Svitek Doctrine



Will Svitek

March 11, 2005

Edge

For America’s Safety

Rogue States:

American foreign policy is guided by sometimes-conflicting doctrines that need to be applied carefully and selectively to emerging crises to protect national security. The United States must confront emerging threats as they arise, dealing with them before they become too powerful. In the post-9/11 world, it has become clear that the U. S. can be attacked on its own soil by terrorists. If terrorists work with rogue states, their capacity to inflict damage rises greatly. America’s economic dominance and unsurpassed military might still leave it vulnerable as long as terrorists and rogue states can pursue more powerful weapons beyond America’s reach.

The Svitek Doctrine confronts the two greatest threats to national security: rogue states and terrorism. As a result of globalism and modern technology, dictators and terrorists in faraway places have suddenly become much more dangerous to our national security. The United Nations has been unable to stop the rogue states—Iraq, North Korea, and Iran—from pursuing weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons. These states can harm national security directly or by selling weapons to other nations or terrorist organizations. It is difficult to trace and dismantle terrorist organizations, and it is futile to attempt to deter them. As a result, the Svitek Doctrine provides for preemptive strikes against terrorist organizations and rogue states to confront threats before they become too costly to confront or we have been attacked.

II. Iraq

Iraq has been one of the most important of the rogue states, because it has posed a threat to the American interests and allies for nearly two decades. Iraq’s former dictator, Saddam Hussein, has sought to become more powerful in the Middle East, and Hussein’s enmity towards America was worrisome for our national security. If Iraq was successful in dominating the Middle East oil supply it could have leverage in the global economy. Hussein was almost successful in 1990 when he invaded oil-rich Kuwait, only being stopped by the coalition forces, which had mobilized in Saudi Arabia along the border with Kuwait. President George H. W. Bush gave Saddam Hussein an ultimatum to withdraw from Kuwait or have his forces decimated by the much more powerful coalition forces. Deterrence failed because Hussein believed irrationally that he could defeat the coalition forces and refused to withdraw his troops from Kuwait. More recently, deterrence failed when Saddam Hussein failed to abide by a series of United Nations Security Council resolutions, which mandated Iraq’s compliance with U. N. weapons inspections, which were a condition of the ceasefire in the first Gulf War. Once again, Hussein irrationally refused to cooperate substantially with the United Nations even with the threat of U. S. and British forces threatening to depose him from across the Kuwaiti border. Instead of willingly giving up his weapons programs, Hussein viewed them as the key to his power. He had not abandoned his hopes for a nuclear program and continued to look for weapons of mass destruction. His continuing violations of the U.N. Resolutions and no cooperation with the weapons inspectors were grounds for alarm due to what he might be hiding and uncertainty over what he could develop given enough time. The United Nations was not willing to enforce its resolutions through the use of military force, instead it hoped that sanctions would convince Hussein. President George W. Bush, however, was not satisfied that the U. N.’s weak approach towards Iraq, believing that in the post-9/11 era the U. S. had an obligation to confront threats early, before they had time to materialize on American soil or threaten America’s allies. Secretary of State Colin Powell went to the U. N. Security Council declaring that Iraq could no longer continue its defiance of the U. N. and would have to immediately allow for thorough inspections and would need to destroy any illegal weapons it possessed. Bush issued an ultimatum to Hussein that either he cooperates with the U. N. weapons inspections or he would be removed from power by force. Hussein once again did not cooperate. And even though to this day we have not found any weapons of mass destruction, the removal of Hussein was still critical. We still are not 100% whether he had weapons or not, and we can come across them at any point. The risk was just too great.

With the failure of deterrence, the U. S. decided to engage in a preemptive war. The Svitek Doctrine recognizes preemption as the strongest means of preserving national security. Preemption was appropriate because in the post-9/11 era it is unwise to give Hussein the opportunity to develop weapons with which he could have an undetected attack towards the American homeland. Even during sanctions and inspections, Iraq continued to pursue its nuclear weapons program. With nuclear weapons, Hussein would have the means to inflict much serious harm on America than has already been suffered in the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001.

