Issue Date: November 20, 1987 - Stanford University
Issue Date: November 20, 1987
South Africa Admits Fighting Soviets, Cubans in Angola
• Intervenes on Behalf of UNITA Rebels
• U.S. Missiles Credited
• Pretoria Claims Anti-SWAPO Raids
• Casualties
• Earlier Developments
• U.S. Arms Airlift Continues
Intervenes on Behalf of UNITA Rebels
South Africa Nov. 11 acknowledged for the first time that its troops had clashed with Cuban and Soviet forces in southern Angola. Pretoria said it intervened on behalf of UNITA rebels after they had routed an Angolan army offensive, drawing the Cuban soldiers and Soviet advisers directly into the fighting.
South Africa had long acknowledged providing arms and logistical aid to UNITA (the Portuguese acronym for the National Union for the Total Union of Angola). This was the first time it had admitted fighting alongside the rebels, although there was evidence that it had done so repeatedly over the years, usually under the pretext of pursuing Namibian insurgents of the South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO).
Pretoria, while admitting to a growing number of casualties, claimed that its troops had combined with UNITA guerrillas to deal a major defeat to the Angolan government and its communist allies. (The rebels continued to insist that they had won the victory without South Africa's direct involvement.)
South African officials indicated that their ultimate goal was to force Angola to come to terms with UNITA and agree to form a coalition government with its leader, Jonas Savimbi. If achieved, that would represent a reversal of the defeat Pretoria suffered in 1975-76, when its troops penetrated almost to the capital of Luanda in a bid to topple the new Marxist MPLA government before being forced to withdraw by the MPLA's Cuban reinforcements as well as international pressure. [See 1976 African Affairs: South African Troops Leave Angola]
However, newspaper editorials and analysts in South Africa Nov. 15 reflected nervousness at the risks involved in raising the ante against the Soviet Union, which had committed some $4 billion in arms and hundreds of military advisers to the war against UNITA. Pretoria was "kicking the shins of a giant," one analyst warned.
U.S. Missiles Credited
Angola had launched its dry-season offensive against UNITA in June and July, although the fighting did not reach a climax until September and October. As they had in the last major Soviet-backed drive in 1985, government forces advanced from their outpost of Cuito Cuanavale in Cuando Cubango province in an effort to take the airstrip at Mavinga, the strategic gateway to the rebels' bush capital of Jamba in far southeast Angola. (The 1985 offensive was reportedly stopped by massive South African air strikes. [See 1985 U.S. Decides on Covert Aid to Angola's UNITA Rebels; Big Anti-UNITA Drive Fails; Other Developments])
After more than a month of heavy fighting, UNITA leader Savimbi and diplomatic sources Oct. 22 said the rebels had decisively defeated the government thrust in the largest battle of the war, along the Lomba River near Mavinga. U.S. officials, cited in a Nov. 2 Washington Post story, confirmed the victory and gave considerable credit to UNITA's use of U.S. Stinger antiaircraft and TOW antitank missiles provided to the rebels by the Central Intelligence Agency as part of a two-year, $30 million covert operation.
The American officials acknowledged that South African artillery and air support also played a role. But they suggested that Angola's claims that it had shot down six South African aircraft were exaggerated. The officials said that both the Angolans (along with their Cuban allies) and the South Africans were generally "less aggressive" in the air due to fears about each other's improved air defense systems, leaving the outcome of the fighting to be determined mainly on the ground.
(It was reported Nov. 11 that Pretoria's forces in Angola were equipped with South African-developed G-5 heavy artillery. The gun, with an accurate range of 25 miles (40 km), reportedly enabled South Africa to inflict heavy casualties on Angolan forces without directly exposing its own troops.)
Pretoria Claims Anti-SWAPO Raids
The size of Pretoria's military intervention in Angola and the extent of South African casualties was unclear.
Throughout late September and October, the Angolan government charged that South African armored units and aircraft were fighting on UNITA's behalf. The South African Defense Forces (SADF), after initially refusing to comment, confirmed in early October that it was operating in southern Angola. But it stuck to its standard explanation that its troops were there to combat the black nationalist guerrillas of SWAPO and the African National Congress.
Pretoria Nov. 2 claimed that its forces had raided a SWAPO base in Angola in a major "preemptive strike," killing 150 insurgents at a cost of 12 dead--10 white SADF soldiers and two black members of the South-West Africa Territory Force (SWATF). The announced South African death toll was unusually high for a single engagement.
(In late July, military headquarters in Windhoek, Namibia claimed that a unit pursuing a group of SWAPO fighters had been lured into an ambush set up by Angolan government troops. In that clash, the South Africans claimed to have suffered only one wounded while killing 190 "terrorists" and Angolan soldiers.)
Finally, SADF chief Gen. Jannie Geldenhuys Nov. 11 announced that SADF and SWATF troops "in recent days...were compelled to take limited action against surrogate forces which intervened in the battle between UNITA and Angolan forces in southeast Angola."
He continued: "Russians and Cubans using tanks, sophisticated ground-to-air missiles and fighter aircraft, including MiG-23s and attack helicopers, entered the battle after Angolan government forces were badly beaten by UNITA and suffered serious setbacks."
South African Defense Minister Magnus Malan Nov. 12 said that Angolan forces were "on the run" from UNITA when Moscow decided "in desperation, to become actively involved....This, in turn, forced South Africa into a clear-cut decision: accept the defeat of Dr. Savimbi or halt Russian aggression."
