U.S. Military Presence in a Unified Korea



Draft: Not for Citation

without Author's Permission]

U.S. Military Presence in a Unified Korea*

Sung-Han Kim

Associate Professor, Institute of Foreign Affairs & National Security

Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Trade, Seoul, Korea

Tel: 02-3497-7644

Fax: 02-575-5245

Email: ksunghan@

"Stability and Security on the Korean Peninsula:

Developing a Research Agenda"

May 26-27, 1999

The University of California at San Diego

* The views in this paper are the author's own and do not represent the official

position of the R.O.K. government.

U.S. Military Presence in a Unified Korea

Sung-Han Kim (IFANS)

Introduction

One common view that seems to be shared by all states in the region is that the security commitment of the United States is the indispensable anchor for East Asian security, insofar as it is conducive to peace and stability as well as to preventing an arms race in the region. There is virtually no country that would not like to see a continued U.S. presence in this region. An abrupt and large-scale American withdrawal would leave a power vacuum that would likely produce intense and destabilizing competition among the regional powers. Japan, which would have no US. security umbrella, inevitably would expand its military forces, which would escalate into an arms race between China and Japan, and also Korea.

Thus, even China welcomes the U.S. military presence, albeit with much ambivalence. To be sure, Beijing's acquiescence to America's military role in the Western Pacific is predicated upon China not being the target or the victim of the U.S. power. From Beijing's point of view, China will oppose an American role if the U.S. presence does not prohibit Japan's militaristic tendencies or if Washington stands in the way of China's goal of national unification with Taiwan.[1]

A research question in this paper is whether the United States will need or be able to continue its military presence after Korea is reunified. If so, how will be the force structure changed? This paper aims at analyzing the question of the continued presence of U.S. forces, or their status, that is to be raised before or after a "durable peace system" has been established on the Korean peninsula. When the two Koreas sign a peace treaty ending the Korean War in legal terms, it would indicate de facto unification of the Korean peninsula. Since the formation of a peace treaty will be possible only after reconciliation and economic cooperation between the two Koreas have been realized in a full scale and political and military confidence has been restored, reaching this phase means that a permanent peace mechanism on the Korean peninsula has been established. This is an interim step toward peaceful unification of the two Koreas, or de jure unification. Thus, this paper will touch upon how to handle the situation in which North Korea urges the change of the status of U.S. forces before or after the conclusion of the peace treaty between the two Koreas, and will discuss the issue of U.S. military presence in a unified Korea that has been achieved on South Korea's terms.

Creation of Peace Mechanism and the Role of U.S. Forces

Establishing Peace Mechanism

There are two issues with regard to a peace mechanism (or system) on the peninsula. One is how to set up such a peace mechanism and the other involves the role of U.S. forces in Korea, an issue that is certain to be raised in the negotiations over a new peace mechanism. If the process of creating a peace system is assumed to involve three phases -- maintenance of the truce system, implementation of the North-South Basic Agreement, and conclusion of a new peace mechanism -- the issue of U.S. forces in Korea is likely to be critical in the third phase, during the final negotiations over a peace agreement between the two Koreas, with the endorsement of the United States and China.

North Korea can be expected to argue that once a peace treaty is concluded then U.S. forces stationed in Korea would no longer be necessary since peace has been assured on the peninsula. Thus, South Korea and the United States need to re-define the strategic role of U.S. forces in Korea not only from a perspective of the Korean peninsular situation, but from a broader framework linked to the maintenance of geopolitical equilibrium, or balance of power, in Northeast Asia. Therefore, South Korea and the United States should seriously review the matter of structuring the role of U.S. forces in Korea to better suit the circumstances following the conclusion of a peace treaty.

The first step toward establishing a viable peace regime on the Korean peninsula should involve the maintenance of the armistice system. Emphasis should be placed on ensuring a state of peace through the normalization of the truce system and stabilization of the respective military sectors. The existing truce system should be retained until the two Koreas reach a new peace treaty to replace the current armistice agreement.

During the second phase, emphasis should be placed on laying the groundwork for a peace system based on the North-South Basic Agreement. Various subcommittees and joint commissions envisioned in the Basic Agreement should be instituted, while detailed programs are prepared and undertaken to build confidence in politics and the military.