The main purpose of the preemptive strategy towards Iraq was to remove Saddam Hussein from power. The coalition forces dealt with Hussein and all loyal Baathists. Once Hussein’s regime was toppled and dismantled, Iraqis gained confidence to rise up against the remnants of the Hussein regime and support the coalition forces in the rebuilding efforts. Although Iraqis feared Saddam Hussein, they opposed their brutal dictator once they believed that the coalition is in control of their country.

A preemptive strategy towards Iraq has proved to be more appropriate than deterrence. The Svitek Doctrine ruled out the possibility of deterrence in large part because Hussein has taken irrational actions in the past. Hussein has neglected the welfare of Iraqis and has deprived them of human rights. Additionally, he has used chemical weapons against the Kurds who live in northern Iraq.

Another reason why it was difficult to deter Hussein is that he could have distributed weapons to terrorist organizations. Even if the U. S. could prevent Hussein from using weapons of mass destruction, it would have been much more difficult to prevent him from selling those weapons to terrorists. The Svitek Doctrine agrees with President Bush that those who harbor terrorists should be dealt with strongly. Iraq has in the past provided some financial support for terrorist organizations.

The third reason why Saddam Hussein could not be deterred was because he did not make rational decisions. On several occasions, he has failed to conduct a coherent risk assessment. Hussein’s propensity for risk and his irrationality were displayed during the Iran/Iraq war, when he invaded Kuwait, and when he failed to abide by U. N. Resolutions. Hussein prolonged the war with Iran even when it was clear that he could not win. In the first Gulf War, Hussein invaded Kuwait even though it was likely that the U. S. would intervene. During that war, Hussein also risked escalating the war by launching Scud missiles against Israel, which could have retaliated with nuclear weapons. Israel’s nuclear capability proved to be an inadequate form of deterrence. In the second Gulf War it is incomprehensible why Hussein would fail to negotiate with the U. N. when he could see that the U. S. was determined to remove him from power. Hussein had nothing to gain from another war since his military strength had been further weakened since the first Gulf War. He had little to gain from failing to cooperate with the U. N., especially since it meant that economic sanctions would not be lifted. The Svitek Doctrine considers how leaders have responded in previous situations to predict what they will do in present circumstances. Hussein’s unpredictable pattern of behavior makes reliance on deterrence unwise.

A preemptive strategy enables the U. S. to eliminate threats before they build up. Diplomacy relies on Hussein’s cooperation and agreements are easily broken. The failure of deterrence would be catastrophic if Hussein acquired and used weapons of mass destruction against the U. S. Hussein could have tried to control the oil supply in the Middle East or could have harbored terrorist organizations. The Svitek Doctrine deals with threats before they become too difficult to manage. While there is no doubt that there are great costs to any preemptive war, the benefit of removing Hussein outweighs the possible risks of relying on previously ineffective deterrence.

III. North Korea

International security is also threatened by North Korea, which is similar to Iraq in several ways: it is ruled by a cruel and irrational dictator; its foreign policy is guided by a hatred of the U. S.; it has a nuclear weapons program; and it has a history of failure to abide to U. N. resolutions. However, since North Korea can inflict greater harm, American foreign policy must be much more measured. Kim Jong II, the leader of North Korea, has turned his country into a Stalin-like totalitarian state. He has deprived his people of human rights and neglected their welfare. John Bolton, the US under-secretary of state, has stated, “While he lives like royalty in Pyongyang, he keeps hundreds of thousands of his people locked in prison camps with millions more mired in abject poverty, scrounging the ground for food. For many in North Korea, life is a hellish nightmare” (Mallet 1). International aid that is meant to provide for the welfare of North Koreans, allows more funds to be channeled towards equipping and training a large military and an advanced weapons program. North Korea has advanced nuclear capabilities, but it is not clear how many nuclear weapons it has.

The crisis between the U. S. and North Korea began in the early 1990’s, when North Korea began its nuclear program. In response, President Clinton enacted an Agreed Framework in an attempt to freeze North Korea’s nuclear program. In return for promising to abandon its nuclear ambitions, North Korea was to receive fuel oil and two light-water nuclear reactors from the U. S. While it seemed like a good solution at the time, in the long-term it has proved detrimental. A foreign policy which relied on “bribery” reinforced the notion that North Korea was in the position of strength and made it more likely that the U. S. would have make more concessions in the future. Rewarding North Korea for its belligerent policies has consequences. The U. S. unwisely trusted North Korea to eliminate its weapons program and to continue to cooperate. Kim Jong II is untrustworthy and conniving. A defector stated, “I think that [the Clinton Administration] didn’t know North Korea, Kim II Sung or Kim Jong II. That was their big mistake…I don’t think that Kim II Sung and Kim Jong II are human beings. He’s working only for his own ambitions, only for himself… He kills our people, arrests people who are against his administration. He produces drugs…He is doing all sorts of bad things, like the devil. Do not trust him, ever, ever” (Nuclear Gamble 2). It is inappropriate to negotiate with a leader who violates international norms.