(The Angolan offensive was said to be directed by Gen. Konstantin Shagnovitch, described by UNITA as the highest-ranking Soviet officer assigned to a foreign military command outside Europe and Afghanistan.)
Malan said that a heavily armed, Cuban-supported Angolan brigade was "successfully forced to withdraw from its position." He indicated that, were it not for his country's prompt intervention, UNITA would have been beaten in the counteroffensive and southern Africa would have been brought "to the brink of the abyss" of communist domination.
Savimbi, however, speaking the same day to foreign reporters in his Jamba base-camp, expressed surprise at Malan's contention. The rebel leader insisted that no South African ground or air forces had intervened to secure UNITA's victory. Instead, he praised the "crucial" role played by the U.S.-supplied Stinger missiles, which he referred to as "those instruments whose name I cannot remember."
"We have shot down every (kind of) plane they have here---bomber, jet fighter, interceptor, helicopter and transport plane," he said. "With five instruments, I got five planes."
Savimbi also showed off two Cuban pilots, captured when their MiG-21 was shot down in late October.
Casualties
UNITA claimed that Angolan government forces had suffered about 2,000 dead and 5,000 wounded since July, while putting its own losses at 155 dead and 662 wounded. In addition, the rebels claimed to have killed 48 Russians and Cubans.
The Soviet foreign ministry Nov. 12 denied that any Soviet advisers were directly involved in the fighting.
Angola, meanwhile, claimed to have killed over 600 UNITA rebels and 200 South Africans while suffering 242 of its own dead. In response, Gen. Malan Nov. 12 said that four South Africans had been killed in the clash with Angolan and Soviet-bloc forces. The SADF Nov. 13 announced that five more of its soldiers had died.
Counting the 10 killed earlier in the alleged anti-SWAPO raid, that brought to 19 the number of confirmed SADF dead in the past two weeks. The rising casualties and lack of details about Pretoria's secret operations in Angola had reportedly caused growing concern among the white South African public.
Malan Nov. 14 revealed that South African President Pieter W. Botha and other top cabinet officials had recently made unannounced morale-boosting visits to South African troops inside Angola. Malan said Botha wanted to show his sympathy, involvement and personal responsibility for the continuing military operations there.
Some observers suggested that Pretoria had masked its casualties by using the 32 Battalion as the spearhead of its Angola involvement. Nicknamed the "Buffalo Battalion," it was a covert unit of black Angolan tribesmen led by white officers. The SADF command Nov. 13 admitted that it had not announced the deaths in combat of 10 of the unit's soldiers since June.
Earlier Developments
In earlier developments in the Angolan conflict:
• UNITA for the first time had acknowledged capturing two guerrillas of the African National Congress, which was committed to overthrowing Pretoria's white minority regime, the New York Times reported Sept. 14. The two black rebels had been based at one of the ANC's training camps in Angola. UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi claimed he had refused a South African request to hand over the guerrillas. He said he was willing to turn them over to the ANC if a suitable intermediary could be found.
• UNITA March 26 said it would allow the Angolan government to reopen the Benguela railroad line in order to help the black-ruled nations of southern Africa reduce their dependence on South Africa for transportation outlets. The rebels had kept the line closed for years with sabotage attacks, but said they would allow it to reopen if the government would guarantee it would not be used to move military goods.
Angola, Zaire and Zambia held a summit meeting April 30 in Lusaka at which the three countries' leaders pledged their support to rehabilitating the once-profitable railroad.
U.S. Arms Airlift Continues
The secret airlift of U.S. weapons to UNITA rebels was continuing through southern Zaire, despite the denials of Zairean President Mobutu Sese Seko, the New York Times reported July 26. [See 1987 CIA Aid to Angola Rebels Sent by Way of Zaire; Abandoned Air Base Used]
According to Western diplomats, the arms were flown as often as five times a week from Kinshasa's international airport in a C-141 cargo plane marked "Santa Lucia Airways" to an abandoned Belgian air base near Kamina, in Shaba province. A smaller C-130 plane then ferried the weapons to UNITA bases in Angola.
(Portuguese radio reported March 19 that Cape Verde had banned stopovers by Santa Lucia Airways because of its role in the covert airlift. The airline, apparently a proprietary of the Central Intelligence Agency, had also been linked to the secret U.S. arms sales to Iran, the Washington Post reported Feb. 24.)
It was reported June 10 that the Reagan administration had informed the congressional intelligence committees that it was going ahead with the second $15 million installment of its covert arms program for the Angolan rebels.
In a related development, California businessman Sam Bamieh July 1 told the House Foreign Affairs subcommittee on Africa that the Saudi Arabian royal family had donated millions of dollars in aid to UNITA at the behest of the late CIA Director William Casey. Bamieh testified under oath that he had acted as a go-between in the deal. [See 1987 Iran-Contra Arms Scandal: McFarlane Notes on Saudi Funds Cited, 1986 Inquiries into Iran Scandal Widen; New Details Emerge]
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Modern Language Association (MLA)
Citation: "South Africa Admits Fighting Soviets, Cubans in Angola; Intervenes on Behalf of UNITA Rebels; Other Developments." Facts On File World News Digest 20 Nov. 1987. Facts On File World News Digest. Facts On File News Services. 20 June2008 .
American Psychological Association (APA)
Citation: The title of the article or cartoon. (1987, November 20). Facts On File World News Digest. Retrieved June 20, 2008, from Facts On File World News Digest.
See the American Psychological Association (APA) Style Citations for more information on citing in APA style.
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