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**SBSP AFF Updates – NCC Packet**Thanks Northwestern <3AdvantagesEnergy Dominance1AC Impending Chinese development of Space-based solar power ensures their geopolitical domination Malcolm Davis 19---a senior analyst at ASPI, Real Clear Defense, "Space-Based Solar Power and 21st-Century Geopolitical Competition", 4/2/19, it’s interesting that, 50 years later, China seems very interested in building solar power satellites of its own. The move is important for a number of reasons, and not just in terms of pure space exploration.Simply put, space solar power satellites (SSPS) are designed to gather energy from the sun—which is uninterrupted in space and isn’t affected by the earth’s atmosphere or by day and night cycles—and beam that energy back to earth where it can power national power grids. Like commercial nuclear fusion power (that other big idea that is forever 30 years away), space-based solar power opens up the prospect of clean, limitless energy.China is now indicating a desire to develop an SSPS capability in coming decades, emphasising a gradual approach of developing larger and more powerful satellites that are assembled in orbit by large space-based 3D printers. Using on-orbit manufacturing reduces the challenges of transporting large structures from earth into space. China’s investment in heavy-lift launch vehicles like the Long March IX, which will carry 140 tons into low-earth orbit, and its accelerating development of reusable rockets and spaceplanes, as well as the growth of its commercial space sector, could also support a Chinese SSPS network.The timetable for developing this capability, originally published in China’s Science and Technology Daily, extends through the next decade. Work has already begun on building a ground station in Chongqing to receive the microwave energy gathered by the SSPS. The next step is to test the system using high-altitude ‘stratospheric’ solar power balloons between 2021 and 2025, and then deployment of the first space-based SSPS in the second half of the next decade. The goal would be to construct megawatt-class satellites by 2030, and gigawatt-class satellites before 2050, which could weigh up to 1,000 tons.With on-orbit manufacturing for building large structures, the raw materials would need to come from mining lunar regolith rather than from earth. That ties in with China’s plans for a lunar base by the 2030s.China’s interest in pursuing SSPS has some significant geopolitical implications for 21st-century energy competition. Fundamentally, the country that achieves a viable SSPS network first can potentially reshape global energy markets and, in turn, have much greater control over economic activity on earth from space.I’ve noted previously that China has been promoting a ‘space Silk Road’ via its Beidou global navigation system to states that have signed up to its Belt and Road Initiative. That campaign appears to be designed to deepen those states’ dependency on China as a provider of information infrastructure provider. Adding an energy dimension would dramatically deepen Chinese control of any recipient society. China’s SSPS would be promoted as contributing towards interdependent co-development—the ‘win–win’ rhetoric of China’s foreign ministry—as well as easing dependency on fossil fuels that contribute to climate change. However, there’s no disguising the fact that it would be China that provides the energy to keep recipient states prosperous. That implies serious political leverage.A Chinese SSPS network would also need large rectenna farms at key locations to receive the beamed energy from orbit and then distribute it to local grids. Such facilities would clearly be critical infrastructure, constructed and operated by China within recipient states. That would further deepen Chinese investment and influence in BRI states.Now is a critical moment for the US---cooperation prevents China from using SBSP to control all energy marketsRay Kwong 19---an aerospace consultant, a commentator on U.S.-China relations, Foreign Policy, 6/16/19, “China Is Winning the Solar Space Race”, , if reports are accurate, China is at the forefront of the technology, which is basically solar power as you know it, except on steroids: It can collect energy 24 hours a day, seven days a week, 365 days a year. And instead of taking up millions of acres of land on the ground, space solar farms would be located in geosynchronous orbit, about 22,000 miles above sea level—far above pesky things like clouds, rain, and the cycle of day and night that make peak terrestrial solar power so intermittent. China plans on putting a commercial-scale solar power station in orbit by 2050, an accomplishment that would give it bragging rights as the first nation to harness the sun’s energy in space and beam power down to Earth.And that’s where things start to get prickly. First, China’s space program is part and parcel of China’s military program, according to a recent report from the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. This means that the army oversees China’s space activities, with “most of China’s ostensibly civilian space activities [having] dual-use applications.”Second, China’s space ambitions are all about the money—and an integral part of the country’s national economic rejuvenation and development goals. So if the space-based solar power demonstrator the Chinese Communist Party plans to have online as soon as next year is successful, more countries could potentially be enticed into Chinese President Xi Jinping’s signature foreign-policy venture, the Belt and Road Initiative. This cheap, emissions-free power would be hard for many countries to turn down and would dramatically deepen China’s political leverage—if not give Beijing de facto control of countries that buy it—advancing China’s goal of creating the world’s first global electrical grid.Meanwhile, the United States has been sitting on space-based solar power technology since 1968, when NASA advisor and Apollo 11 project manager Peter Glaser published his concept of a solar power satellite as a means of harnessing solar energy for transmission to Earth in the journal Science. To top that off, Isaac Asimov, one of the most celebrated and prolific science fiction writers of all time, had predicted the idea in 1941, writing about a space station transmitting energy collected from the sun to planets here and there using microwave beams. In 1983, Asimov wrote again about solar power stations, predicting that they would be up and running, oops, by 2019.It’s not like NASA hasn’t tried to get the space-based solar power ball rolling, providing various presidential administrations with development and evaluation reports and feasibility studies, and even suggesting it as the primary power source for a first-generation, continuously occupied lunar base. “One of the most significant challenges to the implementation of a continuously manned lunar base is power,” researchers wrote in the latter report. “Using an orbiting space based solar power station to generate electrical power and beam it to a base sited anywhere on the moon should therefore be considered. The technology to collect sunlight, generate greater than the estimated 35 kilowatts of [continuous] power [required for the lunar base], and beam it to the surface using microwaves is available today.”Still, for a variety of reasons—most, if not all, having to do with a lack of money—there are no active space-based solar power missions on NASA’s books, much to the consternation of hundreds, if not thousands, of NASA engineers and scientists past and present who see space-based solar power as the project of their dreams.One of these scientists is John Mankins, a former NASA physicist known for his work on space-based solar power and a man of considerable patience. He not only spent 25 years at NASA and NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory advocating for space solar with nothing to show for it, but he also recently wasted hours walking me through the McCain National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2019 to find any sign of space-based solar power that might be buried in that bureaucratic monstrosity. Mankins and others have recalibrated their thinking and are confident that space-based solar power costs are no longer absurd.That said, aside from China, the space agencies of Japan, the European Union, and India are working to get their own space-based solar power programs off the ground as well. Japan’s JAXA deserves an extra shoutout. Mankins said JAXA is currently working on a new and improved road map for its program; this in addition to working on everything including space elevators, space junk removal, looking for water on asteroids, and building motor home-sized moon rovers. And at the end of May, the governments of the United States and Japan, both major partners on the International Space Station, agreed to further cooperation in space that could include flying Japanese astronauts to the moon.But it’s China’s interest in space-based solar power—and the United States’ apparent disinterest—that hold the most geopolitical implications. Energy plays a decisive role in global geopolitics and international order. It has buttressed the rise of great powers, propagated the genesis of alliances, and, too often, sparked the emergence of conflict and wars. Bottom line? In the worst case, the country that first harnesses the power of the sun from space wins, hands down. While earthbound renewable energy is largely a private sector thing, space-based solar power, at least in this scenario, would be a single-source, state-based game-changer that could easily be exploited for geopolitical gain. China’s steady pursuit of militarizing commercial space technologies only makes things more complex—or ominous, depending on one’s perspective.Being the first mover, of course, doesn’t give China a categorical or insurmountable advantage. For all we know now, their space-based solar power technology is straight from the NASA open-source playbook. But that means that the United States has to act quickly—not only to counter inevitable technology evolution, but also to at least keep pace with the energy market evolution brought on by the climate crisis. To be sure, getting the current U.S. administration to buy into and commit to space-based solar power is an iffy proposition. As it stands, NASA has to grovel for funding, even as the White House accelerates major mission dates. (Curiously, though, it gets money for things it doesn’t even ask for, like an extra $125 million to develop nuclear rockets.)That puts the United States at a critical moment. Will a 2020 U.S. presidential candidate latch onto space-based solar power as a way to make the Green New Deal a global endeavor? Maybe. Will commercial companies—American or otherwise—along with countries already working on it, partner up in the name of big science to work together to make it happen? Perhaps. Or will China’s space-based solar power play result in an extraordinary hegemonic shift in global dominance? It’s looking that way—and that keeps me up at night.Successful Chinese expansion destroys the liberal order Hal Brands 17, the Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor at the Henry A. Kissinger Center for Global Affairs at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies and a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 12/14/17, “Trump Could Actually Make Democracy Great Again. Don't Scoff.,” , the best way of promoting liberal values over the long run is to sustain a broader international system in which democracies, rather than hostile autocracies, are geopolitically dominant -- even if that requires working with friendly authoritarians in the short run. When Woodrow Wilson spoke of making the world safe for democracy during World War I, he was not calling for a crusade to spread democracy across the globe. He was arguing that America must stop authoritarian regimes -- in that case, the Kaiser’s Germany -- from becoming geopolitically dominant in a way that would ultimately make it difficult for democracies anywhere to thrive.Likewise, during the Cold War, the U.S. regularly cut deals with friendly dictators in China, Saudi Arabia and elsewhere in the service of containing communism, and thereby preserving an international system in which liberal values could survive and flourish.Today, the single most important thing the U.S. can do to enhance the long-term prospects for the spread of democracy is to prevent Russia and China from overturning -- or even severely disrupting -- the stable and broadly liberal international system it has long worked to construct. To the extent that Washington can keep China from becoming the supreme power in East Asia, to the extent it can stop Moscow from restoring its lost sphere of influence in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, it can create the ideological and geopolitical space for liberal values to flourish -- even if doing so requires cooperating with questionable regimes in Bangkok, Singapore and Warsaw along the way.The liberal order prevents extinction from nuclear war and rogue tech developmentYuval Noah Harari 18, Professor of History at Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 9/26/18, “We need a post-liberal order now,” The Economist, several generations, the world has been governed by what today we call “the global liberal order”. Behind these lofty words is the idea that all humans share some core experiences, values and interests, and that no human group is inherently superior to all others. Cooperation is therefore more sensible than conflict. All humans should work together to protect their common values and advance their common interests. And the best way to foster such cooperation is to ease the movement of ideas, goods, money and people across the globe.Though the global liberal order has many faults and problems, it has proved superior to all alternatives. The liberal world of the early 21st century is more prosperous, healthy and peaceful than ever before. For the first time in human history, starvation kills fewer people than obesity; plagues kill fewer people than old age; and violence kills fewer people than accidents. When I was six months old I didn’t die in an epidemic, thanks to medicines discovered by foreign scientists in distant lands. When I was three I didn’t starve to death, thanks to wheat grown by foreign farmers thousands of kilometers away. And when I was eleven I wasn’t obliterated in a nuclear war, thanks to agreements signed by foreign leaders on the other side of the planet. If you think we should go back to some pre-liberal golden age, please name the year in which humankind was in better shape than in the early 21st century. Was it 1918? 1718? 1218?Nevertheless, people all over the world are now losing faith in the liberal order. Nationalist and religious views that privilege one human group over all others are back in vogue. Governments are increasingly restricting the flow of ideas, goods, money and people. Walls are popping up everywhere, both on the ground and in cyberspace. Immigration is out, tariffs are in.If the liberal order is collapsing, what new kind of global order might replace it? So far, those who challenge the liberal order do so mainly on a national level. They have many ideas about how to advance the interests of their particular country, but they don’t have a viable vision for how the world as a whole should function. For example, Russian nationalism can be a reasonable guide for running the affairs of Russia, but Russian nationalism has no plan for the rest of humanity. Unless, of course, nationalism morphs into imperialism, and calls for one nation to conquer and rule the entire world. A century ago, several nationalist movements indeed harboured such imperialist fantasies. Today’s nationalists, whether in Russia, Turkey, Italy or China, so far refrain from advocating global conquest.In place of violently establishing a global empire, some nationalists such as Steve Bannon, Viktor Orban, the Northern League in Italy and the British Brexiteers dream about a peaceful “Nationalist International”. They argue that all nations today face the same enemies. The bogeymen of globalism, multiculturalism and immigration are threatening to destroy the traditions and identities of all nations. Therefore nationalists across the world should make common cause in opposing these global forces. Hungarians, Italians, Turks and Israelis should build walls, erect fences and slow down the movement of people, goods, money and ideas.The world will then be divided into distinct nation-states, each with its own sacred identity and traditions. Based on mutual respect for these differing identities, all nation-states could cooperate and trade peacefully with one another. Hungary will be Hungarian, Turkey will be Turkish, Israel will be Israeli, and everyone will know who they are and what is their proper place in the world. It will be a world without immigration, without universal values, without multiculturalism, and without a global elite—but with peaceful international relations and some trade. In a word, the “Nationalist International” envisions the world as a network of walled-but-friendly fortresses.Many people would think this is quite a reasonable vision. Why isn’t it a viable alternative to the liberal order? Two things should be noted about it. First, it is still a comparatively liberal vision. It assumes that no human group is superior to all others, that no nation should dominate its peers, and that international cooperation is better than conflict. In fact, liberalism and nationalism were originally closely aligned with one another. The 19th century liberal nationalists, such as Giuseppe Garibaldi and Giuseppe Mazzini in Italy, and Adam Mickiewicz in Poland, dreamt about precisely such an international liberal order of peacefully-coexisting nations.The second thing to note about this vision of friendly fortresses is that it has been tried—and it failed spectacularly. All attempts to divide the world into clear-cut nations have so far resulted in war and genocide. When the heirs of Garibaldi, Mazzini and Mickiewicz managed to overthrow the multi-ethnic Habsburg Empire, it proved impossible to find a clear line dividing Italians from Slovenes or Poles from Ukrainians.This had set the stage for the second world war. The key problem with the network of fortresses is that each national fortress wants a bit more land, security and prosperity for itself at the expense of the neighbors, and without the help of universal values and global organisations, rival fortresses cannot agree on any common rules. Walled fortresses are seldom friendly.But if you happen to live inside a particularly strong fortress, such as America or Russia, why should you care? Some nationalists indeed adopt a more extreme isolationist position. They don’t believe in either a global empire or in a global network of fortresses. Instead, they deny the necessity of any global order whatsoever. “Our fortress should just raise the drawbridges,” they say, “and the rest of the world can go to hell. We should refuse entry to foreign people, foreign ideas and foreign goods, and as long as our walls are stout and the guards are loyal, who cares what happens to the foreigners?”Such extreme isolationism, however, is completely divorced from economic realities. Without a global trade network, all existing national economies will collapse—including that of North Korea. Many countries will not be able even to feed themselves without imports, and prices of almost all products will skyrocket. The made-in-China shirt I am wearing cost me about $5. If it had been produced by Israeli workers from Israeli-grown cotton using Israeli-made machines powered by non-existing Israeli oil, it may well have cost ten times as much. Nationalist leaders from Donald Trump to Vladimir Putin may therefore heap abuse on the global trade network, but none thinks seriously of taking their country completely out of that network. And we cannot have a global trade network without some global order that sets the rules of the game.Even more importantly, whether people like it or not, humankind today faces three common problems that make a mockery of all national borders, and that can only be solved through global cooperation. These are nuclear war, climate change and technological disruption. You cannot build a wall against nuclear winter or against global warming, and no nation can regulate artificial intelligence (AI) or bioengineering single-handedly. It won’t be enough if only the European Union forbids producing killer robots or only America bans genetically-engineering human babies. Due to the immense potential of such disruptive technologies, if even one country decides to pursue these high-risk high-gain paths, other countries will be forced to follow its dangerous lead for fear of being left behind.An AI arms race or a biotechnological arms race almost guarantees the worst outcome. Whoever wins the arms race, the loser will likely be humanity itself. For in an arms race, all regulations will collapse. Consider, for example, conducting genetic-engineering experiments on human babies. Every country will say: “We don’t want to conduct such experiments—we are the good guys. But how do we know our rivals are not doing it? We cannot afford to remain behind. So we must do it before them.”Similarly, consider developing autonomous-weapon systems, that can decide for themselves whether to shoot and kill people. Again, every country will say: “This is a very dangerous technology, and it should be regulated carefully. But we don’t trust our rivals to regulate it, so we must develop it first”.The only thing that can prevent such destructive arms races is greater trust between countries. This is not an impossible mission. If today the Germans promise the French: “Trust us, we aren’t developing killer robots in a secret laboratory under the Bavarian Alps,” the French are likely to believe the Germans, despite the terrible history of these two countries. We need to build such trust globally. We need to reach a point when Americans and Chinese can trust one another like the French and Germans.Similarly, we need to create a global safety-net to protect humans against the economic shocks that AI is likely to cause. Automation will create immense new wealth in high-tech hubs such as Silicon Valley, while the worst effects will be felt in developing countries whose economies depend on cheap manual labor. There will be more jobs to software engineers in California, but fewer jobs to Mexican factory workers and truck drivers. We now have a global economy, but politics is still very national. Unless we find solutions on a global level to the disruptions caused by AI, entire countries might collapse, and the resulting chaos, violence and waves of immigration will destabilise the entire world.This is the proper perspective to look at recent developments such as Brexit. In itself, Brexit isn’t necessarily a bad idea. But is this what Britain and the EU should be dealing with right now? How does Brexit help prevent nuclear war? How does Brexit help prevent climate change? How does Brexit help regulate artificial intelligence and bioengineering? Instead of helping, Brexit makes it harder to solve all of these problems. Every minute that Britain and the EU spend on Brexit is one less minute they spend on preventing climate change and on regulating AI. In order to survive and flourish in the 21st century, humankind needs effective global cooperation, and so far the only viable blueprint for such cooperation is offered by liberalism. Nevertheless, governments all over the world are undermining the foundations of the liberal order, and the world is turning into a network of fortresses. The first to feel the impact are the weakest members of humanity, who find themselves without any fortress willing to protect them: refugees, illegal migrants, persecuted minorities. But if the walls keep rising, eventually the whole of humankind will feel the squeeze.Even U.S. perception of losing to China causes hegemonic war Min-hyung Kim 19, associate professor of political science and international relations at Kyung Hee University in Seoul, 2019, “A real driver of US–China trade conflict: The Sino–US competition for global hegemony and its implications for the future,” International Trade, Politics, and Development, Vol. 3, No. 1, p. 30-40Since the end of the Second World War, the USA has undoubtedly been a global hegemon. With its preponderant military and economic strength, it has created a liberal international economic order and maintained it by promoting global free trade. USA sudden turn to protectionism under the banner of “America First” in the Trump administration illustrates “US fear” that its hegemony or Pax Americana is declining vis-à-vis China’s growing power. It also demonstrates that the USA now seeks to deter China from overtaking its hegemony so as to keep US hegemony as long as possible. Currently, the USA and China are waging a trade war. What is important to note here is that the driving force of the trade war between the world’s two largest economies is more political than economic. That is to say, as China’s economic and political influence in the world vis-à-vis that of the USA increases, US fear about China’s power also grows. Under these circumstances, Washington makes every effort to assert its global dominance by deterring China’s challenge to its hegemony[13]. It is this sort of “US fear” about hegemonic power transition from Washington to Beijing that brought about US policies against the BRI, the AIIB, and Made in China 2015. The fear of hegemonic power transition is indeed a driving force for the US-launched trade war. Understood this way, the trade war between the USA and China may be a harbinger of a much larger-scale conflict between the two parties, since as PTT predicts, war is more likely to occur when the power gap between a declining hegemon and a rising challenger is getting closed.As China’s economic, technological, military and political rise continues down the road, the USA will try to contain it in order to maintain its global hegemony. The obvious consequence of this seesaw game is the intensification of the Sino–US competition over global hegemony. The USA and China, the two most powerful states in the world, appear as if they were on a collision course. What this means is that so long as US fear about China’s overtaking US hegemony persists, a similar type of conflict between the two hegemonic powers is likely to occur in the future even if the current trade war is over.That causes extinctionRobert A. Denemark 18, Associate Professor of Political Science and International Relations at the University of Delaware, 2018, “Nuclear War in the Rivalry Phase of the Modern World-System,” Journal of World-Systems Research, Vol. 24, No. 2, p. 348-371Students of world-systems analysis should reconsider the great power dynamics of the rivalry phase, which constitutes an existential threat given the resurrection of nuclear weaponry.1 My argument proceeds in three parts. First, I briefly review the nature of conflict in the rivalry phase, and predictions regarding its timing. Second, I consider the persistence and impact of nuclear weapons, and the dangerous logic of nuclear confrontation as it evolved in the context of both old and new nuclear states. Finally, I consider the set of processes that influence the chances for nuclear war as outlined by Chase-Dunn and Podobnik in the very first volume of this journal. I outline the manner in which the forces they identified as leading toward war have continued to develop, while those that might reduce the probability of conflict have weakened.This formulation of the cycle of hegemony and rivalry, our possession of nuclear weapons for the first time during the rivalry phase, the return of unstable nuclear confrontation, the novel context presented by new nuclear powers, increased complexity, the decline of impediments to conflict, and the increase in global tension, suggest a new and more threatening global environment. Students of world-systems analysis have much to contribute to this analysis and should consider investing additional attention to these processes.The question of systemic war dissipated in the wake of the dissolution of the USSR, the political consolidation and economic integration of the core, the neo-liberal neutering of the periphery, and China’s non-confrontational transition strategy. Na?ve pronouncements about the end of history, and models of limitless beneficial globalization, flowed from other academic quarters. But a series of tensions emerged from xenophobic plebiscites, populist electoral outcomes, attempts to disarticulate the global economy, and the use of nuclear threats by a resurgent Russia, a recalcitrant North Korea, and the current U.S. administration. Systemic war, including nuclear exchanges, no longer seem so unlikely.I argue that from a world-systems perspective, the chances of nuclear conflict have increased, and will continue to do so as we move deeper into a period of systemic rivalry. In an important sense, the immediate future is more dangerous than the nuclear brinksmanship that emerged in the Cold War. While much of world-systems analysis has focused on the continuing plight of the periphery, under the circumstances it would make sense to undertake more of an effort to understand the dynamics of rivalry and nuclear conflict.Cooperative initiatives ensure energy interdependence which prevents conflict Sreemati Ganguli 16, Honorary Fellow, Institute of Foreign Policy Studies, University of Calcutta, India, Winter 2016, “Global Energy Interdependence: Strategizing for a Secure Future,” Caucasus International, Vol. 6, No. 2, p. 113-125Energy cooperation over political fault lines The one of the most significant trend of the post-Cold War era is the emergence of collaboration on energy projects among states whose relations may otherwise be problematic. What makes this cooperation unique is that as in developing energy initiatives, the parties try to balance competition with cooperation, short-term tactical calculations with long-term policy-planning mechanisms. In this section, two such partnerships are discussed: US-Russia and US-China. It is true that Russia’s relations with the US remain strained, even after the end of the Cold War, due to different policy stances on a host of issues from NATO’s eastward expansion, the color revolutions in the Eurasian space, Russia’s involvement in Georgia and Ukraine, to Western involvement in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria. The relations between the US and China are also affected by a number of factors, ranging from human rights issues, trade imbalances, maritime strategy in the Indo-Pacific region, the South China Sea dispute, to the rebalancing of Asian Pivot concept. It is therefore important to note that there do remain small areas in the energy sectors where these competitors have found it both valuable and necessary to cooperate. One important sphere of energy cooperation is covered by the US–Russia Civil Nuclear Energy Cooperation Action Plan Working Sub-Group, which facilitates the growth of safe, secure and affordable nuclear energy through development of innovative nuclear energy technologies and the key elements of this collaboration are reactor demonstration projects; R&D for innovative nuclear energy technology options; modeling, simulation and safety; and development of a Global Civil Nuclear Framework.17 Notably, Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) was started by the US government in 2006 as an international partnership to promote the use of nuclear energy, without compromising on nuclear proliferation, through reprocessing of the nuclear fuel waste. In 2010 it was re-christened as the International Framework for Nuclear Energy Cooperation (IFNEC). Russia, the US, France, China, and Japan are the founding members of this program, which now consists of 33 participants and 31 observer countries. The program has two principal working groups, the reliable nuclear fuel services working group and nuclear infrastructure development working group. While it is true that there has been US-Russian bilateral competition in the nuclear proliferation arena since the advent of the Cold War, it is also true that they do now cooperate on the research and development agenda of a multilateral program. The program’s Vision Statement declares that “The Framework provides a forum for cooperation among participating states to explore mutually beneficial approaches to ensure the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, proceeds in a manner that is efficient, safe, secure and supports non-proliferation and safeguards.”18US-China clean energy cooperation is another example bilateral cooperation between two not-so-friendly nations, one of whom is viewed as the reigning global power and the other, the challenger, in a transitional international power scenario. In June 2008, the US-China Ten-year Framework for Cooperation on Energy and the Environment was signed, and its scope was expanded during the November 2009 Beijing Summit. This Program now includes US-China Clean Energy research Centre, Electric Vehicles Initiative, Energy Efficiency Action Plan, Renewable Energy Partnership, 21st Century Coal and Shale Gas Resource Initiative. As US Department of Energy Secretary Steven Chu commented, “Science is not a zero-sum game [...] As the world’s largest producers and consumers of energy, the United States and China share many common challenges and interests [...] At the US Department of Energy, we are committed to working with Chinese partners to promote a sustainable energy future. Working together, we can accomplish more than acting alone”.19Regional green cooperation The ASEAN and the EU offer globally recognized models of regional economic cooperation. Still, it is particularly significant that better energy management and implementation of clean energy initiatives provide them with new opportunities for future cooperation to ensure better and more effective energy security. ASEAN Energy Cooperation (AEC) was initiated in 2003 in order to intensify cooperation on the development and exploitation of regional energy resources. The ASEAN Vision 2020 (adopted in 2007) envisaged the establishment of interconnecting arrangements in the fields of electricity and natural gas through the ASEAN Power Grid, (which operates 16 projects) and the Trans-ASEAN Gas Pipeline Projects. In September 2014, a new theme for the ASEAN Plan of Action for Energy Cooperation (APAEC) was endorsed during the 32nd ASEAN Ministers on Energy Meeting, proposing “Enhancing Energy Connectivity and Market Integration in ASEAN to achieve Energy Security, Accessibility, Affordability and Sustainability for All”.20 In addition to the implementation of ASEAN Power Grid and the TransASEAN Pipeline, the APAEC 2016-2025 identified new areas of energy cooperation. These are related to research and development of clean coal technology and civilian nuclear energy technology and regulation, reduction of energy intensity by 20 per cent in 2020, and reaching the ‘aspirational’ target to increase the component of renewable energy to 23 per cent in the ASEAN energy mix by 2025. The European Energy Union was proposed by the European Commission in February 2015 via the adoption of the ‘Framework Strategy for a Resilient Energy Union with a Forward-Looking Climate Change Policy’, aimed at providing secure, sustainable, competitive and affordable energy for its citizens. The idea of this Union is heavily influenced by the Commission’s 2030 Climate and Energy Package, which seeks to reduce greenhouse gas emission by at least 40 per cent by 2030, and to increase the share of renewable energy to 27 percent during the same period. Three of the five dimensions of the Energy Policy are related to the green dimension of energy security: energy efficiency, de-carbonization of the economy, as well as research, innovation and competitiveness in areas of renewable energy, smart grids, carbon capture and storage and nuclear technology. The exceptions are ensuring diversification of energy supply and implementation of a fully integrated energy market. Raines-Thomlinson commented that “The Energy Union will need to accommodate potentially competing factors, embodied in the tension between energy security, economic competitiveness and climate change policy”.21ConclusionMaull22 has argued that “Energy interdependence intertwines national economies in two major ways. First, most economies […] depend on cross-border flows of energy resources for important parts of their total energy requirements. Second, this global energy system is supported by and critically dependent upon information, knowledge and investment capital.” He further notes a significant point that “High levels of interdependence between nations and societies mean that energy objectives cannot be pursued in isolation: energy independence is a chimera.”Buzan makes an important point about security: “security is a relational phenomenon. Because security is relational, one cannot understand the national security of any given state without understanding the international pattern of security interdependence in which it is embedded.”23 Global security, in its broadest sense, cannot afford to remain a victim of energy insecurity and needs the assurance of mutual cooperative interdependence on a global scale. In the post-Cold War context, the use energy as a strategic asset, not a weapon, is not a choice, but rather a necessity in terms of providing human civilization with a new hope for survival. Energy, as a commodity, has acquired its strategic dimension only because human existence has become fully dependent on energy.Significantly, the UN Document ‘Our Common Future’ asserts that “A safe, environmentally sound, and economically viable energy pathway that will sustain human progress into the distant future is clearly imperative. It is also possible. But it will require new dimensions of political will and institutional cooperation to achieve it.”24Energy security is fundamentally significant for the progression of human civilization, but more importantly, it impacts on influences the very survival of the human race on earth, the only planet in the solar system, where environmental conditions are conducive for life. If the earth becomes uninhabitable due to human failures to address environmental degradation, then the only possible option might be to relocate the global population to Proxima B, which may offer conditions for life. However, Proxima B is 4.3 light years away.Space Dominance1ACChinese leadership sees SBSP the a bridge to space dominance---it catalyzes revolutionary technology that cements their leadership Christopher Stone 11, (B.A., M.A.) is a space policy analyst and strategist near Washington DC., 10-3-2011, "The Space Review: National Space Strategy: proactive or reactive?", its history, America has notoriously been reactive when it comes to its national strategy. The United States was the nation to invent the powered airplane, but was slow to realize its potential until European powers seized the opportunity. When it came to space, some historians argue that had the Soviet Union not orbited a satellite and later a cosmonaut, there would have been no Apollo program or human space program of the kind we think of when the phrase “spacepower” is bandied about. In those situations, America had the industrial might and political fortitude to see the threats at hand to their global influence as a superpower on the world stage. However, recently some events have been occurring in the space frontier that seems to indicate a lack of vision and highlights the need for a national space strategy: space based solar power (SBSP) in China. Many may read that last sentence and wonder, “What’s the big deal about the Chinese experimenting with SBSP?” As many in the United States government and elsewhere believe, SBSP is the stuff of science fiction; pipe dreams of space advocacy groups that aren’t found in the real world. However, since the publication of the National Security Space Office’s analysis of the security implications of SBSP, the Chinese have seen that SBSP is not necessarily a pipe dream, has economic and political merit, and is important to China in the future. Recently, the Chinese have committed to the development and deployment of SBSP architectures in low earth orbit (LEO) and geostationary Earth orbit (GEO) as a vital part of the nation’s “future direction”, according to a paper by three space scientists from the China Academy of Space Technology (CAST). This new effort demonstrates Chinese resolve toward a sustainable and long-term strategy for their nation that sees space as the vital national interest and instrument of power that it is. It enables positive advantages in several areas of global power and influence, three of which are economic power, technological prowess, and innovation. All of these enable their planned achievement of global leadership and preeminence in space. Why this push for SBSP in China? Their global interests are increasing due to their economic growth and reach on several continents. As a result, natural resources and energy will become increasingly critical to their goals. With their growing dominance of vital space- and weapons-related resources like rare earth metals, and other natural resources such as oil, the Chinese see themselves as a leading economic power in the world. This increased economic power has helped increase their role in international financial and diplomatic institutions. Because of this increasing need for energy resources to advance their economic growth and power, the Chinese government has been exploring new options for future resources “inside earth” but acknowledge their needs might surpass the natural resources they have access to. This has prompted the Chinese government to look to space. According to the paper by CAST, “the state has decided that power from outside the earth, such as solar power and the development of other space energy resources is to be China’s future direction.” This is not a mere statement of desire as is the case in many circles of the United States space advocacy arena; rather it is a real program that is “currently under development in China”. Having the necessary access to space-based energy resources will enable the Chinese to “sustainably develop” and meet the “thirst for energy to water its blooming industries” that have created it as “one of the principal economies in the world. “ To achieve this goal of power and influence economically, the Chinese have developed a national strategy that explores three advantages of SBSP: sustainable economic and social development, disaster prevention and mitigation, and cultivating innovative talents through an increased space effort the likes of which haven’t been seen since the Apollo program. This would require technological innovation on a grand strategic scale. According to the CAST paper, “The acquisition of space solar power will require development of fundamental new aerospace technologies, such as revolutionary launch approaches, ultra-thin solar arrays, on-orbit manufacture/assembly/integration (MAI), precise attitude control, in-situ resource utilization for deep space exploration and space colonial expansion.” This demonstrates that SBSP is not just one project for economic leadership of China, but part of a grand strategy of space power expansion and a desire to be the leading space power on Earth. They acknowledge this through the comparison of the Apollo project and its benefits for the United States. “In the last century, America’s leading position in science and technology worldwide was inextricably linked with technological advances associated with implementation of the Apollo program. Likewise, China’s current achievements in aerospace technology are built upon with its successive generations of satellite projects in space, China will use its capabilities in space science to assure…” the Chinese development of space development and energy in space. As mentioned previously, China’s desire is to be recognized as the leader in space. To do this, and to support their future economic power and influence worldwide, energy development and the applications of space resources are the way forward. Their human spaceflight program, including the recent launch of Tiangong 1 and the autonomous rendezvous and docking technologies they are developing, will enable the new technologies needed for this SBSP architecture as well as Chinese long-range plans for deep space exploration and “colonial expansion”.Unilateral development of SBSP ensures conflict---only cooperative efforts to establish norms for use of space solar power can solve Leet W. Wood 12, Wood is a PhD student in political science at George Mason University in Fairfax, Virginia, 2012, “Projecting power: The security implications of space-based solar power”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 68 Iss. 1, pg. 70-78Security challengesThere are two main types of security challenges posed by space solar power: threats to the system itself and potential operational modes of the technology that generate security concerns. Each of these two categories is composed of several sub-issues that must be substantively addressed by policy makers and political scientists if there is to be effective debate on space-based solar power’s geopolitical ramifications.Much of space technology is inherently dual-use. The same GPS satellites that provide a motorist with directions to the nearest gas station also provide terminal guidance for precision munitions and the rockets that loft those satellites are in many ways indistinguishable from long-range missiles capable of carrying destructive payloads to a terrestrial target. The literature and international treaty corpus is rife with discussions and agreements regarding the best practices for limiting the proliferation and misuse of such technologies. Space-based solar power is no different insofar as its dual-use nature is concerned, but is distinct in that the security implications of the technology have not received more attention.A space solar power system would represent a serious capital investment and strategic asset for the nation that develops it. The destruction or disruption of a full-scale system would not only constitute the loss of a major piece of infrastructure, but could leave many thousands of people without power and the government without access to a powerful asset. Such disruption could plausibly have both natural and human-made origins.Service interruptions The most basic security problem is that of service interruption caused by interference with either the collection array or the beam that delivers power from space. Placing a power satellite in geostationary orbit means that it will have nearly constant direct exposure to the sun. Occasional, brief blackout periods may occur due to eclipses. While such events may be unavoidable, orbital mechanics are predictable enough that such ephemeral interruptions could be planned for and mitigated by various means (PowerSat Corporation, 2010). Weather and atmospheric attenuation is likewise much less of a concern than it is for land-based solar power. For a space-based solar power beam transmitted at 2.48 or 5.8 gigahertz, atmospheric transparency is very high; clouds and storms would not prevent most of the transmitted power from reaching the ground station (NSSO, 2007). Thus, natural sources of service interruption due to beam interference should be rare and easily predicted, and their impact ameliorated when they do occur.Intentional service interruptions are another concern. A space-based solar power satellite has much in common with communications and GPS satellites, which also transmit radiofrequency beams to Earth. An adversary could jam these types of satellites and cause them to malfunction (Economist, 2011), but a space-based solar power system should be insulated from jamming for two reasons: First, most communications and navigation satellites operate at very low power, so a jamming signal need not be very powerful in order to drown out the information being transmitted. A full-scale solar power system, on the other hand, has a beam power that is rated in gigawatts; even if jamming such a beam were possible in theory, it would be prohibitive in practice. Secondly, most jamming techniques rely on making signals unintelligible by transmitting “noise” that overwhelms the information-carrying signal, but a space-based solar power satellite transmits raw energy rather than noise-sensitive information. It should be noted, however, that it may be possible to jam the telemetry links between a power satellite and ground controllers, potentially leading to a loss of command authority over the system.Physical disruptions Solar power satellites may also be degraded by physical disruption. Again, such damage could occur naturally or artificially. Collisions in space do occur. The primary source of such impacts is space debris. Orbital debris consists of everything from expended upper-stage rocket boosters to flecks of paint. At orbital velocities, even a collision with a small piece of such flotsam can be catastrophic. Collisions can also occur between intact spacecraft. In early 2009, the Russian Cosmos 2251 satellite accidentally struck and destroyed a functional Iridium network satellite (Ianotta and Malik, 2009). The specter of space debris and direct collisions between spacecraft, however, is largely an issue for lower orbits. The majority of such detritus orbits well below the altitude of geostationary orbit, where a space-based solar power system is likely to be built (NASA, 2009).The high altitude also makes the system less susceptible to intentional destruction. Anti-satellite weapons are an established and mature technology; both China and the United States have demonstrated their ability to use them in the recent past (Koplow, 2009). However, the Chinese and US antisatellite tests engaged spacecraft at altitudes well below 1,000 kilometers (Gugliotta, 2008). Delivering payloads to geostationary orbit is more challenging and requires large rockets. While a nation such as China or the United States could, in principle, conduct antisatellite strikes in geostationary orbit, neither has demonstrated this capability nor seems eager to do so. Because of the difficulty of reaching such high altitudes, it is very unlikely that a rogue state or terrorist element would have the means to physically disrupt a power satellite.The altitude that largely insulates geostationary orbit satellites from antisatellite weapons poses its own issues. Despite the large number of satellites and pieces of debris located there, low orbit is still very sparsely populated, and the distances between spacecraft are commensurately large. By contrast, geostationary orbit is a narrow, crowded band. Some parts of the orbit especially those over Europe, North America, and East Asia can be positively claustrophobic. It is thus possible that a “sabotage” satellite or “space mine” could be maneuvered into close proximity to a space-based solar power satellite under somewhat plausible pretenses. So important is geostationary orbit, however, that the position and movement of satellites there are tracked assiduously. An attack, and the identity of the attacker, would likely be painfully obvious after the fact if not before.New capabilities Besides threats to the satellite itself, how such a system is used also has important security ramifications. In its 2007 report, which appears to be the only US government document dealing with the security aspects of space-based solar power, the Pentagon identified more than a dozen potential implications of the system. Key among these was the ability to deliver reliable and constant power to forward-deployed troops potentially anywhere in the world by redirecting the satellite’s beam to another receiving station. Such a capability could dramatically reduce the logistical burden of supporting armed forces, whose energy needs are now largely met by transporting large quantities of fossil fuels. This new capability also has the potential to reduce casualties, because there would be reduced need for supply convoys to traverse hostile territory (NSSO, 2007).The technology is not inherently limited to supporting the troops of the country that develops it. While building and launching the satellite for such a system would be expensive and technically complex, the ground station that receives the power would be easier to engineer and construct. That means the space-based power system could be used to support troops of a friendly nation without ever risking a nation’s own forces, although the Pentagon report did not specifically mention this capability. It could also be used to support rebels or insurgents within the sovereign territory of another nation or to support a regime currently facing energy shortfalls due to internal or interstate warfare. In an extreme case, the system could be used to support a foreign state that is facing an energy embargo or blockade. Because a space-based solar power beam cannot be jammed, interdicting such intervention might necessitate direct action against either the satellite itself or the receiving ground station, either of which could dramatically broaden the scope of a conflict.The ability of the system to direct power on short notice to most points on the globe also has significance for international aid and disaster relief. In the wake of a natural or humanitarian disaster, power from space could be used to keep hospitals and refugee camps operational, as well as providing electricity for water desalination and other critical but energy-intensive processes. Operating in this mode, space based solar power could become a powerful tool of diplomacy rather than one of force projection in the traditional sense.The work ahead While space-based solar power offers the promise of abundant, clean energy, the technology can be used to project power in more than one sense. The unique characteristics of the system mean that it has profound international security implications, yet these issues remain substantially unaddressed. Not only is the concept of the system largely absent from the policy and political science literature, but it does not fall under the effective auspices of international law. The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 is silent on most aspects of the militarization of space aside from the use and deployment of weapons of mass destruction, and even in this respect its scope is ill-defined (UN Office for Outer Space Affairs, 1967). While there have been some attempts in recent years to begin discussion about a treaty banning conventional weapons in space (often spearheaded by China), even these notional efforts only address actual weapons, not power systems (CD 1839, 2008).The individual component technologies of the space solar power system are mature, but the space infrastructure required to construct and maintain such a system will take years, if not decades, to develop. In practical terms, this is not as long as it sounds. The establishment of international agreements, norms, or institutions capable of handling an issue as complex and potentially important as space-based solar power is itself often the work of decades. There are a number of ways in which the international community could address concerns about the system, from nonbinding principles of conduct to more formalized treaties, but such agreements cannot be expected to emerge spontaneously. Debate on the issue should begin now, lest development of this potentially transformative technology outpace the international community’s ability to effectively assimilate it.Offering cooperation over SBSP acts as an olive branch that moderates aggressive Chinese behavior and prevents miscalculation from a space arms racePeter Loftus 19---Lieutenant Loftus is assigned to the 75th Fighter Squadron at Moody AFB, Georgia. He holds a bachelor’s degree from the University of Massachusetts, where he studied Political Science and Chinese, and a master’s degree in China Studies from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, “Counter and Cooperate: How Space Can Be Used to Advance US–China Cooperation While Curbing Beijing’s Terrestrial Excesses,” Air and Space Power Journal, Spring 2019, China’s interests continue to expand outward from its shores, it seeks to build a military capable of protecting its economic interests overseas. For example, China has participated in counterpiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden since 2008 and recently established a permanent base in Djibouti to aid in this effort and serve as a PLA logistics hub for the region. This base will assist the PLA Navy in extending its reach while also securing sea lines of communication, through which much of China’s imports and exports transit. Beijing also has grand ambitions in space, many of which are economical and also require protection. These ambitions include projects to start lunar and asteroid mining, bring the BeiDou-2 Navigation Satellite System network into global service by 2020 and establish a Chinese space station by 2022. Beijing even has preliminary plans for an ambitious space-based solar energy network that will use microwaves to transmit power back to Earth by 2050.10 In the Strategic Studies Quarterly 12, no. 1 edition, Dr. Namrata Goswami argues that Chinese space exploration must be viewed through the broader framework of the Chinese economy’s expanding need for resources.11 She explains that President Xi sees space Counter and Cooperate AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL ? SPRING 2019 73 as an environment for scientific innovation as well as an opportunity to revitalize stagnant state-owned enterprises. She goes on to state that “. . . these goals are unique as they indicate a completely different view of space. Rather than just an arena for conquest and showing off, China views space as an environment in which to live, work, and create wealth through habitation and resource extraction.”12 This begs the question: how will China protect its interests in space? Leadership in Beijing will increasingly have to consider how it will secure these important economic assets in a realm where there are few laws or agreed upon codes of conduct. Although this analysis is not exhaustive, it provides a basis for understanding China’s current space initiatives and ambitions. So what kind of policy should Washington adopt to accommodate China’s interests, advance our own, and dissuade Beijing from extending a potential conflict into space? An intelligent approach will be two-fold. On one hand, we should foster cooperation where our interests with the Chinese overlap. On the other, we should develop a comprehensive approach for defending our interests, especially in the SCS. The latter issue is of great importance because we must first confront Beijing’s transgressions here on Earth to deter China’s militaristic expansionism in space. Proposals for US Policy Cooperate China’s economic and military rise during the last several decades was made possible by the post-World War II economic order established by the US. However, as a great power, China is unsatisfied with the current US-led order that it did little to help shape. Beijing and Washington are increasingly at odds internationally as their competing interests and visions for the future begin to collide. New avenues for cooperation are desperately needed to foster mutual trust and create an environment where the US and China can coexist with minimal friction. Space presents an excellent opportunity for cooperation between Washington and Beijing. Our two nations will compete in this realm—there is no avoiding that. However, both parties will benefit greatly from having a standardized set of rules governing military and economic activities in space. Hopefully, if these two great powers establish a framework of behaviors and norms for space, the rest of the world will follow suit. To start, the US should extend an olive branch. As Brian Wee den and Xiao