, and Japan.68 Beijing has dismissed repeated U.S. reassurances that THAAD would only be used to defend against the North Korean threat and would not be directed in any way at China.69 U.S. Army Chief of Staff Mark Milley visited Beijing in August 2016 to provide a technical briefing on the system to People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Army General Li Zuocheng, in an effort to reassure Beijing that its planned deployment will not threaten China.70A2: Coal Ban(1 response)1. Delink, Fontaine of New American Security 17 explains that in the first quarter of this year, trade ticked up rather than down and the suspension of coal imports isn’t being strictly followed.Cards:Richard Fontaine [Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies is a division of Johns Hopkins University], War on the Rocks, July 7, 2017, ["Time to Lose Your Illusions on North Korea," , 7-21-2017] // AATo its credit, the Trump administration seems to have finally abandoned the notion that Beijing will pressure Pyongyang into denuclearization. China’s trade with North Korea in the first quarter this year went up rather than down, and even its highly-touted suspension of coal imports proved less than meets the eye. Expect Beijing in coming days to embrace U.S. criticism of North Korea and possibly even formal responses, such as U.N. sanctions, that leave the underlying realities unchanged.A2: Harm China Relations(4 responses)1. Delink, Jiyong of the Center for Korean Studies explains in 2017 that China has become less vocal about THAAD which led to the conclusion that China’s stance has changed. He furthers that Beijing has become normalized to the presence of THAAD and no longer will feel pressure to take countermeasures.2. Turn, Kim of the East Asia Peace Research Association 2016 indicates that THAAD will only cause a short-term blow in relations and will foster deeper long term relations between the two countries because it can be a stepping stone for a discourse regarding Chinese involvement on the Korean peninsula.3. Delink, Chen of the Global Public Policy Institute 2016 explains that in the status quo, China is pursuing a closer relationship with South Korea because of its disappointment with North Korea who is not hurting Chinas national interests.4. Turn, Chen of the Global Policy Institute impacts that the China-South Korea relationship is increasable important and can replace the China-North Korea alliance. Increased cooperation between China and South Korea means less conflict, more economic engagement, and an easy place for you to affirm.Cards:Zheng Jiyong (director of the Center for Korean Studies at Fudan University). April 2017. “China remains opposed to South Korea’s THAAD deployment.” Global Times. // AATherefore, some South Korean scholar and media believe China has become less vocal about THAAD, which led to the impression that China's stance has changed. Some South Korean media even amplified the voices of a few Chinese scholars who oppose the retaliation against THAAD. A number of Chinese media outlets also promoted such ideas.Zheng Jiyong, 2017/4/12, Global Times, “China remains opposed to South Korea’s THAAD deployment”, In China, a few scholars have objected to economic retaliation against South Korea. This is normal as there has never been just one voice in China's opinion sphere. However, the South Korean people have all agreed to counter China's "economic retaliation." One especially worrying sentiment is that Beijing-Seoul relations have entered the post-THAAD era, as the deployment of THAAD has become a reality, there is no need for China to take countermeasures.Kim 7/12/16 (Kim Sang Soon – President of the East Asia Peace Research Association – “Can THAAD unite China and South Korea on peninsula strategy?” – 7/12/16 - )/TKThe author, for his part, intends to focus critical attention on the question: “What kind of direction will the North Korea-China relationship take due to the installation of THAAD?” This is preferable to fixating on THAAD’s ramifications for South Korea-Sino ties.? The South Korea-China relationship has been fantastically successful in terms of social exchanges and economic activity over the past 20 years. With regards to political diplomacy, the personal trust built up between South Korean President Park Geun Hye and Chinese President Xi Jinping has raised the trust level between the two countries in general. Therefore, the installation of THAAD will inflict a short term bruise on the relationship, but in the medium to long term, the possibility that this will evolve into a larger conflict is remote.? This author sees the South Korea-China relationship as one on the brink of an era of mature strategic cooperation. It is true that the THAAD decision has caused deep