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The Tyranny of Positive Thinking
Abstract
Western societies emphasize upbeat beliefs, cheerfulness, optimism, hope, confidence, and other manifestations of positive thinking in its aphorisms, songs, religion, books and magazines, medicine, psychology, and business. This has led to the often unchallenged idea that optimism and positive thinking are good for everyone and are to be promoted. While a positive outlook can be a powerful constructive force, at excess levels possitivity generates a number of disadvantages for individuals and organizations. Eleven problematic areas are presented and discussed leading to a conclusion that a more balanced view of positivity is warranted. Across many situations one may need to be positive—but not too positive.
The Tyranny of Positive Thinking
“We are going to a different world,” said Candide, “and I
expect it is the one where all goes well . . . . Everything
will turn out right. It is undoubtedly the new world that
is the best of all possible universes.”
—Voltaire, 1947/1759, p. 48
For millennia Western philosophers have endorsed the merits of positive thinking and the pursuit of happiness. In Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle indicated that happiness is the highest good humans can achieve. While these arguments have been questioned by later thinkers, the virtues of being positive and the pursuit of happiness have been encouraged and are central features of Western civilization for ages (Judge & Ilies, 2004). As seen above, Voltaire’s Candide (1947/1759) displayed a persistent optimism about the future. Regardless of the adversity or disaster that confronted him, Candide continued to believe that the future would be bright.
This value continues today as philosophers, theologians, counseling psychologists, sports psychologists, and authors of self-help books have placed heavy emphasis on looking on the bright side as a means of achieving personal growth, satisfaction, productivity, good health, prosperity, and success (Ehrenreich, 2009; Fineman, 2006; Judge, Erez, & Bono, 1998). Nevertheless, there are various phenomena that suggest that positive thinking is more like paracetamol—the right amount will help you, but too much is a very bad idea indeed. I first discuss positive thinking in America—also known as optimism, confidence, hope, happiness, and positive illusions—and its popularity and power and follow this by a review of key areas where excess levels of positive thinking are problematic. Finally, I summarize these findings and provide a conclusion.
On Being Positive
Individuals high in positive thinking exhibit confidence in a way that is both broad and diffuse, and it encourages them to approach challenges with enthusiasm and persistence (Carver & Scheier, 2003). Positivity has motivational value and is generally perceived as good and helpful. I now briefly discuss how positive thinking is exhibited and valued in our aphorisms and music, in our churches and businesses, in our media and child development practices, and in our military and politics. I also note how positive thinking has entered medicine and academia.
Positive attitudes have been expressed in American aphorisms and music. Consider the following maxims: “Cheer up, things could be worse;” “Smile, look on the bright side;” and “Stop complaining, it’s not that bad.” In our music we have been told to “Ac-cent-tchu-ate the Positive” (Mercer & Arlen, 1945), to “Put on a Happy Face (Adams & Strouse, 1960), and to limit our anxiety by being joyful—“Don’t Worry, Be Happy” (McFerrin, 1988).
Evangelical mega-churches preach the good news that one has only to want something to get it, because God wants to “prosper” people. The new positive theology offers promises of wealth, success, and health in this life now, or at least on the horizon (Ehrenreich, 2009). The medical profession prescribes positive thinking for its reputed health benefits and cancer is often reframed not as a health crisis but as an “opportunity of a lifetime,” or “a makeover opportunity.” Scheier and Carver (1993) found that optimists reported fewer physical symptoms, better health habits, and better coping strategies. According to Peterson, Seligman, Yurko, Martin, and Friedman (1998), people who espoused an optimistic perspective in childhood outlived their more negatively oriented colleagues by an average of almost two years.
Academia has made room for the new disciplines of “positive psychology” (Seligman & Pawelski, 2003), “positive organizational behavior,” (Luthans & Youssef, 2007), and “appreciative inquiry” (Cooperrider & Sekerka, 2003). Harvard even offers new courses in happiness and regularly draws almost 900 students. The peer-reviewed Journal of Happiness Studies (Quality of Life Research, n. d.) is devoted to the scientific understanding of subjective well-being and addresses the conceptualization, measurement, prevalence, evaluation, explanation, imagination, and study of happiness.
Many children are raised to see the glass as half full, recognize that every cloud has a silver lining, to make lemonade out of lemons, to smile and look on the bright side, to keep their chins up, and to have a nice day. Americans expect optimism in its military and political leaders. Politicians compete to be seen as the sunniest candidate. For example, President Ronald Reagan promoted the idea that America is special and that Americans were God’s chosen people, destined to prosper, much to the envy of everyone else in the world and President George W. Bush thought of himself as the optimist-in-chief, as the cheerleader—which he once was in college—and did not want to hear bad news (Kurtzman, 2003). President Franklin Roosevelt indicated that “The only limit to our realization of tomorrow will be our doubts of today. Let us move forward with strong and active faith” (Luntz, 2007, p. 220). General Dwight Eisenhower said that “Pessimism never won any battle” (Luntz, 2007, p. 221) while General Colin Powell said that “Perpetual optimism is a force multiplier” (Harari, 2003, p. 16).
In U.S. media, magazines and television offer feature stories illustrating how thinking positively can turn poverty into riches. Consider also the long tradition in the U.S. of “self-help” books promising people victory and accomplishment if they only think positively (Starker, 1989). From Eleanor Porter’s Pollyanna (“The glad game,” 1913) to Watty Piper’s The Little Engine That Could (“I think I can, I think I can ...,” 1930) to Dale Carnegie’s How to Win Friends and Influence People (“believe that you will succeed, and you will,” 1937) to Norman Vincent Peale’s The Power of Positive Thinking (“the man [sic] who assumes success tends already to have success,” 1952) to Spencer Johnson’s Who Moved My Cheese? (“accept layoffs with a positive attitude,” 1998) to Rhonda Byrne’s The Secret (“think positive thoughts because you become or attract what you think about the most,” 2006) people are surrounded by those who promote an optimistic outlook. The essential theme is that the universe is really on our side and that we can obtain whatever we wish for. If we do not receive the things we want it means that we did not have enough faith and the desire was not sufficiently focused.
