The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility - Philosophy

The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility Author(s): Galen Strawson Reviewed work(s): Source: Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, Vol. 75, No. 1/2, Free Will, Determinism, and Moral Responsibility (Aug., 1994), pp. 5-24 Published by: Springer Stable URL: . Accessed: 20/08/2012 03:46 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@. .

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GALEN STRAWSON

THEIMPOSSIBILITOYFMORALRESPONSIBILITY

(Received 15 September1993)

I

Thereis an argumentw, hichI will call the Basic Argumentw, hich appearsto provethatwe cannotbe trulyorultimatelymorallyresponsibleforouractions. Accordingto theBasicArgumenti,t makesno differencewhetherdeterminismis trueorfalse. Wecannotbe trulyor ultimatelymorallyresponsiblfeorouractionsin eithercase.

TheBasicArgumenhtasvariousexpressionisntheliteraturoef free will,anditscentralideacanbe quicklyconveyed.(1) Nothingcanbe causa sui - nothingcanbe thecauseof itself. (2) Inorderto be truly morallyresponsibleforone'sactionsonewouldhaveto be causa sui, atleastin certaincrucialmentalrespects.(3) Thereforne othingcanbe trulymorallyresponsible.

InthispaperIwanttoreconsidetrheBasicArgumentin, thehopethat anyonewhothinksthatwecanbetrulyorultimatelymorallyresponsible forouractionswillbe preparedto sayexactlywhatis wrongwithit. I thinkthatthepointthatit hasto makeis obvious,andthatit hasbeen underrateidnrecentdiscussionof freewill- perhapbs ecauseit admits of noanswer.I suspectthatit is obviousinsucha waythatinsistingon it toomuchis likelyto makeit seemless obviousthanit is, giventhe innatecontrasuggestibiliotfyhumanbeingsingeneraal ndphilosophers in particularB. utI amnotworriedaboutmakingit seemless obvious thanit is so longas it getsadequateattention.As faras its validityis concernedi,t canlookafteritself.

A morecumbersomestatementof the Basic Argumentgoes as

follows.1

PhilosophicalStudies 75: 5-24, 1994.

? 1994 KluwerAcademicPublishers. Printedin theNetherlands.

6 (1) (2)

(3) (4)

(5)

(6) (7) (8)

GALENSTRAWSON

Interestedin free action,we areparticularliynterestedin actionsthatareperformefdorareason(asopposedto 'reflex' actionsormindlesslyhabituaal ctions).

Whenoneactsfora reason,whatonedoesis a functionof howoneis, mentallyspeaking.(Itis alsoa functionof one's height,one'sstrengtho,ne'splaceandtime,andso on. But thementalfactorsarecrucialwhenmoralresponsibilitiys in question.)

Soif oneistobetrulyresponsiblfeorhowoneacts,onemust be trulyresponsibleforhowoneis, mentallyspeaking- at leastin certainrespects.

Buttobetrulyresponsiblfeorhowoneis, mentallyspeaking, incertainrespectso, nemusthavebroughittabouthatoneis thewayoneis, mentallyspeakingi,n certainrespects.Andit is notmerelythatonemusthavecausedoneselftobetheway one is, mentallyspeaking.Onemusthaveconsciouslyand explicitlychosentobethewayoneis, mentallyspeakingi,n certainrespectsa, ndonemusthavesucceededinbringingit aboutthatoneis thatway.

But one cannotreallybe said to choose, in a conscious, reasonedf,ashion,to be thewayone is mentallyspeaking, in any respectat all, unlessone alreadyexists, mentally speakinga, lreadyequippedwithsomeprinciplesof choice, 'P1'- preferencesv,alues,pro-attitudeisd,eals- inthelight of whichonechooseshowtobe.

Butthentobetrulyresponsibleo,naccounot fhavingchosen to be thewayoneis, mentallyspeakingi,n certainrespects, onemustbetrulyresponsiblfeorone'shavingtheprinciples of choiceP1 inthelightof whichonechosehowtobe.