doubts on the Chinese side. Rather than worrying about how the THAAD installation will sever or terminate relations, we need to be more concerned about how the strategic relationship between the two countries will evolve as a result of the THAAD development.? China’s ambiguous approach to the peninsula is being put to the test by the THAAD emplacement. Compared to South Korea, China has been relatively loose on the matter of denuclearizing the peninsula. The question is: will their increased seriousness on the matter actually bring them closer to the South Korean position. ? The ferocity of China’s opposition to THAAD reveals to us that peninsula issues such as denuclearization have become a hot issue of elevated importance to China. It is up to South Korea to devise and propose cooperative measures to China on these matters. To put it another way, China has been intensely focused on issues such as Taiwan Strait affairs and competing claims with Japan on the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands, but now that Beijing’s attention has shifted over to the peninsula, there is a chance that the path to solving to the North Korean nuclear problem might be hastened. ? The most important element for all sides to focus on is denuclearization. THAAD will not usher in the termination of friendly South Korea-Sino relations. It actually represents a new beginning. In terms of accomplishing the shared goal of denuclearization, THAAD represents a purely defensive measure. But THAAD might also kick start a process in which China changes its strategy on the peninsula. Dialogue between South Korea and China can help both countries to devise and act on a more future oriented and cooperative security policy.? It is best for South Korea to avoid involving itself in diplomatic confrontations between America and China. Instead, it should devote its political energy towards two outcomes on the peninsula: denuclearization and peaceful reunification. At long last, the time is right for South Korea and China to have a security dialogue about denuclearizing the peninsula. South Korea should actively try to fulfill this goal. It’s time for China to change from its ambiguous peninsula strategy to a more forward-oriented approach.Dingding Chen [Global Public Policy Institute]. 2016. “Is a China-South Korea Alliance Possible?” – also has the coolest name ever - 7/8/16 - // AAOne major reason why China is now pursuing a warmer relationship with South Korea is China’s disappointment and anger at North Korea. A number of indicators suggest that China is quietly and slowly shifting its policy toward North Korea. Why China is changing its North Korea policy? The fundamental reason is actually quite simple– North Korea is now hurting China’s core national interests. In recent years, there has been a hot debate in China over whether Beijing should abandon North Korea. Several Chinese scholars (here and here) have already argued that China should abandon North Korea for moral and strategic reasons. They include: 1) North Korea’s value as China’s buffer zone is declining as China’s military modernization develops; 2) the China-South Korea relationship is increasingly important and it can replace the China-North Korea alliance relationship; and 3) North Korea has become a troublemaker for China and East Asia stability, thus a negative asset for China.? In the meantime, several Chinese scholars (here and here) have advocated for a China-South Korea alliance. According to Professor Yan Xuetong at Tsinghua University, China and South Korea share three mutual security interests: namely, the Japan threat, North Korea’s nuclear threat, and maintaining peace in East Asia. Yan further explains that a China-South Korea alliance does not need to replace South Korea’s alliance with the U.S., thus reducing opposition from the U.S. side. According to Yan, Korea historically maintained alliances with two countries at the same time; so technically a China-South Korea alliance should not be a problem for South Korea-U.S. alliance. In addition, China is already South Korea’s biggest trading partner and South Korea’s future economic development heavily depends on China’s huge market. Most importantly, China now seems to embrace the idea that South Korea can play a leading role in future reunification with North Korea. It is thus natural for South Korea to develop a strong security relationship with China.A2: Improve China Relations(3 responses)1. Turn, Pinkston of Rider University writes in 2016 that China has threatened South Korea with a military attack is THAAD is deployed.2. Turn, Yin Zhuo former Navy Admiral of the People’s Liberation army explains that if war breaks out in Northeast Asia, China’s first target would be the THAAD facilities in