ABSA International: The Association for Biosafety and ...
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Date: Tue, 1 Jan 2002 21:14:15 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Norman Umberger
Subject: Re: Bloodborne Pathogen Video
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Our State OSHA (MD) has a number of videos that they loan out for a =
limited time for free (and pls. No copying!). Have you checked there? =
Coastal usually has good ones, but the cost of all vids are way high.
Norm
-----Original Message-----
From: Sam Snyder [mailto:Snyder_Sam@LACOE.EDU]=20
Sent: Thursday, December 27, 2001 12:36 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Bloodborne Pathogen Video
Check on the Coastal Training website:
> ----------
> From: Barry Cohen[SMTP:bcohen@]
> Reply To: A Biosafety Discussion List
> Sent: Thursday, December 27, 2001 6:44 AM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: Bloodborne Pathogen Video
>
> Good Morning:
>
> If anyone is aware of a good Bloodborne Pathogen video (for
> sale) which takes place in a laboratory setting, I would
> appreciate your input.
>
> The only ones I have seen thus far come out of HHMI and MIT.
>
> Regards,
>
> Barry Cohen
> Director, Environmental Health and Safety
> Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc.
> 195 Albany Street
> Cambridge, MA 02139
> (V): 617/613-4385
> (F): 617/613-4492
> (E): bcohen@
>
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 2 Jan 2002 09:17:17 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Michael Betlach
Subject: Re: Bloodborne Pathogen Video
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We use the NCCLS video "Protect Yourself: Preventing Infectious Disease
Transmitted by Blood, Body Fluids, and Tissue". $200 for nonmembers. You
should be able to obtain additional information at One of our
researchers with clinical lab experience recommended it. I'd like a little
more information about bloodborne pathogen diseases themselves, but that's
easy to supplement with a few overheads or a handout. (In that regard, the
Summit Video mentioned previously excels--though the rest of the video is
set in a manufacturing/assembly plant, rather than a lab.)
Michael Betlach, Ph.D.
Biosafety Officer
Promega Corporation
5445 E. Cheryl Parkway
Madison, WI 53711
(608) 274-1181, Ext. 1270
-----Original Message-----
From: Norman Umberger [mailto:numberger@SMCM.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, January 01, 2002 8:14 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Bloodborne Pathogen Video
Our State OSHA (MD) has a number of videos that they loan out for a limited
time for free (and pls. No copying!). Have you checked there? Coastal
usually has good ones, but the cost of all vids are way high.
Norm
-----Original Message-----
From: Sam Snyder [mailto:Snyder_Sam@LACOE.EDU]
Sent: Thursday, December 27, 2001 12:36 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Bloodborne Pathogen Video
Check on the Coastal Training website:
> ----------
> From: Barry Cohen[SMTP:bcohen@]
> Reply To: A Biosafety Discussion List
> Sent: Thursday, December 27, 2001 6:44 AM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: Bloodborne Pathogen Video
>
> Good Morning:
>
> If anyone is aware of a good Bloodborne Pathogen video (for
> sale) which takes place in a laboratory setting, I would
> appreciate your input.
>
> The only ones I have seen thus far come out of HHMI and MIT.
>
> Regards,
>
> Barry Cohen
> Director, Environmental Health and Safety
> Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc.
> 195 Albany Street
> Cambridge, MA 02139
> (V): 617/613-4385
> (F): 617/613-4492
> (E): bcohen@
>
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Date: Wed, 2 Jan 2002 12:41:07 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: J Coggin
Subject: Re: Bloodborne Pathogen Video
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Barry;: I produced a BBP/Universal Precautions 35 minute video some
years ago for our medical school that was scripted over laboratory
visual activities showing the don't and do's for applying the standard
in the workplace which was very popular and is still available for
about $40 from my department here if you are interested. I t still
quite up to date.
Joe Coggin Ph.D. , RBP, CBSP.
jcoggin@jaguar1.usouthal.edu
Professor and Chairman
Dept. Microbiology and Immunology, Univ. South Alabama, Coll. of
Medicine, Mobile, AL 26688
Fax (251) 460-7269
Phone: (251) 460-6314
Barry Cohen wrote:
>Good Morning:
>
>If anyone is aware of a good Bloodborne Pathogen video (for
>sale) which takes place in a laboratory setting, I would
>appreciate your input.
>
>The only ones I have seen thus far come out of HHMI and MIT.
>
>Regards,
>
>Barry Cohen
>Director, Environmental Health and Safety
>Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc.
>195 Albany Street
>Cambridge, MA 02139
>(V): 617/613-4385
>(F): 617/613-4492
>(E): bcohen@
>
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Date: Thu, 3 Jan 2002 14:05:13 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Schlank, Bliss M"
Subject: Autoclave Use Audit
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Happy new year to all.
Have any of you completed an audit program on autoclave use at your site?
The reason I ask, I have been asked to put together a justification document
regarding current autoclave use on our site. The report findings will
dictate whether or not there is enough autoclaves on site for the current
amount of waste generated. Any input to this type of report would be great.
Thanks!
Bliss Schlank
Biosafety Manager
AstraZeneca
302-886-2185
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Date: Thu, 3 Jan 2002 13:56:33 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Funk,Glenn"
Subject: Dry Ice Disposal
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Greetings, Compadres, and a Happy New Year to You All!
Here's one of those weird questions that occasionally arise in the
industrial setting. I can envision a situation in which we need to dispose
of as much as 10,000 lbs of shipping dry ice (in pellet form) at one time.
Obviously, we can "decay" it on site but how do we do that safely, assuming
our air quality management district will allow us to put that much CO2 up
at one time?
My initial thought is a closed, hopper-fed outdoors dumpster with a
circulation fan or two to increase the sublimation and a vent stack tall
enough to provide adequate dispersal of CO2 in air. Other ideas??
Since this is "borderline" biosafety question and I'm probably the only nut
in the world interested in the answers, please contact me directly at
gfunk@. Thanks!!
-- Glenn
Glenn A. Funk, CBSP
Director, EH&S
Aviron
This e-mail message is for the sole use of the intended recipient(s) and may
contain confidential, proprietary or privileged information.
Any unauthorized review, use, disclosure or distribution is prohibited.
If you are not the intended recipient, please contact the sender by reply
e-mail and destroy all copies of the original message, enclosures and
attachments.
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 3 Jan 2002 14:26:27 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Sue Quinn
Subject: Re: Dry Ice Disposal
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My first call would be to our gases vendor (in South San Francisco we =
use Praxair) and see if they can get us one or many large tubs and take =
the dry ice offsite for us? They are vendors of dry ice so it may not =
be that odd a question for them.
Sue
Suzanne M. Quinn
Manager, Environmental Health and Safety
Exelixis, Inc.
PO Box 511
South San Francisco, CA 94044-0511
----- Original Message -----=20
From: Funk,Glenn=20
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU=20
Sent: Thursday, January 03, 2002 1:56 PM
Subject: Dry Ice Disposal
Greetings, Compadres, and a Happy New Year to You All!
Here's one of those weird questions that occasionally arise in the
industrial setting. I can envision a situation in which we need to =
dispose
of as much as 10,000 lbs of shipping dry ice (in pellet form) at one =
time.
Obviously, we can "decay" it on site but how do we do that safely, =
assuming
our air quality management district will allow us to put that much CO2 =
up
at one time?
My initial thought is a closed, hopper-fed outdoors dumpster with a
circulation fan or two to increase the sublimation and a vent stack =
tall
enough to provide adequate dispersal of CO2 in air. Other ideas??
Since this is "borderline" biosafety question and I'm probably the =
only nut
in the world interested in the answers, please contact me directly at
gfunk@. Thanks!!
-- Glenn
Glenn A. Funk, CBSP
Director, EH&S
Aviron
This e-mail message is for the sole use of the intended recipient(s) =
and may
contain confidential, proprietary or privileged information.
Any unauthorized review, use, disclosure or distribution is =
prohibited.
If you are not the intended recipient, please contact the sender by =
reply
e-mail and destroy all copies of the original message, enclosures and
attachments.
------=_NextPart_000_0298_01C19462.A0F59740
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My first call would be to our gases = vendor (in=20 South San Francisco we use Praxair) and see if they can get us one = or many=20 large tubs and take the dry ice offsite for us? They are vendors = of dry=20 ice so it may not be that odd a question for them.
Sue
Suzanne M. Quinn
Manager, Environmental Health and=20 Safety
Exelixis, Inc.
PO Box 511
South San Francisco, CA =20 94044-0511
----- Original Message -----
Funk,Glenn
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Sent: Thursday, January 03, = 2002 1:56=20 PM
Subject: Dry Ice Disposal
Greetings, Compadres, and a Happy New Year to You=20 All!
Here's one of those weird questions that occasionally = arise in=20 the
industrial setting. I can envision a situation in which = we need=20 to dispose
of as much as 10,000 lbs of shipping dry ice (in pellet = form) at=20 one time.
Obviously, we can "decay" it on site but how do we do = that=20 safely, assuming
our air quality management district will allow us = to put=20 that much CO2 up
at one time?
My initial thought is a = closed,=20 hopper-fed outdoors dumpster with a
circulation fan or two to = increase the=20 sublimation and a vent stack tall
enough to provide adequate = dispersal of=20 CO2 in air. Other ideas??
Since this is "borderline" = biosafety=20 question and I'm probably the only nut
in the world interested in = the=20 answers, please contact me directly at
gfunk@. = Thanks!!
--=20 Glenn
Glenn A. Funk, CBSP
Director,=20 EH&S
Aviron
This e-mail message is for the sole use = of the=20 intended recipient(s) and may
contain confidential, proprietary or=20 privileged information.
Any unauthorized review, use, disclosure or = distribution is prohibited.
If you are not the intended recipient, = please=20 contact the sender by reply
e-mail and destroy all copies of the = original=20 message, enclosures and
attachments.
------=_NextPart_000_0298_01C19462.A0F59740--
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Date: Thu, 3 Jan 2002 17:28:37 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Victoria Roberts
Subject: Re: Dry Ice Disposal
In-Reply-To:
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Victoria Roberts
Ph 207-476-5062
Fax 207-472-3847
victoria@
Director of Acquisitions
Lone Wolf Enterprises, Ltd.
BOOK PRODUCERS/BOOK PRODUCTION
P.O. Box 801
Fort Fairfield, ME 04742
Member ABPA
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Victoria Roberts
Ph 207-476-5062
Fax 207-472-3847
victoria@
Director of Acquisitions
Lone Wolf Enterprises, Ltd.
BOOK PRODUCERS/BOOK PRODUCTION
P.O. Box 801
Fort Fairfield, ME 04742
Member ABPA
--=====================_20371652==_.ALT--
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Date: Thu, 3 Jan 2002 17:30:29 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Carol Whetstone
Subject: Biohazard signs
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Hello!
I am fairly new in my position, and am trying to standardize a number
of things, signage being one.
In light of the security concerns with bioterrorism, what is everyone
doing regarding biohazard signage?
Are you still listing hazards on the sign for safety's sake? It was
suggested to me this be omitted now, in order not to publicize this
info.
Any help would be most appreciated! Thanks!
Carol T. Whetstone, Ph.D.
Biological Safety Officer
University of Louisville
Environmental Health and Safety
1800 Arthur Street
Louisville, KY 40292
(502) 852-2959
ctwhet01@gwise.louisville.edu
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Date: Fri, 4 Jan 2002 06:58:26 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "OLINGER, PATRICIA L [S&C/0216]"
Subject: Re: Dry Ice Disposal
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Hi Glenn,
Couple of questions. Are you receiving one shipment or are these multiple
shipments that get pooled together? If you are receiving multiple
shipments, what would be the largest potential quantity?
Thanks,
Patty Olinger
Pharmacia Corp.
-----Original Message-----
From: Funk,Glenn [mailto:gfunk@]
Sent: Thursday, January 03, 2002 4:57 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Dry Ice Disposal
Greetings, Compadres, and a Happy New Year to You All!
Here's one of those weird questions that occasionally arise in the
industrial setting. I can envision a situation in which we need to dispose
of as much as 10,000 lbs of shipping dry ice (in pellet form) at one time.
Obviously, we can "decay" it on site but how do we do that safely, assuming
our air quality management district will allow us to put that much CO2 up
at one time?
My initial thought is a closed, hopper-fed outdoors dumpster with a
circulation fan or two to increase the sublimation and a vent stack tall
enough to provide adequate dispersal of CO2 in air. Other ideas??
Since this is "borderline" biosafety question and I'm probably the only nut
in the world interested in the answers, please contact me directly at
gfunk@. Thanks!!
-- Glenn
Glenn A. Funk, CBSP
Director, EH&S
Aviron
This e-mail message is for the sole use of the intended recipient(s) and may
contain confidential, proprietary or privileged information.
Any unauthorized review, use, disclosure or distribution is prohibited.
If you are not the intended recipient, please contact the sender by reply
e-mail and destroy all copies of the original message, enclosures and
attachments.
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 4 Jan 2002 08:35:31 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Bernholc, Nicole M"
Subject: Re: Dry Ice Disposal
MIME-Version: 1.0
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How long do you usually keep this quantity? Can it be recycled by sending
it back to the shipper?
The question Patty asks is good. I can't envision 10,000 pounds of dry ice.
How big a space does this occupy and what does it come in?
Releasin in small quantities in a hood might be an idea
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Date: Fri, 4 Jan 2002 08:42:05 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Richard Fink
Subject: Re: Dry Ice Disposal
In-Reply-To:
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Hi Glenn,
You do have interesting questions. You need to dispose of 5 TONS of dry
ice! !!! Why not try to recycle it? Contact your local U's and see if they
would like to take the dry ice off of your hands and or contact dry ice
companies. It may be cheaper for them to collect it then to buy/make it.
Richie
At 01:56 PM 01/03/02 -0800, you wrote:
>Greetings, Compadres, and a Happy New Year to You All!
>
>Here's one of those weird questions that occasionally arise in the
>industrial setting. I can envision a situation in which we need to dispose
>of as much as 10,000 lbs of shipping dry ice (in pellet form) at one time.
>Obviously, we can "decay" it on site but how do we do that safely, assuming
>our air quality management district will allow us to put that much CO2 up
>at one time?
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
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Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
Hi Glenn,
You do have interesting questions. You need to dispose of 5 TONS of dry ice! !!! Why not try to recycle it? Contact your local U's and see if they would like to take the dry ice off of your hands and or contact dry ice companies. It may be cheaper for them to collect it then to buy/make it.
Richie
At 01:56 PM 01/03/02 -0800, you wrote:
Greetings, Compadres, and a Happy New Year to You All!
Here's one of those weird questions that occasionally arise in the
industrial setting. I can envision a situation in which we need to dispose
of as much as 10,000 lbs of shipping dry ice (in pellet form) at one time.
Obviously, we can "decay" it on site but how do we do that safely, assuming
our air quality management district will allow us to put that much CO2 up
at one time?
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
--=====================_174357733==_.ALT--
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Date: Fri, 4 Jan 2002 08:51:55 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Kim Auletta
Subject: dry ice
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Our Haz Waste manager also suggested contacting a theater group (univ.,
H.S., etc.) who could some of the dry ice for the "special effects".
Kim Auletta
Lab Safety Specialist
Environmental Health and Safety
SUNY Stony Brook
110 Suffolk Hall
Stony Brook, NY 11794-6200
PHONE: 631-632-9672
FAX: 631-632-9683
E-MAIL: kauletta@.sunysb.edu
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Date: Fri, 4 Jan 2002 09:28:50 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
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From: Victoria Roberts
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Victoria Roberts
Director of Acquisitions
Lone Wolf Enterprises, Ltd.
P.O. Box 801
Fort Fairfield ME 04742
Ph 207-476-5062
Fax 207-472-3847
victoria@
~Professional Publishing Packages~
Lone Wolf Enterprises, Ltd. provides publishers with complete,
camera-ready, professional publishing packages. See our web site for
further details: . Member of American Book
Producers Association
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UNSUBSCRIBE
Victoria Roberts
Director of Acquisitions
Lone Wolf Enterprises, Ltd.
P.O. Box 801
Fort Fairfield ME 04742
Ph 207-476-5062
Fax 207-472-3847
victoria@
~Professional Publishing Packages~
Lone Wolf Enterprises, Ltd. provides publishers with complete,
camera-ready, professional publishing packages. See our web site for
further details: . Member of American Book
Producers Association
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=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 4 Jan 2002 10:32:36 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Hanna, Michael"
Subject: Re: Biohazard signs
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Date: Fri, 4 Jan 2002 09:54:16 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: RG
Subject: inventory issues
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We're in the process of re-evaluating the degree to which our IBC should
monitor "who has what" on campus. In this case the issue is not really
recombinant DNA related but just...to what extent should the IBC have an
inventory of the biological agents that are present in various laboratories
(BSL-2 level for example, multiply antibiotic resistant isolates, etc.). It
would really be helpful if any of you (especially in an academic setting)
could comment on what you're doing. Also, are you requiring laboratories to
establish specific safeguards regarding who has access to such isolates, are
they kept under any sort of "lock and key." Thanks for any input.
Richard V. Goering, Ph.D.
Professor
Dept. Med. Microbiol. and Immunol.
Creighton Univ. Sch. Med.
2500 California Plaza
Omaha, NE 68178
USA
-----------------------------------
tel: (402) 280-4098
fax: (402) 280-1875
email: rgoeri@creighton.edu
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Date: Fri, 4 Jan 2002 08:08:50 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Jay Herzmark
Subject: Re: dry ice
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I do a major haunted house in my yard every year. What I wouldn't give for
5 tons of dry ice!
Oh wait a minute, I have a fog machine.
Jay Herzmark
Industrial Hygienist to the Stars
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 4 Jan 2002 11:17:26 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
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From: Richard Fink
Subject: Re: inventory issues
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Under our IBC mandate was a requirement for periodic biological agent
inventories. So we periodically (every few years) send out an inventory
list. Lock and key are select agent, BL2+ and higher labs.
At 09:54 AM 01/04/02 -0600, you wrote:
>We're in the process of re-evaluating the degree to which our IBC should
>monitor "who has what" on campus. In this case the issue is not really
>recombinant DNA related but just...to what extent should the IBC have an
>inventory of the biological agents that are present in various laboratories
>(BSL-2 level for example, multiply antibiotic resistant isolates, etc.). It
>would really be helpful if any of you (especially in an academic setting)
>could comment on what you're doing. Also, are you requiring laboratories to
>establish specific safeguards regarding who has access to such isolates, are
>they kept under any sort of "lock and key." Thanks for any input.
>
>
>Richard V. Goering, Ph.D.
>Professor
>Dept. Med. Microbiol. and Immunol.
>Creighton Univ. Sch. Med.
>2500 California Plaza
>Omaha, NE 68178
>USA
>-----------------------------------
>tel: (402) 280-4098
>fax: (402) 280-1875
>email: rgoeri@creighton.edu
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
--=====================_183679076==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
Under our IBC mandate was a requirement for periodic biological agent inventories. So we periodically (every few years) send out an inventory list. Lock and key are select agent, BL2+ and higher labs.
At 09:54 AM 01/04/02 -0600, you wrote:
We're in the process of re-evaluating the degree to which our IBC should
monitor "who has what" on campus. In this case the issue is not really
recombinant DNA related but just...to what extent should the IBC have an
inventory of the biological agents that are present in various laboratories
(BSL-2 level for example, multiply antibiotic resistant isolates, etc.). It
would really be helpful if any of you (especially in an academic setting)
could comment on what you're doing. Also, are you requiring laboratories to
establish specific safeguards regarding who has access to such isolates, are
they kept under any sort of "lock and key." Thanks for any input.
Richard V. Goering, Ph.D.
Professor
Dept. Med. Microbiol. and Immunol.
Creighton Univ. Sch. Med.
2500 California Plaza
Omaha, NE 68178
USA
-----------------------------------
tel: (402) 280-4098
fax: (402) 280-1875
email: rgoeri@creighton.edu
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
--=====================_183679076==_.ALT--
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 4 Jan 2002 10:11:15 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Elizabeth Smith
Subject: Re: Autoclave Use Audit
In-Reply-To:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
We do not have this specific information tracked. Each
autoclave is validated for its intended use (since this is a GMP
facility). Each run in an autoclave is documented. So, I could
get this information collated if needed.
If you're dealing with GMP or similar controls, perhaps your
Quality Assurance or Document control staff can help tell you
whether this information is actually collected already.
Elizabeth
--- "Schlank, Bliss M" wrote:
> Happy new year to all.
>
> Have any of you completed an audit program on autoclave use at
> your site?
> The reason I ask, I have been asked to put together a
> justification document
> regarding current autoclave use on our site. The report
> findings will
> dictate whether or not there is enough autoclaves on site for
> the current
> amount of waste generated. Any input to this type of report
> would be great.
>
> Thanks!
> Bliss Schlank
> Biosafety Manager
> AstraZeneca
> 302-886-2185
=====
Elizabeth Smith
Environmental, Health & Safety Manager
BioPort Corporation
3500 N. Martin L. King Blvd.
Lansing, MI 48906
__________________________________________________
Do You Yahoo!?
Send your FREE holiday greetings online!
=========================================================================
Date: Sat, 5 Jan 2002 07:08:56 EST
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Jim Kaufman
Subject: Used Computers Needed
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="US-ASCII"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
The Laboratory Safety Institute is seeking the donation of used computer(s)
to help upgrade our technology resources.
Please contact me if you have or know of someone who has a used computer that
they would consider donating to the Institute.
LSI is a 501C3 nonprofit corporation under IRS code. Donations are
tax-deductible.
Thanks. Happy New Year ... Jim
*********************************************
James A. Kaufman, Director
The Laboratory Safety Institute
Safety in Science and Science Education
192 Worcester Road, Natick, MA 01760
508-647-1900 Fax: 508-647-0062 Cell: 508-574-6264
Email: labsafe@ Web Site:
*******************************************
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 7 Jan 2002 14:26:37 +0100
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: pat king
Subject: biohazard labels
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Can anyone save me searching time by telling me where I can buy
self-adhesive biohazard labels to put on waste bins that are repeatedly
autoclaved?
Thanks a lot !
Pat King
Patrick King
Friedrich Miescher Institute for Biomedical Research
Maulbeerstr. 66
4058 Basel
Switzerland
Tel.: +41-61-6973154
Fax: +41-61-6973976
fmi.ch
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 7 Jan 2002 08:56:05 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Lori Keen
Subject: Re: biohazard labels
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
I bought my roll (each sticker about 2x3") several years ago from
Fisher. I'm still working my way thru the roll.
Lori Keen
Lab Manager, Biology
Calvin College
616-957-6080
Member NAOSMM
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 7 Jan 2002 09:42:34 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: ""
Subject: Biosafety Position in Chicago Area
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Abbott Laboratories, Diagnostics Division, is seeking a Biosafety Officer /
EHS Support Personnel
Abbott Diagnostics Division is seeking a person to support their Lake County
Biosafety/EHS program. Abbott's Lake County facility is located 35 miles
north of Chicago. The division employs 6000 people and has over 500
labs/manufacturing rooms at this site, which handle materials ranging from
potentially infectious to BSL 3 and research to large scale production
facilities. The individual desired would develop and conduct EHS and Biosafety
training and audits. Perform PPE hazard and biosafety risk assessments.
Conduct industrial hygiene monitoring and employee exposure determinations,
and manage the Emergency Control Force. The individual will work with the
other Divisional Biosafety and Safety professionals to provide technical EHS
and Biosafety support to site safety groups and other personnel as needed in
the areas of safety, biosafety, environmental and related health issues. It is
estimated that about 75% of the time would be devoted to biosafety issues.
5-10 years of practical, hands-on biosafety / EHS experience is desired, with
proven skills in industrial hygiene risk assessment and biological
surveillance programs. Comprehensive working knowledge of federal /state
safety and environmental regulations. Strong written and verbal skills.
Computer literacy in word processing and database management.
Abbott offers excellent benefits. Salary is highly competitive and will be
based on level of experience.
Required; Bachelor's degree in microbiology/biology/public health or related
area, with additional work in chemistry and safety desired.
Preferred: Master's degree in science, safety, public health or related areas.
CIH, CSP, CBSP and/or RBP desired.
Please provide your resume to Mary Cipriano: mary.cipriano@
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 7 Jan 2002 11:30:42 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Andy McQuinn
Subject: Re: biohazard labels
In-Reply-To:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Labelmaster Phone: 1-800-621-5808 FOR YOUR BIOHAZARD LABELS.
1"x1" Cat # H-BBLL, $19.05 per roll of 500 labels
2"x2" Cat # H-BBL4, $20.95 per roll of 500 labels
4"x4" Cat # H-BBLR, $49.30 per roll of 500 labels
Andy McQuinn
Director Business Operations
Partners In Compliance, Inc.
100 Dominion Drive, Suite 102
Morrisville, NC 27560
Tel: (919) 468-0333
Fax: (919) 468-0311
-----Original Message-----
From: A Biosafety Discussion List [mailto:BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU]On
Behalf Of pat king
Sent: Monday, January 07, 2002 8:27 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: biohazard labels
Can anyone save me searching time by telling me where I can buy
self-adhesive biohazard labels to put on waste bins that are repeatedly
autoclaved?
Thanks a lot !
Pat King
Patrick King
Friedrich Miescher Institute for Biomedical Research
Maulbeerstr. 66
4058 Basel
Switzerland
Tel.: +41-61-6973154
Fax: +41-61-6973976
fmi.ch
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 7 Jan 2002 11:29:01 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Kyle Boyett
Subject: Re: biohazard labels
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
It's my understanding that the original post was for labels that would be
resistant to repeated autoclaving. Are these labels suitable for this
purpose? Thank you.
Kyle Boyett
Safety Short Distribution List Administrator
Asst. Director of Biosafety
Occupational Health and Safety
University of Alabama at Birmingham
e-mail- kboyett@healthsafe.uab.edu
Phone- 205-934-2487
VISIT OUR WEB SITE AT:
healthsafe.uab.edu
** Asking me to overlook a safety violation is like asking me to reduce the
value I place on YOUR life**
-----Original Message-----
From: Andy McQuinn [mailto:andy@]
Sent: Monday, January 07, 2002 10:31 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: biohazard labels
Labelmaster Phone: 1-800-621-5808 FOR YOUR BIOHAZARD LABELS.
1"x1" Cat # H-BBLL, $19.05 per roll of 500 labels
2"x2" Cat # H-BBL4, $20.95 per roll of 500 labels
4"x4" Cat # H-BBLR, $49.30 per roll of 500 labels
Andy McQuinn
Director Business Operations
Partners In Compliance, Inc.
100 Dominion Drive, Suite 102
Morrisville, NC 27560
Tel: (919) 468-0333
Fax: (919) 468-0311
-----Original Message-----
From: A Biosafety Discussion List [mailto:BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU]On
Behalf Of pat king
Sent: Monday, January 07, 2002 8:27 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: biohazard labels
Can anyone save me searching time by telling me where I can buy
self-adhesive biohazard labels to put on waste bins that are repeatedly
autoclaved?
Thanks a lot !
Pat King
Patrick King
Friedrich Miescher Institute for Biomedical Research
Maulbeerstr. 66
4058 Basel
Switzerland
Tel.: +41-61-6973154
Fax: +41-61-6973976
fmi.ch
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 7 Jan 2002 13:32:28 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Robert N. Latsch"
Subject: Re: biohazard labels
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
I buy self adhesive labels from Lab Safety & Supply. I cannot vouch about
their survivability in an autoclave.
Lab Safety & Supply
P.O. Box 1368
Janesville, Wi, 53547-1368
(800)356-0783
"Biohazard Infectious Agent" 25/pk, #596-25, Price $8.50/Pk.
Hope this helps.
Bob
>Can anyone save me searching time by telling me where I can buy
>self-adhesive biohazard labels to put on waste bins that are repeatedly
>autoclaved?
>
>Thanks a lot !
>
>Pat King
>
>
>Patrick King
>
>Friedrich Miescher Institute for Biomedical Research
>Maulbeerstr. 66
>4058 Basel
>Switzerland
>
>Tel.: +41-61-6973154
>Fax: +41-61-6973976
>fmi.ch
_____________________________________________________________________
__ / _____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 7 Jan 2002 13:27:21 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Anne-Marie Bakker
Subject: Handwashing sinks in production
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Hi Folks,
Here is an unusual question for all you production gurus. We are producing
a gene therapy product for clinical trials. The production work is done at
BL-2. We have sinks for hand washing as required by the NIH guidelines for
Recombinant work and the BMBL. We have a cleanroom/GMP "consultant" stating
that the sinks should be taken out. The water to the sinks are plumbed with
city/domestic water and there is the possibility of accidentally using city
water in production or possible contamination of product? The facility has
been inspected by FDA and they have not brought up this issue.
Any thoughts? Concerns with our current facility? How is your BL-2
production facility set-up?
Please contact me directly at anne-marie_bakker@. Thanks in
advance for your comments.
Anne-Marie Bakker
Manager, EH&S
Berlex Biosciences
(510) 262-5499
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 7 Jan 2002 16:29:34 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Schmaltz, Fay"
Subject: Vaccination Policy
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Hello,
We are reviewing the vaccination policy at our institution, and I wonder if
any of you would care to share your own institutional policies.
Specifically, if your lab deals with anthrax, do you:
1) require anthrax vaccination as a condition of entry to the lab?
2) offer anthrax vaccination to all personnel working with (or in the same
lab as) anthrax, but do not require it?
3) offer no vaccination whatsoever?
If you do require vaccination as a condition of entry, are there any
exceptions made for personnel who are unable to be vaccinated? If so, do
you require any additional precautions such as respiratory protection or
prophylactic antibiotic therapy?
Cheers,
Fay
Fay Schmaltz
Biosafety Officer
Defence Research Establishment Suffield
Box 4000 Stn Main
Medicine Hat, AB Canada
T1A 8K6
Tel: (403) 544-4913
Fax:(403) 544-3388
Email: Fay.Schmaltz@dres.dnd.ca
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 8 Jan 2002 07:27:11 EST
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ed Krisiunas
Subject: Article: Anthrax Missteps Offer Guide to Fight Next
Bioterro...
MIME-Version: 1.0
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Great Artilce on Anthrax in the New York Times.
Ed Krisiunas
>
>
> Anthrax Missteps Offer Guide to Fight Next Bioterror Battle
>
> January 6, 2002
>
> By LAWRENCE K. ALTMAN and GINA KOLATA
>
>
> Officials say that the handling of the anthrax outbreak was
> marked by a lack of knowledge about the disease and
> inadequate communication with the public.
>
>
> ei=1&en=da15140b468abdf2
>
--part1_85.15979296.296c3f9f_alt_boundary
Content-Type: text/html; charset="US-ASCII"
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Great Artilce on Anthrax in the New York Times.
Ed Krisiunas
Anthrax Missteps Offer Guide to Fight Next Bioterror Battle
January 6, 2002
By LAWRENCE K. ALTMAN and GINA KOLATA
Officials say that the handling of the anthrax outbreak was
marked by a lack of knowledge about the disease and
inadequate communication with the public.
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This article from
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/-------------------- advertisement -----------------------\
Share the spirit with a gift from Starbucks.
Our coffee brewers & espresso machines at
special holiday prices.
\----------------------------------------------------------/
Anthrax Missteps Offer Guide to Fight Next Bioterror Battle
January 6, 2002
By LAWRENCE K. ALTMAN and GINA KOLATA
Officials say that the handling of the anthrax outbreak was
marked by a lack of knowledge about the disease and
inadequate communication with the public.
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=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 8 Jan 2002 11:12:29 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Bernholc, Nicole M"
Subject: Re: Article: Anthrax Missteps Offer Guide to Fight Ne
xt Bioterro...
MIME-Version: 1.0
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Thanks for the article
-----Original Message-----
From: Ed Krisiunas [mailto:EKrisiunas@]
Sent: Tuesday, January 08, 2002 7:27 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Article: Anthrax Missteps Offer Guide to Fight Next
Bioterro...
Great Artilce on Anthrax in the New York Times.
Ed Krisiunas
Anthrax Missteps Offer Guide to Fight Next Bioterror Battle
January 6, 2002
By LAWRENCE K. ALTMAN and GINA KOLATA
Officials say that the handling of the anthrax outbreak was
marked by a lack of knowledge about the disease and
inadequate communication with the public.
=1&en=da15140b468abdf2
------_=_NextPart_001_01C1985F.454242D0
Content-Type: text/html;
charset="iso-8859-1"
Thanks for the article
-----Original Message-----
From: Ed Krisiunas [mailto:EKrisiunas@]
Sent: Tuesday, January 08, 2002 7:27 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Article: Anthrax Missteps Offer Guide to Fight Next Bioterro...
Great Artilce on Anthrax in the New York Times.
Ed Krisiunas
Anthrax Missteps Offer Guide to Fight Next Bioterror Battle
January 6, 2002
By LAWRENCE K. ALTMAN and GINA KOLATA
Officials say that the handling of the anthrax outbreak was
marked by a lack of knowledge about the disease and
inadequate communication with the public.
------_=_NextPart_001_01C1985F.454242D0--
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 8 Jan 2002 19:50:09 +0100
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Thomas Lilin
Subject: Companion animal and white powder
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" ; format="flowed"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Hi, wise people...
Had someone already to deal with the problem of handling (housing,
eventually delivering veterinary care) pets which have been exposed
to white powder (suspected of being a biological agent) ?
If yes, i would like to share experiences....
I would also like input from people not directly involved in something alike=
!
TL
--
Thomas Lilin
DVM, MSc
charg=E9 de la bios=E9curit=E9
__________________________
Service Commun des Animaleries
Ecole Nationale Veterinaire d'Alfort
7, avenue du General de Gaulle
=46-94704 Maisons-Alfort cedex
Tel: 33+ 01 43 96 70 14
=46ax: 33+ 01 43 96 72 79
__________________________
mailto:lilin@vet-alfort.fr
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 8 Jan 2002 15:19:19 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Thompson, Larry"
Subject: Re: Companion animal and white powder
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Dr. Lilin, et al,
I had been approached on this question when the local emergency =
responders
quarantined a small building and "deconned" the human occupants and =
were
going to close the building for 3 days (until results got back as to =
the
powder) when one of the deconned ladies said "I forgot my cat in the
building!" One of the responders suited up in his level B suit, =
re-entered
the building, found the cat and gave it right to the owner. Only
retrospectively did they think anything might be amiss. (Powder was
negative for anthrax...)
My best advice is to decon the animals in a fashion similar to the =
human
procedure, eg shower with soap and water. Dogs should be fairly
straightforward, cats will be problematic. Probably putting the animal =
in a
small wire cage and hosing them off would be the most practical =
approach.
Veterinary care will also follow the human protocols somewhat, but I =
would
suggest amoxicillin in place of the expensive ones. I have not seen =
much
literature on the subject, but not very many cases in companion animals =
are
reported.
TTFN,
Larry
Larry J. Thompson, DVM PhD DABVT CBSP
Clinical Toxicologist
University of Georgia
Veterinary Diagnostic and Investigational Lab
43 Brighton Road
Tifton, GA 31794-1961
Ph 229-386-3340 Fax 229-386-7128
-----Original Message-----
From: Thomas Lilin [mailto:lilin@VET-ALFORT.FR]
Sent: Tuesday, January 08, 2002 1:50 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Companion animal and white powder
Hi, wise people...
Had someone already to deal with the problem of handling (housing,
eventually delivering veterinary care) pets which have been exposed
to white powder (suspected of being a biological agent) ?
If yes, i would like to share experiences....
I would also like input from people not directly involved in something =
alike
!
TL
--
Thomas Lilin
DVM, MSc
charg=E9 de la bios=E9curit=E9
__________________________
Service Commun des Animaleries
Ecole Nationale Veterinaire d'Alfort
7, avenue du General de Gaulle
F-94704 Maisons-Alfort cedex
Tel: 33+ 01 43 96 70 14
Fax: 33+ 01 43 96 72 79
__________________________
mailto:lilin@vet-alfort.fr
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 10 Jan 2002 05:36:23 EST
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ed Krisiunas
Subject: Evaluation of glutaraldehyde
MIME-Version: 1.0
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Looking for some assistance to evaluate airborne concentrations of
glutaraldehyde after spilling 10 liters of material in a room. Attempting to
determine how long it takes to reach the STEL.
Can anyone suggest a method for evaluation or company that can do an
independent evaluation?
Regards,
Regards,
Edward Krisiunas, MT(ASCP), CIC, MPH
President
WNWN International
PO Box 1164
Burlington, Connecticut
06013
860-675-1217
860-675-1311(fax)
860-944-2373(mobile)
--part1_10.1812d33c.296ec8a7_boundary
Content-Type: text/html; charset="US-ASCII"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Looking for some assistance to evaluate airborne concentrations of glutaraldehyde after spilling 10 liters of material in a room. Attempting to determine how long it takes to reach the STEL.
Can anyone suggest a method for evaluation or company that can do an independent evaluation?
Regards,
Regards,
Edward Krisiunas, MT(ASCP), CIC, MPH
President
WNWN International
PO Box 1164
Burlington, Connecticut
06013
860-675-1217
860-675-1311(fax)
860-944-2373(mobile)
--part1_10.1812d33c.296ec8a7_boundary--
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 10 Jan 2002 07:53:12 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Petuch, Brian R."
Subject: Re: Evaluation of glutaraldehyde
MIME-Version: 1.0
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Ed,
I have an article about estimating emission rates from pooled liquids. I'll
fax over.
Brian Petuch
Biological Pilot Plant
Merck Research Labs
WP17-301
West Point, PA 19486-0004
Office 215-652-4039
Fax 215-993-4911
pager 800-759-8888 pin 1380162
-----Original Message-----
From: Ed Krisiunas [mailto:EKrisiunas@]
Sent: Thursday, January 10, 2002 5:36 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Evaluation of glutaraldehyde
Looking for some assistance to evaluate airborne concentrations of
glutaraldehyde after spilling 10 liters of material in a room. Attempting to
determine how long it takes to reach the STEL.
Can anyone suggest a method for evaluation or company that can do an
independent evaluation?
Regards,
Regards,
Edward Krisiunas, MT(ASCP), CIC, MPH
President
WNWN International
PO Box 1164
Burlington, Connecticut
06013
860-675-1217
860-675-1311(fax)
860-944-2373(mobile)
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Ed,
I have an article about estimating emission rates from pooled liquids. I'll fax over.
Brian Petuch
Biological Pilot Plant
Merck Research Labs
WP17-301
West Point, PA 19486-0004
Office 215-652-4039
Fax 215-993-4911
pager 800-759-8888 pin 1380162
-----Original Message-----
From: Ed Krisiunas [mailto:EKrisiunas@]
Sent: Thursday, January 10, 2002 5:36 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Evaluation of glutaraldehyde
Looking for some assistance to evaluate airborne concentrations of glutaraldehyde after spilling 10 liters of material in a room. Attempting to determine how long it takes to reach the STEL.
Can anyone suggest a method for evaluation or company that can do an independent evaluation?
Regards,
Regards,
Edward Krisiunas, MT(ASCP), CIC, MPH
President
WNWN International
PO Box 1164
Burlington, Connecticut
06013
860-675-1217
860-675-1311(fax)
860-944-2373(mobile)
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=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 10 Jan 2002 15:07:11 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Karen Ruhl
Subject: archives
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
Good Day:
I seem to recall that there is a means to retrieve archived discussions
from the Biosafety Discussion List. I know the topic I am looking for was
recently discussed and don't want to reinvent the wheel.
Would anyone out there be able to help me with this?
Thank you.
Karen Ruhl
Biological Safety Manager
Gen-Probe
San Diego, CA 92121
858.410.8874
karenr@
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 10 Jan 2002 18:18:39 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Byers, Karen B"
Subject: Re: archives
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
I know this one!! Go to the ABSA webpage, and choose "mailing
lists" from the home page. The directions are under the description for
Biosafty.
Karen B. Byers, MS, RBP, CBSP
Biosafety Officer, Dana-Farber Cancer Institute
44 Binney Street - SWG350
Boston, MA 02115
karen_byers@dfci.harvard.edu
617-632-3890
fax: 617-632-1932
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Karen Ruhl [SMTP:karenr@]
> Sent: Thursday, January 10, 2002 6:07 PM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: archives
>
> Good Day:
> I seem to recall that there is a means to retrieve archived discussions
> from the Biosafety Discussion List. I know the topic I am looking for was
> recently discussed and don't want to reinvent the wheel.
> Would anyone out there be able to help me with this?
>
> Thank you.
>
>
> Karen Ruhl
> Biological Safety Manager
> Gen-Probe
> San Diego, CA 92121
> 858.410.8874
> karenr@
=========================================================================
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 11 Jan 2002 15:40:07 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Greenspan, Cathy"
Subject: Re: 2002 Control of Biohazards Course April 29-May 3
Do you know whether it is possible to get Certification Maintenance points
(CM Points) from this course. I am very interested in this course but need
to maintain my CIH certification. Thanks.
Cathy A. Greenspan, CIH
Senior Site Manager, Occupational Health & Safety
Genzyme, Inc.
5 Mt. Road
Framingham, MA 01701
cathy.greenspan@
=========================================================================
Date: Sat, 12 Jan 2002 09:38:49 EST
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Jim Kaufman
Subject: Fwd: Fire Guts University Lab in Calif.
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Date: Sat, 12 Jan 2002 06:39:33 EST
Subject: Fire Guts University Lab in Calif.
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Fire Guts University Lab in Calif.
SANTA CRUZ, Calif. (AP) - A fire tore through university laboratories and destroyed valuable genetic research that took years to develop, officials said....
For the full text of this story, click here.
To edit your profile, go to keyword NewsProfiles.
For all of today's news, go to keyword News.
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=========================================================================
Date: Sat, 12 Jan 2002 18:47:53 EST
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Jim Kaufman
Subject: Santa Cruz Lab Fire
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Fire Guts University Lab in Calif.
.c The Associated Press
SANTA CRUZ, Calif. (AP) - A fire tore through university laboratories and
destroyed valuable genetic research that took years to develop, officials
said.
The fire broke out early Friday and gutted the top floor of a University of
California, Santa Cruz lab. It later flared up twice more and destroyed the
inside of a second lab, said UCSC Fire Chief Charles Hernandez said.
Flames as long as 5 feet stretched out of windows, shattering them,
firefighters said.
Manuel Ares, chairman of the Molecular, Cell and Developmental Biology
department, estimated about 10 percent of the building's interior was
destroyed and said other labs and offices suffered smoke and water damage.
``It's a devastating situation. I don't know how far it has set me back,'' he
said.
Ares said many of the genetic strains in his lab took 14 years to develop and
could take that long to replace. His work was related to the Human Genome
Project, a national effort to identify the tens of thousands of genes in
human DNA.
Campus spokeswoman Elizabeth Irwin could not estimate damages Friday but said
it was sure to be in the millions. Hernandez said the building did not
contain a sprinkler system because it was built in 1987, before fire codes
mandated one.
The cause of the fire is unknown.
AP-NY-01-12-02 0638EST
Copyright 2002 The Associated Press. The information contained in the AP news
report may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or otherwise distributed
without the prior written authority of The Associated Press. All active
hyperlinks have been inserted by AOL.
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2002 08:02:53 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Gilpin, Richard"
Subject: Re: 2002 Control of Biohazards Course April 29-May 3
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Dear Cathy Greenspan,
Yes, the Control of Biohazards Course qualifies for CM points...check the
middle of this page
Richard W. Gilpin, Ph.D., RBP, CBSP
Assistant Director Environmental Health & Safety
Biosafety Officer
Lecturer in Host Defenses & Infectious Diseases
Department of Microbiology & Immunology
University of Maryland Baltimore
714 West Lombard Street, Room 305
Baltimore, MD 21201
410.706.7845
410.706.1520 (fax)
rgilpin@ehs.umaryland.edu
ehs.umaryland.edu
mailto:biosafety@
-----Original Message-----
From: Greenspan, Cathy [mailto:Cathy.Greenspan@]
Sent: Friday, January 11, 2002 3:40 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: 2002 Control of Biohazards Course April 29-May 3
Do you know whether it is possible to get Certification Maintenance points
(CM Points) from this course. I am very interested in this course but need
to maintain my CIH certification. Thanks.
Cathy A. Greenspan, CIH
Senior Site Manager, Occupational Health & Safety
Genzyme, Inc.
5 Mt. Road
Framingham, MA 01701
cathy.greenspan@
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2002 09:29:42 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Greg Merkle
Organization: Wright State University
Subject: Use of Palm Pilot for Laboratory Audits, Inventories,
Surveys or other data collection
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I am looking for information on use of a palm pilot for
doing information collection when doing laboratory audits,
inventories or other safety inspections of facilities.
Which units, i.e.; HP, Sony or Compaq, have shown to be
more versatile and expandable and what program base is used
for data gathering? The subject of use of a palm pilot was
brought up over a year ago in the discussion postings but
nothing has been said since then about the potential
usefulness. Is this something worth pursuing or should I
look for an alternative?
Thank you for your assistance.
Greg Merkle
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=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2002 10:06:33 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Petuch, Brian R."
Subject: Re: Use of Palm Pilot for Laboratory Audits, Inventories,
Surveys or other data collection
MIME-Version: 1.0
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Applied Occupational and Enviro. Hygiene Vol. 16(4): pp 426-431 has info on
practical uses. Also check with listed software vendor, Pendragon Software,
for hardware compatability.
Brian Petuch
Biological Pilot Plant
Merck Research Labs
WP17-301
West Point, PA 19486-0004
Office 215-652-4039
Fax 215-993-4911
pager 800-759-8888 pin 1380162
-----Original Message-----
From: Greg Merkle [mailto:greg.merkle@WRIGHT.EDU]
Sent: Monday, January 14, 2002 9:30 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Use of Palm Pilot for Laboratory Audits, Inventories, Surveys
or other data collection
I am looking for information on use of a palm pilot for
doing information collection when doing laboratory audits,
inventories or other safety inspections of facilities.
Which units, i.e.; HP, Sony or Compaq, have shown to be
more versatile and expandable and what program base is used
for data gathering? The subject of use of a palm pilot was
brought up over a year ago in the discussion postings but
nothing has been said since then about the potential
usefulness. Is this something worth pursuing or should I
look for an alternative?
Thank you for your assistance.
Greg Merkle
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2002 10:08:37 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Robert N. Latsch"
Subject: Re: Use of Palm Pilot for Laboratory Audits, Inventories,
Surveys or other data collection
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
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My department is using the palm now. We maitain chemical inventories,
laboratory inspections, and other forms of data. Radiation safety uses the
palm as well. Very usefull.
bob
>I am looking for information on use of a palm pilot for
>doing information collection when doing laboratory audits,
>inventories or other safety inspections of facilities.
>Which units, i.e.; HP, Sony or Compaq, have shown to be
>more versatile and expandable and what program base is used
>for data gathering? The subject of use of a palm pilot was
>brought up over a year ago in the discussion postings but
>nothing has been said since then about the potential
>usefulness. Is this something worth pursuing or should I
>look for an alternative?
>
>Thank you for your assistance.
>
>Greg Merkle
>
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_____________________________________________________________________
__ / _____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2002 12:29:38 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Lynn Harding
Subject: Professional Liability Insurance for Biosafety Professionals?
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Dear Colleagues,
On several occasions clients have indicated that they require their =
consultants to have liability insurance. In discussions with biosafety =
colleagues I have been unable to find anyone who has such insurance.
Does anyone have any experience with obtaining Professional Liability =
Insurance for biosafety work? If so what type of activities do you get =
it for, who do you get it from, and how much does it cost?
I would appreciate any assistance you can provide. Should you wish to =
respond to me directly my email address is lynn-harding@=20
Many thanks,
Lynn Harding, MPH, CBSP-ABSA
Biosafety Consultant
2846 Crestwood Avenue
Chattanooga, TN 37415
423-875-5651
423-875-5767 fax
lynn-harding@
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Dear Colleagues,
On several occasions clients have = indicated that=20 they require their consultants to have liability insurance. = In=20 discussions with biosafety colleagues I have been unable to find anyone = who has=20 such insurance.
Does anyone have any experience with = obtaining=20 Professional Liability Insurance for biosafety work? If so what = type of=20 activities do you get it for, who do you get it from, and how much does = it=20 cost?
I would appreciate any assistance you = can=20 provide. Should you wish to respond to me directly my email = address is lynn-harding@ =
Many thanks,
Lynn Harding, MPH, = CBSP-ABSA
Biosafety Consultant
2846 Crestwood Avenue
Chattanooga, TN 37415
423-875-5651
423-875-5767 fax
lynn-harding@
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=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2002 08:47:29 -1000
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Thomas Goob
Subject: BSC Certification Training
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/enriched; charset="us-ascii"
List Members,
I have two questions for you;
1. What credentials do you look for in individuals that you may use to certify your
Biological Safety Cabinets (BSC)?
and
2. Can your recommend any courses or training programs that can lead to certification under NSF 49 or any other well recognized credentials that you may like to see?
Thanks in advance for your response...
Tom Goob
DLS, Inc.
| |
| |Thomas C. Goob, MPH, MBA, CSP
/ \650 Iwilei Road, Suite 300
/ \Honolulu, Hawaii 96817
/ \(808) 589-5100 Fax: (808) 593-8357
| |email: tgoob@dls.
\________/
DIAGNOSTIC
LABORATORY
SERVICES,INC.
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2002 14:18:56 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Greg Merkle
Organization: Wright State University
Subject: Re: BSC Certification Training
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For credentials, one thing I would suggest looking for or
asking for is a listing of places where they have done
work. I would check on the quality of the work they have
provided. I would also ask if they currently certified by
NSF and check the NSF web site for documentation. Check the
NSF site at:
for a current list of who is up to date on field
certification.
For a training course I would suggest one place to look is
the Eagleson Institute. The Eagleson Institute offers a
training course for persons to become certified according to
NSF49. Check out their web site for the courses that they
offer:
Greg Merkle
Thomas Goob wrote:
>
> List Members,
> I have two questions for you;
>
> 1. What credentials do you look for in individuals that you may use to certify your
> Biological Safety Cabinets (BSC)?
>
> and
>
> 2. Can your recommend any courses or training programs that can lead to certification under NSF 49 or any other well recognized credentials that you may like to see?
>
> Thanks in advance for your response...
>
> Tom Goob
> DLS, Inc.
>
> | |
> | |Thomas C. Goob, MPH, MBA, CSP
> / \650 Iwilei Road, Suite 300
> / \Honolulu, Hawaii 96817
> / \(808) 589-5100 Fax: (808) 593-8357
> | |email: tgoob@dls.
> \________/
> DIAGNOSTIC
> LABORATORY
> SERVICES,INC.
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=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2002 09:13:54 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Larry Mendoza
Organization: VCU-OEHS-Biological/Chemical Safety Section
Subject: Nippostrongylus brasiliensis
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Good day to all,
Can anyone tell me if Nippostrongylus brasiliensis is pathogenic to humans?
I've searched but found nothing.
Thanks
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n:Mendoza;Laurence
tel;fax:828-6169
tel;work:827-0353
x-mozilla-html:TRUE
org:VIRGINIA COMMONWEALTH UNIVERSITY;OEHS/CHEMICAL-BIOLOGICAL SAFETY
version:2.1
email;internet:lgmendoz@HSC.VCU.EDU
title:Biosafety Inspector
adr;quoted-printable:;;1101 East Marshall St.=0D=0APO Box 980112;RICHMOND;VA;23298;USA
fn:Laurence Mendoza
end:vcard
--------------3982537B38E4046870231700--
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2002 12:05:39 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Richard Fink
Subject: Re: Nippostrongylus brasiliensis
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="=====================_12307657==_.ALT"
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I believe that this is only a rodent pathogen.
Best check with a vet. to be sure.
Richie
At 09:13 AM 01/15/02 -0500, you wrote:
>Good day to all,
>
>Can anyone tell me if Nippostrongylus brasiliensis is pathogenic to humans?
>I've searched but found nothing.
>Thanks
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
--=====================_12307657==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
I believe that this is only a rodent pathogen.
Best check with a vet. to be sure.
Richie
At 09:13 AM 01/15/02 -0500, you wrote:
Good day to all,
Can anyone tell me if Nippostrongylus brasiliensis is pathogenic to humans?
I've searched but found nothing.
Thanks
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
--=====================_12307657==_.ALT--
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2002 07:44:06 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Barry Cohen
Organization: Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc.
Subject: NIH Guidelines Questions
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Good Morning:
I would like to ask the collective for their thoughts on a
section of Appendix K (Large Scale Physical Containment).
I bring your attention to Criterion #7, under BL2-LS:
Viable organisms should be handled in a system that
physically separates the process from the external
environment (closed system or other primary containment).
The reference is K-IV-B: Cultures of viable organisms
containing recombinant DNA molecules shall be handled in a
closed system (e.g., closed vessel used for the propagation
and growth of cultures) or other primary containment
equipment (e.g., Class III biological safety cabinet
containing a centrifuge used to process culture fluids)
which is designed to prevent the escape of viable
organisms. Volumes less than 10 liters may be handled
outside of a closed system or other primary containment
equipment provided all physical containment requirements
specified in Appendix G-II-B, Physical Containment
Levels--Biosafety Level 2, are met.
My question is: What is the rationale for use of a Class
III Biological Safety Cabinet, as given in the example? My
research states that Class III BSCs are used for BL4
organisms? Would a Class II BSC suffice?
Your thoughts are greatly appreciated.
Regards,
Barry Cohen, SM(NRM), CPSP
Director, Environmental Health and Safety
Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc.
195 Albany Street
Cambridge, MA 02139
(V): 617/613-4385
(F): 617/613-4492
(E): bcohen@
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2002 08:38:52 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: NIH
Subject: Re: NIH Guidelines Questions
In-Reply-To:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
The requirement for a Class III biosafety cabinet for BL-2 large scale
issues from the fact that production centrifuges are notoriously messy and
are not designed for containment. The only way to insure that personnel or
the environment are not exposed is to contain the centrifuge in a "Class
III" or totally enclosed, HEPA filtered containment device. Usually these
devices are custom made to the specifications of the user to fit the
harvesting devices being used.
John H. Keene, Dr. P.H., CBSP
Biohaztec Associates, Inc.
924 Castle Hollow Road
Midlothian, VA 23114
Phone/Fax (804) 379-9192
E-mail jkeene@
Web Site:
-----Original Message-----
From: A Biosafety Discussion List [mailto:BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU]On
Behalf Of Barry Cohen
Sent: Wednesday, January 16, 2002 7:44 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: NIH Guidelines Questions
Good Morning:
I would like to ask the collective for their thoughts on a
section of Appendix K (Large Scale Physical Containment).
I bring your attention to Criterion #7, under BL2-LS:
Viable organisms should be handled in a system that
physically separates the process from the external
environment (closed system or other primary containment).
The reference is K-IV-B: Cultures of viable organisms
containing recombinant DNA molecules shall be handled in a
closed system (e.g., closed vessel used for the propagation
and growth of cultures) or other primary containment
equipment (e.g., Class III biological safety cabinet
containing a centrifuge used to process culture fluids)
which is designed to prevent the escape of viable
organisms. Volumes less than 10 liters may be handled
outside of a closed system or other primary containment
equipment provided all physical containment requirements
specified in Appendix G-II-B, Physical Containment
Levels--Biosafety Level 2, are met.
My question is: What is the rationale for use of a Class
III Biological Safety Cabinet, as given in the example? My
research states that Class III BSCs are used for BL4
organisms? Would a Class II BSC suffice?
Your thoughts are greatly appreciated.
Regards,
Barry Cohen, SM(NRM), CPSP
Director, Environmental Health and Safety
Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc.
195 Albany Street
Cambridge, MA 02139
(V): 617/613-4385
(F): 617/613-4492
(E): bcohen@
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2002 11:05:09 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Robin Newberry
Subject: CDC Select Agent Registration
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed"
How many of you are handling the CDC Select Agent registration out of
EHS? Anyone handling it out of another group (like Research
Compliance)?
--
Robin
--------------------------------------------------------------
W. Robert Newberry, IV CIH, CHMM
Chief Environmental Health and Safety Officer
Clemson University
wnewber@clemson.edu ehs@clemson.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2002 11:18:21 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Jeffrey Good
Subject: Re: CDC Select Agent Registration
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
We have it here at GW.
>>> wnewber@CLEMSON.EDU 01/16/02 11:05AM >>>
How many of you are handling the CDC Select Agent registration out of
EHS? Anyone handling it out of another group (like Research
Compliance)?
--
Robin
--------------------------------------------------------------
W. Robert Newberry, IV CIH, CHMM
Chief Environmental Health and Safety Officer
Clemson University
wnewber@clemson.edu ehs@clemson.edu=20
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2002 11:23:30 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Byers, Karen B"
Subject: Re: CDC Select Agent Registration
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Biosafety is a function on the EH&S team here; the CDC Select Agent program is
handled here as a responsibility of biosafety. But Administration definitely has
a leadership role in terms of support -- focusing research attention on the
problem, {setting up mandatory meetings} , organizing an inventory survey
effort, etc.
Karen B. Byers, MS, RBP, CBSP
Biosafety Officer, Dana-Farber Cancer Institute
44 Binney Street - SWG350
Boston, MA 02115
karen_byers@dfci.harvard.edu
617-632-3890
fax: 617-632-1932
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Robin Newberry [SMTP:wnewber@CLEMSON.EDU]
> Sent: Wednesday, January 16, 2002 11:05 AM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: CDC Select Agent Registration
>
> How many of you are handling the CDC Select Agent registration out of
> EHS? Anyone handling it out of another group (like Research
> Compliance)?
> --
> Robin
> --------------------------------------------------------------
> W. Robert Newberry, IV CIH, CHMM
> Chief Environmental Health and Safety Officer
> Clemson University
>
> wnewber@clemson.edu ehs@clemson.edu
>
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2002 10:24:19 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Senjem, David H."
Subject: Re: CDC Select Agent Registration
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
CDC Select Agent Registration and related activities are managed out of the
safety function at our institution. I am the legally designated
"responsible person".
David H. Senjem
Mayo Clinic
Rochester, MN
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Robin Newberry [SMTP:wnewber@CLEMSON.EDU]
> Sent: Wednesday, January 16, 2002 10:05 AM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: CDC Select Agent Registration
>
> How many of you are handling the CDC Select Agent registration out of
> EHS? Anyone handling it out of another group (like Research
> Compliance)?
> --
> Robin
> --------------------------------------------------------------
> W. Robert Newberry, IV CIH, CHMM
> Chief Environmental Health and Safety Officer
> Clemson University
>
> wnewber@clemson.edu ehs@clemson.edu
>
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2002 11:28:09 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Greg Merkle
Organization: Wright State University
Subject: Re: CDC Select Agent Registration
MIME-version: 1.0
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Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-transfer-encoding: 7bit
When and if the university has to register for use of select
agents it will be coordinated through the university EHS
office.
Greg Merkle
Robin Newberry wrote:
>
> How many of you are handling the CDC Select Agent registration out of
> EHS? Anyone handling it out of another group (like Research
> Compliance)?
> --
> Robin
> --------------------------------------------------------------
> W. Robert Newberry, IV CIH, CHMM
> Chief Environmental Health and Safety Officer
> Clemson University
>
> wnewber@clemson.edu ehs@clemson.edu
>
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url:wright.edu/admin/ehs
org:Wright State University;Department of Environmental Health and Safety
version:2.1
email;internet:greg.merkle@wright.edu
title:Senior Industrial Hygienist
adr;quoted-printable:;;145 Health Sciences Bldg.=0D=0A3640 Col. Glenn Hwy.;Dayton;Ohio;45435-0001;USA
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--Boundary_(ID_wFLgdtrY/WfN/mUKYgb36Q)--
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2002 10:35:01 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ginger Brown
Subject: Re: CDC Select Agent Registration
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Registration is handled by EHS and I am the RFO for
the institution.
Ginger Brown
TX A&M University
>>> wnewber@CLEMSON.EDU 01/16/02 10:05AM >>>
How many of you are handling the CDC Select Agent registration out of
EHS? Anyone handling it out of another group (like Research
Compliance)?
--
Robin
--------------------------------------------------------------
W. Robert Newberry, IV CIH, CHMM
Chief Environmental Health and Safety Officer
Clemson University
wnewber@clemson.edu ehs@clemson.edu=20
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2002 09:30:40 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Sam Snyder
Subject: Re: [APIC] Bioterrorism agents wall chart
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
In a message dated 1/10/02 4:32:10 PM Pacific Standard Time,
Snyder_Sam@lacoe.edu writes:
----------
> From: Ed Krisiunas[SMTP:EKrisiunas@]
> Reply To: A Biosafety Discussion List
> Sent: Thursday, January 10, 2002 4:36 AM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: Evaluation of glutaraldehyde
>
> Looking for some assistance to evaluate airborne concentrations of
> glutaraldehyde after spilling 10 liters of material in a room. Attempting
> to determine how long it takes to reach the STEL.
>
> Can anyone suggest a method for evaluation or company that can do an
> independent evaluation?
>
> Regards,
>
>
>
> Regards,
>
> Edward Krisiunas, MT(ASCP), CIC, MPH
> President
> WNWN International
> PO Box 1164
> Burlington, Connecticut
> 06013
> 860-675-1217
> 860-675-1311(fax)
> 860-944-2373(mobile) >>
I've developed a nifty little scrubber that efficiently removes aldehydes
from ambient air so they can be quantified. Once in an aqueous matrix, the
aldehyde concentration can be determined by a test kit sold by Lamotte
Chemical Co., or by other wet chemistry methods. The sensitivity of the kit
is 0.5 ppm, but the concentration in air that I'm seeking is 0.05 ppm (as
formaldehyde). Thus, the scrubber concentrates the aldehyde in the aqueous
phase.
--Jay L. Stern
> ----------
> From: Ed Krisiunas[SMTP:EKrisiunas@]
> Reply To: A Biosafety Discussion List
> Sent: Thursday, November 29, 2001 9:50 AM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: Fwd: [APIC] Bioterrorism agents wall chart
>
>
> In a message dated 11/29/2001 10:26:26 AM Eastern Standard Time,
> kwittman@ writes:
>
>
>
>
> ========================
> From: Eva Clontz [SMTP:eclontz@email.unc.edu]
> Subject: Bioterrorism agents wall chart
> Sent: 11/27/01 11:43 AM
> ========================
>
> The North Carolina Statewide Program for Infection Control and
> Epidemiology (SPICE), based in the School of Medicine at the
> University of
> North Carolina in Chapel Hill, has developed a wall chart on
> bioterrorist
> agents. It is available in a printer-friendly format and can be
> freely
> printed and used for educational purposes.
>
> The chart is online at
> unc.edu/depts/spice/bioterrorism.html
>
> The wall chart developed by SPICE provides the following information
> for
> the more likely biological weapons: common presenting
> signs/symptoms,
> communicability, decontamination methods, recommended isolation
> precautions, prophylaxis for exposed persons, and therapy. Diseases
> included are the following: smallpox, anthrax, plague, and botulism.
>
>
> Eva P. Clontz, Program Coordinator
> North Carolina Statewide Program for Infection Control and
> Epidemiology
> University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
> Chapel Hill, NC
> phone: (919) 966-3242
> FAX: (919) 843-9979
> unc.edu/depts/spice/
> Eva_Clontz@unc.edu
> .......kw
>
>
>
>
>
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2002 12:49:58 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Richard Fink
Subject: Re: CDC Select Agent Registration
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="=====================_101366747==_.ALT"
--=====================_101366747==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
At MIT it is out of EHS.
Richie
At 11:05 AM 01/16/02 -0500, you wrote:
>How many of you are handling the CDC Select Agent registration out of
>EHS? Anyone handling it out of another group (like Research
>Compliance)?
>--
>Robin
>--------------------------------------------------------------
>W. Robert Newberry, IV CIH, CHMM
>Chief Environmental Health and Safety Officer
>Clemson University
>
>wnewber@clemson.edu ehs@clemson.edu
>
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
--=====================_101366747==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
At MIT it is out of EHS.
Richie
At 11:05 AM 01/16/02 -0500, you wrote:
How many of you are handling the CDC Select Agent registration out of
EHS? Anyone handling it out of another group (like Research
Compliance)?
--
Robin
--------------------------------------------------------------
W. Robert Newberry, IV CIH, CHMM
Chief Environmental Health and Safety Officer
Clemson University
wnewber@clemson.edu ehs@clemson.edu
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
--=====================_101366747==_.ALT--
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2002 13:11:28 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Jairo Betancourt
Subject: Re: CDC Select Agent Registration
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
Content-transfer-encoding: 7bit
We at EHS do it for our Institution.
Jairo Betancourt
EHS
University of Miami
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2002 12:23:04 -0600
Reply-To: louann.burnett@vanderbilt.edu
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: LouAnn Burnett
Subject: Re: CDC Select Agent Registration
In-Reply-To:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
At Vanderbilt, we administer it through EHS, with lots of help from other
folks. We have a new Laboratory Security and Accountability Task Group to
address broader issues, like background checks and overall physical and
operational security. This task group is comprised of people from all over
campus and co-chaired by our Associate Vice Chancellor for Research and the
Associate Provost for Research.
LouAnn
LouAnn C. Burnett, MS, CBSP
Biosafety Program Manager & Biological Safety Officer
Vanderbilt University Environmental Health & Safety
Nashville, Tennessee
615/322-0927 (direct & voice mail)
615/343-4951 (fax)
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2002 12:24:10 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Mario Soares
Organization: The University of Texas-Houston Health Science Center
Subject: Re: CDC Select Agent Registration
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Here at UT-Houston, the Biosafety program handles CDC Select Agent
registration out of the EHS dept.
Mario Soares
Manager, Biosafety Program
Environmental Health and Safety Dept.
University of Texas Health Science Center at Houston
Robin Newberry wrote:
> How many of you are handling the CDC Select Agent registration out of
> EHS? Anyone handling it out of another group (like Research
> Compliance)?
> --
> Robin
> --------------------------------------------------------------
> W. Robert Newberry, IV CIH, CHMM
> Chief Environmental Health and Safety Officer
> Clemson University
>
> wnewber@clemson.edu ehs@clemson.edu
>
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2002 13:39:25 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Robert N. Latsch"
Subject: Re: CDC Select Agent Registration
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
We are looking at select agents from here.
bob
>How many of you are handling the CDC Select Agent registration out of
>EHS? Anyone handling it out of another group (like Research
>Compliance)?