Butforthistobe so onemusthavechosenP1,inareasoned, conscious,intentionaflashion.

Butforthis,i.e. (7),tobesoonemustalreadyhavehadsome principlesof choiceP2,inthelightof whichonechoseP1.

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(9) And so on. Herewe aresettingout on a regressthatwe cannotstop.Trueself-determinatioisnimpossiblebecauseit requiretsheactualcompletionof aninfiniteseriesof choices of principleos f choice.2

(10) Sotruemoralresponsibilitiysimpossibleb, ecauseitrequires trueself-determinatioans,notedin (3).

Thismayseemcontrivedb, utessentiallythesameargumenctanbe givenin a morenaturaflorm. (1) It is undeniablethatoneis theway one is, initially,as a resultof heredityandearlyexperiencea, ndit is undeniabltehatthesearethingsforwhichonecannotbe heldto be in anyresponsible(morallyor otherwise).(2) Onecannotat anylater stageof lifehopetoaccedetotruemoralresponsibilitfyorthewayone is by tryingto changethe way one alreadyis as a resultof heredity andpreviousexperience.For(3) boththeparticulawr ayin whichone is movedto tryto changeoneself,andthedegreeof one'ssuccessin one'sattempat tchange,willbe determinebdy howonealreadyis as a resultof heredityandpreviousexperienceA. nd(4)anyfurthecrhanges thatonecanbringaboutonlyafteronehasbroughat boutcertaininitial changeswill in turnbe determinedv,iatheinitialchanges,by heredity andpreviousexperience.(5) Thismaynotbe thewholestory,for it maybethatsomechangesinthewayoneis aretraceablneottoheredity andexperiencbe uttotheinfluenceof indeterministoicrrandomfactors. Butit is absurdto supposethatindeterministoicrrandomfactors,for whichone is ex hypothesin no way responsiblec,anin themselves contributienanywayto one'sbeingtrulymorallyresponsiblfeorhow one is.

Theclaim,then,is notthatpeoplecannotchangethewaytheyare. Theycan,in certainrespects(whichtendto be exaggeratedby North Americansandunderestimatepde, rhapsb, y Europeans)T. heclaimis only thatpeoplecannotbe supposedto changethemselvesin sucha wayas to be orbecometrulyorultimatelymorallyresponsibleforthe waytheyare,andhencefortheiractions.

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II

I have encounteredtwo mainreactionsto the BasicArgument.On the one handit convincesalmostall the studentswithwhomI have discussedthetopicof freewill andmoralresponsibilityO.3ntheother handit oftentendsto be dismissedi,ncontemporardyiscussionof free willandmoralresponsibilitya,s wrong,orirrelevanto,rfatuouso, rtoo rapido, ranexpressionof metaphysicaml egalomania.

I thinkthattheBasicArgumenits certainlyvalidinshowingthatwe cannotbe morallyresponsiblein the waythatmanysuppose.AndI thinkthatit is thenaturallight,notfear,thathasconvincedthestudents I havetaughthatthisis so. Thatis whyit seemsworthwhilteo restate the argumentin a slightlydifferent- simplerandlooser - version,and to askagainwhatis wrongwithit.

Somemay say thatthereis nothingwrongwith it, butthatit is not veryinterestinga, ndnot verycentralto the free will debate. I doubtwhetheranynon-philosopheorr beginnerin philosophywould agreewiththisview. If one wantsto thinkaboutfreewill andmoral responsibilityco, nsideratioonfsomeversionoftheBasicArgumenitsan overwhelminglnyaturapl laceto start.Itcertainlyhastobeconsidered at somepointin a fulldiscussionof freewillandmoralresponsibility, evenif thepointithastomakeis obvious.Beliefinthekindof absolute moralresponsibilittyhatit showsto be impossiblehasfora longtime beencentratlotheWesternreligiousm, orala, ndculturatlraditione,ven if it is now slightlyon thewane(a disputableview). It is a matterof historicaflactthatconcernaboutmoralresponsibilithyasbeenthemain motor - indeed the ratioessendi- of discussion of the issue of free will. Theonlywayinwhichonemighthopeto show(1)thattheBasic Argumenwt asnotcentralto thefreewilldebatewouldbe to show(2) thatthe issueof moralresponsibilitywas not centralto thefreewill debate.Thereare,obviouslyw, aysof takingtheword'free'in which (2)canbe maintainedB. ut(2) is clearlyfalsenonetheless.4

