The Debate Intensive



Aff – Venezuela ACAdv 1 – Humanitarian Crisis Secondary sanctions fuel the humanitarian crisis in Venezuela Weiss 19 — (Laura, Associate editor at World Politics Review.“U.S. Sanctions, and an Embargo, Will Only Worsen Venezuela’s Humanitarian Crisis“, Aug. 6, 2019. Available Online at , accessed 7-26-2020, mysoor)In a significant escalation, President Donald Trump announced a total economic embargo on Venezuela yesterday, issuing an executive order that would block all transactions with the government and its officials and freeze their property and assets in the United States. The move came on the eve of a meeting in Peru held by the Lima Group, a multilateral body of Latin American countries that supports opposition leader Juan Guaido as the legitimate president of Venezuela, rather than Nicolas Maduro. Fifty-nine countries, including the United States, are attending. The Venezuelan government and its few remaining partners, such as Russia, are not. The announcement of an embargo quickly focused attention back on the Trump administration’s hard line against Maduro, at a moment when the already dire humanitarian situation in Venezuela keeps deteriorating. Maduro’s increasingly repressive and mismanaged government is primarily to blame, but U.S. economic sanctions are making things even worse for Venezuelans. While foreign ministers meet in Lima, Norway is continuing to sponsor talks in Barbados between the Venezuelan government and the opposition. The timing of the Trump administration’s announcement of an embargo, according to some observers, seems designed to derail those talks. It also comes just weeks after a human rights report released by the United Nations confirmed that “there are reasonable grounds to believe that grave violations of economic and social rights, including the rights to food and health, have been committed in Venezuela.” In that report, the U.N. high commissioner for human rights, Michelle Bachelet, included criticism of the economic sanctions imposed by Trump, which she said “are exacerbating further the effects of the economic crisis, and thus the humanitarian situation.” Both the Venezuelan government and opposition had expected Bachelet, the left-leaning former president of Chile who was part of Latin America’s “pink tide” in the 2000s—and had a friendly rapport with the late Hugo Chavez, Maduro’s mentor and predecessor who led that left-wing wave across the region—to present a report that matched her political stripes. But they were both wrong. Using data collected from NGOs, trade unions, churches, the government and over 200 individual interviews, the 16-page U.N. report makes clear how grave the humanitarian situation is. It notes that, as of April, the minimum wage covered less than 5 percent of basic food needs; that an estimated 3.7 million Venezuelans are malnourished; and that there is a severe shortage of essential drugs in four of Venezuela’s major cities. It also documented extrajudicial killings, arbitrary detention and torture, and a dysfunctional judicial system, adding that women and indigenous people suffer disproportionately. According to the report, there are currently an estimated 4 million Venezuelan refugees and migrants. When the Trump administration imposed sanctions on Venezuela’s oil sector back in January, it seemed like the “nuclear option,” David Smilde, a senior fellow at the Washington Office on Latin America, said in an interview. The oil sanctions came just two days after Guaido, head of the opposition-led National Assembly, declared himself interim president, justifying the move on the basis of a clause in Venezuela’s Constitution that says the head of the National Assembly should become president if the seat is vacant. Because Maduro’s July 2018 reelection, which the opposition mostly boycotted, was mired in fraud, Guaido and his supporters argued that the presidency was in fact vacant and that he should legally fill the void. As the U.S. and other countries quickly rallied behind Guaido, it seemed clear that both the Trump administration and the Venezuelan opposition were expecting the Maduro government to quickly fall. Broad sanctions on Venezuela’s oil sector, they thought, could speed that along. Instead, seven months and a coup attempt later, with the government still intact, the sanctions are “making the people pay more than the government,” Smilde said. “As implemented, usually sanctions don’t work, and that’s because they’re not really implemented to work. They’re implemented to express disdain.” “The acute economic crisis already existed before the sanctions, but the sanctions have worsened the situation,” Ociel Lopez, a political analyst and professor at the Universidad Central de Venezuela, added in an email interview. “All without achieving even its most minimal objective of cornering Maduro.” Instead, he argued, U.S. sanctions and Trump’s campaign of so-called maximum pressure have provided fodder to the Venezuelan government, which blames the crisis entirely on “imperialist” U.S. policy. Venezuela’s oil production was already falling rapidly when Washington first imposed financial sanctions in 2017. Despite a recovery in oil prices in 2018, production has continued to fall—between January and June of this year, it declined 36 percent, equating to $9 billion in lost export revenue, according to calculations by Francisco Rodriguez, chief economist at Torino Economics. Rodriguez noted in a recent report that there is “good reason to believe that sanctions contributed to the decline in oil production.” Without sanctions, the report concluded, export revenues would have been higher and socioeconomic indicators would have deteriorated less. This outcome is not surprising to Smilde. “As implemented, usually sanctions don’t work, and that’s because they’re not really implemented to work,” he said. “They’re implemented to express disdain.” But he doesn’t necessarily think all sanctions should be lifted and the Maduro government let off the hook. Instead, making the current sanctions more flexible might, for example, allow American businesses to purchase oil, but in exchange for food delivered directly to the Venezuelan people. The Trump administration’s announcement of an embargo against Venezuela would seem to foreclose any chance of that. Although the embargo is set to exempt international and nongovernmental organizations delivering food, medicine and other humanitarian items to Venezuela, experts are skeptical that such goods would really be delivered. As Jeffrey Schott, a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, told The Wall Street Journal: “The administration hasn’t been very good at dedicating financial lines that would allow the purchase of food and medicine in sanctioned countries. In practice, we still block food and medicine because the parties in the targeted regime that want to import it can’t get financing.” As this stalemate deepens, there is little indication that Maduro will cede power under any terms. “Now that the United States and its neighbors have thrown so many threats against Venezuela and the government, and that these threats have not been able to topple Maduro, it seems very unlikely that the government will change its ways to find a solution,” Lopez said. Maduro, after all, has little incentive to step down. “If he maintains power, even if under the qualification of dictatorship, he has nothing to lose. On the other hand, if he leaves it, he could lose everything.” Dialogue between Maduro’s government and the opposition remains the best way to try and resolve this crisis, which is why U.S. should openly support talks likes the ones brokered by Norway in Barbados and not “undermine” them, according to Smilde. Before the embargo, Guaido’s advisers in Barbados participating in the talks seemed open to negotiating some sort of power-sharing agreement or an interim government that would incorporate members of Maduro’s government. But Guaido’s other advisers in Washington have so far stayed close to the Trump administration’s line of maximum pressure and even regime change, and have not discarded—at least rhetorically—the alarming possibility of military intervention. For Smilde, the best option would involve Latin American countries working together to find their own negotiated outcome, with the United States taking a backseat role. But even then, he warned, “the issue then becomes: If they were to strike a deal, what would happen if the U.S. didn’t agree with it?”The humanitarian crisis is causing an unprecedented refugee crisis – 16% of the population has fled the country. Acevedo 19 [(Nicole, a reporter for NBC News Digital. She reports, writes and produces stories for NBC Latino and ) “Venezuela will be world's worst refugee crisis in 2020 — and most underfunded in modern history” Internally cites Brookings Institute (Brookings brings together more than 300 leading experts in government and academia from all over the world who provide the highest quality research, policy recommendations, and analysis on a full range of public policy issues.) NBC, 12/11/2019] BCThe Venezuelan refugee crisis is the most underfunded in modern history, according to an analysis from the Brookings Institution published this week.About 4.7 million Venezuelans, 16 percent of the country's population, have fled Venezuela since its economy suffered a 65 percent contraction in 2013, the largest outside of war in 45 years.Venezuela is second only to Syria in terms of how many displaced people are living outside their country of origin. But estimates from the United Nations Refugee Agency show that if current trends continue, there could be as many as 6.5 million Venezuelans living outside of their country by 2020, far outpacing the speed of displacement seen in Syria with 6.7 million Syrians being pushed out of their birth nation.And yet funding to aid this crisis affecting millions of Venezuelans and at least 17 host nations — the three largest being Colombia, Ecuador and Peru — has really been lagging.The international community spent $7.4 billion on refugee response efforts in the first four years of the Syrian crisis. But the international community has only spent $580 million four years into the Venezuelan refugee crisis, according to Brookings. On a per capita basis, the international community has spent $1,500 to help each Syrian refugee and $125 per Venezuelan refugee.Brookings experts said the international community has been able to get away with this by labeling the escalating catastrophe as a regional crisis instead of a global one, arguing that the Venezuelan economic collapse was not triggered by external forces or internal unrest and instead "was manufactured by those in power, and thus, was totally avoidable."At the same time, organizations such as Hispanics in Philanthropy have been working on crowdfunding initiatives to help Venezuelan refugees worldwide while sounding the alarm over the crisis.Countries like the U.S. have hesitated to label the Venezuelan refugee crisis a global one "because it is not directly impacting the U.S. yet," Nancy Santiago Negrón, vice president of strategic partnerships and communications at Hispanics in Philanthropy, told NBC News.But that might quickly change since it is almost certain the number of Venezuelan refugees worldwide will reach 5 million next month, said Santiago Negrón.Venezuela already surpassed China in becoming the No. 1 country of origin for those claiming asylum in the U.S., with nearly 30,000 Venezuelans applying for asylum with U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services in 2018.Nearly one-third of all claims filed at USCIS come from Venezuelans, the most of any country by far, according to recent numbers.Funding is crucial not only for immediate humanitarian needs but also to create successful refugee integration efforts in host communities. International financing can help strengthen local infrastructure, such as hospitals, schools, roads and electricity as well as expand access to credit for local firms to help offset possible short-term negative labor market effects caused by the sudden labor supply inflow.But analysts worry that lack of international funding to support host nations' integration efforts may soon backfire on a bigger scale. Countries such as Ecuador, Peru and Chile have already imposed barriers to entry for Venezuelans, which could cause the refugee crisis to spread to other regions.Santiago Negrón said they are already seeing countries like Brazil and Trinidad and Tobago struggling to grapple with the growing crisis.Colombia, the largest Venezuelan hosting nation, launched over $230 million in credit lines for infrastructure and private investment in areas with high refugee density.The World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank have opened up financing to host governments to help support the additional strain on public works.But given the scale of the Venezuelan displacement, these efforts may still fall short, meaning much more funding will be required to mitigate the crisis on a global scale."We know a lot of people and companies ready to help or intervene, but the challenge has been that people view this as a humanitarian crisis wrapped up in a political crisis," said Santiago Negrón. "We know people want to help human beings, but they don't necessarily want to get caught up in the politics."Removing sanctions allows for crucial economic reform which solves the humanitarian crisis. Weisbrot and Sachs 19 – [(Mark Weisbrot is Co-Director at the Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR). Jeffrey Sachs is a Professor of Economics and Director of the Center for Sustainable Development at Columbia University) “Economic Sanctions as Collective Punishment: The Case of Venezuela,” Center for Economic and Policy Research, April 2019 ] DBOne result of the sanctions, as described above, is to deprive the Venezuelan economy of many billions of dollars of foreign exchange needed to pay for essential and lifesaving imports. The sanctions implemented in 2019, including the recognition of a parallel government, accelerated this deprivation and also cut off Venezuela from most of the international payments system, thus ending much of the country’s access to these essential imports including medicine and food — even those that could normally be bought with available dollars. There is no doubt that all of these sanctions since August 2017 have had severe impacts on human life and health. While it is impossible to specify the counterfactual — what would have happened if there were no sanctions — we can first look at some of the deterioration of health indicators (including health care and health-related infrastructure and capacity) between 2017 and 2018. According to the National Survey on Living Conditions (ENCOVI by its acronym in Spanish), an annual survey of living conditions administered by three Venezuelan universities, there was a 31 percent increase in general mortality from 2017 to 2018. 35 This would imply an increase of more than 40,000 deaths.36 This would be a large loss of civilian life even in an armed conflict, and it is virtually certain that the US economic sanctions made a substantial contribution to these deaths. The percentage of deaths due to the sanctions is difficult to estimate because the counterfactual is unknowable, but it is worth noting that the counterfactual in the absence of sanctions could even be that mortality would have been reduced (see below), in the event that an economic recovery would have taken place. Since these are annual statistics, they would not take into account the impact of the sanctions during the last four months of 2017. As noted above, the impact of the August 2017 sanctions on the collapse of oil production and therefore access to imports was quite immediate, so we would expect some of the increased mortality to show up in 2017. In 2018 the Venezuela Pharmaceutical Federation reported that shortages of essential medicines were 85 percent.37 According to a September 2018 study by CodeVida and Provea, more than 300,000 people were at risk because of lack of access to medicines or treatment. This includes an estimated 80,000 people with HIV who have not had antiretroviral treatment since 2017, 16,000 people who need dialysis, 16,000 people with cancer, and 4 million with diabetes and hypertension (many of whom cannot obtain insulin or cardiovascular medicine).38 These numbers by themselves virtually guarantee that the current sanctions, which are much more severe than those implemented before this year, are a death sentence for tens of thousands of people who cannot leave the country to find medicines elsewhere. This is especially true if the projected 67 percent drop in oil revenue materializes in 2019. But the accelerating economic collapse that current sanctions have locked in have many more impacts on health and premature deaths. According to the Venezuelan Medical Federation, some 22,000 doctors — about one third of the total — have left the country.39 As migration accelerates in 2019 due to the tightening sanctions, more of these health professionals, as well as others with necessary technical skills, will leave Venezuela. According to the March 2019 UN Report “Venezuela: Overview of Priority Humanitarian Needs,” ENCOVI surveys find that due to malnutrition, some 22 percent of children under five are stunted.40 Food imports have dropped sharply along with overall imports; in 2018 they were estimated at just $2.46 billion, as compared with $11.2 billion in 2013.41 They can be expected to plummet further in 2019, along with imports generally. The increasing collapse of export revenue and therefore imports has also created massive public health problems in the areas of water and sanitation. The most recent UN Report notes that “lack of access to water, soap, chlorine and other hygiene inhibits hand washing and household water treatment” and that “households not connected to the water network are using improperly treated and unsafe surface water and wells.”42 CodeVida found that for 2018, “79 percent of health facilities experience shortages in water supply,”43 while ENCOVI reports that 61 percent of schools “are in communities without daily access to potable water.”44 The electricity crisis has also impacted hospitals and health care. It is not known how many people have died as a result of power failures in hospitals, but during the March blackouts there were press reports of fatalities due to loss of electricity.45 As noted above, the sanctions contributed substantially to the duration and impact of the blackouts. The UN Report finds that the groups most vulnerable to the accelerating crisis include children and adolescents (including many who can no longer attend school); people who are in poverty or extreme poverty; pregnant and nursing women; older persons; indigenous people; people in need of protection; women and adolescent girls at risk; people with disabilities; and people who identify as lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, or intersex. The Illegality and Intent of Unilateral Economic Sanctions The unilateral sanctions imposed by the Trump administration are illegal under the Charter of the Organization of American States (OAS). There are many provisions in the Charter that prohibit these sanctions, but among the most clear and unambiguous are articles 19 and 20 of Chapter IV: Article 19 No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State. The foregoing principle prohibits not only armed force but also any other form of interference or attempted threat against the personality of the State or against its political, economic, and cultural elements. Article 20 No State may use or encourage the use of coercive measures of an economic or political character in order to force the sovereign will of another State and obtain from it advantages of any kind.46 The Trump administration’s sanctions clearly violate both of these articles of the OAS Charter. With regard to article 19, the US administration is directly interfering in the internal affairs of Venezuela. This is especially true in light of administration officials’ statements and actions indicating that their goal is the overthrow of the Venezuelan government. In discussing US policy in Venezuela, including military threats, Vice President Mike Pence has repeatedly said “Maduro must go.”47 On February 8, Reuters reported that the United States was “holding direct communications with members of Venezuela’s military urging them to abandon President Nicolás Maduro and is also preparing new sanctions aimed at increasing pressure on him,” citing a senior White House official.48 Perhaps even more striking was this exchange between Associated Press reporter Matthew Lee and US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo on March 11, 2019: MATTHEW LEE: Are you satisfied with the pace of the momentum behind Guaidó and his leadership? … MIKE POMPEO: Well, we wish things could go faster, but I’m very confident that the tide is moving in the direction of the Venezuelan people and will continue to do so. It doesn’t take much for you to see what’s really going on there. The circle is tightening, the humanitarian crisis is increasing by the hour. I talked with our senior person on the ground there in Venezuela last night, at 7:00 or 8:00 last night. You can see the increasing pain and suffering that the Venezuelan people are suffering from.49 While the Trump administration has consistently maintained that the humanitarian crisis in Venezuela is solely the result of the government’s economic policies, this exchange tells a different story. “The circle is tightening, the humanitarian crisis is increasing by the hour. … You can see the increasing pain and suffering” — this appears to refer to the impact of the sanctions, not something that has taken place over years of economic failure. Furthermore, it implies that the pain and suffering being inflicted upon the civilian population may not be collateral damage but actually part of the strategy to topple the government. With regard to article 20, which outlaws “coercive measures of an economic or political character” to obtain “advantages of any kind,” there are reports indicating such intent from both President Trump and National Security Adviser John Bolton. In a recent book by Andrew McCabe, former acting FBI director, Trump is quoted as saying “That’s the country we should be going to war with. They have all that oil and they’re right on our back door.”50 In January, Bolton stated that “We’re in conversation with major American companies now. … It will make a big difference to the United States economically if we could have American oil companies really invest in and produce the oil capabilities in Venezuela.”51 A number of legal scholars have argued that economic sanctions of this type are in violation of international law, including the UN Charter and international human rights law.52 It seems obvious that sanctions which cause widespread hunger and disease, and increased mortality, would violate human rights law.53 It is worth noting that both the Hague and Geneva Conventions, to which the US is a signatory, prohibit collective punishment of civilians. Although these treaties apply only during wartime, UN human rights experts have argued that it does not make sense that civilians should only have this protection during situations of armed conflict.54 The sanctions also violate US law. Each executive order since March 2015 declares that the United States is suffering from a “national emergency” because of the situation in Venezuela. This is required by US law in order to impose such sanctions, and the national emergency is invoked under the 1976 National Emergencies Act. This is the same law that President Trump invoked in February 2019 when declaring a national emergency to circumvent Congressional appropriation for funds to build a wall along the border with Mexico. A number of states and public interest organizations have sued the Trump administration over this maneuver with regard to the border wall. Of course, it is quite clear that Venezuela has not created any national emergency for the United States. The executive order also states, as required by law, that Venezuela presents “an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security” of the United States. This also has no basis in fact. It is not clear what can be done to enforce the law with regard to these false declarations — US courts have been very reticent to enforce laws in ways that conflict with the foreign policy decisions of the president, even when they appear to violate the constitution.55 As noted previously, the Venezuelan economy was already in a deep recession for three years when the August 2017 sanctions were imposed, with inflation running at somewhere between 758 percent and 1,350 percent at an annual rate. Proponents of the sanctions argue that the economy would have continued to collapse even without the sanctions that have deprived the economy of many billions of dollars of foreign exchange. (Although it certainly would not have collapsed at the same rate.) While many counterfactuals are possible, it is worth looking at what could have been done to get rid of hyperinflation and stabilize the economy, and how the sanctions affect these options — including going forward. The classic definition of hyperinflation in the economic literature is 50 percent per month, or about 13,000 percent annually.56 There have been seven episodes of hyperinflation in Latin America since World War II.57 In all of these cases, the government eventually adopted a program to get rid of the hyperinflation. The median duration of hyperinflation was about four months. In a situation of hyperinflation, people increasingly lose confidence in the domestic currency and do not want to hold it. Therefore, at some point the hyperinflation becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. However, the dynamic that is created can make it possible to get rid of hyperinflation easier and more quickly than taming much lower, but still high, inflation. This happens when, as a result of the hyperinflation, people cease to look at prices in the domestic currency, and instead look to the exchange rate for pricing. At that point, stabilizing the exchange rate can quickly stabilize domestic prices. For example, in the Bolivian hyperinflation of 1985, hyperinflation was brought under control within 10 days.58 This Exchange-Rate-Based Stabilization (ERBS) was done by creating a new exchange rate system with full convertibility and a managed float of the currency. Following that, in order to change expectations and maintain price stability, the government also had to undertake serious fiscal and monetary reforms. Could Venezuela have adopted such a program in the absence of US economic sanctions? It is certainly possible. Venezuela would not necessarily have needed outside help to have enough reserves to create a new exchange rate system.59 Nor was there any need for further austerity to stabilize the balance of payments; by 2016 imports had already fallen by more than 80 percent from their 2012 level.60 To the extent that the government did need to borrow — or provide collateral for a debt restructuring — Venezuela should have been able to securitize some of their 300 billion barrels of oil in the ground. With unimpeded access to the international financial system, there would be some price — even it if were only a small fraction of current prices — at which the potential return would balance the risk of non-payment and would attract investors. These contracts are less difficult to arrange than in the past, as the ability of investors to collect judgements for such assets has increased substantially in recent years.61 And for a government that wants to avoid an economic collapse, selling off some fraction of its oil in the ground at a very low price would be worthwhile, especially since these reserves are more than it could hope to export in a century. Thus, in the absence of sanctions, a government with these vast oil reserves (in addition to other minerals) would be expected to have the ability to avoid this kind of an economic crisis.62 Again, we can never know what the counterfactual would have been. But what we can know is that the sanctions made such a stabilization program practically impossible. Most immediately, they prevented a debt restructuring that would be necessary to resolve Venezuela’s balance of payments crisis. The sanctions also prevented the government from pursuing an ERBS program because a peg to the dollar would require access to the dollar-based financial system, which the sanctions have cut off as much as possible. The whole idea of restoring confidence in the domestic currency while stabilizing the exchange rate would seem impossible when a foreign power is cutting off as much of the country’s dollar revenue as it can, freezing and confiscating international assets, and, as the Trump administration has done for nearly two years, pledging to do much more of these things — not to mention threatening to take military action. Thus one of the most important impacts of the sanctions, in terms of its effects on human life and health, is to lock Venezuela into a downward economic spiral. For this reason, it is important to note that when we look at, for example, the estimated more than 40,000 excess deaths that occurred just from 2017 to 2018, the counterfactual possibility in the absence of sanctions is not just zero excess deaths, but actually a reduction in mortality and other improvements in health indicators. That is because an economic recovery could have already begun in the absence of economic sanctions. And conversely, the death toll going forward this year, if the sanctions remain in place, is almost certainly going to be vastly higher than anything we have seen previously, given the highly accelerated rate of decline of oil production and therefore the availability of essential imports, and also the accelerated decline of income per person.Refugee crisis cause regional instability and warWhitaker 03 [(Beth, is professor of political science at the University of North Carolina at Charlotte. Her research focuses on migration and security issues, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. She has done extensive work on African migration, exploring how political dynamics influence attitudes toward immigration, comparative refugee policy, and diaspora engagement in homeland politics.) Refugees and the Spread of Conflict: Contrasting Cases in Central Africa, 6/1/2003] BCAlthough there is relatively little academic literature specifically on refugees and the spread of conflict, there is a growing body of work about the internationalization of conflict more broadly (de Silva and May 1991; Midlarsky 1992; Brown 1996; Carment and James 1997; Lake and Rothchild 1998). Research in this field has focused on identifying factors that contribute to the cross-border spread of violence, and refugee movements are often included on the list. But most analyses fall short of fully articulating the mechanisms through which each contributing factor leads to the spread of conflict, portraying the process instead as a “messy, haphazard and highly dangerous phenomenon” (Lischer 2002:16). A reading of the literature suggests that refugee flows can contribute to the spread of conflict in two main ways. The first is when a refugee influx alters the balance of power in the host state, by changing the country’s ethnic composition, for example, or affecting access to resources. This process of diffusion, as termed by Lake and Rothchild (1998), can generate violence in the host country. If the process is left unchecked, according to some analysts, the conflict can eventually engulf an entire region. Fearon (1998) envisions a possible “chain reaction in which ethnic war causes refugees, who de-stabilize a new place, causing more war, causing more refugees, and so on” (p.112). Even more dramatically, Premdas (1991) argues that migration spreads ethnic conflict across borders, creating “an uncontrollable chain of ever-widening involvement of host communities” (p.16) and “embroiling and accumulating antagonists and strange bedfellows, thereby growing larger and more irrationally out of control” (p.10). The second way the literature suggests that refugee flows can contribute to the spread of violence is through a process of escalation that brings new belligerents into the conflict. This could include intervention by the host government in the conflict or the use of its territory by combatants for mobilization and attacks back into their home country. As Lake and Rothchild (1998) explain, “this spillover can lead to recriminations between the two affected states and, in cases of ‘hot pursuit,’ direct border clashes that may spiral out of control” (p.30). The presence of “refugee warriors” is not new (Zolberg, Suhrke, and Aguayo 1989); for years, refugees have conducted military training and launched incursions across the border from bases in host countries. With the end of the Cold War and the decline of external support, though, these groups have increasingly integrated themselves among civilian refugees and exploited humanitarian aid to further their military causes. This situation sours relations with the host government, as well as international aid agencies, and heightens security concerns along the border. Venezuela is on the brink of food conflict now – Maduro’s military has a monopoly on resourcesO’Neil 18 [(Shannon K. O’Neil - vice president, deputy director of studies, and Nelson and David Rockefeller senior fellow for Latin America Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. She is an expert on Latin America, global trade, U.S.-Mexico relations, corruption, democracy, and immigration) “A Venezuelan Refugee Crisis” Council on Foreign Relations, February 2018] FPAn overwhelming majority of Venezuelans already lack easy access to food and daily necessities. Surveys report that nearly nine in ten Venezuelans have difficulty purchasing food; relatedly, three out of four Venezuelans have lost weight, an average of nineteen pounds just in 2017. Years of intervention, nationalization, and expropriation have decimated local agriculture. The vast majority of food now comes from abroad, and distribution is firmly in the hands of the Maduro aligned military. In addition to providing the food sold in price controlled supermarkets and restaurants, the military directly distributes basic products to nearly six million families, roughly 70 percent of the population, through local provision and production committees (CLAPs). According to news reports, a good amount of this official food supply is sold on the black market. This control gives military officers—and their families—access to food as well as significant power and enrichment opportunities. Already there have been reports of uneven access to the military-distributed food packages through CLAPs. If the prevalence of food diminishes, whether at government controlled prices or on the black market, desperate Venezuelans would flee in larger numbers. The government increasingly needs to choose between using its hard currency to pay external debt obligations and feeding its population. In 2017, it chose to reduce food and other essential imports by nearly 30 percent in order to meet debt payments of $10 billion. The government owes another $10 billion in 2018 and $14 billion in 2019. U.S. financial sanctions have made it virtually impossible to roll over or raise new money in international markets, and Russian and Chinese loans have not covered the shortfalls. If the government chooses to continue servicing its obligations, food insecurity could worsen to an extent that drives mass emigration. Inflationary pressures could also cause a collapse in the food supply. With the International Monetary Fund (IMF) predicting inflation rates of over 2,000 percent in 2018, provisions on the black market could become out of reach for the average Venezuelan. The consequences of a debt default are not wholly certain, but a default could further limit access to food. On the surface, a default would free public money for food and medicine by lowering or ending external debt servicing. Additionally, the ensuing economic chaos could lead to regime change and new economic policies that could alleviate the current hardships and migration pressures. However, if the current government remained in power, so too would U.S. financial sanctions. That would make an IMF stabilization package and a broader debt restructuring impossible in the event of a default, further limiting access to hard currency and imports. The ensuing economic dislocations could disrupt food distribution to segments of the population. Given the politicization of access to food, rising political opposition—combined with increasing restrictions on financial resources for any of the reasons above—could push the government to intentionally starve opposition-controlled areas, forcing many to leave.Food insecurity causes violent conflictMartin-Shields and Stojetz 18 [(Charles, a researcher at the German Development Institute in Bonn, worked with the International Security and Development Center, where he was an affiliated researcher, on an FAO-funded project on the political economy of food security and conflict, and was a Visiting Scholar at George Mason University’s School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution during the 2016-17 academic year. He has consulted for the World Bank, and worked with TechChange Inc and the U.S. Institute of Peace on peacebuilding, training and technology programs.) (Wolfgang, a Senior Researcher at ISDC and a Postdoctoral Research Fellow in the Department of Economics at Humboldt-University of Berlin. Previously, he was a Predoctoral Research Fellow at Yale University and a Research Affiliate at the German Institute for Economic Research.) “Food security and conflict Empirical challenges and future opportunities for research and policy making on food security and conflict” Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 9/2018] BC3.2 The impacts of food (in)security on violent conflict The broad field of food security and its consequences has attracted wide attention by academics and practitioners recently. Analyses have predominately focused on a conceptual understanding of food insecurity, such as the lack of dietary energy availability and nutrient deficiencies, and how to alleviate these concerns. While a large body of literature has studied the impact of broad categories of economic and ethnic differences, such as in growth or religion (for a recent review see Ray and Esteban, 2016), researchers and practitioners have only recently started to study the consequential impacts of food insecurity on conflict comparatively and rigorously (for a broad overview and excellent analysis on the effects on the occurrence of conflict see, e.g., Koren and Bagozzi, 2016). Two important points are obvious. First, food security aspects relevant for conflict zones and societies may be very diverse and vary substantially across different types and intensities of armed conflict and income levels. Second, impacts originate from and operate at very different levels. At the individual and household levels, factors such as nutrition and economic opportunity may directly affect participation in virtually any form of anti-social behavior. A range of additional mechanisms may originate at more aggregate levels, including global food prices and policies as well as domestic and local wartime institutions, markets, governance and climatic conditions.3.2.1 The impacts of food insecurity on anti-social behavior At the individual level, food insecurity ─ or the threat thereof ─ may create both material and non-material incentives for individuals to engage in some form of behavior that threatens peace (to which this section will refer to as ‘anti-social behavior’). Pinning down a single channel empirically is extremely difficult, however, and rigorous empirical evidence at the individual level is therefore markedly thin. Two key challenges are that these motives are a) in and of itself very complex and hence difficult to measure and b) empirically extremely difficult to untangle from alternative mechanisms that are often credibly not directly related to food insecurity, such as abduction, peer-pressure, ideology, and emotions. The pioneering studies of ex-combatants by Humphreys and Weinstein (2008) provide perhaps the most compelling empirical evidence. Based on original survey data they show that armed groups sometimes target recruits via basic needs, by