He point out in their article for War on the Rocks, “Washington still hopes that Beijing can be a constructive partner for greater international space security. While China still chafes at the largely American constructed rules-based order, it likewise has a clear interest in using its development of space capabilities to promote bilateral cooperation and to play a role the formation of new international regimes.”13 While Russia seeks to undermine international space initiatives, Beijing and Washington should look toward the future and create a bold plan for space governance. This does not mean intimate cooperation, but there should be norms and codes for how government entities and private corporations 74 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL ? SPRING 2019 Loftus should act in space. Weeden and He go on to say that both sides should seek to establish confidence-building mechanisms to help build trust as well as processes for cooperation and deconfliction. On the economic front, private companies crave stability and clear rules. If the world’s two preeminent military and economic powers establish clear guidelines early on, potential financiers will have greater confidence to invest the large up-front costs for expensive space-based projects. This leads to the next point that both sides should promote: private sector cooperation in the space domain. It would be advantageous for both sides if private corporations in the US and China pursue space exploration together. Space-lift capabilities, space stations, asteroid mining, lunar stations, and other endeavors all require significant initial costs. By partnering, American and Chinese corporations could call upon the support of both the Chinese and US governments in seeking out new resources such as solar power, rare elements, and numerous other fields for scientific discovery that would be of great benefit to people everywhere. A private-sector partnership should be plausible as long as intellectual property rights are respected and the governments involved don’t micromanage the projects. Deep US–Chinese economic integration is often cited as one reason war between our two nations is unthinkable. Why would the same logic not extend to space? Despite the potential space holds for cooperation, there is plenty of room for conflict. While high-ranking military officials in both China and the US believe the militarization of space is inevitable, it would be beneficial to agree upon one rule up front: no kinetic strikes.14 In 2007, China tested an antisatellite missile against one of its failing weather satellites, projecting debris that continues to threaten space-based assets to this day. A kinetic battle involving satellites would create clouds of space junk for which there is no current remedy. Both Beijing and Washington have reason to limit space warfare to nonkinetic means. If a conflict were to occur, there are a number of different ways to neutralize or affect satellites short of kinetic strikes. These methods include radio frequency jamming and lasers that can temporarily incapacitate or even completely destroy satellite-based sensors. It should be added that spy satellites are important to building trust. Spy satellites allow nation-states to have an understanding of what their rivals are doing, at least partially allaying suspicion of the other party. A similar terrestrial example is the Treaty on Open Skies, which is primarily based around the US and Russia but claims 32 other signatories. According to the Department of State, “the Treaty is designed to enhance mutual understanding and confidence by giving all participants, regardless of size, a direct role in gathering information through aerial imaging on military forces and activities of concern to them.”15 Both sides must recognize the importance of this technology in allaying suspicions and preventing paranoia. An agreement to not target spy satellites (through a kinetic strike, jamming, lasers, or any other means) would be a bitter pill to swallow but would foster greater openness while also mitigating the militarization of space.Space war goes nuclearLaura Grego 18, Senior Scientist in the Global Security Program at the Union of Concerned Scientists, Postdoctoral Researcher at the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics, PhD in Experimental Physics at the California Institute of Technology, Space and Crisis Stability, Union of Concerned Scientists, 3-19-18, space is a particular problem for crisis stabilityFor a number of reasons, space poses particular challenges in preventing a crisis from starting or from being managed well. Some of these are to do with the physical nature of space, such as the short timelines and difficulty of attribution inherent in space operations. Some are due to the way space is used, such as the entanglement of strategic and tactical missions and the prevalence of dual-use technologies. Some are due to the history of space, such the absence of a shared understanding of appropriate behaviors and consequences, and a dearth of stabilizing personal and institutional relationships. While some of these have terrestrial equivalents, taken together, they present a special challenge.The vulnerability of satellites and first strike incentivesSatellites are inherently fragile and difficult to protect; in the language of strategic planners, space is an “offense-dominant” regime. This can lead to a number of pressures to strike first that don‘t exist for other, better-protected domains. Satellites travel on predictable orbits, and many pass repeatedly over all of the earth‘s nations. Low-earth orbiting satellites are reachable by missiles much less capable than those needed to launch satellites into orbit, as well as by directed energy which can interfere with sensors or with communications channels. Because launch mass is at a premium, satellite armor is impractical. Maneuvers on orbit need costly amounts of fuel, which has to be brought along on launch, limiting satellites‘ ability to move away from threats. And so, these very valuable satellites are also inherently vulnerable and may present as attractive targets.Thus, an actor with substantial dependence on space has an incentive to strike first if hostilities look probable, to ensure these valuable assets are not lost. Even if both (or all) sides in a conflict prefer not to engage in war, this weakness may provide an incentive to approach it closely anyway. A RAND Corporation monograph commissioned by the Air Force15 described the issue this way:First-strike stability is a concept that Glenn Kent and David Thaler developed in 1989 to examine the structural dynamics of mutual deterrence between two or more nuclear states.16 It is similar to crisis stability, which Charles Glaser described as ―a measure of the countries‘ incentives not to preempt in a crisis, that is, not to attack first in order to beat the attack of the enemy,‖17 except that it does not delve into the psychological factors present in specific crises. Rather, first strike stability focuses on each side‘s force posture and the balance of capabilities and vulnerabilities that could make a crisis unstable should a confrontation occur.For example, in the case of the United States, the fact that conventional weapons are so heavily dependent on vulnerable satellites may create incentives for the US to strike first terrestrially in the lead up to a confrontation, before its space-derived advantages are eroded by anti-satellite attacks.18 Indeed, any actor for which satellites or space-based weapons are an important part of its military posture, whether for support missions or on-orbit weapons, will feel “use it or lose it” pressure because of the inherent vulnerability of satellites. Short timelines and difficulty of attributionThe compressed timelines characteristic of crises combine with these “use it or lose it” pressures to shrink timelines. This dynamic couples dangerously with the inherent difficulty of determining the causes of satellite degradation, whether malicious or from natural causes, in a timely way. Space is a difficult environment in which to operate. Satellites orbit amidst increasing amounts of debris. A collision with a debris object the size of a marble could be catastrophic for a satellite, but objects of that size cannot be reliably tracked. So a failure due to a collision with a small piece of untracked debris may be left open to other interpretations. Satellite electronics are also subject to high levels of damaging radiation. Because of their remoteness, satellites as a rule cannot be repaired or maintained. While on-board diagnostics and space surveillance can help the user understand what went wrong, it is difficult to have a complete picture on short timescales. Satellite failure on-orbit is a regular occurrence19 (indeed, many satellites are kept in service long past their intended lifetimes).In the past, when fewer actors had access to satellite-disrupting technologies, satellite failures were usually ascribed to “natural” causes. But increasingly, even during times of peace operators may assume malicious intent. More to the point, in a crisis when the costs of inaction may be perceived to be costly, there is an incentive to choose the worst-case interpretation of events even if the information is incomplete or inconclusive.Entanglement of strategic and tactical missionsDuring the Cold War, nuclear and conventional arms were well separated, and escalation pathways were relatively clear. While space-based assets performed critical strategic missions, including early warning of ballistic missile launch and secure communications in a crisis, there was a relatively clear sense that these targets were off limits, as attacks could undermine nuclear deterrence. In the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, the US and Soviet Union pledged not to interfere with each other‘s ―national technical means‖ of verifying compliance with the agreement, yet another recognition that attacking strategically important satellites could be destabilizing.20 There was also restraint in building the hardware that could hold these assets at risk.However, where the lines between strategic satellite missions and other missions are blurred, these norms can be weakened. For example, the satellites that provide early warning of ballistic missile launch are associated with nuclear deterrent posture, but also are critical sensors for missile defenses. Strategic surveillance and missile warning satellites also support efforts to locate and destroy mobile conventional missile launchers. Interfering with an early warning sensor satellite might be intended to dissuade an adversary from using nuclear weapons first by degrading their missile defenses and thus hindering their first-strike posture. However, for a state that uses early warning satellites to enable a “hair trigger” or launch-on-attack posture, the interference with such a satellite might instead be interpreted as a precursor to a nuclear attack. It may accelerate the use of nuclear weapons rather than inhibit it. Misperception and dual-use technologiesSome space technologies and activities can be used both for relatively benign purposes but also for hostile ones. It may be difficult for an actor to understand the intent behind the development, testing, use, and stockpiling of these technologies, and see threats where there are none. (Or miss a threat until it is too late.) This may start a cycle of action and reaction based on misperception. For example, relatively low-mass satellites can now maneuver autonomously and closely approach other satellites without their cooperation; this may be for peaceful purposes such as satellite maintenance or the building of complex space structures, or for more controversial reasons such as intelligence-gathering or anti-satellite attacks.Ground-based lasers can be used to dazzle the sensors of an adversary‘s remote sensing satellites, and with sufficient power, they may damage those sensors. The power needed to dazzle a satellite is low, achievable with commercially available lasers coupled to a mirror which can track the satellite. Laser ranging networks use low-powered lasers to track satellites and to monitor precisely the Earth‘s shape and gravitational field, and use similar technologies. 21Higher-powered lasers coupled with satellite-tracking optics have fewer legitimate uses. Because midcourse missile defense systems are intended to destroy long-range ballistic missile warheads, which travel at speeds and altitudes comparable to those of satellites, such defense systems also have inherent ASAT capabilities. In fact, while the technologies being developed for long-range missile defenses might not prove very effective against ballistic missiles—for example, because of the countermeasure problems associated with midcourse missile defense— they could be far more effective against satellites. This capacity is not just theoretical. In 2007, China demonstrated a direct-ascent anti-satellite capability which could be used both in an ASAT and missile defense role, and in 2009, the United States used a ship-based missile defense interceptor to destroy a satellite, as well. US plans indicated a projected inventory of missile defense interceptors with capability to reach all low earth orbiting satellites in the dozens in the 2020s, and in the hundreds by 2030.22DiscriminationThe consequences of interfering with a satellite may be vastly different depending on who is affected and how, and whether the satellite represents a legitimate military objective.However, it will not always be clear who the owners and operators of a satellite are, and users of a satellite‘s services may be numerous and not public. Registration of satellites is incomplete23 and current ownership is not necessarily updated in a readily available repository. The identification of a satellite as military or civilian may be deliberately obscured. Or its value as a military asset may change over time; for example, the share of capacity of a commercial satellite used by military customers may wax and wane. A potential adversary‘s satellite may have different or additional missions that are more vital to that adversary than an outsider may perceive. An ASAT attack that creates persistent debris could result in significant collateral damage to a wide range of other actors; unlike terrestrial attacks, these consequences are not limited geographically, and could harm other users unpredictably.In 2015, the Pentagon‘s annual wargame, or simulated conflict, involving space assets focused on a future regional conflict. The official report out24 warned that it was hard to keep the conflict contained geographically when using anti-satellite weapons:As the wargame unfolded, a regional crisis quickly escalated, partly because of the interconnectedness of a multi-domain fight involving a capable adversary. The wargame participants emphasized the challenges in containing horizontal escalation once space control capabilities are employed to achieve limited national objectives.Lack of shared understanding of consequences/proportionalityStates have fairly similar understandings of the implications of military actions on the ground, in the air, and at sea, built over decades of experience. The United States and the Soviet Union/Russia have built some shared understanding of each other‘s strategic thinking on nuclear weapons, though this is less true for other states with nuclear weapons. But in the context of nuclear weapons, there is an arguable understanding about the crisis escalation based on the type of weapon (strategic or tactical) and the target (counterforce—against other nuclear targets, or countervalue—against civilian targets).Because of a lack of experience in hostilities that target space-based capabilities, it is not entirely clear what the proper response to a space activity is and where the escalation thresholds or “red lines” lie. Exacerbating this is the asymmetry in space investments; not all actors will assign the same value to a given target or same escalatory nature to different weapons. Unilateral space-based solar power ensures China is the first country to successfully set up a lunar baseNamrata Goswami 5/29/19---Research fellow at the Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses, PhD in International Organization from Jawaharlal Nehru University, was a Senior Fellow at the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), Washington. D.C from October 2012 to June 2013; Visiting Fellow at the South Asia Institute, University of Heidelberg (November–December 2010); the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO), August 2006 to July 2010; and a Visiting Fellow at the Centre for Dialogue, La Trobe University, Melbourne from April to August 2009. She is a recipient of the Fulbright-Nehru Senior Research Fellowship, 2012-2013, “China Has a Head Start in the New Space Race,” The Diplomat, competition between countries to get to the lunar poles is on, in the aftermath of the Chang’e 4 landing on the far side. There is, however, a clear difference between China’s ambitions and those of others. While countries like the United States, India, Japan, South Korea are aiming for lunar pole landings for space science and exploration purposes, China is the only country to articulate a long-term vision of space settlement and utilization. It is the only country to have invested serious money ($30 million) in future space technologies like space-based solar power that will help power such a lunar base.No other country has been able to match the long-term space goals of China as of yet. These goals include establishing permanent presence on the lunar surface, space mining, developing solar power stations in geo-synchronous orbit, and accelerating the modernization of military space institutions. While private entrepreneurs like Bezos and Musk have publicly articulated similar long-term space settlement goals, there is no longstanding U.S. government space policy that offer similar far-reaching visions. For the most part, U.S. space experts are in denial of China’s space success or tend to be dismissive of how the discourse on outer space is changing: moving from either “showing off” space technology to impress people on Earth (the hallmark of the Apollo era) or simply developing counterspace weapons for military advantage, to actually viewing space in its own right, with resources to extract (Chang’e era).China’s 30-year space goals (2019-2049), propelled by President Xi Jinping’s China Dream and operationalized within his civil-military integration strategy, put Beijing clearly in the lead with regard to space-renewable energy generation, industrialization, and resource utilization. With the Chang’e 4 already up there exploring and investigating on the lunar far side, and with another mission to follow this year, China is the only country with a demonstrated capability to get to the lunar far side. Only time will tell if others can follow suit, and establish an enduring, sustainable lunar presence.If China is the first to develop lunar and asteroid mining bases they’ll durably and terminally ensure an REM monopoly Brandon J. Weichert 6/28/19---Brandon J. Weichert is a geopolitical analyst who manages The Weichert Report. He is a contributing editor at American Greatness, “We Must Mine Space Before China Does,” American Greatness, object of the Chinese game of “Go” is to outmaneuver your adversary by surrounding him until he has nowhere else to go. Once totally encircled, your rival is forced to surrender and you are victorious. It has become passé to claim that China has been playing “Go” while the United States has been playing checkers, but it is closer to the truth than we care to admit.Since opening itself up to the West in the 1970s, China has been striving to insert itself into every aspect of the world’s economy. Once it integrated itself within this framework, Beijing worked assiduously to dominate the most strategic sectors. If the Chinese could not dominate these sectors, then they sought to become so important that refusing to do business with China would be financially detrimental.China Corners Rare Earth MetalsChina’s encirclement strategy continues today, even as the trade war rages between the two titans.China has become so enmeshed in the global supply chain that, for years, they have managed to work themselves into an important position in the vital rare earth metals market. For the record, rare earth metals are essential for any and all modern pieces of technology. Everything from your iPad to a cruise missile requires rare earths to function.Beijing has endeavored to have an outsized influence in this market not only for the sake of making money (although they do plenty of that) but also because Beijing knows such an outsized influence would complicate the ability of the rest of the world—specifically the United States and its allies—to have access to these important minerals.There is some debate as to whether the Chinese could actually deprive the United States of the vital rare earths. In 2010, the Chinese attempted to restrict access to rare earths and the world market was able to correct for this flagrant abuse and keep trade going.Rare earth metals get their name not because they are hard to find. Instead, they are called “rare” because they are hard to reach. China’s mercantilist trade policy is akin to staking out every waterhole in the desert—only rather than cutting off access to water (although, that’s not beyond them—just ask the Indians), the Chinese are doing it with rare earth metals.Even if China cannot restrict American access to rare earths, the fact that 35 percent of global reserves (the most in the world) are in Chinese control, and that China produced 70 percent of total rare earths in 2018, and that 80 percent of rare earths consumed by the United States in 2018 came from China, means the threat to American high-tech is real. Still, the United States is working with its partners to overcome this apparent deficit.Meanwhile, America is focusing on getting its own rare earth mines back online after decades of neglect. Yet, the Chinese have the United States by the short hairs—at least for the time being. Until the United States and its partners can secure the rare earth metals they need, the risk will increase, meaning that global prices will increase. This is another example of China outmaneuvering the United States.To Break China’s Encirclement, We Must Go to SpaceThere is one, unconventional long term strategy for overcoming the Chinese advantage in this vital industry. That strategy is space mining.China has encircled the United States in the rare earth industry. But the United States can still look up and go above the Chinese encirclement, thereby breaking it. Many of the celestial bodies in the solar system—including the moon and the millions of asteroids that separate the inner solar system from the outer planets—are chock full of these rare earths.Once the United States establishes the infrastructure necessary for space mining, gaining access to a steady stream of these vital resources will be relatively easy. Besides, space mining could be a new market that would be worth trillions of dollars.Yet, America has little time to implement a robust plan for capturing essential asteroids (and laying claim to resource-rich areas of the moon). China is already on the moon, testing the lunar surface to see where a viable mining colony can be established. The United States cannot simply hope that it can overcome the advantages China has spent years building up in the rare earth metals market.What’s more, the current trade war with China is not going away anytime soon. The United States nevertheless has comparative advantages in the strategic domain of space. Those advantages are in danger of eroding, however, so time is of the essence.By maximizing American commitment to space mining now, the United States can hope to never again be fearful of the Chinese in the essential rare earth metals market. Therefore, Congress must move federal research and development dollars into the budding space mining industry while at the same time encouraging American start-up firms to get to the moon and nearby resource-rich asteroids. Fast.Space holds the key to America’s (and humanity’s) future. It is only a matter of time before a nation-state captures the strategic high ground of space and fully exploits it to their advantage. Chinese investment and commitment to space development means that the United States stands a real chance of losing out. And, as America’s comparative advantages in space recede, Washington will find itself increasingly hamstrung on Earth.China has managed to corner key markets and integrate itself in the world economy. It has effectively encircled the United States in key areas. The only way to break Beijing’s encirclement, then, is to go above them and harness the seemingly limitless bounty that space has to offer before Beijing blocks that last refuge in their pernicious encirclement campaign.Chinese rare earth monopoly guarantees conflict escalation Charles J. Butler 14---Colonel Charles J. Butler is the commander of the 611th Air and Space Operations Center at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska, He was a National Defense Fellow at The Fletcher School in 2012, “Rare Earth Elements: China’s Monopoly and Implications for U.S. National Security,” The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, vol.38:1 winter 2014, ’S HOLD ON RARE EARTHS China has not always been the leader in the mining and production of rare earth elements. Only since the mid-1980s has China become the predominant producer on the global market. Before that time, the United States was the world’s largest supplier of rare earths. The decline of U.S. rare earth mining coincided with China’s growth, which has contributed to China’s stranglehold on the trade. China’s appetite for internal consumption of rare earths has also increased due to its booming economy, which is starting to affect availability. With 95 percent of the world’s production capacity in China, rare earths are simply not readily available outside of the Chinese market. The reason for the decline in the U.S. industry was due in part to lower labor costs in China, combined with environmental issues at the Mountain Pass mine, the largest source of U.S. rare earths during this period.38 The latter issue was over a main wastewater pipeline that did not meet regulatory and environmental standards under U.S. law, leading to a shutdown of the mine.39 Since that time, a small amount of rare earths has been produced from bastnasite stockpiles that existed prior to the closure.40 Molycorp reopened the Mountain Pass mine in 2011, and its potential impact on the rare earths industry will be discussed later. China’s ability to provide low cost labor significantly contributed to its rise to the top of the industry. Lower labor costs allowed China to produce rare earths at a more competitive price than other, smaller producers around the world, thus making it economically unattractive for those producers to stay in the market or for new producers to enter. Second, China’s low environmental standards played a role in its emergence as the world’s leader in rare earths production.41 It certainly helped that China was more concerned during this rise with fueling its growing economy than addressing environmental concerns pertaining to rare earths production. A third contributor to China’s rise is its access to large deposits of ores within its borders. The majority of China’s rare earths are produced at the Bayan Obo mine in northeast China and at a number of mines in southern China and Sichuan.42 These mines have significant deposits of bastnasite.43 The Bayan Obo mine provides 50 percent of the rare earths mining production for China’s industry, while the mines in southern China and Sichuan account for 41 percent and 9 percent of production respectively.44 The demand for rare earths continues to rise. In 2010, the worldwide demand for rare earth oxides was 127,500 metric tons.45 China produced over 130,000 metric tons of rare earths in 2010 and 2011, eclipsing world demand.46 The next largest producer was India with a paltry 3,000 metric tons, followed by Brazil at 550 metric tons, and Malaysia at thirty metric tons.47 These production rates exemplify the disparity between China and its closest competitors in the industry. By 2014, it is estimated that total demand for rare earth oxides will reach 177,200 metric tons.48 This increase equates to a 75 percent growth in demand for battery alloy production and a 57 percent growth in demand for permanent magnets.49 Capacity for meeting the increased demand is uncertain. Of the world’s estimated 110,000,000 metric tons of reserves, China controls half.50 The Commonwealth of Independent States is second, controlling approximately 19,000,000 metric tons, with the U.S. in third at 13,000,000 metric tons.51 Despite the large number of reserves deposited across the planet, very few countries possess the capacity to mine the ores and process them into rare earth oxides. However, with increasing demand on the horizon accompanied by increasing value, more nations as well as private corporations may be willing to enter the market. With a firm hold over the industry, China clearly has the upper hand with regards to controlling both supply and overall pricing of rare earths. The price for rare earth elements has risen exponentially over the past several years due to both increased demand for rare earths products and a limited supply chain. For example, lanthanum sold for $3.44 per kilogram in 2007 but, by the third quarter of 2011, was selling for $153 per kilogram.52 That is a forty-four-fold increase in just under four years. Other rare earths have seen similar price spikes over the same period. Neodymium, which is a key ingredient in the manufacturing of permanent magnets, sold for $30.24 per kilogram in 2007 and, in July 2011, hovered near $340 per kilogram.53 As of April 2013, the market prices for lanthanum and neodymium declined and are approximately $11 and $75 per kilogram respectfully.54 The decrease in price is welcome news for manufacturers and is attributed mostly to lower demand for rare earths due to recent high prices. There are several reasons for the skyrocketing rare earths prices from 2007 to 2011, and they all stem from policy decisions within China. These policy decisions resulted in a decrease in supply of rare earths to the outside world. One such policy decision was China’s deliberate move to address environmental issues within the mining industry. According to a 2011 New York Times article, Chinese officials were concerned with polluted water, air, and radioactive residues from the rare earths industry.55 Most of China’s rare earths facilities closed during the fall of 2011 in order to install pollution control equipment.56 Another policy decision addressed the overwhelming number of mine operators operating illegally without a license. These operators conducted business without any concern for the environment or labor practices.57 China’s solution for these issues is to consolidate the mining industry into larger enterprises under government control. For example, in northern China a single, government-controlled monopoly named Bao Gang Rare Earth was formed incorporating thirtyone mostly private rare earths processing companies.58 The same consolidation process is occurring in southern China, where the government has created three distinct companies en route to consolidating 80 percent of production in the region.59 The combination of stricter adherence to environmental regulations and government consolidation of the industry equates to an increase in prices. A third, more ominous factor is also affecting overall supply of Chinese rare earths. China has deliberately cut export quotas for rare earths over the past several years due to its own internal appetite for the resource. This trend is not likely to change in the near future. Molycorp’s former chief executive officer, Mark Smith, reported after a trip to China that Chinese officials told him they did not intend to remain the world’s major supplier of rare earths.60 Molycorp also predicts China may be a net importer of rare earths by as early as 2015.61 This prediction may be a ploy by Molycorp to boost outside investment or to gain greater attention from Congress; however, China’s export quotas provide empirical data that is hard to refute. In 2004 and 2005, China exported 65,609 metric tons of rare earths against a global demand of 90,000 and 98,000 respectively.62 From 2006 through 2009, Chinese exports decreased at a 6 to 7 percent annual rate to 50,145 metric tons in 2009.63 According to a U.S. Geological Survey report, China’s 2010 rare earth elements export quota was 37 percent lower than that of 2009, and a further reduction of 35 percent was designated for 2011.64 Global demand over that period rose to 124,000 metric tons in 2008 with a precipitous drop-off to 85,000 metric tons in 2009 due to the global economic downturn.65 Despite the downturn, demand climbed back up to 127,500 metric tons in 2010. China’s domestic consumption has risen rapidly over the last ten years from an estimated 19,000 metric tons in 2001 to 77,000 metric tons in 2010.66 The increased internal demand combined with a somewhat lower production capacity due to consolidation of the Chinese industry and tougher enforcement of environmental laws signals that declining export quotas will remain a Chinese policy for years to come. China’s rise to become the world leader in rare earths production was not by chance. The U.S. decision to suspend operations at Mountain Pass in the 1990s versus financing the cleanup and upgrade costs required to meet environmental regulations was a key contributor. Furthermore, China’s own decision to increase its production capacity through investment in research and development projects culminated in their monopoly of the rare earths industry. GEO-STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS For one nation to possess 95 percent of the production capacity of an increasingly global, vital natural resource is cause for concern. The fact that the nation that controls that resource has not proven to be a transparent and accountable global partner with regards to territorial claims and increased military spending raises the level of concern significantly. For these reasons, China’s monopoly of the rare earths industry presents national security and manufacturing concerns for the United States and its partners and allies. It is difficult to envision the United States or any other nation relying exclusively on a single supplier for its vital resource needs. The United States diversifies its petroleum imports to avoid such a scenario. Even if the United States were able to import all of its petroleum requirements from a single, secure, external source, such as Canada, it would be a dangerous choice due to a number of factors. For instance, contingencies such as labor strikes, souring diplomatic relations, and natural disasters make overreliance on one source a strategic miscalculation. It is therefore wise for nations to diversify their imports of vital natural resources, using a variety of suppliers and geographic regions if domestic sources are insufficient or unavailable. As demonstrated in the hypothetical scenario at the beginning of this paper, China’s hold on rare earths may be a decisive factor in a future confrontation with the United States. The numerous weapons systems that rely on rare earths technology place the United States at a strategic disadvantage with regards to China. If a prolonged, large-scale conflict between the two nations broke out over a Taiwan Strait or South China Sea dispute, the United States may find itself squeezed to obtain sufficient supplies of rare earths to manufacture replacement parts or systems to remain engaged in the fight. Much as the lack of secure access to oil was crippling to the Germans at the end of World War II, rare earths could play a similar, pivotal role in a future conflict with China. In the air-to-air arena alone, the requirement to replace expended stockpiles of advanced air-to-air missiles could become a factor very quickly based on the number of aircraft China would be capable of employing. Japan recently learned that relying on a single resource supplier was imprudent following an incident between the Japanese Coast Guard and a Chinese fishing trawler near the Senkaku, or Diaoyu Islands.67 In September 2010, a Japanese Coast Guard vessel attempted to stop a Chinese trawler purported to be fishing illegally in Japanese waters. During the incident, the captain of the trawler intentionally rammed the coast guard vessel. Subsequently, the Japanese Coast Guard apprehended the captain. The ensuing political spat boiled over for several weeks with the Japanese threatening to try the captain, while the Chinese suspended high-level contacts with Japan.68 During this period, an unanticipated consequence unfolded. The Chinese were scheduled to deliver several metric tons of rare earths to Japan for use in Japanese commercial industries. In what can only be seen as a direct use of its economic power in a diplomatic tussle, the Chinese withheld shipments of the rare earths during the dispute while awaiting an apology, reparations, and the release of the captain.69 China denied all accusations that it was purposefully withholding the shipments as a political bargaining tool against Japan.70 Whether China purposefully withheld the shipments or not, the lesson learned by Japan as well as outside observers was that China possesses a powerful economic instrument to employ against nations that depend on Chinese rare earths to sustain their economic livelihood. Solvency1ACChina’s behavior is entirely dependent on whether they believe they have the upper hand---if regulatory consensus over SBSP exists, they’ll follow it, BUT if they get their first unilaterally, conflict is inevitable Namrata Goswami, 2018. Dr. Namrata Goswami is a 2016–17 Minerva grantee and independent senior analyst with Wikistrat. She was a Jennings Randolph senior fellow at the US Institute of Peace, Washington, DC, and research fellow with the Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. Spring 2018. Strategic Studies Quarterly, Vol. 12, No. 1 (SPRING 2018), pp. 74-97, “China in Space: Ambitions and Possible Conflict,” pp. 89-91 Accessed 9/7/19ConclusionChina’s investments certainly suggest a desire to exploit space resources and pursue space settlement. Surely the ability of any nation to gain an advantage in accessing the vast wealth of the inner solar system could have an effect on the balance of power in the international system. Such access and mobility are likewise likely to provide certain military advantages as is true in any domain. However, quite aside from general concerns of changes in the distribution of economic and military power are the specific concerns of how such resources themselves are allocated and whether this can lead to conflict. It remains to be seen whether the shift in China’s space goals, as articulated by its scientists and space policy makers, to acquire space-based resources and a permanent space station lead to resource nationalism, territoriality, and expansionism. Furthermore, will Chinese space ambitions result in a scenario of land grabs based on historical claims and counterclaims?Will Chinese territorial assertion be replicated with regard to space resources? Once China reaches somewhere in space first—for instance, the far side of the moon or an asteroid—will it recreate a similar argument of owning a resource by being there first as it does with regard to the South China Sea and East China Sea? Will similar arguments with regard to being the first to use navigational charts in the South China Sea or issue first historical records with regard to the East China Sea be replicated on the lunar surface, where, by 2018, China aims to carry out topographic and geological survey of lunar samples?115 What will be the likely strategic impact if China declares a “Zone of Non-Interference,” similar to an air defense identification zone, on the moon once it establishes a permanent base there? And if China passes an act similar to the 2015 US Asteroid Act that favors “first come, first served” with regard to mining rights and ownership of the mined resources, what would transpire if a US private company applies for landing and mining rights on an asteroid, but China rushes in and establishes its base first?116 What if both US and Chinese companies want to mine the same asteroid? Are there mechanisms that would help peacefully create shared rights?If the South China Sea is taken as a precedence, to date, China and its fellow disputants have not succeeded in establishing a code of conduct. The absence of a regulatory framework reflects the consequential absence of a standard of behavior that is acceptable to all and thereby leaves room for variable interpretations. This situation could get reflected in space once the technology to mine resources becomes cost effective and on-orbit manufacturing becomes commonplace.China’s ambitions in space over the coming 20–30 year time span show all indications of being successful. Chinese scholars on strategy and space indicate that China would prefer the “global commons” or internationalist perspective when it comes to space resources. None asserted any nationalist vision for celestial bodies or space resources, and all were firmly attached to playing as a “responsible stakeholder” within the existing global governance framework.117 Nevertheless, China’s strategic behavior with regard to the South China Sea and East China Sea, both rich in resources and both claimed by China, is based on a “first presence” argument. Consequently, Chinese behavior during a conflict in space would likely depend to a large extent on the kind of international regulatory regime in place, the ability of the regime to mitigate conflicts, and whether China considers itself to be in a superior or inferior position. China’s strategic culture indicates it opts for peaceful conflict resolution when it is inferior to its adversaries but prefers use of force when it is in a superior position. Only those nations that keep up with China with regard to space access and industrial exploitation are likely to have any meaningful rule-making power. Chinese scholars specializing in space law insist that there is no international regulatory mechanism or law to adjudicate space property issues.118 Given the potential increase in space-related resource activities, including China’s officially stated ambitions to exploit asteroids for resources, build an SBSP, and establish a lunar base, those in the international community who desire a peaceful future in space should promptly craft an international regulatory framework tuned to the realities of the twenty-first– century space ambitions.China’s actions in space are driven by a desire for security and status seeking---cooperation is a way to informally recognize China as a space power while preventing an arms race Lincoln Hines 1/18/19---Lincoln Hines is a Ph.D. Candidate in the Government Department at Cornell University. His dissertation focuses on the role of status-seeking in China’s space program, “Coping With the Challenge of China’s Growing Space Power,” The Diplomat, January 2, 2019, China successfully landed the Chang’e 4 space probe on the dark side of the moon – making China the first country in history to do so. This accomplishment represents just one of China’s most recent steps toward fulfilling its goal of becoming “a space power in all respects.” In pursuit of this goal, China has become the world’s second largest spender on space capabilities. Driven by the dual motives of seeking status and security, China’s comprehensive modernization of its space program poses a challenge to U.S. security interests and global standing. However, by recognizing Chinese status aspirations, the United States maintains an important tool by which to temper competitive tensions, and mitigate the threat of a full blown space race.Much of China’s space program is oriented toward enhancing China’s military power. By developing heavier launch capabilities, China can deliver intercontinental-range ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and place heavy spy satellites in orbit. Similarly, China’s pursuit of satellite technologies contributes to China’s efforts of “winning informationized local wars.” Likewise, through China’s BeiDou navigation satellite system (the Chinese equivalent of GPS), Chinese missiles can increase their accuracy and lethality. Moreover, Chinese counterspace capabilities provide China important asymmetric advantages vis-à-vis the United States, facilitating China’s anti-access/area-denial strategy should a conflict break out between the two powers in the Taiwan Strait or in the East and South China Seas.Interacting with Chinese security concerns, however, is China’s increasing desire to enhance its great power status. Chinese nationalist narratives blame China’s “Century of Humiliation,” in part, on the Qing Dynasty’s reluctance to adopt modern technology utilized by Western intruders. As such, technological achievements are viewed as important symbols of national power and as an effective currency for China to enhance its position at the great power table. To signal its aspirations for great power status, China invests considerable resources in expensive status projects. From the launch of the Dong Fang Hong-1 satellite in 1970, to more modern ventures – such as manned spaceflight, the construction of a space station in low earth orbit, or lunar exploration – Chinese leaders have invested heavily on projecting great power status both at home and abroad. By pursuing these expensive and technologically difficult projects, China can demonstrate that it belongs to an exclusive group of great powers.These combined status and security seeking motives have important implications for U.S.-China relations. Rising powers such as China are often driven to “seek a place in the sun.” However, such efforts are often costly and can catalyze arms races by raising threat perceptions abroad and breeding suspicions of hegemonic intent. Symbols of national power are often capabilities that also have military applications. An illustrative case of this phenomenon is that of Wilhelmine Germany. Some scholars, for example, argue that despite facing greater land-based security threats, Germany’s status ambitions led it to invest in battleships (a status symbol at the turn of the 20th century) – which raised threat perceptions in Great Britain and ultimately reduced German security.Overall, this combination of status and security seeking motives is likely to prove particularly destabilizing in the domain of space. Owing to the dual use nature of space technologies, almost any advance made by China in space can be portrayed as a potential threat to U.S. national security. This is especially true considering the opacity of the Chinese space program and its close ties to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Even ostensibly peaceful activities such as China’s manned spaceflight program can, and have, been depicted as security threats. Moreover, China’s technological achievements in areas unrelated to security – e.g. landing on the dark side of the moon – are likely to be read as a bellwether for China’s overall capabilities vis-à-vis the United States, contributing to U.S. fears of decline.As China’s space power continues to increase, some analysts contend that the militarization of space is all but inevitable. To respond to these challenges, the Trump administration is calling for the United States to establish an entirely new branch of the military, to be known as the Space Force. In isolation, such moves are only likely to exacerbate tensions between Washington and Beijing and may give rise to an arms race in space. As China’s economy continues to grow, Beijing will increasingly have the capacity to finance a space race. Considering the reliance of modern militaries and economies on space-based assets, a militarized space race between the United States and China would be disastrous.In preventing a militarized space race, the United States needs to be attentive to the role of China’s aspirations for great power status. Chinese status ambitions provide U.S. policymakers an important tool for forestalling conflict and obtaining Chinese support for the status quo. China is more likely to support an international order in which it has a seat at the table, and the Chinese Communist Party in particular craves international recognition for its domestic political benefits. This provides an important source of leverage for the United States to promote its interests. In practice, the United States can informally recognize Chinese status as a space power through bilateral cooperation between NASA and the Chinese National Space Agency. The United States can allow China to send astronauts to the International Space Station (while it is still operational). Beyond the benefits of inducing cooperation, these activities will have the added benefit of acting as confidence building measures to reduce the likelihood of inadvertent escalation that could lead to conflict in space.As of now, the United States does not cooperate with China in space. There are, in fact, many arguments against cooperating with China in space – including concerns over espionage, the PLA, and China’s opaque authoritarian government. Yet, pessimists forget that the United States has managed to find room for cooperation under much more difficult circumstances than are present today. During the Cold War, the United States and Soviet Union managed to cooperate in outer space despite aiming thousands of nuclear tipped missiles at one another. By contrast, the United States and China are highly interdependent and are not ideological adversaries. Moreover, as China’s military and economy grow increasingly dependent on space-based assets, China will also stand to lose from a conflict in outer space.An armed space race between the United States and China is not inevitable. However the Trump administration’s current approach to foreign policy makes it more likely. So far, the “America First” approach to foreign policy is hostile to multilateralism and unlikely to recognize China’s status aspirations. The current U.S. approach is likely to result in tat-for-tat escalation – a competition in which China will increasingly be able to finance. U.S. policymakers would be wise to recognize the importance of status considerations in Chinese space program and adopt a broader toolkit for mitigating competitive tensions in the increasingly important domain of space.Chinese rise is inevitable---the only question is whether we will moderate their influence by finding ways to cooperate, or abdicate our leadership by retreating inwardsFREDERICK KEMPE 4/14/19---Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council, “The World China Wants,” Atlantic Council, Union leaders sat down this week in Brussels for a summit with a China it recently branded a “systemic rival,” and the United States is nearing the end game of trade talks with a China that national security documents refer to as a “strategic adversary.”So, it’s surprising that transatlantic leaders are neither working at common cause nor asking the most crucial geopolitical questions of our age.What sort of world does China want to create? With what means would it achieve its aims? And, what should the United States and Europe do to influence the outcome? By now, there is little remaining doubt that China’s continued rise marks the most significant geopolitical event shaping the 21st century. Yet US and European officials – mired in issues ranging from Trump administration immigration gyrations to Brexit – have failed to give this mother of all inflection points enough attention.Some are in denial about the fundamental change China’s rise may bring to the global order of institutions and principles established by the United States and its allies after World War II. Others concede that the structural stress between a rising China and an incumbent United States is the defining danger of our times, yet they offer neither an engagement or containment strategy worthy of this epochal challenge.That has produced the worst of all worlds. Fearful that the United States has grown more determined to undermine his country’s rise, President Xi has doubled down on his determination to strengthen the Communist party’s hold domestically while advancing China’s global influence. European allies – stung by trade actions against them and the lack of a US galvanizing strategy to China – are hedging their bets.European Council President Donald Tusk declared a “breakthrough” this week on some of the EU’s major trade disagreements, particularly regarding tech transfers and industrial state subsidies. Then in Croatia a couple of days later, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang pledged to respect EU standards and laws at a summit with Central and East European countries that closed 40 deals and expanded its ranks to Greece so that the so-called 16+1 grouping became 17+1. That relatively positive news in Europe only further underscores the skill with which Chinese leaders are managing their historic aspirations.Graham Allison, one of America’s most astute China watchers, quotes Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew, who shortly before his death in 2015 said this: “The size of China’s displacement of the world balance is such that the world must find a new balance. It is not possible to pretend that this is just another big player. This is the biggest player in the history of the world.”In that context, what China wants is a play in three acts.First, China wants ideally to push the US out of its Asian region, or at the very least reduce its influence, to achieve a regional hegemony that makes all actors ultimately dependent on it. Second, it is acting globally to displace, if not yet replace, the United States wherever it can – including in major parts of Europe – most importantly through its Belt and Road Initiative.Finally, it’s clearer than ever that Beijing by the time of the 100th anniversary of the People’s Republic of China in 2049 aspires to be the dominant economic, political and perhaps military power for an era where democracies remain but authoritarian systems are ascendant.“China is unabashedly undermining the U.S. alliance system in Asia,’” writes Oriana Skylar Mastro of Georgetown University in Foreign Affairs. “It has encouraged the Philippines to distance itself from the United States, it has supported South Korea’s efforts to take a softer line toward North Korea, and it has backed Japan’s stance against American protectionism…It is blatantly militarizing the South China Sea ….It is no longer content to play second fiddle to the United States and seeks directly to challenge its position in the Indo-Pacific region.”Yet it is beyond Asia where China’s reach has expanded fastest. It’s hard to overstate the importance of the Belt and Road Initiative, whose impact on its times may outstrip that of America’s Marshall Plan, which at $13 billion of funding had neither the BRI’s global aspiration or resources. Launched only in 2013, conservative estimates have China already spending $400 billion on the BRI with hundreds of millions more in the pipeline for projects with some 86 countries and international organizations, most recently including the first G-7 member, Italy.Though the BRI is a development scheme, its political and security benefits for China grow increasingly clear, whether through EU members who oppose human rights statements against Beijing or African or Middle Eastern countries who will be less likely over time to provide US forces military access. Finally, a growing number of experts believe China on current trajectories wants to fill America’s shoes as the dominant global agenda-setter and rule-maker.Write Bradley A. Thayer and John M. Friend, authors of the 2018 book How China Sees the World, “By 2040, Western-led institutions will remain, but their liberal principles will be diluted by reforms required by Beijing. As China’s economic power increases and more countries in both the developed and developing world become dependent on Chinese trade and investment, Beijing will use its economic statecraft to pressure countries to downplay or abandon their democratic values and liberal policies.”By then, their relative resources will provide them far greater leverage.If China reaches its stated development goals for the centennial of the Communist party in 2021, and then the centennial of the People’s Republic in 2049, it will be 40% larger than the US economy by the first date and be three times larger by the second! (measured by purchasing power parity) With stakes that high, the secondary questions are crucial. Does Beijing have the wherewithal to achieve such lofty aims and can the US and Europe alter that trajectory?The answer to both questions is yes, but….Chinese leaders’ reawakened sense of destiny is a much more overpowering force than is generally understood in Washington. Financial markets and Western political capitals are littered with those who have underestimated the durability of China’s rise. That said, China’s slowing economy, the loss of manufacturing jobs, and its increasingly autocratic system introduce new vulnerabilities. There’s a higher level of grumbling among its business elites, political class and foreign investors.Given the choice, most countries in the world still would rather navigate a world order where the United States is the dominant actor rather than China. For that to be an option, however, the US and Europe will have to change course in three respects. First, they will have to address domestic challenges that have made their democratic and economic models less appealing globally. They will have to reinvigorate and, in some cases, reinvent the multilateral systems it and others created after World War II. Finally, they must find a way to act together to more intensively and more effectively engage with China to shape the future -- collaborating with China where possible and competing where necessary.Cooperative SBSP gives the U.S. internal influence and allows us to advance our interestsPeter Garretson 12, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF, an airpower strategist currently serving on the CSAF’s Strategic Studies Group (HAF/CK). His previous assignment was at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses in New Delhi as an Air Force Fellow examining Indo–US long-term space collaboration under the sponsorship of the Council on Foreign Relations. he was the chief of future science and technology exploration for the HQ USAF Directorate of Strategic Planning, Strategic Studies Quarterly, Spring 2012, Vol. 6, No. 1, “Solar Power in Space?”, pp. 97-123In late 2010, the China Academy of Space Technology (CAST) quietly articulated its interest and program in the Online Journal of Space Communications, stating that “the acquisition of space solar power will require development of fundamental new aerospace technologies, such as revolutionary launch approaches, ultra-thin solar arrays, on-orbit manufacture/ assembly/integration (MAI), precise attitude control, in-situ resource utilization (ISRU) for deep space exploration and space colonial expansion.” It is clear the CAST proponents see SBSP in strategic terms: Since SPS development will be a huge project, it will be considered the equivalent of an Apollo program for energy. In the last century, America’s leading position in science and technology worldwide was inextricably linked with technological advances associated with implementation of the Apollo program. Likewise, as China’s current achievements in aerospace technology are built upon with its successive generations of satellite projects in space, China will use its capabilities in space science to assure sustainable development of energy from space . . . it is necessary for China to launch an SPS-type Apollo project to increase research and development investment in all corollary fields. This will relate to the country’s goal of attaining the leading position in both energy and space technology” and that therefore, “the [Chinese] state has decided that power coming from outside of the earth, such as solar power and development of . . . space energy resources . . . is to be China’s future direction.24 CAST laid out a detailed five-step plan for achieving the first commercial SPS: “In 2010, CAST will finish the concept design; in 2020, we will finish the industrial level testing of in-orbit construction and wireless transmissions. In 2025, we will complete the first 100 kW SPS demonstration at LEO; and in 2035, the 100 mW SPS will have electric generating capacity. Finally in 2050, the first commercial level SPS system will be in operation at GEO.”25 The concept design was finished in 2010, and in September 2011 came the first highly public announcement where Prof. Wang Xiji, a key drafter of the proposal, stated, “China has acquired sufficient technology and had enough money to carry out the most ambitious space project in history. Once completed, the solar station, with a capacity of 100 MW, would span at least one square kilometre, dwarfing the International Space Station and becoming the biggest man-made object in space.”26 Professor Xiji articulated, “The area of space and aviation is an emerging strategic industry, and the development of a space solar-energy station requires high-end technology. . . . Such a station will trigger a technical revolution in the fields of new energy, new material, solar power and electricity, and [ultimately] lead to the emergence of several industries . . . and possibly even an industrial revolution.” He emphasized that “Whoever takes the lead in the development and utilization of clean and renewable energy and the space and aviation industry will be the world leader.” Professor Xiji, one of the acknowledged fathers of the Chinese space program, warned that if it “did not act quickly, China would let other countries, in particular the US and Japan, take the lead and occupy strategically important locations in space.”27 Clearly our competitors do not seem to share the same technological pessimism that bedevils attempts to begin a US program. As chronicled by author Thomas Friedman, such ambition and technological optimism used to be a part of the ethos and identity of America.28 One might hope that given China’s demonstrated ability to construct mega projects—the massive Three Gorges Dam, high-speed rail, and entire cities, seemingly overnight—that Chinese interest in SBSP might be a wake-up call to what is truly the space race of our generation. But so far at least, the reaction seems more consistent with the worry expressed by Friedman that the United States, as compared to China, had lost its “can-do” spirit in the early twenty-first century.29 Airmen, as stewards of America’s aerospace power, should not be so complacent. Understanding the critical link between dual-use infrastructure that contributes to access and on-orbit capabilities, an Air Force strategist might then take a much less complacent view of international competition. There are no battles in this strategy; each side is merely trying to outdo in performance the equipment of the other. . . . Its tactics are industrial, technical, and financial. . . . A silent and apparently peaceful war is therefore in progress, but it could well be a war which of itself could be decisive. —General d’Armee Andre Beaufre For years the Air Force has kept the United States out of a major war and kept the world from another global conflict by maintaining technological preeminence and overmatch, practicing what a Cold War textbook called a “Strategy of Technology”: The Technological War is the decisive struggle in the Protracted Conflict. Victory in the Technological War gives supremacy in all other phases of the conflict. . . . The Technological War creates the resources to be employed in all other parts of the Protracted Conflict. It governs the range of strategies that can be adapted in actual or hot war. . . . Military superiority or even supremacy is not permanent, and never ends the conflict unless it is used. The United States considers the Technological War as an infinite game: one which is not played out to a decisive victory. We are committed to a grand strategy of defense, and will never employ a decisive advantage to end the conflict by destroying our enemies. Consequently, we must maintain not only military superiority but [also] technological supremacy. The race is an alternative to destructive war, not the cause of military conflict. . . . The United States is dedicated to a strategy of stability. We are a stabilizing rather than a disturbing power, and our goal is preserving the status quo and the balance of power rather than seeking conquest and the final solution to the problems of international conflict through occupation or extermination of all opponents. In a word, the U.S. sees the Technological War as an infinite game, one played for the sake of continuing to play, rather than for the sake of “victory” in the narrow sense. 