Vladimir Shubin - Pécsi Tudományegyetem



Vladimir Shubin

Institute for African Studies,

Russian Academy of Sciences

Africa and the war in Libya

The threshold of the 21st century witnessed the formation of a new continental body, the African Union (AU). A proposal to create it was put forward by the Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi at the summit of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in Algiers in 1999. The AU differs from its predecessor in a number of aspects; the most important are two of them: more attention to democracy and protection of human rights and a higher degree of co-operation, in particular in the military field.

A real test of these innovations came ten years later, with the tragic events in Libya that began in February 2011 and we have to say that the AU failed it, although it was not entirely the fault of that body.

This is not a place to discuss in detail the causes of unrest in Libya. Let us remain, however, that these developments followed the “revolutions” in Tunis and Egypt and coincided with anti-government protests in Yemen, Bahrain and some other Arab countries.

By that time “Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya”, as Libya was officially named, was a welfare state: life expectancy was in the seventies, the country's literacy rate rose to 90%, free education, free healthcare, and financial assistance for housing were introduced as well as financial support was provided for university scholarships and employment programs. The country remained debt-free and its Human Development Index was the highest in Africa.

However all these achievements were not enough to appease a part of the population who were no longer ready to tolerate over four decades of Muammar Qaddafi’s dictatorship, even if it was portrayed as a “direct democracy”. Anti-government protests began on February 15, after the changes in Tunisia and Egypt, and the regime used force to suppress them. The accusations in violation of human rights followed.

The African Union had a mechanism to verify and correct the situation, up to the intervention “in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity” (African Union, The Constitutive Act, 2000). It did act, but too slowly and too late.

It was only on March 10 when the AU Peace and Security Council Security Council of the African Union established an ad hoc High Level Committee on Libya, composed of Presidents of Congo, Mali, Mauritania, Uganda and South Africa. (African Union. Peace and Security Council, 2011). Its delegation was to go to Libya to assess the situation and to carry out a role of a mediator.

Meanwhile other forces were much more in a hurry. On February 26 the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1970. All its members, including three African countries, Gabon, Nigeria and South Africa voted for it, imposing arms embargo, freezing of funds and other financial assets, belonging to Libyan officials, banning their trips abroad and even referring “the situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya since 15 February 2011 to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court”. (United Nations. Security Council, 2011(1)) The resolution was adopted without any investigation, against the background of all kinds of accusations, spread by “international mass-media”, from alleged use of Libyan Air Force against peaceful demonstrators up to supplying Libyan government soldiers with Viagra to rape opposition supporters.[i]

Here is it relevant to point out that the ICC’s role in Africa is at the best controversial. A prominent African scholar Mahmood Mamdani wrote: “Clearly, if an ICC had existed then, we would not have had an anti-apartheid transition in mid-1990s. It was South Africa's good fortune that its transition was in the main internally driven”. The same, in his opinion was true of the settlement ending Mozambique's civil war. (Mamdani, M., 2010: 234)

Like the Peace and Security Council the Africa’s judiciary system was too slow. The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights ordered Libya to end any actions that would cause the loss of life or violation of anyone's "physical integrity" in violation of international human rights law and required to report back to the court in 15 days on the steps it has taken to carry out the ruling, but that was done only on March 25. (Bowcott and Wolfe-Robinson,2011).

***

“The war against Libya is based on fraudulence. Fabrication. Lies”, wrote Rahnuma Ahmed on the website of the Centre for Global Research headed by Canadian Professor Michel Chossudovsky. (Ahmed, 2011)

One of first “warriors” of the “war of lies” was British Foreign Secretary William Hague, who virtually claimed that Qaddafi had left Tripoli for Caracas: “About whether Col. Gaddafi, is in Venezuela, I have no information that says he is although I have seen some information that suggests he is on his way there,” he said, while his officials “stressed that Mr Hague was referring ‘not to media reports but information from other channels’. ‘This is credible information,’ said a diplomat”. (Waterfield, 2011)

Hague was not alone. When the truth about the Libyan tragedy and the persons responsible for it began to be known, it became clear that one of them was a South African citizen Navanethem (Navi) Pillayi, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. The bitter irony is that her words about “widespread and systematic attacks against the civilian population” which “may amount to crimes against humanity” and her reference to a Libyan defector’s claim that “Qaddafi had started the genocide against the Libyan people” (Prashad, 2012) were used by those who wanted the UN’s “cover-up” of their aggressive actions that led to gross violation of human rights, including the very right to live. Her accusations were not confirmed by the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya established by the United Nations’ Human Rights Council (Ibid.), but, again, it was too late.

