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David Hume
Philosophy / Metaphysics of David Hume (1711 - 76)
Explaining philosopher David Hume's Problem of Causation, Necessary Connection and Skepticism with the Wave Structure of Matter (WSM)
David Hume quotes, 'Enquiries Concerning the Human Understanding and Principles of Morals'. Pictures, Biography, Life
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And though the philosopher may live remote from business, the genius of philosophy, if carefully cultivated by several, must gradually diffuse itself throughout the whole society, and bestow a similar correctness on every art and calling. (David Hume, 1737)
When we look about us towards external objects, and consider the operation of causes, we are never able, in a single instance, to discover any power or necessary connexion; any quality, which binds the effect to the cause, and renders the one an infallible consequence of the other. There is required a medium, which may enable the mind to draw such an inference, if indeed it be drawn by reasoning and argument. What that medium is, I must confess, passes my comprehension; and it is incumbent on those to produce it, who assert that it really exists, and is the origin of all our conclusions concerning matter of fact. This question I propose as much for the sake of information, as with an intention of raising difficulties. I cannot find, I cannot imagine any such reasoning. But I keep my mind still open to instruction, if any one will vouchsafe to bestow it upon me. (David Hume, 1737)
We find in the course of nature that though the effects be many, the principles from which they arise are commonly few and simple, and that it is the sign of an unskilled naturalist to have recourse to a different quality in order to explain every different operation.
(David Hume, 1737)
If I ask you why you believe any particular matter of fact, which you relate, you must tell me some reason; and this reason will be some other fact, connected with it. But as you cannot proceed after this manner, in infinitum, you must at last terminate in some fact, which is present to your memory or senses; or must allow that your belief is entirely without foundation. (David Hume, 1737)
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Introduction - Hume's Problem of Causation & Necessary Connection - WSM explains Causation / Necessary Connection - Solution to Hume's Problem of Induction - Hume Solidity Extension Motion Force - David Hume Quotes - Links David Hume - Top of Page
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Introduction - David Hume
The Philosopher David Hume is famous for making us realize that until we know the Necessary Connection / cause of things then all human knowledge is uncertain, merely a habit of thinking based upon repeated observation (induction), and which depends upon the future being like the past.
We should respect Hume's open mind, which is necessary if we are to ever consider new ideas and thus advance Human knowledge.
I cannot find, I cannot imagine any such reasoning. But I keep my mind still open to instruction, if any one will vouchsafe to bestow it upon me. (David Hume, 1737)
I must confess that a man is guilty of unpardonable arrogance who concludes, because an argument has escaped his own investigation, that therefore it does not really exist. I must also confess that, though all the learned, for several ages, should have employed themselves in fruitless search upon any subject, it may still, perhaps, be rash to conclude positively that the subject must, therefore, pass all human comprehension. (David Hume, 1737)
David Hume is one of the most elegant of the philosophers, so his quotes are well worth reading from a purely literary sense. He is also one of the most important philosophers to write on metaphysics, as he makes it clear that until we know the causal connection between things all knowledge is empirical / inductive and thus uncertain (the current state of modern physics).
However, and very importantly, there is actually a very simple solution. We just had to describe reality in terms of one thing, Space, and its wave motions, rather than many things, discrete matter particles in Space and Time (how are they interconnected?).
This Metaphysics of Space and Motion and the Wave Structure of Matter (WSM) explains the necessary connection of matter (cause and effect) due to the interconnection of the Spherical In and Out-waves with all the other matter in the universe. i.e. By describing reality in terms of One Substance which exists (Space) and its Properties (Wave-Medium) we can then explain the necessary connection between the many things which exist - matter as spherical standing waves in Space (the wave centers form the 'particle' effects that we see).
This knowledge is very important to humanity as it allows us to determine the truth about matter and its interactions, as the foundation for determining the truth for how we can live wisely here on earth as part of the universe (and our world is now in great need of some truth and wisdom!)
I hope you enjoy reading the following David Hume quotes. Most are explained from this new foundation of the Wave Structure of Matter in Space - the solution to his problem of causation and necessary connection is simple and obvious once known.
Geoff Haselhurst
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Introduction - Hume's Problem of Causation & Necessary Connection - WSM explains Causation / Necessary Connection - Solution to Hume's Problem of Induction - Hume Solidity Extension Motion Force - David Hume Quotes - Links David Hume - Top of Page
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Hume's Problem of Causation and Necessary Connection (and thus Induction)
It appears that, in single instances of the operation of bodies, we never can, by our utmost scrutiny, discover any thing but one event following another, without being able to comprehend any force or power by which the cause operates, or any connexion between it and its supposed effect. The same difficulty occurs in contemplating the operations of mind on body- where we observe the motion of the latter to follow upon the volition of the former, but are not able to observe or conceive the tie which binds together the motion and volition, or the energy by which the mind produces this effect. The authority of the will over its own faculties and ideas is not a whit more comprehensible: So that, upon the whole, there appears not, throughout all nature, any one instance of connexion which is conceivable by us. All events seem entirely loose and separate. One event follows another; but we never can observe any tie between them. They seemed conjoined, but never connected. And as we can have no idea of any thing which never appeared to our outward sense or inward sentiment, the necessary conclusion seems to be that we have no idea of connexion or force at all, and that these words are absolutely without meaning, when employed either in philosophical reasonings or common life. (David Hume, 1737)
Hume's Problem of Causation has remained unsolved for 250 years (Neither Kant nor Popper positively solved it!) and this lack of certainty, at the very heart of Human Scientific Knowledge, has greatly prejudiced our belief in the possibility of Metaphysics and the certainty of Science, and has ultimately led to the extreme skepticism (Postmodernism) of our currently troubled and confused times. It is a delight to read David Hume, who writes brilliantly - beautifully blending clarity, content and style. As his skills far exceed my own, I shall gladly limit myself to ordering and presenting his words and ideas, such that I may clearly demonstrate his Problem of Causation (and as a consequence, Induction). Most importantly though, by doing this it becomes possible to show how these profound problems can now, finally, be sensibly solved.
It must certainly be allowed, that nature has kept us at a great distance from all her secrets, and has afforded us only the knowledge of a few superficial qualities of objects; while she conceals from us those powers and principles on which the influence of those objects entirely depends. (David Hume, 1737)
When we look about us towards external objects, and consider the operation of causes, we are never able, in a single instance, to discover any power or necessary connexion; any quality, which binds the effect to the cause, and renders the one an infallible consequence of the other. (David Hume, 1737)
... experience only teaches us, how one event constantly follows another; without instructing us in the secret connexion, which binds them together, and renders them inseparable. (David Hume, 1737)
We then call the one object, cause; the other, effect. We suppose that there is some connexion between them; some power in the one, by which it infallibly produces the other, and operates with the greatest certainty and strongest necessity. (David Hume, 1737)
I say then, that, even after we have experience of the operations of cause and effect, our conclusions from that experience are not founded on (a priori) reasoning, or any process of the understanding.(David Hume, 1737)
It is allowed on all hands that there is no known connexion between the sensible qualities and the secret powers; and consequently, that the mind is not led to form such a conclusion concerning their constant and regular conjunction, by anything which it knows of their nature.(David Hume, 1737)
Hume correctly explains that Humans do not know the 'Necessary Connexion' between objects and thus do not know the relationship between cause and effect. This quite simply is the Problem of Causation - that until we know 'what exists' and the 'necessary connexions' between these things that exist, then it is impossible for Humanity to have certainty of knowledge.
This then leads to the further Problem of Induction, for if we do not know the a priori cause of events then we have no Principles from which to logically deduce our conclusions. We are left simply observing that one event follows another and seems connected, but we do not know how or why, thus we must depend upon repeated observation (Induction) to determine the laws of Nature (the current state of Modern Physics) and hence tacitly assuming (without reason) that the future is like the past. (It is simply a habit of thinking to connect two events which seem to occur in conjunction and necessarily assumes that the future will be like the past)
..all arguments concerning existence are founded on the relation of cause and effect; that our knowledge of that relation is derived entirely from experience; and all our experimental conclusions proceed upon the supposition that the future will be conformable to the past. .... Without the influence of custom, we should be entirely ignorant of every matter of fact beyond what is immediately present to the memory and senses. (David Hume, 1737)
I shall venture to affirm, as a general proposition, which admits of no exception, that the knowledge of this relation is not, in any instance, attained by reasonings a priori; but arises entirely from experience, when we find that any particular objects are constantly conjoined with each other. (David Hume, 1737)
It is impossible, therefore, that any arguments from experience can prove this resemblance of the past to the future; since all these arguments are founded on the supposition of that resemblance. Let the course of things be allowed hitherto ever so regular; that alone, without some new argument or inference, proves not that, for the future, it will continue so. (David Hume, 1737)
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Introduction - Hume's Problem of Causation & Necessary Connection - WSM explains Causation / Necessary Connection - Solution to Hume's Problem of Induction - Hume Solidity Extension Motion Force - David Hume Quotes - Links David Hume - Top of Page
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The Metaphysics of Space & Motion & the Wave Structure of Matter (WSM) Solves Hume's Problem of Causation and Necessary Connection
Let us now apply our knowledge of the Metaphysics of Space and Motion and the Wave Structure of Matter (WSM) to this greatest of all Human intellectual problems, Hume's Problem of Causation and Necessary Connection, which can only be solved by understanding how Matter exists and is interconnected within this Space of the Universe.
