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Recommendation 13: Design a DoD Fast-Track for Major Technology InitiativesProblem statementSpeed is overtaking all other variables as the decisive feature of military advantage. Near-peer competitors are fielding weapons systems that harness new technologies more rapidly than the United States. DoD is not optimized to compete at the accelerating pace of technology advancement or to react to operational surprises. ArgumentWhen DoD wants to make rapid progress on a major technology challenge permeating the battleground of the moment, it tends to establish a task force that commands significant attention. In the last decade or so, DoD has taken this route with Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles; Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR); cyber; and other areas. But this is an ad hoc and reactive process.These task forces, while at times successful, don’t solve the fundamental problem: the Department’s enterprise acquisition systems are optimized for meeting requirements that take years to develop and to avoid risk, which has led to increasingly long timelines for delivering operational capability. Culturally, the Research and Engineering (R&E) community, and Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (AT&L) generally, has become gradually more risk-averse over time, largely due to external pressures and incentives. Additionally, most funds available are planned in the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process, which takes two years – significantly limiting the agility of the Department to respond to emerging demands of high-paced competition.In contrast, near-peer competitors are fielding several times more new systems in a fraction of the time by spending more aggressively and accepting more risk. Task forces as a solution to AT&L’s structural deficiencies are therefore inadequate to prevent DoD from falling behind in adopting technology as technology continues to evolve. The increasing number of urgent operational requirements and the increasing timelines to field mature technologies have led the Services to develop a proliferation of “rapid” offices. These organizations provide a valuable contribution to the mission and a needed inject into the prevailing culture; however, they are in varying stages of maturity; tend not to focus on “high-end” threats that are technologically complex (e.g. developing or countering hypersonic weapons); focus on Service-specific challenges rather than Joint requirements; have significantly fewer resources relative to the traditional system; and tend not to be staffed in the most deliberate manner with appropriate expertise.Senior leaders therefore have few options when they want to explore early-stage but potent technology (what some might call a moonshot) to be used across the Joint Force within two years. This gap means that much of DoD's nominal path toward transformative technology is focused on research but not on transition and delivery. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), despite its strengths and important role in DoD, is a prime example of this.Since it is clear that new challenges will emerge that will make the Department think to establish task forces, DoD must address its technology deficits and opportunities in the future, instead of waiting for a task force to be formed. Despite task forces achieving their purpose, they have often been characterized by significant friction, brute force, and organizational turbulence. Given the broader trends, strategically and technologically, it is predictable that the need for senior-leader directed, high-level, high op tempo task forces will grow. Significant advantages would accrue for planning for and optimizing a sustainable process for a portfolio and a pipeline of such initiatives. By studying when and under what conditions – and with which special accommodations – these projects succeed, we can learn over time how to accelerate them, reduce cost, increase performance, and deliver more mission capability.DoD should therefore create an optimized structure for accelerated moonshots with an emphasis on transition rather than research – and forge a process that is proactive about what the Department needs. Proposed SolutionDoD should develop a sustainable process, as opposed to another rapid office, that would act as a “fast-track” for: (1) identifying and prioritizing the most critical operational warfighting problems, (2) assembling cross-functional teams that span organizational boundaries and disciplines to develop rapid solutions, (3) including end users’ feedback from the beginning of the capability development process, and (4) optimizing a pathway for those teams to accelerate fielding of solutions and continue working on them throughout their life cycle, with appropriate tradeoffs in time, cost, schedule, performance, and risk. Responsibility for this process should lie with the Deputy Secretary of Defense (DSD) to demonstrate the seriousness with which the Department takes this gap and to ensure that a DoD-wide solution is ultimately applied across the enterprise, rather than place this new process within a particular Service, Combatant Command, or other organization. Concurrently, the Department should find ways to reward and incentivize fast-tracking throughout the Department, as the novelty of this approach is reflective of a culture that does not value speed. While the proposed pathway described in this recommendation is designed to help DoD see major technology initiatives to fruition faster, it is not a panacea for every one of the Department’s major programs. Enacting changes such as prioritizing fast-tracking within DoD organizations’ budgets, or evaluating acquisition personnel on speed, are merely two of numerous ways to address the cultural deficit holding DoD back from becoming a more agile organization that can keep pace with our adversaries. Pathway for implementing the best ideasDoD should establish an organizational pathway (similar to utilized by a number of private companies) with the following features. These companies generally have in common: Designated product teams work on potential solutions that will have a global impactWith the full support of company leadership, the product team is given the resources and autonomy needed to make progress as fast as possibleAs the teams make progress against established mileposts, the company’s top leadership decides whether to fast-track certain products to scale themIf