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Unit 2: Weimar GermanyKey Interpretations (Rough Guide)Unit 2: Booklet 1THE GERMAN REVOLUTION, 1918The Nature of the new RepublicEbert’s relative conservatism (which is what happened)But could have developed to be:Soviet-style CommunismA third-way between Ebert and Communism which was broadly represented by the USPD.The Nature of the ‘German Revolution’There was little real change – the removal of the monarchy was symbolic rather than of real significance.The Republic which eventually emerged contained at once too much and too little of the old Germany: powerful institutional centre of the old ruling class remained intact and not subject to democratic control.Many Germans saw the Republic as originating in a revolution and therefore illegitimate.Parliamentary democracy began before the November Revolution.The Republic was accepted by many as a convenient means of filling a void left by the collapse of the monarchy.It was widely believed that the alternative to a conservative parliamentary regime was a ‘Red’ dictatorship.The revolution can be seen as a failure as the spirit of imperial Germany lived on e.g. civil service, judiciary, army corps and powerful industrialists.THE TREATY OF VERSAILLESThe Treaty of Versailles was a main cause of the difficulties of the new RepublicThe Treaty of Versailles was a curse on the new Republic from which it never recovered.The Weimar Republic was always associated with the signing of the Versailles Settlement.The Treaty caused Germany’s economic problems after the war due to reparations.The Treaty disillusioned moderate Germans who might otherwise have supported the new Republic.Resentment of the Treaty of Versailles caused political instability, particularly from the right.Reinforced the myth of the ‘stab in the back’ and the ‘November Criminals’The Treaty of Versailles did not create Germany’s economic problemsGermany’s economic problems began before the First World War Problems were made worse by the funding of the war through borrowing in the hope that German victory would allow reparations to be paid by the defeated allies. Ultimately Germany lost and was saddled with huge debts and rising inflation.There were some benefits for Germany from the Treaty of VersaillesThe break-up of the Tsarist Russian, Austro-Hungarian and Turkish Empires created opportunities for Germany, since it was surrounded by small, weak states, especially in the East.France failed to achieve its aims of a permanently weakened Germany and a secure border.Reparations were not so burdensome that they destroyed the German economy.The hope that the allies would in time modify the reparations proved justified.Harshness of the Treaty of VersaillesThe Treaty of Versailles was too harsh.The Treaty of Versailles was not as hash as was perceived.The terms and provisions of the Treaty of Versailles and their severity can be explained and justified.THE WEIMAR CONSTITUTIONDid the Constitution Weaken the Republic?The Constitution Weakened the RepublicThe Constitution was not DisastrousMany of its features were not accepted, e.g. proportional representation, parliamentary government or civil libertiesThe constitution was a product of a compromise between the most successful parties in the January 1919 election e.g. SPD, Z and DDP. Yet at no election after 1919 did these parties poll close to the number of votes achieved in 1919 – it can be argued that the constitution’s base was narrow and unrepresentative.The Weimar Constitution, compromise as it was, reflected a broad spectrum of political opinion. It eve included those on the nationalist right such as the DNVPIt reflected successful constitutional practice at the time and had built into it checks and balances which, if used carefully, might have led to political stability.The most convincing point to make on this side of the argument is that the problem with the Weimar constitution was not its design, but its misuse by the new Republic’s opponents.Verdicts on the ConstitutionWhatever problems faced the Weimar Republic they were not attributable to the democratic nature of the new Constitution which was a brave statement of liberal and democratic beliefs.The Weimar Constitution was a ‘hodge-podge’ of principles drawn from Socialist and liberal agendas; it represented so much confusion in regard to economic objectives and unresolved class conflicts that German democracy was impeded from the beginning.It was one of the most democratic documents in the world. In 1919 however, it was doubtful whether such a democratic constitution could work in the hands of people that were neither psychologically nor historically prepared for self-government.Despite its imperfections, the Weimar constitution provided an open framework which would have been capable of further refinement under more favourable circumstances.It was successful in helping make the transition to a peacetime economy.LEFT-WING OPPOSITION & SPARTACIST UPRISINGLeft-Wing OppositionThe left-wing opposition had the potential to overthrow the Weimar Government.Left-wing opposition did not have the potential to overthrow the Weimar Government.The Left-wing opposition did not seriously challenge the Weimar Republic but did help to reduce the confidence of many Germans in the government.The Government’s actions in dealing with left-wing opposition was flawedThe Government’s actions in dealing with left-wing opposition was effective.Ebert’s Policy of Cooperating with the Army and the EliteThe German communists of 1919 were dangerous and there was a need of repression. (Western historians 1950s)Ebert was the servant of the bourgeoisie, saving capitalism from the revolutionary threat of the communist-inspired masses. (Communist historians – this view was dismissed in the West as mere Communist propaganda).The chances of a Soviet-style communist regime were far lower than Ebert and his worried supporters believed. Ebert overestimated the threat to democracy from the Communists and underestimated the threat from the right.The pact between Ebert and Groener (a pact between a defeated army and a semi-revolutionary government) domed the Weimar republic at Birth. RIGHT-WING OPPOSITION & THE KAPP PUTSCHThe Kapp PutschThe Kapp Putsch was not a serious threat to the Weimar Republic.The Kapp