South Korea.For all these reasons, Zhang Jingwei, of the Charhar Institute concludes that THAAD deployment in South Korea would have a destructive impact more serious than the Nuclear threat posed by North Korea.Cards:Daniel Pinkston [Rider University]. July 2016. “Why it makes sense to deploy THAAD in South Korea.” NK News. // AAChina also has threatened South Korea with a military attack if THAAD is deployed. On 11 July, Yin Zhuo, a retired PLA Navy admiral, said that if a war breaks out in Northeast Asia,?the first target for a PLA military attack will be the THAAD facility in South Korea. One Chinese researcher said a?THAAD deployment in South Korea would have a “destructive impact more serious than even the nuclear threat from North Korea.”A2: Japan Relations Improve(2 responses)1. Non-Unique, Ian Rinehart of the Congressional Research Service writes that since December 2014, South Korea, Japan, and the United States already have an MOU on trilateral intelligence sharing. Enabling, the three countries to share information on North Korea that could be valuable for detecting and tracking North Korean missile activity. This agreement will exist with or without the deployment of missile defense.2. Delink, we’ve has missile defense in South Korea for decades yet there has been no materialization of this impact.Cards:Ian E. Rinehart [Analyst in Asian Affairs], Steven A. Hildreth [U.S. and Foreign National Security Programs] Susan V. Lawrence [Asian Affairs] “Ballistic Missile Defense in the Asia-Pacific Region: Cooperation and Opposition.” April 3, 2015. Congressional Research Service. // AAU.S.-ROK-Japan. Japan-South Korea defense cooperation remains extremely limited due to long-standing historical disputes. In July 2012, South Korea and Japan came to the brink of signing a military information-sharing agreement, but domestic political considerations led the South Korean government to walk away from the agreement at the last minute. The two countries eventually arranged a more limited Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on trilateral intelligence-sharing with the United States in December 2014. This agreement enables Japan and South Korea to share information on North Korea nuclear and missile programs through the United States and could be valuable for detecting and tracking North Korean missile launches. A2: Trilateral(6 responses)1. Mitigate the Impact, Park of John Hopkins University 16 explains that a nuclear-armed North Korea can easily break any trilateral coordination by blackmailing Tokyo and Washington because no politician has the stomach to risk a nuclear catastrophe.2. Mitigate their strength of link, Snyder 2015 concludes that psychological and emotional gaps between South Korea and Japan’s populations are too much to overcome to have full cooperation.3. Terminal-D, A trilateral alliance would be ineffective at denuclearization as Fontaine of War on the Rocks explains on July 7th that there is no way for South Korea or Japan to end Pyongyang’s missile or nuclear capabilities without a high risk of disastrous retaliation. 4. Non-Unique, Ian Rinehart of the Congressional Research Service writes that since December 2014, South Korea, Japan, and the United States already have a Memorandum of Understanding on trilateral intelligence sharing. Enabling, the three countries to share information on North Korea. Their impact should have already materialized three years ago.5. Turn the link, Glosserman of Columbia University 2015 explains that historically, perceptions of US distancing from the region during the Cold War was a major factor that enabled South Korea and Japan to set aside historical issues and work more closely. This means the US breeds overreliance, hindering the formation of alliances.**Don’t read with Link Turn6. Turn, Rosenblum of the Agenda 2017 explains that an alliance to pressure North Korea would threaten Kim’s regime. Which is problematic as he furthers that if Kim believes his sovereignty is at risk, he would launch a preemptive strike to ensure his survival.Cards:Jaehan Park (is a Ph.D. student at the Johns Hopkins’ Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). Prior to SAIS, Park served in the Republic of Korea Army as an officer) & Sangyoung Yun (is a Masters graduate from Johns Hopkins SAIS and currently a research assistant at the US-Korea Institute at SAIS). November 24, 2016. “Korea and Japan's Military Information Agreement: A Final Touch for the Pivot?” The Diplomat. // AAAnother possible explanation is Japan’s heightened security concern vis-a-vis North Korea. Now that Pyongyang has developed substantial capability in its missile and nuclear weapons programs, Tokyo’s nightmare is about to materialize. The problem is not whether the North Korean leadership will actually target Japanese territory — that is highly unlikely. What is problematic is that Pyongyang’s capacity to do so will prevent the SDF from lending support to its South Korean counterpart. In the case of a contingency, one could imagine that the ROK, Japan, and the United States?will closely cooperate to deal with the situation. Yet a nuclear-armed North Korea can easily?break the incomplete trilateral coordination by blackmailing Tokyo and Washington. After all, no politician has the stomach for a nuclear war.Brad Glosserman and Scott A. Snyder. 