>--
>Robin
>--------------------------------------------------------------
>W. Robert Newberry, IV CIH, CHMM
>Chief Environmental Health and Safety Officer
>Clemson University
>
>wnewber@clemson.edu ehs@clemson.edu
>
_____________________________________________________________________
__ / _____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2002 11:00:57 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Ton, Mimi"
Subject: Mouth Pipetting Alternatives
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Dear all,
Does anyone have recommendations for a mechanical alternative to mouth
pipetting, specifically for transferring mouse eggs/embryos (for quantities
of less than 1microliter) while working under a microscope (procedures,
equipment, manufacture)?
Additionally, does any one have information regarding the effectiveness of
filtered micropipette tips that are available on the market?
Your assistance is greatly appreciated!
Mimi
---------------------------------------------
Mimi C. Ton
Safety Engineer
California Institute of Technology
Environment, Health & Safety Office
M/C 25-6
1200 E. California Boulevard
Pasadena, CA 91125
Phone: 626.395.2430
Fax: 626.577.6028
E-mail: mimi.ton@caltech.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2002 15:04:38 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Robert N. Latsch"
Subject: Re: Mouth Pipetting Alternatives
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
I do not have any answers to this one. Just to further the discussion
along however,
I was told that mouth pipetting is still necessary when doing work like
invitro fertilization. The turbulance created by mechanical devices is
enough to damage the eggs.
I have not heard of an effective alternative method.
bob
>Dear all,
>
>Does anyone have recommendations for a mechanical alternative to mouth
>pipetting, specifically for transferring mouse eggs/embryos (for quantities
>of less than 1microliter) while working under a microscope (procedures,
>equipment, manufacture)?
>
>Additionally, does any one have information regarding the effectiveness of
>filtered micropipette tips that are available on the market?
>
>Your assistance is greatly appreciated!
>
>Mimi
>---------------------------------------------
>Mimi C. Ton
>Safety Engineer
>California Institute of Technology
>Environment, Health & Safety Office
>M/C 25-6
>1200 E. California Boulevard
>Pasadena, CA 91125
>Phone: 626.395.2430
>Fax: 626.577.6028
>E-mail: mimi.ton@caltech.edu
_____________________________________________________________________
__ / _____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2002 15:00:23 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Klenner, James"
Subject: Help for the new guy
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Hello everyone,
I am the newly hired Bio-Safety Manager for Indiana University-Purdue
University at Indianapolis and request a little assistance from you
biohazardous veterans. First, does anyone know of a decent multiday
biosafety training course/conference offered in the next several months?
Second, if you had to pick one reference material or book, other than the
BMBL, that you could not live without - what would it be?
Thanks for all you help,
James W. Klenner, MSc, MPH, MPA
Bio-Safety Manager
IUPUI, Environmental Health and Safety
620 Union Dr., UN043
Indianapolis, Indiana 46202-5167
(317) 274-2830
Fax (317) 278-2158
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2002 15:25:28 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Joseph P. Kozlovac"
Subject: Re: Help for the new guy
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
The Hopkins biocontrol course is one of the better ones. I am sending one
of my new biosafety specialist to the next training this spring. For more
information go to this
website.
At 03:00 PM 1/16/02 -0500, you wrote:
>Hello everyone,
>I am the newly hired Bio-Safety Manager for Indiana University-Purdue
>University at Indianapolis and request a little assistance from you
>biohazardous veterans. First, does anyone know of a decent multiday
>biosafety training course/conference offered in the next several months?
>Second, if you had to pick one reference material or book, other than the
>BMBL, that you could not live without - what would it be?
>Thanks for all you help,
>
>James W. Klenner, MSc, MPH, MPA
>Bio-Safety Manager
>IUPUI, Environmental Health and Safety
>620 Union Dr., UN043
>Indianapolis, Indiana 46202-5167
>(317) 274-2830
>Fax (317) 278-2158
______________________________________________________________________________
Biological Safety Officer
Environment, Health, Safety
SAIC-Frederick
National Cancer Institute -
Frederick
(301)846-1451 fax: (301)846-6619
email: jkozlovac@mail.
______________________________________________________________________________
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2002 17:04:43 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ray Hackney
Subject: Re: Help for the new guy
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
James,
The Johns Hopkins course has a good reputation and I also recommend that
course.
I will also mention that I am teaching a 2 and a half day course in
biological safety through the North Carolina Occupational Safety & Health
Education & Research Center. More information can be found at the website:
Ray
Raymond W. Hackney, Jr. , DrPH, CIH, CBSP
Industrial Hygiene Manager
Dept. of Environment Health and Safety
212 Finley Golf Course Rd.
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Chapel Hill, NC 27514
(919) 962-5712
(919) 962-0227 (fax)
----- Original Message -----
From: "Joseph P. Kozlovac"
To:
Sent: Wednesday, January 16, 2002 3:25 PM
Subject: Re: Help for the new guy
> The Hopkins biocontrol course is one of the better ones. I am sending one
> of my new biosafety specialist to the next training this spring. For more
> information go to this
> website.
>
> At 03:00 PM 1/16/02 -0500, you wrote:
> >Hello everyone,
> >I am the newly hired Bio-Safety Manager for Indiana University-Purdue
> >University at Indianapolis and request a little assistance from you
> >biohazardous veterans. First, does anyone know of a decent multiday
> >biosafety training course/conference offered in the next several months?
> >Second, if you had to pick one reference material or book, other than the
> >BMBL, that you could not live without - what would it be?
> >Thanks for all you help,
> >
> >James W. Klenner, MSc, MPH, MPA
> >Bio-Safety Manager
> >IUPUI, Environmental Health and Safety
> >620 Union Dr., UN043
> >Indianapolis, Indiana 46202-5167
> >(317) 274-2830
> >Fax (317) 278-2158
>
>
____________________________________________________________________________
__
>
> Biological Safety Officer
> Environment, Health, Safety
> SAIC-Frederick
> National Cancer Institute -
> Frederick
> (301)846-1451 fax: (301)846-6619
> email: jkozlovac@mail.
>
____________________________________________________________________________
__
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2002 14:50:47 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Sue Quinn
Subject: adenovirus and permitting
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="----=_NextPart_000_0223_01C19E9D.2EA11FD0"
This is a multi-part message in MIME format.
------=_NextPart_000_0223_01C19E9D.2EA11FD0
Content-Type: text/plain;
charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Hi all-
One of my scientists would like to have a collaborator in Europe send =
recomb human adenovirus containing a variety of transgenes for =
validation.=20
What, if any permitting would be required for this? If permitting is =
required, what would be the permitting agency?
Thanks!
Sue=20
Suzanne M. Quinn
Manager, Environmental Health and Safety
Exelixis, Inc.
PO Box 511
South San Francisco, CA 94083-0511
------=_NextPart_000_0223_01C19E9D.2EA11FD0
Content-Type: text/html;
charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Hi all-
One of my scientists would like to = have a=20 collaborator in Europe send recomb human adenovirus containing a variety = of=20 transgenes for validation.
What, if any permitting would be = required for=20 this? If permitting is required, what would be the permitting=20 agency?
Thanks!
Sue
Suzanne M. Quinn
Manager, = Environmental Health=20 and Safety
Exelixis, Inc.
PO Box 511
South San Francisco, = CA =20 94083-0511
------=_NextPart_000_0223_01C19E9D.2EA11FD0--
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2002 16:09:16 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Ton, Mimi"
Subject: Re: Mouth Pipetting Alternatives
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Dear Robert,
Thanks so much for your input. I wish this was addressed in the BMBL. I've
been racking my brain trying to find an easy to use alternative.
Best regards,
Mimi
---------------------------------------------
Mimi C. Ton
Safety Engineer
California Institute of Technology
Environment, Health & Safety Office
M/C 25-6
1200 E. California Boulevard
Pasadena, CA 91125
Phone: 626.395.2430
Fax: 626.577.6028
E-mail: mimi.ton@caltech.edu
-----Original Message-----
From: Robert N. Latsch [mailto:rnl2@po.cwru.edu]
Sent: Wednesday, January 16, 2002 12:05 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@mitvma.mit.edu
Subject: Re: Mouth Pipetting Alternatives
I do not have any answers to this one. Just to further the discussion
along however,
I was told that mouth pipetting is still necessary when doing work like
invitro fertilization. The turbulance created by mechanical devices is
enough to damage the eggs.
I have not heard of an effective alternative method.
bob
>Dear all,
>
>Does anyone have recommendations for a mechanical alternative to mouth
>pipetting, specifically for transferring mouse eggs/embryos (for quantities
>of less than 1microliter) while working under a microscope (procedures,
>equipment, manufacture)?
>
>Additionally, does any one have information regarding the effectiveness of
>filtered micropipette tips that are available on the market?
>
>Your assistance is greatly appreciated!
>
>Mimi
>---------------------------------------------
>Mimi C. Ton
>Safety Engineer
>California Institute of Technology
>Environment, Health & Safety Office
>M/C 25-6
>1200 E. California Boulevard
>Pasadena, CA 91125
>Phone: 626.395.2430
>Fax: 626.577.6028
>E-mail: mimi.ton@caltech.edu
_____________________________________________________________________
__ /
_____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2002 19:31:23 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Morgan Margaret-AMM076
Subject: Blood after PCR
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Hi everyone,
I would like advice on the following problem. Recently we began working with human blood at Motorola Life Sciences in Pasadena CA. We have been experimenting with the amplification of DNA from blood which is added directly to the PCR reaction, and I had been assuming that once the blood had been through the thermalcycler it was no longer likely to be biohazardous. However, I have been asked to provide supporting documentation for this, or to reference the policies of other institutions on this matter. Here is where I need help.
Could you direct me to appropriate literature, and could you let me know what the policy is at your institution for working with PCR amplified material from blood samples.
Here is our protocol:
We use blood purchased from a bloodbank which has screened negative for HIV, Hep B and Hep C, and which we have no reason to suspect is infectious.
2% or 5% blood is used in the PCR; we add 2 or 5 microliters of blood per 100 microliter reaction. The tubes are heated at 95 deg C for three minutes, then put through 40-45 PCR cycles consisting of 94 deg C, 1 min, followed by 65 deg C, 1 min, followed by 72 deg C 1.5 min. At the end the blood appears brown and denatured.
What is the likelihood of common bloodborn pathogens surviving this procedure and being infectious? Has this been looked at?
How would you recommend these post PCR samples be handled in terms of biosafety precautions given the volume, the treatment and the source of the blood?
Do any of you have a policy or risk assessment for this situation at your institution?
I would appreciate any help you can give,
Margaret Morgan,
Senior Scientist,
Motorola Life Sciences,
Pasadena CA.
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 17 Jan 2002 07:57:35 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Kyle Boyett
Subject: BSC's and NSF
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Good morning all, I have a question that I hope the group can help me with.
I am taking an unofficial poll to determine approximately how many
institutions require NSF #49 certifications on BSC's that are purchased at
your facility? I am not referring to the certification process per se, but
rather if the cabinet carries the NSF seal. If you have this as a
requirement, is in the form of institutional policy, recommendation, or
other? Thanks for all the help. Have a good day.
Kyle Boyett
Safety Short Distribution List Administrator
Asst. Director of Biosafety
Occupational Health and Safety
University of Alabama at Birmingham
e-mail- kboyett@healthsafe.uab.edu
Phone- 205-934-2487
VISIT OUR WEB SITE AT:
healthsafe.uab.edu
** Asking me to overlook a safety violation is like asking me to reduce the
value I place on YOUR life**
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 17 Jan 2002 09:25:32 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Joseph P. Kozlovac"
Subject: Re: BSC's and NSF
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
We have the requirement for a BSC to be NSF certified within our BSC
specification that our engineering and purchasing groups use.
At 07:57 AM 1/17/02 -0600, you wrote:
>Good morning all, I have a question that I hope the group can help me with.
>I am taking an unofficial poll to determine approximately how many
>institutions require NSF #49 certifications on BSC's that are purchased at
>your facility? I am not referring to the certification process per se, but
>rather if the cabinet carries the NSF seal. If you have this as a
>requirement, is in the form of institutional policy, recommendation, or
>other? Thanks for all the help. Have a good day.
>
>Kyle Boyett
>Safety Short Distribution List Administrator
>Asst. Director of Biosafety
>Occupational Health and Safety
>University of Alabama at Birmingham
>e-mail- kboyett@healthsafe.uab.edu
>Phone- 205-934-2487
>VISIT OUR WEB SITE AT:
>healthsafe.uab.edu
>
>** Asking me to overlook a safety violation is like asking me to reduce the
>value I place on YOUR life**
______________________________________________________________________________
Biological Safety Officer
Environment, Health, Safety
SAIC-Frederick
National Cancer Institute -
Frederick
(301)846-1451 fax: (301)846-6619
email: jkozlovac@mail.
______________________________________________________________________________
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 17 Jan 2002 09:26:27 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Bernholc, Nicole M"
Subject: Re: BSC's and NSF
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
If you are using radiologicals some industries also require conformance with
ANSI N510 Testing of Nuclear Air treatment systems
-----Original Message-----
From: Kyle Boyett [mailto:KBoyett@HEALTHSAFE.UAB.EDU]
Sent: Thursday, January 17, 2002 8:58 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: BSC's and NSF
Good morning all, I have a question that I hope the group can help me with.
I am taking an unofficial poll to determine approximately how many
institutions require NSF #49 certifications on BSC's that are purchased at
your facility? I am not referring to the certification process per se, but
rather if the cabinet carries the NSF seal. If you have this as a
requirement, is in the form of institutional policy, recommendation, or
other? Thanks for all the help. Have a good day.
Kyle Boyett
Safety Short Distribution List Administrator
Asst. Director of Biosafety
Occupational Health and Safety
University of Alabama at Birmingham
e-mail- kboyett@healthsafe.uab.edu
Phone- 205-934-2487
VISIT OUR WEB SITE AT:
healthsafe.uab.edu
** Asking me to overlook a safety violation is like asking me to reduce the
value I place on YOUR life**
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 17 Jan 2002 09:27:41 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Greg Merkle
Organization: Wright State University
Subject: Re: BSC's and NSF
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: multipart/mixed; boundary="Boundary_(ID_V2i/tEbPQ7eAhCOON2N19g)"
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Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-transfer-encoding: 7bit
At Wright State University, when purchasing a unit it is
strongly recommended that the unit be NSF compliant and
carry the NSF seal. Not all units that area purchased have
the option of carrying the NSF seal.
Greg Merkle
Kyle Boyett wrote:
>
> Good morning all, I have a question that I hope the group can help me with.
> I am taking an unofficial poll to determine approximately how many
> institutions require NSF #49 certifications on BSC's that are purchased at
> your facility? I am not referring to the certification process per se, but
> rather if the cabinet carries the NSF seal. If you have this as a
> requirement, is in the form of institutional policy, recommendation, or
> other? Thanks for all the help. Have a good day.
>
> Kyle Boyett
> Safety Short Distribution List Administrator
> Asst. Director of Biosafety
> Occupational Health and Safety
> University of Alabama at Birmingham
> e-mail- kboyett@healthsafe.uab.edu
> Phone- 205-934-2487
> VISIT OUR WEB SITE AT:
> healthsafe.uab.edu
>
> ** Asking me to overlook a safety violation is like asking me to reduce the
> value I place on YOUR life**
--Boundary_(ID_V2i/tEbPQ7eAhCOON2N19g)
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n:Merkle;Greg
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url:wright.edu/admin/ehs
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version:2.1
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title:Senior Industrial Hygienist
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--Boundary_(ID_V2i/tEbPQ7eAhCOON2N19g)--
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 17 Jan 2002 09:36:33 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: NIH
Subject: Re: BSC's and NSF
In-Reply-To:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
At NIH, we require that all biosafety cabinets purchased be NSF approved.
John H. Keene, Dr. P.H., CBSP
Acting Biosafety Officer
Division of Safety, OSHB
National Institutes of Health
email keenej@mail.
-----Original Message-----
From: A Biosafety Discussion List [mailto:BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU]On
Behalf Of Kyle Boyett
Sent: Thursday, January 17, 2002 8:58 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: BSC's and NSF
Good morning all, I have a question that I hope the group can help me with.
I am taking an unofficial poll to determine approximately how many
institutions require NSF #49 certifications on BSC's that are purchased at
your facility? I am not referring to the certification process per se, but
rather if the cabinet carries the NSF seal. If you have this as a
requirement, is in the form of institutional policy, recommendation, or
other? Thanks for all the help. Have a good day.
Kyle Boyett
Safety Short Distribution List Administrator
Asst. Director of Biosafety
Occupational Health and Safety
University of Alabama at Birmingham
e-mail- kboyett@healthsafe.uab.edu
Phone- 205-934-2487
VISIT OUR WEB SITE AT:
healthsafe.uab.edu
** Asking me to overlook a safety violation is like asking me to reduce the
value I place on YOUR life**
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 17 Jan 2002 10:09:40 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: David Lumby
Subject: Re: adenovirus and permitting
Sue,
I think you need a "permit to import or transfer etiologic agents or
vectors of human disease." That comes from the CDC. It's a
relatively painless application. They turn it around in a week or two.
(at least that was my experience pre-September).
The phone number on the permit it 404-639-3235. All of the info is on
the web. at .
The permit and instructions can be downloaded in Acrobat.
Dave
>>> squinn@ 01/16/02 04:50PM >>>
Hi all-
One of my scientists would like to have a collaborator in Europe send
recomb human adenovirus containing a variety of transgenes for
validation.
What, if any permitting would be required for this? If permitting is
required, what would be the permitting agency?
Thanks!
Sue
Suzanne M. Quinn
Manager, Environmental Health and Safety
Exelixis, Inc.
PO Box 511
South San Francisco, CA 94083-0511
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[] TEXT1.htm
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 17 Jan 2002 12:43:36 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Carl Pike
Subject: Permitting
In-Reply-To:
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; format=flowed; charset=us-ascii
Related to the recent posting which referred to the CDC permitting website-
Can someone advise me if importing E. coli (normal strain as well as
transgenic strain containing a plant gene) would be covered under
this CDC permitting? Is E. coli considered an etiologic agent?
If this is not done by CDC, can you advise me on which agency would
issue permit if one is needed?
Thank you
--
Carl S. Pike
Harry W. and Mary B. Huffnagle Professor of Botany
Department of Biology Phone (717) 291-3958
Franklin and Marshall College email C_PIKE@ACAD.FANDM.EDU
P.O. Box 3003 fax (717) 358-4548
Lancaster, PA 17604-3003 USA
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 17 Jan 2002 13:21:33 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Richard Fink
Subject: Re: Permitting
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="=====================_189662390==_.ALT"
--=====================_189662390==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
>
>Can someone advise me if importing E. coli (normal strain as well as
>transgenic strain containing a plant gene) would be covered under
>this CDC permitting? Is E. coli considered an etiologic agent?
>
>If this is not done by CDC, can you advise me on which agency would
>issue permit if one is needed?
>
>Thank you
>--
>Carl S. Pike
If the E. coli is pathogenic then it would be covered by the CDC
permit. The US does not govern GMO's at present, but some countries due
and IATA regulates if the GMO can cause environmental harm if
released. See for details on their dangerous goods regs.
Richie
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
--=====================_189662390==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
Can someone advise me if importing E. coli (normal strain as well as
transgenic strain containing a plant gene) would be covered under
this CDC permitting? Is E. coli considered an etiologic agent?
If this is not done by CDC, can you advise me on which agency would
issue permit if one is needed?
Thank you
--
Carl S. Pike
If the E. coli is pathogenic then it would be covered by the CDC permit. The US does not govern GMO's at present, but some countries due and IATA regulates if the GMO can cause environmental harm if released. See for details on their dangerous goods regs.
Richie
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
--=====================_189662390==_.ALT--
=========================================================================
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 17 Jan 2002 13:46:42 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Maeve Sowles
Subject: Oops, Try again, Cadavers
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; format=flowed; charset=us-ascii
Hi Bios...
We have a new researcher arriving this summer, who wants to keep a cadaver
in the lab. We do not usually have cadavers, except for in the anat-phys lab.
I assume that BBP (Universal Precautions, and Exposure Control) should be
applied to this as well as Chemical Hygiene Plan and Formaldehyde Standard.
Safety shower/eyewash and ventilation need to be put in place. Biohazard
waste disposal will be used. Is the fixed tissue still a potential BBP? In
the case of prions, I'm thinking, yes.
Am I missing anything? Is there a reference anyone can recommend for
cadavers? I have not yet found one on my (figurative) shelf.
Thanks for your help.
Maeve
_________________
Maeve Sowles
Lab Safety Officer
Environmental Health and Safety
University of Oregon
1230 Franklin Blvd.
Eugene, OR 97403-5224
(541) 346-2867
Fax (541) 346-7008
maeve@oregon.uoregon.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 18 Jan 2002 08:24:56 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Hollingsworth, N J"
Subject: Re: CDC Select Agent Registration
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Yes,we handle it out of Research and the University Graduate School. All
certifications and assurances to DC are signed by the VP of this Arm (Res. &
Sponsored Services are under this VP as is human subjects, animal compliance
and the Biosafety Officer.) Everything is matched up to protocols,purchase
orders and animal or human protocols.
Norma Hollingsworth,
Compliance Officer for Animals and Biosafety Officer
-----Original Message-----
From: Robert N. Latsch [mailto:rnl2@PO.CWRU.EDU]
Sent: Wednesday, January 16, 2002 1:39 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: CDC Select Agent Registration
We are looking at select agents from here.
bob
>How many of you are handling the CDC Select Agent registration out of
>EHS? Anyone handling it out of another group (like Research
>Compliance)?
>--
>Robin
>--------------------------------------------------------------
>W. Robert Newberry, IV CIH, CHMM
>Chief Environmental Health and Safety Officer
>Clemson University
>
>wnewber@clemson.edu ehs@clemson.edu
>
_____________________________________________________________________
__ /
_____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 18 Jan 2002 09:26:00 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Scott, Rick"
Subject: declaration??
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
I was wondering if any of you use a sort of "declaration" that faculty must
submit every year that in essence reports all hazardous materials that they
posses. It would include chemicals, radionuclides, biohazardous
materials/toxins, lasers, etc... I invision the form being submitted to the
"university environmental health and safety office" which would in turn be
forwarded to contracts and grants. Contracts and grants would have to have
a current copy of the form, (or some form of documentation)- before signing
off on applications. I would think something like this would take upper
level administration support to implement.
Rick Scott
Biological Safety Officer
Biological Safety Cabinet Field Certifier
East Carolina University
Greenville, NC
27858
scottwi@mail.ecu.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 18 Jan 2002 09:16:34 -0600
Reply-To: louann.burnett@vanderbilt.edu
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: LouAnn Burnett
Subject: Re: declaration??
In-Reply-To:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Rick - we are formulating a certification statement, similar to what you
describe, for what we are terming "materials of concern" - Select Agents and
chemical and radioactive material with potential use in terrorism. We are
also separately conducting full inventories of biological materials and
chemicals in each lab (about 500 investigators - many more actual lab
facilities, freezers, refrigerators, cold rooms, etc.). Radiation is
already well inventoried. We haven't decided on the frequency of such a
certification statement, but we are also working on long-term tracking
through changes in procurement procedures, etc. It was mentioned that a
certification statement might be required for each grant submittal - I like
your model of EHS supplying grants and contracts a list of compliant folks
who can then get their grants processed. Nothing is in stone yet.
LouAnn
LouAnn C. Burnett, MS, CBSP
Biosafety Program Manager & Biological Safety Officer
Vanderbilt University Environmental Health & Safety
Nashville, Tennessee
615/322-0927 (direct & voice mail)
615/343-4951 (fax)
-----Original Message-----
From: A Biosafety Discussion List [mailto:BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU]On
Behalf Of Scott, Rick
Sent: Friday, January 18, 2002 8:26 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: declaration??
I was wondering if any of you use a sort of "declaration" that faculty must
submit every year that in essence reports all hazardous materials that they
posses. It would include chemicals, radionuclides, biohazardous
materials/toxins, lasers, etc... I invision the form being submitted to the
"university environmental health and safety office" which would in turn be
forwarded to contracts and grants. Contracts and grants would have to have
a current copy of the form, (or some form of documentation)- before signing
off on applications. I would think something like this would take upper
level administration support to implement.
Rick Scott
Biological Safety Officer
Biological Safety Cabinet Field Certifier
East Carolina University
Greenville, NC
27858
scottwi@mail.ecu.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 18 Jan 2002 07:28:28 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Funk,Glenn"
Subject: Re: declaration??
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Rick -
Many universities and other institutions use an authorization system in
which an investigator files an application for authorization of research or
other projects using biohazardous or radioactive materials, controlled
substances, toxins or highly hazardous chemicals. Usually, these systems
involve approval by the relevant Safety Officer and/or Safety Committee and
include provisions for either real-time or annual updating and (often)
renewal of authorization. Sometimes, but not always, Grants and Contracts
may be on the distribution list for approved auths. A quick look at the
EH&S websites for a few larger universities will turn up copies of these
authorization application forms. The ones we used at UC San Francisco can
be found at .
Hope this helps.
Glenn A. Funk, Ph.D., CBSP
Director and Biosafety Officer
Environmental Health & Safety
Aviron
408-845-8857
================================
At 09:26 AM 1/18/02 -0500, you wrote:
>I was wondering if any of you use a sort of "declaration" that faculty must
>submit every year that in essence reports all hazardous materials that they
>posses. It would include chemicals, radionuclides, biohazardous
>materials/toxins, lasers, etc... I invision the form being submitted to
the
>"university environmental health and safety office" which would in turn be
>forwarded to contracts and grants. Contracts and grants would have to have
>a current copy of the form, (or some form of documentation)- before signing
>off on applications. I would think something like this would take upper
>level administration support to implement.
>
>
>Rick Scott
>Biological Safety Officer
>Biological Safety Cabinet Field Certifier
>East Carolina University
>Greenville, NC
>27858
>scottwi@mail.ecu.edu
>
This e-mail message is for the sole use of the intended recipient(s) and may
contain confidential, proprietary or privileged information.
Any unauthorized review, use, disclosure or distribution is prohibited.
If you are not the intended recipient, please contact the sender by reply
e-mail and destroy all copies of the original message, enclosures and
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=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 18 Jan 2002 10:58:42 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "R. Thomas Leonard"
Subject: Re: declaration??
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
Several years ago we implemented a "Hazardous Materials Inventory Form"
which is similar to your declaration concept. We distribute the form
annually to each PI. The questions listed on the inventory form prompts
investigators to identify chemical, physical and biological hazards in
their possession. We seek general classifications and volumes for
chemicals, but more detail for biological agents and others. There's a
direct correlation between the simplicity of the form and the response rate.
While the model of implementation and oversight will vary by institution, I
can say that the inventory process has become an invaluable tool in our
safety program. We usually discover some non-registered materials that have
somehow "slipped through the cracks" of our other registration systems. We
also use the submitted results to update laboratory entrance signs.
Interestingly, we've also noticed an increase in requests for chemical
waste disposal after these forms are distributed, suggesting that the
inventory process prompts folks to clean house--always a good thing.
I think you'll find the annual declaration quite helpful.
Regards, Tom
At 09:26 AM 1/18/2002 -0500, you wrote:
>I was wondering if any of you use a sort of "declaration" that faculty must
>submit every year that in essence reports all hazardous materials that they
>posses. It would include chemicals, radionuclides, biohazardous
>materials/toxins, lasers, etc... I invision the form being submitted to the
>"university environmental health and safety office" which would in turn be
>forwarded to contracts and grants. Contracts and grants would have to have
>a current copy of the form, (or some form of documentation)- before signing
>off on applications. I would think something like this would take upper
>level administration support to implement.
>
>
>Rick Scott
>Biological Safety Officer
>Biological Safety Cabinet Field Certifier
>East Carolina University
>Greenville, NC
>27858
>scottwi@mail.ecu.edu
***********************************
R. Thomas Leonard, M.S., CSP, CBSP
Safety Officer
The Wistar Institute
3601 Spruce Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104
(ph)215-898-3712
(fx)215-898-3868
=========================================================================
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 18 Jan 2002 16:19:08 -0500
Reply-To: pr18@columbia.edu
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: paul rubock
Organization: EH&S
Subject: Re: CDC Select Agent Registration
MIME-Version: 1.0
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Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
At Columbia, EH&S is honcho-ing it.
Paul Rubock
Robin Newberry wrote:
> How many of you are handling the CDC Select Agent registration out of
> EHS? Anyone handling it out of another group (like Research
> Compliance)?
> --
> Robin
> --------------------------------------------------------------
> W. Robert Newberry, IV CIH, CHMM
> Chief Environmental Health and Safety Officer
> Clemson University
>
> wnewber@clemson.edu ehs@clemson.edu
>
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--------------9FB5AA88149D406EE0FD4D56--
=========================================================================
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 21 Jan 2002 09:48:14 +0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Jong Teck Keong
Subject: Maintenance of equipments in Bl2/BL3
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Dear all,
May i ask what are the neccessary precautions/ or procedure to take when we
have suppliers/serviceman coming in for the maintenance of the equipments
(eg autoclave, centrifuge) in BL2 or BL3 facilities?
At the moment, I have a BL3 facility with people working on BL2 agents only.
I had made sure that no one was working in the facilty when the serviceman
was here, and that the room was "UVed" overnight.
I feel like i am missing something, please enlighten me.
Thanks in advance.
Jong Teck Keong
Safety Office
Institute of Molecular and Cell Biology
30, Medical Drive, Singapore 117609
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 21 Jan 2002 10:37:21 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Jennifer Minogue
Subject: Re: Oops, Try again, Cadavers
MIME-Version: 1.0
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Yes, prions are still a problem even in fixed tissue.
I don't know about Oregon, but in Ontario, there are a lot of govt
regulations associated with cadavers - you can't just use any old lab -
the "morgue" must be registered and meet a pile of requirements. You
may wish to check up on that as well.
--
Jennifer Minogue
Environmental Health and Safety
University of Guelph
Guelph, Ontario N1G 2W1
519-824-4120 x 3190 Voice
519-824-0364 Fax
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 21 Jan 2002 10:12:33 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: J Coggin
Subject: Re: Maintenance of equipments in Bl2/BL3
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii; format=flowed
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Make sure the employer of the instrument repair person trains and is
responsible for biosafety compliance for its employee(s). Also give
them a list of the pathogens used in the equipment they service in
writing with a notice that the equipment may be contaminated and that
the worker need to use protective precautions.
Joe Coggin, Jr. Ph.D. , RBP. CBSP
Jong Teck Keong wrote:
>Dear all,
>
>May i ask what are the neccessary precautions/ or procedure to take when we
>have suppliers/serviceman coming in for the maintenance of the equipments
>(eg autoclave, centrifuge) in BL2 or BL3 facilities?
>At the moment, I have a BL3 facility with people working on BL2 agents only.
>I had made sure that no one was working in the facilty when the serviceman
>was here, and that the room was "UVed" overnight.
>I feel like i am missing something, please enlighten me.
>
>Thanks in advance.
>
>
>Jong Teck Keong
>Safety Office
>Institute of Molecular and Cell Biology
>30, Medical Drive, Singapore 117609
>
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 21 Jan 2002 13:14:25 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "John H. Keene, Dr P.H."
Subject: Re: Maintenance of equipments in Bl2/BL3
MIME-Version: 1.0
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In the US, it is the responsibility of the laboratory personnel to
appropriately decontaminate all equipment prior to allowing non-laboratory
personnel to work on the equipment. See section B.10 of the BMBL (Page 23).
John H. Keene, Dr. P.H., CBSP (ABSA)
Biohaztec Associates, Inc.
924 Castle Hollow Road
Midlothian, VA 23113
email jkeene@
----- Original Message -----
From: "Jong Teck Keong"
To:
Sent: Sunday, January 20, 2002 8:48 PM
Subject: Maintenance of equipments in Bl2/BL3
> Dear all,
>
> May i ask what are the neccessary precautions/ or procedure to take when
we
> have suppliers/serviceman coming in for the maintenance of the equipments
> (eg autoclave, centrifuge) in BL2 or BL3 facilities?
> At the moment, I have a BL3 facility with people working on BL2 agents
only.
> I had made sure that no one was working in the facilty when the serviceman
> was here, and that the room was "UVed" overnight.
> I feel like i am missing something, please enlighten me.
>
> Thanks in advance.
>
>
> Jong Teck Keong
> Safety Office
> Institute of Molecular and Cell Biology
> 30, Medical Drive, Singapore 117609
>
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 21 Jan 2002 13:34:34 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Paul Jennette
Subject: Re: Maintenance of equipments in Bl2/BL3
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
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boundary="=====================_363881984==_.ALT"
--=====================_363881984==_.ALT
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At Cornell, we require the following for entry into our BSL-3s by service
personnel:
1. Lab users shut down (to the extent practical) their work in the
affected area and perform a surface decontamination of the equipment to be
serviced.
2. Service personnel put on the same PPE as the lab users.
3. Service personnel are escorted into the BSL-3 by the Biosafety Officer
or Biosafety Engineer.
4. All tools brought into the BSL-3 are decontaminated on the way out.
If an initial investigation reveals that extensive disassembly or removal
of the equipment is necessary, our (so far not needed) plan is fumigate the
room with formaldehyde or remove the equipment using the anteroom as a gas
chamber (whichever is more practical.)
I hope this helps.
At 09:48 AM 1/21/2002 +0800, you wrote:
>Dear all,
>
>May i ask what are the neccessary precautions/ or procedure to take when we
>have suppliers/serviceman coming in for the maintenance of the equipments
>(eg autoclave, centrifuge) in BL2 or BL3 facilities?
>At the moment, I have a BL3 facility with people working on BL2 agents only.
>I had made sure that no one was working in the facilty when the serviceman
>was here, and that the room was "UVed" overnight.
>I feel like i am missing something, please enlighten me.
>
>Thanks in advance.
>
>
>Jong Teck Keong
>Safety Office
>Institute of Molecular and Cell Biology
>30, Medical Drive, Singapore 117609
J. Paul Jennette, P.E.
Biosafety Engineer
Cornell University
College of Veterinary Medicine
Biosafety Program
S3-010 Schurman Hall, Box 4 (607) 253-4227
Ithaca, New York 14853-6401 fax -3723
"Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay
any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose
any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty."
- John F. Kennedy
--=====================_363881984==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
At Cornell, we require the following for entry into our BSL-3s by service personnel:
1. Lab users shut down (to the extent practical) their work in the affected area and perform a surface decontamination of the equipment to be serviced.
2. Service personnel put on the same PPE as the lab users.
3. Service personnel are escorted into the BSL-3 by the Biosafety Officer or Biosafety Engineer.
4. All tools brought into the BSL-3 are decontaminated on the way out.
If an initial investigation reveals that extensive disassembly or removal of the equipment is necessary, our (so far not needed) plan is fumigate the room with formaldehyde or remove the equipment using the anteroom as a gas chamber (whichever is more practical.)
I hope this helps.
At 09:48 AM 1/21/2002 +0800, you wrote:
Dear all,
May i ask what are the neccessary precautions/ or procedure to take when we
have suppliers/serviceman coming in for the maintenance of the equipments
(eg autoclave, centrifuge) in BL2 or BL3 facilities?
At the moment, I have a BL3 facility with people working on BL2 agents only.
I had made sure that no one was working in the facilty when the serviceman
was here, and that the room was "UVed" overnight.
I feel like i am missing something, please enlighten me.
Thanks in advance.
Jong Teck Keong
Safety Office
Institute of Molecular and Cell Biology
30, Medical Drive, Singapore 117609
J. Paul Jennette, P.E.
Biosafety Engineer
Cornell University
College of Veterinary Medicine
Biosafety Program
S3-010 Schurman Hall, Box 4 (607) 253-4227
Ithaca, New York 14853-6401 fax -3723
"Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty."
- John F. Kennedy
--=====================_363881984==_.ALT--
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 22 Jan 2002 10:00:58 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Jairo Betancourt
Subject: Re: Use of Palm Pilot for Laboratory Audits,
Inventories,Surveys or other data collection
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
Content-transfer-encoding: 7bit
Brian: I do not seem top be able to find that publication around the area.
If you have it could you please find a way to send it to me? I would very
much appreciate it. Or if you are going to Atlanta this coming week it would
be easier. Sorry about this request.
Thank you,
Jairo
Jairo Betancourt, RBP
Laboratory Safety Specialist/Laser Safety Officer
Office of Environmental Health and Safety
University of Miami
(305) 243-3400
Fax: (305) 243-3272
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 22 Jan 2002 10:14:56 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Robert N. Latsch"
Subject: Re: Oops, Try again, Cadavers
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
BBP does not apply to specimens in formaldehyde. Having said that,
precautions need to be taken with such specimens to guard against organisms
(cjd) that are still viable in formaldehyde treated specimens.
I would reccommend BBP because it is a good practice.
bob
>Hi Bios...
>
>We have a new researcher arriving this summer, who wants to keep a cadaver
>in the lab. We do not usually have cadavers, except for in the anat-phys lab.
>
>I assume that BBP (Universal Precautions, and Exposure Control) should be
>applied to this as well as Chemical Hygiene Plan and Formaldehyde Standard.
>Safety shower/eyewash and ventilation need to be put in place. Biohazard
>waste disposal will be used. Is the fixed tissue still a potential BBP? In
>the case of prions, I'm thinking, yes.
>
>Am I missing anything? Is there a reference anyone can recommend for
>cadavers? I have not yet found one on my (figurative) shelf.
>
>Thanks for your help.
>Maeve
>_________________
>Maeve Sowles
>Lab Safety Officer
>Environmental Health and Safety
>University of Oregon
>1230 Franklin Blvd.
>Eugene, OR 97403-5224
>(541) 346-2867
>Fax (541) 346-7008
>maeve@oregon.uoregon.edu
_____________________________________________________________________
__ / _____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 23 Jan 2002 14:09:54 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Amy Quattrocchi
Subject: natural gas in biosafety cabinets
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT
Hello all,
I'm rather new to this profession/list and my question has likely
been asked many times in the past....but here goes.
I have an investigator that is interested in installing a natural
gas line in his biosafety cabinet. I have tried to talk him out of it,
explaining that there is no need to flame his flasks because the
cabinet is a sterile environment, but he remains adamant. I called
the manufacturer of the cabinet and they told me that natural gas
should not be installed, but that people have been doing it for
years.
I was hoping that someone might provide advice about installing
a gas line into a cabinet. Is it really a bad idea? If not, would it be
difficult to accomplish? What are the safety issues that I should
be aware of?
I thank you for any help that might be offered.
Amy
Amy Quattrocchi
Health and Safety Specialist
Rutgers Environmental Health and Safety
24 Street 1603
Building 4127 Livingston Campus
Piscataway, NJ 08854
Phone: 732/445-2550
Fax: 732/445-3109
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 23 Jan 2002 15:18:00 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Robert N. Latsch"
Subject: Re: natural gas in biosafety cabinets
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
I had an explosion caused by this years ago. The researcher spent over 6
monthes in a burn unit.
Bob
>Hello all,
> I'm rather new to this profession/list and my question has likely
>been asked many times in the past....but here goes.
> I have an investigator that is interested in installing a natural
>gas line in his biosafety cabinet. I have tried to talk him out of it,
>explaining that there is no need to flame his flasks because the
>cabinet is a sterile environment, but he remains adamant. I called
>the manufacturer of the cabinet and they told me that natural gas
>should not be installed, but that people have been doing it for
>years.
> I was hoping that someone might provide advice about installing
>a gas line into a cabinet. Is it really a bad idea? If not, would it be
>difficult to accomplish? What are the safety issues that I should
>be aware of?
> I thank you for any help that might be offered.
>
>Amy
>
>
>Amy Quattrocchi
>Health and Safety Specialist
>Rutgers Environmental Health and Safety
>24 Street 1603
>Building 4127 Livingston Campus
>Piscataway, NJ 08854
>Phone: 732/445-2550
>Fax: 732/445-3109
_____________________________________________________________________
__ / _____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 23 Jan 2002 15:43:50 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Scott, Rick"
Subject: Re: natural gas in biosafety cabinets
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Amy,
this question does get asked, but I have never answered it in the past, so
I'll take a turn. As you know one of the cardinal rules in working in BSC's
is to minimize airflow disruptions from every avenue possible. The heat
from the burner is heating air w/ in the cabinet and forcing it upwards
AGAINST the sterile airflow which is moving downwards. This downflow in
most cabinets is anywhere from 50-80 fpm (which is slooooow and fragile).
So depending on where the burner is placed, it's possible it could create
enough disturbance to pull contaminated air from the access opening and
introduce it to the work surface, etc... no good. (I make this point
because sometimes talking contamination can be more persuasive.)
There is the fire hazard as I'm sure they use ethanol to disinfect the
cabinet. There is the potential for a gas explosion. And there is the
possibility that the flame accidentally gets turned up too high and scorches
a hole in the supply HEPA. All of these are potential disasters you invite
along with the flame. I'm sure I'm leaving out others....
Maybe it could be time to have your institutional biosafety committee or
other campus safety committee write a policy addressing (and squashing) the
use of flames in BSCs. ;-)
Rick Scott
Biological Safety Officer
Biological Safety Cabinet Field Certifier
East Carolina University
Greenville, NC
27858
scottwi@mail.ecu.edu
> ----------
> From: Amy Quattrocchi
> Reply To: A Biosafety Discussion List
> Sent: Thursday, January 24, 2002 3:09 AM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: natural gas in biosafety cabinets
>
> Hello all,
> I'm rather new to this profession/list and my question has likely
> been asked many times in the past....but here goes.
> I have an investigator that is interested in installing a natural
> gas line in his biosafety cabinet. I have tried to talk him out of it,
> explaining that there is no need to flame his flasks because the
> cabinet is a sterile environment, but he remains adamant. I called
> the manufacturer of the cabinet and they told me that natural gas
> should not be installed, but that people have been doing it for
> years.
> I was hoping that someone might provide advice about installing
> a gas line into a cabinet. Is it really a bad idea? If not, would it be
> difficult to accomplish? What are the safety issues that I should
> be aware of?
> I thank you for any help that might be offered.
>
> Amy
>
>
> Amy Quattrocchi
> Health and Safety Specialist
> Rutgers Environmental Health and Safety
> 24 Street 1603
> Building 4127 Livingston Campus
> Piscataway, NJ 08854
> Phone: 732/445-2550
> Fax: 732/445-3109
>
>
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 23 Jan 2002 12:53:37 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Daniel Shawler
Subject: Re: natural gas in biosafety cabinets
In-Reply-To:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
I have been involved with 5 laboratory fires during my career, 1 that I set
and 4 that I helped extinguish. All 5 fires involved natural gas and 4 of
them involved biosafety cabinets. Thankfully, no one was hurt in any of
these incidents and damage was only minimal.
This is the argument I use when I have to face down stubborn investigators.
BTW, my only exuse for the 1 I set was that it was in my first year of
employment and I think I've learned from it. At least I haven't started
another lab fire in the last 25 years.
Dan Shawler
Director of Quality Control and Assurance
NovaRx Corporation.
-----Original Message-----
From: A Biosafety Discussion List [mailto:BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU]On
Behalf Of Amy Quattrocchi
Sent: Wednesday, January 23, 2002 11:10 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: natural gas in biosafety cabinets
Hello all,
I'm rather new to this profession/list and my question has likely
been asked many times in the past....but here goes.
I have an investigator that is interested in installing a natural
gas line in his biosafety cabinet. I have tried to talk him out of it,
explaining that there is no need to flame his flasks because the
cabinet is a sterile environment, but he remains adamant. I called
the manufacturer of the cabinet and they told me that natural gas
should not be installed, but that people have been doing it for
years.
I was hoping that someone might provide advice about installing
a gas line into a cabinet. Is it really a bad idea? If not, would it be
difficult to accomplish? What are the safety issues that I should
be aware of?
I thank you for any help that might be offered.
Amy
Amy Quattrocchi
Health and Safety Specialist
Rutgers Environmental Health and Safety
24 Street 1603
Building 4127 Livingston Campus
Piscataway, NJ 08854
Phone: 732/445-2550
Fax: 732/445-3109
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 23 Jan 2002 15:08:50 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Michael Betlach
Subject: Re: natural gas in biosafety cabinets
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Other options than natural gas are available. Disposable sterile plastic
inoculating loops, needles,
spreaders and scrapers are readily available. Electric 'incinerators' for
sterilizing metal inoculating
loops offer a safer alternative than open flame. If the investigator can't
do without flame, then
'portable' bunsen burners (Fireboy for one) that operate on butane
cartridges offer an alternative to
connecting a standard burner to a natural gas source (which is all too easy
to do thanks to the
standard petcock connections shipped with many biosafety cabinets).
Michael Betlach, Ph.D.
Biosafety Officer
Promega Corporation
5445 E. Cheryl Parkway
Madison, WI 53711
(608) 274-1181, Ext. 1270
-----Original Message-----
From: Amy Quattrocchi [mailto:aquattrocchi@REHS.RUTGERS.EDU]
Sent: Wednesday, January 23, 2002 1:10 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: natural gas in biosafety cabinets
Hello all,
I'm rather new to this profession/list and my question has likely
been asked many times in the past....but here goes.
I have an investigator that is interested in installing a natural
gas line in his biosafety cabinet. I have tried to talk him out of it,
explaining that there is no need to flame his flasks because the
cabinet is a sterile environment, but he remains adamant. I called
the manufacturer of the cabinet and they told me that natural gas
should not be installed, but that people have been doing it for
years.
I was hoping that someone might provide advice about installing
a gas line into a cabinet. Is it really a bad idea? If not, would it be
difficult to accomplish? What are the safety issues that I should
be aware of?
I thank you for any help that might be offered.
Amy
Amy Quattrocchi
Health and Safety Specialist
Rutgers Environmental Health and Safety
24 Street 1603
Building 4127 Livingston Campus
Piscataway, NJ 08854
Phone: 732/445-2550
Fax: 732/445-3109
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 23 Jan 2002 15:21:52 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Elizabeth Smith
Subject: Re: CDC Select Agent Registration
In-Reply-To:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Howdy,
sorry for the delay in responding to Robin's question, but since
I seem to have a different situation ... possibly since I'm in
industry rather than academia, here's my offering:
SA transfers and compliance are coordinated out of EH&S here
(like most other places, it seems) - but -
My designated back-up ("Alternate Facility Official") is a
manager from regulatory affairs (which here means just
FDA-regulations).
I wanted another manager as the back-up, and someone who
wouldn't need to sign the EA-101 as the PI receiving the
materials and the RFO at the same time.
Elizabeth
=====
Elizabeth Smith
Environmental, Health & Safety Manager
BioPort Corporation
3500 N. Martin L. King Blvd.
Lansing, MI 48906
__________________________________________________
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=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 24 Jan 2002 08:49:18 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Kyle Boyett
Subject: fume hoods and fire alarms
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Since the last time I submitted a question in the morning I had a fairly
good response, I thought I would try again. What is the opinion of the
group, specifically those with HVAC experience, concerning fume hoods
continuing to operate during the activation of the fire alarm system? If
your institution supports position this please provide the code citation. In
addition, if you do not allow fume hoods to operate please provide code
citation for that as well. Thanks and a great day to all.
Kyle Boyett
Safety Short Distribution List Administrator
Asst. Director of Biosafety
Occupational Health and Safety
University of Alabama at Birmingham
e-mail- kboyett@healthsafe.uab.edu
Phone- 205-934-2487
VISIT OUR WEB SITE AT:
healthsafe.uab.edu
** Asking me to overlook a safety violation is like asking me to reduce the
value I place on YOUR life**
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 24 Jan 2002 07:44:47 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Funk,Glenn"
Subject: Re: natural gas in biosafety cabinets
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Amy -
Rick Scott did a fine job of covering all the basic reasons why we no
longer use open flames in biosafety cabinets, and Michael Betlach offered
some very good alternatives. I'm not sure why your customer is so adamant
about his use of a flame in the cabinet but I too am one of those dinosaur
virologists who starting learning the black arts back in the dreamtime days
of mouth pipetting and flaming everything in sight. I know how hard it is
to break old habits - I continued to flame my vessels into the era of
thin-walled plasticware. Somehow I managed to escape the generally
inevitable ethanol vapor "poof" (or, if you're especially unlucky, "BANG")
although I did nearly burn the gas delivery hose on a couple of occasions.
Yup, that scared the hell out of me but what finally broke my bad habits
was the simple logic of the reasons Rick pointed out. Using open flame,
even a tiny "pilot" flame on a Touch-Matic bunsen burner, with the
ever-popular ethanol or IPA disinfectant is just plain dumb, as is
undermining the proper operation of the cabinet by creating convective
currents. Threatening the integrity and function of the supply HEPA can be
both embarassing and fairly destructive to the lab's operating budget.
If he's simply an old-timer who's being difficult to wean off old bad
habits, feel free to have him call me. After we trade old scare stories
from our undergraduate days, I'll try to embarrass him into admitting the
folly of his ways. If he has a very specialized reason for wanting his
open flame, perhaps it's time to look at working environments other than
biological safety cabinets.
-- Glenn
Glenn A. Funk, Ph.D., CBSP
Director and Biosafety Officer
Environmental Health & Safety
Aviron
408-845-8857
=====================================
At 02:09 PM 1/23/02 -0500, you wrote:
>Hello all,
> I'm rather new to this profession/list and my question has likely
>been asked many times in the past....but here goes.
> I have an investigator that is interested in installing a natural
>gas line in his biosafety cabinet. I have tried to talk him out of it,
>explaining that there is no need to flame his flasks because the
>cabinet is a sterile environment, but he remains adamant. I called
>the manufacturer of the cabinet and they told me that natural gas
>should not be installed, but that people have been doing it for
>years.
> I was hoping that someone might provide advice about installing
>a gas line into a cabinet. Is it really a bad idea? If not, would it be
>difficult to accomplish? What are the safety issues that I should
>be aware of?
> I thank you for any help that might be offered.
>
>Amy
>
>
>Amy Quattrocchi
>Health and Safety Specialist
>Rutgers Environmental Health and Safety
>24 Street 1603
>Building 4127 Livingston Campus
>Piscataway, NJ 08854
>Phone: 732/445-2550
>Fax: 732/445-3109
>
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Date: Thu, 24 Jan 2002 10:25:36 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Hofherr, Leslie"
Subject: Laundry Bags that Dissolve in Hot Water
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
I am looking for a source/manufacture/distributor of laundry bags that
dissolve in hot water.
I have a research lab that needs to use cloth gowns and towels during a
surgery and these materials may become contamined with an infectious agent.
We do not want the laundry workers to sort the gowns and towels from this
area before they put them into the wash. One idea is to use laundry bags
that would contain fluid soaked linens and dissolve in the washer.
Any information would be greatly appreciated.
Thanks,
Leslie Hofherr
UCLA, EH&S
(310) 206-3929 phone
(310) 825-7076 fax
leslie@admin.ucla.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 24 Jan 2002 22:05:29 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Thomas J. Shelley"
Subject: Re: fume hoods and fire alarms
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
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>Since the last time I submitted a question in the morning I had a fairly
>good response, I thought I would try again. What is the opinion of the
>group, specifically those with HVAC experience, concerning fume hoods
>continuing to operate during the activation of the fire alarm system? If
>your institution supports position this please provide the code citation. In
>addition, if you do not allow fume hoods to operate please provide code
>citation for that as well. Thanks and a great day to all.
Dear Kyle and Colleagues--It appears that no one has addressed this
question so I am taking a break from the brutality of Duke pounding
BC to bits to respond. Our criteria, which is somewhere in New York
State Code, although I can't directly quote chapter and verse, is
that the fume hoods stay on but the supply air is cut off. This
removes smoke and steam and, in effect, starves the fire. In my
experience with one rather nasty fire, the one fume hood in the
burned room remaining on saved the building from severe smoke damage;
probably tens or even hundreds of thousands of dollars in damages.
If you want the code citation, please drop me a note and i can dig it
up for you. Tom
>Kyle Boyett
>Safety Short Distribution List Administrator
>Asst. Director of Biosafety
>Occupational Health and Safety
>University of Alabama at Birmingham
>e-mail- kboyett@healthsafe.uab.edu
>Phone- 205-934-2487
>VISIT OUR WEB SITE AT:
>healthsafe.uab.edu
>
>** Asking me to overlook a safety violation is like asking me to reduce the
>value I place on YOUR life**
--
*********************************************************
Tom Shelley, Chemical Hygiene Officer, Cornell University
Department of Environmental Health and Safety, 125 Humphreys Service Building,
Ithaca, NY 14853. (607) 255-4288 tjs1@cornell.edu
****************************DISCLAIMER********************
The comments and views expressed in this communication are strictly my own and
are not to be construed to officially represent those of my peers,
supervisors or
Cornell University.
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 25 Jan 2002 16:10:23 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Robin Newberry
Subject: disinfectant for poliovius (vaccine strain)
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed"
A professor is planning to use poliovirus (vaccine Strain) in a class
(grad level), and is asking what disinfectants are suitable for
benchtop clean up and spills. I've crawled the web without finding
anything specific. A little help, someone?
--
Robin
--------------------------------------------------------------
W. Robert Newberry, IV CIH, CHMM
Chief Environmental Health and Safety Officer
Clemson University
wnewber@clemson.edu ehs@clemson.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 25 Jan 2002 16:36:09 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Kim Auletta
Subject: Re: disinfectant for poliovius (vaccine strain)
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Our polio lab is using bleach & also Virkon
their web is:
Kim Auletta
Lab Safety Specialist
Environmental Health and Safety
SUNY Stony Brook
110 Suffolk Hall
Stony Brook, NY 11794-6200
PHONE: 631-632-9672
FAX: 631-632-9683
E-MAIL: kauletta@.sunysb.edu
Robin Newberry
cc:
Sent by: A Subject: disinfectant for poliovius
Biosafety (vaccine strain)
Discussion List
01/25/2002
04:10 PM
Please respond
to A Biosafety
Discussion List
A professor is planning to use poliovirus (vaccine Strain) in a class
(grad level), and is asking what disinfectants are suitable for
benchtop clean up and spills. I've crawled the web without finding
anything specific. A little help, someone?
--
Robin
--------------------------------------------------------------
W. Robert Newberry, IV CIH, CHMM
Chief Environmental Health and Safety Officer
Clemson University
wnewber@clemson.edu ehs@clemson.edu
=========================================================================
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2002 13:00:40 -0500
Reply-To: pr18@columbia.edu
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: paul rubock
Organization: EH&S
Subject: Salary Survey
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~ 5 years ago, there was a poster session at the annual ABSA mtg.
describing the salary ranges of Biosafety professionals. Does anyone
still have this data in a format that can shared with me? I'd really
appreciate it..
Thank you,
Paul Rubock
Biological Safety Officer
Columbia University
fax: 212-795-5847
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--------------3A834381DD047880F9F90DAF--
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2002 13:38:07 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Daniel King
Subject: Database Software for Infectious Agent Inventory
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The inventory of infectious agents in a format that allows exchange of files
in a central record system is of growing interest, if not a requirement, in
many organizations. Is there any software that has been developed
specifically for this purpose, like the widely used bibliographic databases,
or has every organization designed their own unique template utilizing
commercially available database software? My own filing system is now highly
personalized and not readily amenable to the universality that is needed for
exchange with a central record keeping facility. Any comments or suggestions
from your experiences in this regard could be shared with the list or
directed to me personally. Thank you.
Daniel J. (Jack) King D.V.M., Ph.D.
USDA, ARS, Southeast Poultry Research Laboratory
934 College Station Road
Athens, GA 30605
Phone: 706-546-3407
FAX: 706-546-3161
Email: jking@seprl.
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The inventory of infectious agents in a format that allows exchange of files in a central record system is of growing interest, if not a requirement, in many organizations. Is there any software that has been developed specifically for this purpose, like the widely used bibliographic databases, or has every organization designed their own unique template utilizing commercially available database software? My own filing system is now highly personalized and not readily amenable to the universality that is needed for exchange with a central record keeping facility. Any comments or suggestions from your experiences in this regard could be shared with the list or directed to me personally. Thank you.
Daniel J. (Jack) King D.V.M., Ph.D.
USDA, ARS, Southeast Poultry Research Laboratory
934 College Station Road
Athens, GA 30605
Phone: 706-546-3407
FAX: 706-546-3161
Email: jking@seprl.
------_=_NextPart_001_01C1A82A.EE38D120--
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2002 15:06:32 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Barbara Owen
Organization: Bristol-Myers Squibb
Subject: Re: Database Software for Infectious Agent Inventory
MIME-version: 1.0
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I would be interested in learning about this as well. Thanks.
Daniel King wrote:
> The inventory of infectious agents in a format that allows
> exchange of files in a central record system is of growing
> interest, if not a requirement, in many organizations. Is there
> any software that has been developed specifically for this
> purpose, like the widely used bibliographic databases, or has
> every organization designed their own unique template utilizing
> commercially available database software? My own filing system
> is now highly personalized and not readily amenable to the
> universality that is needed for exchange with a central record
> keeping facility. Any comments or suggestions from your
> experiences in this regard could be shared with the list or
> directed to me personally. Thank you.
>
> Daniel J. (Jack) King D.V.M., Ph.D.
> USDA, ARS, Southeast Poultry Research Laboratory
> 934 College Station Road
> Athens, GA 30605
> Phone: 706-546-3407
> FAX: 706-546-3161
> Email: jking@seprl.
>
>
>
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I would be interested in learning about this as well. Thanks.
Daniel King wrote:
The inventory of infectious agents in a format that allows exchange of files in a central record system is of growing interest, if not a requirement, in many organizations. Is there any software that has been developed specifically for this purpose, like the widely used bibliographic databases, or has every organization designed their own unique template utilizing commercially available database software? My own filing system is now highly personalized and not readily amenable to the universality that is needed for exchange with a central record keeping facility. Any comments or suggestions from your experiences in this regard could be shared with the list or directed to me personally. Thank you.
Daniel J. (Jack) King D.V.M., Ph.D.
USDA, ARS, Southeast Poultry Research Laboratory
934 College Station Road
Athens, GA 30605
Phone: 706-546-3407
FAX: 706-546-3161
Email: jking@seprl.
--------------22839F4661295A5E8ED9D8AA--
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2002 16:51:51 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Bernholc, Nicole M"
Subject: Non skid booties that cover the ankle
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Good afternoon Anyone have a good source that they are satisfied with?
I did a quick search and found the following suppliers but I have no
experience with any of them.
No price
No picture
POLY COVERALL EWA LG 25/CS [#30125-XL] POLY COVERALL EWA XLG 25/CS
[#30125-XXL] POLY COVERALL EWA XXLG 25/CS [#SCPL150] POLY LATEX SHOE COVER
IMPERVIOUS NON-SKID 150PR/CS ONE SIZE FITS ALL [#28033M] BLUE ANTI-SKID
POLY. SHOE COVER, SIZE LG-XL, 150 PAIR/CS [#2803M] BLUE ANTI-SKID POLY.
SHOE COVER, SIZE: REGULAR, 150 PAIR/CS.
This are below the ankle
but the requestor would like a picture. No pictures at this site..
This site has something, but it doesn't cover the ankle.
Anyone have experience with ordering these items and have a good source?
Thanks in advance.
Nicole Bernholc, CIH
Brookhaven National Laboratory
Safety and Health Services Division
Bld 120
Upton NY 11973
631-344-2027
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 29 Jan 2002 00:24:52 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Esmeralda Prat
Subject: Re: Database Software for Infectious Agent Inventory
MIME-Version: 1.0
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boundary="------------BA4D0B9EE5747E75B581CE39"
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OnSite Systems has developed a biological safety program that includes
inventory. This systems is being used by a number of places. The
contact person is Mike DaPrato (314) 963-9934. I believe his email
address is HPASSIST@
Esmeralda
Barbara Owen wrote:
> I would be interested in learning about this as well. Thanks.
>
> Daniel King wrote:
>
>> The inventory of infectious agents in a format that allows exchange
>> of files in a central record system is of growing interest, if not a
>> requirement, in many organizations. Is there any software that has
>> been developed specifically for this purpose, like the widely used
>> bibliographic databases, or has every organization designed their
>> own unique template utilizing commercially available database
>> software? My own filing system is now highly personalized and not
>> readily amenable to the universality that is needed for exchange
>> with a central record keeping facility. Any comments or suggestions
>> from your experiences in this regard could be shared with the list
>> or directed to me personally. Thank you.
>>
>> Daniel J. (Jack) King D.V.M., Ph.D.
>> USDA, ARS, Southeast Poultry Research Laboratory
>> 934 College Station Road
>> Athens, GA 30605
>> Phone: 706-546-3407
>> FAX: 706-546-3161
>> Email: jking@seprl.
>>
>>
>>
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OnSite Systems has developed a biological safety program that includes inventory. This systems is being used by a number of places. The contact person is Mike DaPrato (314) 963-9934. I believe his email address is HPASSIST@
Esmeralda
Barbara Owen wrote:
I would be interested in learning about this as well. Thanks.
Daniel King wrote:
The inventory of infectious agents in a format that allows exchange of files in a central record system is of growing interest, if not a requirement, in many organizations. Is there any software that has been developed specifically for this purpose, like the widely used bibliographic databases, or has every organization designed their own unique template utilizing commercially available database software? My own filing system is now highly personalized and not readily amenable to the universality that is needed for exchange with a central record keeping facility. Any comments or suggestions from your experiences in this regard could be shared with the list or directed to me personally. Thank you.
Daniel J. (Jack) King D.V.M., Ph.D.
USDA, ARS, Southeast Poultry Research Laboratory
934 College Station Road
Athens, GA 30605
Phone: 706-546-3407
FAX: 706-546-3161
Email: jking@seprl.
--------------BA4D0B9EE5747E75B581CE39--
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 29 Jan 2002 04:06:00 EST
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Christian Nordqvist
Subject: Specialised Terms
MIME-Version: 1.0
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boundary="part1_92.208e465e.2987bff8_boundary"
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Content-Language: en
Dear Members
I have compiled the world=E2=80=99s largest database of medical, pharma, bio=
tech,=20
dentistry, agrochem and healthcare abbreviations (50,000).
pharma-
You can also download the search box and have it in your own computer (this=20
is free). We also have a Palm Pilot (and pocket PC).
Best regards
Christian
--part1_92.208e465e.2987bff8_boundary
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
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Content-Language: en
Dear Members
I have compiled the world=E2=80=99s largest database of medical, pharma,= biotech, dentistry, agrochem and healthcare abbreviations (50,000).
pharma-
You can also download the search box and have it in your own computer (t= his is free). We also have a Palm Pilot (and pocket PC).
Best regards
Christian
--part1_92.208e465e.2987bff8_boundary--
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 29 Jan 2002 09:16:27 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Andersen, Al"
Subject: Plants in Laboratories
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
A question has come up by our researchers as to whether or not they can have
plants in their laboratories. These are BL2 labs in an open laboratory
research building. Please advise if any of you have come up with this in
your laboratories.
Thank you,
Al Andersen, RBP
Chemical and Biosafety Officer
Department of Environmental Health & Safety
508-856-6723 (phone)
508-856-5410 (fax)
al.andersen@umassmed.edu (e-mail)
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 29 Jan 2002 09:54:53 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Richard Fink
Subject: Re: Plants in Laboratories
In-Reply-To:
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There are no restrictions in the BMBL regarding plants in BL2
labs. Generally I have no problem with that, so long as they are not
working with plant pathogens.
Richie
At 09:16 AM 01/29/02 -0500, you wrote:
>A question has come up by our researchers as to whether or not they can have
>plants in their laboratories. These are BL2 labs in an open laboratory
>research building. Please advise if any of you have come up with this in
>your laboratories.
>
>Thank you,
>
>Al Andersen, RBP
>Chemical and Biosafety Officer
>Department of Environmental Health & Safety
>508-856-6723 (phone)
>508-856-5410 (fax)
>al.andersen@umassmed.edu (e-mail)
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
--=====================_92624777==_.ALT
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There are no restrictions in the BMBL regarding plants in BL2 labs. Generally I have no problem with that, so long as they are not working with plant pathogens.
Richie
At 09:16 AM 01/29/02 -0500, you wrote:
A question has come up by our researchers as to whether or not they can have
plants in their laboratories. These are BL2 labs in an open laboratory
research building. Please advise if any of you have come up with this in
your laboratories.
Thank you,
Al Andersen, RBP
Chemical and Biosafety Officer
Department of Environmental Health & Safety
508-856-6723 (phone)
508-856-5410 (fax)
al.andersen@umassmed.edu (e-mail)
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
--=====================_92624777==_.ALT--
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 29 Jan 2002 09:53:23 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Francis Cole
Subject: Re: Plants in Laboratories
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Bacteria are plants.
Frank
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 29 Jan 2002 10:57:20 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Gilpin, Richard"
Subject: Re: Plants in Laboratories
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
sorry...they and the fungi plants will have to go
-----Original Message-----
From: Francis Cole [mailto:Fcole@]
Sent: Tuesday, January 29, 2002 10:53 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Plants in Laboratories
Bacteria are plants.
Frank
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 29 Jan 2002 10:00:15 -0600
Reply-To: louann.burnett@vanderbilt.edu
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: LouAnn Burnett
Subject: Re: Database Software for Infectious Agent Inventory
In-Reply-To:
MIME-Version: 1.0
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I've been developing a web-to-database inventory called BioWISE for research
with "potentially infectious and/or regulated biological materials) here at
Vanderbilt (includes Select Agent toxins). I presented the basic
information at ABSA in October and have had several queries from
corporations and other universities. We are meeting with our Technology
Transfer folks next week to look at options for commercialization - I expect
that we could have a commercialized version within the year. If you are
interested in updates on this system, please send me your name, phone,
affiliation, and email. PLEASE RESPOND TO ME DIRECTLY AT
louann.burnett@vanderbilt.edu.
LouAnn
LouAnn C. Burnett, MS, CBSP
Biosafety Program Manager & Biological Safety Officer
Vanderbilt University Environmental Health & Safety
Nashville, Tennessee
615/322-0927 (direct & voice mail)
615/343-4951 (fax)
-----Original Message-----
From: A Biosafety Discussion List [mailto:BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU]On
Behalf Of Esmeralda Prat
Sent: Monday, January 28, 2002 11:25 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Database Software for Infectious Agent Inventory
OnSite Systems has developed a biological safety program that includes
inventory. This systems is being used by a number of places. The contact
person is Mike DaPrato (314) 963-9934. I believe his email address is
HPASSIST@
Esmeralda
Barbara Owen wrote:
I would be interested in learning about this as well. Thanks.
