International perspectives on citizenship



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Comparative Perspectives on Citizenship

Annabel Kiernan

1. British citizenship

British civil liberties rest on a different basis from those in most other democracies. Elsewhere, civil rights are normally specified in writing, either in constitutional declarations of rights or in provisions of the legal code of the country

Birch, 1987: 215

British citizenship is a difficult concept to define in absolute terms, precisely because the UK does not have a formal, written, constitution nor a Bill of Rights to which we can refer. Citizenship, as concerned with the relationship between the individual and the state (rights and duties), is widely understood in Britain to be based on the core principles of liberal theory: primarily negative liberty, or ‘freedom from’, and specifically freedom from state interference in the individual or private sphere. However, there is a debate within political theory as to the importance of an individualist concept of liberty versus a more communitarian approach, which implies positive liberty (freedom to) and the moral agency of the state. In addition, T.H. Marshall (1950) made a most significant contribution on the question of citizenship with his inclusion of social rights as a necessary component of meaningful citizenship. He discussed rights in terms of civil (rights associated with individual freedom, negative liberty), political (rights to political participation) and social rights (the right to a minimum social standards), claiming that social rights were necessary to operationalise civil and political rights (Heywood, 2002: 415).

What is clear, despite debates within social science about what constitutes citizenship, in Britain in the postwar period the waves of migration from the Commonwealth[1] gave the government the opportunity to legislate for ‘non-citizens’ (identifying ‘subjects’ of the Empire rather than British citizens) and thus to differentiate between British and non-British citizens in terms of rights and entitlements. This post-war history of multiculturalism coupled with the more recent tensions of a ‘dis-United’ Kingdom means that in meaningful terms the notion of a British national identity infers multi-layered, overlapping identities rather than an assimilated whole. Consequently, conceptualising a uniform or unifying national identity, on which to construct a distinctly British understanding of citizenship is complex; “being British” perhaps demands a more flexible or fluid meaning than is evident in other, comparable European nation states. Furthermore, if we take a citizenship perspective which incorporates something like Marshall’s social rights then, increasingly, a uniform expectation of those rights and entitlements is on the wane. The differentiation and residualisation of social rights has been exacerbated by the political pressures of waves of new migration inside Europe (primarily from central and east European migration into western European states), globalising agendas and the marketisation of public services (see Crouch, 2003). In addition the post-9/11 security agenda has led most states, including Britain, into increasingly complex territory in defining citizen rights and freedoms, such that the hierarchies of citizenship are more and more identifiable.

Since Britain does not have a written constitution then, citizenship has always been closely associated with British nationality, inferring rights for citizens through the exclusion of “aliens” from the same social, economic and political entitlements.

As Dell’Olio has argued,

Before 1981, immigration laws effectively defined the status of citizenship and deprived the United Kingdom of an exclusive citizenship mechanism of the sort that characterised other European countries. The 1981 BNA [British Nationality Act] was designed to reverse this mechanism by basing immigration upon a clear definition of citizenship and nationality

Dell’Olio, 202: 10.

BOX 1: Key immigration and asylum legislation

Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962: distinguished between British citizens in Empire or at home, “the process by which “imperial subjects” were increasingly subjected to immigration controls began” (Wolton, 2006: 456).

Race Relations Act 1965 (primarily concerned with discrimination in public places), extended by second Race Relations Act (1968) to discrimination in employment, housing

Commonwealth an Immigrants Act 1968 removed residence rights from UK citizens with no ancestral connection with the UK, replacing these rights with a special voucher system (Del’Olio, 2002: 11)

Immigration Act 1971 introduced ‘patriality’ clause (ties of blood and kinship)

Asylum and Immigration Act, 1996 (removed welfare benefits), 1999 (support became discretionary by Secretary of State, limited support to 70% of Income Support of a UK citizen)

British Nationality Act 1981 established British citizenship

Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (in force January 2003 – support if destitute and if application is timely)

For an overview of Immigration legislation since 1962 see:

In effect then, the postwar period of Commonwealth immigration posed a challenge to British citizenship and brought forward legislative clarification of rights and entitlements of citizenship through legislating on ‘non-citizens’. Clearly this has raised some difficult questions in terms of integration and multiculturalism in Britain as well as the appropriate state responses (in terms of extending economic, political and social citizenship rights and entitlements) to migrant workers, refugees and asylum seekers. The concept of British citizenship now faces a further challenge however, in the sense of a popular conception of its meaning as well as in legislative terms. Devolution in 1997 not only reiterated the national identities of British citizens but, if we take a maximalist meaning of citizenship – and thus retain the social rights formula, devolved power in the UK has further added to the differentiation of citizen entitlements.