When Kim Jong II wanted assurance of security and financial aid from the U. S., he defected from the agreement and continued to pursue nuclear weapons. As a result, he consolidated his power and gained greater bargaining power with the U. S. Clinton’s policy failed to deal with North Korea because it weakened the American position and increased the possibility of further crises.

American policy towards North Korea should follow stricter guidelines. It is inappropriate to rely on a policy that could largely be described as bribery. The Svitek Doctrine states that the first component must be to get other states involved in any crisis with North Korea. The situation is more easily resolved with all the key players present at during negotiations. The U. S. should decline bilateral negotiations requested by North Korea to avoid another instance when Kim Jong II is rewarded for bad behavior. Bilateral agreements have left the U. S. worse off, as when North Korea broke the nuclear deal in 1994. North Korea has still not abandoned its weapons program and may be feigning to do so only to obtain more economic aid. As long as North Korea does not cooperate, the U. S. has one of two options. Either the U. S. “bribes” North Korea in another nuclear deal and risks being in a “never ending nuclear blackmail contest,” or it takes military action with the possible catastrophic result of a nuclear war (Rauch 3). In either case, the U. S. would be on its own if it agrees to bilateral negotiations. It is a losing proposition for the U. S. to negotiate in the face of North Korea’s cheating and breaking of agreements.

The Svitek Doctrine agrees with President Bush’s proclamation that “multilateral initiative involving countries in the region [is] the best way to convince the North Koreans to change their attitude about a nuclear weapons program.” China should also try to persuade North Korea to agree to abandon its nuclear program, since this is also in China’s best interests. With pressure from the neighboring states, North Korea would have more reasons to finally abandon its nuclear ambitions. Bush has stated the importance of the multilateral approach, “we want this to be sort of like an alcoholic intervention, with everyone at the table saying, ‘We can either hurt you or we can help you’” (Rauch 3). North Korea needs to feel pressure from the neighboring states. Its neighbors, especially China, South Korea, Japan, and Russia all need to declare that North Korea’s dishonest policies must end and should agree to repercussions. North Korea is more likely to reconsider its nuclear ambitions when the larger international community will oppose it.

The benefits of multilateral negotiations substantially outweigh the benefits of bilateral talks. There are advantages when numerous states are involved in negotiations with North Korea. The North Korea crisis is complicated and volatile for the U. S. to handle alone, as it tried in 1994.

The danger of waiting to negotiate with North Korea until it can be done in a multilateral fashion is that a resolution will take more time and it will appear that the U. S. is failing to deal with the situation. North Korea has already requested to negotiate with the U. S. directly. However, Bush has turned down the requests and has stated that the U. S. will negotiate with North Korea if other parties are present, especially China, Japan, and Russia. The cost of this strategy is that there will be a delay in talks with North Korea as the U. S. waits for North Korea’s assent to multilateral negotiations. North Korea may continue to pursue its nuclear program while the U. S. waits, and it may even develop the capability to attack the U. S., its allies, and its interests. Avoiding bilateral conversations might also increase the tension with North Korea, and may cause Kim Jong II to become more erratic.

Despite these dangers, multilateral negotiations are crucial to the eventual restoration of relations between the U. S. and North Korea. American foreign policy towards North Korea should resemble its policy towards the Soviet Union in the Cold War. The U. S. should practice “zero tolerance” to any attack by North Korea. If North Korea attacks the U. S. or any of its allies, the U. S. must take full retaliation.