Being positive has taken firm root within the corporate world. Cultural norms about good business practice stress looking at the sunny side and deemphasizing the problematic. Sales meetings now resemble political rallies or revivals and Seligman (1991) reported that optimistic salespersons had higher performance and lower attrition than their lesser optimistic cohort at a life insurance company. Likewise, Luthans and his collaborators (Luthans, Avolio, Avey, & Norman, 2007; Luthans & Youssef, 2007) found that their concept of psychological capital, key components of which include confidence and optimism, was positively related to performance outcomes in the workplace such as lower employee absenteeism, less employee cynicism and intentions to quit, and higher job satisfaction, commitment, and organizational citizenship behaviors. CEOs are coming to think of themselves as motivators geared toward persuading employees to work harder for less pay and no job security. Historically, the science of management was that of a rational enterprise, where spreadsheets were developed, logic trees created, and decisions made based on careful analysis. All that was swept aside for a new notion of what management is about. The word now used is leadership—particularly the charismatic and transformational leadership models (Yukl, 2002)—where senior executives are primarily charged with inspiring the workforce.
Psychological research has found that slightly positive emotions appear to be the ambient state for most people at most times. In a wide variety of activities, people’s beliefs are distorted by overconfidence (Russo & Schoemaker, 1992) which occurs when individuals’ certainty that their predictions are correct exceed the accuracy of those predictions (Klayman, Soil, Gonzalez-Vallerjo, & Barlas, 1999). For instance, Russo and Schoemaker (1992) found that of the 2000-plus individuals to whom they gave a ten-question quiz using 90 percent confidence intervals, less than 1 percent were not overconfident.
These mildly distorted perceptions have been referred to as positive illusions (Taylor & Brown, 1988) and include inflated positive self-conceptions, an exaggerated perception of personal control, and an overly optimistic assessment of the future (Taylor & Armor, 1996). These illusions have been found to be related to good psychological adjustment, are adaptive, and provide a sense of agency (Taylor & Brown, 1988). Thus, by perceiving themselves and their world in a positive light, people feel empowered as causal agents in effecting changes in their environment (Sigmon & Snyder, 1993). In this regard, social psychologists have concluded that most people have an “illusion of control” about themselves (Abramson & Alloy, 1980; Greenwald, 1980). In summary, faith in the power of positive thinking has become so ingrained in American society that positive seems to not only be normal but also normative—the way a person should be. It seems that Panglossian puffery is alive and thriving in America today.
Problems with Positivity: When Illusions Become Delusions
While modest positive illusions provide a sense of agency and are adaptive, having overly optimistic illusions is no more desirable than having none at all. Researchers have noted that the illusions are helpful when they are in the slightly-to-moderately positive range, but they decrease in adaptiveness as they move into more extreme positive ranges (Baumeister, 1989; McAllister, Baker, Mannes, Stewart, & Sutherland, 2002). Baumeister (1989) refers to this as the “optimal margin of illusion” (p. 176) and concluded that “Optimal health, adjustment, happiness, and performance may arise from overestimating oneself slightly. Departures from this optimal margin, particularly in the positive direction, are dangerous” (p. 188).
At high levels of optimism individuals become overly confident, filled with hubris and narcissistic thinking leading to difficulties coping with the facts of reality. Very high levels of positive affect may constitute too much of a good thing. Below are several areas where holding unbridled positive expectancies can be problematic (see Table 1).
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Goal setting
Goal setting theory is one of the most effective motivational approaches supported by an impressive base of research (Robbins & Judge, 2009). One application of goal setting theory widely used in many modern day organizations and meeting with considerable success is known as management by objectives (MBO), in which the organization’s overall goals are translated into specific objectives for each level in the firm (Robbins & Judge, 2009). When MBO does not work, one culprit is unrealistic performance expectations. This is consistent with goal setting theory which suggests that performance plateaus and then drops as the difficulty of a goal goes from challenging to impossible (Wright, Hollenbeck, Wolf, & McMahan, 1995).
Highly optimistic individuals not only tend to set unrealistically high goals, but are also overconfident that their goals will be attained. They focus primarily on positive information, which supports their belief that success is likely, a disposition that interferes with effective performance. As a result, they tend to attain only average levels of performance in many contexts (Judge & Ilies, 2004). This wishful thinking can distract people from making concrete plans about how to attain goals (Oettingen, 1996). Taken together, evidence suggests that across many different tasks, performance increases with optimism, but only up to a point. Further increments actually reduce performance (Brown & Marshall, 2001). Relatively small positive distortions of reality enable one to look at the facts in a more optimistic way. Giving a situation a positive spin often allows one to function more effectively. Although illusions involve a degree of self-deception, they often provide individuals a sense of mastery fueling a sense of well-being.
Striving for success without the resources to achieve it takes its toll on individuals who face limitations on possibilities regardless of how hard they work. Such people will channel their efforts to what can be attained regardless of how hard they work. If not, people will channel their efforts into unattainable goals and become exhausted, ill, and demoralized (Peterson, 2000). Pursuing a dream of enduring greatness may divert attention from the pressing need to win immediate battles. Unrelenting optimism precludes the caution, sobriety, and conservation of resources that accompany goal attainment.
Decision making
It has been said that “no problem in judgment and decision making is more prevalent and more potentially catastrophic than overconfidence” (Plous, 1993, p. 217). This error is so prevalent that it is called the overconfidence bias. For example, when individuals are given factual questions and asked to judge the probability that their answers are correct, they tend to be far too optimistic. Studies have found that when people say they are 65 to 70 percent confident that they are right, they are actually correct only about 50 percent of the time (Lichtenstein & Fischhoff, 1977) and when they say they are 100 percent sure, they tend to be 70 to 85 percent correct (Fischhoff, Slovic, & Lichtenstein, 1977). One outrageous example was reported by Robbins and Judge (2009) who indicated that 90 percent of U.S. adults said they expected to go to heaven while another poll noted that only 86 percent thought Mother Theresa was in heaven!
The overconfidence bias goes by another name—the “above average effect.” It is the tendency of the average person to believe he or she is above average, a result that defies the logic of descriptive statistics (e.g., Alicke, Klotz, Breitenbecher, Yurak, & Vredenburg, 1995). Larwood and Whittaker (1977) found that corporate executives (and management students) are particularly prone to this form of self-serving bias.
Excessive optimism is a contributing factor to a well documented decision-making error—entrapment. Brockner (1992) describes this bias as escalation of commitment to a failing course of action. Because many executives are overly optimistic about their strategies and reluctant to face reality, they are hesitant to back away and look for new alternatives. This was supported in a study by Audia, Locke, and Smith (2000) who noted that managers who had experienced success in the past, and were therefore more confident, were found to be more likely to stick to an original course of action when the environment they were operating in had changed. Such decision biases cost much time, money, and energy which could better be spent on other alternatives.
Similarly, Finkelstein conducted a six-year examination of 51 companies and published his results in Why Smart Executives Fail (2003a). A key finding was that executives of failed companies clung to an inaccurate view of reality that consistently underestimated obstacles. Finkelstein (2003b) noted that: “… blind adherence to “positive thinking” became a dominant corporate value that was often at the foundation of organizational failure” (pp. 2-3). The executives’ view of the future undermined the realities of the present. When reality surfaced, it was often whitewashed for reasons of face-saving and hubris.