2015. “The Japan-South Korea Identity Clash: East Asian Security and the United States.” Columbia University. // AAAfter extended observation of the relationship and conversations with many Japanese and South Koreans regarding these differences, we conclude that the threat-based and alliance-based evaluations of conditions for Japan-ROK cooperation cannot overcome the psychological and emotional gaps in perspective on Japan-ROK relations, chasms that are reflected in public opinion in both countries. For this reason, this study has chosen to utilize public opinion data as a way of getting into the heads of the publics on both sides and more deeply understanding the nature and parameters of identity-related issues that have inhibited development of the relationship. Richard Fontaine, War on the Rocks, July-7-2017, ["Time to Lose Your Illusions on North Korea," , 7-21-2017] // AAThe president tweeted after the July 4 missile test that it’s “hard to believe that South Korea and Japan will put up with this much longer.” In fact, they have reluctantly put up with a direct North Korean threat to their countries for decades, and any nuclear-tipped ICBM would be aimed at the United States rather than them. When Pyongyang succeeds in its miniaturization efforts, it will be able to deliver a nuclear warhead to Japan and South Korea with its existing missile arsenal. In any case, there exists no way for Seoul or Tokyo to end Pyongyang’s missile or nuclear capabilities without unacceptable risk of disastrous retaliation.Ian E. Rinehart [Analyst in Asian Affairs], Steven A. Hildreth [U.S. and Foreign National Security Programs] Susan V. Lawrence [Asian Affairs] “Ballistic Missile Defense in the Asia-Pacific Region: Cooperation and Opposition.” April 3, 2015. Congressional Research Service. // AAU.S.-ROK-Japan. Japan-South Korea defense cooperation remains extremely limited due to long-standing historical disputes. In July 2012, South Korea and Japan came to the brink of signing a military information-sharing agreement, but domestic political considerations led the South Korean government to walk away from the agreement at the last minute. The two countries eventually arranged a more limited Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on trilateral intelligence-sharing with the United States in December 2014. This agreement enables Japan and South Korea to share information on North Korea nuclear and missile programs through the United States and could be valuable for detecting and tracking North Korean missile launches. Brad Glosserman and Scott A. Snyder. 2015. “The Japan-South Korea Identity Clash: East Asian Security and the United States.” Columbia University. // AAThe first is the fact that they share ties with the United States as a common alliance partner. Victor Cha developed this thesis in his landmark study on the ROK-Japan quasi-alliance relationship. Her argued that alliance partner evaluations of US commitment to the region have been an important factor in Korean and Japanese calculations of their own relationship, and that perceptions of US distancing from the region during the Cold War were a major factor that enabled South Korea and Japan to set aside history issues and work more closely together.Todd Rosenblum (a delegate to the U.S.-China-South Korea-North Korea Four Party Peace Talks in the 1990s. He was a senior official at the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security for the Obama administration from 2009 to 2015. He is a nonresident fellow at The Atlantic Council and serves on the Defense Science Board Task Force on Homeland Defense), Agenda, 7-18-2017, ["How to persuade China to abandon North Korea," , 7-23-2017] // AAThese are just a small sampling of the large and small issues associated with this idea. Even commencing discussion of a U.S.