SHORT ARTICLE PROPOSAL: THE METAETHICS OF COMPUTER …



A META VIEW OF INFORMATION ETHICS

Charles R. Crowell

Department of Psychology and Computer Applications Program

University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN 46556

Phone: 574-277-4774

Fax: 574-271-2058

Email: ccrowell@nd.edu

and

Robert N. Barger

Computer Applications Program

University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN 46556

Phone: 574-289-8939

Fax: 574-289-2039

Email: rbarger@nd.edu

Running Head: META VIEW OF INFORMATION ETHICS

A META VIEW OF INFORMATION ETHICS

Abstract

This article describes how a person's view of reality (i.e., one’s metaphysics or worldview or Weltanschauung) influences that person's view of morality (i.e., one’s ethics). This possibility has broad implications for understanding personal ethics in general and computer ethics in particular. Four worldviews were revealed in a survey of college students: They were Idealism, Realism, Pragmatism, and Existentialism. Idealism is the view that reality is ultimately grounded in the perfect, abstract, ideal world—the world of spirit and ideas. Realism emphasizes the ultimate importance of the natural world, that is, the physical, material, sensible universe. Pragmatism suggests that reality is not static in the sense of depending on absolute ideas or matter, but rather is ultimately "in process" and must be constantly probed and determined by social experimentation. Existentialism holds that reality is not objective, rather it is subjective and must be constructed by each individual. The implications of these worldviews for three examples of ethical dilemmas relating to information technology, those concerning piracy, privacy, and authority-deception are described and discussed.

Keywords: Metaethics, Information ethics, Idealism, Realism, Pragmatism, Existentialism, piracy, privacy, authority-deception

Introduction

"Metaethics" is a term subject to potential misunderstanding. Halverson (1981) regards metaethics as the generic name for inquiries that have as their object the language of moral appraisal. This definition reflects the viewpoint of a branch of philosophy known as Linguistic Analysis. It does not, however, reflect a universal understanding of the term. Consistent with the tenants of systematic philosophy, metaethics can be defined more broadly as the generic name for inquiries about the source of moral judgments (i.e., about their basis) as well as about how such judgments are to be justified (Barger, 2001a). Taken in this sense, metaethics is not about isolated individual judgments concerning whether certain actions are right or wrong. It is about how a particular worldview – or more precisely, a Weltanschauung – is propaedeutic to the formulation of such ethical judgments.

The essential idea here is that before one can make a judgment on whether a particular action is right or wrong, one must have adopted a basic understanding of what reality is about. Morality then becomes a question of whether or not the action in question is in harmony with that understanding. In philosophy, one’s understanding of reality is called metaphysics. A person's preferred metaphysics is basically a statement of belief about fundamental reality. It is a "belief" because it cannot be proven or verified. Rather, one’s metaphysics is simply a fundamental assumption one makes about how things are (Barger, 2001a).

Aristotle called metaphysics "first principles" (McKeon, 1968) in deference to the notion that a foundation of meaning is prerequisite to the interpretation of any particular events or actions within the larger universe of that meaning. The reason more than one metaphysics exists is that different people adopt different personal explanations of reality. Once a personal metaphysical worldview is adopted, that view inevitably influences, if not governs, personal decisions about ethical matters (Barger, 2001a). It is in this sense, then, that a person's view of reality is propaedeutic to one’s stand on value questions.

Objections FROM Linguistic Analysis

It is here that proponents of Linguistic Analysis (e.g., Wittgenstein, 1961) might take issue with our more liberal interpretation of metaphysics. Adherents to Linguistic Analysis believe (and we again use the word “belief” in the sense noted earlier) that statements about reality can be verified or validated in only one of two ways. Those ways are by application of the rules of logic, or by application of sense observation. Thus, from this standpoint, anything not open to logical analysis or to observation by the senses is not meaningful.

Linguistic Analysts argue that, by definition, a Weltanschauung or worldview is an interpretation of ultimate reality and is not subject to examination by logic or sense observation (Barger, 2001a). Adherents to this view argue that ethics, the moral implications for action of a metaphysical worldview, also are not subject to verification and therefore cannot be talked about in any reasoned or meaningful way. Linguistic analysts would admit that there are indeed questions of morality, but such questions are purely emotional and subjective in nature. Thus, for these thinkers, no determination is possible about whether something is objectively good or bad. As Wittgenstein (1961) himself has said: "The solution of the riddle of life in space and time lies outside space and time, (6.4312)" and further, "We feel that even when all possible scientific questions have been answered, the problems of life remain completely untouched" (6.52).