fast-tracked, members of the product team “move” with the idea through its life cycle, ensuring continued knowledge of and passion for the ideaNo such pathway exists in DoD, yet this established private sector approach can be adopted in the DoD R&E division analogously to the above:DSD decides which ideas should be explored, based on the Department’s most significant capability gaps identified by the Services and Combatant Commands; the Under Secretary for R&E (USD(R&E)) will coordinate this effort DSD will authorize product teams, comprising personnel from DARPA, the labs, SCO, and other S&T units in DoD Labs; these individuals detailed to these integrated teams will have personnel policies cleared away to ensure continuity to the projectThese teams will have special waivers, authorities, and exemptions for everything (hiring, acquisition, etc.) the way DIUx and DDS do; this is particularly important for bringing in top engineers and SMEs who are neededThere will be rules around color of money and agreed-upon mileposts to gauge progress; we will work with Congress to see if there are additional waivers or authorities to apply hereAs DSD decides which projects to fast-track, the product teams will “move” with their products as they transition from prototyping to procurement to productionThis pathway offers a way through the Department’s “Valley of Death” – the bureaucratic morass in the acquisition process between prototyping and full-scale production – that so often prevents useful and cutting-edge technology from being adopted. The image below illustrates how DoD’s traditional mechanisms for advancing S&T solutions are best suited to basic research and applied technology (Phases A and B), how DoD’s non-traditional units in recent years have improved the amount of prototyping the Department needs (Phase C), and how this proposed pathway will more smoothly move through the Valley of Death and achieve “go to market” status (Phase D). While it is not impossible for traditional and existing non-traditional S&T units to reach Phase D, by the time this occurs, the technology is often obsolete or circumstances on the ground have changed. Our proposal aims to shepherd critical technology through the procurement system faster than ever, and in ways DoD is not currently doing. This recommendation does not discount the need for other S&T projects to run on separate accelerated tracks. For example, the Air Force could leverage the new Air Force Warfighting Integration Capability (AFWIC) initiative to centralize the guidance, prioritization, and design of future force development efforts. AFWIC, the Air Force Research Lab (AFRL), the Rapid Capability Office (RCO), and AFwerX could coordinate on scaling, integrating, and transitioning a technology that necessitates a pivot in an Air Force program of record – similar to the scale of the programs the proposed fast-track would tackle – while simultaneously supporting downrange and deployed units looking to innovate or adopt new technologies at the edge. These ongoing efforts at a smaller scale than the proposed fast-track are meant to be encouraged, not replaced, by this recommendation. 403352010160Valley of Death00Valley of Death458628882550430720546356002457450111760Phase B00Phase B4743450111760Phase D00Phase D3686175102235Phase C00Phase C1095375111760Phase A00Phase A3623945467360Prototyping00Prototyping8763004686306.1 Basic Research006.1 Basic Research85725034956800842645323852180590825522098004495806.2-6.3 Applied Technology006.2-6.3 Applied Technology350012066670458152585724772025440055“Go to Market”00“Go to Market”55765703810-81280109855Traditional DoD S&T00Traditional DoD S&T895350100330-10033053975Existing non-traditional DoD S&T: Strategic Capabilities Office (SCO) and Rapid Capabilities Offices (RCOs)00Existing non-traditional DoD S&T: Strategic Capabilities Office (SCO) and Rapid Capabilities Offices (RCOs)94234083185-9080585090Defense Innovation Board’s proposed pathway00Defense Innovation Board’s proposed pathway98044082550Placing this pathway outside of the normal acquisition system will create the structural shell and contours of this pathway, and DoD’s talented personnel and their ideas will help the pathway take shape. But sustaining it requires funding mechanisms that don’t require Congressional action or changes to standing policies and regulations. DoD funding for Research Development Test & Evaluation (RDT&E), or prototyping, is already substantial. Funds that are not attached to specific programs of record can be directed to non-specific projects – something the Service RCOs are already doing. The Air Force recently requested $25 million of this type of funding, which should be replicated across all four Services, totaling about $100 million. These funds will require a new program office to handle the inevitable contracting and administrative components inherent in this new pathway. In addition, the DSD, USD(R&E), Services, and Combatant Commands (COCOMs) will develop a selection process for new ideas and to stand up teams around them, as well as form a set of criteria for assessing the viability of projects. This criteria must mirror the ruthless assessments private companies make when deciding whether to continue or terminate projects in their pipelines as well as remove bias around DoD’s usual “no-fail” mentality. Some failure is expected, should be tolerated, and should be seen as a sign that the pathway is working rather than failing. The selection process should include both a technical and operational evaluation of the technology behind the ideas. The former will examine whether the proposed solution is ready for applied research, and the latter will gauge warfighters’ interest in it. Potentially surprising outcomesThis pathway could offer a way for DoD to “put its money where its mouth is” on some of the flashiest yet unproven technologies that experts have been talking about for years.For example, hypersonics and directed energy are two of the most exciting technologies that DoD leadership often mentions as future capabilities, but today, they remain stuck in the basic research phase in the U.S. If the technical and operational evaluations lead to moving these technologies from Phase A to Phase B on the above spectrum, and a product team is established to work on them, the Department might be forced to confirm whether they are viable or not. Positioning, Navigation & Timing (PNT) is another area that is viewed as high-priority, as DoD conducts operations in GPS-denied environments. Whether GPS is