30 That is not to imply that Airmen should recommend a zero-sum orientation toward SBSP competition, only that America should get its head in this game. Because it is the policy of the United States to pursue international cooperation in space and take the lead in multilateral efforts which enhance stability and transparency in space, Airmen must consider not only the threat of losing an important technical competition but also the opportunity international cooperation could provide to advance US interests through partnerships in the domains under their stewardship. Aerospace competition is not only technical; it also has an aspirational moral dimension, as nations are measured, admired, and respected not only by their accomplishments but also by their ambitions. Former USAF strategist Col John Boyd made clear the strategic value of vision: “What is needed is a vision rooted in human nature so noble, so attractive that it not only attracts the uncommitted and magnifies the spirit and strength of its adherents, but also undermines the dedication and determination of any competitors and adversaries.” 31 SBSP opens the doors to engagement with nontraditional partners and could promote exactly the kind of international collaboration called for in our National Space Policy. At least one nontraditional partner has already opened the door. In 2007 at Boston University, then-president of India, Dr. A. P. J. Kalam, laid out a 50-year vision for space with SBSP at the core.32 Dr. Kalam has continued to articulate his vision since, even lending his name to a (so far ignored) proposal for Indo-US cooperation with the largest citizen space advocacy group, the National Space Society (NSS).33 In joint statement after joint statement, both countries reiterate their desire to cooperate in space, in clean energy, in climate change mitigation Solar Power in Space? Strategic Studies Quarterly ? Spring 2012 [ 117 ] and sustainability, in strategic and high technologies. Both sides hand wring that after the “123” civil-nuclear deal, there is no “big idea” animating the strategic partnership. SBSP seems an obvious choice that would and has been floated by several important think tanks in both India and the United States.34 The recent CFR-Aspen report, The United States and India: A Shared Strategic Future, stated, “On climate change and energy technology, the collaboration should: Conduct a joint feasibility study on a cooperative program to develop space-based solar power with a goal of fielding a commercially viable capability within two decades.”35Investment solves every deficitPeter Garretson 12, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF, an airpower strategist currently serving on the CSAF’s Strategic Studies Group (HAF/CK). His previous assignment was at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses in New Delhi as an Air Force Fellow examining Indo–US long-term space collaboration under the sponsorship of the Council on Foreign Relations. he was the chief of future science and technology exploration for the HQ USAF Directorate of Strategic Planning, Strategic Studies Quarterly, Spring 2012, Vol. 6, No. 1, “Solar Power in Space?”, pp. 97-123The problem with experts is they know, only too well, too much about what cannot be done and the difficulties involved. They misperceive as costs and liabilities what are actually investments that could pay back for generations.We as Airmen should recognize how often the vision and tools we rely upon today have been systematically opposed by technological pessimism of even our own best and brightest and consider carefully the counsel of two men of vision: Arthur C. Clark stated what he called “Clarke’s First Law: When a distinguished but elderly scientist states that something is possible, he is almost certainly right. But when he states that something is impossible, he is very probably wrong.” Gen Bernard Schriever observed, “The world has an ample supply of people who can always come up with a dozen good reasons why a new idea will not work and should not be tried, but the people who produce progress are a breed apart. They have the imagination, the courage, and the persistence to find solutions.” It is difficult to say what is impossible or ridiculous or to accurately predict the time lines of technological and societal advances. The retort to the technological pessimist’s argument that “extraordinary claims require extraordinary proof” is that the extraordinary benefits deserve extraordinary diligence and effort. Nearly every assessment has concluded SBSP is technically achievable.14 Few argue that SBSP is technically impossible, only that it is economically difficult. But a system, which could actually scale to solve serious problems on the global agenda—sustainable development, climate change, energy security—and simultaneously advance mankind’s ability to access and make use of the resources of space deserves serious consideration.Indeed, one of SBSP’s current detractors, Brig Gen Simon P. Worden, articulated the extraordinary benefit as the key to space development: “Power beaming technology is slowly maturing and appears today to involve coherent microwaves or lasers as the mechanisms for carrying the energy. When this technology matures, it should open an era in which the global power grid resides in space and can receive its energy inputs from space-based sources such as large solar-power satellites. Thus, the development of a global energy utility, probably decades into the future, is the key to space development.”15But a due-diligence effort would require resources, and Airmen are right to ask whether beyond the abstract argument against “impossible” there is reason to anticipate possible success. What do technological optimists see that makes them evaluate things differently than technological pessimists? First, SBSP advocates see a system that can deliver constant power at predictable levels as fundamentally different than terrestrial solar power. They believe a first-generation system need not compete directly against coal or nuclear power in price but could service niche markets. Niche markets do exist, including DoD forward locations paying exorbitant prices for electricity, up to tens of dollars per kilowatt-hour (kWh). As early as 2008, the Greater Houston Partnership, an NGO which represents the international oil companies, approached the DoD executive agent for space with a formal letter requesting cooperation in examining the use of SBSP to power remote locations to extract shale gas or even manufacture liquid natural gas (LNG) directly. Proof of the concept in niche markets establishes the public viability and acceptability of the concept, increasing private capital available for financing at a greater scale and catalyzing development of further intellectual capital to lower costs. Even then, an SBSP system need not be as cheap as nuclear or coal. There are numerous markets around the world that pay nearly an order of magnitude more for power than the lowest US utility rates. Power is also bought at premium prices at peak loads when individual generators must be brought online to cope with additional demand. Because of its unique ability to reach multiple distant markets, a single SPS could sell peak power to multiple urban centers at different times of the day. The IAA Report evaluates a range of potential systems concepts and their inherent technological risks, asserting that new concepts in satellite design involving highly modular systems appear to be the lowest risk. The story of their economic viability as told by the IAA study involves an argument of scale, favoring massively modular systems and reusable launch systems that leverage known industrial learning curves. Unlike other forms of power generation, SBSP requires no fuel to produce power and comparatively little fuel to maintain its station in GEO. While it would suffer degradation and damage due to particle radiation and micrometeoroid impacts—as would any satellite—it is a massively redundant system of mostly solid-state devices with few moving parts operating in the relatively pristine environment of space. As such it is not expected to require the sort of maintenance a ground-based power plant (subject to weather damage) would require. A nation with the capability to launch 500 times to construct an SPS certainly would have the access and capability to service it. Therefore, the life cycle cost of a solar-power satellite is dominated by the capital cost of acquisition, measured in dollars per installed watt. This cost is principally driven by two factors: cost of the space hardware (measured in dollars per installed watt) and cost of installation, which is a product of the launched satellite mass (kilograms per watt) and cost of launch (measured in dollars per kilogram). Space hardware for an SPS is no more complex than consumer electronics. It is expensive today because of extremely low-volume production and high overhead costs. Once a market is established, there is every reason to believe that standard industrial learning curves will apply, as suggested by figure 2. Say YesITER proves China’s willingness to cooperateAnna Bitong 6/27/16---Los Angeles-based journalist, “The Next Space Race: Farming Solar Power in the Cosmos,” Take Part, Race?U.S. scientists are not alone in their quest to develop and deploy solar power satellites. Among the countries investigating them are China, which has heavily researched the concept, and Japan. Jaffe called them “the world leaders right now, with sophisticated long-range wireless power transmission” that will enable the satellites to send energy from space to Earth.Could the nations work together?Such an alliance has precedence, Jaffe said, citing the International Space Station and the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor, an energy project in France that seeks to build an experimental nuclear fusion reactor to produce carbon-free energy. It involves the U.S., the European Union, Russia, China, India, South Korea, and Japan—“countries that don’t typically cooperate on anything,” he said.“One of the reasons that ITER enjoys this broad international collaboration is there’s a recognition that if that technology comes to fruition, it has literally revolutionary effects for human civilization,” said Jaffe, whose own team includes Mankins and members of NASA and the Department of Defense. “Space solar is similar, although it has the added benefit of global distribution.”China asked “all space-faring nations” to collaborate on SSP---proves their willingness to cooperate Palash Ghosh 12---Reporter for IBT, “China Proposes Space Solar Power Collaboration With India,” International Business Times, 11/2/12, has proposed that it enter into joint agreements with India to collaborate on space solar power projects.During a trip to Beijing, India's former President APJ Abdul Kalam was submitted with the idea by senior Chinese officials – he was also offered the chance to teach at Beijing University.The Times of India reported that the China Academy of Space Technology (CAST), the government agency which oversees China's space missions and satellite launches, gave the 82-year-old Kalam a "great reception" at its headquarters."Wu Yansheng, president of CAST has said his organization is very much interested [in collaborating] with India and [the Indian Space Research Organisation] ISRO on the space mission and would like to establish a formal initiative from both the nations," V. Ponraj, a scientist who is a member of Kalam's delegation, said in a statement."Kalam assured, certainly he will take up this interest to the Government of India and ISRO, so that a hard cooperation and collaboration between ISRO, [Defence Research and Development Organisation] DRDO and CAST is realized... [It] may be space-based Solar Power initiative so that both India and China can work for long-term association with proper funding along with other willing space-faring nations to bring space solar power to earth.”Ponraj added: "Such a mission will be a great example for the entire world and will bring peace and prosperity to the both the nations as well as to the world.”Chinese officials want to collaborate Lu Hongyan 12/24/18---"Launching ceremony of "Space Solar Power Station System Project" held in Xi’an,” China Daily, Zongkai, president of Xidian University, said at the ceremony and forum that as a national strategic infrastructure, a space solar power station is a super project urgently needed by space technology to serve national economy and national security. It is a profound energy revolution focusing on national energy strategy and people’s well-being.In 2013, DuanBaoyan and Yang Shizhong, academician of the Chinese Academy of Engineering, sent a joint letter to Xi Jinping, general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, proposing strengthening the key technologies of space solar power plants in China, which the general secretary approved.Over the past five years, academician Duan Baoyan led his team in systematic research work and put forward an innovative and leading design scheme of "OMEGA". The world's first full-system and full-link ground verification center for solar power plants will be located in Xi'an.[quote] “I hope that through this platform, we can further strengthen and deepen in-depth cooperation and exchanges with all leaders and experts, work together to create a better future for mankind to climb the peak and continue to move forward!” the president P leadership craves international recognition of China’s great power status in space as a means to legitimize its ruleLincoln Hines 3/29/19---PhD candidate in the Government Department at Cornell University, “US-China Engagement in Space,” Secure World Foundation, panel @ Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, transcript: [03:42] China now has the second-largest space program in the planet. China has achieved several milestones in space program, placing a human in outer space in 2003, most recently landing the Chang'e-4 on the dark side of the moon. China moreover has unveiled the core module of its plan to place this planned space station, with plans to launch in 2022. [04:09] From the outside, China has changed space policies, sometimes viewed as part of a large grand strategic plan. It's important to recognize the role of domestic politics in nationalism in China. While lamenting our own domestic politics, we often have the tendency to view other states as unitary, intentional, and strategic. [04:30] Like all countries, Chinese domestic politics are complicated. While it's often easy to dismiss the importance of public opinion in closed states, the Chinese Communist Party cares deeply about maintaining its hold on power. It maintains extensive apparatus for collecting and censoring public opinion. 3 29 March 2019 | US-China Engagement in Space [04:48] Chinese new social credit system and even the innovation of an app for users to study Xi Jinping's thought are just a few examples illustrating CCP's concerns over legitimacy. Chinese Communist Party, in part, legitimizes its rule by claiming to regain respect for China, lost in what nationalist narratives describes China's century of humiliation. [05:09] This is what Xi Jinping refers to when discussing the so-called Great National Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation. China advertises extensively to domestic audiences that it has the dressings of a great power. China has hosted the Olympic Games, built its own infrastructure bank, launched the One Belt One Road initiative, and now has an aircraft carrier, despite the limited strategic rationale of possessing one. [05:35] Likewise, in space, China's most expensive projects are designed to attain the dressings of a great power. Placing humans in space, building its own space station, and landing on the moon. Chinese leaders, like in other states, recognize the political utility of outer space for promoting national indemnity. [05:52] As such, Chinese leaders have a keen interest in attaining recognition from the international community that China is an equal and a space power. These facts are important to keep in mind when attempting to comprehend Chinese policy making, and in understanding potential opportunities for cooperative engagement in space. [06:06] Chinese interest in attaining recognition of its status as a great power, providing a means by which the United States can engage China and shape its behavior. To Chinese leaders, the attainment of status of prestige is invaluable political resource. Recognition of China's status as an equal in world politics is an important priority for Chinese foreign policy. [06:26] We can see this rhetorically with Chinese efforts to get the United States on board with its framework of the so-called new model of major country relations, or to adopt the language of "win-win" cooperation. One avenue by which to attain Chinese support for US priorities in outer space is to entice it with the political carrot of recognition. [06:46] Engaging China bilaterally or multilaterally as an equal member of the international community, similar to the responsible stakeholder framework, provides an important source of external and informal recognition of Chinese status ambitions. [06:59] Political engagement through the United Nations or bilaterally through cooperation with NASA provides an informal means of recognizing Chinese status aspirations as a space power. Bilateral cooperation, moreover, serves as an important confidence building measure for reducing misperceptions between the United States and China. AT: RevisionismChinese capabilities don’t prove revisionism---they’re reactive to historical trendsJoseph W. Prueher et al 16, former career U.S. Naval officer, having served as Commander of the Pacific Command, along with J. Stapleton Roy who is a former senior career U.S. diplomat specializing in Asian affairs, Paul Heer who is a former career U.S. intelligence official who served as National Intelligence Officer for East Asia, David M. Lampton who is Professor and Director of China Studies at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, Michael D. Swaine who is a career policy analyst specializing in Asian security issues, especially those involving the U.S.-China relationship, and Ezra Vogel who is Henry Ford II Professor of the Social Sciences Emeritus at Harvard University, “How America Can Lead in Asia,” National Interest, 12/12/16, the security realm, for the first time in modern history, China is developing military capabilities that significantly improve its ability to defend its interests within at least the “first island chain” that extends from Japan through Taiwan and the Philippines to continental Southeast Asia. This represents a challenge to traditional U.S. air and sea superiority in the western Pacific, a status that the United States has enjoyed since the end of World War II. In particular, China’s growing military capabilities directly impact U.S. defense alliances with Japan, the Republic of Korea and the Philippines, and U.S. security commitments with respect to Taiwan.While China’s growing military capabilities and ambitions certainly create challenges for the United States, they do not necessarily reflect aggressive or expansionist intentions and instead derive largely from Beijing’s difficult security environment and historical experience. China has land borders with fourteen countries, some small and inconsequential but others, like Russia and India, wielding significant power and resources. Four of these neighbors have nuclear weapons, and the United States has a nuclear umbrella over Japan and South Korea. China's “near abroad” also includes major countries such as Indonesia and Iran.While China can develop formidable naval capabilities along its coastal areas, it lacks unfettered access to the open seas, whether the Pacific, Indian, or Arctic Oceans. It does not control the island chains on its eastern flanks, and narrow straits restrict its naval access to the Indian Ocean. In this sense, anti-access and area denial, a concept often applied to China’s military strategy along its maritime periphery, can also work against it.Modern history has not been kind to China. It lost vast swathes of its territory because of its earlier weakness, and it lagged behind Japan in modernization. In the 19th and 20th centuries, multiple wars were fought inside China or on its borders. In addition, vast sweeps of China's western regions are occupied by ethnic minorities, such as the Tibetans and the Uighurs in Xinjiang, living in their historic homelands. These regions are vulnerable to separatist sentiments, which reinforces the importance China attaches to preserving national unity and territorial integrity.Understandably, the Chinese believe that over the last two hundred years they have been bullied and victimized by stronger powers. They are determined not to let this happen again, and genuinely believe their own rhetoric that their goal is not to dominate but to avoid being dominated. Their neighbors, not surprisingly, are skeptical of this claim. Moreover, the Chinese may be poor judges of their own future behavior since their military modernization gives them growing capabilities to bully weaker countries around their periphery.China is defensive realist – only a policy of accommodation can reduce the risk of conflictGhazala Jalil 19---Research Fellow at the Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad, Institute of Strategic Studies, Volume 39, Issue 1, Spring 2019, , since the 1970s China’s policies have shown less revisionist tendencies. The country has increasingly become a state that is embracing defensive realism. One thread of this evidence is that China has toned-down its revolutionary rhetoric. It is also not supporting insurgencies in other countries. The second thread of evidence is that since the late 1970s China has increasingly pursued a cooperative security approach in its relations with regional neighbours and in the international arena. By and large, China has tried to forge friendly relations with its neighbours. It includes ameliorating relations with states like India which is traditionally a rival. Their relations did become strained in 2017 when there was a standoff between the Indian and the Chinese forces on the Doklam plateau. Dhoklam is a territory claimed both by Bhutan (aligned with India) and China. However, Indo-China relations improved as the two countries held an informal summit in China in April 2018.30 The two countries even held a joint military exercise in December 2018, called Hand-in-Hand.31 Over the years, China has also managed to resolve border issues with so many neighbouring states. It has settled border disputes with countries like Myanmar, Nepal and Pakistan initially and recently with Russia, bordering the Central Asian States and Vietnam.32 Moreover, China has territorial disputes with India and Japan but it has never made these disputes a hurdle in forging friendly ties with these two countries. Avery Goldstein dubs it a neo-Bismarckian grand strategy of China whereby it is pursuing its interests by reassuring those who may feel threatened and may form anti-China alliances.33 This, in his opinion, has resulted in a security environment that is conducive for China as well as for the region as a whole. Another indication that China does not show aggressive behaviour in its policies is that China has increasingly engaged and integrated with the international community. Over the past 30 years, China has amply demonstrated this by its increasing membership of international organisations and institutions as well as membership of treaties since the 1980s. China has increasingly participated in the regional multilateral institutions over the years. In the last few decades, East Asia has seen a number of regional institutions being formed. Foremost among those are the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC); the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF); ASEAN plus 3 and the East Asia Summit. China is part of most of these multilateral institutions as well as an active member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). China was also a key player in the sixparty-talks in getting North Korea to halt and roll back its nuclear and missile programmes. On the global front, China sought participation in global institutions like the World Trade Organisation (WTO). China is also playing a very active role in the UN. According to one figure, China’s membership of international governmental organisations doubled (from 21 to 52) during the years 1977-1997. In the same time period, its membership of International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs) increased from mere 71 to an impressive 1,163.34 Similarly, according to another account, China signed less than 30 per cent of the arms control accords it was eligible to join in the 1970s compared to 80 per cent by mid-1990s. 35 China has actively taken part in the treaties of the nuclear non-proliferation regime as well as those of aimed at non-proliferation of biological and chemical weapons. It has also become a part of the voluntary non-proliferation groups like the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in 2004 and exercises strict export control policies. Since 2004, China has also shown interest in joining the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). This is an indicator of China’s willingness to participate in international institutes and regimes, increasing comfort towards norms of interdependent behaviour among states. It has also exhibited the desire to somewhat shape the rules of the game for regional cooperation. This is definitely an indication of its tendency towards the status quo. It also advances China’s national interests and helps dispel concerns about its increasing economic and military power.36 This is also an indicator that China is willing to work in the existing Western-dominated systems of international institution and regimes rather than challenge the system or seek to break it up. Moreover, China consciously pursued a good neighbour policy. The pursuit of good relations with its neighbour is the foundation of its strategy for economic development. It has the dual benefit of attracting foreign trade and investment while, at the same time, it reassures its neighbours that it does not present a threat for them. Deng Xiaoping laid two paths for China’s foreign policy in 1990 ─ anti-hegemonism and establishment of a new multi-polar international order of politics and economics. This meant that China adopted a policy of active defence of China’s interest ─ of minding its own business and be neither a leader nor a challenger but a participant or co-builder of the westerns international order.37 This remains the foundation of China’s foreign policy today. Many analysts, however, argue that participation in the international institutions is not an adequate indicator but compliance with the norms, rules and goals of these institutions is a better indicator of whether a country is a status quo state or not. Along these lines, Alastair Johnston considers China’s compliance with five global normative regimes: these include sovereignty, free trade, non-proliferation and arms control, national self determination and human rights.38 As far as sovereignty is concerned he writes: “Today China is one of the strongest defenders of a more traditional absolutist concept (of sovereignty).”39 Similarly, free trade is another international norm that is seen as an indicator of status quo behaviour. China has moved to support the norms of global free trade. China’s membership of WTO in 2001 is a testament to its support for free trade. China’s tariff rates have declined from over 40 per cent in 1992 to less than 20 per cent in 1997.40 In 2015, the tariff rate was 3.4 per cent.41 China has gradually embraced global capitalist institutions and system. In the Belt and Road Forum that China held in May 2017, hosting 30 world leaders, it released a communiqué, which was signed by all 30 world leaders present on the occasion that emphasised the need to “build an open economy, ensure free and inclusive trade (and) oppose all forms of protectionism.”42 However, the ongoing trade war with the US has forced China to increase its tariffs. Since 2017, the US had imposed three rounds of tariff on the Chinese products worth US$250 billion. China has retaliated by imposing US$110 billion on the US goods. Beijing has accused the US of starting the “largest trade war in economic history.” 43 This damages the global free trade regime. China has gone even a step further and initiated projects like the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which is envisaged as a journey towards economic regionalisation. The CPEC is a framework of regional connectivity which is expected to be beneficial for China and Pakistan as well as the regional states like India, Iran, Afghanistan and Central Asia. Its primary aim is to promote geographical linkages and improve infrastructure connectivity. It would also result in a higher flow of trade and businesses in the region.44 Its ultimate aim is to have a well-connected region, promote harmony and accelerate economic development. This is also a clear indication that China is focused on economic development and regionalisation instead of displaying aggressive hegemonic behaviour. As far as China’s non-proliferation record is concerned, it has a fair record, with no blatant violations of international nuclear non-proliferation norms. The prevailing concerns mostly centred on the transfer of missile technology and components to Pakistan in the 1980s and early 1990s. However, China has not signed the 1987 MTCR, so it does not amount to any violations of China’s treaty obligations. On the positive side, in 1996, China signed the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which a major nuclear non-proliferation proponent like the US has not done till date.45 It has been cooperating with the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO) and has installed four new International Monitoring System (IMS) stations, bringing the total number of certified stations in China, to five. Furthermore, it is also a part of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) since the time that it was signed. Moreover, along with Russia, China has long been trying to get a treaty negotiated to ban the stationing of offensive weapons in outer-space. For nearly two decades, now there have been the Chinese and Russian efforts to negotiate a treaty for Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS). Many proposals have been put forward including the two Chinese working papers and a joint China-Russia working paper in the Conference on Disarmament (CD). However, PAROS remains blocked due to the US refusal to negotiate any such treaty because it goes against its missile defence and space plans.46 China has also played a stabilising role in the North Korean nuclear issue. It acted as a lynchpin in hosting and conducting the six-party talks, which were meant to solve the North Korean nuclear issue. Even after the breakdown of the six-party talks in 2009 and the recent high tensions on the Korean Peninsula in 2017 with the US, China played the role of a stabiliser, urging both sides to show restraint and emphasising that war was not an option for any country. China has, thus, helped strengthen the international nuclear non-proliferation norms. Also, China’s growing soft power47 or its “charm offensive” in Southeast Asia and elsewhere is another indicator that it is not an aggressive, power maximising state. Its economic progress has been accompanied by its increasing cultural and diplomatic influence around the globe. Its growing soft power is not only evident in Southeast Asia but also in Beijing’s economic partnerships in Latin America and Africa.48 The fact that China is able to attract and appeal the states in the region through its soft power is an indicator that its neighbours are increasingly viewing China as less of a threat. However, this has stirred the concerns of waning the US influence in the region. In many parts of Asia, Africa and the Latin America, the “Beijing Consensus” which advocates a mix of authoritarian government and market economy, is overtaking the “Washington Consensus” of market economics and democratic government which was popular in the past.49 With signs that the US is placing emphasis on hard power under President Donald Trump, China seems to be positioning itself as a champion of globalisation and economic integration. It seems to be placing an emphasis on soft power. Taiwan issue is one instance where China’s policies are viewed by the West as a non-status quo. However, the issue can be seen in terms of a security dilemma between the US and China. In the last few decades, America continued selling advanced weapons to Taiwan, mainland China considers these developments to encourage Taiwan’s independence and a threat to its interests. According to Yiwei Wang, “on the Taiwan issue, America’s logic is that peace comes from “balance of power.” China has time and again protested the matter of arms sales to Taiwan with the US but to no avail. China sees these moves as an effort to change the distribution of power in the region. In turn, China has threatened Taiwan against moves for independence and deployed missiles on the mainland as well. Consequently, this makes the US suspicious of China’s revisionist intentions towards Taiwan – locking the two powers in a security dilemma. Another area where China has been accused of displaying revisionist tendencies is in the South China Sea. The dispute centres on territorial claims over two island chains the Paracels and the Spratlys and surrounding oceans. The area provides valuable trade passage and fishing ground, as well as holds hydrocarbon resources ranging from 25,000 Mboe to 260,000 Mboe.51 China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan, Malaysia and Brunei all have competing claims. The dispute has existed for centuries but things got tense in the last few years. China has been island-building since 2014 and has also increased naval patrols. It can be argued that China’s actions are defensive in nature. The US has had increased interference in the area. Under the garb of “freedom of navigation” operations, the US sent planes and ships in the disputed area to keep access to key shipping and air routes.52 In February 2017, the US deployed the aircraft carrier, Carl Vinson, strike force to the South China Sea under the garb of “freedom of navigation.”53 Another week-long US and British Naval exercise took place in January 2019.54 These are meant to send a signal to China to rescind claims over the disputed area. These exercises have angered China. China does not have expansionist or hegemonic designs in the South China Sea. It claims over the two island chains are not something new. Beijing has adjusted its strategy to safeguard its interests, as it becomes increasingly powerful. However, a military conflict over the dispute is not an option. Moreover, the US influence over other claimants of the territory complicates matters for China. This has resulted in China acting more assertively in the South China Sea in order to defend its interests. In fact, the US would act more aggressively if any country was to interfere in matters close to its borders. Overall, from the above analysis, it can be summarised that China has so far behaved more as a status quo power rather than as an aggressive revisionist power. This is apparent in China’s engagement with its neighbours, its participation in the regional and international institutions, it is in compliance with most of the international norms as well as its emphasis on projecting its soft power. The claims of Mearsheimer’s offensive realism are in contrast with Waltz’s defensive realism on several points. While Mearsheimer claims that great powers act aggressively and aim to gain so much power that they are the ultimate hegemons in the system, Waltz’s defensive realism sees the states as acting defensively to maintain rather than upset the balance of power. For Waltz, the states are primarily concerned with maintaining “their position in the system.”55 Defensive realists argue that offence-defence balance favours the defence. 56 Therefore, a robust defence and careful balancing should deter any aggressive impulses from great powers. Defensive realism argues that great powers are concerned with maintaining the status quo rather than maximising their power because often the cost of expansion outweighs the benefits. Defensive realism sees security dilemmas as a problem where an increase in the power of one state increases the insecurity of the other causing the latter to increase its power. Under the conditions of defensive realism, great powers would try to alleviate any security dilemmas rather than exacerbate it. China’s current policy seems to be firmly rooted in defensive realism. Its policy seems to be aimed at maintaining the balance of power rather than upsetting it. As the earlier section has argued, China is not a revisionist power but a status quo one. The analysts like Shiping Tang are convinced that China’s security strategy flows out of its realisation of the security dilemma whereby the Chinese leaders have understood that an aggressive expansionist strategy would just lead to counterbalancing alliances. “This recognition has led China to adopt a defensive realism-rooted security strategy emphasising moderation, self-restraint and security cooperation.”57 Moreover, China’s military modernisation, its Taiwan policy and its increased policies in the South China Sea also make more sense if seen through the lens of defensive realism. China’s Taiwan policy may be more geared towards preventing redistribution of power in the region. Since the US is providing arms assistance to Taiwan, China may be averse to the US aiding Taiwan’s independence ─ the latter issue is one where China has made clear that independence is not acceptable to China. Similarly, there is good evidence that China’s military modernisation programmes and training exercises since the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1996 are aimed partially at dealing with the issue of the Taiwanese separation.58 On the question of whether China is balancing against the US, Johnston says, “There seems to be little doubt that China’s military modernisation programme since the mid-1990s has been aimed in large measure at developing capabilities to deter or slow the application of the US military power in the region.”59 It would then seem that China is not concerned with gaining power or projecting its powers but with balancing against a predominance of the US power in the region. China has not shown any signs of hegemonic behaviour as a lot of Western analysts feared. Instead of guided by offensive realism, China’s policies seem to be guided by defensive realism where it is concerned with survival and with maintaining its position in the system. Just as the US fears China’s hegemonic rise, China also fears the increase of the US influence in the region and its talk of containing China. China’s policy may change in the future to display hegemonic tendencies. However, at present, there is not much evidence to support the theory of offensive realism.AT: DebrisBUT ONLY cooperative approaches can solve debris concernsRam S. Jakhu and Diane Howard 10, Jakhu: Associate Professor, Institute of Air and Space Law, McGill University, Howard: Arsenault Doctoral Fellow in Space Governance, Institute of Air and Space Law, McGill University, May 2010, “SAFETY AND LIABILITY ASPECTS OF SOLAR POWER SATELLITES”, IV: RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONSIn summation, the success of SSP will depend heavily upon safe design and operation of the SPS, which in turn require identification of safety standards prior to design and construction. To be effective, those standards must be uniform and implemented within the existing international and national regulatory regimes. In this way, a larger number of countries could be attracted to, and served by, the project creating a larger market and a chance at eventual return on investment. More significantly, though, these standards would decrease the risks inherent to SSP creating less chance of liability and, again, bringing economic viability into possibility.Environmental standards are needed in addition to safety standards. URSI must play a role in monitoring the risks present at or near ground stations, or anywhere that biota are exposed to the WPT.The most effective vehicle to make SSP a reality would be a PPP consortium, comprised of participants from government, industry, and academia. This model could distribute cost across users, allocate risks, and foster international cooperation. In addition, the involvement of numerous countries could facilitate harmonization of safety and environmental standards, at least among the participants.The time to address these issues is now. The ultimate pay off will be felt by generations to come. We can make it a positive legacy.SBSP can be built to actively remove debris AND R&D solves concernsJohn Mankins 14, a former NASA physicist known for his work on space-based solar power, 2014, “The Case for Space Solar Power,”The principal location in which orbital debris is found is low Earth orbit (LEO) — due largely to Earth-to-orbit (ETO) transportation-derived fragments and occasional high velocity collisions between spacecraft or smaller objects. There are three aspects to this issue of importance for SPS. First, there is the potential impact of LEO debris on dedicated SPS infrastructure in low Earth orbit: impacts from debris could significantly damage SPS related systems. Another issue is the potential for contributions to the debris in low Earth orbit as a result of the operation of SPS Earth-to-orbit and in- space transportation. Finally, there is the potential for geostationary Earth orbit (GEO) based SPS to contribute to the creation of significant amounts of debris in GEO. In September 2012, two experts on this subject — Darren McKnight and Donald Kessler — argued that the space-faring nations have already passed a critical "tipping point" with regard to orbital debris in LEO and that without active steps to mitigate the existing debris population future collisions will generate more and more debris. If this argument proves to be correct, the result will be a self-perpetuating cycle in which the amount of debris population grows uncontrollably. The existing debris in low Earth orbit — not to mention the projected future dramatic increases in debris — places real constraints on any concept of operations for (CONOPS) for future SPS infrastructures. It is evident that the piece-parts of future SPS cannot spend more than a limited period of time in LEO before being transported to higher, safer orbits. Moreover, while SPS in LEO will be at some risk due to space debris, it is also critical that the R&D to develop SPS systems concepts (as well as supporting ETO and in-space transportation) avoid solutions that would exacerbate the production of additional debris in LEO. A proactive step that should be considered is designing SPS ETO and in-space systems so that they not only avoid creating debris but may even actively remove debris. Mission risk due to orbital debris is significantly less in GEO than it is in LEO. However, given the immense scale of possible SPS operations in or near GEO, it is evident that SPS platforms and infrastructures must be designed and developed to minimize the production of space debris under all but the most extraordinary circumstances. They must operate as a "fail-safe" vis-?-vis space debris in the event of a mishap. In this light, the standard practice of removing a failed GEO satellite by simply boosting it slightly outside of that orbit is clearly unacceptable. SPS in GEO must be developed to incorporate proactive containment and permanent disposition of any failed system elements. The idea that we touched upon in the last Chapter — that of "recycling" failed SPS piece parts — may be an essential strategy in dealing proactively with this issue. The impact of space debris-related policy and related international agreements on SPS concept options should be manageable if it addressed early and continuously. The greater the degree of modularity in an SPS architecture, the less vulnerable the overall SPS platform will be to an ill-timed space debris impact; conversely, the greater the degree to which the SPS platform is monolithic and its elements unique, the greater the degree of vulnerability of the platform concept to space debris. Although they are non-binding, the International Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines completed by the UN Inter- Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee in 2007 provided generally recognized rules for current and future space operations. SPS efforts will need to take into account the space debris guidelines, including considerations of debris mitigation and the expected debris environment within which an SPS would operate. Future SPS R&D must explicitly incorporate the challenges of orbital debris, including that related to LEO, GEO and SPS-supporting in-space transportation and infrastructures. The objectives of these studies should include: (a) minimizing SPS systems' vulnerability during ETO, LEO transit, and in-space transportation and operations; (b) ensuring fail-safe operations vis-?-vis the risk of space debris production; and (c) seeking design solutions for SPS supporting infrastructures that could actively mitigate the debris threat. These efforts will need to examine various scenarios, including worst-case scenarios with regard to space debris and Space Solar Power. OFF CaseUnilatUnilat FailsUnilat SBSP would require large scale financingR. Bryan Erb 96, Canadian Space Station Program1996, “International cooperation for the acquisition of space-based energy”, Solar Energy, Vol. 56, Iss. 1, pg. 79-852.3 The scale requires international financingThe energy market is vast and dwarfs almost all other areas of economic activity. The worldwide market for electricity alone is approaching one trillion $U.S. Expanding the energy infrastructure to provide the additional energy needed will require a major capital investment. Varying assessments of the extent of the problem have been put forward. Goldemberg (1987)indicates that the Developing Countries alone would require some 100 billion $U.S. for the decade of the 1990s. Indications from the World Bank (Churchill) are that it could allocate perhaps 15% of the needed amount. Clearly, funding to expand the global energy infrastructure will pose a major challenge, even to international agencies and consortia.If space-based energy is to be a part of the mix of future energy sources, it too will require substantial capital. While it is not reasonable to expect much precision in current estimates, there have been thoughtful studies (Leonard, 1992) which indicate that an investment on the order of 20 billion $U.S. could emplace much of the infrastructure needed to develop space solar power for Earth including installation of the first satellite with a capability to deliver approximately one gigawatt.It is also reasonable to consider intermediate applications which might be profitable and both build confidence and contribute to the eventual large scale implementation of power satellites. Such applications include:? microwave-powered aircraft or aerostats for economical communications, resource monitoring and other surveillance;? terrestrial energy distribution by wireless transmission locally across difficult terrain;? terrestrial energy distribution over intercontinental distances via power relay satellites;? efficient powering of constellations of satellites including orbital transfer vehicles by power-serving satellites.Investments in renewable energy sources, including space-based energy, needs to be weighed against the costs of not promoting these options. While such costs are extremely difficult to assess, attempts have been made. For the U.S. economy only, the cost argument can be made as follows:? If global warming follows the path predicted by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the global average temperature will likely increase about 2.5°C by 2030-2050 (World Meteorological Organization, 1991).? The economic impact to the U.S.A. of such a change is projected by Cline (1992) to be $60B + per year.? If preventive measures were taken to limit CO2 release, major costs would also be incurred. One suggested approach is to sequester CO2 in carbonate or some other disposable form. Such an approach is estimated to increase the cost of electricity by 30-100% (Holdren, 1990). Assessing U.S. electric costs of $170 billion SU.S. per year and taking a 50% increase for illustrative purposes, this measure could add $85 billion $U.S. per year to energy costs. Thus the costs of continuing our present energy practices are enormous and an investment in renewable/space-based energy would seem to be a prudent course of action.Perm CPPerm do the counterplan---it aligns our policy with China’s---that’s tacit cooperation Helen Milner 92, B.C. Forbes Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, April 1992, “Review Article INTERNATIONAL THEORIES OF COOPERATION AMONG NATIONS Strengths and Weaknesses,” World Politics, Vol. 44, No. 2, notable feature of the recent literature on international cooperation is the acceptance of a common definition of the phenomenon.2 Following Robert Keohane, a number of scholars have defined cooperation as occurring "when actors adjust their behavior to the actual or anticipated preferences of others, through a process of policy coordination."3 Policy coordination, in turn, implies that the policies of each state have been adjusted to reduce their negative consequences for the other states. This conception of cooperation consists of two important elements.4First, it assumes that each actor's behavior is directed toward some goal(s). It need not be the same goal for all the actors involved, but it does assume rational behavior on their part. Second, the definition im- plies that cooperation provides the actors with gains or rewards. The gains need not be the same in magnitude or kind for each state, but they are mutual. Each actor helps the others to realize their goals by adjusting its policies in the anticipation of its own reward. Each actor is not nec- essarily out to help the other, though; it is the anticipation of bettering one's own situation that leads to the adjustment in one's policies.Defining what is not cooperation is also important. Cooperation is usually opposed to competition or conflict, which implies goal-seeking behavior that strives to reduce the gains available to others or to impede their want-satisfaction. But there are other alternatives to cooperation as well. Unilateral behavior, in which actors do not take account of the effects of their actions on others, and also inactivity are alternatives to cooperation. Although such behaviors may not attempt to lower the gains of others, they can be considered uncooperative if they do not re-duce the negative consequences for others of each party's policies. What counts as cooperation thus depends on the two elements mentioned above: goal-directed behavior that entails mutual policy adjustments so that all sides end up better off than they would otherwise be.One function of a definition is to enable us to classify different acts as being an instance of the concept at hand. Having a widely accepted def- inition of international cooperation should make it easier to agree on which acts count as cooperation and which do not. Keohane, Kenneth Oye's Cooperation under Anarchy volume, Joseph Grieco, and Peter Haas all employ the same definition. They should therefore be able to agree on what is cooperative behavior and what is not. Indeed, this seems to be the case. Their disagreements are not about what constitutes coopera- tion; they are about what causes it. This, however, may be fortuitous, since the empirical classification of events as cooperative can be very dif- ficult. Establishing the counterfactual may pose great problems: without some process of policy coordination, would the states have behaved dif- ferently? The strategic misrepresentation of preferences may add to this problem. Determining the beginning and end of an attempt at coopera- tion can also be problematic. Finally, it may not be easy to demonstrate that each side adjusted its policies in the expectation of gains. Arriving at a common definition of cooperation is an important first step, then, but it does not alleviate the empirical difficulties in using the concept.Cooperation can be achieved in a number of ways.5 It can be tacit and occur without communication or explicit agreement. The metaphor of iterated prisoners' dilemma captures this type of situation, as Axelrod shows in The Evolution of Cooperation. Explicit agreement is not neces- sary; rather, cooperative behavior emerges as the expectations of the actors converge.6Their interp is conceptually useless and outdated, and other unilat counterplans still competeNancy Ghallagher 14, Associate Director for Research at the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM) and a Senior Research Scholar at the University of Maryland’s School of Public Policy, August 2014, “Rethinking U.S.