In Rahnuma Ahmed’s opinion the UN Security Council “passed two resolutions against Libya on the basis of ‘unproven claims’. Colonel Muammar Gaddafi was killing his own people in Benghazi and other parts of the country. He’d ordered Libyan forces to kill 6,000 people. He’d hired African mercenaries to massacre civilians. Jet attacks were being conducted to quell the `uprising.’ These claims were widely disseminated.” (Ahmed, 2011)

“Gaddafi had ordered air strikes against his people to quell discontent”, went on the claim. “It was reported as well by al Jazeera and the BBC on February 22 – the Libyan government had inflicted air strikes on Benghazi, Libya’s largest city,and on the capital Tripoli”. However, she reminded that the Russian military satellite images showed that “nothing of the sort was going on on the ground and “the attacks some media were reporting have never occurred” (Russian military, 2011)

The same is true about claims of civilian massacres that would inevitably take place if loyalist forces recapture Benghazi. In fact in the cities captured by Qaddafi’s forces, there was “no significant indication of civilian massacres”. The town of Ajdabiya, one of Libya's larger cities, was captured by loyalists a few days before the foreign intervention began and was held by them for over a week, and none of the “slaughter and mass graves” have occurred (Stone, 2011.).

On the other side statements by Gaddafi that he would go “house to house” to cleanse the nation of “cockroaches” and “rats” were used as a proof of the incitement to commit crimes against humanity. These words were repeated by mass-media all over the world, but his next phrase got missing: “people who had no arms had no reason to fear". Moreover Qaddafi simultaneously ordered his troops “not to pursue any protesters who drop their guns and flee when government forces reach the city”. (Ibid.)

***

The next “milestone’ in the Libyan tragedy was the adoption by the UN Security Council on March 17 of the notorious resolution 1973. While Brazil, Russia, India and China, as well as Germany abstained, the rest ten voted for it, including three African countries: Gabon, Nigeria and South Africa. (United Nations Security Council (2011 (2)) This was a radical departure from the position taken by the AU just a week ago, when its Peace and Security Council reaffirmed “its rejection of any foreign military intervention [in Libya] whatever its form” (African Union. Peace and Security Council, 2011). The position taken by South Africa was especially deplorable. A newcomer to BRICS voted for the resolution, while four “old” BRICS members abstained (although I would have preferred them rejecting it).

Moreover, their representatives expressed at least uncertainty about its draft. For example, Russian Ambassador Vitaly Churkin complained that the resolution “departed from the Arab League’s proposal and allowed for wide-ranging military intervention”. (EASTWEEK. 2011) “Work on the resolution was not in keeping with Security Council practice, with many questions having remained unanswered including ‘how and by whom the measures would be enforced and what the limits of the engagement would be’” (United Nations. Security Council, 2011 (2)).

The Chinese representative Li Baodong also complained that his delegation had asked specific questions that failed to be answered, however it had not blocked the passage of the resolution, because it attached great importance to the requests of the Arab League and the African Union (Ibid).

The resolution authorised “Member States that have notified the Secretary-General, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, and acting in cooperation with the Secretary-General, to take all necessary measures… to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi” and authorized them “to take all necessary measures to enforce compliance with the ban on flights”. (Ibid.)

As distinct from the “abstainers” African diplomats represented in the Security Council did not expressed any reservations even if eight months later the same South African Ambassador Baso Sangqu, assuming the rotating presidency of the U.N. Security Council, called for the U.N. to probe alleged human rights abuses in Libya by all sides involved in the conflict, “including and especially NATO”, and said the International Criminal Court should conduct investigations in any cases of gross violations. (Goodenough, P. 2012) Nevertheless it should be noted that the position taken by South Africa, Nigeria and Gabon was not supported universally in Africa. In particular, Yoweri Museveni, President of Uganda wrote in his article: “The African members of the Security Council voted for this Resolution of the Security Council. This was contrary to what the Africa Peace and Security Council had decided in Addis Ababa recently. This is something that only the extra-ordinary summit can resolve”. (Museveni, 2011).

The real aim of the resolution – “the regime change” – became clear at once. Mark Lyall Grant, British Ambassador after the vote at the meeting not only spoke about the end to violence and protection of civilians but claimed that “the Libyan regime had lost legitimacy” and that the resolution should “allow the people of Libya to determine their own future, free from tyranny of the Qaddafi regime”. (UK Mission to the UN, 2011).

The very first steps of a so called “coalition”[ii], soon to be replaced by NATO directly as a warring side, went far beyond establishing a “no-fly zone” and on March 20 Amr Moussa, who a week earlier as the Arab League Secretary-General called for its establishment, complained: “What is happening in Libya differs from the aim of imposing a no-fly zone, and what we want is the protection of civilians and not the bombardment of more civilians” (Evans, D ,2011).