The Major Metaphysical Positions and their Resultant Ethics

However, even if one grants that the basic tenets of any particular metaphysical worldview cannot themselves be verified objectively, the existence of different metaphysical positions across people can be documented and catalogued. For example, in some research done on a random sample of 347 students at a Midwestern regional/comprehensive university, Barger and Barger (1989) found that that there were a limited number of distinguishable metaphysical positions among the students despite their diversity of majors and backgrounds. The worldviews revealed in this research largely were the traditional, systematic philosophies of Idealism, Realism, Pragmatism, and Existentialism (some might argue that Existentialism cannot be described as either "traditional" or "systematic," but for present purposes we will consider it so). Idealism and Realism might be characterized as absolute or objective philosophies, while Pragmatism and Existentialism could be described as relative or subjective philosophies. The descriptions of these positions below follow the treatment of this matter by Barger (2001a).

Idealism

The metaphysical position of Idealism, dating back to the Greek Philosophers Socrates and Plato, holds that reality is more about the spiritual than the physical. The Idealist derives greater meaning from ideas than things and, since ideas are thought not to change, reality is considered to be essentially static and absolute. It follows, then, from an Idealist perspective that the originally intended purposes of things (i.e., the ideas upon which they were based) should weigh heavily in ethical judgments and actions.

Perhaps the most famous modern Idealist philosopher, Immanuel Kant, used what he called the “Categorical Imperative” to assess the ethics of any action. The first form of his Categorical Imperative states: "Act only on that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law" (Kant, 1933). In other words, if you wish to establish (or adhere to) a particular moral or ethical standard, you must be willing to agree that it would also be right for anyone else to follow that standard.

Once it is assumed that reality is to be found in the realm of ideas, the resultant ethical position must be that goodness represents the extent to which the ideal is achieved. Thus, goodness exists only on the immaterial level: that is, within the perfect realization of an idea. Conversely, evil consists of the absence or distortion of the ideal.

Since the Idealist believes ideas do not change (because they are a priori and absolute), moral imperatives concerning those ideas do not admit of exceptions. Thus, these imperatives are stated in terms of "always" or "never." For example: "Always tell the truth" or (put negatively) "Never tell a lie." Since truth is the knowledge of ideal reality, while a lie is a distortion of that reality, truth must always be told and lying can never be justified.

Realism

This position holds that reality is basically matter, rather than spirit. For the Realist, things take precedence over ideas. Whatever exists is therefore primarily material, natural, and physical. As such, reality is quantitative and measurable. It exists independently of any spirit or idea, is governed by the laws of nature, and is subject to the operation of cause and effect. The universe, according to the Realist, is one of natural design and order. Aristotle was an early representative of this view, while B.F. Skinner, the behavioral psychologist, was a more modern representative.

The resultant ethical position that flows from a Realistic metaphysics holds that goodness is to be found in conformity with nature. Since nature is good, one need not look beyond it to some immaterial ideal for standards of right and wrong. Rather, goodness is achieved by living in harmony with nature. Evil, on the contrary, is a departure from this natural norm either in the direction of excess or deficit (i.e., having, or doing, too much or too little of something which is naturally good).

Pragmatism

Within a Pragmatic metaphysics, reality is not so easily localized as it is for the Idealist and Realist. The Pragmatist finds meaning neither in ideas nor things. This view suggests it would be a mistake to think of reality as either a spiritual or a physical "something." Rather, the Pragmatist believes that reality is a process, a dynamic coming-to-be rather than a static being. Reality is to be found in change, activity, interaction—in short, in experience. In this sense, Pragmatic reality is more like a verb than a noun. It is flux and flow where the focus is not so much on the events that happen or the things that exist as on the relationship between those events and things. Since everything changes – indeed, the Pragmatist might say change is everything – nothing can have any permanent essence or identity. The well-known observation of Heraclitus, an ancient Greek Pragmatist, that “you can't step in the same river twice" was intended to convey the notion that the only constant is change, and the only absolute is that there are no absolutes! More modern representatives of this view would be Charles Sanders Pierce, William James, and John Dewey.