Overconfidence usually leads to wrong decisions, shrinking profit margins, firings, or bankruptcies (Russo & Schoemaker, 1989). One study of Fortune 500 CEOs, for example, showed that many are overconfident and their perceived infallibility often caused them to make bad decisions (Malmendier & Tate, 2005a). Consider the comment of Teddy Forstmann, chairman of the sports marketing giant IMG, who indicated “I know God gave me an unusual brain. I can’t deny that. I have a God-given talent for seeing potential” (Sandomir, 2007, p. C10). Research suggests that high levels of optimism have significant detrimental effects on judgment and decision making (Åstebro, Jeffrey, & Adomdza, 2007). These findings show highly optimistic individuals holding unrealistic expectations often discount negative information, and mentally reconstruct experiences so as to avoid such information (Geers & Lassiter, 2002). In contrast, moderately optimistic individuals possess a more balanced view (Spencer & Norem, 1996). They are more sensitive to negative information and less likely to gloss over discrepancies (Spirrison & Gordy, 1993), less easily persuaded by positive information (Geers, Handley, & McLarney, 2003), less likely to have an attentional bias in favor of positive stimuli (Segerstrom, 2001), and hold more realistic expectations when engaging in high risk situations (Gibson & Sanbonmatsu, 2004). When considering these findings it seems likely that highly optimistic persons may be prone to make less than optimal strategic decisions.
One decision making error that has received wide publicity is groupthink. In his book Groupthink, Janis (1972) reviewed well-known fiascoes like the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba and noted that many of these poor decisions could be traced to overconfidence pervading organizations. Sims (1992) pointed out groupthink frequently occurs in the business world and specifically noted Beech-Nut, E. F. Hutton, and Salomon Brothers. Groupthink is the tendency for members of highly cohesive groups to minimize conflict and reach consensus without critically testing, analyzing, or evaluating ideas (Janis, 1972). Small groups often develop shared illusions and related norms that interfere with critical thinking and reality testing (Sims, 1992). They often develop feelings of invulnerability creating a sense of invincibility and excessive optimism engendering extreme risk taking that opens the door to mistakes and misjudgments. Such overconfidence perpetuates costly courses of action despite the evidence that an endeavor is doomed. Groupthink has also been identified as contributing to the Challenger and Columbia space shuttle disasters, the failures of companies such as Enron and Worldcom, some decisions relating to the second Iraq war, and the recent mortgage crisis.
Leader hubris and narcissism
Another problem in overconfidence is the conviction that one’s performance is quite adequate though evidence suggests the opposite. There are many documented negative effects of this “dark side” of excessive confidence (Hayward & Hambrick, 1997; Hiller & Hambrick, 2005). Throughout history, hubris has been cited as a common reason for leadership failure (e.g., Napoleon, Hitler; Kroll, Toombs, & Wright, 2000). In Greek tragedy hubris was considered the greatest of sins severely punished by the gods and Proverbs 16:18 tells us that “Pride comes before destruction, and an arrogant spirit before a fall.” “Self-confidence is rocket fuel for leaders. Used carefully and ignited under the proper conditions, it propels you and those around you to remarkable heights. Too little confidence and leaders are perceived as weak. … Too much self-confidence becomes that most destructive of all leadership attributes, hubris” (Petty, 2009), which Kroll et al. (2000) define as an overbearing sense of grandiosity, need for admiration, and self-absorption—in a word, narcissism.
Narcissism or self-love is essential for self-respect and self-confidence; however, when it becomes inflated it can be destructive. Overvaluing themselves, and deluded by the self-satisfied thinking that usually follows, some executives develop descending contempt for competitors and critics. “Denial is the handmaiden of narcissism” (Levinson, 1994, p. 432.) and can drive executives to create a reality that further reinforces their narcissism (Sankowsky, 1995). Reality is bent to the service of these disorders, reality testing is compromised, and organizational learning is interrupted. An additional manifestation of this need for self-enhancement is the tendency to distort reality by focusing on the positive aspects about themselves and only the selective memories that support their self-concept (Markus & Wurf, 1987). Warping reality to suit a narcissist’s views rewrites the facts and reduces an organization’s performance. If the vision is challenged managers accuse opponents of being timid, weak, incapable of seeing the possibilities, thus getting their way (Ronningstam, 2005).
Hubris may pave a perilous path for corporate acquisitions. Roll (1986) has suggested that takeover attempts result from the erroneous belief that the executive excessive can greatly improve the target firm’s efficiency. The executive rejects feedback from others and believes that despite the often overpaid premium for the targeted firm (Hayward & Hambrick, 1997) they will overcome all obstacles and increase the acquired firm’s value. This is similar to the well documented blunder known as the winner’s curse (Hendricks, Porter, & Tan, 2008), an occurrence akin to a Pyrrhic victory in which individuals bid above an item’s (e.g., an acquisition or merger) true value and thus are “cursed” by acquiring it (Lovallo, Viguerie, Uhianer, & Horn, 2001). By exaggerating the likely benefits of a project and ignoring the potential pitfalls, executives often lead their organizations into initiatives that are doomed to fall well short of projections. This can be costly in terms of money, jobs, prestige, or even lives (Sanna, Parks, Chang, & Carter, 2005) when overly optimistic expansions and acquisitions lead to bankruptcy and layoffs (Norem & Chang, 2002). The winners’ curse is a problem for both clients and providers because it often leads to inefficient use of scarce resources. Thus, compelling research shows that corporate acquisitions driven by hubris are financially harmful for acquiring firms (Limmack, 1993; Malmendier & Tate, 2005b).
Kroll et al. (2000) explain why such actions are common among executives by arguing that hubris can result in a drive to dominate others and engage in empire building for its own sake. Similarly, Kets de Vries and Miller (1984) have made the case that CEOs’ belief that they will achieve positive outcomes can lead to delusions of grandeur. Such excessive optimism can cause executives to stubbornly persist in behaviors that have worked well for them in the past and undervalue new or dissenting information. In short, success often breeds failure because leaders that have tremendous successes begin to lose their competitive edge, believe in their own invulnerability, and become self-righteous and arrogant (Dess & Picken, 1999; Ranft & O’Neill, 2001). This gives rise to complacency, blindness to threats, and a loss of touch with reality. Miller (1990) used the myth of Icarus to describe how many high-flying firms get too close to the sun and burn up. Managers fail to note the changes around them, continue to apply previous formulas for success, and ultimately suffer dramatic failures.