The devolution of citizenship? Scotland and Wales

Although much debate surrounds questions of identity and nationhood, the different choices made by policymakers in the Scottish parliament and the Welsh Assembly inevitably reiterates differences in rights (entitlements) and responsibilities between British citizens. Perhaps the clearest examples of the different routes taken by the devolved powers, in contrast to the direction of policy in England, are the lack of up front university tuition fees and the introduction of free personal care for the elderly in Scotland (2002) and free prescriptions in Wales (2007); as well, perhaps, as the staged introduction of the smoking ban (introduced in England last). Thus, in key areas of the public provision of health and education (where the welfare state is a core indicator of the social rights of citizens) entitlements are different for citizens within the UK.

BOX 2: Referendums on devolution

Results:

Scotland 11th September 1997: 74.3% YES to Scottish Parliament; 63.5% YES to tax-varying powers

Turnout: 60.4%



Wales 18th September 1997: 50.3% YES to Assembly for Wales

Turnout: 50.1%



BOX 3: The Scotland Act 1998

Part I “provides for the establishment of the Scottish Parliament. This was to have 29 members, 73 elected from single member constituencies based currently on the Westminster parliamentary map and 56 chosen from lists presented by registered political arties in eight regions” Johnson, 2004: 176.



BOX 4: The Government of Wales Act 1998

“Part I of the Act … provides for the setting up of the National Assembly for Wales, determines its membership and how members are to be elected … 40 members are elected by relative majority voting in the parliamentary constituencies of Wales, whilst a further 20 are chosen from party lists presented in the five electoral regions set up previously for the purpose of electing members of the European Parliament” Johnson, pp 188-89



In the long term, these differences may grow as nationalist parties in Scotland and Wales increase their political confidence and their representation. The 2007 Scottish elections, although not representing a decisive shift towards nationalist politics, did give the Scottish Nationalist Party (SNP) their most significant electoral coup to date in delivering 47 seats, becoming the largest party by one, and thus gaining the office of First Minister (Alex Salmond, leader of the SNP)[2]. What’s more, the 2007 Welsh Assembly elections delivered the first Welsh nationalist minister. Leader of Plaid Cymru, Ieuan Wyn Jones, became Deputy First Minister in the Welsh Assembly after forming a coalition with Labour. Labour did not win enough seats in 2007 to have an outright majority, and with a 4.5% swing to Plaid Cymru, the nationalists are now the second largest party in the Assembly.

Liberty versus security? UK anti-terrorism legislation

Since the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001[3], the issue of detention of foreign nationals has prompted a strong debate on what constitutes “civilized values” in the UK

Wolton, 2006: 463

Much of the foregoing discussion of citizenship has looked at the challenges posed by Britain’s changing population and constitutional reform. In particular it has raised questions about a maximalist conception of citizenship; one which includes social rights. However, if we return to a more minimalist approach to citizenship with a focus expressly on negative liberty, this too has faced a challenge. The increase in the powers of the state relative to the individual, specifically in post 9/11 security legislation has, in Britain, generated a wide-ranging debate about the importance of protecting individual liberties and freedom from state interference in light of government legislation introducing control orders, limiting freedom of speech (incitement laws): ; extending police powers of detention without charge - currently 14 days, the longest in Europe, but parts of the government have argued for this to be extended to 90 days - and the establishing a national identity card: ). These areas of legislation arguably challenge the very core of the principles underpinning British citizenship, individual liberty and freedom from state power and thus potentially recast and redefine our understanding of British citizenship.

Modern British citizenship and civic duty: The British citizenship test

Since 2002, citizenship education has become a statutory subject for children from 12 to 16 years old and an inspected subject for those aged 5 to 11. Since January 2004, individuals who have successfully naturalized as British have to undergo a citizenship ceremony where they give an oath or an affirmation of allegiance and a pledge of citizenship

Wolton, 2006: 453.