Putsch posed a serious threat to the Weimar Republic – the army proved unreliable.The Kapp Putsch was only stopped by the reluctance of the civil service to accept Kapp’s authority and the actions of trade unionists.The Threat of the Right-WingThe Right-wing posed a bigger threat than the left.The Right-wing was supported by members of the elite, such as: large landowners, the army and the judiciary.The Weimar Republic was in a strong position to resist the right.The Weimar Republic was in a weak position to resist the right.Ebert’s deal with the army undermined the government’s ability to resist the right-wing.MUNICH PUTSCHThe Munich Putsch was a FailureHitler proved ineffective during the putsch’s events.Nothing had been properly planned.Hitler’s decision making was hesitant especially after Lossow and von Kahr had turned against him.The chances of bring off a coup in 1923 as Mussolini had done with his March on Rome in 1922 were never more than marginal.16 Nazis were killed.The Munich Putsch was not a Complete FailureThe Putsch and subsequent trial proved effective propaganda for the NazisThe trial gave Hitler a national platformThe Nazis changed tactics to a policy of legality which ultimately proved successfulOCCUPATION/INVASION OF THE RUHRFrench Invasion of the RuhrFrench occupation was a result of the German government’s inability to meet reparation paymentsThe French were dissatisfied that they were not given the Ruhr as part of the Treaty of VersaillesThe French were not convinced of American support in any future war with Germany due to the American Senate’s refusal to pass and accept the Treaty of Versailles.The French wanted to enforce all terms of the Treaty of Versailles to ensure Germany remained weakened.HYPERINFLATIONHyperinflation + InflationThe entire problem was closely connected with the reparations demanded by the alliesThe reparations issue should be seen as a contributory factor to the inflation and not as a primary cause.Inflation started before reparations became an issue; the connection with reparations cannot therefore be considered the ‘entire problem’.It makes sense to look at the issue of inflation in two stages:Early Stage: Creeping inflation, which was the result of long-term structural problems within the economy and the pressures exerted by war.Later Stage: Hyperinflation which was directly related to the obligation after 1921 to pay reparations.The German government deliberately provoked the inflationary crisis to avoid paying reparations. At most, the action of the German government was unwitting, through the use of deficit spending.German inflation/hyperinflation was caused by a combination of factors which interacted: the war and creeping inflation; loss of value in the German Mark; Government accelerated this by deficit spending from 1919; Impact of reparations – finding enough foreign currency and limiting the impact on the German economy; French occupation of the Ruhr and the policy of passive resistance; Finally, the policy of fulfilment in a hope to prove how unjust and impossible the reparations were. THREATS TO THE WEIMAR REPUBLICThe limited nature of the German RevolutionThe nature of the Weimar ConstitutionThe Treaty of VersaillesRight-Wing ExtremismLeft-Wing ExtremismThe Economic Crisis (Hyper-inflation)The attitudes of the German eliteThe attitudes of ordinary peopleUnit 2: Booklet 2WHO WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PROBLEMS IN THE WEIMAR ECONOMY?A Conservative View (Workers and Government were to blame)Historian Borchhardt is critical of Weimar Germany’s economic performance in the 1920s. He argues that the state was living beyond its means (spending too much), with both subsidies and the redistribution of wealth harmful to the economic growth.Borchhardt argues wages increased unrelated to productivity, due to the strength of trade unions and state arbitration. Profits and thus investment income were therefore squeezed which led to low internal investment, with growth lower than might be expected.Borchhardt stresses the persistence of high unemployment (over 1 million). Recession began at different times, in different sectors, but set in well before the October 1929 crash. Borchhardt points to an ‘abnormal’ in fact a sick economy, which could possibly have gone on in the same way even if the world depression had not occurred.An Alternative View (Industrialists and the Government)Other historians, such as left-wing Holtfrerich, reject what they see as Borchhardt’s stress on working class greed and argue that the main reasons for Germany’s limited economic performance lay with a lack of entrepreneurial attitude and inadequate investment from the industrial elite. Low productivity was primarily caused by government subsidies, and by industrialists’ formation of cartels which reduced entrepreneurial spirit. Thus failures were the responsibility more of cautious and cosseted industrialists than of hard-pressed workers who were striving to maintain their positions.A Synthesis/Revisionist (Workers, Industrialists and Government were to blame)Recent research, partly fuelled by new work in local archives available after the collapse of the East German state, suggest that both workers and employers contributed to economic weakness. Both groups (workers and industrialists) sought to defend their position and were unwilling to cooperate with each other.Wages did rise, but this was due more to local shortages of skilled labour than to greedy workers and over-powerful trade unions.Low investment was caused by savers’ lack of confidence in lending their money and by the government’s priority of trying to balance the budget.Key Interpretations: 1924-29 PeriodOn the surface these were years of recovery and achievement.The years 1924-29 only seem successful because they are held in contrast to the turmoil of 1918-23.Behind the superficial promise of these years, major weaknesses still existed in the Weimar Republic, weaknesses that would later contribute significantly to the downfall of democracy.DID THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC EXPERIENCE A SECURE RECOVERY 1924-1929?Did the Weimar Republic Experience A Secure Recovery, 1924-29?Temporary return of domestic prosperity and a relaxation in international relations.Political life of the Republic had been