If multilateral negotiations fail or if North Korea violates subsequent resolutions, the U. S. should launch a preemptive attack on North Korea. A preemptive war would deal with North Korea before it has the capability to launch an attack on the U. S. It is important that the U. S. have a first strike capability, so that it can take advantage of the “offensive bias,” which is the notion that it is better to fight a war offensively rather than defensively. However, the North Korean situation is extremely dangerous because a nuclear war is possible, which the U. S. should prevent at great lengths. In a preemptive war, the U. S. would need to attack North Korea’s greatest strengths, which would mean taking out their weapons programs. These weapons include North Korea’s Pyongyang facility, its clandestine uranium-enrichment program, nuclear weapons, if any, and plutonium-rich fuel rods (Rauch 2). If any more agreements are violated, the value of further agreements would be questionable. It may be necessary to eliminate North Korea’s nuclear weapons capability through swift military action. Moreover, North Korea’s bargaining powers decrease substantially with the elimination of their nuclear weapons programs. The U. S. and its allies will be more secure with a less powerful North Korea. The critical component of this preemptive strategy is to not allow it to lead to nuclear warfare. The use of nuclear weapons would almost certainly overshadow the benefits of this policy. The U. S. military would attack North Korea with conventional weapons to make it absolutely clear what its intentions are. The U. S. would need support from its allies to contain North Korea.

The greatest danger would be if North Korea launched a nuclear weapon at the U. S. or one of its allies. The U. S. would be compelled to retaliate against North Korea. To avoid this scenario, the U. S. must deter North Korea by clearly stating its retaliatory policy if it is attacked. Kim Jong II should realize that he has more to lose because his military strength will not prevail against the U. S. and a coalition of its allies. Although the U. S. would fight a preemptive war only as a last resort, it should still rely on its nuclear capabilities as a form of deterrence to prevent a nuclear war. A conventional war is the only reasonable military strategy.

During a preemptive war, the U. S. would also need to protect its ally, South Korea, which would almost certainly be attacked. The U. S. should keep its troops along the D. M. Z. to stop an invasion of South Korea. The American President must state that any attacks on its allies will constitute an attack on the U. S. While there are many risks and dangers to a preemptive war in North Korea, those costs pale in comparison to the dangers to our national security as a result of continued inaction. If multilateral negotiations fail, a preemptive approach is necessary to eliminate the risk of being attacked without warning. A preemptive war provides a much greater chance of success and reduces potential harm. The benefit of fighting a preemptive war is that the U. S. can take advantage of the “offensive bias.” The greatest benefit of a preemptive war is that the U. S. does not have to be prepared to deal with an unknown threat at an unknown time. It is critical for the U. S. to fight a preemptive war if multilateral negotiations fail, and refuse to play into North Korea’s hands. There is a danger that North Korea may plan an attack during the time given over to negotiations, which would be the most vulnerable period. The U. S. must deal with North Korea before it can threaten the U. S. The benefits in national security would outweigh the cost of pandering to North Korea and suffering a surprise attack. Continual negotiations might result in great losses if the U. S. suffers a nuclear attack.

The final decision to engage in a preemptive war is made after a cost benefit analysis. It would be wrong to fight a preemptive war if an adequate solution could be arrived at through diplomacy. There would be loss of international support, which would be similar to the response to American policy towards Iraq. Allies such as Germany and France opposed the war in the U. N. Security Council and have not provided support in the rebuilding of Iraq. Since North Korea should be dealt with multilaterally, it is crucial that the U. S. have international support and assistance. Nevertheless, the benefits of a preemptive war in North Korea still outweigh the risks. The risk of suffering an attack if deterrence fails is too great. North Korea cannot be left alone to pursue more powerful weapons.

Therefore, the dealing with rogue states can be very difficult and dangerous. However, the United States needs to control its own destiny, and do what it thinks it needs to do. For each state, there needs to be a different method, but most importantly there needs to be a distinct plan. We have made the world a safer place, with the capture of Saddam Hussein and currently working on an effective multilateral plan with North Korea.

Terrorism

Terrorism has presented a great form of danger for the United States ever since the attacks that occurred on September 11th. Aside from the danger of rogue states that are in the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism is the biggest security issue that the United States faces in this day and age. Terrorism is defined as a "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience" (Council on Foreign Relations).

