Essay #2 - musketmedia



"History of Air Superiority"

Major Joe S. Granducci

From the moment aircraft began to operate offensively against one another, the concept of air superiority became militarily significant. The basic idea is not terribly revolutionary. Military units, when operating against each other naturally attempt to gain some kind of advantage. Whether it was local (tactical) superiority, i.e., cavalry attempting to out maneuver and destroy, or neutralize another force in a battle. Or operational/strategic superiority where maneuvering armies attempt to gain and maintain positional or military superiority via maneuver and battles, the general idea is the same. Gain the ability to operate without the interference of enemy units, or at least without their interference being of significance to ones operations. When this concept is applied to air power there are some unique characteristics which differentiate it from the ground or the naval operations. Airpowers ability to ignore terrain, to mass at critical points, it's flexibility in regards to targets it can effect and it's range of operations are just a few of its unique abilities. The idea of 'air' superiority and what it meant to warfare began in World War I. The base line developed in World War I, and the lessons applied (and some ignored) developed further in the interwar period. World War II was possibly the most important time period in the development of air superiority ideas. Many of the basic doctrines and concepts evolved from experiences in World War II. The period following World War II, from Korea to Vietnam introduced new challenges and further modifications to the concept of air superiority. Several critical questions can be asked in regards to the abovementioned periods to determine what was learned. What was the base line developed in World War I? As air superiority concepts were applied to each successive conflict, what was different in each new era? What was similar? What didn’t change? And finally, what was the significance of each era? Air superiority concepts were born in cauldron of World War I.

World War I

Airmen quickly realized that use of the airplane in support of war made it both an important military asset and target. Therefore, the destruction of enemy machines was a natural extension of war into the third dimension. Very early fliers existed in a short lived fantasy world, where aircraft simply passed each other and sometimes waved as they went about their missions. However, the enemy's machines were providing valuable intelligence, and just as a land commander would not allow an enemy cavalry patrol free access behind his lines to spot and recon, he did not want to allow aircraft the same luxury. In fact, it was more critical to deny aircraft this access, as the third dimension gave a less impeded view of ground situations. Air combat was born as men attempted to stop the enemy machines from spying on their positions. Bricks, flechettes, handguns and rifles were all used, among other things, in largely ineffective attacks against one another. Early on there were little in the way of coordinated attempts at air superiority per se, but the very basic concept was born, even if the going was slow.

"Air Superiority Doctrine came slowly to the air forces of the world. Like most other forms of air doctrine, it had it's origins in World War I. Major military powers saw aviation primarily as an adjunct to ground operations".[1]

Denial of access to friendly airspace immediately above ones army was the early version of air superiority. Limited performance and range of aircraft meant the struggle for air superiority was limited to a relatively small area near the front. Few compelling reasons existed to require air superiority behind the lines, as no aircraft could reach far enough. The British would get the first taste of the strategic meaning of air superiority with the introduction of zeppelin raids against London.[2] However, the preliminary struggle was very much a tactical one, concentrated near the front.

World War I established the baseline for the concept of air superiority, a look at this period will aid the discussion. Doctrine, Technology, Training, Weaponry and Tactics all shaped air superiority concepts in each era of development. First consideration must be given to the overall doctrine of air superiority developed in the war. It was at best a hit and miss process initially. Air warfare was extremely new, other than the obvious idea that one wanted to clear the skies of enemy aircraft, there was little more in the way of details.

"It has often been said that there was little realistic conception of how air power might be used-what air forces like to call doctrine. This is true, but also understandable. The air weapon was after all distinctive, indeed unique. Of all the “new” weapons of the Great War, it alone had no predecessor and no precedent".[3]