Daniel King wrote:
The inventory of infectious agents in a format that allows exchange of
files in a central record system is of growing interest, if not a
requirement, in many organizations. Is there any software that has been
developed specifically for this purpose, like the widely used bibliographic
databases, or has every organization designed their own unique template
utilizing commercially available database software? My own filing system is
now highly personalized and not readily amenable to the universality that is
needed for exchange with a central record keeping facility. Any comments or
suggestions from your experiences in this regard could be shared with the
list or directed to me personally. Thank you.
Daniel J. (Jack) King D.V.M., Ph.D.
USDA, ARS, Southeast Poultry Research Laboratory
934 College Station Road
Athens, GA 30605
Phone: 706-546-3407
FAX: 706-546-3161
Email: jking@seprl.
------=_NextPart_000_000F_01C1A8AB.C03D4780
Content-Type: text/html;
charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
I've=20 been developing a web-to-database inventory called BioWISE for research = with=20 "potentially infectious and/or regulated biological materials) here at=20 Vanderbilt (includes Select Agent toxins). I presented the basic=20 information at ABSA in October and have had several queries from = corporations=20 and other universities. We are meeting with our Technology = Transfer folks=20 next week to look at options for commercialization - I expect that we = could have=20 a commercialized version within the year. If you are interested in = updates=20 on this system, please send me your name, phone, affiliation, and = email. =20 PLEASE RESPOND TO ME DIRECTLY AT louann.burnett@vanderbilt.e= du.
LouAnn
LouAnn C. Burnett, MS, CBSP =20 =20
Biosafety Program Manager = &=20 Biological Safety Officer
Vanderbilt University = Environmental=20 Health & Safety
Nashville, Tennessee
615/322-0927 (direct = & voice=20 mail)
615/343-4951 (fax) =20 =20 =20
-----Original Message-----
From: A Biosafety = Discussion List=20 [mailto:BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU]On Behalf Of Esmeralda=20 Prat
Sent: Monday, January 28, 2002 11:25 PM
To:=20 BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Database Software for=20 Infectious Agent Inventory
OnSite Systems has = developed a=20 biological safety program that includes inventory. This systems = is being=20 used by a number of places. The contact person is Mike DaPrato = (314)=20 963-9934. I believe his email address is HPASSIST@=20
Esmeralda=20
Barbara Owen wrote:=20
I would be interested in learning about this = as=20 well. Thanks.=20
Daniel King wrote:=20
The inventory of infectious agents in a format that = allows=20 exchange of files in a central record system is of growing = interest, if=20 not a requirement, in many organizations. Is there any software = that has=20 been developed specifically for this purpose, like the widely used = bibliographic databases, or has every organization designed their = own=20 unique template utilizing commercially available database = software? My own=20 filing system is now highly personalized and not readily amenable = to the=20 universality that is needed for exchange with a central record = keeping=20 facility. Any comments or suggestions from your experiences in = this regard=20 could be shared with the list or directed to me personally. Thank=20 you.
Daniel J. (Jack) King D.V.M.,=20 Ph.D.
USDA, ARS, Southeast Poultry Research=20 Laboratory
934 College Station Road
Athens, GA 30605
Phone: 706-546-3407
FAX: 706-546-3161
Email: jking@seprl. =
=20 =
=
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=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 29 Jan 2002 16:32:02 +0100
Reply-To: Dick.Verduin@viro.DPW.WAU.NL
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Dick Verduin
Subject: Re: Plants in Laboratories
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Al,
It does not seem logic to me; keep them out.
However Richard Fink stated: There are no restrictions in the BMBL regarding
plants in BL2
labs.
I agree as long as you have an insect and rodent control program in effect
(see appendix G) (point 9 of standard microbiological practices).
You might end up with an Integrated Pest Management program in you BL2
laboratory to prevent unwanted microbiological contamination.
with regards
Dick Verduin
---------------------------------------
Dr Benedictus J.M. Verduin
Biosafety Officer
Wageningen University (WU)
Department of Plant Sciences
Laboratory of Virology
Binnenhaven 11
6709 PD Wageningen
The Netherlands
Telephone +31.317.483093
Facsimile +31.317.484820
E-mail Dick.Verduin@VIRO.DPW.WAU.NL
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Original Message - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
A question has come up by our researchers as to whether or not they can have
plants in their laboratories. These are BL2 labs in an open laboratory
research building. Please advise if any of you have come up with this in
your laboratories.
Thank you,
Al Andersen, RBP
Chemical and Biosafety Officer
Department of Environmental Health & Safety
508-856-6723 (phone)
508-856-5410 (fax)
al.andersen@umassmed.edu (e-mail)
- - - - - - - - - - - - End of Original Message - - - - - - - - - - - -
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Date: Tue, 29 Jan 2002 12:12:56 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Pitts, Jonathan"
Subject: BBP lifespan
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
A general question for the group.
I would like to get a general consensus on the following topic.....
What is the lifespan of a BBP outside of a host. For example, dried blood,
body fluids on a surface, etc.
Additionally, does anyone know of any literature surrounding this topic that
I have missed?
Thank you all for your comments and I look forward to your responses.
Jonathan
Jonathan Pitts Ph.D.
MediSpectra Inc.
45 Hartwell Ave.
Lexington, MA 02421
Tel: (781) 372-2300 x354
Direct Tel. Line: (781) 372-2354
Fax: (781) 674-0002
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 29 Jan 2002 11:13:53 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Francis Cole
Subject: Re: Plants in Laboratories
Mime-Version: 1.0
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and algae.
F
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 29 Jan 2002 12:19:38 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Richard Fink
Subject: Re: BBP lifespan
In-Reply-To:
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Depends upon the pathogen. HIV, outside of a cell, can survive for up to 2
weeks (though the titer declines rapidly). HBV is fairly hearty, so you are
looking at at least a month. HCV I have not heard of a survival
study. Then there are parasites that usually do quite well outside of the
host.
Richie
At 12:12 PM 01/29/02 -0500, you wrote:
>A general question for the group.
>
>I would like to get a general consensus on the following topic.....
>
>What is the lifespan of a BBP outside of a host. For example, dried blood,
>body fluids on a surface, etc.
>
>Additionally, does anyone know of any literature surrounding this topic that
>I have missed?
>
>Thank you all for your comments and I look forward to your responses.
>
>Jonathan
>
>
>
>Jonathan Pitts Ph.D.
>MediSpectra Inc.
>45 Hartwell Ave.
>Lexington, MA 02421
>Tel: (781) 372-2300 x354
>Direct Tel. Line: (781) 372-2354
>Fax: (781) 674-0002
>
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
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Depends upon the pathogen. HIV, outside of a cell, can survive for up to 2 weeks (though the titer declines rapidly). HBV is fairly hearty, so you are looking at at least a month. HCV I have not heard of a survival study. Then there are parasites that usually do quite well outside of the host.
Richie
At 12:12 PM 01/29/02 -0500, you wrote:
A general question for the group.
I would like to get a general consensus on the following topic.....
What is the lifespan of a BBP outside of a host. For example, dried blood,
body fluids on a surface, etc.
Additionally, does anyone know of any literature surrounding this topic that
I have missed?
Thank you all for your comments and I look forward to your responses.
Jonathan
Jonathan Pitts Ph.D.
MediSpectra Inc.
45 Hartwell Ave.
Lexington, MA 02421
Tel: (781) 372-2300 x354
Direct Tel. Line: (781) 372-2354
Fax: (781) 674-0002
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
--=====================_101309445==_.ALT--
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 29 Jan 2002 09:29:23 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Daniel Shawler
Subject: Re: BBP lifespan
In-Reply-To:
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Richie:
Do you have references for your survival figures? The numbers I had were 7
days for HBV and hours for HIV, but I can't produce any references to
support them.
Thanks for the help.
Dan Shawler
NovaRx
San Diego, CA
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Richie:
Do you=20 have references for your survival figures? The numbers I had were = 7 days=20 for HBV and hours for HIV, but I can't produce any references to support = them.
Thanks=20 for the help.
Dan=20 Shawler
NovaRx
San=20 Diego, CA
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=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 29 Jan 2002 12:39:34 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Richard Fink
Subject: Re: BBP lifespan
In-Reply-To:
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I do, but am about to leave till Mon, will look for it then.
richie
At 09:29 AM 01/29/02 -0800, you wrote:
>Richie:
>
>Do you have references for your survival figures? The numbers I had were
>7 days for HBV and hours for HIV, but I can't produce any references to
>support them.
>
>Thanks for the help.
>
>Dan Shawler
>NovaRx
>San Diego, CA
>
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
--=====================_102505855==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
I do, but am about to leave till Mon, will look for it then.
richie
At 09:29 AM 01/29/02 -0800, you wrote:
Richie:
Do you have references for your survival figures? The numbers I had were 7 days for HBV and hours for HIV, but I can't produce any references to support them.
Thanks for the help.
Dan Shawler
NovaRx
San Diego, CA
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
--=====================_102505855==_.ALT--
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 29 Jan 2002 12:49:49 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Pitts, Jonathan"
Subject: Re: BBP lifespan
MIME-Version: 1.0
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Thanks Richie,
I would be very interested in see it.
Jon
Jonathan Pitts Ph.D.
MediSpectra Inc.
45 Hartwell Ave.
Lexington, MA 02421
Tel: (781) 372-2300 x354
Direct Tel. Line: (781) 372-2354
Fax: (781) 674-0002
-----Original Message-----
From: Richard Fink [mailto:rfink@MIT.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, January 29, 2002 12:40 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: BBP lifespan
I do, but am about to leave till Mon, will look for it then.
richie
At 09:29 AM 01/29/02 -0800, you wrote:
Richie:
Do you have references for your survival figures? The numbers I had were 7
days for HBV and hours for HIV, but I can't produce any references to
support them.
Thanks for the help.
Dan Shawler
NovaRx
San Diego, CA
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
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Thanks Richie,
I would be very interested in see it.
Jon
Jonathan Pitts Ph.D.
MediSpectra Inc.
45 Hartwell Ave.
Lexington, MA 02421
Tel: (781) 372-2300 x354
Direct Tel. Line: (781) 372-2354
Fax: (781) 674-0002
-----Original Message-----
From: Richard Fink [mailto:rfink@MIT.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, January 29, 2002 12:40 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: BBP lifespan
I do, but am about to leave till Mon, will look for it then.
richie
At 09:29 AM 01/29/02 -0800, you wrote:
Richie:
Do you have references for your survival figures? The numbers I had were 7 days for HBV and hours for HIV, but I can't produce any references to support them.
Thanks for the help.
Dan Shawler
NovaRx
San Diego, CA
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
------_=_NextPart_001_01C1A8ED.59079830--
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 29 Jan 2002 13:07:19 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Gilpin, Richard"
Subject: Re: Plants in Laboratories
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
without a doubt
-----Original Message-----
From: Francis Cole [mailto:Fcole@]
Sent: Tuesday, January 29, 2002 12:14 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Plants in Laboratories
and algae.
F
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 29 Jan 2002 13:44:13 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Robert N. Latsch"
Subject: Re: BBP lifespan
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
This is not a simple question. It would depend on the organism involved.
bob
>A general question for the group.
>
>I would like to get a general consensus on the following topic.....
>
>What is the lifespan of a BBP outside of a host. For example, dried blood,
>body fluids on a surface, etc.
>
>Additionally, does anyone know of any literature surrounding this topic that
>I have missed?
>
>Thank you all for your comments and I look forward to your responses.
>
>Jonathan
>
>
>
>Jonathan Pitts Ph.D.
>MediSpectra Inc.
>45 Hartwell Ave.
>Lexington, MA 02421
>Tel: (781) 372-2300 x354
>Direct Tel. Line: (781) 372-2354
>Fax: (781) 674-0002
>
_____________________________________________________________________
__ / _____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 29 Jan 2002 14:00:02 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Pitts, Jonathan"
Subject: Re: BBP lifespan
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
OK,
I to get started I will be more specific.
What is the lifespan, out of a host organism for HIV, HBV, HPV and SIV?
I hope that can help.
Best
Jonathan
Jonathan Pitts Ph.D.
MediSpectra Inc.
45 Hartwell Ave.
Lexington, MA 02421
Tel: (781) 372-2300 x354
Direct Tel. Line: (781) 372-2354
Fax: (781) 674-0002
-----Original Message-----
From: Robert N. Latsch [mailto:rnl2@PO.CWRU.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, January 29, 2002 1:44 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: BBP lifespan
This is not a simple question. It would depend on the organism involved.
bob
>A general question for the group.
>
>I would like to get a general consensus on the following topic.....
>
>What is the lifespan of a BBP outside of a host. For example, dried blood,
>body fluids on a surface, etc.
>
>Additionally, does anyone know of any literature surrounding this topic
that
>I have missed?
>
>Thank you all for your comments and I look forward to your responses.
>
>Jonathan
>
>
>
>Jonathan Pitts Ph.D.
>MediSpectra Inc.
>45 Hartwell Ave.
>Lexington, MA 02421
>Tel: (781) 372-2300 x354
>Direct Tel. Line: (781) 372-2354
>Fax: (781) 674-0002
>
_____________________________________________________________________
__ /
_____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 29 Jan 2002 13:09:44 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: RG
Subject: Re: BBP lifespan
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
As mentioned in the previous message it depends on the organism and a
variety of other factors including environmental conditions, amount of virus
in the sample, etc.
Note the following references:
HIV survival: 1-2 weeks
(see pg 2)
also see: Sattar, S.A., and V.S. Springthorpe. 1991. Rev. Infect. Dis.
13:430-447.
Also see pg 165..of the third edition of BiologicalSafety Principles and
Practices published by ASM press..
regarding HBV......
"Hepatitis B virus may be present in blood and blood products of human
origin, in urine, semen, cerebrospinal fluid, and saliva. Parenteral
inoculation, droplet exposure of mucous membranes, and contact exposure of
broken skin are the primary laboratory hazards. The virus may be stable in
dried blood or blood components for several days."
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Robert N. Latsch [mailto:rnl2@PO.CWRU.EDU]
> Sent: Tuesday, January 29, 2002 1:44 PM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: Re: BBP lifespan
>
>
> This is not a simple question. It would depend on the organism involved.
>
> bob
>
> >A general question for the group.
> >
> >I would like to get a general consensus on the following topic.....
> >
> >What is the lifespan of a BBP outside of a host. For example, dried
blood,
> >body fluids on a surface, etc.
> >
> >Additionally, does anyone know of any literature surrounding this topic
> that
> >I have missed?
> >
> >Thank you all for your comments and I look forward to your responses.
> >
> >Jonathan
> >
> >
> >
> >Jonathan Pitts Ph.D.
> >MediSpectra Inc.
> >45 Hartwell Ave.
> >Lexington, MA 02421
> >Tel: (781) 372-2300 x354
> >Direct Tel. Line: (781) 372-2354
> >Fax: (781) 674-0002
> >
>
>
>
> _____________________________________________________________________
> __ /
> _____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
> _ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
> \ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
> \ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental
Safety
> \__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
>
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 29 Jan 2002 13:07:37 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: ""
Subject: Re: BBP lifespan
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
The Canadian Public Health Service biological MSDSs generally have some
information on survival of the organism outside of the hosts.
See also Debra
Hunt's article on Bloodborne Pathogens in the ASM book, Biological Safety,
Principles and Practices (3rd Edition). She includes a table on environmental
survival of HIV.
There are also a number of articles on HIV from about 10-15 years ago. The
Favero /Bond article on Hepatitis B from 20 years ago. So you can do a
literature search if you are looking for a specific condition.
Mary Cipriano
Abbott Labs
"Pitts,
Jonathan" To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: BBP lifespan
Sent by: A
Biosafety
Discussion List
01/29/02 01:00
PM
Please respond
to A Biosafety
Discussion List
OK,
I to get started I will be more specific.
What is the lifespan, out of a host organism for HIV, HBV, HPV and SIV?
I hope that can help.
Best
Jonathan
Jonathan Pitts Ph.D.
MediSpectra Inc.
45 Hartwell Ave.
Lexington, MA 02421
Tel: (781) 372-2300 x354
Direct Tel. Line: (781) 372-2354
Fax: (781) 674-0002
-----Original Message-----
From: Robert N. Latsch [mailto:rnl2@PO.CWRU.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, January 29, 2002 1:44 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: BBP lifespan
This is not a simple question. It would depend on the organism involved.
bob
>A general question for the group.
>
>I would like to get a general consensus on the following topic.....
>
>What is the lifespan of a BBP outside of a host. For example, dried blood,
>body fluids on a surface, etc.
>
>Additionally, does anyone know of any literature surrounding this topic
that
>I have missed?
>
>Thank you all for your comments and I look forward to your responses.
>
>Jonathan
>
>
>
>Jonathan Pitts Ph.D.
>MediSpectra Inc.
>45 Hartwell Ave.
>Lexington, MA 02421
>Tel: (781) 372-2300 x354
>Direct Tel. Line: (781) 372-2354
>Fax: (781) 674-0002
>
_____________________________________________________________________
__ /
_____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 29 Jan 2002 14:34:38 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Kim Auletta
Subject: Fume Hoods & Fire Alarms
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
I asked our Mgr for Fire Safety about last weeks questions on fume hoods
being shut down during a fire alarm. This was his response:
"Ref our conversation on fire alarm systems shutting down chemical hood
exhaust systems. NFPA 90A covers HVAC and requires area
heating/ventilation/air conditioning to be shut down under certain
conditions (over 2000 cfm for example). NFPA 96 covers commercial cooking
hoods only. To find any requirements for lab hoods, NFPA 45 is about it.
In it, it says that the lab units shall be continuously ventilated when
chemicals are present. The inference here is that you don't want anything
automatically shutting it down to include a fire alarm system. The only
reason you want fire alarm systems shutting down HVAC systems is to
isolate, or prevent the segregation of smoke to non-affected areas of the
building. Labs are supposed to be exhausted above the roof level, so this
wouldn't be a problem, therefore not a candidate for shutting down on a
fire alarm."
Some of our buildings leave the fume hoods on, and some shut down during an
alarm. One of our building must shut down, or the building becomes so
negative, (no supply/makeup air), that it is nearly impossible to open the
outside doors.
Kim Auletta
Lab Safety Specialist
Environmental Health and Safety
SUNY Stony Brook
110 Suffolk Hall
Stony Brook, NY 11794-6200
PHONE: 631-632-9672
FAX: 631-632-9683
E-MAIL: kauletta@.sunysb.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 29 Jan 2002 15:35:24 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Norman Umberger
Subject: Re: BBP lifespan
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
This is a very interesting thread.
I asked a similar question to the state BBP folks--is it worth saving
the potential infecting item (needle, blood, etc.) to test for viable or
non-viable indications of a BBP. They said, "no." It was not clear if
this was a cost/benefit analysis or strictly a scientific assessment
Norm
Norman Umberger
NUMBerger@smcm.edu
=20
=20
=20
-----Original Message-----
From: RG [mailto:rgoeri@CREIGHTON.EDU]=20
Sent: Tuesday, January 29, 2002 2:10 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: BBP lifespan
As mentioned in the previous message it depends on the organism and a
variety of other factors including environmental conditions, amount of
virus
in the sample, etc.
Note the following references:
HIV survival: 1-2 weeks
(see pg 2)
also see: Sattar, S.A., and V.S. Springthorpe. 1991. Rev. Infect.
Dis.
13:430-447.
Also see pg 165..of the third edition of BiologicalSafety Principles and
Practices published by ASM press..
regarding HBV......
"Hepatitis B virus may be present in blood and blood products of human
origin, in urine, semen, cerebrospinal fluid, and saliva. Parenteral
inoculation, droplet exposure of mucous membranes, and contact exposure
of
broken skin are the primary laboratory hazards. The virus may be stable
in
dried blood or blood components for several days."
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Robert N. Latsch [mailto:rnl2@PO.CWRU.EDU]
> Sent: Tuesday, January 29, 2002 1:44 PM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: Re: BBP lifespan
>
>
> This is not a simple question. It would depend on the organism
involved.
>
> bob
>
> >A general question for the group.
> >
> >I would like to get a general consensus on the following topic.....
> >
> >What is the lifespan of a BBP outside of a host. For example, dried
blood,
> >body fluids on a surface, etc.
> >
> >Additionally, does anyone know of any literature surrounding this
topic
> that
> >I have missed?
> >
> >Thank you all for your comments and I look forward to your responses.
> >
> >Jonathan
> >
> >
> >
> >Jonathan Pitts Ph.D.
> >MediSpectra Inc.
> >45 Hartwell Ave.
> >Lexington, MA 02421
> >Tel: (781) 372-2300 x354
> >Direct Tel. Line: (781) 372-2354
> >Fax: (781) 674-0002
> >
>
>
>
> _____________________________________________________________________
> __ /
> _____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
> _ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
> \ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
> \ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental
Safety
> \__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail
rlatsch@
>
=========================================================================
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 30 Jan 2002 09:17:58 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Kirk Martin
Subject: Re: BIOSAFTY Digest - 28 Jan 2002 to 29 Jan 2002 (#2002-23)
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
>
>Date: Tue, 29 Jan 2002 09:16:27 -0500
>From: "Andersen, Al"
>Subject: Plants in Laboratories
>MIME-Version: 1.0
>Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
>
>A question has come up by our researchers as to whether or not they can have
>plants in their laboratories. These are BL2 labs in an open laboratory
>research building. Please advise if any of you have come up with this in
>your laboratories.
>
>Thank you,
>
>Al Andersen, RBP
>Chemical and Biosafety Officer
>Department of Environmental Health & Safety
>508-856-6723 (phone)
>508-856-5410 (fax)
>al.andersen@umassmed.edu (e-mail)
> Date: Tue, 29 Jan 2002 09:54:53 -0500
>
> The only concern that I would have with plants in a lab is that there is
> always a tendency for people to want to take their plants home at some
> point. Would the PI/researcher be willing to leave the plants in the lab
> permanently or sacrifice them at some point to prevent potential cross
> contamination?
What about silk plants/plastic plants (just don't try to autoclave them).
>
>
Kirk W. Martin R.S.
Associate Biosafety/Food Safety Officer
Harvard University
Environmental Health and Safety
1033 Massachusetts Ave. 3rd Floor
Cambridge, MA. 02138
TEL: (617)495-2102
FAX: (617)495-0593
Check out our Web Site -
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 31 Jan 2002 09:39:12 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Brian J. Wimmer"
Subject: open position Northwestern University
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="=====================_3874931==_.ALT"
--=====================_3874931==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
Hi,
The following position is not bio-related, but I thought some of you may be
able to pass this along to someone who would like this info. See addresses
at end of description for more information. Thanks.
HAZARDOUS MATERIALS MANAGER
The Office of Research Safety (ORS) is seeking a full-time, non-academic
professional to fill the position of Hazardous Materials Manager for a
two-campus system. The position is based on the Evanston campus, and also
oversees ORS activities on the Chicago campus. The Northwestern University
campuses are classified as large quantity generators.
The function of this position is to provide chemical waste disposal
services to University generators. Assist with achieving and maintaining
compliance with federal, state, and local regulations for hazardous waste
generation, storage, and disposal. Assist with development and
implementation of programs for hazardous waste minimization, chemical
inventory, chemical safety, and emergency response.
The responsibilities of this position include managing the hazardous waste
disposal program for research laboratories and other generators in a
two-campus system; recommending policies and procedures; developing
guidance documents in several media and developing and implementing
training programs for hazardous waste generators; identifying, evaluating,
and engaging chemical waste disposal contractors; supervising activities in
the centralized chemical inventory program for building code compliance;
directing operations of the emergency response team; providing technical
and administrative support to the laboratory safety program; and
supervising the activities of up to six employees.
The Hazardous Materials Manager interacts with faculty, staff, and students
at all levels of the University community, as well as outside contractors
and regulatory agencies. The position is responsible for managing
significant institutional resources. The Hazardous Materials Manager will
be on-call to respond to hazardous materials emergencies at any time.
The preferred qualifications for this position include a Bachelor's degree
in chemistry and several years of experience, preferably in an academic
research environment. An advanced degree is preferred. Certification as a
Hazardous Materials Manager by the Institute of Hazardous Materials
Management is strongly preferred. In-depth knowledge of chemical safety,
classification, storage, and transportation requirements is essential.
Northwestern University offers a generous benefits package including
medical and dental insurance, life insurance, 403b retirement plan, paid
vacation and sick time, long term and short term disability insurance, and
tuition reimbursement. Please send your resume to:
L. Todd Leasia, Director
Office of Research Safety
Northwestern University
B-106 Ward Building, mail code W223
303 E. Chicago Ave.
Chicago, IL 60611
Fax: (312) 503-0547
Email LTL419@northwestern.edu
--=====================_3874931==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
X-MIME-Autoconverted: from 8bit to quoted-printable by merle.it.northwestern.edu id JAA11900
Hi,
The following position is not bio-related, but I thought some of you may be able to pass this along to someone who would like this info. See addresses at end of description for more information. Thanks.
HAZARDOUS MATERIALS MANAGER
The Office of Research Safety (ORS) is seeking a full-time, non-academic professional to fill the position of Hazardous Materials Manager for a two-campus system. The position is based on the Evanston campus, and also oversees ORS activities on the Chicago campus. The Northwestern University campuses are classified as large quantity=20 generators.
The function of this position is to provide chemical waste disposal services to University generators. Assist with achieving and maintaining compliance with federal, state, and local regulations for hazardous waste generation, storage, and disposal. Assist with development and implementation of programs for hazardous waste minimization, chemical inventory, chemical safety, and emergency response.
The responsibilities of this position include managing the hazardous waste disposal program for research laboratories and other generators in a two-campus system; recommending policies and procedures; developing guidance documents in several media and developing and implementing training programs for hazardous waste generators; identifying, evaluating, and engaging chemical waste disposal contractors; supervising activities in the centralized chemical inventory program for building code compliance; directing operations of the emergency response team; providing technical and administrative support to the laboratory safety program; and supervising the activities of up to six employees.
The Hazardous Materials Manager interacts with faculty, staff, and students at all levels of the University community, as well as outside contractors and regulatory agencies. The position is responsible for managing significant institutional resources. The Hazardous Materials Manager will be on-call to respond to hazardous materials emergencies at any time.
The preferred qualifications for this position include a Bachelor=92s degree in chemistry and several years of experience, preferably in an academic research environment. An advanced degree is preferred. Certification as a Hazardous Materials Manager by the Institute of Hazardous Materials Management is strongly preferred. In-depth knowledge of chemical safety, classification, storage, and transportation requirements is essential.
Northwestern University offers a generous benefits package including medical and dental insurance, life insurance, 403b retirement plan, paid vacation and sick time, long term and short term disability insurance, and tuition reimbursement. Please send your resume to:
L. Todd Leasia, Director
Office of Research Safety
Northwestern University
B-106 Ward Building, mail code W223
303 E. Chicago Ave.
Chicago, IL 60611
Fax: (312) 503-0547
Email=20 LTL419@northwestern.edu
--=====================_3874931==_.ALT--
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 31 Jan 2002 15:08:51 -0500
Reply-To: speaker@ehs.psu.edu
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Curt Speaker
Organization: UNIVERSITY SAFETY
Subject: H2O2 sterlizers
Good afternoon:
After ignoring this information for some time, I now have been asked
by a faculty member to gather some information on vapor-phase
hydrogen peroxide sterlizers.
Can some one point me in the right direction for information,
manufacturers, prices, etc.???
Thanks in advance...
Curt
Curt Speaker
Biosafety Officer
Penn State University
Environmental Health and Safety
speaker@ehs.psu.edu
^...^
(O_O)
=(Y)=
"""
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 31 Jan 2002 16:17:15 -0500
Reply-To: pr18@columbia.edu
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: paul rubock
Organization: EH&S
Subject: Echovirus: disinfectant
MIME-Version: 1.0
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--------------1AB9F032D939DCAD3E604A76
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Does any one have info. on an effective disinfectant for echovirus. The
Health Canada MSDS cite only glutaraldehyde and formalin, 2 compounds I
would want to avoid.
Thanks,
Paul Rubock
Biosafety Officer
Columbia University
--------------1AB9F032D939DCAD3E604A76
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Content-Description: Card for paul rubock
Content-Disposition: attachment;
filename="pr18.vcf"
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n:EHS;Paul Rubock, MPH, Biological Safety Officer,
tel;fax:212-795-5847
tel;work:212-305-[5]-1506
x-mozilla-html:FALSE
adr:;;;;;;
version:2.1
email;internet:pr18@columbia.edu
x-mozilla-cpt:;12720
fn:Paul Rubock, MPH, Biological Safety Officer, EHS, 212-305-[5]-1506
end:vcard
--------------1AB9F032D939DCAD3E604A76—
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 4 Feb 2002 10:40:14 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Kim Auletta
Subject: IBCs & Select Agents
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Our IBC has officially expanded its scope to include review of select agent
use. We need to update our forms & procedures. Have any of your IBCs
addressed this issue? If so, and you'd like to share your forms, etc., I'd
really appreciate it. Thanks!
Kim Auletta
Lab Safety Specialist
Environmental Health and Safety
SUNY Stony Brook
110 Suffolk Hall
Stony Brook, NY 11794-6200
PHONE: 631-632-9672
FAX: 631-632-9683
E-MAIL: kauletta@.sunysb.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 4 Feb 2002 10:59:18 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Joseph P. Kozlovac"
Subject: Re: IBCs & Select Agents
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
Kim
We did the same thing a few years ago. Our registration forms are
available on our website as well as a chapter in our compliance program
manual addressing select agents. the links are below.
At 10:40 AM 2/4/02 -0500, you wrote:
>Our IBC has officially expanded its scope to include review of select agent
>use. We need to update our forms & procedures. Have any of your IBCs
>addressed this issue? If so, and you'd like to share your forms, etc., I'd
>really appreciate it. Thanks!
>
>Kim Auletta
>Lab Safety Specialist
>Environmental Health and Safety
>SUNY Stony Brook
>110 Suffolk Hall
>Stony Brook, NY 11794-6200
>PHONE: 631-632-9672
>FAX: 631-632-9683
>E-MAIL: kauletta@.sunysb.edu
______________________________________________________________________________
Biological Safety Officer
Environment, Health, Safety
SAIC-Frederick
National Cancer Institute -
Frederick
(301)846-1451 fax: (301)846-6619
email: jkozlovac@mail.
______________________________________________________________________________
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 4 Feb 2002 11:25:43 -0900
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Andrew J Bartel
Organization: Department of Biological Sciences
Subject: Sterilization Testing
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
We are running an undergraduate microbiology lab dealing primarily with
non-pathogens (Biosafety class I). We are reevaluating how often we
test the autoclave using spore strips. Are there any standards for how
often an autoclave should be tested for effectiveness using this method?
When autoclaving media, clean glassware, trash, etc we use autoclave
tape. Any input would be appreciated.
--
> > > > > > > > > > >
Andrew J Bartel
Laboratory Manager
Department of Biological Sciences
University of Alaska Anchorage
Science Bldg. 243
3211 Providence Drive
Anchorage AK 99508
(907)786-1268 voice
(907)786-1148 fax
ajb@uaa.alaska.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 5 Feb 2002 07:12:41 EST
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Jim Kaufman
Subject: LABSAFETY-L and NACHO Celebrate Fourth Anniversary
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="US-ASCII"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
The National Association of Chemical Hygiene Officers
and the LABSAFETY-L discussion list are celebrating
their fourth anniversary. The lab safety/CHO Internet
discussion list and virtual professional association now
have nearly 1,000 members.
Membership is free. There are no dues, no officers,
no bylaws and no meetings. Just colleagues talking
with colleagues to try to help each other.
Tell you friends about NACHO and LABSAFETY-L.
For more information about NACHO and how to join,
visit the Laboratory Safety Institute's website
().
*****************************************************
James A. Kaufman, Director
The Laboratory Safety Institute
Safety in Science and Science Education
192 Worcester Road, Natick, MA 01760
508-647-1900 Fax: 508-647-0062 labsafe@
LSI is a national nonprofit educational organization dedicated to
making health and safety an integral and important part of science
and science education. Free copies of our Laboratory Safety
Guidelines, seminar schedule, Publications List, AV-Lending
Library List, and membership information are available on request.
The LABSAFETY-L discussion list is a public service of LSI.
******************************************************
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 5 Feb 2002 10:01:03 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Renee Siegel
Subject: use of bunsen in hood
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Hello everyone,
I sent a couple of investigators information that was discussed on this
listserve, in January, regarding "natural gas in biosafety cabinets." I
sent the info after a small fire that they had in their BSC, from a plastic
flask melting and nearby methanol, in hopes of extinguishing the use of
open flames. (No pun intended.) I have a limited knowledge in biosafety.
Would anyone be able to respond to his comments and question below? I will
forward the info on to him. Thank you in advance for any help you may be
able to provide.
Renee
>Subject: use of bunsen in hood
>Scubber-Version: 1.7 (portal)
>
>Renee,
>Thanks for the literature you sent me.
>The use of a flame in the tissue culture hood is for the following:
>we found that storage of trypsin/EDTA solution in plastic tubes led to
>contamination in cultures. Therefore, we use glass bottles which we need
>to flame the neck of the bottle before pouring trypsin into the tissue
>culture flask. A bottle of trypsin/EDTA is used repeatedly and is stored
>in the freezer after each use.
>PLease ask these investigators involved in the literature you sent me, what
>methods do they use to ensure that the neck of the bottle is sterile?
>
>Thank you
>
>Ruy Tchao, Ph.D.
>Professor, Pharmacology and Toxicology
>Department of Pharmaceutical Sciences
>
>
>
>
Renee Siegel
Director, Environmental Health and Radiation Safety
University of the Sciences in Philadelphia
600 South 43rd Street
Philadelphia, Pa., 19104
r.siegel@usip.edu
Phone: 215-596-8925
Fax: 215-895-1100
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 5 Feb 2002 10:41:30 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Byers, Karen B"
Subject: Re: use of bunsen in hood
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Use of a sterile serological pipet to remove the trypsin should eliminate the
requirement to flame the bottle neck.
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Renee Siegel [SMTP:r.siegel@USIP.EDU]
> Sent: Tuesday, February 05, 2002 10:01 AM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: use of bunsen in hood
>
> Hello everyone,
> I sent a couple of investigators information that was discussed on this
> listserve, in January, regarding "natural gas in biosafety cabinets." I
> sent the info after a small fire that they had in their BSC, from a plastic
> flask melting and nearby methanol, in hopes of extinguishing the use of
> open flames. (No pun intended.) I have a limited knowledge in biosafety.
> Would anyone be able to respond to his comments and question below? I will
> forward the info on to him. Thank you in advance for any help you may be
> able to provide.
> Renee
>
> >Subject: use of bunsen in hood
> >Scubber-Version: 1.7 (portal)
> >
> >Renee,
> >Thanks for the literature you sent me.
> >The use of a flame in the tissue culture hood is for the following:
> >we found that storage of trypsin/EDTA solution in plastic tubes led to
> >contamination in cultures. Therefore, we use glass bottles which we need
> >to flame the neck of the bottle before pouring trypsin into the tissue
> >culture flask. A bottle of trypsin/EDTA is used repeatedly and is stored
> >in the freezer after each use.
> >PLease ask these investigators involved in the literature you sent me, what
> >methods do they use to ensure that the neck of the bottle is sterile?
> >
> >Thank you
> >
> >Ruy Tchao, Ph.D.
> >Professor, Pharmacology and Toxicology
> >Department of Pharmaceutical Sciences
> >
> >
> >
> >
> Renee Siegel
> Director, Environmental Health and Radiation Safety
> University of the Sciences in Philadelphia
> 600 South 43rd Street
> Philadelphia, Pa., 19104
> r.siegel@usip.edu
> Phone: 215-596-8925
> Fax: 215-895-1100
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 5 Feb 2002 09:52:52 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Judy Pointer
Subject: Re: use of bunsen in hood
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Dear Renee,
Tell the PI that first of all, the contamination is probably coming from the
multiple use of the trypsin - not the plastic tubes or glass tubes. Once the
contents of the tube/bottle is contaminated (glass or plastic) then using the
same vessel repeatedly only spreads it. To not get the container contaminated
in the first place, should be the objective. How to do that without flaming the
lips? --> good sterile techniques!
First the lab group should assess their system and the skills of those
culturing. They may need some more training and viewing of videos on these
topics plus closer supervision. Second they should run a test. Select some
sterile throw-away cell cultures. Remove the antibiotics in them and have each
person in the lab carry on the cultures for 3 weeks on routine maintenance
(splitting, spinning and replating). If they can't do this without
contamination they have one of 2 problems 1) the cultures were seeded with low
levels of contaminants to start off with or 2) they are introducing them while
working. In my past experience low levels of antibiotic resistant common
microbes (like pseudomonas, yeast and fungus) were present in my cultures to
begin with. They were suppressed by the antibiotics but never completely
killed. If this is the case they need to figure out where the source is by
isolating each step. My contaminants originally came from the incubator, the
water bath and a faulty sweeny filtration system I used for adding supplements.
There were 5 different contaminants and each one was introduced a different way.
None of the introductions were caused by "not flaming the lip of the bottle".
If after finding the source it is determined that contaminated bottles lips are
the problem - the solution is easy 1) don't touch the lip of the bottles with
the pipette and don't use the same supposedly sterile pipette repeatedly. If
you do touch the lip, either throw the contents away and don't use it or
carefully touch the drip on the lip with a sterile alcohol soaked gauze pad. If
you drop a lid, have sterile prepacked ones available as replacements. If they
are pouring the trypsin out (bad technique in my opinion) they should be certain
no media is on the lip before they pour.
What your tissue culturist doesn't realize is that laminar flow sterile cabinets
are designed to work best when the air flow turbulence is at a minimum. That
means, minimum movement, minimum temperature variations (heat from flames) and
minimum introduction of contaminated fluids into the work space to start off
with - like introducing wet media bottles from a contaminated water bath (ditto
for wet flasks or plates from a contaminated incubator). Bottom line is no
amount of flaming the lips of glass bottles will compensate for poor sterile
technique.
Note: trypsin is notorious for carrying contaminants. It is turbid and can not
be filter sterilized. Growth inside of it can not be seen because of its
turbidity. Double check the trypsin source, dilute and steak plates with the
solutions to find out. Also check for mycoplasm - trypsin comes from pig
pancreas and can be contaminated with low levels of swine mycoplasm from the
beginning. Use a good source, test in-house if necessary.
Judy Pointer
Biosafety Officer,
UTMDACC
Renee Siegel on 02/05/2002 09:01:03 AM
Please respond to A Biosafety Discussion List
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
cc: (bcc: Judy M. Pointer/MDACC)
Subject: use of bunsen in hood
Hello everyone,
I sent a couple of investigators information that was discussed on this
listserve, in January, regarding "natural gas in biosafety cabinets." I
sent the info after a small fire that they had in their BSC, from a plastic
flask melting and nearby methanol, in hopes of extinguishing the use of
open flames. (No pun intended.) I have a limited knowledge in biosafety.
Would anyone be able to respond to his comments and question below? I will
forward the info on to him. Thank you in advance for any help you may be
able to provide.
Renee
>Subject: use of bunsen in hood
>Scubber-Version: 1.7 (portal)
>
>Renee,
>Thanks for the literature you sent me.
>The use of a flame in the tissue culture hood is for the following:
>we found that storage of trypsin/EDTA solution in plastic tubes led to
>contamination in cultures. Therefore, we use glass bottles which we need
>to flame the neck of the bottle before pouring trypsin into the tissue
>culture flask. A bottle of trypsin/EDTA is used repeatedly and is stored
>in the freezer after each use.
>PLease ask these investigators involved in the literature you sent me, what
>methods do they use to ensure that the neck of the bottle is sterile?
>
>Thank you
>
>Ruy Tchao, Ph.D.
>Professor, Pharmacology and Toxicology
>Department of Pharmaceutical Sciences
>
>
>
>
Renee Siegel
Director, Environmental Health and Radiation Safety
University of the Sciences in Philadelphia
600 South 43rd Street
Philadelphia, Pa., 19104
r.siegel@usip.edu
Phone: 215-596-8925
Fax: 215-895-1100
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 5 Feb 2002 11:32:44 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Moravek, Paula"
Subject: Re: use of bunsen in hood
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Our BB Dept. researchers & class lab undergraduate students do not use =
flames
during mammalian (and insect) tissue culture manipulations. Haven't =
been for
about 5 years now.
They keep their trypsin in plastic tubes or glass containers in a CLEAN
freezer IN the TC lab--NO PROKARYOTES or YEASTS OR FUNGI are allowed in =
the
room OR the freezer. They swab off the outside of the cap & bottle with =
70%
ethanol & a paper towel before putting it into the BSC. =20
In your PI's case, I imagine if the trypsin was kept in another room, =
there
would be other stuff in the freezer (as well as the trip to the TC room) =
that
could contaminate the outside of the container AND compromise the =
threads
under the cap. They might benefit from bagging the trypsin bottle =
after
each use, stowing in the freezer, and then ditch the plastic bag right =
before
moving the trypsin into the BSC.
They also might opt to divide up the trypsin into single-session =
aliquots
(just enough to do the job each time).
I imagine your folks are not having other contamination problems due to
improper technique or cleanliness of the room or air-flow near the BSC =
if the
trypsin has been isolated as the only source of contamination. Do they =
do
all other TC manipulations without flames? This could be a whole other =
can
of worms to check into.
Just some thoughts. Hope they help.
P. Moravek
Laboratory Manager, Biology & Biotechnology Department
Biosafety Officer, Office of Environmental & Occupational Safety
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Worcester, MA 01609 U.S.A.
pmoravek@wpi.edu
-----Original Message-----
From: Byers, Karen B [mailto:Karen_Byers@DFCI.HARVARD.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, February 05, 2002 10:42 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: use of bunsen in hood
Use of a sterile serological pipet to remove the trypsin should =
eliminate the
requirement to flame the bottle neck.
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Renee Siegel [SMTP:r.siegel@USIP.EDU]
> Sent: Tuesday, February 05, 2002 10:01 AM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: use of bunsen in hood
>
> Hello everyone,
> I sent a couple of investigators information that was discussed on =
this
> listserve, in January, regarding "natural gas in biosafety cabinets." =
I
> sent the info after a small fire that they had in their BSC, from a =
plastic
> flask melting and nearby methanol, in hopes of extinguishing the use =
of
> open flames. (No pun intended.) I have a limited knowledge in =
biosafety.
> Would anyone be able to respond to his comments and question below? I =
will
> forward the info on to him. Thank you in advance for any help you may =
be
> able to provide.
> Renee
>
> >Subject: use of bunsen in hood
> >Scubber-Version: 1.7 (portal)
> >
> >Renee,
> >Thanks for the literature you sent me.
> >The use of a flame in the tissue culture hood is for the following:
> >we found that storage of trypsin/EDTA solution in plastic tubes led =
to
> >contamination in cultures. Therefore, we use glass bottles which we =
need
> >to flame the neck of the bottle before pouring trypsin into the =
tissue
> >culture flask. A bottle of trypsin/EDTA is used repeatedly and is =
stored
> >in the freezer after each use.
> >PLease ask these investigators involved in the literature you sent =
me,
what
> >methods do they use to ensure that the neck of the bottle is sterile?
> >
> >Thank you
> >
> >Ruy Tchao, Ph.D.
> >Professor, Pharmacology and Toxicology
> >Department of Pharmaceutical Sciences
> >
> >
> >
> >
> Renee Siegel
> Director, Environmental Health and Radiation Safety
> University of the Sciences in Philadelphia
> 600 South 43rd Street
> Philadelphia, Pa., 19104
> r.siegel@usip.edu
> Phone: 215-596-8925
> Fax: 215-895-1100
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 6 Feb 2002 14:01:30 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Amy Quattrocchi
Subject: Biosafety Reference Document
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT
Hello,
I recently became aware of a publication "Working Safely with
Biologically Hazardous Materials." Unfortunately, I do not know
the author. I have searched the web for it and have been
unsuccessful in locating a copy. Is anyone familiar with this
publication and where it might be found? Thank you,
Amy
Amy Quattrocchi
Health and Safety Specialist
Rutgers Environmental Health and Safety
24 Street 1603
Building 4127 Livingston Campus
Piscataway, NJ 08854
Phone: 732/445-2550
Fax: 732/445-3109
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 6 Feb 2002 15:58:34 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Don Callihan
Subject: Laboratory Safety Publication
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
Content-transfer-encoding: quoted-printable
Greetings Fellow Biosafety Travellers,
I want to call your attention to a recently published document by NCCLS=
targeted to the clinical laboratory community, but applicable to many l=
ab
workers.
This document was reviewed by the ABSA Technical Review Committee and a=
response was during the public comment period. It was my privilege to
participate on the NCCLS committee responsible for revision, but have n=
o
commercial interest in NCCLS or the document,
Although the focus is clearly on issues related to the ways we "routine=
ly"
think of bloodborne pathogens, there is extensive information on genera=
l
safety in the autopsy suite and safety issues related to laboratory
instruments. Prions (BSE, CJD), safe handling of unknown bacterial cult=
ures
in the clinical labs, and appropriate disinfectants are addressed, in
addition to the usual topics of HIV, HBV, and HCV.
I have included ordering information below for your convenience. Check =
out
the NCCLS website for more details ().
Best regards,
Don Callihan, Ph.D.
Biosafety Officer and Senior Clinical Microbiologists
BD Diagnostic Systems
7 Loveton Circle MC924
Sparks, MD 21152
410-773-6684
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
=20
NCCLS M29-A2=A0=A0=A0=A0 ****NEW**** =20
Protection of Laboratory Workers from Occupationally =20
Acquired Infections?Second Edition; Approved Guideline.=20
This document provides guidance on the risk of =20
transmission of hepatitis viruses and human =20
immunodeficiency viruses in any laboratory setting; =20
specific precautions for preventing the laboratory =20
transmission of bloodborne infection from laboratory =20
instruments and materials; and recommendations for the =20
management of bloodborne exposure. =20
ISBN 1-56238-453-8 =20
NCCLS Member Organizations $85 Nonmembers $140 =20
Chairholder: David L. Sewell, Ph.D. =20
Veterans Affairs Medical Center =20
See videotape section for M29-A-V information. =20
=20
=20
HOW TO ORDER
Order by e-mail
Complete the order form and press the "submit button" or print out=
the
form and mail with payment or purchase order to:
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 NCCLS
-=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 940 West Valley Roa=
d, Ste. 1400
-=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 Wayne, PA=A0 19087-=
1898=A0 U.S.A.
Order using "Electronic Document Delivery" (to have documents
downloaded to your computer), whether a member or non-member.=A0 F=
ollow
this link for entry
Order by phone: Toll Free ~ 1.877.447.1888
Save time by calling.=A0 Please have your credit card number handy=
.=A0 We
do not accept purchase orders over the phone or electronically.
Purchase orders must be faxed or mailed.
Order by fax: +610.688.6400
When you order by FAX, please do not send an additional hard copy =
by
mail.
NOTE: Due to the overwhelming volume of faxes we receive, we are
unable to respond to confirmation requests.=A0 If you need to know=
pricing, you may call the Executive Offices before faxing your
purchase order.
Order via wire transfer:
Please contact the Executive Offices for account information.
Shipping/Handling
Within North America: add 10% (minimum of $7.50). Outside North
America: International surface (allow six weeks for delivery), add=
35%
(minimum $10); International Courier, add 45% (minimum $10).=
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 7 Feb 2002 09:46:56 -0500
Reply-To: pr18@columbia.edu
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: paul rubock
Organization: EH&S
Subject: Is Botox a select agent
MIME-Version: 1.0
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This is a multi-part message in MIME format.
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Today's New York Times described pending FDA licensing of Botox (a
Botulinum Toxin A, rights to it held by Allergan-each vial of dried
Botox contains the equivilant of 100 mouse LD50s ) as a wrinkle remover,
its off-license use in addition to its current status as a drug for
stopping muscle spasms. My question is:
Would researchers using Botox be exempt from Select Agent application
based on the following pasting from the Select Agent Regs. dealing with
exemptions.
"We interpret this to apply to veterinary vaccination purposes as well.
Therefore, if the attenuated strain of the select agent that you will be
working with has been approved by FDA or USDA for vaccination purposes,
or has received an Investigational New Drug (IND) license
with supporting documentation of safety in humans, than we would
consider this strain to be exempt from this regulation."
If it's not exempt: will 1,000s as cosmetic surgeons be saturating the
CDC with Applications??
Thank you,
Paul Rubock
--------------B38D7717A836EF2B79E4A637
Content-Type: text/html; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Today's New York Times described pending FDA licensing of Botox (a Botulinum Toxin A, rights to it held by Allergan-each vial of dried Botox contains the equivilant of 100 mouse LD50s ) as a wrinkle remover, its off-license use in addition to its current status as a drug for stopping muscle spasms. My question is:
Would researchers using Botox be exempt from Select Agent application based on the following pasting from the Select Agent Regs. dealing with exemptions.
"We interpret this to apply to veterinary vaccination purposes as well. Therefore, if the attenuated strain of the select agent that you will be
working with has been approved by FDA or USDA for vaccination purposes, or has received an Investigational New Drug (IND) license
with supporting documentation of safety in humans, than we would consider this strain to be exempt from this regulation."
If it's not exempt: will 1,000s as cosmetic surgeons be saturating the CDC with Applications??
Thank you,
Paul Rubock
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n:EHS;Paul Rubock, MPH, Biological Safety Officer,
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=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 7 Feb 2002 14:14:32 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: John Bristol
Subject: select agents
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Question to the group:
On the original ruling for select agents, Trichothecene Mycotoxins (as a
group) were not included. However T-2 toxins (which are in this group)
were included. Could anyone enlighten me as to why T-2 toxins are a much
greater hazard than others in this class? Additionally, what level of
protection is required for those working with this class of toxins
(trichothecene mycotoxins)?
John Bristol
Associate Director
Environmental Health and Safety
Eisai Research Institute
john_bristol@eri.
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 7 Feb 2002 14:40:10 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Gilpin, Richard"
Subject: Re: select agents
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
I do not believe that things were thought completely through...
For example, TTX-citrate is listed in the CDC SA LD50 by IP route table as 8
ng/kg (SA exemption starts at 100 ng/kg) but it is sold by several suppliers
with LD50's one to three orders of magnitude greater than 100ng/kg. For
example, Sigma-Aldrich sells TTX in citrate with a (mus) IC dose of 600
ng/kg (IC is the most sensitive route of administration) and the company
does not need to fill out an EA-101 to ship it to you.
Richard W. Gilpin, Ph.D., RBP, CBSP
Assistant Director & Biosafety Officer
Environmental Health & Safety (EHS)
University of Maryland Baltimore
714 West Lombard Street, Room 305
Baltimore MD 21201-8212
(410) 706-7845
Fax (410) 706-1500
rgilpin@ehs.umaryland.edu
ehs.umaryland.edu
-----Original Message-----
From: John Bristol [mailto:John_Bristol@ERI.]
Sent: Thursday, February 07, 2002 02:15 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: select agents
Question to the group:
On the original ruling for select agents, Trichothecene Mycotoxins (as a
group) were not included. However T-2 toxins (which are in this group)
were included. Could anyone enlighten me as to why T-2 toxins are a much
greater hazard than others in this class? Additionally, what level of
protection is required for those working with this class of toxins
(trichothecene mycotoxins)?
John Bristol
Associate Director
Environmental Health and Safety
Eisai Research Institute
john_bristol@eri.
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 7 Feb 2002 15:31:37 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Robert N. Latsch"
Subject: Re: select agents
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
We have debated the select agent list to some extent and have found several
inconsistentcies. You are not alone. Not only that, They have not been
very open with information about this subject. i have called the CDC to
ask a question and they do not know who to give me to to answer the
question!
The answer might well be because they said so.
Bob
>Question to the group:
>
>On the original ruling for select agents, Trichothecene Mycotoxins (as a
>group) were not included. However T-2 toxins (which are in this group)
>were included. Could anyone enlighten me as to why T-2 toxins are a much
>greater hazard than others in this class? Additionally, what level of
>protection is required for those working with this class of toxins
>(trichothecene mycotoxins)?
>
>John Bristol
>Associate Director
>Environmental Health and Safety
>Eisai Research Institute
>john_bristol@eri.
_____________________________________________________________________
__ / _____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 8 Feb 2002 09:21:09 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Kim Auletta
Subject: Re: select agents
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Another question for select agents/toxins has just come up at our Univ.
Toxins are also exempt for "biomedical research". I have not found a
definition for this type of research. Has anyone an idea of what the CDC
considers "biomedical research"? Is it basic science in a life science
discipline or the other end of the gamut, and must involve
patients/testing?
Kim Auletta
Lab Safety Specialist
Environmental Health and Safety
SUNY Stony Brook
110 Suffolk Hall
Stony Brook, NY 11794-6200
PHONE: 631-632-9672
FAX: 631-632-9683
E-MAIL: kauletta@.sunysb.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 8 Feb 2002 10:27:38 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Doob, Peter (NIDA/IRP)"
Subject: Re: Laboratory Safety Publication
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
In the document recommended in Don Callihan=92s note (NCCLS M29-A2), =
emphasis
is made in the spill cleanup section on absorbing the bulk of spilled =
blood
or serum prior to decontamination (Sec. 6.4.3, p. 25). In the NCCLS =
video
based on this document (M29-A-V), cleanup of a blood spill involving a
dropped glass tube is shown in which no disinfectant is used until =
after
both (1) glass fragments are forceps-transferred but hand-wrapped in
absorbent sheets and then hand-carried to a suitable biowaste =
container, and
(2) absorbent sheets have been used to pick up the bulk of the spill by
being hand-applied to it. Concern I have is that bloody glass may =
penetrate
the gloves when glass fragments are being wrapped or while they are =
being
moved to waste, or during bulk liquid wipe up if some shards were =
missed
earlier. Is there reason to be concerned about potential for =
parenteral
inoculation in this scenario?
Peter A. Doob, MPH, JD
Chief, Safety and Operations Support Section, ASB=20
National Institute on Drug Abuse, NIH
Intramural Research Program
5500 Nathan Shock Drive
Baltimore, MD 21224
vc: 410-550-1675
> ----------
> From: Don Callihan
> Reply To: A Biosafety Discussion List
> Sent: Wednesday, February 6, 2002 3:58 PM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: Laboratory Safety Publication
>=20
> Greetings Fellow Biosafety Travellers,
>=20
> I want to call your attention to a recently published document by =
NCCLS
> targeted to the clinical laboratory community, but applicable to many =
lab
> workers.
>=20
> This document was reviewed by the ABSA Technical Review Committee and =
a
> response was during the public comment period. It was my privilege =
to
> participate on the NCCLS committee responsible for revision, but have =
no
> commercial interest in NCCLS or the document,
>=20
> Although the focus is clearly on issues related to the ways we =
"routinely"
> think of bloodborne pathogens, there is extensive information on =
general
> safety in the autopsy suite and safety issues related to laboratory
> instruments. Prions (BSE, CJD), safe handling of unknown bacterial
> cultures
> in the clinical labs, and appropriate disinfectants are addressed, in
> addition to the usual topics of HIV, HBV, and HCV.
>=20
> I have included ordering information below for your convenience. =
Check out
> the NCCLS website for more details ().
>=20
> Best regards,
> Don Callihan, Ph.D.
> Biosafety Officer and Senior Clinical Microbiologists
> BD Diagnostic Systems
> 7 Loveton Circle MC924
> Sparks, MD 21152
> 410-773-6684
>=20
> =
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
> =20
> NCCLS M29-A2 ****NEW**** =20
> Protection of Laboratory Workers from Occupationally =20
> Acquired Infections?Second Edition; Approved Guideline.=20
> This document provides guidance on the risk of =20
> transmission of hepatitis viruses and human =20
> immunodeficiency viruses in any laboratory setting; =20
> specific precautions for preventing the laboratory =20
> transmission of bloodborne infection from laboratory =20
> instruments and materials; and recommendations for the =20
> management of bloodborne exposure. =20
> ISBN 1-56238-453-8 =20
> NCCLS Member Organizations $85 Nonmembers $140 =20
> Chairholder: David L. Sewell, Ph.D. =20
> Veterans Affairs Medical Center =20
> See videotape section for M29-A-V information. =20
> =20
> =20
>=20
> HOW TO ORDER
> Order by e-mail
> Complete the order form and press the "submit button" or print =
out
> the
> form and mail with payment or purchase order to:
> NCCLS
> - 940 West Valley Road, Ste. 1400
> - Wayne, PA 19087-1898 U.S.A.
>=20
> Order using "Electronic Document Delivery" (to have documents
> downloaded to your computer), whether a member or non-member. =
Follow
> this link for entry
> Order by phone: Toll Free ~ 1.877.447.1888
> Save time by calling. Please have your credit card number =
handy. We
> do not accept purchase orders over the phone or electronically.
> Purchase orders must be faxed or mailed.
> Order by fax: +610.688.6400
> When you order by FAX, please do not send an additional hard =
copy by
> mail.
> NOTE: Due to the overwhelming volume of faxes we receive, we are
> unable to respond to confirmation requests. If you need to know
> pricing, you may call the Executive Offices before faxing your
> purchase order.
> Order via wire transfer:
> Please contact the Executive Offices for account information.
> Shipping/Handling
> Within North America: add 10% (minimum of $7.50). Outside North
> America: International surface (allow six weeks for delivery), =
add
> 35%
> (minimum $10); International Courier, add 45% (minimum $10).
>=20
>=20
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 8 Feb 2002 10:37:55 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Michael Betlach
Subject: Re: select agents
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
In an inquiry we made several years ago to CDC Select Agents staff, I was
informed that the exemption applied when the material was being used in
Phase I or later clinical studies to support new drug development. In other
words, that the research had been reviewed by the FDA. Our inquiry
specifically dealt with recombinant toxin molecules and subunits that were
to be produced internally and shipped to collaborators for
structure/function studies. Broadly, I considered this "biomedical
research." CDC staff did not, and said that we and collaborators needed to
register. The best course of action is to contact CDC staff directly and
discuss the specific situation, rather than make a naive decision and risk
the substantial penalties associated with violations of the regulation.
Ideally, CDC staff will update the FAQs on the Select Agent web site and
eventually modify the regulation itself to clarify these issues.
Regarding the previous posting and cosmetic surgeons etc. now using BoTox
for wrinkle removal...BoTox is regulated by the FDA for medical uses. The
CLIA lab exemption itself in the Select Agent regulation refers to toxins or
strains shipped as standards for laboratory tests, not material for patient
use. It is my understanding that FDA-regulated uses of FDA-licensed products
are not within the scope of the Select Agents regulations. FDA has
established other mechanisms, as has DEA, to track prescription
drugs/pharmaceuticals.
Michael Betlach, Ph.D.
Biosafety Officer
Promega Corporation
5445 E. Cheryl Parkway
Madison, WI 53711
(608) 274-1181, Ext. 1270
-----Original Message-----
From: Kim Auletta [mailto:kauletta@.SUNYSB.EDU]
Sent: Friday, February 08, 2002 8:21 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: select agents
Another question for select agents/toxins has just come up at our Univ.
Toxins are also exempt for "biomedical research". I have not found a
definition for this type of research. Has anyone an idea of what the CDC
considers "biomedical research"? Is it basic science in a life science
discipline or the other end of the gamut, and must involve
patients/testing?
Kim Auletta
Lab Safety Specialist
Environmental Health and Safety
SUNY Stony Brook
110 Suffolk Hall
Stony Brook, NY 11794-6200
PHONE: 631-632-9672
FAX: 631-632-9683
E-MAIL: kauletta@.sunysb.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 8 Feb 2002 12:30:00 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Don Callihan
Subject: Re: Laboratory Safety Publication
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
Content-transfer-encoding: quoted-printable
Although the document, M29-A2 has been updated, the video has not (to m=
y
knowledge) been. I'll forward your comment to NCCLS.
Thanks for catching this inconsistency.
Don Callihan
"Doob, Peter (NIDA/IRP)" @MITVMA.MIT.EDU> on
02/08/2002 10:27:38 AM
Please respond to A Biosafety Discussion List =
Sent by: A Biosafety Discussion List
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
cc:
Subject: Re: Laboratory Safety Publication
In the document recommended in Don Callihan's note (NCCLS M29-A2), emph=
asis
is made in the spill cleanup section on absorbing the bulk of spilled b=
lood
or serum prior to decontamination (Sec. 6.4.3, p. 25). In the NCCLS vi=
deo
based on this document (M29-A-V), cleanup of a blood spill involving a
dropped glass tube is shown in which no disinfectant is used until afte=
r
both (1) glass fragments are forceps-transferred but hand-wrapped in
absorbent sheets and then hand-carried to a suitable biowaste container=
,
and
(2) absorbent sheets have been used to pick up the bulk of the spill by=
being hand-applied to it. Concern I have is that bloody glass may
penetrate
the gloves when glass fragments are being wrapped or while they are bei=
ng
moved to waste, or during bulk liquid wipe up if some shards were misse=
d
earlier. Is there reason to be concerned about potential for parentera=
l
inoculation in this scenario?
Peter A. Doob, MPH, JD
Chief, Safety and Operations Support Section, ASB
National Institute on Drug Abuse, NIH
Intramural Research Program
5500 Nathan Shock Drive
Baltimore, MD 21224
vc: 410-550-1675
> ----------
> From: Don Callihan
> Reply To: A Biosafety Discussion List
> Sent: Wednesday, February 6, 2002 3:58 PM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: Laboratory Safety Publication
>
> Greetings Fellow Biosafety Travellers,
>
> I want to call your attention to a recently published document by NCC=
LS
> targeted to the clinical laboratory community, but applicable to many=
lab
> workers.
>
> This document was reviewed by the ABSA Technical Review Committee and=
a
> response was during the public comment period. It was my privilege t=
o
> participate on the NCCLS committee responsible for revision, but have=
no
> commercial interest in NCCLS or the document,
>
> Although the focus is clearly on issues related to the ways we
"routinely"
> think of bloodborne pathogens, there is extensive information on gene=
ral
> safety in the autopsy suite and safety issues related to laboratory
> instruments. Prions (BSE, CJD), safe handling of unknown bacterial
> cultures
> in the clinical labs, and appropriate disinfectants are addressed, in=
> addition to the usual topics of HIV, HBV, and HCV.
>
> I have included ordering information below for your convenience. Chec=
k
out
> the NCCLS website for more details ().
>
> Best regards,
> Don Callihan, Ph.D.
> Biosafety Officer and Senior Clinical Microbiologists
> BD Diagnostic Systems
> 7 Loveton Circle MC924
> Sparks, MD 21152
> 410-773-6684
>
> =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
>
> NCCLS M29-A2 ****NEW****
> Protection of Laboratory Workers from Occupationally
> Acquired Infections?Second Edition; Approved Guideline.
> This document provides guidance on the risk of
> transmission of hepatitis viruses and human
> immunodeficiency viruses in any laboratory setting;
> specific precautions for preventing the laboratory
> transmission of bloodborne infection from laboratory
> instruments and materials; and recommendations for the
> management of bloodborne exposure.
> ISBN 1-56238-453-8
> NCCLS Member Organizations $85 Nonmembers $140
> Chairholder: David L. Sewell, Ph.D.
> Veterans Affairs Medical Center
> See videotape section for M29-A-V information.
>
>
>
> HOW TO ORDER
> Order by e-mail
> Complete the order form and press the "submit button" or print o=
ut
> the
> form and mail with payment or purchase order to:
> NCCLS
> - 940 West Valley Road, Ste. 1400
> - Wayne, PA 19087-1898 U.S.A.
>
> Order using "Electronic Document Delivery" (to have documents
> downloaded to your computer), whether a member or non-member.
Follow
> this link for entry
> Order by phone: Toll Free ~ 1.877.447.1888
> Save time by calling. Please have your credit card number handy=
.
We
> do not accept purchase orders over the phone or electronically.
> Purchase orders must be faxed or mailed.
> Order by fax: +610.688.6400
> When you order by FAX, please do not send an additional hard cop=
y by
> mail.
> NOTE: Due to the overwhelming volume of faxes we receive, we are=
> unable to respond to confirmation requests. If you need to know=
> pricing, you may call the Executive Offices before faxing your
> purchase order.
> Order via wire transfer:
> Please contact the Executive Offices for account information.
> Shipping/Handling
> Within North America: add 10% (minimum of $7.50). Outside North
> America: International surface (allow six weeks for delivery), a=
dd
> 35%
> (minimum $10); International Courier, add 45% (minimum $10).
>
>
=
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 8 Feb 2002 14:30:19 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Robert N. Latsch"
Subject: Select Agents List
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
We have a new member who is curious about the Select Agents list. I cannot
locate my e-version. Could somebody post their List please?
Thanks,
bob
_____________________________________________________________________
__ / _____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 8 Feb 2002 14:40:50 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Klenner, James"
Subject: Re: Select Agents List
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="----_=_NextPart_000_01C1B0D8.833779C0"
This message is in MIME format. Since your mail reader does not understand
this format, some or all of this message may not be legible.
------_=_NextPart_000_01C1B0D8.833779C0
Content-Type: text/plain;
charset="iso-8859-1"
I happen to have it as a Word document.
James W. Klenner, MSc, MPH, MPA
Bio-Safety Manager
IUPUI, Environmental Health and Safety
620 Union Dr., UN043
Indianapolis, Indiana 46202-5167
(317) 274-2830
Fax (317) 278-2158
-----Original Message-----
From: Robert N. Latsch [mailto:rnl2@PO.CWRU.EDU]
Sent: Friday, February 08, 2002 2:30 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Select Agents List
We have a new member who is curious about the Select Agents list. I cannot
locate my e-version. Could somebody post their List please?
Thanks,
bob
_____________________________________________________________________
__ /
_____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
------_=_NextPart_000_01C1B0D8.833779C0
Content-Type: application/msword;
name="THE LIST OF SELECT AGENTS.doc"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
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------_=_NextPart_000_01C1B0D8.833779C0--
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 8 Feb 2002 15:56:35 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Donald G. Robasser"
Organization: Princeton University
Subject: Pichia pastoris Biosafety Level/Exempt Status
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
A question came to me from the charirman of our biosafety committee
about the biosafety level for the yeast pichia pastoris as used in rDNA
experiments. Also the question was whether P. pastoris was exempt from
the NIH Guidelines as is
S. cerevisiae. Can anyone fill me in on P. pastoris ? Thanks for your
help.
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 8 Feb 2002 15:22:39 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Elizabeth Smith
Subject: Aflatoxin
In-Reply-To:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Hello,
While engaging in the ever-present efforts of chemical house
cleaning, someone found a container of Aflatoxin M1-BSA
Conjugate.