The most recent attempts to clarify British citizenship can be found in the introduction of the citizenship test for new citizens. A clear point of debate in light of the test, is the extent to which indigenous British citizens would either be able to pass the test or would want to take the pledge of loyalty[4]; raising further questions about the real meaning of citizenship and belonging.

2. Comparative European citizenship

The backbone of all political systems in Europe with the exception of Britain, is a formal constitution defining the role of the institutions and the role of the citizens.

Andersen and Eliassen, 1998: 6.

European nation states represent a wide variety of state building processes, reflecting invasion, civil war, revolution, Empire and migration. Perhaps in ready contrast with the UK, the institutions of the state in many other European countries have been reconstructed in much more recent decades. Again in contrast to the UK, this has meant redrawing the constitution of the state, in turn having implications for the codification of the rights and duties of citizenship. Even if the discussion were confined to the west European nations, the different ways in which the states and their peoples have been constituted and recognised through the development of civil, political and social rights is vast; reflecting different periods of industrialisation and modernisation, different church-state relations, state-society relations and different types of social and public service provision. However, with the reunification of Europe in the post-Soviet era (1989), the challenge of further integration of new constitutional arrangements and citizenship models is complex.

To illustrate some of the complexities of comparative approaches to citizenship, this section will look at the meaning of citizenship in two core EU member states – France and Germany – which have traditionally been understood to represent opposing models of the citizenship principle. Both cases also vary considerably from the UK and thus highlight the difficulties in attempting to establish a common European identity and European citizenship. This section will therefore also consider the attempts by the European Union to establish both a shared identity and a formalised set of EU (rather than national) rights.

France (jus soli: territory)

Although derived from the egalitarian spirit of the Revolution, the ‘universal neutral’ has meant that, if not excluded because of difference (racialising the universal), the inclusion of social groups would operate in the non-recognition of any difference (assimilation policies)

Ducoulombier, 2002: 76

France provides an interesting contrast to UK as, arguably, the thrust of the republican tradition produces a strong emphasis on assimilation rather than n acceptance of multiculturalism. The principles of republicanism which underpin French notions of citizenship have tended to generate a more culturally homogenised view of the civic ethic which has had a negative impact on immigrant communities in France, in particular the large North African community. In addition, the Revolution’s establishment of the principle of secularism (laïcité) has further implications for the visibility of Muslim identity[5]. The emphasis on ‘sameness’ can produce a political nationalism which is based on cultural superiority, and raises questions about the ability to have social stability in culturally diverse societies, where shared history and traditions are lacking.

… the immigrant population’s demands for cultural and religious recognition are seen as threatening republican France

Lefebvre, 2003: 25

Much of the political debate about the practice of republican values as citizenship principles, has revolved around the issue of the integration of the North African community since the period of decolonisation (particularly of Algeria) in 1962. The principle of jus soli was the basis of French citizenship and was not initially challenged by decolonisation and France’s demand for migrant labour to assist economic expansion in the same period. Consequently citizenship was conferred on second generation immigrants as migrant workers from former colonial territories resettled in France. However, the political tensions which arise from the potential conflict between an immigrant community whose cultural and religious identity is visibly different, combined with the economic and social marginalisation of incoming migrant labour[6] arguably gave (electoral) succour to the far right Front National[7] who, in turn, have been able to exert pressure on mainstream political parties to tighten both immigration and citizenship laws. 1992/3 saw the first tightening up of the nationality laws (Code de la nationalité). The debates surrounding this reform in the early 1990s, produced a significant change in legislation which took effect on 1st September 1998. French citizenship, which had been automatic for second generation immigrants, from the principle of jus soli, was significantly undermined by the 1998 law which now requires application for citizenship at 18. A further piece of recent legislation worth noting is the law of 11th February 2004, which prohibits all signs or dress of religious belonging in public schools, on the basis of laïcité. This law was widely interpreted as being a prohibition of the hijab, since laws had not previously been introduced to limit outward signs or symbols of other religions.

Germany (jus sanguinis: descent)

Also providing an interesting contrast is Germany, which is widely perceived as being at the other end of the citizenship spectrum from France given the German citizenship principle of jus sanguinis. This has principle has produced difficulties of integration of ‘non-Germans’ since, until recently, long-term or even permanent residence did not deliver citizenship status. A further interesting dimension of the German case has been the difficulties arising from the reunification of East and West Germany in 1990.