providing food, shelter and physical security. More recently, a growing number of qualitative accounts have emerged that document how civilians survive and protect their livelihoods and food security through forms of support for armed groups, which may be voluntary or involuntary. These processes are endogenous to ‘wartime governance’ by local ruling groups and underline the centrality of shelter, food and information to the fate of armed groups (Wood, 2003; Kalyvas, 2006; Arjona, Kasfir and Mampilly, 2015; Justino and Stojetz, 2016). However, it is apparent that rigorous evidence beyond descriptive and qualitative analyses is very scarce.3.2.2 The impacts of food prices shocks on violent conflict Historical accounts are replete with descriptions of how rising food prices breed violent conflict, including insurgencies, wars and revolutions (Rudé, 1964; Goldstone, 1991; Diamond, 2005). There is now a growing body of econometric evidence ─ broadly in the vein of Hendrix, Haggard and Magaloni (2009) ─ that supports this conjecture for the incidence of very different forms of social unrest, such as protests, riots, violence and war, with most studies relying on the FAO price index of food commodities.Most evidence exists for urban social unrest in contemporary Africa (e.g. Berazneva and Lee, 2013; Smith, 2014), which includes studies linking the ‘Arab Spring’ uprisings to international food price shocks (e.g. Johnstone and Mazo, 2011; Maystadt, Trinh Tan and Breisinger, 2014). More recent findings suggest global relevance (Bellemare, 2015; Cadoret, Hubert, and Thelen, 2015). Studies of the intensive margin of violent conflict are more scarce, but point to broadly similar, positive relationships with increasing food prices (see e.g. Breisinger, Ecker and Trinh Tan, 2015; Maystadt and Ecker, 2014). By contrast, much less is known on how and how much food prices drive violent conflict. Among the most fundamental unsettled questions is whether and when it is the level versus the volatility of food prices that breeds conflict. In this regard, the most convincing evidence is provided by Bellemare (2015), who forcefully argues that increases in food price levels cause urban unrest, while those in food price volatility do not.The dominant explanation for the food price-conflict link are consumer grievances; higher prices essentially create or increase economic constraints and/or sentiments of perceived relative deprivation, which activates grievances that in turn lead to conflict. This causal chain is very difficult to both measure and isolate empirically, for reasons already noted above, which is why it is usually assumed rather than tested directly. In addition, most contributions have looked at the impact of international food prices on conflict at the national level, which is reasonable in principle, as many fragile and conflict-affected countries are net importers of food. However, a few recent studies emphasize the need to use country-specific food price indexes to better understand the consumption patterns and constraints faced by vulnerable populations (e.g. Arezki and Brueckner, 2014; Cadoret, Hubertt and Thelen, 2015; Weinberg and Bakker, 2015). In an innovative study using such an approach based on a country’s food import pattern, Van Weezel (2016) provides three statistically robust and important findings: ? The (previously documented) relationship between food prices and urban conflict is driven mainly by the prices of basic staples like wheat;? It is also predominantly supported for high-intensity conflict; ? Interestingly, however, the magnitude of the effect as well as the predictive power of food prices are both notably moderate.A second set of explanations for the food price-conflict link emphasizes breakdowns of state authority and legitimacy, when the state fails to provide food security, i.e. activating grievances against the state (e.g. Lagi, Bertrand and Bar-Yam, 2011). A few recent analyses have sought to document the related impact on state-level correlates of conflict. For instance, Arezki and Brueckner (2014) argue that the cohesiveness of political institutions in low-income countries deteriorates significantly when international food prices increase, while Berazneva and Lee (2013) show that rising food prices and riots in Africa are associated with more political repression.Conflict in Venezuela draws in Russia, China, and the US – they all have vested interest in the regionKempe 19 [(Fredrick, is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council, a foreign policy think tank and public policy group based in Washington, D.C. He is a journalist, author, columnist and a regular commentator on television and radio both in Europe and the United States.) “Venezuela and great power competition” 2/2/2019] BCA new era of great power competition took shape in Venezuela this past week.As the first battle of this epoch, the contest for the future of Venezuela will have outsized consequences on what forces and values – democratic or autocratic – will determine not only the country’s future but also influence the regional and global future.As the country with the world’s largest proven oil reserves and one of its greatest humanitarian disasters, Venezuela is a place whose destiny in any case would have had outsized consequences for Latin America and global energy markets. Given the involvement of the US and its democratic allies on the one side and China, Russia and Cuba on the other, the stakes are even higher geopolitically.President Trump’s recognition of interim President Juan Guaido on January 23, with the aim of forcing out Venezuelan dictator Nicolas Maduro, elevated the Venezuelan crisis to its most crucial test of his presidency and of the US ability to shape affairs in its own hemisphere. It also marks an opening salvo of the Trump administration’s unfolding strategy to work with regional partners in a more concerted way.The former head of the Venezuelan National Assembly, Julio Borges, a leading player in the interim government, put it eloquently in Washington this week at the Atlantic Council. “The Berlin Wall is falling in Latin America,” he said. “What happened in Europe thirty years ago is happening now in the region.”It’s a useful if imperfect metaphor. Just as then in Germany, the outcome is uncertain, and the impact will be generational on democracy and freedom. The chances of success, however, depend on an even more complex interaction of local, regional and global players.Locally, Guaido thus far has succeeded where Maduro opponents previously failed in unifying the opposition, rallying widespread public and international support and laying out a vision for the future that would bring free elections and provide amnesty for security and armed forces who are not found guilty of crimes against humanity.Regionally, the new Brazilian and Colombia leaders Jair Bolsonaro and Iván Duque provide a significant boost to Venezuela’s chances at democratic change as part of the so-called “Lima Group,” a coalition of 14 Latin American countries plus Canada that is supporting democratic change in Venezuela. Just last month, the Lima Group issued a stinging condemnation of the Maduro regime, urging him to provisionally transfer executive power to the National Assembly and further restricting contacts with the Maduro regime.Globally, the picture is less certain and may be most decisive.The United States’ emerging strategy for Latin America was unveiled last November by National Security Adviser John Bolton in his “troika of tyranny” speech – putting Venezuela, Nicaragua and Cuba in the crosshairs.“The United States looks forward to watching each corner of the triangle fall: in Havana, in Caracas, in Managua,” Bolton said, though most at the time didn’t predict the pace of action. On the same day, the US introduced new sanctions against Venezuela and Cuba, including on Venezuela’s gold sector and entities of the Cuban military and intelligence services.This week, the US unveiled its most punitive economic actions yet against Venezuela, sanctioning its state-owned oil giant PdVSA, which remains the main source of income for the Maduro regime. It was the harshest measure yet against the Maduro regime and will immediately block $7 billion in assets and deprive Caracas of $11 billion in revenues in 2019, according to National Security Advisor John Bolton.What Washington is up against are three authoritarian countries who have bet to one extent or the other on the current Venezuelan leadership: Cuba, Russia and China. The current showdown is a test of just how far each of these actors will go to support its Venezuelan client – and how strategic the United States, Venezuela’s interim government and other Western democracies can be in navigating these shoals.The first indications are that a determined United States has a fair chance of helping to bring about a lasting change in Venezuela.Over years, Havana received subsidized oil from Caracas and Cubans have assumed sensitive posts in Venezuela’s government. The daily intelligence briefing Maduro (himself educated in Havana) receives isn’t prepared by Venezuelans but by Cuban intelligence operatives. Yet as deeply entrenched as Cuba remains, Maduro’s departure would rapidly undermine its position.Russia and China both seem to be hedging their bets, disappointed themselves at Maduro’s leadership and hoping to preserve their economic and political influence in the country in any case. Those include considerable Russian holdings in the Venezuelan energy market – and some $50 billion that China has extended in loans to Venezuela over the past dozen years – some $20 billion still owed.Moscow is out in front in insisting that Maduro remains Venezuela’s legitimate leader, and that the United States is essentially supporting a parliamentary coup. At the same time, however, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said this week that the Kremlin wasn’t engaged in discussions to extend major financial or military assistance to the Maduro regime.Russia in any case would lack logistical capacity to provide decisive help at a time when its larger and more immediate priorities are in Ukraine, ahead of elections in March, and Syria, with the impending US withdrawal. Putin also faces a stagnating economy and falling popularity at home.In a move apparently designed to calm Chinese and Russian concerns, Guaido has told Reuters that he sent communications to both powers. “What most suits Russia and China is the country’s stability and a change of government,” he said. “Maduro does not protect Venezuela, he doesn’t protect anyone’s investments, and he is not a good deal for those countries.”Said Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Geng Shuang, ”We believe that no matter how the situation develops or changes, cooperation between China and Venezuela will not be damaged.”With stakes so high, one must hope the United States, Latin American democracies and European Union countries show determination equal to the historic challenge. (The EU member states haven’t yet recognized the interim president but are expected to do so by Monday when a deadline for Maduro to call fresh elections isn’t met.)In a world where democracies have been fraying and autocracies rising, a democratic win in Venezuela would have outsized significance.Latin America is a powder keg – any conflict escalates Phillips 12/30 [(Tom, the Guardian's?Latin America correspondent)” Latin America's tumultuous year turns expectations on their head” The Guardian, 12/30/2020] BCCelso Amorim joined Brazil’s foreign service nearly six decades ago and rose all the way to its top but even he struggles to recall a Latin American year like 2019.“Like this? Never before,” Brazil’s former foreign minister said of the tumultuous 12 months that have seen social and political upheaval rattle the region, from Buenos Aires to Bogotá.The final year of the decade was only 23 days old when the turmoil began with an explosion of dissent on the streets of Venezuela that most observers felt sure would displace its authoritarian leader, Nicolás Maduro.Mass protests, frantic predictions of Maduro’s imminent downfall, and a botched military uprising followed before Juan Guaidó’s campaign to topple Hugo Chávez’s heir fizzled and an uneasy calm returned.But elsewhere the action was only just beginning, as a wave of protests and violence swept Puerto Rico, Haiti, Ecuador and Bolivia – where President Evo Morales was forced from office amid a bloody military crackdown – leaving some wondering if a Latin American Spring had arrived.In Peru the president dissolved congress; in Argentina Cristina Fernández de Kirchner staged a dramatic political comeback; and in Colombia hundreds of thousands flooded the streets in opposition to the rightwing president, Iván Duque.Even Chile, supposedly a haven of Latin American stability and affluence, was sucked into the mayhem as a hike in subway fares triggered its worst unrest in decades, leaving a trail of destruction and President Sebastián Pi?era’s future in doubt.“Where did that come from?” Ivan Briscoe, the International Crisis Group’s Latin America chief, wondered as he considered that country’s unexpected cameo in the chaos.As a new year of uncertainty approached, Briscoe said he sensed “an acceleration of time” in the region.Things which have been building up for years and years – whether it’s the social stratification of Chile; Evo Morales’s moves towards eternal power in Bolivia; the deeply hostile standoff in Venezuela – now seem to be breaking the surface in so many different contexts and leading to a situation where we fundamentally don’t know what is going to happen.“I can tell you where I think the fault lines are going to be for next year,” he added. “But I can’t say exactly what is going to materialize.”Some on Latin America’s left have sought comfort in the confusion.Amorim, 77, painted the upheaval as a popular “counter-reaction” to the “onslaught of neoliberalism” besieging countries from Colombia to Chile.“It is very difficult to say where we’re going,” he said. “But one thing is different: eight months ago, the appearance was that everything was going rightwing – totally rightwing. And now it’s not so clear. So that – in spite of all the problems – is some kind of progress.“Latin America is in a moment of turbulence. But [for the left] turbulence is better than a death in the cemetery.”As the year draws to a close, minds are turning to what comes next.In a new report the Economist Intelligence Unit warned of a high risk of “protest contagion”, noting how Colombia’s protests were inspired by rebellions in neighbouring countries.“There is a strong chance that 2020 will be another volatile year for Latin America,” the report said, predicting particularly choppy waters in Lenín Moreno’s Ecuador.“It’s like a powder keg,” Amorim agreed. “At any moment that [country] could explode again.”Briscoe saw three likely 2020 flash points: Venezuela, as it fell deeper into political and humanitarian ruin; Brazil and Argentina, as a diplomatic spat intensified between their ideologically opposed leaders; and Mexico, where President Andrés Manuel López Obrador is struggling to control a historic murder crisis claiming almost 100 lives a day.Mass demonstrations rocked Mexico in 2014 after the disappearance of 43 students shocked the nation and Briscoe said a repeat was possible if the killing did not slow.Briscoe also foresaw strife in Bolivia if the ultra-conservative activist Luis Fernando Camacho reached the second-round of fresh presidential elections and faced a candidate from Evo Morales’s leftist Movement Towards Socialism.“I’d say we will be facing a very tricky period … In Colombia, in Chile, but also Brazil, Mexico and Argentina there is potential for things to go very wrong indeed.“We are sitting on a minefield of social discontent,” Briscoe added, identifying Honduras, Nicaragua, Bolivia and Chile as other potential “danger spots”.Observers are split on whether Latin America’s biggest economy runs the risk of unrest, with former president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva recently urging followers to “follow Chile’s example” and rebel against the far-right president, Jair Bolsonaro.Some argue Bolsonaro’s shock 2018 election has helped channel anti-establishment rage away from the streets, for now. But Monica de Bolle, a Latin America expert from the Peterson Institute for International Economics, said Brazil could easily be next.“The moment right now – as of this very second – is not one where people are going to go out in the streets and demonstrate. But things are not static – things are dynamic,” she said.“I think it’s very, very likely that some time soon – and soon could be 2020 or the end of 2020 – people will realize that this is not an economy that is going to grow much because the policies are not there and the agenda doesn’t exist … [and] then Bolsonaro’s support immediately drops.“That may lead to something like we’ve seen in Brazil in the past few years and it could even be a 2013-type scenario,” she said, referring to the mass demonstrations that paved the way for Dilma Rousseff’s impeachment three years later.Amorim also predicted his country could face tumult as public anger at Bolsonaro’s failings grew.“There hasn’t yet been a popular reaction [against Bolsonaro] – but I think it will come. If there’s a small spark it could very easily propagate,” he said.But perhaps not quite yet.“Everything here in Brazil is slow,” Amorim admitted. “Except samba.”Adv 2 – Russia War US-imposed secondary sanctions destroy popular resistance to Maduro and kill any chance for diplomacy –?this locks in Maduro’s leadership and prevents peaceful transfer of powerTaylor 19 – [(Luke Taylor, History and Politics graduate at QMU London and freelance reporter for the Independent, The Economist, and Public Radio International) “Venezuela: New US sanctions pressure Maduro but ‘risk exacerbating humanitarian crisis and torpedoing negotiations’” The Independent, August 11, 2019, ] DBWhen Juan Guaido raised his nation’s tricolour flag in January and swore himself in as interim president to the rapturous cheers of thousands in Caracas, many hoped – and believed – President Nicolas Maduro was finally on his way out. A long-fractured opposition had reorganised, mass protests returned to the capital, and within minutes the US – followed by 50 other nations – officially recognised the national assembly head as the country’s legitimate leader. The successor of Hugo Chavez’s failed socialist project, Maduro had long been in the White House’s diplomatic crosshairs. The country’s economy was now collapsing and an international consensus was forming that his latest elections were fraudulent. “Both the Venezuelan opposition and the US government thought this was going to be a quick win,” says David Smilde, a Venezuela expert and senior fellow at the Washington Office on Latin America. But seven months on, political change has proved more elusive: despite the US’s best efforts to pressure Maduro with bellicose rhetoric and waves of economic sanctions, the embattled leader holds on to power. “They completely underestimated the sociology of authoritarian governments, which are often more resilient than you think,” Smilde says. Last week, the US took centre stage at a Lima Group meeting to announce its latest efforts to turn the screw on Maduro. In the company of 14 other nations allied in seeking a resolution to the Venezuela crisis, it spelled out its boldest, most sweeping economic sanctions on the country to date. The executive order froze Venezuela’s assets in the United States, banned entry to Venezuelan citizens aiding the dictator, and pledged to sanction foreign companies – or governments – dealing with Maduro’s government. Guaido swiftly welcomed the news. The wiry leader stressed to reporters in Caracas that the “sanctions are against Maduro, not the Venezuelan people”; items that alleviate human suffering – clothes, food and medicine – are exempt. The measures would “protect Venezuelans” from the government plundering the nation’s assets, he tweeted. Predictably, Venezuela’s foreign office blasted the sanctions, describing the order as “economic terrorism against the Venezuelan people” and the formalisation of “a criminal economic, financial and commercial blockade that has already started”. While the US has already imposed targeted sanctions on individuals (figures close to Maduro), specific companies and industries, the latest measures cast the net wider. For the first time they include secondary sanctions (targeting those outside the US), threatening to cut off foreign businesses with America and its financial system should they not comply. “Do you want to do business in Venezuela, or do you want to do business with the United States?” US national security adviser John Bolton said to reporters in a message to foreign businesses around the world. “That includes any foreign entity, government, corporation, person, who contributes to keeping the Maduro regime in power”. Although both the US and Guaido deny that the measures are an embargo, experts in international law, international relations and NGOs operating in the country told The Independent they will still exacerbate an already dire humanitarian crisis – and hinder efforts to restore democracy. “Although it is not technically an embargo ... the order will have a chilling effect on any transactions with Venezuelans,” predicts Mary Ellen O’Connell, international law expert at the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies. The academic adds that the move is “unlawful”, violating World Trade Organisation Standards. Mismanagement of the most oil-rich nation in the world – and once the wealthiest of Latin American nations – has caused widespread food and medicine shortages, a spike in crime and rampant hyperinflation, predicted by the IMF to reach 10 million per cent. Over 4 million have fled the crisis, according to the UN Agency for Refugees, and nine out of 10 Venezuelans now say they go hungry, according to local polls. The new sanctions are, according to the US, intended to alleviate that suffering by strangling Maduro’s finances and forcing him out of power. But some fear that the Venezuelan people will hurt more than its leaders. “The new US sanctions worsen the suffering of Venezuelans, they should be personally targeting members of the state,” says Rodolfo Montes de Oca, lawyer at leading Venezuelan human rights organisation, Provea. As many as 40,000 people have already died in Venezuela as a result of US sanctions since 2017 that made it harder for ordinary citizens to access food, medicine and medical equipment, according to a report released by the Washington-based think tank, the Centre for Economic and Policy Research. Bolton boasted that Venezuela now joins Cuba, Iran, Syria and North Korea in the “club of rogue states” exiled from the US market. Academics researching the impact of US sanctions on those countries say none offer a positive case study in restoring democracy; more likely, they weaken resistance to authoritarian governments as local populations are ground down by suffering. “This tends to hurt ordinary people far more than it hurts governments, as governments have control of hard currency,’’ says Barbara Slavin, an Iran expert at the Atlantic Council think tank. “This is cruel and counterproductive. The sanctions look tough but how is this tough if it’s killing innocent people?” Several NGOs told The Independent that they are already facing banking difficulties due to over-compliance with previous sanctions. As Slavin says, financial institutions commonly avoid working with organisations – even if exempt – due to fear of draconian measures from the US. More salient than the potential exacerbation of the already grave humanitarian crisis, Smilde says, is that the announcement could have torpedoed ongoing talks between Maduro and Guaido. As the crisis drags on but Guaido’s opposition loses momentum, international observers have increasingly looked to ongoing negotiations in Barbados, now in their third round, as the most likely peaceful way out. Late on Wednesday, the government announced in an official statement that it would not be sending delegations this week “due to the grave and brutal aggression” being “carried out by the Trump administration against Venezuela”. It is not known if they will return to the table. “The ramping up of sanctions by the US provided the perfect excuse for Nicolas Maduro to withdraw from this round of negotiations,” Smilde says. “The only viable way the opposition has of translating its popularity and legitimacy into power is through some sort of political settlement”. The US diametrically opposes Maduro’s leadership –?Trump seeks to oust the regime at any costWeisbrot 19 [(Mark, co-director of the?Center for Economic and Policy Research?(CEPR). president of Just Foreign Policy, a?non-governmental organization?dedicated to reforming?United States foreign policy, PhD in economis from the University of Michigan), “The Reality Behind Trump’s Coalition for Regime Change in Venezuela,” The New Republic, 3/13/2019] JLToday the Trump administration is repeating the collective punishment?strategy?in Venezuela with a crippling financial embargo since August 2017 and, since January, a trade embargo. The financial embargo has prevented any measures that the government might use to get rid of hyperinflation or bring about an economic recovery, while knocking out billions of dollars of?oil production. The trade embargo is projected to cut off about?60 percent?of the country’s remaining meager foreign exchange earnings, which are needed to buy medicine, food, medical supplies, and other goods essential to many Venezuelans’ survival.Seeking to foment a military coup, a popular rebellion, or civil war, the Trump administration has made it clear that the punishment will continue until the current government is ousted. “Maduro must go,”?said?U.S. Vice President Mike Pence yet again in early March.All of this is illegal under numerous treaties that the U.S. has signed, including the?charter of the United Nations, the?charter of the Organization of American States, and?other international law and conventions. To legitimize this brutality, which has likely already?killed?thousands of Venezuelans by reducing access to life-saving goods and services, the Trump administration has presented the sanctions as a consensus of the “international community”—similar to what George W. Bush did when he put together a “coalition of the willing” of 48 countries to support his disastrous 2003 invasion of Iraq. Military invasion of Venezuela is imminent – increased international and Congressional support and military presence in the region ensure plans for regime change will be executedHunt 4/13 [(Edward, writer for The Progressive, Jacobin, Foreign Policy in Focus, Nation of Change, and Common Dreams, PhD in American Studies from the College of William & Mary), “Trump Sets the Stage for Coup in Venezuela,” The Progressive, 4/13/2020] JLWith much of the world focused on the coronavirus pandemic, the Trump Administration has begun a major?military buildup?in the Caribbean, sending U.S. warships and aircraft to the region while planning for the ouster of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro.?Already, the Trump team has placed significant pressure on the Venezuelan government by implementing harsh sanctions, encouraging Venezuelan military officers to seize power, and making military threats. “We’re deploying additional Navy destroyers, combat ships, aircraft, and helicopters; Coast Guard cutters; and Air Force surveillance aircraft, doubling our capabilities in the region,” President Trump announced in a?press briefing?at the White House on April 1.?Administration officials say they are increasing the U.S. military presence to deter the flow of drugs into the United States. But they acknowledge being particularly focused on Maduro, whom the Justice Department?indicted?at the end of March on drug trafficking charges.?Maduro?denies?the charges, saying they are part of a politically motivated plan to undermine his leadership and overthrow the Venezuelan government.?It is no secret that the Trump Administration has been trying to overthrow the Venezuelan government. In February, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo?boasted?in a major address that the administration is “leading a fifty-nine-nation coalition to oust Maduro.”“Congress has voted a fair amount of money to help the democratic opposition in Venezuela,” State Department official Elliott Abrams?acknowledged?earlier this year.?The day before President Trump announced the military buildup, State Department officials introduced a plan to create a new government in Venezuela, posting it on their?website?and sharing it in several?press?briefings. Their plan creates a pathway for Maduro to leave office and for Guaidó to gain political power through elections.“When we put together this pathway to democracy, we worked closely with him,” Pompeo said, referring to Guaidó.But any military intervention would risk spreading coronavirus among U.S. soldiers, who cannot practice social distancing, and could dramatically worsen a terrible economic and humanitarian?crisis?in Venezuela.?Previously, Guaidó and his associates had reached out to U.S. Southern Command,?requesting?U.S. military assistance in their struggle against Maduro. Although the Trump Administration has kept silent about the request, its allies in Congress have long been calling for military action.“The U.S. must be willing to intervene in Venezuela the way we did in Grenada,” U.S. Senator Lindsey Graham, Republican of South Carolina, wrote last year in an?op-ed?in?The Wall Street Journal, citing the U.S. military’s invasion of Grenada in 1983.One of the most striking aspects of the Trump Administration’s military surge is that it has received virtually no pushback from Congress. Previously, some members of Congress had?criticized?the administration’s attempts to overthrow the Venezuelan government, but Congress has done nothing to prevent the Trump Administration from militarily intervening in Venezuela.?“A U.S. military intervention in Venezuela would be illegal and foolish,” U.S. Representative David Cicilline, Democrat of? Rhode Island,?tweeted?early last year, when the Trump Administration was reportedly considering an intervention.?During a?Congressional hearing?in March 2019, Representative Eliot Engel, Democrat of New York, the chairperson of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, proclaimed that “we cannot just stand here and shrug our shoulders.”“I think it would create an extremely messy situation, and it would be prolonged,” former Defense Department official Rebecca Chavez?told?Congress last year. “It would be ugly. There would be massive casualties. So I think that the picture is very grim.”Yet in recent weeks, Congress has largely shrugged off Trump’s moves toward intervention.Russia will engage the US in any armed conflict in Venezuela – it leads to actor draw-inReuters 19 [(International news organization based in London), “Russia warns U.S. against military intervention in Venezuela,” NBC News, 1/24/2019] JLRussia warned the U.S. on Thursday not to intervene militarily in Venezuela, saying such a move would trigger a catastrophe.Venezuelan opposition leader Juan Guaido declared himself interim president on Wednesday, winning the backing of Washington and prompting socialist incumbent?Nicolas Maduro to sever diplomatic relations with the United States. Violence flared during big protests across Venezuela, and at least seven deaths were reported.In an interview with Russian journal International Affairs published on Thursday, Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov said Moscow would stand with Venezuela to protect its sovereignty and the principle of non-interference in its domestic affairs.Asked about the prospect of U.S. military intervention in Venezuela, Ryabkov said Washington should steer well clear."We warn against that," he said. "We consider that would be a catastrophic scenario that would shake the foundations of the development model which we see in Latin America."President Donald Trump has promised to use the "full weight" of U.S. economic and diplomatic power to push for the restoration of Venezuela's democracy.The prospect of Maduro being ousted is a geopolitical and economic headache for Moscow which, alongside China, has become a lender of last resort for Caracas, lending it billions of dollars as its economy implodes. Millions of people have fled the country in recent years to escape sky-high inflation and food shortages.Ryabkov did not mention Maduro by name, but made clear Moscow backed his government."Venezuela is friendly to us and is our strategic partner," he said. "We have supported them and will support them."Russia has also provided military support to Maduro, who has led?the oil-rich nation since 2013.Two Russian strategic bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons landed in Venezuela last month?in a show of a support that infuriated Washington. Maduro visited Moscow in December, seeking Russia's political and financial support.China also called on the U.S. to stay out of Venezuela's political crisis and said it opposes all outside intervention there. Over the last decade, China has given Venezuela $65 billion in loans, cash and investment. Venezuela owes more than $20 billion.Iran described the opposition's claim there that it holds the presidency as a "coup" and an attempt to take over power unlawfully.And a senior official said Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan had called Maduro to voice his support. Presidential spokesman Ibrahim Kalin tweeted early Thursday that the leader of the NATO member told Maduro: "'My brother Maduro! Stay strong, we are by your side.'"Russia will back Venezuela no matter what–?a South American presence recreates Cold War conditions and enables Russia’s revisionist agendaHerbst and Marczak 19 [(John E., former US ambassador to Ukraine and Uzbekistan, director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center, and Jason, director of the Latin America Economic Growth Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, professor of international affairs at The George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs), “Russia’s intervention in Venezuela: What’s at stake?,” Atlantic Council, 9/12/2019] JLWhy has Moscow thrown its weight behind Maduro? The answer is rooted partly in the increasingly difficult relations between Moscow and Washington over the past fifteen years, as well as in Russian President Vladimir Putin’s original foreign policy vision dating back to his first days in office.That vision has several critical elements, which have driven Kremlin policy for most of the millennium and buffet traditional Russian, and Soviet objectives in the Western Hemisphere:restoring Russia as a great power on the international stage that has the ability to influence issues in every corner of the globe;ensuring Russian hegemony in the “near abroad,” the independent countries that were part of the Soviet Union and the tsarist empire;substituting a multipolar international system for the US-dominated unipolar system of the 1990s and early 2000s;preventing “color revolutions” that the Kremlin believes overthrow legitimate, if corrupt and un-democratic, governments around the world;serving as a spoiler to the United States, undercutting US interests where possible, and using peripheral issues like Venezuela to sustain US-Russian dialogue and Russia’s role as an arbiter of international security; andundermining the rules-based liberal international order, which restricts Moscow’s pursuit of its declared interests in its neighborhood and globally, and the transatlantic alliance that undergirds that order.A late addition to the list was the imperative to thwart “color revolutions,” in which civil society groups drive anti-democratic leaders from power—as seen by Putin’s response to the Rose Revolution in Georgia in 2003 and the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004.Consistent with these policy drivers, the Kremlin has pursued an increasingly robust and mutually advantageous relationship with the leftist regime in Caracas since Chávez first reached out to Putin in 2000. By 2003, the two had met three times.3?For Putin, these contacts would be particularly useful as relations between the United States and Russia entered a downward spiral. The next decade and a half would bring the Rose and Orange revolutions, Putin’s sharp denunciation of the United States and the West at the Munich Security Conference in February 2007, the Kremlin’s cyberattack on Estonia in the summer of 2007,4?its invasion of Georgia in 2008, Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine and annexation of Crimea and war in Donbas in 2014, the Kremlin’s escalation in Syria in 2015 and challenge to American allies and forces there, and Moscow’s interference in the 2016 US presidential election.The political utility of the tie to Venezuela was evident in 2008, when Moscow sent TU-160 strategic bombers to Venezuela for a joint naval exercise in the Caribbean Sea.5?This served as a counterpoint to US support for an increasingly pro-Western Ukraine and for Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili during Moscow’s war on Georgia; Chávez offered Russia the use of a Caribbean coastal air base in 2010.Economic considerations provided additional reasons for Moscow to develop closer relations with Caracas. Venezuela became a significant market for Russian energy companies and arms makers, as Venezuela used Russian credits to buy $4 billion worth of weapons from 2005?to 2008;7?the principal Russian oil company, Rosneft, began to invest heavily in Venezuela.8Moscow’s backing of Maduro supports every element of Kremlin policy listed above. It intends to demonstrate Moscow’s great power reach, thwart US policy in its own hemisphere, and underscore that a multipolar world will replace the era of American predominance. For some Russian thinkers, it presents a potential “spheres-of-influence” bargain: Moscow could drop Maduro in exchange for Washington giving Moscow free rein in its own sphere of influence in Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova. Moreover, Kremlin policy seeks to undermine the international liberal order by supporting a friendly authoritarian ruler fraudulently “re-elected” and on the verge of falling to a democratic movement.In Venezuela as well as Syria, the Kremlin defends its strongman allies against the consequences of elections or protests, at least in part to keep the contagion of regime change from spreading to its own shores. The success of?Moscow’s policy in Venezuela rests on its military, economic, and financial clout. Russia’s investments and loans to Venezuela are certainly sizeable, but they have only kept Maduro afloat. As of July 2019, Venezuela currently owes $10 billion for the purchase of 36 Russian Su-30MK2s fighter jets,9?