HISTORY OF CRYPTOLOGY, ADDRESS TO STAFF AND …

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Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 11-20-2013 pursuant to E .0. 1352a

REF ?ID: A63356

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TITLE

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Trithemius Oath

Sect. 798 of Espionage Law

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Cipher of Phillip II

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Jefferson decode Jefferson encode

Benedict Arnold

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Benedict Arnold Benedict Arnold

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Lincoln Message W. Wilson message W. Wilson message encoded by Mrs. Wilson W. Wilson message as sent Route Cipher - Federal .Army

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Grant cipher 9regory Code 1885

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Gregory Code

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Zimmermann Telegram (code)

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Nigel. De Grey

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German ADFGVX ? ?

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T/A WW I Special Code Section Report

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Specialized Code

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Baseball code Navy NCB

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In inviting me to address the staff 1and? students ot the Senior School

of the Marine Corps on the subject of "Communications Intelligence and

Communication Security" I assume th8.t the objective is to make you aware of

the roles that these two branches of tbe science of cryptology have played as

vital mil.itary weapons in the past and-may in the future again play.

Soon after the close of World War II, service schools began to ask for

lecturers to tell their student office~s something about our cryptologic

activities during the war. There was at first serious question as to the

advisability of lifting the security veil suf'f'iciently to permit discussion of

the subject, but in time an affirmative decision was ma.de. The official views

of the Naval War College on the matter were stated in a letter dated 5 February

1946, and because the letter admirably states those views I shall read two

:paragraphs of it. 1. In commenting upon the fine presentation ma.de by a certain

l From the then President of the College, Admiral R. A. Spruance, to the Chief of Naval C9mmunications, Admiral E. E. Stone.

speaker, the letter said:

G.w,.'t;. "His treatment of the subject matter emphasized the value of

communication intelligence to naval commanders, the vital importance of

maintaining the security of our own communication intelligence activities,

and the necessity for observing the principles of communication security

.. in defense against enemy communication intell.igence. I consider that the

value to be derived from the indoctrination of senior officers of the Navy

in these principles far outweighs any possible 1.oss of security resulting

from a partial reveiation of our.activities in the past war, particularly

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in view of the disclosures which have been ma.de in the press.

REF ID:A63356

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The letter continues: "It appears axiomatic that the fu1l benefit of' communication intelli-

gence can be obtained only when al1 senior officers realize its potentialities for winning and losing battles and wars, and when their actions are tempered by complete knowledge of the elements of communication

source which you'll all recognize--TIME magazine, }ssue of' 17 December 1945.

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I will preface the reading by reminding you that by that date the~war was all

over--or at least V-E and V-J days had been celebrated some months before.

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Many of you no doubt remember the loud clamor on the part of certain .,.~eeife!"oue

members of Congress who had for years been insisting upon learning the reasons

or ~,.c H~o'-' . t

" why we had been caught by surprise :l:B-euch--a disastrousidefeat--a~ the Japanese _...,--

:tnrl!ctr:M'ttpon us at""Pear1. This clamor had to be met, for these Congressman

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REF ID:A63356

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the U.S ? .Army at the time of the Pearl. Harbor Attacl(, 5-star General. George C.

Marshal.l, was cal.led to the witness stand. He testifie~ d f6~ 1"Ae~ e?e!'a~ i-loo~ g, -lo~ ng ~d

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~days ? Toward the end of his ordeal -ft' was questioned about a letter it Md. been-

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srnmlll'e& he'd written to Governor Dewey ii! 'bbe :Mttmnn-?of-i.~ during the~ {fk.1949-

Presidential Campaign. General Marshall 'l!l9Ylei-1? 'He pleaded long and most

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earnestly with the Committee not to force him to disclose the letter or its

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. -e1!>ntents, becauseA.e1.necessity for continued secrecy about code matters? "'But ~

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~?no avail. He had to bow to the will of the majority of the Committee. I

now readi~.,,..\ \t'\? ~

~~1?. "U.S. citizens discovered last week that perhaps their most potent

secret weapon of World War II was not radar, not the VT fuse, not the atom bomb, but a harmless little machine which cryptographers pa.ins-

takingly constructed in a hidden room 1au Fort Washington. With this i

ma.chine, built after years of trial and error, of inference and deduction, cryptographers had duplicated the decoding devices used in Tokyo. Testimony

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before the Pearl Barbor Committee had already shown that the machine

known as 'Magic' was in use long before December 7, 1941, had given ample

warning of the Japs' sneak attack if' only U.S. brass hats had been smart

8'iBB!I enough to realize it

r:?~e-i-~0~. Now General Marshall continued

the story of 'Magic's' magic. It had:

1. "Enabled a relatively small U.S. :f'orce to intercept a Jap

invasion fleet, win a decisive victory in the Battle of' the Coral Sea,

thus saving Australia and Nev Zealand.

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2. "Given the U.S. full. advance information on the size of the Jap

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forces advancing on Midway, enable~ the Navy to concentrate ships which

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otherwise might ha-ve- been. 3, llH!Jl.l( m-i.l.,.e..s.. \?aw- -ay., thus -se--t up an ambush which

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proved to be the turning-point victory of tbe PacifiG war.

3. "Directed U.S. submarines unerringfy to the sea lanes where Japanese

convoys would be passing.

,, . 4. "By decoding messages :f'rom Japan's Ambassador Oshima in Berlin,

often reporting interviews with Hitler, it h....ad given our forces invaluable

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information on German war plans ? 11 ~ ? ? .. ? 1

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WD4E g~a .QD .:t.Q....give more details._ .QL.~t -_story, -.to. -w.bioh w~hal.1~.etu:=.

It is hardly necessary to tell you how carefully Magic was guarded before,

during, and after the war. It is still very carefull.y guarded. Even the fact

of its existence was known to only a very few persons at the time of Pearl

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~-=~ Harbor--~ is an important

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element 1n 8Icy' attempt to explain

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lived in constant fear that the Japs would discover the secret, change

their code machinery, (and) force U.S. cryptographers to start all over again."

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Now I don't want to ae~a.;58 over-emphasize the importance of COMINT in the

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