Big questions in Public Network Management research ...
Big questions in Public Network Management research
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory | |
|Print Media Subtitle: |J-PART |
| |Lawrence |
| |Jul 2001 |
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|Authors: |Robert Agranoff |
|Authors: |Michael McGuire |
|Volume: |11 |
|Issue: |3 |
|Pagination: |295-326 |
|ISSN: |10531858 |
|Subject Terms: |Public administration |
| |Management |
Abstract:
As the use of networks in public management increases, more and larger questions expand this research arena. In many ways, public network management is in search of a paradigm equivalent to the hierarchical-organizational authority paradigm of bureaucratic management. We raise and offer preliminary answers to seven metaquestions that address the nature of network management tasks, group process in collaboration, flexibility of networks, self-responsibility and public agency accountability, the cohesive factor of networks, power and its effect on group problem resolution, and the results of network management.
Copyright Transaction Publishers Jul 2001
Full Text:
|ABSTRACT |
|As the use of networks in public management increases, more and larger questions expand this research arena. In many ways, public |
|network management is in search of a paradigm equivalent to the hierarchical-organizational authority paradigm of bureaucratic |
|management. We raise and offer preliminary answers to seven metaquestions that address the nature of network management tasks, |
|group process in collaboration, flexibility of networks, self-responsibility and public agency accountability, the cohesive factor|
|of networks, power and its effect on group problem resolution, and the results of network management. The light we shed on these |
|issues by examining the black box of networks is designed to contribute to building an empirically derived knowledge base of |
|network management. |
|As long as a branch of science offers an abundance of problems, so long is it alive; a lack of problems foreshadows extinction or |
|the cessation of independent development .... It is by the solution of problems that the investigator tests the temper of his |
|steel; he finds new methods and new outlooks, and gains a wider and freer horizon. |
We share the optimism and enthusiasm of discovery expressed by mathematician David Hilbert one hundred years ago in the above quote. At that time, he outlined twenty-three major problems to be studied over the next century in what is still history's most influential speech about mathematics. He conveyed to the scientific community that unsolved problems are a sign of vitality and that research on the most difficult problems was necessary: "for what is clear and easily comprehended attracts, the complicated repels us" (Hilbert 1902). In the spirit of Hilbert, we attempt to assess, in at least a preliminary way, the operational knowledge base of the public network management field. There are many more questions than answers in network management and, since just a few can be covered in these pages, we selectively raise some core questions-and suggest preliminary answers to these questions-that frame any potential theory of network and collaborative management.
That the study of interorganizational network management is temporally relevant needs little justification. Knowledge as a factor in social and economic production is making land, labor, and capital increasingly secondary. Knowledge work increasingly involves problem solving, problem identifying, and strategic brokering, which constitutes the symbolic-analytic work identified by Reich (1991, 177). Knowledge creation and learning occur best when people are reacting to someone else's thinking; thus networks and other communities of learning are part of today's knowledge program architecture (Pasternack and Viscio 1998). Networks or teamwork are also the vehicles for arranging the human capital needed to create new technologies, including those that are managerial. These assumptions place networks and their management at center stage. Networks, as the term is used in the literature, typically refers to multiorganizational arrangements for solving problems that cannot be achiev! ed, or achieved easily, by single organizations. Public management networks are led or managed by government representatives. Simply put, networks constitute emergent phenomena that are distinctive managerial vehicles and that offer challenges for the single organization and its management.
Since the focus here is on interactions that involve public organizations, we draw conceptual questions and suggest partial answers from a wide range of the policy and management literature, including our own (Agranoff and McGuire 1998; 1999a; 1999b), as well as from more contemporary analyses of interorganizational and intergovernmental relations. In other words, we seek to organize the state of the field on management of public networks by reviewing extant studies. The results suggest that more is known than might have been apparent about a range of issues. This accounting or distillation suggests more detailed but no less important questions. This article presents the results of this broad examination of the research record.
Increasingly, the capacities required to operate successfully in network settings are different from the capacities needed to succeed at managing a single organization. The classical, mostly intraorganizational-inspired management perspective that has guided public administration for more than a century is simply inapplicable for multiorganizational, multigovernmental, and multisectoral forms of governing. If network management is a function distinct from that of hierarchical management, as many eminent scholars suggest (Kettl 1996; Milward 1994; O'Toole 1997a), then focused research and improved conceptualization on this core public activity must be accelerated. Indeed, as the use of networks in public management increases, more questions regarding this research arena need to be answered. Weiner (1990) predicts organizational management and transorganizational (network) management will become two parallel but overlapping streams within administrative theory, relying heavil! y on both behavioral science and management science research and practice. Network management is thus in need of a knowledge base equivalent to the hierarchical organizational authority paradigm of bureaucratic management. The primary challenge for empirical research in public administration is to functionally separate how knowledge issues, problems, and technologies are identified, brokered, and solved in networks.
We will examine seven basic operating questions related to network management. First, we will raise the issue of whether there is a functional network equivalent to traditional management procedure. Is there a POSDCORB in network management? Second, we will investigate the group decision approaches in network management. Are they the same as those derived from applied behavioral science or are other learning and decision processes at work? Third, we will address the issue of flexibility in networks. Do networks provide flexibility beyond rapid adaptation or procedural accommodation? Fourth, we will discuss the venerable accountability issue. In what ways do networks employ mutual self-responsibility, and does this substitute for the loss of public agency accountability? Fifth, we will explore issues of trust, common purpose, mutual dependency, and other issues in networks. What is the cohesion factor in networks that is equivalent to legal-rational authority in organization! s? Sixth, we will consider the issue of power in networks, which is often neglected, particularly its effect on the synergistic creativity that reciprocal relationships hope to produce. How does power come into play and what is its effect on group problem resolution? Seventh, we will pursue the issue of network results or network productivity. Do public management networks produce results that would otherwise not have occurred? The light we will shed on these issues by examining the process-the black box-of networks may contribute to building an empirically derived knowledge base of network management.
What are the critical functional equivalents to traditional management processes? Is there a POSDCORB equivalent set of tasks that replaces the standard planning, organizing, and so forth?
When public or private sector managers are observed operating in their home organizations, one can clearly describe, in the most general sense, what activities are performed at any given time and, for the most part, why they are performed. A vocabulary or nomenclature that has developed and has been refined over many decades is available to us to help elucidate the manager's daily activities within the single organization bureaucratic structure. For example, many textbook descriptions of management include tasks such as planning, organizing, and leading, and for more than sixty years the field has relied, to varying degrees, on a simple acronym-POSDCORB-to distill management activities into seven basic tasks. Furthermore, managers have certain remedies to fix single organizational problems. If an organization appears to lack direction, planning may be the answer; if communication and coordination are poor across departments within an organization, a reorganization may be in! order. Scholars have identified some behaviors used in managing networks and when it is best to use them, but a similar functional and conceptual parallel to traditional management processes has not yet been developed (Hanf and O'Toole 1992). We open with a purely suggestive grouping of network management behaviors as a way to summarize the literature in a substantive way.