Ethical considerations
Leaders exhibiting narcissistic behaviors often set a similar tone for the corporation as a whole since such behaviors become “contagious” (Valente, 1995) leading to what Levinson (1994) called organizational narcissism. The narcissistic organizational identity seeks to justify and legitimize itself at all costs, with scant reference to market accountability, civic responsibility, or ethical concerns (Ganesh, 2003). It institutionalizes dominance, control, entitlement, and exploitation (Gregory, 1999) to reinforce its maladaptive identity. Such organizations are unable to behave ethically because they lack a moral identity and ethical behavior is often ignored in service of the narcissist’s beliefs (Duchon & Drake, 2009). The sense in an organization that “… we are the best negates the wish to become the best” (Levinson, 1994, p. 432).
The organization captured by a grandiose fantasy engendered by pathological narcissism imagines itself something special. Those holding positions of authority in such organizations believe they are extraordinary and hold a special trust, and cannot be bound by normal constraints, including the legal and ethical constraints that limit the conduct of other, lesser, organizations (Levine, 2005). In an interesting study, Schrand and Zechman (2009) showed that overconfident managers are more likely to commit financial reporting fraud. The study used the prevalence of the CEO’s photo in the annual report and the difference in compensation with the second-highest paid official in the company as alternative proxies and showed that overconfident managers are more likely to commit financial reporting fraud.
Such arrogance was the defining quality of Enron and a central element to the ethical lapses that eventually destroyed the firm. Arrogance goes hand in hand with corruption as the corrupt organization arrogates to itself special privileges and exemptions. They believe themselves above the laws of lesser mortals.
Warren Buffet, one of the world’s most successful investors, cautioned against what he called “cock-eyed optimism” (2001, p. 5) in earnings forecasts. He warned that lofty predictions not only spread unwarranted optimism but also corrode CEO behavior:
“... I have observed many instances in which CEOs engaged in uneconomic
operating maneuvers so that they could meet earnings targets they had
announced. Worse still, after exhausting all that operating acrobatics would
do, they sometimes played a wide variety of accounting games to ‘make the
numbers.’ These accounting shenanigans have a way of snowballing: once a
company moves earnings from one period to another, operating shortfalls that
occur thereafter require it to engage in further accounting maneuvers that must
be even more ‘heroic.’ These can turn fudging into fraud” (Buffet, 2001, p. 6).
Support of this view comes from Montgomery’s Auditing, an influential auditing manual used by some of the Big Four Accounting Firms. It specifically mentions “unduly aggressive earnings targets” as a factor contributing to the increased risk of fraud (O’Reilly, McDonnel, Winograd, Gerson, & Jaenicke, 1998, p. 36). This is what happened to computer maker Dell Inc. in 2010. Dell is paying $100 million settlement for civil charges with the Securities and Exchange Commission because it fraudulently used payments from Intel Corporation to pump up its profits to meet Wall Street targets thus falsely portraying the means by which the company met or surpassed earnings targets from 2001 through 2006 (Gordon, 2010).
Schrand and Zechman (2009) describe a path often leading to fraud: an overly optimistic or overconfident executive believes the firm is experiencing only a bad quarter. The CEO also believes it is in the best interest of everyone with a vested interest in the organization to cover up the problem in the short term so that constituents do not misinterpret the current poor performance as a sign of the future. The executive is convinced that the company will make up for losses down the road. Rules get stretched in those ‘gray areas’ of earnings management. If they are wrong and things do not reverse, they have to make up for the prior period. This requires continuing fraudulent behavior and the executive has to do even more in the current quarter.
Technological arrogance
Godkin and Allcorn (2009) suggest leader narcissism is the basis for Arrogant Organizational Disorder (AOD). When interacting with people exhibiting behaviors of this type, little is open to being questioned. Healthy conflict between differing perspectives is stifled. Inquiry, open debate, and the exploration of opinions—the things that make an organization vitally adaptive—are lost. AOD warps the organization into the service of sustaining grandiose images of the firm and attacking anyone or any organization that calls into question or threatens exceptional but unwarranted pride in the organization. The optimism inherent in AOD restricts anticipation of error, downplays its likelihood, and leads to concealing both its occurrence and the severity of its effects. This leads to what Landau and Chisholm (1995) call “The Arrogance of Optimism” (p. 67)—the reluctance to critically examine process, structures, and systems leading to organizational self-deception because of the belief that all is well and under control.
Such an attitude took a pivotal role in our history:
During the Vietnam War, American soldiers and civilian officials
were spurred on by a myopic ‘can-doism’—the conviction that
they could achieve anything, anywhere. Their belief in their own
omnipotence was stimulated too, by pressures from their superiors
in Saigon and Washington. To adopt a negative attitude was defeatism,
and there were no promotions for defeatism. In contrast, positive
reports were rewarded, even if they bore little resemblance to the
truth (New York Times, 1983, p. 1D).
One needs to only read Adams’ (1975) or Sheehan’s (1988) essays on the Vietnamese War to see how pernicious such an attitude can be when discussing the optimism of body-counts or when truth speaks to power and the powers that be command that all is well in the face of calamity.
AOD may evolve into another disorder—technological arrogance—the belief by those in charge that they are the experts and that they know what they are doing is safe and correct. This attitude seems to be a contributing factor to disasters because it too often lulls people into complacency, ill-fated shortcuts, and problems being ignored (Borenstein, 2010). The Titanic is an excellent example of excessive confidence. Consider the famous statement that “God couldn’t sink her” as an example of excessive confidence on the part of many individuals in that era.
It appears that such arrogance is the illegitimate child of confidence in any area. Borenstein (2010) observed that “People don’t spend enough time thinking about what could go wrong” (p. 4D), a sentiment echoed by Landau and Chisholm (1995) who argued for “… the assignment of high priority to the probability of error, of failure” (p. 73); that is, a sensitivity to failure in the interest of preservation.
Because people come to blindly rely on the safety of their processes, equipment, and procedures of the past, they tend to ignore warning signs and presume that things are under control. Such arrogance comes from previous triumphs not present capabilities. Consider the Challenger disaster. Feynman, a member of the Rogers’ Commission, a Presidential Commission charged to investigate the Space Shuttle Challenger disaster, observed that NASA was a poster child for an organization that was fooling itself (Feynman, 1988). They did not want to hear the truth, he stated, and they ignored warning after warning, disregarding even the clearest sign that something was wrong. Their optimism was of such high order that when erosion of the ‘O’ rings was detected after earlier shuttle launches, a condition that was not supposed to occur, they dismissed it out of hand. “It’s hubris, arrogance and indolence” (Borenstein, 2010, p. 4D), says engineering professor Robert Bea who has studied 630 disasters of all types and consulted with the presidential commission investigating the 2010 BP oil spill disaster in the Gulf of Mexico.