General Pete Quesada put it well, even if he was speaking of a later era, the problem was the same. "The fighter business in those days was just a bunch of guys going up and fighting another bunch of guys without a known objective".[4] The initial dearth of doctrine eventually gave way to somewhat more concise thoughts about requirements to gain air superiority. Men such as Air Marshall Sir Hugh Trenchard began the process of making a reasoned and logical attempt at air superiority doctrine. While doctrine started as mostly theoretical, technology made a reality of the theory. It was the advent of the interrupting gear, reliable machine guns and aircraft that could carry them that made it possible to shoot down the enemy.[5] Easily aimed armament mounted on a relatively stable platform turned the airplane into an air superiority weapon. Technology provided a suitable weapon. The idea that air superiority of some kind was a military necessity made it a necessity that men train to carry out the mission. Pilots initially were only taught to fly aircraft. However, it is one thing to fly an aircraft, it is entirely another to employ one as a weapon.[6] Early efforts at training were little more than familiarization with flying followed by on the job training. This system quickly showed its flaws, the loss of inexperienced pilots was horrendous. Most early aces were of the ‘lone wolf’ variety. They hunted alone, developed their own tactics and typically died before much could be learned form them. Expenditure of men and materiel indicated this system was wasteful and inefficient. Air warfare pioneers like the German aviator Oswald Boelcke began to offer structured advice and training.

"It is with Boelcke, and his great rival Leutnant (Lieutenant) Max Immelmann, that the history of air fighting really begins. Up to the end of 1915 air combats had been spasmodic, unplanned affairs. This was all to change now. Boelcke realized the importance of carefully planned tactics and concerted action by a number of pilots, and was soon placed in a position in which he could implement his ideas".[7]

In time, men like Trenchard and Boelcke began to train pilots in the actual science of flying fighter aircraft, before they met their first enemy crate over the front. Formal training units, with experienced combat pilots assigned began training new pilots with tactics and techniques learned in battle. Formal training increased the effectiveness of new pilots greatly.

World War I ended just as air power was about to 'get of the ground'. The long years of war taught much to the fledgling air forces. Aircraft technology took giant strides in airframe, engine and weapon design. Embryonic air superiority concepts were developed by both sides. The aircraft of the day limited air superiority to a question of local dominance at the front lines, and it operated very much in a supporting role to ground armies. The interwar period and World War II would see this limited view of air superiority blown wide open with the advent of long range bombers and the idea of strategic air superiority.

Interwar Period

The interwar period at first saw little progress for air superiority concepts. The terrible experience and losses from the war, and a general lack of interest in things military stagnated practical air power development. What did not stagnate were the theories of airpower. Douhet, Trenchard, Mitchell and the various airpower prophets proposed radical new ways of thinking about war and air power. Concepts of air superiority as something other than fighters vying for local control at the front entered the forum of discussion. This period was little more than academic discussion as during the 20's, technological development was slow.[8] During the 30's in conjunction with Hitler's rise to prominence in Germany rearmament commenced and developments came fast for airpower and air superiority. In the United States, bomber theory came to the van. Air superiority doctrine changed as air power prophets preached the power of the bomber, and its transcendent place in future wars. Air superiority took on a strategic meaning. It was theorized, with enough bombers to strike the enemy decisive blow, he would have to quit.[9] Fighters were thought to be of small consequence; they could not reliably stop the bombers. Indeed, technology of the day seemed to bear this out as bombers in the interwar period were faster than fighters, and intercepting them was difficult using only standing patrols and a spotting corps. Better to concentrate on building bombers vice wasting limited interwar resources on fighters. The weaponry of the interwar period did not change appreciably, though toward the beginning of World War II there was a significant increase in the number of actual guns a fighter could carry. Training in general was lacking. The training establishments of World War I were scrapped or severely drawn down. Most countries air arms were little more than flying clubs. World War II would of course change things.

World War II

As World War II approached and began several significant changes occurred to air superiority concepts and each nation went about air superiority in decidedly different fashions. The concept of air superiority as a strategic struggle was pursued by both the U.S. and U.K. Both countries believed in the primacy of the bomber. The Germans and Japanese concentrated on tactical air superiority. Many reasons for these differences exist, yet there were several primary ones. Both the Japanese and Germans were somewhat limited in resources, and therefore fleets of large bombers were not cost effective for them. Additionally their geographic locations lent themselves to tactical air forces. In Japans case, though the distances involved seemed to point to a large bomber force, their relatively weak neighbors were more than checked with tactical air forces and naval aviation. They were also of a decidedly offensive mindset.[10] Both countries were geared toward a quick war; they realized a protracted conflict was not in their strategic interest. A tactical bomber force in support of ground armies in Germany's case, and in support of naval landing forces in Japans case were deemed the best use of resources.