After chatting w/ CDC, verifying that this is apparently a
select agent, I'm sorta stuck. My facility obtained this in
1990 or '91 (legally and pre-Select Agent). But, I either need
to transfer this to some other facility which is registered to
receive it - or find some way to destroy it on site.
The manufacturer was singularly unhelpful: "incinerate it" was
their only suggestion. Needless to say, I don't have a chemical
waste incinerator on site. Duh... And, if it's a select agent,
I can't give it to my chemical waste vendor, who isn't
registered.
Can anyone provide guideance on what sort of chemical process
would satisfactorily destroy it?
I have people who are competant microbiologists and familiar
with working with highly toxic materials. Having qualified
personnel available isn't a question - it's what to tell them to
do with it... We also have the facilities to work with it
safely.
As always, thank you in advance for any assistance.
Elizabeth
=====
Elizabeth Smith
Environmental, Health & Safety Manager
BioPort Corporation
3500 N. Martin L. King Blvd.
Lansing, MI 48906
__________________________________________________
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=========================================================================
Date: Sat, 9 Feb 2002 20:12:25 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Hanna, Michael"
Subject: Re: Aflatoxin
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
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DQoNCg==
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 11 Feb 2002 09:01:21 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Shipp, Allan (OD)"
Subject: Re: Pichia pastoris Biosafety Level/Exempt Status
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Dear Donald,
Unlike S. cerevisiae (which falls under Appendix C-III), P. pastori is not
explicitly exempted in the NIH Guidelines. And while not listed
specifically in Appendix B as falling under Risk Groups 2-4, one cannot
assume that organisms not so mentioned are automatically Risk Group 1
organisms. Per Appendix B-1, the appropriate Risk Group classification for
these organisms must be assessed on a case-by-case basis - generally by your
IBC - based on their known and potential properties, as well as the
relationship of these organisms to those agents that are listed (i.e., the
characteristics they may share with organisms that do fall under each of the
four levels).
I hope this helps. Feel free to contact us directly at oba@od. if we
can be of further assistance.
Allan Shipp
NIH Office of Biotechnology Activities
301-435-2152
-----Original Message-----
From: Donald G. Robasser [mailto:robasser@PRINCETON.EDU]
Sent: Friday, February 08, 2002 3:57 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Pichia pastoris Biosafety Level/Exempt Status
A question came to me from the charirman of our biosafety committee
about the biosafety level for the yeast pichia pastoris as used in rDNA
experiments. Also the question was whether P. pastoris was exempt from
the NIH Guidelines as is
S. cerevisiae. Can anyone fill me in on P. pastoris ? Thanks for your
help.
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 11 Feb 2002 11:11:35 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Delpin, Leslie"
Subject: Re: Aflatoxin
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"
-----Original Message-----
From: Hanna, Michael [mailto:mhanna@BF.UMICH.EDU]
Sent: Saturday, February 09, 2002 8:12 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Aflatoxin
Elizabeth at BioPort - From one Michigander to another - If it were me, I
might just put it in some strong acid like HCL, which works great to digest
proteins (which are what toxins are). Just oxidize the heck out of them.
If your research into this reveals that aflatoxin is not heat stable you can
also run it through a long cycle in the autoclave (30 min peak instead of
the usual 15). That should do the trick also.
------------------------------------
Michael G. Hanna
Mgr - Biological & Laboratory Safety
Occupational Safety & Environ. Health
University of Michigan
Ph. 734-647-2318
Fx. 734-763-1185
-----Original Message-----
From: Elizabeth Smith [mailto:safety_queen@]
Sent: Fri 2/8/2002 6:22 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Cc:
Subject: Aflatoxin
Hello,
While engaging in the ever-present efforts of chemical house
cleaning, someone found a container of Aflatoxin M1-BSA
Conjugate.
After chatting w/ CDC, verifying that this is apparently a
select agent, I'm sorta stuck. My facility obtained this in
1990 or '91 (legally and pre-Select Agent). But, I either need
to transfer this to some other facility which is registered to
receive it - or find some way to destroy it on site.
The manufacturer was singularly unhelpful: "incinerate it" was
their only suggestion. Needless to say, I don't have a chemical
waste incinerator on site. Duh... And, if it's a select agent,
I can't give it to my chemical waste vendor, who isn't
registered.
Can anyone provide guideance on what sort of chemical process
would satisfactorily destroy it?
I have people who are competant microbiologists and familiar
with working with highly toxic materials. Having qualified
personnel available isn't a question - it's what to tell them to
do with it... We also have the facilities to work with it
safely.
As always, thank you in advance for any assistance.
Elizabeth
=====
Elizabeth Smith
Environmental, Health & Safety Manager
BioPort Corporation
3500 N. Martin L. King Blvd.
Lansing, MI 48906
__________________________________________________
Do You Yahoo!?
Send FREE Valentine eCards with Yahoo! Greetings!
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 11 Feb 2002 11:12:23 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Delpin, Leslie"
Subject: Re: Aflatoxin
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"
Sorry Michael,
Please ignore the e-mail addressed to Elizabeth.
-----Original Message-----
From: Hanna, Michael [mailto:mhanna@BF.UMICH.EDU]
Sent: Saturday, February 09, 2002 8:12 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Aflatoxin
Elizabeth at BioPort - From one Michigander to another - If it were me, I
might just put it in some strong acid like HCL, which works great to digest
proteins (which are what toxins are). Just oxidize the heck out of them.
If your research into this reveals that aflatoxin is not heat stable you can
also run it through a long cycle in the autoclave (30 min peak instead of
the usual 15). That should do the trick also.
------------------------------------
Michael G. Hanna
Mgr - Biological & Laboratory Safety
Occupational Safety & Environ. Health
University of Michigan
Ph. 734-647-2318
Fx. 734-763-1185
-----Original Message-----
From: Elizabeth Smith [mailto:safety_queen@]
Sent: Fri 2/8/2002 6:22 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Cc:
Subject: Aflatoxin
Hello,
While engaging in the ever-present efforts of chemical house
cleaning, someone found a container of Aflatoxin M1-BSA
Conjugate.
After chatting w/ CDC, verifying that this is apparently a
select agent, I'm sorta stuck. My facility obtained this in
1990 or '91 (legally and pre-Select Agent). But, I either need
to transfer this to some other facility which is registered to
receive it - or find some way to destroy it on site.
The manufacturer was singularly unhelpful: "incinerate it" was
their only suggestion. Needless to say, I don't have a chemical
waste incinerator on site. Duh... And, if it's a select agent,
I can't give it to my chemical waste vendor, who isn't
registered.
Can anyone provide guideance on what sort of chemical process
would satisfactorily destroy it?
I have people who are competant microbiologists and familiar
with working with highly toxic materials. Having qualified
personnel available isn't a question - it's what to tell them to
do with it... We also have the facilities to work with it
safely.
As always, thank you in advance for any assistance.
Elizabeth
=====
Elizabeth Smith
Environmental, Health & Safety Manager
BioPort Corporation
3500 N. Martin L. King Blvd.
Lansing, MI 48906
__________________________________________________
Do You Yahoo!?
Send FREE Valentine eCards with Yahoo! Greetings!
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 11 Feb 2002 11:22:06 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Richard Fink
Subject: Aflatoxin, select agents.
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
Aflatoxin can be degraded by chlorine bleach (do it in the fume hood!!).
CDC's meaning regarding biomedical research is a moving target. At one
time it was very strictly medical related, lately they have extended it to
mean bio research. Because of this, we check with CDC for each one (time
consuming, but we want in writting that it is exempt).
Richie
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 11 Feb 2002 13:34:00 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Joseph P. Kozlovac"
Subject: Re: Aflatoxin, select agents.
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
You may wish to take a look at the following reference
Castegnaro, M. et al, (1981) Problems related to the use of sodium
hypochlorite in the detoxification of aflatoxin B1, Am. Ind. Hyg. Assoc.
J. 42: 398-401. Treating with bleach alone could create aflatoxin
B1-2,3-dichloride, a known carcinogen and mutagen.
At 11:22 AM 2/11/02 -0500, you wrote:
>Aflatoxin can be degraded by chlorine bleach (do it in the fume hood!!).
>
>CDC's meaning regarding biomedical research is a moving target. At one
>time it was very strictly medical related, lately they have extended it to
>mean bio research. Because of this, we check with CDC for each one (time
>consuming, but we want in writting that it is exempt).
>
>Richie
>
>Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
>Senior Biosafety Officer
>Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
>617-258-5647
>rfink@mit.edu
______________________________________________________________________________
Biological Safety Officer
Environment, Health, Safety
SAIC-Frederick
National Cancer Institute -
Frederick
(301)846-1451 fax: (301)846-6619
email: jkozlovac@mail.
______________________________________________________________________________
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 12 Feb 2002 11:30:07 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Dade, Aurali"
Subject: Infectious Shipping Policies/Training
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Hello All,
We have been kicking around different ideas to meet the IATA and DOT
requirements for Infectious Shipping Training for awhile now. We are coming
down to decision time and I am hoping to get some input from those of you
who teach or contract out this training. I am especially interested in any
policies that you may have and any training options that you can recommend.
I am also interested in any experiences you can share (positive or negative)
with the Saf-T-Pak cd-rom training. I appreciate any advice and
information you are able to give. Thanks in advance.
Aurali Dade
Laboratory Safety Manager
TTUHSC Safety Services
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 12 Feb 2002 10:45:07 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Tom Sawicki
Subject: Re: Infectious Shipping Policies/Training
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
I have some to share. Please contact me at (631)323-3204.
Thomas Sawicki, Biological Safety Officer
USDA Plum Island Animal Disease Center
>>> "Dade, Aurali" 2/12/02 12:30 PM >>>
Hello All,
We have been kicking around different ideas to meet the IATA and DOT
requirements for Infectious Shipping Training for awhile now. We are coming
down to decision time and I am hoping to get some input from those of you
who teach or contract out this training. I am especially interested in any
policies that you may have and any training options that you can recommend.
I am also interested in any experiences you can share (positive or negative)
with the Saf-T-Pak cd-rom training. I appreciate any advice and
information you are able to give. Thanks in advance.
Aurali Dade
Laboratory Safety Manager
TTUHSC Safety Services
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 12 Feb 2002 10:03:47 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Funk,Glenn"
Subject: Re: Infectious Shipping Policies/Training
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Aurali -
Having been the down the golden path with the FAA before, I take this
training very seriously. I have about twenty people in two US and one UK
sites that require shipper training. The approach I've adopted is to buy a
copy of the Saf-T-Pak CD-ROM training and the training support manual for
each site as soon as it comes out. I send it to my EH&S Specialist at each
site, along with their own copy of the DGRs, and they coordinate
administration of the training. Each Specialist takes the training first
so that they can assist other trainees with quirks of the process. I set a
minimum 90% pass level on the final test and print certificates for each
trainee after I receive a copy of their signed test result. After the last
trainee at a site has completed the CD, the Specialist holds a mandatory
1-hour review session with all trainees, going over relevant
company-specific examples, answering questions and clarifying points of
confusion. For this session, the Specialist uses a loose-leaf collection
of training aids and pages copied from the current DGRs (on appropriately
colored paper) to further familiarize the trainees with the look and feel
of the DGRs. We do this each year because (a) it's relatively cheap
(around $250 per site), (b) it's quick, easy and self-paced, and (c) the
FAA seems to like the Saf-T-Pak training. I'll bend over backward to keep
the FAA out of my shop. With the FAA's current close look at clinical
trial sites that ship specimens to labs or the home company, all biopharm
companies have to be especially alert.
-- Glenn
Glenn A. Funk, Ph.D., CBSP
Director and Biosafety Officer
Environmental Health & Safety
Aviron
408-845-8857
=============================
At 11:30 AM 2/12/02 -0600, you wrote:
>Hello All,
>
> We have been kicking around different ideas to meet the IATA and DOT
>requirements for Infectious Shipping Training for awhile now. We are
coming
>down to decision time and I am hoping to get some input from those of you
>who teach or contract out this training. I am especially interested in any
>policies that you may have and any training options that you can recommend.
>I am also interested in any experiences you can share (positive or
negative)
>with the Saf-T-Pak cd-rom training. I appreciate any advice and
>information you are able to give. Thanks in advance.
>
>
>
>Aurali Dade
>
>Laboratory Safety Manager
>
>TTUHSC Safety Services
>
This e-mail message is for the sole use of the intended recipient(s) and may
contain confidential, proprietary or privileged information.
Any unauthorized review, use, disclosure or distribution is prohibited.
If you are not the intended recipient, please contact the sender by reply
e-mail and destroy all copies of the original message, enclosures and
attachments.
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 12 Feb 2002 12:58:46 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Judy Pointer
Subject: Re: Infectious Shipping Policies/Training
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Hi Aurali,
We have a policy that covers loca, ground, and air transport. It requires
anyone packing stuff for "in commerce" to have training every 2 years. Also it
mandates a transport form (hazardous awareness type) that they must include with
shipments of viable samples, infectious or not. We hire a trainer to come
on-site for 2 days in the spring and the fall for certification. They train the
lab people. At first we were going to have EH&S or shipping dept. people pack
things and sign the DG forms. Trouble is, identification depends upon the
honesty of the originator and the shipping dept. people didn't feel too good
about signing a legal document declaring that something was item X, when they
really had no way of verifying the contents.
I prefer to have a contract presenter that is up on the shipping regs [it's is
their main business] do the training rather than do it myself - because the
regs are very complex and changing all the time. There are too many regulatory
bodies involved - in my opinion - the shipping regs need harmonization, for
sure!
The original course we give is 8 hours, the refresher is 4 hours. Last time we
had Bob from CarboPak do it. He was OK but not as good as Eric Cook was when he
was at SafTPak. (Are you listening Eric? Kudos!) We use the SafTPak CD for
the people that need certification quick and can't wait till the next season.
SafTPak's first CD was so hard no one could pass the test. I have feed back
that the second one is better and the first person who has used the new improved
version, passed it first time.
I hope this helps you make your decisions.
Judy Pointer
Biosafety Officer, UTMDACC
"Dade, Aurali" on 02/12/2002 11:30:07 AM
Please respond to A Biosafety Discussion List
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
cc: (bcc: Judy M. Pointer/MDACC)
Subject: Infectious Shipping Policies/Training
Hello All,
We have been kicking around different ideas to meet the IATA and DOT
requirements for Infectious Shipping Training for awhile now. We are coming
down to decision time and I am hoping to get some input from those of you
who teach or contract out this training. I am especially interested in any
policies that you may have and any training options that you can recommend.
I am also interested in any experiences you can share (positive or negative)
with the Saf-T-Pak cd-rom training. I appreciate any advice and
information you are able to give. Thanks in advance.
Aurali Dade
Laboratory Safety Manager
TTUHSC Safety Services
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 12 Feb 2002 12:41:35 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Therese M. Stinnett"
Subject: Re: Infectious Shipping Policies/Training
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
We are going through a similar exercise at my institution. I don't =
have
first hand knowledge of the CD-ROM training referred to, however, RSPA =
at
DOT has recently (?) posted a training website. I've not looked at it =
in
close detail yet, but our Haz Chem and RSO groups are looking at it. =20
General Awareness and Safety training must be done, in addition to the
function specific training.
If you have decentralized shipping options (each
PI/division/department/dean/school, etc can have one or more shipping
accounts with one or more vendors) how do you track who needs training =
and
when? do you rely on self-reporting? do you have an institutional =
policy?
Therese M. Stinnett=20
Biosafety Officer=20
Health and Safety Division=20
UCHSC, Mailstop C275
4200 E. 9th Avenue
Denver, CO=A0 80262
Voice:=A0 303-315-6754=20
Pager:=A0=A0 303-266-5402=20
Fax:=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 303-315-8026=20
email:=A0=A0=A0 therese.stinnett@uchsc.edu=20
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 12 Feb 2002 14:55:27 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Robert N. Latsch"
Subject: Re: Infectious Shipping Policies/Training
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Hello all,
We send several of our specilists to various DGR courses. I have been
trained in IATA and CFR49 as well as the Saf-T-Pak course. We then
constantly broadcast around about the problems shipping any materials. We
ask that anyperson shipping anything check with us to see if the material
is regulated.
When we locate a regulated material, a specialist is sent to do one on one
training with the shipper. They are trained on that particular item. the
test and certification come when one of our people observe the trainees
package and prepare to ship and actual sample. Passing is doing it right.
All hazardous materials shipments have copies of the documents faxed to our
office. They are reviewed then forwarded to Chemtel, who is our 24 hour
service.
We retrain people every two years. We also instruct that training to ship
one item is good for that material only.
Bob
>Hello All,
>
> We have been kicking around different ideas to meet the IATA and DOT
>requirements for Infectious Shipping Training for awhile now. We are coming
>down to decision time and I am hoping to get some input from those of you
>who teach or contract out this training. I am especially interested in any
>policies that you may have and any training options that you can recommend.
>I am also interested in any experiences you can share (positive or negative)
>with the Saf-T-Pak cd-rom training. I appreciate any advice and
>information you are able to give. Thanks in advance.
>
>
>
>Aurali Dade
>
>Laboratory Safety Manager
>
>TTUHSC Safety Services
_____________________________________________________________________
__ / _____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 13 Feb 2002 09:53:49 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Delia Vieira-Cruz
Subject: Re: Protocol
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="=====================_2411550==_.ALT"
--=====================_2411550==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
Hi All,
We have a researcher who is proposing to infect mice with Semliki Forest
Virus. I have read that although the virus is classified as BSL 3, most
people working with low or moderate amounts of the virus perform their
experiments at BSL 2. Is this correct? Does anyone have any concerns
regarding research with SFV?
Delia M. Vieira-Cruz
Lab Safety Officer
Albert Einstein College of Medicine
1300 Morris Park Avenue, Forch 800
Bronx, NY 10461
(718)430-3560
vieira@aecom.yu.edu
--=====================_2411550==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
Hi All,
We have a researcher who is proposing to infect mice with Semliki Forest Virus. I have read that although the virus is classified as BSL 3, most people working with low or moderate amounts of the virus perform their experiments at BSL 2. Is this correct? Does anyone have any concerns regarding research with SFV?
Delia M. Vieira-Cruz
Lab Safety Officer
Albert Einstein College of Medicine
1300 Morris Park Avenue, Forch 800
Bronx, NY 10461
(718)430-3560
vieira@aecom.yu.edu
--=====================_2411550==_.ALT--
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 13 Feb 2002 12:13:32 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Richard Fink
Subject: Fwd: EH&S officer position posting
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
The following position is posted on web.mit.edu. Click on positions
available which takes you to the HR site. Look for position titled
ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH AND SAFETY with the 83 number at the end.
ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH AND SAFETY
OFFICER, Environmental
Health and Safety, to serve
in a leadership role
and provide expert advice to
support Institute
academic and business objectives
with due consideration
of occupational health laws,
federal and state
regulations, and good practices. Will
function as an integral
member of a multidisciplinary
office. May be assigned
to departments outside of the
EHS office, and as
skills develop, work in EH&S
areas other than main
discipline. REQUIREMENTS:
expertise in industrial
hygiene and biosafety; working
knowledge of
regulations specific to hazard
communication and
bloodborne pathogens and
occupational health
including OSHA, EPA, DOT, and
Massachusetts DPH and
DEP; and general EHS
expertise. A minimum of
seven years of relevant
experience in
recognition, evaluation, and control of
hazardous materials and
conditions, and physical
agents required.
Experience in project management
needed. A bachelor's
degree in science or engineering
and a master's degree
in industrial hygiene or
environmental health
desirable. Certification in
industrial hygiene or
biological safety professional
desired. Hazwoper
training desirable. Ability to
manage people and
projects, think strategically, and
appropriately
prioritize heavy workload and client
needs necessary.
Service and team orientation
important. Must possess
active listening skills; a bias
for action; and the
ability to communicate for results,
think conceptually, and
build teams. Solid
problem-solving skills,
organizational and cultural
awareness, diplomacy,
and good judgment
necessary. Should be
able to appreciate and work to
achieve the big picture
while also being
detail-oriented. 02-0083P
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 13 Feb 2002 14:59:55 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Richard Fink
Subject: Re: Protocol
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
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boundary="=====================_191132253==_.ALT"
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Are they using wild type or the debilitate version that is commercially
available?
At 09:53 AM 02/13/02 -0500, you wrote:
>Hi All,
>
>We have a researcher who is proposing to infect mice with Semliki Forest
>Virus. I have read that although the virus is classified as BSL 3, most
>people working with low or moderate amounts of the virus perform their
>experiments at BSL 2. Is this correct? Does anyone have any concerns
>regarding research with SFV?
>
>
>Delia M. Vieira-Cruz
>Lab Safety Officer
>Albert Einstein College of Medicine
>1300 Morris Park Avenue, Forch 800
>Bronx, NY 10461
>(718)430-3560
>
>vieira@aecom.yu.edu
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
--=====================_191132253==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
Are they using wild type or the debilitate version that is commercially available?
At 09:53 AM 02/13/02 -0500, you wrote:
Hi All,
We have a researcher who is proposing to infect mice with Semliki Forest Virus. I have read that although the virus is classified as BSL 3, most people working with low or moderate amounts of the virus perform their experiments at BSL 2. Is this correct? Does anyone have any concerns regarding research with SFV?
Delia M. Vieira-Cruz
Lab Safety Officer
Albert Einstein College of Medicine
1300 Morris Park Avenue, Forch 800
Bronx, NY 10461
(718)430-3560
vieira@aecom.yu.edu
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
--=====================_191132253==_.ALT--
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 14 Feb 2002 07:24:40 EST
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Lindsey Kayman
Subject: Re: [Infectious Shipping Policies/Training]
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Aurali,
There is an example of online refresher training for shipping at =
. Th=
ere
is also a lot of info on shipping on that page.
At my institution we offer IATA refresher training every other month and =
cover
it at the end of initial bloodborne pathogen/biosafety training for new
employees.
Good luck,
Lindsey Kayman
"Dade, Aurali" wrote:
Hello All,
We have been kicking around different ideas to meet the IATA and DOT
requirements for Infectious Shipping Training for awhile now. We are com=
ing
down to decision time and I am hoping to get some input from those of you=
who teach or contract out this training. I am especially interested in a=
ny
policies that you may have and any training options that you can recommen=
d.
I am also interested in any experiences you can share (positive or negati=
ve)
with the Saf-T-Pak cd-rom training. I appreciate any advice and
information you are able to give. Thanks in advance.
Aurali Dade
Laboratory Safety Manager
TTUHSC Safety Services
____________________________________________________________________
Get free e-mail and a permanent address at
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 20 Feb 2002 10:42:46 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Klenner, James"
Subject: Bunsen burners in BSCs
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Greetings all,
I know this has come up in the past, but I would really appreciate some
feedback regarding the use of bunsen burners in Class II BSCs that
recirculate air. While the arguments against their use are clear (flammables
are prohibited and present explosive risks, and creation of air-flow
turbulence) Section V of the CDC/NIH Guidelines on Biosafety Cabinets allow
for touch-plate microburners with pilot lights. Does anyone have
institutional policies regarding their particular use in BSCs?
Thanks for any assistance you can offer.
James W. Klenner, MSc, MPH, MPA
Bio-Safety Manager
IUPUI, Environmental Health and Safety
620 Union Dr., UN043
Indianapolis, Indiana 46202-5167
(317) 274-2830
Fax (317) 278-2158
jklenner@iupui.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 20 Feb 2002 10:43:39 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Lori Nicholson
Subject: Serum to store Program
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
I need to write a policy for our company on serum to store. Would anyone
out there be willing to share your serum to store policy and procedures
with me.
If so, Please email me directly at lori_nicholson@
Thanks
Lor
Regards,
Lori Nicholson
Corporate Manager of EH&S
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 20 Feb 2002 10:21:42 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Cliff Bond
Subject: Review of field projects
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
The chair of the Animal Care and Use Committee has asked about review of
field projects where rodents are trapped. These projects involve PIs,
research personnel or graduate students. Occasionally, the projects
involve undergraduates. We recommend that the project directors adhere
to the guidelines developed by Jim Mills at the CDC Special Pathogens
Branch .
Some of the members of the Animal Care and Use Committee have asked the
Biosafety Committee to review these projects for infectious agents. The
question is - what do other Biosafety Committees do concerning review of
field projects?
Cliff Bond
Clifford W. Bond, Professor
Department of Microbiology
Montana State University
Bozeman, MT 59718
Telephone: (406) 994-4130
TeleFAX: (406) 994-4926
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 20 Feb 2002 13:15:03 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Robin Newberry
Subject: Re: Review of field projects
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed"
>Some of the members of the Animal Care and Use Committee have asked the
>Biosafety Committee to review these projects for infectious agents. The
>question is - what do other Biosafety Committees do concerning review of
>field projects?
We review projects where wild caught animals (any small animal - not
just rodents) or its tissues are going to be brought bacj for further
lab analysis on campus. Otherwise, we have an IBC approved standing
protocol that they are required to follow in the field.
--
Robin
--------------------------------------------------------------
W. Robert Newberry, IV CIH, CHMM
Chief Environmental Health and Safety Officer
Clemson University
wnewber@clemson.edu ehs@clemson.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 20 Feb 2002 13:49:11 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Gill Norton
Organization: University of Western Ontario
Subject: Re: Review of field projects
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
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At my institution all field projects involving trapping animals of any kind
must be reviewed by the Animal Use Committee.
Any animal which has a potential for transmission of a zoonotic infection
e.g Deermice and Hantavirus or american crows and West Nile Virus, is
reviewed for biosafety issues/ occupational health issues and procedures
written and/ or the people referred for a medical review as appropriate.
Undergraduate students ( as well as graduate students and research staff)
have to be included in any safety programme that is felt necessary and the
research supervisor is responsible for seeing that they are all informed and
trained.
Gillian
Cliff Bond wrote:
> The chair of the Animal Care and Use Committee has asked about review of
> field projects where rodents are trapped. These projects involve PIs,
> research personnel or graduate students. Occasionally, the projects
> involve undergraduates. We recommend that the project directors adhere
> to the guidelines developed by Jim Mills at the CDC Special Pathogens
> Branch .
>
> Some of the members of the Animal Care and Use Committee have asked the
> Biosafety Committee to review these projects for infectious agents. The
> question is - what do other Biosafety Committees do concerning review of
> field projects?
>
> Cliff Bond
>
> Clifford W. Bond, Professor
> Department of Microbiology
> Montana State University
> Bozeman, MT 59718
> Telephone: (406) 994-4130
> TeleFAX: (406) 994-4926
--
------------------------------------------------------------------
Gillian Norton
Biosafety Officer
The University of Western Ontario
Occupational Health and Safety
Stevenson Lawson Building, Rm. 60
Phone: (519)661-2036 Ext. 84747
FAX: (519)661-3420
-------------------------------------------------------------------
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 20 Feb 2002 15:44:10 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Richard Fink
Subject: Fwd: Rejected posting to BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="=====================_112915083==_.ALT"
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>
>
>We made the biosafety officer (me) an ex officio member of the IACUC =
>largely to deal with wildlife protocols.
>
>We have a separate form for mammalian wildlife studies. These must have =
>IBC approval. For rodents we use the CDC hantavirus recommendations. For =
>other mammals we usually ask for rabies vaccination.
>
>
>
>Andrew Cockburn, PhD
>Director of Research Compliance
>309 I Chesnut Ridge Research Bldg
>Box 6845
>West Virginia University
>Morgantown, WV 26506-6845
>
>telephone: 304-293-7157
--=====================_112915083==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
We made the biosafety officer (me) an ex officio member of the IACUC =
largely to deal with wildlife protocols.
We have a separate form for mammalian wildlife studies. These must have =
IBC approval. For rodents we use the CDC hantavirus recommendations. For =
other mammals we usually ask for rabies vaccination.
Andrew Cockburn, PhD
Director of Research Compliance
309 I Chesnut Ridge Research Bldg
Box 6845
West Virginia University
Morgantown, WV 26506-6845
telephone: 304-293-7157
--=====================_112915083==_.ALT--
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 20 Feb 2002 15:14:45 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Stan Klassen
Subject: Validation of Formaldehyde decontaminations
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Hello all:
I have been a "silent observer" of this discussion group for close to 2
years now, and have watched with interest the many ongoing discussions.
My duties at the Canadian Science Centre include decontamination and
certification of BSC's HEPA housings as well as occasionally decontaminating
containment labs.
We have been exploring the idea of doing a study to compare various
indicators used for validating the formaldehyde decontamination process. In
order to get started on this, I would like to do a mini survey of anybody out
there who does formaldehyde decontamination.
My questions are:
-Do you verify or validate your formaldehdye decontamination?
(yes, no, occasionally)
-If yes, what type of indicator do you use? (Chemical,
biological).
-If possible, could you please provide some information such as
the manufacturer, model # , catalog # etc. of the products you use for
validation.
You can e-mail this information directly to me. I will compile the responses and
get a summary back to this group for your information.
Thanks for all your help.
Stan Klassen
Canadian Science Centre for Human and Animal Health
Safety & Environmental Services
1015 Arlington St., Suite A1010
Winnipeg, MB R3E 3P6
Ph: 204-789-2056
Fax: 204-789-2118
EMail: stan_klassen@hc-sc.gc.ca
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 20 Feb 2002 13:38:02 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Elizabeth Smith
Subject: Latex gloves & alcohol
In-Reply-To:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Afternoon, all!
At the ABSA conference last October, someone stated rather
confidently that the practice of washing hands with isopropanol
while wearing latex gloves was very poor, since the alcohol
actually increases the size of the natural holes in the glove
material.
1. Is this true?
2. Any reference to the facts behind this?
I'm presenting some new training on glove selection: one group
for the chemists, one for the microbiologists. I am of course
interested in both aspects of safety - but I think I have a
pretty good grasp of the chemical end of things. So...
3. Any good pointers for where to get the skinny on
biologically protective glove materials and how they work?
Since I am looking at preventing relatively large objects from
contacting the skin. (bacteria vs. formaldehyde)
Thank you for your help,
Elizabeth
=====
Elizabeth Smith
Environmental, Health & Safety Manager
BioPort Corporation
3500 N. Martin L. King Blvd.
Lansing, MI 48906
__________________________________________________
Do You Yahoo!?
Yahoo! Sports - Coverage of the 2002 Olympic Games
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 20 Feb 2002 16:09:23 -0800
Reply-To: ulsoykwan@cuhk.edu.hk
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: YK Wan
Subject: Re: Validation of Formaldehyde decontaminations
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="------------BA2F4B1F9B0E2628F0B6C53F"
--------------BA2F4B1F9B0E2628F0B6C53F
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
X-MIME-Autoconverted: from 8bit to quoted-printable by dont.itsc.cuhk.edu.hk id IAA15897
Stan
You can search the catalog of Amsco and BPI. There are some spore strips=
of B.
subtilis.
Regards
YK Wan
Safety Officer
The Chinese University of Hong Kong
Stan Klassen =BCg=A4J=A1G
> Hello all:
> I have been a "silent observer" of this discussion group for close=
to 2
> years now, and have watched with interest the many ongoing discussions.
> My duties at the Canadian Science Centre include decontamination a=
nd
> certification of BSC's HEPA housings as well as occasionally decontamin=
ating
> containment labs.
>
> We have been exploring the idea of doing a study to compare variou=
s
> indicators used for validating the formaldehyde decontamination process=
. In
> order to get started on this, I would like to do a mini survey of anybo=
dy out
> there who does formaldehyde decontamination.
>
> My questions are:
> -Do you verify or validate your formaldehdye decontamina=
tion?
> (yes, no, occasionally)
> -If yes, what type of indicator do you use? (Chemical,
> biological).
> -If possible, could you please provide some information =
such as
> the manufacturer, model # , catalog # etc. of the products you use for
> validation.
>
> You can e-mail this information directly to me. I will compile the resp=
onses and
> get a summary back to this group for your information.
>
> Thanks for all your help.
>
> Stan Klassen
> Canadian Science Centre for Human and Animal Health
> Safety & Environmental Services
> 1015 Arlington St., Suite A1010
> Winnipeg, MB R3E 3P6
> Ph: 204-789-2056
> Fax: 204-789-2118
> EMail: stan_klassen@hc-sc.gc.ca
--------------BA2F4B1F9B0E2628F0B6C53F
Content-Type: text/html; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Stan
You can search the catalog of Amsco and BPI. There are some spore strips of B. subtilis.
Regards
YK Wan
Safety Officer
The Chinese University of Hong Kong
Stan Klassen ¼g¤J¡G
Hello all:
I have been a "silent observer" of this discussion group for close to 2
years now, and have watched with interest the many ongoing discussions.
My duties at the Canadian Science Centre include decontamination and
certification of BSC's HEPA housings as well as occasionally decontaminating
containment labs.
We have been exploring the idea of doing a study to compare various
indicators used for validating the formaldehyde decontamination process. In
order to get started on this, I would like to do a mini survey of anybody out
there who does formaldehyde decontamination.
My questions are:
-Do you verify or validate your formaldehdye decontamination?
(yes, no, occasionally)
-If yes, what type of indicator do you use? (Chemical,
biological).
-If possible, could you please provide some information such as
the manufacturer, model # , catalog # etc. of the products you use for
validation.
You can e-mail this information directly to me. I will compile the responses and
get a summary back to this group for your information.
Thanks for all your help.
Stan Klassen
Canadian Science Centre for Human and Animal Health
Safety & Environmental Services
1015 Arlington St., Suite A1010
Winnipeg, MB R3E 3P6
Ph: 204-789-2056
Fax: 204-789-2118
EMail: stan_klassen@hc-sc.gc.ca
--------------BA2F4B1F9B0E2628F0B6C53F--
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 20 Feb 2002 16:12:43 -0800
Reply-To: ulsoykwan@cuhk.edu.hk
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: YK Wan
Subject: Re: Latex gloves & alcohol
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Elizabeth
There are thin gloves that made of nitrile rubber. I think they works
for general laboratory chemical and biological materials.
Regards,
YK Wan
Safety Officer
The Chinese University of Hong Kong
Elizabeth Smith =BCg=A4J=A1G
> Afternoon, all!
>
> At the ABSA conference last October, someone stated rather
> confidently that the practice of washing hands with isopropanol
> while wearing latex gloves was very poor, since the alcohol
> actually increases the size of the natural holes in the glove
> material.
>
> 1. Is this true?
> 2. Any reference to the facts behind this?
>
> I'm presenting some new training on glove selection: one group
> for the chemists, one for the microbiologists. I am of course
> interested in both aspects of safety - but I think I have a
> pretty good grasp of the chemical end of things. So...
>
> 3. Any good pointers for where to get the skinny on
> biologically protective glove materials and how they work?
> Since I am looking at preventing relatively large objects from
> contacting the skin. (bacteria vs. formaldehyde)
>
> Thank you for your help,
>
> Elizabeth
>
> =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
> Elizabeth Smith
> Environmental, Health & Safety Manager
> BioPort Corporation
> 3500 N. Martin L. King Blvd.
> Lansing, MI 48906
>
> __________________________________________________
> Do You Yahoo!?
> Yahoo! Sports - Coverage of the 2002 Olympic Games
>
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 21 Feb 2002 15:31:51 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Lenore Koliha
Subject: science buildings
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII
Good day,
I am looking for any policies, procedures, or experiences in
decommissioning science buildings for total renovation. I am especially
interested in efforts in decontamination of fume hoods, ducting, etc., and
any protocol regarding the removal of these items by contracted
personnel. Any and all information is much appreciated.
Thanks in advance,
Lenore Koliha
*****************************************************************
* *
* Lenore Koliha e-mail: lkoliha@creighton.edu *
* Chemical Coordinator ph#: (402)546-6404 *
* Dept. EH&S fax: (402)546-6403 *
* Creighton U. *
* Jahn Bldg., Rm-110 *
* 2204 Burt St. *
* Omaha, NE 68178 *
*****************************************************************
The true measure of a man is not by the life he leads...
but by the memory he leaves behind.
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 22 Feb 2002 08:50:38 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Richard Fink
Subject: Sad news
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="=====================_260902758==_.ALT"
--=====================_260902758==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
>
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: OPS Announcements
> > Sent: Thursday, February 21, 2002 2:37 PM
> > To: OPS Ann. Work Related Personal Information
> > Cc: 'opsannouncements@'
> > Subject: Death of a CDC Employee - Richard C. Knudsen
> >
> >
> > We are saddened to announce:
> >
> > Richard C. Knudsen died early in the morning on February 21, 2002,
> > after a noble
> > and heroic struggle with cancer. He is survived by his wife, Kathy
> > (also a CDC employee),
> > two children, and three sisters.
> >
> >
> > The Visitation will be February 23, 2002 from 3 p.m. to 5 p.m.
> >
> > Lee's Funeral Home
> > 2476 Lawrenceville Hwy.
> > Decatur 30033
> > 404-929-0063
> >
> > Funeral Services will not be held. No flowers please.
> >
> >
> > A memorial fund has been established by the American Biological
> > Safety Association to recognize excellence in scientific publication
> > by its members. Donations can be sent to: ABSA, 1202 Allanson
> > Road, Mundelein, IL 60060
> >
> >
> >
> > Rich earned his Ph.D. in Microbiology in 1971 from the University of
> > Arizona, then served a two-year National Research Council Postdoctoral
> > Fellowship with the Naval Medical Research Institute (NMRI), Bethesda. He
> > held positions in research at NMRI and the Plum Island Animal Disease
> > Center (PIADC) in New York. Rich then focused his attention on biological
> > safety, first at PIADC, and then at the Centers for Disease Control and
> > Prevention in Atlanta, serving for eleven years as the Chief, Laboratory
> > Safety Branch and as Biological Safety Officer.
> >
> > Throughout his professional career, Dr. Knudsen published forty scientific
> > papers on foot-and-mouth disease and African swine fever research and an
> > additional twenty papers of biological safety interest. He was a
> > recognized national and international expert on biological safety and a
> > highly sought-after speaker.
> >
> > Dr. Knudsen was very involved with the American Biological Safety
> > Association. He served in various capacities, including President and
> > Editor of Applied Biosafety. He served as a guest editor for the 4th
> > edition the CDC/NIH publication, Biosafety in Microbiological and
> > Biomedical Laboratories. Rich was also an active mentor to ABSA members
> > and others who sought his advice on biological safety matters.
> >
> > Rich had been very involved with the Boy Scout program, here in Atlanta as
> > well as on Long Island. He coached several soccer teams and was always
> > available to support his team members off the field as well. He will be
> > missed.
> >
> > Point of Contact for this announcement is Jonathan Richmond, Director/OHS
> > - (404)639-2453.
> >
--=====================_260902758==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
> -----Original Message-----
> From: OPS Announcements
> Sent: Thursday, February 21, 2002 2:37 PM
> To: OPS Ann. Work Related Personal Information
> Cc: 'opsannouncements@'
> Subject: Death of a CDC Employee - Richard C. Knudsen
>
>
> We are saddened to announce:
>
> Richard C. Knudsen died early in the morning on February 21, 2002,
> after a noble
> and heroic struggle with cancer. He is survived by his wife, Kathy
> (also a CDC employee),
> two children, and three sisters.
>
>
> The Visitation will be February 23, 2002 from 3 p.m. to 5 p.m.
>
> Lee's Funeral Home
> 2476 Lawrenceville Hwy.
> Decatur 30033
> 404-929-0063
>
> Funeral Services will not be held. No flowers please.
>
>
> A memorial fund has been established by the American Biological
> Safety Association to recognize excellence in scientific publication
> by its members. Donations can be sent to: ABSA, 1202 Allanson
> Road, Mundelein, IL 60060
>
>
>
> Rich earned his Ph.D. in Microbiology in 1971 from the University of
> Arizona, then served a two-year National Research Council Postdoctoral
> Fellowship with the Naval Medical Research Institute (NMRI), Bethesda. He
> held positions in research at NMRI and the Plum Island Animal Disease
> Center (PIADC) in New York. Rich then focused his attention on biological
> safety, first at PIADC, and then at the Centers for Disease Control and
> Prevention in Atlanta, serving for eleven years as the Chief, Laboratory
> Safety Branch and as Biological Safety Officer.
>
> Throughout his professional career, Dr. Knudsen published forty scientific
> papers on foot-and-mouth disease and African swine fever research and an
> additional twenty papers of biological safety interest. He was a
> recognized national and international expert on biological safety and a
> highly sought-after speaker.
>
> Dr. Knudsen was very involved with the American Biological Safety
> Association. He served in various capacities, including President and
> Editor of Applied Biosafety. He served as a guest editor for the 4th
> edition the CDC/NIH publication, Biosafety in Microbiological and
> Biomedical Laboratories. Rich was also an active mentor to ABSA members
> and others who sought his advice on biological safety matters.
>
> Rich had been very involved with the Boy Scout program, here in Atlanta as
> well as on Long Island. He coached several soccer teams and was always
> available to support his team members off the field as well. He will be
> missed.
>
> Point of Contact for this announcement is Jonathan Richmond, Director/OHS
> - (404)639-2453.
>
--=====================_260902758==_.ALT--
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2002 09:45:26 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Richard Fink
Subject: Re: Latex gloves & alcohol
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
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It took awhile for me to get to our files and find the reference regarding
gloves and alcohol. "Virus Penetration of Examination Gloves", by Robert
Klein, Esmeralda Party & Edward Gershey. BioTechniques Vol 9, #2, 196-9, 1990.
They found that polyethylene failed as a viral barrier 40% of the time
pre-exposure to ethanol (70%) and 94% afterwards. Similar experiment with
polyvinyl chloride gloves - failure rate went from 22% to 56%. Latex
gloves had failure rate of 3. Any good pointers for where to get the skinny on
>biologically protective glove materials and how they work?
>Since I am looking at preventing relatively large objects from
>contacting the skin. (bacteria vs. formaldehyde)
Gloves work as a barrier - no holes big enough to allow microorganisms
through. This is much easier to obtain then preventing chemicals from
permeating through.
>=====
>Elizabeth Smith
>Environmental, Health & Safety Manager
>BioPort Corporation
>3500 N. Martin L. King Blvd.
>Lansing, MI 48906
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Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
It took awhile for me to get to our files and find the reference regarding gloves and alcohol. "Virus Penetration of Examination Gloves", by Robert Klein, Esmeralda Party & Edward Gershey. BioTechniques Vol 9, #2, 196-9, 1990.
They found that polyethylene failed as a viral barrier 40% of the time pre-exposure to ethanol (70%) and 94% afterwards. Similar experiment with polyvinyl chloride gloves - failure rate went from 22% to 56%. Latex gloves had failure rate of >> gmorris@PRO- 02/27/02 10:34AM >>>
...
2. Does anyone have data on the numbers and categories of HIV, HBV and HCV
work-related infections?
Thanks in advance,
Gary Morris
EHS Manager
Pro-Virus, Inc.
Gaithersburg, Maryland
One of our training tapes from the early 1990s says that there had been
about 50 health profession occupational cases in the US of HIV infections.
I would expect that most of those occurred in the early 1980s.
Of course, if you consider prostitutes to be workers, then the number of
work-related cases would be very high for both HIV and HBV.
Andrew Cockburn, PhD
Director of Research Compliance
309 I Chesnut Ridge Research Bldg
Box 6845
West Virginia University
Morgantown, WV 26506-6845
telephone: 304-293-7157
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 27 Feb 2002 13:47:13 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Dade, Aurali"
Subject: Animal Biosafety Level 3 Facility
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Hello Group,
I am looking for information about construction of an Animal Biosafety
Level 3 Facility (I already have the BMBL guidelines). What I am
specifically hoping for is advice from anyone who has been involved with
this type of construction at their facility - recommended architects, things
to avoid, things to make sure are included, etc. I appreciate anything that
you are able to share.
Aurali Dade
Laboratory Safety Manger
TTUHSC Safety Services
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 27 Feb 2002 14:58:13 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Byers, Karen B"
Subject: Re: Animal Biosafety Level 3 Facility
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
You might find the NIH design website very helpful for technical details of
Biosafety Level 3 facility construction.
Karen B. Byers, MS, RBP, CBSP
Biosafety Officer, Dana-Farber Cancer Institute
44 Binney Street - SWG350
Boston, MA 02115
karen_byers@dfci.harvard.edu
617-632-3890
fax: 617-632-1932
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Dade, Aurali [SMTP:Aurali.Dade@TTMC.TTUHSC.EDU]
> Sent: Wednesday, February 27, 2002 2:47 PM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: Animal Biosafety Level 3 Facility
>
> Hello Group,
> I am looking for information about construction of an Animal Biosafety
> Level 3 Facility (I already have the BMBL guidelines). What I am
> specifically hoping for is advice from anyone who has been involved with
> this type of construction at their facility - recommended architects, things
> to avoid, things to make sure are included, etc. I appreciate anything that
> you are able to share.
> Aurali Dade
> Laboratory Safety Manger
> TTUHSC Safety Services
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 27 Feb 2002 15:44:04 EST
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ed Krisiunas
Subject: HIV/AIDS Surveillance Report: Midyear 2001 Edition
MIME-Version: 1.0
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boundary="part1_8e.23aee8c8.29ae9f14_boundary"
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The "HIV/AIDS Surveillance Report: Midyear 2001 Edition," Volume 13, Number
1 is now available at .
This edition covers U.S. HIV and AIDS cases reported through June 2001 and
includes new tables which present trends in estimated annual AIDS incidence
from 1996 through 2000, by U.S. region, race/ethnicity, and exposure
category.
Regards,
Edward Krisiunas, MT(ASCP), CIC, MPH
President
WNWN International
PO Box 1164
Burlington, Connecticut
06013
860-675-1217
860-675-1311(fax)
860-944-2373(mobile)
--part1_8e.23aee8c8.29ae9f14_boundary
Content-Type: text/html; charset="US-ASCII"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
The "HIV/AIDS Surveillance Report: Midyear 2001 Edition," Volume 13, Number
1 is now available at .
This edition covers U.S. HIV and AIDS cases reported through June 2001 and
includes new tables which present trends in estimated annual AIDS incidence
from 1996 through 2000, by U.S. region, race/ethnicity, and exposure
category.
Regards,
Edward Krisiunas, MT(ASCP), CIC, MPH
President
WNWN International
PO Box 1164
Burlington, Connecticut
06013
860-675-1217
860-675-1311(fax)
860-944-2373(mobile)
--part1_8e.23aee8c8.29ae9f14_boundary--
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 27 Feb 2002 16:15:44 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Morris, Gary"
Subject: Re: HIV/AIDS Surveillance Report: Midyear 2001 Edition
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="----_=_NextPart_001_01C1BFD3.EAE89400"
This message is in MIME format. Since your mail reader does not understand
this format, some or all of this message may not be legible.
------_=_NextPart_001_01C1BFD3.EAE89400
Content-Type: text/plain
Thanks Edward.
-----Original Message-----
From: Ed Krisiunas [mailto:EKrisiunas@]
Sent: Wednesday, February 27, 2002 3:44 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: HIV/AIDS Surveillance Report: Midyear 2001 Edition
The "HIV/AIDS Surveillance Report: Midyear 2001 Edition," Volume 13, Number
1 is now available at .
This edition covers U.S. HIV and AIDS cases reported through June 2001 and
includes new tables which present trends in estimated annual AIDS incidence
from 1996 through 2000, by U.S. region, race/ethnicity, and exposure
category.
Regards,
Edward Krisiunas, MT(ASCP), CIC, MPH
President
WNWN International
PO Box 1164
Burlington, Connecticut
06013
860-675-1217
860-675-1311(fax)
860-944-2373(mobile)
------_=_NextPart_001_01C1BFD3.EAE89400
Content-Type: text/html
Thanks Edward.
-----Original Message-----
From: Ed Krisiunas [mailto:EKrisiunas@]
Sent: Wednesday, February 27, 2002 3:44 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: HIV/AIDS Surveillance Report: Midyear 2001 Edition
The "HIV/AIDS Surveillance Report: Midyear 2001 Edition," Volume 13, Number
1 is now available at .
This edition covers U.S. HIV and AIDS cases reported through June 2001 and
includes new tables which present trends in estimated annual AIDS incidence
from 1996 through 2000, by U.S. region, race/ethnicity, and exposure
category.
Regards,
Edward Krisiunas, MT(ASCP), CIC, MPH
President
WNWN International
PO Box 1164
Burlington, Connecticut
06013
860-675-1217
860-675-1311(fax)
860-944-2373(mobile)
------_=_NextPart_001_01C1BFD3.EAE89400--
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 27 Feb 2002 16:17:00 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "David N. Easton"
Subject: UV Lights
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Biosafety Folks:
I am painted into a corner and I would really appreciate some help from
your collective expertise.
A few weeks ago the University took possession of a new medical research
facility and the investigators are now moving in. When the biosafety
cabinets were specified in the planning stages, I specifically
instructed the supplier to eliminate all UV lights because of their
inherent worthlessness and potential problems they can cause. Although
I will never relent on this view, the investigators' collective response
is as though I specified cabinets without HEPA filters. The whining has
begun.
Here's the deal... I meet with a room full of these characters this
Friday to do battle. Does anyone have access to some of the study
references that provide dramatic contraindications for UV disinfect ion
in Class II cabinets? I'm aware of the verbiage in the little green
CDC/NIH book, and there was a paper presented at the 2000 ABSA
Conference.
Please help me in my conquest to instill an additional aliquot of logic
in an uncertain world.
David N. Easton
Biological Safety Officer
Univ. of Virginia
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 27 Feb 2002 17:00:07 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Hawkins, Lawrence J"
Subject: Re: Animal Biosafety Level 3 Facility
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Contact the Association for Assessment and Accreditation of Laboratory
Animal Care International (AAALAC) at:
The have an excellent CD-rom titled , "Handbook of Facilities Planning." It
will have the information you are looking for.
Lawrence J. Hawkins
Manager, Environmental & Radiation Safety and
Radiation Safety Officer
Department of Risk Management and Safety Services
University of Oklahoma
905 Asp Ave, Room 112
Norman, OK 73019
Phone: 405.325.0820
Fax: 405.325.7238
ljhawkins@ou.edu
-----Original Message-----
From: Dade, Aurali [mailto:Aurali.Dade@TTMC.TTUHSC.EDU]
Sent: Wednesday, February 27, 2002 1:47 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Animal Biosafety Level 3 Facility
Hello Group,
I am looking for information about construction of an Animal Biosafety
Level 3 Facility (I already have the BMBL guidelines). What I am
specifically hoping for is advice from anyone who has been involved with
this type of construction at their facility - recommended architects, things
to avoid, things to make sure are included, etc. I appreciate anything that
you are able to share.
Aurali Dade
Laboratory Safety Manger
TTUHSC Safety Services
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 28 Feb 2002 08:02:12 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Hanna, Michael"
Subject: Re: UV Lights
MIME-Version: 1.0
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charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
David Easton - Here's the word:
- The University of Michigan no longer supports the use of UVC =
germicidal lights use in general-use biological safety cabinets. They =
lend little or no value to personal safety or product sterility and have =
resulted in hazardous exposures and an expensive hazardous waste =
disposal problem.
- To every rule there are a few exception - one being QA/QC =
environments for FDA IND biopharm production where surface and air =
contamination monitoring is a regiment. In these environments, the use =
of UVC is seen as an added assurance that materials produced for =
human-use in clinical trials will be safe.
- The other exception is in our BL-3 anthrax lab where Lumalier =
fixtures deliver 20 mW/cm2 through out the lab as a biosafety QC =
assurance. This is a measured parameter of facility performance and =
these expensive fixtures are changed-out annually.
We have 850 BSC's registered in our certification program. This UVC =
posture of ours is new as of this FY, and we're slowly depleting our =
stockpile of bulbs. When they're gone, we will no longer install them; =
but that leaves the issue of removing and disposing of the hundreds of =
bulbs already installed that will visibly fail over the next two years =
(actually they effectively fail in 6 months or less, but appear to still =
be working). We expect our investigators to voice a complaint here or =
there, but the burden is upon them to justify use, and that would be =
exceedingly difficult these days. mgh
-------------------------------------------
Michael G. Hanna
Mgr - Biological & Laboratory Safety
Occupational Safety & Environ. Health
University of Michigan
-----Original Message-----
From: David N. Easton [mailto:dne2a@VIRGINIA.EDU]
Sent: Wednesday, February 27, 2002 4:17 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: UV Lights
Biosafety Folks:
I am painted into a corner and I would really appreciate some help from
your collective expertise.
A few weeks ago the University took possession of a new medical research
facility and the investigators are now moving in. When the biosafety
cabinets were specified in the planning stages, I specifically
instructed the supplier to eliminate all UV lights because of their
inherent worthlessness and potential problems they can cause. Although
I will never relent on this view, the investigators' collective response
is as though I specified cabinets without HEPA filters. The whining has
begun.
Here's the deal... I meet with a room full of these characters this
Friday to do battle. Does anyone have access to some of the study
references that provide dramatic contraindications for UV disinfect ion
in Class II cabinets? I'm aware of the verbiage in the little green
CDC/NIH book, and there was a paper presented at the 2000 ABSA
Conference.
Please help me in my conquest to instill an additional aliquot of logic
in an uncertain world.
David N. Easton
Biological Safety Officer
Univ. of Virginia
------_=_NextPart_001_01C1C058.236BC9B0
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Subject: Michael G. Hanna
Date: Mon, 12 Nov 2001 20:26:30 -0500
Message-ID:
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Thread-Index: AcFr4jf7PEPHAKApTCmUyuNlRZGNgQ==
From: "Hanna, Michael"
Emergency Response - Wayne Co. EMD - Tech. Support Team (TST)
Biosafety - Univ. of Michigan Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC)
research.umich.edu/research/contacts/ovpr/BRRC.pdf
------_=_NextPart_001_01C1C058.236BC9B0--
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 28 Feb 2002 07:19:10 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Tom Sawicki
Subject: Re: UV Lights
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Our policy is to have all new Class II Biological Safety Cabinets ordered or come equipped with UV lights and to leave the option of using to the researcher/diagnostician (our customer). We maintain all lights and only remove the bulb when requested. With our staffing structure we have a very fluid base of persons using the cabinet, so we don't have 1 cabinet for 1 researcher/diagnostician (our cabinets must be equipped for everyone's use requirements.)
I understand the issue of UV or not, however sometimes you cannot convince the persons who pay our salary.
We work with our personnel and respond to their needs and convince through education on the safety subject matter. It doesn't pay to treat or refer to the persons that you serve as was in the email.
Thomas Sawicki, Biological Safety Officer
USDA Plum Island Animal Disease Center, NY
>>> "David N. Easton" 2/27/02 4:17 PM >>>
Biosafety Folks:
I am painted into a corner and I would really appreciate some help from
your collective expertise.
A few weeks ago the University took possession of a new medical research
facility and the investigators are now moving in. When the biosafety
cabinets were specified in the planning stages, I specifically
instructed the supplier to eliminate all UV lights because of their
inherent worthlessness and potential problems they can cause. Although
I will never relent on this view, the investigators' collective response
is as though I specified cabinets without HEPA filters. The whining has
begun.
Here's the deal... I meet with a room full of these characters this
Friday to do battle. Does anyone have access to some of the study
references that provide dramatic contraindications for UV disinfect ion
in Class II cabinets? I'm aware of the verbiage in the little green
CDC/NIH book, and there was a paper presented at the 2000 ABSA
Conference.
Please help me in my conquest to instill an additional aliquot of logic
in an uncertain world.
David N. Easton
Biological Safety Officer
Univ. of Virginia
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 28 Feb 2002 07:08:23 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Funk,Glenn"
Subject: Re: UV Lights
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
David -
As you're probably aware, ABSA has had a white paper on UV use in BSCs
"forthcoming" for quite a while. Jack Keene is knowledgeable about this
effort. Let's ask him - Jack, are there any trustworthy references cited
in the white paper draft that may be of help here? You and I both know how
loudly faculty members can whine when they think their cherished but
outdated practices are threatened.
Glenn
Glenn A. Funk, Ph.D., CBSP
Director and Biosafety Officer
Environmental Health and Safety
Aviron
408-845-8857
====================================
At 04:17 PM 2/27/02 -0500, you wrote:
>Biosafety Folks:
>
>I am painted into a corner and I would really appreciate some help from
>your collective expertise.
>
>A few weeks ago the University took possession of a new medical research
>facility and the investigators are now moving in. When the biosafety
>cabinets were specified in the planning stages, I specifically
>instructed the supplier to eliminate all UV lights because of their
>inherent worthlessness and potential problems they can cause. Although
>I will never relent on this view, the investigators' collective response
>is as though I specified cabinets without HEPA filters. The whining has
>begun.
>
>Here's the deal... I meet with a room full of these characters this
>Friday to do battle. Does anyone have access to some of the study
>references that provide dramatic contraindications for UV disinfect ion
>in Class II cabinets? I'm aware of the verbiage in the little green
>CDC/NIH book, and there was a paper presented at the 2000 ABSA
>Conference.
>
>Please help me in my conquest to instill an additional aliquot of logic
>in an uncertain world.
>
>David N. Easton
>Biological Safety Officer
>Univ. of Virginia
>
This e-mail message is for the sole use of the intended recipient(s) and may
contain confidential, proprietary or privileged information.
Any unauthorized review, use, disclosure or distribution is prohibited.
If you are not the intended recipient, please contact the sender by reply
e-mail and destroy all copies of the original message, enclosures and
attachments.
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 28 Feb 2002 11:11:32 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Byers, Karen B"
Subject: Re: UV Lights
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
"Ultraviolet Radiation Exposures in Biomedical Research Laboratories", Appl.
Occup. Environ. Hyg. 10(12) 1995: 969-971 evaluates the UV permissible
exposure time for general eye level in the center of the room . This is
measured in a room with a single biosafety cabinet, with a single 254- or
280- wavelength ultraviolet light, with the sash fixed open at 9". This
paper found, under these conditions, a UV permissible exposure time of 32
minutes to 1.4 hours. I was very surprised by this. We have added the
advice -- turn off the uv light if you're in the room -- to training and I
am seeing fewer and fewer uv bulbs actually on in bsc's. If you want a
copy of the paper, contact me off-line.
Karen B. Byers, MS, RBP, CBSP
Biosafety Officer, Dana-Farber Cancer Institute
44 Binney Street - SWG350
Boston, MA 02115
karen_byers@dfci.harvard.edu
617-632-3890
fax: 617-632-1932
> -----Original Message-----
> From: David N. Easton [SMTP:dne2a@VIRGINIA.EDU]
> Sent: Wednesday, February 27, 2002 4:17 PM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: UV Lights
>
> Biosafety Folks:
>
> I am painted into a corner and I would really appreciate some help from
> your collective expertise.
>
> A few weeks ago the University took possession of a new medical research
> facility and the investigators are now moving in. When the biosafety
> cabinets were specified in the planning stages, I specifically
> instructed the supplier to eliminate all UV lights because of their
> inherent worthlessness and potential problems they can cause. Although
> I will never relent on this view, the investigators' collective response
> is as though I specified cabinets without HEPA filters. The whining has
> begun.
>
> Here's the deal... I meet with a room full of these characters this
> Friday to do battle. Does anyone have access to some of the study
> references that provide dramatic contraindications for UV disinfect ion
> in Class II cabinets? I'm aware of the verbiage in the little green
> CDC/NIH book, and there was a paper presented at the 2000 ABSA
> Conference.
>
> Please help me in my conquest to instill an additional aliquot of logic
> in an uncertain world.
>
> David N. Easton
> Biological Safety Officer
> Univ. of Virginia
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 28 Feb 2002 08:57:01 -0900
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "David A. Bunzow"
Subject: Re: UV Lights
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Glenn and Others:
David Easton appeared to be asking for several areas of help in his post.
I have not seen anyone address the issue of original post on this subject:
What I read was a call for how to address a potentially hostile audience
where the issues are likely cultural/behavioral rather than scientific, and
how to "do battle" with the whiners (and we all have them, don't we??).
Anyone want to take a shot at addressing our colleagues' real concern?
I suspect David may already have his scientific ducks aligned, but what
do you suggest on addressing academics who choose not to become
educated to more modern understanding?
"Funk,Glenn" wrote:
> David -
>
> As you're probably aware, ABSA has had a white paper on UV use in BSCs
> "forthcoming" for quite a while. Jack Keene is knowledgeable about this
> effort. Let's ask him - Jack, are there any trustworthy references cited
> in the white paper draft that may be of help here? You and I both know how
> loudly faculty members can whine when they think their cherished but
> outdated practices are threatened.
>
> Glenn
>
> Glenn A. Funk, Ph.D., CBSP
> Director and Biosafety Officer
> Environmental Health and Safety
> Aviron
> 408-845-8857
>
> ====================================
>
> At 04:17 PM 2/27/02 -0500, you wrote:
> >Biosafety Folks:
> >
> >I am painted into a corner and I would really appreciate some help from
> >your collective expertise.
> >
> >A few weeks ago the University took possession of a new medical research
> >facility and the investigators are now moving in. When the biosafety
> >cabinets were specified in the planning stages, I specifically
> >instructed the supplier to eliminate all UV lights because of their
> >inherent worthlessness and potential problems they can cause. Although
> >I will never relent on this view, the investigators' collective response
> >is as though I specified cabinets without HEPA filters. The whining has
> >begun.
> >
> >Here's the deal... I meet with a room full of these characters this
> >Friday to do battle. Does anyone have access to some of the study
> >references that provide dramatic contraindications for UV disinfect ion
> >in Class II cabinets? I'm aware of the verbiage in the little green
> >CDC/NIH book, and there was a paper presented at the 2000 ABSA
> >Conference.
> >
> >Please help me in my conquest to instill an additional aliquot of logic
> >in an uncertain world.
> >
> >David N. Easton
> >Biological Safety Officer
> >Univ. of Virginia
> >
>
> This e-mail message is for the sole use of the intended recipient(s) and may
> contain confidential, proprietary or privileged information.
> Any unauthorized review, use, disclosure or distribution is prohibited.
> If you are not the intended recipient, please contact the sender by reply
> e-mail and destroy all copies of the original message, enclosures and
> attachments.
--
David A. Bunzow CET; CHMM; REM
University of Alaska
Many Traditions One Alaska
Statewide Office of Risk Management
Environmental, Health and Safety Manager
1-907-474-5005 (phone)
1-907-474-5634 (fax)
sndab1@alaska.edu
alaska.edu/swrisk/
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 28 Feb 2002 11:58:31 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Madeline J. Dalrymple"
Subject: Re: UV Lights
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT
Everyone wants to be heard, including researchers and PI's. I have had
some good results by listening to the others concerns, and paraphrasing
that back to them. It takes a while but when they realize that I
sincerely want to understand their concerns, they become more receptive
to listening to my concerns.
I think of EHS as supporting the researcher and ensuring safe and legal
research. Changing my mental image from an adversarial to a support
role helps in my communication with our researchers.
It also helps me to remember that change is hard for all of us, and I
should not expect change to happen instantaneously.
Madeline Dalrymple
Biological Safety Officer
Environmental Health and Safety
University of Wyoming, Laramie, Wyoming, USA
766-2723, fax 766-5678, dalrympl@uwyo.edu
-----Original Message-----
From: David A. Bunzow [mailto:sndab1@ALASKA.EDU]
Sent: Thursday, February 28, 2002 10:57 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: UV Lights
Glenn and Others:
David Easton appeared to be asking for several areas of help in his
post.
I have not seen anyone address the issue of original post on this
subject:
What I read was a call for how to address a potentially hostile audience
where the issues are likely cultural/behavioral rather than scientific,
and
how to "do battle" with the whiners (and we all have them, don't we??).
Anyone want to take a shot at addressing our colleagues' real concern?
I suspect David may already have his scientific ducks aligned, but what
do you suggest on addressing academics who choose not to become
educated to more modern understanding?
"Funk,Glenn" wrote:
> David -
>
> As you're probably aware, ABSA has had a white paper on UV use in BSCs
> "forthcoming" for quite a while. Jack Keene is knowledgeable about
this
> effort. Let's ask him - Jack, are there any trustworthy references
cited
> in the white paper draft that may be of help here? You and I both
know how
> loudly faculty members can whine when they think their cherished but
> outdated practices are threatened.
>
> Glenn
>
> Glenn A. Funk, Ph.D., CBSP
> Director and Biosafety Officer
> Environmental Health and Safety
> Aviron
> 408-845-8857
>
> ====================================
>
> At 04:17 PM 2/27/02 -0500, you wrote:
> >Biosafety Folks:
> >
> >I am painted into a corner and I would really appreciate some help
from
> >your collective expertise.
> >
> >A few weeks ago the University took possession of a new medical
research
> >facility and the investigators are now moving in. When the biosafety
> >cabinets were specified in the planning stages, I specifically
> >instructed the supplier to eliminate all UV lights because of their
> >inherent worthlessness and potential problems they can cause.
Although
> >I will never relent on this view, the investigators' collective
response
> >is as though I specified cabinets without HEPA filters. The whining
has
> >begun.
> >
> >Here's the deal... I meet with a room full of these characters this
> >Friday to do battle. Does anyone have access to some of the study
> >references that provide dramatic contraindications for UV disinfect
ion
> >in Class II cabinets? I'm aware of the verbiage in the little green
> >CDC/NIH book, and there was a paper presented at the 2000 ABSA
> >Conference.
> >
> >Please help me in my conquest to instill an additional aliquot of
logic
> >in an uncertain world.
> >
> >David N. Easton
> >Biological Safety Officer
> >Univ. of Virginia
> >
>
> This e-mail message is for the sole use of the intended recipient(s)
and may
> contain confidential, proprietary or privileged information.
> Any unauthorized review, use, disclosure or distribution is
prohibited.
> If you are not the intended recipient, please contact the sender by
reply
> e-mail and destroy all copies of the original message, enclosures and
> attachments.
--
David A. Bunzow CET; CHMM; REM
University of Alaska
Many Traditions One Alaska
Statewide Office of Risk Management
Environmental, Health and Safety Manager
1-907-474-5005 (phone)
1-907-474-5634 (fax)
sndab1@alaska.edu
alaska.edu/swrisk/
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 28 Feb 2002 11:42:31 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Funk,Glenn"
Subject: Re: UV Lights
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
I personally believe this is one of the most pressing and stress-inducing
problems facing the academic (and in some cases, biotech) Biosafety
Officer. We certainly don't want to drop to the level of using the CEO's
or the Dean's "clout" to force the issue and taking the safety cop
approach, quoting regulatory chapter and verse and threatening mayhem for
violations, is generally unwelcome, often dangerous and usually
counterproductive. I believe the best approach is to present a strong
argument backed up with logic and knowledge. The critical factor for
success here is credibility - do you have it? If you do, making your point
may still be a hard sell but if you don't, it may be a nearly impossible
sell. So for me, the question (at least in this analysis) boils down to
how I establish the credibility that will allow my audience to pay
attention, recognize relevant points, counter with responses and questions
that aren't "dumbed-down", and in general, have an intelligent discourse
with me as my peer in this particular subject area.