unavailable due to operations in tunnels, caves, or remote areas, or due to jamming or spoofing by adversaries, PNT is already a critical need. More research units in DoD are looking into PNT than they are hypersonics or directed energy, opening the door for competitions and challenges that the coordinator of our proposed pathway – the office of the USD(R&E) – should organize. This approach highlights the urgency of the matter and aligns with our previous recommendations on the importance of challenges and prizes, building off previous successful ones in DoD. Expected outcomesAlthough this pathway focuses on S&T challenges, our proposal attempts to address the underlying cultural, organizational, and personnel obstacles that stand in the way of filling DoD’s capability gaps. Precisely because culture change in DoD is notoriously difficult, some of the most innovative DoD organizations are relatively new and charged with operating in ways that are different from the status quo (DIUx, DDS, SCO, the Services’ rapid capabilities offices, etc.). Their leaders established a particular culture from the onset, making it easier to attract and retain talent that fits with the culture as well as meet the most important warfighter needs. Since DoD’s R&E division will be rebuilt, elevated to the Under Secretary level, and expected to operate as a lean organization – per Congress’ insistence – this change opens the door for a genuine cultural shift in the entire R&E enterprise. A change in culture will help DoD increase its tolerance for risk and move away from a “no-fail” mindset, which is in stark contrast to how innovative companies and organizations succeed; recognize that status quo R&D strategies aren’t working; and accept new and proven approaches that are legally and procedurally permitted in DoD but unprecedented, thereby leading to skepticism among the bureaucracy. The support of DoD’s most senior leadership for this new pathway may encourage similar models elsewhere in the enterprise, all focused on securing big wins with big projects being pursued in new ways. Having a pull vs. push dynamic – aka DoD’s most senior leaders “pulling” their organizations up to their priorities vs. the Services and COCOMs “pushing” good ideas forward and upward – is not a binary choice. Both directions are conducive to molding a more coordinated and integrated R&E enterprise. In doing so, DoD will be poised to harness talent more robustly and gain a competitive and technological advantage over its adversaries. Specifically, this recommendation aims to make the Department’s R&E enterprise less complex, distributed across fewer centers of influence among the Services, Labs, DARPA, etc., and operate via less convoluted funding streams. The DIB recognizes that decentralization and diversity are generally virtues, but they presents an obstacle when the ecosystem needs to converge on rapidly delivering a solution to a challenging problem. While the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) provides a layer of coordination, competing goals, multiple time horizons, budget pressures, and numerous variables constitute a multifaceted problem for the new USD(R&E) to continually balance. This recommendation looks to reduce this burden for whomever occupies that role. Alignment with DoD and Congressional prioritiesPer the 2017 NDAA, DoD will launch its newly elevated R&E division in February 2018. The timing of this organizational change is an ideal moment to infuse the R&E organization with a new mindset. This also tracks with DoD’s August 2017 report to Congress on the implementation of the recommended management structure. This report emphasizes the need for forging culture change, tolerating more risk, hiring new talent, making more flexible decisions, coordinating with warfighters more closely, prioritizing faster procurement methods, and focusing on the capabilities DoD needs rather than the requirements the acquisition community has penned. While the report’s context focused significantly on R&E, the lessons learned via implementing this fast-track should influence every acquisition office and process across the defense enterprise. APPENDIXTable A: Recent DoD Task Forces:OrganizationTimelineBudgetMission FocusJoint Improvised Threat Defeat Organization (JIDO)Organized under DARPAFounded in FY 2006$450 Million (FY15)Enable Department of Defense actions to counter improvised threats with tactical responsiveness and anticipatory acquisition in support of combatant commanders' efforts to prepare for, and adapt to, battlefield surpriseMRAP Task ForceOrganized under USD (AT&L)Founded in FY 2007$5.34 Billion (FY08)Stood up in 2007, Sec Gates established TF to solve vehicular related fatalities. His budget amendment request for the FY08 budget was $5.34 Billion for 1,520 additional vehicles. The Assistant Secretary for AT&L was the lead for this TF.Cyber Deterrence Task ForceOrganized under Defense Science BoardFounded in FY 2015UNKDefense Science Board formed a Task Force to examine the Cyber threats to the US, as well as make recommendations for establishing a credible deterrent to those threats. The Task Force conducted their study over two years, and reported out their findings in February of 2017.ISR Task Force Organized under USD (I)Founded in FY 2008UNKTask Force developed to expedite development and delivery of ISR technology. GAO report found that Task Force lacked complete visibility of entire spectrum of ISR program, due to dual use, national intelligence, or urgent operational needs.Defense Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) Task ForceOrganized under SECDEFFounded in FY 2008UNKIn response to the NDAA of 2005, the Task Force was established in 2008 to look across the Department at the SAPR program. The yearlong study and report detailed both strategic proposals as well as specific actions to improve prevention, response, and accountability.Recovering Warrior Task ForceOrganized under USD (P&R)Founded in FY 2010$2.6 Million (FY10)Designated in Fiscal Year 2010, the Secretary of Defense established the Task Force to assess the effectiveness of the policies and programs developed and implemented by the DoD, and by each of the Military Departments, to assist and support the care, management, and transition of recovering wounded, ill, and injured members of the Armed Forces; and make recommendations for the continuous improvements of such policies and programs, as set out in paragraph four below. ................
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