Given its de-emphasis of absolutes, Pragmatism could be viewed as a more expedient worldview than, say, Idealism. Since change is the norm for a Pragmatist, there is no permanent essence or ideal. In relation to ethics, this outlook implies that all moral values must be tested and proven in practice since nothing is intrinsically good or bad. If certain actions work to achieve a socially desirable end, then these actions are ethical and good. Consequences therefore dictate good and evil.

In the Pragmatist's view, then, actions themselves are value-neutral. No course of action is always good, or always bad. Moral value is assigned based on utility for achieving some particular end. The famous Pragmatic maxim that follows from this notion is “the end justifies the means.” That is, if an act is useful for achieving some laudable goal, then it becomes good. In other words, a means gets its positive value from being an efficient route to the realization of a valued outcome. Accordingly, a means has no intrinsic absolute value, but only gains value relative to its usefulness for achieving some desired result.

Results or consequences are the ultimate “measure” of goodness for a Pragmatist since the usefulness of a means to an end can only be judged after the fact by the effects of that means. Thus, for the Pragmatist, there can be no assurance that any action is good, at least until it is tried. Even then, an action resulting in positive effects would only be viewed as good tentatively, subject to the proof it will continue to work.

For the Pragmatist, just as the goodness of an act is relative to the consequences it produces, so, too, the degree of goodness is relative to the extensity of those consequences. This means that should there ever be a dispute about which means are more effective for achieving an end, the Pragmatist looks for guidance from the group. Reality is experience, both individual and group. So, in the realm of value judgments, the group's experience is more highly esteemed than the experience of any individual within the group. This accounts for the Pragmatic emphasis on “the greatest good for the greatest number” (Barger (2001a).

Existentialism

The Existentialist joins with the Pragmatist in rejecting the belief that reality is a priori and fixed. But, unlike the Pragmatist who believes that reality is a process whose meaning is defined primarily by the controlling group, the Existentialist holds that reality must be defined by each autonomous individual. The Existentialist notions of “subjectivity” and “phenomenological self” imply that the meaning or surdity of an otherwise "absurd" universe is individually determined (Sartre, 1992). Any meaning attached to the world must be put there by the individual and it will be valid only for that individual. Thus, each person's world and self identity is the product of that person's own choices. In a sense, each person can be defined as the sum of his or her choices. It follows, therefore, that reality is different for each individual. We each live in our own world and are determined/defined by our choices. Soren Kierkegaard and Jean-Paul Sartre are well-known representatives of this Existentialist viewpoint.

An Existentialist worldview leads to an ethics in which moral values are individualized through a person’s choices. Each personal choice reflects a preference for one alternative over others. Anyone who makes a choice freely and “authentically” (Sartre, 1992) is therefore acting in a good and moral fashion. This aspect of Existentialism is reminiscent of Polonius’s advice to his son in Shakespeare’s Hamlet: “To thine ownself be true” (Act I, Scene iii). As some have suggested (e.g., Onof, 2004), Existentialism, especially as presented by Sartre (1992), may lend itself to a moral imperative with the same kind of universality that characterizes Kant’s Categorical Imperative.

If personal choices are freely made, then according to the Existentialist viewpoint responsibility for them must be accepted by the choice-maker. This means that individuals cannot deflect praise or blame for personal choices onto others. While groups might influence what choices someone makes, there is a zone of freedom within each person that cannot be conditioned or predetermined. On this view, morality is clearly an individual matter, but an Existentialist may freely choose to adopt or embrace moral standards shared by groups or societies.

Blended WORLDVIEWS

The above summary of metaphysical views might appear to oversimplify the basis for ethical decision-making attendant to these positions. No doubt such decision-making is a much more complex process in real time than the above characterizations imply. For instance, in their research Barger and Barger (1989) found that while most of the students surveyed had primary leanings toward one of the four worldviews described above, students also had simultaneous secondary leanings toward one or more of the other three positions. In other words, nobody in their sample was fully and completely an Idealist, Realist, Pragmatist, or Existentialist.

Such “blended” metaphysics means that simply knowing a person's primary metaphysical position will not guarantee accurate prediction of how he or she might behave in response to a given ethical dilemma. Actually, this predictive inaccuracy happens for at least two important reasons. The first, as just noted, is that people may have strong sympathies with other philosophical positions besides their primary view, which can influence action in any particular case. But, a second reason derives from the fact that people do not always act in a manner consistent with their beliefs, no matter how primary or dominant those views may be. That is, for various reasons, people will fail to follow through with what they believe is the right thing to do in any particular situation.