World War II solidified and in the Americans case codified[11] air superiority ideas by starting with the base line developed during World War I and modified in the interwar period. Doctrinal development was also a dynamic and evolving process as World War II progressed. Entering into the war, neither side truly foresaw the immense size of the strategic air superiority battles in Europe, despite the foreshadowing of the Battle of Britain.[12] Still, the need for an official and institutionalized air superiority doctrine became obvious in the desert of North Africa. The allies learned the value of centralized command and decentralized execution in an air superiority conflict that was theater level.

"The Tunisian campaign proved to be an ideal training ground where earlier mistakes in Anglo-Franco-American relations and army-air cooperation could be identified and remedied".[13]

Africa held little in the way of targets for a strategic superiority campaign, so the emphasis was on the tactical struggle. In Western Europe, strategic air superiority doctrine was emphasized as the U.S. and U.K. employed large bombers against German strategic infrastructure. At the same time, they used the lessons learned in North Africa to ready the tactical air superiority plan for landings in Normandy. In fact, the two blended at times and complimented each other. Strategic superiority sapped strength from the defenders, and the tactical effort did the same.[14] In the east, both Germany and Russia concentrated on the tactical aspects of air superiority. They attempted to gain superiority in local areas to support operations, or to defend against enemy pushes. The vast territory in the east precluded either country from gaining a strategic superiority though Russia gained a measure of strategic advantage due to sheer numbers late in the war.

As each country implemented doctrine, advances in technology and weaponry also played a role. The monoplane fighter brought the fighter back into prominence. With a greater number of reliable machine guns and later cannons, the fighter was the weapon with which air superiority would be determined. Coupled with the advent of ground radar stations the fighter proved highly capable of inflicting heavy casualties on bomber formations. The proposal that unsupported bombers would win the day was false. Although both the Germans in the Battle of Britain and the Americans in their initial strategic campaign would still attempt to send bombers unsupported, both learned the hard way it was unwise because of prohibitive losses. Training was again a key to winning air superiority. The axis powers found themselves in a protracted war neither country had precisely planned on. Their well trained and comparatively small air arms suffered casualties that neither country could make good. Both countries realized too late the critical need for increasing pilots and machine output. In the end air superiority in World War II would be won as much by doctrine and training as by sheer numbers of quality air crews and aircraft. "The air superiority for Operation Overlord was largely the product of vastly superior Allied production and training efforts that were begun very early in the war".[15] Quality was ensured for the allies by taking experienced pilots from the front lines and assigning them to training squadrons. The axis powers, caught behind the power curve of their poor strategic planning, used their valuable instructors in operations where they were killed or captured and were forced into such self defeating options as decreasing training time to produce more crews.

What then was different from the First World War to the second? The relatively limited tactical struggle of World War I changed in Europe to a strategic struggle between the western allies and Germany. Other theaters, notably North Africa remained tactical in nature, but the critical battle was fought over Germany by the bombers and long range fighters of the 8th Air Force and Bomber Command. In the east, the fight for air superiority was little changed from World War I. Aircraft contested the immediate front lines. The largest difference was the very fluid nature of the conflict. Considerations such as air field locations and the speed of advances possible by mobile forces were new considerations over the last war. In the pacific, the greatest difference was the introduction of large scale naval aviation operations. Still tactical in nature at the pointy end, the strategic considerations of island hopping and the need for suitable bases to reach the enemy over vast distances gave air superiority planning a strategic bent. Furthermore, the bombing campaign over Japan late in the war, though on a smaller scale than in the west, also contributed to gaining air superiority over Japan proper.[16] One must not forget the symbiotic relationship applied here as well as in Germany, as the tactical battles in island hopping were aimed at securing the bases to enable commencement of strategic bombing.[17] The similarities between the wars lie largely in the fact that it was the fighter which was the primary tool of air superiority, whether employed strategically as escorts in a bombing campaign, or tactically in support of ground operations. The need for air superiority coverage for ground operations also continued its importance, despite early war ideas that the bomber would reign supreme. What then was the significance of air superiority developments during World War II? The short lived idea that the bomber was supreme gave way to the reality that the fighter was the primary air superiority tool. Doctrine was finally nailed down by the allies, one which enabled their air arms to work independently and employ the inherent strengths of air power without parceling out power to ground commanders. The combination of strategic air superiority operations and tactical air superiority operations proved to be highly effective in wresting control of the air from two adversaries that concentrated too much on the tactical effort. These proven air superiority concepts would continue to evolve in the cold war period and in two following conflicts, Korea and Vietnam.