First, Hume agrees that there obviously is a 'necessary connexion' between objects (Matter) in Space. This is obvious by the fact that Physics is able to describe many events with mathematical precision. Thus if we had knowledge of this 'secret connexion' or Force we could accurately predict (logically deduce) the future (from cause to effect) without need of induction from repeated observation and thus having to assume the future is like the past.
It is universally allowed that matter, in all its operations, is actuated by a necessary force, and that every natural effect is so precisely determined by the energy of its cause that no other effect, in such particular circumstances, could possibly have resulted from it. (David Hume, 1737)
The generality of mankind never find any difficulty in accounting for the more common and familiar operations of nature - such as the descent of heavy bodies, the growth of plants, the generation of animals, or the nourishment of bodies by food: But suppose that, in all these cases, they perceive the very force or energy of the cause, by which it is connected with its effect, and is for ever infallible in its operation. (David Hume, 1737)
From the first appearance of an object, we never can conjecture what effect will result from it. But were the power or energy of any cause discoverable by the mind, we could foresee the effect, even without experience; and might, at first, pronounce with certainty concerning it, by mere dint of thought and reasoning. (David Hume, 1737)
Now it seems evident that, if this conclusion were formed by reason, it would be as perfect at first, and upon one instance, as after ever so long a course of experience. (David Hume, 1737)
This question I propose as much for the sake of information, as with an intention of raising difficulties. I cannot find, I cannot imagine any such reasoning. But I keep my mind still open to instruction, if any one will vouchsafe to bestow it upon me. (David Hume, 1737)
The solution to Hume's Problem of Causation is realised by understanding how Matter exists in Space as a Spherical Standing Wave whose Wave-Center (Focal Point) creates the 'Particle' effect of Matter. By understanding the cause of the 'Particle' effect, the Wave Structure of Matter explains how these matter 'particles' are necessarily interconnected by their spherical waves in a continuously connected Space (existing as a wave medium). We can thus logically deduce the Motion of the Focal Point ('Particle') by simply considering how the Velocity of the Spherical In-Wave changes as they flow in through other matter in the Space around them. This then necessarily determines where these Spherical In-Waves will meet at their Wave-Center 'particle' thus we can determine the future motion of the 'Particle' effect. A simple example of this is to consider gravity, and Hume's simple problem of why a stone falls to the earth;
Would we, therefore, form a just and precise idea of necessity, we must consider whence that idea arises when we apply it to the operation of bodies. ... A stone or piece of metal raised into the air, and left without any support, immediately falls: but to consider the matter a priori, is there anything we discover in this situation which can beget the idea of a downward, rather than an upward, or any other motion, in the stone of metal? (David Hume, 1737)
Firstly, we must realise that the stone exists as many trillions of Spherical (Ellipsoidal) Standing Waves whose Wave-Centers / Focal Points are trapped resonating together in the Space that we call the Matter of the stone. Thus the reason why the stone falls to the Earth is simply because the Spherical (Ellipsoidal) In-Waves travel more slowly through the higher mass-energy density of space Space that we call the matter of Earth than they do in the opposite direction from Space through the Earth's atmosphere. This causes the Focal Point (where the Spherical In-Waves meet at their Wave-Center) to move (accelerate) towards the earth - which we see as the stone falling. Thus as Hume demanded, we have replaced Inductive Logic from repeated observation of effects with Deductive Logic from the Principles of the WSM, which explain matter's necessary connection by explaining the cause of the 'Particle' effect.
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Introduction - Hume's Problem of Causation & Necessary Connection - WSM explains Causation / Necessary Connection - Solution to Hume's Problem of Induction - Hume Solidity Extension Motion Force - David Hume Quotes - Links David Hume - Top of Page
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The Solution to Hume's 'Problem of Induction'
For the most part, attempts to solve the problem of induction have taken the form of trying to fit inductive arguments into a deductive mould. (Ayer, 1956)
Finally, why does Induction work, why is the future like the past? (And it is obvious that it is else all our science would be nonsense.)
Without True Knowledge of Reality it is impossible to understand cause and effect - we are simply limited to describing the effects of things upon us, without understanding the cause of these effects. As we did not know how matter interacted with other matter in the Space around it (action-at-a-distance) we consequently did not understood how our human senses were connected to the world of objects in Space around us and thus what caused the perceived effects of our senses.
This lack of knowledge then leads to (what Popper termed) Hume's 'Problem of Induction'. This problem can again be demonstrated using Hume's simple example of dropping a stone such that when I let go of the stone it falls to earth. I can then repeat this experiment any number of times but despite this number of repetitions does this logically (inductively) infer that the stone must fall the next time I let it go. Hume argued that it does not, that it is simply a habit of thinking and that it is quite possible that at some stage in the future the stone will not fall. This leads to the realization that the logic of induction depends upon repeated observation and thus the assumption that the future is like the past. As Hume explains;
The supposition that the future resembles the past, is not founded on arguments of any kind, but is derived entirely from habit.(David Hume, 1737)
Thus Hume's skepticism is valid and has subsequently plagued Philosophy and the sciences with a terribly destructive doubt and a fertile environment for all kinds of absurdity and mysticism. Ultimately all science depends upon observation of the world for its knowledge, and thus Hume's problem of induction must be solved if we are to have certainty of knowledge. As Ayer explains of the philosophical skeptic;
... his contention is that any inference from past to future is illegitimate ... that it is to be doubted whether the exercise of sense-perception can in any circumstances whatever afford proof of the existence of physical objects. (Ayer, 1956)
The solution to this profound problem is in two parts and is beautiful in its simplicity.
i) Once we understand reality, then we understand the cause of the effect. Thus we no longer depend upon repeated observation to inductively deduce that the stone falls when I let it go, for we can now use deductive logic from first principles to deduce that the stone falls to the earth because its In-Waves are traveling more slowly through the Space of the Earth.
ii) We can also explain why the future is like the past because the In-Waves (our future) after flowing through the Wave-Center (our present) become the Out-Waves (our past) and thus the future causes the past and must therefore be like the past. This then explains why we can trust inductive reasoning, for its assumption that the future is like the past is valid, and this also then explains why science has been so successful even though it was founded on an inductive logic whose validity until now could not be shown to be true.
Now the skeptic can still argue that while I may have replaced induction with deduction, nonetheless I still depend upon induction, i.e. upon repeated observation of events, to confirm the truth of the deductive theory.
This is true, but I then can justify this use of induction to support deduction, by showing that this wave theory of matter explains why the future is similar to the past, and therefore deduce that induction is valid.
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Introduction - Hume's Problem of Causation & Necessary Connection - WSM explains Causation / Necessary Connection - Solution to Hume's Problem of Induction - Hume Solidity Extension Motion Force - David Hume Quotes - Links David Hume - Top of Page
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Explaining Hume's Solidity, Extension, Motion, and Force
Hume astutely points to the heart of the problem when he writes;
Solidity, Extension, Motion; these qualities are all complete in themselves, and never point out any other event which may result from them. The scenes of the universe are continually shifting, and one object follows another in an uninterrupted succession; but the power of force, which actuates the whole machine, is entirely concealed from us, and never discovers itself in any of the sensible qualities of body. (David Hume, 1737)
We can now simply explain these four things, Solidity, Extension, Motion, and Force from the Metaphysics of Space and Motion and the Two Principles of the Wave Structure of Matter (WSM).
Solidity and Extension are Properties of Space. Solid objects like rocks exist in Space as a collection of Spherical Standing Waves whose Wave-Centers (Focal-Points) make up the many trillions of Particles that constitute the matter of the rock.