To avoid technological arrogance one must avoid excessive confidence and engage in self-criticism: “To be cocksure that one is an infallible reasoner,” American philosopher, Charles Peirce, once stated, “is to furnish conclusive evidence that one does not reason at all or that one reasons very badly, since that deluded state of mind prevents the constant self-criticism which is, as we should see, the very light of reasoning” (Hartshorne & Weiss, 1934, p. 400).
Planning fallacy
People often underestimate how long it will take to complete a task. The Sidney Opera House took 16 years to complete instead of the 6 years originally planned (Hall, 1980). The Channel Tunnel between France and England and the Big Dig in Boston similarly, and famously, ran far behind schedule. In a multibillion dollar business, such as software design, overly optimistic estimations of completion time can prove to be extremely expensive and frustrating due to missed deadlines, cost overruns, and general aggravation (Connolly & Dean, 1997). On a less spectacular scale, Kidd and Morgan (1969) noted that production managers persistently predicted better performance for their operations than was later obtained, a result derived from overly optimistic self-impressions. And most of us are all too familiar with the term paper that was supposed to be done in a couple of days but took a whole week to complete, or the home-improvement project that was planned for a weekend but took a month of weekends.
Multiple laboratory studies have also documented systematic overoptimism in people’s estimates of the time required to complete various tasks (Buehler, Griffin, & MacDonald, 1997; Buehler, Griffin, & Ross, 1994). For example, participants in one study thought they would require an average of 34 days to finish their academic theses, whereas, on average, the theses were completed in 56 days (Buehler et al., 1994). Such planning errors abound, supplying poignant public illustrations of overly optimistic plans gone awry (Flyvberg, 2008; Hall, 1980). This is such a common occurrence that it has been labeled the “planning fallacy” which is the tendency to underestimate time to completion despite knowing similar tasks previously took longer than anticipated (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).
This error of reasoning occurs during the planning phase. Individuals ignore the very real chance that things won’t go as anticipated; i.e., individual’s future plans tend to be “best-case scenarios” (Newby-Clark, Ross, Buehler, Koehler, & Griffin, 2000). They do not consider alternative possibilities and underrate the likelihood of unforeseen complications and unexpected obstacles. Indeed, when formulating a plan, these individuals do not like to reflect upon past experiences (Buehler & Griffin, 2003). Instead, they like to consider positive outcomes and fail to review previous lessons. In team settings especially, persons of this bent are increasingly likely to underestimate the time needed to complete a project (Buehler, Messervey, & Griffin, 2005). Presumably, they feel the need to impress others by being perceived as optimistic and efficient further magnifying the planning fallacy (Pezzo, Pezzo, & Stone, 2006).
Display rules
In some lines of work, it is important that employees express certain kinds of moods and refrain from expressing others. For example, waiters, flight attendants, and cheerleaders are expected to operate under “display rules” where they are required to smile and be enthusiastic (i.e., to put on a happy face) and refrain from expressing anger or hostility, even in the face of unkind customers (Diefendorff & Richard, 2003). In certain positions, efforts to keep a situation under control, immersed in emotional settings on a daily basis, and having to filter the expression of moods can be very stressful leading to emotional dissonance (Middleton, 1989). This is appropriately called emotional labor (George, 2002). For example, Wilk and Moynihan (2005) found that when call-center employees’ supervisors placed heavy emphasis on employees expressing positive emotions and being pleasant and polite to callers no matter how rude the callers might be to the employees, the workers were much more likely to feel emotionally exhausted from their work.
This may account for the recent “Steven Slater effect.” Mr. Slater, a 38-year old Jet Blue flight attendant, on August 9, 2010 allegedly grabbed an airplane’s intercom and made an expletive-laced speech, took a beer from the galley, opened the door and slid down the emergency evacuation chute, and quit his job as the plane was arriving at the terminal, after an unruly and rude customer supposedly swore at him, hit him with a piece of carry-on luggage, and refused to apologize (Gawker, n. d.). Mr. Slater quickly acquired folk hero status because his meltdown struck a sympathetic chord with others, especially those in jobs that require daily interaction with a public that, at times, can be difficult to please.
Clearly, organizations have a right to expect friendly behavior from their employees because it is good for business, yet an enlightened manager might weigh this right against the possible cost to employees. For example, less resistance to stress has been observed among those who repress negative emotions (Brown, Tomarken, Orth, Loosen, Kalin, & Davidson, 1996) while Derakshan and Eysenck (1999) noted that those who present an optimistic assessment of their emotional state by denying their negative emotions, even to themselves, tend to have significantly stronger physiological reactions than those who are more realistic about their negative emotions.
Although snapping at customers is probably never a good idea, managers might teach employees how to express their emotions constructively (e.g., politely telling a customer “no” in response to an unreasonable request, rather than barking at the customer or knuckling under). Nevertheless, it does suggest that attempts to build a positive workforce may, surprisingly, take a toll on employees who are asked to conform to happy and cheerful “display rules.”
Denial of risk and peril
Mader and Leibner (2007) suggested that a leader’s supreme confidence is toxic and can erode organizational commitment of subordinates. Leaders who exude confidence at all times, they said, tended to minimize problems or discourage them from being discussed (often unconsciously) for fear that it would reflect poorly on them. Such confidence sends off signals that the leader is not open to feedback or criticism, and making him or her virtually unapproachable—particularly when they are wrong and more prone to engage in risky behavior.
In his studies of unrealistic optimism, Weinstein (1984; Weinstein & Klein, 1996) provided evidence of the harmful effects of optimistic biases in risk perception related to a host of health hazards. Those who underestimate their risk are routinely less likely to show interest in taking preventive action such as not wearing seat belts or condoms (Weinstein & Klein, 1996). Weinstein, Lyons, Sandman, and Cuite (1998) also found that those who optimistically underestimated the risk of radon in their homes were less likely than others to engage in risk detection and risk reduction behaviors. In related research, Kunda and Klein (Klein & Kunda, 1992; Kunda, 1990) provided several examples of mechanisms that help maintain a positive self-view, but likely to have harmful long-term consequences. For instance, smokers may avoid thinking about or trying to quit (Steele, 1988). Thus, the average individual sees himself or herself as below average in risk for a variety of maladies, which of course cannot be. This phenomenon is appropriately lamented because it may lead people to neglect the basics of health practices.
