Superior Court, State of California



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TROUBLESHOOTING TENTATIVE RULINGS

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|LINE # |CASE # |CASE TITLE |RULING |

|LINE 1 | 22CV396914 | RICHIE DORNIDAN vs STANFORD HEALTH CARE |Click on Line 1 for Ruling |

|LINE 2 | 18CV323286 | Mike Rugani et al vs Laura Masri et al |Click on Line 2 for Ruling |

|LINE 3 | 18CV323286 | Mike Rugani et al vs Laura Masri et al |Defendant’s Motion to Compel Plaintiff’s Responses to Discovery |

| | | |Requests---Parties to Appear |

|LINE 4 | 20CV363967 | JACOB SAIDIAN vs ACCEL CONSTRUCTION |Defendant Vortex Builder’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Form|

| | |CORPORATION et al |Interrogatories, Sets One and Two, and Requests for Production of |

| | | |Documents, Set One, and for Monetary Sanctions is unopposed and |

| | | |GRANTED. Plaintiff is order to provide complete responses to the |

| | | |discovery requests within 30 days of the date of this Order. |

| | | |Monetary sanctions in the sum of $1250 are payable within 30 days of |

| | | |the date of this Order. Moving party is instructed to prepare the |

| | | |Order. |

|LINE 5 | 21CV386632 | Idean Pourshams, MD vs Melissa Bearden et al |Off Calendar. Notice of Settlement of Entire Case filed on 9/27/22. |

|LINE 6 | 22CV395235 | Capital One Bank (usa) N.a. vs Alexis Yslas |Plaintiff’s Motion to have Requests for Admissions deemed Admitted is|

| | | |unopposed and GRANTED. Moving party is instructed to prepare the |

| | | |Order. |

|LINE 7 | 19CV340905 | COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA vs Silvia Gonzalez |Hearing on Claim of Exemption of Silvia Gonzalez---Parties to Appear |

| | | |on Teams Virtual Platform |

|LINE 8 | 21CV383731 | Loren Vaccarezza vs Patrice Darisme |Petition to Confirm Arbitration Award is unopposed and GRANTED. |

| | | |Moving party is instructed to prepare the Order. |

|LINE 9 | 22CV395807 | The Ridgecrest Group, Inc. vs A L L H |Petitioner The Ridgecrest Group, Inc.’s Petition for Release of |

| | |Construction |Property from Lien is unopposed and GRANTED. Moving party is |

| | | |instructed to prepare the Order. |

|LINE 10 | 22CV399395 | SCHARF INVESTMENTS, LLC et al vs JEFFREY |Click on Line 10 for Ruling |

| | |SCHARF et al | |

|LINE 11 | 22CV399395 | SCHARF INVESTMENTS, LLC et al vs JEFFREY |Click on Line 11 for Ruling |

| | |SCHARF et al | |

|LINE 12 | | | |

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Case Name: Richie Dornidan v. Stanford Health Care

Case No.: 22CV396914

This is an action for wrongful termination which was originally filed in the Superior Court for Alameda County and later transferred to this Court. The original and still operative Complaint by Plaintiff Richie Dornidan (“Plaintiff”) was filed in Alameda County on May 10, 2021 and filed in this Court (after a motion to change venue was granted) on April 11, 2022. The Complaint states two causes of action, for breach of contract and wrongful termination, against Defendant Stanford Health Care (Plaintiff’s former employer) and various Does.

Currently before the Court is a demurrer to the Complaint by Defendant Stanford Health Care (“Stanford”) filed on June 29, 2022. An amended notice stating the hearing date was filed on August 19, 2022. Plaintiff’s opposition was filed on September 15, 2022.

I. Demurrer to the Complaint

The Court in ruling on a demurrer treats it “as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.” (Piccinini v. Cal. Emergency Management Agency (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 685, 688, citing Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) “A demurrer tests only the legal sufficiency of the pleading. It admits the truth of all material factual allegations in the complaint; the question of plaintiff’s ability to prove these allegations, or the possible difficulty in making such proof does not concern the reviewing court.” (Committee on Children’s Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 213-214.)

Defendant Stanford demurrers to the Complaint’s second cause of action only and only on the ground that it fails to state sufficient facts. Stanford asserts that the second cause of action “has not identified any specific statutes or constitutional provision to support such a claim.” (Notice of Demurrer and Demurrer at p. 2:7-8.)