The role of a “gang leader” was played by Nicolas Sarkozy, then French President. Two days after the resolution had been adopted, on March 19, a “Summit for the support to the Libyan people” was convened by him in Paris. Leaders of Western countries were there, but of the Arab countries only four were represented: three monarchies and Iraq, as well as Amr Moussa. The lies continued: initially mass-media, including the official EU’s TV (TV Newsroom, 2011), reported the participation of the AU as well, but its delegation was not present. Later Jean Ping, Chairperson of the AU Commission, in an interview with the BBC Hardtack programme said that the AU had not been consulted before the Paris meeting (Sudan Tribune, 2011). The AU refused to join the “Contact Group”, formed in Paris and ignored the second “Summit” held in London on March 29 as well, though the reason given by its officials was simply “organisational”. (Matinyi, 2011)

Even before this summit ended, French Air Force attacked targets in Libya, a column of tanks and vehicles, which of course had nothing to do with securing a “no-fly zone”.[iii]

The hypocrisy of Sarkozy and his colleagues was unbelievable. Less than four months earlier the same persons who ordered or facilitated the bombing of Libyan territory took part in the 3rd Africa-EU summit in Tripoli, and in its declaration expressed their “gratitude to the Leader of the Revolution and people of the Great Socialist Peoples’ Libyan Arab Jamahiriya for the care, hospitality and attention extended to the participants of this Summit|”. (Tripoli Declaration, 2010)

The same Sarkozy welcomed the Libyan leader in Paris in 2007 and the “investigative website Mediapart” recently published what it called “compelling new evidence” that the Libyan regime decided to help finance Sarkozy's successful presidential election campaign in 2007 (Chrisafis, 2012), while Berlusconi went as far as kissing Gaddafi’s hand at the Arab League summit conference in Sirte, the town to be destroyed by NATO attacks a year later. (Yutube, 2011)

However not everybody was so “enthusiastic”. 13 of 27 NATO’s European members, including Hungary, abstained from rendering “military support” (BBC, 2011), that is from direct participation in the aggression. The Hungarian Foreign Minister János Martonyi emphasized that a military operation could only aim at protecting civilians and not in changing “Libya’s political system”, even if he indicated that “The removal of Gaddafi would be politically highly desirable”. (Hungarian Presidency, 2011)

***

Let us come back to Africa’s position and actions. Instead of attending the “summit” in Paris, members of its High Level ad hoc Committee met on the same day in Nouakchott, the capital of Mauritania. The host, President of Mauritania Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, spoke about the need for urgent action “so an African solution can be found to the very serious crisis”, which must take into account “our desire that Libya's unity and territorial integrity be respected as well as the rejection of any kind of foreign military intervention” (Emerging Minds, 2011).

However those who attacked Libya did not want to give a chance for an “African solution”. The delegation of the ad hoc Committee was planning to come to Libya on March 20, having received consent both from the Libyan government and rebels. But the trip was sabotaged by the “coalition” that refused to make an exception for its flight under “no-fly” conditions, although Resolution 1973 took note of the decision “of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union to send its ad hoc High-Level Committee to Libya with the aim of facilitating dialogue to lead to the political reforms necessary to find a peaceful and sustainable solution”. (United Nations. Security Council, 2011 (2)).

A prominent Russian scholar and diplomat Dr Andrey Urnov shares the opinion of “many observers” that the “coalition” was in a hurry to begin bombings “not to let the trip of the AU Committee delegation to Libya, for fear that it might upset their plans” (Urnov, A., 2011: 209).

Although ad-hoc Committee expressed “its regret for not being able, as they envisaged, to travel to Libya, on March 20 to deal with the parties, both of which had agreed to deal with it”; (African Union Meeting of the AU High-Level AD HOC Committee on Libya, 2011), however it did not condemn “coalition”’s actions.

The worst had already happened and the “damage control” by the AU was hardly successful. A popular dictum “African solution for African problems” remained on paper. The AU tried in vain (and belatedly) to recover its presumably leading role. Apart from several meetings of its ad-hoc Committee, a consultative meeting on the situation was held on Libya in Addis Ababa on March 25. Together with the Committee members, 15 member states of the AU Peace and Security Council, six countries neighbouring Libya, and three African members of the UN Security Council, the AU invited the five permanent members of the Security Council, 12 other countries the globe, the UN, European Union, League of Arab States, and the Organisation of Islamic Conference. (African Union Consultative Meeting, 2011).

The AU proposed the Libyan government and the so called Transitional National Council (TNC), formed by rebels, to discuss its “road map”. It included five points:

- the protection of civilians and the cessation of hostilities,

- humanitarian assistance to affected populations, including both Libyans and foreign migrant workers, particularly those from Africa,

- the initiation of political dialogue between the Libyan parties in order to reach an agreement on the practicalities of ending the crisis,

- the establishment and management of an inclusive transitional period,

- the adoption and implementation of political reforms necessary to meet the aspirations of the Libyan people, (China Daily, 2011).

The Libyan delegation agreed with it, but the opposition refused to take part in the talks, so the hostilities and the NATO’s intervention continued.

Over two weeks passed before presidents of South Africa, DRC, Mauritania and foreign minister of Uganda visited Tripoli on 10 April 2011 and met Qaddafi, who accepted the AU proposals. However when its representatives came to Benghazi, the rebels’ stronghold they were rejected. A TNC insisted that any peace initiative should be preceded by the departure of Qaddafi and the fall of his regime.