These Wave-Centers become trapped in standing wave arrays (e.g. crystals) and thus take on the nearly rigid properties of Space with their relative motion to one another (e.g. it is hard to squash a rock because you can't push the Wave-Centers closer together with the Wave-Centers of your body - At a certain number of standing waves apart your Wave-Centers become trapped with those on the surface of the rock - because the In and Out Waves pair up with each other). This then prevents the Wave-Centers from moving closer together which we sense as a solid rock in Space.
Motion exists in two different though directly related ways;
i) The Velocity of Wave motion of the Spherical In and Out Waves (Velocity of Light c)
Which then determines;
ii) The Motion of the Wave-Center / Focal Point ('Particle' effect) through Space.
Finally, Force, is caused by a change in Velocity of the In-Waves, which then causes a change in the future location of where these In-Waves will meet at their Wave-Center, which we see as the accelerated motion of the 'Particle'. (Thus explaining Newton's Law of Inertia, Force = Mass times Acceleration.).
References
Hume, David Enquiries Concerning The Human Understanding and Concerning The Principles of Morals (1737) Oxford University Press 2nd Ed. 1957
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Introduction - Hume's Problem of Causation & Necessary Connection - WSM explains Causation / Necessary Connection - Solution to Hume's Problem of Induction - Hume Solidity Extension Motion Force - David Hume Quotes - Links David Hume - Top of Page
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David Hume Quotes: Quotations from 'Enquiries Concerning The Human Understanding and Concerning The Principles of Morals' (1737) By David Hume
It is easy for a profound philosopher to commit a mistake in his subtle reasonings; and one mistake is the necessary parent of another, while he pushes on his consequences, and is not deterred from embracing any conclusion, by its unusual appearance, or its contradiction to popular opinion. (David Hume, 1737)
... Abstruse thought and profound researches I prohibit, and will severely punish, by the pensive melancholy which they introduce, by the endless uncertainty in which they involve you, and by the cold reception which your pretended discoveries shall meet with, when communicated. Be a philosopher; but, amidst all your philosophy, be still a man. (David Hume, 1737)
Accuracy is, in every case, advantageous to beauty, and just reasoning to delicate sentiment. In vain would we exalt the one by depreciating the other.
Besides, we may observe, in every art or profession, even those which most concern life or action, that a spirit of accuracy, however acquired, carries all of them nearer their perfection, and renders them more subservient to the interests of society. And though the philosopher may live remote from business, the genius of philosophy, if carefully cultivated by several, must gradually diffuse itself throughout the whole society, and bestow a similar correctness on every art and calling. The politician will acquire greater foresight and subtlety, in the subdividing and balancing of power; the lawyer more method and finer principles in his reasoning; and the general more regularity in his discipline, and more caution in his plans and operations. (David Hume, 1737)
In short, all the materials of thinking are derived either from our outward or inward sentiment: the mixture and composition of these belongs alone to the mind and will. Or, to express myself in philosophical language, all our ideas or more feeble perceptions are copies of our impressions or more lively ones. (David Hume, 1737)
When we entertain, therefore, any suspicion that a philosophical term is employed without any meaning or idea (as is but too frequent), we need but enquire, from what impressions is that supposed idea derived? And if it be impossible to assign any, this will serve to confirm our suspicion. By bringing ideas into so clear a light we may reasonably hope to remove all dispute, which may arise, concerning their nature and reality. (David Hume, 1737)
All reasonings concerning matter of fact seem to be founded on the relation of cause and effect. (David Hume, 1737)
The mind can never possibly find the effect in the supposed cause, by the most accurate scrutiny and examination. For the effect is totally different from the cause, and consequently can never be discovered in it. (David Hume, 1737)
It is impossible, therefore, that any arguments from experience can prove this resemblance of the past to the future; since all these arguments are founded on the supposition of that resemblance. Let the course of things be allowed hitherto ever so regular; that alone, without some new argument or inference, proves not that, for the future, it will continue so. (David Hume, 1737)
My practice, you say, refutes my doubts. But you mistake the the purport of my question. As an agent, I am quite satisfied in the point; but as a philosopher, who has some share of curiosity, I will not say scepticism, I want to learn the foundation of this inference.
No reading, no enquiry has yet been able to remove my difficulty, or give me satisfaction in a matter of such importance. Can I do better than propose the difficulty to the public, even though, perhaps, I have small hopes of obtaining a solution? We shall at least, by this means, be sensible of our ignorance, if we do not augment our knowledge. (David Hume, 1737)
I must confess that a man is guilty of unpardonable arrogance who concludes, because an argument has escaped his own investigation, that therefore it does not really exist. I must also confess that, though all the learned, for several ages, should have employed themselves in fruitless search upon any subject, it may still, perhaps, be rash to conclude positively that the subject must, therefore, pass all human comprehension. (David Hume, 1737)
It is certain that the most ignorant and stupid peasants- nay infants, nay even brute beasts- improve by experience, and learn the qualities of natural objects, by observing the effects which result from them. When a child has felt the sensation of pain from touching the flame of a candle, he will be careful not to put his hand near any candle; but will expect a similar effect from a cause which is similar in its sensible qualities and appearance. (David Hume, 1737)
Nothing can be more contrary than such a philosophy to the supine indolence of the mind, its rash arrogance, its lofty pretensions, and its superstitious credulity. Every passion is mortified by it except the love of truth; and that passion never is, nor can be, carried to too high a degree. (David Hume, 1737)
Nature will always maintain her rights, and prevail in the end over any abstract reasoning whatsoever. (David Hume, 1737)
If I ask you why you believe any particular matter of fact, which you relate, you must tell me some reason; and this reason will be some other fact, connected with it. But as you cannot proceed after this manner, in infinitum, you must at last terminate in some fact, which is present to your memory or senses; or must allow that your belief is entirely without foundation. (David Hume, 1737)
Nothing is more free than the imagination of man; and though it cannot exceed that original stock of ideas furnished by the internal and external senses, it has unlimited power of mixing, compounding, separating, and dividing these ideas, in all the varieties of fiction and vision. (David Hume, 1737)
When I throw a piece of dry wood into a fire, my mind is immediately carried to conceive, that it augments, not extinguishes the flame. This transition of thought from the cause to the effect proceeds not from reason. It derives its origin altogether from custom and experience. (David Hume, 1737)
It seems evident, that, when the mind looks forward to discover the event, which may result from the throw of such a dye, it considers the turning up of each particular side as alike probable; and this is the very nature of chance, to render all the particular events, comprehended in it, entirely equal. (David Hume, 1737)
There are no ideas, which occur in metaphysics, more obscure and uncertain, than those of power, force, energy or necessary connexion, of which it is every moment necessary for us to treat in all our disquisitions. (David Hume, 1737)
It seems a proposition, which will not admit of much dispute, that all our ideas are nothing but copies of our impressions, or, in other words, that it is impossible for us to think of any thing, which we have not antecedently felt, either by our external or internal senses. I have endeavoured to explain and prove this proposition, and have expressed my hopes, that, by a proper application of it, men may reach a greater clearness and precision in philosophical reasonings, than what they have hitherto been able to attain. Complex ideas may, perhaps, be well known by definition, which is nothing but an enumeration of those parts or simple ideas, that compose them. But when we have pushed up definitions to the most simple ideas, and find still some ambiguity and obscurity; what resource are we then possessed of? By what invention can we throw light upon these ideas, and render them altogether precise and determinate to our intellectual view? (David Hume, 1737)
Produce the impressions or original sentiments, from which the ideas are copied. These impressions are all strong and sensible. They admit not of ambiguity. They are not only placed in a full light of themselves, but may throw light on their correspondent ideas, which lie in obscurity. And by this means, we may, perhaps, attain a new microscope or species of optics, by which, in the moral sciences, the most minute, and most simple ideas may be so enlarged as to fall readily under our apprehension, and be equally known with the grossest and most sensible ideas, that can be the object of our enquiry. (David Hume, 1737)
It is universally allowed that matter, in all its operations, is actuated by a necessary force, and that every natural effect is so precisely determined by the energy of its cause that no other effect, in such particular circumstances, could possibly have resulted from it. (David Hume, 1737)
Would we, therefore, form a just and precise idea of necessity, we must consider whence that idea arises when we apply it to the operation of bodies. (David Hume, 1737)
.. they are thence apt to suppose, that there is a difference between the effects which result from material force, and those which arise from thought and intelligence. (David Hume, 1737)
Necessity, according to the sense in which it is here taken, has never yet been rejected, nor can ever, I think, be rejected by any philosopher. It may only, perhaps, be pretended that the mind can perceive, in the operations of matter, some farther connexion between the cause and effect; and connexion that has not place in voluntary actions of intelligent beings. Now whether it be so or not, can only appear upon examination; and it is incumbent on these philosophers to make good their assertion, by defining or describing that necessity, and pointing it out to us in the operations of material causes.