The possibility of blended worldviews may have led some writers to posit guidelines for dealing with ethical dilemmas that appear to be derived from multiple metaphysical positions. Parker (1991), for example, offers several “rules for action” that seem at first glance to include both Idealistic and Pragmatic elements. Parker’s seemingly Idealistic guideline is something he calls the "Kantian Universality Rule," which states: "If an act or failure to act is not right for everyone to commit, then it is not right for anyone to commit" (Parker, 1991). Of course, this Universality Rule is just an alternate formulation of the Categorical Imperative discussed above. Another of Parker’s guidelines is called "The Higher Ethic,” which states: "Take the action that achieves the greater good" (Parker, 1991). This maxim appears very much to be an instance of the Pragmatic motto we discussed earlier: "Do the greatest good for the greatest number.” Thus, Parker’s proposed guidelines may indeed be a hybrid offspring of differing worldviews, or it may be, as Rashdall (1907) has argued, that the moral imperatives of Idealism and Pragmatism are not really so disparate after all. Rashdall has attempted a synthesis of Idealism and Pragmatism in suggesting that the ideally right action is always that which will produce the greatest amount of good on the whole. Whatever the exact philosophical analysis of Parker's guidelines may prove to be, the fact that they are in sync with seemingly different worldviews could enhance their practical usefulness for ethical decision-making among those with “blended” metaphysics.

METAPHYSICAL IMPLICATIONS FOR THREE Computing-RELATED ETHICAL Dilemmas

The different worldviews noted above seem to offer divergent solutions for many possible ethical information-technology-related dilemmas. We select but three hypothetical dilemmas for purposes of illustration. They have to do with piracy, privacy, and authority-deception. Our argument here is that any divergence in the “ethically correct” solutions to these dilemmas can be traced rather directly to the seemingly different ethical standards associated with each separate worldview. In the interest of brevity, we will consider only two worldview alternatives for each dilemma: an "absolutist" type of solution which is characteristic of the Idealist and Realist views; and a "relativist" solution which is characteristic of the Pragmatist and Existentialist views. Finer distinctions could be made within each of these main solution categories to separate the four distinct worldviews.

Piracy

First consider piracy, a common ethical dilemma in today’s digital world, involving wrongful appropriation of computing resources. As an example, suppose someone uses a personal account on a university's mainframe computer for something that has no direct relation to University business. Such use could involve anything from sending a personal e-mail message to a hometown friend, to conducting a full-blown private business on the computer (billing, payroll, inventory, etc.). Is there anything unethical about such computer usage?

An absolutist position would likely say that the above-described activities are indeed unethical—whether only the e-mail message is involved, or the larger-scale business activities (although an absolutist might recognize a difference between the two in the degree of wrong being done)—provided that such use is prohibited by the University’s published computer utilization policies. The guiding principle here would be based on the purposes for which the University (i.e., the computing-resource owner) intended the computer to be used. Any utilization for purposes other than what was intended, as specified in the usage policy, would be unethical. A similar argument would apply to the “misuse” of any other computing resource or digital property for which ownership and an owner’s wishes for those resources/materials could be established, explicitly or implicitly.

On the other hand, a relativist might say that only the full-scale business activities really were unethical because they tied up too much memory and slowed down the machine's operation, thereby depriving other legitimate users of access to, or reasonable performance of, the computing resources in question. However, the personal e-mail message might not be unethical because it represented no significant drag on operations or no deprivation of services/performance for other legitimate users. The guiding principle here is consequences or harm: no harm, no foul.

Privacy

Next consider a dilemma having to do with privacy. Suppose Student A enters a public computer lab on campus and encounters a machine still logged into Student B’s account (presumably Student B forgot to log off when she left the lab). Student A then decides to get nosey and accesses the personal files that are available on the system belonging to Student B. Is this behavior unethical?

An absolutist position would maintain that the behavior was unethical because the only person who is entitled to access someone’s personal files is the owner of those files, unless the owner knowingly grants permission to others. This is of course based on the notion that the original purpose of any personal file is to serve the sole needs of the owner until that owner says differently.