The war continued and intensified and the AU statements, initially mild, were becoming more critical of the NATO. The Extraordinary Session of the AU Assembly of the Union on the State of Peace and Security in Africa, convened on May 25 in Addis Ababa adopted a special Decision on the Peaceful Resolution of the Libyan Crisis, stressing the need for the cease-fire that “should lead to the establishment of a consensual and inclusive transitional period during which the necessary reforms to meet the legitimate aspirations of the Libyan people would be carried out, culminating in elections that would enable the Libyans to choose freely their leaders.” Pending its establishment and “in view of the dire humanitarian situation on the ground, the AU Assembly “demanded an immediate pause in the fighting and in the NATO-led air campaign, to provide respite to the civilian population, alleviate its suffering and make it possible to deliver the much-needed humanitarian assistance to all those in need of it. In this respect, the Assembly is of well-considered view that the continuation of the NATO-led military operation defeats the very purpose for which it was authorized in the first place, i.e. the protection of the civilian population, and further complicates any transition to a democratic dispensation in Libya.” (African Union. Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of the Union on the State of Peace and Security in Africa, 2011)

The Assembly also expressed “Africa’s surprise and disappointment at the attempts to marginalize the continent in the management of the Libyan conflict…” (Ibid.) However the complain fell on a deaf ear. The decision on “the immediate deployment of an AU Observer Mission to closely monitor the situation, provide independent assessment of developments taking place on the ground and facilitate the subsequent establishment of a larger international mission that would involve the United Nations, the League of Arab States, the AU and other organizations|” (Ibid) was sabotaged by NATO and its accomplices as well.

Then at a meeting with the UN representatives on June 15 the High Level ad hoc Committee of the African Union (AU) handed over to the Security Council a letter that elaborated its position:

- “Whatever the genesis of the intervention by NATO in Libya, the AU called for dialogue before the U.N. Resolutions 1970 and 1973 and after those resolutions. Ignoring the AU for three months and going on with the bombings of the sacred land of Africa has been high-handed, arrogant and provocative.”

- “An attack on Libya or any other member of the African Union without express agreement by the AU is a dangerous provocation… sovereignty has been a tool of emancipation of the peoples of Africa who are beginning to chart transformational paths for most of the African countries after centuries of predation by the slave trade, colonialism and neocolonialism. Careless assaults on the sovereignty of the African countries are, therefore, tantamount to inflicting fresh wounds on the destiny of the African peoples”.

- “Fighting between government troops and armed insurrectionists is not genocide. It is civil war…. It is wrong to characterise every violence as genocide or imminent genocide so as to use it as a pretext for the undermining of the souvereignity of states.”

-. “The U.N. should not take sides in a civil war. The U.N. should promote dialogue… The demand…. The demand by some countries that Col. Muammar Qaddafi must go first before the dialogue is incorrect. Whether Qaddafi goes or stays is a matter for the Libyan people to decide. It is particularly wrong when the demand for Gaddafi's departure is made by outsiders… Qaddafi accepted dialogue when the AU mediation committee visited Tripoli on April 10, 2011. Any war activities after that have been provocation for Africa. It is an unnecessary war. It

must stop…. The story that the rebels cannot engage in dialogue unless Qaddafi goes away does not convince us. If they do not want dialogue, then, let them fight their war with Qaddafi without NATO bombing…. The externally sponsored groups neglect dialogue and building internal consensus and, instead, concentrate on winning external patrons.”

(Quoted in: Ahmed A, 2011).

Strong as it was the statement did not carry much of practical weight. Perhaps it is time to rеmind that African countries had a special mechanism to deal with foreign aggression, the AU non-aggression and common defence pact. The definition of aggression, contained in it included, in particular, “the bombardment of the territory of a Member State or the use of any weapon against the territory of a Member State” as well as “the blockade of the ports, coasts or airspace of a Member State”. The AU members were obliged to “undertake to provide mutual assistance towards their common defence and security vis-à-vis any aggression or threats of aggression; and “undertake, individually and collectively, to respond by all available means to aggression or threats of aggression against any Member State;” (African Union Non-Aggression Common Defence Pact, 2005). Whether any discussion took place on implementation of these provisions in the case of Libya remains to be found out.

***

The last meaningful participation of Africa in peace efforts was a trip of Jacob Zuma in his capacity as a member of the AU’s ad hoc High-Level Committee on Libya to Sochi in early July 2011, just after the AU Summit in Malabo, which reaffirmed its belief that a political solution was the only viable means of realising the aspirations of the Libyan people. (Mail and Guardian, 2011). The South African president with a short notice accepted an invitation from his Russian counterpart to come there for a joint meeting with the NATO's Secretary-General, Anders Fogh Ramussen. (Ibid.) But this genuine attempt to install some sanity into NATO’s leadership thinking was in vain.