One class of behaviors addressed in the literature involves the general tasks of activation. Activating includes the process of identifying participants for the network (Lipnack and Stamps 1994) and stakeholders in the network (Gray 1989) as well as tapping the skills, knowledge, and resources of these persons (Agranoff and McGuire 1999a). All interests should be included in network processes (Innes and Booher 1999). Network managers arrange (Klijn and Teisman 1997), stabilize as much as possible (Stone 1999), nurture (O'Toole 1988), and integrate (Lipnack and Stamps 1994) the network structure. Activation is a critical component of network management because resources like money, information, and expertise can be the integrating mechanisms of networks. According to Scharpf (1978), selective activation of potential participants in the network is "an essential prerequisite for successful interorganizational policy formation and policy implementation" and, if it is performed ! correctly, is based on "the correct identification of 'necessary participants' in policy-congruent networks," as well as the willingness of these potential participants to devote resources to the network and not be influenced by actors who may have other interests at stake (p. 364).
Activating the right players with the right resources is the crucial task of governing in cities through coalitions of public and nongovernmental organizations. We know from the urban regime literature (Stone 1989 and 1999; Stoker and Mossberger 1994) that governing coalitions in cities must "bring together resources that are adequate to address the identifying agenda," otherwise the arrangements will not be effective (Stone 1999, 3). Such regimes operate according to network principles, but do so informally, usually through nongovernmental organizations' pursuit of mutually derived agendas. Since the probability of activating a weak link in the chain-involving the wrong player or the wrong mix of resources-is greater than zero (see Landau 1991), this task is of crucial importance to network effectiveness. Deactivation also appears to be an important component of network management. For this task, network structures are rearranged and shifted if they are not performing as d! esired. The most common prescription in this regard is to introduce new actors as a means of changing the network dynamic, shifting the influence of existing actors, and facilitating fluid leadership roles (Klijn 1996; O'Toole 1988; Klin and Teisman 1997; Termeer and Koppenjan 1997).
Other management behaviors identified in the literature are consistent with the general task of framing. Like activation, framing is used both during the formation of the network and as a management tool when network effectiveness diminishes or is suboptimal. Compared to activation, framing is a more subtle task but is just as necessary. Framing involves establishing and influencing the operating rules of the network (Mandell, 1990; Klijn 1996; Gray 1989), influencing its prevailing values and norms (Kickert and Koppenjan 1997; O'Toole 1997b), and altering the perceptions of the network participants (Termeer and Koppenjan 1997). The rules of interaction among participants and the perception of that interaction are malleable, and conscious change in the latter through framing can jump start an unproductive network. A manager can frame the network context by introducing new ideas to the network (Kickert and Koppenjan 1997), thereby creating (or celebrating) a shared purpose o! r vision (Mandell 1988; Gray 1989; Lipnack and Stamps 1994; O'Toole 1997b). In this regard, the manager might offer suggestions for looking at a problem differently or might recommend an alternative decision-making mechanism. Although not a simple or straightforward managerial task, framing "gives shape to purposes, and . . . has great influence in the alignment of various forms of engagement" (Stone 1999, 7).
In addition to activating the network and framing the interaction of network participants, the literature indicates that network managers need to induce individuals to make a commitment to the joint undertaking-and to keep that commitment. A manager must often sell an idea to potential network participants to secure commitment; support for the network and its purposes) must be built (Gray 1989; Innes and Booher 1999; Mandell 1990). Mobilizing "requires a view of the strategic whole and an ability to develop and achieve a set of common objectives based on this whole" (Mandell 1988, 33). Managers build support for the network by mobilizing organizations (Mossberger and Hale 1999) and coalitions (Kickert and Koppenjan 1997), and by forging an agreement on the role and scope of network operations (see Benson 1975). Additionally, the ability to manage networks is related to the internal support and cooperation of the manager's primary organization. Managers in city government, f! or example, should have the cooperation of city councils and their chief executives as a means to more confidently engage in networking and achieve the strategic purpose at hand (Agranoff and McGuire 1999a). We distinguish between behaviors associated with activation and mobilization by including in the latter the important finding that a human relations component-motivating, inspiring, inducing commitment-is a standard part of the network management repertoire.
Research on network management also addresses synthesizing the network by creating the environment and enhancing the conditions for favorable, productive interaction among network participants. Managers must find a way to blend the various participants-each with conflicting goals or different perceptions or dissimilar values-to fulfill the strategic purpose of the network. The network manager seeks to achieve cooperation between actors while preventing, minimizing, or removing blockages to cooperation. This steering of network processes is tantamount to game management in the sense that the result of the network process "derives from the interaction between the strategies of all actors involved" (Klijn and Teisman 1997, 99). The strategies of each network participant and the outcomes of those strategies are influenced by the patterns of relations and interactions that have developed in the network. Relationships and interactions that result in achievement of the network pur! pose are the aim of the network manager, and important management behaviors include facilitating and furthering interaction among participants (Agranoff and McGuire 1999a; Kickert and Koppenjan 1997); reducing complexity and uncertainty by promoting information exchange (Innes and Booher 1999; O'Toole 1988 and 1997b; Mossberger and Hale 1999); changing incentives to cooperation (Kickert et al. 1997); developing new rules and procedures of interaction (Klijn 1996; Termeer and Koppenjan 1997); changing positions, relations, and roles of participants (Klijn 1996; Kickert et al. 1997); helping the network to be self-- organizing (Innes and Booher 1999); and engendering effective communication among participants (Mandell 1990; Kickert et al. 1997). Synthesizing seeks to lower the cost of interaction, which can be substantial in network settings.
Although we distinguish among four different management behaviors or tasks, the tasks identified in the network management literature are nearly seamless in their applicability. That is, just as a manager in a single organization may lead, plan, and organize simultaneously within the context of a particular goal, so too are multiple behaviors utilized in network settings. Synthesizing and activating are management tasks often used in conjunction. For example, the removal of a network participant can have myriad effects on the network. Alternatively, if the attitudes and behaviors of some participants are stifling productive interaction, the manager might try to create an environment within which greater interaction can take place by improving the incentives of participation or reassigning (facilitating the reassignment of) various roles within the network. Similarly, synthesizing the network is often accompanied by refraining, or a conscious attempt to change the network pa! rticipants' perception of the interaction changes. After or during deactivation or refraining, managers must mobilize support for the changes, reestablish the purpose of the network, and make sure all participants are on board.
Beyond identifying these tasks, research must discover the set of managerial decision rules that network managers currently follow in their quest for performance. What does a network manager do when trust is lacking among the actors? What should she do? What does a network manager do when the goals of the network actors are conflicting? What should he do? What are the best mechanisms to improve decision making in the network, or to increase productivity, or to address a slacker in the network? Broadly, what are the critical occurrences or situations that affect network operations, and what are the preferred responses to these situations? Extensive observation and in-depth interviewing are required to answer these critical questions.
Are the approaches to groupware-that is, group development that reaches a mutual understanding and transcends the more immediate and interactive bases of coordination and communication through hierarchy-substantively different from those derived from the applied behavioral science approaches that emanate from human relations research?