stabilised or matured.The Republic had come into being as an accidental Republic, with a democratic constitution that few Germans understood or appreciated. The political foundation of the Republic was also under attack by Germany’s elite institutions and groups e.g. judges, teachers, military, leaders of heavy industry.The profound social, economic, political and psychological destabilization which had set in with World War One had not really been overcome.It might appear that under Stresemann’s guidance a considerable amount had been achieved.Under the fa?ade of apparent stabilization there were many cracks, both political and economic.The era of Stresemann was the high noon of the Weimar Republic. Between 1924 and 1928, many wages doubled and the value of the currency was maintained. The standard of living was higher in 1928 than in 1913. Unemployment was generally below one million. In 1927, the expansion of the German State culminated in the introduction of a comprehensive unemployment insurance scheme. German industry regained its technical and organizational lead. The Dawes loan encouraged modernisation.Domestic Success? Most accept that Stresemann failed to strengthen significantly the Weimar regime. He hoped that the successful diplomacy that had strengthened the economy and had led to revision of the Versailles Treaty would win greater domestic support for the regime.There is considerable evidence that his policy failed to rally Germans to the regime as the concessions he gained were not sufficiently dramatic.Many Germans, especially on the right-wing, saw Stresemann’s policy of fulfilment of the terms of the Treaty of Versailles as capitulation. They believed that the Locarno Pact only benefitted the French, and that Germany should have nothing to do with the League of Nations. To right-wingers, Stresemann’s concessions achieved little because Germany remained occupied and disarmed. Even the Young Plan was opposed because it confirmed that Germany still had to pay reparations.STRESEMANN’S FOREIGN POLICYHow Successful was Stresemann’s Foreign Policy? It was successful e.g. Dawes Plan and Young Plan and Locarno Pact, Entry to the League of Nations.The concrete gains from his diplomacy were not great e.g. full withdrawal from west bank of the Rhine only happened after Stresemann’s death, no formal agreement changing the demilitarisation terms of Versailles.Stresemann’s basic approach was fundamentally flawed. By 1929 it was clear that Stresmann’s policy of combining Revisionism and Rapprochement had failed. The only way forward was to abandon either his method of his aims.The concessions Stresemann gained, if continued, would have led to major revision of the Versailles Treaty. This cannot be known as his death was followed by the adoption of more assertive foreign policy, and the Wall Street Crash in October 1929 changed the whole atmosphere.Was Stresemann a ‘Good European’ or a ‘Good German’?Stresemann moved away from his assertive nationalist past to become a ‘good European’. Thus, although he remained a true German patriot, he accepted that Germany’s interests were best protected by becoming part of the European Order and cooperating with foreign countries.Stresemann did not abandon his earlier extreme nationalist position and was essentially a ‘good German’, putting Germany’s interests above all else and determined to exploit the international situation to re-establish German hegemony in Europe.Some historians even argue that there were similarities between Stresemann’s and Hitler’s foreign policy. Stresemann was moderate (Good European)Stresemann maintained domestic support by using nationalistic rhetoric (Good German)Stresemann used both techniquesStresemann was prepared to manipulate events/circumstances to advance Germany’s cause (Good German).Stresemann’s Policies EvaluatedStresemann’s policies could be viewed as highly successful:The Locarno Pact gave France reassurance and ended the issue of what the western border should be. As Germany’s main antagonist, it was important for France to be placated. Stresemann could claim to have done this, at no real cost to Germany. Indeed, the evacuation of troops from Germany was a major gain, allowing Germany to focus on its eastern border.Entry into the League of Nations as a permanent member of the Council helped restore Germany’s status as a major power. Stresemann insisted on this, and was then able to exert pressure through the League on issues such as German minorities living in other states. Stresemann was given the Nobel Prize in 1926 for his work in restoring cooperation between states (‘the Spirit of Locarno’). The Dawes Plan was very important in German economic recovery, while the Young Plan diluted the original terms still further and made it unlikely that the full payment would ever be made.On the other hand, there were limitations:There was no formal change to the military limitations forced on Germany by the Treaty of Versailles.Historian Peukert argues that Stresemann ought to have settled the eastern borders and tried to build up economic and political influence in the new eastern and southern-eastern states. He also believes that by 1929 the policy of rapprochement and revisionism had failed and that Stresemann would have had to abandon his policy or method.Stresemann’s gradualism did not result in enthusiastic support from the electorate. Generally, Germans would have liked to have seen more dramatic concessions and revisions made. Those on the Right saw his supposed successes as a series of capitulations to the Allies, especially the French, and nationalist sentiment culminated in a widespread campaign against the Young Plan. In the subsequent referendum on the Plan, only 5.8 million (14%) voted for rejecting it. However, this campaign helped popularise Hitler as a fierce critic of the Plan. VIEW OF WEIMAR GERMANY BY 1929Optimistic Case:Weimar system seemed well established by 1929Inflation cured and 5 years of continuous growthReorganization of reparationsCould have survived if depression had not occurredMore money entering Germany1928 General Election – growth in support for parties committed to democracyStresemann’s conciliatory foreign policy – laying basis for long term consolidation of WeimarElection of Hindenburg as President in 1925 reassured