Korea

Korea was a crossroads of sorts for air superiority concepts. The end of the piston era of fighters and advent of the jet fighter heralded a new standard combat aircraft. Korea also introduced the idea of limited war. The Far East Air Force (FEAF) found itself in a battle of attrition, with limited objectives and resources allotted. This was vastly different from prior experiences in World War II. The doctrine of strategic air superiority, so painfully developed in World War II was of moderate use in Korea. Korea had little in the way of strategic targets, those that existed were generally in range of tactical forces. Strategic bombers were employed, but the campaign was chiefly tactical. Despite this difference strategic air superiority doctrine was not scrapped, as the advent of the nuclear weapon and the Cold War with Communist forces in Europe kept the strategic doctrine valid (if somewhat modified by the power of nuclear weapons). In the Korean clash tactical doctrine came to the forefront, modified for a limited war. The basics continued to apply here, gain superiority locally for friendly operations and deny the enemy access to your airspace. FEAF air power was largely successful in both endeavors, and in fact Korea was the last war to see American ground forces attacked from the air.

Technology caused a significant change with the advent of operational the jet fighters. Korea was a bridge between the piston era of World War II and the modern jet age of supersonic fighters and guided missiles. Early jets were still armed with cannon and machineguns, and air to air combat was still a very close and personal undertaking. Yet the speeds and altitudes, as well as the general performance of aircraft significantly improved.[18] Training and tactics played a critical role and enabled American airmen to enjoy a significant advantage over their adversaries.

"Korea showed that war experience was as important as war materiel . The U.S. Army, Air Force and Navy were short of the latter in 1950, but the three services made up for materiel deficiencies with officers and enlisted personnel skilled in wartime operations".[19]

The two primary jets which fought the Korean War, the Mig-15 and F-86 were roughly equivalent; it was the training and tactics which made the difference. Many American pilots were combat veterans from World War II, whose experience advantage was a great aid. The American knowledge of training procedures was also fresh from World War II and it was an easy matter to generate excellent pilots, even from the limited training apparatus that was in place. Korean pilots, though trained by Russians, were of lesser quality, which cost them dearly. The introduction of Chinese and Russian pilots helped the north somewhat, but it came down to training in the end, and the allied combination of superior training and experience swung the equation solidly in their favor. Tactics as well played a part in American air superiority. Rigid tactics on the part of the communist forces were ill suited to the more fluid tactics of the Americans, which were extensions of those learned from the Germans and British in World War II. What was the significance of the changes in air superiority in Korea?

The Korean air superiority campaign was significantly different from World War II in several respects. The scale of the effort was certainly smaller, but the true difference was the lack of a World War II style strategic effort. The battle for air superiority was primarily tactical in nature. The enemy fought from largely untouchable bases in China which were for political reasons out of reach of the air superiority campaign. American forces also contested the air while out numbered, quite a change from the effort in World War II. This is significant as it heralds a shift in American air superiority concepts. American forces would generally fight with a numerical disadvantage from this point and make up the difference up in technology, training and tactics. Air to air combat, although fought with jets, remained similar to the experience of World War II, even as the stirrings of the future were being felt.[20] Useful airborne radar for daylight fighters and guided missile technology was around the corner. The doctrine of limited war, and limited air superiority aims was introduced. Korea was a crossroads between World War II style total war and Vietnam where the modern jet age and limited war further modified air superiority concepts.

