The Zimbabwean



INTRODUCTIONThe Political Economy of the State in Zimbabwe: The rise and fall of the Securocrat State Ibbo MandazaHis face is on money, his photograph hangs in every office in his realm, his ministers wear gold pins with tiny photographs of him on the lapels of their pinstriped tailored suits. He names streets, football stadiums, hospitals and universities after himself. He carries a silver inlaid ivory rungu or an ornately carved walking stick or a flywhisk or chiefly stool. He insists on being called doctor or being the big elephant or the number one peasant or nice old man or the national miracle or the most popular leader in the world, his every pronouncement is reported on the first page. He shuffles ministers without warning, paralysing policy decisions as he undercuts pretenders to his throne. He scapegoats minorities to show up popular support. He bans all political parties except the one he controls. He rigs elections. He emasculates the courts and he cows the press, he stifles academia. He gives the church. The Big Man’s off-the-cut remarks have the power of law. He demands thunderous applause from the legislature when ordering far-reaching changes in the constitution. He blesses his home region with highways, schools, hospitals, housing projects, irrigation schemes and a presidential mansion. He packs the civil service with his tribesmen… His enemies are harassed by youth wingers from the ruling party. His enemies are detained or exiled, humiliated, tortured or killed.-Willy Mutunga (Now the Chief Justice of Kenya)I. THE LEGACY AND SCOURGE OF THE POST-COLONIAL STATE IN AFRICAWilly Mutunga’s citation above is an apt description of one of the main symptoms of the political pathology that is attendant to the legacy and scourge of the post-colonial state in Africa. Therefore in citing Mutunga, Eric Matinenga argues that the main objective of constitution-making (and constitutionalism) in Africa has been the need to rein in and curtail the excesses of the Executive - the “Big Man” syndrome. However, here it is necessary to explain why, notwithstanding the best of constitutions, including the Zimbabwean one which was signed into law in 2013(but remains largely unimplemented by a stubborn Executive), the pursuit of (bourgeois) democracy (or the “national democratic revolution”) has so far remained largely illusive. For, always implicit but seldom explicit in the discourse on the political processes and/or transitions in the post-colonial situation has been the subscription to bourgeois democracy; with its origins in the (European) Westphalian State; finding its contemporary expression in the African context in the nationalist struggle for independence and the establishment of the nation-state-in-the-making at independence , with all the requisite trappings for a constitutional democracy, in a community of nations as represented by the United Nations and other international organisations. Central to the bourgeois democracy model or, to use a term which connotes the same, “national democratic revolution”, are the following; a constitution as the supreme law of the land, with a strong emphasis on the separation of powers - between the Executive, Legislature and Judiciary – as the guarantee for the rule of law, the basic freedoms for all citizens and genuine democratic discourse; the establishment and maintenance of national institutions that are simultaneously non-partisan and conducive to nation building; and an enlightened leadership that, in the absence of the conventional national bourgeoisie that is the anchor class in contemporary (western) bourgeois societies, can be the driving force for the political and socio-economic development of the post-colonial dispensation. There are various concepts that have emerged among progressive African scholars in particular, as part of the quest for an unique (African) epistemology, but also reflecting a recent past (1970’s to 1980’s) when the development debate in Africa centred on the (presumed) choice between capitalism and socialism. Hence the less precise concept of the “Developmental State” and the more dynamic one, “Developmental Democracy”; both seek to explain the contemporary African reality as essentially the struggle for bourgeois democracy and economic development in an era dominated by international capital, neo-liberalism and a relentless globalization that has virtually relegated Sub-Saharan Africa to the status of an extractive industry bowl for primary products, bereft of an industrial capacity and therefore destined for a cycle of unemployment, poverty and underdevelopment now, almost sixty years since the first Sub-Saharan country (Ghana) gained its independence in 1957, Kwame Nkrumah’s clarion call – “Seek ye first the political kingdom and all else will be added unto it” – rings so hollow for the majority of Africa’s citizens. And, as Willy Mutanga and others in this collection have inferred, even the constitutions themselves are not worth the paper they are written on: though a symptom of a more fundamental problem, the burden of an all-powerful executive - the “Big Man”- is a glaring symbol of the failure of constitutional democracy and constitutionalism itself. Needless to add, the constitutional provision, which has become a virtual necessity in constitution-making in post-colonial Africa, for a two-term limit for presidents/ heads of states, constitutes part of this struggle to restrain and contain the burden of an incorrigible incumbency. But even this has made little or no difference, not least for those heralded in the 1980’s as “new generation” of African leaders. Yoweri Museveni, now in power since 1986, asserts arrogantly that, “We do not believe in the term limits…if you don’t want [them] to be there forever, you vote them out.” This is the same man who, on taking office 30 years ago (in 1986) said; “The problem of Africa in general and Uganda in particular, is not the people but leaders who want to overstay in power”. Recently, Rwanda and Congo Republic both changed their constitutions to allow their leaders to seek third terms; while Burundi’s President Pierre Nkurunzinza has sparked a major political furore in his country by his decision to stay in office beyond the two terms. In Zimbabwe, the two term limit provision was introduced only recently, in the 2013 Constitution, when Mugabe was already 33 years in office (7 years of which were as Prime minister, from 1980 to 1987). So, nature and the run of politics permitting, this means that President Mugabe can stand for the second term in 2018, at the age of 94; to relinquish office in 2023, at the age of 99! But his disdain for this (two-term) provision and the constitution itself is summed up in his retort to U.N Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon during the African Union Summit in Addis Ababa in January 2016. The Secretary-General had advised that African leaders should not cling to power. Mugabe responded that he was virtually “Life President,”: “I will still be there until God says, come join the other angels. But as long as I’m still alive, I’ll still have the punch.”Yet, the burden of incumbency in Africa has less to do with the personality make-up of the individuals concerned, the attendant disease of power megalomania that is characteristic of dictatorships, nor exclusively that which Ali Mazrui described, in the early 1970’s already, as the “monarchical tendency” in African politics. It has more to do with the nature of this animal called the post-colonial state, the colonial inheritance: the continuity of the key pillars of the colonial state in the transition to independence and after; the (petit bourgeois and emergent comprador bourgeois) class that inherits state power at independence, a class which, unlike the conventional national bourgeoisie (of the bourgeois democracies), is not grounded in the economy and production and is, therefore, parasitically dependent upon the state for access to wealth, primitive accumulation and such predatory activities as are characteristic of this social formation; and how these exesses, in turn, inhere a level of political insecurity, paranoia, and the fear of an uncertain future – for self, family and associates – should one relinquish office. Elsewhere, we have sought to establish a relationship between (the African nationalist) ideology of the class that inherits power at independence on one hand and, on the other, the failure to transform the economic and social structure of Zimbabwe. This was an ideology founded essentially on two interrelated neo-liberal themes:(a) An implicit faith in western values, institutional arrangements and related paraphernalia (including cultural, ceremonial and even garb). Therefore, the (bourgeois) state model which the African nationalists inherit with political independence epitomises as much this faith as the exercise of power and priviledge that is on hand for the new class of rulers. Add to this, the extent to which the western value system is taken for granted, as an integral part of any dispensation that the African nationalists would one day wish to see established in their countries; and how the African nationalist leaders, including those who remain in our midst, are so much creatures of a colonial system that has left an indelible mark on their thought processes, their lives and their aspirations (b) The vision of the democratic society in which the violations and demands of the colonial era would be a thing of the past and a new meritocracy established. As Claude Ake explained, The language of the nationalist movement was the language of democracy, as is clear; I speak of Freedom (Nyerere), Without Bitterness (Orizul), Facing Mount Kenya (Kenyatta), Not yet Uhuru (Odinga), Freedom and Development (Nyerere), African Socialism (Senghor), and The Wretched of the Earth (Fanon). It denounced the violation of dignity of the colonized, racial discrimination, lack of equal opportunity and equal access, and economic exploitation of the colonized. The people were mobilized according to these grievances and expectations of a more democratic dispensation.As in the case of the post-colonial Africa in general, Zimbabwe has demonstrated a glaring (economic and political) incapacity to fulfil its vision. Unlike the conventional bourgeois state after which model it was in pursuit at independence, the nation-state-in-the-making lacks the economic foundations – and the anchor (or national bourgeoisie) in particular- through which to inhere a commendable level of national confidence, project national interest, and create a national economy. Hence the continued hegemony of parasitic and comprador