In sayingthatthe notionof moralresponsibilitycriticizedby the BasicArgumenits centratlo theWesterntraditionI,amnotsuggesting thatit is someartificiaal ndlocalJudaeo-Christian-Kantcioanstruct thatis foundnowhereelse in thehistoryof thepeoplesof theworld,

THE IMPOSSIBILITYOF MORALRESPONSIBLITY

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althougheven if it werethatwouldhardlydiminishits interestand importancfeorus. Itis naturatlo supposethatAristotlealsosubscribed toit,5andit is significantthatanthropologishtsavesuggestedthatmost humansocietiescanbe classifiedeitheras 'guiltcultureso' ras 'shame cultures'.It is truethatneitherof thesetwo fundamentaml oralemotionsnecessarilypresupposeas conceptionof oneselfas trulymorally responsiblfeorwhatonehasdone.Butthefactthatbotharewidespread doesatleastsuggestthata conceptionof moralresponsibilitsyimilarto ourownis a naturapl artof thehumanmoral-concepturaelpertoire.

Infactthenotionof moralresponsibilitcyonnectsmoretightlywith thenotionof guiltthanwiththe notionof shame. In manycultures shamecanattachto onebecauseof whatsomememberof one'sfamily - or government- has done, andnot becauseof anythingone has done oneself;andin suchcases the feelingof shameneed not (although it may)involvesomeobscure,irrationafleelingthatone is somehow responsiblfeorthebehaviourof one'sfamilyorgovernmentT. hecase of guiltis less clear.Thereis no doubtthatpeoplecanfeel guilty(or canbelievethattheyfeel guilty)aboutthingsfor whichtheyarenot responsiblel,et alonemorallyresponsibleB. utit is muchless obvious thattheycando thiswithoutanysenseor beliefthattheyarein fact responsible.

III

Suchcomplicationasretypicalof morapl sychologya,ndtheyshowthat it is importantto tryto be preciseaboutwhatsortof responsibilitiys underdiscussion.Whatsortof 'true'moralresponsibilitiys beingsaid to be bothimpossibleandwidelybelievedin?

An old storyis veryhelpfulin clarifyingthisquestion.Thisis the storyof heavenandhell. AsI understanidt,truemoralresponsibilitiys responsibilitoyf sucha kindthat,if we haveit, thenit makessense,at least,tosupposethatitcouldbejusttopunishsomeof uswith(eternal) tormentin hell andrewardotherswith(eternalb) liss in heaven.The stresson thewords'makessense'is importantf,oronecertainlydoes nothaveto believein anyversionof the storyof heavenandhell in

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GALENSTRAWSON

orderto understandthe notionof truemoralresponsibilitythatit is beingusedto illustrateN. ordoesonehavetobelievein anyversionof thestoryof heavenandhellin ordertobelievein theexistenceof true moralresponsibilityO. nthecontrarym: anyatheistshavebelievedin theexistenceof truemoralresponsibilityT.hestoryof heavenandhell is usefulsimplybecauseitillustratesi,napeculiarlyvividway,thekind of absoluteorultimateaccountabilitoyrresponsibilittyhatmanyhave supposedthemselvetsohave,andthatmanydostillsupposethemselves to have.Itveryclearlyexpressesitsscopeandforce.