The elements of a claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy are an employment relationship between the plaintiff and defendant, actual termination or constructive termination of the plaintiff’s employment, the termination violated public policy, and the plaintiff sustained damages as a result of the termination. (See Barbee v. Household Automotive Finance Corp. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 525, 533; see also Holmes v. General Dynamics Corp. (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 1418, 1426 (“Holmes”).) The plaintiff must show that he or she was terminated in violation of a policy that is “(1) delineated in either constitutional or statutory provisions; (2) ‘public’ in the sense that it ‘inures to the benefit of the public’ rather than serving merely the interests of the individual; (3) well established at the time of the discharge; and (4) substantial and fundamental.” (Stevenson v. Super. Ct. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 880, 894 (“Stevenson”); Holmes, supra, 17 Cal.App.4th at p. 1426 [“To recover in tort for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, the plaintiff must show the employer violated a public policy affecting ‘society at large rather than a purely personal or proprietary interest of the plaintiff or employer.’ [Citations.]”].)

Plaintiff’s Opposition to the demurrer does not actually disagree with Stanford’s characterization of the second cause of action. The Opposition states in pertinent part that Plaintiff “agrees that the second cause of action for wrongful termination failed to specify the specific statute/constitutional provision at issue, and requests leave to amend to add additional facts and references to cure this issue.” (See Opposition at p. 1:17-19.)

As this is the first pleading challenge heard by this Court in this matter, the Court will SUSTAIN the demurrer to the second cause of action WITH 10 DAYS’ LEAVE TO AMEND.

Plaintiff is reminded that when a demurrer is sustained with leave to amend, the leave must be construed as permission to the pleader to amend the causes of action to which the demurrer has been sustained, not add entirely new causes of action. (Patrick v. Alacer Corp. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 995, 1015.) To raise claims entirely unrelated to those originally alleged requires either a new lawsuit or a noticed motion for leave to amend. Absent prior leave of court an amended complaint raising entirely new and different causes of action may be subject to a motion to strike. (See Harris v. Wachovia Mortg., FSB (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1018, 1023 [“Following an order sustaining a demurrer or a motion for judgment on the pleadings with leave to amend, the plaintiff may amend his or her complaint only as authorized by the court's order. The plaintiff may not amend the complaint to add a new cause of action without having obtained permission to do so, unless the new cause of action is within the scope of the order granting leave to amend.”])

The Court’s order on this demurrer only grants leave to amend the second cause of action, it does not grant leave to add new claims or parties.

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Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel Defendant Mike Rugani, Trustee of the Rugani 1978 Trust (“Defendant”) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART as follows:

1. RFP 20: The Motion to Compel the trust documents is DENIED. These documents are confidential and protected by Defendant’s constitutional right to privacy and Plaintiffs have failed to establish that they are directly relevant to any issue in the litigation.

2. RFP’s 21-26: Preliminarily, Defendant argues that there has been insufficient meet and confer between the parties as to these requests. The Court has reviewed the record and agrees that the meet and confer process on these requests was less than meaningful and should have been more substantive. Nonetheless, in light of the upcoming trial date, the Court will address the substantive arguments raised in the briefs. The Motion to Compel Requests 21-26 is GRANTED IN PART. As the requested documents relate to the landlord/tenant relationship of the parties and their understandings based on prior dealings, the Court finds them to be reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. The Court will limit the time for production to five years prior to the subject incident.

3. Both parties have agreed to waive the requests for sanctions so that issue is not before the Court.

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Respondents Jeffrey Sharf and Sherril Smith-Scharf (“Respondents”) bring the instant Motion to Stay Pending Appeal. Specifically, Respondents seek to stay the hearing of the Petition to Confirm Arbitration Award brought by Petitioners’ Scharf Investments, LLC and Brian Krawez (“Petitioners”) pending their appeal of this Court’s order granting Petitioners’ Motion to Quash (entered on June 6, 2022). Respondents had filed a Petition to Correct the Arbitration Award and this Court (Judge Shella Deen) subsequently granted a motion quashing service of that Petition on the basis that it was not served within the statutory time frame. Respondents subsequently appealed the Court’s order and that appeal is currently pending. Respondents seek an order staying the Petition to Confirm Arbitration Award (set for Sept. 29, 2022) pending their appeal.