classes most of whose members have grown pari passu this post-colonial pathology, and are largely dependent upon the state, international capital or an institutionalized aid regime. This the narrative herein; to seek to analyse the foundations of this pathology. II. ZIMBABWE IN TRANSITION Zimbabwe’s transition has been characterized by the factors of (state) continuity, class, the primacy of “national security” over political and economic reform, and the conflation of (ruling) party and state as a necessary feature of the securocrat state. The latter term is also derived from the military-security factor in the Zimbabwean case, a feature that might also distinguish the latter from other post-colonial situations in Sub-Saharan Africa. This is the enduring role, so far, of leading elements of Zimbabwe’s former guerilla army within the security establishment of the state; and how these, through a combination of the liberation ideology rhetoric that has contrivedly sought to pervade the post-independence period, the related system of patronage (borne out of a seemingly open-minded entitlement) that has made them part of the comprador bourgeois class, and their capacity for violence (or the threat of it), have been an indispensable factor in Robert Mugabe’s incumbency, particularly since 2000. In short, this is the Zimbabwe in crisis: a state as apparently invincible and impervious to change since the turn of this century, and yet so brittle as the current political and economic implosion illustrates. Therefore, here is to offer a brief political economy of the crisis, the origins and development of the securocrat state; and in doing so, try to identify the dialectic of change, the contradictions that are simultaneously the agency for change in such a crisis1. Continuity (as opposed to transformation) of the inherited (colonial) state. Thirty years since the publication of Zimbabwe: The Political Economy, 1980-86, it is now more obvious why the term “transition”, and not “transformation”, was used by the authors to characterize the Zimbabwean political and economic process: some of us had had exposure as exiles to the realities of the post-colonial situation in the neigbouring countries of Botswana Zambia, Mozambique and Tanzania; African scholarship had by that time sufficiently analysed and exposed the nature and content of the post-colonial state; and six years after independence, the myth of “Southern African exceptionalism”- the view, underpinning the revolutionary rhetoric of the liberalism struggle of Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa, that the protracted struggle would naturally inhere a transformative post-liberation process – had been sufficiently exposed, as the book itself sought to illustrate. Therefore, continuity rather than change is what characterizes Zimbabwe in transition: The main problem arose from the fact that Zimbabwe inherited the key elements of the white settler colonial apparatus…this was precisely the intention of the Lancaster House Agreement: to provide for the continuity of the state as a guarantee for ‘stability’, the ‘maintenance of high standards’; and the survival and maintenance of the economic (capitalist) status quo. The reality of the white settler colonial state was brought home to the African nationalists during the ceasefire and election processes, in which the Rhodesian state was dominant. The fact was reaffirmed with the birth of a new government that had to depend on the goodwill of elements of the old in its attempt to build new structures. The problem of reconciling the old and new into the new state would persist…Only time, and the vantage of a deeper – if only because retrospective analysis - will reveal the extent to which the inherited state structures would in turn influence the nature and character of the new state in Zimbabwe… Today, it is no longer possible to underestimate the nearly universal and hegemonic parameters of the bourgeois state model and its accompanying neo-liberal ideology, constraining and, perhaps, thereby delaying, the (historically) inevitable explosion of the contradictions that constitute modern day capitalism. So, is there, for the time being, an alternative, for such nation-states-in-the-making as Zimbabwe, to the pursuit of the bourgeois democracy model as is implicit in the struggle for political and economic reform of the post-colonial state.? As has already been pointed out in the foregoing, the distinguishing feature between other post-colonial situations and the Zimbabwe case is that the latter’s state was able to combine within itself both the inherited structures of the colonial order and a former guerilla army whose leadership worked hand-in-glove with its civilian counterparts, not only in developing the securocracy that is now so self-evident today, but also as part of the comprador bourgeoisie. The backdrop of a bloody armed struggle in which a number of its survivors still constitute a significant, if not a central, factor in the securocrat state, and the (ideological) rhetoric that has accompanied and sought to pervade the entire post-independence period to this day, contribute towards the attempt to sustain and justify the twin pillars of contemporary securocracy in Zimbabwe: violence (or the threat of it) and entitlement and/or patronage which has become integral to endemic corruption and blatant looting of state resources. As will be elaborated shortly in the context of an outline of the main features of the securocrat state, it is the extent to which the conflation of (ruling ZANU PF) party and state has sought to envelop the entire society, from central government itself, to the provinces and districts, and down to the villages and wards. Structurally, this has been achieved through the system of traditional leaders who are virtually employees and therefore an extension of the state apparatus; district and village heads who are simultaneously party and state functionaries; and a military-security superstructure that is generally pervasive throughout the society. Thus, regimentation, as opposed to mobilization which is no longer sustainable in such conditions, has become the order of the day, through a combination of state-driven violence (or the threat of it) and state-sponsored patronage. This has been most pronounced since the violence that accompanied the “run-off” elections of 2008 and no doubt pervaded and influenced the outcome of the 2013 poll. This has been the pattern of politics in Zimbabwe since 2000, as the Mugabe regime has tenuously and perilously hung on in the face of mass opposition, a flagging economy and migration of at least a third of the country’s population. 2. The nature (and development) of the class that inherits power at independence. Inheriting a bourgeois state model but without a national bourgeoisie! As has been explained elsewhere, the nature and impact of white settler colonialism in Zimbabwe (as elsewhere in Southern Africa) directly impeded and pre-empted the development of an indigenous national bourgeoisie. African nationalists in Zimbabwe have almost universally condemned the Land Apportionment Act of 1930 as mainly an expression of the racial nature of white settler colonialism. But, as Giovanni Arrighi illustrated in his seminal work on “The Political Economy of Rhodesia,” this piece of legislation constituted the cornerstone of the economic underdevelopment of Zimbabwe and determined that its indigenous people were reduced to classes of land hungry peasants, wage earners in the capitalist economy, and an amorphous petit bourgeois class composed of school teachers, nurses, labour supervisors, educated elites, petty traders etc. The combination of this historical backdrop and a relentless globalization has virtually killed the prospects of (post-colonial and neo-colonial) economies (such as Zimbabwe’s) ever producing a national bourgeoisie; whatever potential there might have been for the emergence of such a class was, with the passage of time, reduced to a predatory and parasitic class of a comprador bourgeoisie that straddles both public and private sectors. As the term implies, the comprador bourgeoisie in Zimbabwe is a class not rooted in production; on the contrary, it thrives on back handers, fat rewards for crooked contracts and shady deals, official corruption and looting of state coiffeurs; not to forget the “casino economy” era during which the comprador bourgeois class thrived through the agency of the Central Bank, but at the expense of the economy in general and collapse of the national currency in early 2009. By nature, the comprador bourgeoisie is a class in itself and for itself, bereft of a national vision because it is incapable of conceiving one and, more significantly, lives for today, uncertain about tomorrow. The origins of the comprador bourgeoisie in Zimbabwe are to be found in African nationalism itself, in its class ambitions and, as has already been explained, in its (class) frustrations at the failure to become a national bourgeoisie. So, in such historical circumstances, the African nationalist leaders and their class associates were always easy prey for international capital in its quest for new representatives and agents for its enterprise in the post-colonial dispensation. For example, the role of such multinationals as Tiny Rowland’s LONRHO in the “compradorization” of almost all of Zimbabwe’s nationalists even before independence. But, perhaps not surprisingly, it has been largely through the extractive industries that the comprador bourgeoisie has grown during the post-independence period, expressing itself as it has, not only through the members of the political and military-security and bureaucratic hierarchy, and in collaboration with their counterparts in the private sector and in multinationals at home and abroad; but also in the apparent conflation between power, corruption and wealth. The $15 billion diamond scandal is the most symbolic in this sad saga and yet could be only the proverbial tip of the iceberg for what is clearly an integral component of the securocrat state in Zimbabwe. As Ken Yamamoto states:A President discloses that mines essentially owned by his government looted $15 billion and the newspapers don’t even make it front page news with screaming headlines is a sign of a country that has lost its soul. With the stolen $15 billion, Zimbabwe could have provided its economy a huge bailout, funding refurbishment of railways infrastructure, construction of power plants, construction and expansion of national highways, a bailout to the sinking industrial sector, provided clean water in cities, funded alternative agriculture and processing