Groupware describes interagency task group development for reaching jointly arrived at solutions. Hierarchies have become one among many means to coordinate and control actions across people, knowledge, time, and space. This type of groupware (which is different from computer decision support software) produces more immediate and interactive bases of coordination than does hierarchy. It incorporates principles that are qualitatively different from interorganizational coordination or mutual adjustment. Groupware requires that "virtuous circles" have a multiplier effect as multiple cultures, procedures, and divisions of labor be incorporated into the network (Clegg and Hardy 1996, 11). Decisions are deliberative, creative, and group based, as organization representatives shed some of their ideology and forge redefined problems, a mutual course of action, a multi-- organizational implementation technology, and diversified methods of resource acquisition. Groupware leads to syn! ergistic products. Operating by groupware clearly requires the application of standard applied behavioral science techniques, but is more required? Myron Weiner (1990, 456) suggests that in transorganizational (network) management, techniques similar to organization management are normally employed: group problem solving, force-field analysis, action planning, team building, process consultation, and others. However, the two domains are distinctive in at least two ways. First, in network management, empowerment is based on information rather than on authority. Second, in network management, existing organizational structures are dependent variables for network systems. The several organizations working together can be fashioned into new systems, using the flow of information to link the transorganizational system.
Social capital is one possible ingredient in the interorganizational information flows that are necessary for developing groupware. Fountain (1998, 104) refers to social capital as the stock that is created when a group of organizations develops the ability to work together for mutual productive gain (for related definitions see Coleman 1990; Putnam 1993). Social capital is essential for groups of disparate representatives to work toward sharing resources held by individual organizations:
Like physical capital and human capital-tools and training that enhance individual productivity-'social capital' refers to features of social organization, such as networks, norms, and trust, that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit. The notion of social capital extends our understanding of 'cooperation' or 'collaboration' in two significant ways. First, linking cooperation to the economic concept 'capital' signals the investment or growth potential of a group's ability to work jointly. Second, the concept identifies the structure created from collaborative effort as capital (Fountain 1998, 105).
Fountain argues that the important elements of social capital are trust, norms, and operations of the network, which are closely related to the values and objectives of the actors. She suggests that tools that enhance the creation of social capital need to be part of policies that promote innovation and productivity growth (p. 113). As a result, social capital has been associated with increased innovation and economic growth within the biotechnology and information industry, as well as revitalization in manufacturing.
Shared learning is a fundamental component of groupware. Collaborative processes among organizational representatives can be characterized as joint learning systems. Inner and Booher (1999, 3) suggest that a new mind-set is needed to overcome traditional notions of producing specific agreements and actions. The idea is similar to Senge's (1990, 3) learning organization, "where people continually expand their capacity to create the results they truly desire, where new and expansive patterns of thinking are nurtured, where collective aspiration is set free, and where people are continually learning how to learn together." To Inner and Booher, the most important consequences occur not at the end, but during the discussion process itself. An environment conducive to learning is created when network members follow principles of civil discourse; when all are listened to; and when conditions of sincerity, comprehensibility, accuracy, and legitimacy are met. Collaborative discussio! ns involve creating shared meaning, pursuing mechanisms other than arguing and debating, bringing out added knowledge, and formulating ideas and processes of joint action that can result in "good answers through process" (Inner and Booher 1999, 5). Senge (1990) suggests that learning organizations require five core disciplines: personal mastery, mental models, shared vision, team learning, and systems thinking. Like learning organizations, networks require similar collective "cognitive capabilities" since "the intelligence of a network lies in the patterns of relationships among its members" (Lipnack and Stamps 1994, 210).
Groupware is also developed through negotiation. Bardach (1998, 232) refers to a "culture of joint problem solving" that includes an "ethos that values equality, adaptability, discretion and results." Part of this ethos is to overcome bureaucratic tendencies (hierarchy, stability, obedience, procedures) through a lively sense of value-creating possibilities. Bardach (p. 238) also suggests that "collaboration is a matter of exhortation, explication, persuasion, give and take. To collaborate is to negotiate." Negotiations have to take into account all interests-personal, organizational, partner organizations, and the collective (Galaskiewicz and Zaheer 1999). Bardach (pp. 245-46) suggests that there may be stages in network negotiations that are analogous to the contentiousness-stalemate-constructive dynamic in private-- sector negotiations: the mutual understanding of a latent opportunity to create public value; the recognition that collective efforts and risks are manageabl! e; and the process of collaboration proceeds. Negotiations in networks seek consensus only after members have fully explored the issues and interests, and only after significant effort has been made to find creative responses to differences (Innes and Booher 1999). Such processes are supported by trust-based accommodations and by the dualism manifest in the agency delegate to the network and the network delegate to the agency being the same person. Weiner (1990) suggests that whether collaborating or negotiating, such dual loyalty necessitates a totally new mind-set and value stance for managers who work within transorganizational systems.
An example of groupware at work occurred as a collaborative task force of governmental and nongovernmental leaders from Iowa, under the sponsorship of the National Governors' Association, created a strategic plan for rural development. The Rural Policy Academy collaborative-comprising state program administrators, Agricultural Extension Service executives, agriculture and agribusiness representatives, business agency heads of peak interest associations, credit and capital executives, and civic leaders-approached its task as a temporary organization, going through process facilitation, brainstorming, problem identification, team building, survey feedback, and so on. Most essential were five task teams or work groups, involving expanded memberships and built around mutually derived goals such as business development and retention and public infrastructure. Over time, each work group found that individual and organizational positions receded in favor of new group understanding! . Members also learned about different policy arenas and developed new mind-sets regarding rural problems. For example, few members of either the business or the agriculture work team knew about the difficulties of access to venture capital or the diminution of an entrepreneurial ethos among young Iowans. Obviously, the work groups and the entire Rural Policy Academy could not incorporate all individual and organizational interests brought to the table. Healthy doses of negotiation ensued over dearly held interests and concerns, including the future of small hospitals in nonmetropolitan areas and the consolidation of local government facilities, offices, and programs. Complex issues like these required considerable negotiation to reach any policy recommendations (Agranoff 1991). Despite such obstacles, groupware was developed through difficult negotiation, and social capital was built as members saw different ways of looking at problems.
A number of behavioral process questions remain that could be answered with systematic observation of network processes. The foregoing discussion suggests that information is an important ingredient in interorganizational transactions. Is the information that participants bring to the network an empowering or an overpowering force in collaborative discussion? If the techniques of applied behavioral science are virtually the same but the clustering is different, what is the distinctive clustering in networking? Social capital's contribution to groupware also raises questions. Is social capital necessary to reach collaboration or can other features (resources, legal requirements, perception of mutual gain) make up for capital deficiencies? Is social capital sufficient to reach mutual outcomes? Can collaboration occur when social capital is low or absent from an interagency situation? With respect to joint learning, are there new and different dimensions of such learning? If j! oint learning through process is the key, what is the process? If negotiations are part of the collaborative process, to what extent are network negotiations different from those between single organizations? In the process, when does joint, learning-based, mutual decision making end and negotiation begin? Does a negotiation imbalance (too much negotiation) reduce the chances of creative synergy? Most important, how does negotiation within the network contribute to the development of group abilities to recognize and solve problems?