Along with the fact that there are many different structures of terrorism, there are also three different types of terrorists. These consist of national terrorism, religious and state-sponsored terrorism. “Nationalist terrorists seek to form a separate state for their own national group, often by drawing attention to a fight for “national liberation” that they think the world has ignored” (Council on Foreign Relations). These nationalist terrorists consider themselves as freedom fighters and work for gaining sympathy among the international community to earn support for their cause. Examples of these terrorist organizations are the Irish Republican Party, Basque Fatherland and Liberty, and Kurdistan Workers’ Party. Religious terrorists are another very common terrorist group. “Religious terrorists seek to use violence to further what they see as divinely commanded purposes, often targeting broad categories of foes in an attempt to bring about sweeping changes”(Council on Foreign Relations). These terrorists come from many different kinds of religions, faiths, and even certain cults. And these religious terrorists targets individuals and groups who are not involved in their religion, such as al Qaeda, the Palestinian Sunni Muslim organization Hamas, and the Lebanese Shiite group Hezbollah.

Al Qaeda is the terrorist organization that is best known to the United States. They are an organization led by Osama bin Laden and are in pursuit to promote fundamentalist Islamic regimes in many Muslim countries. They once were based in Afghanistan until the United States drove out al Qaeda on an attack against the terrorist organization due to the September 11th attacks. The final terrorist organization, state-sponsored terrorist groups, “are deliberately used by radical states as foreign policy tools—as Hoffman puts it, as “a cost-effective way of waging war covertly, through the use of surrogate warriors or ‘guns for hire’”” (Council on Foreign Relations). Additionally, state-sponsored terrorist organizations are very effective because “with enhanced resources at their disposal, state-sponsored terrorist groups are often capable of carrying out more deadly attacks than other terrorists, including airplane bombings”(Council on Foreign Relations). By the different terrorist organizations and various methods of attack, it becomes apparent how the United States is in such danger with the war on terror.

After identifying the different terrorist organizations, it is imperative for the United States to pinpoint what terrorists pose a serious threat and which terrorists do not threaten America’s homeland. The first obvious answer is al Qaeda. This terrorist organization poses the greatest threat to the American people in this day and age. President Bush made it clear that the attacks on September 11th were an act of war and such acts would not be tolerated. Since that time, the United States has gone into Afghanistan and completely ran out al Qaeda out of the country. The attack on Bora Bora was the last step that needed to be made to liquidate the terrorists from Afghanistan. The only problem is that Osama bin Laden has still been unaccounted for to this day. Capturing this brutal leader is an important step towards gaining a symbolic victory in this war on terror and al Qaeda. Although capturing this man is an important component for the assurance of the American people, it is not the last needed goal to win this war. The people in Osama bin Laden’s inner circle need to be captured as well and anyone else who associates themselves with this dangerous terrorist organization.

The next question that needs to be addressed is should the United States treat all the terrorist organizations the same, regardless of the different levels of threat that they pose towards America’s homeland. The simple answer is the terrorists that pose a greater threat should be dealt with more aggressively and preemptively, while the less dangerous terrorists can be dealt with more passively and diplomatically. For example, with the dangerous al Qaeda, the United States has been very aggressive and took the initiative that it was going to go after this terrorist organization. But once a target can be identified, the next serious question is the method in which to attack. For example, the war with al Qaeda proved to be very unconventional as it used three different options: cruise missiles, large conventional forces, and then some guerrilla like warfare with air to ground forces with some air support. Are all three components necessary for war or should the United States pick which ones are essential? The answer will vary depending on what type of terrorist organization is the target and how immediate the threat is.

However, these different methods of attack are not enough to defeat the war on terror because the United States needs help from the rest of the international community. General Clark, who served as a NATO ally commander, stated, “In the war on terrorism, alliances are not an obstacle to victory. They’re the key to it” (The Washington Monthly). Also, it is important to support the “expansion of NATO and the European Union; forging a coalition through the UN Security Council to pressure Iraq to adhere to a “robust” weapons inspection program; and “attaching the highest priority to serving as a catalyst to achieve an Israeli-Palestinian peace”” (Center for Strategic and International Studies). This support from other states would enable the United States from not having to attack the terrorism war by itself. A multilateral approach is what General Clark clearly emphasized as being the key to winning the war on terror. His belief is that you cannot win in the international community by yourself. Therefore, initially it is important for the United States to take a multilateral approach, but it is critical for them not to be dependent on this. The United States cannot wait around for the approval from the rest of its allies in what it can and cannot do. Once again, the United States needs to put its destiny in its own hands and not rely on some other states. The multilateral approach is the first choice, but once this fails, the war on terror will need to become unilateral.