When the results of political[2] and military[3] confidence-building and exchanges and cooperation have become tangible between the two Koreas due to the successful efforts of the first two phases, then further measures should be promoted in the third phase to convert the truce system into a peace system, to have the United States and China endorse an inter-Korean peace treaty based on the four-party talks, and to secure the United Nations' acknowledgement of this accord with the participation of Russia and Japan.

Status of U.S. Forces

An issue likely to emerge at this phase involves the very question of the need to maintain the continued presence of U.S. forces in Korea. North Korea insists that dissolution of the United Nations Command is inseparably linked to the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Korea. But since American forces are stationed in Korea under the Korea-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty, U.S. troops in Korea are not tied to operations of the United Nations Command.

Furthermore, as the Korea-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty provides for a defensive military alliance between South Korea and the United States, which was concluded by a lawful exercise of their sovereignty, third countries have no right to intervene in this regard. In this light, the issue of establishing a peace mechanism on the Korean peninsula and the questions regarding the future of U.S. forces in Korea and the Korea-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty should be handled separately.

However, since the issue of U.S. forces in Korea is likely to arise sometime during the process of establishing a peace mechanism on the Korean peninsula, and since debate will center on the original raison d'etre once the threat from North Korea disappears, South Korea and the United States need to begin discussing how to deal with the issue of revising the Korea-U.S. alliance and the future role of U.S. forces in Korea.

Security Interests of South Korea and the United States

Convergence or Divergence?

The strategic interests of South Korea and the United States converge most in the post-Cold War era over the issue of establishing a new order in Northeast Asia. South Korea and the United States both desire a stable power balance in the region. It is against this backdrop that the United States describes its participation in bilateral or multilateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia as a "stabilizing force." This may well be akin to the United States performing the role of a "balancer" between China and Japan.

The interests of the United States, as a superpower, are in line with those of South Korea, as a semi-developed country, in seeking to engage North Korea as a responsible member of the world community. However, the two countries may differ in their policy priorities related to promoting such engagement.

The U.S. policy toward the Korean peninsula in general and North Korea in particular is part of a larger framework of global, Northeast Asian and Korean peninsular strategic interests. At the global level, the U.S. deals with North Korea in terms of maintaining the leadership role of the U.S. in the post-Cold War era. In order to protect its leadership as the sole superpower, the U.S. must prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction among the nations which do not possess them already. Thus, the U.S. policy toward the North Korean nuclear problem and missile exportation is basically premised on this global strategic view. At the regional level, the U.S. policy to North Korea is interconnected mainly with its policy toward China. If the U.S. successfully deals with China through the U.S.-Japan security alliance and holds North Korea under its arm, the policy goal of the U.S. (i.e., preventing the emergence of a hegemon in Northeast Asia) could be more easily achieved. At the level of the Korean peninsula, the U.S. must reduce the tension between the two Koreas in order to prevent the outbreak of a war on the peninsula and must also seek the ways by which the sudden change of North Korea can be successfully managed.[4]

At this point the policy priorities between the United States and South Korea diverge. The Clinton Administration puts the first priority on the North Korea policy at the global level, the second on the regional level, and the third on the peninsula level, while Korea's priorities are in reverse order. In other words, the South Korean government is more concerned with how to reduce tension and promote reconciliation between the two Koreas, while the United States is keen on preventing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Of course, South Korea and the United States have already reached the like decision that the United States should play a leadership role in the Northeast Asian security architecture and that North Korea should be engaged to the international community in a gradual manner. However, convergence of interests does not always guarantee convergence of policy priorities, which thus requires sophisticated efforts.

Regional Adjustments

A clue to resolving any divergence should be found in overcoming differences in policy priorities between South Korea and the United States. In other words, the two countries can adjust the nature of their alliance in such a way that places their top policy priority on the "regional strategic interests of Northeast Asia surrounding the Korean peninsula." The two countries should capitalize on the global outlook of the U.S. strategy and the national focus of South Korean strategy to pursue their common interests.

To adjust the South Korea-U.S. alliance to a regional strategic approach means reaffirming the fact that the efforts designed to deter war on the Korean peninsula will ultimately contribute to stability in Northeast Asia as well; emphasizing that even if the threat from North Korea dissipates, the South Korea-U.S. alliance can continue to contribute to regional stability; and creating a crisis management system between South Korea and United States in preparation for any unexpected change in the situation in North Korea.

