Evaluation of CeaseFire-Chicago

The author(s) shown below used Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice and prepared the following final report:

Document Title: Author:

Document No.: Date Received: Award Number:

Evaluation of CeaseFire-Chicago

Wesley G. Skogan ; Susan M. Hartnett ; Natalie Bump ; Jill Dubois 227181 June 2009 2005-MU-MU-0033

This report has not been published by the U.S. Department of Justice. To provide better customer service, NCJRS has made this Federallyfunded grant final report available electronically in addition to traditional paper copies.

Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect

the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

Evaluation of CeaseFire-Chicago by

Wesley G. Skogan, Susan M. Hartnett, Natalie Bump and Jill Dubois with the assistance of

Ryan Hollon and Danielle Morris

The research reported here was conducted with the support of Grant Number 2005-MU-MU-0033, National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs. Findings and conclusions of the research reported here are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

March 20, 2008

All CeaseFire reports are available at: northwestern.edu/ipr/publications/ceasefire.html For further information contact skogan@northwestern.edu i

Contributors to the Report

Richard Block Natalie Bump Andrew Clark Jill Dubois Susan M. Hartnett

Ryan Hollon So-young Kim Danielle Morris Stacy Pancratz Andrew Papachristos

Catrina Roman Wesley G. Skogan Jonathan Webber Tao Xie Jennifer Yahner

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Abstract

The report presents the findings of an evaluation of CeaseFire, a Chicago-based violence prevention program. The program is administered by the Chicago Project for Violence Prevention (CPVP). Formed in 1999, it began to expand in Chicago and elsewhere in Illinois during the 2000s. At its peak it was active in about 25 program sites. CeaseFire focused on changing the behavior of a small number of carefully selected members of the community, those with a high chance of either "being shot or being a shooter" in the immediate future. Violence interrupters worked on the street, mediating conflicts between gangs and intervening to stem the cycle of retaliatory violence that threatens to break out following a shooting. Outreach workers counseled young clients and connected them to a range of services.

CeaseFire's interventions are "theory driven." The program is built upon a coherent theory of behavior that specifies how change agents could be mobilized to address some of the immediate causes of violence: norms regarding violence, on-the-spot decision making by individuals at risk of triggering violence, and the perceived risks and costs of involvement in violence among the targeted population. Some of the program's core concepts and strategies were adapted from the public health field, which has shown considerable success in addressing issues such as smoking, seat belt use, condom use, and immunization.

The evaluation of CeaseFire had both process and outcome components. The process portion of the project involved documenting how the program actually looked in the field. This included issues involved in selecting target neighborhoods, choosing local host organizations, and staffing, training, and management practices. The outcome evaluation used statistical models, crime hot spot maps and gang network analyses to assess the program's impact on shootings and killings in selected CeaseFire sites. In each case, changes in the target areas after the introduction of the program were contrasted with trends in matched comparison areas.

A large survey of clients found that they were high risk on many indicators. Once in the program they saw their outreach workers frequently, and many were active participants in CeaseFire activities. In interviews, clients reported getting a great deal of assistance with the problems they brought to the program. These included needing a job, getting back into school or a GED program, and wanting to disengage from a gang

An examination of the impact of CeaseFire on shootings and killings found that violence was down by one measure or another in most of the areas that were examined in detail. Crime mapping found decreases in the size and intensity of shooting hot spots due to the program in more than half of the sites. There were significant shifts in gang homicide patterns in most of these areas due to the program, including declines in gang involvement in homicide and retaliatory killings.

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Table of Contents

Chapter 1: Introduction Program Theory. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1 About the Evaluation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-14 About the Report. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-16

Chapter 2: Selecting Sites and Host Organizations A "Host Organization" Model for Program Implementation.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-1 Organization Structure. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-3 The Sites and Host Organizations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-5 Crime Rates and Site Locations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-18 Trends in Program Capacity.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-19 Issues in Site and Host Selection. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-20

Chapter 3: Staffing and Funding the Program Staffing the Program. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1 Funding the Program. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-18

Chapter 4: Client Outreach Outreach Work.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-2 Clients and Their Problems. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-14 Issues in Serving Clients. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-31

Chapter 5: Violence Intervention Methodology. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-2 Where They Came From. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-4 Managing Violence Interrupters. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-8 Daily Issues in Violence Interruption.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-12

Chapter 6: Community Partners Collaborator Involvement in CeaseFire. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-1 Case Studies in Collaboration: The Police.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-11 Case Studies in Collaboration: The Clergy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-21

Chapter 7: The Impact of CeaseFire on Violent Crime Impact on Trends in Shootings and Killings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-1 Impact on Crime Hot Spots. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-11 Impact on Gang Homicide Networks.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-23 Impact Analysis Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-37 Data and Design Limitations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-39

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