Meanwhile the war of lies continued and intensified. The NATO command claimed that its targets are strictly civilian, although from time it had to admit “mistakes”. However it was far from the truth. A group of 37 medics from Russia, Ukraine and Belarus sent an open letter to President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin after bombing of Tajura, a Tripoli suburb: “Bombs and rockets hit dwelling houses and fell near the hospital… There was no such number of wounded and killed as today in one day during all the disturbances in Libya. And this is called “protection of civilian population”?!” (Zavtra, 2011)

In June 2011, an investigation carried out by Amnesty International, the same organization that initially contributed into mass-media hysteria, found that many of the allegations against the Libyan authorities turned out to either be false or lack any credible evidence, and at times rebels manufactured evidence. The number of casualties was heavily exaggerated, some of the protesters may have been armed, there is was neither proof of mass killing of civilians, nor evidence that aircraft or heavy anti-aircraft machine guns were used against them. It also doubted claims from the Western media that the protest movement was “entirely peaceful” and “presented no security challenge.” (Cockburn, 2011)

One more example. The big noise in media arose when rebels claimed that 1270 people were buried 15 years earlier at a mass grave they discovered (Washington Post, 2011), but not much has been said when investigating journalists found only animal bones at the site. (CNN, 2011).

On the other hand the bitter truth about NATO and its accomplices’ crimes was coming into the light, more so after their “victory”. The US Congressman from Texas Ron Paul (a candidate, though unsuccessful for Presidency in 2012) wrote later: “Americans may be tempted to celebrate the apparent victory of US and NATO backed rebels in Libya, since it seems the Gaddafi regime is overthrown. But I believe any enthusiasm for our Libyan misadventure is premature.

As the civilian toll from NATO bombs adds up in a war started under the guise of protecting a civilian population, even the initial argument for intervention is ridiculous. We should not forget that there were no massacres taking place in Libya before the NATO attack. The attack was a dubbed a preventative humanitarian intervention. But as soon as NATO planes started bombing, civilians started dying.” (Paul, 2011)

An independent report published by Middle Eastern human rights groups says there is evidence that human rights violations were committed by all the participants – NATO, rebel forces and those loyal to Gaddafi. On the basis of interviews with eye-witnesses and victims of attacks, and visits to areas targeted by the alliance, the report highlights the issue of NATO classifying civilian sites as military targets during its operations. In particular, in Sirte in September “civilians converged at the site of NATO strikes on two trucks, and were subsequently killed by a third missile”. (Chabi, 2012)

Such disclosures did not prevent Rasmussen from saying: “We have carried out this operation very carefully, without confirmed civilian casualties.” (Chivers and Schmitt, 2011) Moreover NATO’s criminal actions were protected by the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, who rejected claims that NATO had exceeded its mandate in Libya: “Security Council resolution 1973, I believe, was strictly enforced within the limit, within the mandate”, he said. (Charbonneau, 2011)

Crimes, committed by NATO’s accomplices became evident as well: killing, torturing, detention and ill-treatment of loyalists, forced displacements of suspected “enemies of the revolution”. In some cases they had a racial connotations, like in the town of Tawergha, near Misrata, where 30,000 residents, mostly dark skinned, had been driven out of their homes in revenge. (Fafm, 2011)

NATO`s Operation Unified Protector, has resulted in 55 cases documented by Amnesty International of named civilians, including 16 children and 14 women that were killed in air strikes in the capital Tripoli and other towns. (Lehmann, 2012) However a real figure, no doubt, several thousands. Indeed according to NATO, it flew 24,200 sorties, including over 9,000 strike sorties.”(Prashad, 2012). So, who would believe that in average over 160 striking sorties resulted in a single civilian death?

South African Deputy President Khalema Motlanthe, speaking in National Assembly on 24 August 2011 raised a very important point. He asked whether the ICC would have the will to unearth links and co-ordination between “rebels” and NATO and bring those who are responsible to book, including the NATO commanders on the ground (and, I would add, NATO politicians as well) (Kgosana, 2011).

Amidst growing criticism, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, had to promise in November 2011 that NATO forces would be investigated along with the two Libyan sides of the conflict for breaches of the laws of war, but so far nothing is known about the outcome of this investigation if it ever took place. ( McElroy, 2011)

***

The resolution 1973, as deficient as it was, had at least one vital point: it excluded “a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory”. (United Nations. Security Council, 2011 (2)). However the armed intervention was not limited by attack from air and sea.