-China Security Cooperation,” ideas obstruct arms control and nonproliferationThere are numerous reasons why progress on arms control and nonproliferation has been more difficult than expected in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, including geopolitical shifts, changes in weapons technology, and greater activism by anti-arms control domestic political actors than pro-arms control groups. But there are also less obvious conceptual reasons why those of us who research, teach, and advise policy makers about international security may be inadvertently compounding the difficulties by continuing to think about arms control in ways that do not fit well with the current circumstances of global security.When American or Chinese experts argue for or against the utility of “traditional” arms control, they typically have a narrow, time-bound conception of what arms control is, how it operates, and what its objectives are. Usually, it’s some version of the bilateral agreements negotiated during the Cold War by two roughly equal superpowers to enhance deterrence stability by limiting or prohibiting specific types of nuclear capabilities.I define arms control more broadly, to include any cooperative constraints on security-related capabilities or behavior among states with a mix of common and competing interests, ideologies, and values.2 {BEGIN FOOTNOTE 2} Unilateral actions can be cooperative even when they are not designed to elicit reciprocal actions if the objective is to reassurance other states regarding real or perceived threats to other states. Unilateral arms control initiatives can also be adversarial, if they are intended to make other states appear to be dangerous because they do not want to reciprocate by taking steps that would advantage the country proposing reciprocal unilateral initiatives. Or, they may be undertaken for purely internal reasons, without regard to what other countries might do in response. {END FOOTNOTE 2} Many successful arms control and nonproliferation agreements have involved two or more states with very different military capabilities and security needs, including the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and the 1992 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).Cooperation can be tacitPhramaha Chakbodin 12, PhD Pune University; with Thanyarat Kanewan; 2012 (most recent citation), “Theravada Buddhism in Thailand and Sustainable Development: Challenges and Opportunities for International Cooperation,” Cooperation definedIn this study, cooperation is looked at for international relations. Cooperation may occur as a result of adjustment in behavior by actors in response, or in anticipation of the actions of other. Cooperation can be negotiated in the bargaining process that is explicit or tacit. Cooperation may be the result of relationship between a stronger actor and a weaker party11. Hegemonic powers may provide stability that enhances the security and economic well-being of lesser states. The hegemonic power provides a basis for mutual gains in the form of expanding markets or military protection12.Energy RaceCounterplan ensures an SSP raceMalcolm Davis 19---a senior analyst at ASPI, Real Clear Defense, "Space-Based Solar Power and 21st-Century Geopolitical Competition", 4/2/19, technology is a highly diversified private-sector market. It’s not so easy for one state to dominate it. By contrast, SSPS would be a centrally controlled, state-based ‘big science’ endeavour that can be more easily exploited for geopolitical and astropolitical purposes. Renewable energy technology may offer part of the solution, but it doesn’t necessarily cancel out China’s potential to use SSPS for hegemonic influence.What emerges is the possibility of strategic jostling between competing approaches for ensuring 21st-century energy security and economic prosperity.Certainly, the U.S. and others can rise to the challenge. NASA has plans for a return to the lunar surface by 2024, and commercial space companies such as SpaceX and Blue Origin emphasise a permanent lunar presence. That ‘moon first’ approach opens up the possibility of an SSPS race centred on ensuring access to the lunar ‘high ground’ to get the vital resources required for building large structures like satellites.Even if we make absolute gains, they still outcompete us absent cooperation Kevin Pollpeter 15---research scientist in the CNA China Studies Division. He is an internationally recognized expert on China's space program and is widely published on Chinese national security issues, focusing on Chinese military modernization, China's defense industry, and Chinese views on information warfare, “China Dream, Space Dream China’s Progress in Space Technologies and Implications for the United States,” Report prepared for the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 3/1/15, Even if U.S. space power continues to improve in absolute terms, China’s rapid advance in space technologies will result in relative gains that challenge the U.S. position in space. The real question concerning U.S. competiveness may not be whether Chinese satellites and launchers are the equal of their U.S. competitors, but whether their products provide sufficient value. A Chinese industry that can offer moderately priced but sufficiently capable products may be able to compete effectively in the market. Similarly, a Chinese space program that can provide a good enough solution to deter or raise the costs of military intervention for an adversary may be all that is necessary. If the current trajectory of China’s space program continues, by 2030 the China will have a new line of advanced launch vehicles, a robust, space-based C4ISR network made up of imagery satellites with resolutions well below one meter, and more capable electronic intelligence communication satellites linked together by data-relay satellites, in addition to a global satellite-navigation system that may gradually approach current GPS standards. At this point, China could also likely have made operational a number of advanced counterspace capabilities, including kinetic-kill, directed-energy, and co-orbital ASAT capabilities as well as some form of missile defense system. In addition, China’s more capable satellites and launch vehicles could not only compete with U.S., European, and Russian industry but also provide new avenues for cooperation. This could be especially true if China were to conduct manned lunar missions. Although China is probably truthful when it says that it is not in a space race, such statements mask the true intent of its space program: to become militarily, diplomatically, commercially, and economically as competitive as the United States is in space. Despite Chinese statements that it is not in a space race, China’s space program has generated concern both in the United States and in Asia. As Clay Moltz of the Naval Postgraduate School writes, “There is a space race going on in Asia, but its outcome―peaceful competition or military confrontation―is still uncertain.” He concludes that although “there are still reasonable prospects for avoiding negative outcomes in space…Asia is at risk of moving backward, motivated by historical mistrust and animosities and hindered by poor communications on security matters.” 633 As a result, China’s progress in space technologies, whether in relative or absolute terms, has implications for the United States and its neighbors. As China’s space program increases in capability, it can be expected to wield this power in ways that, according to Bonnie Glaser, not only “persuade its neighbors that there is more to gain from accommodating Chinese interests” but also “deter countries from pursuing policies that inflict damage on Chinese interests.” 634 Nevertheless, although China’s space program may pose challenges for the United States and its space power neighbors, it may also present opportunities for scientific collaboration on the Earth’s environment and outer space. In addition, it may make human spaceflight safer by providing additional capabilities to rescue stranded or imperiled astronauts through the use of common docking apparatus.China WinsChina ahead on SBSP Namrata Goswami, 2019. Dr. Namrata Goswami is a 2016–17 Minerva grantee and independent senior analyst with Wikistrat. She was a Jennings Randolph senior fellow at the US Institute of Peace, Washington, DC, and research fellow with the Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. 1/10/19, “The new space race pits the U.S. against China. The U.S. is losing badly.” Accessed 9/9/19 China aims to be the leading space power by 2045, and the country’s vision significantly differs from the imperatives that drove the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. What mattered then was planting a flag and then moving on to some other show-off stunt.By contrast, China is focused on establishing a permanent presence in space. China views space, especially the area of space including Earth’s moon, as directly connected to the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. Last week, China established an important foothold toward resource exploitation by landing on the far side; the United States needs two to three years before its first robotic missions touch down on the moon. The relative lead on space resources could determine who is the dominant power in the years to come.The stakes are high: Who will be able to obtain the vast resources in space, for example, water/ice, iron, titanium, platinum and nickel; secure the routes of trade; and write the rules of space commerce such as trade in energy propellant and precious metals. Who will benefit from the military power that flows from that industrial might? Most people think about space exploration; what matters to the future of power is space exploitation. In the United States, the discussion on space exploitation is led by a disorganized commercial sector; within China, the discourse on space resources is led by the Communist Party of China and President Xi Jinping.China’s space strategy involves building a lunar industrial infrastructure for cost-effective access to deep space. The Chang’e 4 is the first step: demonstrating the ability to communicate, land, survey and surveil the location for a future industrial and logistical base. This mission secures China’s access to the resource rich lunar south pole and establishes first presence to exploit space resources, industrialize the moon to build a solar power satellite, and mine the moon and asteroids for their vast wealth. It is the first step toward colonizing the moon. In particular, Chinese officials see the lunar south pole as a future base, very similar to how navies viewed coaling stations in the mid-19th century.In the age of steamships, the reach of a nation’s navies and merchant ships was determined by where they could stop and refuel with coal. Nations competed to gain key coaling stations such as Hawaii. Today, nations are limited in the reach of their spacepower by the unavailability of in-orbit rocket fuel. It takes about 19 tons of propellant just to get a single ton of payload into space. That makes it very difficult to do ambitious things beyond Earth’s surface.But getting a ton of payload off the moon requires only one ton of propellant. That’s a tremendous logistical advantage. The most powerful chemical rocket fuel is made by combining hydrogen and oxygen, by separating the elements of water. It is estimated that there are hundreds of millions of tons of water at the lunar poles — enough to fuel countless missions to the farthest reaches of the solar system; to access the wealth of the asteroid belt; to extend logistics to enable massive industrialization; to develop military logistics in the space near Earth.By 2030, China aims to send robotic probes to the north and south poles of the moon. The race to watch is not China’s manned lunar landing but the race between China’s robotic prospectors and NASA’s Commercial Lunar Payload Services, as this will determine each nation’s relative advantage in accessing and exploiting lunar resources.China is best placed to win a space race, given its well-coordinated, disciplined, technocratic system, able to set and maintain long-term goals, with a vast population and talent base.The United States is disorganized regarding space and cannot offer a serious challenge to the long-term plans China is setting in this domain. Neither the American people nor the U.S. military seems to perceive the significance of what China is doing strategically in the Earth-moon space. They see it through the lens of their own Cold War experience, assuming the motivations China harbors are akin to that of the erstwhile U.S.S.R. — for global prestige and simply ticking of boxes — when they are not.America is fundamentally incapable of beating China Mike Gold 3/29/19--- Chair of the Commercial Space Transportation Advisory Committee, US-China Engagement in Space,” Secure World Foundation, panel @ Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, transcript: [24:40] We talk about China, and I think it's so different than the Soviet example. This isn't a conflict so much as it is a competition. No one was ever worried about those amazing Soviet 10 29 March 2019 | US-China Engagement in Space products driving US companies out of the market. We really need to think about this in a different, a new paradigm. [25:07] Frankly, I think it's one that the US system is fundamentally ill suited to participate in because we don't have this kind of government control and direction for the economy like China does, and frankly many other nations are developing. It is a very serious issue, which is again why I'm glad we're getting some attention here. [25:32] Going back to the COMSTAC and space transportation, we have seen China target industrial sectors, demand to dominate in those sectors and have been very successful in solar rays, etc. From my understanding space launch is next up and that China will want to reduce those expenses by five times what even Space X is offering. [25:55] That's an existential threat to a critical capability to the US that I think we need to take seriously as an industry and as a company. Meantime in the satellite world, we're already seeing the competition develop from China. Previously the Chinese would, when they were doing a treaty or an agreement internationally weave-in a satellite sale to a country like Nigeria or a developing nation. [26:22] They weren't really so much on the satellite scene in terms of big products with developed nations. Now we've seen satellite sales by China's Great Wall Corporation to TYCOM and to Indonesia, winning contracts that Europeans, Japanese, American entities otherwise could have. [26:41] They're doing so with robust and substantial government support. Subsidies, even potential free launches, again these are the concerns that America can't compete or looking at subsidized or potentially free launches of satellites. Financing that allow the companies to not even pay anything until the satellite starts generating revenue.China is terminally ahead of the US in space BUT they’re willing to cooperate---AND, Chinese unilateral lunar colonization lets them monopolize Helium-3 which is an independent internal link to energy dominance Brandon J. Weichert, 9/1/19. Brandon J. Weichert is a geopolitical analyst who runs The Weichert Report. He is also a contributing editor at American Greatness and a contributor at The American Spectator. His writings on national security have appeared in various international publications, such as Real Clear Politics, Real Clear Policy, Real Clear World, and he has been featured on the BBC and CBS News. Brandon also travels the country on behalf of the Department of Defense and various academic institutions to lecture audiences on emerging technology, Chinese foreign policy, and Eurasian affairs. 9/1/19, “China’s Space Dream is America’s Nightmare” Accessed 9/9/19 *note: no precise date is given for the article, but it is listed as from September 2019 and the earliest comment is from 9/1/19, so it must have been posted on that date If you look up at the moon tonight, understand that you are not looking at a primordial rock that has orbited above our heads, rearing its pale, pockmarked face every night, since the dawn of humanity. Instead, you are looking at a treasure trove of natural resources. As you stare up at the pale, dimpled, and ancient face of Earth’s only natural satellite, understand that there is a Chinese rover roaming the previously-unexplored dark side (the part that permanently faces away from Earth) of the lunar surface, testing the soil to determine whether or not China might be able to strip mine the moon. Should Beijing conclude that the moon is home to a bevy of abundant, untapped natural resources, then China’s space program will return to the moon, and exploit those natural resources for China’s benefit before anyone else can.In fact, as you will see throughout this piece, China’s space ambitions are expansive, compelling, and a direct (and enduring) threat to the United States. For, it is not only in the area of space mining that China envisions becoming the dominant player. China also seeks to acquire true military parity with the United States in orbit of Earth; by building the capability to damage or destroy vulnerable American satellites and by potentially placing weapon systems—disguised as civilian systems—in orbit.Understanding Space Nationalism in ChinaThe Chinese view space quite differently from their American rivals. China’s space vision is a cold, clear-eyed, nationalist mission for space exploration and, inevitably, exploitation. As I’ve written recently, the Chinese leadership cares “little for the betterment of humanity.” They do not go into space possessed of the same airy, globalist notions that so many American policymakers have been imbued with. What’s more, the Chinese have a far more realistic—even cynical—view of space than most American leaders do. Theirs is a belief that nationalism will empower China’s rise in the strategic domain of space. And, once ensconced as the dominant force in the strategic high ground of space, the Chinese will be able to have control over the other terrestrial strategic domains of space (land, sea, air, and cyberspace).The Chinese leadership fundamentally believes that space is an unpossessed resource waiting to be conquered by the nation (or group of nations) that have the gumption to take it before other states can. The cynicism of Chinese leaders when it comes to space is in their belief that China must do everything it can—including weaponizing space—to prevent China’s rivals (read, the United States) from denying space to them.Or, as Ye Peijian, the head of China’s lunar mission, said in December of last year:The universe is an ocean, the moon is the Diaoyu Islands, Mars is Huangyan Island. If we don’t go there now even though we’re capable of doing so, then we will be blamed by our descendants. If others go there, then they will take over, and you won’t be able to go even if you want to. This is reason enough [to go to the moon].The Chinese want space. Why wouldn’t they want space? Think about it: the solar system is replete with celestial bodies that, while lacking life in the way that Earth possesses, it has a treasure trove of mineable natural resources. The moon is believed to be home to vital commodities, such as magnesium, aluminum, silicon, iron, and titanium to just name a few. Further, the moon is believed to proffer new age commodities, such as Rare Earth Minerals (these are minerals that are hard to reach via mining on Earth, making them very expensive), as well as an isotope known as Helium-3 (He-3). Many scientists believe that He-3 can be used as an efficient, non-radioactive fuel source for nuclear fusion. Scientists claim that just 25 tons of refined He-3 harvested from the lunar surface could power the European Union or the United States cleanly for a year.Not only is the moon potentially the next Persian Gulf of natural resources, but the millions of asteroids that separate the inner solar system (the sun, Mercury, Venus, Earth, and Mars) from the outer solar system (Jupiter, Saturn, Uranus, Neptune, and Pluto) offer trillions of dollars- worth of opportunity for the nation-state or corporation that can claim them. There are asteroids nearby that are believed to house pure gold, for instance. There are asteroids that possess a host of other, valuable natural resources, any of which, if mined, could lead to the rise of the world’s first trillionaire. Right now, because of investments that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has made into their space program, it is China, not the United States, which would likely directly benefit from these stunning developments.China’s Space DreamIndeed, over the years, the Chinese government has identified space as a primary zone of technological and economic development, but more importantly, as an arena of strategic competition—specifically between itself and the United States. Going back to 1957, when the Soviet Union launched humanity’s first satellite, Sputnik, into orbit, Mao Zedong, the founder of the Chinese Communist Party, vowed that his nation would build satellites as well. By the 1970s, China launched their first satellite into orbit. There was a delay between that launch and when China placed their first people into orbit—that came in 2003—but since the rise of Xi Jinping to the Chinese presidency in 2012, China’s “space dream” has been put into overdrive. President Xi has claimed that his “space dream” is a cornerstone of his overall push to make China stronger (the “China Dream” program). In many ways, China has attained its greatest space achievements since Xi’s rise to power—from placing not one, but two, temporary space stations in orbit since 2011, to landing the world’s first rover on the dark side of the moon.Xi has outlined what the space dream looks like. According to Xi:Developing the space program and turning the country into a space power is the space dream that we have continuously pursued.First, on a national prestige level, the plan entails China finally catching up with the United States and the Russian Federation “after years of belatedly matching their space milestones.” As you will see, however, China’s sheer commitment and their consistent investment in their space program (as well as the technologies that undergird a national space program) imply that they will not only match American and Russian space capabilities within the next few years, but they will quickly leapfrog the Russians and Americans in space as well.Second, on the practical application side, China is keen on assembling parts of their new, modular space station—the Tianhe-1—in space within the next year. Since 2011, when the Chinese launched the Tiangong-1, their first rudimentary space station in Earth orbit, Chinese taikonauts have honed their space stations skills. After the Tiangong-1 crashed to the Earth in 2017, the Chinese already had placed their slightly more advanced, Tiangong-2 in orbit. Now that Tiangong-2’s mission is nearly complete, Beijing believes it is ready for a more permanent structure in orbit.The Tianhe-1 will be of a similar, modular design to that of the International Space Station (ISS). And, like the ISS, the Chinese are inviting other nations to partake in the program—except for the United States (this is considered payback for when the Clinton Administration refused to allow the Chinese to take part in the ISS out of understandable fears that China would engage in technology theft, if they were granted access to the advanced ISS). China hopes to have their station assembled in orbit by 2022 when the station’s first Chinese residents are expected to arrive. The irony is that the Tianhe-1 is expected to become operational at precisely the moment that the ISS reaches the end of its lifespan. In essence, then, the United States’ only permanent space station will be gone while China becomes the only nation to possess a space station in orbit—and the Americans will be explicitly barred from having access to that station to boot! This moment will be akin to the moment in 2011 when America’s space shuttle program was terminated by the Obama Administration, leaving the United States without an indigenous manned spaceflight program for the first time since the 1960s.The Chinese Academy of Space Technology has also outlined the details of how China plans to build a permanent settlement on the lunar surface. The facility will be built in the mid-2020s and will be run by artificial intelligence robots until Chinese taikonauts are sent to manage it. Presently, China’s leadership believes that their people will be living on the moon by the end of the decade.China has endured setbacks in their space program that bears noting. Namely, their entire lunar and space station program is on hold until the technical kinks of their potent Long March V rocket can be worked out. There has already been a yearlong delay after a version of the rocket crashed into the Pacific Ocean shortly after liftoff from the Wenchang Space Launch Center in Hainan Province last year due to an oxygen supply problem. This type of heavy-lift rocket, similar to the old NASA Saturn V rockets, is the only way China could get the large and heavy modules for the Tianhe-1 into Earth orbit; they are the only way that China could launch certain sensitive, heavier military satellites into high Earth orbit; these rockets are also the only way to get sample return missions to the moon, and eventually, Chinese taikonauts to the moon. The oxygen-supply problem that the previous launch of the Long March V rocket experienced occurred because of a turbofan failure in the rocket engine. The Chinese have since worked that out and are now streamlining the production of the next phase of the Long March 5. It is believed that the next test will occur before 2019 ends.This last technical hurdle will be overcome, one way or the other. China is simply committed to their cause more than we understand. This is an oddity, because the United States was trailing their Soviet rivals in the early phases of the Space Race during the Cold War. Yet, the United States refused to cede the strategic high ground of space. Instead, the Americans intensified their investment in their national space program and greatly expanded its national investment in science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM) programs that would help the nation achieve its goal of becoming a space power. Although the Americans neither placed the first satellite in orbit nor the first man in orbit, the United States did prevail in putting the first men on the moon. By the time that the Americans achieved this, the Soviets were relegated to a similar place that the Americans today are relegated: the sidelines. The Reds of yesteryear could only place satellites and cosmonauts in Earth’s orbit, leaving the far more impressive deep space exploration missions to their American rivals.Embarrassingly, it is from the sidelines today where American and Western scientists continue laughing at the Chinese, without taking note of the fact that the United States abandoned its own heavy-lift rockets—the Saturn V—in favor of the cheaper and weaker rockets needed to place the space shuttle in low-Earth orbit (LEO) more than 30 years ago. The capabilities to return to space beyond Earth’s orbit are almost gone, meaning that the U.S. will be playing catch-up to the Chinese soon. In the Second Space Race, China is playing the upstart Americans while the United States is, sadly, playing the Soviet Union.Chinese tech is decades ahead---we need it for SBSP to succeed Eric Rosenbaum and Donovan Russo, 2019. Editor, CNBC; Strategic Content intern and former Assignment Desk intern for CNBC. 3/17/19, CNBC, “China plans a solar power play in space that NASA abandoned decades ago” Accessed 9/4/19 “The dramatically stated interest on the part of the Chinese will do a lot to engender interest,” Mankins said. “Around a decade ago the Chinese started working seriously on this, and about five years ago they started coming to international meetings. Before that, they were in the dark. Now they are coming out of the shadows and talking much more openly about this.” He added, “There is absolutely progress from the Chinese at this point. This is not posturing; this is a real plan from serious organizations with revered scientists in China. They have a perfectly good technical plan, and they can do it by 2030,” Mankins said, describing a small-scale solar power project producing megawatts of electricity, but not a commercial-scale project able to produce gigawatts needed to compete with utilities.A space-based solar power station would capture the sun’s energy that never makes it to the planet and use laser beams to send the energy back to Earth to meet energy demand needs. China said in a recent announcement about the project that a big advantage of space-based solar power is its ability to offer energy supply on a constant basis and with greater intensity than terrestrial solar farms.One of the issues with renewable-energy projects like solar and wind power plants are their intermittency — that refers to the fact that the sun isn’t shining and the wind is not blowing 24-hours a day, limiting the periods of time during which these projects can be a source of power generation.A slide from a presentation Chinese scientists made in South Korea showing an early design idea for a solar power project in space that could beam energy back to the Earth.Space-based solar would not only offer a solution to intermittency, but also delivery. Today, utility power generation is regional, if not local, but electricity generated in space and near the equator could be beamed almost anywhere across the globe, except for the poles. “You could beam electricity from Canada to the Tierra del Fuego at the southern tip of South America from a satellite at equator,” Mankins said. Roughly one billion people live in the Americas.Hopkins said the current Chinese view is, “We want to be major dominant power in space solar power by 2050. This has the potential to really turn the geopolitics in our favor if we are a leader, so let’s look at it seriously.” Meanwhile, the U.S. says, “Are you kidding? Let’s worry about something else.”New life for a ‘losing proposition’The idea of collecting solar power in space was popularized by science fiction author Isaac Asimov in 1941 in a short story that envisioned space stations that could transport energy from the sun to other planets with microwave beams. In 1968, Asimov’s vision was brought closer to reality when an American aerospace engineer named Peter Glaser wrote the first formal proposal for a solar-based system in space. After experimenting in the 1970s with transporting solar power, Glaser was able to land a contract with NASA to fund research. However, the project suffered with changes in federal administrations and it was not until 1999 that NASA’s solar power exploratory research and technology program jumped back in to study the issue.In the end “NASA didn’t want to do it,” Mankins said. But a lot has changed, especially relating to the cost equation and rapid advances in technologies like robotics.A NASA spokeswoman said it is not currently studying space-based solar power for use on Earth. It is exploring several advanced power and energy technologies to enable long-duration human exploration of the Moon and Mars, such as its Kilopower project, a small, lightweight nuclear fission system that could power future outposts on the Moon to support astronauts, rovers and surface operations. Next year, this project is expected to transition from ground-based testing to an in-space demonstration mission.Historically, the cost of rocket launches and the weight that would be required for a project of this scale, made the idea of space-based solar unfeasible. There are scientists who still hold that view today. “The energy, mass and cost budgets involved show that this is a losing proposition, not just now but perhaps for centuries to come,” said Olivier L de Weck, a professor of Aeronautics, Astronautics and Engineering Systems at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. “The energy we need to put in to launch the mass required for the SBSP [spaced-based solar power] station is so enormous that we may never recoup it.”Mankins said this view is becoming quickly outdated due to a dramatic lowering of rocket launch costs through efforts funded by billionaires including Tesla founder Elon Musk’s SpaceX and Amazon founder Jeff Bezos’s Blue Origin. Meanwhile, developments in robotics and modular-manufacturing — being able to produce many small modular pieces to make a whole rather than one huge piece of equipment — could lead to cost-effective ways to construct these projects in orbit without having to build a multi-billion-dollar factory in space. He referenced a major review conducted by the federal government in 1981 that when looked at in today’s dollars would have cost up to $1 trillion to deliver the first kilowatt/hour of solar from space. “The whole program was killed in the U.S.,” he said.Now the studies conducted on feasibility are decades old and simply no longer relevant to the discussion, Mankins said. “Whenever a gray-haired senior scientist tells you something can be done, they are almost certainly right. When they tell you it can’t be done, he or she may very well be wrong,” he said, referencing an adage by science fiction author Arthur C. Clarke from his famous “three laws.”“We have had a revolution in robotics, drones and warehouse robots that didn’t exist. Previously, the whole thing had to be built as one huge system, an enormous thing like a aircraft carrier shipyard in space to fabricate one enormous object weighing 10,000 tonnes rather than 10 million small units each weighing a few pounds that can use mass production,” he said. “We no longer need a stupendously huge factory in space and hundreds of astronauts to put it together. The whole world, other than the space program, has moved forward to mass-produced modular network devices. That’s the way you would do it, and it was unthinkable 40 years ago, but suddenly it is physically, technically and economically doable.”AlliancesCompetition badCompetition in space ensures conflict---cooperating over mutual interests fosters trust and strengthens the relationship Brian Weeden and Xiao He 16---Dr. Brian Weeden is the Director of Program Planning for Secure World Foundation and has nearly two decades of professional experience in space operations and policy, Xiao He is an Assistant Research Fellow at the Institute of World Economics and Politics in the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, "USE OUTER SPACE TO STRENGTHEN U.S.-CHINA TIES,” War on the Rocks, 4/26/16, the end of the Cold War, outer space activities lost much of their urgency and hipness. But today space is back, and more important than ever. Modern militaries and the global economy are dependent on space capabilities. Private companies are daring to take on challenges that were once the domain of superpowers. And in national security circles, there is discussion of a renewed strategic competition in space that could pit the winner of the last space race, the United States, against the rising power of China. The United States and China have identified space as a strategic domain that is critical to their national interests and development. Both nations are dedicating considerable resources to developing their civil, military, and commercial space sectors. Beijing and Washington see their space accomplishments as important to boosting national pride and international prestige. Over time, what happens in space could serve as either a source of instability, or a means of strengthening the U.S.-China relationship. The United States and China have differing goals and priorities in space. The United States is focused on assuring continued access to space and sees it as a critical domain to its security and prosperity. Space-based capabilities and services provide the foundation for U.S. national security, enabling communications with U.S. strategic forces, allowing the verification and monitoring of arms control treaties, forming the cornerstone of the United States’ intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, and serving as essential enablers for the United States’ ability to defend its borders, project power to protect its allies and interests overseas, and defeat adversaries. Space capabilities are also a critical piece of the U.S. — and the global — economy. China is focused on developing its own capabilities in the space domain, and increasingly depends on space-based assets for both economic and military aims that may be partly incompatible, and even in competition, with other key players, especially the United States. China sees space as critical to defending its national security and securing its role as a rising power. From China’s perspective, the most urgent problem is that the space capability gap between the United States and China is growing. China also seeks a voice in the creation of international norms and institutions — particularly because it perceives that it must accept rules that have been decided mainly by the United States. As the two nations act on these differing priorities and goals, tensions in the space domain have had ramifications for the overall bilateral relationship. Recent testing and development of anti-satellite capabilities by China, and a doctrinal focus on “active defense” have caused the United States to openly call for a stronger focus on space protection and warfighting. From the Chinese perspective, it is necessary to develop such capabilities to support national security, close the power gap, and defend itself from American aggression., Failure to reconcile their differences in this domain could lead to a renewed arms race that could be to the detriment of both sides. Both countries have acknowledged the importance of developing a more stable, cooperative, and long-lasting bilateral relationship in space. Washington still hopes that Beijing can be a constructive partner for greater international space security. While China still chafes at the largely American constructed rules-based order, it likewise has a clear interest in using its development of space capabilities to promote bilateral cooperation and to play a role the formation of new international regimes. Both of these dynamics were evident in recent United Nations discussions on space governance, with an isolated Russia attempting to undermine international consensus on new guidelines for enhancing the long-term sustainability of space activities. Thus, the two sides have overlapping interests that present opportunities for cooperation and bilateral engagement. Accordingly, the United States and China should continue to engage in both bilateral and multilateral initiatives that enhance the long-term sustainability and security of space. Working together, and with other stakeholders, to help ensure the success of these initiatives would go a long way toward reinforcing the desire of both countries to be seen as playing leading roles in space governance and being responsible space powers. The United States and China, as well as the private sectors of the two countries, should also find a way to engage in bilateral and multilateral civil space projects, including science and human exploration, though doing so will need to overcome strong political challenges.Limited engagement over mutual interests doesn’t trade off with a broader push for US Space dominance, but does solve conflictAdam Yang 18---Adam Yang is a Major in the U.S. Marine Corp and a student at the Command and Staff College, Marine Corps University in Quantico, Virginia, “How Should the US Engage China in Space?,” 3/17/18, The Diplomat, is striving to become a space power that rivals or surpasses the United States, Russia, and Europe. In September 2006, China tested lasers against U.S. imagery satellites in a manner that could potentially blind or damage them in future conflict. For U.S. officials, this event and China’s subsequent destruction of its own weather satellite in 2007 signaled that space was a “contested domain.” Subsequently, in 2011, U.S. lawmakers passed legislation that banned cooperation between the National Aeronautical Space Administration (NASA) and the China National Space Administration – largely in response to China’s history of espionage against U.S. technical industries.The 2018 U.S. National Defense Strategy categorized China as a revisionist power, and through this lens, it seems strategically sound for the United States to shield its precious technical advantages from a potential adversary. Nevertheless, some NASA officials insist that the United States should still collaborate with China to capitalize on a revolutionary period of high technical exchange between China and other space powers. Other officials warn that if the U.S. and China do not find meaningful ways to cooperate in space, relations could devolve into greater mistrust and lead to conflict. To guide strategic thinking on U.S. space policy, this article submits that policymakers may gain strategic insights on how to address China’s growing influence in the space domain by examining its actions in the maritime domain.First, China possesses three major maritime agencies that apply force in order to protect and pursue its interests: the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), People’s Armed Police (PAP) and the Maritime Law Enforcement Forces that include the Coast Guard, and the Maritime Militia. As Andrew Erickson notes, each agency represents the largest of its kind globally. The PLAN commands over 300 ships (whereas U.S. Navy has 277 as of 2017) and its Coast Guard has over 1,200 ships.In their research on territorial disputes in the South China Sea, scholars Christopher Yung and Patrick McNulty find that China utilized its military and paramilitary forces 148 times from 1995 to 2013 – more than all other active claimants (Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and Taiwan) combined in the same period. Their research concluded that as China’s capabilities increased, Beijing was more likely to use force to advance its interests and less likely to defer to legal or multilateral solutions.From a space perspective, U.S. policymakers can surmise that if China had a comparable offensive capability in the space domain, it might also prefer utilizing force to challenge rivals over other means. Though China currently does not have an offensive space capability on par with the scale of its maritime forces, the U.S. Department of Defense 2017 Annual Report to Congress asserted that the PLA is aggressively acquiring a range of counterspace capabilities. Given the fact that there are no international limitations on developing ground-based counterspace weapons, China may pursue an equivalent path of developing a high quantity of systems to overwhelm adversaries during conflict.Second, China could reinterpret laws as a pretext to apply force. In the maritime domain, China reinterprets the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) to challenge U.S. freedom of navigation patrols through the South China Sea. China claims waters extending past 12 nautical miles and into the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), saying that foreign states must refrain from threatening the “territorial integrity or political independence” of the owning state. Concurrently, in 1992, China promulgated domestic maritime laws that extended its sovereign claims and deemed the commercial or research activities of other states illegal in contested waters. The international community at large does not recognize this reimagining of the EEZ; however, it does provide China some legal footing and domestic cover to deploy maritime forces in this region.Similarly, the Central Military Commission is exploring the legalities for the use of force in space. PLA doctrine proclaims the need to destroy, damage, or disrupt an adversary’s space capability to secure victory in the information space. Nationally, China codified its security strategy of active defense – using defensive counterattacks in order to spoil the offensive actions of an adversary – in its National Security Law of 2015. By watching the evolution of China’s space-related domestic laws or reinterpretations of international laws, U.S. policymakers may find China strategically telegraphing its intentions through legal maneuvering.Third, when China feels international laws are unfavorable, it may create an alternate framework that advances its own interests. Shortly after a tribunal at the Permanent Court of Arbitration of The Hague ruled against China’s activities in the South China Sea in 2016, China announced that it would create a “maritime judicial center” and a “maritime arbitration center” to promote its own vision for maritime law. China claimed that this endeavor would advance the nation’s role as a maritime power and support the development of its Belt Road Initiative. Skeptics assert that China initiated this endeavor to harden its claims on disputed territories and to divert cases away from UNCLOS courts. By doing so, China can create legal precedents to interpret international maritime laws and begin to undermine the international maritime system framed around UNCLOS.In the space arena, China is not anywhere close to rearranging an entire judicial system around its views; however, it actively participates in international space organizations and introduces measures that could limit the ability for the United States to project force. Through the United Nations, China and Russia have twice (2008 and 2014) proposed the legally binding Treaty of Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects (PPWT). The primary U.S. objections to the treaty were that it did not include verification mechanisms, only applied to space-based weapons, and did not include ground based ASAT weapons – a primary counterspace capability China is advancing.Fourth, policymakers could also examine China’s maritime cooperation initiatives to envision potential space cooperation. China’s counterpiracy operation in the Gulf of Aden has slowly emerged as a valuable mechanism to improve U.S.-China cooperation as seen through the counterpiracy exercises of December 2014. On a grander scale in June 2017, China laid out an ambitious vision for cooperation in relation to the “Maritime Silk Road” as part of its larger Belt and Road Initiative. This plan envisions the establishment of cooperative principles, environmental norms, maritime security, and “collaborative governance” to achieve mutual prosperity. If one believes in China’s sincerity, working cooperatively across these lines could greatly reduce security tensions and set conditions for long-term mutual gain.Subsequently, China is pursuing international cooperation in space – not only for security and economic reasons, but also to bolster the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party to domestic and international audiences. The European Space Administration (ESA) has already expressed desires to cooperate with China on human space flight and the use of its future space station. China especially values its relationship with ESA due to the opportunities to trade and transfer technologies denied by the United States. China and Russia have also agreed to cooperate on human space flight and deep space exploration. Though these initiatives are not on the scale of a Maritime Silk Road, they do offer U.S. policymakers opportunities to work with a rising space power for positive ends.Finally, the United States should pay attention to China’s diplomatic and engagement efforts with other nations. Contrary to the cooperative tenets for a Maritime Silk Road, in 2016, China convinced Cambodia to block an Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) joint statement that recognized The Hague’s arbitration ruling on the South China Sea dispute in favor of the Philippines. In June 2017, Vietnam resisted China’s demands to vacate an oil venture within its EEZ, but eventually capitulated when China threatened to use force. The most concerning aspect for Vietnam was an atypical silence from its neighbors – particularly from the Philippines, Indonesia, and Singapore. Apparently, China’s political and economic leverage over these nations prevented them from publicly sympathizing with Vietnam or rebuking China’s actions.Seemingly, when pressed, China uses soft and hard power tactics bilaterally to dislodge multilateral initiatives that counter it interests. Could China disrupt the U.S.-European alliance as it did with ASEAN unity? At this stage, Chinese-European cooperation in space seems well intentioned. Nevertheless, U.S. policymakers should consider whether China’s growing space relations with Europe, Russia, or any other space power could complicate U.S. interests in other areas. As China strengthens its partnerships, its ability to shape laws, institutions and the strategic preferences of others increase as well.ConclusionThe United States sits at an important period to develop a comprehensive space strategy that addresses China’s growing influence. U.S. cooperation with the Soviets in space during the Cold War was not due to a desire for true cooperation, but a means to manage a potential crisis related to the management of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons. The United States could develop a similar mechanism for limited engagement with China to send positive signals and reduce misperceptions.China’s activities in space have already intersected with U.S. interests and will only increase in frequency and intensity over time. In the end, for the United States to compete and lead in the space domain, it must engage new players and shape the contours of the game. If Washington is worried about how China will play the game, it can always look in the maritime arena for strategic clues.Cooperation GoodJapan favors space cooperation among US and China---fears a space raceNUPUR SHAW 1/8/19---Nikkei staff writer Yuji Kuronuma in New Delhi and Nikkei Asian Review assistant politics & economy news editor Yujin Yanaseko in Tokyo contributed to this report, “India and Japan awaken to risks of superpower space race,” Asian Review, DELHI -- India, Japan and other space-faring countries are waking up to a harsh reality: Earth's orbit is becoming a more dangerous place as the U.S., China and Russia compete for control of the final frontier.Growing fears that satellites could be threatened by newfangled space weapons or sophisticated hacking are forcing governments to think of their space programs not just as scientific endeavors but as pressing national security concerns.China has a "sophisticated military space program in place," said Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, head of the Nuclear and Space Policy Initiative at the Observer Research Foundation, an independent think tank in India. So countries like India and Japan, which have promoted space development from a "civilian and peaceful perspective," are "increasingly driven to develop certain military characteristics."This explains India and Japan's recent decision to launch a Space Dialogue this March. The countries intend to cooperate not only on lunar exploration but also security, including surveillance sharing.New Delhi is nervous because China has made no secret of its desire for influence in the Indian Ocean. China set up a naval base in Djibouti, a gateway to the ocean at the Horn of Africa. It secured a 99-year lease to the port of Hambantota in Sri Lanka. It is deeply involved in development projects in Maldives.Beijing is "setting up capacities that can be used in the future," Rajagopalan said. India, she said, "has been forced to join" the space defense race because, if it does not enhance its capabilities, it "will face certain disadvantages when it comes to conflicts."India has established itself as a player in the budget satellite business. It even put a probe into orbit around Mars in 2014, in a U.S.-assisted project that cost just $76 million. But it is scurrying to enhance its ability to monitor China's activities, and the partnership with Japan is part of this.Another sign that space is becoming a defense focus for India came on Dec. 19, when the country launched its third military communications satellite, the GSAT-7A. The satellite will connect with ground-based radar, bases and military aircraft, along with drone control networks.This rocket, launched on Dec. 19, carried an Indian military communications satellite into orbit. ? Courtesy of Indian Space Research OrganisationJapan, for its part, had space in mind when it published new national defense guidelines in December. Defense Minister Takeshi Iwaya told reporters at the time that space, cyber and electromagnetic pulse, or EMP, attacks were major concerns in a security environment that is evolving with "extraordinary speed."All of this comes amid an intensifying technological race between the U.S. and China.China's success in landing a craft on the far side of the moon on Jan. 3 came as a fresh reminder of its growing prowess. In late December, China also achieved global coverage with its BeiDou Navigation Satellite System. Only the U.S., Russia and the European Union had that capability.China aims to launch a Mars explorer in 2020 and complete its own Earth-orbiting space station around 2022.These are ostensibly peaceful endeavors, and Beijing makes a point of promoting international cooperation. It announced last May that its space station would be open to all United Nations members."The China Space Station belongs not only to China but also to the world," Shi Zhongjun, the Chinese ambassador to the U.N., was quoted as saying by the state-run Xinhua News Agency.But China's progress has clear geopolitical and military implications, experts say.China's lunar rover, the Jade Rabbit 2, makes humanity's first mark on the far side of the moon in this handout image from Jan. 3. ? Imaginechina/APDean Cheng, a senior research fellow at the Heritage Foundation in the U.S., called the moon mission "an enormous scientific achievement." Still, he cautioned, "The Chinese have always viewed their space program as a political message," Cheng said."Developing an advanced space capability," he said, "will be exploited for political as well as military purposes."In the back of Indian and Japanese officials' minds is likely a stunning test China conducted in 2007. Beijing successfully destroyed one of its own weather satellites with a weapon, becoming only the third nation to pull off such a feat, after the Soviet Union and the U.S."Russian and Chinese destructive ASAT (anti-satellite) weapons probably will reach initial operational capability in the next few years," the 2018 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community predicted.The U.S., meanwhile, is becoming more vocal about space as a new battleground and is changing its military structure accordingly. In December, President Donald Trump ordered the Department of Defense to create a Space Command, widely seen as a precursor to a full-fledged Space Force.Vice President Mike Pence, while laying out a vision for a Space Force at the Pentagon in August, said, "As their actions make clear, our adversaries have transformed space into a war-fighting domain already, and the United States will not shrink from this challenge."Figuring out how to defend satellites and other space assets may be the biggest challenge of all. Yasuhito Fukushima, a research fellow at the National Institute for Defense Studies of Japan, said, "What makes it difficult is that in space, offense is overwhelmingly dominant over defense."There were 1,957 active satellites orbiting Earth as of Nov. 30, according to the Union of Concerned Scientists, a nonprofit U.S. advocacy group. America had the most by far, with 849, or 43% of the total. China was No. 2, with 284, followed by Russia with 152.Japan and India had a combined 132 -- 75 for the former and 57 for the latter.What can be done to protect the satellites?Japan, India and other countries increasingly emphasize a concept known as space situational awareness, or SSA. The term refers to systems that keep tabs on conditions and threats in space -- from orbiting junk to satellite killers -- using radar and sensors on the ground.India has plans to set up five large ground stations and more than 500 small installations in five countries -- Bhutan, Nepal, Maldives, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka -- the Times of India reported on Jan. 3.There are also broader diplomatic efforts afoot, as world powers look to establish laws or a nonbinding code of conduct for space. Yet they do not see eye to eye.The European Union tried to push a "soft law" on international space activity, winning support from the U.S., Japan, Australia and others. China and Russia refused to play along, and India initially opposed it as well, perceiving the attempt as Europe foisting rules on developing countries."China and Russia have consistently tabled self-serving proposals that would not limit their own anti-satellite weapons development"Dean Cheng, senior research fellow at the Heritage FoundationChina and Russia have their own proposal for banning space weapons with a treaty under the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. The U.S. opposes this, arguing the proposal fails to address ground-launched weapons and would make defending space assets impossible."China and Russia have consistently tabled self-serving proposals that would not limit their own anti-satellite weapons development," Cheng said.Rajagopalan said India did not support China and Russia's draft treaty either, partly due to "so many ambiguities." But she would like to see India play an active role. "Unless India sits in the room and becomes an active participant, [it] will not have the upper hand."Either way, getting the superpowers to agree is always going to be difficult. That leaves Japan and India to find their own strategies and solutions.Asked about the India-Japan dialogue, Cheng said the two countries are both "clearly uncomfortable with Chinese strategic expansion.""This cooperation, and the broader defense and foreign policy cooperation that we already see, will be a major part of the Asian security context in the coming decade."Coop key to assuranceMichael D. Swaine 13, senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, prominent American analyst in Chinese security studies, with; Mike Mochizuki, Michael L. Brown, Paul S. Giarra, Douglas H. Paal, Rachel Esplin Odell, Raymond Lu, Oliver Palmer, and Xu Ren; 2013, “CHINA’S MILITARY & THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE IN 2030 a strategic net assessment,” such an outcome is not impossible, it is also far from inevitable, even under conditions of a relative decline in certain U.S. and Japanese military capabilities. As indicated in chapter 2, Beijing’s long-term security strategy in Asia is at present to a great extent undetermined and focused more on short- and medium-term efforts to deter threats to Chinese territory or sovereignty claims than on establishing hegemonic control decades in the future. Therefore, the primary threat posed to Japan and the alliance during the time frame covered in this study involves increasing levels of uncertainty about the future security environment in the Western Pacific, with a possibly growing likelihood of confrontations or even limited conflicts as both sides respond to shifting relative military capabilities and changing political, social, and economic pressures.Such dynamic factors could increase Beijing’s willingness to utilize military means to signal resolve, exert intimidating pressure, or “punish” alleged Japanese (or even U.S.) wrongdoing within a limited time horizon, thereby increasing the likelihood of crises or incidents. As a result, even limited Chinese gains in several military domains could alter the threshold at which Beijing might contemplate more aggressive military efforts to push back against what it perceives as threatening levels of U.S. surveillance along its periphery, to assert its claim to disputed territories or maritime areas, or to signal resolve in an unanticipated crisis, such as the September 2010 trawler collision between Beijing and Tokyo or the more recent face-off precipitated by Japan’s purchase of several of the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Moreover, such possibilities would arguably become more likely if the United States and Japan were unable to reach a more stable modus vivendi with Beijing regarding such issues over the time frame of this study, and if political leaders in Tokyo or Washington were to adopt a more confrontational stance toward a more capable and apparently more assertive Beijing.