At the same time, to ensure the South Korea-U.S. alliance can move in such a direction, both countries should promote closer relations with China in an effort to minimize any negative influence that Beijing may exert at the time of unification of the Korean peninsula, and to ensure China's constructive role in the interests of regional security. Furthermore, by also strengthening the Japan-U.S. alliance, which parallels the South Korea-U.S. alliance, Japan will be properly aligned, regional security promoted, and security cooperation enhanced between South Korea and Japan.

Along with the promotion of an engagement policy to encourage North Korea to participate in the international community and to induce Pyongyang to reform and open itself up, South Korea and the United States should prepare fully for any contingency that might arise in North Korea.[5] At the same time, the two countries should initiate preparations so that their alliance can be developed into a relationship which facilitates close cooperation for ensuring regional security even after unification, instead of remaining a system designed to deal only with the current Korean peninsula situation.

Efforts should be undertaken to prepare for discussion about the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea, which is certain to arise in the course of bringing about a peace mechanism on the Korean peninsula. However, since such measures may cause concern on the part of China, as was the case with the revised U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines, South Korea and the United States should emphasize that they are pursuing a "multilateral security cooperative system," involving the participation of all the countries of the region for forging a security mechanism for Northeast Asia.

When the security-related officials of South Korea and the United States discuss measures to develop the South Korea-U.S. alliance into a regional alliance in the long term, one of the focal points will involve the issue of the future role of U.S. troops in Korea. The two security-related challenges now facing South Korea and the United States on the Korean peninsula include the deterrence of war and preparations for a crisis other than war.

The most important issue to address in the process of transforming the Korea-U.S. alliance into a regional one involves the restoration of the U.S. wartime operational control over South Korean forces to the Korean side. However, South Korea should now refrain from taking back wartime operational control as long as a serious threat from North Korea persists because South Korea has little experience in commanding a war effort and is rather lacking in its ability to collect and analyze strategic intelligence. Thus, South Korea and the United States should prepare a phased schedule to discuss this issue. At the same time, South Korea should request that the United States assist South Korea in improving its ability to plan for its own defense, operate a command system effectively, collect and analyze intelligence, monitor combat situations and maintain an early warning system. Wartime operational control should be restored only after full preparatory measures have been completed.

Post-Unification Role of U.S. Forces in Korea

Expanding the Scope

South Korea and the United States should promote the creation of a peace mechanism on the Korean peninsula through close consultations on converting their bilateral alliance into a regional system. Once unification is realized on the Korean peninsula, there will be the need to transform the South Korea-U.S. alliance system from a security cooperative relationship for stability and peace on the Korean peninsula into a regionally-oriented security system. Under Article 3 of the South Korea-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty, the treaty is to be invoked when either South Korea or the United States encounters an armed attack from the "Pacific area." Therefore, the scope of security cooperation between South Korea and the United States can reasonably be expanded to the Pacific area beyond the Korean peninsula.

The significance of revamping the South Korea-U.S. alliance into a regional alliance is that it would involve a cooperative system designed to contain any hegemonic efforts by China or Japan,[6] provide a common forum for discussing regional issues, and collectively deal with factors involving regional instability such as possible political unrest in China or Russia. At the same time, military cooperation between South Korea and the United States should aim to ensure safe sea lanes of communication (SLOC). Presently, safe passage along sea lanes linking South Korea to world markets hinges in large measure on the presence of the U.S. Navy.

However, once the South Korea-U.S. alliance becomes a regional system following unification of the Korean peninsula, both parties will need to clarify the extent of its responsibility with regard to Korea-U.S. naval cooperation. If the nature of regional security is defined vaguely under a mutual defense treaty, substantial confusion may occur with Korea being expected to cooperate in various disputes. Therefore, it is important to clarify the specific scope of such an alliance. It would be desirable to restrict the realm of cooperation to the Northeast Asian area surrounding the Korean peninsula in view of Korea's primary interests.

Force Restructuring

When an expanded role for regional cooperation between Korea and the United States and the responsibility and scope of such an alliance are specified, it will be necessary to resolve issues related to force restructuring. Possible scenarios related to the restructuring of U.S. forces in Korea include a complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea; a pullout of U.S. ground troops with U.S. air and naval forces remaining in Korea; and the continued presence of U.S. air and naval forces with a reduced number of ground troops.