$1.1 billion for Rosneft investment into Venezuelan oilfield development,10?and has received more than $4 billion of investment from Russia, according to Russian Economic Development Ministry.11?Given Russia’s present economic status, it is clear while these numbers are only a fraction of Russia’s total assets, Moscow continues to show a strong political commitment to Venezuela through its sale of military equipment, sending military advisors, and receiving high-profile visits from Maduro and members of his regime to the Kremlin.Counting its nuclear and conventional arsenals, Russia is the world’s second-ranking military power,12?and over the past five years, Moscow has demonstrated its ability to deploy forces well beyond its neighborhood. Russia’s principal area of forward deployment has been Syria, where it has deployed the S-300 surface-to-air missile system,13?scores of surface-to-air bombers, Spetznatz forces, and the Wagner mercenary group.14?Moscow has also deployed Wagner to Africa and Latin America.Russia’s increased intervention in Syria in the fall of 2015 prevented the fall of President Bashar Assad’s regime, which had been steadily losing ground to various opposition groups. Moscow’s growing military cooperation with Caracas from the 2005 arms sales was initially much less ambitious. It served to strengthen a friendly regime through arms sales and to signal to Washington that Russia could operate militarily in the Western Hemisphere. Kremlin strategists saw this as a suitable response to US support for Georgia and Ukraine.But the starkly deteriorating circumstances in Venezuela over the past eighteen months have added a new urgency to this cooperation. Once again, Putin intervened to shore up an ally who was in danger of losing power. His first play—sending two TU-160s in December 201815—was dramatic but not particularly effective: while it signaled Moscow’s ability to put strategic weapons close to the United States, the bombers would offer Maduro no help against an enraged populace seeking his ouster. But as Maduro weakened in the first months of 2019, Putin supplied the same S-300 systems to Maduro that he had provided Assad.16?This play had two objectives. First, the S-300s could help deter US military intervention on behalf of Guaidó, whom Washington and other Western countries had recognized as the legitimate leader of Venezuela. (The Trump Administration publicly had left all options on the table for dealing with the growing chaos in Venezuela.) Second, the S-300s came with Russian “experts” (soldiers), who, along with the thousands of Cuban intelligence personnel in country, could provide security for Maduro.17US Russia war goes nuclearBeebe 19 (Beebe, George “We're More at Risk of Nuclear War With Russia Than We Think.” POLITICO Magazine, 7 Oct. 2019, magazine/story/2019/10/07/were-more-at-risk-of-nuclear-war-with-russia-than-we-think-229436. [George Beebe is vice president and director of studies at the Center for the National Interest, a nonpartisan think tank in Washington. He is also the former head of Russia analysis at the CIA, and the author of The Russia Trap: How Our Shadow War with Russia Could Spiral into Nuclear Catastrophe.])//LKIn the 1950s and 1960s, Americans genuinely and rightly feared the prospect of nuclear war with the Soviet Union. Schoolchildren regularly participated in air raid drills. Federal, state and local governments prepared for operations in the event of a nuclear emergency. More than a few worried citizens built backyard bomb shelters and stockpiled provisions. Today, that old dread of disaster has all but disappeared, as have the systems that helped preclude it. But the actual threat of nuclear catastrophe is much greater than we realize. Diplomacy and a desire for global peace have given way to complacency and a false sense of security that nuclear escalation is outside the realm of possibility. That leaves us unprepared for—and highly vulnerable to—a nuclear attack from Russia. Advertisement The most recent sign of American complacency was the death, a few weeks ago, of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty—a pivotal 1987 agreement that introduced intrusive on-site inspection provisions, destroyed an entire class of dangerous weaponry, and convinced both Washington and Moscow that the other wanted strategic stability more than strategic advantage. The New START treaty, put in place during the Obama administration, appears headed for a similar fate in 2021. In fact, nearly all the key U.S.-Russian arms control and confidence-building provisions of the Cold War era are dead or on life support, with little effort underway to update or replace them. Meanwhile, U.S. officials from both parties are focused not on how we might avoid nuclear catastrophe but on showing how tough they can look against a revanchist Russia and its leader, Vladimir Putin. Summit meetings between White House and Kremlin leaders, once viewed as opportunities for peace, are now seen as dangerous temptations to indulge in Munich-style appeasement, the cardinal sin of statecraft. American policymakers worry more about “going wobbly,” as Margaret Thatcher once put it, than about a march of folly into inadvertent war. President Donald Trump’s suggestion that the United States and Russia might explore ways to manage their differences diplomatically has produced mostly head-scratching and condemnation. In my more than 25 years of government experience working on Russia matters, I’ve seen that three misguided assumptions underlie how the United States got to this point. The first is that American policymakers think that because neither side wants nuclear war, then such a war is very unlikely to occur. Russia would be foolish, we reason, to cross swords with the powerful U.S. military and risk its own self-destruction, and many Americans find it hard to imagine that modern cyber duels, proxy battles, information operations and economic warfare might somehow erupt into direct nuclear attacks. If the Cold War ended peacefully, the thinking goes, why should America worry that a new shadow war with a much less formidable Russia will end any differently? But wars do not always begin by design. Just as they did in 1914, a vicious circle of clashing geopolitical ambitions, distorted perceptions of each other’s intent, new and poorly understood technologies, and disappearing rules of the game could combine to produce a disaster that neither side wants nor expects. In fact, cyber technologies, artificial intelligence, advanced hypersonic weapons delivery systems and antisatellite weaponry are making the U.S.-Russian shadow war much more complex and dangerous than the old Cold War competition. They are blurring traditional lines between espionage and warfare, entangling nuclear and conventional weaponry, and erasing old distinctions between offensive and defensive operations. Whereas the development of nuclear weaponry in the Cold War produced the concept of mutually assured destruction and had a restraining effect, in the cyber arena, playing offense is increasingly seen as the best defense. And in a highly connected world in which financial networks, commercial operations, media platforms, and nuclear command and control systems are all linked in some way, escalation from the cyber world into the physical domain is a serious danger. Cyber technology is also magnifying fears of our adversaries’ strategic intentions while prompting questions about whether warning systems can detect incoming attacks and whether weapons will fire when buttons are pushed. This makes containing a crisis that might arise between U.S. and Russian forces over Ukraine, Iran or anything else much more difficult. It is not hard to imagine a crisis scenario in which Russia cyber operators gain access to a satellite system that controls both U.S. conventional and nuclear weapons systems, leaving the American side uncertain about whether the intrusion is meant to gather information about U.S. war preparations or to disable our ability to conduct nuclear strikes. This could cause the U.S. president to wonder whether he faces an urgent “use it or lose it” nuclear launch decision. It doesn’t help that the lines of communication between the United States and Russia necessary for managing such situations are all but severed. A related, second assumption American policymakers make is seeing the Russian threat as primarily a deterrence problem. The logic goes something like this: Wars often happen because the states that start them believe they can win, but the United States can disabuse a would-be aggressor of this belief through a show of force, thus deterring conflict. Indeed, Washington seems convinced that showing the Kremlin it will punish Russian transgressions—through toughened economic sanctions, an enhanced military posture in Europe and more aggressive cyber operations—is the best path to preserving peace. But, when dealing with states that believe they are under some form of assault, focusing on deterrence can be counterproductive. Rather than averting aggression by demonstrating the will to fight back, America might be unintentionally increasing the odds of a war. To a great degree, this is the situation the United States already faces. Years of enlargement of NATO and perceived U.S. involvement in Russia’s internal affairs have convinced the Kremlin that America poses an existential threat. In turn, Russia’s meddling in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, coupled with a string of aggressions against its neighbors, have convinced Washington that Moscow is going for the West’s jugular. The United States experienced this spiral phenomenon with Georgia in 2008. Convinced that Russia harbored aggressive designs on its southern neighbor, Washington policymakers accelerated U.S. military training in Georgia, openly advocated bringing Tbilisi into the NATO alliance and issued multiple warnings to Moscow against military action, believing this firm resolve would deter Russian aggression. In fact, it had the opposite effect. Russia grew increasingly alarmed by the prospect of Georgian membership in NATO, while Tbilisi felt emboldened to launch a military operation in the breakaway Georgian region of South Ossetia, which yielded an immediate and massive Russian military response. Lastly, the United States assumes that Russia’s anti-American hostility flows from the internal nature of its regime, and therefore is likely to diminish when a more enlightened leader with more liberal approaches succeeds Putin. Sooner or later, the unsatisfied longing for freedom will produce new leadership in Russia that will advance liberal reforms and seek cordial relations with Washington, just as Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin once did. Compromising with the Putin regime, American policymakers believe, is not only immoral, but also unnecessary and counterproductive. But the notion that Moscow hates us for what we are—a democracy—rather than the ways we influence important Russian interests is inconsistent with Russia’s business-like, if not cordial, relations with democracies that it does not see as threatening, including Israel, India and Japan. Moreover, Putin’s domestic critics include not only the country’s narrow slice of liberal reformers but also its wider expanse of hard-liners on the left and right who think he has been too soft on Washington. The reality is that Russia’s differences with Washington flow from a deep mix of geopolitical, perceptual, historical and systemic factors that will not go away once Putin eventually does. Managing and containing the combustive mixture of volatile factors in the U.S.-Russian relationship is a daunting, but far from impossible, challenge. Washington’s approach must dispassionately balance firmness with accommodation, military readiness with diplomatic outreach—all without skewing too far toward either concession or confrontation. It’s a difficult balance, but the United States is not even attempting it at the moment. It will require more robust U.S.-Russian communication, as well as new rules of the game to deal with new weapons systems, game-changing cyber technologies and the shifting geopolitical order. None of this will be possible, however, absent a recognition that real danger is looming—not a modern variation of World War II-style planned aggression, but a nascent World War I-type escalatory spiral that few recognize is developing. That danger could end catastrophically if nothing changes.It outweighs the disad –?US-Russia nuclear war is the most probable extinction scenarioCotton-Barratt '17 (Owen Cotton-Barratt, PhD in Pure Mathematics, Oxford, Lecturer in Mathematics at Oxford, Research Associate at the Future of Humanity Institute, Sebastian Farquhar, DPhil student in Computer Science at the University of Oxford supervised by Yarin Gal as part of the CDT for Cyber Security, John Halstead, a policy and charity researcher with expertise across a broad range of fields including climate change, geoengineering, global catastrophic risk, road safety, and immigration, part of the research team at Founders Pledge, an NGO providing philanthropic advice to founders of tech companies, Stefan Schubert, Ph.D. in philosophy from Lund Uniersity, researcher at the the Social Behaviour and Ethics Lab, University of Oxford, working in the intersection of moral psychology and philosophy, Haydn Belfield, Associate Fellow at the Leverhulme Centre for the Future of Intelligence, has a background in policy and politics, including as a Senior Parliamentary Researcher to a British Shadow Cabinet Minister, as a Policy Associate to the University of Oxford’s Global Priorities Project, and a degree in Philosophy, Politics and Economics from Oriel College, University of Oxford. Andrew Snyder-Beattie, Director of Research at the Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford, where he manages a number of research, outreach, and fundraising activities, fellow in the Emerging Leaders in Biosecurity Initiative from the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security; 2-21-2017; "Existential Risk"; , Future of Humanity Institute, accessed 12-1-2019; JPark)The bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki demonstrated the unprecedented destructive power of nuclear weapons. However, even in an all-out nuclear war between the United States and Russia, despite horrific casualties, neither country’s population is likely to be completely destroyed by the direct effects of the blast, fire, and radiation.8 The aftermath could be much worse: the burning of flammable materials could send massive amounts of smoke into the atmosphere, which would absorb sunlight and cause sustained global cooling, severe ozone loss, and agricultural disruption – a nuclear winter. According to one model 9 , an all-out exchange of 4,000 weapons10 could lead to a drop in global temperatures of around 8°C, making it impossible to grow food for 4 to 5 years. This could leave some survivors in parts of Australia and New Zealand, but they would be in a very precarious situation and the threat of extinction from other sources would be great. An exchange on this scale is only possible between the US and Russia who have more than 90% of the world’s nuclear weapons, with stockpiles of around 4,500 warheads each, although many are not operationally deployed.11 Some models suggest that even a small regional nuclear war involving 100 nuclear weapons would produce a nuclear winter serious enough to put two billion people at risk of starvation,12 though this estimate might be pessimistic.13 Wars on this scale are unlikely to lead to outright human extinction, but this does suggest that conflicts which are around an order of magnitude larger may be likely to threaten civilisation. It should be emphasised that there is very large uncertainty about the effects of a large nuclear war on global climate. This remains an area where increased academic research work, including more detailed climate modelling and a better understanding of how survivors might be able to cope and adapt, would have high returns. It is very difficult to precisely estimate the probability of existential risk from nuclear war over the next century, and existing attempts leave very large confidence intervals. According to many experts, the most likely nuclear war at present is between India and Pakistan.14 However, given the relatively modest size of their arsenals, the risk of human extinction is plausibly greater from a conflict between the United States and Russia. Tensions between these countries have increased in recent years and it seems unreasonable to rule out the possibility of them rising further in the future.SolvencyPlan: The United States should end its use of secondary sanctions on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.Gaspard 7/22.?(Patrick Gaspard, 7-22-2020, accessed on 7-22-2020, Kitv, "In Venezuela, US sanctions are only hurting", ) // djbAs president of the Open Society Foundations, which is supporting responses to the humanitarian crisis in Venezuela, I have also seen the opposite -- broad sanctions hurting ordinary people, and entrenching the power of those at the top. This is what is happening now in Venezuela, with the odds stacked against free and fair legislative elections in December, and an opposition divided and tarnished by scandals. It is time for the United States to stop being part of the problem and be part of an international effort to address ongoing humanitarian catastrophe. Unfortunately, there seems to be little hope of this happening under the Trump Administration, especially with some members of the Republican Party eager to use fantasies of military intervention or regime collapse to inspire Florida voters in November. On their part, the Democrats should keep their options open, and avoid a battle to out-tough President Trump on Venezuela. The need to lift all sanctions contributing to the humanitarian crisis in Venezuela is clear. Remaining sanctions, targeting corrupt and abusive officials, should align with diplomacy. Using sanctions as a scalpel, and not as a sledgehammer, the United States should actively engage in midwifing additional humanitarian agreements -- such as the recent initiative with the Pan American Health Organization -- that allow international assistance to reach the country, and eventually enable a path to free and fair elections. More broadly, it is time for Washington to take a step back and review its approach to the use of sanctions globally -- with the State Department, House Foreign Affairs Committee, and Senate Committee on Foreign Relations working to develop a set of principles to prevent a mess like Venezuela from happening again. The United Nations is the only international actor with the capacity and experience to tackle a crisis like Venezuela's. At the Security Council, the US could foster a resolution based on a minimum consensus with China and Russia of allowing and supporting in-country operations of the World Food Programme to prevent a famine. From there, together with the European Union and Latin American governments, the US should work with all political factions to build a path to free and fair elections. US interests would be best served by prioritizing what Venezuelans need most to reclaim their destiny: address the humanitarian crisis that has caused millions to flee, and eventually support Venezuelans in designing their own way back to the ballot box -- in that specific order.1AR – Case 1AR – XT: Sanctions k2 Maduro Sanctions make Venezuelans more sympathetic to Maduro regimeO’Neil 18 [(Shannon K. O’Neil - vice president, deputy director of studies, and Nelson and David Rockefeller senior fellow for Latin America Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. She is an expert on Latin America, global trade, U.S.-Mexico relations, corruption, democracy, and immigration) “A Venezuelan Refugee Crisis” Council on Foreign Relations, February 2018] FPThese actions could cause further hardship for Venezuelans if the regime does not fall quickly (which has been the experience with other sanctioned regimes), resulting in more refugees. Moreover, polls show that sanctions are unpopular even among Venezuelans who support the opposition; therefore, outside economic pressure risks increasing overall sympathy for the regime rather than weakening its political hold. A major impediment to the success of these diplomatic and economic policy options is the criminal history of many Venezuelan government officials. The top echelon includes individuals already sanctioned by the United States for human rights abuses, corruption, and undemocratic practices. Sealed indictments allegedly detail Venezuelan officials’ roles in drug trafficking and extensive corruption. For these officials, a democratic transition would likely mean incarceration; this possibility hardens their resolve to remain in power. Military action, which the Trump administration has floated as a possibility, is inappropriate for this situation. The concrete objectives for such action remain vague, and significant resources would be necessary to occupy the nation for what could be an extended period of time. While a military option could begin with air and other limited strikes, the significant possibility of a government collapse and ensuing civil war would require preparation for a full-blown invasion and occupation. Venezuela is double the size of Iraq; to secure it, the U.S. military would need to plan for the presence of 150,000 or more troops. Much as in Iraq, these forces would likely need to remain not only to oversee new elections but also to enable a democratically elected government to regain control of portions of the country, to maintain stability, and potentially to rebuild physical and other infrastructure. A Venezuelan presence would draw attention and resources away from other security threats around the globe. Polls show a majority of Venezuelans, and a plurality of opposition supporters, are against current U.S. financial sanctions. A military intervention would be even less popular. U.S. troops would be greeted, at least by a significant segment of the population, as oppressors. The United States would also face staunch opposition from other Latin American nations, which roundly condemned President Trump’s suggestion of a military option last year. While a number of Latin American nations might be convinced to join the United States, Canada, and the European Union in sanctioning individual Venezuelan leaders for human rights, corruption, and other abuses (they have yet to do so), any military involvement or action by Venezuela’s neighbors, whether with the United States or on their own, would run counter to over one1AR – AT: Russia War GoodRussia will retaliate laterDallas Boyd 16, Program Analyst, National Nuclear Security Administration, Spring 2016, “Revealed Preference and the Minimum Requirements of Nuclear Deterrence,” Strategic Studies Quarterly, Vol. 10, No. 1, p. 43-73Central to the question of the minimum requirements of nuclear deterrence are the criteria for a deterrent force to be considered “credible.” Conventional wisdom holds that several characteristics are necessary to apply this label, among them survivable second-strike weapons and command and control facilities. However, the definition of a secondstrike weapon is somewhat nebulous. At the most basic level, a state is “nuclear capable” if it has sufficient fissile material and expertise to build a nuclear explosive device. The next level is achieved when a state actually builds said device. More credible still is a confirmation to that effect in the form of an explosive test, along with a demonstrated means of delivery such as a ballistic missile.41 Finally, a state may take measures to place its weapons beyond the reach of an enemy attack, usually by deploying them on mobile launchers or submarines or within hardened missile silos. Victor Cha, who served as a policy adviser on the National Security Council during the George W. Bush administration, presents two additional criteria in an analysis of North Korea’s deterrent: a proven missile reentry capability and evidence of warhead miniaturization. Without these capabilities, he writes, Pyongyang’s small arsenal “does not come close to a credible nuclear deterrent,” and the regime “gets no added security from these weapons.”42If the United States’ anxiety over nuclear terrorism is any guide, these requirements vastly overstate the threshold for credibility. After all, the fear that North Korea might transfer a nuclear weapon to terrorists has been central to the case for reversing its nuclear program. If these weapons pose a catastrophic threat in the hands of extremists, on what basis should they be considered less threatening when deployed by their original owners? In truth, Pyongyang can have confidence in its minimalist posture for two reasons. First, contrary to the emphasis placed on strategic delivery vehicles, such platforms are not necessary for nuclear retaliation. In extreme circumstances, a variety of unconventional delivery means can be used. As the late political scientist Kenneth Waltz observed, “Everybody seems to believe that terrorists are capable of hiding bombs. Why should states be unable to do what terrorist gangs are thought to be capable of?”43 Second, no arbitrary deadline exists for a state to respond to a nuclear attack. Retaliation may come weeks or even months after a first strike, providing ample time to prepare nondeployed warheads or even construct a makeshift weapon from available nuclear material. Together these concepts call into question the key assumption on which nuclear primacy rests: that a nuclear counterstrike must come immediately and in the form of ballistic missile attacks, or not at all. This questionable premise permits US leaders to entertain first strike scenarios that are wildly at odds with their apparent tolerance for risk.Strikes failBill Gertz 9/6, senior editor and reporter for Washington Beacon and the Washington Post, 9/6/18, “U.S. Lacks Nuclear Weapon for Hardened Underground Targets,” administration plans to upgrade the military's aging nuclear arsenal do not include a new weapon that experts say is needed to blast deeply buried, hardened targets used by Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran to house their leaders and weapons.The Air Force announced recently that a B-2 bomber at Nellis Air Force Base conducted a simulated test of the modernized B61 nuclear gravity bomb that the Pentagon says will have some earth-penetrating capability.However, the B61 Mod 12 will not be capable of exploding through hundreds of feet of rock or concrete that protects Russia's Kasvinsky Mountain nuclear command post, or key underground command centers in the 3,000-mile-long Great Underground Wall complex that houses China's nuclear forces and leaders.North Korea and Iran also have dug deep underground bunkers to hide leaders and protect weapons systems from precision aircraft and missile strikes.Rogue AI won’t cause extinction---strategist think the actual risk is from integration with nuclear weapons which the EPA wouldn’t stop!Andrew J. Lohn 18, Ph.D. in electrical engineering, University of California Santa Cruz, engineer at the RAND Corporation and a professor of public policy at the Pardee RAND Graduate School, et al., 4/30/18, “Will artificial intelligence undermine nuclear stability?” intelligence and nuclear war have been fiction clichés for decades. Today’s AI is impressive to be sure, but specialized, and remains a far cry from computers that become self-aware and turn against their creators. At the same time, popular culture does not do justice to the threats that modern AI indeed presents, such as its potential to make nuclear war more likely even if it never exerts direct control over nuclear weapons.? Russian President Vladimir Putin recognized the military significance of AI when he declared in September that the country that leads in artificial intelligence will eventually rule the world. He may be the only leader to have put it so bluntly, but other world powers appear to be thinking similarly. Both China and the United States have announced ambitious efforts to harness AI for military applications, stoking fears of an incipient arms race.? In the same September speech, Putin said that AI comes with “colossal opportunities” as well as “threats that are difficult to predict.” The gravest of those threats may involve nuclear stability—as we describe in a new RAND publication that outlines a few of the ways in which stability could be strained.? Strategic stability exists when governments aren’t tempted to use nuclear threats or coercion against their adversaries. It involves more than just maintaining a credible ability to retaliate after an enemy attack. In addition to that deterrent, nuclear stability requires assurance and reassurance. When a nation extends a nuclear security guarantee to allies, the allies must be assured that nukes will be launched in their defense even if the nation extending the guarantee must put its own cities at risk. Adversaries need to be reassured that forces built up for deterrence and to protect allies will not be used without provocation. Deterrence, assurance, and reassurance are often at odds with each other, making nuclear stability difficult to maintain even when governments have no interest in attacking each other.? In a world where increasing numbers of rival states are nuclear-armed, the situation becomes almost unmanageable. In the 1970s, four of the five declared nuclear powers primarily targeted their weapons on the fifth, the Soviet Union (Beijing, after its 1969 border clashes with the Soviet Union, feared Moscow much more than Washington). It was a relatively simple bilateral stand-off between the Bolsheviks and their many adversaries. Today, nine nuclear powers are entangled in overlapping strategic rivalries—including Israel, which has not declared the nuclear arsenal that it is widely believed to possess. While the United States, the United Kingdom, and France still worry about Russia, they also fret about an increasingly potent China. Beijing’s rivals include not just the United States and Russia but India as well. India fears China too, but primarily frets about Pakistan. And everyone is worried about North Korea.? In such a complex and dynamic environment, teams of strategists are required to navigate conflict situations—to identify options and understand their ramifications. Could AI make this job easier? With AI now beating human professionals in the ancient Chinese strategy game Go, as well as in games of bluffing such as poker, countries may be tempted to build machines that could “sit” at the table amid nuclear conflicts and act as strategists.? Artificially intelligent machines may prove to be less error-prone than humans in many contexts. But for tasks such as navigating conflict situations, that moment is still far off in the future. Much effort must be expended before machines can—or should—be relied on for consistent performance of the extraordinary task of helping the world avoid nuclear war. Recent research suggests that it is surprisingly simple to trick an AI system into reaching incorrect conclusions when an adversary gets to control some of the inputs, such as how a vehicle is painted before it is photographed.If AI is powerful enough to cause their impact, nothing can stop it Edward Moore Geist 15, MacArthur Nuclear Security Fellow at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation, 8/9/15, “Is artificial intelligence really an existential threat to humanity?,” misguided approach to the control problem. The findings of artificial intelligence researchers bode ill for Bostrom’s recommendations for how to prevent superintelligent machines from determining the fate of mankind. The second half of Superintelligence is devoted to strategies for approaching what Bostrom terms the “control problem.” While creating economic or ecological incentives for artificial intelligences to be friendly toward humanity might seem like obvious ways to keep AI under control, Bostrom has little faith in them; he believes the machines will be powerful enough to subvert these obstacles if they want. Dismissing “capability control” as “at best, a temporary and auxiliary measure,” he focuses the bulk of his analysis on “giving the AI a final goal that makes it easier to control.” Although Bostrom acknowledges that formulating an appropriate goal is likely to be extremely challenging, he is confident that intelligent machines will aggressively protect their “goal content integrity” no matter how powerful they become—an idea he appears to have borrowed from AI theorist Stephen Omohundro. Bostrom devotes several chapters to how to specify goals that can be incorporated into “seed AIs,” so they will protect human interests once they become superintelligent.If machines are somehow able to develop the kind of godlike superintelligence Bostrom envisions, artificial intelligence researchers have learned the hard way that the nature of reason itself will work against this plan to solve the “control problem.” The failure of early AI programs such as the General Problem Solver to deal with real-world problems resulted in considerable part from their inability to redefine their internal problem representation; if their designers failed to provide an efficient way to represent the problem in the first place, the programs usually choked.1AR – AT: DA – Terror 1AR – Sanctions Turn Sanctions on Venezuela embolden ties between Maduro and Iran and increase risk of a terrorist attackCafiero 5/28 – [(Giorgio Cafiero is the CEO of Gulf State Analytics a Washington, DC-based geopolitical risk consultancy) “It's US foreign policy that gives life to Iran-Venezuela solidarity” May 28 2020, ]A stronger relationship between the two will trigger another headache for the US, but this time in its own hemisphere. When Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was the president of Iran, the Islamic Republic made inroads across various Latin American countries. To the ire of Washington, Tehran deepened its links with left-wing governments in Bolivia, Brazil, Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Venezuela during those years. Such relationships, which spoke volumes about the growth of South-South relations in the 21st century, were largely a product of shared grievances and a common determination to challenge US hegemony in a world growing more multipolar. Today, the Trump administration’s foreign policy remains heavily focused on imposing “maximum pressure” on Iran. Although most discussions about this anti-Iranian agenda pertain to Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere in the Middle East, there have been implications for Latin America. The pressure that Washington has put on Argentina, Colombia, Honduras, and Paraguay to designate Hezbollah a “terrorist” organisation underscores the US administration’s determination to eject Tehran’s influence from Latin America. Washington is now focusing energy on pressuring Venezuela, where Washington maintains that Hezbollah has its Western Hemisphere foothold, into severing its relations with Iran. The Trump administration’s recent threats to use military force to prevent Iranian oil tankers from reaching the South American country underscore the extent to which the White House views the growth of Iranian-Venezuelan relations as a grave threat. Earlier this month, Trump’s administration condemned Iran — plus China, Cuba, and Russia — for giving support to “the illegitimate and tyrannical regime of Nicolas Maduro,” and vowing to continue applying “maximum pressure” against Caracas “until Maduro's hold on Venezuela is over.” Michael G. Kozak, Acting Assistant Secretary for US Department of State's Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, accused Caracas of importing Iran’s “terror gasoline”. Yet despite the US attempting to prevent the Islamic Republic and Maduro’s government from growing any closer, the Trump administration’s policies have had the polar opposite effect. Today Iran and Venezuela are closer than ever before, largely because Washington’s efforts to bring down both governments have given these two countries virtually no choice but to turn to each other to circumvent American efforts to isolate and strangle Caracas and Tehran amid the global Covid-19 pandemic and period of collapsed oil prices. Across Iran’s political spectrum, many voices have been celebrating their country’s successful delivery of oil shipments to Venezuela without any US interception. One newspaper owned by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Javan, hailed the move as a demonstration of Iran’s “might under the nose of America” while others said that the deliveries “humiliated America.” Maduro’s own statements, expressing gratitude for solidarity from the Islamic Republic, and the displays of Iranian flags in the Venezuelan capital say much about the country’s appreciation for Tehran’s help. The Venezuelan president boasted that his country and Iran are “two rebel nations, two revolutionary nations that will never kneel down before US imperialism.” Venezuela’s Minister of Energy Tareck El Aissami tweeted: “We keep moving forward and winning.” As both Caracas and Tehran see it, the delivery of these tankers successfully called the Trump administration’s bluff and the US did not take actions to thwart the Islamic Republic from helping Maduro’s crisis-stricken government. Undeniable is that the Tehran-Caracas partnership has reached new heights. The IRGC’s warning earlier this month about the US facing repercussions if America “acts like pirates” vis-a-vis Iranian fuel shipments to Venezuela was significant as one analyst explained, “Iran-Venezuela ties are close, but Iran typically reserves this kind of language for its proxy forces, rather than extra-regional countries.” The growth of this partnership is an outcome of a common trend in international relations. States that are targeted by US sanctions tend to work together. While Iran-Venezuela relations predate the ascendancy of both regimes and go back to the Shah’s era when the two countries were founding OPEC members, their current relationship is special for its geopolitical context. A fair comparison is the Iran-North Korea partnership, which has evolved under rather similar circumstances. As Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei declared while visiting Pyongyang shortly after the Iran-Iraq war, “If big countries threaten progressive countries, then progressive countries should threaten them in turn.” Iran-Venezuela ties have been, at least up until now, largely symbolic. Yet there is potential for the relationship to become more substantial. As one expert on Iranian foreign policy opined, there is “huge potential” for bilateral cooperation to boost significantly in the upcoming months and years. If Trump is to secure a second term in November, the odds are good that his administration will continue efforts to topple Maduro’s government which could result in Caracas embracing military assistance from the Islamic Republic. The technology behind Iranian missiles, which have deterred Tehran’s global and regional adversaries from striking against Iran’s homeland, could possibly be transferred to Venezuela in order to strengthen the South American country’s own defenses down the road. Similar to how Iran and Russia worked in tandem to prevent their Syrian ally from falling from power throughout the post-2011 period, it is clear that Tehran is also joining Moscow in terms of investing resources and taking chances to ensure that Maduro does not fall in any US-backed coup or campaign of sabotage. As Venezuela’s head of state said, “Venezuela has friends in this world, and brave friends at that.” From the Iranian perspective, Tehran’s increased support for Caracas serves to remind Washington that the Islamic Republic not only challenges US interests in the Middle East, but also in America’s own “backyard”. By establishing stronger ties with Maduro’s government, the Iranians will likely be able to enhance their ability to force the US to deal with unpredictable blowback in the Western Hemisphere should there be a continuation of “maximum pressure” on Tehran. Put simply, the Iranian-Venezuelan partnership is a card that the regime in Tehran can continue playing in order to gain greater leverage as US-Iran brinkmanship remains intense. 