It would seem, indeed, that men begin at the wrong end of this question concerning liberty and necessity, when they enter upon it by examining the faculties of the soul, the influence of the understanding, and the operations of the will. Let them first discuss a more simple question, namely, the operations of body and of brute unintelligent matter; and try whether they can there form any idea of causation and necessity, except that of a constant conjunction of objects, and subsequent inference of the mind from one to another. (David Hume, 1737)
By liberty, then, we can only mean a power of acting or not acting, according to the determinations of the will; that is, if we choose to remain at rest, we may; if we choose to move, we also may. (David Hume, 1737)
Necessity may be defined in two ways, conformably to the two definitions of cause, of which it makes an essential part. It consists either in the constant conjunction of like objects, or in the inference of the understanding from one object to another. (David Hume, 1737)
It is experience only, which gives authority to human testimony; and it is the same experience, which assures us of the laws of Nature. (David Hume, 1737)
.. the knavery and folly of men are such common phenomena, that I should rather believe the most extraordinary events to arise from their concurrence, than admit of so signal a violation of the laws of Nature. (David Hume, 1737)
Our most holy religion is founded on Faith, not on reason ... (David Hume, 1737)
And whoever is moved by Faith to assent to it, is conscious of a continued miracle in his own person, which subverts all the principles of his understanding, and gives him a determination to believe what is most contrary to custom and experience. (David Hume, 1737)
If the cause, assigned for any effect, be not sufficient to produce it, we must either reject that cause, or add to it such qualities as will give it a just proposition to the effect. But if we ascribe to it farther qualities, or affirm it capable of producing other effects, we can only indulge the licence of conjecture, and arbitrarily suppose the existence of qualities and energies, without reason or authority. ... The same rule holds, whether the cause assigned be brute unconscious matter, or a rational intelligent being. If the cause be known only by the effect, we never ought to ascribe to it any qualities, beyond what are precisely requisite to produce the effect: Nor can we, by any rules of just reasoning, return back from the cause, and infer other effects from it, beyond those by which alone it is known to us. (David Hume, 1737)
I deny a providence, you say, and supreme governor of the world, who guides the course of events, and punishes the vicious with infamy and disappointment, and rewards the virtuous with honour and success, in all their undertakings. But surely, I deny not the course itself of events, which lies open to every one's inquiry and examination. I acknowledge, that, in the present order of things, virtue is attended with more peace of mind than vice, and meets with a more favorable reception from the world. I am sensible, that, according to the past experience of mankind, friendship is the chief joy of human life, and moderation the only source of tranquility and happiness. I never balance between the virtuous and the vicious course of life; but am sensible, that, to a well-disposed mind, every advantage is on the side of the former. And what can you say more, allowing all your suppositions and reasonings? (David Hume, 1737)
It is still open for me, as well as you, to regulate my behavior, by my experience of past events. (David Hume, 1737)
While we argue from the course of nature, and infer a particular intelligent cause, which first bestowed, and still preserves order in the universe, we embrace a principle, which is both uncertain and useless. It is uncertain; because the subject lies entirely beyond the reach of human experience. It is useless; because our knowledge of this cause being derived entirely from the course of nature, we can never, according to the rules of just reasoning, return back from the cause with any new inference, or making additions to the common and experienced course of nature, establish any new principles of conduct and behavior. .. But allowing you to make experience (as indeed I think you ought) the only standard of our judgment concerning this, and all other questions of fact. (David Hume, 1737)
... thus speech and words and language are fixed by human convention and agreement. (David Hume, 1737)
And as this is the obvious appearance of things, it must be admitted, till some hypothesis be discovered, which by penetrating deeper into human nature, may prove the former affections to be nothing but modifications of the latter. All attempts of this kind have hitherto proved fruitless, and seem to have proceeded entirely from that love of simplicity which has been the source of much false reasoning in philosophy. ... The simplest and most obvious cause which can there be assigned for any phenomena, is probably the true one.(David Hume, 1737)
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Introduction - Hume's Problem of Causation & Necessary Connection - WSM explains Causation / Necessary Connection - Solution to Hume's Problem of Induction - Hume Solidity Extension Motion Force - David Hume Quotes - Links David Hume - Top of Page
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David Hume - Related Links
Uniting Metaphysics and Philosophy - Solving Hume's Problem of Causation, Kant's Critical Idealism, Popper's Problem of Induction, Kuhn's Paradigm.
Metaphysics: Skepticism - On Truth and Certainty - Scientific Minds are Skeptical and Open. On how we can be certain we know the Truth about Reality. Quotations David Hume, A.J. Ayer, Immanuel Kant, Albert Einstein, George Berkeley.
Philosophy - Free Will Determinism - Wave Structure of Matter explains Limited Free Will in a Necessarily Connected (Logical) Universe. Quotations David Hume.
Philosophy Morality Ethics - The Fundamental Morality of World Religions 'Do Unto Others ...' is Logically True as the Other is a Part of the Self. Quotations Albert Einstein, Buddha, Confucius, David Hume, Leo Tolstoy.
Atheist Atheism Agnostic Agnosticism - Religion is our Connection to What exists and causes all Things (Universe, Physical Reality, God) thus we are all Religious. Religion should Unite us to One Thing and thus bring Harmony to Humanity. Quotations David Hume, Sigmund Freud, Buddha, Leo Tolstoy.
Evolution: Culture - Importance of True Knowledge of Reality (Wave Structure of Matter) for Human Cultural Evolution (Utopia). Quotations David Hume on Custom, Habit, Society and Law.
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Site Introduction (2010): Despite several thousand years of failure to correctly understand physical reality (hence the current postmodern view that this is impossible) there is an obvious solution.
Simply unite Science (Occam's Razor / Simplicity) with Metaphysics (Dynamic Unity of Reality) and describe reality from only one substance existing, as Leibniz wrote;
'Reality cannot be found except in One single source, because of the interconnection of all things with one another'.
Given we all experience many minds and many material things, but always in one common Space, we are thus required to describe physical reality in terms of Space. We then find there is only one solution, a Wave Structure of Matter (WSM) where the electron is a spherical standing wave. See Wave Diagrams.
In hindsight the error was obvious, to try and describe an interconnected reality with discrete 'particles', which then required forces / fields to connect them in space and time. This was always just a mathematical solution which never explained how matter was connected across the universe.
I realise that there are a lot of 'crackpot' theories about truth and reality on the internet, but it is easy to show that the Wave Structure of Matter is the correct solution as it deduces the laws of Nature (the fundamentals of Physics & Philosophy) perfectly (there are no opinions). While the Wave Structure of Matter is obvious once known, to begin it will seem strange simply because it takes time for our minds to adjust to new knowledge.
For those who are religious / spiritual, I think Albert Einstein expresses the enlightened view of God. He writes 'I believe in Spinoza's God who reveals himself in the orderly harmony of what exists, not in a God who concerns himself with the fates and actions of human beings.' This harmony arises from a Wave Structure of Matter in Space (we are all interconnected in this space that we all commonly experience). This unity of reality (God, Brahman, Tao, Spirit, Energy, Light, Vibration) is central to all major world religions, thus their common moral foundation of 'Do unto others as to thyself' as the other is part of the self.
Please help our world (human society / life on earth) by sharing this knowledge.
Clearly our world is in great trouble due to human overpopulation and the resultant destruction of Nature, climate change and the pollution of air, land and water. The best solution to these problems is to found our societies on truth and reality rather than past myths and customs (which invariably cause harm).
We are listed as one of the Top Philosophy Websites on the Internet with around 600,000 page views each week, and rank in the top 20 in Google for many academic search terms - so we just need a bit of help to get in the top five. Given the Censorship in Physics / Philosophy of Science Journals (founded on the standard model / particle physics) the internet is clearly the best way to get new knowledge visible to the world.
A world now in great need of wisdom from truth and reality.
Sincerely,
Geoff Haselhurst - Karene Howie - Full Introduction - Email - Nice Letters - Share this Knowledge
In a time of universal deceit - telling the truth is a revolutionary act. (George Orwell)
You must be the change you wish to see in the world. (Mohandas Gandhi)
All that is necessary for evil to succeed is for good men to do nothing. (Edmund Burke)
Hell is Truth Seen Too Late. (Thomas Hobbes)
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David Hume's Theory of Ideas
The Origin and Limits of Thought
Jun 28, 2008 Nathaniel Moya
We often take ideas for granted, stepping from one to another as steps in the process of thought. But how do we procure our ideas? David Hume provides an answer.