-China-Korea deal on the future of North Korea would carry huge risks. The Kim dynasty will not allow for a smooth transition; if it believes that its sovereignty is at risk, it could launch a preemptive strike to ensure its survival. We must be ready for all possibilities.A2: Regional Commitments(1 response)1. Turn, Postol of MIT explains in 2017 that as a result of the continuous deployment of missile defense in South Korea, there will be a downgrade in American credibility because deployment affirms the view of hostile nations that deal with the U.S. that the U.S. is untrustworthy. This has two ramifications: First, it hinders diplomatic efforts because North Korea and China less likely to trust the US to hold its end of the bargain. And Second, there is an increased likely hood that national begin building up arms because they don’t know the United States’ true intent. Cards:Theodore Postol (Professor Emeritus at MIT) & Amitai Etzioni (Amitai Etzioni is a University Professor and professor of international relations at The George Washington University. He is the author of?Avoiding War with China, just published by University of Virginia Press). The Diplomat, Diplomat, 8-10-2017, ["THAAD: Best a Bargaining Chip," , 8-10-2017] // AATheodore Postol, professor emeritus at MIT, notes: “[Deploying THAAD] puts South Korea at odds with China over a defense system that has no merit for South Korea’s defense, and it will certainly raise tensions between China and Japan.” Postol adds that an indirect and far-ranging consequence of THAAD could be the downgrade of American credibility, as deployment affirms “the view of many nations that deal with the U.S. that the U.S. is untrustworthy in terms of its commitments.”A2 Prevent ConflictA2: Decrease Probability of Conflict(2 responses)1. Turn, Reif of St. Andrews University 17 explains that the deployment of missile defense will provide Trump with the overconfidence needed to preemptively strike North Korea preemptively. Thus, comparatively, missile defense increases the probability of conflict.2. Turn, Etzioni of American University explains on August 10th that the eroded deterrence that stems from deploying missile defense will prompt nations like China and North Korea to put its nuclear forces on a hair trigger alert, ready to strike preemptively on any perceived military threats. This is problematic as it greatly increases the probability for miscalculation.Cards:Kingston Reif [St. Andrews University]. May 2017. “MISSILE DEFENSE CAN’T SAVE US FROM NORTH KOREA.” War on Rocks. // AAMisplaced overconfidence in missile defense could prompt Trump think he can escalate in response to another North Korean nuclear or missile test or other provocation without having to worry about a potential North Korean nuclear response. This would greatly increase the risk of conflict on the Korean Peninsula.Amitai Etzioni (Amitai Etzioni is a University Professor and professor of international relations at The George Washington University. He is the author of?Avoiding War with China, just published by University of Virginia Press). The Diplomat, Diplomat, 8-10-2017, ["THAAD: Best a Bargaining Chip," , 8-10-2017] // AAOpinions differ among experts as to how effective these systems are. Jeffrey Lewis, an arms control analyst at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey, notes that THAAD can defend against short- and medium-range missiles, but would not against ICBM. Anyhow, so far South Korea allowed only the positioning of one battery, which has a limited effect. However, even if these anti-missile batteries are much less valuable than advocates claim, we need to pay more mind to the high costs they exact. They are very destabilizing, because there is reason to hold that THAAD surveillance could be marshaled in the tracking, identification, and destruction of not just North Korean but also Chinese missiles. Those quick to exclaim “Great, two for the price of one” should recall that nuclear powers hold each other at bay; that mutually assured destruction seems to be a major reason why the big powers have avoided war since 1945. To remind: The logic of nuclear deterrence presumes that if either China or the U.S. launches a nuclear attack, they must expect to be paid back in kind, to be devastated, making any major strike virtually suicidal. However, if one nuclear power can prevent a retaliatory strike (by an anti-missile defense system, for instance), the other nation must fear the possibility of a devastating attack without the ability to respond. As a result, mutual destruction is no longer assured, and the deterrence effect breaks down. Further, such concerns may well lead the newly vulnerable nation to put its nuclear forces on a hair trigger alert, ready to strike preemptively at any sign of preparation of an attack by the other. In short, if THAAD batteries are effective, they are highly destabilizing.A2: Less Paranoia(2 responses)1. Turn, Reif of St. Andrews University explains that decreasing paranoia doesn’t matter because a missile defense system will provide Trump with overconfidence needed to preemptively strike North Korea.2. Turn, realize