Again in my own opinion, this is why it is so important for a BSO to be
well-grounded in basic and medical microbiology, biochemistry and molecular
genetics. After all, our jobs center around the prevention of inadvertent
infection. Much of my credibility, at least in the early "formative"
stages, is based on the impression I create when I first speak on a
technical level - if I immediately insert my foot in my mouth by saying
something factually incorrect or any other indicator that I might not know
what I'm talking about, I've already lost a good part of my audience and
I'll be playing catch-up for a while trying to recapture whatever
credibility I may have started out with. We're called upon, by our
customers as well as courts of law, to be experts in biosafety and we need
to be able to carry that off. The only way to do that is to know our stuff
cold and be able to back up our knowledge with citations, supporting
opinions and anything else relevant.
The hard references David seeks may be important in his factual
understanding of how UV lamps work and how they are misused and
misunderstood, but it's my opinion that they should be held in reserve for
use only as a last resort. If I were in his shoes, my first approach would
be to make my point and then carefully lay out my reasoning, using examples
that would indicate the inherent weaknesses of UV/BSC use and the potential
costs for violating any of the requirements for maximal UV operation. Then
I'd sit back, listen to the responses and try to refute them directly and
accurately. From here on, it's "playing it by ear" and I may ultimately
have to accede to someone's old habits or someone else's cGMP requirements
and either order cabinets for them with UV or retrofit their cabinets.
-- Glenn
========================================
At 08:57 AM 2/28/02 -0900, you wrote:
>Glenn and Others:
>David Easton appeared to be asking for several areas of help in his post.
>I have not seen anyone address the issue of original post on this subject:
>What I read was a call for how to address a potentially hostile audience
>where the issues are likely cultural/behavioral rather than scientific, and
>how to "do battle" with the whiners (and we all have them, don't we??).
>
>Anyone want to take a shot at addressing our colleagues' real concern?
>I suspect David may already have his scientific ducks aligned, but what
>do you suggest on addressing academics who choose not to become
>educated to more modern understanding?
>
>
>"Funk,Glenn" wrote:
>
>> David -
>>
>> As you're probably aware, ABSA has had a white paper on UV use in BSCs
>> "forthcoming" for quite a while. Jack Keene is knowledgeable about this
>> effort. Let's ask him - Jack, are there any trustworthy references cited
>> in the white paper draft that may be of help here? You and I both know
how
>> loudly faculty members can whine when they think their cherished but
>> outdated practices are threatened.
>>
>> Glenn
>>
>> Glenn A. Funk, Ph.D., CBSP
>> Director and Biosafety Officer
>> Environmental Health and Safety
>> Aviron
>> 408-845-8857
>>
>> ====================================
>>
>> At 04:17 PM 2/27/02 -0500, you wrote:
>> >Biosafety Folks:
>> >
>> >I am painted into a corner and I would really appreciate some help from
>> >your collective expertise.
>> >
>> >A few weeks ago the University took possession of a new medical research
>> >facility and the investigators are now moving in. When the biosafety
>> >cabinets were specified in the planning stages, I specifically
>> >instructed the supplier to eliminate all UV lights because of their
>> >inherent worthlessness and potential problems they can cause. Although
>> >I will never relent on this view, the investigators' collective response
>> >is as though I specified cabinets without HEPA filters. The whining has
>> >begun.
>> >
>> >Here's the deal... I meet with a room full of these characters this
>> >Friday to do battle. Does anyone have access to some of the study
>> >references that provide dramatic contraindications for UV disinfect ion
>> >in Class II cabinets? I'm aware of the verbiage in the little green
>> >CDC/NIH book, and there was a paper presented at the 2000 ABSA
>> >Conference.
>> >
>> >Please help me in my conquest to instill an additional aliquot of logic
>> >in an uncertain world.
>> >
>> >David N. Easton
>> >Biological Safety Officer
>> >Univ. of Virginia
>> >
>>
>> This e-mail message is for the sole use of the intended recipient(s) and
may
>> contain confidential, proprietary or privileged information.
>> Any unauthorized review, use, disclosure or distribution is prohibited.
>> If you are not the intended recipient, please contact the sender by reply
>> e-mail and destroy all copies of the original message, enclosures and
>> attachments.
>
>--
>David A. Bunzow CET; CHMM; REM
>University of Alaska
>Many Traditions One Alaska
>Statewide Office of Risk Management
>Environmental, Health and Safety Manager
>1-907-474-5005 (phone)
>1-907-474-5634 (fax)
>sndab1@alaska.edu
>alaska.edu/swrisk/
>
This e-mail message is for the sole use of the intended recipient(s) and may
contain confidential, proprietary or privileged information.
Any unauthorized review, use, disclosure or distribution is prohibited.
If you are not the intended recipient, please contact the sender by reply
e-mail and destroy all copies of the original message, enclosures and
attachments.
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 28 Feb 2002 15:44:16 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "David N. Easton"
Subject: Re: UV Lights
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Colleagues,
First, I would like to sincerely thank those of you who took the time and effort
to provide precisely the information I requested. I sort of feel like the child
who never spoke until he was several years old. When his parents asked him why
he waited so long to say anything, he said "up 'til now, everything's been OK."
I also apologize to the fellow who implied that I was somehow condescending in
the way my question was framed. My personal philosophy in these (and all)
matters of life is if you take yourself too seriously, no one else will. We all
deal with the stress of the job with our own coping mechanisms (Re: Glenn Funk's
comments).
There are times when we know things are not going to change, and there are times
when we choose to take a stand. In this particular instance I have a brand new
facility and a perceived a chance to influence positive change. I have no
intention of sweeping the series. If I can influence a handful of folks to
change the way they operate, I'll be happy. I'm actually looking forward to the
challenge because, after all, these are researchers not Salem Aldermen at the
witch trials.
Thank you again for your collective assistance and for the spirited followup.
You folks are pretty terrific.
David N. Easton
"Funk,Glenn" wrote:
> I personally believe this is one of the most pressing and stress-inducing
> problems facing the academic (and in some cases, biotech) Biosafety
> Officer. We certainly don't want to drop to the level of using the CEO's
> or the Dean's "clout" to force the issue and taking the safety cop
> approach, quoting regulatory chapter and verse and threatening mayhem for
> violations, is generally unwelcome, often dangerous and usually
> counterproductive. I believe the best approach is to present a strong
> argument backed up with logic and knowledge. The critical factor for
> success here is credibility - do you have it? If you do, making your point
> may still be a hard sell but if you don't, it may be a nearly impossible
> sell. So for me, the question (at least in this analysis) boils down to
> how I establish the credibility that will allow my audience to pay
> attention, recognize relevant points, counter with responses and questions
> that aren't "dumbed-down", and in general, have an intelligent discourse
> with me as my peer in this particular subject area.
>
> Again in my own opinion, this is why it is so important for a BSO to be
> well-grounded in basic and medical microbiology, biochemistry and molecular
> genetics. After all, our jobs center around the prevention of inadvertent
> infection. Much of my credibility, at least in the early "formative"
> stages, is based on the impression I create when I first speak on a
> technical level - if I immediately insert my foot in my mouth by saying
> something factually incorrect or any other indicator that I might not know
> what I'm talking about, I've already lost a good part of my audience and
> I'll be playing catch-up for a while trying to recapture whatever
> credibility I may have started out with. We're called upon, by our
> customers as well as courts of law, to be experts in biosafety and we need
> to be able to carry that off. The only way to do that is to know our stuff
> cold and be able to back up our knowledge with citations, supporting
> opinions and anything else relevant.
>
> The hard references David seeks may be important in his factual
> understanding of how UV lamps work and how they are misused and
> misunderstood, but it's my opinion that they should be held in reserve for
> use only as a last resort. If I were in his shoes, my first approach would
> be to make my point and then carefully lay out my reasoning, using examples
> that would indicate the inherent weaknesses of UV/BSC use and the potential
> costs for violating any of the requirements for maximal UV operation. Then
> I'd sit back, listen to the responses and try to refute them directly and
> accurately. From here on, it's "playing it by ear" and I may ultimately
> have to accede to someone's old habits or someone else's cGMP requirements
> and either order cabinets for them with UV or retrofit their cabinets.
>
> -- Glenn
>
> ========================================
>
> At 08:57 AM 2/28/02 -0900, you wrote:
> >Glenn and Others:
> >David Easton appeared to be asking for several areas of help in his post.
> >I have not seen anyone address the issue of original post on this subject:
> >What I read was a call for how to address a potentially hostile audience
> >where the issues are likely cultural/behavioral rather than scientific, and
> >how to "do battle" with the whiners (and we all have them, don't we??).
> >
> >Anyone want to take a shot at addressing our colleagues' real concern?
> >I suspect David may already have his scientific ducks aligned, but what
> >do you suggest on addressing academics who choose not to become
> >educated to more modern understanding?
> >
> >
> >"Funk,Glenn" wrote:
> >
> >> David -
> >>
> >> As you're probably aware, ABSA has had a white paper on UV use in BSCs
> >> "forthcoming" for quite a while. Jack Keene is knowledgeable about this
> >> effort. Let's ask him - Jack, are there any trustworthy references cited
> >> in the white paper draft that may be of help here? You and I both know
> how
> >> loudly faculty members can whine when they think their cherished but
> >> outdated practices are threatened.
> >>
> >> Glenn
> >>
> >> Glenn A. Funk, Ph.D., CBSP
> >> Director and Biosafety Officer
> >> Environmental Health and Safety
> >> Aviron
> >> 408-845-8857
> >>
> >> ====================================
> >>
> >> At 04:17 PM 2/27/02 -0500, you wrote:
> >> >Biosafety Folks:
> >> >
> >> >I am painted into a corner and I would really appreciate some help from
> >> >your collective expertise.
> >> >
> >> >A few weeks ago the University took possession of a new medical research
> >> >facility and the investigators are now moving in. When the biosafety
> >> >cabinets were specified in the planning stages, I specifically
> >> >instructed the supplier to eliminate all UV lights because of their
> >> >inherent worthlessness and potential problems they can cause. Although
> >> >I will never relent on this view, the investigators' collective response
> >> >is as though I specified cabinets without HEPA filters. The whining has
> >> >begun.
> >> >
> >> >Here's the deal... I meet with a room full of these characters this
> >> >Friday to do battle. Does anyone have access to some of the study
> >> >references that provide dramatic contraindications for UV disinfect ion
> >> >in Class II cabinets? I'm aware of the verbiage in the little green
> >> >CDC/NIH book, and there was a paper presented at the 2000 ABSA
> >> >Conference.
> >> >
> >> >Please help me in my conquest to instill an additional aliquot of logic
> >> >in an uncertain world.
> >> >
> >> >David N. Easton
> >> >Biological Safety Officer
> >> >Univ. of Virginia
> >> >
> >>
> >> This e-mail message is for the sole use of the intended recipient(s) and
> may
> >> contain confidential, proprietary or privileged information.
> >> Any unauthorized review, use, disclosure or distribution is prohibited.
> >> If you are not the intended recipient, please contact the sender by reply
> >> e-mail and destroy all copies of the original message, enclosures and
> >> attachments.
> >
> >--
> >David A. Bunzow CET; CHMM; REM
> >University of Alaska
> >Many Traditions One Alaska
> >Statewide Office of Risk Management
> >Environmental, Health and Safety Manager
> >1-907-474-5005 (phone)
> >1-907-474-5634 (fax)
> >sndab1@alaska.edu
> >alaska.edu/swrisk/
> >
>
> This e-mail message is for the sole use of the intended recipient(s) and may
> contain confidential, proprietary or privileged information.
> Any unauthorized review, use, disclosure or distribution is prohibited.
> If you are not the intended recipient, please contact the sender by reply
> e-mail and destroy all copies of the original message, enclosures and
> attachments.
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 28 Feb 2002 15:11:41 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Lois Sowden-Plunkett
Subject: Re: UV Lights
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Here is my address in case you have trouble faxing it to me.
Thanks again for your generous offer to share the information.
Lois
"Byers, Karen B" wrote:
> "Ultraviolet Radiation Exposures in Biomedical Research Laboratories", Appl.
> Occup. Environ. Hyg. 10(12) 1995: 969-971 evaluates the UV permissible
> exposure time for general eye level in the center of the room . This is
> measured in a room with a single biosafety cabinet, with a single 254- or
> 280- wavelength ultraviolet light, with the sash fixed open at 9". This
> paper found, under these conditions, a UV permissible exposure time of 32
> minutes to 1.4 hours. I was very surprised by this. We have added the
> advice -- turn off the uv light if you're in the room -- to training and I
> am seeing fewer and fewer uv bulbs actually on in bsc's. If you want a
> copy of the paper, contact me off-line.
> Karen B. Byers, MS, RBP, CBSP
> Biosafety Officer, Dana-Farber Cancer Institute
> 44 Binney Street - SWG350
> Boston, MA 02115
> karen_byers@dfci.harvard.edu
> 617-632-3890
> fax: 617-632-1932
>
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: David N. Easton [SMTP:dne2a@VIRGINIA.EDU]
> > Sent: Wednesday, February 27, 2002 4:17 PM
> > To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> > Subject: UV Lights
> >
> > Biosafety Folks:
> >
> > I am painted into a corner and I would really appreciate some help from
> > your collective expertise.
> >
> > A few weeks ago the University took possession of a new medical research
> > facility and the investigators are now moving in. When the biosafety
> > cabinets were specified in the planning stages, I specifically
> > instructed the supplier to eliminate all UV lights because of their
> > inherent worthlessness and potential problems they can cause. Although
> > I will never relent on this view, the investigators' collective response
> > is as though I specified cabinets without HEPA filters. The whining has
> > begun.
> >
> > Here's the deal... I meet with a room full of these characters this
> > Friday to do battle. Does anyone have access to some of the study
> > references that provide dramatic contraindications for UV disinfect ion
> > in Class II cabinets? I'm aware of the verbiage in the little green
> > CDC/NIH book, and there was a paper presented at the 2000 ABSA
> > Conference.
> >
> > Please help me in my conquest to instill an additional aliquot of logic
> > in an uncertain world.
> >
> > David N. Easton
> > Biological Safety Officer
> > Univ. of Virginia
--
Lois Sowden-Plunkett
Head, Radiation and Biosafety
University of Ottawa
Environmental Health and Safety Service
100 Thomas More, Suite 306
Ottawa, ON. K1N-6N5
phone: (613) 562-5800 ext. 3058
fax.: (613) 562-5112
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 28 Feb 2002 22:15:00 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Paul Rubock
Subject: Re: UV Lights
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
I too am convinced of the wisdom of doing away with UV and emphasizing 'good
housekeeping/practices'. Realizing that it's hard to convince every one,
I'd like to follow up on something I THINK I heard from a reliable source.
That is:
Whatever bugs UV is going to zap on the surface of a BSC will be zapped
within the first 5-10 minutes and that it is therefore pointless to keep
them on overnight or extended periods. If this so, we could minimize
exposure to some of the stubborn folks and their colleagues.
Can anyone confirm or deny?
Thanks,
Paul Rubock
----- Original Message -----
From: "Byers, Karen B"
To:
Sent: Thursday, February 28, 2002 11:11 AM
Subject: Re: UV Lights
> "Ultraviolet Radiation Exposures in Biomedical Research Laboratories",
Appl.
> Occup. Environ. Hyg. 10(12) 1995: 969-971 evaluates the UV permissible
> exposure time for general eye level in the center of the room . This is
> measured in a room with a single biosafety cabinet, with a single 254- or
> 280- wavelength ultraviolet light, with the sash fixed open at 9". This
> paper found, under these conditions, a UV permissible exposure time of 32
> minutes to 1.4 hours. I was very surprised by this. We have added the
> advice -- turn off the uv light if you're in the room -- to training and
I
> am seeing fewer and fewer uv bulbs actually on in bsc's. If you want a
> copy of the paper, contact me off-line.
> Karen B. Byers, MS, RBP, CBSP
> Biosafety Officer, Dana-Farber Cancer Institute
> 44 Binney Street - SWG350
> Boston, MA 02115
> karen_byers@dfci.harvard.edu
> 617-632-3890
> fax: 617-632-1932
>
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: David N. Easton [SMTP:dne2a@VIRGINIA.EDU]
> > Sent: Wednesday, February 27, 2002 4:17 PM
> > To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> > Subject: UV Lights
> >
> > Biosafety Folks:
> >
> > I am painted into a corner and I would really appreciate some help from
> > your collective expertise.
> >
> > A few weeks ago the University took possession of a new medical research
> > facility and the investigators are now moving in. When the biosafety
> > cabinets were specified in the planning stages, I specifically
> > instructed the supplier to eliminate all UV lights because of their
> > inherent worthlessness and potential problems they can cause. Although
> > I will never relent on this view, the investigators' collective response
> > is as though I specified cabinets without HEPA filters. The whining has
> > begun.
> >
> > Here's the deal... I meet with a room full of these characters this
> > Friday to do battle. Does anyone have access to some of the study
> > references that provide dramatic contraindications for UV disinfect ion
> > in Class II cabinets? I'm aware of the verbiage in the little green
> > CDC/NIH book, and there was a paper presented at the 2000 ABSA
> > Conference.
> >
> > Please help me in my conquest to instill an additional aliquot of logic
> > in an uncertain world.
> >
> > David N. Easton
> > Biological Safety Officer
> > Univ. of Virginia
>
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 1 Mar 2002 09:59:47 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Kim Auletta
Subject: Re: UV Lights
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
I looked at this article that Karen cited:
"Ultraviolet Radiation Exposures in Biomedical Research Laboratories",
Appl.
> Occup. Environ. Hyg. 10(12) 1995: 969-971
It includes recommendations for ethidium bromide staining & UV light box
use. Have any of you addressed these UV exposure issues?
"Recommendations:
Substutite the ethidium bromide staining method with a method that does not
require UV fluorescence to visualize the DNA. .....Light box users should
wear protective equipment whenever using the light boxes.Also, while safety
glasses provide protection for the eyes, the rest of the face is still
exposed. THerefore, safety glasses hsould not be considered a substitute
for face shields."
At our facility, the labs only leave the UV lights on when the BSCs are
not in use. I choose to pick my battles, and try to eliminate gas use in
the cabinets & let them keep their UV crutches. But, I haven't addressed
other UV sources & I think I might get "some" resistance to this.
Kim Auletta
Lab Safety Specialist
Environmental Health and Safety
SUNY Stony Brook
110 Suffolk Hall
Stony Brook, NY 11794-6200
PHONE: 631-632-9672
FAX: 631-632-9683
E-MAIL: kauletta@.sunysb.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 1 Mar 2002 10:34:01 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "KLEIN, Jan"
Subject: Biosafety designation
Hello Biosafty Group,
I would appreciate your assistance in determining appropriate precautions
for laboratory work with Brucella neotomae, originally isolated from the
woodrat. I am seeking information on whether it can infect humans and other
animals, is transmitted via the aerosol route, and its geographic
occurrence. Unless extenuating information is available, it seems that BL3
is appropriate.
Please respond directly to me, not to the list, since this subject is of
limited interest.
Thanks,
Jan
//
Jan Klein
Office of Biological Safety
UW-Madison
608-263-9026
jklein@fpm.wisc.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 1 Mar 2002 07:46:36 -0900
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Andrew J Bartel
Organization: Department of Biological Sciences
Subject: Re: UV Lights
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
I'm curious, does this general feeling of UV's extend to sterilization cabinets
for safety glasses/goggles? If so, is the recommended treatment good ole soapy
water?
Paul Rubock wrote:
> I too am convinced of the wisdom of doing away with UV and emphasizing 'good
> housekeeping/practices'. Realizing that it's hard to convince every one,
> I'd like to follow up on something I THINK I heard from a reliable source.
> That is:
>
> Whatever bugs UV is going to zap on the surface of a BSC will be zapped
> within the first 5-10 minutes and that it is therefore pointless to keep
> them on overnight or extended periods. If this so, we could minimize
> exposure to some of the stubborn folks and their colleagues.
>
> Can anyone confirm or deny?
>
> Thanks,
> Paul Rubock
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "Byers, Karen B"
> To:
> Sent: Thursday, February 28, 2002 11:11 AM
> Subject: Re: UV Lights
>
> > "Ultraviolet Radiation Exposures in Biomedical Research Laboratories",
> Appl.
> > Occup. Environ. Hyg. 10(12) 1995: 969-971 evaluates the UV permissible
> > exposure time for general eye level in the center of the room . This is
> > measured in a room with a single biosafety cabinet, with a single 254- or
> > 280- wavelength ultraviolet light, with the sash fixed open at 9". This
> > paper found, under these conditions, a UV permissible exposure time of 32
> > minutes to 1.4 hours. I was very surprised by this. We have added the
> > advice -- turn off the uv light if you're in the room -- to training and
> I
> > am seeing fewer and fewer uv bulbs actually on in bsc's. If you want a
> > copy of the paper, contact me off-line.
> > Karen B. Byers, MS, RBP, CBSP
> > Biosafety Officer, Dana-Farber Cancer Institute
> > 44 Binney Street - SWG350
> > Boston, MA 02115
> > karen_byers@dfci.harvard.edu
> > 617-632-3890
> > fax: 617-632-1932
> >
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: David N. Easton [SMTP:dne2a@VIRGINIA.EDU]
> > > Sent: Wednesday, February 27, 2002 4:17 PM
> > > To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> > > Subject: UV Lights
> > >
> > > Biosafety Folks:
> > >
> > > I am painted into a corner and I would really appreciate some help from
> > > your collective expertise.
> > >
> > > A few weeks ago the University took possession of a new medical research
> > > facility and the investigators are now moving in. When the biosafety
> > > cabinets were specified in the planning stages, I specifically
> > > instructed the supplier to eliminate all UV lights because of their
> > > inherent worthlessness and potential problems they can cause. Although
> > > I will never relent on this view, the investigators' collective response
> > > is as though I specified cabinets without HEPA filters. The whining has
> > > begun.
> > >
> > > Here's the deal... I meet with a room full of these characters this
> > > Friday to do battle. Does anyone have access to some of the study
> > > references that provide dramatic contraindications for UV disinfect ion
> > > in Class II cabinets? I'm aware of the verbiage in the little green
> > > CDC/NIH book, and there was a paper presented at the 2000 ABSA
> > > Conference.
> > >
> > > Please help me in my conquest to instill an additional aliquot of logic
> > > in an uncertain world.
> > >
> > > David N. Easton
> > > Biological Safety Officer
> > > Univ. of Virginia
> >
--
> > > > > > > > > > >
Andrew J Bartel
Laboratory Manager
Department of Biological Sciences
University of Alaska Anchorage
Science Bldg. 243
3211 Providence Drive
Anchorage AK 99508
(907)786-1268 voice
(907)786-1148 fax
ajb@uaa.alaska.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 1 Mar 2002 12:24:18 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Scott, Rick"
Subject: Re: Biosafety designation
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
The concensus from our Brucella spp. folks here is that it should be
handled at BL3 unless there is documented evidence that it does not cause
disease in humans. His feeling is there has not been enough work done with
B. neotomae to justify lowering it below a 3. Feel free to email me if you
want more information.
Rick Scott
Biological Safety Officer
Biological Safety Cabinet Field Certifier
East Carolina University
Greenville, NC
27858
scottwi@mail.ecu.edu
> ----------
> From: KLEIN, Jan
> Reply To: A Biosafety Discussion List
> Sent: Saturday, March 2, 2002 12:34 AM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: Biosafety designation
>
> Hello Biosafty Group,
>
> I would appreciate your assistance in determining appropriate precautions
> for laboratory work with Brucella neotomae, originally isolated from the
> woodrat. I am seeking information on whether it can infect humans and
> other
> animals, is transmitted via the aerosol route, and its geographic
> occurrence. Unless extenuating information is available, it seems that BL3
> is appropriate.
>
> Please respond directly to me, not to the list, since this subject is of
> limited interest.
>
> Thanks,
> Jan
> //
> Jan Klein
> Office of Biological Safety
> UW-Madison
> 608-263-9026
> jklein@fpm.wisc.edu
>
>
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 1 Mar 2002 12:45:59 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Robert N. Latsch"
Subject: Re: UV Lights
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
I prefer bleach.
Bob
>I'm curious, does this general feeling of UV's extend to sterilization
>cabinets
>for safety glasses/goggles? If so, is the recommended treatment good ole
>soapy
>water?
>
>Paul Rubock wrote:
>
>> I too am convinced of the wisdom of doing away with UV and emphasizing 'good
>> housekeeping/practices'. Realizing that it's hard to convince every one,
>> I'd like to follow up on something I THINK I heard from a reliable source.
>> That is:
>>
>> Whatever bugs UV is going to zap on the surface of a BSC will be zapped
>> within the first 5-10 minutes and that it is therefore pointless to keep
>> them on overnight or extended periods. If this so, we could minimize
>> exposure to some of the stubborn folks and their colleagues.
>>
>> Can anyone confirm or deny?
>>
>> Thanks,
>> Paul Rubock
>> ----- Original Message -----
>> From: "Byers, Karen B"
>> To:
>> Sent: Thursday, February 28, 2002 11:11 AM
>> Subject: Re: UV Lights
>>
>> > "Ultraviolet Radiation Exposures in Biomedical Research Laboratories",
>> Appl.
>> > Occup. Environ. Hyg. 10(12) 1995: 969-971 evaluates the UV permissible
>> > exposure time for general eye level in the center of the room . This is
>> > measured in a room with a single biosafety cabinet, with a single 254- or
>> > 280- wavelength ultraviolet light, with the sash fixed open at 9". This
>> > paper found, under these conditions, a UV permissible exposure time of 32
>> > minutes to 1.4 hours. I was very surprised by this. We have added the
>> > advice -- turn off the uv light if you're in the room -- to training and
>> I
>> > am seeing fewer and fewer uv bulbs actually on in bsc's. If you want a
>> > copy of the paper, contact me off-line.
>> > Karen B. Byers, MS, RBP, CBSP
>> > Biosafety Officer, Dana-Farber Cancer Institute
>> > 44 Binney Street - SWG350
>> > Boston, MA 02115
>> > karen_byers@dfci.harvard.edu
>> > 617-632-3890
>> > fax: 617-632-1932
>> >
>> > > -----Original Message-----
>> > > From: David N. Easton [SMTP:dne2a@VIRGINIA.EDU]
>> > > Sent: Wednesday, February 27, 2002 4:17 PM
>> > > To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
>> > > Subject: UV Lights
>> > >
>> > > Biosafety Folks:
>> > >
>> > > I am painted into a corner and I would really appreciate some help from
>> > > your collective expertise.
>> > >
>> > > A few weeks ago the University took possession of a new medical research
>> > > facility and the investigators are now moving in. When the biosafety
>> > > cabinets were specified in the planning stages, I specifically
>> > > instructed the supplier to eliminate all UV lights because of their
>> > > inherent worthlessness and potential problems they can cause. Although
>> > > I will never relent on this view, the investigators' collective response
>> > > is as though I specified cabinets without HEPA filters. The whining has
>> > > begun.
>> > >
>> > > Here's the deal... I meet with a room full of these characters this
>> > > Friday to do battle. Does anyone have access to some of the study
>> > > references that provide dramatic contraindications for UV disinfect ion
>> > > in Class II cabinets? I'm aware of the verbiage in the little green
>> > > CDC/NIH book, and there was a paper presented at the 2000 ABSA
>> > > Conference.
>> > >
>> > > Please help me in my conquest to instill an additional aliquot of logic
>> > > in an uncertain world.
>> > >
>> > > David N. Easton
>> > > Biological Safety Officer
>> > > Univ. of Virginia
>> >
>
>--
>> > > > > > > > > > >
>Andrew J Bartel
>Laboratory Manager
>Department of Biological Sciences
>University of Alaska Anchorage
>Science Bldg. 243
>3211 Providence Drive
>Anchorage AK 99508
>
>(907)786-1268 voice
>(907)786-1148 fax
>
>ajb@uaa.alaska.edu
_____________________________________________________________________
__ / _____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 1 Mar 2002 13:00:55 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Morris, Gary"
Subject: Disinfectant for Blood
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Can anyone comment?
I've seen many references on using bleach to disinfect blood. However, the
people over at Clorox stated that their product is not virucidal for HBV or
HBC. My guess is that they make this statement due to the difficulty in
testing their product against the two viruses.
Does anybody have insight? Do you use bleach? Any suggested replacements?
Thanks,
Gary Morris
Pro-Virus, Inc.
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 1 Mar 2002 13:15:45 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Robert N. Latsch"
Subject: Re: Disinfectant for Blood
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
1) OSHA has adopted the EPA's List of approved tuberculocidal
disinfectants and said that anything on the list will kill bbp. Chlorox is
on the list.
2) The alternative method of disinfection is to use a 10% bleach solution
and soak for 20 min. 10% to OSHA says to take 10 mls of chlorox(5.25%) and
add it to 90 mls of water:) Don't worry it works.
3) OSHA has also approved the EPA's list of approved tuberculocidal
sterilants. Ohio has not gone along with this so I list it last.
bob
>Can anyone comment?
>
>I've seen many references on using bleach to disinfect blood. However, the
>people over at Clorox stated that their product is not virucidal for HBV or
>HBC. My guess is that they make this statement due to the difficulty in
>testing their product against the two viruses.
>
>Does anybody have insight? Do you use bleach? Any suggested replacements?
>
>Thanks,
>
>Gary Morris
>Pro-Virus, Inc.
_____________________________________________________________________
__ / _____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 1 Mar 2002 13:28:43 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Morris, Gary"
Subject: Re: Disinfectant for Blood
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Bob,
Thanks for the info.
-----Original Message-----
From: Robert N. Latsch [mailto:rnl2@PO.CWRU.EDU]
Sent: Friday, March 01, 2002 1:16 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Disinfectant for Blood
1) OSHA has adopted the EPA's List of approved tuberculocidal
disinfectants and said that anything on the list will kill bbp. Chlorox is
on the list.
2) The alternative method of disinfection is to use a 10% bleach solution
and soak for 20 min. 10% to OSHA says to take 10 mls of chlorox(5.25%) and
add it to 90 mls of water:) Don't worry it works.
3) OSHA has also approved the EPA's list of approved tuberculocidal
sterilants. Ohio has not gone along with this so I list it last.
bob
>Can anyone comment?
>
>I've seen many references on using bleach to disinfect blood. However, the
>people over at Clorox stated that their product is not virucidal for HBV or
>HBC. My guess is that they make this statement due to the difficulty in
>testing their product against the two viruses.
>
>Does anybody have insight? Do you use bleach? Any suggested replacements?
>
>Thanks,
>
>Gary Morris
>Pro-Virus, Inc.
_____________________________________________________________________
__ /
_____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
=========================================================================
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 1 Mar 2002 15:41:28 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Terry Lawrin
Subject: LD 50 of Anthrax Toxin
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
Hello all,
Where do I get, or who knows the LD 50 of Anthrax Toxin?
Thanks,
Terry
Terrance J. Lawrin, MT. (ASCP) SLS, CBSP (ABSA)
Biosafety Officer / Sanitarian
University of Illinois at Chicago
Environmental Health and Safety Office
Telephone: 312-413-3701
email: tlawrin@uic.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 1 Mar 2002 16:51:02 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Bernholc, Nicole M"
Subject: Re: LD 50 of Anthrax Toxin
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
I was surprised that rtecs doesn't have it.
-----Original Message-----
From: Terry Lawrin [mailto:tlawrin@UIC.EDU]
Sent: Friday, March 01, 2002 4:41 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: LD 50 of Anthrax Toxin
Hello all,
Where do I get, or who knows the LD 50 of Anthrax Toxin?
Thanks,
Terry
Terrance J. Lawrin, MT. (ASCP) SLS, CBSP (ABSA)
Biosafety Officer / Sanitarian
University of Illinois at Chicago
Environmental Health and Safety Office
Telephone: 312-413-3701
email: tlawrin@uic.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 1 Mar 2002 15:53:34 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ausrine Karaitis
Subject: Re: LD 50 of Anthrax Toxin
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="=====================_2631634==_.ALT"
--=====================_2631634==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
did u try a search online? what about that bio MSDS site fr Canada?
At 03:41 PM 3/1/02, you wrote:
>Hello all,
>
>Where do I get, or who knows the LD 50 of Anthrax Toxin?
>
>Thanks,
>
>Terry
>
>
>
>Terrance J. Lawrin, MT. (ASCP) SLS, CBSP (ABSA)
>Biosafety Officer / Sanitarian
>University of Illinois at Chicago
>Environmental Health and Safety Office
>Telephone: 312-413-3701
>email: tlawrin@uic.edu
Ausrine A E Karaitis, CSHM, FAIC Ausrine@uic.edu
Environmental Chemical Specialist 312 413 3702
University of Illinois at Chicago M/C 645
--=====================_2631634==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
did u try a search online? what about that bio MSDS site fr Canada?
At 03:41 PM 3/1/02, you wrote:
Hello all,
Where do I get, or who knows the LD 50 of Anthrax Toxin?
Thanks,
Terry
Terrance J. Lawrin, MT. (ASCP) SLS, CBSP (ABSA)
Biosafety Officer / Sanitarian
University of Illinois at Chicago
Environmental Health and Safety Office
Telephone: 312-413-3701
email: tlawrin@uic.edu
Ausrine A E Karaitis, CSHM, FAIC Ausrine@uic.edu
Environmental Chemical Specialist 312 413 3702
University of Illinois at Chicago M/C 645
--=====================_2631634==_.ALT--
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 1 Mar 2002 17:03:32 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Petuch, Brian R."
Subject: Re: LD 50 of Anthrax Toxin
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
My understanding is toxic effects of edema factor and lethal factor require
protective antigen. Could this be a reason LD 50 is not listed.
-----Original Message-----
From: Bernholc, Nicole M [mailto:bernholc@]
Sent: Friday, March 01, 2002 4:51 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: LD 50 of Anthrax Toxin
I was surprised that rtecs doesn't have it.
-----Original Message-----
From: Terry Lawrin [mailto:tlawrin@UIC.EDU]
Sent: Friday, March 01, 2002 4:41 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: LD 50 of Anthrax Toxin
Hello all,
Where do I get, or who knows the LD 50 of Anthrax Toxin?
Thanks,
Terry
Terrance J. Lawrin, MT. (ASCP) SLS, CBSP (ABSA)
Biosafety Officer / Sanitarian
University of Illinois at Chicago
Environmental Health and Safety Office
Telephone: 312-413-3701
email: tlawrin@uic.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 1 Mar 2002 17:00:34 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Mahjoub Labyad
Subject: Re: LD 50 of Anthrax Toxin
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="----=_NextPart_000_0023_01C1C142.9A914AE0"
This is a multi-part message in MIME format.
------=_NextPart_000_0023_01C1C142.9A914AE0
Content-Type: text/plain;
charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Folks,
LD50 (mg/kg) is a mesure of oral toxicity, and is used to evaluate and =
classify the toxicity hazards of chemical substances. I Don't think it =
exists for biologicals? Never heard of it anyway.
Anthrax is lethal by Inhalation. 8000 -50,000 spores ( as per MSDS of =
Bacillus Anthracis, Canadian Office of Laboratory Security)
Mahjoub Labyad
Env. Health Specialist
----- Original Message -----=20
From: "Petuch, Brian R."
To:
Sent: Friday, March 01, 2002 4:03 PM
Subject: Re: LD 50 of Anthrax Toxin
> My understanding is toxic effects of edema factor and lethal factor =
require
> protective antigen. Could this be a reason LD 50 is not listed.
>=20
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Bernholc, Nicole M [mailto:bernholc@]
> Sent: Friday, March 01, 2002 4:51 PM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: Re: LD 50 of Anthrax Toxin
>=20
>=20
> I was surprised that rtecs doesn't have it.
>=20
>=20
>=20
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Terry Lawrin [mailto:tlawrin@UIC.EDU]
> Sent: Friday, March 01, 2002 4:41 PM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: LD 50 of Anthrax Toxin
>=20
>=20
> Hello all,
>=20
> Where do I get, or who knows the LD 50 of Anthrax Toxin?
>=20
> Thanks,
>=20
> Terry
>=20
>=20
>=20
> Terrance J. Lawrin, MT. (ASCP) SLS, CBSP (ABSA)
> Biosafety Officer / Sanitarian
> University of Illinois at Chicago
> Environmental Health and Safety Office
> Telephone: 312-413-3701
> email: tlawrin@uic.edu
------=_NextPart_000_0023_01C1C142.9A914AE0
Content-Type: text/html;
charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Folks,
LD50 (mg/kg) is a mesure of oral toxicity, and is = used to=20 evaluate and classify the toxicity hazards of chemical substances. I = Don't think=20 it exists for biologicals? Never heard of it anyway.
Anthrax is lethal by Inhalation. 8000 = -50,000 spores ( as=20 per MSDS of Bacillus Anthracis, Canadian Office of Laboratory=20 Security)
Mahjoub Labyad
Env. Health Specialist
----- Original Message -----
From: "Petuch, Brian R."
To:
Sent: Friday, March 01, 2002 4:03 PM
Subject: Re: LD 50 of Anthrax = Toxin
> My = understanding is toxic=20 effects of edema factor and lethal factor require
> protective=20 antigen. Could this be a reason LD 50 is not listed.
> =
>=20 -----Original Message-----
> From: Bernholc, Nicole M=20 [mailto:bernholc@]
> Sent: Friday, March 01, 2002 4:51 = PM
>=20 To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> = Subject: Re: LD=20 50 of Anthrax Toxin
>
>
> I was surprised that rtecs = doesn't=20 have it.
>
>
>
> -----Original = Message-----
>=20 From: Terry Lawrin [mailto:tlawrin@UIC.EDU]
> Sent: Friday, March = 01, 2002=20 4:41 PM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> = Subject: LD 50 of=20 Anthrax Toxin
>
>
> Hello all,
>
> = Where do I=20 get, or who knows the LD 50 of Anthrax Toxin?
>
> = Thanks,
>=20
> Terry
>
>
>
> Terrance J. Lawrin, = MT. (ASCP)=20 SLS, CBSP (ABSA)
> Biosafety Officer / Sanitarian
> = University of=20 Illinois at Chicago
> Environmental Health and Safety = Office
>=20 Telephone: 312-413-3701
> email: tlawrin@uic.edu
------=_NextPart_000_0023_01C1C142.9A914AE0--
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 4 Mar 2002 09:03:12 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Richard Fink
Subject: Re: LD 50 of Anthrax Toxin
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="=====================_3263152==_.ALT"
--=====================_3263152==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
Actually LD50 can be for any measure of toxicity - oral, subcutaneous, IV,
etc. - just depends upon how the agent was administered. It exists for a
variety of biological toxins s.a. bot. toxin, tetnus tox.
At 05:00 PM 03/01/02 -0600, you wrote:
>Folks,
>
>LD50 (mg/kg) is a mesure of oral toxicity, and is used to evaluate and
>classify the toxicity hazards of chemical substances. I Don't think it
>exists for biologicals? Never heard of it anyway.
>
>Anthrax is lethal by Inhalation. 8000 -50,000 spores ( as per MSDS of
>Bacillus Anthracis, Canadian Office of Laboratory Security)
>
>Mahjoub Labyad
>Env. Health Specialist
>
>
>----- Original Message -----
>From: "Petuch, Brian R."
>
>To:
>Sent: Friday, March 01, 2002 4:03 PM
>Subject: Re: LD 50 of Anthrax Toxin
>
> > My understanding is toxic effects of edema factor and lethal factor require
> > protective antigen. Could this be a reason LD 50 is not listed.
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Bernholc, Nicole M [mailto:bernholc@]
> > Sent: Friday, March 01, 2002 4:51 PM
> > To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> > Subject: Re: LD 50 of Anthrax Toxin
> >
> >
> > I was surprised that rtecs doesn't have it.
> >
> >
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Terry Lawrin [mailto:tlawrin@UIC.EDU]
> > Sent: Friday, March 01, 2002 4:41 PM
> > To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> > Subject: LD 50 of Anthrax Toxin
> >
> >
> > Hello all,
> >
> > Where do I get, or who knows the LD 50 of Anthrax Toxin?
> >
> > Thanks,
> >
> > Terry
> >
> >
> >
> > Terrance J. Lawrin, MT. (ASCP) SLS, CBSP (ABSA)
> > Biosafety Officer / Sanitarian
> > University of Illinois at Chicago
> > Environmental Health and Safety Office
> > Telephone: 312-413-3701
> > email: tlawrin@uic.edu
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
--=====================_3263152==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
Actually LD50 can be for any measure of toxicity - oral, subcutaneous, IV, etc. - just depends upon how the agent was administered. It exists for a variety of biological toxins s.a. bot. toxin, tetnus tox.
At 05:00 PM 03/01/02 -0600, you wrote:
Folks,
LD50 (mg/kg) is a mesure of oral toxicity, and is used to evaluate and classify the toxicity hazards of chemical substances. I Don't think it exists for biologicals? Never heard of it anyway.
Anthrax is lethal by Inhalation. 8000 -50,000 spores ( as per MSDS of Bacillus Anthracis, Canadian Office of Laboratory Security)
Mahjoub Labyad
Env. Health Specialist
----- Original Message -----
From: "Petuch, Brian R."
To:
Sent: Friday, March 01, 2002 4:03 PM
Subject: Re: LD 50 of Anthrax Toxin
> My understanding is toxic effects of edema factor and lethal factor require
> protective antigen. Could this be a reason LD 50 is not listed.
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Bernholc, Nicole M [mailto:bernholc@]
> Sent: Friday, March 01, 2002 4:51 PM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: Re: LD 50 of Anthrax Toxin
>
>
> I was surprised that rtecs doesn't have it.
>
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Terry Lawrin [mailto:tlawrin@UIC.EDU]
> Sent: Friday, March 01, 2002 4:41 PM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: LD 50 of Anthrax Toxin
>
>
> Hello all,
>
> Where do I get, or who knows the LD 50 of Anthrax Toxin?
>
> Thanks,
>
> Terry
>
>
>
> Terrance J. Lawrin, MT. (ASCP) SLS, CBSP (ABSA)
> Biosafety Officer / Sanitarian
> University of Illinois at Chicago
> Environmental Health and Safety Office
> Telephone: 312-413-3701
> email: tlawrin@uic.edu
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
--=====================_3263152==_.ALT--
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 5 Mar 2002 08:56:22 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Kim Auletta
Subject: Toxin exemption definition
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Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
I wanted to share the response I rec'd from the CDC to my question I had
also asked this group, on the definition of "biomedical research" for the
toxin exemption:
"Biomedical research encompasses both biological and medical research.
Toxins for medical use, or toxins inactivated for use as vaccines are
exempt. To qualify for the "biomedical research use" exemption, you must be
using the toxin for biomedical research and the toxin must have an LD50....
of more than 100 nanograms/kg body wt.
If you determine that you meet the above criteria, than the process to
verify that you meet the exemption criteria must be determined during the
dialogue between the transferror and the receiver of the toxin. We
recommend in these situations that both facilities maintain records of the
transfer and a statement of why the transfer of this select agent toxin is
exempt from 42 CFR 72.6."
Kim Auletta
Lab Safety Specialist
Environmental Health and Safety
SUNY Stony Brook
110 Suffolk Hall
Stony Brook, NY 11794-6200
PHONE: 631-632-9672
FAX: 631-632-9683
E-MAIL: kauletta@.sunysb.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 7 Mar 2002 13:03:33 -0500
Reply-To: speaker@ehs.psu.edu
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Curt Speaker
Organization: UNIVERSITY SAFETY
Subject: transplanted human tissue?
A question for the collective wisdom:
I was having a conversation with our small animal vet the other day,
and he asked me if I thought there was any risk of bloodborne
diseases (HBV, HCV, HIV) from human tissue that has been
transplanted into nude mice. The question got the ol' wheels
spinning...the mice have no immune system to fight off the viruses,
and the tissues have not been screened against BBPs.
But this type of work has been going on for many years, so
SOMEONE must have tried to quantify this at some point along the
way, right? If human tissue positive for any of BBPs was
transplanted into a nude mouse, would they provide a living
incubator for these viruses? Would they be shed (urine, feces)?
thanks in advance for any insights...
Curt
Curt Speaker
Biosafety Officer
Penn State University
Environmental Health and Safety
speaker@ehs.psu.edu
^...^
(O_O)
=(Y)=
"""
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 7 Mar 2002 13:44:01 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Larry Mendoza
Organization: VCU-OEHS-Biological/Chemical Safety Section
Subject: Dangerous Goods Shipping Question
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Good afternoon biosafety people,
We offer training at our institution on shipping infectious agents (6.2)
and Dry Ice (9). One researcher raised a question about
bacteriophages. Are bacteriophages regulated under IATA or DOT
regulation? I would assume that if they carry genes that code for
toxins such as Shiga-like toxins which are phage encoded and that can be
transducted into bacteria (E. coli) making them pathogenic, would make
these viruses regulated under the IATA regs. I know that any pathogen
that affects humans, animals or plants is regulated, but what about
pathogens that only affect bacteria? Although not directly affecting
humans, these viruses indirectly can have pathogenic affects on humans
through certain bacteria. Thanks in advance for any comments or
responses.
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=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 7 Mar 2002 15:42:08 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Judy Pointer
Subject: Re: Dangerous Goods Shipping Question
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I'll try this one, but it's hard.
Correct me if I am wrong, but I think the shipped agent has to be infectious for
humans or infectious for animals for the material to fall into the Class 6.2 DGR
category. Bacteriophage is neither and couldn't infect any type of somatic cell
of mammals. But I think that recombinant DNA comes under the Class 9
designation (miscellaneous DGR) and should be labeled as a Genetically Modified
Organism with UN/ID of 3245 and following packaging instruction 913.
Any one else willing to make a stab at it?
Judy Pointer
Larry Mendoza on 03/07/2002 12:44:01 PM
Please respond to A Biosafety Discussion List
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
cc: (bcc: Judy M. Pointer/MDACC)
Subject: Dangerous Goods Shipping Question
Good afternoon biosafety people,
We offer training at our institution on shipping infectious agents (6.2)
and Dry Ice (9). One researcher raised a question about
bacteriophages. Are bacteriophages regulated under IATA or DOT
regulation? I would assume that if they carry genes that code for
toxins such as Shiga-like toxins which are phage encoded and that can be
transducted into bacteria (E. coli) making them pathogenic, would make
these viruses regulated under the IATA regs. I know that any pathogen
that affects humans, animals or plants is regulated, but what about
pathogens that only affect bacteria? Although not directly affecting
humans, these viruses indirectly can have pathogenic affects on humans
through certain bacteria. Thanks in advance for any comments or
responses.
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=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 7 Mar 2002 17:24:54 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: David Griffith
Organization: The University of Western Ontario
Subject: Re: Dangerous Goods Shipping Question
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Hi Larry,
Being a Canuck I'll talk in terms of IATA regulations. Besides, just about
every courier follows these rules now.
IATA gives the following definition for Class 6.2 "Division 6.2 includes
substances which are infectious to humans, and/or animals, genetically
modified micro-organisms and organisms, genetically modified micro-organisms
and organisms, biological products, diagnostic specimens and clinical and
medical waste, as described in 3.6.2.1.1 to 3.6.2.1.5." In the case of your
phage, if they are naturally occurring they do not meet the qualifications
for class 6.2. As soon as you, or someone else, have "tinkered" with its
encoding it becomes a genetically modified micro-organism if it can
"altering animals, plants, or microbiological substances in a way which is
not normally the result of natural reproduction must be classified in Class
9 and assigned to UN3245". This is also a direct quote from the IATA regs.
So in a long rambling way, phage with any modified genetic material is now
considered a dangerous good belonging to Class 9 UN3245 with the shipping
name of "Genetically modified micro-organisms". The packing instruction 913
for this class just refers you to the rules for 602 the infectious packing
rules with the only exception being the additional testing requirements.
Think of it as using a "limited quantity" packaging rules for the infectious
class.
As for all the other wee little beasties.......
If you have a genetically modified micro-organism that also is capable of
infecting humans, animals you must classify it as 6.2 Infectious substances,
affecting humans (or animals).
I would also include information about the many different permits necessary
in many cases as they can also mess up an otherwise smooth shipment. Have
your shipping/receiving people in on the course to help with items like
customs papers and carrier selection. It is a real team effort to make some
of these shipments go without a hitch. The last thing you need is a dry ice
shipment thawing away at a customs warehouse because you didn't attach a
"vital" customs declaration form.
Dave
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=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 11 Mar 2002 10:54:58 -0600
Reply-To: louann.burnett@vanderbilt.edu
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: LouAnn Burnett
Subject: Re: San Francisco
In-Reply-To:
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Information on the Annual Biosafety Conference (this year in San Francisco)
is posted on the front page of the ABSA web site (). You'll be
able to find the particulars about the meeting as they become available, so
check back periodically over the next few months.
LouAnn
LouAnn C. Burnett, MS, CBSP
Chair, ABSA Communications Committee
Biosafety Program Manager & Biological Safety Officer
Vanderbilt University Environmental Health & Safety
Nashville, Tennessee
615/322-0927 (direct & voice mail)
615/343-4951 (fax)
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 11 Mar 2002 16:41:18 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Eric COok
Subject: Re: Dangerous Goods Shipping Question
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
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Everything that Dave has said is true. But as a side note, currently in the
US, Genetically Modified Micro-Organisms (as defined by IATA) are not
considered dangerous goods (as long as they are not capable of causing
disease in humans or animals) and they are not regulated by 49 CFR. In
1998, the DOT posted a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) which addressed
this point. The NPRM proposes to adopt a similar requirement for GMOs but
as yet it has not become a final rule.
At 05:24 PM 3/7/2002 -0500, you wrote:
>Hi Larry,
>
>Being a Canuck I'll talk in terms of IATA regulations. Besides, just about
>every courier follows these rules now.
>
>IATA gives the following definition for Class 6.2 "Division 6.2 includes
>substances which are infectious to humans, and/or animals, genetically
>modified micro-organisms and organisms, genetically modified micro-organisms
>and organisms, biological products, diagnostic specimens and clinical and
>medical waste, as described in 3.6.2.1.1 to 3.6.2.1.5." In the case of your
>phage, if they are naturally occurring they do not meet the qualifications
>for class 6.2. As soon as you, or someone else, have "tinkered" with its
>encoding it becomes a genetically modified micro-organism if it can
>"altering animals, plants, or microbiological substances in a way which is
>not normally the result of natural reproduction must be classified in Class
>9 and assigned to UN3245". This is also a direct quote from the IATA regs.
>So in a long rambling way, phage with any modified genetic material is now
>considered a dangerous good belonging to Class 9 UN3245 with the shipping
>name of "Genetically modified micro-organisms". The packing instruction 913
>for this class just refers you to the rules for 602 the infectious packing
>rules with the only exception being the additional testing requirements.
>Think of it as using a "limited quantity" packaging rules for the infectious
>class.
>
>As for all the other wee little beasties.......
>If you have a genetically modified micro-organism that also is capable of
>infecting humans, animals you must classify it as 6.2 Infectious substances,
>affecting humans (or animals).
>
>I would also include information about the many different permits necessary
>in many cases as they can also mess up an otherwise smooth shipment. Have
>your shipping/receiving people in on the course to help with items like
>customs papers and carrier selection. It is a real team effort to make some
>of these shipments go without a hitch. The last thing you need is a dry ice
>shipment thawing away at a customs warehouse because you didn't attach a
>"vital" customs declaration form.
>
>Dave
>
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 11 Mar 2002 15:23:56 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Eric Hansen
Subject: Re: Classification resource and CBSP
MIME-version: 1.0
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Good afternoon, I have two questions I'm hoping to find answers for.
First, is anyone aware of a single resource (book, web page, etc.) that
pulls together the biosafety levels assigned to different organisms, aside
from the BMBL?
Secondly, could someone provide a brief overview of the requirements to
obtain and then maintain the CBSP certification? I've looked at the NRM web
page, but it intermingles requirements for the certification with other
certifications so I'm not sure what the requirements are.
Thanks so much, I appreciate your expertise and willingness to help me learn
more about the profession!
Eric Hansen
Training Manager/Biosafety Officer
Utah State University
Logan, UT
435-797-1053
ehansen@cc.usu.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 12 Mar 2002 09:01:18 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Jairo Betancourt
Subject: Re: Classification resource and CBSP
MIME-version: 1.0
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Eric: All the information you are asking for can be found and downloaded
from the ABSA Webpage. Good Luck
Jairo
Jairo Betancourt, RBP
Laboratory Safety Specialist/Laser Safety Officer
Office of Environmental Health and Safety
University of Miami
(305) 243-3400
Fax: (305) 243-3272
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 13 Mar 2002 13:37:35 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Morgan Margaret-AMM076
Subject: Heat killed chlamydia pneumoniae
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Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Hi Everyone,
I would like to know what BSL practices you would recommend for working with
heat killed clinical specimens of nasal/throat swabs or sputum which contain
Chlamydia pneumoniae. If they are heat killed is it necessary to handle
them at BSL 2 or can they be considered as non-infectious?
Thanks,
Margaret Morgan
Motorola Life Sciences
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 14 Mar 2002 08:17:26 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ron Amoling
Subject: Purified Micro Environments Brand
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Hello
Has anyone on this list heard of or bought from a company named Purified
Micro Environments. One of our researchers has a need for a custom sized
biosafety cabinet. Please respond to me directly if you have comments
(positive or negative).
Thanks
Ron
Ronald K. Amoling II, MS, MBA
Senior Environmental Health & Safety Coordinator
Aventis Pharmaceuticals, Cambridge Genomics Center
26 Landsdowne Street
Cambridge, MA 02139
email: ronald.amoling@
phone: 617-768-4043
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 14 Mar 2002 10:09:57 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Michael Betlach
Subject: Snake venom disposal
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
I'd like to enlist the collective expertise of the group to devise a
solution to a (hopefully) unique problem.
We recently acquired the assets of another company that had leased space in
one of our buildings. Some of the 'assets' included several vials of
lyophilized snake venoms, primarily from Crotalus (rattlesnake) but also
including Naja (cobra) venoms. The vendor's MSDS recommends disposal by
dissolving materials in a combustible solvent and then burning them in a
chemical incinerator with afterburner and scrubber. Needless to say, we
don't have access to such equipment.
Our thoughts have included disposal through our chemical waste hauler, e.g.,
lab pack for secure landfill disposal; disposal through our biowaste hauler,
who uses electro-thermal deactivation for red bag waste; and on-site methods
to inactivate the protein components of the venoms. On-site options include
rehydration followed by autoclaving; dry heat (how hot for how long?); and
rehydration in 0.1 N sodium hydroxide to digest the proteins, hold at room
temperature for a day, then dispose to sanitary sewer or landfill. I'd like
to minimize handling--especially opening crimp-top vials by hand--for
obvious reasons.
Thank you for your help. If you wish to reply off the list, my e-mail is
mbetlach@
Michael Betlach, Ph.D.
Biosafety Officer
Promega Corporation
5445 E. Cheryl Parkway
Madison, WI 53711
(608) 274-1181, Ext. 1270
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 14 Mar 2002 16:29:43 -0000
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Stuart Thompson
Subject: Re: Snake venom disposal
In-Reply-To:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Maybe your liability is really an asset? Would a chemicals broker make you
an offer? I heard that companies with thick catalogues, e.g. Sigma, acquire
some of their stock in this way. They are one of the best known but there
are other, smaller, specialist companies. I believe that Dr Peter Dean, in
Cambridge, England, used to run a brokerage.
Stuart Thompson B.Sc., Ph.D.
University Biological Safety Officer
Health & Safety Services
University of Manchester
Waterloo Place
182/184 Oxford Road
Manchester M13 9GP
tel: +44 (0)161 275 5069
fax: +44 (0)161 275 6989
mobile 07946 022 698
stuart.thompson@man.ac.uk
-----Original Message-----
From: A Biosafety Discussion List [mailto:BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU]On
Behalf Of Michael Betlach
Sent: 14 March 2002 16:10
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Snake venom disposal
I'd like to enlist the collective expertise of the group to devise a
solution to a (hopefully) unique problem.
We recently acquired the assets of another company that had leased space in
one of our buildings. Some of the 'assets' included several vials of
lyophilized snake venoms, primarily from Crotalus (rattlesnake) but also
including Naja (cobra) venoms. The vendor's MSDS recommends disposal by
dissolving materials in a combustible solvent and then burning them in a
chemical incinerator with afterburner and scrubber. Needless to say, we
don't have access to such equipment.
Our thoughts have included disposal through our chemical waste hauler, e.g.,
lab pack for secure landfill disposal; disposal through our biowaste hauler,
who uses electro-thermal deactivation for red bag waste; and on-site methods
to inactivate the protein components of the venoms. On-site options include
rehydration followed by autoclaving; dry heat (how hot for how long?); and
rehydration in 0.1 N sodium hydroxide to digest the proteins, hold at room
temperature for a day, then dispose to sanitary sewer or landfill. I'd like
to minimize handling--especially opening crimp-top vials by hand--for
obvious reasons.
Thank you for your help. If you wish to reply off the list, my e-mail is
mbetlach@
Michael Betlach, Ph.D.
Biosafety Officer
Promega Corporation
5445 E. Cheryl Parkway
Madison, WI 53711
(608) 274-1181, Ext. 1270
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 14 Mar 2002 11:31:00 EST
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ed Krisiunas
Subject: Re: Snake venom disposal
MIME-Version: 1.0
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Michael:
I like the brokerage idea.
You could inform you medical waste hauler you need some waste to be
specifically incinerated (as the ETD process would not be used for chemo or
path waste - so they will have arrangements made for incineration).
Regards,
Edward Krisiunas, MT(ASCP), CIC, MPH
President
WNWN International
PO Box 1164
Burlington, Connecticut
06013
860-675-1217
860-675-1311(fax)
860-944-2373(mobile)
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Michael:
I like the brokerage idea.
You could inform you medical waste hauler you need some waste to be specifically incinerated (as the ETD process would not be used for chemo or path waste - so they will have arrangements made for incineration).
Regards,
Edward Krisiunas, MT(ASCP), CIC, MPH
President
WNWN International
PO Box 1164
Burlington, Connecticut
06013
860-675-1217
860-675-1311(fax)
860-944-2373(mobile)
--part1_186.4c725f6.29c22a44_boundary--
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 14 Mar 2002 11:33:16 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Bernholc, Nicole M"
Subject: Re: Snake venom disposal
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
You know, there has been a real shortage of snake venom. I heard somehow
production was down and that the only producer would be somewhere in england
and that production wouldn't be up for quite a while.
You might offer it to a poison control or hospital.
-----Original Message-----
From: Michael Betlach [mailto:MBetlach@]
Sent: Thursday, March 14, 2002 11:10 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Snake venom disposal
I'd like to enlist the collective expertise of the group to devise a
solution to a (hopefully) unique problem.
We recently acquired the assets of another company that had leased space in
one of our buildings. Some of the 'assets' included several vials of
lyophilized snake venoms, primarily from Crotalus (rattlesnake) but also
including Naja (cobra) venoms. The vendor's MSDS recommends disposal by
dissolving materials in a combustible solvent and then burning them in a
chemical incinerator with afterburner and scrubber. Needless to say, we
don't have access to such equipment.
Our thoughts have included disposal through our chemical waste hauler, e.g.,
lab pack for secure landfill disposal; disposal through our biowaste hauler,
who uses electro-thermal deactivation for red bag waste; and on-site methods
to inactivate the protein components of the venoms. On-site options include
rehydration followed by autoclaving; dry heat (how hot for how long?); and
rehydration in 0.1 N sodium hydroxide to digest the proteins, hold at room
temperature for a day, then dispose to sanitary sewer or landfill. I'd like
to minimize handling--especially opening crimp-top vials by hand--for
obvious reasons.
Thank you for your help. If you wish to reply off the list, my e-mail is
mbetlach@
Michael Betlach, Ph.D.
Biosafety Officer
Promega Corporation
5445 E. Cheryl Parkway
Madison, WI 53711
(608) 274-1181, Ext. 1270
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 14 Mar 2002 13:12:37 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Robert N. Latsch"
Subject: Re: Snake venom disposal
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
These items are poisons. BUT
They do not qualify as pathogens.
They are not regulated by federal environmental laws. Check with your
State, county, city. They probably do not regulate them either.
OSHA still applies but that covers worker safety.
In which case I am am glad that you take our approach. It is not regulated
but, it will be dealt with responsibly. Check with your chemical waste
broker. We send almost everything out for disposal to be burned by the
method you discribe.
If it is in a landfill, even though you did everything proper and right,
You are still responsible. If the landfill ever becomes a superfund, you
will probably be named a prp. Get out your checkbook.
The same thing could happen with incineration. But the risks are decreased
significantly.
bob
>I'd like to enlist the collective expertise of the group to devise a
>solution to a (hopefully) unique problem.
>We recently acquired the assets of another company that had leased space in
>one of our buildings. Some of the 'assets' included several vials of
>lyophilized snake venoms, primarily from Crotalus (rattlesnake) but also
>including Naja (cobra) venoms. The vendor's MSDS recommends disposal by
>dissolving materials in a combustible solvent and then burning them in a
>chemical incinerator with afterburner and scrubber. Needless to say, we
>don't have access to such equipment.
>Our thoughts have included disposal through our chemical waste hauler, e.g.,
>lab pack for secure landfill disposal; disposal through our biowaste hauler,
>who uses electro-thermal deactivation for red bag waste; and on-site methods
>to inactivate the protein components of the venoms. On-site options include
>rehydration followed by autoclaving; dry heat (how hot for how long?); and
>rehydration in 0.1 N sodium hydroxide to digest the proteins, hold at room
>temperature for a day, then dispose to sanitary sewer or landfill. I'd like
>to minimize handling--especially opening crimp-top vials by hand--for
>obvious reasons.
>
>Thank you for your help. If you wish to reply off the list, my e-mail is
>mbetlach@
>
>Michael Betlach, Ph.D.
>Biosafety Officer
>Promega Corporation
>5445 E. Cheryl Parkway
>Madison, WI 53711
>(608) 274-1181, Ext. 1270
_____________________________________________________________________
__ / _____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 14 Mar 2002 13:18:59 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Jean Lancaster
Subject: Re: Snake venom disposal
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Isn't toxicity to humans a criteria for hazardous waste?
-----Original Message-----
From: Robert N. Latsch [mailto:rnl2@PO.CWRU.EDU]
Sent: Thursday, March 14, 2002 1:13 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Snake venom disposal
These items are poisons. BUT
They do not qualify as pathogens.
They are not regulated by federal environmental laws. Check with your
State, county, city. They probably do not regulate them either.
OSHA still applies but that covers worker safety.
In which case I am am glad that you take our approach. It is not =
regulated
but, it will be dealt with responsibly. Check with your chemical waste
broker. We send almost everything out for disposal to be burned by the
method you discribe.
If it is in a landfill, even though you did everything proper and right,
You are still responsible. If the landfill ever becomes a superfund, =
you
will probably be named a prp. Get out your checkbook.
The same thing could happen with incineration. But the risks are =
decreased
significantly.
bob
>I'd like to enlist the collective expertise of the group to devise a
>solution to a (hopefully) unique problem.
>We recently acquired the assets of another company that had leased =
space in
>one of our buildings. Some of the 'assets' included several vials of
>lyophilized snake venoms, primarily from Crotalus (rattlesnake) but =
also
>including Naja (cobra) venoms. The vendor's MSDS recommends disposal by
>dissolving materials in a combustible solvent and then burning them in =
a
>chemical incinerator with afterburner and scrubber. Needless to say, we
>don't have access to such equipment.
>Our thoughts have included disposal through our chemical waste hauler, =
e.g.,
>lab pack for secure landfill disposal; disposal through our biowaste =
hauler,
>who uses electro-thermal deactivation for red bag waste; and on-site =
methods
>to inactivate the protein components of the venoms. On-site options =
include
>rehydration followed by autoclaving; dry heat (how hot for how long?); =
and
>rehydration in 0.1 N sodium hydroxide to digest the proteins, hold at =
room
>temperature for a day, then dispose to sanitary sewer or landfill. I'd =
like
>to minimize handling--especially opening crimp-top vials by hand--for
>obvious reasons.
>
>Thank you for your help. If you wish to reply off the list, my e-mail =
is
>mbetlach@
>
>Michael Betlach, Ph.D.
>Biosafety Officer
>Promega Corporation
>5445 E. Cheryl Parkway
>Madison, WI 53711
>(608) 274-1181, Ext. 1270
_____________________________________________________________________
__ / =
_____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental =
Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail =
rlatsch@
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 14 Mar 2002 13:50:20 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Robert N. Latsch"
Subject: Re: Snake venom disposal
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
It can be.
But epa provides no criteria for what is and is not toxic. They provide a
list. If it is on the list it is toxic and regulated. if it is not on the
list, it might be toxic, but it is not regulated.
Bob
>Isn't toxicity to humans a criteria for hazardous waste?
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From: Robert N. Latsch [mailto:rnl2@PO.CWRU.EDU]
>Sent: Thursday, March 14, 2002 1:13 PM
>To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
>Subject: Re: Snake venom disposal
>
>
>These items are poisons. BUT
>They do not qualify as pathogens.
>They are not regulated by federal environmental laws. Check with your
>State, county, city. They probably do not regulate them either.
>OSHA still applies but that covers worker safety.
>
>In which case I am am glad that you take our approach. It is not regulated
>but, it will be dealt with responsibly. Check with your chemical waste
>broker. We send almost everything out for disposal to be burned by the
>method you discribe.
>
>If it is in a landfill, even though you did everything proper and right,
>You are still responsible. If the landfill ever becomes a superfund, you
>will probably be named a prp. Get out your checkbook.
>
>The same thing could happen with incineration. But the risks are decreased
>significantly.
>
>bob
>
>>I'd like to enlist the collective expertise of the group to devise a
>>solution to a (hopefully) unique problem.
>>We recently acquired the assets of another company that had leased space in
>>one of our buildings. Some of the 'assets' included several vials of
>>lyophilized snake venoms, primarily from Crotalus (rattlesnake) but also
>>including Naja (cobra) venoms. The vendor's MSDS recommends disposal by
>>dissolving materials in a combustible solvent and then burning them in a
>>chemical incinerator with afterburner and scrubber. Needless to say, we
>>don't have access to such equipment.