David Hume was, and still is, a controversial Scottish Philosopher. He was born on April 26th, 1711, in Edinburgh, Scotland, and died August 25th, 1776. Although noted primarily for his innovative work in philosophy, he was not accepted kindly as a philosopher during his lifetime, and instead made a living in politics, economics, and as a historian. His History of England was for years the authoritative source on the subject. His works on philosophy span moral, religious, political, and epistemological concerns.
Basic Foundation of Hume’s Theory
David Hume sees the most fundamental fact of experience as being composed of perceptions. Furthermore, our perceptions can be further dichotomized into two categories: impressions and ideas.
Impressions, and their Source
Impressions are more forceful than ideas and can originate either externally (outward sensations) or internally (operations of the mind). External impressions can be thought of as impressions of sensation, and internal impressions as impressions of reflection. Furthermore, impressions are reducible to either simples or complexes. Simples being composed of a singularity, or one specific quality (hot), whereas complexes are composed of many qualities (fire: hot, red, orange, etc.). Lastly, no matter how complex an impression may be it is always reducible to its constituent simples.
Ideas, and their Source
Ideas are less forceful than impressions because they derive from, and are copies of impressions. So, for example, an idea of a computer comes from the initial impression of a computer. Consequently, an idea of a computer cannot exist without a corresponding impression of a computer. And when we have a particular idea of a computer it is nothing more than a reflection on that original impression. Importantly, then, ideas are not to be thought of as originals.
Furthermore, ideas are also dichotomized as simples or complexes. The idea of ‘hot’ would be considered a simple idea, whereas the idea of ‘fire’ would be defined as a complex idea because ‘fire’ generally makes us also have the ideas ‘hot’, ‘red’, ‘orange’, and whatever qualities may come to mind. Consequently, complex ideas derive from complex impressions, and simple ideas derive from simple impressions. Ultimately, though, all ideas are reducible to simple impressions. And unless original impressions are copied (reflected upon) they do not develop into ideas. They exist in a state of pre-thought.
The Limits of Thought and Imagination
An interesting consequence develops when ideas derive from impressions. All thinking uses ideas as its contents of thought, and so all thinking is confined to what it gathers through simple or complex impressions. Thought or imagination, then, can only combine ideas that it has gathered from impressions. And no matter how flexible an imagination may be, and now matter the depth of any thought, they are entirely restricted to the domain of experienced impressions.
Hume presents an example to argue his case. He says imagine a virtuous horse. Most people might consider this a ridiculous idea because it implies even a fish, or a rat, or whatever animal we imagine can also be virtuous. There is certainly nothing wrong with the thought of a virtuous horse, but we shouldn’t think of it as something authentically real because all we are doing is combining the impression of ‘virtue’ with an impression of a ‘horse’.
This argument was primarily meant to be a critique of philosophers who would develop incredibly detailed and complex systems that, when considered objectively, did not seem to refer to anything or experience from the world. Immanuel Kant, the great German philosopher, cited David Hume as the source that enabled him to break from the overly idealistic philosophies of Spinoza, Wolff, and Leibniz. Kant then went on to form one of the most famous and complex systems of philosophy, not to mention one of the most influential, as it synthesized his training in German idealism with Hume’s systematic empiricism.
References
Hume, David, An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding, 2nd edition, edited and introduction by Eric Steinberg. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1993.
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History of Philosophy
by
Alfred Weber
§ 61. David Hume(1)
"There are no bodies," the idealists dogmatically declared; "there is no spiritual substance," was the equally dogmatic assertion of the materialists. The Scotchman, DAVID HUME (1711-1776), an acute thinker and classical historian of England,(2) opposes to each of these schools the doubts of Protagoras and Locke: Can the human mind solve the ontological problem? Is metaphysics, considered as the science of the immanent essence and primary causes of things, possible? In his Essays, which are inimitable masterpieces of acumen and clearness, modern philosophy enters upon the path marked out by English empiricism. The human mind begins to reflect upon its resources with a view to ascertaining the pre-conditions of knowledge, the origin of metaphysical ideas, and the limits of its capacity. Philosophy becomes decidedly critical and positivistic.
For the old metaphysics, i. e., the alleged science of the essence of things, "that abstruse philosophy and metaphysical jargon, which, being mixed up with popular superstition, renders it in a manner impenetrable to careless reasoners, and gives it the air of science and wisdom,"(3) we must, according to Hume, substitute criticism. In other words, we must inquire seriously into the nature of human understanding, and show, from an exact analysis of its powers and capacity, that it is by no means fitted for such remote and abstruse subjects as traditional metaphysics busies itself with. We must submit to this fatigue, in order to live at ease ever after; and must cultivate true metaphysics with some care, in order to destroy the false and adulterate.
Though criticism is more modest in its pretensions than ontology, it is no inconsiderable part of science to know the different operations of the mind, to separate them from each other, to class them under their proper heads, and to correct all that seeming disorder in which they lie involved, when made the object of reflection and inquiry. This science has the immense advantage over metaphysics of being certain. Nor can there remain any suspicion that this science is uncertain and chimerical; unless we should entertain such a scepticism as is entirely subversive of all speculation, and even action.(4) To throw up all at once all pretensions of this kind may justly be deemed more rash, precipitate, and dogmatical than even the boldest and most affirmative philosophy.(5) We esteem it worthy of the labor of a philosopher to give us a true system of the planets, and adjust the position and order of those remote bodies. How much more highly should we value those who, with so much success, delineate the parts of the mind, in which we are so intimately concerned! We have succeeded in determining the laws by which the revolutions of the planets are governed. And there is no reason to despair of equal success in our inquiries concerning the mental powers and economy. All we have to do is to enter upon the enterprise with thorough care and attention.(6)
Hume loves to call himself a sceptic, and he is a sceptic as regards dogmatic metaphysics. But from the above explicit statements and many other like assertions, it would seem that his philosophy is nothing but criticism. It is not his purpose to renounce philosophy or even metaphysics, but to give it a different direction and a different object, to turn it from fruitless speculation, and to establish it on the firm and certain foundation of experience.(7) Had Hume been an absolute sceptic he could never have produced an Immanuel Kant. Now, whatever difference there may be between the results of these two thinkers, one thing is certain: The spirit of their theoretical philosophy, the fundamental conception of their investigations, and the goal at which they aim, are perfectly identical. Theirs is the critical spirit, and positive knowledge the goal at which they aim. To claim for Kant the sole honor of having founded criticism is an error which a closer study of British philosophy tends to refute.
The following is the substance of Hume's inquiries concerning human understanding: --
All our perceptions may be divided into two classes: ideas or thoughts and impressions. Ideas are the less lively perceptions, of which we are conscious when we reflect on our sensations. By the term "impression" Hume means all our more lively perceptions, when we hear, or see, or feel, or love, or hate, or desire, or will.(8) Nothing, at first view, he says, seems more unbounded than thought; but a nearer examination shows that it is really confined within very narrow limits, and that it amounts to no more than the faculty of compounding, transposing, augmenting, or diminishing the materials afforded us by the senses and experience. All the materials of our thinking are derived either from our outward or inward sentiment; the mixture and composition of these belongs alone to the mind and will.(9) Or, in other terms, all our ideas or more feeble perceptions are copies of our impressions or more lively ones. Even the idea of God arises from reflecting on the operations of our own mind, and augmenting, without limit, those qualities of goodness and wisdom which we observe in ourselves. We may prosecute this inquiry to what length we please; we shall always find that every idea which we examine is copied from a similar impression. A blind man can form no notion of colors; a deaf man of sounds.(10) Moreover, all ideas, compared to sensations, are naturally faint and obscure.(11)
After having proved that all our ideas are derived from sensation, Hume shows that they succeed each other in a certain order, and that there is a certain connection between them. This order and this connection presuppose certain principles of connection, according to which our thoughts succeed each other. They are: Resemblance, contiguity in time or place, and causality. The question here presents itself: Are these principles, especially causality, the most important of all notions, a priori, innate, anterior to all impressions, as idealism claims, or are they ideas in the sense which sensationalism attaches to the term, i.e., faint sensations, copies of similar impressions? Kant answers the first question in the affirmative; Hume, the latter. He devotes all the efforts of his criticism to the notion of causality, force, power, or necessary connection, and the explanation of its origin. This idea, like all others, arises from sensation. Experience teaches us that one billiard-ball communicates motion to another upon impulse, and that the latter moves in a certain direction. We have no a priori knowledge either of the movement or of the direction of the movement. Between what we call the cause and what we call the effect there is no necessary connection that could ever be discovered a priori. The effect is totally different from the cause, and consequently can never be discovered in it. The mind can never possibly find the effect in the supposed cause, by the most accurate scrutiny and examination; and wherever experience shows us that a particular effect succeeds a particular cause, there are always many other effects which, to reason, must seem fully as consistent and natural.(12) In vain, therefore, should we pretend to determine any single event, or infer any cause or effect, without the assistance of observation and experience. In a word, the idea of cause is no exception to the rule according to which all our ideas arise from sensation.