Another consideration is that risk assessments may vary as a function of the product itself. Simon and Houghton (2003) found in their study of high-technology firms, a correlation between overconfidence and the degree to which product introductions were pioneering (risky). Managers introducing pioneering products were more apt to express extreme certainty about achieving success, yet these products were less likely to achieve success. These type of people are extremely certain they will achieve success and thus underestimate the dangers. This suggests that overconfidence plays a greater role in risk taking.
In a related area, sales, Iannarino (2010) indicated that excessive belief in an organization’s product or service can be destructive to sales if it leads to arrogance. An exaggerated sense of importance leads to several problems. Companies believe that there are not substitutes for their product or service and that clients cannot succeed without them. Companies stop listening to the needs of its constituents. Ultimately, when they no longer fear the competition, arrogance dulls their competitiveness. When companies stop listening, they lose their connection to the changes that are occurring in the marketplace. They lose touch with customer’s needs. Arrogance causes a loss of the desire to please the customer, to make changes to win deals, and to innovate. Eventually, having fired customers, alienated prospects, and failed to innovate, leaner, hungrier, aggressive competitors strike and these unsuspecting companies get overtaken. Their competitors are listening, they are acquiring those discarded clients, and they are innovating. Arrogance can cost an organization its very existence.
The trait of optimism works well for keeping employees motivated and inspired, but carried to extreme, it can ruin proper risk assessments, warp reality checks, and lead to self-deception. While some may argue that an appetite for risk taking is considered a prerequisite for success, Gellerman (1986) argued that “Contrary to popular mythology, managers are not paid to take risks; they are paid to know which risks are worth taking” (p. 89).
Finally, on a personal level, overconfidence can cost an individual their life. Anecdotal information from two scenarios provides some dramatic insights. Eminent management scholar, Jim Collins, interviewed Admiral James Stockdale, one of the most highly decorated officers in the history of the United States Navy, who survived eight years as a prisoner of war in Vietnam and was tortured over 20 times, for his classic text Good to Great (2002). In interviewing Stockdale Collins asked who were those who did not survive their captivity. “Oh, that’s easy,” Stockdale said, “the optimists. They were the ones who said, ‘We’re going to be out by Christmas.’ And Christmas would come, and Christmas would go. Then they’d say, ‘We’re going to be out by Easter.’ And Easter would come, and Easter would go. And then Thanksgiving, and then it would be Christmas again. And they died of a broken heart” (Collins, 2002, p. 84). Collins (2002) indicated that he carries a mental image of Admiral Stockdale admonishing the optimists: “We’re not getting out by Christmas; deal with it!” (p. 85).
The events Admiral Stockdale noted in the North Vietnamese prison were similar to famous psychotherapist and holocaust survivor Viktor Frankl’s experience in Man’s Search for Meaning (1959). He observed that the death rate in the concentration camps increased close to Christmas because many people who believed they would be spending it with their family died of disappointment. The point both Collins and Frankl make is that, at least under certain circumstances, it is maladaptive to have high optimism and that the “power of positive thinking” can sometimes backfire under stressful life conditions and that one can never let such beliefs and faith cloud one’s encounter with reality.
Impression management
The process by which individuals attempt to influence the impression others form of them is called impression management (Leary & Kowalski, 1990). While often discussed at the individual level, it also refers to practices in professional communication and public relations, to describe the process of forming public image. The idea that perception becomes a viable reality is fundamental to this process.
Today firms are encouraged generally to present an external “image” (Dutton & Dukerich, 1991) or “reputation” (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990) that is overly optimistic. Organizations are expected to be acutely sensitive to outside perceptions and make decisions and disclose data that create favorable impressions (Caves & Porter, 1977; Fombrun & Zajac, 1987). A favorable reputation can generate excess returns for a firm by inhibiting the mobility of rivals (Caves & Porter, 1977; Wilson, 1985), signaling product quality (Milgrom & Roberts, 1986), attracting better applicants (Stigler, 1962), enhancing the firm’s access to capital markets (Beatty & Ritter, 1986), and attracting investors (Milgrom & Roberts, 1986).
Organizations are frequently encouraged to make optimistic projections about their performance, deemphasize the financial risks associated with holding their stock (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990), predict and plan for higher sales than those possible for the average firm to attain (Larwood & Whittaker, 1977), rationalize problems and errors (Staw, 1980), deny faults (Elsbach, 1994), and conceal negative information (Abrahamson & Park, 1994). Biases toward the faulty prediction of organizational growth can be particularly pernicious to suppliers and competitors as well. For instance, unrealistic biases toward exponential growth, if held by each competitor in a market, may lead to ruinous attempts at overexpansion and competition for scarce resources.
Impression management does not imply that the impressions people convey are necessarily false but misrepresentations do occur. Indeed, lying can be thought of as an “extreme form of impression management that involves the deliberate fostering of a false impression” (DePaulo, Kashy, Kirkendol, &Wyer, 1996, p. 980). Ambiguous situations, such as in strategic business dealings in ill-structured environments lacking discrete input variables or measurement calibration (Roll, 1986), offer particularly attractive opportunities for deception. Such situations provide relatively little information for challenging a fraudulent claim and thus reduce the risks associated with misrepresentation and overconfidence (Goffman, 1959). This combined with the tendency for executives to preserve a positive self-image leads to misrepresentations and rationalizations (Grover, 2005). If honesty can be defined as “the refusal to fake reality ... to pretend that facts are other than they are, whether to himself or others” (Smith 2003, p. 518), then we can feel some assurance in calling such overconfident and overoptimistic executives and organizations dishonest.
Entrepreneurial activities
Optimism is vital in overcoming the anxiety about starting a new venture, but too much optimism can keep entrepreneurs from acknowledging that there are risks involved. Some entrepreneurs bite off more than they can chew. Some launch a business that does not have a marketable product or service. Some do not raise adequate capital to survive early cash flow crises (Trevelyan, 2007). Such optimism develops because when entrepreneurs evaluate situations they magnify their strengths and opportunities and minimize the importance of weaknesses and threats (Palich & Bagby, 1995). They also tend to treat their assumptions as facts and do not see uncertainty associated with conclusions stemming from those assumptions (Simon, Houghton, & Aquino, 2000). Moreover, they perceive less risk because they are more optimistic about those assumptions (Russo & Schoemaker, 1992) which results in less information search (Zacharakis & Shepherd, 2001). Such excessive optimism has been cited as a primary reason for the high incidence of failure among start-ups (Gartner, 2005)—45% of newly created firms fail before their fifth birthday (Shane, 2008).
