Harvard, October 9



October 5, 2007

What Can We Expect Of Europe?

Speaking notes for presentation at a meeting sponsored by the

Cold War Studies Program and the Center for European Studies

Harvard University

Center for Government and International Studies, 1730 Cambridge Street, Room S 354

Tuesday, October 9, 2007

12:15 - 2:00 p.m.

My visits to Harvard have never failed to be exciting. In my freshman year at Yale Law School, when I was on a visit to Cambridge to attend the Harvard-Yale game, my Yale college classmate Bert Walker offered me his seat in the class on future interests, taught by the legendary Barton Leach at Harvard Law School. Professor Leach had a reputation of taking no prisoners in his use of the Socratic method. And Bert probably sensed what was coming. So you can imagine my consternation when Leach called on me. I left class with burn marks, even though I was just a visitor from New Haven. This time I come prepared.

Introduction

Before I start, I want to declare myself. I am a convinced believer in the importance of the transatlantic relationship. Experiencing World War II in occupied Holland, I came to appreciate profoundly the leading role of the United States in bringing the war to a successful conclusion. Rescue from the misery of occupation came in the form of the Canadian First Army Corps. Hopkins School in New Haven and Yale provided a safe haven for the completion of my education. Then, my career path in the State Department put me into the thick of US-European relations, during the Cold War, and afterwards. I shared with many of my professional colleagues a deep satisfaction with the successes of Western policy in coping with the Soviet threat, in the unification of Germany, and in opening the way toward a Europe whole and free. Not long ago, I could fairly say that I had spent equal time on both sides of the Atlantic. By my count, I have now crossed it 199 times. Someone observed that all these hours in airplane seats probably dulled my thinking. But I am clear in my mind that the central theme of my career and, indeed, of my life, has been the transatlantic relationship

Setting

I want to start with some points that are so obvious that they tend to be overlooked.

First, Europe today is mostly democratic, prosperous, and at peace. This is a historic achievement. The United States can justifiably claim a good share of the credit. The major credit, however, goes to the Europeans themselves, and to enlightened European leaders who pointed the way to this historic result. This outcome serves American interests.

Second, Europe is no longer the principal concern of the United States. For nearly a century, America’s major interests were in Europe. Europe spawned the major threats to these interests. The action was in Europe.

Now, American interests have shifted to the Greater Middle East and to East Asia. The United States will seek to protect these interests in those parts of the world. For Washington, European help will be important. But the action will be elsewhere.

Third, right after World War II, the transatlantic relationship consisted mostly of government-to-government relations. The information revolution and globalization have changed all that. Government-to-government relations, while in some cases decisive, now make up only a small portion of the overall relationship.

Fourth, after 9/11, the transatlantic relationship has experienced large shocks. Repairs to this relationship will not take us back to where we were before. Instead, they will take us into a new relationship.

Key judgments

Europe will be preoccupied with matters internal to the European Union (EU). France has a new government. So does the United Kingdom. Italy has returned to the familiar pattern of unstable government. Poland is struggling with its past as it seeks to realign its present. The future of Kosovo casts a shadow over Serbia and the Eastern Balkans. The threat of armed conflict in that area remains. Turkey is seeking to redefine itself, with uncertain effects on its role in the region. The transformation of the EU continues.

Europeans face two key issues: The state of the economy and immigration. Decisions on those issues will be made in capitals, not in Brussels.

The EU has abandoned the grand project of a European constitution. The result will be more a union of European states than a united states of Europe. With 27 member states, the EU has now come close to geographical and institutional limits. Countries to the East have no reasonable prospect of membership any time soon. The EU remains unconvinced that Turkish membership is in its interest.

It remains an underlying fact that Europe is a continent of immense and persistent diversity. Integration is not around the corner. Fissiparous tendencies are visible in the east, as in the continuing fractioning of the former Yugoslavia, and in the west, where Flemish nationalists are pursuing greater independence from Brussels. Leadership in Europe will continue to have a mostly national base.

Russia has made its reentry onto the European scene as a discordant if not threatening element, but the EU seems not to have a Russian policy worth the name. In Berlin, some Social Democrats are suggesting a policy of “equidistance,” opening a possible new chapter of the German question.