It remains to be seen how it is derived, what is the impression from which it comes?
Let us first observe - and here the sensationalistic explanation strikes a difficulty which Hume fully appreciated - let us observe that what we call power, force, energy, or necessary connection can never be perceived. One object follows another in an uninterrupted succession; that is all we see; but the power or force which actuates the whole machine is entirely concealed from us. We know that, in fact, heat is a constant attendant of flame; but what is the connection between them we cannot conjecture or even imagine. Since external objects give us no such idea, let us see whether this idea be derived from reflection on the operations of our own minds. It may be said that we are every moment conscious of internal power; while we feel that, by the simple command of our will, we can move the organs of our body, or direct the faculties of our mind. But the influence of volition over the organs of the body is a fact which, like all other natural events, can be known only by experience. The motion of our body follows upon the command of our will. Of this we are every moment conscious. But the means by which this is effected; of this we are so far from being conscious that it must forever escape our most diligent inquiry.(13) A man suddenly struck with a palsy in the leg or arm, or who had newly lost those members, frequently endeavors, at first, to move them, and employ them in their usual offices. Here he is as much conscious of power to command such limbs as a man in perfect health. But consciousness never deceives. Consequently, neither in the one case nor in the other, are we ever conscious of any power. We learn the influence of our will from experience alone. And experience only teaches us how one event constantly follows another, without instructing us in the secret connection which binds them together and renders them inseparable.
The idea which we are examining is not derived from any consciousness within ourselves. Nor do we get it through the senses. Then how does it originate? As we can have no idea of anything which never appeared to our outward sense or inward sentiment, the necessary conclusion seems to be that we have no idea of power or connection at all, and that these words are absolutely without meaning, when employed either in philosophical reasonings or common life.
But there still remains one method of avoiding this conclusion; it is to explain the idea of cause by custom or habit. We are accustomed to seeing certain events in constant conjunction. When any natural object or event is presented, it is impossible for us, by any sagacity or penetration, to discover or even conjecture, without experience, what event will result from it, or to carry our foresight beyond that object which is immediately present to the memory and senses. But when one particular species of event has always, in all instances, been conjoined with another, we make no longer any scruple of foretelling one upon the appearance of the other.(14) We observe, for example, that there is a constant connection between heat and flame, between solidity and weight, and we are accustomed to infer the existence of one from the existence of the other. We then call the one object, cause, the other, effect. We, suppose that there is some connection between them, some power in the one by which it infallibly produces the other, and operates with the greatest certainty and strongest necessity.
Hence the idea of cause does not arise from any single impression, from the perception of a particular object; it springs from our habit of seeing several impressions and several objects follow each other in regular order. This connection, therefore, which we feel in the mind, this customary transition of the imagination from one object to its usual attendant, is the sentiment or impression from which we form the idea of power or necessary connection.
To recapitulate: Every idea is copied from some preceding impression or sentiment; and where we cannot find any impression, we may be certain that there is no idea. In all single instances of the operation of bodies or minds, there is nothing that produces any impression, nor consequently can suggest, any idea of power or necessary connection. But when many uniform instances appear, and the same object is always followed by the same event, we then begin to entertain the notion of cause and connection. We then feel a new sentiment or impression, to wit, a customary connection in the thought or imagination between one object and its usual attendant; and this sentiment is the original of that idea which we seek for.
Hume, whose criticism aims to overthrow the principle of causality on the ground that it is neither an a priori possession, nor derived from any particular experience, is nevertheless a thorough-going determinist in morals and in history. Indeed, he is, with Hobbes and Spinoza, one of the founders of positive historical science, which is based on the principle of necessary human action. "It is universally acknowledged," he says,(15) "that there is a great uniformity among the actions of men, in all nations and ages, and that human nature remains still the same, in its principles and operations. The same motives always produce the same actions; the same events follow from the same causes. Ambition, avarice, self-love, vanity, friendship, generosity, public spirit; these passions, mixed in various degrees, and distributed through society, have been, from the beginning of the world, and still are, the source of all the actions and enterprises which have ever been observed among mankind. Would you know the sentiments, inclinations, and course of life of the Greeks and Romans? Study well the temper and actions of the French and English; you cannot be much mistaken in transferring to the former most of the observations which you have made with regard to the latter. Mankind are so much the same, in all times and places, that history informs us of nothing new or strange in this particular. Its chief use is only to discover the constant and universal principles of human nature."
"Were there no uniformity in human actions, and were every experiment which we could form of this kind irregular and anomalous, it were impossible to collect any general observations concerning mankind. . . . The vulgar, who take things according to their first appearance, attribute the uncertainty of events to such an uncertainty in the causes as makes the latter often fail of their usual operation, though they meet with no impediment in their operation. But philosophers, observing that almost in every part of nature, there is contained a vast variety of springs and principles, which are hid by their minuteness or remoteness, find that it is at least possible the contrariety of events may not proceed from any contingency in the cause, but from the secret operation of contrary causes. This possibility is converted into certainty by farther observation, when they remark that, upon an exact scrutiny, a contrariety of effects always betrays a contrariety of causes, and proceeds from their mutual opposition. A peasant can give no better reason for the stopping of any clock or watch than to say that it does not commonly go right, but an artist easily perceives that the same force in the spring or pendulum has always the same influence on the wheels, but fails of its usual effect, perhaps by reason of a grain of dust, which puts a stop to the whole movement. From the observation of several parallel instances, philosophers form a maxim that the connection between all causes and effects is equally necessary, and that its seeming uncertainty in some instances proceeds from the secret opposition of contrary causes." The human will is governed by laws which are no less steady than those which govern the winds, rain, and clouds (Spinoza); the conjunction between motives and voluntary actions is as regular and uniform as that between the cause and effect in any part of nature.(16)
This truth has been universally acknowledged among mankind; it is the source of all the inferences which we form concerning human actions, the basis of all our inferences concerning the future. Physical necessity and moral necessity are two different names, but their nature is the same. Natural evidence and moral evidence are derived from the same principle. In spite of the reluctance which men have to acknowledge the doctrine of necessity in words, they all tacitly profess it. "Necessity, according to the sense in which it is here taken, has never yet been rejected, nor can ever, I think, be rejected by any philosopher. . . . By liberty, then, we can only mean a power of acting or not acting, according to the determinations of the will (Locke). . . . It is universally allowed that nothing exists without a cause of its existence, and that chance, when strictly examined, is a mere negative word, but it is pretended that some causes are necessary, some not necessary. Here then is the advantage of definitions. Let any one define a cause, without comprehending, as a part of the definition, a necessary connection with its effect. Whoever attempts to do that will be obliged either to employ unintelligible terms, or such as are synonymous to the term which he endeavors to define, and if the definition above mentioned be admitted, liberty when opposed to necessity, not to constraint, is the same thing with chance, which is universally allowed to have no existence."