After the “victory” in Libya the forces which illegally intervene there became blunter. Although nor just rumours but evidence of the presence of Qatari special forces came out several times earlier, it was only on October 26, 2011, when its chief-of-staff, Major-General Hamad bin Ali al-Atiya, publicly admitted: “We were among them and the numbers of Qataris on the ground were hundreds in every region. Training and communications had been in Qatari hands. Qatar … supervised the rebels' plans because they are civilians and did not have enough military experience. We acted as the link between the rebels and NATO forces.” (Black, 2011). In particular, Qatari Special Forces “were seen on the frontline” during the final assault on Gaddafi's Bab al-Aziziya compound in Tripoli in late August. Besides, they provided infantry training to fighters in the western Nafusa Mountains which then joined them in attacking the capital. And so called “defensive weapons” provided by Doha to rebels included Milan anti-tank missiles. (Ibid.) Taking into account, that number of “rebels”, at least initially, was very limited “in every region”, his words mean that Qataris were the main striking force, if not to count some “Caucasians”, that is special forces from Western countries; indeed, the New York Times wrote: “Britain, France and other nations deployed special forces on the ground inside Libya to help train and arm the rebels, the diplomat and another official said”. (Schmitt and Meyers, 2011).

So the intervention of NATO and its allies from the Gulf monarchies was crucial for the “victory” of “thuwar” (“revolutionaries”), though Moreno-Ocampo missed the chance to prosecute him: the Libyan leader was brutally assassinated and US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton accepted responsibility for this crime, when paraphrased a well-known Julius Caesar quotation (veni, vidi, vici) saying: “We came, we saw, he died”. (Yutube, 2011)

She did it albeit unintentionally, sitting for a news interview in Kabul, with the camera still rolling, but But Senator John McCain was deliberately candid, when he disclosed to CNN that, during his visit to Tripoli, new government officials had told him “they were willing to reimburse the United States for its role in helping end the Qaddafi regime. “So far, that tab has run about $1.2 billion, according to Pentagon and State Department officials. ‘Obviously, it's their money,’ said he “They are willing to reimburse us and our allies. They're obviously are going to be a very wealthy country.” (Liberto,2011)

The West’s role in the tragic developments was summarised by an American Stratfor think tank that wrote with sarcasm: “The Arab Spring is a classic how-to guide to mainstream media's wishful thinking. Got a minority seeking to topple a regime on your hands? Just label it a unanimous revolution against authoritarianism, and give it an air of a fledgling democracy. Problem solved!” (Stratfor, 2011)

* * *

Once again back to Africa. It looks like Qaddafi’s death “set free” those politicians in Africa who earlier paid lip service for African unity and souvereignity. Even earlier the AU members’ joint position (if it ever really existed) began crumbling, when several countries unilaterally recognised the TNC. Finally the recognition was announced by AU Chairman and Equatorial Guinea President, Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, at a high level meeting on Libya held at the UN. (This Day Live, 2011) This was a flagrant violation of the very basic AU document, its Constitutive Act which proclaimed “condemnation and rejection of unconstitutional changes of governments”.(African Union. The Constitute Act, 2000)

***

The comprehensive analysis of the consequences of the war in Libya is beyond the theme of this paper. However, there is no doubt, that “democracy” being installed in post-Qaddafi’s Libya is rather specific. It includes a couple of attacks of “rebel militia” at Prime Minister’s office, a seizure of the Tripoli airport by another armed group, never-ending inter-tribal fighting… It remains to be seen, whether a general multi-party election scheduled for June 19, 2012 and the subsequent formation of “a democratic government” would change the situation to the better.

Samir Amin, an Egyptian academic working in Senegal gave such an assessment of the Western intervention: “… in Libya, at the start we had no [broad popular] movement . . . against Gaddafi. We had small armed groups, and one has to question immediately . . .where those arms were coming from.  They were - we know it from the beginning, from the Gulf, with the support of Western powers, and the US. And attacking the army, police, and so on. And the same day, not even the next day, those very people who qualified themselves as “liberation forces” “democratic liberation forces” called upon NATO- the French and then NATO - to come to the rescue, and that allowed for the intervention.  That intervention has succeeded in the sense that it destroyed the regime of Gaddafi.  But what is the result of the success?  Is it democratic Libya?  Well, one should laugh at that when one knows that the president of the new regime is nobody else than the very judge who condemned to death the Bulgarian nurses.  What a curious democracy it is!  But it has also led to the dislocation of the country on a Somalian pattern: that is, local powers - all of them in the name of so-called "Islam," but local warlords - with the destruction of the country.  One can raise the question: was this the target of the intervention - that is, the destruction of the country?” (Amin, 2011)

In any case, there is no doubt that the Libyan tragedy was a heavy blow on the future of African Union and its members. The matter is not just in the loss of funds provided earlier by Tripoli. More harmful is the feeling of defenselessness which is growing on the continent. It was clearly expressed by an African ambassador, who said to the author: “No African country is safe now, after Libya”.

The false stories of “African mercenaries” and the real intimidation and abuses of dark-skinned people by rebels are very detrimental to the unity of Africa. Even Amnesty International could not verify a single “African mercenary” fighting for Gaddafi story, but “the highly charged international satellite television accounts of African mercenaries raping women” that proved to be fabrications were used to frighten the population. (Mountain, 2011)

“It has been a deceptively mild end to a winter of discontent in Libya. No bountiful showers of sorely needed funds for reconstruction, rehabilitation and development materialised. Libya's infrastructure is in shambles. In short, Libya is fast sliding into chaos”, wrote Gamal Nkrumah, a son of Kwame Nkrumah in Egyptian Al-Ahram. He (and many others) was particularly worried by “extra-judicial executions and vicious attacks against black Libyans” . (Nkrumah, G. 2012).