How do networks provide flexibility beyond rapid adaptation or procedural accommodation?
Flexibility is one of the most venerable attributes of networking. The search for flexibility has been bound-up to a considerable degree with the need for different institutional frameworks that facilitate mobility of resources, rapid access to skills and technology, efforts to stabilize market or systemic shocks on small organizations, and policing of unfair competition (Piore and Sabel 1984, 29-35). Networks are said to facilitate the arrangement of entities in a way that falls somewhere between the openness of the market and the rigidity of the hierarchy. As Powell (1990, 301) suggests, "Networks are `lighter on their feet' than hierarchies. In network modes of resource allocation, transactions occur neither through discrete exchanges or by administrative fiat, but through networks of individuals engaged in reciprocal, preferential, mutually supportive actions." Adaptive efficiency is the theme Alter and Hage (1993, 39) use to depict interorganizational adaptation associ! ated with "quality, flexibility and innovativeness" (p. 14) because networks are superior to individual organizations in achieving such efficiencies. Sengenberger and Pyke's (1992) assessment of networks in industrial districts, involving regional and municipal governments along with private-- sector enterprises, highlights the advantages of flexibility:
At their best, they represent a type of industrial organization that meets competitive challenges through differentiated high-quality products, flexibility of adjustment, and the ability for innovation. The ability to offer quality, design flair, choice, flexibility, speed, and innovation is itself a product of a particular kind of organization, based, as we have indicated, on a peculiar mixture of competition and co-operation. Often people refer to the combination of flexibility and specialized production units typical of industrial districts as "flexible specialization" and contrast it to Fordism, the inflexible organization of production on mass market lines, employing dedicated machines and specialized, often unskilled or semi-skilled, workers (P. 5).
Fulop (1996) found that the need to accommodate to rapidly changing technology, markets, and management approaches is an important reason participants join networks in Australia. Agranoff's (1998) study of public-private rural enterprise alliances found that needs to leverage public money, to harness emerging technology, to adapt the workforce to technical changes, and to provide services to small firms are additional advantages of networks. Agranoff and McGuire's (1998) study of city government networking with other local governments and the private sector, for economic development purposes, revealed that most cities become involved in multiple networks. These networks are forged for different purposes: strategy making, resource exchange, or promotion of particular projects. The presumption is that local governments engage in such multiple arrangements in pursuit of flexibility.
If one accepts these advantages at face value, the question remains, How do networks provide such flexibility? The basic question assumes rapid adaptation and procedural accommodation as a means to overcome the natural tendency of bureaucracies to slowly respond to complex environmental changes. In 1997, the South Dakota Federal-State Rural Development Council convened a group of officials from the federal government, state government, state association, private sector, and tribes to respond to the devastating impact of the 1996-1997 winter blizzards and spring floods. The network was able to move federal assistance through the state and local governments in ways that had not been accomplished before, particularly the programs of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and, to a lesser extent, the Small Busines Administration (SBA). State officials brokered remediation programs through nonprofit and statewide as! sociations, and mayors were pleasantly surprised at how quickly food and temporary shelter were forthcoming. Not only did most network participants respond rapidly, but a number of standard procedures that normally slow down processes were overlooked or put on the back burner. HUD, for example, decided to streamline its application form, particularly the survey of conditions portion, and agreed to accept a shorter Housing Authority of South Dakota form until the two could be merged. FEMA actually moved its response and remediation teams into some towns before an assessment of conditions could be made. Some extra SBA funds were moved to the state's Small Business Development Center (SBDC) before the expected multiple applications were filed. How did all this happen? It was a result of the joint effort to gauge the extent of the problem, identify barriers to problem resolution, and ask the appropriate agencies to respond in an aberrant fashion. When the emergency responses subsi! ded, the council worked with the U.S. Department of Agriculture/Rural Development (USDA/RD) and FEMA to develop a strategic plan for weather related emergencies (Radin et al. 1997). In this way, flexibility and adaptation were enhanced by the network, not only by convening many decision makers, but by making the adjustments and committing the resources to solve the immediate problem.
Do networks reach beyond these standard advantages of flexibility and facilitate new means of dealing with political problems, bureaucratic obstacles, and resource deficiencies? If so, how do network efforts create flexibility that would not otherwise occur through hierarchies? Certainly, managers representing city hall seek out adjustments across organizational jurisdiction boundaries without operating in a network. But what are the political issues that managers must address in networks that they cannot address from their positions in the hierarchy? Do they garner support from different levels of government and nongovernmental organizations to solve problems that the actors have mutually identified? One example of flexibility is found in urban regimes that can make major urban improvement efforts work in ways that city government cannot. Urban revitalization networks, such as those in Baltimore, are shadow governments that have circumvented cumbersome city hall bureaucrat! ic procedures, overcome public procurement rules, leveraged private investments with public dollars, and ignored political criticism from neighborhood and other citizen groups. Hula (1990, 201) estimates that thirty to forty of such networks existed during William Schaefer's administration. While these networks made the Inner Harbor development possible, some have questioned the propriety and accountability of the administration's failure to operate in the public, their circumvention of standard public procurement property disposal and purchasing processes, and their lack of public responsiveness.
There are also bureaucratic issues that managers can facilitate by achieving flexibility in networks that hierarchies cannot do, or do only with extreme difficulty. Can network identification of rules and obstacles publicly reveal outmoded or silly regulations? Do networks create new operating rules that allow organizations to circumvent some of their own procedural obstacles? Do the new rules help organizational officials save face? Does the moral and numerical power of the coalition of organizations help recalcitrant bureaucrats back-off from their rules and procedures? Do network solutions that run up against established procedures present a logic of revision that otherwise recalcitrant or rule-bound officials cannot avoid? Does the sheer number of organizations within networks create pressures to change some procedures?
Finally, what resource deficiencies do network flexibilities plug? Are networks involving governments better than hierarchies at securing multiple resource contributions such as money, human resources, information, technology? Better at sharing such resources? Do networks leverage resources easier than hierarchies do? These are the kinds of empirical questions that need to be answered if we are to understand the real contributions that flexibility can make in public management networks.
In what ways do networks employ mutual self-responsibility, and does this substitute for the loss of public agency accountability? Is there residual accountability that falls between the cracks of organizations, and does it fall in any direction?
The issue raised here involves the question of control and the difficulty of establishing accountability in public management networks. Indeed, this is one of the most frequently raised questions in the public administration field (Kettl 1996; Milward 1996; Frederickson 1997). In single organization settings (networks), do bureaucrats (government network managers and network members) operate in accordance with executive direction and the policy preferences of those in authority to whom they report, melding personal responsibility with constitutional duty (Rohr 1989)? Or do they contradict the norms of representative democracy by assuming too much discretion and disregarding the important direction of legislators and elected officials of the executive branch (Burke 1986)? Such venerable issues are magnified for more-complex network settings, where multiple parties operate with limited authority and even less direct contact with executive principals or legislative oversight m! echanisms. Is this strong concern with accountability issues in networking warranted? Is there a demonstrable "leakage of authority" in collaborative settings (Bardach and Lesser 1996, 198) and, if so, can its impact be determined through empirical study?