Experience refutes the dualism of will and physical agencies; it also destroys the dualism of reason and instinct. Animals, as well as men, learn many things from experience, and infer that the same events will always follow the same causes. By this principle they become acquainted with the more obvious properties of external objects, and gradually, from their birth, treasure up a knowledge of the nature of fire, water, earth, stones, heights, depths, etc., and of the effects which result from their operation. The ignorance and inexperience of the young are here plainly distinguishable from the cunning and sagacity of the old, who have learned, from long observation, to avoid what hurt them, and to pursue what gave ease or pleasure. A horse that has been accustomed to the field becomes acquainted with the proper height which he can leap, and will never attempt what exceeds his force and ability. An old greyhound will trust the more fatiguing part of the chase to the younger, and will place himself so as to meet the hare in her doubles; nor are the conjectures which he forms on this occasion founded in anything but his observation and experience. Animals, therefore, are not guided in these inferences by reasoning, neither are children, neither are the generality of mankind, in their ordinary actions and conclusions; neither are the philosophers themselves. Animals undoubtedly owe a large part of their knowledge to what we call instinct. But the experimental reasoning itself, which we possess in common with beasts, is nothing but a species of instinct or mechanical power that acts in us unknown to ourselves.(17)
The universal propensity to form an idea of God, if not an original instinct, is at least "a general attendant of human nature."(18) This proposition contains the gist of Hume's theology. He is an outspoken opponent of all positive religions, and finds it hard to regard them as "anything but sick men's dreams," or "the playsome whimsies of monkeys in human shape."(19) The doctrine of immortality is "a riddle, an enigma, an inexplicable mystery." He opposes the following arguments to miracles: There is not to be found in all history any miracle attested by a sufficient number of men, of such unquestioned good sense, education, and learning, as to secure us against all delusion in themselves; of such undoubted integrity, as to place them beyond all suspicion of any design to deceive others; of such credit and reputation in the eyes of mankind, as to have a great deal to lose in case of their being detected in any falsehood; and at the same time attesting facts performed in such a public manner, and in so celebrated a part of the world, as to render the detection unavoidable. The passion of surprise and wonder gives a sensible tendency towards the belief of those events from which it is derived. Supernatural relations abound among ignorant and barbarous nations; or if a civilized people has ever given admission to any of them, that people will be found to have received them from ignorant and barbarous ancestors, who transmitted them with that inviolable sanction and authority which always attend received opinions. It is a general maxim that no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind that its falsehood would be more miraculous than the fact which it endeavors to establish.(20)
Although Hume's conclusions in theology, as well as in ethics and psychology, wholly agree, on the one hand, with the doctrines of the rationalist Spinoza, and on the other, with those of the French materialists, the Scotch philosopher nevertheless maintains to the end his scepticism, as he loves to call it, or criticism, or positivism, as we designate it nowadays, in order to distinguish it from the scepticism of the ancients. True scepticism, as he conceives it, does not consist in perpetually doubting all things, but in limiting "our enquiries to such subjects as are best adapted to the narrow capacity of human understanding.(21) . . . This narrow limitation, indeed, of our enquiries, is, in every respect, so reasonable, that it suffices to make the slightest examination into the natural powers of the human mind, and to compare them with their objects, in order to recommend it to us."(22)
The most salient feature of this scepticism, as compared either with metaphysical dogmatism, or the naive objectivism of common-sense, is that it distinguishes between things as they are and things as they appear to us. Without any reasoning, says Hume,(23) we always suppose an external universe, which depends not on our perception, but would exist, though we and every sensible creature were absent or annihilated. This very table, which we see white, and which we feel hard, is believed to exist, independent of our perception, and to be something external to our mind, which perceives it. Our presence bestows not being on it; our absence does not annihilate it. It preserves its existence uniform and entire, independent of the situation of intelligent beings, who perceive or contemplate it. But this universal and primary opinion of all men is soon destroyed by the slightest philosophy. And no man who reflects ever doubted that the existences which we consider, when we say, this house and that tree, are nothing but perceptions in the mind, and fleeting copies or representations of other existences which remain uniform and independent. Even the primary qualities of extension and solidity are perceptions of the mind. - (Berkeley.)
Are these perceptions produced by external objects resembling them? Here experience, which alone can answer this question of fact, is and must be entirely silent. Do external objects at least exist? Experience is equally silent on this point. However, to doubt the existence of bodies is an excessive scepticism, which action and employment, and the common occupations of life, subvert. This excessive scepticism, or Pyrrhonism, true scepticism rejects as barren.(24) Every time it attempts to reappear, nature puts it to flight. Nevertheless, the existence of bodies, being a matter of fact, is incapable of demonstration. The only objects of real knowledge and demonstration are quantity and number. Experience decides concerning all matters of fact and existence, and experience never goes beyond probability.(25) - (Carneades.)
Hume's teachings were violently opposed, in the name of common-sense and morality, by THOMAS REID,(26) the founder of the so-called Scottish school, and by his disciples, 0SWALD,(27) BEATTIE,(28) and DUGALD STEWART.(29) All of these men were psychologists of merit, but, with the exception of Reid, mediocre metaphysicians.(30) In order to refute Hume it was necessary to put oneself in his position, - the critical position, - to use his own weapons, to renew the inquiry into the human understanding, and, if possible, to make it more thorough and complete. Kant, the most illustrious continuer and the most acute critic of the Scotch philosopher, saw that very clearly. "Common-sense," he says, "is a precious gift of God. But we must prove it by its acts, by deliberate and rational thought and speech, and not appeal to it as to an oracle, whenever reasons fail us. It is one of the subtle devices of our times to appeal to common-sense when our knowledge gives out, and the shallowest fool confidently measures his strength with the profoundest thinker's. . . . And what is this appeal to common-sense but a bid for the applause of the rabble, which cannot but bring the blush to the cheek of the philosopher? I cannot help thinking that Hume had as much good sense as Beattie." Reason can be corrected by reason alone.(31)
It is true, Hume's philosophy was not unassailable. There were breaks in his criticism; difficulties were eluded rather than solved. If experience is the sole source of knowledge, whence arises the exceptional character of absolute certainty which Hume himself concedes to mathematics? If there is nothing in the intellect which was not previously in the senses, how shall we explain the ideas of cause, necessary connection, and necessity? As was seen, the Scotch criticist explains the idea of necessary connection by the principle of habit. After the constant conjunction of two objects, we are determined by custom alone to expect the one from the appearance of the other. But this explanation does not suffice. The idea of necessity cannot come from experience alone, for the widest experience supplies us only with a limited number of cases; it never tells us what happens in all cases, and consequently does not yield necessary truth. Besides, it is not true that the notion of causality is that of necessary contiguity in time.(32) Causality signifies connection, and therefore contains an element not included in the notion of contiguity. Now, Hume expressly states that one event follows another, but that we can never observe any tie between them. They seem conjoined, but never connected.(33) Hence, if experience never shows us a cause, but only a succession of events (for that is what Hume means by the ill-chosen term conjunction, which is synonymous with connection), must we not either negate the idea of causation, or infer a different origin for it?
At this point Hume's criticism is corrected and completed by that of Kant.(34)
1. [Treatise on Human Nature, 3 vols., London, 1739-1740; ed. by Selby-Bigge, Clarendon Press, 1888. Hume afterwards worked over the three books of the Treatise, and published them under the following titles: An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, 1748; A Dissertation on the Passions; and An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, 1751. The first and last of these works, reprinted from the posthumous edition of 1777, have been edited, with introduction, etc., by J. A. Selby-Bigge, Oxford, 1894. Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary, 1741. The Natural History of Religion, 1755. All of the above-mentioned works, except the Treatise, were published under the title, Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects, London, 1770. The best edition of this collection (with introduction and notes), by T. H. Green and T. H. Grose, 2 vols., London, 1875, new ed., 1889. The Dialogues concerning Natural Religion appeared after Hume's death. These, together with the Treatise, are published, with introduction and notes, by T. H. Green and T. H. Grose, 2 vols., London, 1874, new ed.,1889. The Autobiography was published by Adam Smith, London, 1777. The essays on Suicide and the Immortality of the Soul appeared 1783. Selections from the Treatise (B. I.), by H. A. Aiken, in Series of Modern Philosophers, New York, 1893; from Hume's ethical writings, by J. H. Hyslop, in the Ethical Series, Boston, 1893. Works on Hume: F. Jodl, Leben und Philosophie David Hume's, Halle, 1872; E. Pfleiderer, Empirismus und Skepsis in D. H.'s Phil., Berlin, 1874; Meinong, Hume-Studien, 2 vols., Vienna, 1877,1882; G. v. Gizycki, Die Ethik D. H.'s, Breslau, 1878; T. Huxley, Hume, London, 1879 ; W. Knight, Hume (Philosophical Classics), London, 1886; Introduction to ed. of Hume's works by T. H. Green. - TR]
2. History of England from the invasion of Julius Cæsar, etc., 6 vols., London, 1754-1763. Hume's historical work made a greater impression on his age than his philosophical works. He himself was especially proud of his achievements as a historian (see Letters of David Hume to William Strahan. Now first edited by G. Birkbeck Hill, Oxford, 1888). Our age, however, has reversed this opinion. Hume, the spiritual father of Kant, now takes precedence over Hume, the rival of Robertson and Gibbon.
3. An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, sect. I. [Green's edition of Hume].
4. An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, sect. I., p. 10.
5. Id., p. 12
6. Id.
7. Id., sect. XII., part III., p. 133.
8. An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, sect. II., p. 14.
9. Id., p. 14. We have here, word for word, the teaching of Kant, who, however, adds that this mixture and composition depends on a priori forms, inherent in the mind. Hume also assumes that it depends on principles; but, absolute sensationalist that he is, derives the principles themselves from sensation, experience, and habit.