The complexities of the principles of German citizenship stem from the late establishment of a unified German nation state. Prior to Bismarck’s establishment of a single German state (through the dominance of Prussia) in 1871, the German territories were a collection of more than forty sovereign states. The consequence of this was that the state did not define the nation as in the UK and France and, as such, German identity developed from cultural unity. The evolution of cultural unity in a political sense was quickly transformed by nationalists into an ethnically homogenising force (Preuss, 2003: 42 - 43)

For them the German nation state had to be the political organisation of Germandom (Deutschtum), the definition of which oscillated between ethno-cultural and racist connotations

Preuss, 2003: 43

In the modern context this has meant that individuals are German irrespective of where they are born, if they have a German parent. The corollary is that, until recent changes in the law, even if you were born in Germany but to non-German parents, you could not be German – that is, not gain German citizenship. The jus sanguinis principle has had an especially negative effect on the Turkish community in particular, described as gastarbeiter: remaining guestworkers irrespective of their length of residence in Germany. The citizenship and nationality laws were finally reformed in 1999 (and came into force on 1st January 2000) so that children born after this date to non-German parents can obtain citizenship if at least one parent has been living in Germany for at least eight years.

A further political debate on the nature of German citizenship emerged after the reunification process in 1990. The accession of the East German länder to the Federal Republic of Germany has proved to be the complex (and expensive) process to be expected from the unification of two such socially, economically and politically diverse societies. The economic burden of integration has, arguably, fallen on citizens of East Germany who have borne the brunt of unemployment and economic restructuring, raising questions about their status as second class citizens. It is claimed that the Ossis retain ‘a wall in their minds’ (Almond et al, 2006: 202), which may take a generation to overcome.

The European Union – creating supranational civil society?

Historically, the formation of a polity is a lengthy process and closely linked to a generalised notion of citizenship. The growth of these ideas in Western Europe coincided with the development of the nation-state. The gradual codification of such rights corresponds to the formation of a dominant national political culture. Today the close interrelationship at the national level between rights and identity creates obstacles to the development of a European polity.

Andersen and Eliassen, 1998: 7.

The establishment of European Union citizenship came in 1993, through the Treaty on European Union (TEU, more commonly referred to as the Maastricht Treaty), and can be found in the supranational pillar[8]. Establishing a common European identity which could give rise to a workable citizenship concept has been on the agenda of the EU for more than thirty years. The Copenhagen Summit in 1973 included a ‘Declaration of European Identity’; the Paris Summit in 1974 had a working group on special rights for member state citizens: “Among other things, the ‘Declaration on European identity’ spoke of the urgent need to focus on the shared ‘heritage’ and ‘to ensure the survival of the civilization’ which the Community countries and the potential new members were said to have in common” (Hansen, 2002: 142). In 1976 the Tindemans Report, referred to a ‘Citizens’ Europe’ and at Fontainebleu 1984 this became ‘A People’s Europe’. However giving real substance to a European citizenship only started to develop more recently and, it might be claimed, this was inevitable since any form of political integration would follow, rather than precede, economic or market harmonisation.

Consequently, the development of European citizenship in the 1990s was, in part, intended to give some substance to the political rhetoric of a ‘union of people’ as the same Treaty (TEU) transformed the European Community into the European Union[9]. The political union dimension of the TEU was also about establishing basic political participation norms to sit alongside the legal entitlements to freedom of movement. Importantly then, the Treaty created EU citizens, not just EU workers. The previous lack of a meaningful political dimension to the EU had been criticised for weakening its democratic credentials. Europe after all consists of people not economic units, so the parliament was granted more power both to give meaning to the notion of citizenship and to provide some legitimacy for the continued expansion of EU policy competence. Additionally the social dimension of the European project was weak relative to the economic side and the only limited success of attempts at social provision up to this point were seen as further evidence of a European integration project which served political and business elites rather than citizens of the Member States. The Social Charter had been an attempt to do establish citizens’ social rights but, through a negotiated compromise, was changed from ‘The Fundamental Charter of Social Rights of Citizens’ to ‘The Fundamental Charter of Social Rights For Workers’ and was delayed in its full implementation in 1989 by the British veto[10]. The Social Charter contained limited protection for in-work labour in European member states, but had to be appended to the Treaty as the Social Chapter until the reversal of the UK veto after the 1997 election. Despite its marginal status in the 1990s, the Directorate General for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, have been able to use the Charter as a platform on which to build further citizen-focused social affairs policy