The concern for loss of accountability in multiorganizational settings first emerged as contracting relationships were becoming plentiful. In such arrangements, there is some fear that the employees of contracting organizations will pursue purposes inconsistent with those of elected officials (Milward 1994). Because contractors assume a critical intermediary position in service delivery systems, they have autonomy from each of the other governmental players (Kettl 1993). Kettl describes the discrepancy between intent and reality in the contracting relationship:
The philosophy of contracting out presumes that the basic relationship between government and contractor will be that of principal and agent. The contractor's job is to act as agent of the government's policy. The relationship is fractured, however, if contractors create independent political ties with policymakers and thus outflank their administrative overseers. In such cases contractors are less agents than partners, helping to shape the very design of the program, free of any significant oversight, and beneficiary of state and local governments' dependence on their performance (p. 176).
Two important factors render discussions of accountability in network unique. First, accountability relationships in multi-- organizational networks are quite different from those found in the dyadic linkages of contracting or the bi-level interaction of levels of government portrayed in some definitions of federalism. Myriad applications of principal-agent theory to contractual and extrajurisdictional activity exist in the literature (Waterman and Meier 1998). Even in intergovernmental policy implementation, Chubb (1985) describes the federal system as a two-tiered hierarchy and argues that a principal-agent model provides an accurate description of the impact of federal grants on policy making and managerial behavior. This results in an oversimplification of the multiple two-way interactions that constitute policy implementation. For settings where multiple interests-jurisdictional, organizational, sectoral-are involved in policy design or implementation, establishing jus! t who is the principal and who are the agents is a near impossible, maybe even meaningless, exercise. As O'Toole points out in his description of networks, "IT]hey do not have the formal wherewithal to compel compliance with such cooperative undertaking" (1997c, 445).
Second, because in networks there is no obvious principal or agent, and no exigent authority to steer the activities of the network in harmony with elected officials, the issue of accountability is miscast. With no single authority, everyone is somewhat in charge, thus everyone is somewhat responsible; all network participants appear to be accountable, but none is absolutely accountable. Additionally, the expectations of accountability to a legally constituted democratic entity are not consistent with networks that may possess insufficient democratic legitimacy; interaction between civil servants and representatives of private interest groups, other governmental layers, and implementing organizations makes it difficult for representative bodies to influence policy. In general, one can argue that the public sector's responsibility for affecting the public interest is compromised and limited by the use of networks.
However, it may be that networks force us to shift our concern away from hierarchical accountability to notions of responsibility, responsiveness, and the fostering of democratic ideals. From this perspective, O'Toole asks, "Does networked public administration pose a threat to democratic governance or offer the prospect of its more complete attainment?" (1997c, 458). He suggests that consideration of the aforementioned dimensions offers a more complete assessment of the effect of networks on democratic governance, and he concludes that network management "provides both complications and opportunities to facilitate parts of the democratic ideal" (p. 458). In a similar call for redirecting traditional public administration concerns with accountability, some argue that accountability means organizational systems based in oversight and reporting arrangements. This accountability to concern obfuscates issues of effectiveness and performance (Bardach and Lesser 1996). Accountabi! lity for means accountability for results, accountability for setting wise priorities, accountability for targeting, and accountability for system modification and design. Accountability for these outcomes is the objective of the collaborative or network and accountability to is the means to that objective. From this perspective, bureaucratic notions of accountability are simply inapplicable in networks, if they ever were in bureaucracies.
Since a control orientation is problematic for collaborative structures, some steps can be taken to maintain the flexibility of collaboration while ensuring accountability. Wondolleck and Yaffee (2000) offer suggestions derived from their study of natural resource management. First, collaborative processes should be developed as supplemental to, not exclusive of, normal decision-making processes. Decisions made collaboratively "still need to pass muster under legally derived administrative procedures" (p. 237). Second, they argue that accountability can be ensured by using mechanisms that allow decisions to be reviewed by independent, ostensibly objective, sources. Third, where possible, collaborative decision making should strive toward achieving agreed-upon performance measures that capture the intent of policy objectives. Standard setting can create incentives for collaborative players to seek solutions that achieve the standard. Finally, elected officials and other stak! eholders are too often uninformed about the results of collaborative decision making. Wondolleck and Yaffee suggest that home agencies of collaborative decision makers should monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of solutions created collaboratively.
Some descriptive and normative issues must be sorted out. To whom or what do (should) network players feel responsible? To whom or what do (should) network players feel responsive? If we analyze the network as a single entity rather than as many pieces, then how does personal responsibility get translated into network accountability? Are there certain collaborative structures, such as hub-spoke structures (Harrison and Weiss 1998), that are (or are perceived to be) more accountable because there is a single organization through which most information passes and from which the network manager emerges? If so, does collaboration still require some single player that can be held accountable?
We must be able to measure the outcomes and performance of networks in order to assess how accountable a particular network is to its stakeholders and for achievement of its stated goals. The groundbreaking work of Provan and Milward (1995; Milward and Provan 1998) in this regard is very important. How do we know if a network is shirking its responsibility if we don't know what the network is doing or how well it is doing it? If there is variation within and across networks in the level of personal responsibility assumed by the players, is performance affected? The most basic issues of network management are bound up in our ability to assess effectiveness and then compare that effectiveness against some baseline to which the network can be held accountable. As with all empirical questions, conceptualization and measurement development is imperative.
What is the cohesion factor in networks that is the equivalent to legal-rational authority in organizations?
This is one of the most difficult questions in network management, not so much because nothing has been said about this area, but because of so many apparent alternate interpretations. Since Weber, scholars and public managers have explicitly or implicitly accepted that legal authority vested in a hierarchy keeps people operating in a bureaucratic structure and is the reason people allow themselves to be led, so long as expectations are within a zone of acceptance. Networks are not based on the legal authority paradigm, however; they are "structures of interdependence, involving multiple organizations or parts thereof, where one unit is not merely the formal subordinate of the others in some hierarchical arrangement"(O'Toole 1997a, 45). When people from different organizations are not in legally bounded authority relationships, why would they decide to come to the table, work together on problem clarification and solutions, reach agreement, and follow through on implementat! ion? The literature suggests the importance of trust, common purpose, mutual dependency, resource availability, catalytic actors, and managerial ability.
In the absence of the legal charter, it is commonly accepted that people join, remain, and work together because of some element of trust. Trust in collective behavior is linked to the obligation. Such fiduciary obligations are said to be essential in holding networks together because they involve the obligation to attend broadly to the concerns of specific others beyond the boundaries of specific, measurable transactions (Barber 1983). Trust does not require common belief, but obligation and expectation. Ferguson and Stoutland (1999, 44) relate to such expectation through four trust dimensions: participant motives, not exploiting or betraying purposes; competency, possessing the knowledge and skills to do what is expected; dependability, holding the necessary resources; and collegiality, showing respect and fairness.