A relativist position would be based on the consequences. If Student A logged Student B off the system after snooping around and never revealed to Student B or anyone else any confidential information he or she may have seen, then no harm would accrue to Student B from Student A’s intrusion. So, it could be argued that Student A’s snooping was not unethical. But, if Student A passed on any personal or confidential information about Student B, or failed to log Student B off after looking at the personal files, then unethical action could be involved since potential harm might result.

Authority-Deception

Finally, let’s look at a dilemma involving what may arguably be regarded as an abuse of power by authority, but certainly involves an instance of deception. A student is strongly suspected by his university of a major “fair-use” computer-policy violation involving a hoax email allegedly being sent by the student under the name of a prominent administrator. This email proved to be exceedingly disruptive to student affairs until it was identified as being fraudulent. The student suspect, though not a professional hacker, was adept enough to cover his electronic tracks well. However, the administration decided to confront the student and falsely inform him that they had hired an outside expert whose skills were sufficient to uncover electronic evidence of the student’s perpetration of the hoax. The suspect thus was being deceived in an effort to force an admission of responsibility, which the student eventually did provide. Did the administration behave unethically in this instance?

An absolutist position would maintain that lying under any circumstances is wrong. This follows, of course, from an Idealist emphasis on the universal importance of truth. A relativist could argue, however, that the “end justified the means” in this case. The “greater good” was being served by any means used to identify the perpetrator, dispense a severe penalty, and hopefully deter future instances of similar computer-use violations.

CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE TRENDS

The skeletal cases we have just presented are not meant to suggest that ethical solutions to computing dilemmas are easily forthcoming. Indeed, just the opposite likely is true. In the present world of computing and information technology, where ethical dilemmas are becoming ever more complex, the prospect of finding a single normative code containing standards with which everyone would agree seems difficult at best. However, this does not mean that such efforts are futile. For example, it is possible for people of different philosophic worldviews to agree upon the same standards, although perhaps for different reasons. Also, as noted above, Parker’s (1991) “blended” approach may have some promise in this regard.

There is little doubt that technology use will continue to escalate. As it does, so will the potential for ethical dilemmas arising from such use. While there is some controversy about whether technology-based ethical dilemmas are unique, or merely instances of age-old moral questions (Barger, 2001b; Barger & Crowell, 2005), it is clear that morality and ethics must be an ever increasing focus of our educational system at all levels.

The field of Moral Psychology may have much to offer in this regard. As those who study the process of moral development formulate and test theories about the various psychological and behavioral factors contributing to ethical decision making, it becomes possible to consider whether or not and to what extent and technology may impact those factors (cf. Crowell, Narvaez & Gomberg, 2005). Such efforts may help to illuminate the educational practices and tools that will be needed to effectively prepare students to understand and resolve technology-related ethical dilemmas. Moreover, it is important to continue to explore how metaethical analysis may be helpful in understanding and promoting moral education and personal development.

References

Barger, R. N. (2001a). Philosophical Belief Systems. Retrieved January 26, 2006, on the World Wide Web:

Barger, R. N. (2001b). Is computer ethics unique in relation to other fields of ethics? Retrieved

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Barger, R. N., & Crowell, C. R. (2005). The ethics of parasitic computing: Fair Use or Abuse of TCP/IP Over the Internet? In L. A. Freeman, & A. G. Peace (Eds.). Information Ethics: Privacy and Intellectual Property. Hershey, PA: Idea Group, pp. 143-161.

Crowell, C. R., Narvaez, D., & Gomberg, A. Moral psychology and information ethics: The effects of psychological distance on the components of moral behavior in a digital world. In L. A. Freeman, & A. G. Peace (Eds.). Information Ethics: Privacy and Intellectual Property. Hershey, PA: Idea Group, pp. 19-37.

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Onof, C. J. (2004). Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980): Existentialism. The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved January 26, 2006, on the World Wide Web: .

McKeon, R. (ed.). (1968). The Basic Works of Aristotle. New York: Random House.

Parker, D. B. (1991, October 14). Computerworld.

Rashdall, H. (1907). The Theory of Good and Evil. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Sartre, J-P. (1992). Being and Nothingness. Tr. Hazel Barnes. New York: Washington Square Press.

Wittgenstein, L. (1961). Tractatus Logico-philosophicus (D.F. Pears & B.F. McGuinness, Trans.). London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, Ltd. (Original work published 1921).

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