Vietnam

Vietnam was another limited war for American air forces. Air superiority concepts from previous wars were further modified by experience in Vietnam, which more closely resembled the Korean scenario than the World War II experience. U.S. forces enjoyed nearly complete air superiority over North Vietnam in a tactical sense. Nevertheless strategic concepts of air superiority would be hard pressed to prove effective in a limited conflict. While targets in North Vietnam were plentiful, political considerations kept many of them off the target lists, and similar to Korea, a large portion of the war fighting materiel was built and transported in countries that were politically immune to attack by air. A strategic campaign aimed at complete destruction of enemy 'war fighting' ability was not politically feasible. American air power struggled to achieve the same result, basically strategic victory by forcing enemy capitulation by waging an essentially limited and graduated tactical campaign.

The doctrine of air superiority applied to a limited war was again attempted in Vietnam, forced by the political realities of the day. This time however, the north was untouchable by ground forces, and the (limited) campaign against the power base of the enemy was entirely by air. Not to mention the fact that even the airfields and infrastructure that was in North Vietnam was not targetable.

"In Korea, the USAF's air interdiction campaign went on behind a shield created and maintained by forces that shot down Chinese MiGs and cratered North Korean airfields. Chinese air units had a sanctuary, but they had to leave it to assault the USAF's protective fighter screen. In Southeast Asia, however, the USAF's protective fighter screen covered only Thailand and South Vietnam. The North Vietnamese Air Force (NVAF) operated from bases that were immune to attack until the air interdiction campaign was in it's third year".[21]

American air power sought to establish local superiority to support graduated air bombardment without the threat of ground invasion. Additionally they attacked only a limited target set which generally had little to do with military factors and much to do with political factors. Technology as well, played a crucial role in the story of air superiority over North Vietnam. Jet fighters continued their dominance, however their weaponry was changing. Guided air to air missile technology matured to a point where they became valid weapons. Ranges in which fighters could engage each other increased, which caused changes in tactics. Electronic warfare became increasingly important. Air to ground munitions entered the precision era with laser guided bombs. Perhaps the most significant technological advancement was the arrival of the Surface to Air Missile (SAM). Air superiority doctrine, technology and tactics would now have to consider the relatively cheap and very effective ground missile threat. There was even a brief flirtation with the notion that the cannons and machine guns that armed aircraft for so long were no longer needed or effective with the advent of missiles.[22] Training and tactics too played a significant role in the struggle for air superiority. The training establishment had lost some of the robustness that existed in World War II and Korea but as the war progressed the lessons learned and experience increased American pilot's capabilities.[23]

What was different in Vietnam from the previous struggles? Limited war ideas were similar to Korea, but the implementation was somewhat modified in Vietnam. The graduated responses and political agenda's tied to the air war kept classic strategic air superiority doctrine on the sideline. Unlike Korea, North Vietnam was immune to invasion for political reasons. Much of her critical infrastructure was also untouchable. The air war aimed to force a withdrawal from the south by graduated strikes on a limited target set. A series of air operations were used to illicit the various political responses from the north, vice an ongoing air campaign like the Korean War or World War II. Technology's effect on air superiority concepts was very different from previous wars. The advent of the air to air missile and the SAM threat changed the tactical aspect of air superiority forever. Engagement ranges increased, the already quick engagement times from the Korean era were further shortened and electronic warfare became increasingly important. Similarities to prior wars existed as well. The fighter was still the primary tool of air superiority although the modern jet fighter began to blur the lines between purely tactical and purely strategic aircraft.[24] Air superiority in the tactical sense still required a massing of assets at the critical point to ensure aircraft could continue with their mission without effective interference.[25] Vietnam was significant to air superiority doctrine for the development of modern tactics and techniques such as precision guided munitions, electronic warfare and jet age combat. It also served as a warning to the confines of graduated air campaigns and limited warfare. Vietnam's lessons would be applied to later conflicts like Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom, where limited war objectives were fused with nearly unlimited air superiority campaigns.