Trust is required as public and nonpublic organizations attempt to redefine their usual legal-based (hierarchical, contractual) relationships (Nohria 1992). As there is more trust, there is less need to constantly monitor compliance (Alter and Hage 1993). Sabel (1992) suggests that mutual obligation and expectation is key: "Trust-based governance structures have rich, consultative institutional structures whose very existence belies the assumption that the agents expect their actions automatically to be harmonized by the confluence of belief." Indeed, Fountain (1994) suggests that trust as a social relation may be on a par with exchange as a lubricant in network behavior. Operationally, Perrow (1992) suggests several forces that build trust within small-firm networks: sharing and discussing information; similarity in processing and techniques; experience in working with another firm; long-term relationships, even if contact is intermittent; similar size, power, or strategic! position among firms; rotation of leadership; similar financial rewards; and economic advantages to support shared meaning.
Others maintain that public or collective good, as manifest in a shared belief or common purpose, contributes to holding the network together (Alter and Hage 1993). Mandell (1999, 46) refers to the sum of these qualities as a program rationale, which describes the mind-set or commitment to the whole that holds a network together when traditional methods of coordination and control are not operative. From this perspective, program structures are not merely aggregates of individual organizations; the network itself is more critical than the component organizations, and focus on the individual organization is relevant only for the understanding of how and why each organization contributes to the overall effort (Provan and Milward 1991). These program structures display common features: reciprocal relationships, many suppliers of resources, overlapping and dynamic divisions of labor, diffused responsibility for actions, high potential for poor coordination, massive information ! exchanges, and need for information input from all actors (Hanf, Hjern, and Porter 1978). Program rationale keeps actors working in spite of the difficulty of maintaining these network features.
Mutual dependency, particularly oriented to the availability of resources, is yet another explanation of cohesion. The interorganizational literature dating back a few decades suggests that actors in a network are in some form of interactive dependency, usually based on resource exchanges (Pennings 1981). Most organizations in a network are thus strategically interdependent, but some are more resource dependent than others (Yuchtman and Seashore 1967). All interorganizational interactions-communication as well as joint activity-are ultimately and fully dependent and seeking an adequate supply of resources. This orientation is the defining activity and is equated with forces of control within networks. Alter and Hage (1993) believe that both private and nonprofit organizations (including subnational governments) are resource dependent and must avoid single vertical markets (funders) while they engender multiple horizontal resource markets. While the extent of commitment and ! resources shared may vary greatly, parties possess some measure of resources (funding, expertise, support, human resources) to move the network forward.
Leadership and guidance ability within self-managing systems is another prominent contributor to network cohesion identified in the public network management literature. It is commonly understood that network leadership and management require the "principles of 'soft' guidance" as a replacement for command and control (Windhoff-Hentier 1992). The principles of steering ability are critical in holding the network together. All the managerial tasks we have discussed take advantage of network self-management propensities, using minimal coercion and resources, "balancing social forces and interests and enabling social actors and systems to organize themselves" (Kooiman 1993, 256). Bardach's (1998) thorough examination of success and failure in collaborative settings relies heavily on various aspects of capacity building (i.e., human resources, use of best practices, availability of critical skills, ability to ward off hostile forces), but points most heavily to leadership as th! e central factor holding the network together. The leader as craftsman elicits common goals, creates an atmosphere of trust, brokers organizational and individual contributions, and deploys energies in accord with some strategic plan. It is important to note that these are not personal attributes, talents, or conditions of individuals; they are roles in a system of strategic interactions. Cohesion in the network from this perspective is thus dependent on the integrative, creative, and purposive opportunities seized by those who apply the craft of network management. Building on numerous cases, Bardach illustrates how capacities are accumulated through various stages of investigation, decision, operation, avoidance of obstacles, building of momentum, and rewarding of performance-all the time holding the structure together. This type of managing against the hierarchical grain, he concludes, means that leaders have to create interagency collaborative capacity, thus moving toward ! tangible resource exchanges plus "cooperative dispositions and mutual understanding of the individuals who are trying to work together on a common task" (p. 307).
Is it possible that more than one of these forces can be at work within the same network configuration? One network study of six rural enterprise alliances-nonmetropolitan partnerships among producers, distributors, labor unions, employer associations, credit institutions, and government agencies-revealed several cohesive dimensions at work. Mutual dependence clearly held the alliances together; scarcity of technical information, advanced equipment, design expertise, market information, venture capital, and operating funds were among the resources exchanged. Generally speaking, a program rationale also existed in the underlying belief in creating rural-based industry by promoting small production units. The obligations and expectations regarding trust within the alliances developed over time, even among competing entrepreneurs. Also, the private partners had to trust the various governments' reciprocal actions, whereas the governments had to place faith in program success w! hen loans or grants were awarded. Finally, all of the alliances were held together by strategic, operational implementation and assessment abilities, a form of steering that used a catalytic leader or project manager to build a type of interorganizational collaborative capacity (Agranoff 1998).
Clearly, a public network management theory must come to grips with an equivalent to hierarchical authority, but the answer may not lie along a single channel. If this is so, then questions other than, What is it? may be relevant. For example, what measures of shared purpose, trust, resource dependence/interdependence, and steering or collaborative capacity are needed to hold networks together? How do leaders use each cohesive force to reach the aims of the network? Is an operating deficit in one cohesive area complemented by a surplus in another? At what point do deficits in one or more of these cohesive factors contribute to a functional collapse of cohesion, and thus to a collapse of the network?
How does the often neglected or misunderstood role of organizational power in network management come into play?
Network power, or the ability to get action by partners or organizations under circumstances where actors are under dual responsibility roles to both organizations and networks, is clouded by the rhetoric of networking. A focus on joint decision forces within networking such as those we have mentioned, as well as perceptions of equity, mask the potential for coercive behavior in network management. Klijn (1996), for example, characterizes policy networks as coequal, interdependent, patterned relationships. It is possible, however, that different actors occupy different role positions and carry different weights within networks. Some sit in positions with extensive opportunity contexts, filling "structural holes" (Burt 1992, 67), creating unequal opportunity, while others may be less willing or able players. Organizational representatives also differ with regard to the resource dependencies they may bring to the network (Rhodes 1981), leading to power differences. Clegg and ! Hardy (1996, 679) suggest that " [w]e cannot ignore the facade of 'trust' and the rhetoric of 'collaboration' used to promote vested interest through the manipulation and capitulation by weaker partners." Power concerns should be at the core of any general theory of network management because we must know whether power moves hinder the kind of synergistic creativity that reciprocal relationships are purported to produce.