----markOn a broader level, even under conditions in which the alliance retains overall military superiority, such military shifts, if improperly handled by all sides, could produce an environment of growing uncertainty regarding the durability of the existing preference of all parties for dialogue and restraint vis-à-vis many regional security issues, such as military activities in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), the security of sea lines of communication, the disposition of the Taiwan issue, and various maritime territorial disputes in the East China and South China seas. At worst, improper handling of the shifting regional environment could greatly reduce the perceived credibility of U.S. security assurances to Japan and other allies and friends in the Asia-Pacific region.Such a perceptual shift could make regional powers less willing to resist possible Chinese pressures and eventually compel them to accommodate China in ways that might be seen to jeopardize U.S. interests and reduce U.S. influence, however defined. In particular, such a shift in power could result in a significant transition by local powers—including Japan— toward Chinese-supported policies that in some cases might directly or indirectly challenge existing United States–supported norms, institutions, and policies relevant to the overall U.S. security posture in the Western Pacific. These might include forward basing or access arrangements, interpretations of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea with regard to territorial disputes and foreign military activities in EEZs, the purpose and membership of multilateral regional security-related organizations and forums, and so on. Conversely, such a shift could also provoke Japan, and other allies and friends, to engage in a far more destabilizing arms race with China than any yet seen, possibly including efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction.In this context, the proper question to ask is not how to prevent China from ejecting the United States from Asia, but rather what set of long-term military and nonmilitary policies Tokyo and Washington should adopt to reduce overall uncertainty, sustain key U.S. and Japanese norms and interests, decrease the probability of severe crises and confrontations, and increase strategic trust among all parties in the region. For Japan and the United States, this requires politically and economically viable and credible policies that combine elements of both deterrence and reassurance toward China—deterrence to maintain a high threshold for coercive or aggressive actions that threaten allied interests; and reassurance to reduce fears in Beijing that Japan or Washington will use its deterrent capabilities to threaten or deny China’s core interests, including both the security of its territory and the survival of the Chinese Communist Party regime. China Rise Link TurnEven launching a successful prototype gives China enormous political leverage they will use to overturn the US-led orderPeter Garretson 7/1/19---Lieutenant Colonel, USAF, an airpower strategist currently serving on the CSAF’s Strategic Studies Group (HAF/CK). His previous assignment was at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses in New Delhi as an Air Force Fellow examining Indo–US long-term space collaboration under the sponsorship of the Council on Foreign Relations. he was the chief of future science and technology exploration for the HQ USAF Directorate of Strategic Planning, “Why the next Space Policy Directive needs to be to the Secretary of Energy,” The Space Review, energy dominance with space solar power and space power beamingCentral to the PRC’s plans is to develop the technology to build extremely large on-orbit power stations capable of capturing gigawatts of power and beaming it to Earth and anywhere in the Earth-Moon system. Even at the megawatt class planned for their 2030 prototype, this is a game-changing dual-use technology. The United States at present has, at most, 100 kilowatts of power on the International Space Station.The DOE program should seek, via public-private partnerships, to retire the technical risk toward commercially viable utility-scale space solar power.The tactical threat, though, pales in significance to the strategic threat. The PRC’s strategic plan to usurp US hegemonic power is to create—through sustained national effort—the technology to build solar power satellites, and then to use the material from the Moon to build them cheaply to become the major supplier of Earth-based energy. Power that is city-baseload appropriate, that can scale to the entirety of global demand, that can be sent anywhere on Earth as needed, and that is 100 percent green and non-carbon producing will be attractive to most nations. Today the Persian Gulf and the few chokepoints for oil are the strategic center, with the key energy producers—the US, Russia, OPEC—having substantial coercive power. If the PRC succeeds in its plans, it will be the major energy supplier to planet Earth, and with that, enormous economic power to force others to submit to their geopolitical designs.Chinese SBSP monopoly will allow them easy world domination Tom Fish 3/26/19---science reporter at Express, citing Dr Mark Hopkins, Chair of the Executive Committee Emeritus, National Space Society and is on the National Space Society Board of Directors, “China SPACE RACE: Chinese solar panels plan will ‘lead to world DOMINATION’,” Express, is building the world’s first space solar panel array - and according to one leading space exert, the aim to monopolise the world's energy market is an attempt at global military domination. Limiting the global temperature rise to below 2 Celsius this century is the defining challenge of our area. Renewable energy, such as harnessing solar energy, is a cornerstone in our world’s survival energy. But rather than trying to save the planet, China’s audacious attempt to blast solar panels into space is a soft power grab intent on “world domination” by the Communist state, a leading observer has warned. The sun pumps out 10 trillion times the energy currently used by the human race. A solar panel orbiting Earth at an altitude of 22,500 miles (36,000 km) could harness these solar rays without disruption from atmospheric conditions or loss of sunlight at night, according to Dr Mark Hopkins of the National Space Society. Dr Hopkins told Express.co.uk: “The Chinese plan to place a satellite in geo-synchronous orbit, meaning the satellite is always over one spot on the ground. “One of the big advantages is the beam is on constantly, therefore you do not have to worry about storing energy, as it is on during the night. “The satellite collects energy from the Sun, using solar cells and converts that energy into a laser beam.” “And the beam is not affected by the day-night cycle or the weather.” The Chinese claim to be already testing the technology and intend to build the solar panel array by 2050. And although the Communist state is lacking the technology the US possesses, they are rapidly advancing in space, and catching up with their rivals, believes Dr Hopkins He said: “The Chinese are spending between $5-10million a year on space solar power, which is between $15-30million a year because Chinese labour costs so little.” The cutting-edge technology has both strategic and military implications, according to the scientist, who has 45 years experience in the space sector. He said: “We have seen what happens when countries such as Saudi Arabia, which are unstable, have a big effect on energy. “Or like the case in Europe, you have Russia exporting gas, who use this for geopolitical gain, as they can cut off the gas. “Imagine a situation where one country, such as China, is producing a large proportion of the electricity being consumed by the world. “And if they don’t like you, China could just throw a switch and all of a sudden you have no electricity. “So it is a much bigger geopolitical club than gas from Russia. “You do not want China to have a monopoly on it: a successful space solar power program could lead to world domination.”AT: Spillover No link---cooperation over space doesn’t impact other areas of the relationship---doesn’t prevent the US from signaling resolve in the SCS or areas their impacts are aboutLi Zheng 19---Assistant Research Fellow, China Institutes of Contemporary, Space: A New Frontier for Sino-American Cooperation, China US Focus, 1/29/19, 3 January, Chinese Chang’e-4 lunar probe successfully landed on the far side of the moon, the first such mission in human history. China plans to launch a more advanced Chang’e-5 later this year. That probe is expected to collect samples on the moon and return to Earth.The success of Chang’e-4 was an important milestone in the Chinese Lunar Exploration Program (CLEP). China is gradually approaching its objective of a crewed lunar landing. Nearly fifty years ago, American Apollo 11 landed the first humans on the moon, marking a critical step in human civilization. But men have not landed there since 1972. Project Apollo served only US-Soviet contest for hegemony in pace. When the Americans were sure that they had won the race, the ambition to explore space was put aside.The Apollo missions did not lead other countries to space exploration because no country other than the US and USSR was able to afford the huge cost. It was extremely difficult to sustain the project even for the US. The cost of one launch of the Saturn V rocket, the carrier of Apollo 11 in 1969, was nearly $400 million, roughly the size of the total budget for the US National Science Foundation that year.Fifty years later, the situation is fundamentally different. Space exploration is no longer the prerogative of superpowers. Besides the US, Russia, and China, India has also made an ambitious plan to put astronauts in space by 2022. With constantly improving manufacturing and new material technologies, the cost of space launches has decreased remarkably. Space X has conducted many successful launches of recoverable rockets and its launch cost per kilo payload has been reduced to below $2000, one tenth that of the space shuttle launch. The costs of launches in India and China are also below $5000 per kilo.Another major change affecting space exploration is the gradual advancement of 3D printing technology with extensive potential uses. Astronauts will be able to produce parts and components in space stations, thus reducing the number of supply launches. In the future, 3D printing will play an enormous role in the construction of a permanent space station on the moon with inexhaustible moon soil as the raw material.These technological advancements have driven a new wave of space fever across the world. President Trump has reactivated the plan to send astronauts to the moon and the target now is to land humans on Mars by 2033. Private space companies, such as Space X and Blue Origin, have thrived. There are also similar competitors in China. The construction of a permanent space station and a rocket launch platform on the moon will be critical to human exploration of wider space. And we are gradually approaching that objective.Most American media have made positive comments on the success of Chang’e-4. NASA Administrator Jim Bridenstine expressed his congratulations on Twitter and described the mission as ‘a first for humanity and an impressive accomplishment’. The Chinese side revealed that scientists of the two countries had conducted close communications in the process. The American side told China about its satellites in orbit around the moon while China shared with the US the longitude, latitude and timing of Chang’e-4’s landing and expressed the hope that American satellites would observe the process. The interaction was in sharp contrast to the tense relationship in other areas of science and technology. The contrast implies opportunities for China-US cooperation in the area of space exploration.Although both countries have made great progress in space technologies, they are also both at a rather primitive stage in terms of developing and using space. Neither country is fully capable of building permanent space stations in the space, let alone doing so on the moon or making use of planetary resources. Collaboration will reduce the cost of space development for both countries and enable them to aim at more ambitious targets.China-US space cooperation will also steer more countries to join the effort to develop space instead of choosing a side between the two countries. After the end of the Cold War, international space cooperation has increased. The International Space Station launched in 1998 has been operated through cooperation between the US, Japan, Europe, Russia, Canada, and Brazil. The four major satellite positioning systems in the world, GPS (US), Beidou (China), GLONASS (Russia) and Galileo (Europe), may also complement each other to provide the most accurate positioning services. Once China and the US engage in a major space project, other countries will also take an active part, thus jointly taking human exploration of space to a new stage.AT: ResolveIncoherent space strategy nowNamrata Goswami 9/23, senior space analyst and author, “America’s incoherent Moon strategy is weakening its space leadership,” 9/23/19, December 11, 2017, the Trump Administration issued Space Policy Directive 1, where NASA was directed to go back to the Moon. Since then, the US is no better off than it was on December 10, 2017 with regard to the Moon. Vice President Mike Pence stated as much when he lamented in his March 26, 2019, speech at the fifth meeting of the National Space Council in Huntsville, Alabama:In Space Policy Directive-1, the President directed NASA to create a lunar exploration plan. But as of today, more than 15 months later, we still don’t have a plan in place. But Administrator Bridenstine told me, five minutes ago [emphasis added], we now have a plan to return to the moon…The truth is, despite the dedication of the men and women who are designing and building and testing the SLS [Space Launch System], you all know the program has been plagued by bureaucratic inertia, by what some call the “paralysis of analysis.”In contrast, China’s Lunar Exploration Program (CLEP) has impressed the world with a “humanity first” lunar far side landing on January 3, 2019. What is even more interesting, and not much discussed, is that Chang’e-4 accomplished another first for humanity: demonstrating a cotton seed spouting 384,400 kilometers from Earth, as part of a larger Chinese program of human settlement on the lunar surface. While many Western analysts dismissed these accomplishments as of little value (see “Red Moon revisited”, The Space Review, March 11, 2019), or that the Moon has dubious or no strategic value, major spacefaring countries in the Asia-Pacific clearly think otherwise. Chang’e-4 has a radar that is penetrating the lunar surface, as we speak, searching for resources.At the same time, India’s Chandrayaan 2 lunar mission has arrived at the moon, and while its lander appears to have failed (see “Schr?dinger’s lander”, The Space Review, September 9, 2019), the orbiter is operating well. According to the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO), Chandrayaan 2 will map the lunar surface and prospect for resources. Critically, another Asian space faringnation, Japan, signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with India on space cooperation. As part of that cooperation, Japan will partner in India’s Chandrayaan 3 lunar mission for purposes of resource prospecting and lunar sample return. China, in the meantime, announced several follow-on lunar missions, to include sample return and lunar settlement. So proud is China of its lunar success that Ye Peijan, the “father of China’s Lunar Probes” at the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS)—the same person who asserted that “The universe is an ocean, the moon is the Diaoyu Islands, Mars is Huangyan Island. If we don't go there now even though we’re capable of doing so, then we will be blamed by our descendants”—is being awarded China’s highest state honor.China’s space growth was recognized by Pence in his National Space Council speech in March:Now, make no mistake about it: We’re in a space race today, just as we were in the 1960s, and the stakes are even higher. Last December, China became the first nation to land on the far side of the Moon and revealed their ambition to seize the lunar strategic high ground and become the world’s preeminent spacefaring nation.In that same speech, Pence asserted that, “And as President Trump has said, in his words, “It is America’s destiny to be…the leader amongst nations on our [own] adventure into the great unknown.” However, despite all such assertions, the Trump Administration has failed to offer a coherent space strategy for the Moon that sticks, notwithstanding claims to the contrary. NASA’s Artemis Moon project, planned to land American astronauts on the lunar South Pole by 2024 faces domestic opposition over which state (Texas or Alabama) should get the billion-dollar project to build the lander that takes those astronauts to the Moon. Meanwhile, still others like Newt Gingrich believe that building that lander should be contracted over, not to NASA, but to the wining private space company based on a $2 billion space contest. SpaceX’s Elon Musk has welcomed that proposal. In the meantime, Jeff Bezos asserted in a public speech this May that his company, Blue Origin, has been building a lander, Blue Moon, that should be ready by 2023, in time to meet that 2024 deadline set by the Trump Administration, for sending a man and a woman to the Moon.Trump’s commitment to that lunar landing has wavered and gone off-center since then. On June 7, 2019, Trump undermined his own 2017 Space Policy Directive 1 to NASA to go back to the Moon, when he tweeted that the Moon should not be the focus of U.S. space strategy, creating policy confusion. Instead, Trump urged NASA to focus on what they have already been doing, before his own space policy directive 1: focus on getting to Mars. On June 10, 2019, NASA administrator, Jim Bridenstine hosted a town hall to explain NASA’s “Moon to Mars program,” in essence a defense of Trump’s tweet. On July 19, during the 50th anniversary celebrations of the Apollo 11 historic landing at the White House, Trump asked Bridenstine “To get to Mars, you have to land on the Moon, they say…Any way of going directly without landing on the Moon? Is that a possibility?” This statement contradicted Trump’s earlier 2017 directive:It marks a first step in returning American astronauts to the Moon for the first time since 1972, for long-term exploration and use. [emphasis added] This time, we will not only plant our flag and leave our footprints — we will establish a foundation for an eventual mission to Mars, and perhaps someday, to many worlds beyond.Neither has Trump offered a compelling vision speech on US space power (the likes of John F. Kennedy’s 1962 Moon speech) that is powerful and inspiring. This inability to steer space leadership has resulted in loss of American prestige and influence, and countries are looking elsewhere for leadership.China has not only expressed far-reaching space ambitions to mine the Moon and asteroids propelled by a coherent space strategy, but has also demonstrated capability to sustain presence on the Moon. To augment those lunar ambitions, China is proposing far-reaching technologies like Space Based Solar Power (SBSP) that would sustain a planned Moon base. In support of those space resource ambitions, Xi established the People’s Liberation Army Strategic Support Force (PLASSF) in 2015, tasked with developing doctrines and warfighting capacities for space power projection. The PLASSF is equal in grade to the PLA Army, PLA Navy, PLA Air Force, and PLA Rocket Force, and directed by Xi’s space dream. One of most innovative leaders is PLASSF Deputy Commander, Lieutenant General Shang Hong, known for futuristic thinking on what space means for power projection capabilities.In contrast, the Trump Administration has undermined its own policy directive by issuing contradictory statements and subsequent contradictory presidential interventions. As a result, US power and leadership to influence the shape of the future space order has been weakened. Already, this lack of American strategic coherence has resulted in the loss of American power in the Asia-Pacific region, with China fast catching up, as per the Asia Power Index 2019 released by the Lowy Institute, Australia. However, this course can be reversed, with some deft strategic interventions. The time is now.AT: JapanChinese hegemony wrecks assurance Robert E. Kelly 14---associate professor of international relations in the Department of Political Science and Diplomacy at Pusan National University, “What Would Chinese Hegemony Look Like?,” 2/10/14, Asia is becoming, in the language of international relations theory, “bipolar.” That metaphor, from magnetism, suggests two large states with overlapping spheres of influence competing for regional leadership. The Cold War was a famous global example of bipolarity. Most states in the world tilted toward the United States or the Soviet Union in a worldwide, zero-sum competition. Although analysts have hesitated for many years in applying such strong language to East Asia, this is now increasingly accepted. A lengthy twilight struggle between China and Japan, with U.S. backing, seems in the offing.Until recently, Asia was arguably “multipolar”—there was no one state large enough to dominate and many roughly equal states competed for influence. China’s dramatic rise has unbalanced that rough equity. China is now the world’s second largest GDP. Although its growth is slowing, it is still expanding at triple the rate of the U.S. economy and six times the rate of Japan’s. By 2020 China is predicted to be the world’s largest economy. Its population, 1.35 billion, is enormous. One in seven persons on the planet is Chinese. Were China’s GDP per capita to ever reach Japanese or American levels, its total GDP would match that of entire planet today. These heady numbers almost certainly inspire images of national glory or a return to the “middle kingdom,” in Beijing. They help account for China’s increasingly tough claims in the East and South China Seas.Until recently, China pursued a “peaceful rise” strategy, one of accommodation and mutual adjustment. This approach sought to forestall an anti-Chinese encircling coalition. China’s rapid growth unnerves many states on its perimeter, from India, east to Vietnam, Indonesia and Australia, north to Taiwan, Japan, and Russia. Were these states to align, they might contain China in the same way the Japan, China, and NATO all worked to contain the U.S.SR. The peaceful rise seemed to work, especially in southeast Asia, where Chinese generosity has successfully blocked a united ASEAN position on South China Sea issues.Since 2009 however, China has increasingly resorted to bullying and threats. The 2008 Olympics appears to have been read in Beijing as a sign of China’s newfound might and sway. In the South China Sea it has pushed a very expansive definition of its maritime zone of control, and it recently faced down the Philippines in a dispute over the Scarborough Shoal in that sea. Indeed, one possible explanation for China’s expansion of its air defense identification zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea is that a hard line seems to be working in the South China Sea. But China’s northeast Asian neighbors are far stronger and more capable than its southeast Asian ones. Most observers expect Japan, South Korea and the U.S. to push back, as indeed they have. The U.S. flew bombers through the new ADIZ without warning, and both Japanese and South Korean civilian airlines have been instructed by their respective governments not to comply.All this then sets up a bipolar contest between China and Japan, in the context of China’s rapid rise toward regional dominance.Chinese Hegemony?A common theme in the literature on China’s rise is its apparent inevitability. Westerners particularly tend to get carried away with book-titles such as Eclipse (of the U.S. by China), When China Rules the World, or China’s New Empire. History is indeed filled with the rise to dominance of powerful states. China and Japan both sought in the past to dominate Asia. Various European states including the U.S.SR, Germany, and France did the same. But frequently these would-be hegemons collided with a counter-hegemonic coalition of states unwilling to be manipulated or conquered. Occasionally the hegemonic aspirant may win; Europe under Rome was “unipolar,” as was feudal Asia now-and-again under the strongest Chinese dynasties. But there is nothing inevitable about this. Hegemonic contenders as various as Napoleon or Imperial Japan have been defeated.To be fair, it is not clear yet if indeed China seeks regional hegemony. But there is a growing consensus among American and Japanese analysts that this is indeed the case. By Chinese hegemony in Asia we broadly mean something akin to the United States’ position in Latin America. We do not mean actual conquest. Almost no one believes China intends to annex even its weakest neighbors like Cambodia or North Korea. Rather, analysts expect a zone of super-ordinate influence over neighbors.For example, in 1823, U.S. president James Monroe proclaimed the Monroe Doctrine, which warned all non-American powers to stay out of the Western Hemisphere on pain of U.S. retaliation. This has worked reasonably well for almost 200 years. The U.S. has variously used force, aid, covert CIA assistance, trade, and so on to eject foreign powers from what Washington (condescendingly) came to call “America’s backyard.” Today, of course, such language seems disturbingly neocolonial, but many assume that the fundamental illiberalism of such spheres of influence do not worry non-democracies like China. A Sinic Monroe Doctrine would likely include some mix of the following:– the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Japan and Korea,– U.S. naval retrenchment from east Asia, perhaps as far back as Hawaii,– a division of the Pacific into east/U.S. and west/China zones with a Chinese blue-water navy operating beyond the so-called second island chain running from Japan southeast to New Guinea,– an RMB currency bloc in southeast Asia and possibly Korea,– a regional trading zone,– foreign policies from China’s neighbors broadly in sync with its own.– the isolation, if not absorption, of TaiwanSBSP can supply power to bases in Okinawa --- makes operations cheaper and allows budget reallocation towards defense missions Nathan Kitzke 16---Deployed Squadron Commander, Middle East, “A new level of urgency for space-based solar power,” The Space Review, 6/27/19, military and commercial application for microwave SBSPThe USAF has based outside the continental US, especially in the Pacific Command region, that present phenomenal cases for a microwave SBSP market, not just to provide electricity to the military but also for supporting the entire community. Kadena Air Force Base in Okinawa, Japan, has one of the most expensive power bills in the Defense Department. In 2013, the Government of Japan and the DoD together spent $65.21 million on the electric bill supporting Kadena AFB, with $30 million of it going toward base housing.28 A tremendous portion of the money budgeted for defense goes toward keeping the lights on in our buildings, infrastructure, and housing for our families. In 2015, Kadena AFB spent $50 million for 318 million kilowatt-hours at roughly $0.16 per kilowatt-hour—compared to the average price of $0.10 per kilowatt-hour in the US—after further improving initiatives to save energy on base and a favorable currency exchange rate.29Over the past 15 years, US Pacific Command leaders have emphasized a growing concern for increasing energy costs within the AOR and a strategic vision of improved, affordable green energy development. With John Mankins’ SPS-ALPHA satellite design, the Air Force could provide energy not just to Kadena AFB but the entire island of Okinawa. According to the Okinawa Electric Power Company, the estimated population growth for the island in 2023 will increase energy demands to 8.156 billion kilowatt-hours per year.30 If the Air Force were to charge its airmen and the citizens of Okinawa just $0.10 a kilowatt-hour, decreasing the average Okinawan’s monthly electricity bills by 57 percent, it would generate $815 million in revenue and would pay off its $10 billion investment in less than 12 years.31Instead of focusing on “power naps” every year in hopes of slightly lowering the Defense Department’s energy costs, the Air Force would further solidify its influence within the Pacific Command region. If the US government proves this concept in Okinawa, it could lead to further commercial developments in SBSP within the region. It may even improve American influence in the Pacific by starting a technology that provides clean, affordable energy for numerous US allies in the region. Kadena AFB could provide the benchmark for other bases in the Pacific to follow suit, like Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam and Camp Smith in Hawaii.At $0.32 per kilowatt-hour, Hawaii ranks number one in highest average energy costs in the United States.32 With the Defense Department responsible for 15 percent of the state’s energy consumption, the US Pacific Command commander directed an energy security strategy for the command’s entire region, focusing on improved energy security across the Pacific with the intent to free up resources for mission requirements.33 Its strategic goal was to match or exceed the state’s goals for harnessing clean, efficient, secure, and renewable energy. The strategy aimed to emphasize stability by designing new buildings with 30 percent less energy and decrease fossil fuel-generated energy consumption 65 percent by 2015 and 90 percent by 2025.By supplying SBSP in high-demand, high-energy-cost environments, the Defense Deparment can fulfill its growing energy requirement, better solidify a strategic expeditionary foothold in its overseas bases, and ignite a new energy resource to help bolster the US economy.In 2009, Pacific Command had a total of $1.42 billion in unfunded energy projects, including photovoltaic roofs, hangars, and carports; wave energy “powerbuoys”; range control wind/solar systems; smart metering; and biofuel electrical power plants. Per capita, Hawaii residents consume 57,740 kilowatt-hours per year.34 If a microwave SBSP satellite supplied every island with power at $0.10 per kilowatt-hour, it would generate $8.2 billion in revenue a year. Whether the Air Force developed a SBSP satellite to supply energy to Defense Department assets and the civilian state infrastructure in Hawaii, or a US company took out a $10 billion loan to launch a SPS-ALPHA, Hawaii exemplifies another tremendous market for microwave SBSP. Pacific Command should look to SBSP to meet its future energy goals.Whether it’s powering small teams on remote operations or simply finding new power systems for in-garrison everyday infrastructure, SBSP represents a strategic move toward fulfilling a sustainable force. For the Defense Department, military infrastructure can become extremely costly at bases located in high-energy markets. By supplying SBSP in high-demand, high-energy-cost environments, the Defense Deparment can fulfill its growing energy requirement, better solidify a strategic expeditionary foothold in its overseas bases, and ignite a new energy resource to help bolster the US economy. The US should formulate a strategic vision that gives the Air Force the responsibility to develop laser SBSP as soon as possible and microwave SBSP on the six-year timeline presented by John MankOkinawa is the lynchpin Japanese defense commitments Matthew Reisener 18---Matt Reisener is a program associate at the Center for the National Interest, “Improving the U.S.-Japan Alliance Begins on Okinawa,” The National Interest, 12/23/18, America has far too many military bases which have become redundant, costly and counterproductive to America’s national interests, the bases in Okinawa remain a vital component of America’s grand strategy in East Asia. The American military presence on the island, and specifically U.S. Marines, play an important role in establishing American power projection in a critically important region that is home to roughly 60 percent of the global population. Still, in the interest of preserving the long-term sustainability of the American presence in Okinawa, the United States should work with the local government to better address the valid complaints of the Japanese people regarding the role of the American military in Okinawa.Okinawa’s strategic location between the Philippine, East China and South China Seas makes it an important military outpost to preserve free navigation and protect American security interests in the region. Okinawa’s close proximity to China, Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula and mainland Japan allows the marines stationed there to serve as a flexible rapid-response force to confront any challenges that should emerge. The marines at Okinawa are, according to the former commander of the Marine Corps Forces Pacific Lieutenant General Keith J. Stalder, always “a day’s transit time to either a U.S. defense treaty ally, a threat to regional stability, or a perennial disaster relief location.” Okinawa functionally serves as an ideal launching point from which the United States can easily conduct military operations in defense of its interests and those of allies like Japan, including deploying the marines from Futenma or air force fighters from Kadena Air Base to attack targets throughout the region.The Okinawa bases’ geostrategic flexibility perfectly positions the United States to counter a wide range of potential threats. Okinawa is viewed as a critical component of America’s strategy to limit Chinese aggression in East Asia due to its close proximity to both Taiwan and the Senkaku Islands, the latter of which China has a disputed claim with Japan regarding the islands’ ownership. Should China threaten Taiwan, attempt to limit freedom of navigation in the East or South China Seas, or make an overt move to claim the Senkaku Islands, troops in Okinawa would be a critical component of an American military response, and their presence on the island serves as a deterrent to prevent such provocations from the Chinese.America’s presence in Okinawa is also a critical component of its strategy to preserve peace on the Korean Peninsula. American marines play an integral role in Operations Plan 5027 (the U.S.-South Korean response plan to a potential North Korean invasion), and the former commander of U.S. Forces Korea General Burwell Bell concluded that “when the North Koreans consider the potential for the United States Marines to interdict their logistics sites and fragile supply lines deep in their rear areas, the likelihood of the North seriously considering a sustained ground offensive drops drastically.” Furthermore, Okinawa would become even more important should the United States ever decide to end or reduce its military presence in South Korea, something President Donald Trump has seriously considered.Perhaps most importantly, America’s military remains heavily invested in Okinawa as a means of assisting Japan in its national defense, an obligation assumed by the United States upon signing the Security Treaty with Japan in 1960. Despite ending its ban on collective self-defense in 2014, Japan remains legally constrained to deploying its Self-Defense Force only when the safety of Japan itself is threatened and all diplomatic options have been completely exhausted. The Japanese military also suffers from numerous shortcomings even after its efforts at modernization in recent years. America’s robust military presence in Okinawa (74 percent of America’s military facilities in Japan are located there) significantly bolsters Japan’s defensive posture, facilitates cooperation between the two militaries, and sends a clear signal to other regional actors about America’s commitment to defending key allies from outside aggression.AT: IndiaNo link---India could be included in the plan’s mechanism as an investor or give input over normsRam S. Jakhu and Diane Howard 10, Jakhu: Associate Professor, Institute of Air and Space Law, McGill University, Howard: Arsenault Doctoral Fellow in Space Governance, Institute of Air and Space Law, McGill University, May 2010, “SAFETY AND LIABILITY ASPECTS OF SOLAR POWER SATELLITES”, (b) International Consortium/Public-private partnershipThe 2007 feasibility study performed by the US National Security Space Office identified the costs associated with access to space and development of the necessary supporting infrastructure as the chief obstacles to bringing SSP to fruition.83 Cooperative efforts are the most efficient means to overcome these challenges, between the commercial and government sectors and also internationally.A number of countries are onboard, exhibiting more than casual interest in SSP. For instance, Japan has ranked SSP with a high level of importance and the US conducted the feasibility study mentioned in the paragraph preceding.84 Canada, Europe, India, China, and Russia have seen participation in SSP at some level in the past few years.85 Not only would international teaming help spread the risks and defray costs, it would also promote global coordination. Already, international energy groups exist that could lay the groundwork for increasing public awareness, which could in turn help direct political will.86 Moreover, partnerships between government, industry, and academia could allocate risk and allow for profit in the development of the requisite economic and distribution infrastructure. Methods of financing public services have undergone significant transformation since World War II. “[T]he international trend was to nationalize energy and other infrastructure assets and institute controls over private monopolies in order to limit abuses of market power.”87 Over time, the costs of public ownership and/or subsidization, including the erosion of operational efficiency, became apparent, resulting in a restructuring trend.88 Internationally, governments felt pressure to change the standard models of procurement, largely because of concerns for high levels of public debt.89 Whereas privatization is on a downward spiral,90 public-private partnerships are now hailed as “the new paradigm for economic development in the 21st century…increasingly being used as a policy tool to transform the role of national and local governments in public service delivery, infrastructure development, poverty alleviation, capital market improvement, and governance around the world.”91 This trend is global,92 particularly in the European and Asian markets.93 In an interview given in 1999 when he was Deputy Director of the Congressional Budget Office, Barry Anderson, now head of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), expressed his belief that public-private partnerships were a possible mechanism to achieve budget reform in the face of constraints on top-down budgeting mechanisms in the US.94Absent a universal legal definition of P3s, they are “generally recognized [to exist] wherever there is a contractual relationship between the public sector and a private sector company designed to deliver a project or service that traditionally is carried out by the public sector.”95 Public-private partnerships aspire to draw upon the strengths of both sectors. In Canada, the term has a very specific meaning: “[f]irst, it relates to the provision of public services or public infrastructure. Second, it necessitates the transfer of risk between partners. Arrangements that do not include these two concepts are not technically ‘publicprivate partnerships’….”96 Allocation of risk is a necessary factor.[FIGURE OMITTED]P3s are creative arrangements. Usually, a governmental entity enters into contract with a private consortium which sets up a single purpose entity known as a special purpose vehicle (SPV). The private consortium is typically formed by a joint venture (JV) between a range of contractors, banks, investors, and suppliers willing to commit equity and/or resources to the project.98 Some underlying principles are indispensable to their success. Value for money (VFM) is crucial. It refers “to the best possible outcome after taking account of all benefits, costs and risks over the whole life of the procurement.”99 Risk is perceived from the public sector’s perspective as “any event which jeopardizes the quality or quantity of service that they have contracted for” and from the private sector’s perspective as any event which “causes the cash flow profile of the project to depart from the base case and jeopardize the debt servicing ability of the project or its ability to generate a dividend stream for shareholders.”100 Optimally, risks are allocated to the party in the best position to control them. Rules guiding optimal distribution of risk require that the party to whom the risk is allocated:! Has been made fully aware of the risks they are taking.! Has the greatest capacity [expertise and authority] to manage the risk effectively and efficiently (and thus charge the lowest risk premium).! Has the capability and resources to cope with the risk eventuating.! Has the necessary risk appetite to want to take the risk.! Has been given the chance to charge an appropriate premium for taking it.101Internationally, examples of P3s abound. They include, inter alia, airports, airlines, tunnels, highways, hospitals, social programs, defense facilities, rapid transit systems including the Las Vegas monorail, bridges, health service delivery systems, governance infrastructure, schools and universities, air traffic services, power providers, Central Park in New York City, the US Federal Reserve, water taxi companies, InfraGard (the FBI and the private sector), construction projects, ports, domestic telecommunications infrastructure, and the information superhighway.102 Commercial space mirrors this trend toward hybrid entities; examples can be found in a host of space applications encompassing remote sensing, international telecommunications, global navigation, spaceports, and proposed space solar power systems. A consortium structured on the early Intelsat/COMSAT model for SSP could provide the necessary support from both the public and private side, buy-in from multiple countries which would most likely be necessary to overcome the steep economic costs, adequate allocation of risks, facilitate legislation to provide a legal framework, and create sufficient operational infrastructure.103 The first intergovernmental organization (IGO), Intelsat began as an intergovernmental consortium of country shareholders who paid according to use.104 COMSAT was a private for-profit company, legislatively created to be the US signatory to, investor in, and provider of Intelsat services in the US.105 A consortium with monies paid in according to use lends itself well to SSP.(c) Dispute Resolution The Liability Convention provides for nonadversarial settlement of disputes not settled through diplomatic channels.106 However, only states can bring a claim under the Convention. Alternatively, disputes have been resolved through the courts, arbitration, or mediation. Because of the probability of private sector involvement in SBSP and its transnational nature, these last methods of dispute resolution become very attractive options to resolve disputes that may arise in SBSP ventures.The UN Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, drafted by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), defines the principal requirements, or elements, of dispute resolution by arbitration.107 They are: 1) an agreement by the parties, 2) to submit all or certain disputes to arbitration, 3) which have arisen or may arise out of a defined legal relationship between them, 4) whether these disputes are contractual or not.108 Only those claims arising out of a defined legal relationship are covered by the arbitration agreement. Usually, the agreement refers to claims “which arise out of or in connection with this contract.”109 This language is sufficient to include all issues associated with the contract’s conclusion, validity, interpretation, performance, damages, and termination.110 Tort claims may be covered if they bear some nexus to the performance of the parties’ contractual obligations.111Arbitration agreements are usually in the form of a clause in the contract that sets forth the parties’ rights and responsibilities. They are recognized globally and favored in some jurisdictions.112 While the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris (ICC) recommends that parties referencing ICC arbitration in their contracts use model language,113 not all parties share the same priorities for their dispute resolution. In drafting an arbitration clause, the same principles apply that are applicable to good drafting in general. Simplicity is a good starting point. If the parties have a specific tribunal in mind, then it is necessary to ensure that the provision’s language meets that tribunal’s requirements and is compliant with its rules.114 The arbitration clause gives the parties latitude to choose the arbitrator selection process and set arbitrator qualifications, determine whether and what discovery is available, what rules apply (evidentiary and procedural), scheduling, level of confidentiality, the role the arbitrators will serve, decision format and whether binding, the appeal process if any, choice of law, provisional remedies, and methods of enforcement.115 Often, a contract choosing the UNIDROIT Principles as the contract’s governing law also includes an arbitration clause. There is a complex interplay between arbitration providers and arbitration clauses; at times, the chosen provider will not enforce other negotiated terms of the arbitration agreement because of conflicts with provider rules.116 As a result, even simple clauses can have complicated results.Mediation, like both arbitration and adjudication, also employs neutral third parties.117 However, the mediator does not issue a binding decision. The procedures are less structured and more flexible than those followed by either courts or arbitral tribunals.118 Mediation can be entirely consensual or it can be court ordered.119 (d) Legislation as regulatory risk management Legislation provides yet another alternative for risk management. The Price-Anderson Act in the US “provides a system of indemnification for legal liability” arising from nuclear accidents.120 In 2005, the Act was extended for another twenty years. India recently enacted the Indo-U.S. Civilian Nuclear Agreement to foster civilian partnership between the two countries and to encourage this cooperation. As a result, India drafted the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Bill which would indemnify US corporations for any nuclear accidents caused on Indian territory , instead channeling liability to the operator of the nuclear plant.121 These are good examples of use of legislation to manage risk and can be used as models for SSP.Part IV: RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONSIn summation, the success of SSP will depend heavily upon safe design and operation of the SPS, which in turn require identification of safety standards prior to design and construction. To be effective, those standards must be uniform and implemented within the existing international and national regulatory regimes. In this way, a larger number of countries could be attracted to, and served by, the project creating a larger market and a chance at eventual return on investment. More significantly, though, these standards would decrease the risks inherent to SSP creating less chance of liability and, again, bringing economic viability into possibility.Space cooperation now thumps the DAJeff Foust 18---writes about space policy, commercial space, and related topics for SpaceNews, “Foust Forward | The challenges to Chinese space cooperation,” 10/29/18, Space News, this month, the two countries appeared to open the door for additional cooperation. Appearing onstage at the International Astronautical Congress (IAC) in Bremen, Germany, NASA Administrator Jim Bridenstine and Zhang Kejian, administrator of the China National Space Administration, seemed willing to work together in space exploration.“I had a very good discussion with NASA Administrator Mr. Bridenstine for bilateral cooperation in this particular area,” Zhang said, referring to a meeting earlier in the day with his American counterpart. “I think the response was very positive.”Bridenstine, at a later news conference, praised China’s growing space capabilities, such as its upcoming Chang’e-4 mission, which will be the first to attempt a landing on the moon’s far side. “We can share data and collaborate that way so that each country can learn more about science,” he said.Sharing scientific data, he said, could lay the groundwork for more substantial cooperation in the future. “This could be the first confidence-building measure that is necessary to establish the kind of relationship that is necessary to go to the next step.”Two weeks later, during a panel discussion in Washington on the past and future of lunar exploration, National Space Council Executive Secretary Scott Pace suggested that the U.S. and China could later exchange lunar samples once China carries out its Chang’e-5 lunar sample return mission in 2019.INdia favors space cooperation among US and China---fears a space raceNUPUR SHAW 1/8/19---Nikkei staff writer Yuji Kuronuma in New Delhi and Nikkei Asian Review assistant politics & economy news editor Yujin Yanaseko in Tokyo contributed to this report, “India and Japan awaken to risks of superpower space race,” Asian Review, DELHI -- India, Japan and other space-faring countries are waking up to a harsh reality: Earth's orbit is becoming a more dangerous place as the U.S., China and Russia compete for control of the final frontier.Growing fears that satellites could be threatened by newfangled space weapons or sophisticated hacking are forcing governments to think of their space programs not just as scientific endeavors but as pressing national security concerns.China has a "sophisticated military space program in place," said Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, head of the Nuclear and Space Policy Initiative at the Observer Research Foundation, an independent think tank in India. So countries like India and Japan, which have promoted space development from a "civilian and peaceful perspective," are "increasingly driven to develop certain military characteristics."This explains India and Japan's recent decision to launch a Space Dialogue this March. The countries intend to cooperate not only on lunar exploration but also security, including surveillance sharing.New Delhi is nervous because China has made no secret of its desire for influence in the Indian Ocean. China set up a naval base in Djibouti, a gateway to the ocean at the Horn of Africa. It secured a 99-year lease to the port of Hambantota in Sri Lanka. It is deeply involved in development projects in Maldives.Beijing is "setting up capacities that can be used in the future," Rajagopalan said. India, she said, "has been forced to join" the space defense race because, if it does not enhance its capabilities, it "will face certain disadvantages when it comes to conflicts."India has established itself as a player in the budget satellite business. It even put a probe into orbit around Mars in 2014, in a U.S.-assisted project that cost just $76 million. But it is scurrying to enhance its ability to monitor China's activities, and the partnership with Japan is part of this.Another sign that space is becoming a defense focus for India came on Dec. 19, when the country launched its third military communications satellite, the GSAT-7A. The satellite will connect with ground-based radar, bases and military aircraft, along with drone control networks.This rocket, launched on Dec. 19, carried an Indian military communications satellite into orbit. ? Courtesy of Indian Space Research OrganisationJapan, for its part, had space in mind when it published new national defense guidelines in December. Defense Minister Takeshi Iwaya told reporters at the time that space, cyber and electromagnetic pulse, or EMP, attacks were major concerns in a security environment that is evolving with "extraordinary speed."All of this comes amid an intensifying technological race between the U.S. and China.China's success in landing a craft on the far side of the moon on Jan. 3 came as a fresh reminder of its growing prowess. In late December, China also achieved global coverage with its BeiDou Navigation Satellite System. Only the U.S., Russia and the European Union had that capability.China aims to launch a Mars explorer in 2020 and complete its own Earth-orbiting space station around 2022.These are ostensibly peaceful endeavors, and Beijing makes a point of promoting international cooperation. It announced last May that its space station would be open to all United Nations members."The China Space Station belongs not only to China but also to the world," Shi Zhongjun, the Chinese ambassador to the U.N., was quoted as saying by the state-run Xinhua News Agency.But China's progress has clear geopolitical and military implications, experts say.China's lunar rover, the Jade Rabbit 2, makes humanity's first mark on the far side of the moon in this handout image from Jan. 3. ? Imaginechina/APDean Cheng, a senior research fellow at the Heritage Foundation in the U.S., called the moon mission "an enormous scientific achievement." Still, he cautioned, "The Chinese have always viewed their space program as a political message," Cheng said."Developing an advanced space capability," he said, "will be exploited for political as well as military purposes."In the back of Indian and Japanese officials' minds is likely a stunning test China conducted in 2007. Beijing successfully destroyed one of its own weather satellites with a weapon, becoming only the third nation to pull off such a feat, after the Soviet Union and the U.S."Russian and Chinese destructive ASAT (anti-satellite) weapons probably will reach initial operational capability in the next few years," the 2018 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community predicted.The U.S., meanwhile, is becoming more vocal about space as a new battleground and is changing its military structure accordingly. In December, President Donald Trump ordered the Department of Defense to create a Space Command, widely seen as a precursor to a full-fledged Space Force.Vice President Mike Pence, while laying out a vision for a Space Force at the Pentagon in August, said, "As their actions make clear, our adversaries have transformed space into a war-fighting domain already, and the United States will not shrink from this challenge."Figuring out how to defend satellites and other space assets may be the biggest challenge of all. Yasuhito Fukushima, a research fellow at the National Institute for Defense Studies of Japan, said, "What makes it difficult is that in space, offense is overwhelmingly dominant over defense."There were 1,957 active satellites orbiting Earth as of Nov. 30, according to the Union of Concerned Scientists, a nonprofit U.S. advocacy group. America had the most by far, with 849, or 43% of the total. China was No. 2, with 284, followed by Russia with 152.Japan and India had a combined 132 -- 75 for the former and 57 for the latter.What can be done to protect the satellites?Japan, India and other countries increasingly emphasize a concept known as space situational awareness, or SSA. The term refers to systems that keep tabs on conditions and threats in space -- from orbiting junk to satellite killers -- using radar and sensors on the ground.India has plans to set up five large ground stations and more than 500 small installations in five countries -- Bhutan, Nepal, Maldives, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka -- the Times of India reported on Jan. 3.There are also broader diplomatic efforts afoot, as world powers look to establish laws or a nonbinding code of conduct for space. Yet they do not see eye to eye.The European Union tried to push a "soft law" on international space activity, winning support from the U.S., Japan, Australia and others. China and Russia refused to play along, and India initially opposed it as well, perceiving the attempt as Europe foisting rules on developing countries."China and Russia have consistently tabled self-serving proposals that would not limit their own anti-satellite weapons development"Dean Cheng, senior research fellow at the Heritage FoundationChina and Russia have their own proposal for banning space weapons with a treaty under the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. The U.S. opposes this, arguing the proposal fails to address ground-launched weapons and would make defending space assets impossible."China and Russia have consistently tabled self-serving proposals that would not limit their own anti-satellite weapons development," Cheng said.Rajagopalan said India did not support China and Russia's draft treaty either, partly due to "so many ambiguities." But she would like to see India play an active role. "Unless India sits in the room and becomes an active participant, [it] will not have the upper hand."Either way, getting the superpowers to agree is always going to be difficult. That leaves Japan and India to find their own strategies and solutions.Asked about the India-Japan dialogue, Cheng said the two countries are both "clearly uncomfortable with Chinese strategic expansion.""This cooperation, and the broader defense and foreign policy cooperation that we already see, will be a major part of the Asian security context in the coming decade."India will always cooperate with the US---they wouldn’t survive without usBenjamin E. Schwartz 19, former India Director in the Office of the Secretary of Defense from 2014 to 2016, “From Inertia to Integration: Getting Serious About U.S.-India Defense Cooperation,” 6/24/19, irony at the core of Indian foreign policy is that autonomy is heralded to be its central principle but in practice Indian policies are often guided by foreign coercion. For example, India’s military equipment is overwhelmingly of Soviet origin and without the resupply of Russian spares and maintenance, India’s ground forces would literally come to a grinding halt. There is widespread disdain within the Indian military toward Russia for this state of affairs and a sincere desire to diversify away from Russia. Yet India keeps purchasing new Russia defense systems. Why?The official answer is that Indian defense procurement is based on value for money and the Russian systems serve Indian military requirements at the best price. While this is true in some instances, such as a Russian partnership in nuclear submarines, there is also an unofficial second answer: India has little choice. Moscow will cut off the sustainment support the Indian military needs and retaliate by selling more advanced systems to China and Pakistan unless India buys new Russian systems. This is the cold logic of India’s “difficult neighborhood,” and it encourages an Indian approach to foreign relations that manifests in placation of foreign powers. India offers energy deals to Moscow, foundational agreements to the United States, and buys fighter aircraft from the French, all in an effort to keep such powers happy enough to respect Indian interests. But such hedging also forestalls the kind of deep partnerships that could truly empower the country.The plan is compartmentalized---India makes decisions about cooperation on a case-specific basisWalter C. Ladwig 19, Associate Professor of International Relations in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London, “The United States, India, and the Future of the Indo-Pacific Strategy,” 6/20/19, and foremost, we should not lose sight of the fact that the Indo-U.S. relationship is a strategic partnership, which is not simply a synonym for an alliance. Unlike alliances, which can require binding responses by parties to specific events, strategic partnerships involve a much lower level of commitment. Moreover, the interests of the two sides in such a relationship may overlap or diverge depending on the issue at hand. With its traditional aversion to alliances, India, has embraced the ambiguity of strategic partnerships in its contemporary diplomacy. On most counts, however, from joint military exercises and staff-level talks to intelligence sharing to diplomatic consultations, the United States is “India’s most important partner on global issues.” In turn, as the Indo-Pacific Strategy Report notes, the naming of India as a “major defense partner” and the establishment of the U.S.-India 2+2 ministerial dialogue are part of an effort to put the bilateral defense relationship “on par with that of the United States’ closest allies and partners.” Despite these achievements, Cara Abercrombie contends that the U.S.