conservatives.Germany could use the League of Nations to raise issue of German minorities.Pessimistic View:Key weaknesses in the Weimar Republic were still present in 1929The Republic still faced opposition from left- and right-wing partiesUnderlying weaknesses in the economyWeimar was still blamed for accepting Treaty of Versailles and there had been no major revisionFundamental political problems still remainedStresemann’s diplomatic achievements looked paltry to many GermansAny reparations would be resentedNo party had been able to achieve a majority in the Reichstag – plagued by weak coalition GovernmentsIndustrial production grew at a slower rate than rest of EuropeFrom 1927 farmers were increasingly hit by falling food prices, and were getting into debt. Was Weimar Democracy Undermined by the World Economic Depression (1929)?Slump had a major effect on Weimar Democracy – it induced a feeling of gloom and reinforced many Germans’ hostility to what they saw as a feeble and failing democratic systemIt contributed to the fall of Muller’s Govt in March 1930 (the last Weimar Govt that held a majority); it led to a large increase in support for anti-democratic partiesParliamentary Govt declinedSome historians argue that the Weimar Republic was fundamentally flawed containing major weaknesses even before the impact of the slumpOther historians argue that it was the slump that killed a system just beginning to establish itselfMost would agree that the economic effects of the slump reduced the chances of Weimar democracy surviving to virtually nil, even if it still was not certain that a Nazi Govt would take powerWas Weimar democracy undermined by the world economic depression (1929)? SummaryGermany’s economy was already suffering difficulties before 1929 and was heavily dependent on American loans, many of which could be withdrawnFrom October 1929, Germany was badly hit by the effects of the Wall Street CrashBetween 1929 and 1932 production nearly halved and unemployment rose to 6 millionGovts were terrified of sparking off inflation if they spent extra money, so took little action to counter the DepressionThe slump led to growing support for extreme parties in the 1930 and 1932 electionsUnit 2: Booklet 3Intentionalism – Actions of individualsStructuralism – Structure of Weimar Germany i.e. weaknessesRevisionism – A combination of Intentionalism and StructuralismKey Events in the Changing Fortunes of the Nazi Party:Failure of the Munich Putsch = Adoption of policy of legalityBamberg Meeting = Hitler defeated more socialist elements of the partyWall Street Crash 1929 = polarization of politicsSuccess in 1930 Election and Elections of July and Nov 1932Revolt of the SA = Failure of the revolt ensured Hitler’s leadership and policy of legality was maintainedFurther economic collapse in 19311932 Presidential Election = helped to hide divisions within the Nazi Party and although a loss, it was portrayed as a success Why did Nazi Support Increase?:Wall Street Crash 1929Further economic collapse 1931Polarization of politicsNazis offered/ promised solutions to Germany’s problemsNazi propagandaRole of HitlerWhy did People Support the Nazis?:Emotional Appeal – Nazis provided people with a charismatic leader, symbols and rallies. But high turnover suggests many joined for emotional reasons but this could not be maintainedIrrationalism (not based on reason) – The Nazis were particularly successful with those Germans who had weak, unsupportive communitiesPropaganda (seduction theory) – Nazis appealed to the emotions especially mass meetings and ralliesRational Economic Reasons – 1930-33 the Nazis put forward a series of economic policies offering a third way between Marxist state planning and laissez faire capitalismVirulent Anti-Semitism – A powerful attraction for early members but NOT especially for voters. The interpretation that virulent anti-Semitism was a major contributor to Hitler’s mass support is no longer held by historiansImportance of the SAHad 500,000 members by 1933Over half came from the working class, especially the unemployedSA’s work entailed distributing propaganda leaflets, protecting Nazi meetings, drive Communists from the streets1932 Bruning banned the SAPapen ended the ban in an attempt to appease Hitler The SA played a major role in Hitler’s success: their ‘propaganda by deed’ focused attention on the Communist threat and the Nazis’ determination to smash it; despite violence and disorder they caused, their disciplined marches created the impression that the Nazis would offer firm govt to restore Germany to law and order.The fear of a SA seizure of power persuaded some in the elite to favour Hitler playing a role in govt, since they thought he was the only one who could control the SARole of Propaganda: Germans were manipulated (seduction theory)Propaganda was more successful in reinforcing existing sympathies and feelings than in creating themThe Nazis had electoral success in some areas where there was little propaganda and vice versaWho were Nazi Party Members?:Mittelstand; white collar workers; civil servants and upper middle class were over-representedWorking class and peasants were under-representedWho supported the Nazi Party?:The Nazis were a Volkspartei (a people’s party) who appealed to all groupsThe Nazis mainly appealed to the Mittelstand (lower middle class)The Nazis appeal to some in the working class depending on their job, community, religion and where they livedNazis mainly appealed to ProtestantsAnti-Communists supported the NazisThe Working Class and the Nazis:Traditional View: The Working Class were seen as industrial workers who did not support the NazisModern View: need to take into account the religion, locality, community and job of workers: Workers from large industrial cities; who worked in large industries; who worked in employment geared towards export; who were a member of a trade union = more likely to support SPD or KPDWorkers from small towns, villages and rural areas, who worked in small factories or were rural labourers; who worked in employment geared towards sales within Germany; were protestant and not a member of a trade union = more likely to vote NaziWhy was Hitler Appointed Chancellor in January 1933?:Economic CollapsePolarization of PoliticsNazi Party Organization and TacticsRole