The EU Social Charter is an example of a strong facilitating institution that has been effectively used to support and build civil society within the EU

Muetzelfeldt & Smith, 2002: 66

TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION (1993) ESTABLISHING EU CITIZENSHIP

Articles 8a – e TEU, conferring specific rights to

* live and work in any Member State of the EU

* vote and stand as a candidate in local elections in any EU country

* vote and stand as a candidate for EP elections in any EU country

* diplomatic or consular protection in non-European country from any MS

* petition the EP or Ombudsman in cases of maladministration by EU

instituions

(EU citizenship)

(CEC proposal for Citizens for Europe 2007-2013)

(euronews on Europe for Citizens programme – short video clip)

In addition, the EU was to codify fundamental rights through inserting the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (which was developed in the Nice Treaty 2000, and came in to force in 2003) as the opening section of the new Constitutional Treaty[11], drafted in parallel with the accession of 10 new member states in 2004. It had been argued that, as with all previous enlargements of EU membership, a new Treaty outlining the new structures, powers and competences of the Union brought about by enlargement was necessary. It was proposed that the Charter of Fundamental Rights should provide the opening section of the new Treaty, thus making it something more akin to a constitution, opening with a statement of citizen rights. However Member States had differing reasons for finding fault with the draft constitution, not least for some the inclusion of the section on rights, so the new constitution for Europe is currently in limbo. Consequently the potential ‘Bill of Rights’ is also in not a formal part of the architecture of the EU.

Do these limits to political and social citizenship imply that what has been created at the level of the EU is fundamentally an economic citizenship? It is certainly the case that the political and social dimensions of the European project are underdeveloped compared to the strides that have been made towards full single market integration. Arguably this variable development has been exacerbated since enlargement in 2004 and 2007[12] as well as by the election of the new Commission in 2005, led by President Barroso, who has clearly placed the emphasis of the EU’s current strategy on growth and competitiveness. However there is some sense in which there is at least some recognition of a shared cultural identity based, in a broad sense, on our common heritage of the evolution of European civilisation, something which has often been articulated to illustrate the differences between Europeans and Americans.

Much research only emphasises the dynamic between these two ways of construing citizenship in the EU, and when concluding, correctly, that the social dimension gets marginalised, it also tends to conclude, incorrectly, that the entire notion of ‘European citizenship’ is reducible to market citizenship … It is therefore of the utmost importance to take cognizance of the fact that there is within EU policy also a strong collectivist articulation of European citizenship; an articulation which appeals to a popular sense of rootedness in a shared culture, heritage, history and civilisation

Hansen, 2000: 152 – 153

This notion of a distinctly European civilisation has been perhaps most clearly illustrated in some of the contributions to the debate on Turkey’s admission to the EU[13]. Former French president Giscard d’Estaing, who led the drafting of the new Constitutional Treaty for the EU, was quoted during the negotiations as “saying Turkey's entry into the EU would be "the end of Europe" … he continued, “people who backed Turkey's accession were "the adversaries of the European Union". Mr Giscard d'Estaing told Le Monde that Turkey's capital was not in Europe, 95% of its population lived outside Europe, and it was "not a European country”. ()

Despite this common heritage and moves towards establishing a meaningful EU citizenship, the fundamental link between individuals and the EU remains a national one – it is by virtue of being a national of an EU member state that entitles the individual to EU citizenship, rather than the EU autonomously and independently developing civil, social and political rights. As Dell’Olio explains,

… the establishment of European citizenship guarantees the validity of national citizenship because it depends on national citizenship and reinforces the ideology of nationality rather than precipitating its demise. Instead of reinforcing the link between individuals and the European Union, European citizenship strengthens the relationship between individuals and their respective nationality

Dell’Olio, 2002: 14.

It is clear that European citizenship does not replace national citizenship or national identity, but complements it. In fact, for the most part, it contributes to the multi-layered identities that European citizens now have, e.g. Scottish, British and European.