1AR – Maduro Turn Maduro’s drug trade keeps Hezbollah aliveNeumann 19 [Dr. Vanessa Neumann is President Juan Guaidó’s appointed ambassador and chief of diplomatic mission to the United Kingdom. She is also the president of the British-Venezuelan Society and Chamber of Commerce, which is partnered with UK Trade & Investment’s Oil & Gas Team for the Americas, as well as the Caracas-based British-Venezuelan Chamber of Commerce. Prior to her diplomatic appointment, Dr. Neumann was a long-standing expert on crime-terror pipelines, the founder and CEO of Asymmetrica, and the author of?Blood Profits: How American Consumers Unwittingly Fund Terrorists, “How Hezbollah evades sanctions in Venezuela and partakes in Maduro’s drug trade”, Al Arabiya, 5-8-19, ] ARWhile Russian interference is likely to be bought off in a repayment deal with a post-Maduro government, Hezbollah will pose a different challenge. The US sanctions on Venezuela have had a secondary effect on Hezbollah’s finances, impacting the salaries of their fighters in Syria and degrading their military and terrorist capabilities. However, they still make a lot of money through the Maduro regime’s drug running, which continues to spike to horrifying proportions, as Maduro’s military-backed cartel scrambles for cash to get around the sanctions. Maduro’s military is making an estimated $8.8 billion a year from the trafficking of narcotics, gasoline, food, gold, and coltan. As we saw this week, they will not easily be moved away from their financial interests, which suits Hezbollah perfectly.1AR – Hezbollah ResilientHezbollah is resilient – regime change is ineffective, and Tehran continues to fuel terrorism regardless of sanctionsClarke 19 [Colin P. Clarke of Foreign Policy - Colin P. Clarke is a senior research fellow at the Soufan Center and an assistant teaching professor in the Institute for Politics & Strategy at Carnegie Mellon University. “Hezbollah is in Venezuela to Stay” 2/9/2019] RMRegime change in Caracas won’t change the country’s problematic relationship with the terrorist group.Responding to a question on current instability in Venezuela and the presence of terrorist groups in the region, specifically?Lebanese Hezbollah, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo confirmed in a recent interview that the Trump administration believes that the “Party of God,” as Hezbollah is known, maintains “active cells” in Venezuela. He went on to say that “Iranians are impacting the people of Venezuela,” because Hezbollah is trained, financed, and equipped by Tehran.Some security policy analysts seemed surprised by Pompeo’s claims, but they shouldn’t be.?Hezbollah has long maintained a presence in Latin America, especially in the infamous Tri-Border Area, a?semi-lawless region?where Argentina, Paraguay, and Brazil converge. But even beyond the Tri-Border Area, Hezbollah is well-entrenched in Venezuela, where the Shiite terrorist group has long worked to establish a?vast infrastructure?for its criminal activities, including drug trafficking, money laundering, and illicit smuggling. For example, Margarita Island, located off the coast of Venezuela, is a well-known criminal hotbed where Hezbollah members have established a safe haven. Under the regime of former Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, the government took a more active approach to?offering sanctuary?to Venezuela-based supporters of Hezbollah.More controversial than what Pompeo said, however, should have been what he implied—namely, that regime change would rid Venezuela of Hezbollah. Whatever the benefits of replacing the current Venezuelan regime with Washington’s preferred alternative, there’s reason to doubt that it would change the country’s problematic relationship with the terrorist group.Hezbollah has a long and sordid history in Venezuela. A?cocaine-smuggling ring?active throughout the 2000s led by a Hezbollah-linked Lebanese national named Chekry Harb—a drug trafficker and money laundering kingpin who went by the nickname “Taliban”—used Panama and Venezuela as critical hubs in an operation that?sent narcotics?from Colombia to the United States, West Africa, the Middle East, and Europe. Proceeds from the cocaine-trafficking ring were laundered into Colombian pesos or Venezuelan bolivars, with Hezbollah?netting?between 8 and 14 percent of profits.Hezbollah’s reliance on sympathizers within its diaspora communities, including in Venezuela, has significantly minimized the group’s potential exposure to detection.?Venezuela’s border security officials and law enforcement, amid the country’s general desperation, have been largely unwilling to resist bribes and kickback schemes offered by Hezbollah membersVenezuela’s border security officials and law enforcement, amid the country’s general desperation, have been largely unwilling to resist bribes and kickback schemes offered by Hezbollah members and their cadres.Given the?present instability?in Venezuela, it’s fair to wonder what would happen with Hezbollah under a government led by opposition leader Juan Guaidó, who was recently recognized as the legitimate ruler of the country by the United States and dozens of other nations, including European heavyweights France, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Spain.A government led by Guaidó would almost certainly be more active in opposing Hezbollah’s presence on Venezuelan soil, not just nominally but in more aggressively seeking to curtail the group’s criminal network and, by extension, the influence of Iran. As part of a quid pro quo for its support, Washington would likely seek to lean on Guaidó to crack down on any Iran-linked activities throughout the region.But there is a major difference between will and capability. And while a Guaidó-led government might initially demonstrate strong political will in countering Hezbollah and Iran—at least to appease the Trump administration—Venezuela as a country faces an immense challenge in attempting to rebuild its shattered society.?Pushing back against Hezbollah may simply fall much lower on the list of priorities for Guaidó and his administration than the United States might like.Pushing back against Hezbollah may simply fall much lower on the list of priorities for Guaidó and his administration than the United States might like.The uncertain nature of Venezuela’s security services and military suggests a serious capability gap to contend with when working with Caracas. Venezuela has maintained close links to Russia militarily, and it remains unknown what portion of the security services are or will remain loyal to Maduro. The United States experienced great success with?Plan Colombia, a multiyear, multibillion-dollar effort to engage in security cooperation with and build the capacity of Colombian law enforcement and military forces.But replicating the?success?of Plan Colombia, which helped the Colombian armed forces gain a significant advantage over the FARC, has proven elusive in other contexts, including in Mexico, where the Mérida Initiative, a security cooperation agreement between the United States and Mexico focused on counter-narcotics, failed to successfully combat drug trafficking and organized criminal networks in that country.CARLOS VECCHIODuring his first two years in office, President Donald Trump has demonstrated a desire to extricate the United States from costly overseas interventions. This is just one of several reasons why a “Plan Venezuela” aimed at helping that country rebuild critical government institutions may be unfeasible.To be successful, such a strategy would require a multiyear commitment of U.S. trainers (troops, contractors, or a mixture of the two) to work with Venezuelan authorities to counter the unique threat posed by Hezbollah, a group that combines terrorist and criminal activities to great effect. Another challenge is the baseline capability of the Venezuelan military and security services, certainly well below where Colombian personnel were when U.S. troops first began training them in the early 2000s.There is also the issue of Iran. Hezbollah is backed by a regime in Tehran that provides it with?upward of $700 million?annually, according to some estimates.?Venezuela serves as Iran’s entry point into Latin America, a foothold the Iranians are unlikely to cede without putting up a fight.Venezuela serves as Iran’s entry point into Latin America, a foothold the Iranians are unlikely to cede without putting up a fight.Moreover, Russia retains a vested interest in propping up Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and keeping him in power, given the longstanding relationship between the two countries. Moscow?recently warned?the United States against intervening in Venezuela militarily. Further, after?cooperating?closely in Syria, Hezbollah is now a known quantity to the Kremlin and an organization that President Vladimir Putin could view as an asset that, at the very least, will not interfere with Russia’s designs to extend its influence in the Western Hemisphere.If the Maduro regime is ultimately ousted from power, it will likely have a negative impact on Hezbollah in Venezuela. After all, the group’s tentacles extend into the upper reaches of Venezuela’s current government— HYPERLINK "" Tareck El Aissami, the minister of industries and national production, was designated by the U.S. Treasury Department under a counter-narcotics authority and allegedly has a close relationship with Hezbollah.Yet on balance, Hezbollah has deep roots in Venezuela, and completely expelling the group—no matter how high a priority for the Trump administration—remains unlikely. The best-case scenario for Washington could be an ascendant Guaidó administration that agrees to combat Hezbollah’s influence—if the new government?is willing to accept a U.S. presence in the country to begin training Venezuelan forces in the skills necessary to counter terrorism and transnational organized criminal networks with strong ties to Venezuelan society. But that scenario, of course, is dependent on the United States offering such assistance in the first place.1AR – Hezbollah Not ResilientCoronavirus, Israel, wildfires, and political exclusion have made Hezbollah weak AF – they have resorted to isolationism Dr. Eyal Zisser 5/6 [Eyal Zisser is a lecturer in the Middle East History Department at Tel Aviv University. “Signs of Hezbollah’s weakness” published on 05-06-2020] RMFor years, Hezbollah was able to control what happened in Lebanon from behind the scenes and maneuver the government in Beirut to do its bidding, while Hezbollah presented itself as the opposition representing the weak and oppressed in Lebanese society, particularly the Shiites, in their fight for social justice. Hezbollah also presumed to promise the Lebanese that its ongoing battle against Israel would not only not harm Lebanon but would bolster the country, allowing the citizens to continue living in comfort, freedom, and prosperity as the conflict went on.But Hezbollah's protective masks have been ripped off one after the other, and the organization has been exposed as an entity likely to wreak greater disaster than corona.The fires started at the end of last year after the Lebanese economy collapsed and the government was helpless to address the crisis. Hezbollah, which came under criticism as the "strong man" of the country, was at first embarrassed, then rushed to exploit the protests to put in place a government in which it and its allies could set the tone, a government that would not interfere with it and would not criticize its conduct. But the economic problems in Lebanon only grew worse when corona arrived. The Lebanese lira lost 100% of its value in the space of a few weeks, and over half the Lebanese were driven into conditions of dire poverty.Now the Lebanese are starting to acknowledge that the crisis demands that they fight not only corona, but also Hezbollah, which has turned Lebanon into a pariah nation and made it difficult for it to receive international aid. Only recently did Germany declare the entire Hezbollah organization – not only its military arm – a terrorist entity.Despite the troubles at home, Hezbollah wants to send a message of "business as usual" when it comes to Israel. Only a week ago, Hezbollah fighters breached the Israeli border, seeking to send a threatening message about what could happen if Israel dared to attack Hezbollah or Iranian assets in Syria. But it was actually a message of weakness, and like the previous times in the past few years, such as after Iranian Revolutionary Guards commander Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani was killed, it turns out that both Hezbollah and its Iranian patron talk a big game but do little, and are deterred and afraid right now that any escalation would not be to their benefit.All the organization wants is to be left alone so it and the Iranians can keep building up their forces. But it seems that the last thing Israel must do right now is let up the pressure if what it wants is to oust the Iranians from Syria and weaken Hezbollah.?1AR – No Hezbollah ImpactHezbollah has no motive to attack the US – Lebanon’s economy is in shambles and Nasrallah is terrified by American retaliationDaoud 1/13 [David Daoud, David Daoud is a research analyst at United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI), focusing on Hezbollah and Lebanon.?“Will Hezbollah’s Revenge on America Destroy Lebanon?” Published on 1/13/2020] RMAs Iran’s most prominent, powerful proxy, Hezbollah is committed to avenging Qassem Soleimani’s death. But the Party of God can't risk inviting the kind of U.S. retaliation that would push Lebanon over the edgeIran has declared that it has?concluded?its official retaliation for the death of former Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani with a largely symbolic missile strike on Iraqi bases hosting U.S. forces.However, it now remains to be seen how its "Axis of Resistance" will react, particularly Lebanon-based?Hezbollah.?While eulogizing Soleimani, the group’s Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah essentially declared?open-ended war?on all American forces throughout the Middle East,?irrespective?of an Iranian retaliation. But despite Nasrallah’s bellicosity, Hezbollah is too constrained by domestic factors to directly retaliate against U.S. forces. Indirect attacks are more likely.In his most recent remarks,?Nasrallah?conspicuously failed to commit his group to leading the retaliatory fight against U.S. forces. Instead, he stressed that Soleimani’s death was an attack on the entire?Resistance Axis, not just Iran or any one faction. He also included an important caveat: stressing Iran wouldn’t demand a response from its proxies, he noted that "the forces of the Resistance Axis must?[each] decide [for themselves], how will they deal with this event? How will they handle this event?"That concession to pragmatism is particularly vital for Hezbollah. For almost three months,?Lebanon?has been gripped by an uprising against its ruling political class. While this would-be revolution doesn’t?directly?threaten Hezbollah, it has virtually paralyzed Lebanon, catalyzing its economic collapse.As the crisis continues,?unemployment?is expected to?rise?exponentially, the Lebanese pound has unofficially become unpegged from the dollar, and even basic foodstuffs are becoming?unaffordable. Unchecked, these developments could further fuel the current state of civil unrest, potentially leading to widespread violence. The crisis has also begun?affecting?neighboring Syria, where Hezbollah has increasingly deepening interests.Hezbollah can’t sustain growth in such an unstable environment, thus – since the onset of the October 17 uprising –?Nasrallah?has?repeatedly?expressed?his group’s?fear?of Lebanon’s impending economic collapse. The group has therefore spared no effort – alternating between feigned conciliation, propaganda, harassment, and?even violence?– to end the protests. It has even acquiesced to forming an?ostensibly purely?technocratic?government – albeit one headed by a political ally,?Hassan Diab?– all to restore a semblance of Lebanese normalcy, where the economy would resume at least limping along.But Lebanon’s fragility will continue beyond the formation of a new government, limiting Hezbollah’s direct retaliatory options. Diab’s efforts to revive Lebanon’s economy will be difficult enough – due to his lack of broad domestic, particularly Sunni, legitimacy – without the impact on Lebanon of open Hezbollah-U.S. conflict. The group will therefore be forced to delicately balance its commitments to the broader "Resistance Axis" with its need to maintain its base country’s stability.The group must also consider that the United States could retaliate against any Hezbollah attack with economic sanctions on Lebanon itself, bringing about the group’s nightmare scenario of total Lebanese economic collapse.?The Trump administration has already signaled?its readiness?to levy sanctions against Iraq over potential fallout from Soleimani’s death, and would likely also not hesitate in levying penalties against Beirut, where Hezbollah possesses significant political influence. Pro-Western Saad Hariri’s departure from the helm of government makes this more likely. His replacement with the Hezbollah-aligned Diab would makes it more likely that Washington could discard its long-standing distinction between Hezbollah and "official Lebanon" if the group attacks American of FormBottom of Form1AR – AT: CP – Diplomacy PIC1AR – Maduro DeficitCant solve the net benefit – maduro will stay regardless of sanctionsAponte-Moreno 2-12 (Marco, 2-12-2020, “5 reasons why Trump’s Venezuela embargo won’t end the Maduro regime,” [Marco Aponte-Moreno is an Associate Professor of Global Business and Board Member of the Institute for Latino and Latin American Studies, St Mary's College of California])//LK [Accessed 7/28/20]The U.S. has announced an economic embargo on Venezuela, intended to put an end to President Nicolás Maduro’s authoritarian regime. In an Aug. 5 executive order, President Donald Trump said that the tough new sanctions – which target any company or individual outside of Venezuela doing business directly or indirectly with Maduro’s government – were a response to the Maduro regime’s “continued usurpation of power” and “human rights abuses.” All Venezuelan government assets in the United States are also now frozen. The new measures represent a significant escalation from previous sanctions, which mainly targeted government officials and some key industries such as oil and gas, gold and finance. But my analysis of Venezuela’s political and economic crisis suggests that an embargo alone will not provoke Maduro’s ouster. Here are five reasons why. 1. Venezuela’s economy is already broken Embargos are a foreign policy tool meant to pressure rogue governments into changing their ways by cutting off their cash flow. It’s too late for that in Venezuela. After years of mismanagement and corruption by the Maduro government, Venezuela’s economy is in shambles. The GDP has contracted by more than 15% every year since 2016. Hyperinflation hit 10 million percent in 2019. Maduro’s cash-strapped government defaulted on its dollar-based bonds in 2017. This year it has failed to make payments on US$1.85 billion that Deutsche Bank and Citigroup loaned Venezuela using the regime’s gold as collateral. Venezuela’s government is nearly bankrupt. But since this economic decline has happened gradually, beginning in 2014, wealthy Venezuelans – especially corrupt government officials – have already put their money overseas, primarily in European markets. For example, Venezuelans own some 7,000 luxury apartments in Madrid, according to The New York Times. American sanctions just can’t hurt Venezuela’s ruling class the way they might have several years ago. 2. The embargo leaves some cash flows untouched Trump’s harsh new sanctions on Venezuela are not a full trade embargo like the Cuba embargo, which has almost totally isolated the island from world markets since 1962. Imports and exports with the private sector – a still sizable market despite Maduro’s socialist policies – will continue to flow freely, as will remittances from Venezuelans living abroad. These two income sources both come in dollars, which is far more stable and valuable than the local currency. Combined, they can keep the ailing Venezuelan economy afloat for some time. An incomplete embargo, in other words, will not provoke complete economic collapse. The U.S. embargo is sure to be unpopular in Venezuela. A wall in Caracas reads, ‘Trump, un-embargo Venezuela.’ AP Photo/Leonardo Fernandez 3. The poor, not the regime, will be hurt the most Venezuelans with access to dollars – through remittances or savings squirreled away before the crisis – are surviving this crisis. They can afford food, medicine and gasoline, and buy other goods to barter. But most Venezuelans today are desperately poor. According to the United Nations, 90% of people there live in poverty. That’s double what it was in 2014. The Venezuelan minimum wage of roughly $7 per month is not enough to cover a family’s basic needs. As a result, malnutrition is spreading. Last year, Venezuelans reported losing an average of 25 pounds, and two-thirds said they go to bed hungry. The majority of Venezuelans rely on the government to eat. Its monthly delivery of heavily subsidized food and basic goods known as “CLAP” is a lifeline to the poor. If the government runs out of money, poor people will feel it the most – not the government officials and other Venezuelans with access to dollars. Venezuelan National Militia members carry boxes of subsidized food for distribution across the capital of Caracas, July 5, 2019. AP Photos/Ariana Cubillos 4. China and Russia still support Venezuela Maduro has few international allies. When the Trump administration led efforts earlier this year to recognize opposition leader Juan Guaidó as the legitimate president of Venezuela, 60 countries joined it. But China and Russia continue to be the Venezuela’s most powerful international boosters and have bailed out Maduro by giving his government massive loans in the past. Both have vetoed every U.S. effort to pass resolutions against Maduro’s government within the United Nations. China has exploited Venezuela’s vast natural resources for profit. Russia has made the South American nation a strategic geopolitical partner in the Western Hemisphere, a key ally in its efforts to undermine American influence. Neither of the two countries are likely to comply with an economic embargo to Venezuela. Analysts expect them to continue buying oil, gold and other valuable commodities from Maduro’s regime, providing much-needed cash to his government. 5. Remember Cuba? Embargoes rarely produce regime change of the sort Trump seeks in Venezuela. Just consider Cuba, which this year celebrated the 66th anniversary of its communist revolution – 57 years after the Kennedy government imposed a trade embargo against it. The Cuba embargo didn’t end the Castro regime; it fueled anti-American sentiment, handing the Castros an easy scapegoat for all the country’s problems – thereby improving the government’s own popularity. An embargo will almost surely do the same in Venezuela. Trump has given Maduro even more ammunition to blame the U.S. for his country’s economic woes. Maduro has been doing that for years anyway. Now, he won’t be totally wrong. Maduro will withhold aid if sanctions are removedRendon and Fernandez 6-22 [Moises Rendon, Director, The Future of Venezuela Initiative and Fellow, Americas Program, Claudia Fernandez, Research Associate, The Future of Venezuela Initiative, Can Sanctions on Venezuela Be Improved?, CSIS, 6-22-20, ] ARThe Treasury Department should continue to monitor and evaluate the effects of sanctions on Venezuela. But despite their flaws, unless the Maduro regime agrees to a democratic transition, sanctions should not be lifted at this stage. To do so would exacerbate the suffering of the Venezuelan people by prolonging Maduro’s grip on power while undermining the efforts of the international community to re-establish democracy and prosperity in Venezuela. The Maduro regime continues to downplay the humanitarian crisis in Venezuela, and there is no compelling evidence to suggest this will change significantly amid Covid-19. On the contrary, despite signing an agreement to address Covid-19 with the interim government led by Guaidó, the regime continues to systematically and deliberately block the work of vital humanitarian organizations, such as the World Food Programme, while jailing political dissidents, censoring journalists, and looting natural resources. If sanctions were lifted, there is no reason to believe that the regime—which has a history of mismanaging, politicizing, and neglecting welfare programs—would be willing, or even able, to alleviate the humanitarian crisis, the bulk of which began long before sanctions were imposed.1AR – AT: CP – Advantage1AR – Block Aid DeficitMaduro will block US aid until sanctions are liftedLaya and Vasquez 19— (Patricia Laya, Alex Vasquez, Bureau Chiefs “Maduro Shuns Humanitarian Aid While Asking for Sanctions Relief“, Bloomberg, 2-5-2019, Available Online at , accessed 7-28-2020, mysoor)Venezuela’s Nicolas Maduro has an offer for the U.S.: If you want to bring humanitarian aid into the country, you must lift economic sanctions first. The autocratic leader, who blames U.S. imposed sanctions for shortages of food and medicine that existed long before, said he will not allow the delivery of humanitarian aid expected to reach Venezuelan borders as soon as this week. The shipments are being orchestrated by Juan Guaido, who is challenging Maduro as the legitimate head of the nation, and an international coalition including the U.S. and Canada. “You want to help Venezuela? Then let the blockade end,” Maduro said on state TV late Monday night. “We are not beggars. You want to come humiliate Venezuela and I will not let our people be humiliated." Guaido said the aid would enter at points along Venezuela’s border with Brazil and Colombia as well as from an unnamed Caribbean island. The first bundles of food and medicine are expected to be handed over later this week in the Colombian border town of Cucuta. The looming showdown over aid represents a "lose-lose gambit" for Maduro as he will either have to allow the goods to enter the country, bolstering Guaido, or force the military to block the delivery, which would likely lead to more blow back in the streets, Eurasia Group Analyst Risa Grais-Targow said in a note on Monday. “In the next days they will be faced with an important decision, to stay alongside someone who doesn’t protect anyone or by the side of humanity and of patients needing help,” Guaido said of the armed forces in a press conference on Monday. "The moment is now, soldiers of the nation. Ask your family what is right." Maduro, who has largely allowed Guaido to roam the streets with no restrictions to take part in press conferences, speak with foreign leaders and hold daytime rallies, sent a not-so-subtle warning to the 35-year-old lawmaker seeking to unseat him: "Until when is he going to continue his virtual mandate? Until 2025 or until he ends up in jail by mandate of the Supreme Court?"1AR – US Intervention DeficitThe US has lost credibility -- further intervention allows Maduro to manufacture support against the oppositionBowman 19 [Bryan Bowman, 8-11-19, "For Venezuela's Opposition, the US is an Increasingly Uncomfortable Ally," Globe Post, ] GargIn early August, days before representatives from the Venezuelan government and opposition were scheduled to reconvene for talks in Barbados, the U.S. announced it would be imposing a near-total economic embargo on the country. In response, Venezuelan President Nicholas Maduro canceled the talks, scuttling hopes that the two sides could make progress towards a negotiated settlement to the country’s ongoing political crisis. For analysts following the stalemate, the timing of the new American sanctions was suspect. In January, U.S.-backed opposition leader Juan Guaido declared himself interim president and demanded that Maduro step down immediately. In the ensuing months, he even led several unsuccessful attempts to topple the government. But during the talks in Barbados, Guaido and his allies softened their stance, proposing the establishment of a transition government in which both sides would be represented before new elections would take place. The proposal, however, would go unanswered, as the announcement of the new sanctions – made by former National Security Advisor John Bolton in Lima on August 5 – led to the break down of the talks.“The U.S. knew perfectly well that there was a proposal on the table and that the ball was in the government’s court,” Phillip Gunson, a Caracas-based analyst with the Crisis Group, told The Globe Post. “It was either very clumsy or it was deliberate.” According to Gunson, the opposition negotiators were “taken completely by surprise” by the sanctions. And while Guaido and his allies in many ways remain dependent on American support, the Barbados episode highlights the extent to which the Trump administration and the various elements of the opposition have competing and divergent interests at play in Venezuela’s political drama. ‘Awkward Ally’There’s no certainty that Maduro would have accepted the terms of the offer made by the opposition in Barbados, but the undermining of the diplomatic process by the U.S. – intentional or not – has made the situation in Venezuela bleaker, both for ordinary people and for the opposition. “What was left is a country deeper in misery because of huge sanctions and an opposition that has largely lost a significant amount of credibility among internal factions in Venezuela, especially popular sectors,” Alejandro Velasco, a historian of modern Latin America at New York University and the executive editor of NACLA Report on the Americas, told The Globe Post. U.S. sanctions, imposed first by Barack Obama’s administration in 2015 and then escalated significantly by Donald Trump beginning in 2017, have taken a serious toll on Venezuelans. With the economy already suffering from severe hyperinflation, the sanctions have prevented a possible recovery and have made it difficult for the government to import medicine and equipment to sustain civilian infrastructure, like water and electric systems. The Washington-based Center for Economic and Policy Research estimates that American sanctions have caused the deaths of about 40,000 people since 2017, as Venezuelans with serious medical conditions have been forced to go with little or no treatment. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the United States is hugely unpopular among some sectors in Venezuela, particularly among “Chavistas” – the mostly lower-class supporters of former president Hugo Chavez and his United Socialist Party (PSUV), of which Maduro is the heir. “They don’t care,” Carolina Subero, a mother who is struggling to get medication for her epileptic daughter, said of the U.S., speaking to the German publication DW earlier this month. “They think they are hurting President Maduro, and they’re really hurting the people. If they really wanted something good for Venezuela, they would not be doing what they are doing right now.”Thus, Washington is an increasingly “awkward,” “uncomfortable” ally for the opposition, Gunson said. “The fact that the opposition is so dependent on the U.S. makes it’s very easy for the government to turn around and say, ‘well, these guys just represent the U.S. They’re traitors. They’re trying to overthrow the government because the U.S. wants our oil,” he said. “It’s hugely over-simplistic, but it is something that has a certain resonance with the Venezuelan electorate.” Divergent Interests The opposition’s dependence on the U.S. stems from the fact that it wields little power within Venezuela, even with its control over the legislative branch. Despite his dwindling popularity, Maduro maintains firm control over the supreme court and the military and has driven many opposition figures into exile or prison. Without outside pressure, Maduro would have little incentive to even negotiate with the opposition or allow Guaido to operate freely. Further, Guaido’s bloc also benefits from financial support from the U.S. government. On Tuesday, the U.S. Agency for International Development pledged an additional $98 million in aid for the opposition. But the aid also comes with its costs. “I think the opposition lost a lot of credibility by being so openly aligned with the United States in this effort to get Maduro out,” Daniel Hellinger, a Venezuela expert and professor emeritus at Webster University, told The Globe Post. Making matters more difficult for Guaido is the Trump administration’s refusal to back down from its hardline anti-Maduro stance. The U.S., along with about 50 allied countries, recognizes Guaido as the “legitimate” leader of Venezuela and maintains that Maduro is a “usurper,” arguing his 2018 reelection victory was illegitimate because high-profile opposition figures were barred from running. Even with the opposition’s efforts to find a negotiated solution, the Trump administration has little interest in compromise, as its hawkish posture plays well among many in the strategically important Latino community in Florida going into the 2020 election. The strategy is evidenced by the outsized role played Florida Republican Senator Marco Rubio in driving Washington’s aggressive Venezuela policy. “Trump in particular, and maybe Senator Rubio and others, require Maduro to go because they want to declare victory,” Gunson said. “And if he doesn’t go, their political interest is better served by rattling sabers and being very belligerent than it is by seeking a compromise.”1AR – Prosecution Deficit Extrajudicial prosecution can’t check corruption. False accusations, saber rattling, and perception mean prosecutions make peaceful negotiation impossible.Readers, 3-26-2020, "US indicts Nicolás Maduro and other top Venezuelan leaders for drug trafficking," Guardian, MVPAnother of the accused, Clíver Alcalá, broke from the Maduro camp in 2013 and and has admitted to?plotting to overthrow Maduro?with a mercenary army based in Colombia.Reached by the Guardian in the Colombian city of Barranquilla where he still lives, Alcalá said he had been mistakenly accused.“The Colombian authorities know where I am. They know I’m at home, and have no plans to run away,” he said. “I support the indictments against the Maduro regime but I’m a false positive. I shouldn’t be included.”The charges portray Venezuelan drug smuggling as a major national security issue. The justice department statement on the indictments said: “Maduro and the other defendants expressly intended to flood the United States with cocaine in order to undermine the health and wellbeing of our nation. Maduro very deliberately deployed cocaine as a weapon.”But US data for 2018, which shows 210 tons of cocaine passing through Venezuela, shows that six times as much passed through Guatemala in the same period.“The evidence they point to against Maduro is thin, which suggests this is more about politics than about drugs,” said Geoff Ramsey, director of the Venezuela programme at the Washington Office on Latin America thinktank. “Venezuela’s nowhere close to a primary transit country for US-bound cocaine. If the US government wanted to address the flow of cocaine they’d focus on corruption in places like Honduras and Guatemala – both governments that the administration has coddled in recent years.”The charges?torpedoed efforts to break a standoff between Maduro, supported by Russia and China, and the US-backed opposition leader, Juan Guaidó.On Thursday afternoon, Tarek William Saab, the prosecutor general and a close ally of Maduro, announced an investigation into Guaidó, Alcalá – the ex-general also indicted by the US – and a host of alleged co-conspirators.“Guaidó and his North American advisers planned to bathe Venezuela in blood,” Saab?tweeted?following the announcement.Just a day earlier, Maduro had extended an olive branch to his opponents because of the Covid-19 crisis.“I’m ready to meet with all sectors that want to talk about the coronavirus pandemic,” he said in a televised address on Wednesday.But that offer appeared to have been rescinded following the US charges.“From the US and Colombia they have conspired and given the order to fill Venezuela with violence,” Maduro tweeted on Thursday morning.“No negotiation is possible now,” said one source close to the US administration and the Venezuelan opposition. “There aren’t going to be elections, how could there be?”David Smilde, a Venezuela expert at Tulane University, said it would be “tragic” if the indictments stopped the Maduro government receiving international assistance during the coronavirus epidemic.He also added that the charges would make it harder for the US to force Maduro out.“These indictments seriously increase the exit costs for Maduro, Cabello and Moreno. It is hard to imagine Maduro being willing to do anything other than hunker down knowing he has a price on his head,” Smilde said. “These moves effectively ensure a longterm deadlock between the US and Venezuela, just as we have seen with Cuba.”Neg – Venezuela DA – Terror NC – CP The US should increase secondary sanctions on Venezuela.NC – DA Venezuela is Hezbollah’s forward operating base in the Western Hemisphere – it’s increasingly important to their regional agendaSavage 19 [(Sean, news editor at Jewish News Syndicate, former Middle East analyst at the David Project, and contributor to American Interest ), “Are Iran and Hezbollah turning Venezuela into their ‘forward operating base’ in the Western Hemisphere?” Jewish News Syndicate, 6/5/2019] JLThe ongoing?instability in Venezuela?under dictator Nicolás Maduro has continued the misery and suffering of tens of millions of Venezuelans. A failed uprising earlier this spring by National Assembly president Juan Guaidó, who the United States, Israel and many other Western democracies recognize as Venezuela’s leader, has only led to further entrenchment of Maduro and his regime.At the same time, Maduro is being heavily supported by international pariahs such as Russia, Cuba, Iran and its terror proxy Hezbollah, leading some to fear that the once prosperous South American country could turn into the next Syria as a hub for supporting international terrorism.“Venezuela has opened its doors to Iran and Hezbollah, giving them full access to Latin America,” Emanuele Ottolenghi, a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, told JNS.“Venezuela is their forward operating base in the Western Hemisphere. Iran and Hezbollah run many of their overt and covert activities from there. Preserving this relationship is paramount for their interests.”This alliance comes as U.S. President Trump has sanctioned the Venezuelan government in the hopes of helping Guaidó come to power peacefully. Yet Trump has made it clear that all options remain on the table when it comes to Venezuela.Sanctions drive Hezbollah out of Venezuela –?the plan emboldens Hezbollah and locks in its Latin American expansionism campaign Kahjjo and Jedinia 19 [(Sirwan, journalist and fellow at the Middle East Institute and Middle East Center for Reporting and Analysis and Mehdi, counterterrorism news analyst and producer at the US Agency for Global Media and former social media analyst at the US Department of State), “Could Venezuela Crisis End Hezbollah's Presence There?,” VOA News, 3/22/2019] JLAs the political and humanitarian tumult in Venezuela unfolds, analysts say illicit activities by Lebanese militant group Hezbollah in the South American country could be disrupted.Since the beginning of the crisis in January, many observers have been wondering about the future of the Lebanese militant group and its activities in Venezuela, particularly with growing U.S. sanctions on the Venezuelan government.For years, the government of embattled President Nicolas Maduro has maintained a close relationship with Hezbollah and its benefactor, Iran, which has empowered Hezbollah financially, analysts say.U.S. officials have been warning about Hezbollah's growing presence in Venezuela and elsewhere in Latin America."People don't recognize that Hezbollah has active cells — the Iranians are impacting the people of Venezuela and throughout South America," U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said in a recent interview with Fox Business Network."We have an obligation to take down that risk for America," he said.Hezbollah, a U.S.