industries and invested in clean energy…What matters is that with the stolen $15 billion, Zimbabwe could have provided its economy a huge bailout, funding refurbishment of railways infrastructure, construction and expansion of national highways, provide working capital to the sinking industrial sector, provide clean water in cities, fund alternative agriculture and processing industries and invested in clean energy. It could also build at least ten power stations providing over 1000 MW of power for local consumption and export. It could also build hospitals and import the latest technology and Mugabe himself would not need to fly to Singapore and Dubai for medical treatment. It’s selfish to stash national wealth in foreign countries and then fly there for medical treatment. The stolen $15 billion could transform Zimbabwe overnight, taking millions out of street vending back into the productive sector. Sadly, while he was touting ZIMASSET, Robert Mugabe did not tell Zimbabweans a secret he knew, that billions have been and were at that material time being siphoned out of the country. He only revealed this when he turned 92.The question that keeps nudging my mind is how do human beings became so bland and lose their souls to such a point? How does Mugabe sleep well at night? How do his coterie of praise-singers and bootlickers live with themselves? How do you preside over such theft and keep a straight face? How do you disadvantage 99% of the population and not bat an eyelid? What kind of people live between the two rivers – Zambezi and Limpopo? How do people continue to eat, drink, sleep, go to work, vend, or even make merry in the midst such a scandal?The (belated) land reform exercise that began two decades after independence was also an agency for primitive accumulation and patronage on the part of the political elites, the military-security top brass, the upper echelons of the civil service and parastatal sectors, the judiciary, traditional leaders and ruling party chiefs and operatives across the country. So, beginning with the Fist Family itself, Vice Presidents and Cabinet Ministers and their deputies, provincial governors/ministers, the top brass in the army, air-force, police, security services, the Chief Justice and almost the entire leadership of the supreme and high courts, all the traditional leaders (or chiefs) – all these were, almost in order of the hierarchy, the key beneficiaries of about the 4000 best commercial farms and estates that were “acquired” by the state on the back of fast-tracked legislation that followed one of the most violent episodes in Zimbabwe’s post independence period.No doubt, less voracious than the colonial violence that preceded the Land Apportionment Act, the fast track land reform which began under the politically charged circumstances of the referendum over the constitution in February, 2000, could have been the agency through which to replace the former white settler agrarian bourgeoisie with an indigenous one; but the process lacked the enormous financial, technical and market resources with which colonialism was able to create such a class in a different historical context. So, after, almost two decades, the commercial agriculture sector has virtually collapsed, and together with it, also an industrial sector which was so dependent upon it; the country has become one large informal sector, with only 4% of the economically active in employment; about 50% or more Zimbabwe’s professional/ skilled population now in the diaspora; and the public sector accounting for 83% of the national budget of 4 Billion in terms of the salary bill. These are the circumstances under which the comprador bourgeoisie finds itself under pressure and in search for new avenues for primitive accumulation; and, to some degree, therefore, even “resource nationalism” generally and the “indigenization” policy in particular reflect the aspirations of this class, especially since the focus of such attention is the attractive mining sector around which the comprador bourgeoisie has waxed rich in recent decades. In short, the alliance between the comprador bourgeois class and sections of the security forces around the state over the last two decades represents the failure of the former national liberation movement as an agency of political and economic development in Zimbabwe. III. THE SECUROCRAT STATETherefore, securocracy is the very antithesis of democracy; ruling without or despite the popular will. The securocrat state is one in which the military-security apparatus is a dominant factor in the power complex that is the state. In Zimbabwe, this revolves around (but symbolic in that herein lies the centre of power) the proverbial office of the President, Head of State and Governemnt, Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces. As will be outlined shortly, Zimbabwe’s securocracy has its origins in the liberation struggle – in both ZAPU and in particular ZANU – in which the military-security factor reigned supreme over civil and political relations. Of special significance in contemporary Zimbabwe is the extent to which, under the direction of the president himself, the military-security factor has, since 2000 in particular, sought to pervade social and political relations, compromise or contradict public policy issues, subvert the electoral system and purge political rivals to the incumbent “Big Man”. Of course, it can be as fascinating as the James Bond-type spy (or the cloak and dagger) narratives to have to single out and detail the operations of the arm of one military-security complex in such analyses of the security sector in African states, as Miles-Blessing Tendi has sought to do recently But, this can be both a distraction from political economy and, more seriously, a misreading of the history and development of the Zimbabwean state. For example, if it is significant as Tendi seeks to demonstrate, that military intelligence was the agency through which Joice Mujuru in particular was purged in 2014, how would he explain why, a year later, the same agency is itself under siege, as Vice President Emmerson Mnangagwa and his allies that include the Chief of Defence Forces (under whom military intelligence operates), Constantine Chiwenga, and a significant section of the war veterans led by Christopher Mutsvangwa, are being systematically purged and neutralized under the same military-security complex which includes the army (and its military intelligence and Presidential guard), air force, police, prisons and CIO? The point here is that the dynamics at play within the ZANU PF party/state are best understood in the context of a securocrat state in which the “Big Man” himself, and in the current situation, “State House” itself, has so far been its epicentre and the constant factor. This is because, as in all such dictatorships, cach of the heads of the military-security chiefs are individually beholden to the “Big Man” who, as has been explained, has discretion to renew or terminate the annual extension to their respective contracts, and are beneficiaries of a patronage (and state-sponsored corruption) system in which, inter alia, he has personally facilitated the participation of the military, police and intelligence, in the extractive industries, including diamonds and platinum. Reports of fierce rivalry (and competition for access to resources attendant to the growing train) between some of the Chiefs of the military-security establishment are not surprising since, as part of the machinations of the securocrat state, these individuals operate less in concert than each in relation to the “Big Man”, as will be illustrated shortly. This is “divide and rule” par excellence as is characteristic of dictatorships; as illustrated in Tendi’s account with respect to the role of the military intelligence in the purging of Vice President Joice Mujuru and her allies in 2014, this means one arm of the military-security complex can be used expediently to execute a given political programme, at the expense of other arms of the complex; and, a year later, the order reversed, as military intelligence itself is being purged of yet another political project. This, is the process of self-immolation of the securocrat state, but it is too early to predict how it will unravel nor the ramifications thereof. Of course, it can be as fascinating as the James Bond-type spy (or the cloak and dagger) narratives to have to single out and detail the operations of the arm of one military-security complex in such analyses of the security sector in African states, as Miles-Blessing Tendi has sought to do recently. In retrospect, the rise of the securocrat state can therefore be traced to at least three main features that have characterized the Zimbabwean social formation over the last 36 years. These are the very factors around which the possible trajectory of political and economic reform has to be identified, as the securocrat state itself is thawing under its own contradictions and the inexorable forces of change and development. (i)The rise and rise of the “Big Man” and the (commensurate) subversion of national institutions. This has taken place on the back of a process whereby the constitution was variously amended over the years to create an all-powerful executive; whilst correspondingly blurring the separation of powers, subverting and eroding national institutions, and the gradual conflation thereby of (ruling) party and the state. Notwithstanding the shortcomings of a document designed specifically for the transition from Rhodesia to Zimbabwe, the Lancaster House Constitution did lay down the foundations for the separation of powers between the Executive, the Legislature and the Judiciary, at least until the advent of the Executive Presidency in 1987. Thereafter, the Executive President became increasingly the very centre and symbol of power in the Zimbabwean state. As explained elsewhere, the Mugabe story is one that requires its own attention and space. But it is already an informative lesson on the exercise of power in a post-colonial setting, in the careful interplay of state and party, and with the conflation of both around him; and how this provides the “Big Man” with the framework for enhancing his power and control over the entire polity. Like the Cabinet under him, the ZANU PF politburo and central committee – including the Women’s and Youth wings – become instruments through which to institutionalize the control system, pre-empt or manage dissent, while the patronage that necessarily accompanies post and priviledge also keeps the entire state as well greased as possible. In recent years, and as the years and vagaries