-India military partnership has not developed the “habits of cooperation” that the United States typically enjoys with its closest partners. Drawing on her personal experience managing the India portfolio at various levels for the U.S. Department of Defense, she provides the most comprehensive analysis of the military-to-military relationship to date. Abercrombie argues that although the defense and security dimension of the strategic partnership has demonstrated significant progress in recent years, the overall output resulting from numerous dialogues, military exercises, and engagements—as well as the tangible impact they have had on Indian and U.S. security objectives—are less than one would expect. The bilateral relationship still lacks the elements of a mature partnership that are critical to enabling the type of cooperation envisioned. This is not entirely surprising given that India’s security partnership with the United States presents a departure from its traditional foreign relations. In turn, the United States is also learning how to adapt its established patterns of bilateral cooperation to a model that is acceptable to India.The fact that the Indo-U.S. relationship is a strategic partnership means its contours are rife with ambiguity, which has resulted in differing expectations from the two sides. A major line of effort in the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy Report is expanding interoperability with allies and partners to “ensure that our respective defense enterprises can work together effectively during day-to-day competition, crisis, and conflict.” The United States presumes that over time India will grow more comfortable with such bilateral military cooperation. In contrast, New Delhi appears to want to consult and coordinate with the United States on defense matters of shared concern but operate in parallel rather than jointly, achieving the benefits of cooperation while preserving strategic autonomy.Xi LegitimacyNon UniqueXi power low—Hong Kong protestsDoug Saunders 19, International Affairs Columnists, 8/23/2019, “Opinion: For Xi Jinping, Hong Kong represents a crossroads between power and legitimacy,” mass protests that led to the end of Europe’s communist regimes 30 years ago are a subject of obsessive interest to Xi Jinping. According to his biographers, the Chinese president has required Communist Party officials to watch documentaries that blame the collapse of the Soviet Union and its satellite states on the infiltration of “subversive Western values,” and has often told people that the 1989 democratic revolutions only succeeded because Moscow was too weak, impoverished and disorganized to put a stop to them.So the past several weeks have sent Mr. Xi into something of a time warp. As governments here in Europe prepare to mark the anniversaries of those decisions, he has found his commitment to respond with force to any 1989-style democracy movement sorely tested by the presence of hundreds of thousands of unhappy people in Hong Kong.This is not the protest movement he had prepared his party, his army and his loyal officials to confront.It is not a Tiananmen Square – a student movement in multiple cities, in a poor country, demanding changes to the way national government works. He has made it very clear that he would crush any such movement with at least as much force as Deng Xiaoping did in 1989. Nor is it a local, singe-issue protest. Such protests had become very commonplace in China by the time Mr. Xi came to power in 2012, and he has also cracked down on these.Hong Kong is something much more difficult. It is the reasonable manifestation of a middle class – exactly the sort of middle class Mr. Xi knows he needs to build and cultivate in the cities of mainland China if he is to maintain his party’s legitimacy.The students and businesspeople of Hong Kong aren’t demanding multiparty rule in Beijing; they don’t have power-seeking leaders, they aren’t separatist-minded members of an ethnic group and they aren’t agents of some foreign power. They’re simply ordinary citizens trying to maintain the things an educated middle class needs to thrive: The rule of law, a stable economic environment and some control over local conditions. Hong Kong has always had these things, and is constitutionally guaranteed them – and they are what people seek once they attain a moderate level of financial security.Here, Mr. Xi faces a dilemma. His claim to power has been built on centralizing all authority around his party and his personality, and he’s done this by eliminating any competing sources of power – factions and individuals within the party, local governments doing things their own way, people expressing dissent on social media or minorities wanting their own customs.But his claim to legitimacy – that is, to be accepted by one and a half billion people as their rightful ruler – is built on giving people a better life than they had before. When annual growth rates of 10 per cent were the norm, that was a given. Now it requires smart policies and a plausible vision of the future. As Mr. Xi himself once told a U.S. audience: “If we cannot solve problems and let them get worse, the people will not trust and support us."If he accedes to the Hong Kong protesters or lets the uprising continue, Mr. Xi could lose the source of his power, especially if middle-class residents of Guangzhou and Shanghai are inspired by Hong Kong.If he crushes them or otherwise wishes them away, though, he could lose his source of legitimacy. The vision of a better future for the Chinese people would lose its most prominent example, and the idea of a competing “China model” would lose some of its global appeal.“Beijing has a nationalistic stake to show the world that Chinese people can run Hong Kong as well as the British colonialists,” writes Ching Kwan Lee, a professor of sociology who has been documenting the Hong Kong protests. She adds: “And sending in the tanks will irreparably ruin the prospect of peaceful reunification with Taiwan and President Xi’s legacy and honour.”No LashoutDomestic troubles push Xi to turn inwards---NOT lash out---AND factional pushback is inevitable BUT, NOT related to US cooperationGeorge Yin 1/22/19---Dickey Fellow @ Dartmouth College, Ph.D. in government from Harvard, “Domestic repression and international aggression? Why Xi is uninterested in diversionary conflict,” Brookings Institute, is China’s most powerful leader since Deng. Xi has scrapped the People’s Republic of China (PRC) constitutional rule that limited the term of PRC chairman to 10 years. Xi has fostered a new cult of personality; the PRC constitution now enshrines “Xi Jinping Thought of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics.” But Chairman Xi is not Emperor Xi. Forces that oppose Xi may be dormant but their powers remain intact, and criticisms of Xi’s administration have been multiplying since the 19th Party Congress.Chinese people often say that foreign relations are the extension of domestic politics (waijiao shi neizheng de yanxu). How is Chinese foreign policy shaped by Xi’s political position after the 19th Party Congress and the dynamic of Chinese elite politics? Some argue that Xi, in order to consolidate power, has adopted the twin strategy of domestic repression and foreign aggression. Domestically, Xi cracks down on both popular discontent and elite dissent with increasingly authoritarian measures. Internationally, Xi expands Chinese military presence in the South China Sea and flexes Chinese muscles globally through initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Playing the game of great power competition gives Xi the ammunition to incite nationalism and rally the Chinese nation behind him despite a multitude of domestic troubles.This line of thinking has its origin in diversionary war theories, which rest on assumptions that do not hold for Xi. Xi’s domestic troubles, instead of making him more confrontational, would pressure Xi into improving China’s foreign relations and in particular Sino-American relations. This opens up the possibility for Sino-American relations to improve in the next few years, ceteris paribus.WHO ARE UNHAPPY WITH XI AND WHY?On May 4th 2018, Fan Liqin posted a 24-page “big-character poster” (dazhibao) at a public bulletin area in Peking University that sharply criticized Xi. This is significant in two ways. First, Fan is a close friend of Deng Pufang, Deng Xiaoping’s first son who was crippled by the Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution. Fan’s big character poster, therefore, represents the attitude of at least some “red aristocrats” towards Xi. Second, Fan’s big-character poster criticized Xi using the “party’s language.” Specifically, Fan, by referring to historical CCP debates on the perils of personality cults, attacked Xi’s removal of the PRC leader term limit and Xi’s ambition to “dress himself up as the emperor and the savior of the Chinese nation.” If someone as brilliant as Mao could become arrogant and make serious mistakes when he concentrated power, why would Xi, “an average party fu???nctionary” (Fan’s words), be immune from the same corruptive effect of power?In July 2018, another influential critique of Xi emerged. Xu Zhangrun, one of China’s top legal scholars who is based in Tsinghua University (Xi’s alma mater), published a trenchant critique of Xi. As in the case of Fan’s dazhibao, Xu questioned Xi’s scrapping of the term limit. Furthermore, Xu also disapproved Xi’s disrespect of private property (“if you are on the wrong side with a government official, risk bankruptcy and your life”) and Xi’s support for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) at the expense of competitive private business. Lastly, Xu blasted Xi for antagonizing the United States while hobnobbing with corrupt totalitarian regimes such as North Korea and Venezuela.Many of Xu’s complaints are picked up by participants in the Chinese Economists 50 Forum, which was founded by Xi’s economic guru and current vice premier Liu He. Its members include the most influential technocrats and economists in China (e.g. former finance minister Lou Jiwei). During a special meeting commemorating the 40th anniversary of PRC’s economic reform and opening up on September 16, 2018 (which Liu He attended), many of the forum members expressed concern over the current Chinese administration’s promotion of state capital over private enterprise, and the erosion of rule of law as the state takes control of the economy.[1]These episodes point to two lessons. First, elites from across the political spectrum in China oppose Xi’s concentration of power; Xi’s scrapping of his term limit is a watershed that galvanized opposition. Second, there is a pervasive sense that Xi has deviated from China’s overall path of political and economic developments after the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution.Fan, Xu, and participants of the Chinese economists 50 Forum do not wield real political power in China, but their opinions are important for at least two reasons. First, they are opinion leaders who may influence the actual power brokers if not Xi himself. After Fan’s protest, Xi temporarily scaled back his promotion of the cult of personality surrounding himself. Second, these people’s opinions are good proxies of the opinions of the CCP power brokers. They grew up and went to university with top CCP leaders and are in the same social circles. The fact that these people aired—and expressed this publicly—is an indication that at least some people within the CCP’s top echelon are also unhappy with the current administration.Some argue that the era of factional politics has ended in the PRC as Xi concentrates power. But this is not the case. Chinese factions are often centered around top national leaders, such as former party secretaries Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin. Their influence has been weakened by Xi’s anti-corruption campaign, which eliminated many of their protégés. Nonetheless, Xi could not eliminate Hu and Jiang for at least two reasons. First, both Jiang and Hu built extensive patronage networks when they were in power. Their protégés therefore consist of entire cohorts of provincial governors, generals, and technocrats. Xi needs them to run the country before he could fill up the positions with his own people.Second, it is difficult for Xi to attack Jiang and Hu directly. Xi has broken the convention of not prosecuting a retired PSC member by going after Zhou Yongkang, but Jiang and Hu are different. Because Jiang and Hu are both former PRC leaders, it would be difficult to attack them without also discrediting CCP’s reign under their leadership, which risks delegitimizing CCP rule. Jiang and Hu, therefore, are largely immune to prosecution.While Xi could do little to further undermine the rival CCP factions, these factions could now “bide their time” and wait for Xi to make enough mistakes before possibly striking back. In PRC’s 70-year history, five top leaders have been forced out of power. Mao (temporarily) and Hua Guofeng were forced out for radical leftist policies. Liu Shaoqi, Hu Yaobang, and Zhao Ziyang were forced out for their rightist predilection for economic and political reforms.[2] Historically, top CCP leaders are held accountable for major “policy mistakes” as defined by the power brokers at the time of their removal. As the earlier discussions suggest, there are already signs that the CCP elites believe that Xi has gone too far in his concentration of power and support for state over private enterprises. Xi is also under pressure for the recent Sino-American trade war, which reinforces the narrative that a totalitarian Xi is bound to make mistakes and led China astray.Note that the top CCP leaders mentioned above were often removed from power due to a surprise attack at either a major party conference or an emergency PSC meeting. It is rumored that the current administration had the party elites closely monitored during both the 19th Party Congress and the Beidaihe summer retreats where current and retired CCP leaders meet informally. This is a sign that Xi is not terribly confident of his hold on power.WHY XI DOES NOT WANT CONFLICTThe theory of diversionary wars posits that leaders often have the incentive to pursue aggressive foreign policies in order to divert the domestic audience’s attention from domestic troubles. Through international conflict, leaders can either foster national solidarity or demonstrate their competence. Could Xi seek to consolidate power by adopting an assertive foreign policy in his second term?Crucially, diversionary war theory rests on a number of assumptions, two of which do not hold for Xi today.Assumption 1: Leaders prefer foreign adventure over addressing domestic troubles.As discussed earlier, in the realm of domestic policies, Xi has been criticized for primarily two things: his promotion of his cult of personality and a slowing Chinese economy overly focused on inefficient SOEs. It is easy for Xi to dial back his cult of personality, and he has already done so. Reverting his policy of guo jin min tui (“as the state advances, the private sector retreats”) is not going to be easy and would entail important financial system and legal reforms (see discussions from the 2018 Chinese Economists 50 forum), but is quite doable. There is little reason why Xi would want to create international tension to distract his critics when it is much more straightforward to directly address the domestic issues. Furthermore, a diversionary skirmish involving Vietnam or the Philippines over one of the South China Sea islands would hardly be significant enough for diversion. To rally the nation behind him, Xi must pick on Taiwan, Japan, or even the United States. The problem is that a confrontation with either Taiwan or Japan is highly risky. The Chinese military, which has not fought a war since the Sino-Vietnamese conflict in 1979 and is embroiled in corruption scandals, might well suffer defeat. Perhaps China could take on the United States in the economics arena, but China has been unable to react effectively to the ongoing trade war with the United P elites do not want international conflict, especially one involving the United States.Assumption 2: Key domestic political players want conflict.Most importantly, the CCP elites do not want international conflict, especially one involving the United States. This is not because the CCP elites like the United States, which is still seen by many as an imperial power that supports Japanese militarism and secessionism in Taiwan, Hong Kong, Tibet, and Xinjiang. However, in Fan’s words, it is important “to deal with domestic issues before pacifying the barbarians” (an nei rang wai). In the eyes of his critics, any foreign adventure would indicate that Xi was getting the priorities wrong and further deviate from Deng’s grand strategy of fostering a favorable foreign environment to promote development. A diversionary conflict is therefore likely to further galvanize Xi’s opposition.In conclusion, the Xi administration’s performance since 2012 has been attacked by a wide range of groups that constitute China’s governing elites; Xi can do little to eliminate rival factions who are waiting for the opportune moment to strike back. Xi is unlikely to be interested in a foreign adventure that would at best distract him from domestic power struggles, and at worst provide more political ammunition for his opponents to use against him. Instead, Xi actually faces a lot of pressure to improve China’s relations with the U.S. in his second term, which could help him deal with his domestic troubles or at least not exacerbate them.Win-Win Link TurnPlan is spun as “win-win” cooperation Lincoln Hines 3/29/19---PhD candidate in the Government Department at Cornell University, “US-China Engagement in Space,” Secure World Foundation, panel @ Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, transcript: [03:42] China now has the second-largest space program in the planet. China has achieved several milestones in space program, placing a human in outer space in 2003, most recently landing the Chang'e-4 on the dark side of the moon. China moreover has unveiled the core module of its plan to place this planned space station, with plans to launch in 2022. [04:09] From the outside, China has changed space policies, sometimes viewed as part of a large grand strategic plan. It's important to recognize the role of domestic politics in nationalism in China. While lamenting our own domestic politics, we often have the tendency to view other states as unitary, intentional, and strategic. [04:30] Like all countries, Chinese domestic politics are complicated. While it's often easy to dismiss the importance of public opinion in closed states, the Chinese Communist Party cares deeply about maintaining its hold on power. It maintains extensive apparatus for collecting and censoring public opinion. 3 29 March 2019 | US-China Engagement in Space [04:48] Chinese new social credit system and even the innovation of an app for users to study Xi Jinping's thought are just a few examples illustrating CCP's concerns over legitimacy. Chinese Communist Party, in part, legitimizes its rule by claiming to regain respect for China, lost in what nationalist narratives describes China's century of humiliation. [05:09] This is what Xi Jinping refers to when discussing the so-called Great National Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation. China advertises extensively to domestic audiences that it has the dressings of a great power. China has hosted the Olympic Games, built its own infrastructure bank, launched the One Belt One Road initiative, and now has an aircraft carrier, despite the limited strategic rationale of possessing one. [05:35] Likewise, in space, China's most expensive projects are designed to attain the dressings of a great power. Placing humans in space, building its own space station, and landing on the moon. Chinese leaders, like in other states, recognize the political utility of outer space for promoting national indemnity. [05:52] As such, Chinese leaders have a keen interest in attaining recognition from the international community that China is an equal and a space power. These facts are important to keep in mind when attempting to comprehend Chinese policy making, and in understanding potential opportunities for cooperative engagement in space. [06:06] Chinese interest in attaining recognition of its status as a great power, providing a means by which the United States can engage China and shape its behavior. To Chinese leaders, the attainment of status of prestige is invaluable political resource. Recognition of China's status as an equal in world politics is an important priority for Chinese foreign policy. [06:26] We can see this rhetorically with Chinese efforts to get the United States on board with its framework of the so-called new model of major country relations, or to adopt the language of "win-win" cooperation. One avenue by which to attain Chinese support for US priorities in outer space is to entice it with the political carrot of recognition. [06:46] Engaging China bilaterally or multilaterally as an equal member of the international community, similar to the responsible stakeholder framework, provides an important source of external and informal recognition of Chinese status ambitions. [06:59] Political engagement through the United Nations or bilaterally through cooperation with NASA provides an informal means of recognizing Chinese status aspirations as a space power. Bilateral cooperation, moreover, serves as an important confidence building measure for reducing misperceptions between the United States and China. Link Turn---Coop GoodSpace cooperation boosts domestic prestige Luuk Muthert 18, Masters Thesis from the Utrecht University, 7/2018, “Does the Middle Kingdom Rise Up Alone,?” pg 51-53, Chapter 3 China’s International Space Orientation and Strategic Impact Development of space capabilities is an expensive effort with dubious economic and intangible prestige benefits in the long term, making space cooperation an attractive option. Cooperation means shared cost, risks and data, yet also shared prestige. However, the latter is compensated by the positive peaceful and cooperative image of the state that emerges from joint projects. NASA alone has signed more than 3000 international agreements, and Europe’s space accomplishments are owed entirely to its common European Space Agency bundling small national space budgets.213 The clear benefits of cooperation are not lost on the Chinese. International cooperation in space is especially rewarding in terms of both domestic and international prestige, which are the primary rationales for the Chinese space program. Therefore, although its space program had to start out almost entirely independently due to Cold War political constraints and the 1960 Sino-Soviet split, China has increasingly been looking for international space partners as its program advances. Central to global collaborative and peaceful space efforts is the International Space Station (ISS), where another instance of the US exclusionist policy can be seen. Five major space agencies, NASA, Russia’s Roscosmos, ESA, Canada’s CSA and Japan’s JAXA, signed the Space Station Intergovernmental Agreement governing the ISS program in January 1998. Over the years, China has repeatedly expressed interest in joining the ISS. CNSA director Luan Enjie was quoted in 2001 as saying: ‘‘Without China's particChina’s backing down from the trade war---they want to cooperate with the USUnnikrishnan Nair 8/26/19, Editorial Director @ Newsweek Media Group, Aug 26 2019, "China Seeks 'Calm' End To Trade War As Trump Tariffs Crumble Asian Markets, Crack Yuan", International Business Times, said it wants to resolve the trade war with the United States through "calm" negotiations, shortly after President Trump threatened to declare a national emergency and force American businesses to freeze their relationships with the communist nation.President Trump, speaking later Monday in France, where he is attending the G7 summit, welcomed the Chinese offer. "China called last night our top trade people and said ‘let’s get back to the table’ so we will be getting back to the table and I think they want to do something," Trump said. "They have been hurt very badly but they understand this is the right thing to do and I have great respect for it. This is a very positive development for the world."“I think we are going to have a deal,” Trump added.China's public conciliatory signals came after Asian markets cracked Monday and its currency plummeted to an 11-year low. The market and currency rout came after the United States imposed tariffs on $550 billion in Chinese exports Friday.Chinese Vice Premier Liu He also said that his country is opposed to escalation of the trade conflict, which threatens to push the world economy into a recession and has caused anxiety across world capitals.Speaking at a tech conference in Chongqing, Liu said, “We are willing to resolve the issue through consultations and cooperation in a calm attitude and resolutely oppose the escalation of the trade war.” Liu has led the trade negotiations with Washington and is Chinese President Xi Jinping's top economic adviser.Based on Trump's statement after Liu made his comments, it seems the Chinese were already prepared to get back to the table before the bloodbath in the Asian markets and had contacted Washington.Trump has attracted negative press over his use of tariffs to punish China, but the visible softening of Beijing's stand and the conciliatory language show that Trump was right in relentlessly pursuing the tariff path from his position of strength -- a U.S. economy that is much stronger than the Chinese economy.Liu also said U.S. companies are especially welcome in China, Reuters reported quoting government transcripts. “We welcome enterprises from all over the world, including the United States, to invest and operate in China,” he said. 1AR---AT: Link---Xi Looks Weak“weakness” link is wrongGeorge Yin 1/22/19---Dickey Fellow @ Dartmouth College, Ph.D. in government from Harvard, “Domestic repression and international aggression? Why Xi is uninterested in diversionary conflict,” Brookings Institute, may wonder whether Xi would risk looking weak in the eyes of his domestic rivals if he makes policy adjustments—e.g. conceding to some U.S. demands in order to de-escalate the trade war—in order to fend off his domestic critics. For two reasons, this should not be an important concern for Xi. First, Xi already has a reputation for strength, possibly for too much strength. Tempering this image of strength might not to be Xi’s disadvantage. Second, ultimately, the most important thing is how the Xi administration performs. Since Deng, top CCP leaders are evaluated by the party elites according to three metrics: political stability, economic development, and successful management of Sino-American relations. The current administration passes when it comes to the first metric, but has been underperforming on the latter two metrics. Policy adjustment, therefore, is necessary. A reputation for competence is much more important than a reputation for strength, even if appearing weak might be a concern.K Answers2AC---FrameworkScenario planning good---breaks cognitive biases and heuristics the restrict political imagination--- causes more effective IR theory because it relies on testable hypothesis AND it trains students to think deeply about applying IR to policyTimothy Junio 13, cybersecurity postdoctoral fellow at CISAC, PhD in political science from the University of Pennsylvania, and Thomas Mahnken, Naval War College, “Conceiving of Future War: The Promise of Scenario Analysis for International Relations”, September, International Studies Review Volume 15, Issue 3, pages 374–395This article introduces political scientists to scenarios—future counterfactuals—and demonstrates their value in tandem with other methodologies and across a wide range of research questions. The authors describe best practices regarding the scenario method and argue that scenarios contribute to theory building and development, identifying new hypotheses, analyzing data-poor research topics, articulating “world views,” setting new research agendas, avoiding cognitive biases, and teaching. The article also establishes the low rate at which scenarios are used in the international relations subfield and situates scenarios in the broader context of political science methods. The conclusion offers two detailed examples of the effective use of scenarios.? In his classic work on scenario analysis, The Art of the Long View, Peter Schwartz commented that “social scientists often have a hard time [building scenarios]; they have been trained to stay away from ‘what if?’ questions and concentrate on ‘what was?’” (Schwartz 1996:31). While Schwartz's comments were impressionistic based on his years of conducting and teaching scenario analysis, his claim withstands empirical scrutiny. Scenarios—counterfactual narratives about the future—are woefully underutilized among political scientists. The method is almost never taught on graduate student syllabi, and a survey of leading international relations (IR) journals indicates that scenarios were used in only 302 of 18,764 sampled articles. The low rate at which political scientists use scenarios—less than 2% of the time—is surprising; the method is popular in fields as disparate as business, demographics, ecology, pharmacology, public health, economics, and epidemiology (Venable, Li, Ginter, and Duncan 1993; Leufkens, Haaijer-Ruskamp, Bakker, and Dukes 1994; Baker, Hulse, Gregory, White, Van Sickle, Berger, Dole, and Schumaker 2004; Sanderson, Scherbov, O'Neill, and Lutz 2004). Scenarios also are a common tool employed by the policymakers whom political scientists study.? This article seeks to elevate the status of scenarios in political science by demonstrating their usefulness for theory building and pedagogy. Rather than constitute mere speculation regarding an unpredictable future, as critics might suggest, scenarios assist scholars with developing testable hypotheses, gathering data, and identifying a theory's upper and lower bounds. Additionally, scenarios are an effective way to teach students to apply theory to policy. In the pages below, a “best practices” guide is offered to advise scholars, practitioners, and students, and an argument is developed in favor of the use of scenarios. The article concludes with two examples of how political scientists have invoked the scenario method to improve the specifications of their theories, propose falsifiable hypotheses, and design new empirical research programs.? Scenarios in the Discipline? What do counterfactual narratives about the future look like? Scenarios may range in length from a few sentences to many pages. One of the most common uses of the scenario method, which will be referenced throughout this article, is to study the conditions under which high-consequence, low-probability events may occur. Perhaps the best example of this is nuclear warfare, a circumstance that has never resulted, but has captivated generations of political scientists. For an introductory illustration, let us consider a very simple scenario regarding how a first use of a nuclear weapon might occur:? During the year 2023, the US military is ordered to launch air and sea patrols of the Taiwan Strait to aid in a crisis. These highly visible patrols disrupt trade off China's coast, and result in skyrocketing insurance rates for shipping companies. Several days into the contingency, which involves over ten thousand US military personnel, an intelligence estimate concludes that a Chinese conventional strike against US air patrols and naval assets is imminent. The United States conducts a preemptive strike against anti-air and anti-sea systems on the Chinese mainland. The US strike is far more successful than Chinese military leaders thought possible; a new source of intelligence to the United States—unknown to Chinese leadership—allowed the US military to severely degrade Chinese targeting and situational awareness capabilities. Many of the weapons that China relied on to dissuade escalatory US military action are now reduced to single-digit-percentage readiness. Estimates for repairs and replenishments are stated in terms of weeks, and China's confidence in readily available, but “dumber,” weapons is low due to the dispersion and mobility of US forces. Word of the successful US strike spreads among the Chinese and Taiwanese publics. The Chinese Government concludes that for the sake of preserving its domestic strength, and to signal resolve to the US and Taiwanese Governments while minimizing further economic disruption, it should escalate dramatically with the use of an extremely small-yield nuclear device against a stationary US military asset in the Pacific region.? This short story reflects a future event that, while unlikely to occur and far too vague to be used for military planning, contains many dimensions of political science theory. These include the following: what leaders perceive as “limited,” “proportional,” or “escalatory” uses of force; the importance of private information about capabilities and commitment; audience costs in international politics; the relationship between military expediency and political objectives during war; and the role of compressed timelines for decision making, among others. The purpose of this article is to explain to scholars how such stories, and more rigorously developed narratives that specify variables of interest and draw on extant data, may improve the study of IR. An important starting point is to explain how future counterfactuals fit into the methodological canon of the discipline.2AC---Reps TurnThe security dilemma best explains US-Chinese competition in space---their analysis lacks predictive utilityChristopher D. Fabian 19, MA thesis, B.S. from US Air Force Academy, May 2019, "A Neoclassical Realist's Analysis of Sino-U.S. Space Policy," realism is the best theoretical approach to perform the medium-term predictive analysis that competitive strategies require. It acknowledges that structural factors such as relative power and geography are the chief independent variables of international relations in the long-term, ultimately setting the left and right bounds of state behavior.19 This theory suggests that foreign policy is strongly linked to systemic incentives but asserts that those incentives are not deterministic. 20 Therefore, it accounts for the general trend of conflict that occurs when the global status quo is usurped, while avoiding the propensity for structural determinism inherent to offensive realism. Neoclassical realism emphasizes that building an understanding of structural factors is required as the first step to analyzing international relations, therefore the overarching method through which competitive strategy must be developed is by examining external, systemic variables impacting Sino-U.S. relations. This thesis will examine the unique geography of East Asia, the physics of the space domain, and the relative power dynamic between China and the United States as its primary independent variables. One of the core tenants of neoclassical realism is the assumption of imperfect rationality. A leader’s understanding of structural factors is inevitably refracted as it passes through the lens of cultural perception and behavioral economics, and often functions in combination with a lack of information about an opponent’s intentions and capabilities. These influences create misperceptions about the relative power dynamic, causing leaders to make seemingly irrational decisions. As a result, structural factors can only impact states’ behavior to the extent that they influence the perception and decision making of leaders. This complicates the linear correlation between structural factors and state behavior, making a purely realist analysis less accurate over the short and medium terms. 21 Therefore, neoclassical realism requires that a state’s decision making apparatus must be considered as an intervening variable to account for these factors. 22 Internal factors must be studied in conjunction with external factors to be able to perform a comprehensive analysis of state behavior. In order to determine the effects of these intervening variables, this thesis will examine the decision making apparatuses of China and the United States through an examination of unmotivated and motivated biases that affect the Sino-U.S. strategic relationship. For foreign policy analysis, a neoclassical realist approach seeks to avoid both a heavily quantitative game theoretical analysis or the purely qualitative methods of thick description.23 A balance must be struck between the tendencies for game theoretical analysis to devolve into structural determinism, or for thick description to become mired in overly-nuanced analysis. A non-quantitative, descriptive game theoretical analysis is able to strike this balance. On one hand, purely quantitative game theoretical framework used for predictive analysis succumbs to exponentially increasing complexity as a greater range of intervening variables is introduced. On the other, a simple 2x2 game is often dismissed as being too simplistic to capture the complexity of international politics.24 Therefore, a game should be used as a representation of general policy stances, one that can be modified to encompass a wide range of phenomena in order to illuminate the fundamental nature of a policy issue.25 The foundation of this analysis will be a basic 2x2 game that seeks to describe the structural dynamic of Sino-U.S. relations. Independent variables such as relative military capability and economic means will be used to set a reference point for each player, assign utility within the function, and establish equilibrium. The game will be then be modified using intervening variables, such as motivated and unmotivated biases, in order to anticipate deviations from perfect rationality. This method is based off Robert Jervis’s seminal article Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma, in which he sets the theoretical groundwork for integrating game theory, neoclassical realism, and the security dilemma.26 This analysis will build on Jervis’s framework by incorporating actor and domain specific information. D. LITERATURE REVIEW The best fit for a literature review when using a neoclassical realist methodology is a topdown approach as it requires a solid appreciation of structural incentives before applying them to the analysis of a given scenario. Therefore, developing a conceptual understanding of the mechanisms of international conflict and how they are modified to account for psychological factors is foundational to this thesis. In order to apply this understanding to Sino-U.S. space policy the structural variables affecting Sino-U.S. space policy must be examined. These includes the geography of the space domain, establishing deterrence in space, its use as an instrument of national power, and the broader Sino-U.S. geostrategic balance. Subsequently assessing intervening psychological variables is based on attaining an understanding of Chinese and American security cultures, the perceptions of policy makers about the space and its role in strategy, and domestic variables that impact decision making. Finally, integrating space policy into the thesis schema requires both a review of existing literature on competitive strategy for East Asia and a review of each nations’ space capabilities and policies in an attempt to link the two. This will include an analysis of how space capabilities fit into current strategy, how they interact with psychological factors, and conclude with a near-term predictive analysis of technology and policy development. In his 1978 publication Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma, Robert Jervis provides an excellent analysis of structural and cognitive factors influencing the security dilemma in international relations. His fundamental assumption is that international relations exist in a condition of anarchy where a state is responsible for its own security absent an international sovereign.27 This results in zero-sum relationships where a state’s quest for security impedes the security of another. Therefore, when a state seeks to expand its influence in order to increase its own security it upsets the existing status quo, making another state less safe. 28 He uses a game theoretical framework to broadly explain the choices that both states can make, cooperate or defect. Both states can defect and the result is conflict; both states can cooperate and reap gains; or one can cooperate while the other defects, which results in one state losing big and the other winning big. The fear of this third condition is the causal force behind the security dilemma.29 Jervis expands the theory by adding the offense-defense postulate which examines the circumstances under which the security dilemma is most strong. When technology and geography conspire to give an advantage to an attacker, first strikes are incentivized and the dilemma becomes stronger. 30 Additionally, the security dilemma is heightened when offense is not distinguishable from defense because signaling is inherently ambiguous. When both of these conditions are met, it creates a doubly dangerous scenario where it is difficult to gain security without menacing others. When the opposite condition is true, signaling is effective and a zerosum relationship is not exaggerated. This results in a doubly stable relationship with a diminished propensity towards the security dilemma. Even when defense has the advantage a security dilemma can result when offensive and defensive postures are indistinguishable because intentions are difficult to predict.31 The usefulness of Jervis’s work to this analysis would be limited if he had only accounted for structural factors. However, in “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma” Jervis briefly acknowledges imperfect rationality through the concept of subjective security demands. He purports that if every world leader rationally understood her nation’s alignment with this theory, conflict would be obsolete. Therefore, the structural mechanism of the security dilemma is dependent on the psychology and perception of national leaders, which alters their calculus of the security dilemma.32 Jervis expands this idea in a topical anthology titled Psychology and Deterrence. These two works, when taken together, form the basis of a neoclassical realist’s analysis of the security dilemma. Case studies involving deterrence failure are used to discern the factors responsible for the underlying miscalculations.33 Three hypothesis are of particular interest to this thesis. First, the misperception of the offense-defense balance prior to World War I (WWI) contributed to a lack of first-strike stability. Second, culture differences resulting in bad signaling were a factor leading to the Falklands War. Third, a miscalculation of an unacceptable shift in balance of power created an incentive to launch a preemptive attack preceding the ArabIsraeli War of 1973. 34. The integration of structural and psychological factors in decision making under the security dilemma is accomplished through the application of behavioral economics. Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky set the basis for this understanding in their collected works, the capstone of which is Thinking Fast and Slow. Cognitive predispositions, the availability heuristic, and motivated biases are all used to explain deterrence failures in Psychology and Deterrence. 35 However, the most relevant of their works is Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk. It explains that the linear correlation between risk and gains in a rational model can be modified to account for the propensity of an actor to accept risk based on her satisfaction with the status quo. The result is a non-linear relationship between risk and gains. Their model is often used to account for psychological variables within a game theoretical framework.36 Kahneman and Tversky propose that actors have the tendency to assess their position in relative rather than absolute terms, therefore those who are dissatisfied with their relative position are increasingly likely to accept risk while those who are satisfied become risk averse.37 This dynamic is expected to be especially strong between China and the United States where the U.S. represents a strong status quo power and China is emerging to challenge America’s position. Assessing internal variables for China and the United States can set a reference point for each nation and, using prospect theory, perform an analysis of their propensity to accept risk. After examining models of international conflict and incorporating them within a theoretical framework in order to set the foundation for this thesis methodology, structural dynamics underlying the Sino-U.S. space policy relationship must be examined. Because context is essential to any niche policy arena, the broader Sino-U.S. geostrategic balance is the primary structural dynamic affecting Sino-U.S. space policy. In Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? Grahm Allison coins the term Thucydides’s Trap to describe the friction caused by a state gaining comparative military, political, and economic power at the expense of an existing hegemon. He uses Thucydides examination of this dynamic in History of the Peloponnesian War as the basis of his research and examines 15 additional case studies in which a rising power has displaced a status quo power.38 By Allison’s own admission the use of words like destined or predetermined are misleading. However, he reveals that, “…in all cases we find heads of state confronting strategic dilemmas about rivals under conditions of uncertainty and chronic stress,”39 and in 12 of 16 cases examined the result has been war between the two states.40 Additional to the zero-sum hard power relationship strongly acting upon both actors to strengthen the security dilemma, Allison proposes that psychological factors can modify the relationship and serve to either dampen or exacerbate Thucydides’s Trap. Generally, a rising power’s recognized status in the international community lags behind that state’s self-perceived importance whereas the status quo power faces fear and anxiety in the face of potential decline.41 Management of these perceptions is essential to avoiding conflict. Allison makes the case that the contemporary Sino-U.S. relationship meets the conditions for Thucydides’s trap and analogizes it with the pre-WWI dynamic between Britain and Germany. He argues that the rapid expansion (or reemergence) of China’s economy is supporting a subsequent increase in military power and political influence in East Asia. This threatens to upset the status quo of American hegemony in the region.42 Allison examines China’s national motivations and internal decision making apparatus and proposes that the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) mandate is to return Chinese national prestige and recoup national sovereignty. This is supported primarily by a strong nationalist sentiment and continued economic reform. 43 The analysis is useful in that it examines the structural preconditions for conflict, but also conducts a layered neoclassical realist analysis by identifying accompanying psychological factors and suggesting a way forward to help soften the structural predilection for conflict. These actor-specific recommendations may be integrated into a competitive strategy approach to increase its efficacy. Robert Haddick’s Fire on the Water is relevant to this thesis in that it combines an understanding of East Asian geography, the current state of military technology and doctrine, and national motivations to perform a holistic analysis of the Sino-U.S. strategic balance. Although China has substantial coastline, it is viewed as a continental power rather than a maritime one due to the cramped nature of the South China and East China Seas. A series of island chains create a physical barrier that serves to constrain Chinese naval expansion and offers the opportunity for hostile nations to stage attacks into mainland China. China’s traditional fear of encirclement, its quest for resources, and unresolved national sovereignty creates incentives for maritime expansion.44 On the other hand, fear of China’s expanding influence among nations along China’s periphery has resulted in rebalancing in order to contain China. Furthermore, China’s expanded influence threatens U.S. interest in the region, creating the potential to limit access to sea lines of communication and coerce trading partners. This creates a struggle where China must demonstrate the capability to deny U.S. military assets access to the area close to China’s maritime borders while the U.S. seeks to maintain the ability to project power into the region and strike at Chinese strategic interests. This dynamic has two important implications for this thesis. Due to the emphasis on systems warfare and information systems, the current overall military balance lacks first-strike stability. Also, the cost of offensive capabilities is far lower than the capabilities they are designed to defeat. American surface ships and 5th generation air assets are orders of magnitude more expensive and harder to produce than the Chinese anti-access missiles designed to interdict them. Haddick’s assessment of an offensive dominant condition is bleak considering Jervis’s observations about how an environment that favors the offense heightens the security dilemma. More importantly, the tyranny of distance has created an overreliance on space assets in East Asian military operations. It is clear to see through Haddick’s analysis that space operations and terrestrial geography are interrelated. He paints a bleak picture where, in the event of hostilities, the area within 2000km of the Chinese mainland would turn into a dead zone where the cost of performing military operations is prohibitive aside from limited probing actions.45 The United States will likely be deprived of traditional land, sea, and air assets used for performing ISR used for targeting mainland China, which greatly reduces the coercive capability of the U.S. military. The resulting reliance on space assets to perform these functions increases their value as military targets. Likewise, China uses space-based capabilities for targeting U.S. military assets between the Chinese mainland and the second island chain. Aided by their continental position, China’s space and ground based ISR assets create a redundant architecture with which to threaten U.S. assets. 46 This creates an asymmetric advantage for China that makes space warfare a possible tool of coercion and deterrence. However, for the Chinese, as the theater of operation’s distance from the mainland increases their reliance on space assets is proportionally raised. Therefore, projecting power beyond the first island chain becomes a difficult proposition without space power. Due to the importance of space assets in the East Asian military balance this thesis argues that they will likely be considered as first-strike options by both nations. In addition to the links between terrestrial geography and space power, space has a unique geography in and of itself. Said geography, defined by orbital mechanics and the relentless pull of gravity, must be examined as a fundamental structural component of this analysis. Often times policy makers fail to grasp that realities of orbital mechanics and current state of technology create a very limited right and left bound of what is possible (or at the very least practical) in space. Everett Dolman, author of Astropolitik: Classical Geopolitics in the Space Age, argues that space, counterintuitively, is an operationally limited environment. Due to the exponential cost that the rocket equation imposes on lifting objects into orbit, spacefaring nations develop narrow, well-trodden pathways to space in an attempt to minimize this cost.47 Launch locations and support stations at given latitudes and longitudes are more valuable than others.48 Also, an orbit’s characteristics translate to their relative path along the earth’s surface. Therefore, only certain combinations of orbital elements produce an orbit that serves a purpose for terrestrial support functions. These limiting factors create strategic chokepoints through which the entirety of the space domain may be controlled. 49 Dolman uses his assessment of space geography to apply the geopolitical realist lines of thinking from Mackinder and Mahan’s to the space domain. It is arguable that his Realpolitik thought experiment has had disproportional influence on space strategists, but a useful line of thought still comes out of Dolman’s analysis. It is evident that space domination is possible given a state with adequate technological prowess and the will to do so. Rather than the cosmos being an impossibly large area out of reach of a single hegemon, a state could physically dominate space by controlling the most important chokepoints. These chokepoints may serve as flash points for future conflicts because of space’s overall importance to terrestrial conflict.50 The entire structure of the space law framework set about in the Cold War was not benign, rather it was an attempt by Russia and the United States to prevent the domination of space by the other power considering their own inability to do so.51 Therefore, with the technological advancements since the Cold War and the removal of the primary buffer against U.S. expansion, the prospect of the U.S. seeking space domination seems more likely. This effectively extends the “border” between the Chinese and Americans and adds another dimension to the already complex relationship. This thesis will argue that the geography of space combined with the American doctrine of space control exacerbates the Chinese fear of encirclement. In Heavenly Ambitions: America’s Quest to Dominate Space, Joan Johnson-Freese argues that, despite the impressions of policy makers in both China and the U.S., domination of space is currently impractical due to the current technological development of space systems. Ideologically, her soft-power driven, innerpolitik analysis of space policy is a counterpoint to Dolman. This has won her a similar number of disciples in the space policy realm. Three arguments in particular, which are consistent and well developed through her collected works, contribute to understanding the structural elements of space policy. First, she believes that domination of space is inherently threatening. A space hegemon, unlike one in land, air, or sea would inherently have the capability to violate any nations sovereignty with little posturing, at a moment’s notice.52 This would require the placement of space weapons to interdict all objects passing through space and be omnipresent in scope and duration.53 Second, space is an offensive dominant domain. The cost of developing, launching, and maintaining a space asset that provides a terrestrial effect is far greater than the corresponding technology that can defeat it. Anti-Satellite (ASAT) technologies to include on-orbit interdictors, terrestrial based missiles, and electronic jammers are simple, cheap, and efficient, making them accessible to nations less capable than top-tier space powers.54 Also, the development time of space technologies is far slower than their counter. It is possible to shield on-orbit assets with maneuver capability, shielding, or escorts. However, these assets drastically increase the cost of maintaining a given effect in a hostile environment. When taken in concert, it is clear from Dolman and Freese’s work that space hegemony will take a concerted national effort, requiring an expenditure of time, political capital, and money. Also, the window of time between setting out to achieve dominance and actually achieving it would be exceptionally vulnerable to a security dilemma. Even after achieving dominance a hegemon would need to maintain the capability to render an opponent’s ASAT technologies useless, a capability which also falls prey to the unfavorable cost relationship of an offensive dominant domain.55 Third, in the space domain offensive technologies are difficult to distinguish from defensive ones. The capabilities that make a good weapon are not mutually exclusive with those that have scientific or commercial uses.56 Very few red flag capabilities exist that give an adversary certainty as to the purpose of a given platform. This results in the necessity to either judge an adversary by its potential capabilities or take it at face value to be benign. It also results in a delicate situation where technology diffusion between commercial entities of one country and the commercial or military organization of another has national security implications.57 Even worse, the exact same satellite may be used for civilian or military purposes, sometimes at the same exact time.58 This complicates the legitimacy of civilian assets as military targets, a line of thought reminiscent of the strategic bombing campaigns during WWII. Also, escalation could occur if third party assets are being used by one of the belligerents. Therefore, it is evident through Freese’s arguments that space is susceptible to Jervis’s doubly dangerous scenario where technologies are both offensive dominant and offensive-defense indistinguishable. Continuing the thread of integrating theories of international conflict to the space domain, Forrest Morgan applies the principles of deterrence to space in his RAND monograph Deterrence and First Strike Stability in Space: A Preliminary Assessment. Morgan’s work operates on the theoretical level, using traditional cost imposition/denial of gains structure in support of a broad analysis. Generally, the point where perceived cost of executing a strategy outweighs the gains reaped from said strategy, deterrence is established. He heavily caveats the work, calling it an empty template for further research. Due to deterrence’s subjective nature the deterrent effect of a strategy may be strong on one actor but useless for another. 