-designated terrorist organization, has been increasingly targeted by U.S. sanctions in the past few months.In October 2018, the Department of Justice named Hezbollah as one of the top five transnational criminal organizations in Latin America.In an attempt to step up efforts to prevent Hezbollah's illicit activities in the Western Hemisphere, the U.S. hosted a conference last December. It was attended by senior officials of 13 U.S. partners across the Americas who discussed threats posed by transnational terrorist groups.Analysts charge that recent U.S. sanctions against several key Hezbollah figures could ultimately harm the group's financial operations in Venezuela and elsewhere in Latin America.Hezbollah's financiers "have integrated themselves into [the Venezuelan] government in a variety of different ways," said Phillip Smyth, a research fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. "Everyone is kind of getting a cut from the apparatus."So, it wouldn't shock me if there are reverberations down to Hezbollah's finance network. The way [the U.S.] Treasury has done this is they've targeted certain individuals that are kind of key brokers of the Hezbollah money, so it will have its effect," he told VOA.Analysts say the relationship between the Venezuelan government and Hezbollah is largely centered on a strategic partnership between Venezuela and Iran, which provides Hezbollah members, facilitators, financiers?and fixers with the ability to covertly move people, money?and material.?An emboldened Hezbollah attacks the US –?captured operatives prove they seek retaliation against the Soleimani strikeMohamed 1/15 [(Salma, reporter for Arab News) “Hezbollah’s unsettling presence in South America” Arab News, 1/15/2020] BCEntrenched deeply over the years in South America, Hezbollah is arguably the only Shiite militia belonging to the Soleimani network that has the twin advantages of ability and proximity to consider retaliating against the Trump administration for the targeted killing of the Quds Force commander with a direct attack on the US.As recently as September, authorities in New York apprehended Alexei Saab, aka Ali Hassan Saab, an alleged Hezbollah operative who “conducted surveillance of possible target locations in order to help the foreign terrorist organization prepare for potential future attacks against the United States.”Unlike China and Russia, the US is an avowed enemy of Hezbollah, having long designated the entire group, including its political wing, as a foreign terrorist organization.In recent months, the State Department and Washington’s intelligence community have concluded that there is enough evidence to support claims linking Hezbollah to criminal activities, including drug trafficking, in South America and Europe.Much has been written about Hezbollah’s presence in the “triple frontier” area along the Paraguay-Argentina-Brazil border in South America. Since the Al-Qaeda attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, Americans have warned of potential terrorist cells forming in this under-policed corner of the continent.Hezbollah has been able to find a footing in the tri-border area by piggybacking on the Lebanese diaspora presence. The ancestors of South Americans of Lebanese descent began arriving in the area before 1930 and were mostly Christian.The fact that, today, more than 5 million Lebanese migrants and their descendants live in just two countries (Brazil and Argentina) has proved a distinct advantage for Hezbollah, which tries to cultivate intelligence assets from across the religious spectrum.Hezbollah has developed local contacts to facilitate as well as conceal its drug-trafficking, money-laundering and terrorist-financing operations. Since 2009, a number of Lebanese nationals have been sanctioned by the US Treasury for their connection to organized crime, involving drug trafficking and money laundering in particular.Just last month, the US Department of Justice sentenced Lebanon-born Ali Kourani, a naturalized US citizen, to 40 years in prison for his “illicit work” as an operative for ”the Islamic Jihad Organization,” the “external attack-planning component” of Hezbollah.Maximilian Brenner, of the Berlin-based Security Institute, sees a mixed picture emerging from recent developments. “In the US, significant progress has been made in terms of harnessing crime-fighting ops to curb Hezbollah,” Brenner said.“However, the international community is divided on the issue, with diverging interests preventing organized action to tackle Hezbollah also in the criminal — not solely in the international terrorism — context.”Jonathan Cardozo, of the Paris-based Media Research Inc., says there is obvious overlap between terrorism and illicit drug trade, but the motives are not necessarily the same.“Americans will find it very difficult, if not impossible, to combine the war against terrorism with the war against the drug trade, especially considering the differences in agency infrastructure, personnel and local assets,” he said.“Slow-moving bureaucracies are not equipped to fight guerrilla-style tactics of lawless — and ruthless — criminal and terrorist outfits. While terrorists and criminals certainly collaborate in many instances, it is incredibly difficult to pinpoint any grand strategy at play in Latin America between the two elements.”What is for certain, though, is that the rationale behind Hezbollah’s “South America strategy” is closely linked to its origin as revolutionary Iran’s most successful export.Even as Hezbollah’s domestic position was fortified by election successes and sectarian polarization, its aggressive anti-Western rhetoric and targeting of US and Israeli interests placed it firmly in the crosshairs of the two countries. On the other hand, distant South America, with its leftist political parties and “revolutionary” regimes, was a study in friendliness.Sympathetic South American governments granted Hezbollah a high degree of operational freedom. For instance, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, the socialist politician who served as Brazil’s president between 2003 and 2010, invested a lot of diplomatic capital in trying to forge a rapprochement with Hamas and Hezbollah as well as the two groups’ main backer, Iran.Da Silva’s initiative was part of a larger strategy of increasing Brazil’s outreach to, and strengthening bilateral relations with, Russia and Iran and their Middle Eastern allies, while effectively ignoring Washington’s concerns regarding the presence of Hezbollah cells in his country.According to Ghanem Nuseibeh, founder of strategy and management consultancy company Cornerstone Global Associates, Hezbollah has been active in Latin America for decades now.“The organization has been operating at the grass-roots level as well as attempting to infiltrate senior levels of government,” he said, pointing to the 2015 arrest of Dino Bouterse, the son of Suriname’s president, for inviting Hezbollah agents to establish a base in his home country in exchange for $2 million that was ultimately not paid.Under the current conservative government of Jair Bolsonaro, Brazil has made a U-turn with regard to its Iran policy. As an inevitable corollary, the country now has little tolerance for Hezbollah’s activities in the region. Argentinian foreign policy too has swung in the same direction as Brazil.An upshot of the rightward shift in the region’s political mood was the arrest in September 2018 by Brazilian authorities of Assad Ahmad Barakat, a man the Americans have long considered a key financier for Hezbollah.In contrast with the hardening stances of Brazil and Argentina, the government of Venezuelan socialist President Nicolas Maduro views Hezbollah as a natural ally as part of a policy first adopted by his predecessor, Hugo Chavez, who deepened ties with Iran when he came to power in 1999.Against this mixed background, security analysts say subterfuge and criminality remain the key elements of Hezbollah’s South America strategy. They say it will not be easy to cut Hezbollah down to size and deny it the ability to influence governments — or to carry out terror attacks if it wants to avenge the killing of Soleimani.There are possibly drug traffickers active in South America who are sympathetic to Hezbollah’s cause, the analysts say, adding that the fact that a group in control of 12 seats in the Lebanese parliament is involved in drug trafficking and fundraising halfway across the world is deeply worrisome, even without their terrorist connotations.Nuseibeh asserts that, going forward, “it is likely Latin America will be an even more important frontier for Hezbollah as it is a region in which the group has invested so many resources.”Clearly, in the absence of a firm and coherent response to Hezbollah’s activities in South America, the organization, fired with a zeal to avenge the death of Soleimani, could pose a serious security threat to the Western Hemisphere and beyond in the days to come.Trump responds to Hezbollah attack with unprecedented force Byman 17 [(Daniel, senior fellow in the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings, where his research focuses on counterterrorism and Middle East security. He previously served as the research director of the center. He is also vice dean for undergraduate affairs at Georgetown University’s Walsh School of Foreign Service and a professor in its Security Studies Program. Byman served as a staff member with the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States and the Joint 9/11 Inquiry Staff of the House and Senate Intelligence Committees.) “Trump and the next terrorist attack” Brookings, 5/3/2017] BCThe days after a terrorist attack are trying for any president. Initial reports of responsibility are often wrong, and the public response is a loud mix of fear, demonstrations of support for the victims, and calls for revenge. Americans look to the president and his advisors for information on the scope and scale of the threat, and as the repositories of national security information, the presidents has a tremendous opportunity to control our national narrative. As the cries grow ever louder, the president must show resolve and reassure the American people that the U.S. will respond effectively. At the same time, he must avoid overreacting.I worry that President Trump will bungle the response to a jihadist terrorist attack on U.S. soil, making the fear worse at home and helping the terrorists score a win.Although I’m on record saying that the terrorism danger to the U.S. homeland has so far proven manageable, some attacks are likely regardless of who occupies the Oval Office. Since September 11, 2001, 95 Americans have died from jihadist-linked attacks on U.S. soil—an average of almost six a year. Of course, we’ve seen near-misses like the 2009 “underwear bomber,” who was able to to slip a bomb through airport security. Especially with the rise of lone wolves, who are difficult to identify and disrupt, it is not realistic to expect the government to stop every terrorist attack. Finally, because of the steady success of the U.S.-led military campaign against the Islamic State, we should expect a rise in terrorism as the group seeks to demonstrate its relevance as it loses territory and prestige in the region. So we should recognize that some attacks are likely and, for Trump critics, that they are not inherently linked to who won the 2016 election. If and when it happens, it won’t prove anyone was right to vote for Hillary.Trump’s response, however, will tell us a great deal.The best response in the hours after an attack involves a mix of rhetoric, leadership, and caution. The president should publicly honor the dead and reassure Americans that the government is working to hunt down the guilty and care for those injured. At the same time, he should point out that American Muslims have proven vital allies against terrorism. As FBI Director James Comey put it, “They do not want people committing violence, either in their community or in the name of their faith, and so some of our most productive relationships are with people who see things and tell us things who happen to be Muslim.” Almost half of all tips on extremism come from the community.An immediate retaliatory strike—one that on its surface would signal toughness and thus be attractive to a president who talks about toughness a lot—might be a mistake. Initial information on responsibility or the extent of overseas links is often flawed or incomplete, and it is useful for the administration to assess a full range of options before plunging in. Since the Trump administration is already hitting the Islamic State hard, it’s difficult to imagine an easy way to ratchet up the pressure that does not involve significant costs or downsides. Instead, various agencies should be scrutinizing intelligence and security procedures to determine culpability and identify real and potential holes while the military and intelligence agencies assess options overseas.Based on his initial record in office and rhetoric on the campaign trail, however, Trump might opt for a disastrous approach. The president acts out of impulse, whether this involves sarcastic tweets to Arnold Schwartzenegger or the sudden decision to bomb Syria after the regime’s use of chemical weapons. It’s safe to say that restraint and deliberation are not characteristics of this administration—or the man himself. Perhaps even worse, this administration has a track record of mismanaging policy processes. This includes signature items like the “Muslim Ban” executive order or less prominent but important announcements, like the supposed deployment of an aircraft carrier to Korea. This bungling and the president’s many about-faces on issues have damaged his credibility as a messenger and are likely to make people more skeptical of the content of his statements and actions in the aftermath of a terrorist attack.The president is likely to want to overreact abroad. He seems to want to appear tough more than he wants to be effective. So he boasted, for example, about dropping a massive bomb on Islamic State targets in Afghanistan without waiting to learn whether it achieved its objectives. On the campaign trail, the president wanted to “bomb the shit out of them” even though it was not clear an increase in the scale of bombing would achieve much. Trump might also expand the war, bringing it to new zones that have only a tenuous Islamic State or al-Qaida presence. He has already authorized the intensification of US operations targeting Shabaab and increased the pace of strikes targeting terrorist groups more generally.Even more worrisome is what the President might do at home. On the campaign trail, the President repeatedly conflated Muslims and terrorists, and with tensions and emotions running high after an attack this demonization might be especially likely. In the name of border security, he might further limit immigration and travel from Muslim-majority countries or try to single out Muslims over other faith communities. He might embrace the decision to declare the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist group even though this would be counterproductive and cause difficulties with several allies. Surveillance of Muslim communities around the country might be stepped up, further alienating Muslims from law enforcement and make them less likely to turn in suspected terrorists. After 9/11, the United States detained over one thousand Muslims, gaining almost no useful intelligence but harming relations with the community. As Daniel Benjamin, a former senior counterterrorism official, warns, “Repairing the damage from that crackdown took years.”Such unthinking measures might benefit Trump politically while inadvertently helping the terrorists operationally. Trump would look tough, and his argument that the terrorism danger is high and Muslims are the enemy would be vindicated, at least to his supporters and to some who are undecided on this question. The Islamic State would gain more evidence to back up the narrative that the United States is hostile to Muslims, while the vast majority of Muslims who loath the group would be less eager to work against it because it means working with what they see as a hostile government. It’s just the American people who would suffer.A possible bright spot is that many of these potentially harmful actions depend on the so-called “axis of adults:” the seasoned and professional members of Trump’s foreign policy team. Secretary of Defense James Mattis, National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster, and FBI Director James Comey would be important players as events unfolded. They and their staffs must prepare politically for such an attack, developing a range of options and contingencies that vary depending on the scope and nature of the attack. They also need to be ready to make the case that prudence and planning should trump instinct and impulse, a particularly hard sell after American blood has been spilled. U.S. allies, or at least the few that have gained the President’s respect, must also be ready to make the case for a careful response. In the end, the best U.S. response may involve significant military force under U.S. leadership or other tough and controversial measures, but these are more likely to have sustained support if the President can convince skeptics he has explored all options and acted deliberately.Hezbollah turns the case – they prop up the Maduro regime and create a Latin American stronghold for Russia and IranSolomon 19 [(Jay Solomon- adjunct fellow with The Washington Institute; covered U.S. diplomacy, efforts to combat ISIS and other counterterrorism issues, and nuclear weapons proliferation. The Wall Street Journal nominated him for three Pulitzer Prizes during his nearly two-decade career with the paper) “Are Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah Trying to Reprise Syria in Venezuela?” The Washington Institute, May 23rd 2019] FPAccording to U.S. officials, Maduro’s allies may be finding new ways to prop up the strongman. In addition to buying up sanctioned Venezuelan oil to buttress his government’s finances, Russia is believed to have deployed around 150 military and security personnel in Caracas in recent months. Iran has commenced weekly flights to Caracas, potentially to ferry military supplies to Maduro. Meanwhile, Lebanese Hezbollah and Cuba have deployed a network of intelligence officials to help him maintain control of the military and the streets, according to Venezuelan and American officials briefed on the relevant intelligence.If Maduro survives, Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah would score another major victory against the West, essentially replicating their defense of Assad in the Western Hemisphere at a much lower cost in lives and treasure. They would also solidify a beachhead in Latin America through which to challenge U.S. allies while drawing from Venezuela’s enormous energy and mineral wealth. U.S. officials are particularly concerned about Hezbollah’s ability to exploit the weakened state to generate more revenue from narcotics trafficking.PRESSURE ON WASHINGTON TO DO MORETo deny a Maduro victory, the Trump administration has been imposing further sanctions on Venezuela and its allies, simultaneously working with National Assembly president Juan Guaido to split the military and political leadership from Maduro. Washington formally recognized Guaido as Venezuela’s leader in January after accusing Maduro of fraudulently extending his presidency. Fifty-three other countries have followed the U.S. lead.The Venezuelan opposition is pressing American officials to be even more aggressive, however. Steps now being considered by the administration include imposing secondary sanctions targeting any foreign firm or person that conducts business with designated Venezuelan entities. The Treasury Department is also studying whether to seize Venezuelan assets overseas, on the argument that they advance the Maduro government’s criminal activities. In addition, Washington is seeking to offer greater financial and diplomatic incentives to Venezuelan political and military leaders who break from Maduro and support Guaido, whose attempt earlier this month to spur military defections failed.MADURO’S TIES TO THE IRAN-RUSSIA AXISMaduro and his mentor, the late dictator Hugo Chavez, share a long history of aligning with Russia, Cuba, and Iran’s “axis of resistance” against the United States and Israel. Chavez regularly met with former Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a firebrand who threatened to wipe Israel of the map. Another veteran senior official, Minister of Industries and National Production Tareck El Aissami, has been designated a “drug kingpin” by the U.S. government and accused of bringing Hezbollah operatives to Venezuela. Earlier this month, the?New York Times?printed the contents of an internal Venezuelan intelligence assessment that concluded Aissami and his Syrian-born father had recruited and trained these operatives “with the aim of expanding intelligence networks throughout Latin America and...working in drug trafficking.”Because of these links, Maduro’s foreign allies were able to bolster Maduro quickly after Guaido launched his rebellion with U.S. backing in January. Moscow began ferrying supplies to Caracas, and Russia’s state energy company, Rosneft, increased oil purchases from Venezuela’s sanctioned energy behemoth, PDVSA. Rosneft has virtually taken financial control of PDVSA ever since the company began defaulting on Russian bond investments.These moves are in line with the conclusions of an unclassified U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency report released in February, which described how Russia has sought to expand its military and intelligence capabilities in Latin America through its relationship with Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua. The report cited open-source data showing that Russia shipped $11 billion in arms to Venezuela from 2001 to 2013, making the Kremlin the largest weapons supplier to Caracas by a large margin. The report also documented that Venezuelan soldiers regularly attend Russian war games, and that Moscow has deployed long-range bombers in Venezuela “to display Russian capabilities in a historic U.S. sphere of influence.” According to Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, Moscow holds so much sway there that it was apparently able to stop Maduro from fleeing Caracas earlier this month after Guaido sought to incite military defections. “He had an airplane on the tarmac, he was ready to leave this morning as we understand it, and the Russians indicated he should stay,” Pompeo told CNN.Tehran has likewise stepped up its diplomatic and financial support to Maduro this year. Iranian state media reported that Defense Minister Amir Hatami visited Caracas in January to discuss security issues, while senior Iranian officials traveled to Moscow in February to discuss support for Maduro. These trips echoed the secret Moscow meetings held by Russian and Iranian security officials in 2015, shortly before they launched a joint military operation to prop up the Syrian regime.Moreover, the Trump administration has been alarmed by Iran’s resumption of weekly flights to Venezuela in April, using national carrier Mahan Air. The Treasury Department sanctioned the airline in 2011 for allegedly?shipping weapons to allies in Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen?on behalf of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. U.S. officials worry that the Venezuela flights could be serving a similar purpose—especially since they commenced just a week after Maduro’s foreign minister, Jorge Arreaza, visited Lebanon and Syria to meet with two of Tehran’s closest allies: Assad and Hezbollah secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah.HEZBOLLAH OPERATIONAL AND DRUG ACTIVITYThe Trump administration is becoming more concerned about Hezbollah as the Venezuela crisis drags on. The Iranian proxy militia has been active in Latin America for decades, often infiltrating Arab emigre populations to conduct operations. For example, investigators concluded that the group coordinated with Iran to bomb the Israeli embassy and Jewish community center in Buenos Aires in the early 1990s, with some senior Argentinian officials accused of complicity in the latter crime. More recently, the Treasury Department blacklisted the Lebanese Canadian Bank in 2011 on charges of laundering hundreds of millions of dollars of Latin American drug money into Hezbollah accounts in Beirut.Today, top aides to Guaido allege that Hezbollah operatives have been working with Maduro’s government and Cuban intelligence to conduct surveillance on the Venezuelan opposition. They are also concerned that the group may be helping Maduro’s security forces conduct crowd control.Yet Washington’s biggest fear is that Hezbollah will use Venezuela’s financial and political turmoil to increase its drug revenues at a time when Iranian support for the group has been sharply curtailed. According to members of Guaido’s government, cocaine sales out of Venezuela have skyrocketed this year as Maduro’s financial woes mount. Much like the Lebanese Canadian Bank case, U.S. agencies have sanctioned a number of senior Hezbollah and Venezuelan officials in recent years for allegedly colluding to launder drug money (specifically, Latin American cocaine sold in Europe) via accounts in Lebanon.NR – Uniqueness Iranian sanctions weaken Hezbollah – they’ll looking to retaliate via oil warsSly and Haidamous 19 [Susan Sly, Education: Cambridge University, BA and MA in historyLiz Sly is The Washington Post’s Beirut bureau chief, responsible for coverage of Syria, Lebanon and the wider Middle East. She joined The Post in 2010 as Baghdad bureau chief, then in 2011 moved to Beirut to focus on Syria and the region. Before that, she covered Iraq for the Los Angeles Times and the Chicago Tribune. She has spent nearly three decades as a foreign correspondent, based in the Middle East, Africa, China, South Asia and Europe. She began her career with Lebanon's Daily Star newspaper in Beirut in the 1980s. Suzan Haidamous, Reporter with washington post currently in washington DC, U.S. sanctions on Iran hit Lebanon's Hezbollah hard , 2019/05/18, ] ARThe powerful Lebanese Hezbollah militia has thrived for decades on generous cash handouts from Iran, spending lavishly on benefits for its fighters, funding social services for its constituents and accumulating a formidable arsenal that has helped make the group a significant regional force, with troops in Syria and Iraq.?But since President Trump introduced sweeping new restrictions on trade with Iran last year, raising tensions with Tehran that reached a crescendo in recent days, Iran’s ability to finance allies such as Hezbollah has been curtailed. Hezbollah, the best funded and most senior of Tehran’s proxies, has seen a sharp fall in its revenue and is being forced to make draconian cuts to its spending, according to Hezbollah officials, members and supporters.?Fighters are being furloughed or assigned to the reserves, where they receive lower salaries or no pay at all, said a Hezbollah employee with one of the group’s administrative units. Many of them are being withdrawn from Syria, where the militia has played an instrumental role in fighting on behalf of President Bashar al-Assad and ensuring his survival.?Programs on Hezbollah’s television station Al-Manar have been canceled and their staff laid off, according to another Hezbollah insider. The once ample spending programs that underpinned the group’s support among Lebanon’s historically impoverished Shiite community have been slashed, including the supply of free medicines and even groceries to fighters, employees and their families.?The sanctions imposed late last year by Trump after he withdrew from the landmark nuclear deal aimed at curbing Iran’s nuclear ambitions are far more draconian than those that helped bring Iran to the negotiating table under the Obama administration, and they are having a profound effect on the Iranian economy, analysts say.Trump administration officials claim they have wiped $10?billion from Iranian revenue since November, inflicting widespread misery on the lives of many poor Iranians, as well as the government’s own spending.The tensions between Washington and Tehran spiked after further restrictions went into effect on May?2, eliminating waivers from eight countries that had previously been allowed to continue importing Iranian oil with the goal, U.S. officials say, of reducing Iranian oil exports to “zero.”?Many in the region say the ferocity of the sanctions offers an incentive to Tehran to push back against Washington, crossing a “red line” that will give Iran little choice but to retaliate, according to Kamal Wazne, a Beirut-based political analyst who is sympathetic to the Iranian and Hezbollah point of view.?“The Iranians are used to sanctions. But this level of sanctions will generate a different response. The Iranians will not be quiet about it,” he said. “They are a form of war more detrimental than actual war. .?.?. It’s the slow death of a country, the government and its people.”Although it is too early to confirm that Iran was responsible for the sabotage attack on four oil tankers near the Persian Gulf in the past week, as U.S. officials claim, “Iran has a major incentive to put the squeeze also on the U.S. economy by making the price of oil jump,” he said. “The pain will be reciprocated.”Hezbollah on the verge of collapse in Venezuela – continued sanctions are key Iran Focus 19 [organization with a network of specialists and analysts of the region and correspondents and reporters in several countries, “The Hezbollah-Venezuela Relationship”, 3-26-19, ] ARLondon, 26 Mar - The Iran-backed Hezbollah militant group could have its illicit activities in Venezuela disrupted due to the ongoing political and humanitarian crises besieging the country, according to some analysts.For years, Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro maintained a close relationship with Hezbollah and Iran, which empowered Hezbollah in terms of both money and influence. Now, the group can raise money through illicit means and funnel it through financial hubs in Central and South America.US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said: “People don’t recognize that Hezbollah has active cells — the Iranians are impacting the people of Venezuela and throughout South America. We have an obligation to take down that risk for America.”However, US sanctions on Venezuela, as well as increasing sanctions on Hezbollah and Iran are leaving many to speculate that Hezbollah may not be able to survive in the country much longer.In recent months, the US named Hezbollah as one of the top five transnational criminal organizations in Latin America, held a conference to discuss the threats posed by Hezbollah, and levied sanctions against several key Hezbollah figures.Phillip Smyth, a research fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, explained that Hezbollah’s financiers “have integrated themselves into [the Venezuelan] government in a variety of different ways”, so it is likely these sanctions will affect Hezbollah and Venezuela as a whole.NR – Link Venezuela has financial and logistical importance for Hezbollah-sanctions disrupt thatKajjo and Jedinia 19 [Sirwan Kajjo, Kajjo joined VOA in 2012 as an international broadcaster at the Kurdish service. He was born in the town of Amuda in northern Syria. He now works for VOA’s?Extremism Watch Desk, where he focuses on Islamic militancy, extremism, and conflict in the Middle East and beyond. Prior to joining VOA, Sirwan worked for a number of news outlets and research centers in Washington and abroad. He has written two book chapters on Syria and the Kurds, published by Indiana University Press and Cambridge University Press.?Mehdi Jedinia Jedinia is an Iranian-American journalist and social media activist.” “Could Venezuela Crisis End Hezbollah's Presence There?”, 3-22-19, VOA, ] ARAs the political and humanitarian tumult in Venezuela unfolds, analysts say illicit activities by Lebanese militant group Hezbollah in the South American country could be disrupted.Since the beginning of the crisis in January, many observers have been wondering about the future of the Lebanese militant group and its activities in Venezuela, particularly with growing U.S. sanctions on the Venezuelan government.For years, the government of embattled President Nicolas Maduro has maintained a close relationship with Hezbollah and its benefactor, Iran, which has empowered Hezbollah financially, analysts say.U.S. officials have been warning about Hezbollah's growing presence in Venezuela and elsewhere in Latin America."People don't recognize that Hezbollah has active cells — the Iranians are impacting the people of Venezuela and throughout South America," U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said in a recent interview with Fox Business Network."We have an obligation to take down that risk for America," he said.Hezbollah, a U.S.-designated terrorist organization, has been increasingly targeted by U.S. sanctions in the past few months.In October 2018, the Department of Justice named Hezbollah as one of the top five transnational criminal organizations in Latin America.In an attempt to step up efforts to prevent Hezbollah's illicit activities in the Western Hemisphere, the U.S. hosted a conference last December. It was attended by senior officials of 13 U.S. partners across the Americas who discussed threats posed by transnational terrorist groups.Analysts charge that recent U.S. sanctions against several key Hezbollah figures could ultimately harm the group's financial operations in Venezuela and elsewhere in Latin America.Hezbollah's financiers "have integrated themselves into [the Venezuelan] government in a variety of different ways," said Phillip Smyth, a research fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. "Everyone is kind of getting a cut from the apparatus."So, it wouldn't shock me if there are reverberations down to Hezbollah's finance network. The way [the U.S.] Treasury has done this is they've targeted certain individuals that are kind of key brokers of the Hezbollah money, so it will have its effect," he told VOA.Analysts say the relationship between the Venezuelan government and Hezbollah is largely centered on a strategic partnership between Venezuela and Iran, which provides Hezbollah members, facilitators, financiers?and fixers with the ability to covertly move people, money?and material.?Iran's "proxy Lebanese Hezbollah maintains facilitation networks throughout the region that cache weapons and raise funds, often via drug trafficking and money laundering," U.S. Southern Command's Adm. Craig Faller told the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee during a hearing last month.The convergence of Hezbollah's networks in Venezuela has created an environment that enables the Shiite group to move large amounts of money in illicit revenue, using gold refineries in the Middle East and financial hubs in Central and South America?and the Caribbean, according to the Center for a Secure Free Society, a Washington-based research organization that has extensively researched Hezbollah's activities in Latin America.Some experts believe that Hezbollah has built a vast network that is made up of mostly underground Syrian-Venezuelans who facilitate movement for the group's members in the Middle East and Latin America."Hezbollah is already helping Maduro through an established transregional network between Lebanon, Syria and Venezuela," said Joseph Humire, executive director of the Center for a Secure Free Society."The main reason for Hezbollah supporting the Maduro regime is the same reason it protects the Bashar al-Assad government in Syria — to protect the logistical network Iran needs to export its revolution," he told VOA.Since the outbreak of Syria's civil war in 2011, Iran and Hezbollah have been playing a major role defending the Syrian president against the rebel forces."In the case of Syria, it's for the land bridge to Lebanon, and in the case of Venezuela, it's the air bridge to Latin America," Humire added.Smyth of the Washington Institute echoed a similar analysis of the entangling relationship between Venezuela and Hezbollah."If you look at certain representatives that Venezuela has put in the Middle East as diplomatic staff, a lot of them are full-fledged Hezbollah supporters and are linked in a variety of ways to Hezbollah networks," Smith said.?The role of Hugo ChavezHezbollah's activities in Venezuela flourished during the term of former President Hugo Chavez, who died in 2013 and was succeeded by Maduro."The presence of Hezbollah expanded during the time of [former Iranian President Mahmoud] Ahmadinejad, who opened the doors for Iranian and Lebanese businesses [and] facilitated trade for them in Venezuela through a cemented friendship he developed with Chavez," a Tehran-based journalist, who worked in Latin America for years, told VOA. He requested anonymity for security reasons.He added that many multimillion-dollar business ventures were established in those years."Lebanese businessmen work with Hezbollah because it's a lucrative business, but some of them do it because their business interests in Lebanon could be under threat if they refuse to cooperate with Hezbollah in Venezuela," the Iranian journalist added.With growing pressures on Maduro's government, some analysts say it is unlikely that he would sever ties with Hezbollah."Ideologically speaking, [Maduro] has thrown his lot in with groups like Hezbollah and with the Iranians. They have the same motivations, which are anti-American," analyst Smyth said."These are the allies [Venezuelan government officials] have. I seriously doubt that they would cut [these allies off] as a signal to the U.S. ... I think they're in this for good," he added.?The Latin America drug trade provides millions to Hezbollah – it’s better than the US and EuropeSantiago 17 [Adam Garrett Santiago, District Director of local Congressman’s congressional office, An Examination of the Nature of Hezbollah’s Evolving Presence in Latin America, A Thesis in the Field of Government for the Degree of Master of Liberal Arts in Extension Studies, 11-2017, DASH, ] ARThe current body of literature on Hezbollah demonstrates that the organization and their strategic partners have been operating within Latin America since the mid 1980s. In Latin America, Hezbollah operates mainly out of “the tri-border area between Argentina, Paraguay, and Brazil.”16 Hezbollah has exploited the Tri-Border Area of Latin America (see Figure 1), successfully blending-in among local Lebanese and Shia Muslim communities that have been migrating to the region for more than sixty years.17 In addition, Hezbollah has benefited from making the Tri-Border Area their hub of operations due to the lawless nature of the existing illicit economy in the region, which has allowed them to generate significant amounts of revenue through diversified criminal enterprises.18 Levitt explains that “Hezbollah traces its origins in Latin America back to the mid-1980s…when its operatives set up shop in the tri-border area…a natural home for operatives to build financial and logistical Hezbollah support networks within existing Shi’a and Lebanese diaspora communities.”19 Figure 2 presents the extent of Lebanese diaspora communities across the worldAccording to a report written by Kyle Dabruzzi and Daveed Gartenstein-Ross as well as experts testifying before a United States House of Representatives Committee, Hezbollah’s partnerships in the Tri-Border Area and beyond include cooperative activities such as narcotics trafficking, money laundering, counterfeiting, and terrorist training.23 Lieutenant Colonel Philip Abbott of the United States Army describes Hezbollah’s main Latin American operational hub, the Tri-Border Area, as “a lawless area of illicit activities that generates billions of dollars annually in money laundering, arms and drug trafficking, counterfeiting, document falsification, and piracy…[where] illegal activity and commerce in the area fund terrorist groups, primarily Hezbollah and Hamas.”24 According to Charles’ research, United States Drug Enforcement Agency testimony before the United States Congress revealed Hezbollah as one of the “major terrorist organizations that exist in the Tri-Border Area…[, who] are using cocaine trafficking to provide economic assistance to terrorist movements in the Middle East.”25 Joshua Gleis and Benedetta Berti also state that “[t]he tri-border area has been used by Hezbollah, Hamas, and a whole host of other non-state armed groups for a plethora of illicit activities.”26 Ilan Berman explained in United States House of Representatives testimony that estimates show “Hezbollah cumulatively nets some $20 million annually from the Tri-Border region alone.”27 While a study by the United States Naval War College has estimated that the group raises an estimated $10 million from the region annually. 28 Raising revenue throughout Latin America at the time of Hezbollah’s arrival was and has been more appealing, less costly, more achievable, and more profitable to Hezbollah than attempting efforts on the same scale in the United States, Europe, or elsewhere where tighter regulations and law enforcement interdiction efforts have existed. The already existing illicit economy throughout what has been considered to be a lawless region was flourishing when Hezbollah went operational in Latin America in the 1990s. Hezbollah only had to set up their own reliable network to tap into the illicit economy and eventually realize what would amount to tens of millions in US dollars generated for the organization.With the extent of illicit activity occurring in the Tri-Border Area eventually becoming so vast and obvious to intelligence agencies and law enforcement, the United States government and its partners began and have been closely monitoring and acting to disrupt the illegal operations occurring in this region, especially in the post 9/11 era. This development still did not completely deter Hezbollah from operating in the Tri-Border Area, but did cause the group to seek further opportunities elsewhere in Latin America. Gleis and Berti explain that “as a result of increased scrutiny of the [tri-border] area…Hezbollah has expanded its enterprises to other areas in Central and South America…among these…is Venezuela, with some reports indicating that [the former President] Hugo Chavez’s government [was] providing training facilities and funding to Hezbollah.”29 Kenneth Katzman also points out that “[d]uring [Iranian President] Ahmadinejad’s presidency, Iran had particularly close relations with Venezuela and its president, Hugo Chavez.” 