of the state have taken their toll on the “Big Man”, the First Lady has taken centre stage in propping him up in a purported “life presidency” that also boarders on dynastic politics. However, driven equally by fear and a palpable paranoia over the inevitable closure of the Mugabe regime, she has inadvertently accelerated the implosion of both party and state. So, in the meantime, the current situation has all the hallmarks of a conventional dictatorship in the political economy definition of the term: a decisive and thorough purge of anyone – or anything – that purports to be opposed to the First Family and its party/state; an amazing disdain for, and apparent obliviousness to, the political and economic realities that constitute the Zimbabwe crisis; and a relentless determination to rule ad nauseam, regardless of the consequences. Against the background of this political pathology, national institutions – e.g. Parliament itself, the Public Services Commission and the Defence and Security Forces – have lost the relative autonomy and non-partisanship so clearly demanded under the constitution and adhered to for most of the first decade of post-independence. The state, not to mention incorrigible incumbency itself, has consequently relegated and subverted the meritocracy, professionalism and non-partisanship that was commendable in Zimbabwe’s national institutions in those days of contagious patriotism. Today, for example, the provisions that the heads of such national institutions as the defence forces should serve two terms of five years each, exist only on paper, having been abandoned since 2000, and replaced by annual renewals at the discretion of the President, Head of State and Government and Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces. Not, surprisingly, the term “retirement” has virtually disappeared out of the vocabulary and practice of Zimbabwe’s subverted national institutions, no doubt in keeping with incorrigible incumbency at the top of the edifice.(ii)The primacy of the “national security” axis in the state As has already been intimated, the primacy of the military-security factor over civil and political relations has its origins in Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle, in particular the structure of ZANLA. Traditionally, the Chief of Defence, such as were Josiah Tongogara and Rex Nhongo (Solomon Mujuru) after him, was also the apex of the entire military-security system that undergirded ZANU during the last phase (1977-79) of the struggle. As such, Tongogara was the centre of power in both ZANU and ZANLA , with the political and civilian part of the latter virtually subservient to the military-security factor, even though the official line was to the contrary, namely, the doctrine that “politics controls the gun”! The advent of political independence in 1980 and the subsequent development of the (post-colonial) state instituted a new power matrix for the emergent defence and security forces: selected ZANLA units, some of the ZIPA elements and the former Rhodesian forces, were integrated into the Zimbabwean National Army, under the close supervision of the British Military Advisory and Technical Team (BMATT), initially (up to early 1981) under the command of the Rhodesian General Peter Walls and, later, the former ZANLA Commander, Solomon Mujuru; and selected elements of the former members of ZANLA’s seguranza (or security-military intelligence) were integrated into the (former) Rhodesian Special Branch, which was then subsumed under the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO), under the leadership of the British-Rhodesian Ken Flower and deputized by Emmerson Mnangagwa , hitherto Mugabe’s Special Assistant since 1978. Other former combatants from both ZANLA and ZIPRA found their place in the police force, the British South Africa Police (BSAP), also under a former Rhodesian commander but later renamed, in July 1980, the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP). Subsequently, its command was also “Africanized” with Wiridzayi Rodwell Nguruve, a former member of the BSAP, taking command, to be succeeded by another former BSAP member, Henry Mukurazhizha, before Augustine Chihuri, a former ZANLA combatant, took over in 1993. Similarly, the Rhodesian Prison Services, into which a number of ex-combatants were recruited, before it was also renamed the Zimbabwe Prison Services: “Africanized” accordingly in 1980, to be headed subsequently by a former ZANLA commander (who became a senior member of the Zimbabwe National Army), Paradzai Zimondi in 1994 Finally, the former Rhodesian Air Force which remained almost autonomous as largely a white outpost, even though it was also baptized the Zimbabwe Air Force in 1980, until much later in 1986 when Josiah Tungamirai, a former member of the ZANLA High Command (virtually third in line after Tongogara and Mujuru), was appointed its commander. It has to be recalled that, in the early years of independence that also witnessed the internecine conflict between ZANLA and ZIPRA forces at Entumbane and, subsequently, the Gukurahundi episode, this white manned and/or former Rhodesian Air Force was a key instrument in the defeat of ZAPU and its military wing as the Zimbabwean state under Robert Mugabe exorcised itself of any rivals to him. It was against this background, in addition to the various constitutional and institutional arrangements that constituted the Zimbabwean State at Independence in 1980, that Robert Mugabe ascended to the “throne” on which he would remain for 36 years, at first as the Prime Minister and then (Executive) President in 1987. The foregoing section has outlined in some detail the trajectory of power that produced the “Big Man.” However, in explaining how Mugabe became the centre of a state power matrix in which the “national security” factor was increasingly writ large, there is need to highlight two issues that are also attendant to the origins and development of the securocrat state. First, the inherited Rhodesian state apparatus and how this provided a level of continuity through which Robert Mugabe was able to establish and develop his power base, in a transition that simultaneously reduced the threat of a white military backlash and deconstructed the former guerilla armies – especially the hitherto dominant security-military factors within both ZANLA and ZIPRA – into a national institution, the defence and security forces, under the command and control of the President, the Head of State and Government and Commander in Chief of the Defence Forces. This was the process through which the state – composed of the old and new - also dispensed with any would be rivals to Robert Mugabe; and herein the origins of the “national security” axis that developed with the virtual destruction of Joshua Nkomo’s ZAPU and ZIPRA through the bloody Gukurahundi episode of 1984 to 1987, and became synonymous with the self-preservation of Mugabe’s incumbency and the securocrat state itself. Also significant in this regard, is how the Zimbabwean state inherited an apparatus so central to the doctrine and command structure of the Rhodesian military-security state: the Joint Operations Command (JOC) which was chaired by General Peter Walls and became virtually parallel, in terms of its power and influence during the last years of the Rhodesian regime, to the political civilian leadership of Ian Smith and, from 1978 to 1979, with Bishop Abel Muzorewa in the aborted Rhodesian/Zimbabwean episode. In post-independent Zimbabwe, JOC became a central feature of the state’s military-security complex, prominent as ever during such “war time” periods as Gukurahundi, anti-RENAMO war in Mozambique (1977-1992), the DRC escapade (1998), and during the elections from 2000 onwards, as the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) also became, at least operationally and functionally, an extension of the military-security establishment, and election periods degenerated increasingly into virtual “war zones”. As others have pointed out with respect to the laws and legislation that the Zimbabwean state inherited – and perfected - from Rhodesia, continuity has been a central feature of the securocrat state. The following statement by Sydney Sekeremayi, the then Minister of State for National Security, constitutes an apt summary of the origins and development of the Zimbabwean state and its “national security” mantra.May I take this opportunity to urge you to remain steadfast against the rhetoric and cheap propaganda by retrogressive forces about the need for security reforms in Zimbabwe. Our security establishment is very professional. The British Military Advisory and Training Team left the country in 2001 after a 20 year stint with our army. They did not complain then, why now? In the same vein, the President’s Department held various exchange programmes with other Western Intelligence Services among them CIA, BND (Germany Intelligence) and M16.Second, the role of Solomon Mujuru and the former ZANLA guerilla army in sustaining both the military-security factor that underpins the “national security” axis and the ideological rhetoric (of the liberation struggle) which seeks to legitimize it ad nauseam. Solomon Mujuru (nom de guerre, Rex Nhongo) had been instrumental in having Robert Mugabe accepted by the ZANLA guerillas as head of ZANU, after almost two years (1975-1976) of virtual “house arrest” (together with Edgar Tekere) in Quelimane, some 1 547 km from Maputo. Not only Samora Machel and other Frontline leaders like Julius Nyerere and Kenneth Kaunda, but also the guerilla leaders themselves, deemed Robert Mugabe unsuitable and unacceptable as leader of ZANU and ZANLA during those days. But Mujuru made it his objective to have Mugabe gradually accepted as head of ZANU: he kept contact with Mugabe and Tekere, by driving under the stealth of night to Quelimane and on many occasions during that period, a journey that would take 20 hours, to and from; and it was through the consultation that the two nationalists were kept abreast about the war effort, including, presumably, the balance of forces among and between the guerillas themselves, until the circumstances for their arrival in Maputo and subsequent participation in the Geneva Conference on Zimbabwe in October 1976, with Mugabe now de facto head of ZANU, a position to be confirmed at Chimoio, Mozambique, in 1977Reference has already been made to Josiah Tongogara’s pre-eminence as Chief of Defence and Security in ZANLA, and the extent to which these functions by nature rendered the national liberation movement virtually subservient to the military-security factor. No doubt, the last phase