European leaders expect, even as they regret, that the EU is unlikely to provide leadership on global issues. There is no more talk of the EU as a counterweight to the United States. The EU will not be an equal partner of the United States. Claims to leadership on energy and climate control are at present just statements of intent.

If the transatlantic community is to function, a leading US role will remain essential. The challenge for the US will be to provide such leadership. A serious obstacle is the present low degree of trust on the part of Europeans in the capacity of the United States to play a global role they would regard as constructive. Regaining credibility will take a long time.

European mistrust is compounded by a sense among the European publics that, on the issue of values, the US has strayed from the principles that Europeans consider the bedrock of the transatlantic relationship.

As America proceeds into primaries and toward the next presidential election, future American leaders need to be equipped to chart, and ready to pursue, a course to deal with an array of global challenges.

How to define Europe?

In the American foreign policy world, the word “Europe” rolls off the tongue rather easily, but its meaning is not always clear.

Historian Norman Davies begins his magisterial history of Europe with a laconic observation: “[I]n the beginning, there was no Europe.” (Norman Davies, EUROPE, A History, Harper, 1998, p. xvii).

Then, after the last ice age, immigrants arrived. According to legend, Europe was a princess, beguiled by the Father of Gods, who appeared in the guise of a snow-white bull, and carried her off the Phoenician beach, westward, into the sea toward Crete, her fluttering tunic floating in the breeze. (Ovid, Metamorphoses, ii, lines 862, as cited in Davies).

Davies observes that, while other civilizations were stagnant, the civilization of the Mediterranean Sea was stimulated by constant movement. Uncertainty and insecurity produced a constant ferment of ideas. Thus, Davies concludes, Europe rode in the path of the sun, from East to West. With the enlargement of the European Union (EU) eastward, we may now be seeing an opposite trend.

It is hard to speak of a geographic Europe. How far east does Europe go? Politically, the term EU is often used to indicate Europe, but non-members Norway and Switzerland are beyond any doubt European countries. Strategically, Russia and Turkey are in Europe, and so is the United States.

Over twenty years ago, historian Hugh Seton-Watson probed the question “What is Europe, Where is Europe?” (Encounter, July-August 1985, pp. 9-17). He observed that the growth of an increasingly homogeneous European culture, and also the belief among thinking men and women that they belong to a single, even if diverse European cultural community, are ”facts of history and facts of this present time.” Seton-Watson notes that the idea of Christendom, as a higher ideal transcending narrow territorial and feudal loyalties, was maintained by the reality of conflict, on sea and land, with Islam. He then traces the dichotomy between Christendom and infidel to something more ancient, namely the dichotomy between the civilized world and barbarians.

Seton-Watson concludes that ”[T]he two dichotomies – civilization and barbarism, and true faith and infidel – were fused in the later Roman Empire. The one word which combined true faith with civilization was ‘Christendom,’ which became coextensive with Europe, a geographical, not cultural term.”

One can speculate about the validity of these views. But now there are new facts of the present time. One is globalization. Another is immigration. In 1989, historian Fritz Stern talked about Europe “as if it existed or might again exist, as if its great political and historical divisions were disappearing,” with a future ”blessedly, dangerously open.” However, it remains a fact of the present time that Europe today remains marked by profound national and regional differences. Czech author Milan Kundera emphasizes that “cultural diversity is the great European value.” “Die Weltliteratur,”, The New Yorker, January 8, 2007, p. 28.)

Another issue is whether the term Christendom captures the essence of Europe today. As I see it, the historical fact of conflict between Christians and Islam needs to give way to the imperative that Europe get along with Islam. (Kristy Hughes, “Turkey and Europe,” International Herald Tribune, August 24, 2007, p. 6).

Europe’s economy: The perennial challenge

Two drivers are shaping Europe today. First, the economy. Led by Germany, European economies have shown signs of picking up. In 2006, the German economy grew at 2.7%, unemployment dropped to 9.8%, and consumer spending rose by 0.6% ( Frances G. Burwell and Jan Neutze, “The German Locomotive: Can It Drive The European Economy?” Issue Brief, The Atlantic Council of the United States, April 2007). But the economic problems of Europe have not gone away. The 2000 EU Lisbon Agenda of economic reforms failed, as did British plans for economic liberalization during the UK presidency of the EU in 2005. ( Reginald Dale and Robin Niblett, “2006 Will Provide Clues to Europe’s Future,” CSIS-EURO-FOCUS, Vol. 12, No.1, April 5, 2006).