of the Establishment e.g. Von Papen, Hindenburg, Business (Political Intrigue)Role of Hitler himselfNazi Support fell between July 1932 and Nov 1932 = some argue that the Nazi Party was actually in decline in Jan 1933 when Hitler was appointed ChancellorAppointment of Hitler as Chancellor was not inevitableReasons for Growth of the Nazi Party:Hitler himselfRole of SA and Nazi Party organizationEconomic DepressionWeaknesses of the Weimar RepublicPropagandaHindenburgStrengths of Hitler and the Nazi Party Moderate Parties would not work togetherBusiness and the Nazi Party:The help given by business was modestThe links between industry and the rise of Hitler were far more importantBig business was initially put off by Nazis anti-capitalist/ big business policiesBy 1932 big business and industry realised they could benefit from the Nazi movementCollapse of Weimar and Rise of HitlerHitler as a product of Germany’s history however there was considerable variety in German history rather than developing in a particular directionGermany deviated from proper course of European History however German history must be studies in its own right and not compared to some ‘normal’ developmentWar and depression created a dictatorship as elsewhere in Europe however Nazism was a unique phenomenonNazism was a product of capitalism in crisis however Mass support was more important than that of elites. Hitler was not a capitalist stoogeNazism was an emotional response to a crisis however Nazism gained support from rational calculationNazism was the product of a fanatical one man: Hitler however Nazism cannot be dismissed as just the product of one manHitler was just bad luck however such a major event can’t be seen as a mere accidentWas the Rise of the Nazis and Hitler inevitable?:Hitler and the Nazi Party were Germany’s Fate (The Rise of Hitler and the Nazis was Inevitable)Hitler and the Nazi Party were Germany’s misfortune (The Rise of Hitler and the Nazis was NOT Inevitable)Would Nazis have collapsed if Hitler had not been appointed Chancellor in January 1933?Nazis lost support between July and November 1932 electionsNazis were running short on money to fight election campaignsThere were divisions within the Nazi Party particularly between Left-wing and Right-wing of the Party, and those who wanted policy of legality and those who wanted to seize powerNazi movement was built on momentum and by November 1932 Election it looked like they were losing momentumThe economy did start to improve by late 1932Hitler refused to join a coalition unless he was made Chancellor – Hindenburg refused to appoint Hitler Chancellor in 1932However…Nazis were still the largest party in the ReichstagThe Nazis still had a large and powerful SAPolitical intrigue amongst the eliteGeneral interpretations:Intentionalists: The failure of the Weimar state was not inevitable Whilst there were weaknesses, the Weimar Republic was not doomed to collapseThe Weimar state proved itself to be stronger than previously portrayedThe fatal problems of Weimar were the result of the manoeuvrings of President Hindenburg, rather than weaknesses of democracyStructuralists: The Weimar Republic was structurally weak and therefore bound to failThe Weimar Republic was doomed to failure due to built in weaknessesOne of the main weaknesses of the Weimar state was the economyRevisionist: The Nazi rise to power was the result of a number of inter-related factors.Key Interpretations Round this Theme and Other Reasons Include:HoltferichRise of the Nazis is linked to the Great depression which was a world-wide phenomenonSalmonRise of the Nazis was a miscalculation by conservative politicians and the military. But by no means had a majority of the electorate put the Nazis in a position to contend for power.KershawThe rise of Hitler was not inevitable – it was the worst outcome of an irrevocable crisis of Weimar democracy.KolbRise of the Nazis was not inevitable. By the summer of 1932, given the attitudes, aims and relative strength of the parties and individuals concerned, and the degree to which the constitution had been undermined, the trend towards a Hitler solution was very strongTaylorThe rise of Hitler and the Nazis was inevitable due to Germany’s history (largely discredited today)LafanRise of Nazis was more due to the Nazis’ enemies’ weaknesses and failures than because of their own strength.NichollsThe Nazi movement was declining and a further period of frustration might have finished them off.HarmanGenerals and industrialists estimated in late 1932 that ruling with a Nazi movement that would destroy the working class organizations was preferable to ruling with the SPD movement that would buy off the workers.FischerSpecial conditions existed in Germany over a 60 year span: anti-Semitism; nationalism; imperialism; defeat of war; Treaty of Versailles; vindictive attitude of western powers; catastrophic economic circumstances; Germany’s unstable political institutions and parties; short-sightedness of Hindenburg and his conservative clique; and the charismatic genius of Hitler.Unit 2: Booklet 4When considering the impact of the Depression, the reasons why the Weimar failed and the Nazi Rise to Power, try to link them to the schools of thought in the last booklet: Intentionalism – Actions of individualsStructuralism – Structure of Weimar Germany i.e. weaknessesRevisionism – A combination of Intentionalism and StructuralismECONOMIC DEPRESSIONHow Did Weimar Govts Respond to the Economic Collapse?Like most other Govts in countries hit by the slump – for a long while the Weimar Govt did very littleAfter 1929 the Weimar Govt made cuts (the whole Weimar System was blamed not individual politicians or parties)Economic Crisis made Govts appear weak and dividedThe Govt did become more interventionist Once reparations were suspended in 1931 Chancellor Bruning set up some public works schemes and land schemesThe economy did start to improve in late 1932, but this was not recognisable enough for the votersDid Problems of the Great Depression develop Instantly?The depression in Germany was not a sudden event resulting from the Wall Street CrashThere had been major economic problems before the Wall Street Crash (see booklet 3). These problems and others continued to accelerate for 2 years after 1929Most politicians