of the struggle, 1977 to 1980, would have been one characterized by a tension, albeit a benign one, between Tongogara and Mugabe. But Mujuru would have quietly mediated throughout, until he succeeded (as Chief of Defence and Security) Tongogara with the latter’s untimely death on 26 December 1979, on the eve of independence. Throughout the 3 months ceasefire period that preceded independence in April 1980, during the transition that saw the three armies (Rhodesia, ZANLA and ZIPRA) integrated into the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA), and even upto the 2008 elections when their relations deteriorated alarmingly, Solomon Mujuru remained both Robert Mugabe’s indispensable source of strength for the power base that he wields to this day, and the anchor on the basis of which the ZANLA military-security factor was sustained and developed as an integral component of the securocrat state. Together with Josiah Tungamirai and Vitalis Zvinavashe, Solomon Mujuru had established a strong ZANLA chore within the Zimbabwean defence and security forces; and all three, in conjunction with those of their ZANU who were in the first Cabinet at independence, sought to ensure that the legacy of the national liberation struggle would continue to inveigh, if not sustain, the state well into the 1990’s and, to some extent, to this day.It was also Solomon Mujuru who was instrumental in the promotion and appointment of the second tier (in the hierarchy of ZANLA) of former guerillas that subsequently succeeded himself, Josiah Tungamirai and Vitalis Zvinavashe: Constantine Chiwenga the Chief Defence Forces (CDF), Parence Shiri as the Commander of the Air Force, Augustine Chihuri as Commissioner of the Zimbabwe Republic Police, Paradzai Zimondi as Head of the Prisons and Correctional Services and Happyton Bonyongwe as the Director-General of CIO. Also, the “militarization” – through the infusion of former ZANLA from the ZNA (e.g. Happyton Bonyongwe in 2002) – of the CIO itself is attributed largely to Solomon Mujuru, as he sought to reproduce the structure, so central to ZANLA during the liberation struggle, in which the military-security complex developed into an integrated force under his invisible hand. Similarly, the development of the War Veterans Association as part of the State apparatus; consisting of a chore of former guerillas whose numbers are fast depleting naturally, a corterie of war collaborators, former political prisoners and detainees, the war veterans have been integral to the process through which the defence and security infrastructure has developed and strengthened. As former or serving military and security functionaries, many of them would have been party to the operations and massacres associated with Gukurahundi, and, likewise, the violence that accompanied some aspects of the fast track land reform exercise at the turn of the century. The war veterans have been until recently a major political weapon in the armory of ZANU PF and its state since 2000, especially during all the elections since then, as their political and combative role had almost become indispensable to the disputed outcomes of the poll in 2002, 2005 and especially 2008 and 2013. In the latter role in particular, the war veterans have been an extension of the military-security establishment, under the virtual command and direction of the defence and security chiefs at KGVI Headquarters, and remunerated accordingly, possibly out of the possibly budget of the “Office pf the President and Cabinet”, an open-ended facility that enjoys both a disproportionate chunk of the national budget and is beyond the scrutiny of audit and parliament. Not surprisingly, given its conflation with the (ZANU PF) party and state, the war veterans association appears to be splintering and disintegrating as the force it has been over the last three decades, under the weight of the current implosion afflicting the establishment. Apparently, the war veterans is now split between the various factions within ZANU PF, while another portion of it is angling towards the new Zimbabwe People First, led by Joice Mujuru, the former Vice President who was purged, along with many others (including war veterans and former military and security chiefs), in the political tsunami that has been raging through the ruling party and its state. So far, the most significant component of the war veterans is that which, over the last decade, has been associated with, if not also commandeered from, KGVI Headquarters, the latter being also the euphemism for both the purported nerve centre of the Zimbabwean state, and Constantine Chiwenga, the current Chief of the Defence Forces and, until recently, the apparent power base for the besieged Emmerson Mnangagwa and such of his allies as Christopher Mutsvangwa. Clearly, with Solomon Mujuru’s decline in influence since 2008 and, ultimately his death in August, 2011, the security-military complex has been centred around Mugabe himself and a State House headed by his family members and loyalists and, combining within it, selected elements from the army, military intelligence, the presidential guard and CIO. This has been the weapon behind the Grace Mugabe tsunami over the period since late 2014. Conversely, Solomon Mujuru;s exit from both the military-security complex over which he superintended till 2008, and the political sphere in which he was a senior member of the ZANU PF politburo, until his death in August 2011, also marked the beginning of the end of Joice Mujuru’s fortunes in the ZANU PF party/state. However, it is significant that the second tier of the leadership of the guerilla struggle - at one time, and for that matter, all of Solomon Mujuru’s products and protégés - have remained in office as heads of, the defence and security services, to this day; and in all five cases – Chiwenga, Shiri, Chihuri, Zimondi and Bonyongwe – well in excess of the two-term periods specified under the constitution and the Defence Act. A fair indication of the contrived and, perhaps, even tenuous bases, under which the liberation struggle mantra continues to inveigh the securocrat state. Time will soon tell whether, given the vagaries of the party/state as evidenced in the role of the First Lady and the accompanying succession battles around Mugabe, Zimbabwe is fast entering the final stages of the securocrat state, as the current members of the military-security complex leadership are either purged, retired or replaced. Certainly, whether by design or coincidence, the Grace Mugabe tsunami appears intent on casting aside almost all of those associated with the liberation struggle era, as a prerequisite for a presumed, if not also imagined, dispensation. Whatever the outcome of the current succession debacle in the ZANU PF party and state, herein lie the death throes of the latter, including even those, like the First Lady, who appear now to have the upper hand; and the possibilities and prospects for political and economic reform, as elaborated in the following sections. (iii) The decline of cabinet rule and consequent relegation of socio-economic policy imperatives An obvious consequence of the over-emphasis and concentration on the security requirements of a securocrat state has been the relegation of socio-economic imperatives, as the policy framework itself became increasingly distorted, amorphous, inconsistent in import, and even contradictory and uncoordinated. This was, in turn, an outcome of a process whereby the collective responsibility so central to Cabinet rule became subservient to the priorities of “national security.” In the 1980’s, the Cabinet system followed very closely the Westminister model, and the inherited Rhodesian personnel remained in office long enough into post-independence to ensure continuity of best practices in this regard. Besides, the cabinet which met weekly every Tuesday, 8.45am to 12.45pm, with the requisite agenda and accompanying documentation for the day, there were also several Cabinet Committees which fed systematically into the main Cabinet. The most important of these was the Cabinet Committee on Development which was chaired by the Minister of Finance and Economic Development, and constituted the main crucible for economic and social policy throughout most of the 1980’s, and well into the era of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) in the early 1990’s. In addition to the inputs from the various ministers and their ministries, these Cabinet Committees were essential to the information and data collection necessary as a prerequisite for the interaction that constitute policy formulation and, ultimately, the policy framework itself. The latter is meant to reflect and reinforce the collective that is Cabinet rule, inform and influence leadership within the state, and help to enhance the legitimacy of the latter and its ideological superstructure that is public policy. This also constitutes the interface between the Executive and Legislature, as the necessary process towards a public policy framework for the nation. References to three issues will suffice in illustrating the decline of both Cabinet rule and the policy framework during the era of securocracy. First, the gradual devaluation of the principle of “ Ministerial responsibility” and the consequent erosion of “collective responsibility” within a Cabinet rule system that therefore became, from 2000 onwards, more a formality than a forum for robust interaction towards informed policy decisions. As such, the President appointed his Ministers less on the criterion of suitability and/or qualifications for the post, than as an exercise in patronage and the expectation of unbridled loyalty to the President, Head of State and Government and Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces. With the passage of time, critical issues of policy were made less in Cabinet than between the President and the individual Minister responsible for the sector: sometimes, after the Cabinet meeting itself, as Ministers queue with their files outside the President’s office, to have their respective matter cleared, far from the glare and scrutiny of collective responsibility; and, at other times, President and Minister will meet as circumstances or expediency demands, to deliberate and decide upon a policy issue that might have otherwise been rejected in Cabinet.Against this background, the Cabinet Committees have become redundant, if not also itinerant and irrelevant; and the Cabinet Committee on Development which, in the 1980’s certainly, met monthly, now convenes annually. Likewise, the Cabinet meetings themselves: these, confides a Minister, are occasions for tea-drinking; so