3. International citizenship

Institutions of global governance raise questions about global citizenship as ‘a possible counter or response to, or complement of, the growth of global governance

Muetzelfeldt & Smith, 2002: 55

In the era of economic globalisation and the internationalisation of political organisation, there have inevitably been a number of debates about the decline of the nation state. Given the connections people can establish with one another through new technologies and what may be understood as an homogenisation of culture (sometimes referred to as an Americanisation arising from the omnipotence McDonalds/Starbucks/Nike and other forms of global branding) national identity has been challenged. In the context of citizenship this is a potentially significant shift. If indeed the nation state, and those political and cultural norms and values which arise from it, is on the wane, are individuals recreating those identities in the international arena? The foregoing discussion of the European Union indicates the complexities of trying to establish supranational identities and citizenship norms, as well as the enduring importance of national difference. This section will address the question of ‘post-national’ citizenship and the development of cosmopolitanism.

Despite the difficulties of attempting to define citizenship for a culturally diverse continent such as Europe, the achievements of organisations such as the EU illustrate that we do now have some transnational rights. These transnational rights are significant inasmuch as they have developed from the core of an abstracted set of human rights to more specific rights (to employment, political participation and representation, in-work social protection, for example) which Europeans can carry with them across borders. In other words the political organisation of the EU, although still weak relative to a nation state, has established something of a social contract with citizens of Member States. However, although nationality remains the basis of this identification of rights, some have argued that the nationality link is weakening. For example, Soysal [in discussing rights across borders] claims that: “Citizenship assumes a single status; all citizens are entitled to the same rights and privileges …” She continues by arguing that some of these social, political and economic rights are shared by people resident in national polities who do not have citizenship of those polities. This leads Soysal to argue that a “post-national citizenship is emerging, and that universal personhood, not national citizenship, is the basis of membership in national polities” (Schuster & Solomes, 2002: 40.)

Schuster & Solomes (2002) argue that there are distinct groups of citizenship scholars: those who argue that national citizenship is giving way to transnational or post-national citizenship (appeal of minority rights to universal concepts); and those who claim that national citizenship is resilient. Within those categories, inevitably, there are those who view the demise of the nation state positively and those who view it negatively. This is at least partly a function of whether the nation state is understood as an anachronism and an inhibitor of more progressive notions of an international society; or alternatively that since citizenship is fundamentally about national identity, the loss of the nation state implies the loss of meaningful identities and rights.[14]

Global citizenship or cosmopolitanism?

It is doubtful whether citizenship can become global since it remains a state institution, and it is based on contributions that presuppose a reciprocal relationship between rights and obligations, and imply a relationship between rights and territory

Isin & Turner, 2007: 14

The debates surrounding the development of international society and thus a global citizenry (rather than the more straight forward concept of cosmopolitanism) remain, understandably, concerned with the definition of citizenship and the extent to which it is a state-based concept. If citizenship must be understood as effectively arising from a relationship (or contract) with a state, a bounded territory which delivers identity and reflects a shared political culture which is imbued in the nation’s political institutions (and thus delivers social stability and social capital) then the lack of a supranational state or world government means that we are not yet global citizens. The contract with the state in its formalistic sense is an exchange relationship in terms of rights and duties. Apart from the nation state, there is not yet another form of political organisation to which individuals have claims to social rights, civil rights or political duties. The EU, for example, provides some entitlements (through policymaking and political participation) primarily through the mechanism of the nation state, and as yet cannot extract duties (it does not raise tax – thus has no welfare state – nor an army). In international terms the EU is the most developed supranational political organisation given its fully enfranchised parliament and its independent judiciary. Yet when the EU attempted to further strengthen its foundation and structure through the Constitutional Treaty (2005), it was rejected in referenda in key member states. In light of the difficulties associated with establishing anything approaching a post-national citizenship, Isin and Turner (2007) reject the notion of a ‘global citizen’ precisely because, they argue, it requires something akin to global governance. Instead they argue that the cosmopolitan citizen, revolving around the changes to mobility and transactions arising from globalisation processes, is a more accurate reflection of evolution of citizenship in the international arena.

Conclusion

This brief overview of comparative citizenship illustrates that it is still best understood as a function of national identity and political culture. That is, citizenship remains a concept which reflects a boundedness, a shared set of values, a common heritage and social bonds of community. Consequently both elite attempts to create new forms of citizenship and the internationalisation of other social, political and economic processes, cannot replace or recreate the sense of belonging, of sameness rather then otherness, which citizenship in any meaningful sense seemingly requires.