had expected the economy to recover naturally as it had done from the 1926 downturnHowever… in the summer of 1931 a major banking crisis deepened the slump and particularly hit the Middle ClassThe biggest withdrawal of investment (foreign loans) actually occurred late in 1930, partly as a reaction to the success of extremist parties in the September elections.Was Weimar Democracy Undermined by the Economic Slump?Germany’s economy was already suffering difficulties before 1929 and was heavily dependent on American loans, many of which could be withdrawnFrom October 1929, Germany was badly hit by the effects of the Wall Street CrashBetween 1929 and 1932 production nearly halved and unemployment rose to 6 millionGovts were terrified of sparking off inflation if they spent extra money, and so took little action to counter the DepressionThe slump led to growing support for extremist parties (polarization of politics)Historians’ Views:The slump had a major effect on the Weimar RepublicIt led to a feeling of gloom and reinforced many Germans’ hostility Weimar democracyThe slump contributed, in March 1930, to the collapse of the last Weimar Govt (Muller’s SPD coalition) that had a majority in the ReichstagIn September 1930 it led to a large increase in support for anti-Democratic Parties (NSDAP + KPD)The rise of anti-democratic parties = virtually impossible for any Govt to gain the support of the Reichstag, and parliamentary Govt declinedHowever… some historians argue:The Weimar Republic was fundamentally flawed, containing major weaknesses even before the impact of the slumpOthers argue:That it was the slump that killed a system a system just beginning to establish itselfMost world argue:The economic effects of the slump reduced the chances of Weimar democracy surviving to virtually nil, even if it was still not certain that a Nazi Govt would take power.DECLINE OF PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACYThe Movement to Authoritarian DictatorshipA combination of planning and improvisationControl over events and being controlled by eventsStages that can be identified:An increase use of Article 48 as an alternative to submitting all legislation to the ReichstagBreakdown in the relationship between Chancellor, President and Reichstag. After the appointment of Papen the Reichstag attacked the use of Article 48 with the result that President had to call 2 further electionsHindenburg could not keep calling elections, so political intrigue replaced electionsHitler’s appointment as Chancellor – but this could be seen as a step backwards to party politics as the Nazis were the largest party in the ReichstagWho was to Blame for Weimar Germany’s Demise?Muller: Before it collapsed Muller’s Govt was the last Weimar Govt to have a majority in the ReichstagBruning: Deepened the economic crisis to achieve an end to reparations and increasingly used Article 48 to get policies passedSchleicher: His scheming and political intrigue which had the ultimate aim of establishing a right-wing authoritarian Govt in Germany: Schleicher’s scheming led to the collapse of Bruning as ChancellorVon Papen: His coup in Prussia removed the elected SDP Govt and further undermined Parliamentary Democracy. Von Papen persuaded Hindenburg to appoint Hitler Chancellor and von papen as vice-ChancellorHindenburg: Ultimately, although reluctantly appointed Hitler Chancellor. Along with the Elite, he hoped Hitler could be used to as a stepping stone to establishing an authoritarian Govt.Hitler: The Elite’s plan backfired and Hitler out-smarted and out-manoeuvred the Elite to establish a Nazi dictatorshipBruning’s Govt***When considering Bruning it is important to remember that after he stood down as Chancellor, he had an academic career in America where he had time to reflect upon his time in office and prepare his memoirs. It is also important to remember the impact the publication of his memoirs in 1970 had on the development of interpretations***Bruning and Weimar Germany:Bruning was the potential saviour of Weimar DemocracyBruning was the destroyer of Weimar DemocracyBruning did what he could in the circumstances of the timeBruning wanted a more authoritarian Govt and a restoration of the monarchy in GermanyBruning’s Economic Policies:Bruning deliberately escalated the Economic Crisis to help achieve his foreign policy aims i.e. follow a policy of fulfilment but to deepen the economic crisis in Germany to prove that Germany was unable to pay reparations Bruning had no alternative to the actions he took since he was helpless in the face of the economic situation.The economic crisis Bruning faced had been long in the making, between 1925 and 1929, where wages increased without an increase in productivity and expensive welfare programmesBruning was committed to his policy of spending cuts to settle the issue of reparationsBruning and Decline in Parliamentary Democracy:Bruning agreed to a ‘Presidential Cabinet’ which excluded the SDP and appeared to be forming an ‘anti-Parliamentary’ and ‘anti-Marxist’ Govt.Bruning requested Hindenburg dissolve the Reichstag, which led to the elections in July 1930 = significant growth in support for KPD and NSDAP became largest partyAfter July 1930 election Bruning maintained himself in power for the next 22 months by the use of Article 48How Far was Bruning Involved in the Slide of the Weimar Republic to Dictatorship?There are 5 main perspectives:1.Bruning started the rot in the constitution and established the authoritarian system which Papen and Schleicher continued.Bruning broke the ‘spirit of the constitution’Bruning was attempting from 1930 to restore a constitution similar to Germany before 19142.There is a direct but unintended connection between Bruning and the transition to dictatorshipBruning was trying to find an alternative to Party Politics which had clearly failedIn this respect he was also trying to avoid permanent dictatorship3.Although Bruning was implicated in the move to dictatorship, this was only part of an inevitable process.The switch to presidential Govt was the inevitable result of the crisis of the party-political stateThe parliamentary system had already failed by the time Bruning became chancellor and that a shift to an openly presidential system was only a matter of time4.Dictatorship occurred after