30 Ahmadinejad and Chavez are no longer in power, but seemingly intensifying the issue of the existence of the dangerous alliance among Hezbollah and its partners in Latin America even more so for the United States and its allies is what Berman explained in 2014 when he wrote: “Iran’s strategic presence in Latin America today is significantly greater than it was a decade ago – and it is still growing.”31 Berman’s analysis is important for many reasons, chief among them is the label that has been given to Iran in the past, as described by Jonathan Winer when he wrote, “the United States found Iran to be the most active [state sponsor of terror], providing support to Hezbollah.”32 According to Douglas Farah, a strategic presence in Latin America is important to Iran and Hezbollah in order to have and maintain a forward position in the western hemisphere, allowing them to “carry out intelligence operations, train and position operatives and prepare attacks, particularly if Israel or the U.S. strikes Iran’s nuclear facilities.”33 Further, Berry et al. point out that Hezbollah had developed a “so-called strategic alliance with [the recognized narco-terrorist organization known as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia] FARC.” 34 Linking and exacerbating this past Hezbollah connection, Steven Monblatt explained: “The former Government of Colombia, in its attempt to bring the FARC to negotiations, ceded to the FARC control of a wide swath of territory…. Iran – Hezbollah’s principal financial supporter – was included in the mix of foreign entities operating in FARC-controlled areas and supporting the FARC movement” for some time.35 The FARC threat seems to have been alleviated today as FARC and the current Colombian government have reached a peace deal that ultimately pacifies the group. NR – AT: Not Significant FundingIt’s significantRendon and Kohan 19 [ Moises Rendon, Director, The Future of Venezuela Initiative and Fellow, Americas Program, Arianna Kohan, Program Coordinator, Americas Program, Identifying and Responding to Criminal Threats from Venezuela, CSIS, 7-22-19, ] ARHezbollah, the Iranian-backed Shi’ite Lebanese militant group classified as a terrorist organization by the United States and other countries, is another nonstate actor with a foothold in Venezuela. Hezbollah has operated in South America for over two decades, mainly partaking in drug trafficking, money laundering, and illegal financing to raise money around the region for its terrorist activities. According to Insight Crime, it is also possible that some colectivos received training from Hezbollah officials, particularly on Margarita Island, a notion which would explain the rise in violent tactics being used by colectivos. Hezbollah has been known to conduct much of its business from Margarita Island, a small island in the Caribbean Sea just north of the Venezuelan mainland. The terrorist group is allegedly receiving a significant portion of funding from the Maduro regime, a claim currently being investigated by U.S., Israeli, and Colombian authorities.NR – Internal Link Hezbollah’s role in Latin America is targeting the USMartin 19 [Sabrina Martin, Venezuelan journalist, commentator, and editor based in Valencia with experience in corporate communication, How Hezbollah Operates in Venezuela: El Aissami and Nasr al Din Are the Key Players, 6-7-19, PanamaPost, ] ARWhat are Iran and Hezbollah seeking in Venezuela?Humire explained that in the case of Iran, proximity to the United States is key.“At the strategic level, I believe that Iran, as a hostile and undemocratic government, understands that the only way to advance its revolution is to remove the influence of the United States,” he said.In the case of Hezbollah, he explained that each day it deepens its relationship with transnational crime groups and terrorists in Latin America to provide them with intelligence, drug trafficking, and money laundering services.“Hezbollah is a terrorist group, recognized as such by more than fifty countries in the world. They commited acts of terrorism in Latin America, the most famous were 25 years ago with the AMIA in Argentina, and one in Panama in 1994; but beyond simply executing attacks, they also get involved with other terrorist groups in the region and criminal groups such as the FARC and the ELN,” he explained.He explained that Hezbollah has a huge international money laundering network and offers its services to drug cartels.The key individuals that keep Hezbollah in the countryAlthough it is impossible to count how many Iranian members of the terrorist group there are in Venezuela, it has been possible to identify at least two key pieces that facilitate clandestine work. The first is Ghazi Nasr al Din. Currently in Venezuela, he was a diplomat of Nicolás Maduro, Venezuela’s advisory minister in Syria, and also has a “family clan” with economic power within the South American country.In 2008 Nasr al Din was sanctioned by the United States for facilitating the Venezuelan government’s connection with Hezbollah and in 2015 he was described as a person of interest to the FBI.“He came to Venezuela in the 90s, he went into the Foreign Ministry, he was a diplomat and he was sent to Syria to be a minister, he was mainly in charge of the embassy in that country and before the civil war in Syria in 2011, he was in Damascus connecting the subversive networks that exist in Syria with the subversive networks of Venezuela and with Lebanon,” Humire explained.“He is of Lebanese descent and is considered the main contact link with the Venezuelan government and Hezbollah. He worked with Nicolás Maduro when he was foreign minister, and he was also essentially the eyes and ears of El Aissami in the Middle East for a long time,” he added.“The family clan of Nasr al Din is great. He has relatives who settled mostly on the island of Margarita, Barquisimeto, and La Guajira. In Margarita they have lotteries, shopping centers, and large investments in the island and therefore helped Hugo Chavez in his campaign before he became president,” he explained.“Nasr al Din is in Venezuela, but he moves around a lot: sometimes he is in Colombia, the Dominican Republic, or in Mexico. He is under US sanctions and is being sought by the FBI, but is not wanted by Interpol. He has so much power that he was one of the main people in charge of designing the immigration system that Venezuela used to provide passports to Hezbollah,” Humire added.NR – Mod – Panama Canal When Iran retaliates it’ll be through the Panama Canal – they’ve shown interest and it’s key for US tradeFaddis 19 [Charles S. (Sam) Faddis, Senior Partner- Artemis, LLC is a former CIA operations officer with thirty years of experience in the conduct of intelligence operations in the Middle East, South Asia and Europe. His last assignment prior to retirement in May of 2008 was as head of the CIA's terrorist Weapons of Mass Destruction unit. He took the first CIA team into Iraq in the Summer of 2002 in advance of the invasion of that country and has worked extensively in the field with law enforcement, local security forces and special operations teams. Since retirement, he has written extensively, provided training to a wide variety of government and private entities and appears regularly on radio and television, What If Iran Brings Energy War Here with Hezbollah Attack on U.S. Oil and Gas?, Homeland Security Today, 7-21-19, ] ARTensions with Iran are escalating by the day. Already the Iranians have staged a number of sabotage attacks on oil tankers and seized a British vessel on Friday. Their Houthi allies have conducted drone attacks on at least 10 targets including a major Saudi oil pipeline. Speculation is rife as to where Tehran or one of its surrogates will strike next.We would do well to remember it may be here.Iran, via the Qods Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Hezbollah, retains the capacity to stage terrorist attacks worldwide. That includes inside the United States. Planning for such attacks is ongoing and detailed as illustrated by the cases of Ali Kourani and Samer el-Debek, two Hezbollah operatives tasked with collecting information on U.S. targets in preparation for terrorist attacks and arrested by U.S. authorities in 2017.Should Iran decide to utilize its worldwide capability to retaliate against U.S. oil sanctions and other measures, it seems likely that attacks may focus on targets associated with the U.S. oil and natural gas sectors. Damaging the U.S. in this way would be a clear, comparable response to the actions the United States has taken against Iran’s energy industry. It would also fit nicely with the broader purpose of Iran’s sabotage actions to date, which have been designed to dangle before the world the prospect of energy shortages, skyrocketing oil prices and economic catastrophe. The Iranians, with good reason, calculate that Washington’s less-stalwart allies are likely to break ranks if the U.S.-Iranian confrontation begins to have real economic consequences. Should the Iranians be able to cause discontent inside the United States, as well, particularly in the run-up to a presidential campaign, that would be an added bonus.Since 9/11, government and private security forces inside the United States have dealt with a number of terrorist and sabotage threats. None of them, however, are comparable to what Hezbollah will bring to the table, and it is unlikely that the measures that have sufficed to date will even begin to pass the test of detecting and preventing attacks by this sophisticated adversary.Most attacks or attempted terrorist attacks inside the United States in the past 18 years have been connected to individuals or groups of individuals who were largely self-radicalized and acting without the benefit of training or a support structure. While the diffuse nature of this threat has made detection a challenge, it has also meant that most of the individuals planning and carrying out attacks were unsophisticated and their attacks consequently amateurish. That will most definitely not be the case with Hezbollah.Within the energy sector most attacks have been carried out by environmental groups opposed to fossil fuels and have been focused on relatively simple sabotage measures. In some cases, such groups have been successful in shutting down pipelines or temporarily disrupting construction, but none of their actions have been designed to cause mass casualties or to harm the public as a whole. Whatever their politics, U.S. environmental “terrorists” have placed serious self-limitations on how far they will go in the use of violence. This will also most definitely not be the case with Hezbollah.The cases cited at the outset of this article involving Samer El Debek and Ali Kourani provide a clear window into just what the capabilities of Hezbollah are, its ongoing preparation for actions inside the United States and the sophistication of its operations.Debek is a naturalized U.S. citizen living in Dearborn, Mich. He was recruited in 2007 or 2008 by Hezbollah’s Islamic Jihad Organization (IJO), which is responsible for terrorist actions outside of Lebanon. According to El Debek he was recruited largely because he was a U.S. passport holder. Debek was paid $1,000 a month by Hezbollah and also received medical expenses.Between 2008 and 2014 Debek received training in a number of terrorist disciplines. These included surveillance, the use of disguise, bomb-making and the employment of automatic weapons.In May 2009, Debek traveled to Thailand at the direction of Hezbollah to retrieve explosives from a compromised safehouse. He used multiple passports and covered his travel to Bangkok by saying he was on a sex holiday. In Thailand he hired a female prostitute and had her enter the compromised safehouse first while he watched from a safe distance until he was satisfied the building was not under surveillance.In 2011, at the direction of Hezbollah, Debek traveled to Panama to locate and case the U.S. and Israeli embassies and to gather preliminary information on the Panama Canal. In addition, while in Panama Debek identified locations from which to purchase materials such as acetone and battery acid, which are used in the manufacture of explosives. He also learned to drive and began to take Spanish lessons.Debek traveled to Panama under the pretext that he was thinking of opening a business there. To solidify that cover he did, in fact, gather information regarding the cost of opening a business in Panama. Debek also sent numerous emails to a variety of companies discussing his plan to open an import-export business and inquiring about the availability of different types of merchandise. Debek spent roughly one month in Panama on this mission.In early 2012 Debek returned to Panama for another month. On this trip he conducted more intensive casing of the Panama Canal. Debek was instructed by his IJO handler to identify areas of weakness in the Canal’s construction, gather information on Canal security and establish how close one could get to a ship transiting the Canal. Debek took over a hundred pictures of the Canal, which he subsequently gave to the IJO. Debek also gave the IJO extensive notes and maps he had prepared.Kourani, a native of the Bronx, was recruited by Hezbollah in 2009. Shortly after, he began to carry out operational activities similar to those undertaken by Debek. He cased targets including the buildings housing the FBI and U.S. Secret Service in Manhattan, as well as New York’s John F. Kennedy International Airport and a U.S. Army armory. He also worked on identifying sources from whom he could procure arms that Hezbollah could stockpile for future use.Like Debek, Kourani received extensive training in clandestine communications, tradecraft, weapons and tactics. This included time at a terrorist camp in Lebanon. When arrested, Kourani described himself as being part of a sleeper cell. In the words of U.S. Assistant Attorney General for National Security John Demers, “While living in the United States, Kourani served as an operative of Hezbollah in order to help the foreign terrorist organization prepare for potential future attacks against the United States.”The picture painted by the investigation into the activities of these two individuals is one of a very large, very sophisticated organization with superb tradecraft. The targets under consideration, including the Panama Canal, are complex and well-guarded. And yet, undeterred Hezbollah, using trained assets employing cover and well versed in how to conduct detailed casing, set about the task of tackling the significant operational and logistical challenges involved.An organization willing to put together a plan to attack JFK airport in New York or cripple the Panama Canal would have no trouble in identifying the legion of vulnerabilities in the U.S. oil and natural gas industry. All across the United States tens of thousands of miles of pipelines sit effectively unguarded. The key pumping stations dotted along these pipelines are only marginally better secured. Along the coast massive refineries and, increasingly, LNG export terminals, while better guarded have nothing like the resources and expertise necessary to detect and/or respond to the kind of attacks Hezbollah is capable of launching.The U.S. government is unlikely to be much help. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA), the U.S. agency in charge of the U.S. oil and gas pipeline system, for example, employs a grand total of six individuals in its pipeline security branch. It will fall then to the private sector to make the necessary preparations for what may be a coming Hezbollah offensive. Let’s hope those preparations begin immediately. We may not have much time.Hezbollah’s scouting the Canal nowLevitt 17 [Matthew Levitt is the Fromer-Wexler Fellow and Director of the Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.?He is the author of?Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of Lebanon’s Party of God, How Trump Is Going After Hezbollah in America’s Backyard, Politico, 11-30-17, ] ARBut Hezbollah’s more recent moves in Latin America are very much a matter of interest for investigators, too. In October, a joint FBI-NYPD investigation led to the arrest of two individuals who were allegedly acting on behalf of Hezbollah’s terrorist wing, the Islamic Jihad Organization (IJO). At the direction of their Hezbollah handlers, one person allegedly “conducted missions in Panama to locate the U.S. and Israeli Embassies and to assess the vulnerabilities of the Panama Canal and ships in the Canal,” according to a Justice Department press release. The other allegedly “conducted surveillance of potential targets in America, including military and law enforcement facilities in New York City.” In the wake of these arrests, the director of the National Counterterrorism Center warned: “It’s our assessment that Hezbollah is determined to give itself a potential homeland option as a critical component of its terrorism playbook, and that is something that those of us in the counterterrorism community take very, very seriously.” These cases, one official added, are “likely the tip of the iceberg.”Panama shutdown kills US naval power – it’s instantDannells-Ruff 10 [Kimberley Dannels-Ruff, Professor American Military University, 02-2010, “Security of the Panama Canal: One decade after US departure”, ] ARThe U.S. still has vital national security and economic interests in Panama. An important part of this interest is our use of the Canal to support trade, thus supporting our economy. While we might not immediately think of the economy when we think of security, the US National Defense Strategy emphasizes that our safety and security are intrinsically linked with economic well-being. The strategy states in part: For more than sixty years, the United States has secured the global commons for the benefit of all. Global prosperity is contingent on the free flow of ideas, goods, and services. The enormous growth in trade has lifted millions of people out of poverty by making locally produced goods available on the global market… None of this is possible without a basic belief that goods shipped through air or by sea, or information transmitted under the ocean or through space, will arrive at their destination safely.12 International trade is inextricably intertwined with our human security. For this reason, the US assumes a certain amount of responsibility for maintaining the smooth flow of trade. The Canal carries approximately 5% of world trade and links over one hundred trade routes throughout the world.14According to Stratfor: If the only waterway in the Western Hemisphere that connects the Atlantic and Pacific were to be closed down for any length of time, the impact likely would be felt on stock and commodities exchanges worldwide, given the high degree of economic interdependence that now exists. 15 The ACP estimates that with the Canal expansion, Canal traffic will increase from 72-106 % over 2005 numbers by 2025. 16 There is a scarcely a nation untouched by trade in some way. Any closure of the Canal would be damaging worldwide; it would certainly harm the US both in economic and strategic terms. Economically, the U.S. relies on the Canal more than any other country for commerce. In 2008, the US shipped 1,408,779 long tons of cargo through the Canal.17 Approximately 12% of U.S. trade transported by waterways goes through the Canal.18 According to the Progressive Policy Institute, 19 one seventh of US exports are shipped through the Canal, or about 72 million tons in 2008. It is estimated that 65% of the cargo transiting the Canal is either going to or from US facilities.20 Many US ports have been developing infrastructure or enlarging ports in anticipation of the Canal expansion.21This economic interdependence makes the Canal a “soft target.” Because the Canal is critical to the economic well-being of the US, it is at risk for attack. One has only to consider the economic impact of the terrorist attacks of September 11th on container shipping to gain an understanding of the economic fallout that would result in the event the Panama Canal closed, even if only for a few days. When the U.S. shut down its own sea and airports for one week following the 9/11 attacks, container shipping lost a billion dollars a day for months as they disentangled freight traffic. The economic impact of even the briefest Canal closure is undeniable. While US forces have withdrawn from Panama, our strategic interests remain. According to a SOUTHCOM analyst, It is vital, imperative, that the Canal remain open to shipping. It is a critical Line of Communication (LOC) for the USG, its allies and the world. The Canal is critical to US and world commerce and defense of the United States….Canal security is paramount to both the USG [U.S. government] and GOP [government of Panama]. Were there to be an interruption in shipping for any length of time, e.g., a WMD explosion that effectively shut down the Canal, the repercussions would be extraordinary and devastating… The sudden closure of the Canal would amount to commercial losses in the many millions or even billions of US dollars daily. Any permanent shutdown of the Canal would most likely result in Panama failing as a State. The economic and strategic interests of the USG would also be gravely jeopardized.23 The Canal still plays a crucial role for US military planning. The Progressive Policy Institute (2009) estimates that US naval vessels utilize the Canal about once a week. 24 John Keller, editor of Military & Aerospace Electronics, notes “The Panama Canal is of the utmost strategic importance to the United States, as it enables the U.S. Navy to transfer its forces rapidly between the Pacific and Atlantic theaters. The potential for Canal disruption is of dire concern to U.S. military authorities.”25 While military analysts would not reveal specific US military use of the Canal due to security concerns, Anthony Rainone, an intelligence analyst with the Department of the Army 1st Information Operations Command, noted that the Canal is “critical to U.S. defense planning.”26 CP – Diplomacy PICNC – CP Counterplan text – the United States should:Lift all sanctions prohibiting humanitarian aid and organizations from assisting VenezuelaKeep all sanctions targeting corrupt and abusive officialsAnd collaborate with the EU and Venezuelans to establish paths to a free and fair electionGaspard 7/22.?(Patrick Gaspard, 7-22-2020, accessed on 7-22-2020, Kitv, "In Venezuela, US sanctions are only hurting", ) American former diplomat who currently serves as the president of the Open Society Foundations. Gaspard has overseen the Open Society Foundations’ advocacy work in Washington and Brussels, as well as provided strategic direction and oversight to the organization’s programmatic agenda // djbAs president of the Open Society Foundations, which is supporting responses to the humanitarian crisis in Venezuela, I have also seen the opposite -- broad sanctions hurting ordinary people, and entrenching the power of those at the top. This is what is happening now in Venezuela, with the odds stacked against free and fair legislative elections in December, and an opposition divided and tarnished by scandals. It is time for the United States to stop being part of the problem and be part of an international effort to address ongoing humanitarian catastrophe. Unfortunately, there seems to be little hope of this happening under the Trump Administration, especially with some members of the Republican Party eager to use fantasies of military intervention or regime collapse to inspire Florida voters in November. On their part, the Democrats should keep their options open, and avoid a battle to out-tough President Trump on Venezuela. The need to lift all sanctions contributing to the humanitarian crisis in Venezuela is clear. Remaining sanctions, targeting corrupt and abusive officials, should align with diplomacy. Using sanctions as a scalpel, and not as a sledgehammer, the United States should actively engage in midwifing additional humanitarian agreements -- such as the recent initiative with the Pan American Health Organization -- that allow international assistance to reach the country, and eventually enable a path to free and fair elections. More broadly, it is time for Washington to take a step back and review its approach to the use of sanctions globally -- with the State Department, House Foreign Affairs Committee, and Senate Committee on Foreign Relations working to develop a set of principles to prevent a mess like Venezuela from happening again. The United Nations is the only international actor with the capacity and experience to tackle a crisis like Venezuela's. At the Security Council, the US could foster a resolution based on a minimum consensus with China and Russia of allowing and supporting in-country operations of the World Food Programme to prevent a famine. From there, together with the European Union and Latin American governments, the US should work with all political factions to build a path to free and fair elections. US interests would be best served by prioritizing what Venezuelans need most to reclaim their destiny: address the humanitarian crisis that has caused millions to flee, and eventually support Venezuelans in designing their own way back to the ballot box -- in that specific order.CP – Advantage NC – CP The United States should: Work with NGO’s in the region to create multinational refugee assistance initiativesProsecute corruption of Venezuelan officialsCoordinate with the UN World Food Program to ensure rapid emergency food assistance O’Neil 18 [(Shannon K. O’Neil - vice president, deputy director of studies, and Nelson and David Rockefeller senior fellow for Latin America Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. She is an expert on Latin America, global trade, U.S.-Mexico relations, corruption, democracy, and immigration) “A Venezuelan Refugee Crisis” Council on Foreign Relations, February 2018] FPThe United States could help Venezuela’s neighbors mitigate a refugee crisis by creating a U.S. interagency refugee plan as the basis for a larger coordination effort. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in conjunction with the State Department’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) and the Defense Department’s 88 Preparing for the Next Foreign Policy Crisis Southern Command could prepare a refugee policy—one that builds on lessons learned in Syria and South Sudan—to be implemented largely by nongovernmental and multilateral organizations working in the region. In addition to coordinating among the agencies, U.S. officials could create multilateral or multinational refugee plans, whereby the U.S. government would work with other organizations or governments to provide monetary, personnel, or supply assistance to refugees. On the ground, this assistance could contribute to expanding intake centers and building shelters, clinics, schools, warehouses, and other humanitarian infrastructure for the delivery of basic goods and services for families. Assistance could also take the form of transportation funds for Venezuelans fleeing to other, less burdened nations. The United States could push the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), as the largest shareholder in both, to provide low-interest loans to middle-income countries (including Colombia and Brazil) to build infrastructure for refugees. The United States and partners, such as the EU or Japan, could guarantee these loans and fast-track the approval process. More systematically, the United States could help countries that take in Venezuelans to develop asylum and refugee policies. The United States could encourage Guyana to sign the 1951 Refugee Convention and/or its 1967 protocol, thereby committing to accept and protect refugees. The United States could assist other Latin American nations that are already signatories (with the exception of Cuba) in developing refugee policies. It could also support refugee assistance efforts in these countries—as it has done in Lebanon for Syrian refugees—by funding food and shelter provisions, infrastructure projects, and the work of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Countries expecting or experiencing significant refugee inflows could work with multilateral agencies too, particularly the UNHCR, which can set up local offices to help in capacity building, support the development of an effective asylum system, and provide direct assistance to refugees and asylum seekers through and in coordination with local donors and NGOs. The United States could spearhead the development of a broader burden-sharing arrangement, coordinating efforts across the region and with other allies around the world to alleviate the crisis both for those fleeing and for people in the refugee destinations. The United States could work with the EU and other donor nations to help recipient countries build social services and support for asylum- A Venezuelan Refugee Crisis 89 seeking and refugee families that may not be able to return to Venezuela for years. RECOMMENDATIONS Despite the limited chances for success, the United States should continue to pressure the Venezuelan government, preferably as part of a multinational coalition, for policy and political change. This means supporting diplomatic efforts and negotiations, despite the failure of previous efforts to bring about the desired outcomes. In addition, the United States should increase legal and financial pressures on regime wrongdoers. While sectoral or economy-wide sanctions would likely aggravate the situation, individual sanctions limit the ability of transgressors and their families to enjoy their ill-gotten gains around the world. The Department of Justice should aggressively prosecute those who have committed crimes, including drug trafficking, money laundering, international fraud, and racketeering, while the Department of the Treasury should work with other countries to replicate existing U.S. sanctions on individuals. Recognizing the difficulty in shaping events within Venezuela, the United States should concentrate on working with its allies in Venezuela’s neighborhood and the region to ease the suffering of the refugees themselves as well as to mitigate the potential political, economic, and social disturbance in receiving nations. This involves creating a broader burden-sharing arrangement for processing refugees, providing immediate humanitarian aid, and helping build the necessary infrastructure to integrate potentially over a million individuals with families into new homes and countries. The United States should weave together a domestic interagency plan and an international effort focused on countries of first asylum, supported by nations and multilateral institutions both regional and global. Internally, the State Department’s PRM and the USAID Offices of Food for Peace (FFP) and Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) should lead this effort, coordinating closely on logistics with the Southern Command given that Venezuela lies within its area of responsibility. Together they should work with regional and donor countries, and with multilateral agencies. With previous financial assistance for the internally displaced in Colombia and recent support for refugees in Yemen as guides, costs would range between $150 million and $200 million. Initiatives would include 90 Preparing for the Next Foreign Policy Crisis ? FFP coordinating with NGOs and the UN World Food Program to ensure rapid emergency food assistance; ? PRM and OFDA working with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and UNHCR to create shelters and settlements; ? PRM working with the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) to coordinate child protection; education; health; and water, sanitation, and hygiene; ? PRM working with the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and UNHCR to provide transportation, health, and essential survival items such as water containers, hygiene kits, blankets, and rechargeable lights; ? PRM working with ICRC, UNICEF, IOM, and WHO to provide medicine and surgical supplies; ? PRM working with NGOs to provide legal services and education; and ? PRM and the Treasury Department working with the IADB and the World Bank to provide infrastructure loans to Colombia and Brazil. Following the Cuban example, the Maduro government is already encouraging migration as a way to diminish internal opposition—a trend likely to continue, if not escalate, in the months to come. These recommendations, if implemented, would serve to alleviate the pressure of a mass migration on Venezuela’s neighbors, protect those fleeing, and lessen the risk of an epidemic or armed conflict and violence spreading more broadly. By making the region more secure and politically stable, even as it faces a potential refugee crisis, these policies will protect U.S. interests.NC – CP Text: The United States should:- create incentives to members of the Maduro regime to accept a peaceful political transition- initiate a diplomatic effort to get the United Nations involved in implementing a stabilization effort in Venezuela- implement a plan for stabilization and reconstruction following the end of the Maduro regime- facilitate more vigorous nongovernmental relief operations for neighboring countries- prepare for an international stabilization force for the post-Maduro transition phaseMora 19 [Frank O. Mora (former Director of the Kimberly Green Latin American and Caribbean Center and Professor of Politics and International Relations at Florida International University), 6-14-2019, "Stabilizing Venezuela: Scenarios and Options," Council on Foreign Relations, ] GargPolitical change in Venezuela is necessary to resolve the political impasse and humanitarian crisis. The United States and its regional partners should pursue a democratic transition and resolution to the humanitarian crisis through policies that intensify economic and diplomatic pressure, while providing incentives to regime elements willing to support a post-Maduro democratic government. The following recommendations to the U.S. government offer a proactive way to support the transition and stabilization of a post-Maduro Venezuela, under the prolonged stasis and deterioration scenario mentioned above and the policy option of intense diplomatic and economic pressure.Sustain the sanctions regime, but simultaneously promise assistance for a robust humanitarian and economic stabilization program. A strong diplomatic effort is necessary to ensure that the international coalition remains united and supports the sanctions regime. The United States should encourage Lima Group members to develop the domestic legal framework required to impose targeted plement the sanctions regime with clear incentives (e.g., lifting individual sanctions, immunity, and opportunity to participate in politics) to members of the regime to accept a peaceful political transition.Continue pursuing overt and back-channel negotiations with regime and armed-forces elements willing to support a peaceful transition. Similar outreach to external supporters of the regime—such as China, Cuba, and Turkey—could help create conditions for transition, but only if open threats and “all options are on the table” rhetoric are avoided, as these countries are less likely to cooperate if they anticipate aggressive action. The United States and its global partners’ negotiations with the regime and its international allies should be coordinated with Guaido and the democratic coalition.Initiate a vigorous diplomatic effort to get the United Nations more involved in Venezuela, specifically in planning and implementing a humanitarian assistance and stabilization effort. China and Russia will remain an obstacle, but in a post-Maduro scenario they may be more open to such an effort if some of their equities are protected. The U.S. government should strongly encourage the UN secretary-general to be part of the international effort to pressure the Maduro regime to accept a peaceful transition to democratic rule. This would be carried out via a transfer of power to an interim government that would then hold elections in which Maduro was not a candidate.Develop and implement a plan for stabilization and reconstruction, including significant international support, to be implemented following the end of the Maduro regime. This can begin with a call for an international donors conference where states and international financial institutions would show, through their commitments, what a post-Maduro Venezuela could look like. A compelling package of humanitarian and development assistance could deepen fissures within the regime, leading to leadership change.Facilitate and fund more vigorous nongovernmental relief operations for neighboring countries, such as Brazil, Colombia, and the Caribbean island states, to help manage spillover effects: the humanitarian crisis is adversely affecting neighboring states as migrants and disease overwhelm their absorptive capacity. The United States and multilateral organizations should announce and implement a robust program to support these states by delivering food, medicine, and other needed goods to the border.Prepare for an international stabilization force for the post-Maduro transition phase. Security will be essential for delivering aid and for the subsequent process of reconstruction and elections. Democratic transition is central to solving the humanitarian crisis, but without security, the post-Maduro government will not be able deliver aid, stabilize the economy, or restore democracy and the rule of law. The approval and planning of such a force should begin soon to be ready on request of the transitional government. This will require the consent of the UN Security Council, including China and Russia. Getting their support for the resolution or their agreement to abstain will require certain guarantees, such as including Chinese and Russians in the civilian leadership staff supporting the force.The Venezuelan political and humanitarian crisis threatens the interests and security of the United States and its regional partners. Planning and coordinating with regional partners and Venezuela’s democratic coalition need to begin now, both to provide humanitarian relief and security assistance in the immediate phase of the transition and also to accelerate change by demonstrating to regime elements that a future without Maduro and his cohorts is preferable.Humanitarian Crisis AdvNC – No Internal LinkSanctions did not cause Venezuela’s economic crisis – removing sanctions cant prevent human rights abusesRendon and Price 19 [(Moises Rendon is director of the Future of Venezuela Initiativeand fellow with the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Max Price is a former intern with the CSIS Americas Program.) “Are Sanctions Working in Venezuela?” CSIS, 9/2019] BC Sanctions did not cause the economic or humanitarian crisis in Venezuela as dire conditions in Venezuela preceded the implementation of sanctions. By 2016, a year before any financial or sectoral sanctions hit the country, Venezuela’s economy was already enduring severe hyperinflation, which surpassed a rate of 800 percent. Between 2013 and 2016, food imports fell 71 percent and medicine and medical equipment imports dropped 68 percent. Over the same period, infant mortality increased by 44 percent. By the time sanctions were introduced, Venezuelans earning the minimum wage could only afford 56 percent of the calories necessary for a family of five. Over two million Venezuelans had already fled the country at this point.The extent of the humanitarian damage suffered before sectoral sanctions indicates that the blame cannot be placed on the sanctions themselves. As an example, Venezuela’s Central Bank confirmed in 2014 that plummeting oil prices had triggered a severe economic contraction with simultaneous hyperinflation. Under the guise of austerity, Maduro announced cuts to major social services upon which millions of citizens relied.For decades, Venezuelan success has been contingent on global oil prices. Data from the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) suggests that