irregular as to be inconsequential, especially when, in the absence of the President, who is a regular traveler and is away for the festive holiday season in the Far East for close to two months every year, there are no Cabinet meetings; and, in recent years, there have been reports about the old man fall in asleep during meetings of an institution that would otherwise be the apex of governance in any modern state.Second, the Zimbabwean state would thus be described as being on “autopilot” were it not for the primacy of “national security” within it, as reflected in the President’s diary on Monday, a day before that of Cabinet. In a recent article and obviously, one designed to dispel both the speculation about the President’s health and the widely-held public perception that the government is “on autopilot”, Chief Secretary to the President and Cabinet, Misheck Sibanda, stated the following,. on the occasion of President Mugabe’s 92nd birthday:He is alert, he knows what is happening. All those things (that he is no longer fit) are myths because he works – I can tell you. Sometimes he goes beyond nine o’clock or 10 o’clock…He is amazing… He is fit; that I can tell you because we work with him. He has a very very tight (weekly) programme. So, whoever says (he is not fit), we don’t know. (These are) totally, totally misplaced (notions). In fact, most of these people who say so are sometimes themselves not fit. He has stamina; that I can tell… You can therefore, see that when some people allege that Government is auto-piloting, you don’t dignify those comments with a reply because you will be wasting your time…Misheck Sibanda goes on to explain, albeit unintentionally and, perhaps, inadvertently, the President’s obsession with “national security” matters; and, as has already been intimated, these have primacy over Cabinet and related socio-economic policy issues. Thus, the President’s Monday – from morning till night – is devoted almost entirely to programmed meetings with the security chiefs, individually or in collaboration with such of their counterparts in the state as deemed necessary and expedient by the President. As one who has always been sensitive to the view about him (and “my Zimbabwe”) in the international sphere, the President meets the Permanent Secretary for Foreign Affairs as often as is necessary but also as part of the “security” briefings on Mondays. But it is the office of the Secretary for Information, Media and Broadacsting Services that has increasingly become important during the period, since 2000, when Mugabe and his party/state have been under siege, domestically and internationally. As such, state media and the extent to which it has sought to project and sustain the securocrat state and Mugabe in particular, as behovolent, developmental and forever indispensable, became integral to the military-security complex; and, consequently, the current incumbent in the Ministry, George Charamba, has had his post elevated from the conventional one of “Press Secretary to Spokesperson”, a role reflecting as much the party/state conflation, in which case he is spokesperson for a President of both party and state; as well as his functions as part of the military-security complex; to control and monitor the state media as part of an increasingly self-defeating propaganda war; accredit or bar foreign media, and wrestle with a private (and social) media; which in recent years has become unbridled, if not also occasionally intemperate, in its opposition to, and tirades against, Mugabe and his government. Thirdly, the point to highlight herein is that both the structure and practice of governance in the Zimbabwean state revolves around the military-security complex under the President, Head of State and Government and Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces: in which Cabinet and the Ministers therein become, in practice at least secondary to their Permanent Secretaries, as is the case of Foreign Affairs and Information Media and Broadcasting Services, in relation to the military-security complex; with the conventional relationship between Minister and Permanent Secretary now distorted beyond recognition, except in as far both defer to a Cabinet Secretariat that, at least in form and not content, is now responsible for all policy clusters; and, in reality, a Cabinet Secretariat which is divested of its role as a managerial and policy coordinatory framework for government, and reduced to a “secretariat” for the securocrat state. So, the Office of the President and Cabinet has become an administrative complex representing the centralization of power: consisting of the Chief Secretary (and not Secretary to Cabinet, in the conventional sense of the post) to the President and Cabinet, whose attention is divided (as reflected in the incumbent’s interview in the Sunday Mail on the occasion of President’s interview on 21 February, 2016) between the secretariat functions of the military-security meetings on Monday, and those of Cabinet on Tuesday, in addition to other matters attendant to such an office; several permanent secretaries (and their deputies, including former diplomats and other state functionaries), each responsible for this and that policy cluster of government and thereby, albeit inadvertently, eroding the status and functions of Permanent Secretaries and their line Ministries; and the result is not only a top-heavy and uncoordinated structure in which the stresses and tensions in the party/state are reflected from time to time, but also around which control and “national security” take precedence over economic and social policy imperatives. This is reflected for example in the national budget of about $4 billion for 2016, in which 83% of it is devoted to the salary bill and, therefore, by implication at least, only 17% to “development issues”. Not to mention the predominance of the “national security” factor in the budgetary allocations thereof: $205 million plus for the Office of the President and Cabinet; $337 million plus for Defence; and $373 million plus for Home Affairs (which includes Police). With a total of $916,706 or nearly $1 billion, these three allocations alone account for about 25% of the entire national budget of $4 billion. It is against this scenario that has emerged in the ZANU PF party/state lexicon, the term “one centre of power”, as both a euphemism for, and defence of, Mugabe’s dictatorship. Simultaneously, it describes a subverted bourgeois state model in which the legislature lies lame and the judiciary rendered vulnerable to an executive now synonymous with securocracy itself. This is a state in crisis: incapable of reform, neither politically nor economically; and, therefore, pregnant with enormous contradictions now expressing themselves in the current political and economic implosions. This is because political reform (e.g. implementation of the new Constitution and electoral reform perse) would amount to “undressing the emperor” and undo his empire; while economic reform is not possible as long as those elements of the state – e.g. a bloated public sector of 530 000 (of which 300 000 is the military and security establishment) – that sustain the empire remain intact and impervious to political reform. IV The Role of Re-Engagement By all accounts, this the final phase of the Mugabe era: beginning as it did with the 2008 elections in which he was defeated but afforded a life-line by the Government of National Unity (GNU) which ended with the equally disputed elections of 2013; closing, as being witnessed now, in the intersection between efforts towards the international re-engagement of Zimbabwe, on the one hand and, on the other, the growing divisions in the ZANU PF party/state. Engagement has been a persistent theme in the history of modern Zimbabwe, not only given the latter’s colonial backdrop and the series of brokered negotiations which culminated in the Lancaster House Agreement of 1979, but also because the country’s post-colonial situation itself has developed against the background of pervasive, if not also intrusive, oversight of global factors. For, Zimbabwe’s post-independent history also coincides with the period during which Southern Africa as a whole experienced intense global scrutiny, with respect to the defeat of apartheid in Namibia (1990) and South Africa (1994), and some of other the post-Cold War developments which yielded peace in Angola and the demise of the Mobutu regime in what became thereby the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Besides, “engagement” refer to both the political and economic spheres of international relations: Zimbabwe is a member of the United Nations and many other international organisations, and a subscriber to the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, multilateral institutions with whom Zimbabwe has had heady relations at times, but which nevertheless have maintained a subtle hegemonic overview in the country’s economic life. In turn, this also explains why international capital in particular and the western world in general, cannot – and will not – disengage permanently from a country who economy is historically and inextricably part of its system. Therefore, re-engagement here refers to the process whereby Zimbabwe’s relations with mainly the western world is being restored after a period, since 2002, when the European Union, the USA and other western countries imposed “sanctions” or “special measures” against it, following the violence and acrimony attendant to the presidential elections that year; and in the course of which period the country has been isolated internationally and subject to economic tribulations. This includes the return of the multilateral institutions, led by the IMF which is negotiating with Zimbabwe for resumption of business terminated in 1999, but on condition the country clears its arrears, against a debt of about $10 billion owed to the IMF itself, the World Bank, African Development Bank and several other bilateral lenders. A backdrop to the current re-engagement process has been the facilitation exercise in which President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, with the blessing of USA President George Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair who visited Pretoria in the course of 20005, became the “pointman” for the resolution of Zimbabwe crisis. Purportedly under the aegis of SADC, but initially with the support of Nigeria’s President Olesegun Obasanjo, the facilitation process began in the immediate aftermath of the disputed outcome of the 2002 presidential election in Zimbabwe, the event which sparked the fall-out between the