Power in networks can be portrayed neutrally, or at least dualistically, as a property that either prevents or facilitates action. Collaboration can involve changes in structures of domination or asymmetries of resources employed in the sustaining of power relations (Gray 1999). Schapp and van Twist (1997, 66-- 67) refer to individual veto power in networks because "actors in the network are able to cut themselves off from the steering interventions of other actors." Such veto power can be used in different ways: to exclude certain actors, to ban certain points of view, or to close potential actors outside of the network. On the other hand, there is an enabling component to network power. The use of power does not always include getting the dominant to act, or altering their social control. In the social production model identified by Stone and his associates (1999, 354), it is assumed that social forces (and society's most vexing problems) are characterized by a lack of co! herence and that many activities are autonomous with many middle range accommodations instead of a cohesive system of control. In this type of situation, the main concern is how to bring about enough cooperation among disparate community elements to get things done. This is a power to that, under many conditions of ultra complexity, characterizes situations better than power over. Moreover, the social production model holds out hope of constituting new possibilities under conditions of flexible preferences, or "bringing about a fresh configuration of preferences through opening up new possibilities" (p. 355). The key task in such power configurations is that of building critical skills within networks of relationships while enlarging the view of what is possible. It is different than mobilization against the powerful, but it entails enlarging ways of thinking about preferences. The social production model juxtaposed against veto power illustrates just two dimensions of power i! n networks. As any political scientist can relate, power has many faces. In the minimum, it can inhibit or facilitate collective action, including action within networks.
Are there important operating dimensions of power? Gray (1989) characterizes collaboration as power sharing. The exercise of collaboration involves how power is acquired and challenged in the formation of collaborative efforts. Resource mobilization theorists (Alinsky 1971; Gamson 1975; Bachrach and Baratz 1963) suggest that two sources of power are critical to the problem-setting phase: the power to mobilize and the power to organize. Gray (1999) offers others: the power to strategize; control of information, particularly in the direction-setting phase of collaboration; and the ability to exercise influence or authorize action, which is paramount to implementation. Gray sees this collaboration sequence as a power sharing that implies at least a temporary redistribution of power, enabling stakeholders with differential power levels to engage in domain transformation. She cautions, however, that alternative strategies of engagement can also characterize stakeholder involveme! nt: compliance, when one organization bows to the wishes of the other (or others) because of resource leverage or undermining of legitimacy; contention, or challenging practices held or decisions made by more powerful stakeholders, leading to discursive legitimacy; and contesting, or a means of engagement within the domain of other stakeholders, particularly the more powerful ones. Also, equality of power can be eroded by invoking formal or legal authority, resource control, or cooptation of low-power stakeholders. These sequences illustrate that power is a property in network management that can facilitate or inhibit collaborative actions.
Dynamics within the Federal-State Rural Development Councils again illustrate these complexities of network power. In their formative years these multijurisdictional councils did a reasonably adequate job of bringing together the disparate actors and following the five-step sequence of collaborative power that we have identified. In regard to certain problems related to rural development, particularly those that dealt with intergovernmental regulatory or programmatic barriers to economic and community development, these networks opened up numerous new possibilities. Thus, in regard to the intergovernmental program issues explored by the councils, power was leveled among partners. Federal, state, association, private-sector, and tribal stakeholders were able to explore identified problems in depth, develop workable solutions, and get implementing agencies to yield power and procedure in the interest of solving the problem. In this sense, true social production was possible. !
Lurking behind the overt pretenses of network power sharing, however, was the contesting and sometimes contention or compliance enforcing of the most powerful stakeholders. In virtually every state the interest or noninterest of the governor's office proved to be a key force in determining the issues that the councils addressed. In one or two states, councils' agendas proved to be their governor's agenda. In other states, the work of councils could come to a halt should their governors be uninterested or unwilling to support it. Under very limited circumstances could most councils tread on the turf of an administration's rural agenda, if one existed. Rural policy agendas belonged to the governor, so councils were relegated to marginal cross-- jurisdiction discussions, issue papers, and demonstrations. Moreover, at a network operating level most councils have to defer to the power of their two most important stakeholders, the state departments of economic development (agenci! es also very close to their governors) and USDA/RD, housed in each state and headed by a presidential appointee. These two agencies constitute the sources of discretionary funding for rural development projects. In one state the power conflict within the council between these two major stakeholders was so intense that the rest of the council tried to mute it by precluding either party from membership in its steering committee. But this was not a deterrent for either, as they wielded their levers behind the scenes. Most important, in this state the powerful stakeholders limited the council's agenda to issues that did not interfere with their interests (Radin et al. 1996; Radin et al. 1997). In virtually every state that has a council (thirty-five in total), both the power to and the power over is exhibited.
The power issue must take center stage in network research. What techniques can be used to channel negative stakeholder engagement into positive engagement? Do networks need to manage power in collaboration in different ways than do hierarchies? How does an operating network recognize when collaboration is breaking down because the power balance is breaking down? How is power channeled from stakeholders protecting their interests into social production? How do power brokers in networks build effective social production? What are the negative effects on creative problem solving of unequal application of power?
Power is obviously a more complicated concern in networks than we can possibly depict here. As an attribute of management, the subject needs to be raised because so much of the rhetoric of networking emphasizes processes that imply mutuality. One popular book on network management, for example, extolls five key features of mutuality: unifying purpose, independent members, voluntary links, multiple leaders, and work at integrated levels (Lipnack and Stamps 1994). It says much less about the ability of key stakeholders to dominate or how such domination may erode unifying purpose, independent members, and so on. Some empirical research has revealed the reality of power. The work of Milward and Provan (1998) found that network effectiveness was associated with stakeholder exercise of controlling power among community mental health centers, a monopoly provider that dominated both service delivery and funding provisions for others in the network. Power concerns must be moved to ! the core of network management research.
Do public management networks produce results that otherwise would not have occurred? Do networks discover processes and solutions that would not have emerged from work through a single organization?
These questions address the origin of a public management network. That networks are a unique institutional form, consisting of processes different than the spontaneous coordination of markets or the visible management of hierarchy (Powell 1990), is the premise upon which the study of networks is based. The critical issue in question is whether public management networks produce solutions and results that otherwise would not have occurred through single, hierarchical organizations. Are networks required for achieving results in particular problem areas? When the public demands action on certain public issues, are multiple players drawn together to fulfill that demand because, if the demand is to be fulfilled, it can be only through a network? Or, when the public demands action on certain public issues, do multiple players work jointly to fulfill those demands because governments will not do so?
One dominant perspective argues that the pace and quality of social change at this point in history are the primary determinants of the emergence of network forms. This social change thesis is prominent in the writings of futurists (Toffler 1980), business consultants (Lipnack and Stamps 1994; Peters 1992), organization theorists (Clegg 1990), and in much of the literature on public management networks. Just as the bureaucratic organization was the signature organizational form during the industrial age, the emerging information or knowledge age gives rise to the network, where persons link across internal functions, organization boundaries, and even geographic boundaries. The world is characterized by extreme complexity and diversity (Dunsire 1993; Kooiman 1993). Power is dispersed, not centralized, and tasks are becoming unified, rather than subdivided and specialized. Society worldwide demands greater freedom and individuation, rather than integration. In such a world, a! n organizational form based on individuation, dispersed power, and unification is necessary; the network is that form.