that because we don’t know how effective missile defense systems will be in real life, the increased reliance placed upon them combined with such uncertainty will increase paranoia.Cards:Kingston Reif [St. Andrews University]. May 2017. “MISSILE DEFENSE CAN’T SAVE US FROM NORTH KOREA.” War on Rocks. // AAMisplaced overconfidence in missile defense could prompt Trump think he can escalate in response to another North Korean nuclear or missile test or other provocation without having to worry about a potential North Korean nuclear response. This would greatly increase the risk of conflict on the Korean Peninsula.A2: Econ = Peace(1 response)1. [Delink – Pre-req]. Khan of the International Monetary Fund explains that you need peace before you can have trade, economic growth, and prosperity. This is really important because it means my opponents cannot link into the regional peace through a better economic situation. Make them prove the opposite.Cards:Dominique Strauss-Kahn [Managing Director; International Monetary Fund]. October 23, 2009. “Economic Stability, Economic Cooperation, and Peace—the Role of the IMF, speech by Dominique Strauss-Kahn Managing Director, International Monetary Fund at Oslo, October 23, 2009.” International Monetary Fund. // AAOver the past year or so, the global financial crisis has been the subject of intense debate. But today, instead of dwelling on the economic risks, I would like to Turn instead to another important topic—the relationship between economic stability and peace. It is my abiding belief that they are intimately entwined. If you lose one, you are likely to lose the other. Peace is a necessary precondition for trade, sustained economic growth, and prosperity. In Turn, economic stability, and a rising prosperity that is broadly shared—both within and among countries—can foster peace. This is most likely to happen in an atmosphere of economic cooperation, of openness, of a multilateral approach to economic and political problems.A2: Peace = Econ(1 response)1. [Delink – Reverse Causality] Khan of the IMF explains that economic strength and stability are a large factor in fostering peace.Cards:Dominique Strauss-Kahn [Managing Director; International Monetary Fund]. October 23, 2009. “Economic Stability, Economic Cooperation, and Peace—the Role of the IMF, speech by Dominique Strauss-Kahn Managing Director, International Monetary Fund at Oslo, October 23, 2009.” International Monetary Fund. // AAOver the past year or so, the global financial crisis has been the subject of intense debate. But today, instead of dwelling on the economic risks, I would like to Turn instead to another important topic—the relationship between economic stability and peace. It is my abiding belief that they are intimately entwined. If you lose one, you are likely to lose the other. Peace is a necessary precondition for trade, sustained economic growth, and prosperity. In Turn, economic stability, and a rising prosperity that is broadly shared—both within and among countries—can foster peace. This is most likely to happen in an atmosphere of economic cooperation, of openness, of a multilateral approach to economic and political problems.A2: No Arms Race(8 responses)1. Turn, Reif of War on Rocks 2017 indicates that the arms race is being accelerated by the THAAD missile defense system as North Korea is developing solid-fueled mobile missiles, practicing launching multiple missiles at the same time, developing submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and experimenting with maneuverable reentry vehicles. This is vital as it will push both nations to the brink of war.2. We outweigh – long term threat, Reif 17 indicates that as time progresses, North Korea will have more artillery pieces pointed at Seoul which South Korea has no defense against.3. Turn, Perry of the United Institute of Peace explains that China is increasing the size of its nuclear arsenal in response to the US missile defense systems.4. Turn, Dr. Suh of the Center for Korean Research 2016 explains that there is an arms race in Northeast Asia as South Korea for example has increased its military spending my 4% per year over the past 10 years which is more than can be explained by economic growth. In fact, South Korea has raised its defense spending at a higher rate than Norht Korea.5. Turn, Zhen of the Defense and Diplomacy 17 indicates that Trump will use the ‘China threat’ to push other countries in the region to buy large amounts of American weapons.6. Turn, Zhen of Defense & Diplomacy 2017 explains that Russia is developing the nuclear capabilities to penetrate the missile defense system.7. Turn, The South China Morning Post 2017 explains that an arms race will go nuclear as Trump recently stated that the US must strengthen and