As the EU has expanded, action in the economic field has remained with national capitals and large industries, though the EU Commission is playing a strong regulatory role. The Growth and Stability Pact is not being observed by Germany, France, and Italy. Protectionist tendencies to favor national industries are alive and well (“The curse of the Habsburgs,” The Economist, March 31, 2007, p.15). National squabbles about jobs and financing are affecting European enterprises such as Airbus and Galileo. Services remain governed by closed markets. Growth is modest. Unemployment remains high and affects young, unskilled and nonnative persons disproportionally.

There are also encouraging signs. The EURO is strong, though this is not an unmixed blessing for European exports. Social care in many European countries is well established, and expected. Medical care is good and available, particularly in France. Western Europeans have become used to – and count on – liberal vacation and leave policies.

Many of these features of European economies do not affect the United States directly. But a Europe that lives below its economic potential exercises a downward pull on the US economy. Tight budgets also restrict the ability of EU countries to fund national programs, such as NATO defense expenditures, another key US interest.

Immigration

The other driver shaping Europe today is immigration. This issue continues to bedevil Europe. Demographic projections strongly suggest the need for immigrants. But public aversion to large-scale immigration is widespread.

The problem is general, but it will play out in widely different contexts. Though not without its own problems, the United Kingdom presents a more favorable environment for people from Commonwealth and other countries, than does France, for its young Muslim population. German policy has adapted with some success to the flow of immigrants from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, as well as from Turkey. Italy continues to cope unsuccessfully with illegal arrivals by boat. The recent EU Commission ideas on immigration, under the opaquely named policies of “circular integration” and “mobility partnerships” await further discussions (“In search of an immigration policy,” The Economist, June 2, 2007, p.54). There is no one-size-fits-all approach to Yugoslavs in Sweden, Poles in Ireland, Portugese in The Netherlands, and Turks in Germany. Attempts to shape a comprehensive EU immigration policy are bound to disappoint. However, EU countries are likely to be alert to best practices employed by their neighbors.

How Europe handles immigration – especially Muslim immigration – is not of direct interest to the United States. But American interests come into play if significant and persistent European problems with growing Muslim minorities begin to shape European policies with respect to the Muslim world.

Though a separate issue, terrorism is seen by some European publics as a problem related to immigration. Threat perception varies from country to country. But, on the whole, the European discussion treats terrorism as a phenomenon that demands vigilant attention by law enforcement. Europeans seek to cope with terrorism, rather than pursue an elusive victory. American interests are deeply affected by terrorist actions spawned in Europe and directed at the United States.

The EU Constitution

The idea of a European Constitution is dead. Instead, the EU has agreed on a mandate to produce, by the end of this year, a “Treaty on the Functioning of the Union.” It will need to be approved by the parliaments of all member states, except for Ireland, which will have a referendum. A President will be elected for a term of two and a half years. There will be new voting arrangements based on a “double majority” system of 55% of member states representing 65% of the EU population. This new system will not take effect until 2014, and may be postponed at the request of a member state until 2017. The Berlin Summit which agreed on these changes last June, was hardly an example of European harmony. The Economist termed it “a strikingly bad-tempered affair.” (The Economist, June 30, 2007, p. 61). Columnist John Vinocur described the Summit as an example of jostling for leadership among Britain, France and Germany (“In cohesive disunion, Europe stumbles on,” International Herald Tribune, June 26, 2007, p.2). The constitutional conundrum illustrates a fundamental problem: On this issue, Europe is practicing democracy from the top down.

The text of the new treaty will include the requirement for a commitment, on the part of future entrants, to promote European values. ( Stephen Castle and Dan Bilefsky, ” The new EU power broker: Sarkozy,” International Herald Tribune, June 25, 2007, p.3). Europeans are likely to discover how difficult it will be to put this requirement into practice. The requirement will also put into play the question to what extent European values differ from American values.

