The British Perception of the Remilitarization of the Rhineland, 1936

The British Perception of the Remilitarization of the Rhineland, 1936

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Huang, Hanson. 1973. The British Perception of the Remilitarization of the Rhineland, 1936. Bachelor's thesis, Harvard College.

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PREFACE

"There is always something rather absurd about the past." Max Beerbohm

Hitler remilitarized the Rhineland on 7 March 1936 in explicit violation of both the treaties of Versailles and Locarno. Within days, it became apparent that no nation was willing to restore the status quo ante by force. And with good reasons. To politicians of the day, the Rhineland simply was not an important issue.

Historians, however, endowed, or burdened, with the gift of hindsight, have read much into the Rhineland crisis. Without exception, they pronounce this success of Hitler as the harbinger of calamity; if only Britain and France had the resolve to resist Hitler there and then, the world might have been spared a holocaust unmatched, and hopefully not to be matched, in history.

Two decades later, Anthony Eden, second-fiddle in 1936 but now at the helm of state, considered the Rhineland crisis a lesson learned; in a fit of mid-summer madness, Britain embarked on an expedition to dislodge the rightful owners of Suez, but instead, the excursion hit a watery bier. It was the same lesson, but now unlearnt.

Are we then doomed to Beerbohm's dictum and can do no more than indulge in scholastic sophistry? No; I beg to disagree. There was more to history than met the eyes of the post hoc Cassandras; tediously well known though it

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may be, the "forgotten problem" (this is Taylor's contribution) of the Rhineland should be exhumed and reexamined in the light of new evidence and with a detachment afforded by being a generation removed. This project is but a personal fetish "to understand what happened, and why it happened."

In this endeavor, I owe much to many. Bread and butter courtesy requires thanks to the Harvard Scholarship Fund which, in paying for my trip home, afforded me several work-loaded weeks in London. To my tutor, who is condemned to anonymity by the Department, to Mr. Stuckey and the staff of the Public Record Office, to Mr. Owen and the staff of the Cambridge University Library, to Mr. Cotter and the staff of our own Documents Division, and to my typist, A.D. 2200, I express my deepest gratitude, for without them, this project would not have been logistically possible. A special debt is owed to my roommates and friends: I apologize for the increasingly frequent fits of deliria when I sojourn with spirits past. And, not least of all, I regret the admittedly nerve-wracking tap-taps that slowly brought this to the light of day. All mistakes are, of course, mine.

Hanson Y. Huang

Dunster April, 1973

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page PREFACE ..................................................................... 2 CHAPTERS

I Introduction...................................................... 4 II The Foreign Office: An Overview............................. 10 III "She loves me, she loves me not ...";

Germany: Daisy or Artichoke? ............................... 22 IV The Pre-Crisis Game Plan: Triple Option.................... 49 V Tarnished Brass.................................................. 84 VI The Phoney Crisis............................................... 99 VIII "Pray Excuse My Blunder" .................................... 121

APPENDICES I The Legal Aspect of the Rhineland............................ 124 II Memorandum of the German Government Respecting the Franco-Soviet Treaty, the Treaty of Locarno, and the Demilitarized Zone in the Rhineland......................................................... 127

BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................................... 132

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CHAPTER I

Introduction

The affairs of state are such that no statesman can objectively grasp the full implication of every item of information he receives. Planning and decision, therefore, depends very much on the disposition and beliefs of the individual. This perceptive role with respect to the Rhineland crisis is the central theme of this thesis.

The question of the Rhineland first came into prominence during the Versailles Peace Conference in 1919. France's aim then was to create an independent Rhenish Republic allied to France. But British and United States objections changed the Rhineland into a demilitarized and allied occupied zone.1

This arrangement, however, was a constant source of disagreement between the allies and Germany, and, indeed, even among the allies. Therefore, in 1925, the Weimar Government, represented by Stresemann, reaffirmed the agreements in return for several concessions, one of which was the early withdrawal of the Allied occupying troops in three phases.2 The last troops left on 30 Jan. 1930, and the Rhineland became truly demilitarized five years ahead of schedule.

Hitler addressed the Reichstag on the morning of 7 March 1936; the speech began, as was the custom of the past weeks, with a denunciation of the

1 For the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, see Appendix I. 2 This became the Treaty of Locarno, the pertinent articles of which are in Appendix I.

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