A related perspective is the problem change thesis, which asserts that the types of problems or issues that society addresses collectively are increasingly wicked-"problems with no solutions, only temporary and imperfect resolutions" (Harmon and Mayer 1986, 9). Tame problems are readily defined and easily decomposable into neat, technical solutions (O'Toole 1997a), but these have given way in large part to wicked problems. For most of the problems that emerged in the first part of the twentieth century, a bureaucratic organization was ideal-problems were easily defined, goals were clear, and objectives were measurable. The metaphor of the wicked problem stands in contrast to traditional bureaucratic policy making and implementation. When there is little or no agreement about the appropriate division of moral, institutional, or legal responsibility for any particular public problem, who can say how that problem might be solved (Harmon and Mayer 1986)? For wicked problems, ag! reement is forged by jointly steering courses of action and delivering policy outputs that are consistent with the multiplicity of societal interests. Other, more nonconventional modes of organizing, like networks, have emerged to do just that.
Is the emergence of networks a completely natural phenomenon as the social change and problem change arguments indicate? The empirical literature offers mixed answers, most of which focus on the types of policy instruments adopted as the key determinants of network emergence. For example, the emergence of intergovernmental networks within the context of municipal wastewater treatment assistance does not appear to be "natural" (O'Toole 1996) in that their creation was necessary in order to continue delivering such assistance. In fact, the network emerged from a decision by the federal government (EPA) to reduce its role as grantor to municipalities and also from the ensuing initiative of states to create separate state revolving loan funds as a partial replacement for the lost federal support. This is evidence for the claim that "efforts from political levels to trim the scale of bureaucracy and extent of direct administrative responsibility for accomplishing public purposes! . . . accentuate the networking impulse" (O'Toole 1996, 239). The decision to utilize state revolving loan funds resulted in more complex governing configurations involving new actors with needed resources and technologies. O'Toole concludes that "decisions to shift programs to the states, deregulate, privatize, and employ market-based mechanisms have consequences for interorganizational arrangements and programs in practice" (p. 239). It is unclear whether a networked policy structure is the best choice for providing assistance to cities for wastewater treatment, but evidence indicates that it certainly is the best-perhaps the only choice-for the type of policy instrument being used, which, in this case, is a state-level revolving loan fund.
Similarly, as the acceptable technology for treating people with severe mental illness shifted in the 1960s from directly provided institutionalization to a reliance on services provided by community health and social service organizations, collaborative service implementation networks of these provider agencies emerged (Provan and Milward 1991 and 1995; Weiss 1990). Did these public management networks produce results in the mental health field that otherwise would not have occurred? Once direct provision of government services in hospitals was viewed as an unacceptable policy instrument and, consequently, vertical integration of services through one provider was no longer appropriate, service implementation networks became the only, therefore the best, organizational form through which mental health services could be delivered. Given the type of policy instrument adopted by governments, networks did indeed produce results that otherwise would not have occurred. Harrison a! nd Weiss (1998) use numerous cases to demonstrate how a more inclusive approach to workforce development results in networks of inter-- organizational relationships that connect the residents of low-- income neighborhoods to employers with training positions through mediating institutions such as community colleges, government agencies, and various community-based organizations. Since the most politically acceptable means for employing persons in America is for these persons to find jobs on their own in a competitive market, rather than have government give jobs to them, extensive networks of employers, trainers, and the unemployed clearly become the best organizational fit for delivering such services. Like the empirical research cited in these last two paragraphs, any examination of public management networks clearly must not disregard the political context within which networks emerge and operate. Even in network settings, structure follows strategy.
Finally, over and above the societal level changes occurring and the shift in the types of acceptable policy instruments used in governing, decisions made in networks may simply be better decisions. Not better in the sense of more efficient-there is nothing particularly efficient about making decisions jointly-but better in the sense of being more effective, since, ideally, those involved in any given network are not merely steerers, but stakeholders, suppliers, clients, even customers. If the basic problem and challenge of policy and strategy making in many policy settings is for multiple governmental and nongovernmental organizations to jointly steer courses of action and to deliver policy outputs that are consistent with the multiplicity of societal interests, then a policy decision that laboriously, even painfully, meets that test is bound to be viewed as the best decision. When all relevant interests are considered in decision making, then, at the minimum, the decision! will have wider agreement, which still may be the test of the best policy (Lindblom 1959). To some degree, network decision making can be viewed as more rational than individual decision making is. Multiple parties means multiple alternatives to suggest and consider, more information available for all to use, and a decision system that is less bounded by the frailties of individual thinking. Additionally, decisions in networks may not be the product only of a more rational process, but they may also occur as a result of a synergy that can develop when multiple players pursue a common solution. Synergy means that the commitment and interaction of the participants stimulates new alternatives that otherwise would not have been considered.
More empirical research is necessary to sort out the distinctive contribution of networks as a decision-making entity. Is the emergence of networks in public policy and administration due to a shift in the types of policy instruments used by governments (McGuire 2000)? Do we see a greater number of networks because of a shift in the level of political acceptability of some forms of governance? Conversely, do networks select policy instruments that are fundamentally different than those selected by bureaucracies? Does the choice to utilize networks emerge from the political calculus of government institutions, or is that choice predetermined by the natural forces of change? Research that examines how and why networks emerge within the context of particular policy and program areas is necessary to better understand what can be expected from network forms of governance and how to evaluate the solutions that emerge from such forms.
CONCLUSION
In order to produce useful information on the structure and process of management in networks involved in public action, one must address relevant questions. These questions are not answered here. However, we are able to make some tentative conclusions regarding network management. There are apparent common network management sequences like activation, framing, mobilizing, and synthesizing. We need to know more about how these processes unfold. Some of these are behavioral, as collaborative learning that draws on social capital plus negotiation supplement more standard behavioral science techniques. We need to know more about how negotiation plays off against collaborative learning. Apparently, many political, bureaucratic, and resource deficiency issues can be facilitated through flexible processes by managers. It is apparent that accountability in networks is defined and perceived differently than in single organizations. We also need to know more about the contribution o! f personal responsibility and responsiveness to network performance. Additionally, the cohesion developed through trust and a program rationale should be measured against the force of authority in hierarchies.
Not all is peace and harmony in networks. We know that power needs to be confronted as a core element in network management, both in terms of control and its social production forms. The impact of control on synergistic collaboration needs further elaboration. While we know that networks create value by acting as important means of bridging multiple organizations and dealing with difficult problems, there is more to be explored. Is the emergence of networks attributable to changes in policy instruments? Is the emergence of new policy instruments attributable to the availability of network forms of organizing? There is little research on the productive outcomes of networks regarding whether solutions would be different if carried out through single organizations. Simply put, we need to know more about how networks produce.
In the opening chapter of the volume that emerged from the first national Public Management Research Conference, Hal Rainey addressed the topics of what public management is and what public management should be, by asking "whether public administration scholars might do better in advancing both the identity of the field and its research and theory if fewer of us ruminated on these topics and more of us simply identified important theoretical and research questions and worked on providing answers to them" (1993, 9). So it is with public network management. It is not so much that scholars who study networks ruminate needlessly about normative issues-indeed, the subject is rarely introduced (O'Toole 1997a)-but rather that so few do empirical research with the expectation that it will lead to additional research, and too few provide empirical researchers with questions to consider and hypotheses to test. To be relevant, management research must inform action: data for data's sa! ke is not useful. As it is now a core task of governance, network management must be placed up front as an essential arena of examination in the fields of public management and administration.
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