>>Our thoughts have included disposal through our chemical waste hauler, e.g.,
>>lab pack for secure landfill disposal; disposal through our biowaste hauler,
>>who uses electro-thermal deactivation for red bag waste; and on-site methods
>>to inactivate the protein components of the venoms. On-site options include
>>rehydration followed by autoclaving; dry heat (how hot for how long?); and
>>rehydration in 0.1 N sodium hydroxide to digest the proteins, hold at room
>>temperature for a day, then dispose to sanitary sewer or landfill. I'd like
>>to minimize handling--especially opening crimp-top vials by hand--for
>>obvious reasons.
>>
>>Thank you for your help. If you wish to reply off the list, my e-mail is
>>mbetlach@
>>
>>Michael Betlach, Ph.D.
>>Biosafety Officer
>>Promega Corporation
>>5445 E. Cheryl Parkway
>>Madison, WI 53711
>>(608) 274-1181, Ext. 1270
>
>
>
>_____________________________________________________________________
>__ / _____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
>_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
> \ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
> \ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
> \__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
_____________________________________________________________________
__ / _____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 14 Mar 2002 14:08:00 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: NIH
Subject: Re: Snake venom disposal
In-Reply-To:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
These are proteins folks, not hazardous chemicals. What will destroy
proteins? Heat, acid, caustic?
John H. Keene, Dr. P.H., CBSP
Biohaztec Associates, Inc.
924 Castle Hollow Road
Midlothian, VA 23114
Phone/Fax (804) 379-9192
E-mail jkeene@
Web Site:
-----Original Message-----
From: A Biosafety Discussion List [mailto:BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU]On
Behalf Of Robert N. Latsch
Sent: Thursday, March 14, 2002 1:50 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Snake venom disposal
It can be.
But epa provides no criteria for what is and is not toxic. They provide a
list. If it is on the list it is toxic and regulated. if it is not on the
list, it might be toxic, but it is not regulated.
Bob
>Isn't toxicity to humans a criteria for hazardous waste?
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From: Robert N. Latsch [mailto:rnl2@PO.CWRU.EDU]
>Sent: Thursday, March 14, 2002 1:13 PM
>To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
>Subject: Re: Snake venom disposal
>
>
>These items are poisons. BUT
>They do not qualify as pathogens.
>They are not regulated by federal environmental laws. Check with your
>State, county, city. They probably do not regulate them either.
>OSHA still applies but that covers worker safety.
>
>In which case I am am glad that you take our approach. It is not regulated
>but, it will be dealt with responsibly. Check with your chemical waste
>broker. We send almost everything out for disposal to be burned by the
>method you discribe.
>
>If it is in a landfill, even though you did everything proper and right,
>You are still responsible. If the landfill ever becomes a superfund, you
>will probably be named a prp. Get out your checkbook.
>
>The same thing could happen with incineration. But the risks are decreased
>significantly.
>
>bob
>
>>I'd like to enlist the collective expertise of the group to devise a
>>solution to a (hopefully) unique problem.
>>We recently acquired the assets of another company that had leased space
in
>>one of our buildings. Some of the 'assets' included several vials of
>>lyophilized snake venoms, primarily from Crotalus (rattlesnake) but also
>>including Naja (cobra) venoms. The vendor's MSDS recommends disposal by
>>dissolving materials in a combustible solvent and then burning them in a
>>chemical incinerator with afterburner and scrubber. Needless to say, we
>>don't have access to such equipment.
>>Our thoughts have included disposal through our chemical waste hauler,
e.g.,
>>lab pack for secure landfill disposal; disposal through our biowaste
hauler,
>>who uses electro-thermal deactivation for red bag waste; and on-site
methods
>>to inactivate the protein components of the venoms. On-site options
include
>>rehydration followed by autoclaving; dry heat (how hot for how long?); and
>>rehydration in 0.1 N sodium hydroxide to digest the proteins, hold at room
>>temperature for a day, then dispose to sanitary sewer or landfill. I'd
like
>>to minimize handling--especially opening crimp-top vials by hand--for
>>obvious reasons.
>>
>>Thank you for your help. If you wish to reply off the list, my e-mail is
>>mbetlach@
>>
>>Michael Betlach, Ph.D.
>>Biosafety Officer
>>Promega Corporation
>>5445 E. Cheryl Parkway
>>Madison, WI 53711
>>(608) 274-1181, Ext. 1270
>
>
>
>_____________________________________________________________________
>__ /
_____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
>_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
> \ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
> \ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental
Safety
> \__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
_____________________________________________________________________
__ /
_____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 14 Mar 2002 16:50:03 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Dan Liberman
Subject: JobOpening for Safety Professional
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
There is an opening for a Safety Professional in the Department of
Environmental Affairs & Safety at Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
located in Ridgefield, Connecticut. Enclosed is the position
description. All candidates must apply via the registration process at
Location is Danbury/Bridgeport
Department is Environmental Affairs and Safety
Daniel F. Liberman, Ph.D.
Associate Director
Environmental Affairs and Safety
Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
900 Ridgebury Road, P.O. Box 368
Ridgefield, CT 06877-0368
Telephone (203) 798-4081
Specialist I, Safety
Internal Location: BIPI-BRC
Department: Environmental Affairs & Safety
Manager: Daniel Liberman
Recruiter: Darlene Russell
Job Type: Full Time
Job Grade: E1B
Job Description:
Boehringer Ingelheim is in the business if sustaining and improving the
quality of life for the customers of our products. We are customer focused
and committed to the highest quality and ethical standards for our products
and our people. We are a privately held global Company and we believe that
remaining privately held is a competitive advantage which allows us to set
long term strategy while affording us the ability to make critical decisions
on important short term issues. The Diversity of our people fosters
innovative thinking, problem solving and has a positive impact on the bottom
line. Boehringer Ingelheim - Discover us at us.boehringer-.
REQUIREMENTS:
* Certified Safety professional with advanced degree in Safety
Management is desirable.
* Minimum 2 years experience managing a safety program in a
pharmaceutical or chemical facility or 5 years experience as a safety
professional.
* Proven strong communication skills to effectively interact with all
levels in the organization.
* Proven ability to analyze accident/injury and costs to develop and
implement effective accident control programs.
* Persuasive individual with command of technical issues that genders
trust and authority.
* Self-motivated and have sufficient background/ experience to develop
and implement programs which meet the Company's health and safety
objectives.
DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES:
* Administer a portfolio of programs and projects that address
facility related safety elements.
* Ensure compliance with OSHA safety regulations and Life Safety
Codes.
* Manage workplace safety programs including contractor safety,
confined space entry, lock-out/tag-out, hot work, machine guarding and
electrical safety.
* Manage Life Safety Program, coordinate facility emergency
organization, participate in response to HAZMAT incidents and work with
Engineering on property protection.
* Manage OSHA Accident/Investigation and record-keeping/reporting
effort. Train supervisors in procedures and practices associated with
accident/incident investigation. Analyze accident/incident data to determine
trends and develop/recommend control programs to reduce injuries.
* Develop & conduct employee safety training programs, including new
employee orientation.
* Conduct other activities as assigned by Department Director.
Requisition ID: P0602
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 15 Mar 2002 12:03:00 -0000
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Stuart Thompson
Subject: Re: Snake venom disposal
In-Reply-To:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
If there is a shortage, than it might be worth contacting the only company
that now makes the antivenom as they will need the venom in order to raise
antibodies. For details, see:
Stuart
Dr Stuart Thompson
University Biological Safety Officer
Health & Safety Services
University of Manchester
Waterloo Place
182/184 Oxford Road
Manchester M13 9GP
tel: +44 (0)161 275 5069
fax: +44 (0)161 275 6989
mobile 07946 022 698
stuart.thompson@man.ac.uk
-----Original Message-----
From: A Biosafety Discussion List [mailto:BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU]On
Behalf Of Bernholc, Nicole M
Sent: 14 March 2002 16:33
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Snake venom disposal
You know, there has been a real shortage of snake venom. I heard somehow
production was down and that the only producer would be somewhere in england
and that production wouldn't be up for quite a while.
You might offer it to a poison control or hospital.
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2002 10:40:14 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Terry Lawrin
Subject: Light chain bot tox
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
Once again hello all,
I have a need to know about light chain botulinum toxin. I looked for an
LD 50 for it, and all I found was some MSDS's for the toxic dimer. I have
been told this section of the dimer is non-toxic, but I can't find
supportive info to back it up. Does the Select Agent Act come into
play? What type of containment is required?
I e-mailed the CDC 2 business days ago and I still don't have a
response. Is there a CDC phone number that I can call a person, that can
walk me through this?
Any input would be a great help.
Thanks,
Terry
Terrance J. Lawrin, MT. (ASCP) SLS, CBSP (ABSA)
Biosafety Officer / Sanitarian
University of Illinois at Chicago
Environmental Health and Safety Office
Telephone: 312-413-3701
email: tlawrin@uic.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2002 13:19:02 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Robert N. Latsch"
Subject: Re: Light chain bot tox
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Try this gentlemen.
Dr. Mark Hempheill
CDC-Select Agents
Office of Health & Safety
Atlanta, Ge
404-639-4418
Don't be suprized if they do not know who you are asking for or what a
selct agent is. Just keep pushing:)
bob
>Once again hello all,
>
>I have a need to know about light chain botulinum toxin. I looked for an
>LD 50 for it, and all I found was some MSDS's for the toxic dimer. I have
>been told this section of the dimer is non-toxic, but I can't find
>supportive info to back it up. Does the Select Agent Act come into
>play? What type of containment is required?
>
>I e-mailed the CDC 2 business days ago and I still don't have a
>response. Is there a CDC phone number that I can call a person, that can
>walk me through this?
>
>Any input would be a great help.
>
>Thanks,
>
>Terry
>
>
>
>Terrance J. Lawrin, MT. (ASCP) SLS, CBSP (ABSA)
>Biosafety Officer / Sanitarian
>University of Illinois at Chicago
>Environmental Health and Safety Office
>Telephone: 312-413-3701
>email: tlawrin@uic.edu
_____________________________________________________________________
__ / _____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2002 16:37:08 -0500
Reply-To: pr18@columbia.edu
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: paul rubock
Organization: EH&S
Subject: Intra-campus transport of infectious materials
MIME-Version: 1.0
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Travel between some buildings here requires walking on a city street and
sometimes crossing a public street. My question arises from the
proposed in vitro cultivation of M. tb and/or West Nile in building "A"
followed by transport to the animal facility in building "B".
My thought is to place the material in class 6.2 packaging, note the
destination, source, and emergency phone on the exterior, and go
directly to the destination. (In other words do everything as if they
were sending the stuff via FedEx as an Infectious Substance, except they
don't call FedEx.) I wouod also require a periodic log of trips between
buildings, limiting this responsibility to a subset of investigators
trained on DOT and IATA regs.
How are others in this position approaching it?
Thanks,
Paul Rubock
Columbia University
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n:EHS;Paul Rubock, MPH, Biological Safety Officer,
tel;fax:212-795-5847
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=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2002 07:54:52 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Gilpin, Richard"
Subject: Control of Biohazards Course 4/29 to 5/3/02 Enrollment Closed
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
It is Wednesday, March 20, it is raining in Baltimore and the temperature is
about 42 degrees.
Byron and I must send our apologies to those of you who were planning to
register for the 23rd version of a Baltimore tradition..... The Control of
Biohazards Course.
The class is now full; we cannot accept additional registrations.
We will make every effort to have another course this fall for those of you
who were not able to register for the April-May 2002 course. If you are
interested, let us know by sending an email to
biosafety@
by June 1, 2002.
Possible times are:
Mid September 2002 Early
November 2002
Late September 2002 Mid
November 2002
The official website for the course is
which has the course information. The site will be updated with additional
information if a new time and location can be made available.
Richard Gilpin & Byron Tepper
mailto:biosafety@controlofbiohazards
Richard W. Gilpin, Ph.D., RBP, CBSP
Assistant Director & Biosafety Officer
Environmental Health & Safety (EHS)
University of Maryland Baltimore
714 West Lombard Street, Room 305
Baltimore MD 21201-1084
(410) 706-7845
Fax (410) 706-1520
rgilpin@ehs.umaryland.edu
ehs.umaryland.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2002 10:25:58 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Donald G. Robasser"
Organization: Princeton University
Subject: Fitness Center Use Rules/Cleaning,Disinfection Procedures
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Biosafety colleagues,
A little different question for those having responsibilities covering
this area of concern. I am interested in what use rules are in place
for fitness centers at colleges and universities, particularly for those
facilities that are open to the campus-wide population as opposed to
those limited to an athletic team use. I would like to know about rules
in place regarding open wounds/infectious skin diseases/communicable
diseases and what procedures are in place for cleaning and disinfecting
common-use equipment, both by users and staff personnel. If you don't
have direct knowledge, but could direct me to those with direct
responsibility, that would be very helpful.
Thanks for your help on this question.
Don Robasser
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2002 08:33:39 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Therese M. Stinnett"
Subject: Re: Fitness Center Use Rules/Cleaning,Disinfection Procedures
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
I think you need to talk to a registered sanitarian or the equivalent =
in
your state or county or city. It varies from place to place and if you =
are
a private institution vs. a public institution, the rules you will be
required to follow will likely be different. Colorado does those sorts =
of
public health things county by county and each county health group =
decides
what they will enforce and in my experience (as a condo owner), ignores =
what
they don't have funding to do. As a state agency we are not subject to =
the
county jurisdictions.
Therese M. Stinnett=20
Biosafety Officer=20
Health and Safety Division=20
UCHSC, Mailstop C275
4200 E. 9th Avenue
Denver, CO=A0 80262
Voice:=A0 303-315-6754=20
Pager:=A0=A0 303-266-5402=20
Fax:=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 303-315-8026=20
email:=A0=A0=A0 therese.stinnett@uchsc.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2002 14:00:03 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ben Owens
Subject: Modular BSL3 Lab
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Biosafety Members,
A colleague of mine forwarded to me the Scientific Buildings, Inc. web
site (). This company appears to be offering
prefabricated, modular BSL3 labs. Does anyone have experience with such
a lab, or this particular company?
Ben
------------
Ben Owens
Chemical Hygiene Officer
Environmental Health and Safety Department, MS 328
University of Nevada, Reno 89557
(775) 327-5196
(775) 784-4553 fax
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Biosafety = Members,
A colleague of mine = forwarded to me the Scientific Buildings, Inc. web site ().=A0 This company appears to be = offering prefabricated, modular BSL3 labs.=A0 = Does anyone have experience with such a lab, or this particular = company?
Ben
------------
Ben = Owens
Chemical Hygiene = Officer
Environmental Health and = Safety Department, MS 328
University of Nevada, Reno 89557
(775) 327-5196
(775) 784-4553 fax
------=_NextPart_000_0010_01C1D017.88CEBD40--
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2002 16:29:29 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Kyle Boyett
Subject: Re: Modular BSL3 Lab
MIME-Version: 1.0
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boundary="----_=_NextPart_001_01C1D05E.B3702920"
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this format, some or all of this message may not be legible.
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Ben, If you are interested in modular lab space I would suggest you try
giving Jim Grantham at Certek a call. His contact info is in the ABSA
directory. At least you can compare features and prices. Hope this helps.
Kyle G. Boyett
Asst. Director of Biosafety
Safety Short Distribution List Administrator
University of Alabama @ Birmingham
Department of Occupational Health and Safety
933 South 19th Street Suite 445
Birmingham, Alabama 35294
Phone: 205.934.9181
Fax: 205.934.7487
Visit our WEB site at: healthsafe.uab.edu
Asking me to overlook a safety violation is like asking me to reduce the
value I place on YOUR life
-----Original Message-----
From: Ben Owens [mailto:bowens@UNR.EDU]
Sent: Wednesday, March 20, 2002 4:00 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Modular BSL3 Lab
Biosafety Members,
A colleague of mine forwarded to me the Scientific Buildings, Inc. web site
( ). This company
appears to be offering prefabricated, modular BSL3 labs. Does anyone have
experience with such a lab, or this particular company?
Ben
------------
Ben Owens
Chemical Hygiene Officer
Environmental Health and Safety Department, MS 328
University of Nevada, Reno 89557
(775) 327-5196
(775) 784-4553 fax
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Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
xmlns:w=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:word" = xmlns:st1=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags" = xmlns=3D"">
Ben, If = you are interested in modular lab space I would suggest you try giving Jim = Grantham at Certek a call. His contact info is in the ABSA directory. At least you = can compare features and prices. Hope this = helps.
=
Kyle G. Boyett
Asst. Director of Biosafety
Safety Short Distribution List Administrator
University of Alabama @ Birmingham
Department of Occupational Health and Safety
933 South 19th Street Suite 445
Birmingham, Alabama 35294
Phone: 205.934.9181
Fax: 205.934.7487
Visit our WEB site at: healthsafe.uab.edu
Asking me to overlook a safety violation is like asking me to = reduce the value I place on YOUR life
-----Original = Message-----
From: Ben Owens [mailto:bowens@UNR.EDU]
Sent: Wednesday, March 20, 2002 4:00 = PM
To: = BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Modular BSL3 = Lab
Biosafety = Members,
A colleague of mine = forwarded to me the Scientific Buildings, Inc. web site (). This company appears to be = offering prefabricated, modular BSL3 labs. Does anyone have experience with such a lab, or this particular = company?
Ben
----------= --
Ben Owens
Chemical Hygiene = Officer
Environmental Health and = Safety Department, MS 328
University of Nevada, Reno = 89557
(775) = 327-5196
(775) 784-4553 = fax
------_=_NextPart_001_01C1D05E.B3702920--
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 21 Mar 2002 15:02:49 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Larry Mendoza
Organization: VCU-OEHS-Biological/Chemical Safety Section
Subject: Respiratory Protection Program?
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Once again I turn to the ever so helpful group of biosafety professionals,
Can someone tell me if N-95 respirators fall under the premises of 29 CFR
1910.134? In the standard itself it states that:
(c)(2)(ii)
...Exception: Employers are not required to include in a written respiratory
protection program those employees whose only use of respirators involves the
voluntary use of filtering facepieces (dust masks).
If the the use of N-95s is not voluntary does this mean they have to be coverd in
the program (ie. baseline medical examination, spirometry, etc...etc...seems
silly)? I know that employees have to be fit-tested and trained, but does a
laboratory working with certain viruses, say Adenoviruses, have to be in compliance
with1910.134 when all they are using are N-95s? And are N-95 respirators considered
simple dust masks? I looked at NIOSH regs as well and am still left a little
confused.
Thanks in advance for any help.
Larry Mendoza
VCU-Biosafety Inspector.
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version:2.1
email;internet:lgmendoz@HSC.VCU.EDU
title:Biosafety Inspector
adr;quoted-printable:;;1101 East Marshall St.=0D=0APO Box 980112;RICHMOND;VA;23298;USA
fn:Laurence Mendoza
end:vcard
--------------AE4200AB176FE9880C6D4CC5--
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 21 Mar 2002 15:01:38 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Scott Finkernagel
Subject: Influenza Virus Vaccine
Mime-Version: 1.0
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Hello Biosafety Colleagues:
Do any of you have or know of someone who could provide expertise on =
Influenza virus vaccine stock and the Influenza Vaccine Manufacturing =
process?
I am concerned about a researcher who has a large quantity (>1 liter) of =
frozen Influenza A Bejing/32/92/X-117/H3N2 stock from 1993-1994.This stock =
was collected from different stages of the vaccine manufacturing process =
from a pharmaceutical manufacturer (0.1-1.0 mg/ml HA).=20
It will be used in the membrane fusion field, biochemical amounts of =
enveloped viruses that fuse with cell membranes are used as controls in =
fusion assays. Investigators in this field handle large amounts of =
influenza or other viruses and apparently don't have much concern about =
acquiring the disease although they also claim that the virus is "virulent"=
This investigator was trained at another (prestigious) institution to =
transfer and divide the virus in the fume hood.
I would want to know if this Influenza virus from the vaccine manufacturing=
process is capable of causing the Flu in people who are exposed to it or =
is it a live attenuated form of the virus?
We have had problems finding out how this type of preparation is responsibl=
y handled. Obviously it must not make people very sick or the entire =
membrane fusion research field would be devoid of investigators. Bl-2 =
practices and procedures seem appropriate and the PI and workers will need =
training but what additional biosafety practices are necessary? =20
We would really appreciate a response from someone who either is knowledgea=
ble or can help us contact a knowledgeable person about these types of =
influenza virus preparations.
Regards,
Scott
Scott W. Finkernagel, MS
Biological Safety Officer=20
UMDNJ- EOHSS=20
335 George Street Liberty Plaza -Room 2117
New Brunswick, NJ 08901-2688
Ph.# 732-235-9370 Fax 5-9371
e-mail: finkersw@umdnj.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 21 Mar 2002 15:20:51 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Morris, Gary"
Subject: Re: Respiratory Protection Program?
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Larry,
What we used to call dust masks are now referred to by OSHA as filtering
facepieces, which is what the N-95 is. The use of a filtering facepiece is
covered by 1910.134. If the employer requires the employee to wear the
device, then all components of the standard are in effect. If the employee
chooses to use the device on a voluntary basis, the employer only has to
provide some basic information to the user. An example of this basic
information is provided in the standard as an appendix. Click on the
following link for this appendix:
ml#Appendix%20D
What I did was to transfer the language of this one-page information handout
and added a section for them to sign.
Regarding volunatry use of filtering facepieces, scroll down near the end of
the link below for OSHA's answer to this question.
Click on the link below for the respiratory protection technical page.
Gary Morris, MS, CIH, CSP
EHS Manager
Pro-Virus, Inc.
Gaithersburg, MD 20878
-----Original Message-----
From: Larry Mendoza [mailto:lgmendoz@HSC.VCU.EDU]
Sent: Thursday, March 21, 2002 3:03 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Respiratory Protection Program?
Once again I turn to the ever so helpful group of biosafety professionals,
Can someone tell me if N-95 respirators fall under the premises of 29 CFR
1910.134? In the standard itself it states that:
(c)(2)(ii)
...Exception: Employers are not required to include in a written respiratory
protection program those employees whose only use of respirators involves
the
voluntary use of filtering facepieces (dust masks).
If the the use of N-95s is not voluntary does this mean they have to be
coverd in
the program (ie. baseline medical examination, spirometry, etc...etc...seems
silly)? I know that employees have to be fit-tested and trained, but does a
laboratory working with certain viruses, say Adenoviruses, have to be in
compliance
with1910.134 when all they are using are N-95s? And are N-95 respirators
considered
simple dust masks? I looked at NIOSH regs as well and am still left a
little
confused.
Thanks in advance for any help.
Larry Mendoza
VCU-Biosafety Inspector.
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 21 Mar 2002 15:32:58 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Robert N. Latsch"
Subject: Re: Respiratory Protection Program?
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
The question becomes why are they wearing a respirator?
If they are wearing a respirator because of an employer reason. I.e. there
is something here, respiratory protection is necessary, 1910.134 applies.
Medical, training, fittest.
OR are they wearing it as protection from TB? 1910.139 applies, medical
training, fittest.
OR are they wearing it because the employees feel more comfortable wearing
them and the employer has no dicernable reason to mandate respirators be
worn? This is voluntary use. I believe this found in one of the
appendices "A"? maybe?
bob
>Once again I turn to the ever so helpful group of biosafety professionals,
>
>Can someone tell me if N-95 respirators fall under the premises of 29 CFR
>1910.134? In the standard itself it states that:
>
>(c)(2)(ii)
>...Exception: Employers are not required to include in a written respiratory
>protection program those employees whose only use of respirators involves the
>voluntary use of filtering facepieces (dust masks).
>
>If the the use of N-95s is not voluntary does this mean they have to be
>coverd in
>the program (ie. baseline medical examination, spirometry, etc...etc...seems
>silly)? I know that employees have to be fit-tested and trained, but does a
>laboratory working with certain viruses, say Adenoviruses, have to be in
>compliance
>with1910.134 when all they are using are N-95s? And are N-95 respirators
>considered
>simple dust masks? I looked at NIOSH regs as well and am still left a little
>confused.
>
>Thanks in advance for any help.
>
>Larry Mendoza
>VCU-Biosafety Inspector.
>
>Content-Type: text/x-vcard; charset=us-ascii;
> name="lgmendoz.vcf"
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>Content-Disposition: attachment;
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>
>Attachment converted: Siberia:lgmendoz.vcf (TEXT/MSWD) (00014586)
_____________________________________________________________________
__ / _____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 22 Mar 2002 08:53:06 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Bernholc, Nicole M"
Subject: Re: Respiratory Protection Program?
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
I believe that even for voluntary use, it is the obligation of the employer
to insure a) there is no hazard or document the level of hazard b) insure
that the protection is appropriate and that the people have training and fit
testing to wear appropriate ppe and that they are medically able to do so
and that the appropriate respirator is chosen.
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 22 Mar 2002 11:34:34 -0600
Reply-To: lknopp@
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Lolly Knopp
Organization: MRI
Subject: ABSL-3
MIME-Version: 1.0
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All-I'm seeking information on a sewer trap system for showers and sinks
in an ABSL-3. Any suggestions?
Lolly Knopp, Safety Officer, 816.753.7600 ext 1645
"Trouble is part of your life, and if you don't share it, you don't give
the person who loves you a chance to love you enough."--Dinah Shore
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All-I'm=20 seeking information on a=20 sewer trap system = for showers and=20 sinks in an ABSL-3. Any suggestions?
Lolly Knopp, Safety Officer,=20 816.753.7600 ext 1645
"Trouble is part of = your life,=20 and if you don't share it, you don't give the=20 person who loves you a chance to love you=20 enough."--Dinah=20 Shore
------=_NextPart_000_0017_01C1D195.8AF10C70--
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 22 Mar 2002 13:25:42 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Jairo Betancourt
Subject: Biosafety Officer position
MIME-version: 1.0
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boundary="----=_NextPart_000_003C_01C1D1A5.111A4D70"
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Distinguished: I know this has been requested before and I already =
e-mail Kyle B. for the salary survey summary. But Does anyone have a job =
description for a Biological Safety Officer position that I can use? Any =
help will be more than appreaciated.
Thanks
Jairo
=20
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Distinguished: I know this has been = requested=20 before and I already e-mail Kyle B. for the salary survey=20 summary. But Does anyone have a job description for a = Biological=20 Safety Officer position that I can use? Any help will be more than=20 appreaciated.
Thanks
Jairo
------=_NextPart_000_003C_01C1D1A5.111A4D70--
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 22 Mar 2002 12:43:57 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Mark Grushka
Subject: Re: Biosafety Officer position
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/mixed;
boundary="----=_NextPart_000_0008_01C1D19F.3BC29E20"
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Jairo:
This is what was advertised about two and a half years ago for my =
current position. The salary data was based upon information that was =
gathered from a biosafty listserve inquiry at the time. Call for more =
details.
Mark Grushka
Biosafety Officer
University of Arizona
520-621-5279----- Original Message -----=20
From: =20
To: =20
Sent: Friday, March 22, 2002 11:25 AM
Subject: Biosafety Officer position
Distinguished: I know this has been requested before and I already =
e-mail Kyle B. for the salary survey summary. But Does anyone have a job =
description for a Biological Safety Officer position that I can use? Any =
help will be more than appreaciated.
Thanks
Jairo
=20
------=_NextPart_001_0009_01C1D19F.3BC29E20
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charset="iso-8859-1"
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Jairo:
This is what was advertised = about two and a=20 half years ago for my current position. The salary data was based = upon=20 information that was gathered from a biosafty listserve inquiry at = the=20 time. Call for more=20 details.
Mark Grushka
Biosafety Officer
University of Arizona
520-621-5279----- Original Message -----
To:
Sent: Friday, March 22, 2002 = 11:25=20 AM
Subject: Biosafety Officer = position
Distinguished: I know this has been = requested=20 before and I already e-mail Kyle B. for the salary survey=20 summary. But Does anyone have a job description for a = Biological=20 Safety Officer position that I can use? Any help will be more than=20 appreaciated.
Thanks
Jairo
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Content-Disposition: attachment;
filename="Biosafety Officer Advertisement.doc"
=========================================================================
Date: Sat, 23 Mar 2002 07:59:35 EST
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Christian Nordqvist
Subject: terms used in science and healthcare
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="part1_18f.547896e.29cdd637_boundary"
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Dear Members
The largest database in the world of medical, pharma, biotech, dentistry,
agrochem and healthcare abbreviations (51,000).
pharma-
Also the largest database in the world of Scientific Articles (30 million).
Best regards
Christian
--part1_18f.547896e.29cdd637_boundary
Content-Type: text/html; charset="US-ASCII"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Dear Members
The largest database in the world of medical, pharma, biotech, dentistry, agrochem and healthcare abbreviations (51,000).
pharma-
Also the largest database in the world of Scientific Articles (30 million).
Best regards
Christian
--part1_18f.547896e.29cdd637_boundary--
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 25 Mar 2002 08:18:59 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Lori Nicholson
Subject: Re: Influenza Virus Vaccine
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Scott:
Our company manufactures the Influenza vaccine and is sold world wide. I
may be able to help you find the right person to answer your questions.
Call me at 608 231-3150 ext 230.
PowderJect Vaccines, Inc.
Madison WI.
Regards,
Lori Nicholson
Corporate Manager of EH&S
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 25 Mar 2002 12:08:15 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ben Owens
Subject: N-95 Respirators
MIME-Version: 1.0
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Biosafety Listservers,
=20
In my opinion, OSHA does not adequately define =93filtering =
facepieces=94
(dust masks) in the respiratory protection standard; however, it is my
understanding that N-95 masks are considered =93respirators=94 and thus
within the scope of 1910.134. In various interpretation letters and the
compliance directive for the respirator standard (CPL 2-0.120), OSHA
appears to include all NIOSH approved respirators (including N-95 dust
mask-type respirators) in the respiratory protection standard. Although
the N-95 dust mask-type respirators may appear to be a common dust mask,
they have an inner molded facepiece that permits a good seal, allowing
persons wearing these respirators to pass a fit test. These N-95 masks
are commonly worn by healthcare professionals when treating tuberculosis
patients. Disposable dust masks are not approved by NIOSH as N-95 or
otherwise.
=20
Involuntary use of respiratory protection, including an N-95 mask,
invokes the full OSHA standard. Voluntary use of filtering facepieces
(dust masks) only requires that the employer provide the information in
Appendix D of the standard to the employee. Since N-95 masks are not
considered dust masks, voluntary use requires a medical evaluation and
the information in Appendix D; however, the OSHA standard does not
require a fit test for voluntary use.
=20
Regards,
Ben
=20
------------
Ben Owens
Chemical Hygiene Officer
Environmental Health and Safety Department, MS 328
University of Nevada, Reno 89557
(775) 327-5196
(775) 784-4553 fax
=20
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xmlns:w=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:word" = xmlns:st1=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags" = xmlns=3D"">
Biosafety Listservers,
In my opinion, OSHA does not adequately define filtering facepieces (dust masks) in the respiratory protection standard; = however, it is my understanding that N-95 masks are considered = respirators and thus within the scope of 1910.134.=A0 In various interpretation letters and the compliance directive for the = respirator standard (CPL 2-0.120), OSHA appears to include all NIOSH approved = respirators (including N-95 dust mask-type respirators) in the respiratory = protection standard.=A0 Although the N-95 = dust mask-type respirators may appear to be a common dust mask, they have an = inner molded facepiece that permits a good seal, allowing persons wearing = these respirators to pass a fit test.=A0 = These N-95 masks are commonly worn by healthcare professionals when treating tuberculosis patients.=A0 = Disposable dust masks are not approved by NIOSH as N-95 or = otherwise.
Involuntary use of respiratory protection, including an N-95 = mask, invokes the full OSHA standard.=A0 = Voluntary use of filtering facepieces (dust masks) only requires that the employer provide the information in Appendix D of the standard to the = employee.=A0 Since N-95 masks are not = considered dust masks, voluntary use requires a medical evaluation and the information = in Appendix D; however, the OSHA standard does not require a fit test for voluntary = use.
Regards,
Ben
------------
Ben = Owens
Chemical Hygiene = Officer
Environmental Health and = Safety Department, 328
of Nevada, Reno 89557
(775) = 327-5196
(775) 784-4553 = fax
------=_NextPart_000_0003_01C1D3F5.BE715070--
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 25 Mar 2002 16:01:11 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Scott, Rick"
Subject: in line HEPA's
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
I'm looking for an inline HEPA filter for a biosafety cabinet that is tied
into the building vac system. We have nice access to the 1/2 inch copper
supply pipe which I am assuming is the best place to install the filter. ?
The cabinet has the standard "stepped" nozzle and petcock inside. Any
ideas? I know this is the kind of question I should be able to answer... :
\
Thanks alot,
Rick Scott
Biological Safety Officer
Biological Safety Cabinet Field Certifier
East Carolina University
Greenville, NC
27858
scottwi@mail.ecu.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 25 Mar 2002 16:09:41 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Robert N. Latsch"
Subject: Re: in line HEPA's
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Two Questions:
What BLS level are we talking here.
AND
Why do this?
Bob
>I'm looking for an inline HEPA filter for a biosafety cabinet that is tied
>into the building vac system. We have nice access to the 1/2 inch copper
>supply pipe which I am assuming is the best place to install the filter. ?
>The cabinet has the standard "stepped" nozzle and petcock inside. Any
>ideas? I know this is the kind of question I should be able to answer... :
>\
>
>Thanks alot,
>
>Rick Scott
>Biological Safety Officer
>Biological Safety Cabinet Field Certifier
>East Carolina University
>Greenville, NC
>27858
>scottwi@mail.ecu.edu
_____________________________________________________________________
__ / _____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 25 Mar 2002 16:21:01 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Scott, Rick"
Subject: Re: in line HEPA's
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
It's for BSL 3. Although they are specifically NOT using the house vac, we
had an inspector (for one of his sponsors) come through and said we need to
get a HEPA installed in the line anyway. And it makes sense, (ie- portable
vac. pump dies/so in a pinch- plug into the house vac.). Using Brucella
spp. in the lab.
Rick
> ----------
> From: Robert N. Latsch
> Reply To: A Biosafety Discussion List
> Sent: Tuesday, March 26, 2002 5:09 AM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: Re: in line HEPA's
>
> Two Questions:
>
> What BLS level are we talking here.
> AND
> Why do this?
>
> Bob
>
> >I'm looking for an inline HEPA filter for a biosafety cabinet that is
> tied
> >into the building vac system. We have nice access to the 1/2 inch copper
> >supply pipe which I am assuming is the best place to install the filter.
> ?
> >The cabinet has the standard "stepped" nozzle and petcock inside. Any
> >ideas? I know this is the kind of question I should be able to answer...
> :
> >\
> >
> >Thanks alot,
> >
> >Rick Scott
> >Biological Safety Officer
> >Biological Safety Cabinet Field Certifier
> >East Carolina University
> >Greenville, NC
> >27858
> >scottwi@mail.ecu.edu
>
>
>
> _____________________________________________________________________
> __ /
> _____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
> _ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
> \ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
> \ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental
> Safety
> \__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
>
>
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 25 Mar 2002 16:38:04 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Robert N. Latsch"
Subject: Re: in line HEPA's
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
OK,
A normal BLS3 must exhaust out of the building and the exhaust must have a
hepa on it. I can see no reason to hood the hood exhaust to any vac line.
Bob
>It's for BSL 3. Although they are specifically NOT using the house vac, we
>had an inspector (for one of his sponsors) come through and said we need to
>get a HEPA installed in the line anyway. And it makes sense, (ie- portable
>vac. pump dies/so in a pinch- plug into the house vac.). Using Brucella
>spp. in the lab.
>
>Rick
>
>> ----------
>> From: Robert N. Latsch
>> Reply To: A Biosafety Discussion List
>> Sent: Tuesday, March 26, 2002 5:09 AM
>> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
>> Subject: Re: in line HEPA's
>>
>> Two Questions:
>>
>> What BLS level are we talking here.
>> AND
>> Why do this?
>>
>> Bob
>>
>> >I'm looking for an inline HEPA filter for a biosafety cabinet that is
>> tied
>> >into the building vac system. We have nice access to the 1/2 inch copper
>> >supply pipe which I am assuming is the best place to install the filter.
>> ?
>> >The cabinet has the standard "stepped" nozzle and petcock inside. Any
>> >ideas? I know this is the kind of question I should be able to answer...
>> :
>> >\
>> >
>> >Thanks alot,
>> >
>> >Rick Scott
>> >Biological Safety Officer
>> >Biological Safety Cabinet Field Certifier
>> >East Carolina University
>> >Greenville, NC
>> >27858
>> >scottwi@mail.ecu.edu
>>
>>
>>
>> _____________________________________________________________________
>> __ /
>> _____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
>> _ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
>> \ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
>> \ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental
>> Safety
>> \__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
>>
>>
_____________________________________________________________________
__ / _____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2002 08:47:38 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Donald G. Robasser"
Organization: Princeton University
Subject: NIH Guidelines for rDNA
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
I am looking for the latest edition og the Guidelines on the web. The
latest one I see is the 1998 version. Does anyone know if there is a
more current version posted. Please pass on the web address. Thanks
Don Robasser
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2002 09:01:19 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Shipp, Allan (OD)"
Subject: Re: NIH Guidelines for rDNA
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
The URL for the NIH Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant DNA
Molecules is:
The January 2001 version is posted at present, but very shortly, a newer
version will go up that will include our revised adverse event reporting
requirements. This newer version will also be fully indexed and
hyperlinked, greatly facilitating navigation through the document.
I'll post a notice to this listserv (as well as to the OBA_NEWS listserv:
) when the latest version is up.
Please feel free to contact me directly if you have any additional
questions.
Allan Shipp
NIH Office of Biotechnology Activities
301-435-2152
-----Original Message-----
From: Donald G. Robasser [mailto:robasser@PRINCETON.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, March 26, 2002 8:48 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: NIH Guidelines for rDNA
I am looking for the latest edition og the Guidelines on the web. The
latest one I see is the 1998 version. Does anyone know if there is a
more current version posted. Please pass on the web address. Thanks
Don Robasser
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2002 09:14:28 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Greg Merkle
Organization: Wright State University
Subject: Re: NIH Guidelines for rDNA
MIME-version: 1.0
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Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-transfer-encoding: 7bit
From the NIH web site the last revision of the guideline is
dated January 2001
Greg Merkle
"Donald G. Robasser" wrote:
>
> I am looking for the latest edition og the Guidelines on the web. The
> latest one I see is the 1998 version. Does anyone know if there is a
> more current version posted. Please pass on the web address. Thanks
> Don Robasser
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n:Merkle;Greg
tel;fax:1-937-775-3761
tel;work:1-937-775-2217
x-mozilla-html:FALSE
url:wright.edu/admin/ehs
org:Wright State University;Department of Environmental Health and Safety
version:2.1
email;internet:greg.merkle@wright.edu
title:Senior Industrial Hygienist
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=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2002 08:23:42 -0600
Reply-To: louann.burnett@vanderbilt.edu
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: LouAnn Burnett
Subject: Re: NIH Guidelines for rDNA
In-Reply-To:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="Windows-1252"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
For those of you who are unfamiliar with the ABSA website, there is a list
of biosafety resources that includes a direct link to the NIH Guidelines and
other important biosafety documents. Go to , click on Biosafety
Resources and take your choice of menu items. If you run across links that
require updating or links that you feel should be included, please send a
note directly to me (louann.burnett@vanderbilt.edu) or to absa@.
Thanks! LouAnn
LouAnn C. Burnett, MS, CBSP
Chair, ABSA Communications Committee
Biosafety Program Manager & Biological Safety Officer
Vanderbilt University Environmental Health & Safety
Nashville, Tennessee
615/322-0927 (direct & voice mail)
615/343-4951 (fax)
-----Original Message-----
From: A Biosafety Discussion List [mailto:BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU]On
Behalf Of Donald G. Robasser
Sent: Tuesday, March 26, 2002 7:48 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: NIH Guidelines for rDNA
I am looking for the latest edition og the Guidelines on the web. The
latest one I see is the 1998 version. Does anyone know if there is a
more current version posted. Please pass on the web address. Thanks
Don Robasser
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2002 13:05:35 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Randall Morin
Subject: Anthrax Decontamination-Brentwood Mail Facility
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="----=_NextPart_000_000C_01C1D4C6.EB3B9C10"
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------=_NextPart_000_000C_01C1D4C6.EB3B9C10
Content-Type: text/plain;
charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
For those that might be interested, this article was in the Washington Times
this morning. This is going to be quite an undertaking.
.
html
Randall S. Morin, Dr.P.H.
Director; Environment, Safety & Health Program
SAIC Frederick, Inc.
National Cancer Institute at Frederick
Fort Detrick, Frederick, MD 21702
Tel: 301 846-1740(V), 301 846-6619(F)
email: morin@
------=_NextPart_000_000C_01C1D4C6.EB3B9C10
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charset="iso-8859-1"
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For those that = might be=20 interested, this article was in the Washington Times this morning. = This is=20 going to be quite an undertaking.
Randall S. Morin,=20 Dr.P.H.
Director; Environment, Safety & = Health=20 Program
SAIC Frederick, Inc.
National Cancer Institute at=20 Frederick
Fort Detrick, Frederick, MD = 21702
Tel: 301 846-1740(V), 301=20 846-6619(F)
email: =20 morin@
------=_NextPart_000_000C_01C1D4C6.EB3B9C10--
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2002 16:14:55 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Gordon, Deborah"
Subject: PSEUDOMONAS AERUGINOSA EXOTOXIN A
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
> Does anyone know the requirements for the safe handling of Pseudomonas
> aeruginosa exotoxin A? Is this a BSL 2 or 3 toxin?
>
>
>
Deborah Gordon
phone: (205) 581-2417
Fax: (205) 581-2880
Southern Research Institute
Birmingham,Alabama
____________________________________________________________________________
_
Confidentiality Notice
The information contained in this communication and its attachments is
intended only for the use of the individual to whom it is addressed and may
contain information that is legally privileged, confidential, or exempt from
disclosure. If the reader of this message is not the intended recipient, you
are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution, or copying of this
communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this
communication in error, please notify postmaster@ (205-581-2999) and
delete the communication without retaining any copies.
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2002 14:51:59 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Funk, Glenn"
Subject: Re: PSEUDOMONAS AERUGINOSA EXOTOXIN A
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Handling toxins should be governed by the principles of chemical safety
rather than infectious agent safety and containment (Biosafety Levels or
BSLs). ExoA should be handled as though it were any other highly toxic
chemical, employing such principles as solubilization and dilution to the
lowest working concentration at the soonest possible time, both done in a
chemical fume hood while wearing proper PPE; safe manipulation of the
working reagent; ready availability of a denaturing or inactivating agent;
and so on. Depending on your institution's policies about working with
toxins, you may want to require that all handlers of the material read and
sign off on the MSDS and any related safety documents. In extreme cases,
you may want to require that the Occupational Health physician have on hand
an antitoxin and be informed prior to the start of procedures. The CDC's
Biosafety in Microbiology and Biomedical Laboratories provides some good
safety guidelines for toxin work in its Appendix I.
Hope this helps ...
Glenn A. Funk
Director and BSO
EH&S
Medimmune-West
408-845-8857
-----Original Message-----
From: Gordon, Deborah [mailto:gordon@]
Sent: Tuesday, 26 March, 2002 14:15
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: PSEUDOMONAS AERUGINOSA EXOTOXIN A
> Does anyone know the requirements for the safe handling of Pseudomonas
> aeruginosa exotoxin A? Is this a BSL 2 or 3 toxin?
>
>
>
Deborah Gordon
phone: (205) 581-2417
Fax: (205) 581-2880
Southern Research Institute
Birmingham,Alabama
____________________________________________________________________________
_
Confidentiality Notice
The information contained in this communication and its attachments is
intended only for the use of the individual to whom it is addressed and may
contain information that is legally privileged, confidential, or exempt from
disclosure. If the reader of this message is not the intended recipient, you
are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution, or copying of this
communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this
communication in error, please notify postmaster@ (205-581-2999) and
delete the communication without retaining any copies.
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 27 Mar 2002 08:29:34 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Lindsey Kayman
Subject: Re: [Re: NIH Guidelines for rDNA]
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
There are also lots of biosafety links at the AIHA Lab Health and Safety
Committe biosafety page: =
Lindsey Kayman
LouAnn Burnett wrote:
For those of you who are unfamiliar with the ABSA website, there is a lis=
t
of biosafety resources that includes a direct link to the NIH Guidelines =
and
other important biosafety documents. Go to , click on Biosaf=
ety
Resources and take your choice of menu items. If you run across links th=
at
require updating or links that you feel should be included, please send a=
note
directly to me (louann.burnett@vanderbilt.edu) or to absa@.
Thanks! LouAnn
LouAnn C. Burnett, MS, CBSP
Chair, ABSA Communications Committee
Biosafety Program Manager & Biological Safety Officer
Vanderbilt University Environmental Health & Safety
Nashville, Tennessee
615/322-0927 (direct & voice mail)
615/343-4951 (fax)
-----Original Message-----
From: A Biosafety Discussion List [mailto:BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU]On
Behalf Of Donald G. Robasser
Sent: Tuesday, March 26, 2002 7:48 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: NIH Guidelines for rDNA
I am looking for the latest edition og the Guidelines on the web. The
latest one I see is the 1998 version. Does anyone know if there is a
more current version posted. Please pass on the web address. Thanks
Don Robasser
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 27 Mar 2002 08:38:00 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: LUKENS Carl B
Subject: Re: N-95 Respirators
Ben & to whom it may concern:
Voluntary use of filtering face piece respirators DOES NOT require medical
evaluations, but does invoke the provision of the info in Appendix D, and it
must be kept clean and sanitary between uses.
Carl Lukens
CIH/MSPH
Oregon OSHA consultation
>>> bowens@UNR.EDU 03/25/02 12:05PM >>>
Biosafety Listservers,
In my opinion, OSHA does not adequately define filtering facepieces
(dust masks) in the respiratory protection standard; however, it is my
understanding that N-95 masks are considered respirators and thus
within the scope of 1910.134. In various interpretation letters and the
compliance directive for the respirator standard (CPL 2-0.120), OSHA
appears to include all NIOSH approved respirators (including N-95 dust
mask-type respirators) in the respiratory protection standard. Although
the N-95 dust mask-type respirators may appear to be a common dust mask,
they have an inner molded facepiece that permits a good seal, allowing
persons wearing these respirators to pass a fit test. These N-95 masks
are commonly worn by healthcare professionals when treating tuberculosis
patients. Disposable dust masks are not approved by NIOSH as N-95 or
otherwise.
Involuntary use of respiratory protection, including an N-95 mask,
invokes the full OSHA standard. Voluntary use of filtering facepieces
(dust masks) only requires that the employer provide the information in
Appendix D of the standard to the employee. Since N-95 masks are not
considered dust masks, voluntary use requires a medical evaluation and
the information in Appendix D; however, the OSHA standard does not
require a fit test for voluntary use.
Regards,
Ben
------------
Ben Owens
Chemical Hygiene Officer
Environmental Health and Safety Department, MS 328
University of Nevada, Reno 89557
(775) 327-5196
(775) 784-4553 fax
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 27 Mar 2002 15:30:11 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Amy Barringer
Subject: Pregnancy and the Laboratory
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
I am trying to gather literature concerning BSL 2 laboratories and =
pregnant employees. I'm interested in Regulatory Agency recommendations, =
journal articles, Institutional Policies, etc. Any resources that you =
are aware of? Thanks in advance, Amy
Amy A. Barringer
Biosafety Officer, SOHES
ARS/USDA
Beltsville Agricultural Research Center
Bldg. 003, Rm. 118
Beltsville, MD 20705
(Ph) 301-504-5557, (F) 301-504-5857
barringa@ba.ars.
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 28 Mar 2002 08:21:35 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Lori Nicholson
Subject: Re: Pregnancy and the Laboratory
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Amy:
Here is how we handle pregnancy in our laboratories. We have a voluntary
pregnancy declaration policy. Here is how it works.
When an employee becomes pregnant she can confidentially come to EH&S and
declare a pregnancy. We give her a form to fill out. The form is
specifically designed to encourage the employee to think of all the hazards
she may come in contact with during her work day. Chemicals, biological,
physical hazards etc. Once she has filled out the form she returns it to
EH&S. EH&S gathers MSDS's or Safety information on the identified hazards.
Then this packet of information and the form are returned to the employee
for her to take back to her physician. The goal is to provide her and her
physician with as much information as possible so that together they can
make an informed decision about her work and her pregnancy. We also give
the employee the NIOSH book on Reproductive Hazards in the workplace
Bibliography and a publication by the Department of Health and Social
Services called Workplace Hazards to Reproductive Health. We also keep a
record of the pregnancy and outcome. Hope this is helpful, I have more, if
you are interested, please email me directly.
Lor
Regards,
Lori Nicholson
Corporate Manager of EH&S
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 28 Mar 2002 09:36:20 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Carl Pike
Subject: Re: Pregnancy and the Laboratory
In-Reply-To:
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; format=flowed; charset=us-ascii
I'm interested in a related angle. Lori Nicholson described a useful
protocol for employees. Does anyone have thoughts on pregnant
students? Obviously the same safety considerations apply, but the
legal framework (and I'm not a lawyer or even a biosafety
professional) would seem to me to be rather different. A college
could also have a voluntary declaration form as Lori mentions, but
are the obligations (or privacy concerns) for a college different
from those of an employer?
thanks
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 28 Mar 2002 11:00:19 EST
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Jim Kaufman
Subject: Re: BIOSAFTY Digest - 26 Mar 2002 to 27 Mar 2002 (#2002-64)
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="part1_130.bc3bf09.29d49813_boundary"
--part1_130.bc3bf09.29d49813_boundary
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="US-ASCII"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
The autodigester did not include to message about pregnancy. Please resend.
James A. Kaufman, Ph.D., Director
The Laboratory Safety Institute
A National Center for Science Safety
192 Worcester Road, Natick, MA 01760-2252
508-647-1900 Fax: 508-647-0062
Cell: 508-574-6264 Res: 781-237-1335
labsafe@
--part1_130.bc3bf09.29d49813_boundary
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The autodigester did not include to message about pregnancy. Please resend.
James A. Kaufman, Ph.D., Director
The Laboratory Safety Institute
A National Center for Science Safety
192 Worcester Road, Natick, MA 01760-2252
508-647-1900 Fax: 508-647-0062
Cell: 508-574-6264 Res: 781-237-1335
labsafe@
--part1_130.bc3bf09.29d49813_boundary--
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 28 Mar 2002 12:13:56 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Carl Pike
Subject: Pregnant Students in the Laboratory
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; format=flowed; charset=us-ascii
If you receive this twice, my apologies - I was asked to resend it
because of a posting problem. Carl
I'm interested in a related angle. Lori Nicholson described a useful
protocol for employees. Does anyone have thoughts on pregnant
students? Obviously the same safety considerations apply, but the
legal framework (and I'm not a lawyer or even a biosafety
professional) would seem to me to be rather different. A college
could also have a voluntary declaration form as Lori mentions, but
are the obligations (or privacy concerns) for a college different
from those of an employer?
thanks
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 29 Mar 2002 15:11:33 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Johnson, Julie A."
Subject: IBC review of outside institution projects
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
We had a request from a small (3 person) start-up company in town to use our
university IBC to review their research. The company is associated with the
university as part of an associated Research Park (associated with the
university, but a separate commercial entity ). The company head is also a
university professor. They have a grant that requires them to have IBC
review. I can't find anything in the NIH Guidelines that specifically
addresses this kind of case. Have any of you had a similar experience? Is
there any problems with the university IBC reviewing outside projects?
Julie A. Johnson, Ph.D., CBSP
Biosafety Officer
Environmental Health and Safety
118 Agronomy Lab
Iowa State University
Ames, IA 50011
Phone: 515-294-7657
Fax: 515-294-9357
Email: jajohns@iastate.edu
Web site: ehs.iastate.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 29 Mar 2002 13:31:39 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Bruce Hanley
Subject: Re: IBC review of outside institution projects
In-Reply-To:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Julie,
I had a similar situation about a year ago. I contacted NIH who verified
that they required a local institutional committee approval. There weren't
too many options here in sleepy Santa Barbara, so my IBC chair agreed. I
perform an annual survey. This is RG1 work (15 Liters, S. cerevisiae
only), otherwise it may not have gotten approval. I'm curious what would
have happened if I had consulted our Risk Management first...
Good Luck, Bruce
--On Friday, March 29, 2002 3:11 PM -0600 "Johnson, Julie A."
wrote:
> We had a request from a small (3 person) start-up company in town to use
> our university IBC to review their research. The company is associated
> with the university as part of an associated Research Park (associated
> with the university, but a separate commercial entity ). The company head
> is also a university professor. They have a grant that requires them to
> have IBC review. I can't find anything in the NIH Guidelines that
> specifically addresses this kind of case. Have any of you had a similar
> experience? Is there any problems with the university IBC reviewing
> outside projects?
>
> Julie A. Johnson, Ph.D., CBSP
> Biosafety Officer
> Environmental Health and Safety
> 118 Agronomy Lab
> Iowa State University
> Ames, IA 50011
> Phone: 515-294-7657
> Fax: 515-294-9357
> Email: jajohns@iastate.edu
> Web site: ehs.iastate.edu
----------------------
Bruce Hanley
UCSB Biosafety Officer
Bruce.Hanley@ehs.ucsb.edu
(805) 893-8894
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 29 Mar 2002 18:00:04 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Shipp, Allan (OD)"
Subject: Re: IBC review of outside institution projects
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Julie,
Your question raises a matter that is presently under consideration by our
office and that was discussed at a policy conference we held last December.
A number of scenarios have come to our attention whereby various forms of
"off-site" IBCs have been proposed.
Looking at the issue from your perspective, there is nothing in the
Guidelines that precludes your university from conducting reviews on behalf
of outside entities, though you should be mindful that the IBC be able to
conduct the kinds of assessments called for under the Guidelines, which
would include such things as review of facilities, SOPs, training and
expertise of personnel, and so forth. To adequately assess these things,
your IBC may need to have members conduct a site visit, or you may wish to
include ad hoc members from the other entity on the IBC.
Looking at the issue from the company's perspective, one issue in the
scenario you describe would be if the company has any NIH support
(specifically) for recombinant DNA research (which was a little unclear from
your description). If the company (as the "institution") does not have any
NIH support for recombinant DNA research, it is not "obliged" to establish
an IBC (though the grantor seems to be requiring it in this instance).
Nonetheless, it certainly would be encouraged to do so as part of voluntary
compliance with the Guidelines. If it does receive NIH support, it has to
"establish" an IBC to review recombinant DNA research. At the December
conference, participants acknowledged that under certain scenarios,
establishing an IBC on-site can be difficult. Some flexibility in using
off-site arrangements was called for -- particularly where biosafety risks
are low -- provided these arrangements allowed the IBC to function as the
Guidelines intended (by being able to attend to the concerns described in
the paragraph above). Another issue that arose was the importance of mutual
accountability and responsibility for the review process (between the IBC
and the institution).
Our office is in the process of developing appropriate policy on this
matter, and welcomes input from the extramural community.
I hope that helps!
Allan Shipp
NIH Office of Biotechnology Activities
301-435-2152
-----Original Message-----
From: Johnson, Julie A. [mailto:jajohns@IASTATE.EDU]
Sent: Friday, March 29, 2002 4:12 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: IBC review of outside institution projects
We had a request from a small (3 person) start-up company in town to use our
university IBC to review their research. The company is associated with the
university as part of an associated Research Park (associated with the
university, but a separate commercial entity ). The company head is also a
university professor. They have a grant that requires them to have IBC
review. I can't find anything in the NIH Guidelines that specifically
addresses this kind of case. Have any of you had a similar experience? Is
there any problems with the university IBC reviewing outside projects?
Julie A. Johnson, Ph.D., CBSP
Biosafety Officer
Environmental Health and Safety
118 Agronomy Lab
Iowa State University
Ames, IA 50011
Phone: 515-294-7657
Fax: 515-294-9357
Email: jajohns@iastate.edu
Web site: ehs.iastate.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Sun, 31 Mar 2002 08:38:38 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: David Silberman
Subject: Re: IBC review of outside institution projects
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed"
Hi Julie,
I would be concerned about potential conflicts of interest (real and
perceived). Although an arms-length relationship may, in fact, be in
place, I suggest the start-up company contact a private IBC (e.g,
Western Institutional Review Board: ).
Several regulatory and governmental agencies are taking a much closer
look at conflicts arising from affiliations between academia and the
private sector. This is especially so when a PI has an interest, be
it financial or operational, in a company that has a relationship
with their university. What does your Risk Management Office or Dean
of Research have to say? It's the University that's taking the main
risk, not the IBC.
>We had a request from a small (3 person) start-up company in town to use our
>university IBC to review their research. The company is associated with the
>university as part of an associated Research Park (associated with the
>university, but a separate commercial entity ). The company head is also a
>university professor. They have a grant that requires them to have IBC
>review. I can't find anything in the NIH Guidelines that specifically
>addresses this kind of case. Have any of you had a similar experience? Is
>there any problems with the university IBC reviewing outside projects?
>
>Julie A. Johnson, Ph.D., CBSP
>Biosafety Officer
>Environmental Health and Safety
>118 Agronomy Lab
>Iowa State University
>Ames, IA 50011
>Phone: 515-294-7657
>Fax: 515-294-9357
>Email: jajohns@iastate.edu
>Web site: ehs.iastate.edu
--
David H. Silberman
Director, Health and Safety Programs
Stanford University School of Medicine
Medical School Office Building
Stanford, CA 94305 Mail Code: 5460
650 723-6336 (DIRECT LINE)
650 725-7878 (FAX)
silberman@stanford.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 1 Apr 2002 09:33:30 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ninni Jacob
Subject: FYI/MAILED MICRO-ORGANISMS RISK THE LAST POST
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
>
>
>MAILED MICRO-ORGANISMS RISK THE LAST POST
>BioMedNet, Mar 29 - Irradiation equipment to sterilize letters, packages,
>and parcels in the U.S. mail, which the U.S. Postal Service has installed
>as a counter-terrorist measure, could be putting legitimate biological
>material at risk, fear researchers.
>
>
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 2 Apr 2002 15:59:26 +0100
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Stuart Thompson
Subject: FW: Pregnancy and the Laboratory
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="Windows-1252"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
I discussed this with our occupational health people who mentioned that they
would be interested in seeing the form that was referred to. Is it possible
that Lori could send it to me as an E-mail attachment?
Thank you
Best wishes
Stuart
Dr Stuart Thompson
University Biological Safety Officer
Health & Safety Services
University of Manchester
Waterloo Place
182/184 Oxford Road
Manchester M13 9GP
tel: +44 (0)161 275 5069
fax: +44 (0)161 275 6989
mobile 07946 022 698
stuart.thompson@man.ac.uk
-----Original Message-----
From: A Biosafety Discussion List [mailto:BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU]On
Behalf Of Lori Nicholson
Sent: 28 March 2002 14:22
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Pregnancy and the Laboratory
Amy:
Here is how we handle pregnancy in our laboratories. We have a voluntary
pregnancy declaration policy. Here is how it works.
When an employee becomes pregnant she can confidentially come to EH&S and
declare a pregnancy. We give her a form to fill out.
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 2 Apr 2002 10:00:03 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Donald G. Robasser"
Organization: Princeton University
Subject: Shipping Syntheic DNA
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
List members,
Can anyone tell me what the current requirements are for shipping this
kind of material? This would be DNA material not having any pathogenic
nature.
Thanks for your help.
Don Robasser
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 2 Apr 2002 10:10:39 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Thomas Barton
Subject: Re: FW: Pregnancy and the Laboratory
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="=_alternative 0053627885256B8F_="
This is a multipart message in MIME format.
--=_alternative 0053627885256B8F_=
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
I would be interested in a copy of the form as well.
Thank you
Tom
Thomas Barton
Biosafety Officer
EHS
Biogen
Cambridge, MA
Thomas_Barton@
Stuart Thompson
Sent by: A Biosafety Discussion List
04/02/2002 09:59 AM
Please respond to A Biosafety Discussion List
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
cc:
Subject: FW: Pregnancy and the Laboratory
I discussed this with our occupational health people who mentioned that
they
would be interested in seeing the form that was referred to. Is it
possible
that Lori could send it to me as an E-mail attachment?
Thank you
Best wishes
Stuart
Dr Stuart Thompson
University Biological Safety Officer
Health & Safety Services
University of Manchester
Waterloo Place
182/184 Oxford Road
Manchester M13 9GP
tel: +44 (0)161 275 5069
fax: +44 (0)161 275 6989
mobile 07946 022 698
stuart.thompson@man.ac.uk
-----Original Message-----
From: A Biosafety Discussion List [mailto:BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU]On
Behalf Of Lori Nicholson
Sent: 28 March 2002 14:22
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Pregnancy and the Laboratory
Amy:
Here is how we handle pregnancy in our laboratories. We have a voluntary
pregnancy declaration policy. Here is how it works.
When an employee becomes pregnant she can confidentially come to EH&S and
declare a pregnancy. We give her a form to fill out.
--=_alternative 0053627885256B8F_=
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
I would be interested in a copy of the form as well.
Thank you
Tom
Thomas Barton
Biosafety Officer
EHS
Biogen
Cambridge, MA
Thomas_Barton@
Stuart Thompson <stuart.thompson@MAN.AC.UK>
Sent by: A Biosafety Discussion List <BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU>
04/02/2002 09:59 AM
Please respond to A Biosafety Discussion List
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
cc:
Subject: FW: Pregnancy and the Laboratory
I discussed this with our occupational health people who mentioned that they
would be interested in seeing the form that was referred to. Is it possible
that Lori could send it to me as an E-mail attachment?
Thank you
Best wishes
Stuart
Dr Stuart Thompson
University Biological Safety Officer
Health & Safety Services
University of Manchester
Waterloo Place
182/184 Oxford Road
Manchester M13 9GP
tel: +44 (0)161 275 5069
fax: +44 (0)161 275 6989
mobile 07946 022 698
stuart.thompson@man.ac.uk
-----Original Message-----
From: A Biosafety Discussion List [mailto:BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU]On
Behalf Of Lori Nicholson
Sent: 28 March 2002 14:22
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Pregnancy and the Laboratory
Amy:
Here is how we handle pregnancy in our laboratories. We have a voluntary
pregnancy declaration policy. Here is how it works.
When an employee becomes pregnant she can confidentially come to EH&S and
declare a pregnancy. We give her a form to fill out.
--=_alternative 0053627885256B8F_=--
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 2 Apr 2002 10:35:32 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Jean Lancaster
Subject: Re: FW: Pregnancy and the Laboratory
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="----_=_NextPart_001_01C1DA5C.06459C5A"
This is a multi-part message in MIME format.
------_=_NextPart_001_01C1DA5C.06459C5A
Content-Type: text/plain;
charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
ditto
thanks
Jean Lancaster
Novascreen Biosciences Corp
jlancaster@
-----Original Message-----
From: Thomas Barton [mailto:Thomas_Barton@]
Sent: Tuesday, April 02, 2002 10:11 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: FW: Pregnancy and the Laboratory
I would be interested in a copy of the form as well.
Thank you
Tom
Thomas Barton
Biosafety Officer
EHS
Biogen
Cambridge, MA
Thomas_Barton@
Stuart Thompson
Sent by: A Biosafety Discussion List
04/02/2002 09:59 AM
Please respond to A Biosafety Discussion List
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
cc:
Subject: FW: Pregnancy and the Laboratory
I discussed this with our occupational health people who mentioned that =
they
would be interested in seeing the form that was referred to. Is it =
possible
that Lori could send it to me as an E-mail attachment?
Thank you
Best wishes
Stuart
Dr Stuart Thompson
University Biological Safety Officer
Health & Safety Services
University of Manchester
Waterloo Place
182/184 Oxford Road
Manchester M13 9GP
tel: +44 (0)161 275 5069
fax: +44 (0)161 275 6989
mobile 07946 022 698
stuart.thompson@man.ac.uk
-----Original Message-----
From: A Biosafety Discussion List [mailto:BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU]On
Behalf Of Lori Nicholson
Sent: 28 March 2002 14:22
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Pregnancy and the Laboratory
Amy:
Here is how we handle pregnancy in our laboratories. We have a =
voluntary
pregnancy declaration policy. Here is how it works.
When an employee becomes pregnant she can confidentially come to EH&S =
and
declare a pregnancy. We give her a form to fill out.
------_=_NextPart_001_01C1DA5C.06459C5A
Content-Type: text/html;
charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
ditto
thanks
Jean Lancaster
Novascreen Biosciences Corp
jlancaster@
-----Original Message-----
From: Thomas Barton [mailto:Thomas_Barton@]
Sent: Tuesday, April 02, = 2002 10:11 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: = FW: Pregnancy and the Laboratory
I would be interested in a copy of the form as well. =
Thank you
Tom
Thomas = Barton
Biosafety Officer =
EHS
Biogen
Cambridge, = MA
Thomas_Barton@
Stuart Thompson
Sent by: A Biosafety Discussion List
04/02/2002 09:59 AM =
Please respond to A Biosafety = Discussion List
=
To: = BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
cc:
= Subject: FW: Pregnancy and the = Laboratory
I discussed this with our occupational health people who = mentioned that they
would be interested in seeing the form that was referred to. = Is it possible
that Lori could send it to me as an E-mail attachment?
Thank you
Best = wishes
Stuart
Dr Stuart Thompson
University Biological Safety Officer
Health & = Safety Services
University of Manchester
Waterloo Place
182/184 = Oxford Road
Manchester M13 9GP
tel: +44 (0)161 275 5069
fax: +44 = (0)161 275 6989
mobile 07946 022 = 698
stuart.thompson@man.ac.uk
-----Original Message-----
From: A Biosafety Discussion List [mailto:BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU]On
Behalf Of Lori = Nicholson
Sent: 28 March 2002 14:22
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: = Pregnancy and the Laboratory
Amy:
Here is how we handle pregnancy = in our laboratories. We have a voluntary
pregnancy declaration = policy. Here is how it works.
When an employee becomes pregnant she can = confidentially come to EH&S and
declare a pregnancy. We give her a form = to fill out.
------_=_NextPart_001_01C1DA5C.06459C5A--
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 2 Apr 2002 10:01:56 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Heather H. Gonsoulin"
Subject: Re: FW: Pregnancy and the Laboratory
In-Reply-To:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="----=_NextPart_000_000A_01C1DA2D.6C14F1E0"
This is a multi-part message in MIME format.