First, the idea of a complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea can only be put into practice based on a premise that the United States has no vital interest in the Korean peninsula. Under such a scenario, it may be inadvisable for the United States to maintain a confrontational presence toward China by continuously stationing troops in such close proximity as on the Korean peninsula to contain China after Korean unification. Some political voices in the United States assert that if the United States continues to maintain U.S. troops in Korea and Japan at substantial U.S. expense, Korea and Japan will continue to enjoy a free ride on security, while jeopardizing the economic interests of the United States.[7]

However, if the United States pulls its troops out of Korea after unification, this would inevitably create a power vacuum in this part of the world, a void that would likely be filled by China or Japan. South Korea can hardly accept such a consequence, especially since it has already suffered dearly in previous hegemonic struggles between China and Japan, most recently the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95. If a unified Korea is forced to fend for itself under a new Northeast Asian order without any trustworthy ally in terms of security matters, it is highly possible that Korea would feel compelled to resort to the development of nuclear arms, for lack of a better alternative, in the interests of its own security. If Korea goes nuclear, Japan can be expected to follow suit in short order. Consequently, Northeast Asia would enter an era of a "balance of terror" in which nuclear countries face off against each other.

Another alternative is for the United States to withdraw its ground troops from Korea leaving behind only naval and air force units in a unified Korea. This may well be an approach by which Washington would retain its existing role of ensuring regional security while at the same time enjoying increased flexibility. Seen from the standpoint of the United States, this option is compatible with the policy of ensuring safe passage in the Pacific, while avoiding possible criticism of infringing upon the sovereignty of Korea that may be raised over a continued presence of U.S. ground troops in Korea, in addition to checking the emergence of hegemonic activity in the region.

Nevertheless, a drawback of this scenario is that in light of its lack of ground forces, the U.S. commitment to "automatic involvement" in any development on the Korean peninsula would be seen as considerably weakened. The presence of ground troops constitutes the clearest evidence of the political determination of the United States. Therefore, if Washington's political commitment appears diminished due to the withdrawal of all but its naval and air forces, the effectiveness of U.S. forces in Japan would also decline markedly. Moreover, if the United States were to maintain naval forces along Korea's west coast across from the Chinese coastal territory, Beijing would likely react sensitively, a factor which could harm U.S.-China relations.

A third option is to maintain a minimum number of U.S. ground troops, perhaps around 3,000 to 5,000, along with naval and air forces, in a unified Korea. This alternative seems to be the most desirable in reality. The presence of U.S. ground troops, no matter how small their number, would bolster the Korea-U.S. alliance as a regional alliance. In this manner, the United States would be able to dampen a possible hegemonic struggle between China and Japan and negate the urgency of a unified Korea to go nuclear, which would be a major source of instability in Northeast Asia. From the standpoint of Korea, too, Seoul should contemplate how much it would really help Korea's national interests to possess, in an effort to appease public sentiments, nuclear arms that are likely to fuel regional instability in Northeast Asia.

The stationing of U.S. ground troops could be limited to the southern region of the Korean peninsula far from the Chinese border, as a gesture of good faith to Beijing. During his visit to South Korea in March 1997, U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen said that the United States would continue to station its military in Korea even after unification if the Korean people so desired. Assistant Secretary of Defense Kurt Campbell also told a Congressional hearing that "The United States is thinking of maintaining a strong security alliance with Korea in the interests of regional security even after threat from North Korea disappears."

To translate this third option into action, one condition should be satisfied. The shared feeling that the United States made a considerable "contribution" to the process of Korean unification should be promoted among the Korean people. Otherwise, even the symbolic presence of U.S. ground forces will be subject to public opposition. However, there should be no major problem if the two countries redefine the focus of the South Korea-U.S. alliance and undertake detailed preparations for these and other possibilities.

Conclusion

The raison d'etre of the South Korea-U.S. alliance, which represents an important element of Washington's Asia-Pacific strategy in the post-Cold War era, has been sustained as inter-Korean relations have yet to depart from the Cold-War confrontation. It is also true that there are limits to the alliance, while various problems have emerged in South Korea-U.S. relations due to differences in policy priorities of the two countries.