latter and the rest of the western world, with the European Union and the US both imposing “sanctions” or “special measures” against Mugabe’s government. In fact, it was the report of the Commonwealth election observer mission to the 2002 elections that had given the latter a thumbs down verdict and prompted such a drastic global reaction, including Zimbabwe’s breach with the Commonwealth itself in 2003. The 2002 elections had been accompanied by political violence, largely a continuation of that associated with the fast track land reform exercise that had begun in February, 2000 but thereafter a central feature of the emergent securocrat state, as has already been outlined in the foregoing. As indicated in this collection of papers, particularly the Foreword by Dave Peterson and Minister Patrick Chinamasa’s opening address to Conference on re-engagement seeks to give impetus to an assumed (political and economic) reform agenda, but in which Zimbabwe’s re-engagement with those it has had strained relations is but a part of that process. In his Foreword to this collection Dave Peterson intimates the close relationship between the earlier NED/SAPES Conferences in 2012 and 2013 on the one hand and, on the other, the expectation that the 2013 elections in Zimbabwe would hopefully yield a new dispensation in the nearly universally-held prediction that Robert Mugabe would be defeated at those polls and the securocrat state dented at its chore. That this failed to happen will have no doubt detracted from the momentum towards re-engagement and the anticipated political and economic reform agenda that would accompany such a process. But the 2014 conference, of which this collection is a record, sought to renew the hope that all was not lost. Since then, the pace of the re-engagement has been both slow and tentative, depending on how the respective factors in the Western bloc have been responding to political and economic development in Zimbabwe. The U.SA has remained reticent throughout, insisting on evidence of concrete political reforms and an improvement in the human rights situation, before any possibility of full re-engagement with Zimbabwe. Likewise the (white) members of the Commonwealth, namely Canada, New Zealand and Australia, as reflected in the paper by Mathew Neuhaus herein. The position of the European Union has remained as flexible as it has purported to be, as outlined by its ambassador Aldo Dell'Ariccia during the same Conference in May 2014, even though the… would amount to a higher level of re-engagement with Zimbabwe than hitherto the case. In all these cases, the Itai Dzamara case (in which the young man was abducted in March 2015 and has most likely been murdered in an alleged state-sponsored sting) has been another reminder that the securocrat state is ready for neither reform nor re-engagement. Overall, however, there are currently negotiations between Zimbabwe and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) towards the resumption of a Comprehensive Country Financing Programme, but after the roll-out and conclusion of the Debt Arrears Clearance Strategy (which Zimbabwe presented to her creditors in Lima, Peru at the IMF/World Bank Annual General Meeting in September 2015). So far, Zimbabwe has successfully completed the Staff Monetary Programme that was one of the key prerequisites to the re-engagement process: promote both macro-economic stability and inclusion growth; address weaknesses in the financial sector; improve the external position; and lay the foundations to build the capacity to repay the outstanding debt. In turn, the Comprehensive Country Financing Programme has the following as its main priorities: power generation, irrigation infrastructure, enhanced agricultural support, industrialization and social protection. Notwithstanding the euphoria which accompanied the during which the Minister of Finance and Economic Planning, Patrick Chinamassa, announced the significant benchmark in Zimbabwe’s re-engagement with the IMF (and, by implication, the western world in general), doubts linger as to sustainability of an economic reform programme without concrete political reform, or, to put it more bluntly, while President Mugabe remains at the helm of the state Not to mention the related theme, or the report that, so far as the IMF/World Bank and such Western countries as Britain and a number of the EU member states are concerned, the current efforts towards economic reform in Zimbabwe have been premised on the belief and/or expectation that Mugabe was about to retire and hand over to Vice President Emmerson Mnangagwa . That recent political developments in the ZANU PF party/state have all but pre-empted such an outcome for the time being, of course, exacerbates the pessimism about the possibility of economic reform. In the meantime, Patrick Chinamasa and Governor of the Reserve Bank John Mangudya, appear to be afforded the latitude with which to pursue negotiations with the IMF, even though the persistence of those pursuing the “indigenization” policy agenda continues to reflect an overall policy regime characterized by inconsistencies and contradictions.As indicated in the scenarios outlined in the following sections, it is likely that the re-engagement process, as represented in part by the current efforts at economic reform, will soon coincide with inevitable, if not also, imminent and immanent political upheavals, given the self-immolation process at play within ZANU PF policy/state. If such characterization of the last phase of Mugabe regime is correct, there will be required a greater level of engagement with the Zimbabwe situation, on the part of the sub-region, Africa as a whole, and the global community in general. The danger is that all these factors appear almost indifferent as Zimbabwe rolls to the precipice.Historical precedents with respect to political “transitions” in Zimbabwe would suggest that such urgent and requisite engagement begins, as in the case of the Lancaster House talks of 1979, at the global level, with London and Washington, quietly an diplomatically, encouraging key factors in both SADC in particular and the African Union in general, towards supporting an evolving National Plan of Action. As proposed herein, the Plan of Action should be contingent one, in the event that the political and economic situation in Zimbabwe implodes and deteriorates to levels that give rise to violence and bloodshed. Therefore, the contingent Plan should be a requisite is a thereby pre-empt a possible violent and bloody end to the securocrat state. It consists of three interrelated processes:(i)Facilitation Team On the basis of appropriate diplomatic consultations between key SADC, AU and global factors, there should be found an individual, or a team of no more than 3 persons, who can, at an appropriate moment within the coming weeks, months or years, engage President Mugabe (and the First Lady) in confidence, highlighting both the crisis and potential for violence, and thereby also offer the option of safe passage for him, his family and close associates. The main objective of such a closely guarded initiative would be two-fold: to pre-empt or minimize the possible violent and bloody confrontation between the factions in ZANU PF party/state in the first instance, or the kind of mass uprisings that might accompany such an end of the regime; and to facilitate and kick start the next process, as outlined in (ii) below.(ii) The National Transitional Authority (NTA) and its Truth and Reconciliation CommissionThe NTA should be composed of about 10 persons, all of whom recognised for both non-partisanship and technocratic backgrounds, and led from among them by a prominent citizen of unquestioned stature, dignity and integrity. As such, no member of the NTA should harbour political ambitions or seek office in government after the tenure of the NTA. The role of the NTA would be to govern the country until the next elections, to be held only after the requisite and full implementation of the National Constitution (which will also need the necessary amendments such as those provisions left hanging or denying the vote to Zimbabweans in the diaspora), electoral reform, and the kind of economic reforms as outlined in (iii) below. A truth and Reconciliation Commission will need to be instituted under the NTA, to probe the atrocities of the post-independence period, cause the perpetrators to confess and be pardoned or punished, as the case may be; and to provide the agency through which the nation can heal after a tumultuous post-independence period. (iii) Economic Reforms These should be effected through the NTA and include debt relief and an internationally-sponsored Economic Recovery Programme the main elements of which will be: the establishment of a Recovery and Development Fund, designed to restore agricultural, industrial, infrastructural and energy development; help the country to recover - including repatriation of - resources plundered through corruption; and to assist through attractive loans and joint ventures with foreign companies and investors,, those in the diaspora who wish to return home as investors and entrepreneurs in the various sectors of the economy.V. Possible Scenarios in the Current DebateAccordingly, the following appear to be the likely scenarios as the securocrat state becomes undone on the back of the current political and economic dynamics in Zimbabwe.A.The Election Route to 2018Given current circumstances, this is the least likely scenario. Factionalism within ZANU PF party/state is so fast approaching alarming proportions that it is difficult to imagine it (ZANU PF party/state) surviving into 2018, let alone win the poll in such a state. Worse still, if Mugabe were, for natural incapacity, reasons, to depart from the scene, with the possible scenario outlined below in (B) B. The Departure of Mugabe from the Political Scene before 2018 Derek Matyzak has provided a rare if not most comprehensive insight into the (constitutional) process attendant in the event of the death, retirement or incapacity of the President, as presently governed by transitional provisions (effective until 2023) set out in paragraph 14 of the Sixth Schedule of Zimbabwe’s Constitution. These are to be read with Section 26(2) of the ZANU PF Party Constitution. Immediately upon the death, retirement or incapacity of the President Mugabe, the person who was last nominated to act as President, acts as President until a new president is appointed. The acting president may not, in this period, unilaterally exercise certain presidential powers such as the deployment of the army, entry into international treaties, make