The moving papers argue that a stay is required pursuant to CCP 916 because the issues embraced in the appeal (whether the Respondents effected proper service of their petition to correct on Petitioners) will effect the outcome of the current proceeding. Respondents further argue that a stay of the current proceeding would avoid inconsistent results and promote the interests of judicial economy and efficiency. Respondents contend that they have already paid the full arbitration award of $83,844,086.26 and Petitioners will suffer no prejudice as a result of the stay.

In opposition to the instant motion, Petitioners make the following arguments: (1) CCP 1290.2 does not support a stay as the Petition to Confirm the Arbitration Award is entitled to preference over other civil actions or proceedings and that all such “proceedings shall be quickly heard and determined”; (2) CCP 916 does not apply in the present case as it is inapplicable to special proceedings such as a petition to confirm an arbitration award; (3) confirmation of the arbitration award does not impact the narrow question on appeal which involves the issue of proper service; (4) if confirmation of the arbitration award is granted, the Respondents will likely appeal the confirmation and consolidate it with the pending appeal so that it will be addressed simultaneously by the Court of Appeal; (5) staying the present action would be inefficient and waste judicial and party resources; (6) an indefinite stay of the Petition to Confirm would deprive Petitioners of the advantages of arbitration; and (7) portions of the arbitration award relating to injunctive relief are set to expire in March 2023 and a stay would effectively prevent enforcement of these provisions.

In reply, Respondents focus on the potential for inconsistent results if a stay is not ordered and further argue that Petitioners’ contention that Respondents “may have” violated the injunctive relief is speculative and not supported by competent evidence. Respondents argue that staying the present action will promote efficiency, conserve resources and is the most efficient way to conduct two proceedings concerning the same arbitration award.

The Court has now reviewed and considered the positions of the parties as set forth in their respective papers. The Motion to Stay Pending Appeal is DENIED. CCP 1291.2 clearly supports a prompt resolution of Petitions such as the present one and CCP 1290.2 provides that the Petition shall be heard in a summary way. The imposition of a stay in the present case would effectively undermine the legislative intent of these sections and also undermine the primary advantages of arbitration, i.e. an expeditious way to resolve disputes in a cost-efficient manner. In addition, an indefinite stay in the instant action would effectively prevent Petitioner from enforcing time sensitive portions of the arbitration award which have expiration dates in 2023. Respondents’ argument that Petitioners have no evidence to support alleged violations of the agreement does not change the Court’s decision as Petitioner should have the opportunity to enforce time sensitive remedies that were part of the arbitration award. Finally, as noted by Petitioners in their opposition papers, Respondents will have the opportunity to appeal an order confirming the arbitration award which will likely be addressed simultaneously by the Court of Appeal. Accordingly, the potential for inconsistent results and wasting of judicial resources will be mitigated.

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Petitioners’ Scharf Investments, LLC and Brian Krawez (“Petitioners”) Petition to Confirm Arbitration Award is GRANTED. CCP 1286 states that if a Petition to Confirm is duly filed and served, “the court shall confirm the award as made……unless in accordance with this chapter it corrects the award and confirms it as corrected, vacates the award or dismisses the proceeding.” Respondents had earlier filed a Petition to Correct the Arbitration Award in a separate proceeding (Case No. 22CV395005) and on June 6, 2022, Judge Shella Deen issued an order quashing service of the Petition to Correct on the grounds that it was untimely and not in compliance with CCP 1288 as it was not properly served within the 100 day time limitation. Respondents have since appealed that order and the appeal is now pending before the Court of Appeal, Sixth District. As noted in Petitioners’ reply papers, a party who misses the deadline to serve a challenge to the arbitration award cannot circumvent the rules by requesting that the award be corrected in response to a petition to confirm. (Douglass v. Serenivision, Inc. (2018) 20 Cal.App. 5th 376, 384-385). That is exactly what Respondents are attempting to do here. Respondents argue that this Court is not bound by Judge Deen’s order and should either reconsider or independently determine whether service was proper. In addition, Respondent argues that the Court has an independent obligation to evaluate whether the injunction in the award is unconstitutional or against public policy and whether punitive damages were erroneously awarded. The Court disagrees. Because Judge Deen ruled that the Respondents failed to serve any challenge to the award within the jurisdictional deadline, the arguments as to why the arbitration award should be corrected are too late. The fact that Judge Deen’s order was entered in a separate case (Respondents’ Petition to Correct) does not change or alter the analysis. Petitioners’ correctly point out that the timeliness of service issue is now on appeal and this Court does not have jurisdiction to change or modify Judge Deen’s order. Accordingly, the Petition to Confirm is GRANTED.

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