expand its nuclear arsenal. While the US Institute for Peace explains China is doing the same thing.8. Turn, Zhen 2017 explains that in response to the South Korean deployment of a missile defense system, China is developing sea based missiles and multiple re-entry vehicles with the sole focus of breaking through the systems’ shield.Cards:Kingston Reif [St. Andrews University]. May 2017. “MISSILE DEFENSE CAN’T SAVE US FROM NORTH KOREA.” War on Rocks. // AANorth Korea is also taking steps to overwhelm and evade U.S. defenses through such steps as developing solid-fueled mobile missiles, practicing to launch multiple missiles at the same time (known as salvo launches), developing submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and experimenting with maneuverable reentry vehicles. It could also pursue the development of decoys and countermeasures specifically designed to fool U.S. missile defenses. While imperfect defenses might be able to limit damage against conventionally armed missiles, the devastation that would result from even one nuclear weapon landing on Seoul or Guam gives North Korea a significant deterrent capability. And it wouldn’t even need to come to this: North Korea possesses hundreds of artillery pieces that hold Seoul at risk and against which the United States and South Korea?have no defense.William J. Perry [Professor; Stanford University]. 2009. “America’s Strategic Posture The Final Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States.” United States Institute of Peace. // AAFor more than a decade the development of U.S. ballistic missile defenses has been guided by the principles of (1) protecting against limited strikes while (2) taking into account the legitimate concerns of Russia and China about strategic stability. These remain sound guiding principles. Defenses sufficient to sow doubts in Moscow or Beijing about the viability of their deterrents could lead them to take actions that increase the threat to the United States and its allies and friends. Both Russia and China have expressed concerns. Current U.S. plans for missile defense should not call into question the viability of Russia’s nuclear deterrent. China sees its concerns as more immediate, given the much smaller size of its nuclear force. U.S. assessments indicate that a significant operational impact on the Chinese deterrent would require a larger and more capable defense than the United States has plans to construct, but China may already be [is] increasing the size of its ICBM force in response to its assessment of the U.S. missile defense program.Dr. Jae-Jung Suh (Johns Hopkins University). March 2016. “Allied to Race? The U.S.-Korea Alliance and Arms Race.” Center for Korean Research. // AAThe Republic of Korea has continuously increased its military spending since 2000 at a rate higher than conventional explanations would expect. Its spending grew at an average annual rate of 4% for the past 10 years, higher than would be warranted by the growth of its economy or government budget for the same period. It is also notable that South Korea raised its defense spending at a higher rate than North Korea at a time when Seoul was taking a more conciliatory policy of engagement, commonly dubbed sunshine policy. Its defense spending increased ostensibly in response to its policy goal to build a more autonomous military at least under the Roh administration, but closer examination shows that the U.S-Korea alliance in fact strengthened during this period and served as driver of South Korea’s military transformation. Furthermore, Roh’s predecessor and successor have despite their opposite political orientations strengthened the military in a way that dovetail with changes in American strategy and military. This article examines the degree to and the ways in which the South’s military transformation, in quantity and form, is attributable at least partly to the pressure that its alliance with the United States keeps on Seoul to maintain military readiness and interoperability.Liu Zhen. January 2017. “Will Donald Trump aggravate the China-US arms race?” South China Morning Post: Defense and Diplomacy. // AABut Li said heightened tensions with China could pay off for US arms manufacturers. “Trump will certainly use the ‘China threat’ theory to push other countries in the region to buy large amounts of American weapons,” he said.Liu Zhen. January 2017. “Will Donald Trump aggravate the China-US arms race?” South China Morning Post: Defense and Diplomacy. // AAIn a speech a few hours earlier, Russian President Vladimir Putin said his country should fortify its military nuclear potential and “develop missiles that can penetrate any missile-defence system”.Liu Zhen. January 2017. “Will Donald Trump aggravate the China-US