Conclusion

Air superiority concepts have evolved greatly from the initial hesitant steps in World War I to the highly tuned campaigns over Iraq. The basic idea of air superiority, to allow aircraft the freedom to operate without significant opposition remains unchanged. The various doctrines employed however, continually changed, to suit conflicts ranging from total war to limited operations. Technology played an important role in the achievement of air superiority, and in some cases drove the changes in doctrine. As technology advanced and doctrine became solidified, tactics and training took on an increased importance. By the time the Vietnam War started, the apparatus for gaining air superiority, especially in the USAF was well institutionalized. The challenge remains, as always, to apply the capabilities to the evolving political situation.

Selected Bibliography

Cooling, Benjamin Franklin. Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority. Center for Air Force History, Washington D.C., 1991, 678 p.

Kennett, Lee. The First Air War 1914-1918, The Free Press, New York, 1991, 275 p.

Mortensen, Daniel, R., ed. Airpower and Ground Armies. Alabama: Maxwell Air Force Base, 1998, 207p.

The Encyclopedia of Air Warfare. Hamlyn Publishing group Ltd, London, 1974, 256 p.

Winter, Denis. The Fist of the Few. University of Georgia Press, Athens Georgia, 1983. 216 p.

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[1] Cooling, Benjamin Franklin. Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority. Center for Air Force History, Washington D.C., 1991, p 1

[2] An experience that would significantly affect their doctrine leading up to the Battle of Britain

[3] Kennett, Lee. The First Air War 1914-1918, The Free Press, New York, 1991, pg 21

[4] Cooling, p 2

[5] Anthony Fokker's Eindecker E I aircraft and the period known as the 'Fokker Scourge' truly ushered in the era of air to air combat.

[6] Russian pilots at the outbreak of World War II, Arab pilots in the string of wars with Israel and Iraqi pilots during desert storm could all attest to this fact.

[7] The Encyclopedia of Air Warfare. Hamlyn Publishing group Ltd, London, 1974, p 24

[8] For fighters especially, commercial aircraft made significant improvements. As these were the airplanes bombers were designed upon, the bomber got a boost from their development.

[9] Essentially true, the problem lie in the lack of sufficient numbers, large enough weapons, and a lack of precision. Nuclear bombs proved the ultimate proof of this concept.

[10] Bomber theory was initially a very defensive concept. Enough bombers would ensure an enemy would not dare attack.

[11] FM 100-20 was a direct result of the attempt to publish a coherent air superiority doctrine.

[12] Much to Germany's detriment, America and Britain simply threw more planes and crews into the grinder, the German's did not realize the importance until too late.

[13]Mortensen, Daniel, R., ed. Airpower and Ground Armies. Alabama: Maxwell Air Force Base, 1998, p 25

[14] One must be careful to not place too much emphasis on the doctrine employed as the allies had the luxury of gaining both tactical and strategic superiority, while touting the strategic as the war winner.

[15] Cooling, p 313

[16] It can be argued that by 1944 when the strategic campaign got underway, Japan's naval aviation had been virtually destroyed and that fact in itself essentially gave air superiority in the pacific to the allies.

[17] Just as in Europe, the allies enjoyed a huge numerical advantage late in the war which contributed greatly to the gaining of air superiority.

[18] Weaponry in general remained unchanged from World War II.

[19] Cooling, p 497

[20] Fighter speeds had an effect on air to air combat, engagements were quicker, and losses generally lower on both sides, a trend which continues to this day.

[21] Cooling, p 510

[22] This was however a premature idea as aircrew complained of lost opportunities for kills without the availability of a gun.

[23] Creation of Red Flag exercise's for the Air Force, and the establishment of the Navy's Top Gun school and Air Forces Fighter Weapons school were direct responses to the training problem encountered early in Vietnam

[24] One could classify aircraft like the F-105 as either strategic or tactical depending on its ordnance.

[25] This massing of aircraft took on a decidedly more complex tone with considerations of electronic warfare, SAMs and precision weapons requiring guidance.

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