Enlargement

The issue of EU enlargement is divisive. The inclusion of Bulgaria and Romania is now a fait accompli, creating an EU of 27 members. Other potential members – remnants of the former Yugoslavia – are on stage, and Ukraine looms in the wings. But these countries are a long way from being ready to join. Turkish membership remains a contentious issue.

The eastern Balkans will pose a major challenge. Serbia feels aggrieved by the loss of territories in Bosnia, Montenegro, and now Kosovo. Albanian Kosovars insist on full sovereignty for Kosovo. The presence of NATO forces and EU personnel will keep the lid on. Some Balkan experts are of the view that there will be no violence. Others believe that the potential for armed conflict remains (Richard Holbrooke, “Russia’s Test in Kosovo,” Washington Post, March 13, 2007, p. A 17). A European statesman with long and direct experience in the area worried to me recently about the explosive nature of the situation. I am inclined to agree with Dick Holbrooke: This part of Europe remains unstable.

Key members of the EU.

Inasmuch as political decisions will continue to be made in capitals, what is the outlook for key member states of the EU?

Having elected a new President, France will need time to redefine its role in Europe and reestablish its global credentials.

The election has changed the political landscape. Changes in political patterns will accelerate. The French public demands a government that responds to its needs. But this public is divided on major issues – unemployment, immigration, unassimilated Muslims, and education. Strong unions and other special interest groups constitute formidable hurdles to governing. The issue of what it means to be French will remain part of the debate even after the election.

The excitement about President Sarkozy is justified. He is a new face and he projects a new style. He is a smart political tactician. He has no hang-ups about America. Former US Ambassador to France Felix Rohatyn sees much promise for a rejuvenated France (“Sarkozy breaks the mold,” International Herald Tribune, August 31, 2007, p. 4). If France were to rejoin the NATO integrated command and obtain a key slot in the command structure, it would be a win-win situation for both France and the NATO alliance.

But Americans should have no illusion that life with a Sarkozy-led France will be much different from our historical experience with the French. Domestically, Sarkozy’s approach to modernizing France leaves much room for the French state. In international affairs, he has shown a tendency to act rapidly but without consultation, as he did in the case of the Bulgarian nurses held by Libya. Within the EU, he has challenged the independence of the European Central Bank, causing jitters in Berlin. (“Disillusion across the Rhine,” The Economist, August 11, 2007, p. 41). New Yorker Magazine staff writer Adam Gopnik has characterized Sarkozy as “an outsider in a Parisian setting: opportunistic, authoritarian, maneuvering, personality-cultish, and successful.” (“The Human Bomb,” The New Yorker, August 27, 2007, p.42 at p. 44). This is hardly a reassuring description.

With less fanfare, the United Kingdom also has acquired new leadership. There has been speculation that a short tenure at No. 10 by Gordon Brown might be followed by an election which could return a conservative government to power. For now, this won’t be the case. However, the prospect of such changes is likely to keep the British government from major initiatives with respect to the EU. Meanwhile, the Brown government has signaled its intention to maintain close ties with the United States, even as it draws down its forces in Iraq.

Under the deft leadership of Chancellor Angela Merkel, Germany is asserting a growing claim to European leadership. Though in an enlarged EU, Germany retains the capacity to set its course. (“Germany’s role in Europe is changing,” The Economist, January 13, 2007, p. 48). But the country still faces a daunting domestic agenda, not the least of which is the continued dichotomy between its western part and the former East. Moreover, the arrival of the Left as a new political party is likely to complicate the process of forming workable coalitions (“Merkel’s magic,” The Economist, June 30, 2007, p. 57). Former US Ambassador to Germany John Kornblum thinks that Germany is having a hard time adjusting to the 21st century, noting that “[T]he country has no experience with dramatic change in time of peace.” (“The World Looks Up to the Germans,”AICGS Advisor, American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, November 19, 2006). I agree that, as Germany goes, so will Europe.