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[1] SS Windrush famously brought migrant labour from the Caribbean in 1948. Further information can be found at:

[2] For full results and analysis of the 2007 Scottish election results, see:

[3] The Crime and Security Act 2001 can be found at:

[4] The citizenship pledge can be found at: .uk/british_citizenship/english/homepage/what_happens_at_a.html?

[5] France’s Muslim population is estimated at 5 million, Europe’s largest. More than 30% of Muslims in France are second generation (El Hamel, 2002: 294).

[6] 2005 saw significant rioting by North African youth in Paris which spread to other inner city areas. The riots were seen as emblematic of the failure of the French state to successfully integrate these communities but to expose them to social and economic exclusion. This marginalisation was interpreted by immigrant communities as a signifier of their lack of genuine French citizen status.



[7] Le Pen’s Front National (FN, set up in 1972) has fought national, local and European elections since the 1970s. Despite limited electoral fortune, the shock result of the first round ballot of the 2005 presidential election was a reminder of the issues which the FN is able to exploit: The party’s famous electoral slogan, launched in 1975, was ‘1 million unemployed is 1 million immigrants too many’. The nature of the 2 ballot French electoral system means that smaller parties which lose out in the first round, step down and often request their voters transfer their vote to a mainstream party in the second round run-off – a system of ‘mutual désistemenst’. This can increase the impact of small parties like the FN as they bargain with major parties for policy recognition in exchange for votes.

[8] The TEU introduced the ‘pillar system’ to the EU: creating three pillars of EU policy competence, it introduced two new intergovernmental pillars, Common, Foreign and Security Policy and Justice and Home Affairs, enabling member state cooperation in these fields. All other Community legislation was placed in the supranational pillar, indicating that competence in this area lies with the Community institutions and decisions are legally binding on all member states.

[9] Established as the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957 through the Treaty of Rome, the EEC became the European Community (EC) with the signing of the Single European Act in 1986, with the dropping of the ‘Economic ‘E’’ emblematic of the widening competence of the institutions. The move towards political union (rather than simply market integration) was further established in the TEU (1993) which refers to a “Union of the Peoples of Europe” ()

[10] Veto: Not a formal mechanism but a convention inside the EU decisionmaking process which dates back to 1965 and an event referred to as the ‘Luxembourg Compromise’. In brief, the supranational direction on the EEC in the 1960s concerned then French President Charles de Gaulle, who argued that nation states should still control the pace and direction of European integration. In making a stand on the issue, French representatives boycotted EEC business meetings in 1965-66 causing ‘the empty chair crisis’. The resolution to the stand off was to allow individual member states to effectively veto any piece of proposed Community legislation if it could be shown that it would harm the “vital national interests” of the member state. This national veto was used by the UK in 1989 to gain a British opt-out of the provisions of the proposed Social Charter. This prevented the legislation from being formally ratified by the EU and thus it was not legally binding on member states. The other 11 member states chose to ‘opt-in’ to the provisions – the Social Protocol - until the reversal of the UK veto by the New Labour government in 1997 allowed it to become Community policy.

[11] The proposed EU Constitutional Treaty – thought necessary to reflect a Union of 25 rather than 15 Member States - was rejected in referendums in France and the Netherlands in 2005, although was accepted in many of the new Member States. New European legislation requires a unanimous decision, so one rejection was sufficient to stall the process and send European leaders back to the drawing board.

[12] In May 2004 the EU extended membership to 10 additional European countries, 8 from Central and Eastern Europe (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Slovenia, Slovakia, Malta and Cyprus) This was arguably the biggest challenge of enlargement faced by the EU in its history, in terms of both quantity and quality of applicant states. In January 2007, the EU further expanded to 27 Member States with the accession of Bulgaria and Romania.

[13] Turkey has been in negotiation with the EU for membership since officially becoming a candidate state in 1999. Turkey’s membership has caused fervent discussion amongst EU member states as to the potential impact of Turkish membership. Despite being secular, the vast majority of Turkish society is Sunni Muslim and, geographically, Turkey borders the Middle East and potentially complicates the Iraq conflict (particularly if there is to be a Kurdish state) as well as having implications for Cyprus. These complexities are too challenging for some existing Member States, notably France and the Netherlands, who have thus suggested a bar to Turkish membership.

[14] For an overview of all arguments see Schuster & Solomos, 2002.

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