Furthermore, the aftereffects of NATO’s aggression could be felt well beyond the borders of Libya. A recent fighting in Mali, resulting in proclamation of so called “independent Azavad” by Tuaregs is one of them. The same is right about a proliferation of portable surface-to-air missiles from Libyan stockpiles, which contained about 20,000 missiles. By May teams from the United States and NATO have secured roughly 5,000; the same number are thought to be in the hands of the various militias, a number of them were destroyed by NATO airstrikes or used by government forces, however, it looks like that around 5, 000 have been smuggled out of the country and some of them have been already seized in Egypt and Algeria. (Scott, 2012) Where will the rest surfaced?

***

A final point. Half a century ago when most of the European powers agreed to independence of their colonies in Africa, Portugal could not follow them; it was too weak economically to apply neocolonial methods of control. Fifteen years of ruthless repressions and colonial war followed. Historical parallels are at times precarious, but perhaps something similar is going on today. Having been weakened economically, Western powers are over and over again resorting to the use of their military power to subjugate others. The consequences of such policy will be too ghastly to contemplate.

-----------------------

[i] The latter ridiculous claim was made by Luis Moreno Okampo, prosecutor of the ICC which by that time became notorious for its biased approach. It remains to be added that Moreno Ocampo himself was accused in 2006 by his media spokesman of sexual misconduct by forcing a journalist in South Africa to have sexual intercourse with him.

[ii] The Western powers tried to create a broader alliance, and in particular, to rope in Arab countries, however only two of the, “the most democratic” – Qatar and the United Arab Emirates joined a so called “coalition”. An unexpected participant was Sweden, a non-member of NATO; Russian military experts believe that “it can be explained not just political, but by marketing considerations as well – to advance its JAS -39 Gripen fighter to the world market…” (Chuzhie voiny (2012) [Alien wars], Tsentr analiza strategii I tehnologii, Moscow; 262)

[iii] However the leading role in the war in the first weeks was played by the US, in particular by its African Command – AFRICOM. Maurice Carney, Executive Director of the American NGO, Friends of the Congo said: “When AFRICOM was first launched… we were told that AFRICOM would be primarily concerned with humanitarian issues — digging wells and training and providing support in disaster areas. But we quickly

saw with the NATO onslaught in Libya that that was led by the Africa Command." ()

Bibliography

African Union Consultative Meeting on the Situation in Libya (2011) Addis-Ababa. Ethiopia. 25 March 2011. Communiqué.

. (25 May 2012)

African Union. Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of the Union on the State of Peace and Security in Africa (2011). Addis-Ababa, Ethiopia. 25 May 2011. Decision on the Peaceful Resolution of the Libyan Crisis (29 April 2012)

African Union Non-Aggression Common Defence Pact, (2005). (5 June 2012)

African Union. The Constitutive Act. (2002) (25 April 2012)

African Union. Peace and Security Council (2011) 265th Meeting. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 10 March 2011. PSC/PR/COMM.2 (CCLXV) Communique. (25 April 2012)

Ahmad, A. (2011) Libya Recolonised: New African Bases For AFRICOM-NATO Combine. The Global Research, November 2, 2011, (29 April 2012)

Ahmed, R. (2011) NATO's War in Libya: Protecting to Kill, Killing to Protect. Global Research, October 9, 2011. (26 April 2012)

Amin, S. (2011). An Imperialist Springtime? 

Libya, Syria, and Beyond

Samir Amin Interviewed by Aijaz Ahmad. MR Sine. 24 April 2012.

(25 May 2012)

Black, I (2011) Qatar admits sending hundreds of troops to support Libya rebels

The Guardian, (2011), 26 October 2011,

(7 June 2012)

BBC (2011), News Africa, 21 April 2011. Libya: Where do Nato countries stand? http://w China Daily (2011). March 26, 2011. Libya agrees with AU's road map. (28 May 2012)

ww.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13092451 (3 June 2012)

Bowcott, O. and Wolfe-Robinson, M.(2011) Gaddafi regime ordered to appear before Africa's highest court. Guardian, 30 March 2011

(20 March 2012)

Charbonneau, L. (2011) UN chief defends NATO from critics of Libya war. (3 June 2012)

!habi, R. (2012). Nato accused of war crimes in Libya The IndependentСhabi, R. (2012). Nato accused of war crimes in Libya The Independent , 19 January 2012. http:/.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/nato-accused-of-war-crimes-in-libya-6291566.html (1 June 2012)

Chrisafis. A. Nicolas Sarkozy faces renewed claim Gaddafi agreed to fund 2007 campaign. The Guardian, London, April 29, 2012.