Poland’s government has introduced strident and discordant elements into its relations with the EU and Germany. It argued, unsuccessfully, for equal representation with Germany under the prospective EU voting arrangements on the theory that, had not so many of its people been killed in World War II, it would now have a population of roughly equal size. It has raised a possible claim of some $ 20 billion as compensation for destruction of art treasures during the Nazi occupation. Facing early elections, Prime Minister Jaroslav Kaczynski has stoked anti-German sentiments. Possibly related are residual Polish concerns that Germany might again deal with Russia at the expense of Poland. (John Vinocur, “A dilemma of distance in German approach,” International Herald Tribune, July 3, 2007, p. 2).

Within the EU procedural framework, members continue to pursue their national interests, using traditional political means. Past images of a German locomotive, and of a French – German directoire, have given way to a kaleidoscopic pattern of coalitions. Some are off the mark; suggestions that Britain and France must lead efforts to create a strategic partnership within the EU seem ludicrously out of date, since they leave no room for Germany (Yves Boyer and Julian Lindley-French, “Britain and France need to lead, together,” International Herald Tribune, Sept. 20, 2006, p. 8).

Russia

Russian statements and actions are forcing their way to European – and American – attention. Much of the European interest in Russia emanates from the countries on Russia’s periphery. The Putin government has taken issue with US plans for missile defense in Eastern Europe, NATO enlargement, and US bases close to Russia. Moscow’s use of energy as leverage, its recalcitrance on the issue of Kosovo’s independence, and its sharp reaction to western criticism of Russia’s tendency to step back from democratic reforms and civil liberties, are underlining the need for a western policy. Right now, however, neither Washington nor the EU has much in the way of a policy, let alone a coordinated policy.

The future EU

The goal of the EU has been, from the beginning, “an ever closer Union.”

Members of the Union can look upon many achievements with satisfaction. It has established a working common market. It speaks with one voice in matters of trade. Key members have successfully created a common currency. The Union is widely regarded as an example of peacefully managed diversity.

But the EU may now have reached the limits of the possible:

A common foreign policy remains beyond reach. (The Spanish Fundacion para las relationes internationales y el Dialogo Exterior recently published a document entitled ”New Governments, New Directions in European Foreign Policies?” The publication contained six articles on the foreign policies of six EU member states).

The French and Dutch “no” votes illustrate widespread popular dissatisfaction with the EU.

In a speech to the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London on November 7, 2006, Polish President Lech Kaczynski spoke about the need for a common vision on European integration, but added that “this does not require a federation – a strong union of member states will suffice.” (IISS News, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Winter 2006, p.9).

The EU has not prevented continued national rivalries, e.g., the Italian-German tussle with respect to UN Security Council enlargement, and French-German disagreements with respect to Airbus.

Europeans are resentful of rule making by the EU Commission in Brussels.

A critic might thus conclude that the EU finds itself back where it began – a free trade area with common economic policies. This conclusion would be too severe. Without question, the EU has achieved enhanced productivity, a much improved regulatory environment, and compelling habits of consultation. Nonetheless, the EU presents a paradox. Europeans have enjoyed progressive evolution toward peace, freedom, democracy, and prosperity. The continent is being held up to the rest of the world as a model of regional governance. But the EU has been unable to take much of a leading role on global issues.

John Kornblum views this situation with concern. Referring to the European criticism of American plans to install radar systems and some missiles for anti-missile defense in Central Europe, he concludes: ”The emotions will soon subside. Left behind will be two unfortunate consequences: solidarity among NATO and EU partners has little chance if Europeans erupt publicly each time the Russians warn of dire consequences from this or that Western action. Europeans will continue to be divided among themselves over how to deal with Russia and increasingly with the US. Even worse, the EU could continue to separate into pro-U.S. and pro-Russian factions.”(John Kornblum, “Europe and the radars,” AICGS Advisor, American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, March 30, 2007). Acknowledging that American leadership has been wanting, Kornblum goes on to say: ”Of longer term concern is the steady loss of confidence in Europe’s leadership abilities. There are many people, myself included, who are convinced Europe would be a safer place if the European members of NATO would play a larger role in defining Atlantic security policy. But there are just as many who doubt that Europe is up to the job.” (Ibid.)