Therefore, South Korea and the United States should promote an engagement policy toward North Korea with due patience, while simultaneously strengthening their alliance system and striving to develop a regional alliance capable of contributing to regional stability in Northeast Asia. Security officials of both countries should engage in close consultation and announce sometime in the future a "new Korea-U.S. security joint statement" comparable to the "U.S.-Japan security joint statement," while preparing to transform their bilateral relations into a new alliance based on a shared new role for promoting stability and prosperity in Northeast Asia in the 21st century.

The U.S. forces in Korea, who have contributed immensely to ensuring stability on the Korean peninsula, should continue to cooperate with the South Korean forces under the South Korea-U.S. joint defense system so long as a threat from North Korea persists. Once this threat from the North dissipates, the scale of U.S. forces in Korea will inevitably be reduced. But the continued presence in Korea of a symbolic number of U.S. ground troops, along with naval and air force elements, even after Korean unification, together with U.S. forces in Japan,[8] will contribute to maintaining stability in Northeast Asia.

Since the present South Korea-U.S. joint defense system will have to be changed once the threat from North Korea disappears, consultations should be held with the United States to discuss the issues of restoring wartime operational control and improving the South Korean military's ability to prepare for its own defense, manage command control operations, and effectively gather and analyze intelligence.

The key to overcoming differences between South Korea and the United States in policy priorities, as evidenced in the waging of a "triangular game" among North and South Korea and the United States despite South Korea-U.S. concurrence in security interests, lies in further cementing the South Korea-U.S. bilateral security alliance and preparing to convert this alliance into a regional alliance system.

One thing that should be kept in mind in this process is that a multilateral approach to a security system for Northeast Asia should be pursued in parallel with a consolidation of the South Korea-U.S. alliance. South Korea's relations not only with the Untied States but also with China, Japan and Russia should be handled with attention to detail under a framework of South Korea's security policy structure. It is now time for South Korea to lay the groundwork for long-term security programs by retaining cooperative relations with the United States in regard to North Korea policy amid a changing security environment in the post-Cold war period while preparing for new developments on the Korean peninsula.

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[1]) Yong Deng, "The Asianization of East Asian Security and the United States' Role," East Asian Studies, Autumn/Winter 1998, p.105.

[2]) A political prerequisite for the creation of a peace mechanism on the Korean peninsula involves an atmosphere of "political confidence-building." Confidence-building in the political realm between the two Koreas refers to a situation in which North Korea renounces any intention to engineer a subversive revolution in South Korea and agrees to abide by the spirit of the North-South Basic Agreement, while South Korea promotes an environment in which North Korea is convinced that the South has no intention to achieve unification through absorption of the North. Since military confrontation on the Korean peninsula reflects underlying political antagonism, military confidence-building will more easily follow suit once trust is developed in political relations.

[3]) The priority focus for promoting confidence building in military relations involves prohibition of the development, possession and use of weapons of mass destruction. If either North or South Korea possesses or attempts to develop nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, this would shatter the political goal of peaceful coexistence and constitute a fundamental obstacle to the development of inter-Korean relations.

[4]) Sung-Han Kim, "Korea-U.S. Relations: Convergence or Divergence?" The Korea Herald, November 21, 1998, p.5.

[5]) See Crisis Management on the Korean Peninsula: Korea-U.S. Reponses (Seoul: Institute of Foreign Affairs & National Security, 1997).

[6]) The most important bilateral relationship that may significantly influence the East Asian security architecture in the first half of the 21st century would be the Sino-Japanese relationship. See Charles Horner, "The Third Side of the Triangle: The China-Japan Dimension," The National Interest, Winter 1996/97, p.23.

[7]) Chalmers Johnson & E. B. Keehn, "The Pentagon's Ossified Strategy," Foreign Affairs, July/Aug 1994, pp.103-4.

[8]) Regarding the question of the double presence of U.S. military forces in Korea and Japan, the United States will have to consider the fact that Japan will remain the sole country hosting the U.S. military presence when the United States withdraws its forces from unified Korea. If so, opposing voices in Japan toward the U.S. military presence will be stronger, thereby endangering the U.S. presence even in Japan. This is not the scenario that China wants to happen, since Japan without U.S. security umbrella means Japan which is embarking on rapid military build-up. Thus, the question of U.S. military presence in Korea and Japan should be treated as a single basket.

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