Indeed, Landier and Thesmar (2009) investigated different levels of optimism in entrepreneurs and found that overly confident entrepreneurs were more likely to be associated with failing businesses. Optimistic entrepreneurs did not view their endeavor as a major risk, because they saw success as inevitable and were not likely to abandon their dreams quickly or easily. The authors found that entrepreneurs with optimistic views at the start of their business ventures were still holding high expectations three years later. Even if it became apparent that their business will not succeed without abandoning some portion of the business plan, adapting it, or scaling back the business, optimistic entrepreneurs’ strong belief in their venture prevented them from adapting to early feedback regarding the venture’s success. Such misguided persistence has undesirable consequences and goal disengagement in some circumstances is useful and adaptive (Wrosch, Scheier, Carver, & Schulz, 2003).
Landier and Thesmar (2009) indicated that “The enthusiasm of optimistic entrepreneurs is their strength and their weakness. They work hard, but are reluctant to adapt their initial idea” (p. 128). When the business does not perform as well as it should, it is crucial to revise the business plan and adapt the product to customer demand. The optimistic entrepreneur, however, is unlikely to make these changes. Furthermore, Landier and Thesmar (2009) noted that the failed businesses which were run by optimistic entrepreneurs tended to be worth less just before their demise than other start-ups.
Entrepreneurs, who are highly involved in start-ups, also tend to be very high in optimism and confidence (Lovallo & Kahneman, 2003). Ironically, Hmieleski and Baron (2009) found that entrepreneurs’ dispositional optimism is negatively related to firm performance (revenue and employment growth). This may be because highly optimistic individuals often hold unrealistic expectations, suffer from overconfidence, and discount negative information—tendencies that can seriously interfere with their decision making and judgment (Geers & Lassiter, 2002; Hmieleski & Baron, 2009). Indeed, Ranft and O’Neill (2001) noted that “The major problems for boards in successful entrepreneurial firms is [the] need to develop the capability to counter the entrepreneur’s naturally occurring overconfidence” (p. 129). Additionally, entrepreneurs may fail to assess potential opportunities carefully, and show a strong preference for heuristic decision making (Sarmány, 1992), and come to experience high levels of overconfidence that ultimately interfere with their performance of key tasks (e.g., full assessment of potential opportunities). Such tendencies adversely affect the success of new ventures. Finally, of particular relevance to entrepreneurs, positive expectations often lead to goal conflict, because optimists see new opportunities everywhere they look (Segerstrom & Solberg Nes, 2006). This tendency can generate significant problems for individuals who cannot easily decide which goals to pursue and therefore may become overextended as they seek to exploit more opportunities than is realistically feasible. In contrast, moderate optimists tend to be more realistic in their choice and pursuit of opportunities. Entrepreneurs must be able to decide which goals they can accomplish in order to maximize the potential for survival and long-term success (McMullen & Shepherd, 2006).
Incongruence with certain jobs/positions
Seligman (1991) made an important observation when he commented on the role of a CEO, stating “…at the head of the corporation must be a CEO, sage enough and flexible enough to balance the optimistic vision of the planners against the jeremiads of the CPAs” (p. 112). This suggests that positive thinking may be associated with individuals in particular positions and that optimism may not always be the correct approach in selecting applicants. When a risk of negative consequences exists, a cautious, risk-avoiding approach is appropriate. Pessimism can keep people from taking risky, optimistic actions in areas where the downside risks are unacceptable.
Certain jobs that require persistence and initiative and involve frequent frustration, rejection, and defeat call for an optimistic outlook (Seligman, 1991). Such jobs might include sales, public relations, and fundraising positions. Positions that are highly competitive have a tendency for high-burnout or require inventing and creativity are best suited for optimistic persons. Other occupations, such as financial control and accounting, quality control, design and safety engineering, and technical writing call for a pessimistic outlook. These positions generally require individuals with a pronounced sense of reality who know when not to charge ahead and to err on the side of caution. For example, in accounting, optimistic assumptions can easily wreak havoc (Munger, 2002). Does an organization want an accountant telling it the reality of what it has in its checking account or does it want some starry-eyed optimist managing the firm’s finances? Do individuals want their financial advisor telling them that everything is going well or do want to hear the truth about their retirement plan?
Summary and Conclusion
Misplaced positive thinking, optimism, and confidence are ubiquitous in America. The central claim that “positivity is good and good for you; negativity is bad and bad for you” (Held, 2005, p. 2) and that happiness, or optimism, or positive something—is not only desirable in and of itself but actually useful, leading to better health, enhanced achievement, and greater success. However, there are costs to being positive and despite such an endorsement it is important to note that it is a double-edged sword and that excessive levels are problematic. It is dangerous to assume the best possible outcome regardless of facts to the contrary.
America’s fascination with all things positive may be specific to Western cultures. At other times and places great cultures incorporated in their worldviews elements of negative thinking. Muslims, in general, see grief, sadness, and other dysphoric emotions as concomitants of religious piety and correlates of the painful consequences of living justly in an unjust world (Woolfolk, 2002). Sorrow marks the depth of personality and understanding. In Iran, for example, pathos is central to the Iranian ethos. Sadness for Iranians is associated with maturity and virtue. A person who expresses happiness too quickly often is considered socially incompetent (Good, Good, & Moradi, 1985).
Sadness is also valued in Japan. Several centuries ago Motoori Norinaga (1730-1801) fashioned the concept of mono no aware, sometimes translated as “the persistent sadness that inheres in all things.” This concept was postulated to define an essential ingredient of Japanese culture and meant to characterize both a certain aesthetic and a capacity to understand the world directly, immediately, and sympathetically (Masahide, 1984). Mono no aware was thought to distinguish Japanese culture and mark its superiority. The idea here is that of a sensitivity that involves being touched or moved by the world. This kind of sensibility is thought to be inextricably intertwined with a capacity to experience the sadness that emanates from the transitory nature of things.
Another relevant worldview is that of Buddhism. This philosophic system of self denial goes beyond the mere karmic tribulations of the unjust or the unfortunate. It begins, famously, with a declaration of the universal pervasiveness of suffering inherent in the human condition. The First Noble Truth forming the foundation for the Buddhist Weltanschauung is that consciousness in interaction with the universe inevitably entails dukkha, often translated as suffering but also the whole spectrum of negatives: pain, sorrow, unhappiness, dysfunctionality, frustration, dissatisfaction, angst, and even stress (Woolfolk, 2002). Dukkha is ever-present, persistent, and unavoidable. From a Buddhist standpoint, it is not a cognitive distortion to see the world and human existence as dangerous, unsatisfying, painful, and meaningless; rather it is irrational not to see the world this way. Such negative appraisals can be thought of as the beginning of wisdom (King & Woolfolk, 2001).