------=_NextPart_000_000A_01C1DA2D.6C14F1E0
Content-Type: text/plain;
charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Me too!
Heather H. Gonsoulin
Safety Officer
UL-Lafayette
New Iberia Research Center
hah8377@louisiana.edu
-----Original Message-----
From: A Biosafety Discussion List [mailto:BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU]On
Behalf Of Jean Lancaster
Sent: Tuesday, April 02, 2002 9:36 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: FW: Pregnancy and the Laboratory
ditto
thanks
Jean Lancaster
Novascreen Biosciences Corp
jlancaster@
-----Original Message-----
From: Thomas Barton [mailto:Thomas_Barton@]
Sent: Tuesday, April 02, 2002 10:11 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: FW: Pregnancy and the Laboratory
I would be interested in a copy of the form as well.
Thank you
Tom
Thomas Barton
Biosafety Officer
EHS
Biogen
Cambridge, MA
Thomas_Barton@
Stuart Thompson
Sent by: A Biosafety Discussion List
04/02/2002 09:59 AM
Please respond to A Biosafety Discussion List
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
cc:
Subject: FW: Pregnancy and the Laboratory
I discussed this with our occupational health people who mentioned that
they
would be interested in seeing the form that was referred to. Is it
possible
that Lori could send it to me as an E-mail attachment?
Thank you
Best wishes
Stuart
Dr Stuart Thompson
University Biological Safety Officer
Health & Safety Services
University of Manchester
Waterloo Place
182/184 Oxford Road
Manchester M13 9GP
tel: +44 (0)161 275 5069
fax: +44 (0)161 275 6989
mobile 07946 022 698
stuart.thompson@man.ac.uk
-----Original Message-----
From: A Biosafety Discussion List [mailto:BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU]On
Behalf Of Lori Nicholson
Sent: 28 March 2002 14:22
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Pregnancy and the Laboratory
Amy:
Here is how we handle pregnancy in our laboratories. We have a
voluntary
pregnancy declaration policy. Here is how it works.
When an employee becomes pregnant she can confidentially come to EH&S
and
declare a pregnancy. We give her a form to fill out.
------=_NextPart_000_000A_01C1DA2D.6C14F1E0
Content-Type: text/html;
charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Me too!
Heather H. Gonsoulin
Safety Officer
UL-Lafayette
New Iberia Research Center
hah8377@louisiana.edu
-----Original Message-----
From: A Biosafety = Discussion List [mailto:BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU]On Behalf Of Jean Lancaster
Sent: Tuesday, April 02, 2002 9:36 = AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: FW: Pregnancy and the Laboratory
ditto
thanks
Jean Lancaster
Novascreen Biosciences Corp
jlancaster@
-----Original Message-----
From: Thomas Barton [mailto:Thomas_Barton@]
Sent: Tuesday, April 02, = 2002 10:11 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: = Re: FW: Pregnancy and the Laboratory
I would be interested in a copy of the form as well. =
Thank you
Tom
Thomas = Barton
Biosafety Officer =
EHS
Biogen
Cambridge, MA
Thomas_Barton@ =
Stuart Thompson
Sent by: A Biosafety Discussion List
04/02/2002 09:59 AM =
Please respond to A Biosafety = Discussion List
= To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
= cc:
Subject: = FW: Pregnancy and the Laboratory
I discussed this with our occupational = health people who mentioned that they
would be interested in seeing the = form that was referred to. Is it possible
that Lori could send it to = me as an E-mail attachment?
Thank you
Best wishes
Stuart
Dr Stuart Thompson
University = Biological Safety Officer
Health & Safety Services
University of Manchester
Waterloo Place
182/184 Oxford Road
Manchester = M13 9GP
tel: +44 (0)161 275 5069
fax: +44 (0)161 275 = 6989
mobile 07946 022 698
stuart.thompson@man.ac.uk
-----Original Message-----
From: A Biosafety Discussion List [mailto:BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU]On
Behalf Of Lori = Nicholson
Sent: 28 March 2002 14:22
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: = Pregnancy and the Laboratory
Amy:
Here is how we handle = pregnancy in our laboratories. We have a voluntary
pregnancy declaration = policy. Here is how it works.
When an employee becomes pregnant she can confidentially come to EH&S and
declare a pregnancy. We = give her a form to fill out.
------=_NextPart_000_000A_01C1DA2D.6C14F1E0--
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 2 Apr 2002 10:47:59 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Meylonie G. Schatz"
Organization: Nebraska Wesleyan University
Subject: Re: FW: Pregnancy and the Laboratory
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="----=_NextPart_000_001C_01C1DA33.DABEA900"
This is a multi-part message in MIME format.
------=_NextPart_000_001C_01C1DA33.DABEA900
Content-Type: text/plain;
charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Please include me also.
Thanks,
Meylonie Schatz
Nebraska Wesleyan University
----- Original Message -----
From: Jean Lancaster
To: BIOSAFTY@mitvma.mit.edu
Sent: Tuesday, April 02, 2002 9:35 AM
Subject: Re: FW: Pregnancy and the Laboratory
ditto
thanks
Jean Lancaster
Novascreen Biosciences Corp
jlancaster@
-----Original Message-----
From: Thomas Barton [mailto:Thomas_Barton@]
Sent: Tuesday, April 02, 2002 10:11 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: FW: Pregnancy and the Laboratory
I would be interested in a copy of the form as well.
Thank you
Tom
Thomas Barton
Biosafety Officer
EHS
Biogen
Cambridge, MA
Thomas_Barton@
Stuart Thompson
Sent by: A Biosafety Discussion List =
04/02/2002 09:59 AM
Please respond to A Biosafety Discussion List
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
cc:
Subject: FW: Pregnancy and the Laboratory
I discussed this with our occupational health people who mentioned =
that they
would be interested in seeing the form that was referred to. Is it =
possible
that Lori could send it to me as an E-mail attachment?
Thank you
Best wishes
Stuart
Dr Stuart Thompson
University Biological Safety Officer
Health & Safety Services
University of Manchester
Waterloo Place
182/184 Oxford Road
Manchester M13 9GP
tel: +44 (0)161 275 5069
fax: +44 (0)161 275 6989
mobile 07946 022 698
stuart.thompson@man.ac.uk
-----Original Message-----
From: A Biosafety Discussion List [mailto:BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU]On
Behalf Of Lori Nicholson
Sent: 28 March 2002 14:22
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Pregnancy and the Laboratory
Amy:
Here is how we handle pregnancy in our laboratories. We have a =
voluntary
pregnancy declaration policy. Here is how it works.
When an employee becomes pregnant she can confidentially come to =
EH&S and
declare a pregnancy. We give her a form to fill out.
------=_NextPart_000_001C_01C1DA33.DABEA900
Content-Type: text/html;
charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Please include me also.
Thanks,
Meylonie Schatz
Nebraska Wesleyan = University
----- Original Message -----
Jean Lancaster
To: BIOSAFTY@mitvma.mit.edu =
Sent: Tuesday, April 02, 2002 = 9:35 AM
Subject: Re: FW: Pregnancy and = the Laboratory
ditto
thanks
Jean Lancaster
Novascreen Biosciences Corp
jlancaster@
-----Original Message-----
From: Thomas Barton [mailto:Thomas_Barton@]
Sent: Tuesday, April 02, = 2002 10:11 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: FW: Pregnancy and the Laboratory
I would be interested in a copy of the = form as well.
Thank you =
Tom
Thomas Barton
Biosafety Officer
EHS =
Biogen
Cambridge, MA
Thomas_Barton@
Stuart Thompson
Sent by: A Biosafety Discussion List
04/02/2002 09:59 AM =
Please respond to A Biosafety = Discussion List
= To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
= cc:
Subject: = FW: Pregnancy and the Laboratory
I discussed this with our occupational = health people who mentioned that they
would be interested in seeing the = form that was referred to. Is it possible
that Lori could send it to = me as an E-mail attachment?
Thank you
Best wishes
Stuart
Dr Stuart Thompson
University = Biological Safety Officer
Health & Safety Services
University of Manchester
Waterloo Place
182/184 Oxford Road
Manchester = M13 9GP
tel: +44 (0)161 275 5069
fax: +44 (0)161 275 = 6989
mobile 07946 022 698
stuart.thompson@man.ac.uk
-----Original Message-----
From: A Biosafety Discussion List [mailto:BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU]On
Behalf Of Lori = Nicholson
Sent: 28 March 2002 14:22
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: = Pregnancy and the Laboratory
Amy:
Here is how we handle = pregnancy in our laboratories. We have a voluntary
pregnancy declaration = policy. Here is how it works.
When an employee becomes pregnant she can confidentially come to EH&S and
declare a pregnancy. We = give her a form to fill out.
------=_NextPart_000_001C_01C1DA33.DABEA900--
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 3 Apr 2002 09:37:02 +1000
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Adam Janssen
Subject: Re: FW: Pregnancy and the Laboratory
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
I would also be interested in a copy of the form as well
Thank you
Adam
At 10:47 AM 2/04/02 -0600, you wrote:
> Please include me also. Thanks, Meylonie Schatz Nebraska Wesleyan
>University ----- Original Message ----- From: Jean Lancaster
>To: BIOSAFTY@mitvma.mit.edu Sent: Tuesday, April 02, 2002 9:35 AM
>Subject: Re: FW: Pregnancy and the Laboratory
> ditto thanks Jean Lancaster Novascreen Biosciences Corp
> jlancaster@
>> -----Original Message-----
>>From: Thomas Barton [mailto:Thomas_Barton@]
>>Sent: Tuesday, April 02, 2002 10:11 AM
>>To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
>>Subject: Re: FW: Pregnancy and the Laboratory
>>
>>
>>I would be interested in a copy of the form as well.
>>Thank you
>>Tom
>>
>>Thomas Barton
>>Biosafety Officer
>>EHS
>>Biogen
>>Cambridge, MA
>>Thomas_Barton@
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> 04/02/2002 09:59 AM
>>Please respond to A Biosafety Discussion List
>>
>> BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
>>
>> FW: Pregnancy and the Laboratory
>>
>>
>>I discussed this with our occupational health people who mentioned
>>that they
>>would be interested in seeing the form that was referred to. Is it
>>possible
>>that Lori could send it to me as an E-mail attachment?
>>
>>Thank you
>>
>>Best wishes
>>
>>Stuart
>>
>>Dr Stuart Thompson
>>University Biological Safety Officer
>>& Safety Services
>>University of Manchester
>>Waterloo Place
>>182/184 Oxford Road
>>Manchester M13 9GP
>>tel: +44 (0)161 275 5069
>>fax: +44 (0)161 275 6989
>>mobile 07946 022 698
>>stuart.thompson@man.ac.uk
>>
>>-----Original Message-----
>>From: A Biosafety Discussion List [mailto:BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU]On
>>Behalf Of Lori Nicholson
>>Sent: 28 March 2002 14:22
>>To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
>>Subject: Re: Pregnancy and the Laboratory
>>
>>
>>Amy:
>>
>> We have a voluntary
>>pregnancy declaration policy. Here is how it works.
>>&S and
>> We give her a form to fill out.
>>
>>
>>
>
>
******************************************************************
Adam Janssen
OH&S Coordinator
Risk Management Unit
University of New South Wales
Sydney 2052 AUSTRALIA
Tel: 61 2 9385 2214 Fax 61 2 9385 2365
email: d.janssen@unsw.edu.au
*******************************************************************
Visit our website at
for details of the services provided by UNSW Risk Management
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 2 Apr 2002 15:57:49 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Teresa Robertson
Subject: Personal E-Mail (formerly Pregnancy and the Laboratory)
In-Reply-To:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU writes:
>I would also be interested in a copy of the form as well
>
>> Please include me also.
>
>> ditto thanks
>>>I would be interested in a copy of the form as well.
>>>that Lori could send it to me as an E-mail attachment?
>
>>> We have a voluntary
>>>pregnancy declaration policy.
>
Dear Colleagues,
For those of you new to or unacquainted with listservs, it is not of
interest to everyone to see personal requests and responses. It is
generally considered in-appropriate netiquette to send messages such as
those above to the Listserv.
Before you hit "send" please watch the "to" line to make sure you are
sending your request only to the intended party(ies).
No flames intended...just hoping to prevent it from happening to you later
on....
Thanks!
Teresa
Teresa R. Robertson, B.S., NRCC-CHO
Certified Chemical Hygiene Officer
Instructional Support, Chemistry Department
Natural Sciences, Mathematics & Engineering
California State University
9001 Stockdale Highway, Bakersfield, CA 93311-1099
Member of:
The Laboratory Safety Institute (LSI),
The American Chemical Society (ACS),
The National Registry of Certified Chemists (NRCC),
The National Association of Chemical Hygiene Officers (NACHO)
The National Association of Scientific Materials Managers (NAOSMM)
Confidentiality Notice - The information contained in this communication
and its attachments is intended only for the use of the individual to whom
it is addressed and may contain information that is legally privileged,
confidential, or exempt from disclosure. If the reader of this message is
not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any
dissemination, distribution, or copying of this communication is strictly
prohibited.
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 3 Apr 2002 08:43:10 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Bernholc, Nicole M"
Subject: Re: FW: Pregnancy and the Laboratory
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Guess I would like to be added to the list.
Nicole Bernholc, CIH
Brookhaven National Laboratory
Safety and Health Services Division
Bld 120
Upton NY 11973
631-344-2027
-----Original Message-----
From: Adam Janssen [mailto:d.janssen@UNSW.EDU.AU]
Sent: Tuesday, April 02, 2002 6:37 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: FW: Pregnancy and the Laboratory
I would also be interested in a copy of the form as well
Thank you
Adam
At 10:47 AM 2/04/02 -0600, you wrote:
> Please include me also. Thanks, Meylonie Schatz Nebraska Wesleyan
>University ----- Original Message ----- From: Jean Lancaster
>To: BIOSAFTY@mitvma.mit.edu Sent: Tuesday, April 02, 2002 9:35 AM
>Subject: Re: FW: Pregnancy and the Laboratory
> ditto thanks Jean Lancaster Novascreen Biosciences Corp
> jlancaster@
>> -----Original Message-----
>>From: Thomas Barton [mailto:Thomas_Barton@]
>>Sent: Tuesday, April 02, 2002 10:11 AM
>>To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
>>Subject: Re: FW: Pregnancy and the Laboratory
>>
>>
>>I would be interested in a copy of the form as well.
>>Thank you
>>Tom
>>
>>Thomas Barton
>>Biosafety Officer
>>EHS
>>Biogen
>>Cambridge, MA
>>Thomas_Barton@
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> 04/02/2002 09:59 AM
>>Please respond to A Biosafety Discussion List
>>
>> BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
>>
>> FW: Pregnancy and the Laboratory
>>
>>
>>I discussed this with our occupational health people who mentioned
>>that they
>>would be interested in seeing the form that was referred to. Is it
>>possible
>>that Lori could send it to me as an E-mail attachment?
>>
>>Thank you
>>
>>Best wishes
>>
>>Stuart
>>
>>Dr Stuart Thompson
>>University Biological Safety Officer
>>& Safety Services
>>University of Manchester
>>Waterloo Place
>>182/184 Oxford Road
>>Manchester M13 9GP
>>tel: +44 (0)161 275 5069
>>fax: +44 (0)161 275 6989
>>mobile 07946 022 698
>>stuart.thompson@man.ac.uk
>>
>>-----Original Message-----
>>From: A Biosafety Discussion List [mailto:BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU]On
>>Behalf Of Lori Nicholson
>>Sent: 28 March 2002 14:22
>>To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
>>Subject: Re: Pregnancy and the Laboratory
>>
>>
>>Amy:
>>
>> We have a voluntary
>>pregnancy declaration policy. Here is how it works.
>>&S and
>> We give her a form to fill out.
>>
>>
>>
>
>
******************************************************************
Adam Janssen
OH&S Coordinator
Risk Management Unit
University of New South Wales
Sydney 2052 AUSTRALIA
Tel: 61 2 9385 2214 Fax 61 2 9385 2365
email: d.janssen@unsw.edu.au
*******************************************************************
Visit our website at
for details of the services provided by UNSW Risk Management
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 3 Apr 2002 08:17:59 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Lenore Koliha
Subject: Re: FW: Pregnancy and the Laboratory
In-Reply-To:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII
I would also appreciate a copy.
Thank you,
Lenore
*****************************************************************
* *
* Lenore Koliha e-mail: lkoliha@creighton.edu *
* Chemical Coordinator ph#: (402)546-6404 *
* Dept. EH&S fax: (402)546-6403 *
* Creighton U. *
* Jahn Bldg., Rm-110 *
* 2204 Burt St. *
* Omaha, NE 68178 *
*****************************************************************
The true measure of a man is not by the life he leads...
but by the memory he leaves behind.
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 3 Apr 2002 06:43:05 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Macdonald, Lynn"
Subject: Re: FW: Pregnancy and the Laboratory
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
and me. Thanks
Lynn
Email: Lynn.Macdonald@ors.ubc.ca
-----Original Message-----
From: Lenore Koliha [mailto:lkoliha@CREIGHTON.EDU]
Sent: Wednesday, April 03, 2002 6:18 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: FW: Pregnancy and the Laboratory
I would also appreciate a copy.
Thank you,
Lenore
*****************************************************************
* *
* Lenore Koliha e-mail: lkoliha@creighton.edu *
* Chemical Coordinator ph#: (402)546-6404 *
* Dept. EH&S fax: (402)546-6403 *
* Creighton U. *
* Jahn Bldg., Rm-110 *
* 2204 Burt St. *
* Omaha, NE 68178 *
*****************************************************************
The true measure of a man is not by the life he leads...
but by the memory he leaves behind.
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 3 Apr 2002 09:04:36 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Johnson, Julie A."
Subject: serum banking for vet diagnostic labs
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
For those of you who have a Veterinary School:
Do you bank serum samples from personnel working in the veterinary
diagnostic lab (because of potential zoonoses exposure)?
If yes, why, if no, why not?
We had this question come up, but so far have only banked serum from
personnel working with known pathogens. I appreciate hearing perspectives
of others in this area.
Julie A. Johnson, Ph.D., CBSP
Biosafety Officer
Environmental Health and Safety
118 Agronomy Lab
Iowa State University
Ames, IA 50011
Phone: 515-294-7657
Fax: 515-294-9357
Email: jajohns@iastate.edu
Web site: ehs.iastate.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 3 Apr 2002 12:26:38 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Richard Fink
Subject: admin.
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
Dear folks,
When replying to a person (such as request for info) please reply just to
that person and not to the whole list. Of course if that person gets 30
requests he/she may deduce that the topic is of general enough interest to
reply to the whole list.
Richie
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Biosafty List Owner
rfink@mit.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 3 Apr 2002 12:35:49 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Robert N. Latsch"
Subject: Re: FW: Pregnancy and the Laboratory
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Can we just make it everybody?:)
Bob
_____________________________________________________________________
__ / _____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 4 Apr 2002 00:15:56 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Hans-Peter Weiss
Subject: AW: admin.
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
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=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 4 Apr 2002 14:34:11 EST
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ed Krisiunas
Subject: Anthrax Victim Wasn't Wearing Gloves
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="part1_a0.24aa3af7.29de04b3_boundary"
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Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Want to send this story to another AOL member? Click on the heart at the top
of this window.
Anthrax Victim Wasn't Wearing Gloves
By ERIN McCLAM
.c The Associated Press
ATLANTA (AP) - A Texas laboratory worker who contracted skin anthrax last
month probably got it because he was not wearing gloves when he handled vials
of spores collected from last fall's mail attacks, the government said
Thursday.
The worker handled the spores a day after he had cut his jaw while shaving,
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention reported. He then apparently
touched his face and developed an anthrax sore on his jaw.
The man was put on antibiotics and is recovering.
It was the first known anthrax case in the United States since the
anthrax-by-mail attacks that killed five people and sickened 13 more.
None of the 40 workers at the lab had been vaccinated against anthrax, the
CDC said.
The CDC has not identified the worker or the lab.
The infection apparently happened March 1 as the worker was moving vials from
a cabinet into a freezer, the CDC said. He was not wearing gloves, contrary
to federal health recommendations, the agency said.
Over the next few days, the shaving cut became larger and the man reported
swelling on his neck and a low-grade fever. He spent five days in the
hospital.
The CDC said the case highlights the need for workers who regularly handle
anthrax specimens to be vaccinated against the disease. Workers at many
anthrax labs already are.
The private laboratory was one of several the CDC contracted with to work
through a backlog of samples collected during the peak of the anthrax
attacks.
On the Net:
CDC:
AP-NY-04-04-02 1209EST
Copyright 2002 The Associated Press. The information contained in the AP news
report may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or otherwise distributed
without the prior written authority of The Associated Press. All active
hyperlinks have been inserted by AOL.
Regards,
Edward Krisiunas, MT(ASCP), CIC, MPH
President
WNWN International
PO Box 1164
Burlington, Connecticut
06013
860-675-1217
860-675-1311(fax)
860-944-2373(mobile)
--part1_a0.24aa3af7.29de04b3_boundary
Content-Type: text/html; charset="US-ASCII"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Want to send this story to another AOL member? Click on the heart at the top of this window.
Anthrax Victim Wasn't Wearing Gloves
By ERIN McCLAM
.c The Associated Press
ATLANTA (AP) - A Texas laboratory worker who contracted skin anthrax last month probably got it because he was not wearing gloves when he handled vials of spores collected from last fall's mail attacks, the government said Thursday.
The worker handled the spores a day after he had cut his jaw while shaving, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention reported. He then apparently touched his face and developed an anthrax sore on his jaw.
The man was put on antibiotics and is recovering.
It was the first known anthrax case in the United States since the anthrax-by-mail attacks that killed five people and sickened 13 more.
None of the 40 workers at the lab had been vaccinated against anthrax, the CDC said.
The CDC has not identified the worker or the lab.
The infection apparently happened March 1 as the worker was moving vials from a cabinet into a freezer, the CDC said. He was not wearing gloves, contrary to federal health recommendations, the agency said.
Over the next few days, the shaving cut became larger and the man reported swelling on his neck and a low-grade fever. He spent five days in the hospital.
The CDC said the case highlights the need for workers who regularly handle anthrax specimens to be vaccinated against the disease. Workers at many anthrax labs already are.
The private laboratory was one of several the CDC contracted with to work through a backlog of samples collected during the peak of the anthrax attacks.
On the Net:
CDC:
AP-NY-04-04-02 1209EST
Copyright 2002 The Associated Press. The information contained in the AP news report may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or otherwise distributed without the prior written authority of The Associated Press. All active hyperlinks have been inserted by AOL.
Regards,
Edward Krisiunas, MT(ASCP), CIC, MPH
President
WNWN International
PO Box 1164
Burlington, Connecticut
06013
860-675-1217
860-675-1311(fax)
860-944-2373(mobile)
--part1_a0.24aa3af7.29de04b3_boundary--
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 4 Apr 2002 15:05:31 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Erik A. Talley"
Subject: Mosquito Insectory
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
I have a researcher requesting the installation of an insectory to house
mosquitos in our research animal facility. The mosquitos will carry several
pathogens including Plasmodium falciparum. I have some great references for
arthropod containment and feel confident about the safety requirements, but
would like to speak to a biosafety officer with experience in this area if
possible. Besides reviewing the safety considerations, I am also interested
in is how accepting people in and around the facility have been since it is
such a small organism and more difficult to know when it has escaped and
when you have been exposed.
Please email me directly if you have experience with insectories and would
be willing to talk.
Sincerely,
Erik Talley
___________________________________
Erik A. Talley, Director
Environmental Health and Safety
Weill Medical College of Cornell University
418 East 71st Street, Suite 62
New York, NY 10021
212-746-6201
ert2002@med.cornell.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 4 Apr 2002 12:37:51 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Hofherr, Leslie"
Subject: Containment for Infectious Ticks
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
A researcher at UCLA would like to generate and use in animal experiments
tick nymphs (Ixodes scapularis) infected with Borrelia burgdorferi the
causative agent of lymes disease. Please let me know what kind of
containment would be needed for these experiments. Do they need to do these
experiments inside an insectary meeting the new draft BSL 2 Arthropod
Containment Guidelines?
They claim that ticks don't fly so they do not need an insectary or to meet
these guidelines.
Thanks for any advice or information,
Leslie Hofherr
UCLA, Biosafety
(310) 206-3929 phone
leslie@admin.ucla.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 4 Apr 2002 16:41:45 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Don Callihan
Subject: Re: Containment for Infectious Ticks
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
While it's true that ticks don't fly (nor do pigs, for that matter), nymphs
can jump a surprising distance. That's one way they get from a blade of
grass to a CO2-generating mammal for the blood meal they require to mature
to adult tick.
For my money (and from my limited experience with non-microorganisms),
insectiary guidelines make the most sense. Think of the infected nymphs as
infectious sharps!! You want to contain them at a level that they can't
infect people by the percutaneous route! They will need to be handled in a
way that the researcher minimizes (or eliminates, in this case) the
possibility of an "accidental needle stick" while they are being used and
discarded in a way that they are not accidentally released (along with
their contents) into the laboratory environment or the community.
A call to the Rocky Mountain CDC lab may be in order to get the best
advise. I'm sure they have had to think about such things.
Good luck.
Don Callihan, Ph.D.
BD Diagnostic Systems
Sparks, MD
410-773-6684
"Hofherr, Leslie" @MITVMA.MIT.EDU> on 04/04/2002
03:37:51 PM
Please respond to A Biosafety Discussion List
Sent by: A Biosafety Discussion List
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
cc:
Subject: Containment for Infectious Ticks
A researcher at UCLA would like to generate and use in animal experiments
tick nymphs (Ixodes scapularis) infected with Borrelia burgdorferi the
causative agent of lymes disease. Please let me know what kind of
containment would be needed for these experiments. Do they need to do these
experiments inside an insectary meeting the new draft BSL 2 Arthropod
Containment Guidelines?
They claim that ticks don't fly so they do not need an insectary or to meet
these guidelines.
Thanks for any advice or information,
Leslie Hofherr
UCLA, Biosafety
(310) 206-3929 phone
leslie@admin.ucla.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 4 Apr 2002 18:25:26 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Richard Pollack
Subject: Re: Containment for Infectious Ticks
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed"
The statement below, that "ticks jump", is fanciful. Some ticks
readily detect an appropriate host and then actively move (by walking
on 6 or 8 legs) toward it using visual, odor, heat and other cues.
In contrast, other types of ticks wait passively on a blade of grass
or twig, much like a seed with hooks, and are swept onto the skin/fur
(or clothing) of the passing animal. Ixodes ticks generally have
adopted the passive mode of host-questing. Ticks can neither jump
nor fly, but their hosts certainly can.
Containment procedures for ticks should reflect the type of tick used
(exotic or indigenous), the infection status, the particular
procedures proposed, and the skills and experiences of the
investigators. No one scenario is best for all procedures. A
climate-controlled insectary (nowadays with a locked door) is
generally desirable, but ticks can also be safely maintained in
tick-secure containers within a free-standing incubator housed in a
BL2 lab. More problematic are procedures for feeding ticks on
animals and for handling the ticks in the lab. In reality, deer
ticks (Ixodes dammini, I. scapularis, I pacificus and other
closely-related species do not survive long in the lab unless
maintained in conditions of high humidity. Such a tick that escapes
in a standard laboratory will soon desiccate and will likely be dead
within a day. Other types of ticks are much more resistant to water
loss, however. Special arrangements/exemptions may be needed to
house vertebrates for more than 12 hours in an insectary, or for
vector ticks to be fed in an animal room.
Note that the draft containment guidelines are just that - draft
guidelines. As with the BMBL itself, these documents are ideally
used as they were originally intended - as suggestions for safely
containing and working with the relevant organisms. When blindly
adopted as regulations, they often become unnecessarily restrictive,
burdensome and costly, and they sometimes fail to consider other
suitable strategies for containment.
I would be pleased to reply to specific issues directly, and can
suggest others who may comment on these as well. A post from earlier
today inquired about suitable conditions for mosquitoes infected with
the agent of falciparum malaria. Here again, it all depends on the
specific procedures to be performed, and the skills of the
investigators.
-Richard Pollack
>While it's true that ticks don't fly (nor do pigs, for that matter), nymphs
>can jump a surprising distance. That's one way they get from a blade of
>grass to a CO2-generating mammal for the blood meal they require to mature
>to adult tick.
>
>For my money (and from my limited experience with non-microorganisms),
>insectiary guidelines make the most sense. Think of the infected nymphs as
>infectious sharps!! You want to contain them at a level that they can't
>infect people by the percutaneous route! They will need to be handled in a
>way that the researcher minimizes (or eliminates, in this case) the
>possibility of an "accidental needle stick" while they are being used and
>discarded in a way that they are not accidentally released (along with
>their contents) into the laboratory environment or the community.
>
>A call to the Rocky Mountain CDC lab may be in order to get the best
>advise. I'm sure they have had to think about such things.
>
>Good luck.
>Don Callihan, Ph.D.
>BD Diagnostic Systems
>Sparks, MD
>410-773-6684
>
>
>
>
>"Hofherr, Leslie" @MITVMA.MIT.EDU> on 04/04/2002
>03:37:51 PM
>
>Please respond to A Biosafety Discussion List
>
>Sent by: A Biosafety Discussion List
>
>
>To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
>cc:
>Subject: Containment for Infectious Ticks
>
>
>A researcher at UCLA would like to generate and use in animal experiments
>tick nymphs (Ixodes scapularis) infected with Borrelia burgdorferi the
>causative agent of lymes disease. Please let me know what kind of
>containment would be needed for these experiments. Do they need to do these
>experiments inside an insectary meeting the new draft BSL 2 Arthropod
>Containment Guidelines?
>They claim that ticks don't fly so they do not need an insectary or to meet
>these guidelines.
>Thanks for any advice or information,
>Leslie Hofherr
>UCLA, Biosafety
>(310) 206-3929 phone
>leslie@admin.ucla.edu
--
Richard J. Pollack, PhD
Laboratory of Public Health Entomology
Harvard School of Public Health
665 Huntington Ave.
Boston, MA 02115 USA
phone: 617-432-1587
fax: 617-432-1796
Information on the biology and management of head lice:
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 4 Apr 2002 18:39:35 EST
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ed Krisiunas
Subject: Re: Containment for Infectious Ticks
MIME-Version: 1.0
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boundary="part1_21.1bcaa19b.29de3e37_boundary"
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Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Great analogy Don!
Thanks!
Edward Krisiunas, MT(ASCP), CIC, MPH
President
WNWN International
PO Box 1164
Burlington, Connecticut
06013
860-675-1217
860-675-1311(fax)
860-944-2373(mobile)
--part1_21.1bcaa19b.29de3e37_boundary
Content-Type: text/html; charset="US-ASCII"
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Great analogy Don!
Thanks!
Edward Krisiunas, MT(ASCP), CIC, MPH
President
WNWN International
PO Box 1164
Burlington, Connecticut
06013
860-675-1217
860-675-1311(fax)
860-944-2373(mobile)
--part1_21.1bcaa19b.29de3e37_boundary--
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 5 Apr 2002 06:01:07 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Elizabeth Smith
Subject: anthrax case in TX - safety investigation info
In-Reply-To:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
The attached article from MMWR has some interesting information
about the safety program, accident investigation, etc.
ANTHRAX, HUMAN, LABORATORY WORKER - USA (TEXAS)(02)
Date: 5 Apr 2002
From: ProMED-mail
Peace,
Elizabeth
=====
Elizabeth Smith
Environmental, Health & Safety Manager
BioPort Corporation
3500 N. Martin L. King Blvd.
Lansing, MI 48906
__________________________________________________
Do You Yahoo!?
Yahoo! Tax Center - online filing with TurboTax
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 5 Apr 2002 09:26:02 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Joseph P. Kozlovac"
Subject: Fwd: Workshop sponsored by IOM's Roundtable on Environmental
Health Sciences, Research, and Medicine
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
I thought some in the group may find the below announcement of interest.
>Date: Thu, 4 Apr 2002 09:38:42 -0500
>Reply-To: "Geraldine M. Wolfle"
>Sender: Announcements to all NIH Staff
>From: "Geraldine M. Wolfle"
>Subject: Workshop sponsored by IOM's Roundtable on Environmental Health
> Sciences, Research, and Medicine
>To: NIH-STAFF@LIST.
>
> "Environmental Health Indicators: Bridging the Chasm of Public Health
>and the Environment"
>
>
> April 10-11, 2002
> The National Academies Auditorium
> 2101 Constitution Avenue, N.W.
> Washington, D.C. 20418
>
>
> There have been a number of calls for such a national environmental
>health monitoring system that would expand current human exposure
>monitoring and health surveillance efforts complimented by the development
>and validation of a variety of potential indicators for environmental
>health status. Some members of Congress have begun work on legislation to
>appropriate funds needed to provide for such a system, while Federal
>agencies have begun discussions of implementation and development of
>indicators. The Roundtable on Environmental Health Sciences, Research,
>and Medicine is convening this workshop as an opportunity to discuss
>current efforts by industry, private, global, US federal government, and
>state governments. The workshop will take a critical look at potential
>indicators, proposed calls for monitoring, and other national
>monitoring systems to stimulate discussion of the necessary steps for a
>national environmental health monitoring system. Speakers include THE
>HONORABLE HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, US Senator; DR. EVE SLATER, assistant
>secretary, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services; MS. KIMBERLY
>NELSON, assistant administrator, Office of Environmental Information, U.S.
>Environmental Protection Agency, and DR. PATRICK LEAHY, associate
>director, U.S. Geological Survey.
>
>To register or to view the preliminary agenda please visit the web site at
>iom.edu/monitoring.
>
>
>Individuals with disabilities who need Sign Language Interpreters and/or
>reasonable acommodation to participate in this workshop should contact Dr.
>Christine Coussins, Institute of Medicine, 202-334-2521. Requests should
>be made at least 5 days in advance of the event.
>
>Individuals with disabilities who need Sign Language Interpreters and/or
>reasonable acommodation to participate in this workshop should contact Dr.
>Christine Coussins, Institute of Medicine, 202-334-2521.Requests should be
>made at least 5 days in advance of the event.
______________________________________________________________________________
Biological Safety Officer
Environment, Health, Safety
SAIC-Frederick
National Cancer Institute -
Frederick
(301)846-1451 fax: (301)846-6619
email: jkozlovac@mail.
______________________________________________________________________________
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 5 Apr 2002 10:37:06 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Stefan Wagener
Subject: Biosecurity for Laboratories Symposium in May, 2002
Mime-Version: 1.0
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The Canadian Science Centre for Human and Animal Health (CSCHAH) is hos=
ting the
first international "Symposium on Biosecurity for Laboratories" on May =
13 and
14, 2002 at the Fairmont Hotel in Winnipeg, Manitoba (Canada). We are
partnering with Health Canada's Office of Laboratory Security, CFIA's
Biocontainment, Safety and Facilities Division, and ABSA Canada to put =
on the
event under the umbrella of the "2002 Canadian Biosafety Symposium". In=
setting
up this timely event, we will address important topics as they relate t=
o
biosecurity. Our goal is to stimulate discussion, provide ideas and ult=
imately
help in the establishment of national and international guidelines on l=
aboratory
biosecurity. We welcome your participation and look forward to seeing y=
ou in
Winnipeg in May.
For more information, please see the attached pdf file or visit the web=
site at:
Stefan Wagener, PhD, CBSP
Scientific Director, Biosafety and Environment
Canadian Science Center for Human and Animal Health
1015 Arlington Street
Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada R3E 3P6
Phone: (204) 789-2029
Fax: (204) 789-5019
(See attached file: biosecurity.pdf)
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=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 5 Apr 2002 15:15:06 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Stefan Wagener
Subject: Biosecurity Symposium and visit to the lab?
Mime-Version: 1.0
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Some of you have asked if there is a possibility to see the "Winnipeg l=
ab"? The
answer is YES. We are planning to offer a tour through the facility on
Wednesday, May 15, 2002 for 60 participants. Please indicate your inter=
est in
the tour on your registration form and make sure you register early. Th=
e first
60 will go. Hope this helps and see you in Winnipeg.
Stefan
---------------------------------------------------------------
The Canadian Science Centre for Human and Animal Health (CSCHAH) is hos=
ting the
first international "Symposium on Biosecurity for Laboratories" on May =
13 and
14, 2002 at the Fairmont Hotel in Winnipeg, Manitoba (Canada). We are
partnering with Health Canada's Office of Laboratory Security, CFIA's
Biocontainment, Safety and Facilities Division, and ABSA Canada to put =
on the
event under the umbrella of the "2002 Canadian Biosafety Symposium". In=
setting
up this timely event, we will address important topics as they relate t=
o
biosecurity. Our goal is to stimulate discussion, provide ideas and ult=
imately
help in the establishment of national and international guidelines on l=
aboratory
biosecurity. We welcome your participation and look forward to seeing y=
ou in
Winnipeg in May.
For more information, please see the attached pdf file or visit the web=
site at:
Stefan Wagener, PhD, CBSP
Scientific Director, Biosafety and Environment
Canadian Science Center for Human and Animal Health
1015 Arlington Street
Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada R3E 3P6
Phone: (204) 789-2029
Fax: (204) 789-5019
(See attached file: biosecurity.pdf)
=
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=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 8 Apr 2002 13:33:53 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Gerry.Griffin"
Subject: biosafety cabinet move
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; CHARSET=US-ASCII
For a biosafety cabinet that's been used with replication defective
sindbis virus (BSL2) and human cell lines as its only
potentailly infections materials, would you require decontamination prior
to its being moved? The move is to another lab in the same complex and it
will be used by the same researchers. We will definitely have it
recertified once it's moved.
----------------------------------------
Gerry Griffin
Environmental Services
Email: Gerry.Griffin@med.nyu.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 8 Apr 2002 10:57:15 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Funk, Glenn"
Subject: Re: biosafety cabinet move
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Gerry -
Consistent with the common practice of considering =
replication-defective
vectors as in the same Risk Group as their wild-type counterparts =
(sindbis
RG2), and with the Universal Precaution vis-=E0-vis human source =
material, I'd
require decontamination of this cabinet prior to the move.
-- Glenn
Glenn A. Funk, PhD, CBSP
Director and Biosafety Officer
Environment, Health and Safety
MedImmune Vaccines, Inc.
408-845-8857
-----Original Message-----
From: Gerry.Griffin [mailto:Gerry.Griffin@MED.NYU.EDU]
Sent: Monday, 08 April, 2002 10:34
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: biosafety cabinet move
For a biosafety cabinet that's been used with replication defective
sindbis virus (BSL2) and human cell lines as its only
potentailly infections materials, would you require decontamination =
prior
to its being moved? The move is to another lab in the same complex and =
it
will be used by the same researchers. We will definitely have it
recertified once it's moved.
----------------------------------------
Gerry Griffin
Environmental Services
Email: Gerry.Griffin@med.nyu.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 8 Apr 2002 15:01:08 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Robert N. Latsch"
Subject: Re: biosafety cabinet move
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
We like decon as well. Our protocols call for all large peices of
equipment being moved or thrown out to be cleared in three areas, chemical,
biological and radioactive. We post a form that details what was done. No
form, No move.
Bob
>For a biosafety cabinet that's been used with replication defective
>sindbis virus (BSL2) and human cell lines as its only
>potentailly infections materials, would you require decontamination prior
>to its being moved? The move is to another lab in the same complex and it
>will be used by the same researchers. We will definitely have it
>recertified once it's moved.
>
>----------------------------------------
>Gerry Griffin
>Environmental Services
>Email: Gerry.Griffin@med.nyu.edu
_____________________________________________________________________
__ / _____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 8 Apr 2002 16:00:41 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Kim Heard
Organization: Yale University - Office of Environmental Health and Safety
Subject: Re: biosafety cabinet move
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At Yale, we follow the same procedure that Bob does. The form posted on each
piece of equipment clearly states what that unit has been cleared for.
Kim
"Robert N. Latsch" wrote:
> We like decon as well. Our protocols call for all large peices of
> equipment being moved or thrown out to be cleared in three areas, chemical,
> biological and radioactive. We post a form that details what was done. No
> form, No move.
>
> Bob
>
> >For a biosafety cabinet that's been used with replication defective
> >sindbis virus (BSL2) and human cell lines as its only
> >potentailly infections materials, would you require decontamination prior
> >to its being moved? The move is to another lab in the same complex and it
> >will be used by the same researchers. We will definitely have it
> >recertified once it's moved.
> >
> >----------------------------------------
> >Gerry Griffin
> >Environmental Services
> >Email: Gerry.Griffin@med.nyu.edu
>
> _____________________________________________________________________
> __ / _____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
> _ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
> \ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
> \ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
> \__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
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=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 8 Apr 2002 17:21:24 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Donald G. Robasser"
Organization: Princeton University
Subject: Psuedotyped retrovirus
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
List members,
We have just had a researcher submit a proposal to use psuedotyped
retroviruses (VSVg envelope) for trangenic mice production. Since I am
not familiar with this type of viral material, I am interested to know
how others approach the biosafety aspects of work with these viruses.
This appears to fall into the category of lenitviruses and there is a
suggestion that these modified viruses can contain some HIV sequences.
What help can you give me on work with this material?
I appreciate knowing what your experience suggests.
Thanks. Don Robasser
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 8 Apr 2002 17:56:45 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Barbara Owen
Organization: Bristol-Myers Squibb
Subject: Containment Suites
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-transfer-encoding: 7bit
This question is a little off topic for a Biosafety group, but
maybe someone on this list serve can help me.
I need information on how to build a "state of the art"
containment suite that will be used for making and handling
potent/ cytotoxic compounds (end product is powder). Anyone know
of where I can get information quickly?
Barb
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 9 Apr 2002 08:33:25 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: John Bristol
Subject: Re: Containment Suites
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Barbara,
I would highly recommend Safebridge Consultants, Inc. They have a good
deal of information available free on their website regarding the handling
of potent compounds.
Contact information is below:
John P. Farris, CIH
President and Managing Principal
SafeBridge Consultants, Inc.
1924 Old Middlefield Way
Mountain View, CA 94043-4820
Phone (650) 961-4820 ext. 229
Fax (650) 623-0096
John Bristol
Associate Director
Environmental Health and Safety
Eisai Research Institute
Barbara Owen
cc:
Sent by: A Subject: Containment Suites
Biosafety
Discussion List
04/08/2002 05:56
PM
Please respond to
A Biosafety
Discussion List
This question is a little off topic for a Biosafety group, but
maybe someone on this list serve can help me.
I need information on how to build a "state of the art"
containment suite that will be used for making and handling
potent/ cytotoxic compounds (end product is powder). Anyone know
of where I can get information quickly?
Barb
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 9 Apr 2002 08:51:28 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Richard Fink
Subject: Re: Psuedotyped retrovirus
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
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The VSVg envelop is frequently used to make the virus hardier so that it
can survive centrifugation. It also may increase host range. For a
retrovirus with human in the host range (and VSV pseudotype would meet
this) we rate it as RG2 with BL2 containment. If the cloned gene is an
oncogene then we go up one level of containment to BL2+.
If your investigator is using lentivirus (ie. modified HIV) rather then
other types of retroviruses then find out which one (3, 4, 5 plasmid
system). Many of the lentiviral vectors use severly crippled viruses that
require the help of 3 or more plasmids to get a replicated virus. The
virus cannot replicate outside of the TC's that provide these plasmids. As
you increase the # of plasmids the chances of random recombination with
wildtype resulting in a replication competent virus goes down. Even with
the three reversion is just about unheard of.
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
--=====================_85647104==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
The VSVg envelop is frequently used to make the virus hardier so that it can survive centrifugation. It also may increase host range. For a retrovirus with human in the host range (and VSV pseudotype would meet this) we rate it as RG2 with BL2 containment. If the cloned gene is an oncogene then we go up one level of containment to BL2+.
If your investigator is using lentivirus (ie. modified HIV) rather then other types of retroviruses then find out which one (3, 4, 5 plasmid system). Many of the lentiviral vectors use severly crippled viruses that require the help of 3 or more plasmids to get a replicated virus. The virus cannot replicate outside of the TC's that provide these plasmids. As you increase the # of plasmids the chances of random recombination with wildtype resulting in a replication competent virus goes down. Even with the three reversion is just about unheard of.
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
--=====================_85647104==_.ALT--
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 9 Apr 2002 08:40:14 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "OLINGER, PATRICIA L [S&C/0216]"
Subject: Working with one's own established cells
MIME-Version: 1.0
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this format, some or all of this message may not be legible.
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This should get some discussion going.
A question has come up regarding a section in the Fleming/Hunt book,
Biological Safety - Principles and Practices, 3rd. ed. Some of us in
the Pharma business off line have been kicking it around and believe we
understand the author's intent but would like to gain a wider
perspective.
The author of the section is Otto Doblhoff-Dier and Glyn Stacey, I know
that at least Otto is a member of the list and would send this note
directly to them but do not have their email id. Hopefully they will
see this and respond.
On page 227, Risk Assessment - Cell line source it states the following:
"It must be noted that in case of an accidental injection, human
autologous cells from a foreign donor will normally be recognized by the
operator's immune system. The operator should never handle autologous
cells (cells isolated from the operator), because these will express the
tissue type of the operator and could evade the normal immune responses
that recognize and destroy foreign cells".
What the consensus interpretation has been is that there is a fear that
if by some mechanism you had a transformation event in vitro and then
had those cells reintroduced into your body by accident, then your
immune system would not recognize those cells as foreign and you have a
really bad situation on your hands. Much worse than if you injected
someone else's cells into you, since they would be recognized as
foreign.
Is this indeed the intent of the author's.
The original question was regarding the use of ones own blood in a short
term experiment. Under laboratory conditions should researchers be
allowed to use their own blood for short term experiments. The
interpretation of the above guidance is that it does not apply to the
use of ones own blood.... or does it?
One last comment. We all understand that even when using your own blood
you follow universal precautions.
Thanks,
Patty Olinger
Pharmacia Corp.
Biosafety Officer - US - Kalamazoo
616-833-7931
Patricia.L.Olinger@
------_=_NextPart_001_01C1DFCC.13F739BA
Content-Type: text/html;
charset="iso-8859-1"
This should get some discussion going.
A question has come up regarding a section in the Fleming/Hunt book, Biological Safety - Principles and Practices, 3rd. ed. Some of us in the Pharma business off line have been kicking it around and believe we understand the author's intent but would like to gain a wider perspective.
The author of the section is Otto Doblhoff-Dier and Glyn Stacey, I know that at least Otto is a member of the list and would send this note directly to them but do not have their email id. Hopefully they will see this and respond.
On page 227, Risk Assessment - Cell line source it states the following: "It must be noted that in case of an accidental injection, human autologous cells from a foreign donor will normally be recognized by the operator's immune system. The operator should never handle autologous cells (cells isolated from the operator), because these will express the tissue type of the operator and could evade the normal immune responses that recognize and destroy foreign cells".
What the consensus interpretation has been is that there is a fear that if by some mechanism you had a transformation event in vitro and then had those cells reintroduced into your body by accident, then your immune system would not recognize those cells as foreign and you have a really bad situation on your hands. Much worse than if you injected someone else's cells into you, since they would be recognized as foreign.
Is this indeed the intent of the author's.
The original question was regarding the use of ones own blood in a short term experiment. Under laboratory conditions should researchers be allowed to use their own blood for short term experiments. The interpretation of the above guidance is that it does not apply to the use of ones own blood.... or does it?
One last comment. We all understand that even when using your own blood you follow universal precautions.
Thanks,
Patty Olinger
Pharmacia Corp.
Biosafety Officer - US - Kalamazoo
616-833-7931
Patricia.L.Olinger@
------_=_NextPart_001_01C1DFCC.13F739BA--
--------------InterScan_NT_MIME_Boundary--
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 9 Apr 2002 07:36:49 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Funk, Glenn"
Subject: Re: Working with one's own established cells
MIME-Version: 1.0
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boundary="----_=_NextPart_001_01C1DFD3.FBBD1150"
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this format, some or all of this message may not be legible.
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charset="iso-8859-1"
Patty -
I certainly can't speak for Otto or Glyn but it is my understanding that the
concern about failure to immunologically recognize "self" is the primary
driver for the long-standing and widely accepted rule that one should never
handle one's own cellular material in the laboratory. This includes blood;
the possibility of inadvertently working with one's own source material is
one of the major concerns about in-house blood donor programs that provide
human source substances for in-house R&D use. Once your own blood or cells
enter the artificial laboratory environment, you can never be absolutely
certain how your material may have responded to the new environmental
stimuli and interfaces. It seems to me that to take the chance of possibly
reintroducing it into your body after it's had a chance to experience the
outside world is to accept an undefined and largely unknown level of risk.
I'm anxiously waiting to hear what Otto and/or Glyn have to say ...
-- Glenn
Glenn A. Funk, PhD, CBSP
Director and BSO
Environment, Health & Safety
MedImmune Vaccines
-----Original Message-----
From: OLINGER, PATRICIA L [S&C/0216]
[mailto:patricia.l.olinger@]
Sent: Tuesday, 09 April, 2002 06:40
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Working with one's own established cells
This should get some discussion going.
A question has come up regarding a section in the Fleming/Hunt book,
Biological Safety - Principles and Practices, 3rd. ed. Some of us in the
Pharma business off line have been kicking it around and believe we
understand the author's intent but would like to gain a wider perspective.
The author of the section is Otto Doblhoff-Dier and Glyn Stacey, I know that
at least Otto is a member of the list and would send this note directly to
them but do not have their email id. Hopefully they will see this and
respond.
On page 227, Risk Assessment - Cell line source it states the following:
"It must be noted that in case of an accidental injection, human autologous
cells from a foreign donor will normally be recognized by the operator's
immune system. The operator should never handle autologous cells (cells
isolated from the operator), because these will express the tissue type of
the operator and could evade the normal immune responses that recognize and
destroy foreign cells".
What the consensus interpretation has been is that there is a fear that if
by some mechanism you had a transformation event in vitro and then had those
cells reintroduced into your body by accident, then your immune system would
not recognize those cells as foreign and you have a really bad situation on
your hands. Much worse than if you injected someone else's cells into you,
since they would be recognized as foreign.
Is this indeed the intent of the author's.
The original question was regarding the use of ones own blood in a short
term experiment. Under laboratory conditions should researchers be allowed
to use their own blood for short term experiments. The interpretation of
the above guidance is that it does not apply to the use of ones own
blood.... or does it?
One last comment. We all understand that even when using your own blood you
follow universal precautions.
Thanks,
Patty Olinger
Pharmacia Corp.
Biosafety Officer - US - Kalamazoo
616-833-7931
Patricia.L.Olinger@
------_=_NextPart_001_01C1DFD3.FBBD1150
Content-Type: text/html;
charset="iso-8859-1"
Patty -
I certainly can't speak for Otto or Glyn but it is my understanding that the concern about failure to immunologically recognize "self" is the primary driver for the long-standing and widely accepted rule that one should never handle one's own cellular material in the laboratory. This includes blood; the possibility of inadvertently working with one's own source material is one of the major concerns about in-house blood donor programs that provide human source substances for in-house R&D use. Once your own blood or cells enter the artificial laboratory environment, you can never be absolutely certain how your material may have responded to the new environmental stimuli and interfaces. It seems to me that to take the chance of possibly reintroducing it into your body after it's had a chance to experience the outside world is to accept an undefined and largely unknown level of risk.
I'm anxiously waiting to hear what Otto and/or Glyn have to say ...
-- Glenn
Glenn A. Funk, PhD, CBSP
Director and BSO
Environment, Health & Safety
MedImmune Vaccines
-----Original Message-----
From: OLINGER, PATRICIA L [S&C/0216] [mailto:patricia.l.olinger@]
Sent: Tuesday, 09 April, 2002 06:40
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Working with one's own established cells
This should get some discussion going.
A question has come up regarding a section in the Fleming/Hunt book, Biological Safety - Principles and Practices, 3rd. ed. Some of us in the Pharma business off line have been kicking it around and believe we understand the author's intent but would like to gain a wider perspective.
The author of the section is Otto Doblhoff-Dier and Glyn Stacey, I know that at least Otto is a member of the list and would send this note directly to them but do not have their email id. Hopefully they will see this and respond.
On page 227, Risk Assessment - Cell line source it states the following: "It must be noted that in case of an accidental injection, human autologous cells from a foreign donor will normally be recognized by the operator's immune system. The operator should never handle autologous cells (cells isolated from the operator), because these will express the tissue type of the operator and could evade the normal immune responses that recognize and destroy foreign cells".
What the consensus interpretation has been is that there is a fear that if by some mechanism you had a transformation event in vitro and then had those cells reintroduced into your body by accident, then your immune system would not recognize those cells as foreign and you have a really bad situation on your hands. Much worse than if you injected someone else's cells into you, since they would be recognized as foreign.
Is this indeed the intent of the author's.
The original question was regarding the use of ones own blood in a short term experiment. Under laboratory conditions should researchers be allowed to use their own blood for short term experiments. The interpretation of the above guidance is that it does not apply to the use of ones own blood.... or does it?
One last comment. We all understand that even when using your own blood you follow universal precautions.
Thanks,
Patty Olinger
Pharmacia Corp.
Biosafety Officer - US - Kalamazoo
616-833-7931
Patricia.L.Olinger@
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Date: Tue, 9 Apr 2002 10:15:30 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Andrew Braun
Subject: Re: Working with one's own established cells
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
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boundary="=====================_9028906==_.ALT"
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Dear List,
Is there any documented evidence of such an inadvertent exposure
to autologous cells causing illness? Or is this risk theoretical?
Andy
At 07:36 AM 4/9/02 -0700, you wrote:
>Patty -
>
>I certainly can't speak for Otto or Glyn but it is my understanding that
>the concern about failure to immunologically recognize "self" is the
>primary driver for the long-standing and widely accepted rule that one
>should never handle one's own cellular material in the laboratory. This
>includes blood; the possibility of inadvertently working with one's own
>source material is one of the major concerns about in-house blood donor
>programs that provide human source substances for in-house R&D use. Once
>your own blood or cells enter the artificial laboratory environment, you
>can never be absolutely certain how your material may have responded to
>the new environmental stimuli and interfaces. It seems to me that to take
>the chance of possibly reintroducing it into your body after it's had a
>chance to experience the outside world is to accept an undefined and
>largely unknown level of risk.
>
>I'm anxiously waiting to hear what Otto and/or Glyn have to say ...
>
>-- Glenn
>
>
>Glenn A. Funk, PhD, CBSP
>Director and BSO
>Environment, Health & Safety
>MedImmune Vaccines
>-----Original Message-----
>From: OLINGER, PATRICIA L [S&C/0216]
>[mailto:patricia.l.olinger@]
>Sent: Tuesday, 09 April, 2002 06:40
>To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
>Subject: Working with one's own established cells
>
>This should get some discussion going.
>
>A question has come up regarding a section in the Fleming/Hunt book,
>Biological Safety - Principles and Practices, 3rd. ed. Some of us in the
>Pharma business off line have been kicking it around and believe we
>understand the author's intent but would like to gain a wider perspective.
>
>The author of the section is Otto Doblhoff-Dier and Glyn Stacey, I know
>that at least Otto is a member of the list and would send this note
>directly to them but do not have their email id. Hopefully they will see
>this and respond.
>
>On page 227, Risk Assessment - Cell line source it states the
>following: "It must be noted that in case of an accidental injection,
>human autologous cells from a foreign donor will normally be recognized by
>the operator's immune system. The operator should never handle autologous
>cells (cells isolated from the operator), because these will express the
>tissue type of the operator and could evade the normal immune responses
>that recognize and destroy foreign cells".
>
>What the consensus interpretation has been is that there is a fear that if
>by some mechanism you had a transformation event in vitro and then had
>those cells reintroduced into your body by accident, then your immune
>system would not recognize those cells as foreign and you have a really
>bad situation on your hands. Much worse than if you injected someone
>else's cells into you, since they would be recognized as foreign.
>
>Is this indeed the intent of the author's.
>
>The original question was regarding the use of ones own blood in a short
>term experiment. Under laboratory conditions should researchers be
>allowed to use their own blood for short term experiments. The
>interpretation of the above guidance is that it does not apply to the use
>of ones own blood.... or does it?
>
>One last comment. We all understand that even when using your own blood
>you follow universal precautions.
>
>Thanks,
>
>Patty Olinger
>Pharmacia Corp.
>Biosafety Officer - US - Kalamazoo
>616-833-7931
>Patricia.L.Olinger@
---------------------------------------
Andrew Braun, Sc.D
Harvard Medical School, Office for Research
25 Shattuck Street
Boston, MA 02115
617-432-4899; FAX 617-432-3169
---------------------------------------
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Dear List,
Is there any documented evidence of such an inadvertent exposure to autologous cells causing illness? Or is this risk theoretical?
Andy
At 07:36 AM 4/9/02 -0700, you wrote:
Patty -
I certainly can't speak for Otto or Glyn but it is my understanding that the concern about failure to immunologically recognize "self" is the primary driver for the long-standing and widely accepted rule that one should never handle one's own cellular material in the laboratory. This includes blood; the possibility of inadvertently working with one's own source material is one of the major concerns about in-house blood donor programs that provide human source substances for in-house R&D use. Once your own blood or cells enter the artificial laboratory environment, you can never be absolutely certain how your material may have responded to the new environmental stimuli and interfaces. It seems to me that to take the chance of possibly reintroducing it into your body after it's had a chance to experience the outside world is to accept an undefined and largely unknown level of risk.
I'm anxiously waiting to hear what Otto and/or Glyn have to say ...
-- Glenn
Glenn A. Funk, PhD, CBSP
Director and BSO
Environment, Health & Safety
MedImmune Vaccines
-----Original Message-----
From: OLINGER, PATRICIA L [S&C/0216] [mailto:patricia.l.olinger@]
Sent: Tuesday, 09 April, 2002 06:40
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Working with one's own established cells
This should get some discussion going.
A question has come up regarding a section in the Fleming/Hunt book, Biological Safety - Principles and Practices, 3rd. ed. Some of us in the Pharma business off line have been kicking it around and believe we understand the author's intent but would like to gain a wider perspective.
The author of the section is Otto Doblhoff-Dier and Glyn Stacey, I know that at least Otto is a member of the list and would send this note directly to them but do not have their email id. Hopefully they will see this and respond.
On page 227, Risk Assessment - Cell line source it states the following: "It must be noted that in case of an accidental injection, human autologous cells from a foreign donor will normally be recognized by the operator's immune system. The operator should never handle autologous cells (cells isolated from the operator), because these will express the tissue type of the operator and could evade the normal immune responses that recognize and destroy foreign cells".
What the consensus interpretation has been is that there is a fear that if by some mechanism you had a transformation event in vitro and then had those cells reintroduced into your body by accident, then your immune system would not recognize those cells as foreign and you have a really bad situation on your hands. Much worse than if you injected someone else's cells into you, since they would be recognized as foreign.
Is this indeed the intent of the author's.
The original question was regarding the use of ones own blood in a short term experiment. Under laboratory conditions should researchers be allowed to use their own blood for short term experiments. The interpretation of the above guidance is that it does not apply to the use of ones own blood.... or does it?
One last comment. We all understand that even when using your own blood you follow universal precautions.
Thanks,
Patty Olinger
Pharmacia Corp.
Biosafety Officer - US - Kalamazoo
616-833-7931
Patricia.L.Olinger@
---------------------------------------
Andrew Braun, Sc.D
Harvard Medical School, Office for Research
25 Shattuck Street
Boston, MA 02115
617-432-4899; FAX 617-432-3169
---------------------------------------
--=====================_9028906==_.ALT--
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 9 Apr 2002 17:58:02 +0200
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Doblhoff-dier Otto
Organization: Universitaet fuer Bodenkultur Wien
Subject: Re: Working with one's own established cells
In-Reply-To:
MIME-Version: 1.0
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Dear Safety Netters,
having written the lines with Glyn in the ASM book gives me the
opportunity to clarify the issue.
As Patty correctly states, the rule is mainly applicable to cell
lines (the chapter is all about cell lines). Patty also correctly
assumes, that the risk is especially related to Cells, that may have
undergone transformation. When handling such cell cultures, the
operator could accidentally reinject im/herself with fairly high cell
numbers of a autologous transormed cell clone, that, under very
special circumstances could be tumorigenic.
Now to make things very clear. If you would do a comparative risk
analysis, when handling blood, I would make the following statement:
The risk posed by a possible needlestick accident when handling blood
is related to blood born pathogens and not the hypothetical risk of a
transformation event taking place in the blood sample and this
transformed cell forming a tumor when injected back into the
operator.
Taking the analysis a bit further, just for the fun of it, one might
even say, that an autologous blood sample carries less risk of being
contaminated with a blood born pathogen, to which the operator has no
immune defenses.
I could think of two scenarios, where handling of autologous blood
samples could be risky. Infection of blood cells with adventitious
agents ex-vivo, during laboratory procedures (more likely) and
accidental reinjection and forced transformation of many cells by
e.g. transforming chemical substances during handling and accidental
reinjection (unlikely)
So, handling ones own blood in clinical analysis procedures is
acceptable. I still would very much refrain from reinjecting myself
with this blood, after it has been in contact with reagents or non-
sterile environment.....
Otto Doblhoff-Dier, Inst. Appl. Microbiol, Univ. Agric.,
Nussdorfer L=E4nde 11, A-1190 Vienna, Austria, Europe
Tel: *43-1-36006-6204 Fax:*43-1-3697615
EMAIL: doblhoff@edv2.boku.ac.at
WWW:
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 9 Apr 2002 10:30:27 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Elizabeth Smith
Subject: Re: LD 50 of Anthrax Toxin
In-Reply-To:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
There are two toxins: edema toxin (EF + PA) and the lethal
toxin (LF + PA). They won't have the same LD50, since they're
not the same chemical. They also don't work the same way.
According to one of our R&D fellows, the following source can be
used to find toxicity information:
> Elizabeth,
> you probably can't find exact LD50 numbers of individual
toxins but there are LD50 data for strains lacking one or two
toxin proteins. The reason is that EF does not kill animals and
some animals are insensitive to purified LF toxins. Please take
a look at the following paper:
> Pezard, et. al. 1991. Contribution of individual toxin
components to virulence. Infection and Immunity, 59: 3472-3477.
> Unfortunately, I don't have the paper with me. Basically the
paper tells you that LD50 for Swiss mice is 10(6) [I think he
means 10^6 - eliz.] when the B. anthracis strain has both PA and
LF but increases more than 1000 folds to higher than 10(9) when
LF gene is missing. This results indicates that the virulence
is mostly due to LF and effect of EF is very minimum. Sorry I
don't have the paper.
I hope this is helpful,
Peace,
Elizabeth
=====
Elizabeth Smith
Environmental, Health & Safety Manager
BioPort Corporation
3500 N. Martin L. King Blvd.
Lansing, MI 48906
__________________________________________________
Do You Yahoo!?
Yahoo! Tax Center - online filing with TurboTax
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 9 Apr 2002 14:16:42 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ginger Brown
Subject: Medical History Questionnaire
Mime-Version: 1.0
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Do any of your institutions have a medical history questionnaire
for employees who work with (or will work with) animals?
I'm thinking of a device that could be used to determine what
type, if any, medical examination might be needed/ useful.
Legitimate questions such as "When was your last tetanus
vaccination?", etc.
If you do have such a questionnaire, I would appreciate
receiving a copy for review. Please send directly to me, not
to the entire listserv group. Thanks in advance.
Ginger Brown, CBSP
Manager, Biological Safety
Env Health & Safety
TX A&M University
College Station, TX 77843-4472
979/862-4038
FAX 979/845-1348
gingerbrown@tamu.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 9 Apr 2002 13:29:48 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Eric Hansen
Subject: Re: Monolithic floors
In-Reply-To:
MIME-version: 1.0
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Good afternoon folks. My concern of the day comes from evaluating a lab
being modified to meet BSL-3 requirements. As I read through the BMBL, the
requirements for the floor indicate it needs to be constructed for easy
cleaning and decontamination, and that if there are any seams, they must be
sealed. It continues by indicating that floors should "monolithic and
slip-resistant". What is your opinion on having a vinyl floor tile floor
that is waxed in a BSL-3 lab? Do you consider the seams to be "sealed" with
the wax? Since the floor tile generally come in 12-inch squares, I don't
consider it to be monolithic. How far do you go in recommending/requiring
that another flooring material be used in the lab? Thanks for your help.
Eric Hansen
Utah State University
ehansen@cc.usu.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 9 Apr 2002 15:32:21 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Kim Auletta
Subject: Re: Medical History Questionnaire
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
All of our animal use forms are on our web site:
Kim Auletta
Lab Safety Specialist
Environmental Health and Safety
SUNY Stony Brook
110 Suffolk Hall
Stony Brook, NY 11794-6200
PHONE: 631-632-9672
FAX: 631-632-9683
E-MAIL: kauletta@.sunysb.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 9 Apr 2002 16:46:16 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Andrew Cockburn
Subject: Re: Monolithic floors
Mime-Version: 1.0
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I do not consider tile to be monolithic. There are lots of monolithic =
types of flooring available, and it is a cheap fix. You should be able to =
do a small lab for about $1K.
We are in the process of covering a tiled floor in our animal surgery with =
vinyl flooring to correct this very problem.
Andrew Cockburn, PhD
Director of Research Compliance
309 I Chesnut Ridge Research Bldg
Box 6845
West Virginia University
Morgantown, WV 26506-6845
telephone: 304-293-7157
>>> ehansen@CC.USU.EDU 04/09/02 03:29PM >>>
Good afternoon folks. My concern of the day comes from evaluating a lab
being modified to meet BSL-3 requirements. As I read through the BMBL, =
the
requirements for the floor indicate it needs to be constructed for easy
cleaning and decontamination, and that if there are any seams, they must =
be
sealed. It continues by indicating that floors should "monolithic and
slip-resistant". What is your opinion on having a vinyl floor tile floor
that is waxed in a BSL-3 lab? Do you consider the seams to be "sealed" =
with
the wax? Since the floor tile generally come in 12-inch squares, I don't
consider it to be monolithic. How far do you go in recommending/requiring
that another flooring material be used in the lab? Thanks for your help.
Eric Hansen
Utah State University
ehansen@cc.usu.edu
--=_BAE7380E.7C1D17A2
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
I do not consider tile to be monolithic. There are lots of monolithic = types of flooring available, and it is a cheap fix. You should be able to = do a small lab for about $1K.
We are in the process of covering a tiled floor in our animal surgery = with vinyl flooring to correct this very problem.