Bruning’s fallThe onset of dictatorship is related to the dismissal of BruningWithout the fall of Bruning, Weimar Democracy could very well have been able to survive the difficult economic crisis and attacks on the spirit of the constitution and averted a Nazi dictatorship5.Bruning was not implicated at all in the slide to dictatorshipBruning should not be linked any longer with anti-democratic projects that he actually opposed as chancellorHis use of Article 48 was entirely constitutional and he rejected every suggestion for some kind of “dictatorship” incompatible with the terms of Article 48Why Did Bruning Lose Office?The failure of Bruning’s economic policies: as economy deteriorated support for the Communists grew; a fear of a Communist takeover intensified amongst the M/CIn the economic circumstances and growing Communist support Schleicher, Hindenburg’s most influential adviser began to think in terms of solutions to Germany’s problems which did not involve BruningRelations between Hindenburg and Bruning turned sour – the two fell out over the Presidential Election of 1932 – Hindenburg hoped to avoid an election, but Bruning could not gain enough support in the Reichstag for postponing the election As a result the election was held and Hindenburg was forced into a run-off with Hitler. Hindenburg had to rely on votes from Catholics and SPD supports (both of whom he hated) to beat Hitler.It also became known in Junker circles that Bruning was toying with the idea of buying up insolvent Junker estates and settling unemployed workers on them – this outraged Junkers who complained to HindenburgBruning Points of Consideration:Bruning was certainly out of joint with all his predecessors as Chancellors of the Weimar Republic and moved in a new and dangerous directionHis motives may well have been uncontaminated by the desire for power at all costs and he certainly had no sympathy with those who sought to make use of the destructive power of the NazisHe did have political ideas that lay beyond the confines of the Weimar constitution e.g. his favouring of the restoration of the monarchyUnlike Stresemann, he did not really adapt to a new political situation and tried to impose his own views of how the constitution should work.Von Papen’s RoleVon Papen’s AppointmentVon Papen was recommended to Hindenburg by SchleicherVon Papen’s appointment was greeted in Germany with astonishment as Von Papen was a little-known figure, with hard-line right-wing views and no experience of GovtBut Von Papen’s appointment made sense in the wider context of Schliecher’s plansSchleicher hoped that as Von Papen held such right-wing views, Hitler would be more agreeable to the idea of working with him. Ultimately Schleicher wanted to use Hitler and the mass support of the Nazis to establish an authoritarian dictatorship in GermanyVon Papen’s Contribution to the Decline of Parliamentary DemocracyMinisters were appointed alongside Von Papen who were as right-wing as he was: the new govt was quickly labelled ‘the cabinet of barons’The ban that Bruning placed on the SA was liftedVon Papen’s govt called for new Reichstag elections knowing that the Nazis were certain to do well in themIn flagrant violation of the constitution, Von Papen removed the Social Democrat (SDP) controlled state Govt of Prussia from office. Hitler was glad because it had been a determined opponent of Nazism Von Papen played a role in the political intrigue that led to the appointment of Hitler as ChancellorVon Schleicher’s RoleSchliecher had the ultimate aim of establishing a right-wing authoritarian GovtAfter July 1932 Election, Hitler angry that he had not been appointed Chancellor joined with the Communists in the Reichstag in passing a vote of no-confidence in von Papen’s GovtNovember 1932 Elections, Nazis lost 2 million votesIn December 1932 Schleicher took over as chancellor himself – but he was short of allies and had no real backing in the country at largeSchleicher tried to gain a broad based support from the SDP and tried to split the more ‘socialist’ elements of the Nazi Party away from Hitler by offering to make Gregor Strasser vice-Chancellor. However, it was fanciful to think the SDP would work with the ‘socialist’ wing of the Nazi PartyHitler and the Nazis would not support Schleicher’s Govt and was effectively unable to governFrom 4th January 1933, von Papen and Hitler had talks about forming a coalitionVon Papen suggested to Hindenburg that in a new right-wing coalition, Hitler would be the Chancellor, von Papen vice-Chancellor and Nazis would have a minority of Govt jobsHindenburgWhy did Hindenburg Appoint Hitler Chancellor in January 1933?Hitler was undisputed leader of the Nazi PartyThe Nazis were the largest party in the ReichstagThe effects of the Great DepressionThe failure of Weimar Govts, 1929-32Elite wanted a more authoritarian GovtPolitical intrigue e.g. advice Hindenburg took from his son, Schleicher and PapenHindenburg reluctantly appointed Hitler Chancellor after previously refusing to make Hitler ChancellorFraud investigation inquiry that potentially implicated HindenburgHitlerIn July 1932, the Nazis became the largest party in the ReichstagHindenburg refused to appoint Hitler Chancellor + Hitler refused to enter a coalition unless he was appointed ChancellorIn Nov 1932 Nazis lost support – was seen as the Nazis as possibly starting to go into declineHitler refuse calls from some within the Nazi Party, particularly the SA, to seize power and instead he stayed with the policy of legalityMany in the Elite wanted to use Hitler to help them establish an authoritarian dictatorshipThe Elite felt that the divisions within the Nazi Party and their decline in support would make it easier for them to use and manipulate HitlerAfter political intrigue, Hitler was appointed Chancellor in January 1933 – the Elite’s plan to use Hitler severely backfired and Hitler would go on and establish a Nazi dictatorship Hitler and the EliteThe Elite hoped to use Hitler so that they could use the mass support of the Nazi Party to establish an authoritarian GovtHitler needed the support of the Elite so that he could be appointed ChancellorThe Elite needed Hitler as much as Hitler needed the EliteThe Elite’s plan to use Hitler and the Nazis backfiredCOLLAPSE OF WEIMAR GERMANYThe Weimar