Interestingly, a new approach in psychotherapy in the United States, Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT; Hayes & Smith, 2005), seems to be a movement away from an emphasis on the positive and toward an acceptance of the negative. Hayes argues that trying to correct negative thoughts can paradoxically actually intensify them (e.g., telling someone to “not think about a blue tree,” actually focuses their mind on a blue tree). Rather than trying to resist anxiety and negativity, individuals are taught to acknowledge that pain and negative thoughts recur throughout their life and that suffering is a basic component of life. They must then identify and commit to their values in life. Patients who embrace their negative emotions subsequently find it easier to commit to what they want in life and improve their mental health (Hayes, Luoma, Bond, Masuda, & Lillis, 2006). The acronym ACT describes the nature of therapy among the initiated: Accept the effects of life’s hardships, Choose directional values, and Take action.
The goal of this paper has been to question the wholesale endorsement of all things positive and the wisdom of always being cheerful. A more balanced approach is required rather than the “accentuate the positive” mantra advanced by self-help manuals and lifestyle gurus as the key to health, wealth, love, and success. Unfortunately, one size does not fit all. Although positive thinking is useful for some people some of the time, a purely positive approach to everyday life (e.g., “Positive anything is better than negative thinking,” attributed to Elbert Hubbard) appears to backfire for others. This demonstrates that such a cookie-cutter approach to human nature is unwarranted and unconstructive. A more nuanced approach is needed to counter the belief that if a little positive thinking is good, then a lot must be better.
Consider the extensive work by Norem and her colleagues on defensive pessimism (Norem, 2001; Norem & Chang, 2002; Spencer & Norem, 1996) who found that some people are negative because their pessimism helps to shield them from potential pain—the sting of more optimistic expectations failing to materialize. Studies have found that people who exhibit defensive pessimism are actually less stressed when they indulge in this personal routine than when they are forced to express more optimistic thoughts. For defensive pessimists, worrying about upcoming challenges is a way of life. It is also a healthy coping strategy that helps them prepare for adversity. Norem has shown that when deprived of their pessimism, defensive pessimists’ performance levels drop. For defensive pessimists, being positive has a decidedly negative side (Lilienfeld, 2009)!
Other research by Wood, Perunovic, and Lee (2009) likewise found that positive thinking and the repetition of stock optimistic phrases such as “I can do it” or “I will succeed” do more harm than good for some people. Specifically, the researchers concluded that repeating positive affirmations may benefit certain people, such as individuals with high self-esteem, but backfire for those with low self-esteem, the people who need them the most. Wood et al. (2009) asked people with high and low self-esteem to repeat a number of positive self-statements and then measured the participants’ moods and their feelings about themselves. The low-esteem group felt worse afterwards compared with a control group while people with high self-esteem on the other hand felt better after repeating the positive affirmations—but only slightly. The researchers then asked the participants to list negative and positive thoughts about themselves. They found, paradoxically, that those with low self-esteem were in a better mood when they were allowed to have negative thoughts than when they were asked to focus exclusively on affirmative thoughts.
Wood et al. (2009) suggest that, like overly positive praise, unreasonably positive self-statements can provoke contradictory thoughts in low self-esteem individuals. When positive self-statements strongly conflicted with self-perception, the researchers argue, there was not mere resistance but a reinforcing of existing self-perception. People who view themselves as unlovable, for example, find that saying statements that are so unbelievable actually strengthens their own negative view. The positive statements may act as reminders of failure, highlighting the gulf someone sees between reality and the personal standard set. In short, someone could say “I’m a lovable person” but may be thinking “I’m actually not” or “I’m not as lovable as I should be.” Statements that contradict a person’s self-image, no matter how encouraging in intention, are likely to boomerang. In a study by Schwarz, Bless, Strack, Klumpp, Rittenauer-Schatka, and Simons (1991) individuals asked to remember 12 examples of being assertive rated themselves as being less assertive than those who just had to remember 6 examples. Because people had trouble coming up with a dozen examples, they reasoned that they must not be very assertive after all!
The Wood et al. (2009) findings were also supported by the previous research of Swann, De La Ronde, and Hixon (1994) that showed that when people got feedback that they believed was overly positive, actually felt worse, not better. Researchers found that people with negative self-views were most intimate with marital partners who evaluated them unfavorably! This tendency for married persons to eschew overly favorable evaluations was not restricted to those with negative self-views; even people with positive self-views were less intimate with spouses whose evaluations were extremely favorable. Apparently, when a spouse’s evaluations fall outside one’s latitude of acceptance (Sherif, Sherif, & Nebergall, 1961), married people withdraw psychologically from the relationship. It seems that marriage partners prefer that their spouses recognize their strengths and weaknesses and want their spouses to see them as they see themselves. In summary, these studies call into question the exaggerated benefits of being positive encouraged by magazine columnists, self-help books, talk-show hosts, business associates, selected religious authorities, and friends and neighbors.
I agree with Pfeffer (2001) who indicated that companies may be much better served by having “wise” people as opposed to positive workers. As originally defined by Plato, wisdom is the attitude of knowing what you know and knowing also what you don’t know. Overconfidence, in many ways, refers to the failure to know the limits of one’s knowledge (Zacharakis & Shepherd, 2001). This leads to overestimation of one’s certainty regarding facts. Most of us possess enough self-confidence to function properly and to even get up in the morning. Too much, however, has a downside because it can move us to agree with and support people, plans, or projects which a more realistic evaluation would have rejected. Wisdom permits organizations to take action in the face of doubt to continue learning even as it is doing.
I also agree with Peterson (2000) that people should be optimistic when the future can be changed by positive thinking but not otherwise. Perhaps individuals should adopt what Seligman (1991) called a flexible or complex optimism, a psychological strategy to be exercised when appropriate as opposed to a reflex or habit over which they have no control:
You can choose to use optimism when you judge that less
depression, or more achievement, or better health is the
issue. But you can also choose not to use it, when you judge
that clear sight or owning up is called for. Learning optimism
does not erode your sense of values or your judgment. Rather
it frees you to ... achieve the goals you set . . . . Optimism’s
benefits are not unbounded. Pessimism has a role to play, both
in society at large and in our own lives; we must have the courage
to endure pessimism when its perspective is valuable ( Seligman,
1991, p. 292).
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| |
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Table 1. Difficulties resulting from excessive overconfidence and optimism
|Goal setting |Planning fallacy |
|Decision making |Display rules |
|Leader hubris and narcissism |Denial of risk and peril |
|Technological arrogance |Impression management |
|Ethical considerations |Entrepreneurial activities |
|Incongruence with certain jobs | |
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