arms race?” South China Morning Post: Defense and Diplomacy. // AAThe arms race between China and the US could also spill over into nuclear weapons. Trump [stated] tweeted last month that “the United States must greatly strengthen and expand its nuclear capability until such time as the world comes to its senses regarding nukes.” The New York Times said there were three ways that could be interpreted: modernizing existing nuclear forces; developing delivery systems like nuclear cruise missiles; or deploy nuclear weapons closer to potential adversaries. Liu Zhen. January 2017. “Will Donald Trump aggravate the China-US arms race?” South China Morning Post: Defense and Diplomacy. // AA “What really worries China more is the deployment of US missile-defence systems in the region, like the Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) system set to be installed in South Korea,” he said. Zhao said China would have to develop more sea-based missiles and multiple re-entry vehicles to be able to break through such defences.A2 Misc.A2: No Health Risks(3 responses)1. Delink, Elich of the Korean Policy Institute 16 explains that officials and reporters were not given the methodology nor any information pertaining to how the test was conducted which negates the results of the test.2. Turn, Elich 16 explains that the THAAD system is expected to be in the ‘search operations mode’ for most of its operation which is problematic because that mode has the longest range and thus, impacts the most people.3. Turn, The Journal of Experimental Oncology concludes that even with low levels of exposure to radiation, over 10 years, negative health implications are observed.Cards:Gregory Elich. August 2016. “THAAD Comes to Korea, But At What Cost?.” Korean Policy Institute. // AAOr was it? All the Korean reporters were given were readings. Nothing was said about the factors that went into the test. Without that information, the result is meaningless. Was the measurement taken in the line of the main beam, or outside it, where the radiation level would have dropped off dramatically? What was the power setting of the radar during the test? Radars can operate at a variety of power levels. At what angle was the radar? Varying these factors would produce entirely different results, and it is not impossible to imagine that measures were intentionally taken to ensure the lowest possible reading.Gregory Elich. August 2016. “THAAD Comes to Korea, But At What Cost?.” Korean Policy Institute. // AAThe U.S. Army’s field manual for AN/TPY-2 forward-based mode radar operations defines three search plans for the radar while in forward mode. The “standard operations mode,” called Autonomous Search Plans, provides the broadest range and quantity of search sectors. This is the search plan the radar typically uses in forward-based mode, and can be expected to cross a wider area of the immediate vicinity, exposing a broader segment of the population.? HYPERLINK "" \l "_edn10" [x]Gregory Elich. August 2016. “THAAD Comes to Korea, But At What Cost?.” Korean Policy Institute. // AAIt is possible that long-term exposure to electromagnetic radiation may pose a risk even when the level is low enough to be considered safe. In a paper published in?Experimental Oncology, four scientists called for a “re-elaboration of the current safety levels,” based on their studies. The authors conclude, “The carcinogenic effect of MW [microwave radiation] is typically manifested after long-term (up to 10 years and more) exposure.”? HYPERLINK "" \l "_edn11" [xi]A2: Trump Wants Peace(2 responses)1. Turn, Cheng of NYU 2017 explains that Donald Trump shifted the US’s tone from one of caution to one of aggressive pushback.2. Delink, Zhen of the China Moring Post 2017 explains that China is stepping up preparedness for a military conflict with the US as Donald Trump has increased the risk of hostilities breaking out.Cards:Evelyn Cheng [NYU]. “US-China war increasingly a 'reality,' Chinese army official says.” CNBC. // AAIn just over a week in office, President?Donald Trump's administration has shifted the U.S. tone from one of caution to more aggressive pushback against China's assertive territorial claims in the South China Sea. Trump said the Monday after his inauguration that the U.S. would prevent China from taking territory in international waters in the region.Liu Zhen. January 2017. “China ‘steps up preparedness for possible military conflict with US’.” South China Morning Post: Defense and Diplomacy. // AAChina is stepping up preparedness for a possible military conflict with the US as the Donald Trump presidency has increased the risk of hostilities breaking out, state media and military observers said. ................
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