10. An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, sect. II., p. 15.
11. Id., p. 16.
12. An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, sect. IV., p. 27.
13. Id., sect. VII., pp. 54 f.
14. An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, sect. VII., p. 62.
15. An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, sect. VIII., p. 68.
16. An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, sect. VIII., pp. 71 f.
17. An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, sect. IX., pp. 85 ff.
18. The Natural History of Religion, sect. IV., p. 362.
19. Id., p. 362.
20. Essay concerning Human Understanding, sect. X., p. 94.
21. Id., XII., p. 133.
22. Id.
23. Id., p. 124.
24. Essay concerning Human Understanding, p. 130.
25. In excluding physics from the sphere of pure knowledge, the idealist Plato advances the same opinion.
26. 1710-1796. Professor at Glasgow. Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common-sense, London, 1764 ff. [Selections from the Inquiry by E. Sneath in Series of Modern Philosophers, New York, 1892. Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, 1785; Essays on the Active Powers of Man, 1788. Complete works, ed. by W. Hamilton, Edinburgh, 1827 ff. On the Scotch School see James McCosh, The Scottish Philosophy, London, 1875 ; New York, 1890. - TR. ].
27. Appeal to Common Sense in Behalf of Religion, Edinburgh, 1766.
28. 1735-1803. Professor at Edinburgh. Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth in Opposition to Sophistry and Scepticism, Edinburgh, 1770; Theory of Language, London, 1778; Elements of the Science of Morals, 1790-1793.
29. 1753-1828. Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind, 3 vols., London, 1792-1827; Outlines of Moral Philosophy, 1793 [ed. with critical notes by J. McCosh, London, 1863. Collected works, ed. by W. Hamilton, 10 vols., Edinburgh, 1854-1858. Thomas Brown (1778-1820), a pupil of Stewart, approximates Hume (Inquiry into the Relation of Cause and Effect, Edinb., 1803 ff.) - TR.].
30. In the philosophy of William Hamilton (1788-1856), the Scottish school, following the example of the Academy, culminates in scepticism, which it had undertaken to combat in David Hume. Sir W. Hamilton was noted for his Discussions on Philosophy and Literature, London and Edinburgh, 1852; 3d ed., 1866; Lectures on Metaphysics, 2d ed., 1860, and on Logic, 2d ed., 1866. See J. Stuart Mill, Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy, London, 1865; 5th ed., 1878, [Veitch, Hamilton (Philosophical Classics)].
31. Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik, Preface, vol. III. (Rosenkranz), p. 8.
32. What succession, as Thomas Reid aptly remarks, is older and more regularly observed than that of day and night? Now, it never occurs to any one to consider night as an effect of day, and day as the cause of night. Moreover, there is this peculiarity about the truths of experience that the certainty we get from them is susceptible of increase and diminution. After a second successful test, the physician is more convinced of the virtue of his medicine than after the first, and so on, until a long line of authentic cases changes into certainty what was at first a mere presumption and surmise. The case is quite different with a truth like the following: Nothing happens without a cause. The child, whose experience has just begun, believes in it with the same instinctive force as the adult and the old man, and experiences multiplied by the myriads can neither increase nor diminish its certainty.
33. An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, sec. VII., p. 62.
34. [Before the advent of Kant's criticism, German philosophy was dominated by the Leibnizo-Wolffian school (see pp. 368 f.), which culminated in a form of eclecticism similar to the English common-sense philosophy. J. H. Lambert (1728-1777), one of Kant's correspondents, attempts to reconcile Wolff and Locke, German metaphysics and English empiricism (Kosmologische Briefe, Augsburg, 1761); N. Tetens (1736-1805), who influenced Kant, aims to reconcile the rationalistic and sensationalistic psychology (Versuch über die menschliche Natur, 1776) ; M. Knutzen (died 1751), Kant's teacher, endeavors to reconcile Wolffian metaphysics, Newton's natural philosophy, and orthodox theology. Other representatives of this eclectic movement are the so-called popular philosophers, whose chief aim is to popularize philosophy: Moses Mendelssohn (1729-1786; complete works, 7 vols., Leipsic, 1843-44) ; C. Garve (1742-1798), the translator of Ferguson's and A. Smith's writings; J. J. Engel (1741-1802; Der Philosoph für die Welt, 1775-77) ; T. Abbt (1738-1766; Vom Tode fürs Vaterland, Berlin, 1761); Ernst Platner (1744-1818; Philosophische Aphorismen, 1776); F. Nicolai (1733-1811). To the Aufklürung also belong the deist H. S. Reimarus (1694-1765; Abhandlungen von den vornehmsten Wahrheiten der natürlichen Religion, Hamburg, 1754, 6th ed., 1794; and the poet G. E. Lessing (1729-1781). - TR.]
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David Hume
Knowledge is gained only through experience, and experiences only exist in the mind as individual units of thought. This theory of knowledge belonged to David Hume, a Scottish philosopher. Hume was born on April 26, 1711, as his family's second son. His father died when he was an infant and left his mother to care for him, his older brother, and his sister. David Hume passed through ordinary classes with great success, and found an early love for literature. He lived on his family's estate, Ninewells, near Edinburgh. Throughout his life, literature consumed his thoughts, and his life is little more than his works. By the age of 40, David Hume had been employed twice and had failed at the family careers, business and law. Occasionally, he served on diplomatic missions in France and other countries.
Hume's major work, A Treatise of Human Nature, was not well understood when first published, and received much criticism. The first two volumes were published in 1739, and the third in 1740. Immanuel Kant and other philosophers did notice his work and began respecting Hume for his reasoning. Later, he republished the first and third volumes as An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, and An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals in 1748 and 1751 respectively. The second volume was used as Part 2 of Four Dissertations in 1757.
During his lifetime Hume's reputation derived from the publication of his Political Discourses (1751) and six-volume History of England (1754-1762)," (Langley 415). David Hume discovered he was literary celebrity when visiting France in 1763. He retired to Edinburgh in 1769 and lived a happy life. He passed away August 25, 1776 and left in his will that he only wanted his name and date on his gravestone, "leaving it to posterity to add the rest," (Langley 415).
Skepticism is the belief that people cannot know the nature of things because perception reveals things not as they are, but as we experience them. In other words, knowledge is never known in truth, and humans should always question it. David Hume advanced skepticism to what he called mitigated skepticism. Mitigated skepticism was his approach to try to rid skepticism of the thoughts of human origin, and only include questions that people may begin to understand. Hume's goal was to limit philosophical questioning to things which could be comprehended.
Empiricism states that knowledge is based on experience, so everything that is known is learned through experience, but nothing is ever truly known. David Hume called lively and strong experiences, perceptions, and less lively events, beliefs or thoughts. Different words and concepts meant different things to different people due to the knowledge, or experiences they have. He believed, along with the fact that knowledge is only gained through experience, that a person's experiences are nothing more than the contents of his or her own consciousness. The knowledge of anything comes from the way it is perceived through the five senses. Hume began to distinguish between feelings and thoughts. Feelings are only impressions made upon the body, and thoughts arrive from impressions; for nothing can be thought that has not been experienced.
The meaning of ideas is more important than their truth. Belief results from ideas and assumptions, which are recollected from previous knowledge. Hume's analysis of causal relation is that everything that happens beyond what is available to memory rests on assumption.
"Let us examine two cases: I see lightning and hear thunder; I see a rabbit and then a fox. The question is why I am right in concluding that lightning causes thunder but wrong in believing that rabbits cause foxes. Experience, in both instances, reveals an A that is followed by B, and repeated experiences show that A is always followed by B. While the constant conjunction of A and B might eliminate the rabbit-fox hypothesis, it is of no help in explaining causality because there are all sorts of objects, such as tables and chairs, which are similarly conjoined but not supposed to be causally related. Thus experience reveals only that constant conjunction and priority are sufficient but not necessary conditions for establishing a causal connection." (Langley 417)
David Hume was a great philosopher. He was well known for his works and respected by the people of his time. His philosophical reasonings were written down to explain the unknown, to the people who know nothing but what they have experienced. Today philosophers read his material and highly regard his theory of knowledge. Empiricists and skeptics are still improving upon his thoughts. According to David Hume, there is no truth, but humans must continue to seek it by constantly improving upon one another. His theories can be used by ordinary people to improve upon themselves and their culture.
Works Cited
Langley, Raymond J. "The McGraw-Hill Encyclopedia of World Biography." 1973. Hume. Vol. 5. New York, New York: McGraw Hill Book Company, 1973. 415-17.
Mannoia, V. James. "Building a Christian World View, God, Man, and Knowledge." 1986. Rationalism and Empiricism. Vol. 1. Phillipsburg, New Jersey: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company, 1986. 268-71.
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