oil accounts for 98 percent of the country’s export revenues. The government’s dependence on these revenues to finance basic social spending has in part produced the current crisis. Venezuelan oil production plummeted by millions of barrels prior to the introduction of U.S. economic sanctions, reflecting a lack of economic diversity and intolerance for non-state competition in oil extraction which has once again left the nation’s prosperity precariously tied to oil prices.Economic mismanagement is just one side of the story, however. The Maduro regime has been unflinching in its efforts to centralize power and undermine democracy. In addition to amending the constitution several times , Maduro created a new legislative body to override a National Assembly with an opposition supermajority and packed the Supreme Court with loyalist justices. Maduro and his coconspirators are complicit in a 20-year process of institutional collapse, large-scale corruption, economic negligence, and suppression of individual rights.NC – Can’t Solve the Refugee CrisisRemoving sanctions has no impact on the humanitarian crisis; they rein in Maduro’s illiberal regimeRendon and Price 19 [(Moises Rendon is director of the Future of Venezuela Initiativeand fellow with the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Max Price is a former intern with the CSIS Americas Program.) “Are Sanctions Working in Venezuela?” CSIS, 9/2019] BC Sanctions are undoubtedly cutting off financing to the Maduro regime, limiting the government’s ability to import food and medicine amid economic freefall. However, reversing sanctions against Maduro and giving the regime access to revenues will not fix the humanitarian crisis for three main reasons: ? Although government revenues have been used in the past to bankroll social programs, Maduro’s regime has neglected to provide food and medicine to the Venezuelan people. Instead, they have directly profited from these revenues, funding illicit projects and buying the loyalty of military officials. Sanctions are designed to choke off these earnings, weakening Maduro’s grasp on power and therefore accelerating the restoration of democracy. ? According to the Venezuelan constitution, Maduro has not been the legitimate president of the country since January 10th, 2019. Over 50 countries have denounced his regime and recognized Juan Guaidó as interim president until free and fair elections can be held. Granting financial access to Maduro only serves to undermine calls for free and fair elections. Instead, the legitimate government of Venezuela should be given authority over the nation’s resources and institutions. ? Alternative approaches to the humanitarian crisis can more effectively relieve the suffering of Venezuelans without empowering Maduro with the state’s assets and resources. NC – No Food Wars ImpactFood shortages don’t cause conflict. Buhaug et al ‘15 [Halvard Buhaug, Peace Research Institute in Oslo an Norwegian University of Science and Technology. Tor Benjaminsen, Espen Sjaastad, Ole Magnus Theisen.] “Climate variability, food production shocks, and violent conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa” Environmental Research Letters, Volume 10, Number 12 () - MZhuAcross all models, we find relatively weak and insignificant effects for domestic food production and we also note that the sign of the coefficients shifts between outcome types. In this sense, table 1 implicitly contrasts both claims that political violence is more prevalent when basic needs are met (Salehyan and Hendrix 2014) and claims that agricultural income shocks increase civil conflict risk (von Uexkull 2014). The results are consistent with Koubi et al (2012) and van Weezel (2015), however, who conclude that rainfall—a significant determinant of yields in SSA—has little impact on conflict either directly or through economic performance. The covariate that best and most consistently explains temporal variation in political violence is the time-lagged conflict incidence indicator. Models 1–2 show that a new civil conflict is unlikely to break out if another one is already ongoing in the same country whereas Models 3–6, which capture the occurrence of less organized conflict, demonstrate that violence begets violence. Coups d'état (Models 7–8) exhibit a comparatively weak temporal correlation pattern in our data and are generally regarded as a highly unpredictable phenomenon (Luttwak 1979). Next, we estimate the same set of models on a subsample of 14 countries in SSA where rainfall has a large and significant positive effect on food production (figure 2(b); see supplementary information, section B for details). To better capture the influence of climate variability and reduce concerns with endogeneity, we further replace the standard OLS model with two-stage instrumental variable regression. The first stage in this model estimates the joint influence of annual rainfall (linear and squared terms) and temperature (linear) on contemporaneous food production. This effect then constitutes the exogenous instrument for food production in the second stage. The results are reported in table 2. Mirroring the results presented above, we fail to uncover a robust signal for agricultural performance, although the sign of the coefficient for food production now remains negative in seven of the eight specifications. Food production shocks may have different consequences depending on the socioeconomic context, so next we consider a series of interactive relationships. Specifically, we investigate the joint effect of food production and (i) low level of development, (ii) extent of discriminatory political system, and (iii) economic dependence on agriculture; three conditions whereby loss of income from agriculture might constitute a particular challenge to society. To model these interactions, we include time-varying regressors instead of country-fixed effects where (i) is represented by infant mortality rate (IMR; World Bank 2014), (ii) is captured using the Ethnic Power Relations v.1.1 data (Cederman et al 2010), while (iii) uses an index of agricultural contribution to GDP (World Bank 2014). Moreover, to preserve focus on temporal dynamics, food production is now operationalized as yearly deviation from the country mean, 1961–2009. We use additive inverse deviation values to ensure theoretical consistency among the components in the interaction terms. All models control for (ln) population size, conflict history, and a common time trend, and models without IMR and agricultural dependence additionally control for (ln) GDP per capita. The results are presented in table 3. Again, we are unsuccessful in establishing a consistent covariation pattern between agricultural performance and political violence. Interpreting the combined effect of interaction terms with continuous parameters is inherently difficult but figure 4 shows that food production is insignificantly related to all conflict outcomes across levels of socioeconomic development for all three interaction terms. The sole exception is the result in Model 24, where lower food production in highly discriminatory societies is negatively associated with non-state conflict. This result would seem to contradict the standard scarcity thesis (Homer-Dixon 1999) although it is consistent with observations that conflict is more prevalent during surplus years (Witsenburg and Adano 2009, Salehyan and Hendrix 2014). Mirroring earlier research, ethnopolitical exclusion is strongly related to higher civil conflict risk, but not necessarily to other forms of political violence. Infant mortality rate and economic dependence on agriculture appear largely irrelevant. While this may come as a surprise, recall that most countries in SSA are characterized by underdevelopment and a large agricultural sector, implying that the variation in values on these indicators is modest. Large parameter uncertainties and p-values above the conventional significance threshold (5%) may disguise substantively important effects (Ward et al 2010). Accordingly, as a final assessment, we conduct a set of out-of-sample simulations and compare predictions for models with and without food production. The models are estimated on a subset of the full sample, in this case all years before 2000, and the estimated effects are then used to predict conflict outcomes out of sample, i.e., the 2000–09 period. Figure 5 shows the predicted values from four pairs of models that are specified similarly to Models 17, 20, 23, and 26, except for the shorter time period and the fact that one model in each pair drops the food production deviation variable. For civil conflict and social unrest, the models generate very similar predictions, signaling that agricultural performance adds little to the models' predictive power. There is more spread in the predictions for the remaining two outcome categories. Puzzlingly, the model without food production performs better in both cases—i.e., the Receiver Operating Characteristics curves have higher 'Area Under the Curve' scores. We hesitate to put too much emphasis on the ROC tests, given the rareness of the outcomes (notably Models 17 and 26) and the relatively small training samples (Models 20 and 23), but nonetheless the patterns observed in the out-of-sample simulations substantiate the regression results reported above; fluctuations in agricultural output explain little of the observed variation in political violence in post-colonial Sub-Saharan Africa. 5. Concluding remarks Emerging evidence suggests that food price shocks are associated with an increase in social unrest (Smith 2014, Bellemare 2015, Hendrix and Haggard 2015, Weinberg and Bakker 2015). Yet, the robust 'non-finding' presented here implies that so-called 'food riots' play out largely isolated from climate-sensitive production dynamics in the affected countries. Likewise, claims that adverse weather and harvest failure drive contemporary violence in Africa (e.g., Hsiang et al 2013, IFPRI 2015) are not supported by our analysis. Instead, social protest and rebellion during times of food price spikes may be better understood as reactions to poor and unjust government policies, corruption, repression, and market failure (e.g., Bush 2010, Buhaug and Urdal 2013, Sneyd et al 2013, Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2015).No global food wars – the status quo is overproduction.Latham ’15 (Jonathan; 1/12/2015; PhD in sustainable agriculture; “How the Great Food War Will Be Won,” ; Date Accessed: 10/15/2016)Yet this strategy has a disastrous foundational weakness. There is no global or regional shortage of food. There never has been and nor is there ever likely to be. India has a superabundance of food. South America is swamped in food. The US, Australia, New Zealand and Europe are swamped in food (e.g. Billen et al 2011). In Britain, like in many wealthy countries, nearly half of all row crop food production now goes to biofuels, which at bottom are an attempt to dispose of surplus agricultural products. China isn’t quite swamped but it still exports food (see Fig 1.); and it grows 30% of the world’s cotton. No foodpocalypse there either. Of all the populous nations, Bangladesh comes closest to not being swamped in food. Its situation is complex. Its government says it is self-sufficient. The UN world Food Program says it is not, but the truth appears to be that Bangladeshi farmers do not produce the rice they could because prices are too low, because of persistent gluts (1). Even some establishment institutions will occasionally admit that the food shortage concept – now and in any reasonably conceivable future – is bankrupt. According to experts consulted by the World Bank Institute there is already sufficient food production for 14 billion people – more food than will ever be needed. The Golden Fact of agribusiness is a lie. So, if the agribusiness PR experts are correct that food crisis fears are pivotal to their industry, then it follows that those who oppose the industrialization of food and agriculture should make dismantling that lie their top priority. Anyone who wants a sustainable, pesticide-free, or non-GMO food future, or who wants to swim in a healthy river or lake again, or wants to avoid climate chaos, needs to know all this. Anyone who would like to rebuild the rural economy or who appreciates cultural, biological, or agricultural diversity of any meaningful kind should take every possible opportunity to point out the evidence that refutes it. Granaries are bulging, crops are being burned as biofuels or dumped, prices are low, farmers are abandoning farming for slums and cities, all because of massive oversupply. Anyone could also point out that probably the least important criterion for growing food, is how much it yields. Even just to acknowledge crop yield, as an issue for anyone other than the individual farmer, is to reinforce the framing of the industry they oppose.NC – No Latin American War ImpactNo Latin America impactFeinberg, 15 - (Richard Feinberg is professor of international political economy at the Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, University of California, San Diego. Feinberg served as special assistant to President Clinton and senior director of the National Security Council’s Office of Inter-American Affairs. He has held positions on the State Department's policy planning staff and worked as an international economist in the U.S. Treasury Department's Office of International Affairs. Harold Trinkunas is a senior fellow and director of the Latin America Initiative in the Foreign Policy program. His research focuses on Latin American politics and Emily Miller. "Better than you think: Reframing Inter-American Relations" Policy Brief in March 2015 from brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2015/03/inter-american-relations-feinberg-miller-trinkunas/better-than-you-think--reframing-interamerican-relations.pdf)Much of the contemporary U.S. policy toward the hemisphere has its roots in the 1990s. In the wake of the end of the Cold War, the regional agenda became crowded with new initiatives and institutions: the Summit of the Americas, the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), the Conference of Defense Ministers of the Americas, a reoriented Organization of American States (OAS) focused on democracy promotion and a reinvigorated Inter-American Court of Human Rights. At its core, this agenda was intended to consolidate and give regional institutional weight to core U.S. interests in the region, namely free elections, free markets, free trade and cooperative security. In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, the United States redoubled efforts to secure regional cooperation on combating terrorism and controlling the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Even if some specific initiatives have run aground, such as the FTAA, or have been troubled, such as recent Summits, the hemispheric agenda of the United States has by and large been achieved. In country after country, international and domestic actors have aligned to produce the triumph of democracy and sustainable market-based economies, leading a wave of democratization and liberalization that has swept the globe since the 1970s. The region experienced its last (brief) interstate conflict between Ecuador and Peru in 1995, and the probability of war in Latin America is vanishingly small, an astounding achievement when compared to present troubles in Europe, Asia and the Middle East. In addition, although international terrorism and proliferation have not vanished from the region, Latin America is far better off than any other part of the world on this security dimension.22 In contrast to 1980, democracy is now by and large consolidated, with only a few exceptions of backsliding (shown in Figure 5),23 and military coups have become increasingly rare. Latin American democracies have pioneered new forms of political and social inclusion, such as participatory budgeting and conditional cash transfer programs. Civil society has flourished across much of the region, and there is a vibrant media in many countries. Across Latin America, we have generally witnessed stronger economic growth and better macroeconomic management during the past decade than in the previous two. In the wake of the 1980s debt crisis, bouts of hyperinflation and financial crises in the 1990s, regional political and economic leaders have been much more cautious, accumulating substantial international reserves and keeping close watch on inflation. By 2011, the nine largest economies in Latin America had, on average, accumulated reserves equivalent to 16 percent of GDP.24 At the end of 2013, Brazil was sitting on $376 billion and Mexico on $177 billion (Figure 6). Inflation has fallen dramatically from over 200 percent between 1990 and 1995 to an average of six percent since 2010.25 This improved macroeconomic management has produced significant reductions in poverty and improvements in social inclusion. The size of the middle class in Latin America has also nearly doubled since 2002,26 contributing to economic growth and new demands for improved governance. Figure 727 illustrates the sustained GDP per capita growth and poverty reduction beginning in 2003, which contrast with the income stagnation of the 1980s and modest improvements of the 1990s. Similarly, Figure 8 demonstrates consistent downward trends in inequality in some of the region’s largest economies.28 While Latin America remains the most unequal region of the world,29 it is clear that sound macroeconomic policies have contributed to improved social equity, either directly through broad-based growth, or indirectly through enabling states to finance targeted redistributive policies. The region’s rapid recovery from the 2008 global financial crisis is evidence of the strength of the macroeconomic policies and institutions that have prevailed thus far. This has meant that much of the region has needed fewer loans and external assistance, and also that Latin American leaders have less need to adhere to external conditions for financial support. For example, in 2014 the Brazilian economy slowed down but its external reserves are so large that it does not need to revert to the multilateral institutions for funds or advice. Rather, international markets and competitive pressures are tilting the internal debate in Brazil toward more market-friendly policies, as signaled by the recent appointments of a more orthodox finance minister, Joaquim Levy, and market-oriented politicians to the agriculture and industry portfolios. Latin America has also expanded its participation in global trade and its range of trading partners. In conjunction with a fall in average tariffs from 39 percent in 1985 to 10 percent in 2005, Latin America’s export volume quadrupled.30 There is now a broad array of free trade agreements in place across the region, not only among Latin American states but also with China, Europe and the United States. This tangible multi-polarity offers nations more options for economic development and export-led growth. For example, growing commodity exports toward China during the 2000s (Figure 9) reflects rising demand relative to traditional Latin American export markets such as Europe and the United States. Latin America’s diversified trade is not the “fault” of U.S. policy inattention but rather a reflection of structural shifts in the global economy. For Latin America, this is a healthy development because it reduces the risks of being tied to the economic prospects of any one region of the world; vulnerabilities of course remain, as South America depends heavily on commodity exports and Central America and Mexico are subject to the ups and downs of the U.S. economy. Inter-state peace in Latin America has become the status quo. States in the region rarely militarize disputes, and civil conflicts have declined as well; Figure 10 plots civil and international conflicts as measured by magnitude scores that reflect “societal-systemic impact.”31 According to Figure 10, the only nations currently plagued by major episodes of civil violence are Colombia and Mexico, both drug-fueled conflicts.32 Even though most states in the region continue to share some disputed borders, such sources of friction are by and large the province of diplomats and lawyers arguing cases at the International Court of Justice in The Hague rather than of armies.33 Latin America has in place a nuclear-weapon-free zone, and the two leading nuclear technology powers, Argentina and Brazil, have a longstanding non-proliferation institution, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC), that monitors their mutual rejection of the pursuit of nuclear weapons.34 While fears about international terrorism in the region have occasionally made headlines in the United States post 9/11, the last major incidents occurred in 1992 and 1994 when Hezbollah agents attacked the Israeli Embassy and Jewish Cultural Center in Buenos Aires. In its most recent report on terrorism in the region, the U.S. State Department maintained that the majority of terrorist attacks in Latin America were committed by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). However such tactics by transnational criminal organizations and insurgents in the hemisphere are largely aimed at domestic audiences rather than linked to international terrorist networks.35 The bottom line is that since the end of the Cold War, Latin America has advanced far and fast along a number of political, security, economic and social dimensions. It is impossible to untangle the relative weight of the external and internal factors contributing to this felicitous outcome, but it is safe to say that Latin American countries have made themselves much more democratic, peaceful and prosperous, and that past instruments of U.S. influence, when smartly deployed, have largely worked themselves out of a job. These achievements are deeply compatible with longrange core U.S. interests in regional peace, democracy and human rights, market-based economies and free trade. As such, a return to a mid-20th century interventionist foreign policy is neither feasible nor desirable.Russia War AdvNC – Negotiations TurnSanctions are key to reopening US-Venezuela negotiations Rendon and Price 19 [(Moises Rendon is director of the Future of Venezuela Initiativeand fellow with the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Max Price is a former intern with the CSIS Americas Program.) “Are Sanctions Working in Venezuela?” CSIS, 9/2019] BC There is significant evidence of the impact of sanctions on Maduro’s power. Not only have targeted economic sanctions limited his ability to finance his regime’s antidemocratic activities and human rights abuses by reducing oil and illegal mining earnings, but they have also strained his inner circle. His control over state institutions and assets is slipping along with public confidence in his regime. The United States has instituted a strategy of risk; the current administration’s interminable threat to impose further sanctions leaves Maduro and his accomplices unsure as to how far it will go, forcing them to fear the worst. Most recently, sanctions have increased leverage for democratic forces within Venezuela. Maduro recently agreed to send a delegation to Barbados to reopen talks with the opposition after dialogues stalled earlier this year. The increased pressure of sanctions was a key factor in his decision to negotiate with political adversaries, as he and his inner circle are more limited than ever in their capacity to travel and engage with financial assets.NC – No US-Russia WarNo Russia war. Bandow 16 (Doug, Senior Fellow, the Cato Institute, “Western Paranoia Aside, Russia Unlikely to Attack the Baltics,” 2/16, , ) Yet the surging fear over Russian adventurism distorts Moscow's interests and ambitions. Vladimir Putin is a nasty fellow, brutal at home and abroad. However, he seems to well represent much of his country's power elite and public. There is little apparent support for Western-style liberalism. Oust Putin and "le deluge" to follow would not likely be pretty. Putin's behavior is bad, but poses little threat to America, "old" Europe, or even most of Russia's neighbors. He is behaving like a traditional Tsar, not a reincarnated Joseph Stalin or Adolf Hitler. He has taken Moscow back to the Russian Empire, not the Soviet Union. His government is not interested in an ideological crusade and sees no inherent conflict with the West. Rather, Moscow demands respect for its status, protection of Russia's borders, and consideration of its interests. In pursuing these ends Putin is practical and measured, if perhaps imprudent and myopic--and, of course, dismissive of the cost to others. Mikhail Saakashvili's Georgia was actively anti-Russian, pursued close ties with America, and sought membership in NATO--all certain to antagonize Moscow. Abkhazia and South Ossetia had resisted Georgian control in the past, giving Russia an easy means to weaken Tbilisi and pay back NATO over the latter's dismemberment of Serbia, with historic ties to Moscow. (Russia's defense of Belgrade helped turn an assassination into World War I.) Ukraine always mattered more to Moscow than Georgia or the Baltics for historical and cultural reasons, as well as the naval base of Sebastopol. Nevertheless, Russia accepted an independent Ukraine, even when ruled by the hostile, incompetent Viktor Yushchenko, who also pushed for his nation's membership in the alliance--then opposed by the majority of Ukrainians. Yushchenko's failure opened the way for the election of Viktor Yanukovich, nominally pro-Russian, though he resisted Moscow's control. Putin acted only after Europe pushed a trade agreement to reorient Ukraine away from Russia and both Brussels and Washington backed a street revolution against Yanukovich. Even then, Putin sought to weaken, not conquer, Ukraine. He seized Crimea, historically part of Russia, and backed ethnic Russian separatists in the east. Despite numerous predictions, Moscow did not absorb the Donbass, create a land bridge to Crimea, stage a coup de' main against Kiev, or launch a general assault on Ukraine. His brutal response was murderous and unjustified, but militarily on par with U.S. interventions. Putin continues to demonstrate no interest in ruling those likely to resist Russia's tender mercies. Ukrainians and Georgians would not likely act like docile Russian citizens today. Indeed, the former resisted the restoration of Soviet control after German forces were expelled in World War II. Nor was occupation necessary to bar those nations' way to NATO. Seizing the Baltic states likely would generate similar resistance. They developed separate identities under the Russian Empire and enjoyed brief independence between World Wars I and II. They also have the advantage of having joined NATO before Moscow could cause much trouble. Moreover, as weak nations currently containing no foreign troops, the Baltics pose no potential threat to Russia. Ukraine in NATO would look very different. Finally, the Baltic ethnic Russian populations, though significant, demonstrate little sentiment for joining Mother Russia. They prefer cultural connection to political affiliation, creating a poor target for the sort of destabilizing tactics deployed against Ukraine. Wrote Robert Person, a professor at West Point: "the Baltic Russians are not particularly amenable to Russian hybrid warfare. Though they have many lingering grievances over language, cultural and citizenship policies, these grievances have not translated into separatism." So what would Russia gain from attacking the Baltics? A recalcitrant, majority non-ethnic Russian population. A possible temporary nationalist surge at home. A likely short-lived victory over the West. The costs would be far greater. Grabbing the Baltics likely would spur population exodus and trigger economic collapse. Launching a war without the convincing pretext present in the cases of Georgia and Ukraine might leave the Russian public angry over the retaliation certain to come. Worse, Moscow certainly would rupture economic and political relations with the U.S. and Europe and probably start a losing conventional war with NATO. Even more frightening would be the prospect of a nuclear conflict, whether intentional or inadvertent. Russia has destroyed Europe's peaceful equilibrium, but everything about Putin's presidency so far argues against reckless war for no rational purpose against the Baltics. Of course, they should act to reduce even minimal chances of such a war. However, the U.S. should not launch a multi-billion dollar allied build-up, one which, ironically, would create a perceived threat to Russia where none currently exists. Could NATO lose a war over the Baltics? As Rand warned, yes, at least in the short-term. But the allies could defeat Russia if they were prepared for World War III. That would be beyond foolish for Washington--another reason why the U.S. should stop making defense promises which serve the interests of other nations rather than America. If the Europeans, in contrast, are ready to make that commitment, they should be preparing their own defense.NC – Russia War GoodIf conventional war with Russia started or was imminent, the US would use nukes firstTong Zhao et al 18, fellow @ Carnegie, PhD in Science, Technology, and International Affairs @ Georgia Institute of Technology, MA in International Relations @ Tsinghua University, “Reducing the Risks of Nuclear Entanglement”, or Russian non-nuclear strikes against the United States could also spark escalation—a risk that has been overlooked since the Cold War—for reasons other than crisis instability. The risk would be most acute if China or Russia launched non-nuclear attacks against dual-use U.S. C3I assets (including early-warning and communication satellites, as well as ground-based radars and transmitters). Even if conducted exclusively for the purpose of winning (or at least not losing) a conventional war, such non-nuclear attacks could be misinterpreted by Washington as preparations for nuclear use. As a result, Washington might come to believe (wrongly) that it was about to become the victim of a nuclear attack—an effect termed misinterpreted warning. For example, China or Russia might attack U.S. early-warning satellites to enable their regional non-nuclear ballistic missiles (or, perhaps, non-nuclear ICBMs or boost-glide weapons in the future) to penetrate U.S. missile defenses. However, such an attack might be misinterpreted by the United States as an attempt to disable missile defenses designed to protect the homeland against limited nuclear strikes. Even if the United States did not believe that nuclear use by an adversary was imminent, it might still worry that non-nuclear strikes against its dual-use C3I assets could compromise its ability to limit the damage it would suffer if the war turned nuclear at some later point. Such damage-limitation operations, which are an acknowledged part of U.S. nuclear strategy, would probably involve nuclear or non-nuclear attacks on the adversary’s nuclear forces backed up by missile defenses. To have any chance of success, these operations would require very sophisticated C3I capabilities (to target mobile missiles, for example). Attacks on—or even perceived threats to—these C3I assets (many of which are dual use) could lead to concerns in Washington that, unless it took action now, effective damage limitation might be impossible—that is, the damage-limitation window might already have closed—if the war turned nuclear. The United States might respond to either of these concerns in ways that could further escalate the crisis. Washington would probably take steps to protect surviving C3I capabilities. It might, for example, attack anti-satellite weapons that were seen as particularly threatening. Such strikes could prove especially escalatory if they were conducted deeper inside the adversary’s borders than the United States had previously struck. Alternatively, or additionally, Washington might issue explicit or implicit nuclear threats against nuclear use or further attacks on C3I assets. In fact, the 2018 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review even goes so far as to threaten to use nuclear weapons in response to attacks on C3I assets. Risk mitigation will likely prove challenging. China may not want to disentangle its nuclear and non-nuclear forces because doing so might weaken its ability to deter U.S. attacks against the latter and because such disentanglement might prove challenging organizationally for the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (which operates China’s land-based nuclear forces). For Russia, the financial costs associated with disentanglement are likely to be a significant barrier. Moreover, inadvertent escalation is not generally regarded as a serious risk in China or Russia. Unfortunately, the belief that inadvertent escalation is unlikely actually makes it more probable because it leaves political and military leaders less inclined, in peacetime, to take steps that could mitigate the risks and more inclined, in wartime, to interpret ambiguous events in the worst possible light. Although there is more acceptance of the possibility of inadvertent escalation in the United States, there is little evidence that the U.S. government and military have fully factored the risks of entanglement into procurement policies and war planning. There is also little evidence that the administration of President Donald Trump is willing to invest significant political capital in reducing the risk of inadvertent escalation.That initial strike will completely destroy their nuclear arsenal – solves the impactHans Kristensen et al 17, Associate Senior Fellow with the SIPRI Disarmament, Arms Control and Non-proliferation Programme, director of the Nuclear Information Project with the Federation of American Scientists, co-author to the world nuclear forces overview in the SIPRI Yearbook (Oxford University Press) and a frequent adviser to the news media on nuclear weapons policy and operations, "How US nuclear force modernization is undermining strategic stability: The burst-height compensating super-fuze", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, US nuclear forces modernization program has been portrayed to the public as an effort to ensure the reliability and safety of warheads in the US nuclear arsenal, rather than to enhance their military capabilities. In reality, however, that program has implemented revolutionary new technologies that will vastly increase the targeting capability of the US ballistic missile arsenal. This increase in capability is astonishing—boosting the overall killing power of existing US ballistic missile forces by a factor of roughly three—and it creates exactly what one would expect to see, if a nuclear-armed state were planning to have the capacity to fight and win a nuclear war by disarming enemies with a surprise first strike. Because of improvements in the killing power of US submarine-launched ballistic missiles, those submarines now patrol with more than three times the number of warheads needed to destroy the entire fleet of Russian land-based missiles in their silos. US submarine-based missiles can carry multiple warheads, so hundreds of others, now in storage, could be added to the submarine-based missile force, making it all the more lethal. The revolutionary increase in the lethality of submarine-borne US nuclear forces comes from a “super-fuze” device that since 2009 has been incorporated into the Navy’s W76-1/Mk4A warhead as part of a decade-long life-extension program. We estimate that all warheads deployed on US ballistic missile submarines now have this fuzing capability. Because the innovations in the super-fuze appear, to the non-technical eye, to be minor, policymakers outside of the US government (and probably inside the government as well) have completely missed its revolutionary impact on military capabilities and its important implications for global security. Before the invention of this new fuzing mechanism, even the most accurate ballistic missile warheads might not detonate close enough to targets hardened against nuclear attack to destroy them. But the new super-fuze is designed to destroy fixed targets by detonating above and around a target in a much more effective way. Warheads that would otherwise overfly a target and land too far away will now, because of the new fuzing system, detonate above the target. FIGURE 1. The deployment of the new MC4700 arming, fuzing, and firing system on the W76-1/Mk4A significantly increases the number of hard target kill-capable warheads on US ballistic missile submarines. The result of this fuzing scheme is a significant increase in the probability that a warhead will explode close enough to destroy the target even though the accuracy of the missile-warhead system has itself not improved. As a consequence, the US submarine force today is much more capable than it was previously against hardened targets such as Russian ICBM silos. A decade ago, only about 20 percent of US submarine warheads had hard-target kill capability; today they all do. (See Figure 1.) This vast increase in US nuclear targeting capability, which has largely been concealed from the general public, has serious implications for strategic stability and perceptions of US nuclear strategy and intentions. Russian planners will almost surely see the advance in fuzing capability as empowering an increasingly feasible US preemptive nuclear strike capability—a capability that would require Russia to undertake countermeasures that would further increase the already dangerously high readiness of Russian nuclear forces. Tense nuclear postures based on worst-case planning assumptions already pose the possibility of a nuclear response to false warning of attack. The new kill capability created by super-fuzing increases the tension and the risk that US or Russian nuclear forces will be used in response to early warning of an attack—even when an attack has not occurred. The increased capability of the US submarine force will likely be seen as even more threatening because Russia does not have a functioning space-based infrared early warning system but relies primarily on ground-based early warning radars to detect a US missile attack. Since these radars cannot see over the horizon, Russia has less than half as much early-warning time as the United States. (The United States has about 30 minutes, Russia 15 minutes or less.) The inability of Russia to globally monitor missile launches from space means that Russian military and political leaders would have no “situational awareness” to help them assess whether an early-warning radar indication of a surprise attack is real or the result of a technical error. The combination of this lack of Russian situational awareness, dangerously short warning times, high-readiness alert postures, and the increasing US strike capacity has created a deeply destabilizing and dangerous strategic nuclear situation. When viewed in the alarming context of deteriorating political relations between Russia and the West, and the threats and counter-threats that are now becoming the norm for both sides in this evolving standoff, it may well be that the danger of an accident leading to nuclear war is as high now as it was in periods of peak crisis during the Cold War. How the new accuracy-enhancing fuze works. The significant increase in the ability of the W76-1/Mk4A warhead to destroy hardened targets—including Russian silo-based ICBMs—derives from a simple physical fact: Explosions that occur near and above the ground over a target can be lethal to it. This above-target area is known as a “lethal volume”; the detonation of a warhead of appropriate yield in this volume will result in the destruction of the target. The recognition that the killing power of the W76 warhead could be vastly increased by equipping it with a new fuze was discussed in a 1994 alternate warhead study conducted by the Defense and Energy departments. The study calculated the number of warheads that would be needed for the W76 to attack the Russian target base, if START II were implemented. At the time, W76/Mk4 warheads had a fixed height-of-burst fuze (meaning the fuze could not adjust its detonation at an optimal location if it were falling short or long of a target). With those fixed-height fuzes, submarine-launched nuclear missiles were mainly aimed at softer targets such as military bases. But the study found that an enhanced Mk4A reentry-body with a new fuze that provided for an adjustable height-of-burst as it