Ministerial appointments or reassign Ministerial duties. In terms of section 26(2) of the ZANU PF Party Constitution, at the instance of the Party’s Secretary for Administration (currently Ignatius Chombo), an extra-ordinary Congress must be convened to nominate a person to replace President Mugabe.The name of the person determined by the extra-ordinary Congress must be submitted to the Speaker of Parliament (currently Jacob Mudenda) within 90 days of President Mugabe’s death, retirement or incapacity. The nominee must be sworn into office as President by the Chief Justice (currently Godfrey Chidyausiku) within 48 hours after the Speaker has been notified of the nominee.The nominee assumes office and the person acting as President ceases to do so at the moment of the swearing in. It is implicit that the new President only serves the remainder of the President Mugabe’s term of office, which expires with the formation of a new Parliament, after the next general election, which unless, Parliament is earlier dissolved, will be no later than July 2018.Part B: Since incapacity is a basis upon which the above provisions may be implemented, it may be of interest to note how a declaration of incapacity may come about. “Incapacity” is one of several grounds upon which a President may be removed from office. The procedure is as follows: The Senate and the National Assembly, sitting together, must resolve that the question of the President’s incapacity must be investigated. A resolution to this effect must be passed by the affirmative vote of 50% of the total membership of both Houses, and not merely of those present. 3. The Parliamentary Committee on Standing Rules and orders must then appoint a joint committee to investigate the question of incapacity. 4. The joint committee comprises nine members drawn from both Houses and who reflect the political composition of Parliament. 5. If the joint committee recommends that the president be removed on account of incapacity and two-thirds of the total membership (not those sitting and present) accept the recommendation, then the President ceases to hold office from that moment, and the procedures set out in Part A applySo, if President Mugabe were to die or retire due to incapacitation before 2018 but in the midst of the current internecine conflict and factionalism in the ZANU PF party/state, there are the possible sub-set scenarios:(a)The Acting President ignores the Constitutional provisions of both State and party, engage as much of the military-security complex around him, in pursuit of the interests of his faction ad at the unimaginable expense of the other factions, including the First Lady and the family. Given the current balance of forces, Emmerson Mnangagwa and his “Lacoste” faction have an edge over the rest and is likely to have 9actual or forced) precedence over Vice President Mphoko, particularly given his alliance with the Chief of the Defence Forces, Constantine Chiwenga, and some of (though not all, by any account) of the key elements in the military-security complex. But given his shallow political base in both ZANU PF party/state power matrix and the country at large, Emmerson Mnangagwa will seek to avoid the possibility of a Special Congress (at which the party is to elect the person whose name goes to the speaker of Parliament, as the one to serve as President for the remaining period before the 2018 elections) or, at least, try to manipulate the attendance therein so as to maximise his prospects and emerge the President. The feasibility and sustainability of such a subset scenario depends of course, on Emmerson Mnangagwa’s capacity to weather the storm of possible national and international outrage at the blatant breach of constitutional provisions that should guide the transition, quite apart from the reaction of the First Lady and her G40 group as outlined in subset (b) below.(b) Factionalism Flares up in Opposition to the Acting PresidentInitially, the First Lady and G40 will try to manage the transition: including the possibility of ensuring that Vice President Mphoko is found being the last to have been Acting President: insist on a rigorous application of the state and party constitutions with respect to the transitional arrangements; ensure that herself, or a chosen one from the G40, is the one elected at the Special Congress and, therefore, emerges the President upto 2018; and then mobilise not only the party faithful, but also the rest of the country – including the emergent Zimbabwe People First – against Emmerson Mnangagwa, Constantine Chiwenga, Christopher Mutsvangwa and his war veterans group; and then ensure, if that will not have already been done by the time Mugabe dies or forced to retire, that the military-security is sufficiently sanitized and a new leadership therein created. Again, the feasibility or sustainability of such a sub-set scenario depends on the extent to which the “Lacoste” faction is sufficiently neutralized and the political forces across the country mobilized in support of the First Lady and her groups and agenda. Given the current balance of forces in both the ZANU PF party/state and the country at large, the level of factionalism in the former will escalate to frightening and possible internecine violence and bloodshed, while the opposition movements will capitalize on such an opportunity to mobilise and bring down the ZANU PF party/state.(c) Roll-out of the Contingency PlanThe factionalism alone that will accompany the transitional process following the President’s death or forced retirement could be also serious as to cause an indeterminate conclusion to the succession, as respective factions produce names of persons to be submitted to the speaker within the 90 days specified in the national constitution. This will be enough to cause an unimaginable crisis, untold acrimony within the ZANU PF party/state itself, and between the latter and the various political parties and actors in Zimbabwe, and therefore, the potential for violence and bloodshed. Yet this is also the kind of tension and anxiety already building up in the country, as the factionalism and factiousness within and around the ZANU PF party/state impacts negatively on an economy already in distress, and as the negotiations with the IMF and other multi-lateral and bilateral organizations grind to a halt under the weight of political uncertainty, lack of coherent leadership and virtual collapse of the economy. As it is, the country is already in crisis, and it would be ideal to begin rolling out the Contingent Plan, initially through the requisite consultations between a group of concerned but non-partisan persons, and selected regional and global actors; and, subsequently, through a mechanism that includes provisions for the safe passage of the President, his family and, those of his associates in the ZANU PF party/state, whose absence from the scene would facilitate the transition or them physical and mortal danger. As has already been explained, the National Transitional Authority (NTA) would be established and facilitated in its functions on the back of the implementation of the Contingency Plan.VI Conclusion: From Securocracy to Democracy: Towards a Reform Agenda Reference has already been made to the structure and functions of the National Transitional Authority (NTA). Here is to highlight the main elements of the Reform Agenda with which it will necessarily have to be seized, in active consultation with all stakeholders in Zimbabwean society, including civic groups, political parties and representatives of people in the diaspora. These are the basic pre-requisites for the next elections and the Reform Agenda to which all Zimbabweans will have subscribed, to ensure both that political and economic pathologies of the Mugabe era are dead and buried, and a new Zimbabwean born and developed. Hence the Reform Agenda should include the following:1.Political Reforms: Which include the full implementation of the (new) Constitution of Zimbabwe and if possible the amendment of such provisions as were left either tentative because of lack of consensus between the political parties to the constitution-making exercises, or, as in the case of the vote for Zimbabweans in the diaspora, sacrificed on the altar of political expediency.Reform of all national Institutions, to ensure the requisite separation of party and state (in addition to the necessity of separation of powers) so as render them truly non-partisan, in adherence with the Constitution.Reform of the electoral process, to include, inter alia, ensuring that the Zimbabwean Electoral Commission (ZEC) is completely independent of both political influence and the military-security complex.National Consensus on Critical national policies, as broadly specified in the Constitution in Chapter Two (National Objectives) and in Chapter Four (Declaration of Rights) and thereby ensuring that the broad policy framework represents the wishes and aspirations of the citizens of Zimbabwe. 2. Economic Reform which should be premised on the following macro-economic fundamentals and policy consistency: - Debt Clearance or, better still, Debt Relief as outlined underA Comprehensive Land Policy that restores the principle of property rights while affording tenure to all landholders, whether freehold, leasehold or CommunalRevival of the Productive Sectors through appropriate policy interventions and incentives designed to ensure food security, create jobs, institute social policy/ welfare programmes for the economically vulnerable, and attract investment – and joint ventures between Zimbabweans and foreign companies/ investors – into agriculture, the manufacturing sectors and in scientific and technological development. The hope here is that all this will create the conditions and environment through which to both restore progressive nationalism in Zimbabwe and thereby reconstruct Zimbabwe beyond the current provincializition system that coincides with ethnic or colonial nomenclature, as is the case in such neigbouring countries a Tanzania, Zambia, Botswana or even South AfricaEqually important, the mew Zimbabwe must be an agency for generational change in politics, as the gateways through which the country and the nation can transit to the twenty first century. This Article is the “Introduction” to a book to be published (April 2016) under the tittle Zimbabwe: The Challenges of Democratization and Economic Recovery, Edited by Ibbo Mandaza, Sapes TrustIbbo Mandaza is Zimbabwean academic author and publisher. He is currently the convener of the Sapes Trust’s Policy Dialogue Forum. ................
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