republic was doomed because of its origins and its inherent flawsWeimar Germany was killed off during the period in which it was actually thriving, by an external calamity (World Economic Depression) over which it could have had no controlThe collapse of Weimar Germany cannot be based on just one factor, but was caused by multiple reasons which unbalanced Weimar GermanyLong Term reasons: Flaws within the Weimar Constitution and the partial revolution in 1918 which allowed the conservative elite to largely remain intact, long term economic problemsShort Term reasons: The catalyst was the economic depression which had economic, political and social consequencesKey FactorsEconomic DepressionWeaknesses with Weimar systemPolitical IntrigueDecline in Parliamentary DemocracyGerman VotersRise of the Nazi PartyPOTENTIAL OUTCOME FOR WEIMAR GERMANYContinuation of Weimar DemocracyAuthoritarian GovtNazi DictatorshipCommunist StateKey Interpretations – The Failure of WeimarJackalThe main predicament of the Weimar republic was not defeat nor the difficulties which its government faced in the post-war years, but the social and political structure of German society with their origins rooted in the nineteenth century.GearyNo one in their right mind would claim that the terms of the Treaty of Versailles did not play a major role in the collapse of the Weimar Republic.CraigThe republic’s basic vulnerability was rooted in the circumstances of its creation, and it is no exaggeration to say that it failed in the end partly because German officers were allowed to put their epaulets [i.e. uniforms] back on again so quickly and because the public buildings were not burned down, along with the bureaucrats who inhabited them.Kolb The Weimar Republic was hampered by a basic weakness due to the circumstances of its foundation. In the form it took in 1919, parliamentary democracy was truly accepted and zealously defended by only a minority of the population.RaffWithout the sympathy and assistance of the various foreign powers, the Weimar Republic had proved unable in the end to withstand the stresses and strains of the lost war. The allies’ lack of sympathy burdened the fledgling republic from its earliest days with handicaps which even a firmly entrenched government, could scarcely have borne. How much less Germany, which had a tradition of strong and authoritarian Govt. GearyThe Weimar Republic had failed to build on the fundamental compromises achieved in 1918 and to use them to create a deep rooted legitimacy of its own: it had lost the struggle for the hearts and minds of the people.PeukertPerhaps the miracle of Weimar is that the Republic survived as long as it did … The Republic had already been heading for the crossroads before the immediate crisis of 1929-30 occurred. Everything had been pointing towards a possible crash.GearyThe economic crisis acted as a trigger, occasioning the abandonment of a political system that had already lost its legitimacy.KershawThe future [for Weimar] looked promising. And without the onset of the world economic crisis from 1929 it might have remained so.SalmonIf Weimar had some chances of survival before [the Depression], it had very little chance afterwards.ArdaghGloom was such that already by the mid-1920s many Germans were losing faith in the principle of parliamentary democracy; this was above all the cancer that killed Weimar… A growing number of politicians … came to feel that democracy was unworkable … Probably by 1930 a period of authoritarian rule had become inevitable.HidenNo single problem ‘caused’ the downfall of the Weimar Republic … the interaction of … problems, many of which pre-dated the Republic, progressively weakened the new German state.Points to Consider for Question 2Explaining How and Why Would Author Have Adopted Interpretation?AuthorDoes author have a particular point of view (consider source content and attribution)Does author have a particular political outlook? Does the attribution identify them as a Socialist? Nationalist? Other?What is the nationality of the author? Does attribution state nationality? If not, don’t be afraid to make an assumption from the author’s name.Would the author’s nationality suggest limited research time in archives in Germany i.e. will author have to travel to Germany and thus be limited in time due to financial constraints and other commitments? Would the author’s nationality affect their point of view?AgendaLook at the title of the extract – does the author have a particular agenda? Is it Positive? Negative? Other?What type of source is it? What is the title of the extract? Is it specialist with a focus on Weimar Germany? Or a general history of Germany? Does extract title and content focus on Parties and Organizations, Political and Social Structures e.g. Constitution? On individuals e.g. Stresemann, Hitler, Hindenburg, Ebert?Remember:- Intentionalists: Focus on the actions and intentions of individuals- Structuralists: Focus on the social and political structures- Revisionism/ Synthesis: Focus on a combination of intentionalism and structuralismAuthor’s Status:Historian – Professional and Academic or Amateur?JournalistSociologist/ Psychologist?Other?The author’s status would affect their research methods, sources used, approach, subject knowledge and agenda which would help explain the development of their interpretationConsider subject knowledge – what facts would the author be drawing on to reach their interpretation?ContextWhat is the context? When was extract produced? What were the circumstances?How would context affect extract and what author says?What sources would be available?Bruning’s Memoirs published in 1970Berlin Wall fell in November 1989Soviet Union fell in December 1991Consider the context in which author is writing i.e. is it post war = the agreed view is that the Nazis and Hitler were badDoes the author/interpretation of one extract challenge/ build upon/ support the author/interpretation of the other extract?Is the interpretation in the extract developed by the author themselves or is the author simply discussing other people’s interpretations e.g. if the extract from a Textbook, then the Author may be discussing existing interpretations rather than putting forward their own. ................
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