To attack the war on terror through a multilateral approach, the United States needs to strengthen its relationships with its allies through diplomatic means. Public diplomacy is “sometimes referred to as the effort to win hearts and minds, U.S. public diplomacy uses international publications, broadcasts, and cultural exchanges to cultivate goodwill toward America, its interests, and its policies” (Council on Foreign Relations). Diplomatic measures are especially crucial in the Middle East since al Qaeda is using public diplomacy to gain support for their actions. The United States needs to illustrate to the Middle Easterners that they are not attempting to invoke any additional harm to them. The war on terror has turned into winning the public relations war by way of positive and public diplomacy. To carry out these plans, President Bush’s cabinet is performing persuasive interviews on Islamic television and distributing millions of brochures on the truth and occurrences of September 11th, called “The Network of Terrorism,” distributed in over 30 different languages. This is essential in attempt to deflate Osama bin Laden’s propaganda. This is an attempt for the international community to perceive the United States in a positive eye.

Furthermore, there is an anti-American sentiment that “is motivated principally by unpopular U.S. policies and perceptions of American unilateralism, brochures and radio broadcasts aren’t enough; instead, they argue, public diplomacy considerations should be woven into the policymaking process. Washington currently formulates foreign policies on its own, fails to consider how they will play abroad, and makes selling them an afterthought.” But to counter this, Council on Foreign Relations Chairman Peter G. Peterson has written, “To serve U.S. interests better, public diplomacy should be present at the creation as a truly integral part of policymaking””(Council on Foreign Relations). According to Peterson, it is essential to get approval from the rest of the international community and be politically correct in decisions are made. Public diplomacy is critical to stopping the fight on terrorism, but most importantly to not letting the actions and decisions of the United States foreign policy backfire on itself and create more terrorism.

The next step to fighting terrorism is to improve the intelligence of the United States. Some argue that American officials had warnings that al Qaeda was planning an attack on American soil before the September 11th incident occurred, and that no serious action was taken to offset these threats. But since that incident, President Bush has made it a priority on raising intelligence at an exponential rate. “The FBI made terrorism its top priority, began shifting 480 agents from drug and other criminal investigations to counterterrorism, moved to coordinate better with the CIA, and planned to more than double the bureau’s permanent counterterrorism forces. For its part, the CIA spent millions of dollars in the largest and fastest makeover in its 55-year history. It reshuffled employees, induced retired officers to join the counterterrorism effort, and deployed hundreds of officers into and around Afghanistan” (Council on Foreign Relations). Due to this increase in intelligence, Bush’s cabinet hopes to detect an attack such as September 11th before it would occur again. This detection can therefore prevent another terrible invasion from happening again.

After using diplomacy and intelligence to track these terrorists, the next step for the United States is to stop the flow of money and freeze the finances that go to the terrorist organizations. By eliminating the money that the terrorists can encompass, they are then limited in their resources. Money is necessary for terrorists because it provides compensation, training, living expenses, forged paperwork, and any other essentials that are required for carrying out the terrorist actions. In order to help these measures, the United States passed the International Money Laundering Abatement and the Financial Anti-Terrorism Act to help prevent money transfers to terrorism and to other money laundering incidents. By implementing more laws in addition to these, terrorists will have additional difficultly to accumulate the funds necessary to carry out their proceedings. Proactive measures in policies need to be implemented to stop the transfer of money to the wrong group of people for the wrong purposes.

After these procedures are complete and terrorist threats are located, it is essential for the United States to act preemptively to the major threats that pose to be very dangerous. As stated earlier in the paper, there is a major advantage when one can fight offensively compared to being on the defensive according to the theory of the offensive bias. The mentality needs to get them, before the terrorist can get us. But preemption should be used wisely and only implemented towards terrorist organizations that pose a serious and immediate threat.