(2 June 2012)

Chivers, C. and Schmitt, E. (2011).In Strikes on Libya by NATO, an Unspoken Civilian Toll. The New York Times. 18 December 2011.

(3 June 2012)

CNN (2011). 26 September 2011 “Libya hedges mass grave claim ” (3 June 2012)

Cockburn, Patrick (2011)."Amnesty Questions Claim That Gaddafi Ordered Rape as Weapon of War".The Independent, 24 June 2011. (3 June 2012) ( (1 June 2012)

EASTWEEK (2011). 03.23. OSW. Russia on the military intervention in Libya. . (27 April 2012)

Emerging minds (2011), March 21, 2011. African Union opposes foreign military intervention in Libya,



(1 June 2012)

Evans, D (2011) Arabs say Gaddafi must go, wary of Western action. .(20 May 2012)

Fafm, K.(2011) Accused of Fighting for Qaddafi, a Libyan Town’s Residents Face Reprisals. New York Times, 23 September 2011.

(7 June 2012)

Goodenough, P. (2012) South Africa calls for UN Probe into NATO’mission.

(12 may 2012)

Hungarian Presidency of the Council of the European Union. Martonyi: no aim to change Libya’s political system.

(3 June 2012)

Kgosana, C. (2011) Motlanthe wants Nato probe. Sowetan, 26 August, 2011. (25 April 2012)

Lehmann, C. (2012) Amnesty and the NATO Cover-Up of War Crimes in Libya. NSBC. (30 May 2012)

Liberto, J. (2011) Libya set to get back $37 billion from U.S. CNN Money, 20 October 2011. (1 June 2012)

Mail and Guardian (2011), 5 July 2011. Zuma recruits Russia to AU's quest for peace in Libya. 26 April 2012)

Mountain, T. (2011).Lies of the Libyan War. Counterpunch, 27 July 2011.

(10 May 2012)

McElroy. D.(2011). Libya: Nato to be investigated by ICC for war crimes. The Telegraph, 2 November, 2011 (27 M ay 2012)

Mamdani M. (2010) Saviours and Survivors: Darfur, Politics and the War on Terror. Malthouse Press Limited, Lagos, Benin, Ibadan, Jos, Port-Harcourt, Zaria.

Matinyi (2011).Why Africa is ignored in global affairs. The Citizen Dar es Salaam, March 31, 2011. (2 June 2012)

Museveni, Y. (2011) The Qaddafi I know. Washington, Foreign Policy, March 24, 2011.

(27 April 2012)

Nkrumah, G .(2012) Libya: Legacy or Lunacy. Al-Ahram Weekly On Line, 12-18 April 2012.. (28 May 2012)

Paul, R. Mission Accomplished in Libya? ((3 June 2012)

Pr

Scott. S. (2012). The Continuing Threat of Libyan Missiles. Stratfor, 3 May 2012. (5 June 2012

ashad, V. (2011) NATO’s craven cover-up of its Libyan bombing. Pambazuka News,

2012-03-21 . (27 April 2012)

Russian military. (2011)“Airstrikes in Libya did not take place” – , RT, March 01, 2011 Quoted in : Ahmed, R. Nato’s War in Libya.

Schmitt, E. and Meyers, S (2011) Surveillance and Coordination With NATO Aided Rebels

The New York Times (2011), 22 August 2011, > (3 June 2012)

Stone A. (2011)The White House and the decision for Libyan intervention. A case of mangled information and sloppy analysis.

.(27 April 2012)

Stratfor (2012). What is next for Libya? www, (20 May 2012)

Sudan Tribune (2011), 31 March. African Union absent from 2nd meeting on Libya as its chief pleads for funds. (6 June 2012)

This Day Live (2011). At UN. AU finally recognized Libyan TNC. 21 September 2011,

TV Newsroom. European Council (2011).Libya Summit - March 2011, . (1 June 2012)

Tripoli Declaration (2010) .

(1 June 2012

UK Mission to the UN. (2011) United Nations Security Council resolution on Libya No-Fly Zone has been approved. (30 May 2012)

United Nations. Security Council. Resolution 1970 (2011). .(30 April 2012)

Urnov, A (2011). Afrika i OON [Africa and the UN]. Institut Afriki RAN, Moscow, 2011.

The Washington Post (2011). 25 September 2011. "Mass grave believed to hold more than 1,200 Libyan prisoners killed by Gadhafi regime in '96"

(1 June 2012)

Waterfield,B. (2011). Libya: Colonel Gaddafi 'flees' to Venezuela as cities fall to protesters.

.(26 April 2012)

Youtube (2011) Berlusconi kisses Gaddafi's hand.

. (27 May 2012)

Yutube (2011) Hillary Clinton on Gaddafi: We came, we saw, he died. (1 June 2012)

Zavtra (2011), March-April 2011 г. №13. Quoted in A.Urnov “Afrika i OON” (Africa and the UN), Moscow, 2011.

................
................

In order to avoid copyright disputes, this page is only a partial summary.

Google Online Preview   Download