My observations parallel those of Kornblum. I have found European officials uniformly skeptical of the ability of the EU to take the lead on global issues. Former Dutch Defense Minister Willem van Eekelen puts it bluntly: “Unfortunately, with the Constitution in limbo, the idea of a European Union as a semi-coherent unit with a balanced mix of communitarian and intergovernmental activities is at risk.” (From Words to Deeds – The Continuing Debate on European Security, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, 2006, p. 312).

Even a less pessimistic view needs to make room for two factors:

Despite the logic of the EU countries pulling together, Europe remains a continent marked by profound differences..

Changes in the global balance of power are limiting the capacity of the EU to play a significant role on the world stage.

Two British researchers have suggested that both the French-German vision and the Anglo-Saxon vision of Europe do not offer viable prospects. Philip Blond and Adrian Pabst state the issue provocatively: “Europe’s alienated voters distrust both versions of their future. What they want is local autonomy and socioeconomic security, which are not currently on offer. Civic institutions and ways of life have been destroyed by the combined forces of the state and the market. Cultures want to act in concert with others but modernize on their own terms, and this requires a fresh political vision. Only a radical decentralization of power and money can tie the universal hopes of the European project to each particular citizen.” (“Europe needs to start thinking locally,” International Herald Tribune, June 25-26, 205, p.6).

The transatlantic interface

There is no lack of suggestions about the way in which the partners to the transatlantic bargain should structure their interface. None have taken root.

Stanley Sloan proposes an Atlantic Community Treaty, creating an organization for non-military security cooperation. The new body would complement, not compete with, NATO and the EU. (Stanley R. Sloan, NATO, The European Union and the Atlantic Community: The Transatlantic Bargain Challenged, Rowman & Littlefield, 2005.) He traces this idea to European suggestions for a transatlantic pact that would unite the United States, Canada, and European countries in a new cooperative framework. (Stanley R. Sloan, “European Proposals for a New Atlantic Community,” Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, March 10, 1995).

Franklin Kramer and Simon Serfaty notethat the range of issues of common interest cannot be adequately addressed in existing fora. Hence, they conclude, there is a need for a new body that does have this mandate. They name it the Euro-Atlantic Forum. They argue that “[T]he new forum could simply, with all parties present, decide upon the necessity of a military action, determine how best to implement it, and approve the appropriate implementing organization.” (Franklin D. Kramer and Simon Serfaty, “Recasting the Euro-Atlantic Partnership,” Initiative for a Renewed Transatlantic Partnership, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, March, 2007, p.3).

If only the matter were that simple. These suggestions would entail a major realignment of competencies and powers now constituting the transatlantic relationship, something existing bureaucracies will resist. Giving this power to an international body would require a major domestic political effort, not least in Washington. There is no evidence the Bush administration is in the least attracted to these ideas. A new body, thus empowered, would get in the way of the competencies of the North Atlantic Council and hamper the work of the “foreign minister” of the EU. These structural suggestions bring to mind the comment of George Kennan that, in our approach to world affairs, we must be gardeners and not mechanics (George F. Kennan, Realities of American Foreign Policy, Princeton, 1954, p. 93).

European comments on these suggestions range from unenthusiastic to negative. European officials have no desire to see another Year of Europe imposed by Americans. This feeling is accentuated by the decline of European trust in Washington’s good judgment, and by the fear that the US will dump unwelcome tasks on the Europeans.

The argument made by these private sector Americans is that there is a need for transatlantic consultative mechanisms more suitable to the task at hand. But US officials point out that ad hoc, small groups, tailored for the occasion, have in practice worked well: The Quad (UN, Russia, US, EU) for the Middle East, the EU-3 (UK, France, Germany) with respect to Iran, and the Quint (UK, France, Germany, US, Italy) in the Balkans. Contact groups have a long and successful diplomatic tradition, e.g., the Contact Group on Namibia in the early eighties. In this view, contact groups are effective and useful tools to deal with specific issues involving the transatlantic partners.

There is the additional danger that procedure eclipses substance. It is undoubtedly true, as National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley told a dinner audience in February, that relations between the EU and the US are “at an unprecedented level.” This practical pattern of consultation and cooperation would be put at risk by any proposal to reorder the way transatlantic business gets done. As needs arise, officials will find a way to get the diplomatic business done. The pattern will not be tidy, but it will be the best available.