arrives would have significant capabilities against harder targets, compared to warheads with the earlier fuzes. The study assumed that a smaller number of Mk4 nuclear warheads with higher killing power per warhead could cover the Russian target base and be more effective than multiple attacks on targets with less destructive warheads. In other words, an enhanced fuze would allow the United States to reduce the number of warheads on its ballistic missile submarines, but increase the targeting effectiveness of the fleet. Figure 2 illustrates the kill distribution of US submarine-launched nuclear missiles equipped with the earlier, fixed height-of-burst fuzes. The dome-shaped volume outlined in gray shows the lethal volume within which a 100-kiloton nuclear explosion will generate 10,000 pounds per square inch or more of blast pressure on the ground. In other words, if a target on the ground cannot survive a blast of 10,000 pounds per square inch or more, it will be destroyed if a 100-kt nuclear weapon detonates anywhere within that dome-shaped volume. To show the physical relationship of the lethal volume for a particular ground target of interest—in this case a Russian SS-18 ICBM silo—Figure 2 was drawn to scale. Also shown to scale is the approximate spread of warhead trajectories that correspond to a missile that is accurate to 100 meters, a miss distance roughly the same as what is achieved by the Trident II sea-launched ballistic missile. Miss distances are typically characterized in terms of a quantity called the “circular error probable,” or CEP, which is defined as the radius of a circle around the aim point within which half of the warheads aimed at a target are expected to impact. In the case of a Trident II 100-kt W76-1 ballistic missile warhead, the lethal distance on the ground and the CEP are roughly equal. As a result, roughly half of the warheads equipped with the old, fixed-height fuze system could be expected to fall close enough to detonate on the ground within the lethal range. The new super-fuze for W76-1/Mk4A has a flexible height-of-burst capability that enables it to detonate at any height within the lethal volume over a target. Figure 3 shows how the new fuze vastly increases the chances that the target will be destroyed, even though the arriving warheads have essentially the same ballistic accuracy. The super-fuze is designed to measure its altitude well before it arrives near the target and while it is still outside the atmosphere. This measurement would typically be taken at an altitude of 60 to 80 kilometers, where the effects of atmospheric drag are very small. At this point, the intended trajectory is known to very high precision before the warhead begins to substantially slow from atmospheric drag. If the warhead altitude measured by the super-fuze at that time were exactly equal to the altitude expected for the intended trajectory, the warhead would be exactly on target. But if the altitude were higher than expected, the warhead could be expected to hit beyond the intended aim point. Likewise, if the altitude is lower than that expected, the warhead would likely hit short of the intended aim point. Testing has established the statistical shape and orientation of the expected spread of warhead locations as they fly towards the target. In the case of Trident II, the spread of trajectories around the intended trajectory is so small that the best way to increase the chances of detonating inside the lethal volume is to intentionally shift the aim point slightly beyond the location of the target. (Note that the intended trajectory in Figure 3 is shifted slightly down range.) By shifting the aim point down range by a distance roughly equal to a CEP, warheads that would otherwise fall short or long of the target using the conventional Mk4 fuze instead will detonate—at different heights dictated by the super fuze—within the lethal volume above a target. This shift in the down-range aim point will result in a very high percentage of warheads that overfly the target detonating in the lethal volume. The end result is that with the new Mk4A super-fuze, a substantially higher percentage of launched warheads detonate inside the lethal volume, resulting in a considerable increase in the likelihood that the target is destroyed. The ultimate effect of the super fuze’s flexible burst-height capability is a significantly increased target kill probability of the new W76-1/Mk4A warhead compared with the conventional warhead of the same type. Figure 4 shows the probability that warheads will detonate close enough to destroy the ground-target for both the conventional fuze and the super-fuze. As can be seen from figure 4, the probability of kill using a submarine-launched warhead with the new super-fuze (W76-1/Mk4A) is about 0.86. This 86 percent probability is very close to what could be achieved using three warheads with conventional fuzes to attack the same target. To put it differently: In the case of the 100-kt Trident II warhead, the super fuze triples the killing power of the nuclear force it has been applied to. Many Russian targets are not hardened to 10,000 pounds per square inch blast overpressure. Figure 5 shows the same probability of kill curves for the case of a target that is only hard to 2,000 pounds per square inch or more of blast overpressure, which is the actual case for almost all targets hardened to nuclear attack—ICBMs and supporting command posts, hardened structures at strategic airbases, submarines at pierside or in protected tunnels, hardened command posts at road mobile missile bases and elsewhere, etc. In this case, the super-fuze achieves a probability of kill of about 0.99—or very near certainty. This case also is equivalent to achieving a probability of kill associated with using three warheads with a 0.83 probability to achieve a 0.99 probability of kill. The probability of kills revealed by figures 4 and 5 have enormous security ramifications. The US military assumes that Russian SS-18 and TOPOL missile silos are hardened to withstand a pressure of 10,000 pounds per square inch or more. Since with the new super-fuze, the probability of kill against these silos is near 0.9, the entire force of 100-kt W76-1/Mk4A Trident II warheads now “qualifies” for use against the hardest of Russian silos. This, in turn, means that essentially all of the higher-yield nuclear weapons (such as the W88/Mk5) that were formerly assigned to these Russian hard targets can now be focused on other, more demanding missions, including attacks against deeply-buried underground command facilities. In effect, the significant increase in the killing power of the W76 warhead allows the United States to use its submarine-based weapons more decisively in a wider range of missions than was the case before the introduction of this fuze. The history of the US super-fuze program. The super-fuze is officially known as the arming, fuzing and firing (AF&F) system. It consists of a fuze, an arming subsystem (which includes the radar), a firing subsystem, and a thermal battery that powers the system. The AF&F is located in the tip of the cone-shaped reentry body above the nuclear explosive package itself. The AF&F developed for the new W76-1/Mk4A is known as MC4700 and forms part of the W76 life-extension program intended to extend the service life of the W76—the most numerous warhead in the US stockpile—out to the time period 2040-2050. The new super-fuze uses a technology first deployed on the high-yield W88/Mk5 Trident II warhead. The Navy’s Strategic Systems Program contracted with the Lockheed Missile and Space Corporation in the early 1980s to develop a new fuze that included “a radar-updated, path-length compensating fuze … that could adjust for trajectory errors and significantly improve the ability to destroy a target. This was an early and sophisticated use of artificial intelligence in a weapon.” It was the radar-updated, path-length compensating fuze—combined with the increased accuracy of the Trident II missile—that gave an SLBM the ability to hold a hardened target at risk. Efforts to incorporate the W88/Mk5 fuze capability into the W76/Mk4 was part of the Energy Department’s Warhead Protection Program in the mid-1990s to permit “Mk5 fuzing functionality (including radar-updated path length fuzing, and radar proximity fuzing) as an option to replacement of the much smaller Mk4 AF&F,” according to the partially declassified 1996 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan (emphasis added). Apart from the inherent drive to improve military capabilities whenever possible, the motivation for increasing the target kill capability of the submarine-borne W76 was that the Air Force’s hard-target killer, the MX Peacekeeper ICBM, was scheduled to be retired under the START II treaty. The Navy only had 400 W88 hard-target kill warheads, so a decision was made to add the capability to the W76. In an article in April 1997, Strategic Systems Program director Rear Adm. George P. Nanos publicly explained that “just by changing the fuze in the Mk4 reentry body, you get a significant improvement. The Mk4, with a modified fuze and Trident II accuracy, can meet the original D5 [submarine-borne missile] hard target requirement,” Nanos stated. Later that same year, the Energy Department’s Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan formally described the objective of the fuze modernization program “to enable W76 to take advantage of [the] higher accuracy of [the] D5 missile.” By 1998, the fuze modernization effort became a formal project, with five SLBM flight tests planned for 2001-2008. Full-scale production of the super-fuze equipped W76-1/Mk4A began in September 2008, with the first warhead delivered to the Navy in February 2009. By the end of 2016, roughly 1,200 of an estimated 1,600 planned W76-1/Mk4As had been produced, of which about 506 are currently deployed on ballistic missile submarines. The implications. The newly created capability to destroy Russian silo-based nuclear forces with 100-kt W76-1/Mk4A warheads—the most numerous in the US stockpile—vastly expands the nuclear warfighting capabilities of US nuclear forces. Since only part of the W76 force would be needed to eliminate Russia’s silo-based ICBMs, the United States will be left with an enormous number of higher-yield warheads that would then be available to be reprogrammed for other missions. Approximately 890 warheads are deployed on US ballistic missile submarines (506 W76-1/Mk4A and 384 W88/Mk5). Assuming that the 506 deployed W76-1s equipped with the super-fuze were used against Russian silo-based ICBMs, essentially all 136 Russian silo-based ICBMs could be potentially eliminated by attacking each silo with two W76-1 warheads—a total of 272 warheads. This would consume only 54 percent of the deployed W76-1 warheads, leaving roughly 234 of the 500 warheads free to be targeted on yet other installations. And hundreds of additional submarine warheads are in storage for increasing the missile warhead loading if so ordered. The Trident II missiles that are deployed today carry an average of four to five W76-1 warheads each. However, each missile could carry eight such warheads if the US were to suddenly decide to carry a maximum load of W76 warheads on its deployed Trident II ballistic missiles. And the missile was tested with up to 12 warheads. Essentially all the 384 W88 “heavy” Trident II warheads, with yields of 455 kt, would also be available for use against deeply-buried targets. In addition, about 400 Minuteman III warheads, with yields of about 300 kt, could be used to target hardened Russian targets. In all, the entire Russian silo-based forces could potentially be destroyed while leaving the US with 79 percent of its ballistic missile warheads unused. Even after Russia’s silo-based missiles were attacked, the US nuclear firepower remaining would be staggering—and certainly of concern to Russia or any other country worried about a US first strike. Because of the new kill capabilities of US submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), the United States would be able to target huge portions of its nuclear force against non-hardened targets, the destruction of which would be crucial to a “successful” first strike. One such mission would likely involve the destruction of road-mobile ICBMs that had left their garrisons to hide in Russia’s vast forests in anticipation of attack. The garrisons and their support facilities would probably be destroyed quickly, and some of the dispersed road-mobile launchers would also be quickly destroyed as they were in the process of dispersing. To destroy or expose the remaining launchers, United States planners would have the nuclear forces needed to undertake truly scorched-earth tactics: Just 125 US Minuteman III warheads could set fire to some 8,000 square miles of forest area where the road-mobile missiles are most likely to be deployed. This would be the equivalent of a circular area with a diameter of 100 miles. Such an attack would be potentially aimed at destroying all road-mobile launchers either as they disperse or after they have taken up position some short distance from roads that give them access to forested areas. Many of the nearly 300 remaining deployed W76 warheads could be used to attack all command posts associated with Russian ICBMs. A very small number of Russia’s major leadership command posts are deeply buried, to protect them from direct destruction by nuclear attack. The US military would likely reserve the highest-yield warheads for those targets. Figure 7 below shows an example of a structure that is roughly the size of the US Capitol building that is postulated to have rooms and tunnels as deep as 800 feet or more. Shelters that have rooms and tunnels at even greater depths could be sealed by using multiple nuclear warheads to crater every location where an entrance or exit might conceivably have been built.Successful preemptive strike forces a surrender – solves further escalationSarah Johnson 17, "U.S. Nuclear First Strike Policy; Be Afraid", Bill Track 50, second situation is a?preemptive strike?—?a?first-strike attack with nuclear weapons carried out to destroy an enemy’s capacity to respond. Preemptive strikes can be?based on the assumption that the enemy is planning an imminent attack, but don’t have to be.?The methodology behind a preemptive nuclear strike is to attack the enemy’s?strategic nuclear weapon facilities (missile silos, submarine bases, bomber airfields), command and control sites and storage depots first. By hitting these targets first the enemy?will be so wounded with so little of their resources left that they will be forced to surrender with minimal damage to the attacking party.Otherwise, Russia will broadly scale up military AI – extinctionMike Rogers 17, former US Representative from Michigan, chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, "Artificial intelligence — the arms race we may not be able to control", TheHill, “Whoever becomes the leader in this sphere will become ruler of the world,” said Vladimir Putin. The sphere the President of Russia is referring to is artificial intelligence (AI) and his comments should give you a moment of pause. Addressing students at the beginning of our Labor Day weekend, Putin remarked “Artificial intelligence is the future, not only for Russia, but for all humankind,” adding, “It comes with colossal opportunities, but also threats that are difficult to predict.” For once, I find myself in agreement with the President of Russia, but just this once. Artificial Intelligence offers incredible promise and peril. Nowhere is this clearer than in the realm of national security. Today un-crewed systems are a fact of modern warfare. Nearly every country is adopting systems where personnel are far removed from the conflict and wage war by remote control. AI stands to sever that ground connection. Imagine a fully autonomous Predator or Reaper drone. Managed by an AI system, the drone could identify targets, determine their legitimacy, and conduct a strike all without human intervention. Indeed, the Ministry of Defence of the United Kingdom issued a press statement in September that the country “does not possess fully autonomous weapon systems and has no intention of developing them,” and that its weapons systems “will always be under control as an absolute guarantee of human oversight and authority and accountability.” Let’s think smaller. Imagine a tiny insect-sized drone loaded with explosive. Guided by a pre-programmed AI, it could hunt down a specific target — a politician, a general, or an opposition figure — determine when to strike, how to strike, and if to strike based on its own learning. Howard Hughes Medical Center recently attached a backpack to a genetically modified dragonfly and flew it remotely. These examples are, however, where humans are involved and largely control the left and right limits of AI. Yet, there are examples of AI purposely and independently going beyond programed parameters. Rogue algorithms led to a flash crash of the British Pound. In 2016, in-game AIs created super AIs weapons and hunted down human players, and AIs have created their own languages that were indecipherable to humans. AIs proved more effective than their human counterparts in producing and catching users in spear phishing programs. Not only did the AIs create more content, they successfully captured more users with their deception. While seemingly simple and low stakes in nature, extrapolate these scenarios into more significant and risky areas and the consequences become much greater. Cybersecurity is no different. Today we are focused on the hackers, trolls, and cyber criminals (officially sanctioned and otherwise) who seek to penetrate our networks, steal our intellectual property, and leave behind malicious code for activation in the event of a conflict. Replace the individual with an AI and imagine how fast hacking takes place; networks against networks, at machine speed all without a human in the loop. Sound far-fetched? It’s not. In 2016, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency held an AI on AI capture the flag contest called the Cyber Grand Challenge at the DEF CON event. AI networks against AI networks. In August of this year the founders of 116 AI and robotics companies signed a letter petitioning the United Nations to ban lethal autonomous systems. Signatories to this letter included Google DeepMind’s co-founder Mustafa Suleyman and Elon Musk who, in response to Putin’s quote tweeted, “Competition for AI superiority at national level most likely cause of WW3 imo (sic)”. AI is not some far off future challenge. It is a challenge today and one with which we must grapple. I am in favor of fielding any system that enhances our national security, but we must have an open and honest conversation about the implications of AI, the consequences of which we do not, and may not, fully understand. This is not a new type of bullet or missile. This is a potentially fully autonomous system that even with human oversight and guidance will make its own decisions on the battlefield and in cyberspace. How can we ensure that the system does not escape our control? How can we prevent such systems from falling into the hands of terrorists or insurgents? Who controls the source code? How and can we build in so-called impenetrable kill switches? AI and AI-like systems are slowly being introduced into our arsenal. Our adversaries, China, Russia, and others are also introducing AI systems into their arsenals as well. Implementation is happening faster than our ability to fully comprehend the consequences. Putin’s new call spells out a new arms race. Rushing to AI weapon systems without guiding principles is a dangerous. It risks an escalation that we do not fully understand and may not be able to control. The cost of limiting AI intelligence being weaponized could vastly exceed all of our nuclear proliferation efforts to date. More troubling, the consequences of failure are equally existential.NR – Russia War Good – Uniqueness Russian enhancements since the Syria disaster have led them to new command and control strike capabilities Thomas 12/19 [Timothy Thomas, author of the MITRE Foundation, specialist in Military Planning, Information Security, Intelligence Analysis, Military Operations, He served for more than twenty years as a senior analyst at the Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He holds a BS in engineering science from the U.S. Military Academy and an MA in international relations from the University of Southern California. During his Army career, he was a foreign area officer who specialized in Soviet/Russian studies. He is the author of numerous articles and books, including three on Russia:?Russia Military Strategy: Impacting 21st Century Reform and Geopolitics,?Recasting the Red Star: Russia Forges Tradition and Technology through Toughness, and?Kremlin Kontrol.; “Russian Combat Capabilities for 2020: Three Developments to Track” published in December 2019] RMSeveral points merit special attention for the West to follow, to include Russian preemption capabilities and new methods to deter (scare) adversaries with advanced weapon capabilities. Gerasimov’s AMS address noted that Russia’s overall “strategy of active defense” is a set of measures for the preemptive neutralization of threats to the state’s security—that is, the desire to preempt when threatened and deter potential adversaries in the region, to include Lebanon and Israel. The Syrian experience has allowed Russia to test a host of new weapons and new concepts and has trained a number of leaders in contemporary warfare outside its borders, making it much different than the earlier, more localized fight in Chechnya. New methods of employing Spetsnaz forces and new ways of utilizing private military companies were explored. The Syrian experience has refocused Russia’s military on urban warfare and the difficulty of extracting extremists from buildings while trying simultaneously not to harm the local population and to find humanitarian corridors for their extraction from the combat zone. The use of robotics during urban operations, learning ways to use radio-electronic equipment or information technologies to disorganize enemy signals, and defending airfields from UAV attacks were other lessons learned. Finally, Russia is in the process of incorporating these lessons learned into the force through conferences, round tables, and new manuals. Russia’s military will undoubtedly be a stronger foe after their Syrian experience than before it. Part Two: Operational Art/Maneuver Groups in Space While it is not known for certain whether Russia utilizes operational art in space, there is growing circumstantial evidence supporting that contention. First, Russia considers space as a theater of military operations (TVD), within the boundaries of which operations of a strategic force can be organized and conducted. This TVD hosts Russian satellites of various types that gather and pass information, conduct reconnaissance and communication functions, and maneuver alone or in groups, among other functions. Second, in a 2009 article in Russia’s Air-Space Defense, one author 7 was identified as a teacher of the “spacecraft launch and command and control forces operational art and tactics department of the Military-Space Academy.” Third, Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu has called aerospace operations, of which space is an important element in Russian theory, the center of gravity of future conflicts. Fourth, in a 2018 article in the journal Military Thought on modern methods of aerospace and air defense practices, the author stated that “operational art in terms of its inherent purpose remains a theory and practice of resolutely changing the situation in aerospace in one’s favor…” Finally, satellites and other equipment are capable of employing the principles of operational art, which include the conduct of deep operations, envelopment, and maneuver; and attacking weak flanks in an integrated and planned fashion, in space. These principles could be carried out in the following way: ? Deep operations could involve Russian strikes against satellites in space or against underwater cables or the use of special operations to destroy critical infrastructure targets (SODCIT) criteria. Satellites perform maneuver operations often to inspect other satellites or to perform other missions. ? Space is underdeveloped at the moment, which indicates it could remain for some time as a place for maneuver. ? Moving satellites to more favorable positions enable either strikes against adversary equipment or the achievement of a strategic position in a specific orbit, such as to conduct inspections of other satellites. ? The use of satellites as an operational maneuver group would be an unconventional form of using such assets and would consist of both ground and space-based weapons that can influence the TVD. ? Russian analysts write that practically every US weapon is hooked to satellite communications, GPS navigation, and the mobile Internet. Russian EW operators claim to be able to shut these space channels down with ease. ? Space may now be considered a flank for planetary operations. ? Space assets that maneuver in the form of groups can operate in deep space to envelop an opponent. The majority of these operations are present in the planning of Russian aerospace operations today. The actual equipment employed in space or on the ground (and aimed at space objects) at the moment includes the following items that are capable of conducting maneuver and deep/planetary operations in near or deep space: ? Inspector satellites, such as the Kosmos 2521 ? Killer satellites ? Tirada-2s, to thwart communications ? Rudolf, anti-satellite strike system ? Nudol, anti-satellite and missile system ? Peresvet combat laser ? Ground stations that can jam objects in space ? MiG-31armed with anti-satellite missiles ? Space junk that comes alive ? Reconnaissance-strike complexes or information-strike systems 8 Also, ground based hackers should be included, since they have attempted to take control of satellites, such as theoretically occurred in 1998. Russian authors contend that satellites can guide weaponry to distant shores or be the focal point from which an operation unfolds. In a global conflict the destruction of the enemy’s group of satellites is vital to success, since it deprives him of communications, navigation, and the capability to conduct reconnaissance. The following citation indicates what distant targets might include: It is possible to use various space systems in support of each of these operations. Thus, supporting a strategic operation to destroy critically important enemy targets necessitates the use of space-based means of reconnoitering these targets; electronic intelligence assets; meteorological reconnaissance assets in the interests of a proper selection of attack weapons and their combat employment methods; and space-based navigation, communications, relay, and strike evaluation systems.0F 1 Therefore, the emergence of new forms of military operations in near space can be expected that would aim to block and defeat orbital alignments of forces while suppressing radio communication systems in specific areas of space. Satellites, due to their ability to maneuver and move singularly or in swarms, could be capable of acting as an operational maneuver groups (OMG) in space. A contemporary space OMG potentially would consist of reconnaissance-strike units, satellites of various types, counter communication units, and other assets combined into a single organism. These assets are available, but it is unclear what the plans are of the Operational Art Department at the General Staff Academy for using its space assets in a space TV. Part Three: Russia’s Electronic Warfare Force: Blending Concepts with Capabilities Russian Major General Yuriy Lastochkin, who is in charge of the Defense Ministry’s radioelectronic warfare (REB) force, believes REB capabilities will permit his forces “to decide the fate of all military operations” in the near future. They will be arrayed against what Russia considers a major Western weakness, the latter’s numerous links to space assets. There is certainly ample evidence to suggest that a significant REB capability is under development. Appendix A at the end of the report lists many capabilities of the ground force, aviation, and naval REB equipment. There are several key items in the report that require Western consideration. First, while the West worries about Russian A2AD concepts, it is more likely that Russia is putting together a program that will cause chaos in Western control systems. They are working on methods to disorganize an adversary’s command and control capability. The Russians also are now expanding the use of REB as an independent branch, experimenting with REB maneuver units, and focusing on developing a disorganization plan for use in each REB brigade. In 2018 Lastochkin stated that the disorganization of enemy troop and weapons command and control and the reduction of the effectiveness of the conduct of reconnaissance and weapons employment by them “is the primary goal of the conduct of electronic warfare.” Second, Russia appears to be experimenting with the disorganization of command and control (C2D) in live engagements, such as the attempts to disrupt the Trident Juncture NATO exercise. It is working on using C2D to protect its Northern Sea Route and access to vital resources there 1 Vasiliy Y. Dolgov, and Yuriy D. Podgornykh, “Space as a Theater of Military Operations: On Possible Forms and Methods of Combat Employment of Space Command Forces and Assets,” Vozdushno-Kosmicheskaya Oborona Online, 10 April 2013. 9 with its Murmansk-BN system, which is designed to interfere with communication systems and the navigation and control systems of ships along this route. If Russia targeted US Command and control, the US would strikeBidgood 6/8 [Sarah Bidgood (director of the Eurasia Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies in Monterey, California. Her research focuses on US-Soviet and US-Russia nonproliferation cooperation, as well as the international nonproliferation regime more broadly. She is the co-editor of the book?Once and Future Partners: The United States, Russia, and Nuclear Non-Proliferation, which was published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in 2018. She also leads the Young Women in Nonproliferation Initiative at CNS.) “Russia’s new nuclear policy could be a path to arms control treaties,” published June 8/2020] RMRussia recently?published?a new document, titled “Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence.” Its release marks the first time that Russia’s official policy on deterrence has been made publicly available. As?others have observed, this document is an example of declaratory policy aimed primarily at a foreign audience — and should be read with this orientation in mind. Still, it contains information that helps readers better understand how Russia thinks about nuclear weapons, and this certainly makes it worth a close examination.Some of the more useful insights this document offers pertain to Russia’s threat assessments and what it sees as likely pathways to nuclear use. A number of these threats line up with American declaratory policy as reflected in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review. These overlaps are noteworthy, since the U.S. and Russia have traditionally been able to work together to mitigate mutual threats even when their bilateral relationship is in crisis. As such, they can point toward ways to get arms control back on track at a time when it is in deep trouble.One such area of overlap appears in section 19C, which covers the conditions that could allow for nuclear use. This list includes an “attack by [an] adversary against critical governmental or military sites of the Russian Federation, disruption of which would undermine nuclear forces response actions."The similarities between this language and that which appears in the 2018 NPR are considerable. That document identifies “attacks on U.S., allied, or partner civilian populations and infrastructure and attacks on U.S. or allied nuclear forces, their command and control, or warning and attack assessment capabilities” as a significant non-nuclear strategic attacks that could warrant the use of nuclear weapons.New Russian intelligence means attacks on US command and control are imminent and devastatingKofman 9/19 [Michael Kofman, Commentator of War on the Rocks, national security journal for analysis, commentary debate and multimedia content on foreign policy and national security issues through a realist lens. “It features articles and podcasts produced by an array of writers with deep experience in these matters: top notch scholars who study war, those who have served or worked in war zones, and more than a few who have done it all. This is what sets us apart from similar web publications: experience. In fact, we are confident that there is no other web-based publication on war and foreign policy out there that has been blessed with this much experience from its collection of regular contributors. Among our 70+ regular contributors are people who have worked on every continent in the world (aside from Antarctica, so far). They have commanded ships, bargained with militias, led patrols, managed alliances, called for fires (ten of them are combat veterans), and negotiated treaties. They include former diplomats, officers, NCOs, intelligence professionals, and some of the most established scholars in the world studying war, conflict, and international politics. We have seen the worst battlefields of our times. And we have studied war at some of the world’s greatest institutions of higher learning.” – “It’s Time to Talk About A2/AD: Rethinking the Russian Military Challenge,” published: 9/5/2019] RMThe Russian vision also includes destroying an adversary’s ability to execute such a campaign by achieving information superiority and functionally degrading their operations by eliminating their ability to effectively command and control their forces. This means Russia seeks to go after intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, battle space management systems, satellites, and all the information the U.S. military needs to orchestrate an aerospace campaign. Ultimately, nobody should be surprised if the Russian General Staff concludes that the best place to destroy or disable aircraft is on the ground, particularly aircraft that are high-value support units or what would constitute critical ‘subsystems’ of a NATO aerospace attack.Thus the operational problem is not just integrated air defenses, but rather the defense/offense combination of Russia’s strategic operations. The defensive aspect of strategic operations is meant to degrade or deflect an incoming aerospace attack, while strikes on transportation hubs, logistics, precision-guidance munition systems, and command and control are intended to erode and disaggregate U.S. forces in theater. Russia’s air force is quite large compared to most powers. Together with the long-range aviation component, supported by land-based missile units, it may inflict a successful offensive aerospace attack in theater to suppress force generation or take out critical supporting infrastructure. Non-kinetic means like cyber warfare and electronic warfare are part of the equation, especially since modern systems are networked and integrated. Russia’s strike power is hardly delimited to things that go boom. The Russian military views electronic warfare as essential to disaggregation and functional defeat of adversary command, control, and communications.The challenge here is first deciding what is important: the integrated air defense network, the forces assigned to strategic targets, the Russian ground force in contact, or the critical objects that Russia values so greatly. In defense-speak these are different ‘centers of gravity,’ and they all come with tradeoffs. Restraint reduces risk of escalation but accepts a much higher degree of cost. Scoping the problem is important, since Russian air defense is not just a bunch of S-400 regiments and their radars but a vast network of land-based and airborne assets. If functionally destroyed, the result will give the Russian General Staff few options beyond employment of theater nuclear weapons. This will result in a problem once summarized by Oscar Wilde as the “two great tragedies in life: one is not getting what one wants, and the other is getting it.”Rethinking Russia’s Precision StrikePrecision strike in the modern Russian armed forces evolved out of the Soviet General Staff’s thinking under the leadership of?Nikolai Ogarkov, chief of the General Staff from 1977 to 1984. At the tactical-operational level, the link between sensors and precision-guided weapons would allow the Soviet Union to create what they called “recon-strike” and “recon-fire complexes.” In practice, this meant artillery and missile strike systems would prove much more effective against an enemy that could be targeted in real-time. Looking out at the theater of military operations, long-range conventional weapons could substitute for tactical nuclear weapons in missions because they could be trusted to destroy high-value targets, and a low likelihood of escalation.The Russian General Staff has turned the Soviet Union’s ideas into reality, developing recon-strike and recon-fire contours or loops, together with a long-range precision strike arsenal designed to deter or inflict unacceptable consequences, i.e., coerce the adversary. Strike systems like the Iskander-M deliver precision-guided munitions at operational depths of?300 to 500 kilometers, typically in support of Russian land forces. Though they could be used to contest access in the maritime domain, their targets are semi-permanent military objects, critical infrastructure, command posts, logistics, etc. Recon-fire contours represent a kill chain linking sensors with tube artillery and multiple launch rocket systems. Since much of the Russian military’s fire power is not in a joint force but in the ground force, artillery is how the Russian ground force enables its own maneuver and denies the freedom of maneuver to adversaries. Conversely, U.S. and NATO militaries have displaced most of their firepower into the joint force, primarily delivered via airpower, and have a much lower ratio of artillery units in maneuver formations compared to Russian forces.The Russian conception for modern ground warfare with peer adversaries is a fluid fight, where maneuvering formations engage each other with minimal visual contact, which means that artillery plays an essential role. Artillery always plays a central role in Russian ground forces, as Charles? HYPERLINK "" Bartles and Lester Grau have written, “like its predecessor, the Russian Army is an artillery army with a lot of tanks.” Ironically, Russia’s principal area-denial weapons are not precision strike complexes but old-fashioned tube artillery and multiple-launch rocket systems, which are expected to virtually hold sectors on a tactical battlefield without requiring the presence of forces. Russian artillery is typically not discussed as an area denial weapon, but it should be. Yet modern Russian intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets and automated systems of command and control pose the real challenge today. Seeing and communicating at operational depths is the more significant development in the Russian armed forces, without which the recon-strike and recon-fire contours will struggle to work.There is also a growing arsenal of theater strike weapons, which reach far beyond operational ranges, representing the kinetic component of Russian strategic operations in theater. These include land and sea based cruise missiles (9M728,?9M729,? HYPERLINK "" Kalibr-NK), aeroballistic missiles ( HYPERLINK "" Kinzhal), along with air launched weapons (Kh-101/102,?Kh-32, Kh-59MK,?Kh-555), and quite likely will be expanded to?intermediate-range ballistic missiles?now that the INF Treaty has expired. These missiles tend to be dual capable, delivering conventional and nuclear payloads. Their functions range from strategic deterrence, conducting single or grouped strikes against critical objects as part of a strategy of calibrated escalation, to large-scale theater strike campaigns under the rubric of destroying critically important objects and affecting a?disaggregating strike on the enemy’s command and control. ................
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