Butonedoesnothaveto referto religiousfaithin orderto describe thesortsof everydaysituationthatareperhapsprimarilyinfluentiailn givingriseto ourbeliefin trueresponsibilityS.upposeyouset off fora shopontheeveningof a nationahl olidayi,ntendingtobuya cakewith yourlasttenpoundnote. Onthestepsof theshopsomeoneis shaking anOxfamtin. Youstop,andit seemscompletelyclearto youthatit is entirelyupto youwhatyoudo next.Thatis, it seemsto youthatyouare trulyr, adicallyfreetochoose,in sucha waythatyouwillbeultimately morallyresponsibleforwhateveryoudo choose. Evenif youbelieve thatdeterminismis true,andthatyouwillinfiveminutestimebeableto lookbackandsaythatwhatyoudidwasdeterminedth, isdoesnotseem tounderminyeoursenseof theabsolutenesasndinescapabilitoyf your freedom,andof yourmoralresponsibilitfyoryourchoice. Thesame seemsto be trueevenif youacceptthevalidityof theBasicArgument statedin sectionI, whichconcludesthatone cannotbe in any way ultimatelyresponsibleforthewayone is anddecides. Inbothcases, it remainstruethatas onestandsthere,one'sfreedomandtruemoral responsibilitsyeemobviousandabsoluteto one.

Largeandsmall,morallysignificanot r morallyneutrals, uchsituationsofchoiceoccurregularlyinhumanlife. Ithinktheylieattheheart of the experienceof freedomandmoralresponsibilityT. heyarethe fundamentaslourceof ourinabilityto giveupbeliefintrueorultimate moralresponsibilityT. herearefurtherquestionsto be askedaboutwhy humanbeingsexperiencethesesituationsof choiceas theydo. It is aninterestingquestionwhetheranycognitivelysophisticatedr,ational, self-consciouasgentmustexperiencesituationsof choiceinthisway.6

THEIMPOSSIBILITOYFMORALRESPONSIBILITY

1I1

But theyarethe experientiarlockon whichthe belief in truemoral responsibilitiys founded.

Iv

I will restatethe Basic Argument.First,though,I will give some examplesofpeoplewhohaveacceptedthatsomesortof trueorultimate responsibilityfor the way one is is a necessaryconditionof trueor ultimatemoralresponsibilitfyorthewayoneacts,andwho,certainthat theyaretrulymorallyresponsiblefor the way theyact,havebelieved theconditionto befulfilled.7

E.H. Carrheld that "normaladult humanbeings are morally responsiblefortheirownpersonality"J.ean-PauSlartretalkedof "the choicethateachmanmakesof hispersonality"a,ndheldthat"manis responsiblfeorwhatheis". Ina laterinterviewhejudgedthathisearlier assertionsaboutfreedomwereincautiousb;uthe stillheldthat"inthe endoneis alwaysresponsiblfeorwhatis madeofone"insomeabsolute sense. Kantdescribedthepositionveryclearlywhenhe claimedthat "manhimselfmustmakeorhavemadehimselfintowhateveri,na moral sense,whethergoodorevil,he is to become.Eitherconditionmustbe aneffectof his freechoice;forotherwisehe couldnotbe heldresponsibleforitandcouldthereforbe emorallyneithergoodnorevil."Since he was committedto beliefin radicalmoralresponsibilityK, antheld thatsuchself-creationdoes indeedtakeplace,andwroteaccordingly of "man'scharacterw, hichhe himselfcreates".andof "knowledgoef oneself as a person who ... is his own originator". John Patten, the currenBt ritishMinisterforEducationa, Catholicapparentlpyreoccupiedby the idea of sin, has claimedthat"itis ... self-evidentthatas we growupeachindividuaclhooseswhethertobe goodorbad."Itseems clearenoughthathe,seessuchchoiceas sufficientogiveustruemoral responsibilitoyf theheaven-and-hevllariety.8

The restof us arenot usuallyso reflective,butit seemsthatwe dotend,in somevagueandunexaminedfashion,to thinkof ourselves as responsiblefor - answerablefor - how we are. The point is quitea

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