In transatlantic relations, what will matter more than procedural arrangements and structures is the political attraction of the policies on offer, and the way they are presented.

What is ahead?

So what can we expect of Europe? Fortunately, we have some guidance about what the future may hold. The Global 2020 project, a thoroughly sourced and imaginative projection by the National Intelligence Council (NIC), sketches four different but not mutually exclusive worlds emerging from today’s trends: A Davos world marked by increasing globalization, a Pax Americana centered around the United States, a new Caliphate with a national base and a strident Jihadist agenda, and an Orwellian world driven by fear. (Mapping the Global Future, NIC 2004-13, nic).

In a globalized world, Europe will be a significant player. Americans will find European support in trying to meet the challenges of a world newly focused more on Asia than on the Old Continent. But Europe will not easily adjust to its new status as a less prominent global player and an inevitably reduced role in international institutions. Protectionist tendencies will remain.

A Pax Americana will find European countries with the United States on many key issues, though the relationship will be neither as stable nor as predictable as it was before 9/11. The EU will remain preoccupied with its internal workings. Key European governments will want their views to be taken into account in Washington, even if these are not in harmony. At the same time they will want to preserve as much freedom of action as possible.

A new Caliphate with a distinct national and geographic base and a Jihadist attitude has the potential to drive deep wedges between Europe and the United States. The strong and growing Muslim presence in Europe will influence domestic attitudes and shape foreign policies by which European countries will seek to shield themselves from threat or cope with any consequences.

A cycle of fear – of nuclear weapons, climate change, energy shortage, or Jihadist terrorism – has the potential of driving America and Europe apart, both in their respective assessments of the threat and their preferred policy responses. At the same time, any immediate and palpable threat has the potential of forcing the two continents together.

Implications for the United States

As EU handicaps will leave the leadership ball mostly in the US court, Washington will face major hurdles.

The Iraq war and other policies have undercut the trust of Europeans in American good judgment. Europeans have a growing sense that the two continents no longer live by the same values. Lack of European trust will potentially stand in the way of effective transatlantic cooperation. Zbigniev Brzezinski estimates that it will take years of deliberate effort and genuine skill to restore America’s political credibility and legitimacy (Second Chance, Basic Books, 2007, p. 192). I agree.

The Europeans, too, face big challenges. They may anticipate a smoother transatlantic relationship after the 2008 US elections. But this may be misplaced hope for a false dawn. While the diplomatic style of the new administration will be different, American interests will remain the same, and so - by and large - will the tools by which Washington will seek to protect these interests, including by the use of armed force. In transatlantic relations, the challenge for Europe will be how to speak to Washington in a voice that will be heard. Europe’s limited ability to deploy military forces – because of lack of funds, troops, or will – will limit its influence.

Furthermore, the United States is likely to continue its push for a reconfiguration of international institutions to account for a shift of the global distribution of power. This shift will be away from Europe. (Daniel W. Drezner, “The New New World Order,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 86, No.2, March-April 2007, p. 34).

Prospects

Prospects are that:

With skillful management on all sides, the transatlantic relationship holds the promise of practical synergies to meet a broad array of global challenges, from security and growth, to energy and environment.

As a matter of vital national interest, US presidential candidates need to prepare now to sketch, and be ready to implement, the global leadership role that will be theirs if elected. A workable transatlantic relationship will be a key element.

Ultimately, the question what to expect of Europe comes back to us. American goals and the way we pursue them will be key drivers of the transatlantic relationship. When the task was to help shape the Europe of today, America met this test. Now the test has assumed global proportions. We will need European allies. With effort on our part, we can meet this new test. To do so is in our interest.

Marten van Heuven

Senior Consultant RAND Corporation, US Foreign Service Officer (Ret.), former National Intelligence Office for Europe. These are the personal views of the author.

October 9, 2007

Parts of his text have benefited from helpful comments by colleagues of long standing: Robert Levine of the RAND Corporation in Santa Monica, Stanley Sloan of the Atlantic Community Initiative in Richmond, Vermont, Samuel F. Wells Jr., Associate Director of the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington DC, Peter Wilson of the RAND Corporation in Washington, DC, and, last but hardly least, my wife Ruth, herself, like me, a retired US Foreign Service Officer.

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