59 This foundational analysis can be applied to Sino-U.S. space policy if the relative development of the U.S. and China’s space capabilities and strategic culture are accounted for. Morgan points out that the nature of space deterrence has fundamentally changed since the end of the Cold War. First, a decoupling of space and nuclear warfare has destroyed the tacit red lines that guaranteed an attack on space systems would result in nuclear retaliation.60 Furthermore, technologies have been developed that allow for incremental escalation and nonlethal functional kills of space assets.61 A paradigm is created where escalation is probable, but the extent to which it will happen is unknown. This is a problem for Sino-U.S. space relations because China is a nuclear capable power who believes itself to have achieved nuclear deterrence with the United States, yet does not have the implied strategic understanding that it took the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. four decades to build. The rules of the game have changed, but the danger of nuclear apocalypse is still real and a risk of miscalculation has increased. Morgan echoes Johnson-Freese’s assertion that the dual-use phenomenon complicates deterrence and extends the reasoning on offensive dominance by adding valuable insight on the state of first-strike stability. In short, first-strike stability is difficult to maintain because the disproportionate gain from a first strike outweighs any cost a recipient can impose in response. The United States’ overwhelming reliance on and comparative advantage from space based effects gives a prospective attacker very high payoff and satellites being relatively soft targets increases the likelihood of success and further adds to the benefit of a first-strike.62 Conversely, the emphasis on system based warfare means that an effective attack on space assets drastically reduces the ability of the U.S. to impose costs. Also, its overreliance on space and the fragility of the space environment require an asymmetric response to both avoid a tit-for-tat spiral and protect the continued use of the domain. Furthermore, a lack of space situational awareness (SSA) prevents a rapid response.63 Chinese military planners are acutely aware of the asymmetric advantage to be gained from a first-strike in space and have integrated it into military doctrine. This further strengthens the argument of space warfare as a flash point in East Asia. The structural factors examined in the literature thus far paint a bleak picture for a peaceful restructuring of East Asia. However, a bipartisan grand strategy that preempts conflict, is sustained and refined over decades, and has an acute sense of both a competitor and one’s own culture and history may be able to subvert structural determinism.64 When imperfect rationality and miscalculation results in deterrence failure it is difficult to underestimate the importance of understanding a competitor’s decision making apparatus. Strategic culture, political climate, and soft power interactions are the core of this apparatus. Joan Johnson-Freese, who is equal parts East Asia policy and space policy expert, asserts that, “it might be generally possible to grasp the mechanics of the Chinese space program without the benefits of historical information, but the likelihood of truly understanding the policy aspects without this contextual information is slightly less, and attempts at analysis and extrapolation become superficial at best.”65 Likewise, competitive strategy will be ineffective absent an understanding of one’s own limitations. Resources such as latent military capacity, budget, political capitol, strategic culture, and soft power/international prestige should be easy to calculate, but many times within the space program’s short history the failure to grasp internal limitations has been a stumbling block. We’ve accurately depicted how China would act in space---analysis of their actions in the Antarctic and SCS proveL.M Foster and Namrata Goswami 19, L.M Foster is a Wing Commander (WGCDR) in the Royal New Zealand Air Force and currently a student at the United States Air University’s Air War College, Dr. Namrata Goswami is a Senior Analyst and Author. Her work on “Outer Space and Great Powers” was supported by the MINERVA Initiative Grant for Social Science Research, What China’s Antarctic Behavior Tells Us About the Future of Space, The Diplomat, 1/11/19, his opening remarks to the 19th Communist Party of China (CPC)’s National Congress, Chinese President Xi Jinping specified that China aims to become a powerful country by 2050 based on modernizing socialism. Built in as a major component of Xi’s China Dream is China’s Space Dream aimed at turning the country into the most advanced country with space technology by 2045. The road map published by the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corp (CASTC) indicates that between 2020 and 2045, China aims to achieve several significant milestones with regard to space technology to include a reusable carrier rocket by 2035, and a nuclear powered space shuttle by 2040, which would augment larger payloads to include human presence in space. These plans for a nuclear powered space fleet are supported by the China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology (CALT), which in a report published in the People’s Daily front page stated that this development would enable China to commercially explore and exploit the natural resources available in space by 2040. Wang Chunghui, associate professor of aerospace propulsion at the School of Astronautics at Beihang University, stated, “The nuclear vessels are built to colonise the solar system and beyond.”In separate but interconnected mission goals, published by the state funded China National Space Administration (CNSA), tasked with setting policy for space, China aims to launch its first Mars probe by 2020, probe asteroids by 2022, and launch an exploration mission to Jupiter by 2029. Plans to establish a lunar research base are afoot, led by the Chang’e 4 lunar landing on the far side of the moon, a Yuegong-1 (Lunar Palace 1) 365 days simulated experiment at Beihang University, Beijing, where eight students lived in conditions similar to the lunar surface. Inside the lunar module, the students conducted bioregenerative life support system experiments, growing food like wheat and potato from their own waste. The aim, according to Liu Hong, chief designer and chief scientist of Lunar Palace 1 was to further seek a ride on China’s lunar and Mars probes to study the sustainability of human colonization and long term settlement within a bioregenrative life support system on the moon or Mars. Experiments to sustain human reproduction were conducted by China in April 2016 when the SJ-10 recoverable satellite took about 6000 mouse embryos to space, which demonstrated that some of the embryos developed in space.For China, investing in the incremental development of its space program is connected to its long term ambitions to utilize space for its vast resource potential. This is consistent with its objectives to develop China into a country that benefits from the most advanced indigenously built space technology, especially tied to its national development goal of overall rejuvenation. The advantage China has over countries like the United States, India, Australia, or New Zealand (NZ) is that the CPC does not submit itself to democratic elections every four or five years. This aspect augments the Chinese regime’s capacity for long term planning and resource commitments. After President Xi Jinping came to power in 2013, China has engaged in visible demonstrations of its power by asserting its stake on disputed territory to include the South China Sea (SCS) islands, disputed territories with India and Bhutan as well as the East China Seas (ECS). Significantly, while China asserts that it will share its space technology with other countries, framing outer space as a “global common,” and abide by international and bilateral agreements, China’s past behavior of staking claims to territory based on “first presence” and historical revisions, to include the SCS islands, Tibet, and Taiwan, offers us little assurance that it will follow through on its commitments to recognize other stakes on shared territory in outer space, to include the moon, especially if those areas are rich with resources. Tibet (an area rich in water and mineral resources) and the South China Sea offer evidence of China committing to non-escalation of conflict on paper with countries like India (with regard to Tibet) and fellow signatory countries of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, while engaging in escalatory behavior of taking over territory by force. This aspect was most evident when Xi assured former U.S. President Barack Obama in the White House in September 2015 that there were zero plans to build a military base on artificial islands in the SCS. Yet we know from subsequent evidence that China had plans to do the exact opposite and went ahead and built military facilities on disputed islands. China’s militarization of the SCS has been a gradual process, where alternative actions by the United States, as well as other countries, could have changed the course of history.China in AntarcticaChina’s behavior in Antarctica could offer valuable insights on how it might behave in outer space once it establishes a presence, for instance, on the lunar surface. Antarctica is the coldest, driest, and windiest continent on the planet with access over the last 100 years being in support of science and exploration exclusively; however, more recently Antarctica has come under increased attention as nations seek solutions to the challenges of resource scarcity, climate change, and food security. What do these three areas have in common? Strategic territory, an ability to solve resource scarcity issues, energy, and the ability to leverage a world where actions fail to prevent Chinese aggression. The West needs to understand this threat, the impact now and in the future, and strategize to combat it.The Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) was established in 1961 by the territorial claimant states; Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, NZ, Norway, and the U.K. along with several non-claimant countries including the U.S.S.R and United States. The Antarctic treaty defines the Antarctic continent as the land and ice shelves below 60 degrees south. The treaty stipulates that all territorial claims be suspended, the region to remain demilitarized and nuclear-free, and the primary goal is for cooperative scientific exploration. Additional agreements over the continent include the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR, 1982) to protect marine resources, and the Protocol on Environment Protection of the Antarctic Treaty (1991), known as the “Madrid Protocol,” which forbids the exploitation of mineral resources. Any alterations to the ATS cannot take effect until 2048 without unanimous approval.Economically, interests include tourism, fishing, logistics for expeditions, the involvement of businesses in Antarctica, and the potential exploitation of scientific research from the continent. For example, fishing by NZ-based fishing companies in the Ross Sea and Southern Ocean bring in approximately NZ$20 million (US$13.6 million) per annum. However, CCAMLR tightly prohibits overfishing which can, as a direct flow-on effect, affect the availability of fish in other EEZs. Tourism includes country based activities including international Antarctic attractions in several major cities as well as sea tours of the region. Nations are keen to further exploit the potential economic upsides but remain wary of utilizing large-scale commercial operators due to the strategic importance of the region and the desire to retain political control.Politically, interest for claimant states is based fundamentally around the maintenance of their sovereign claim to the continent and a strong desire for involvement in international Antarctic governance. In NZ’s case, its geographic location and reliance on other states for maintaining security and access to markets drives the dependence on multinational relationships and alliances to pursue its foreign policy. However, Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing in the Ross Sea is raising significant concern, particularly the fact that some of the infringing fishers are from ATS signatory states. A Stockholm report from January 2015 tallied 147 cases of suspected IUU activities in Antarctic waters using 72 vessels between 1995 and 2009. These vessels frequently change their names and flag states to conceal the true beneficiaries of their fishing. Although CCAMLR protects the legal catch, it will take a significant investment in surveillance and security systems to avert IUU fishing. NZ’s recent acquisition of the P-8 Poseidon from the U.S. Navy will assist in the Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) of the “deep south” and the ability to kinetically target the IUU fishers may provide a deterrence effect. Furthermore, it is envisioned that the acquisition of space-based sensor assets will have a marked impact on the surveillance of the Southern Ocean. In recent times, vessels have been caught illegally fishing in Antarctic waters for toothfish. Although detained and prosecuted, given the various flags these vessels posses and the multiple nationalities of the crew, it makes it difficult to pinpoint the beneficiaries.With the growth of the world population, plentiful Antarctic waters, shortage of food resources, and the lack of prosecution through hard power; illegal fishing is likely to rise, particularly if ATS states are shielding the vessels. Anne-Marie Brady suggests that China is flouting the rules of the ATS. In 2014, the Chinese krill catch was 55,000 tons, worth approximately$10 million, however, in 2015 China announced plans to increase their intake to between one to two million tons. CCAMLR restricts annual krill catch to 680,000 tons. As such, Chinese plans were to definitively and pugnaciously exceed the limits. Moreover, China’s record of IUU fishing is poor. China refused fisheries permission to board and inspect four Chinese flagged vessels caught illegally fishing in the Southern Ocean in 2007, and in 2016 the Argentinean Coast Guard sank a Chinese flagged vessel illegally fishing in a protected area. China’s antagonistic disregard of the ATS is not the only example where China flouts the CCAMLR rules.Although China joined CCAMLR in 2007, it explicitly did not necessitate Hong Kong (HK) to seek membership, in fact, Bliss argues this is “diplomatic deception” as HK is the base of the multinational fishing company Pacific Andes which, through its activities and that of its offshoots, is heavily implicated in the illegal fishing of Patagonian toothfish. IUU fishing is not only a security risk to the Antarctic region, it flouts the laws of the global commons and displays ill strategic intent. With global food security issues, it is likely to increase given the difficulty in prosecuting and deterring offenders. If signatory countries of the ATS do not have the political will or desire to take kinetic action against these offenders it must aim to use diplomatic power and political means to discourage the offenders, particularly China. If such behavior is not exposed, and the world continues to stand by and silently observe this exploitation by China, it will likely continue and expand into other resources, to include space based resources. With climate change, global demand due to a rising population, the world’s energy crisis, and advances in technology/extraction methods, Antarctica’s minerals are ripe for the picking. Research to date suggests Antarctica has bountiful stocks; it is home to four of the 10 minerals with less than 25 years of global reserves, and a further five of 14 with less than 50 years reserves. Given global population growth, it is likely that by 2050 demand will increase by an additional 25 percent. Although extraction methods are not financially viable at present and the “Madrid Protocol” prohibits extraction of such minerals (until 2048), as necessity is the mother of invention, innovative methods are likely to arise. Furthermore, under the guise of “scientific research” any exploration is deemed accidental, which creates the situation where many real exploratory events are masked under the name of science. This exploration and potential mining are of concern as any conflict arising over minerals would likely involve multiple sovereign claimant states. NZ’s sovereign claim area alone is believed to hold more than 200 billion barrels of oil plus numerous minerals such as calcium, copper, iron, magnesium, and phosphorus, as well as an abundance of Krill stocks. Any conflict arising would adversely impact sovereign claims and likely influence multiple nations security. Scholars suggest that China is the foremost player in the mineral exploitation game, as their four (soon to be five) bases are all in areas it has identified as strategically important and rich in resources. The Polar Research Institute of China (PRIC) estimates there are 500 billion tons of oil and 300-500 billion tons of natural gas on the continent, plus more in the Southern Ocean stating “when all the world’s resources have been depleted, Antarctica will be a global treasure house of resources.” China’s focus is on exploiting resources in and above the ground.China’s State Oceanic Administration (SOA) is the government department responsible for China’s Antarctic activities, the same department responsible for maritime law enforcement and the interface for the United Nations Convention for the Law of the SEA (UNCLOS).Moreover, the SOA oversees maritime surveillance in the SCS. China’s recent actions in this global common are of concern particularly when analyzing China’s future trends as a growing power in both Antarctica and the space domain. The lack of clear policy in the SCS or cooperation with international bodies such as ASEAN make it difficult to correlate diplomatic gestures when military modernization and expansion continue to occur.Headlined by large-scale investment, China is using Antarctica for the development of their ice-based satellite communications system; the placement of BeiDou 2 ground stations (China’s GPS equivalent) on the ice increasing the accuracy and capability of missile tracking, timing and positioning; and an astronomical program that includes infrared telescopes capable of detecting enemy satellites, drones, and missile launches. The use of this suite of technology means that in any future dispute, the targeting of Antarctic bases could be a reality even if the conflict is not on the continent. Several other threats stem from Chinese involvement in Antarctica that will affect international security such as commercial tourism; bioprospecting; and the undeclared (but inflammatory) military actions. Several of the Antarctic concerns can be directly transposed into the space environment where China expresses similar intent of establishing a lunar research base for scientific experiments. China’s Chang’e 4 lunar probe is hosting a 3 kg cylindrical container consisting of the first lunar biosphere experiment.China views exploration of outer space as part of its overall national development. Its space-based BeiDou 2 system aims for global coverage by 2020. Furthermore, China aims to have a human-crewed space station by 2020-22 and a space-based solar power station by 2050, all to protect China’s national interests. Comparable to its actions in Antarctica, Chinese nationalistic goals and somewhat imperialistic advance will likely determine the shape of future conflict. There are signs that in Antarctica, a South China Sea type scenario could unfold where China is propelled by resource nationalism which is defined as “anti-competitive behavior designed to restrict the international supply of a natural resource.” Again, one can draw similarities in the future space environment by linking previous statements to subsequent actions.Like the rhetoric coming from the Chinese government regarding Antarctica, officials from the Chinese Long March design have stressed the importance of them being “first in space, or the U.S. and Japan could take the lead and occupy strategically important locations.” Additionally, officials from the Chinese moon exploration program state that “the moon could serve as a new and tremendous supplier of energy and resources for human beings… whoever first conquers the moon will benefit first.”China continues to link space exploration with its economic goals, drawing further similarities with Antarctica. Leading Chinese space institutions have identified three unique space goals: space-based solar power (energy), lunar and asteroid mining (resources), and the establishment of its human-crewed space station (human presence). Comparing these goals with the Chinese rhetoric regarding Antarctica, we see similarities: the want to harness oil reserves (energy), the desire to test for and mine minerals (resources), and the buildup and expansion of basing (human presence). Moreover, when we compare Antarctica to the SCS, we draw further similarities with Chinese mapping of the entire geography, the renaming of landscapes and significant landforms in Chinese, and a gradual, calculated and intentional buildup of military equipment. The deliberate nature of Chinese actions both in the SCS and Antarctica should serve as an indicator to space powers that without regulations and ongoing dialogue the “first come, first served” mentality might prevail.SBSP TurnAND SBSP is the only solution to innovate out of the current energy crisis---proves sustainability AND that the ALT ALONE fails because a) energy is required to provide people a decent standard of living and b) no amount of energy efficiency can make up for the increased energy demand of a growing population---SBSP provides the largest and cheapest supply of clean energy Peter Garretson 10, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF, an airpower strategist currently serving on the CSAF’s Strategic Studies Group , Nov 5 2010, "Is the Future of Energy Geopolitics in Space?", Strategic Analysis, Vol 34, 2010, Issue 6: The Politics of Energy Security, ’s face the facts: we are not going to regulate our way out of either climate change, or a peaking of fossil fuels. Even if we could imagine that individuals and nations were capable of accepting significant reductions in their lifestyle for long-term self-interest or the interests of their grandchildren, no amount of increased efficiency of those already using energy is going to make up for the Other Three Billion (O3B) citizens of the world moving to developed lifestyles and their accompanying energy demand. We can kid ourselves that some mix of efficiency, nuclear and renewable energy is going to do the trick, but the reality is that we will have to do something much more radical. And right now, we are not.Although energy security and climate change have risen to the top of the international agenda, the scale and importance of the problems have far from penetrated even the best minds in the strategic and international relations community. This was evident in the recent presentations on Asian Geopolitical Scenarios in 2030 at the Indian Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses’ recent Asian Security Conference.What was striking to some in the audience was that none of the potential scenarios explicitly took into account either the geopolitical implications of the possibility of real energy scarcity resulting from a peaking in supply of oil, gas, and coal (peak oil), or of, as the chair of the session, Mr. K. Subrahmanyam said, the likelihood of ‘a second industrial revolution’ in green energy that would reshape the economy and technological leadership of the world. Nor did any of the scenarios explore that perhaps both would take place, but staggered in time such that the second industrial revolution might in fact take place, shifting the balance of technological power and future distribution of power, but occur too late for a smooth transition, seeing only slow initial growth amidst the calamity of a highly constrained or decreasing fossil fuel supply and accompanying conflict.People just don’t understand the scale of ‘radical’. Let’s take India as the archetypal example of global energy growth and development. What sort of multiplier would you think would be ‘reasonable’ for India to show its commitment to addressing climate change? Would a doubling of hydro or nuclear or renewables impress you? What about a quadrupling? What if I told you that India’s Integrated Energy Plan actually plans to increase overall demand side management efficiency by 15 per cent, increase hydroelectric supply five-fold, nuclear by 20-fold, and renewables over 40-fold by 2030? You might think that would put India soundly on the path to energy security and selfsufficiency and expect to see a significant reduction in greenhouse gases . . . and you’d be completely wrong, because India’s energy growth (three to four times primary, five to seven times electrical to support eight to nine per cent GDP growth) completely swallows all that new non-fossil capacity, and requires staggering growth in fossil fuels, leaving India both less energy secure (importing four to five times as much, with more than 40 per cent import dependency versus less than 30 per cent at present), and less climate secure (emitting four to six times as much CO2 as today)!1The problemSo the basic problem—and it is both an engineering as well as geopolitical problem— is to bring about this ‘second industrial revolution’ that provides an energy resource vast enough to supply our enormous global energy demand before either our fossil fuel energy regime irreparably damages our long-term environmental interests or runs short, and to eventually expand to allow the service of the energy needs of a developing world. The engineering answer to this problem may just take us to space.Let’s define the scope and scale of the problem. Today the world uses on the order of 16 Terrawatts (TW) of energy in all forms (thermal, electrical, transportation . . . coal, oil, nuclear, hydro, renewable). The vast majority (85 per cent) comes from fossil fuels (coal, oil, gas), which are limited in supply, and concentrated in certain regions like Russia and West Asia. The total amount of all fossil fuel resources is estimated by the World Energy Council to be 6,000 billion or Barrels of Oil Equivalent (BOE), with the world currently consuming 81 billion BOE per year, with consumption steadily growing at least two per cent a year.Disregarding that steady growth in demand and assuming no new major finds or breakthroughs would imply that there was only about 74 years until exhaustion of conventional fossil fuels. But the nearer-term problem is demand not keeping up with supply, an unprecedented global condition likely to have tremendous consequences.2 While some (Association for the Study of Peak Oil and Gas (ASPO), Matt Simmons, Kenneth S. Deffeyes, Sadad Al Husseini, former head of Saudi Aramco’s production and exploration, T. Boone Pickens, Energy Watch Group) think the peak may have already occurred, even more optimistic estimates of Energy Information Agency (EIA) and International Energy Agency (IEA) place the peak in global oil production before 2030 at below 100 billion BOE.3 While some seem to think coal will last forever, at least the Energy Watch Group report suggests global coal production may peak in by 2025–2030 at only 30 per cent above current levels.4By 2030 the world will have an additional two billion people (eight billion total), and require about 50 per cent more energy (～24TW). The global population might rise to as high as 10 billion, and if each of the citizens of the world were to have a decent standard of living, as per UN goals, the world’s total energy needs would be 50–55TW (or alternately 280 billion BOE annually), almost four times what we use today. That means that today’s sustainable energy supply will have to increase some 23 times, the equivalent of adding 12 Three Gorges Dams (or less than 276 new 1 GW nuclear plants) every year through the end of the century.5That is just the energy supply-demand side of things. If we are serious about controlling carbon to limit risk regarding climate change, an effort of similar scale is required as well. Right now our fossil fuel energy system dumps about 8.38 GtC (30.75 Gt CO2) annually into the atmosphere, with the rate growing at about three per cent per year annually since 2004. To stabilise at twice pre-industrial levels (below 550 ppm) and avoid dangerous levels of warming, emissions must not rise above 10 GtC per year. And to meet the UN development goals that would require some 50TW in 2100. No more that 10TW can come from fossil fuel sources; 40TW must come from some sustainable energy system that does not yet exist.6Most known renewables—wind, hydro-electric, biomass—top out far below the requirements. So what are the options that could scale to meet this truly staggering demand of a post-fossil fuel world? The big ticket potential contributors are nuclear fission, nuclear fusion, terrestrial solar combined with some breakthrough in storage technology or combined with some global electrical distribution grid, and space-based solar power.While the limits of growth and longevity for nuclear fission are well known, a practical commercial fusion reactor still appears to be at least 30 years in the future (which was the estimate 30 years ago as well). Terrestrial solar is only appropriate to certain locations and requires vast amounts of land and overbuild to ensure the kind of 24-hour power our modern societies require.The wild card in all this, and the one with the most interesting geopolitical implications, is space-based solar power (SBSP). Its capacity far exceeds the 55TW of a fully developed world of 10 billion people, with a calculated capacity in geostationary orbit alone of over 177TW. While the world might spend on the order of $1,700 trillion on energy between now and 2100, the non-recurring Research and Development (R&D) and capital investment to get to a viable SBSP system are likely to be under $200 billion, and a race that showcases the multi-polarity of today’s world has already begun, with Japan in the lead.Capitalism is key to successful space development---private innovation brings costs down---government programs are inefficient Harry W. Jones 18, Life support systems engineer at NASA Ames Research Center, "The Recent Large Reduction in Space Launch Cost", 48th International Conference on Environmental Systems, 8-12 July 2018, . IntroductionTHE cost of space launch dropped from very high levels in the first decade of the space age but then remained high for decades and was especially high for the space shuttle. In the most recent decade, commercial rocket development has reduced the typical space launch cost by a factor of 20 while NASA’s launch cost to ISS has declined by a factor of 4.This paper reviews the history of the reduction in space launch costs, considers the reasons for the decline, and discusses the implications for space users. Very high launch cost was long considered the major impediment to space exploration and exploitation. Many technical approaches were suggested to reduce launch cost but none succeeded until commercially motivated suppliers bypassed the problems long inhibiting government sponsored rocket builders. Surprisingly, launch vehicle reuse - the most anticipated method to cut cost - has not so far actually cut cost and probably contributed to very high shuttle launch cost. The decline in launch costs has removed a major barrier and is expected to increase exploration, exploitation, and human expansion in space. The commercial market, the military, and NASA have responded differently due to their different goals and methods. Rocket builders and users are reacting to market signals by cutting prices, and the military sees an opportunity to increase security using space, but NASA seems slower to adapt.II. The history of space launch costsThe mass that launch systems can deliver depends on the destination orbit. Launch systems are usually compared using the launch cost per kilogram to Low Earth Orbit (LEO). The cost for cargo to the International Space Station (ISS) is higher since the payload is lower because ISS is in a higher inclination orbit to accommodate Russian launch sites.A. Launch cost per kilogram to Low Earth Orbit (LEO)Figure 1 shows the launch cost per kilogram to LEO in current dollars for various launch systems plotted against the first system launch date. The data is taken from Table A1 in Appendix A. The usual approach is to compare launch costs per kilogram by dividing the total cost per flight by the maximum payload delivered to LEO. Smaller payloads, payload accommodation systems, and limited payload volume often increase the launch cost per kilogram.The major impression given by Figure 1 is of two large initial and recent cost drops with a long intermediate period of more constant cost. Three early systems had launch costs to LEO above $100 k/kg, even approaching $1,000 k/kg. Vanguard was the first and by far most expensive launch system. Costs dropped rapidly to the Saturn V used for Apollo, which still has the lowest historical cost except for three Soviet systems and the two recent Falcons. Vanguard’s launch cost was about 170 times that of the Saturn V.The average launch cost did not change much from 1970 to 2000, especially since many systems with initial flight before 2000 continue to be used. From 1970 to 2000 the average launch cost was $18.5 k/kg, with a typical range of $10 to $32 k/kg. Of the 22 systems initially launched from 1970 to 2000, only 7 have costs below $10 k/kg, and they are all Soviet or Chinese and their cost may be subsidized. Only 2 systems have costs above $32 k/kg, the shuttle at $61.7 k/kg and the small and costly Pegasus.A major drop in cost occurred in 2010 with the Falcon 9 at $2.7 k/kg. The Falcon Heavy reduces the cost to $1.4 k/kg. Shuttle’s launch cost was about 20 times that of the Falcon 9 and about 40 times that of the Falcon Heavy. The average 1970 to 2000 launch cost of $18.5 k/kg is reduced by a factor of 7 for the Falcon 9 and and 13 for the Falcon Heavy. (Costs from Appendix A are in 2018 dollars. Some differ from unadjusted costs in the abstract.)B. Launch cost per kilogram to the International Space Station (ISS)Table 1 shows the launch cost of the space shuttle and Falcon 9 plus Dragon to the International Space Station (ISS). The numbers are taken from Appendix B: [TABLE REDACTED]The Falcon 9 plus Dragon reduce the space shuttle cost to ISS by about a factor of 4. The cost reduction factor for cargo to ISS is much less than the reduction factor for LEO, but it is still a significant cost reduction.III. The reasons for the decline in launch costsThe technical problems leading to high space launch costs have been identified and cures proposed, but the long delay until the recent reduction in launch costs suggests that cultural and institutional barriers have hindered implementing potential technical improvements. The next sections discuss the technical and institutional reasons for the decline in launch costs. A. Technical causes and cures of very high space launch costAfter an initial decline at the beginning of the space age, Western launch costs have remained very high and relatively constant until recently. High launch costs have been “the greatest limiting factor to expanded space exploitation and exploration.” (Wertz and Larson, 1996, pp. 115-7)The technical causes of high launch cost have been assessed as follows:1. Goal of maximum performance and minimum weight, originally from ballistic missiles2. Higher cost of expendables versus reusables3. High cost of human spaceflight4. High cost of new technology, hardware, and software5. Low failure tolerance and consequent intense design effort and detailed oversight6. High system complexity, parts counts, and number of interfaces (Wertz and Larson, 1996, pp. 126-33)Commercial launchers saved initial development cost by using missile designs, but missiles are designed for high performance, not minimum cost. Comparing rockets to aircraft, it seems that reusability is the obvious path to reducing costs, but the example of the space shuttle does not support this. Reusable rockets have higher development costs and reduced payload due to the need for landing fuel. The Falcon 9 is reusable and has been reused, but the projected cost savings remain in the future. Human spaceflight adds costs for life support, higher reliability, and man rating. Commercial and military payloads are expensive and there is low tolerance for failure. Development and production cost increases with system complexity. (Wertz and Larson, 1996, pp. 126-33)The possible technical approaches to cut launch cost have been assessed as follows:1. Simplify the vehicle configuration2. Increase vehicle production and launch rates3. Use industrial design and production methods (cultural change)4. Optimize for minimum cost5. Reduce the parts count6. Increase simplicity and design margins7. Reduce instrumentation8. Design for production and operation (Wertz and Larson, 1996, pp. 147-53)One study suggested that the record low cost of the Saturn V could be reduced by a factor of 5, to a cost similar to the Falcon Heavy. The Pegasus system achieved low development cost using a commercial off-the-shelf approach, but because of its small payload it had the second highest launch cost in recent decades. Wider design margins can accommodate weight growth without costly last minute weight reducing efforts, help avoid miniaturization, and allow redundancy rather than intensive design to increase reliability. (Wertz and Larson, 1996, pp. 148, 149, 154)“To make significant reductions in launch costs, new ‘clean sheet’ launch systems must be developed. … institutional barriers within government and industry have prevented major inroads is cost reduction.” (Wertz and Larson, 1996, p. 155) The long awaited large reduction in launch cost has now been achieved, but what were the “institutional barriers” that delayed this?B. Institutional causes and cures of very high space launch costThe high cost of ordinary launch vehicles, the higher cost of the space shuttle, and the success of SpaceX can all be explained by institutional causes.Some of the institutional causes of high cost for ordinary launch vehicles were mentioned above, including military heritage, need for high reliability, and a non-industrial culture. The fundamental cause of the past high commercial launch cost seems to be lack of competition. The US launch industry has been a monopoly, the United Launch Alliance (ULA), and its main customer has been the US government, NASA and the military, which need high reliability and had little incentive to exert cost pressure. The ULA lost most of the commercial market to Russia and Arianespace which are also heavily subsidized by their governments. (Zimmerman, 2012)The space shuttle had unique NASA cost drivers. About one-fourth of the shuttle operational costs went for “the general area of NASA center and program support, maintenance of capability, and product improvement.” “Another major cost driver in Shuttle is launch operations costs. The fact that 10,000 contractors and 1,000 civil service are needed … is indicative of the lack of operational simplicity. This marching army plus mission operations and crew operations personnel make up one third of the overall shuttle operations costs. The low Shuttle flight rate not only makes for inefficient use of personnel and facilities, it distorts the cost per flight calculations because of high fixed costs.” (Rutledge, 93-4063)SpaceX has low costs largely because it is vertically integrated, with largely in-house development of the components of its rockets. It carries out all phases of the product lifecycle, including design, engineering, manufacturing, software, integration, testing, launch, and operations. Most activities have been in a single large facility. The competing ULA is a systems integrator and launch operator with hundreds of subcontractors that have dozens of facilities spread all over the country, which is a political necessity for a government funded jobs program. SpaceX designs for simplicity, for instance the Falcon 9 uses 9 identical engines. The Falcon Heavy effectively uses three Falcon 9’s. Another key factor in SpaceX’s low costs is its young, highly motivated workforce of top graduates willing to work significant unpaid overtime. SpaceX uses state of the art automated manufacturing equipment “previously unheard of in the space industry, where hand assembly of components is still the norm.” (Greg, 2015)In 2010, NASA compared SpaceX’s cost to develop the Falcon 9 to the cost NASA’s models predicted using the traditional cost-plus-fee method. Using the NASA-AF Cost Model (NAFCOM), NASA estimated that it would have cost NASA $1,383 million to develop these systems using traditional contracting. The estimated SpaceX cost was $443 million, a 68% reduction from the traditional approach. SpaceX attributed their cost efficiencies to a few key factors:1. Smaller workforce2. Use of in-house development3. Fewer management layers and less infrastructure4. Commercial development cultureThe cost of Design, Development, Test and Evaluation (DDT&E) depends primarily on the size of the workforce needed. SpaceX estimates that subcontracting one dollar’s worth of in-house work would cost three to five dollars due to subcontractor overhead and profit. The commercial development approach includes a firm fixed price versus cost plus, no oversight, fixed requirements, disciplined systems engineering, and fixed funding instead of annual budgeting. (NASA, 2011)Perhaps the the key determinant of SpaceX’s lower cost was that modern management allowed a highly effective engineering effort. “SpaceX’s approach to rocket design, which stems from one core principle: Simplicity enables both reliability and low cost.” All the Falcon 9 engines are identical where other rockets use two or three to gain performance at higher cost. The Falcon 9 avionics and controls are triple-redundant. Elon Musk, SpaceX’s CEO, is also chief engineer and he claims. “I know my rocket inside out and backward.” The frequent management - engineering conflict of goals and communications gap seem eliminated. SpaceX’s organizational style is Silicon Valley, not NASA. “(T)he buzzwords of the business culture—lean manufacturing, vertical integration, flat management—are real and fundamental. … This really is the greatest innovation of SpaceX: It’s bringing the standard practices of every other industry to space.” (Chaikin, 2012)C. Will space launch cost go lower?There are many reasons to expect that space launch costs will go lower, even much lower. These include launch vehicle reuse, an expanded market due to lower cost, increased commercial competition, better management and engineering, and technical advances.The reuse of rockets and entire launch vehicles has been considered important in reducing launch cost, but so far reuse has not led to lower cost. The space shuttle was extremely expensive, largely due to the high cost of refurbishing the shuttle between flights. The Falcon 9 was designed to be reused, at a significant increase in development cost, but so far it has been reused only a few times. Falcon 9 reuse may reduce costs by a factor of two. “SpaceX president Gwynne Shotwell told the Space Symposium conference that the cost of refurbishing the Falcon 9 rocket that originally flew the CRS-8 Space Station resupply mission last year for SES-10 was ‘substantially less than half’ what it would have cost to build a brand new one.” (Morris, 2017)Reuse might provide much more drastic cost reductions. Elon Musk believes that the new Raptor engine can achieve full reusability of all rocket stages and “a two order of magnitude reduction in the cost of spaceflight” to $10 per pound by 2025. (Wang, 2016)General market and competitive effects could lead to further cost reduction. The lower cost of launch should lead to an increased number of space flights, which would lead to cost reduction due to the learning curve, to reliability growth due to failure mode discovery and repair, and would more quickly pay back the initial development cost and so justify more investment in launcher design. Previously the launch market belonged to a limited number of government supported entities possibly more concerned with military capability, launch reliability, national prestige, and creating jobs and economic stimulus than with reducing costs or developing new technology. The commercial rocket business has provided a different engineering-savvy business model that has greatly reduced costs. A growing more competitive market will tend to favor technology advances that cut cost and improve performance. AT: OntologyOntological explanations wrong---too reductive Azar Gat 9, Chair of the Department of Political Science at Tel Aviv University, “So Why Do People Fight? So Why Do People Fight? Evolutionary Theory and the Causes of War”, European Journal of International Relations 2009 15: 571-599This article’s contribution is two-pronged: it argues that IR theory regarding the causes of conflict and war is deeply flawed, locked for decades in ultimately futile debates over narrow, misconstrued concepts; this conceptual confusion is untangled and the debate is transcended once a broader, comprehensive, and evolutionarily informed perspective is adopted. Thus attempts to find the root cause of war in the nature of either the individual, the state, or the international system are fundamentally misplaced. In all these ‘levels’ there are necessary but not sufficient causes for war, and the whole cannot be broken into pieces.13 People’s needs and desires — which may be pursued violently — as well as the resulting quest for power and the state of mutual apprehension which fuel the security dilemma are all molded in human nature (some of them existing only as options, potentials, and skills in a behavioral ‘tool kit’); they are so molded because of strong evolutionary pressures that have shaped humans in their struggle for survival over geological times, when all the above literally constituted matters of life and death. The violent option of human competition has been largely curbed within states, yet is occasionally taken up on a large scale between states because of the anarchic nature of the inter-state system. However, returning to step one, international anarchy in and of itself would not be an explanation for war were it not for the potential for violence in a fundamental state of competition over scarce resources that is imbedded in reality and, consequently, in human nature. The necessary and sufficient causes of war — that obviously have to be filled with the particulars of the case in any specific war — are thus as follows: politically organized actors that operate in an environment where no superior authority effectively monopolizes power resort to violence when they assess it to be their most cost-effective option for winning and/or defending evolution-shaped objects of desire, and/or their power in the system that can help them win and/or defend those desired goods.AT: Dyer-Witheford and MatviyenkoMilitarism NOT root cause of everything—their sweeping claims lack nuanced analysisEllen Willis 2, From a book re-printing her essays in 2014, now deceased, headed New York University’s Center for Cultural Reporting and Criticism. She was also a professor in the NYU journalism department. She was not at all a neocon – so many epistemic indicts are dubious. Ms. Willis was a vital figure in the women’s movement of the late 1960s and afterward. She was a founder of Redstockings, a highly influential radical feminist group begun in 1969. She was perhaps best known for her political essays, which appeared in The Nation, Dissent and elsewhere. She studied English and Comparative Lit in college. This book is a New York Times best-selling compilation of her work. This essay – within the book - is called “Why I’m Not for Peace” - The book is titled: Essential Ellen Willis, Minneapolis, MN, USA: University of Minnesota Press, 2014. The essay originally appeared in the publication Radical Society in April of 2002 - Obtained via ProQuest ebrary. p. 395-98Watching these developments I flashed back to the Gulf War, a far more dubious proposition that nonetheless had me feeling a similar alienation from the peace movement. Then, too, the moral and conceptual assumptions of the Vietnam opposition were dusted off as if international relations had frozen in 1975. Demonstrations were notable for the simpleminded slogan “No blood for oil,” as well as for a strain of vulgar pacifism amounting to little more than the conviction that war is a yucky nasty thing we shouldn’t have to deal with. (I was particularly chilled by a news photograph of some young protesters holding up a sign that read “Nothing is worth dying for.” What would Gandhi have thought?) That Saddam Hussein was a megalomaniac tyrant; that he clearly meant to establish himself as a regional superpower, with highly dangerous consequences; that his move on Kuwait was, among other things, a test to see if anyone cared to stop him— none of this was deemed relevant to the debate. Nor, a year later, did Slobodan Milosevic’s “ethnic cleansing” campaign in Bosnia prompt any serious soul searching on the antiwar left about whether intervention to prevent genocide might be warranted. Nor did its reprise in Kosovo. Whatever the circumstance, the dogma remained constant: violence is bad; any military action by the United States is imperialist. And so the arguments went after 9/11. Making war on the Taliban was revenge, not justice, and would only perpetuate the “cycle of violence.” We could not win, because the Afghan people did not want foreign intruders and would reject us as they had the Soviet Union. Our cause would be seen by millions of Middle Easterners and South Asians as a war of the West against Islam and would incite a massive backlash in support of Osama bin Laden’s jihad. It would destabilize the fragile government of Pakistan, with its nuclear weapons. Instead, we should address the root causes of anti-American terrorism, which lie in our misguided foreign policy. Meanwhile we should regard the attack not as war but as a crime, and seek to try the criminals before an international court. These arguments raise political, moral, and practical questions that deserve to be addressed. Yet in the end it seems to me that they are debating points marshaled to support an a priori conviction, that to the extent they can be refuted— or have been refuted by events (the Taliban fell, to no apparent regret on the part of the Afghans; no massive Islamic backlash has occurred)—other points will hastily fill the gap. For at the heart of the matter is an unspoken meta-argument: that America is a sinful country, and must achieve redemption through nonviolence. Violence as committed against us is the wages of sin. To strike back in kind is to continue to collect the geopolitical equivalent of bad karma, inevitably provoking more “blowback.” Sow the wind, reap the whirlwind. The crudest expression of this attitude— the claim that terrorism is retaliation for specific U.S. policies— does not pass cursory inspection. It trivializes the Islamic fundamentalist movement, which has quite bluntly declared its dedication to destroying unbelievers and their morally corrupt societies, to imagine it would be mollified by the withdrawal of American troops from the Persian Gulf or the lifting of sanctions against Iraq. Even sillier is the idea that our route to safety is getting tough and imposing an Israeli-Palestinian settlement (the one cause in which throwing our weight around is okay, it seems). While such a settlement is devoutly to be wished, far from deterring fundamentalist terrorism it would probably cause a Palestinian civil war. The radical Islamists do not want a settlement; they want Israel to go away. Yet the broader claim that we are responsible for our vulnerability has resonance because it’s at least partly true. After all, it’s incontestable that America’s tunnel-vision cold war policy of building up radical Islamists to fight the Soviet Union has blown back on us. Overall, our government’s commitment to the notion that the business of America is global business, its championing of neoliberal policies that exacerbate economic inequality, its alliances with “stable” autocratic regimes and allergy to any democratizing movement with a leftish tinge have done their part to foment the economic and political resentments that fundamentalist demagogues exploit. Suppose, then, that this were the whole story: America’s malfeasances unleashed a monster. Why would it follow that we should not fight back? On the contrary, wouldn’t we have even more responsibility to confront the golem we created? In the years before World War II the Western Powers were clearly complicitous in Hitler’s rise; they hoped he would attack the Soviet Union and solve their Communism problem. Furthermore, the Nazis exploited the economic misery and political humiliation of the German people, which stemmed from the crisis of capitalism and its most horrendous symptom, World War I: in these developments Britain, France, and the U.S. were thoroughly implicated. Hitler, in short, was blowback too. And at the time, many on the left insisted— especially before Hitler attacked Russia— that this was just another war among rival imperialists. Were they right? Of course, it’s simplistic to see Nazism as purely a product of capitalism and imperialism, and equally so to see Osama bin Laden as a product of the World Bank. Nazism was a revolt against modernity (notwithstanding its use of modern technology and media as mainstays of its power) and specifically against the liberal values of the Enlightenment. As a mass movement, it was an outbreak of collective irrationalism, impelled by the anxieties of a people caught up in the clash between the rigid patriarchalism of traditional German culture and the competing forces of globalization, liberalism, and democracy. It was in the context of such liberalizing forces that a populist movement like fascism could emerge. It was in the context of deeply rooted patriarchalism that the people’s rebelliousness failed to take the form of a democratic movement aimed at improving their economic and political situation, but instead expressed itself in submission to an absolute authority that provided an outlet for their rage: the capitalist/communist/rootless cosmopolitan Jew. Much the same can be said of the religious totalitarianism Al Qaeda represents. It is the latest flashpoint in the ongoing, worldwide culture war that began in the eighteenth century: intertwined with the spread of capitalism, though by no means synonymous with it, the ideas of freedom, equality, separation of church and state— and their more recent application to our sexual and domestic lives— have penetrated everywhere, eroding traditional patriarchal institutions and rigid social controls. And in the Islamic world as in Weimar Germany this erosion has had a paradoxical result, at once inciting a fundamentalist backlash and creating the conditions for mobilizing its supporters. There could hardly be a more vivid metaphor for this paradox than the success of the Al Qaeda hijackers in blending into American society and using our airplanes against us. The United States is the world’s most powerful exporter of liberal and secular values, just as it is the preeminent tribune of corporate globalization; yet neither global class conflict nor the culture war can be reduced to a question of American national power. The division between transnational corporations and their increasingly immiserated victims exists within America itself, as does the clash between secular modernity and patriarchal fundamentalism. Transnational capital may use the United States as its headquarters and dictate its economic policies, but it has no loyalty to any nation or national interest. Nor is the democratic secular impulse the property of America, or of the West. These global forces are fundamentally beyond American control. Indeed, I would argue that the U.S. government has contributed to its present predicament not only by exercising but also by abdicating its power. Our bracketing of theocratic despotism and the persecution of women as non-issues in our international relations— a cultural-political blind spot as well as a matter of corporate realpolitik— has substantially strengthened the hand of radical fundamentalists no longer willing to confine their atrocities to their own population. (Consider our complaisance toward Saudi Arabia, or our tepid response to the death sentence pronounced on Salman Rushdie.) Which is to say that the old imperialism model does not hold, either economically or culturally— and that the left badly needs a new and more nuanced analysis of the role of the nation-state in world affairs. But this assumes a left that’s genuinely interested in politics— that is, in how to influence national and international policy to promote more freedom, equality, and democracy in the world. In fact, the animating impulses of the left’s peace wing have far less to do with politics in this sense than with a quasireligious moralism that conceives of the United States as a soul that needs saving: it is power-hungry, violent, greedy; it’s a sinkhole of lies and hypocrisy, professing democracy while supporting dictators and selectively condemning terrorism; and so on. I could argue that this indictment is one-sided, that if you’re appraising America’s soul you also have to consider its passion for freedom and irreverence toward authority, its ability to inspire great social movements, its inventiveness, its appetite for pleasure and fantasy. I could claim that if you stack up our virtues and faults against those of other nations around the world, we actually come off as relatively well. I could point out that on 9/11 it was our virtues more than our faults that were under attack. AT: Coop badDespite IR theory’s Western origins, it can still reveal useful insights when applied to Asia, particularly when combined with a focus on policy consequencesAmitav Acharya 7, UNESCO Chair in Transnational Challenges and Governance and Professor of International Relations at the School of International Service @ American University, Fellow of the Asia Center, Harvard University, Fellow of Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, 9-27-2007, “Theoretical Perspectives on International Relations in Asia,” , theory is too “Western”. Thus, even among those writers on Asian IR that are theoretically oriented, disagreement persists as to whether IR theory is relevant to studying Asia, given its origin in, and close association with, Western historical traditions, intellectual discourses and foreign policy practices. International relations theory, like the discipline itself, has been, and remains, an “American social science” to quote Stanley Hoffman’s much quoted phrase.3 The recent advances made by the “English School” and continental European constructivism have not made IR theory “universal”; it might have entrenched and broadened the Western dominance. The question of how relevant is IR theory to the study of Asian security have evoked strikingly different responses. On the one hand, David Kang has seized upon the nonrealization of realist warnings of post-war Asia being “ripe for rivalry” to critique not just realism, but Western IR theory in general for “getting Asia wrong”.4 In analyzing Asian regionalism, Peter Katzenstein comments: “Theories based on Western, and especially West European experience, have been of little use in making sense of Asian regionalism.”5 Although Katzenstein’s remarks specifically concern the study of Asian regionalism, they can be applied to Asian IR in general. And it is a view widely shared among Asian scholars. On the other side, John Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno, defend the relevance of Western theoretical frameworks in studying the international relations of Asia. While intra-Asian relationships might have had some distinctive features historically, this distinctiveness had been diluted by the progressive integration of the region into the modern international system. The international relations of Asia has acquired the behavioral norms and attributes associated with the modern inter-state system which originated from Europe and still retains much of the features of the Westphalian model. Hence, the core concepts of international relations theory such as hegemony, the distribution of power, international regimes, and political identity, are as relevant in the Asian context as anywhere else.6To this writer, this debate is a healthy caveat, rather than a debilitating constraint, on analyzing Asian international relations with the help an admittedly Western theoretical literature. To be sure, theoretical paradigms developed from the Western experience do not adequately capture the full range of ideas and relationships that drive international relations in Asia. But IR theories - realism, liberalism, constructivism and critical IR theories - are relevant and useful in analyzing Asian IR provided they do not encourage a selection bias in favor of those phenomena (ideas, events, trends, relationships) which fit with them and against that which does not. IR scholars should feel free to identify and study phenomena that are either ignored or given scarce attention by these perspectives. They should also develop concepts and insights from the Asian context and experience, not just to study Asian developments and dynamics, but also other parts of tGutmhe world. In other words, Western IR theory, despite its ethnocentrism, is not to be dismissed or expunged from Asian classrooms or seminars, but universalized with the infusion of Asian histories (Sam Kim essay), personalities, philosophies, trajectories and practices. To do so, one must look beyond the contributions of those who write in an overtly theoretical fashion, explicitly employing theoretical jargon and making references to the theoretical literature of IR. A good deal of empirical or policy-relevant work may be regarded as theoretical for analytical purposes because they, like the speeches and writings of policymakers, reflect mental or social constructs that side with different paradigms of international relations.7 To ignore these in any discussion of theory would be to miss out on a large and important chunk of the debate and analysis of Asian IR.AT: rationalityParisi evidence impact turned by garrettson aboveEnvironmental management doesn’t result in instrumental domination---more managerialism is the only way to solve their impacts Shellenberger and Nordhaus 11 - co-founders of American Environics and the Breakthrough Institute a think tank that works on energy and climate change, health care, social inequality, and human rights (Michael and Ted, Love Your Monsters; Bruno Latour, Breakthrough Journal, NO. 2 / FALL 2011, ) italics in orig Frankenstein lives on in the popular imagination as a cautionary tale against technology. We use the monster as an all-purpose modifier to denote technological crimes against nature. When we fear genetically modified foods we call them "frankenfoods" and "frankenfish." It is telling that even as we warn against such hybrids, we confuse the monster with its creator. We now mostly refer to Dr. Frankenstein's monster as Frankenstein. And just as we have forgotten that Frankenstein was the man, not the monster, we have also forgotten Frankenstein's real sin.? Dr. Frankenstein's crime was not that he invented a creature through some combination of hubris and high technology, but rather that he abandoned the creature to itself. When Dr. Frankenstein meets his creation on a glacier in the Alps, the monster claims that it was not born a monster, but that it became a criminal only after being left alone by his horrified creator, who fled the laboratory once the horrible thing twitched to life. "Remember, I am thy creature," the monster protests, "I ought to be thy Adam; but I am rather the fallen angel, whom thou drivest from joy for no misdeed... I was benevolent and good; misery made me a fiend. Make me happy, and I shall again be virtuous."