This is significant because the United States does not want to fight wars that are unnecessary and would cause turmoil and bad blood in the international community. A difficult component in fighting the war on terror is presented in the question: Will our strategy towards terrorism and our foreign policy decisions just anger other people, which would just lead to more terrorism in the future? It is critical for the United States to be aggressive in its actions, but at the same time there needs to be a level ground where public diplomacy in order to prevent any additional enemies. It is not important for the United States to make friends in its foreign policy, but it is important for them to not make enemies.

For instance, the United States has a legitimate cause and purpose in going after al Qaeda and capturing Osama bin Laden and his inner circle. It is critical for Bush to inform the public on the United States intent and motive in order to keep the public and international support on our side. Winning the war on support is just as important as winning the war on terror. The American people need to know that what the United States is doing is for the betterment of the international community. Additionally, the people of the Middle East need to believe that the United States is attempting to make the world a safer place. This will sub sequentially lead to a moral and public relations victory.

The strategies the United States has with Iraq and North Korea can also be examined in how terrorism will affect the American people. America’s foreign policy received massive amounts of criticism while invading Iraq and performing preemptive attacks without the approval from the United Nations and other states in Europe. Many fear that this will cause more terrorism towards the United States. It is quite the irony that defeating the regime of Saddam Hussein is felt necessary to defeat the war on terror, while others feel coincidently that this will just increase the level of terrorism towards the United States. Their argument is that the preponderance preemptive strategy has hurt the United States relations with other organizations and states, and that our involvement and presence in the Middle East is the reason why al Qaeda attacked us on September 11th. This is where the fine line needs to be addressed for whether the United States should go to go to war or not. But if the United States performs the strategies that were discussed above, the United State’s decisions will not backfire on them, and sub sequentially lead to peace for the American people and international community.

It should additionally be noted that the lack of international support is what held back both presidents in aggressive preemptive strategies towards al Qaeda before 9-11. The 9-11 panel pointed out that the administrations did not do enough to deter and eliminate these terrorist threats, however any aggressive actions in Afghanistan to eliminate al Qaeda would have resulted in an international uproar, just like when the United States invaded Iraq to unseat Hussein. Former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright stated “Things looked very different before 9/11. We were mostly accused of overreacting, not underracting.” Pre 9-11, nobody could have expected such a catastrophic incident to happen. People back then assumed we were doing enough. Post 9-11, the Bush administration realized how dangerous terrorism was, and thus acted on it. It is easy for people to play Monday Quarterback and make decisions after everything has been played out. Anyone can make decisions based on the past; the important thing is to learn form the past. The Bush administration learned accordingly.

The final component that needed to be addressed is a cost/benefit analysis on whether to attack a terrorist organization or not. Once a terrorist organization is identified, such as al Qaeda, Bush needs to determine what the benefits and what the costs are of initiating this war on terror. If the benefits of conquering this terrorist organization outweigh the costs, the war can be justifiable. And in this day and age, in a post 9-11 world, the benefit of eliminating a terrorist threat is high. The Bush administration does not have the luxury of paying the costs of another terrorist attack. They need to protect the American people at all costs, thus resulting in the United States performing various preemptive strikes. The benefits of capturing a terrorist leader such as Osama bin Laden clearly outweigh the costs of attempting to perform these actions. This is quite different from the past when fighting terrorism came at such a great cost, with little in return.

The day of September 11th has changed the way America will forever feel about terrorism. Terrorist activities will always be on the minds of the American people and of the man in presidency. By performing many different tasks, such as improving intelligence, attacking on the offensive, and learning from past mistakes, the United States will be on its way to reduce the terrorist acts towards America’s homeland. Terrorism may never be completely eliminated, therefore it is important to eradicate as many terrorists a possible. The quintessential factor for the United States is to control its own destiny and not rely on other states in the international community to eliminate the terrorism that our world faces today. The American people cannot bear another cost of September 11th.

Bibliography

Center for Strategic and International Studies “The Geopolitical Implications of the War Against Terrorism” Washington, DC July 10, 2002.

Clark, Wesley. The Washington Monthly. “An Army of One?” September 2002.

Council on Foreign Relations “Terrorism” 2004.

Nuclear Gamble Frontline. “Who Are the North Koreans?” April 10, 2003.

Rauch, Jonathan. “Yes, Bush Has a North Korea Policy” National Journal March 18, 2003.

Robbins, James S. “Where’s Bolton?” National Review Online August 13, 2003.

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