? Written at the dawn of the great technological revolutions that would define the 19th and 20th centuries, Frankenstein foresees that the gigantic sins that were to be committed would hide a much greater sin. It is not the case that we have failed to care for Creation, but that we have failed to care for our technological creations. We confuse the monster for its creator and blame our sins against Nature upon our creations. But our sin is not that we created technologies but that we failed to love and care for them. It is as if we decided that we were unable to follow through with the education of our children.4? Let Dr. Frankenstein's sin serve as a parable for political ecology. At a time when science, technology, and demography make clear that we can never separate ourselves from the nonhuman world -- that we, our technologies, and nature can no more be disentangled than we can remember the distinction between Dr. Frankenstein and his monster -- this is the moment chosen by millions of well-meaning souls to flagellate themselves for their earlier aspiration to dominion, to repent for their past hubris, to look for ways of diminishing the numbers of their fellow humans, and to swear to make their footprints invisible?? The goal of political ecology must not be to stop innovating, inventing, creating, and intervening. The real goal must be to have the same type of patience and commitment to our creations as God the Creator, Himself. And the comparison is not blasphemous: we have taken the whole of Creation on our shoulders and have become coextensive with the Earth. ? What, then, should be the work of political ecology? It is, I believe, to modernize modernization, to borrow an expression proposed by Ulrich Beck.5 This challenge demands more of us than simply embracing technology and innovation. It requires exchanging the modernist notion of modernity for what I have called a "compositionist" one that sees the process of human development as neither liberation from Nature nor as a fall from it, but rather as a process of becoming ever-more attached to, and intimate with, a panoply of nonhuman natures.? 1.? At the time of the plough we could only scratch the surface of the soil. Three centuries back, we could only dream, like Cyrano de Bergerac, of traveling to the moon. In the past, my Gallic ancestors were afraid of nothing except that the "sky will fall on their heads."? Today we can fold ourselves into the molecular machinery of soil bacteria through our sciences and technologies. We run robots on Mars. We photograph and dream of further galaxies. And yet we fear that the climate could destroy us.? Everyday in our newspapers we read about more entanglements of all those things that were once imagined to be separable -- science, morality, religion, law, technology, finance, and politics. But these things are tangled up together everywhere: in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, in the space shuttle, and in the Fukushima nuclear power plant.? If you envision a future in which there will be less and less of these entanglements thanks to Science, capital S, you are a modernist. But if you brace yourself for a future in which there will always be more of these imbroglios, mixing many more heterogeneous actors, at a greater and greater scale and at an ever-tinier level of intimacy requiring even more detailed care, then you are... what? A compositionist!? The dominant, peculiar story of modernity is of humankind's emancipation from Nature. Modernity is the thrusting-forward arrow of time -- Progress -- characterized by its juvenile enthusiasm, risk taking, frontier spirit, optimism, and indifference to the past. The spirit can be summarized in a single sentence: "Tomorrow, we will be able to separate more accurately what the world is really like from the subjective illusions we used to entertain about it."? The very forward movement of the arrow of time and the frontier spirit associated with it (the modernizing front) is due to a certain conception of knowledge: "Tomorrow, we will be able to differentiate clearly what in the past was still mixed up, namely facts and values, thanks to Science."? Science is the shibboleth that defines the right direction of the arrow of time because it, and only it, is able to cut into two well-separated parts what had, in the past, remained hopelessly confused: a morass of ideology, emotions, and values on the one hand, and, on the other, stark and naked matters of fact.? The notion of the past as an archaic and dangerous confusion arises directly from giving Science this role. A modernist, in this great narrative, is the one who expects from Science the revelation that Nature will finally be visible through the veils of subjectivity -- and subjection -- that hid it from our ancestors.? And here has been the great failure of political ecology. Just when all of the human and nonhuman associations are finally coming to the center of our consciousness, when science and nature and technology and politics become so confused and mixed up as to be impossible to untangle, just as these associations are beginning to be shaped in our political arenas and are triggering our most personal and deepest emotions, this is when a new apartheid is declared: leave Nature alone and let the humans retreat -- as the English did on the beaches of Dunkirk in the 1940s.? Just at the moment when this fabulous dissonance inherent in the modernist project between what modernists say (emancipation from all attachments!) and what they do (create ever-more attachments!) is becoming apparent to all, along come those alleging to speak for Nature to say the problem lies in the violations and imbroglios -- the attachments! ? Instead of deciding that the great narrative of modernism (Emancipation) has always resulted in another history altogether (Attachments), the spirit of the age has interpreted the dissonance in quasi-apocalyptic terms: "We were wrong all along, let's turn our back to progress, limit ourselves, and return to our narrow human confines, leaving the nonhumans alone in as pristine a Nature as possible, mea culpa, mea maxima culpa..."? Nature, this great shortcut of due political process, is now used to forbid humans to encroach. Instead of realizing at last that the emancipation narrative is bunk, and that modernism was always about attachments, modernist greens have suddenly shifted gears and have begun to oppose the promises of modernization.? Why do we feel so frightened at the moment that our dreams of modernization finally come true? Why do we suddenly turn pale and wish to fall back on the other side of Hercules's columns, thinking we are being punished for having transgressed the sign: "Thou shall not transgress?" Was not our slogan until now, as Nordhaus and Shellenberger note in Break Through, "We shall overcome!"?6? In the name of indisputable facts portraying a bleak future for the human race, green politics has succeeded in leaving citizens nothing but a gloomy asceticism, a terror of trespassing Nature, and a diffidence toward industry, innovation, technology, and science. No wonder that, while political ecology claims to embody the political power of the future, it is reduced everywhere to a tiny portion of electoral strap-hangers. Even in countries where political ecology is a little more powerful, it contributes only a supporting force.? Political ecology has remained marginal because it has not grasped either its own politics or its own ecology. It thinks it is speaking of Nature, System, a hierarchical totality, a world without man, an assured Science, but it is precisely these overly ordered pronouncements that marginalize it. ? Set in contrast to the modernist narrative, this idea of political ecology could not possibly succeed. There is beauty and strength in the modernist story of emancipation. Its picture of the future is so attractive, especially when put against such a repellent past, that it makes one wish to run forward to break all the shackles of ancient existence. ? To succeed, an ecological politics must manage to be at least as powerful as the modernizing story of emancipation without imagining that we are emancipating ourselves from Nature. What the emancipation narrative points to as proof of increasing human mastery over and freedom from Nature -- agriculture, fossil energy, technology -- can be redescribed as the increasing attachments between things and people at an ever-expanding scale. If the older narratives imagined humans either fell from Nature or freed themselves from it, the compositionist narrative describes our ever-increasing degree of intimacy with the new natures we are constantly creating. Only "out of Nature" may ecological politics start again and anew.? 2.? The paradox of "the environment" is that it emerged in public parlance just when it was starting to disappear. During the heyday of modernism, no one seemed to care about "the environment" because there existed a huge unknown reserve on which to discharge all bad consequences of collective modernizing actions. The environment is what appeared when unwanted consequences came back to haunt the originators of such actions. ? But if the originators are true modernists, they will see the return of "the environment" as incomprehensible since they believed they were finally free of it. The return of consequences, like global warming, is taken as a contradiction, or even as a monstrosity, which it is, of course, but only according to the modernist's narrative of emancipation. In the compositionist's narrative of attachments, unintended consequences are quite normal -- indeed, the most expected things on earth!? Environmentalists, in the American sense of the word, never managed to extract themselves from the contradiction that the environment is precisely not "what lies beyond and should be left alone" -- this was the contrary, the view of their worst enemies! The environment is exactly what should be even more managed, taken up, cared for, stewarded, in brief, integrated and internalized in the very fabric of the polity.? France, for its part, has never believed in the notion of a pristine Nature that has so confused the "defense of the environment" in other countries. What we call a "national park" is a rural ecosystem complete with post offices, well-tended roads, highly subsidized cows, and handsome villages.? Those who wish to protect natural ecosystems learn, to their stupefaction, that they have to work harder and harder -- that is, to intervene even more, at always greater levels of detail, with ever more subtle care -- to keep them "natural enough" for Nature-intoxicated tourists to remain happy.? Like France's parks, all of Nature needs our constant care, our undivided attention, our costly instruments, our hundreds of thousands of scientists, our huge institutions, our careful funding. But though we have Nature, and we have nurture, we don't know what it would mean for Nature itself to be nurtured.7? The word "environmentalism" thus designates this turning point in history when the unwanted consequences are suddenly considered to be such a monstrosity that the only logical step appears to be to abstain and repent: "We should not have committed so many crimes; now we should be good and limit ourselves." Or at least this is what people felt and thought before the breakthrough, at the time when there was still an "environment."? But what is the breakthrough itself then? If I am right, the breakthrough involves no longer seeing a contradiction between the spirit of emancipation and its catastrophic outcomes, but accepting it as the normal duty of continuing to care for unwanted consequences, even if this means going further and further down into the imbroglios. Environmentalists say: "From now on we should limit ourselves." Postenvironmentalists exclaim: "From now on, we should stop flagellating ourselves and take up explicitly and seriously what we have been doing all along at an ever-increasing scale, namely, intervening, acting, wanting, caring." For environmentalists, the return of unexpected consequences appears as a scandal (which it is for the modernist myth of mastery). For postenvironmentalists, the other, unintended consequences are part and parcel of any action.? 3.? One way to seize upon the breakthrough from environmentalism to postenvironmentalism is to reshape the very definition of the "precautionary principle." This strange moral, legal, epistemological monster has appeared in European and especially French politics after many scandals due to the misplaced belief by state authority in the certainties provided by Science.8? When action is supposed to be nothing but the logical consequence of reason and facts (which the French, of all people, still believe), it is quite normal to wait for the certainty of science before administrators and politicians spring to action. The problem begins when experts fail to agree on the reasons and facts that have been taken as the necessary premises of any action. Then the machinery of decision is stuck until experts come to an agreement. It was in such a situation that the great tainted blood catastrophe of the 1980s ensued: before agreement was produced, hundreds of patients were transfused with blood contaminated by the AIDS virus.9? The precautionary principle was introduced to break this odd connection between scientific certainty and political action, stating that even in the absence of certainty, decisions could be made. But of course, as soon as it was introduced, fierce debates began on its meaning. Is it an environmentalist notion that precludes action or a postenvironmentalist notion that finally follows action through to its consequences? ? Not surprisingly, the enemies of the precautionary principle -- which President Chirac enshrined in the French Constitution as if the French, having indulged so much in rationalism, had to be protected against it by the highest legal pronouncements -- took it as proof that no action was possible any more. As good modernists, they claimed that if you had to take so many precautions in advance, to anticipate so many risks, to include the unexpected consequences even before they arrived, and worse, to be responsible for them, then it was a plea for impotence, despondency, and despair. The only way to innovate, they claimed, is to bounce forward, blissfully ignorant of the consequences or at least unconcerned by what lies outside your range of action. Their opponents largely agreed. Modernist environmentalists argued that the principle of precaution dictated no action, no new technology, no intervention unless it could be proven with certainty that no harm would result. Modernists we were, modernists we shall be!? But for its postenvironmental supporters (of which I am one) the principle of precaution, properly understood, is exactly the change of zeitgeist needed: not a principle of abstention -- as many have come to see it -- but a change in the way any action is considered, a deep tidal change in the linkage modernism established between science and politics. From now on, thanks to this principle, unexpected consequences are attached to their initiators and have to be followed through all the way.? 4.? The link between technology and theology hinges on the notion of mastery. Descartes exclaimed that we should be "ma?tres et possesseurs de la nature."10 ?? But what does it mean to be a master? In the modernist narrative, mastery was supposed to require such total dominance by the master that he was emancipated entirely from any care and worry. This is the myth about mastery that was used to describe the technical, scientific, and economic dominion of Man over Nature. ? But if you think about it according to the compositionist narrative, this myth is quite odd: where have we ever seen a master freed from any dependence on his dependents? The Christian God, at least, is not a master who is freed from dependents, but who, on the contrary, gets folded into, involved with, implicated with, and incarnated into His Creation. God is so attached and dependent upon His Creation that he is continually forced (convinced? willing?) to save it. Once again, the sin is not to wish to have dominion over Nature, but to believe that this dominion means emancipation and not attachment.? If God has not abandoned His Creation and has sent His Son to redeem it, why do you, a human, a creature, believe that you can invent, innovate, and proliferate -- and then flee away in horror from what you have committed? Oh, you the hypocrite who confesses of one sin to hide a much graver, mortal one! Has God fled in horror after what humans made of His Creation? Then have at least the same forbearance that He has. ? The dream of emancipation has not turned into a nightmare. It was simply too limited: it excluded nonhumans. It did not care about unexpected consequences; it was unable to follow through with its responsibilities; it entertained a wholly unrealistic notion of what science and technology had to offer; it relied on a rather impious definition of God, and a totally absurd notion of what creation, innovation, and mastery could provide.? Which God and which Creation should we be for, knowing that, contrary to Dr. Frankenstein, we cannot suddenly stop being involved and "go home?" Incarnated we are, incarnated we will be. In spite of a centuries-old misdirected metaphor, we should, without any blasphemy, reverse the Scripture and exclaim: "What good is it for a man to gain his soul yet forfeit the whole world?" /AT: SustainableThe solution to critiques of liberalism is more liberalism---institutional innovations make it self-correcting and key to human prosperity---the alt is nationalist takeover and it IS self-sustaining G. John Ikenberry 18, Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University; Daniel Deudney, Associate Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University, August 2018, “Liberal WorldThe Resilient Order,” liberalism holds that world politics requires new levels of political integration in response to relentlessly rising interdependence. But political orders do not arise spontaneously, and liberals argue that a world with more liberal democratic capitalist states will be more peaceful, prosperous, and respectful of human rights. It is not inevitable that history will end with the triumph of liberalism, but it is inevitable that a decent world order will be liberal.The recent rise of illiberal forces and the apparent recession of the liberal international order may seem to call this school of thought into question. But despite some notable exceptions, states still mostly interact through well-worn institutions and in the spirit of self-interested, pragmatic accommodation.Moreover, part of the reason liberalism may look unsuited to the times is that many of its critics assail a strawman version of the theory. Liberals are often portrayed as having overly optimistic—even utopian—assumptions about the path of human history. In reality, they have a much more conditional and tempered optimism that recognizes tragic tradeoffs, and they are keenly attentive to the possibilities for large-scale catastrophes. Like realists, they recognize that it is often human nature to seek power, which is why they advocate constitutional and legal restraints. But unlike realists, who see history as cyclical, liberals are heirs to the Enlightenment project of technological innovation, which opens new possibilities both for human progress and for disaster.Liberalism is essentially pragmatic. Modern liberals embrace democratic governments, market-based economic systems, and international institutions not out of idealism but because they believe these arrangements are better suited to realizing human interests in the modern world than any alternatives. Indeed, in thinking about world order, the variable that matters most for liberal thinkers is interdependence. For the first time in history, global institutions are now necessary to realize basic human interests; intense forms of interdependence that were once present only on a smaller scale are now present on a global scale. For example, whereas environmental problems used to be contained largely within countries or regions, the cumulative effect of human activities on the planet’s biospheric life-support system has now been so great as to require a new geologic name for the current time period—the Anthropocene. Unlike its backward-looking nationalist and realist rivals, liberalism has a pragmatic adaptability and a penchant for institutional innovations that are vital for responding to such emerging challenges as artificial intelligence, cyberwarfare, and genetic engineering.Overall, liberalism remains perennially and universally appealing because it rests on a commitment to the dignity and freedom of individuals. It enshrines the idea of tolerance, which will be needed in spades as the world becomes increasingly interactive and diverse. Although the ideology emerged in the West, its values have become universal, and its champions have extended to encompass Mahatma Gandhi, Mikhail Gorbachev, and Nelson Mandela. And even though imperialism, slavery, and racism have marred Western history, liberalism has always been at the forefront of efforts—both peaceful and militant—to reform and end these practices. To the extent that the long arc of history does bend toward justice, it does so thanks to the activism and moral commitment of liberals and their allies. DEMOCRATIC DECLINE IN PERSPECTIVEIn many respects, today’s liberal democratic malaise is a byproduct of the liberal world order’s success. After the Cold War, that order became a global system, expanding beyond its birthplace in the West. But as free markets spread, problems began to crop up: economic inequality grew, old political bargains between capital and labor broke down, and social supports eroded. The benefits of globalization and economic expansion were distributed disproportionately to elites. Oligarchic power bloomed. A modulated form of capitalism morphed into winner-take-all casino capitalism. Many new democracies turned out to lack the traditions and habits necessary to sustain democratic institutions. And large flows of immigrants triggered a xenophobic backlash. Together, these developments have called into question the legitimacy of liberal democratic life and created openings for opportunistic demagogues.Just as the causes of this malaise are clear, so is its solution: a return to the fundamentals of liberal democracy. Rather than deeply challenging the first principles of liberal democracy, the current problems call for reforms to better realize them. To reduce inequality, political leaders will need to return to the social democratic policies embodied in the New Deal, pass more progressive taxation, and invest in education and infrastructure. To foster a sense of liberal democratic identity, they will need to emphasize education as a catalyst for assimilation and promote national and public service. In other words, the remedy for the problems of liberal democracy is more liberal democracy; liberalism contains the seeds of its own salvation.Indeed, liberal democracies have repeatedly recovered from crises resulting from their own excesses. In the 1930s, overproduction and the integration of financial markets brought about an economic depression, which triggered the rise of fascism. But it also triggered the New Deal and social democracy, leading to a more stable form of capitalism. In the 1950s, the success of the Manhattan Project, combined with the emerging U.S.-Soviet rivalry, created the novel threat of a worldwide nuclear holocaust. That threat gave rise to arms control pacts and agreements concerning the governance of global spaces, deals forged by the United States in collaboration with the Soviet Union. In the 1970s, rising middle-class consumption led to oil shortages, economic stagnation, and environmental decay. In response, the advanced industrial democracies established oil coordination agreements, invested in clean energy, and struck numerous international environmental accords aimed at reducing pollutants. The problems that liberal democracies face today, while great, are certainly not more challenging than those that they have faced and overcome in these historically recent decades. Of course, there is no guarantee that liberal democracies will successfully rise to the occasion, but to count them out would fly in the face of repeated historical experiences.Growth sustainable---technology removes dependence on nature and solves resource scarcity John Asafu-Adjaye 15, associate professor of economics at the University of Queensland, et al., April 2015, “An Ecomodernist Manifesto,” the same time, human flourishing has taken a serious toll on natural, nonhuman environments and wildlife. Humans use about half of the planet’s ice-free land, mostly for pasture, crops, and production forestry. Of the land once covered by forests, 20 percent has been converted to human use. Populations of many mammals, amphibians, and birds have declined by more than 50 percent in the past 40 years alone. More than 100 species from those groups went extinct in the 20th century, and about 785 since 1500. As we write, only four northern white rhinos are confirmed to exist.? Given that humans are completely dependent on the living biosphere, how is it possible that people are doing so much damage to natural systems without doing more harm to themselves?? The role that technology plays in reducing humanity’s dependence on nature explains this paradox. Human technologies, from those that first enabled agriculture to replace hunting and gathering, to those that drive today’s globalized economy, have made humans less reliant upon the many ecosystems that once provided their only sustenance, even as those same ecosystems have often been left deeply damaged.? Despite frequent assertions starting in the 1970s of fundamental “limits to growth,” there is still remarkably little evidence that human population and economic expansion will outstrip the capacity to grow food or procure critical material resources in the foreseeable future.? To the degree to which there are fixed physical boundaries to human consumption, they are so theoretical as to be functionally irrelevant. The amount of solar radiation that hits the Earth, for instance, is ultimately finite but represents no meaningful constraint upon human endeavors. Human civilization can flourish for centuries and millennia on energy delivered from a closed uranium or thorium fuel cycle, or from hydrogen-deuterium fusion. With proper management, humans are at no risk of lacking sufficient agricultural land for food. Given plentiful land and unlimited energy, substitutes for other material inputs to human well-being can easily be found if those inputs become scarce or expensive.? There remain, however, serious long-term environmental threats to human well-being, such as anthropogenic climate change, stratospheric ozone depletion, and ocean acidification. While these risks are difficult to quantify, the evidence is clear today that they could cause significant risk of catastrophic impacts on societies and ecosystems. Even gradual, non-catastrophic outcomes associated with these threats are likely to result in significant human and economic costs as well as rising ecological losses.? Much of the world’s population still suffers from more-immediate local environmental health risks. Indoor and outdoor air pollution continue to bring premature death and illness to millions annually. Water pollution and water-borne illness due to pollution and degradation of watersheds cause similar suffering.? 2? Even as human environmental impacts continue to grow in the aggregate, a range of long-term trends are today driving significant decoupling of human well-being from environmental impacts.? Decoupling occurs in both relative and absolute terms. Relative decoupling means that human environmental impacts rise at a slower rate than overall economic growth. Thus, for each unit of economic output, less environmental impact (e.g., deforestation, defaunation, pollution) results. Overall impacts may still increase, just at a slower rate than would otherwise be the case. Absolute decoupling occurs when total environmental impacts — impacts in the aggregate — peak and begin to decline, even as the economy continues to grow.? Decoupling can be driven by both technological and demographic trends and usually results from a combination of the two.? The growth rate of the human population has already peaked. Today’s population growth rate is one percent per year, down from its high point of 2.1 percent in the 1970s. Fertility rates in countries containing more than half of the global population are now below replacement level. Population growth today is primarily driven by longer life spans and lower infant mortality, not by rising fertility rates. Given current trends, it is very possible that the size of the human population will peak this century and then start to decline.? Trends in population are inextricably linked to other demographic and economic dynamics. For the first time in human history, over half the global population lives in cities. By 2050, 70 percent are expected to dwell in cities, a number that could rise to 80 percent or more by the century’s end. Cities are characterized by both dense populations and low fertility rates.? Cities occupy just one to three percent of the Earth’s surface and yet are home to nearly four billion people. As such, cities both drive and symbolize the decoupling of humanity from nature, performing far better than rural economies in providing efficiently for material needs while reducing environmental impacts.? The growth of cities along with the economic and ecological benefits that come with them are inseparable from improvements in agricultural productivity. As agriculture has become more land and labor efficient, rural populations have left the countryside for the cities. Roughly half the US population worked the land in 1880. Today, less than 2 percent does.? As human lives have been liberated from hard agricultural labor, enormous human resources have been freed up for other endeavors. Cities, as people know them today, could not exist without radical changes in farming. In contrast, modernization is not possible in a subsistence agrarian economy.? These improvements have resulted not only in lower labor requirements per unit of agricultural output but also in lower land requirements. This is not a new trend: rising harvest yields have for millennia reduced the amount of land required to feed the average person. The average per-capita use of land today is vastly lower than it was 5,000 years ago, despite the fact that modern people enjoy a far richer diet. Thanks to technological improvements in agriculture, during the half-century starting in the mid-1960s, the amount of land required for growing crops and animal feed for the average person declined by one-half.? Agricultural intensification, along with the move away from the use of wood as fuel, has allowed many parts of the world to experience net reforestation. About 80 percent of New England is today forested, compared with about 50 percent at the end of the 19th century. Over the past 20 years, the amount of land dedicated to production forest worldwide declined by 50 million hectares, an area the size of France. the “forest transition” from net deforestation to net reforestation seems to be as resilient a feature of development as the demographic transition that reduces human birth rates as poverty declines.? Human use of many other resources is similarly peaking. The amount of water needed for the average diet has declined by nearly 25 percent over the past half-century. Nitrogen pollution continues to cause eutrophication and large dead zones in places like the Gulf of Mexico. While the total amount of nitrogen pollution is rising, the amount used per unit of production has declined significantly in developed nations.? Indeed, in contradiction to the often-expressed fear of infinite growth colliding with a finite planet, demand for many material goods may be saturating as societies grow wealthier. Meat consumption, for instance, has peaked in many wealthy nations and has shifted away from beef toward protein sources that are less land intensive.? As demand for material goods is met, developed economies see higher levels of spending directed to materially less-intensive service and knowledge sectors, which account for an increasing share of economic activity. This dynamic might be even more pronounced in today’s developing economies, which may benefit from being late adopters of resource-efficient technologies.? Taken together, these trends mean that the total human impact on the environment, including land-use change, overexploitation, and pollution, can peak and decline this century. By understanding and promoting these emergent processes, humans have the opportunity to re-wild and re-green the Earth — even as developing countries achieve modern living standards, and material poverty ends.Liberalism Good---Racism---2ACReclaiming liberalism for radical racial justice is key to egalitarian societyMills 17 (Charles, a Caribbean philosopher from Jamaica. He is known for his work in social and political philosophy, particularly in oppositional political theory as centred on class, gender, and race. “Occupy Liberalism!”, Black Rights/White Wrongs, Kindle)The “Occupy!” movement, which has made headlines around the country, has raised the hopes of young American radicals new to political engagement and revived the hopes of an older generation of radicals still clinging to nostalgic dreams of the glorious ’603. If the original and still most salient target was Wall Street, a long list of other candidates for “occupation” has since been put forward. In this essay, I want to propose as a target for radical occupation the somewhat unusual candidate of liberalism itself. But contrary to the conventional wisdom prevailing within radical circles, I am going to argue for the heretical thesis that liberalism should not be contemptuously rejected by radicals but retrieved for a radical agenda. Summarized in bullet-point form, my argument is as follows: 0 The “Occupy Wall Street" movement provides an opportunity unprecedented in decades to build a broad democratic movement to challenge plutocracy, patriarchy, and white supremacy in the United States. 0 Such a movement is more likely to be successful if it appeals to principles and values most Americans already endorse. o Liberalism has always been the dominant ideology in the United States. - Liberalism in the United States has historically been complicit with plutocracy, patriarchy, and white supremacy, but this complicity is a contingent function of dominant group interests rather than the result of an immanent conceptual logic. Therefore progressives in philosophy [and elsewhere) should try to retrieve liberalism for a radical democratic agenda rather than rejecting it, thereby positioning themselves in the ideological mainstream of the country and seeking its transformation. Let me now try to make this argument plausible for an audience likely to be aprioristically convinced of its obvious unsoundness. Preliminary Clarification of Terms First we need to clarify the key terms of “radicalism” and “liberalism.” While of course a radicalism of the right exists, I mean to refer here to radicals who are progressives. But “progressive” cannot just denote the left of the political spectrum, since the whole point of the “new social movements” of the 19 605 onwards was that the traditional left-right political spectrum, predicated on varying positions on the question of public vs. private ownership, did not ex- haust the topography of the political. Issues of gender and racial domination were to a significant extent “orthogonal” to this one-dimensional trope. So I will use “radicalism” broadly, though still in the zone of progressive politics, to refer generally to ideas/ concepts / principles/values endorsing pro-egalitari- an structural change to reduce or eliminate unjust hierarchies of domination. “Liberalism” may denote both a political philosophy and the institutions and practices characteristically tied to that political philosophy. My focus will be on the former. The issue of how bureaucratic logics may prove refractory to reformist agendas is undeniably an important one, but it does not really fall into the purview of philosophy proper. My aim is to challenge the radical Shibboleth that radical ideas / concepts/ principles/values are incompatible with liberalism. Given the deep entrenchment of this assumption in the worldview of most radicals, refuting it would still be an accomplishment, even if working out practical details of operationalization are delegated to other hands. In the United States, of course, “liberalism” in public parlance and everyday political discourse is used in such a way that it really denotes left- liberalism specifically (“left” by the standards of a country whose center of gravity has shifted right in recent decades]. In this vocabulary, right-liberals are then categorized as “conservatives”—in the market sense, as against the Burkean sense. On the other hand, some on the right would insist that only they, the heirs to the classic liberalism of John Locke and Adam Smith, are re- ally entitled to the “liberal” designation. Later welfarist theorists are fraudu- lent pretenders to be exposed as socialist intruders unworthy of the title. Re- jecting both of these usages, I will be employing “liberalism” in the expanded sense typical of political philosophy, which links both ends of this spectrum. “Liberalism” then refers broadly to the anti-feudal ideology of individual- ism, equal rights, and moral egalitarianism that arises in Western Europe in the seventeenth to eighteenth centuries to challenge the ideas and values inherited from the old medieval order, and which is subsequently taken up and develped by others elsewhere, including many who would have been explicitly excluded by the original conception of the ideology. Left-wing so- cial democrats and right—wing market conservatives, fans of John Rawls on the one hand and Robert Nozick on the other, are thus both liberals.1 From this perspective, it will be appreciated that liberalism is not a monolith but an umbrella term for a variety of positions. Here are some ex- amples—some familiar, some perhaps less so: Varieties of Liberalism Left-wing [social democratic) vs. Right-wing (market conservative) Kantian vs. Lockean Contractarian vs. Utilitarian Corporate vs. Democratic Social vs. Individualist Comprehensive vs. Political Ideal-theory vs. Non-ideal-theory Patriarchal vs. Feminist Imperial vs. Anti-imperial Racial vs. Anti-racial Color-blind vs. Color-conscious Etc. It is not the case, of course, that these different species of liberalism have been equally represented in the ideational sphere, or equally implemented in the institutional sphere. On the contrary, some have been dominant while others have been subordinate, and some have never, at least in the full sense, been implemented at all. But nonetheless, I suggest they all count as liberalisms and as such they are all supposed to have certain elements in common, even those characterized by gender and racial exclusions. (My motivation for making these last varieties of liberalism rather than deviations from liberalism is precisely to challenge liberalism’s self- congratulatory history, which holds an idealized Platonized liberalism aloft, untainted by its actual record of complicity with oppressive social systems.) So the initial question we should always ask people making generalizations about “liberalism” is: What particular variety of liberalism do you mean? And are your generalizations really true about all the possible kinds of liberalism, or only a subset? Here is a characterization of liberalism from a very respectable source, the British political theorist, John Gray: Common to all variants of the liberal tradition is a definite conception, distinctively modern in character, of man and society. . . . It is individualist, in that it asserts the moral primacy of the person against the claims of any social collectivity; egalitarian, inasmuch as it confers on all men the same moral status and denies the relevance to legal or political order of differences in moral worth among human beings; universalist, affirming the moral unity of the human species and according a secondary importance to specific historic associations and cultural forms; and meliorist in its affirmation of the corrigibility and improvability of all social institutions and political arrangements. It is this conception of man and society which gives liberalism a definite identity which transcends its vast internal variety and complexity.2 What generate the different varieties of liberalism are different concepts of individualism, different claims about how egalitarianism should be con- strued or realized, more or less inclusionary readings of universalism [Gray’s characterization sanitizes liberalism’s actual sexist and racist history), dif- ferent views of what count as desirable improvements, con?icting normative balancings of liberal values (freedom, equality) and competing theoretical prognoses about how best they can be realized in the light of (contested) soda-historical facts. The huge potential for disagreement about all of these explains how a common liberal core can produce such a wide range of vari- ants. Moreover, we need to take into account not merely the spectrum of actual liberalisms but also hypothetical liberalisms that could be generated through novel framings of some or all of the above. So one would need to differentiate dominant versions of liberalism from Oppositional versions, and actual from possible variants. Once the breadth of the range of liberalisms is appreciated—dominant and subordinate, actual and potential—the obvious question then raised is: Even if actual dominant liberalisms have been conservative in various ways (corporate, patriarchal, racist) why does this rule out the development of emancipatory, radical liberalisms? One kind of answer is the following [call this the internalist answer): Because there is an immanent conceptual/ normative logic to liberalism as a political ideology that precludes any emancipatory development of it. Another kind of answer is the following [call this the externalist an- swer): It doesn't. The historic domination of conservative exclusionary lib- eralisms is the result of group interests, group power, and successful group political projects. Apparent internal conceptual /normative barriers to an emancipatory liberalism can be successfully negotiated by drawing on the conceptual/normative resources of liberalism itself, in conjunction with a revisionist socio-historical picture of modernity. Most self-described radicals would endorse—indeed, re?exively, as an obvious truth-the first answer. But as indicated from the beginning, I think the second answer is actually the correct one. The obstacles to developing a “radical liberalism” are, in my opinion, primarily externalist in nature: material group interests, and the way they have shaped hegemonic varieties of liberalism. So I think we need to try to justify a radical agenda with the normative resources of liberalism rather than writing off liberalism. Since liberalism has always been the dominant ideology in the United States, and is now globally hegemonic, such a project would have the great ideological advantage of appealing to values and principles that most people already endorse. All projects of egalitarian social transformation are going to face a combination of material, political, and ideological obstacles, but this strategy would at least reduce somewhat the dimensions of the last. One would be trying to win mass support for policies that—and the challenge will, of course, be to demonstrate this—are justifiable by majoritarian norms, once reconceived and put in conjunction with facts not always familiar to the majority. Material barriers [vested group interests) and political barriers [organizational difficulties) will of course remain. But they will constitute a general obstacle for all egalitarian political programs, and as such cannot be claimed to be peculiar problems for an emancipatory liberalism. But the contention will be that such a liberalism cannot be developed. Why? Here are ten familiar objections, variants of internalism, and my re- plies to them. Ten Reasons Why Liberalism Cannot Be Radicalized (And My Replies) 1. Liberalism Has an Asocial, Atomic Individualist Ontology This is one of the oldest radical critiques of liberalism; it can be found in Marx’s derisive comments, for example in the Grundrisse, about the “Robin- sonades” of the social contract theory whose “golden age” [1650—1800) had long passed by the time he began his intellectual and political career: The individual and isolated hunter or fisher who forms the starting-point with Smith and Ricardo belongs to the insipid illusions of the eighteenth century. They are Robinson Crusoe stories . . . . no more based on such a naturalism than is Rousseau’s contrat social which makes naturally inde— pendent individuals come in contact and have mutual intercourse by con- tract... . . Man is in the most literal sense of the word a zoon politikon, not only a social animal, but an animal which can develop into an individual only in society. Production by individuals outside society . . . is as great an absurdity as the idea of the development of language without individuals living together and talking to one another.3 But several replies can be made to this indictment. To begin with, even if the accusation is true of contractarian liberalism, not all liberalisms are contractarian. Utilitarian liberalism rests on different theoretical founda- tions, as does the late nineteenth—century British liberalism of T. H. Green and his colleagues: a l-legelian, social liberalism.4 Closer to home, of course, we have [ohn Dewey’s brand of liberalism. MoreOver, even within the so- cial contract tradition, resources exist for contesting the assumptions of the Hobbesian/Lockean version of the contract. Rousseau's Discourse on the Origins of Inequality [1755) (nowhere given proper credit by Marxs) re- thinks the “contract” to make it a contract entered into after the formation of society, and thus the creation of socialized human beings. So the ontology presupposed is explicitly a social one. In any case, the contemporary revival of contractarianism initiated by John Rawls's 1971 A Theory of ] ustice makes the contract a thought experiment, a “device of representation," rather than a literal or even metaphorical anthropological account. The communitar- ian/contractarian debates of the 19805 onwards recapitulated much of the “asocial” critique of contractarian liberalism (though usually without a radi- cal edge). But as Rawls pointed out against Michael Sandel, for example, one needs to distinguish the figures in the thought experiment from real hu- man beings.6 And radicals should be wary about accepting a communitarian ontology and claims about the general good that deny or marginalize the dynamics of group domination in actual societies represented as “communi- ties.” The great virtue of contractarian liberal individualism is the conceptu- al room it provides for hegemonic norms to be critically evaluated through the epistemic and moral distancing from Sittiichkeit that the contract, as an intellectual device, provides. 2. Liberalism Cannot Recognize Groups and Group Oppression in Its Ontology—I (Macro) The second point needs to be logically distinguished from the first, since a theory could acknowledge the social shaping of individuals while denying that group oppression is central to that shaping. [So #1 is necessary, but not sufficient, for #2.) The Marxist critique, of course, was supposed to encapsulate both points: people were shaped by society and society (post- “primitive communism") was class-dominated. The ontology was social and it was an ontology of class. Today radicals would demand a richer ontology that can accommodate the realities of gender and racial oppression also. But whatever candidates are put forward, the ‘key claim is that a liberal frame- work cannot accommodate an ontology of groups in relations of domination and subordination. To the extent that liberalism recognizes social groups, these are basically conceived of as voluntary associations that one chooses to join or not join, which is obviously very different from, say, class, race, and gender memberships. But this evasive ontology, which obfuscates the most central and obvious fact about all societies since humanity exited the hunting-and-gathering stage—viz, that they are characterized by oppressions of one kind or another—is not a definitional constituent of liberalism. Liberalism has certainly recognized some kinds of oppression: the absolutism it opposed in the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries, the Nazism and Stalinism it opposed in the twentieth century. Liberalism’s failure to systematically address structural oppression in supposedly liberal-democratic societies is a contingent artifact of the group perspectives and group interests privileged by those structures, not an intrinsic feature of liberalism’s conceptual apparatus.2AC---AT: AltTheir alt does absolutely nothingNik Hynek 13, Prof of International Relations and Theory of Politics at the Metropolitan University Prague and Charles University, with David Chandler, No emancipatory alternative, no critical security studies, Critical Studies on Security, 2013 Vol. 1, No. 1, 46–63, [Note: CSS = “Critical Security Studies”]These ‘post-emancipatory’ scholars still frame Western and international intervention in potentially emancipatory terms, but the horizons and aspirations have been substantially lowered from the universalist call to radical academic policy advocacy, of the founders of emancipatory approaches within security studies. While the initial confident calls for emancipatory alternatives at least had an understanding of the need for emancipatory agency, unfortunately found only in Western powers and international institutions, the later approaches lack this clarity and confidence, merely suggesting that more ‘open’, ‘unscripted’, ‘locally sensitive’, ‘desecuritised’ and less ‘universalist’ and ‘liberal’ approaches can avoid the ‘resistances’ held to come from the local level. If these approaches are ‘emancipatory’ they lack any clear project or programme as to what these claims might mean or how they might be carried out in reality and are little different to mainstream think tank proposals calling for more ‘local ownership’,1AR---Perm BestSecurity can be positively transformed by politics—the alt is false choice, there is no security outside of politicsNunes 7 – Jo?o Reis Nunes, Marie Curie Fellow and Ph.D. Candidate in International Politics at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, September 2007, “Politics, Security, Critical Theory: A Contribution to Current Debates on Security,” online: in this light, Booth’s conception of security as a derivative concept can perhaps be refined: security is dependent, not of a prior understanding of the political, but of a simultaneous and continuous engagement with the political – in Booth’s case, the political can be defined as an instance of the full realization of the ‘human’18. This does not mean that politics is derivative of security, but rather that the sphere of what is envisaged as politically possible and desirable is constrained by the dominant security practices. There is, therefore, a normative and political surplus in critique that can allow for the transformation of security practices and open the way for change in the political realm. In other words, security does not necessarily cancel politics – in fact, in order to have more politics, one needs more security.Booth and the Welsh School thus intend to recover the positive value of security, which was lost with the identification of the latter with state interest (W?ver 2004). The focus on individual security is an essential part of this move – as Rothschild has noted, visions of security in the early liberal period put the emphasis on the sovereignty of individuals, seeing security as an essential component of human freedom (1995:55). Booth is indebted to this liberal conception of security as something positive19, and he explicitly defines security as a springboard to ‘human possibilities’ (2005b:22), ‘an instrumental value that enables people(s) some opportunities to choose how to live’ (2005b:23).It is exactly this positive value of security that, as has been argued, is absent in most of the critical literature on security. Huysmans is a particularly interesting example. Like Booth, he sees security as playing a determinant role in the constitution of the political sphere: in his work, security is seen as a signifier, a ‘wider framework of meaning (symbolic order, culture or discursive formation) within which we organize particular forms of life’ (1998:228). In this sense, not only is security constitutive of the ‘energetic principle’ (2004:324) around which political communities are built and organized, but also the particular ‘substance’ of communities and identities is dependent on the definition and negotiation of security concerns20. Nonetheless, Huysmans has so far eschewed the possibility of security being able to produce an ‘energetic principle’ that avoids the realm of unchecked power – rather, he has argued that in order for such an energetic principle to be generated security must be put aside.In contrast, the Welsh School has a clearer conception of security as a site of permanent negotiation and normative struggle (see in particular Wyn Jones 1999). Insofar as what happens at the level of security understandings and practices has profound political effects, a different understanding of security can be the key to opening up the political and disturbing the dominant state of affairs. In other words, security theory and security practices are privileged agents of political change.2AC---ALT---Markets Ingrained Markets are societally ingrained, and even if not, the alt certainly can’t solveBryant, 12—Professor of Philosophy at Collin College (Levi, “We’ll Never Do Better Than a Politician: Climate Change and Purity,” , dml)It is quite true that it is the system of global capitalism or the market that has created our climate problems (though, as Jared Diamond shows in Collapse, other systems of production have also produced devastating climate problems). In its insistence on profit and expansion in each economic quarter, markets as currently structured provide no brakes for environmental destructive actions. The system is itself pathological.However, pointing this out and deriding market based solutions doesn’t get us very far. In fact, such a response to proposed market-based solutions is downright dangerous and irresponsible. The fact of the matter is that 1) we currently live in a market based world, 2) there is not, in the foreseeable future an alternative system on the horizon, and 3), above all, we need to do something now. We can’t afford to reject interventions simply because they don’t meet our ideal conceptions of how things should be. We have to work with the world that is here, not the one that we would like to be here. And here it’s crucial to note that pointing this out does not entail that we shouldn’t work for producing that other world. It just means that we have to grapple with the world that is actually there before us.It pains me to write this post because I remember, with great bitterness, the diatribes hardcore Obama supporters leveled against legitimate leftist criticisms on the grounds that these critics were completely unrealistic idealists who, in their demand for “purity”, were asking for “ponies and unicorns”. This rejoinder always seemed to ignore that words have power and that Obama, through his profound power of rhetoric, had, at least the power to shift public debates and frames, opening a path to making new forms of policy and new priorities possible. The tragedy was that he didn’t use that power, though he has gotten better.I do not wish to denounce others and dismiss their claims on these sorts of grounds. As a Marxist anarchists, I do believe that we should fight for the creation of an alternative hominid ecology or social world. I think that the call to commit and fight, to put alternatives on the table, has been one of the most powerful contributions of thinkers like Zizek and Badiou. If we don’t commit and fight for alternatives those alternatives will never appear in the world. Nonetheless, we still have to grapple with the world we find ourselves in. And it is here, in my encounters with some Militant Marxists, that I sometimes find it difficult to avoid the conclusion that they are unintentionally aiding and abetting the very things they claim to be fighting. In their refusal to become impure, to work with situations or assemblages as we find them, to sully their hands, they end up reproducing the very system they wish to topple and change. Narcissistically they get to sit there, smug in their superiority and purity, while everything continues as it did before because they’ve refused to become politicians or engage in the difficult concrete work of assembling human and nonhuman actors to render another world possible. As a consequence, they occupy the position of Hegel’s beautiful soul that denounces the horrors of the world, celebrate the beauty of their soul, while depending on those horrors of the world to sustain their own position.To engage in politics is to engage in networks or ecologies of relations between humans and nonhumans. To engage in ecologies is to descend into networks of causal relations and feedback loops that you cannot completely master and that will modify your own commitments and actions. But there’s no other way, there’s no way around this, and we do need to act now. ................
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