Andrew Cockburn, PhD
Director of Research Compliance
309 I = Chesnut Ridge Research Bldg
Box 6845
West Virginia University
Morgantown, = WV 26506-6845
telephone: 304-293-7157
>>> ehansen@CC.USU.EDU = 04/09/02 03:29PM >>>
Good afternoon folks. My concern of the day = comes from evaluating a lab
being modified to meet BSL-3 requirements. = As I read through the BMBL, the
requirements for the floor indicate it needs = to be constructed for easy
cleaning and decontamination, and that if there = are any seams, they must be
sealed. It continues by indicating that = floors should "monolithic and
slip-resistant". What is your opinion on = having a vinyl floor tile floor
that is waxed in a BSL-3 lab? Do you = consider the seams to be "sealed" with
the wax? Since the floor tile = generally come in 12-inch squares, I don't
consider it to be monolithic. = How far do you go in recommending/requiring
that another flooring material be = used in the lab? Thanks for your help.
Eric Hansen
Utah State University
ehansen@cc.usu.edu
--=_BAE7380E.7C1D17A2--
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 9 Apr 2002 16:56:04 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Robert N. Latsch"
Subject: Re: Monolithic floors
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Our labs, BSL3 qnd others are of one piece material. The seams are fused
when multiple pieces are used.
I do not like the idea of wax as the sealant for two reasons.
Many solvent will dessolve or emulsify wax, breaking the seal. I have
evaluated this clause in the past to mean water resistant.
second, A wax floor needs constant upkeep. Who is going to do that for
you? what kind of contamination issues will this raise?
Bob
>Good afternoon folks. My concern of the day comes from evaluating a lab
>being modified to meet BSL-3 requirements. As I read through the BMBL, the
>requirements for the floor indicate it needs to be constructed for easy
>cleaning and decontamination, and that if there are any seams, they must be
>sealed. It continues by indicating that floors should "monolithic and
>slip-resistant". What is your opinion on having a vinyl floor tile floor
>that is waxed in a BSL-3 lab? Do you consider the seams to be "sealed" with
>the wax? Since the floor tile generally come in 12-inch squares, I don't
>consider it to be monolithic. How far do you go in recommending/requiring
>that another flooring material be used in the lab? Thanks for your help.
>
>Eric Hansen
>Utah State University
>ehansen@cc.usu.edu
_____________________________________________________________________
__ / _____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 9 Apr 2002 13:46:11 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "David A. Bunzow"
Subject: Re: Monolithic floors
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Robert and others:
There are additional factors to consider in this discussion, all that seem to work
against multiple tiles.
1] Seams between tiles are not uniform and tend to be difficult to clean (as when
there is a release or spill);
2] Wax will allow inclusions of trapped materials; once scuffed, they will act
like delayed release sources of contaminants;
3] Floor upkeep is always an issue to consider; with wax or other high
maintenance surface, people who must provide services for the floors run a higher
risk of exposure to materials within the lab;
4] Most tiles (unless of special order) do not have edges sealed in the same
manner as the surface, leading to a much larger surface area (probably want to
minimize this in the event of a release).
Just another $0.02 to consider...
"Robert N. Latsch" wrote:
> Our labs, BSL3 qnd others are of one piece material. The seams are fused
> when multiple pieces are used.
>
> I do not like the idea of wax as the sealant for two reasons.
>
> Many solvent will dessolve or emulsify wax, breaking the seal. I have
> evaluated this clause in the past to mean water resistant.
>
> second, A wax floor needs constant upkeep. Who is going to do that for
> you? what kind of contamination issues will this raise?
>
> Bob
>
> >Good afternoon folks. My concern of the day comes from evaluating a lab
> >being modified to meet BSL-3 requirements. As I read through the BMBL, the
> >requirements for the floor indicate it needs to be constructed for easy
> >cleaning and decontamination, and that if there are any seams, they must be
> >sealed. It continues by indicating that floors should "monolithic and
> >slip-resistant". What is your opinion on having a vinyl floor tile floor
> >that is waxed in a BSL-3 lab? Do you consider the seams to be "sealed" with
> >the wax? Since the floor tile generally come in 12-inch squares, I don't
> >consider it to be monolithic. How far do you go in recommending/requiring
> >that another flooring material be used in the lab? Thanks for your help.
> >
> >Eric Hansen
> >Utah State University
> >ehansen@cc.usu.edu
>
> _____________________________________________________________________
> __ / _____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
> _ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
> \ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
> \ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
> \__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
--
David A. Bunzow CET; CHMM; REM
University of Alaska
Many Traditions One Alaska
Statewide Office of Risk Management
Environmental, Health and Safety Manager
1-907-474-5005 (phone)
1-907-474-5634 (fax)
sndab1@alaska.edu
alaska.edu/swrisk/
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2002 09:14:13 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Ton, Mimi"
Subject: Aerosols and Microscopes
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Dear all,
Does anyone have recommendations on how to protect workers from aerosols
while working at a microscope? Can a microscope be placed in a BSC? Would a
local exhaust system work? How to decon the microscope?
Example: A researcher is injecting a replication incompetent viral vector
into mice embryos under a microscope.
Please advise. Thanks so much.
Mimi Ton
---------------------------------------------
Mimi C. Ton
Safety Engineer
California Institute of Technology
Environment, Health & Safety Office
M/C 25-6
1200 E. California Boulevard
Pasadena, CA 91125
Phone: 626.395.2430
Fax: 626.577.6028
E-mail: mimi.ton@caltech.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2002 12:56:02 -0400
Reply-To: pr18@columbia.edu
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: paul rubock
Organization: EH&S
Subject: Select Agents Question
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Two years ago a request was made by my predecessor in this position to
the CDC for exemption from Select Agents requirements for use of light
chain ONLY botulinum toxin. It was turned down based on: "purified
light and heavy chains (and you do need both for toxicity) may retain
some toxicity due to trace amounts of intact toxin".
I recently examined the MSDS and Cert. of Analysis for one of the light
chain botulinum toxins provided by a fairly well established company
wherein they state, citing the same rationale, that users should be be
vaccinated with the pentavalent toxoid. Add to this the fact that when
I called the same company they stated that they do not consider 'light
chain ONLY' a selcet agent and do not ship it as such.
My questions are:
* Does the CDC still consider light (or heavy) chain ONLY botulinum
toxin a Select Agent.
* Has any EH&S or Biosafety colleague recommended or required users
be vaccinated if they are only using one chain.
* Or, might it be appropriate to still call consider this a Select
Agent based on the potential, as cited in the aforementioned CDC
note, to combine light and heavy chains to get the real thing.
Thanks in advance for any advice and comments.
Paul Rubock
--------------436F73AABBFF13BE11793B69
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Two years ago a request was made by my predecessor in this position to the CDC for exemption from Select Agents requirements for use of light chain ONLY botulinum toxin. It was turned down based on: "purified light and heavy chains (and you do need both for toxicity) may retain some toxicity due to trace amounts of intact toxin".
I recently examined the MSDS and Cert. of Analysis for one of the light chain botulinum toxins provided by a fairly well established company wherein they state, citing the same rationale, that users should be be vaccinated with the pentavalent toxoid. Add to this the fact that when I called the same company they stated that they do not consider 'light chain ONLY' a selcet agent and do not ship it as such.
My questions are:
Does the CDC still consider light (or heavy) chain ONLY botulinum toxin a Select Agent.
Has any EH&S or Biosafety colleague recommended or required users be vaccinated if they are only using one chain.
Or, might it be appropriate to still call consider this a Select Agent based on the potential, as cited in the aforementioned CDC note, to combine light and heavy chains to get the real thing.
Thanks in advance for any advice and comments.
Paul Rubock
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--------------A2E8059AF8A5D3051569A280--
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2002 12:27:06 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Senjem, David H."
Subject: USA Patriot Act
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
I would be interested if anyone has developed internal policies or guidance
documents on institutional compliance with the USA Patriot Act.
For instance, the Act criminializes possession of select agents "not
reasonably justified by a bona fide research or peaceful purpose." Has
anyone addressed whether or not an agent being stored and not actively used
in a research activity would represent legal or illegal possession?
Also, the Act speaks to non-permanent residents from any one of seven State
Department designated countries being unable to transport or possess select
agents. Does anyone have any suggestions beyond common sense due diligence
for establishing the nationality of individuals working with select agents?
Lastly, the Act identifies other "restricted persons" and precludes them
from transporting or possessing select agents. Among the identifiers of a
restricted person are:
* a person indicted or convicted or a crime with imprisonment
exceeding one year
* a fugitive from justice
* a user of illegal drugs
* an illegal alien
* an adjudicated mental defective or one who has been committed to a
mental institution
* one who has been dishonorably discharged from the military
My questions in this regard would be what level of background checks are
being done to establish this information and whether or not institutions
with select agents have established drug testing protocols for persons
working with or otherwise having access to these agents.
Lastly, is anyone aware of any federal interpretive documents developed
around the USA Patriot Act or contact within the federal government who may
be able to speak to it.
Comments may be addressed to the list or directly to me on a personal basis.
Dave Senjem
Mayo Clinic
(507)284-7459
senjem.david@mayo.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2002 13:35:06 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Gill Norton
Organization: University of Western Ontario
Subject: Re: Aerosols and Microscopes
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Hi Everyone,
I have found this to be a difficult issue. It depends on the virus and
whether sterility is required for the embyos.
For the virus -you will have to get documentation about it's " defective"
nature from the researcher or literature and possibly other opinions.
If you can verify ( involve your biosafety committee) that the virus is indeed
defective then here are a few possible solutions:
1. Buy a Class II cabinet with a modified front - Baker makes these I believe
so that the microscope eyepieces protrude through the glass/plastic front. This
violates the certification on the cabinet though.
2. Place the microscope in a reverse flow hood - Aerosols will be pulled away
from the researcher. Work will not be sterile.
Worker could wear respiratory protection as well if required.
3. Place the microscope inside a Class II bsc by opening up the front. Use it
like this. Violates the certification and will not contain all the aerosols.
Work seems to stay sterile. Worker can wear respiratory protection
The microscope can be decontaminated by wiping with disinfectant. Check to see
that it won't harm the instrument but will kill the virus!
If you can't verify the defective nature of the virus or oit is not known -
none of the above will work except for the modified bsc.
I would be really interested to get other opinions on this as I have never
found a really good answer
Gillian
"Ton, Mimi" wrote:
> Dear all,
>
> Does anyone have recommendations on how to protect workers from aerosols
> while working at a microscope? Can a microscope be placed in a BSC? Would a
> local exhaust system work? How to decon the microscope?
>
> Example: A researcher is injecting a replication incompetent viral vector
> into mice embryos under a microscope.
>
> Please advise. Thanks so much.
>
> Mimi Ton
>
> ---------------------------------------------
> Mimi C. Ton
> Safety Engineer
> California Institute of Technology
> Environment, Health & Safety Office
> M/C 25-6
> 1200 E. California Boulevard
> Pasadena, CA 91125
> Phone: 626.395.2430
> Fax: 626.577.6028
> E-mail: mimi.ton@caltech.edu
--
------------------------------------------------------------------
Gillian Norton
Biosafety Officer
The University of Western Ontario
Occupational Health and Safety
Stevenson Lawson Building, Rm. 60
Phone: (519)661-2036 Ext. 84747
FAX: (519)661-3420
-------------------------------------------------------------------
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2002 11:57:21 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Therese M. Stinnett"
Subject: Re: USA Patriot Act
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
We are tackeling these issues and involve a number of our departments =
in
doing so.
Previously we had our documents drafted, reviewed, etc for compliance =
with
the Select Agents act.
Once the Patriot Act became law, we had to take some additional steps. =
Since
what we "do" in our labs is research, the definition of bona fide =
research
has really not been an issue for us. Whenever we have contacted a PI =
who is
not using the material in their current research, they have generally =
been
quite willing to dispose of it.
Health and Safety surveyed all the labs/principal investigators. The
University Counsel is involved to read and interpret the Act. Human
Resources and our GME offices are involved as well--because all foreign
students must have visas and all employees must have I9's on file with
appropriate documentation. So in actuality I would say the HR office =
bears
the burden of this effort.
Background checks are a huge issue, in terms of privacy, resources, =
etc.
But if you have your SA labs registered and the materials secured, with
restricted access, and inventoried on a regular basis, then I think the =
more
in-depth background checks will be limited to a very few persons.
Therese M. Stinnett
Biosafety Officer
Health and Safety Division
UCHSC, Mailstop C275
4200 E. 9th Avenue
Denver, CO=A0 80262
Voice:=A0 303-315-6754
Pager:=A0=A0 303-266-5402
Fax:=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 303-315-8026
email:=A0=A0=A0 therese.stinnett@uchsc.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2002 14:06:06 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Pitts, Jonathan"
Subject: Re: Aerosols and Microscopes
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
My solution in the past has been to place the microscope in a standard Class
II BSC, attach a CCD camera to an output port (or the eye piece) and run the
video feed from the camera to a TV outside of the BSC. Careful
disinfecting, avoiding optics and electronics seems reasonable to me.
Jon
P.S. While this costs a little extra, as I researcher, I like it since it
allows for both still images and video of the work being done.
Jonathan Pitts Ph.D.
MediSpectra Inc.
45 Hartwell Ave.
Lexington, MA 02421
Tel: (781) 372-2300 x354
Direct Tel. Line: (781) 372-2354
Fax: (781) 674-0002
-----Original Message-----
From: Gill Norton [mailto:gmnorton@UWO.CA]
Sent: Wednesday, April 10, 2002 1:35 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Aerosols and Microscopes
Hi Everyone,
I have found this to be a difficult issue. It depends on the virus and
whether sterility is required for the embyos.
For the virus -you will have to get documentation about it's " defective"
nature from the researcher or literature and possibly other opinions.
If you can verify ( involve your biosafety committee) that the virus is
indeed
defective then here are a few possible solutions:
1. Buy a Class II cabinet with a modified front - Baker makes these I
believe
so that the microscope eyepieces protrude through the glass/plastic front.
This
violates the certification on the cabinet though.
2. Place the microscope in a reverse flow hood - Aerosols will be pulled
away
from the researcher. Work will not be sterile.
Worker could wear respiratory protection as well if required.
3. Place the microscope inside a Class II bsc by opening up the front. Use
it
like this. Violates the certification and will not contain all the aerosols.
Work seems to stay sterile. Worker can wear respiratory protection
The microscope can be decontaminated by wiping with disinfectant. Check to
see
that it won't harm the instrument but will kill the virus!
If you can't verify the defective nature of the virus or oit is not known -
none of the above will work except for the modified bsc.
I would be really interested to get other opinions on this as I have never
found a really good answer
Gillian
"Ton, Mimi" wrote:
> Dear all,
>
> Does anyone have recommendations on how to protect workers from aerosols
> while working at a microscope? Can a microscope be placed in a BSC? Would
a
> local exhaust system work? How to decon the microscope?
>
> Example: A researcher is injecting a replication incompetent viral vector
> into mice embryos under a microscope.
>
> Please advise. Thanks so much.
>
> Mimi Ton
>
> ---------------------------------------------
> Mimi C. Ton
> Safety Engineer
> California Institute of Technology
> Environment, Health & Safety Office
> M/C 25-6
> 1200 E. California Boulevard
> Pasadena, CA 91125
> Phone: 626.395.2430
> Fax: 626.577.6028
> E-mail: mimi.ton@caltech.edu
--
------------------------------------------------------------------
Gillian Norton
Biosafety Officer
The University of Western Ontario
Occupational Health and Safety
Stevenson Lawson Building, Rm. 60
Phone: (519)661-2036 Ext. 84747
FAX: (519)661-3420
-------------------------------------------------------------------
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2002 14:12:59 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Scott, Rick"
Subject: Re: USA Patriot Act
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Same answer as Therese. University Counsel is reviewing our policy and an
"affidavit" that the individuals will sign. HR will do our background
checks. Myself and an intern actually completed the surveying process as we
have what I would consider to be a "manageable" number of labs. I found
most folks were willing to give up the materials as opposed to falling under
the regulation. Can't say I blame them. : ) We created a paper trail for
the disposal and incinerate on site.
And agreed, we will end up with a relatively small number of individuals who
will undergo the actual background check.
Rick Scott
Biological Safety Officer
Biological Safety Cabinet Field Certifier
East Carolina University
Greenville, NC
27858
scottwi@mail.ecu.edu
> ----------
> From: Therese M. Stinnett
> Reply To: A Biosafety Discussion List
> Sent: Thursday, April 11, 2002 1:57 AM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: Re: USA Patriot Act
>
> We are tackeling these issues and involve a number of our departments in
> doing so.
> Previously we had our documents drafted, reviewed, etc for compliance with
> the Select Agents act.
>
> Once the Patriot Act became law, we had to take some additional steps.
> Since
> what we "do" in our labs is research, the definition of bona fide research
> has really not been an issue for us. Whenever we have contacted a PI who
> is
> not using the material in their current research, they have generally been
> quite willing to dispose of it.
>
> Health and Safety surveyed all the labs/principal investigators. The
> University Counsel is involved to read and interpret the Act. Human
> Resources and our GME offices are involved as well--because all foreign
> students must have visas and all employees must have I9's on file with
> appropriate documentation. So in actuality I would say the HR office
> bears
> the burden of this effort.
>
> Background checks are a huge issue, in terms of privacy, resources, etc.
> But if you have your SA labs registered and the materials secured, with
> restricted access, and inventoried on a regular basis, then I think the
> more
> in-depth background checks will be limited to a very few persons.
>
> Therese M. Stinnett
> Biosafety Officer
> Health and Safety Division
> UCHSC, Mailstop C275
> 4200 E. 9th Avenue
> Denver, CO 80262
> Voice: 303-315-6754
> Pager: 303-266-5402
> Fax: 303-315-8026
> email: therese.stinnett@uchsc.edu
>
>
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2002 14:30:21 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Amy Quattrocchi
Subject: Human Tumor Cell Transplants
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT
Hello all,
I have recently become aware of a proposed research project at my
institution that will involve transplanting human tumor cells into nude
mice. I recognize that the tumor cells will be regulated as BBP, as
they are primary tissue explants.
The researcher has asked if there is a mechanism by which the
tumors could be proven free of BBP contaminants. I imagine that
this type of analysis would be extensive (based on the numbers of
BBP that are potentially present in the tumor), and might be costly.
Has anyone attempted to perform this type of evaluation? Are there
commercial labs that would be able to certify that a sample is free of
BBP contaminants?
It also has occurred to me that the tumor cells might still be
considered BBP based on their inherent nature as human cells even
if there are no known microbial contaminants.
Any thoughts and suggestions on this matter would be appreciated.
Best regards,
Amy
Amy Quattrocchi
Health and Safety Specialist
Laboratory and Biological Safety
Rutgers Environmental Health and Safety
24 Street 1603
Building 4127 Livingston Campus
Piscataway, NJ 08854
Phone: 732/445-2550
Fax: 732/445-3109
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2002 14:54:53 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Joseph P. Kozlovac"
Subject: Re: LD 50 of Anthrax Toxin
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="=====================_24507625==_.ALT"
--=====================_24507625==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
You may also want to read a chapter authored by Stephen Leppla, entitled
The bifactorial Bacillus anthracis lethal and oedema toxins in the
Comprehensive Sourcebook of Bacterial Protein Toxins (1999), Academic press.
At 10:30 AM 4/9/02 -0700, you wrote:
>There are two toxins: edema toxin (EF + PA) and the lethal
>toxin (LF + PA). They won't have the same LD50, since they're
>not the same chemical. They also don't work the same way.
>
>According to one of our R&D fellows, the following source can be
>used to find toxicity information:
>
> > Elizabeth,
> > you probably can't find exact LD50 numbers of individual
>toxins but there are LD50 data for strains lacking one or two
>toxin proteins. The reason is that EF does not kill animals and
>some animals are insensitive to purified LF toxins. Please take
>a look at the following paper:
>
> > Pezard, et. al. 1991. Contribution of individual toxin
>components to virulence. Infection and Immunity, 59: 3472-3477.
>
> > Unfortunately, I don't have the paper with me. Basically the
>paper tells you that LD50 for Swiss mice is 10(6) [I think he
>means 10^6 - eliz.] when the B. anthracis strain has both PA and
>LF but increases more than 1000 folds to higher than 10(9) when
>LF gene is missing. This results indicates that the virulence
>is mostly due to LF and effect of EF is very minimum. Sorry I
>don't have the paper.
>
>
>I hope this is helpful,
>
>Peace,
>
>Elizabeth
>
>
>
>
>=====
>Elizabeth Smith
>Environmental, Health & Safety Manager
>BioPort Corporation
>3500 N. Martin L. King Blvd.
>Lansing, MI 48906
>
>__________________________________________________
>Do You Yahoo!?
>Yahoo! Tax Center - online filing with TurboTax
>
______________________________________________________________________________
Biological Safety Officer
Environment, Health, Safety
SAIC-Frederick
National Cancer Institute -
Frederick
(301)846-1451 fax: (301)846-6619
email: jkozlovac@mail.
______________________________________________________________________________
--=====================_24507625==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
You may also want to read a chapter authored by Stephen Leppla, entitled The bifactorial Bacillus anthracis lethal and oedema toxins in the Comprehensive Sourcebook of Bacterial Protein Toxins (1999), Academic press.
At 10:30 AM 4/9/02 -0700, you wrote:
There are two toxins: edema toxin (EF + PA) and the lethal
toxin (LF + PA). They won't have the same LD50, since they're
not the same chemical. They also don't work the same way.
According to one of our R&D fellows, the following source can be
used to find toxicity information:
> Elizabeth,
> you probably can't find exact LD50 numbers of individual
toxins but there are LD50 data for strains lacking one or two
toxin proteins. The reason is that EF does not kill animals and
some animals are insensitive to purified LF toxins. Please take
a look at the following paper:
> Pezard, et. al. 1991. Contribution of individual toxin
components to virulence. Infection and Immunity, 59: 3472-3477.
> Unfortunately, I don't have the paper with me. Basically the
paper tells you that LD50 for Swiss mice is 10(6) [I think he
means 10^6 - eliz.] when the B. anthracis strain has both PA and
LF but increases more than 1000 folds to higher than 10(9) when
LF gene is missing. This results indicates that the virulence
is mostly due to LF and effect of EF is very minimum. Sorry I
don't have the paper.
I hope this is helpful,
Peace,
Elizabeth
=====
Elizabeth Smith
Environmental, Health & Safety Manager
BioPort Corporation
3500 N. Martin L. King Blvd.
Lansing, MI 48906
__________________________________________________
Do You Yahoo!?
Yahoo! Tax Center - online filing with TurboTax
______________________________________________________________________________
Biological Safety Officer
Environment, Health, Safety
SAIC-Frederick
National Cancer Institute - Frederick
(301)846-1451 fax: (301)846-6619
email: jkozlovac@mail.
______________________________________________________________________________
--=====================_24507625==_.ALT--
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2002 11:48:24 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Donald Mosier
Subject: Re: Human Tumor Cell Transplants
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Amy,
Although one could in principle design PCR assays for all known human
pathogens, in practice this would be too expensive and time consuming to be
reasonable. Fresh tumors must be transplanted to nude mice immediately
after removal, and BBP restrictions would still apply until results were
available.
Even without concerns about BBP, these experiments should still be
performed under animal BSL-2 because of the proven ability of human and
mouse retroviruses to interact by pseudotyping or recombination.
Donald Mosier
IBC Chair
>Hello all,
>
>I have recently become aware of a proposed research project at my
>institution that will involve transplanting human tumor cells into nude
>mice. I recognize that the tumor cells will be regulated as BBP, as
>they are primary tissue explants.
>
>The researcher has asked if there is a mechanism by which the
>tumors could be proven free of BBP contaminants. I imagine that
>this type of analysis would be extensive (based on the numbers of
>BBP that are potentially present in the tumor), and might be costly.
>
>Has anyone attempted to perform this type of evaluation? Are there
>commercial labs that would be able to certify that a sample is free of
>BBP contaminants?
>
>It also has occurred to me that the tumor cells might still be
>considered BBP based on their inherent nature as human cells even
>if there are no known microbial contaminants.
>
>Any thoughts and suggestions on this matter would be appreciated.
>Best regards,
>
>Amy
>
>
>Amy Quattrocchi
>Health and Safety Specialist
>Laboratory and Biological Safety
>Rutgers Environmental Health and Safety
>24 Street 1603
>Building 4127 Livingston Campus
>Piscataway, NJ 08854
>Phone: 732/445-2550
>Fax: 732/445-3109
_______________________________________________________________________________
Donald E. Mosier, PhD, MD
Professor
Department of Immunology, IMM-7
The Scripps Research Institute
10550 North Torrey Pines Road
La Jolla, CA 92037, USA
858 784-9121 phone
858 784-9190 fax
This email and any files transmitted with it are confidential and
intended solely for the use of the individual or entity to whom they
are addressed. If you have received this email in error please notify
Dr. Mosier by telephone or fax.
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2002 16:39:11 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Morris, Gary"
Subject: Inactivation of Blood
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Can someone advise?
What would be the best compound/disinfectant for inactivating human blood
samples, other than bleach?
We are looking for an alternative to bleach because the samples contain
ammonium chloride.
Thanks,
Gary Morris
Pro-Virus, Inc.
Gaithersburg, MD
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2002 16:40:44 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Robert N. Latsch"
Subject: Re: Aerosols and Microscopes
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Doesn't the vibration of the hood interfere with the images?
Bob
>My solution in the past has been to place the microscope in a standard Class
>II BSC, attach a CCD camera to an output port (or the eye piece) and run the
>video feed from the camera to a TV outside of the BSC. Careful
>disinfecting, avoiding optics and electronics seems reasonable to me.
>
>Jon
>
>P.S. While this costs a little extra, as I researcher, I like it since it
>allows for both still images and video of the work being done.
>
>
>Jonathan Pitts Ph.D.
>MediSpectra Inc.
>45 Hartwell Ave.
>Lexington, MA 02421
>Tel: (781) 372-2300 x354
>Direct Tel. Line: (781) 372-2354
>Fax: (781) 674-0002
>
>
>
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From: Gill Norton [mailto:gmnorton@UWO.CA]
>Sent: Wednesday, April 10, 2002 1:35 PM
>To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
>Subject: Re: Aerosols and Microscopes
>
>
>Hi Everyone,
>
> I have found this to be a difficult issue. It depends on the virus and
>whether sterility is required for the embyos.
>
> For the virus -you will have to get documentation about it's " defective"
>nature from the researcher or literature and possibly other opinions.
>
>If you can verify ( involve your biosafety committee) that the virus is
>indeed
>defective then here are a few possible solutions:
>
>1. Buy a Class II cabinet with a modified front - Baker makes these I
>believe
>so that the microscope eyepieces protrude through the glass/plastic front.
>This
>violates the certification on the cabinet though.
>
>2. Place the microscope in a reverse flow hood - Aerosols will be pulled
>away
>from the researcher. Work will not be sterile.
> Worker could wear respiratory protection as well if required.
>
>3. Place the microscope inside a Class II bsc by opening up the front. Use
>it
>like this. Violates the certification and will not contain all the aerosols.
>Work seems to stay sterile. Worker can wear respiratory protection
>
> The microscope can be decontaminated by wiping with disinfectant. Check to
>see
>that it won't harm the instrument but will kill the virus!
>
> If you can't verify the defective nature of the virus or oit is not known -
>none of the above will work except for the modified bsc.
>
> I would be really interested to get other opinions on this as I have never
>found a really good answer
>
>Gillian
>
>"Ton, Mimi" wrote:
>
>> Dear all,
>>
>> Does anyone have recommendations on how to protect workers from aerosols
>> while working at a microscope? Can a microscope be placed in a BSC? Would
>a
>> local exhaust system work? How to decon the microscope?
>>
>> Example: A researcher is injecting a replication incompetent viral vector
>> into mice embryos under a microscope.
>>
>> Please advise. Thanks so much.
>>
>> Mimi Ton
>>
>> ---------------------------------------------
>> Mimi C. Ton
>> Safety Engineer
>> California Institute of Technology
>> Environment, Health & Safety Office
>> M/C 25-6
>> 1200 E. California Boulevard
>> Pasadena, CA 91125
>> Phone: 626.395.2430
>> Fax: 626.577.6028
>> E-mail: mimi.ton@caltech.edu
>
>--
>------------------------------------------------------------------
>Gillian Norton
>Biosafety Officer
>The University of Western Ontario
>Occupational Health and Safety
>Stevenson Lawson Building, Rm. 60
>Phone: (519)661-2036 Ext. 84747
>FAX: (519)661-3420
>-------------------------------------------------------------------
_____________________________________________________________________
__ / _____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2002 16:42:23 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Robert N. Latsch"
Subject: Re: Human Tumor Cell Transplants
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
The mechanism is simple. Somebody has to certify the tissue to be disease
free. Problem: nobody will do that.
bob
>Hello all,
>
>I have recently become aware of a proposed research project at my
>institution that will involve transplanting human tumor cells into nude
>mice. I recognize that the tumor cells will be regulated as BBP, as
>they are primary tissue explants.
>
>The researcher has asked if there is a mechanism by which the
>tumors could be proven free of BBP contaminants. I imagine that
>this type of analysis would be extensive (based on the numbers of
>BBP that are potentially present in the tumor), and might be costly.
>
>Has anyone attempted to perform this type of evaluation? Are there
>commercial labs that would be able to certify that a sample is free of
>BBP contaminants?
>
>It also has occurred to me that the tumor cells might still be
>considered BBP based on their inherent nature as human cells even
>if there are no known microbial contaminants.
>
>Any thoughts and suggestions on this matter would be appreciated.
>Best regards,
>
>Amy
>
>
>Amy Quattrocchi
>Health and Safety Specialist
>Laboratory and Biological Safety
>Rutgers Environmental Health and Safety
>24 Street 1603
>Building 4127 Livingston Campus
>Piscataway, NJ 08854
>Phone: 732/445-2550
>Fax: 732/445-3109
_____________________________________________________________________
__ / _____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2002 16:01:39 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Burnett, LouAnn Crawford"
Subject: Re: Aerosols and Microscopes
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Mimi and others -
Why do the replication-incompetent viruses need to be in the biosafety
cabinet? Are you protecting the researcher from an organism with a true
aerosol route of transmission or one that must be used at BSL3? Or is
it for sterility?
We have a researcher doing similar work - we mutually agreed that it
couldn't be done in a BSC, so I advised him on the appropriate PPE - as
stated in the BMBL under BSL2 Safety Equipment (page 24, item #2):
"Face protection (goggles, mask, face shield, or other splatter guard)
is used for anticipated splashes or sprays of infectious or other
hazardous materials to the face when the microorganisms must be
manipulated outside the BSC." We also addressed appropriate
housekeeping after the procedure - I can't remember the specific decon
procedure for the microscope but we addressed it. Have I missed
something in my risk assessment?
LouAnn
LouAnn C. Burnett, MS, CBSP =09
Biosafety Program Manager & Biological Safety Officer=09
Vanderbilt University Environmental Health & Safety
Nashville, Tennessee
615/322-0927 (direct & voice mail)
615/343-4951 (fax) =09
-----Original Message-----
From: Ton, Mimi [mailto:Mimi.Ton@CALTECH.EDU]
Sent: Wednesday, April 10, 2002 11:14 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Aerosols and Microscopes
Dear all,
Does anyone have recommendations on how to protect workers from aerosols
while working at a microscope? Can a microscope be placed in a BSC?
Would a local exhaust system work? How to decon the microscope?
Example: A researcher is injecting a replication incompetent viral
vector into mice embryos under a microscope.
Please advise. Thanks so much.
Mimi Ton
---------------------------------------------
Mimi C. Ton
Safety Engineer
California Institute of Technology
Environment, Health & Safety Office
M/C 25-6
1200 E. California Boulevard
Pasadena, CA 91125
Phone: 626.395.2430
Fax: 626.577.6028
E-mail: mimi.ton@caltech.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2002 17:02:31 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Pitts, Jonathan"
Subject: Re: Aerosols and Microscopes
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Some microscopes are unbelievably stable (Zeiss/Leica) and some need some
vibration damping.
Jonathan Pitts Ph.D.
MediSpectra Inc.
45 Hartwell Ave.
Lexington, MA 02421
Tel: (781) 372-2300 x354
Direct Tel. Line: (781) 372-2354
Fax: (781) 674-0002
-----Original Message-----
From: Robert N. Latsch [mailto:rnl2@PO.CWRU.EDU]
Sent: Wednesday, April 10, 2002 4:41 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Aerosols and Microscopes
Doesn't the vibration of the hood interfere with the images?
Bob
>My solution in the past has been to place the microscope in a standard
Class
>II BSC, attach a CCD camera to an output port (or the eye piece) and run
the
>video feed from the camera to a TV outside of the BSC. Careful
>disinfecting, avoiding optics and electronics seems reasonable to me.
>
>Jon
>
>P.S. While this costs a little extra, as I researcher, I like it since it
>allows for both still images and video of the work being done.
>
>
>Jonathan Pitts Ph.D.
>MediSpectra Inc.
>45 Hartwell Ave.
>Lexington, MA 02421
>Tel: (781) 372-2300 x354
>Direct Tel. Line: (781) 372-2354
>Fax: (781) 674-0002
>
>
>
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From: Gill Norton [mailto:gmnorton@UWO.CA]
>Sent: Wednesday, April 10, 2002 1:35 PM
>To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
>Subject: Re: Aerosols and Microscopes
>
>
>Hi Everyone,
>
> I have found this to be a difficult issue. It depends on the virus and
>whether sterility is required for the embyos.
>
> For the virus -you will have to get documentation about it's " defective"
>nature from the researcher or literature and possibly other opinions.
>
>If you can verify ( involve your biosafety committee) that the virus is
>indeed
>defective then here are a few possible solutions:
>
>1. Buy a Class II cabinet with a modified front - Baker makes these I
>believe
>so that the microscope eyepieces protrude through the glass/plastic front.
>This
>violates the certification on the cabinet though.
>
>2. Place the microscope in a reverse flow hood - Aerosols will be pulled
>away
>from the researcher. Work will not be sterile.
> Worker could wear respiratory protection as well if required.
>
>3. Place the microscope inside a Class II bsc by opening up the front. Use
>it
>like this. Violates the certification and will not contain all the
aerosols.
>Work seems to stay sterile. Worker can wear respiratory protection
>
> The microscope can be decontaminated by wiping with disinfectant. Check to
>see
>that it won't harm the instrument but will kill the virus!
>
> If you can't verify the defective nature of the virus or oit is not known
-
>none of the above will work except for the modified bsc.
>
> I would be really interested to get other opinions on this as I have never
>found a really good answer
>
>Gillian
>
>"Ton, Mimi" wrote:
>
>> Dear all,
>>
>> Does anyone have recommendations on how to protect workers from aerosols
>> while working at a microscope? Can a microscope be placed in a BSC? Would
>a
>> local exhaust system work? How to decon the microscope?
>>
>> Example: A researcher is injecting a replication incompetent viral vector
>> into mice embryos under a microscope.
>>
>> Please advise. Thanks so much.
>>
>> Mimi Ton
>>
>> ---------------------------------------------
>> Mimi C. Ton
>> Safety Engineer
>> California Institute of Technology
>> Environment, Health & Safety Office
>> M/C 25-6
>> 1200 E. California Boulevard
>> Pasadena, CA 91125
>> Phone: 626.395.2430
>> Fax: 626.577.6028
>> E-mail: mimi.ton@caltech.edu
>
>--
>------------------------------------------------------------------
>Gillian Norton
>Biosafety Officer
>The University of Western Ontario
>Occupational Health and Safety
>Stevenson Lawson Building, Rm. 60
>Phone: (519)661-2036 Ext. 84747
>FAX: (519)661-3420
>-------------------------------------------------------------------
_____________________________________________________________________
__ /
_____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2002 17:22:28 EDT
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ed Krisiunas
Subject: Re: Inactivation of Blood
MIME-Version: 1.0
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Gary:
What would you do with the blood after you hav completed this inactivation
process?
How are the samples contained?
What are the volumes of blood you are dealing with?
Regards,
Edward Krisiunas, MT(ASCP), CIC, MPH
President
WNWN International
PO Box 1164
Burlington, Connecticut
06013
860-675-1217
860-675-1311(fax)
860-944-2373(mobile)
In a message dated 4/10/2002 4:43:38 PM Eastern Daylight Time,
gmorris@PRO- writes:
>
> Can someone advise?
>
> What would be the best compound/disinfectant for inactivating human blood
> samples, other than bleach?
>
> We are looking for an alternative to bleach because the samples contain
> ammonium chloride.
>
> Thanks,
>
> Gary Morris
> Pro-Virus, Inc.
> Gaithersburg, MD
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Content-Type: text/html; charset="US-ASCII"
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Gary:
What would you do with the blood after you hav completed this inactivation process?
How are the samples contained?
What are the volumes of blood you are dealing with?
Regards,
Edward Krisiunas, MT(ASCP), CIC, MPH
President
WNWN International
PO Box 1164
Burlington, Connecticut
06013
860-675-1217
860-675-1311(fax)
860-944-2373(mobile)
In a message dated 4/10/2002 4:43:38 PM Eastern Daylight Time, gmorris@PRO- writes:
Can someone advise?
What would be the best compound/disinfectant for inactivating human blood
samples, other than bleach?
We are looking for an alternative to bleach because the samples contain
ammonium chloride.
Thanks,
Gary Morris
Pro-Virus, Inc.
Gaithersburg, MD
--part1_6e.1acbda33.29e60714_boundary--
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2002 17:50:20 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: NIH
Subject: Re: Inactivation of Blood
In-Reply-To:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Gary, OSHA documents say that any EPA registered hospital disinfectant with
tuberculocidal properties can be used to inactivate/disinfect blood or blood
products.
John H. Keene, Dr. P.H., CBSP
Biohaztec Associates, Inc.
924 Castle Hollow Road
Midlothian, VA 23114
Phone/Fax (804) 379-9192
E-mail jkeene@
Web Site:
-----Original Message-----
From: A Biosafety Discussion List [mailto:BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU]On
Behalf Of Morris, Gary
Sent: Wednesday, April 10, 2002 4:39 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Inactivation of Blood
Can someone advise?
What would be the best compound/disinfectant for inactivating human blood
samples, other than bleach?
We are looking for an alternative to bleach because the samples contain
ammonium chloride.
Thanks,
Gary Morris
Pro-Virus, Inc.
Gaithersburg, MD
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2002 18:04:10 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: NIH
Subject: Re: Human Tumor Cell Transplants
In-Reply-To:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Amy, Even if you could do pcr's for every known human bloodborne pathogen
and found nothing, you would still not guarantee that you had a pathogen
free material. There are potential pathogens that we know nothing about as
yet. Bottom line is that the researcher has to work at BL-2. I wish that
we could convince these guys that working at BL-2 is not difficult and might
even make their research results come out better since the procedures not
only serve to protect the researcher from possible exposure, but also
protect the work from potential contamination. Try to convince them not to
fight it.
John H. Keene, Dr. P.H., CBSP
Biohaztec Associates, Inc.
924 Castle Hollow Road
Midlothian, VA 23114
Phone/Fax (804) 379-9192
E-mail jkeene@
Web Site:
-----Original Message-----
From: A Biosafety Discussion List [mailto:BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU]On
Behalf Of Amy Quattrocchi
Sent: Wednesday, April 10, 2002 2:30 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Human Tumor Cell Transplants
Hello all,
I have recently become aware of a proposed research project at my
institution that will involve transplanting human tumor cells into nude
mice. I recognize that the tumor cells will be regulated as BBP, as
they are primary tissue explants.
The researcher has asked if there is a mechanism by which the
tumors could be proven free of BBP contaminants. I imagine that
this type of analysis would be extensive (based on the numbers of
BBP that are potentially present in the tumor), and might be costly.
Has anyone attempted to perform this type of evaluation? Are there
commercial labs that would be able to certify that a sample is free of
BBP contaminants?
It also has occurred to me that the tumor cells might still be
considered BBP based on their inherent nature as human cells even
if there are no known microbial contaminants.
Any thoughts and suggestions on this matter would be appreciated.
Best regards,
Amy
Amy Quattrocchi
Health and Safety Specialist
Laboratory and Biological Safety
Rutgers Environmental Health and Safety
24 Street 1603
Building 4127 Livingston Campus
Piscataway, NJ 08854
Phone: 732/445-2550
Fax: 732/445-3109
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2002 16:42:36 -0800
Reply-To: ulsoykwan@cuhk.edu.hk
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: YK Wan
Subject: Re: Aerosols and Microscopes
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Tom
You can search the product of BAKER, NUAIRE, and MICROFLOW. They do have
adapter at the sash for microscope. You should know the model and the wo=
rking
dimension of the microscope before contact them.
Regards,
YK Wan
Safety Officer & NSF Field Certifier
The Chinese University of Hong Kong
"Ton, Mimi" =BCg=A4J=A1G
> Dear all,
>
> Does anyone have recommendations on how to protect workers from aerosol=
s
> while working at a microscope? Can a microscope be placed in a BSC? Wou=
ld a
> local exhaust system work? How to decon the microscope?
>
> Example: A researcher is injecting a replication incompetent viral vect=
or
> into mice embryos under a microscope.
>
> Please advise. Thanks so much.
>
> Mimi Ton
>
> ---------------------------------------------
> Mimi C. Ton
> Safety Engineer
> California Institute of Technology
> Environment, Health & Safety Office
> M/C 25-6
> 1200 E. California Boulevard
> Pasadena, CA 91125
> Phone: 626.395.2430
> Fax: 626.577.6028
> E-mail: mimi.ton@caltech.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2002 16:46:49 -0800
Reply-To: ulsoykwan@cuhk.edu.hk
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: YK Wan
Subject: Re: Aerosols and Microscopes
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Bob
We ask the factory to put heavy marble on the bench. It works.
YK Wan
Safety Officer
The Chinese University of Hong Kong
"Robert N. Latsch" =BCg=A4J=A1G
> Doesn't the vibration of the hood interfere with the images?
>
> Bob
>
> >My solution in the past has been to place the microscope in a standard=
Class
> >II BSC, attach a CCD camera to an output port (or the eye piece) and r=
un the
> >video feed from the camera to a TV outside of the BSC. Careful
> >disinfecting, avoiding optics and electronics seems reasonable to me.
> >
> >Jon
> >
> >P.S. While this costs a little extra, as I researcher, I like it sinc=
e it
> >allows for both still images and video of the work being done.
> >
> >
> >Jonathan Pitts Ph.D.
> >MediSpectra Inc.
> >45 Hartwell Ave.
> >Lexington, MA 02421
> >Tel: (781) 372-2300 x354
> >Direct Tel. Line: (781) 372-2354
> >Fax: (781) 674-0002
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >-----Original Message-----
> >From: Gill Norton [mailto:gmnorton@UWO.CA]
> >Sent: Wednesday, April 10, 2002 1:35 PM
> >To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> >Subject: Re: Aerosols and Microscopes
> >
> >
> >Hi Everyone,
> >
> > I have found this to be a difficult issue. It depends on the virus=
and
> >whether sterility is required for the embyos.
> >
> > For the virus -you will have to get documentation about it's " defect=
ive"
> >nature from the researcher or literature and possibly other opinions.
> >
> >If you can verify ( involve your biosafety committee) that the virus i=
s
> >indeed
> >defective then here are a few possible solutions:
> >
> >1. Buy a Class II cabinet with a modified front - Baker makes these I
> >believe
> >so that the microscope eyepieces protrude through the glass/plastic fr=
ont.
> >This
> >violates the certification on the cabinet though.
> >
> >2. Place the microscope in a reverse flow hood - Aerosols will be pull=
ed
> >away
> >from the researcher. Work will not be sterile.
> > Worker could wear respiratory protection as well if required.
> >
> >3. Place the microscope inside a Class II bsc by opening up the front.=
Use
> >it
> >like this. Violates the certification and will not contain all the aer=
osols.
> >Work seems to stay sterile. Worker can wear respiratory protection
> >
> > The microscope can be decontaminated by wiping with disinfectant. Che=
ck to
> >see
> >that it won't harm the instrument but will kill the virus!
> >
> > If you can't verify the defective nature of the virus or oit is not k=
nown -
> >none of the above will work except for the modified bsc.
> >
> > I would be really interested to get other opinions on this as I have =
never
> >found a really good answer
> >
> >Gillian
> >
> >"Ton, Mimi" wrote:
> >
> >> Dear all,
> >>
> >> Does anyone have recommendations on how to protect workers from aero=
sols
> >> while working at a microscope? Can a microscope be placed in a BSC? =
Would
> >a
> >> local exhaust system work? How to decon the microscope?
> >>
> >> Example: A researcher is injecting a replication incompetent viral v=
ector
> >> into mice embryos under a microscope.
> >>
> >> Please advise. Thanks so much.
> >>
> >> Mimi Ton
> >>
> >> ---------------------------------------------
> >> Mimi C. Ton
> >> Safety Engineer
> >> California Institute of Technology
> >> Environment, Health & Safety Office
> >> M/C 25-6
> >> 1200 E. California Boulevard
> >> Pasadena, CA 91125
> >> Phone: 626.395.2430
> >> Fax: 626.577.6028
> >> E-mail: mimi.ton@caltech.edu
> >
> >--
> >------------------------------------------------------------------
> >Gillian Norton
> >Biosafety Officer
> >The University of Western Ontario
> >Occupational Health and Safety
> >Stevenson Lawson Building, Rm. 60
> >Phone: (519)661-2036 Ext. 84747
> >FAX: (519)661-3420
> >-------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> _____________________________________________________________________
> __ / _____________________AMIGA_LIVES!____________________________=
_______
> _ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
> \ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
> \ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental S=
afety
> \__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@naso.=
org
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2002 17:41:29 -0800
Reply-To: ulsoykwan@cuhk.edu.hk
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: YK Wan
Subject: Re: Aerosols and Microscopes
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
The researcher in my institute tried this option. But they said the embr=
yo is
difficult to be manipulated as the loss of the 3D vision. Thus, they pre=
fer the
use of eyepiece.
YK Wan
Safety Officer
The Chinese University of Hong Kong
"Pitts, Jonathan" =BCg=A4J=A1G
> My solution in the past has been to place the microscope in a standard =
Class
> II BSC, attach a CCD camera to an output port (or the eye piece) and ru=
n the
> video feed from the camera to a TV outside of the BSC. Careful
> disinfecting, avoiding optics and electronics seems reasonable to me.
>
> Jon
>
> P.S. While this costs a little extra, as I researcher, I like it since=
it
> allows for both still images and video of the work being done.
>
> Jonathan Pitts Ph.D.
> MediSpectra Inc.
> 45 Hartwell Ave.
> Lexington, MA 02421
> Tel: (781) 372-2300 x354
> Direct Tel. Line: (781) 372-2354
> Fax: (781) 674-0002
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Gill Norton [mailto:gmnorton@UWO.CA]
> Sent: Wednesday, April 10, 2002 1:35 PM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: Re: Aerosols and Microscopes
>
> Hi Everyone,
>
> I have found this to be a difficult issue. It depends on the virus =
and
> whether sterility is required for the embyos.
>
> For the virus -you will have to get documentation about it's " defecti=
ve"
> nature from the researcher or literature and possibly other opinions.
>
> If you can verify ( involve your biosafety committee) that the virus is
> indeed
> defective then here are a few possible solutions:
>
> 1. Buy a Class II cabinet with a modified front - Baker makes these I
> believe
> so that the microscope eyepieces protrude through the glass/plastic fro=
nt.
> This
> violates the certification on the cabinet though.
>
> 2. Place the microscope in a reverse flow hood - Aerosols will be pulle=
d
> away
> from the researcher. Work will not be sterile.
> Worker could wear respiratory protection as well if required.
>
> 3. Place the microscope inside a Class II bsc by opening up the front. =
Use
> it
> like this. Violates the certification and will not contain all the aero=
sols.
> Work seems to stay sterile. Worker can wear respiratory protection
>
> The microscope can be decontaminated by wiping with disinfectant. Chec=
k to
> see
> that it won't harm the instrument but will kill the virus!
>
> If you can't verify the defective nature of the virus or oit is not kn=
own -
> none of the above will work except for the modified bsc.
>
> I would be really interested to get other opinions on this as I have n=
ever
> found a really good answer
>
> Gillian
>
> "Ton, Mimi" wrote:
>
> > Dear all,
> >
> > Does anyone have recommendations on how to protect workers from aeros=
ols
> > while working at a microscope? Can a microscope be placed in a BSC? W=
ould
> a
> > local exhaust system work? How to decon the microscope?
> >
> > Example: A researcher is injecting a replication incompetent viral ve=
ctor
> > into mice embryos under a microscope.
> >
> > Please advise. Thanks so much.
> >
> > Mimi Ton
> >
> > ---------------------------------------------
> > Mimi C. Ton
> > Safety Engineer
> > California Institute of Technology
> > Environment, Health & Safety Office
> > M/C 25-6
> > 1200 E. California Boulevard
> > Pasadena, CA 91125
> > Phone: 626.395.2430
> > Fax: 626.577.6028
> > E-mail: mimi.ton@caltech.edu
>
> --
> ------------------------------------------------------------------
> Gillian Norton
> Biosafety Officer
> The University of Western Ontario
> Occupational Health and Safety
> Stevenson Lawson Building, Rm. 60
> Phone: (519)661-2036 Ext. 84747
> FAX: (519)661-3420
> -------------------------------------------------------------------
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2002 23:13:25 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Erik A. Talley"
Subject: Re: Inactivation of Blood
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
Did anyone else notice the NAIN site is gone? Apparently they lost funding
and so it is back at EPA now. Here is the link:
I do find it interesting their other antimicrobial information links page
has a link to CDC's "Use of Bleach in Prevention of Transmission of HIV in
Health Care Settings" page stating "In addition to commercially available
chemical germicides, a solution of sodium hypochlorite (household bleach)
prepared daily is an inexpensive and effective germicide."
Erik Talley
At 05:50 PM 4/10/2002 -0400, you wrote:
>Gary, OSHA documents say that any EPA registered hospital disinfectant with
>tuberculocidal properties can be used to inactivate/disinfect blood or blood
>products.
>
>John H. Keene, Dr. P.H., CBSP
>Biohaztec Associates, Inc.
>924 Castle Hollow Road
>Midlothian, VA 23114
>Phone/Fax (804) 379-9192
>E-mail jkeene@
>Web Site:
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From: A Biosafety Discussion List [mailto:BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU]On
>Behalf Of Morris, Gary
>Sent: Wednesday, April 10, 2002 4:39 PM
>To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
>Subject: Inactivation of Blood
>
>
>Can someone advise?
>
>What would be the best compound/disinfectant for inactivating human blood
>samples, other than bleach?
>
>We are looking for an alternative to bleach because the samples contain
>ammonium chloride.
>
>Thanks,
>
>Gary Morris
>Pro-Virus, Inc.
>Gaithersburg, MD
___________________________________
Erik A. Talley, Director
Environmental Health and Safety
Weill Medical College of Cornell University
418 East 71st Street, Suite 62
New York, NY 10021
212-746-6201
ert2002@med.cornell.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 11 Apr 2002 08:24:03 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Richard Fink
Subject: Fwd: FW: Competencies of a bso
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="=====================_170263255==_.ALT"
--=====================_170263255==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
>Dear all
>Could you pls direct me to some information, preferably a web address, where
>i could find the competencies required of a biosafety officer/manager? Also
>is there info out there on how one would determine the competency of such
>officers?
>Your help would be much appreciated - as we have such a small group here in
>Australia, we don't have many guidelines in this area.
>Thanks!
>Denise
>
>Denise Elson
>Health, Safety and Environment Coordinator
>CSIRO Livestock Industries - AAHL
>Private Bag 24
>Geelong Vic 3220
>Tel: 03 5227 5113
>Fax: 03 5227 5555
>Mobile: 0419 561 488
>email: Denise.Elson@csiro.au
--=====================_170263255==_.ALT
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Dear all
Could you pls direct me to some information, preferably a web address, where
i could find the competencies required of a biosafety officer/manager? Also
is there info out there on how one would determine the competency of such
officers?
Your help would be much appreciated - as we have such a small group here in
Australia, we don't have many guidelines in this area.
Thanks!
Denise
Denise Elson
Health, Safety and Environment Coordinator
CSIRO Livestock Industries - AAHL
Private Bag 24
Geelong Vic 3220
Tel: 03 5227 5113
Fax: 03 5227 5555
Mobile: 0419 561 488
email: Denise.Elson@csiro.au
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Date: Thu, 11 Apr 2002 08:27:43 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Allyson Cowels
Organization: Protometrix, Inc.
Subject: Re: FW: Competencies of a bso
In-Reply-To:
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I would like to have some information in that area as well. We only have
about 15 people here! Thank you.
-----Original Message-----
From: A Biosafety Discussion List [mailto:BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU] On
Behalf Of Richard Fink
Sent: Thursday, April 11, 2002 8:24 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Fwd: FW: Competencies of a bso
Dear all
Could you pls direct me to some information, preferably a web address,
where
i could find the competencies required of a biosafety officer/manager?
Also
is there info out there on how one would determine the competency of
such
officers?
Your help would be much appreciated - as we have such a small group here
in
Australia, we don't have many guidelines in this area.
Thanks!
Denise
Denise Elson
Health, Safety and Environment Coordinator
CSIRO Livestock Industries - AAHL
Private Bag 24
Geelong Vic 3220
Tel: 03 5227 5113
Fax: 03 5227 5555
Mobile: 0419 561 488
email: Denise.Elson@csiro.au
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I would like to have some = information in that area as well. We only have about 15 people here! Thank = you.
-----Original = Message-----
From: A Biosafety = Discussion List [mailto:BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU] On = Behalf Of Richard Fink
Sent: Thursday, April 11, = 2002 8:24 AM
To: = BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Fwd: FW: = Competencies of a bso
Dear all
Could you pls direct me to some information, preferably a web address, = where
i could find the competencies required of a biosafety officer/manager? = Also
is there info out there on how one would determine the competency of = such
officers?
Your help would be much appreciated - as we have such a small group here = in
Australia, we don't have many guidelines in this area.
Thanks!
Denise
Denise Elson
Health, Safety and Environment Coordinator
CSIRO Livestock Industries - AAHL
Private Bag 24
Geelong Vic 3220
Tel: 03 5227 5113
Fax: 03 5227 5555
Mobile: 0419 561 488
email: Denise.Elson@csiro.au
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Date: Thu, 11 Apr 2002 09:32:44 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Joseph P. Kozlovac"
Subject: Re: FW: Competencies of a bso
In-Reply-To:
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I believe individuals should look to the American Biological Safety
Association for this information. They have criteria for Registered
Biological Safety Professionals and Certified Biological Safety
Professionals. The core competencies that a Biosafety professional would
need to obtain certification or become registered are listed in documents
found at ABSA web page
At 08:27 AM 4/11/02 -0400, you wrote:
>I would like to have some information in that area as well. We only have
>about 15 people here! Thank you.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From: A Biosafety Discussion List [mailto:BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU] On
>Behalf Of Richard Fink
>Sent: Thursday, April 11, 2002 8:24 AM
>To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
>Subject: Fwd: FW: Competencies of a bso
>
>
>
>
>
>Dear all
>Could you pls direct me to some information, preferably a web address, where
>i could find the competencies required of a biosafety officer/manager? Also
>is there info out there on how one would determine the competency of such
>officers?
>Your help would be much appreciated - as we have such a small group here in
>Australia, we don't have many guidelines in this area.
>Thanks!
>Denise
>
>Denise Elson
>Health, Safety and Environment Coordinator
>CSIRO Livestock Industries - AAHL
>Private Bag 24
>Geelong Vic 3220
>Tel: 03 5227 5113
>Fax: 03 5227 5555
>Mobile: 0419 561 488
>email: Denise.Elson@csiro.au
______________________________________________________________________________
Biological Safety Officer
Environment, Health, Safety
SAIC-Frederick
National Cancer Institute -
Frederick
(301)846-1451 fax: (301)846-6619
email: jkozlovac@mail.
______________________________________________________________________________
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I believe individuals should look to the American Biological Safety Association for this information. They have criteria for Registered Biological Safety Professionals and Certified Biological Safety Professionals. The core competencies that a Biosafety professional would need to obtain certification or become registered are listed in documents found at ABSA web page
At 08:27 AM 4/11/02 -0400, you wrote:
I would like to have some information in that area as well. We only have about 15 people here! Thank you.
-----Original Message-----
From: A Biosafety Discussion List [mailto:BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU] On Behalf Of Richard Fink
Sent: Thursday, April 11, 2002 8:24 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Fwd: FW: Competencies of a bso
Dear all
Could you pls direct me to some information, preferably a web address, where
i could find the competencies required of a biosafety officer/manager? Also
is there info out there on how one would determine the competency of such
officers?
Your help would be much appreciated - as we have such a small group here in
Australia, we don't have many guidelines in this area.
Thanks!
Denise
Denise Elson
Health, Safety and Environment Coordinator
CSIRO Livestock Industries - AAHL
Private Bag 24
Geelong Vic 3220
Tel: 03 5227 5113
Fax: 03 5227 5555
Mobile: 0419 561 488
email: Denise.Elson@csiro.au
______________________________________________________________________________
Biological Safety Officer
Environment, Health, Safety
SAIC-Frederick
National Cancer Institute - Frederick
(301)846-1451 fax: (301)846-6619
email: jkozlovac@mail.
______________________________________________________________________________
--=====================_2645789==_.ALT--
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 11 Apr 2002 09:25:26 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Norman, Randy"
Subject: Re: USA Patriot Act
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
The USAPATRIOT Act (note USAPATRIOT is an acronym) is an interesting item.
It fails to provide for implementing regulations and fails to assign the
responsibility for same to any agency. That leaves folks in an uncomfortable
situation if they use Select Agents.
To deal with this problem, Congress has been working on legislation to
assign the responsibility to the Secretary of HHS to publish an interim
final rule within 180 days of its passage. Perhaps most notably, it would
place the responsibility for background searches on the Attorney General.
Check
The current version of this legislation is H.R.3448. The House and Senate
could not agree on some parts of this rather hodepdge collection of
requirements, so it has been held up awaiting a conference to resolve the
differences since 02/28/2002. Meanwhile select agent facilities are kind of
in limbo, and the rest of us can relax a bit knowing that the current
emphasis is on handling it all through the select agent regs.
You can look at and print out the various versions of HR3448 at
Randy Norman
Safety Specialist, Sr.
BioReliance Corporation
Rockville, MD
rnorman@
"Success is a journey, not a destination" - Ben Sweetland
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 11 Apr 2002 13:54:50 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "OLINGER, PATRICIA L [S&C/0216]"
Subject: Re: Human Tumor Cell Transplants
MIME-Version: 1.0
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A good example to use to explain this to your researchers is that of HCV.
There was not a test available until 1992.
Patty Olinger
Pharmacia
Patricia.L.Olinger@
-----Original Message-----
From: NIH [mailto:keenej@MAIL.]
Sent: Wednesday, April 10, 2002 6:04 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Human Tumor Cell Transplants
Amy, Even if you could do pcr's for every known human bloodborne pathogen
and found nothing, you would still not guarantee that you had a pathogen
free material. There are potential pathogens that we know nothing about as
yet. Bottom line is that the researcher has to work at BL-2. I wish that
we could convince these guys that working at BL-2 is not difficult and might
even make their research results come out better since the procedures not
only serve to protect the researcher from possible exposure, but also
protect the work from potential contamination. Try to convince them not to
fight it.
John H. Keene, Dr. P.H., CBSP
Biohaztec Associates, Inc.
924 Castle Hollow Road
Midlothian, VA 23114
Phone/Fax (804) 379-9192
E-mail jkeene@
Web Site:
-----Original Message-----
From: A Biosafety Discussion List [mailto:BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU]On
Behalf Of Amy Quattrocchi
Sent: Wednesday, April 10, 2002 2:30 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Human Tumor Cell Transplants
Hello all,
I have recently become aware of a proposed research project at my
institution that will involve transplanting human tumor cells into nude
mice. I recognize that the tumor cells will be regulated as BBP, as
they are primary tissue explants.
The researcher has asked if there is a mechanism by which the
tumors could be proven free of BBP contaminants. I imagine that
this type of analysis would be extensive (based on the numbers of
BBP that are potentially present in the tumor), and might be costly.
Has anyone attempted to perform this type of evaluation? Are there
commercial labs that would be able to certify that a sample is free of
BBP contaminants?
It also has occurred to me that the tumor cells might still be
considered BBP based on their inherent nature as human cells even
if there are no known microbial contaminants.
Any thoughts and suggestions on this matter would be appreciated.
Best regards,
Amy
Amy Quattrocchi
Health and Safety Specialist
Laboratory and Biological Safety
Rutgers Environmental Health and Safety
24 Street 1603
Building 4127 Livingston Campus
Piscataway, NJ 08854
Phone: 732/445-2550
Fax: 732/445-3109
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2002 11:31:55 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Sue Quinn
Subject: Waste Management Cheat Sheet
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Hi all-
Does anyone have an electronic cheat sheet for lab waste and what goes =
where? I would like to make up some posters for the labs to help my =
scientists determine what kind of waste they have (non-haz, =
biohaz/medical, chemical) and how they need to handle it (what is a =
sharp and how is it handled, etc.?).
I have all the information, but if someone has already put something =
similar together for their people and would be willing to share it I =
would really appreciate it!
Thanks!
Sue
Suzanne M. Quinn
Manager, Environmental Health and Safety
Exelixis, Inc.
PO Box 511
South San Francisco, CA 94083-0511
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Hi all-
Does anyone have an electronic cheat = sheet for lab waste and what goes where? I would like to make up some posters = for the labs to help my scientists determine what kind of waste they have = (non-haz, biohaz/medical, chemical) and how they need to handle it (what is a = sharp and how is it handled, etc.?).
I have all the information, but if = someone has already put something similar together for their people and would be = willing to share it I would really appreciate it!
Thanks!
Sue
Suzanne M. Quinn
Manager, = Environmental Health and Safety
Exelixis, Inc.
PO Box 511
South San Francisco, = CA 94083-0511
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=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2002 14:39:29 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Meylonie G. Schatz"
Organization: Nebraska Wesleyan University
Subject: Re: Waste Management Cheat Sheet
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Sorry to reply to the whole list but I can't quite figure out how to =
access Sue's e-mail address.
Anyway,
Sue,
Would you please share with me the responses you get. Also, would you =
be willing to share the info you have compiled? I think it would be =
helpful to my folks also.
Thanks,
Meylonie Schatz
Biology and Chemistry stockroom manager
Nebraska Wesleyan University
Lincoln, NE
----- Original Message -----
From: Sue Quinn
To: BIOSAFTY@mitvma.mit.edu
Sent: Friday, April 12, 2002 1:31 PM
Subject: Waste Management Cheat Sheet
Hi all-
Does anyone have an electronic cheat sheet for lab waste and what goes =
where? I would like to make up some posters for the labs to help my =
scientists determine what kind of waste they have (non-haz, =
biohaz/medical, chemical) and how they need to handle it (what is a =
sharp and how is it handled, etc.?).
I have all the information, but if someone has already put something =
similar together for their people and would be willing to share it I =
would really appreciate it!
Thanks!
Sue
Suzanne M. Quinn
Manager, Environmental Health and Safety
Exelixis, Inc.
PO Box 511
South San Francisco, CA 94083-0511
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Sorry to reply to the whole list but I = can't quite figure out how to access Sue's e-mail address.
Anyway,
Sue,
Would you please share with me the = responses you get. Also, would you be willing to share the info you have compiled? I think it would be helpful to my folks = also.
Thanks,
Meylonie Schatz
Biology and Chemistry stockroom manager
Nebraska Wesleyan = University
Lincoln, NE
----- Original Message -----
Sue = Quinn
To: BIOSAFTY@mitvma.mit.edu =
Sent: Friday, April 12, 2002 = 1:31 PM
Subject: Waste Management Cheat = Sheet
Hi all-
Does anyone have an electronic cheat = sheet for lab waste and what goes where? I would like to make up some = posters for the labs to help my scientists determine what kind of waste they have (non-haz, biohaz/medical, chemical) and how they need to handle it = (what is a sharp and how is it handled, etc.?).
I have all the information, but if = someone has already put something similar together for their people and would be = willing to share it I would really appreciate it!
Thanks!
Sue
Suzanne M. Quinn
Manager, = Environmental Health and Safety
Exelixis, Inc.
PO Box 511
South San = Francisco, CA 94083-0511
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=========================================================================
Date: Sat, 13 Apr 2002 08:17:16 EDT
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ed Krisiunas
Subject: Re: Waste Management Cheat Sheet
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Suzanne:
Since you are in California, best to use California regulations as the basis
for your waste management practices. There may be applicable Federal regs.
based upon the waste stream.
I found the following web site from UC Berkley after a quick search of the
Internet (Interesting search engine - . Others may have heard of
it).
Regards,
Edward Krisiunas, MT(ASCP), CIC, MPH
President
WNWN International
PO Box 1164
Burlington, Connecticut
06013
860-675-1217
860-675-1311(fax)
860-944-2373(mobile)
In a message dated 4/12/2002 2:52:41 PM Eastern Daylight Time,
squinn@ writes:
>
> Hi all-
>
> Does anyone have an electronic cheat sheet for lab waste and what goes
> where? I would like to make up some posters for the labs to help my
> scientists determine what kind of waste they have (non-haz, biohaz/medical,
> chemical) and how they need to handle it (what is a sharp and how is it
> handled, etc.?).
>
> I have all the information, but if someone has already put something
> similar together for their people and would be willing to share it I would
> really appreciate it!
>
> Thanks!
> Sue
>
> Suzanne M. Quinn
> Manager, Environmental Health and Safety
> Exelixis, Inc.
> PO Box 511
> South San Francisco, CA 94083-0511
>
Edward Krisiunas, MT(ASCP), CIC, MPH
President
WNWN International
PO Box 1164
Burlington, Connecticut
06013
860-675-1217
860-675-1311(fax)
860-944-2373(mobile)
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Suzanne:
Since you are in California, best to use California regulations as the basis for your waste management practices. There may be applicable Federal regs. based upon the waste stream.
I found the following web site from UC Berkley after a quick search of the Internet (Interesting search engine - . Others may have heard of it).
Regards,
Edward Krisiunas, MT(ASCP), CIC, MPH
President
WNWN International
PO Box 1164
Burlington, Connecticut
06013
860-675-1217
860-675-1311(fax)
860-944-2373(mobile)
In a message dated 4/12/2002 2:52:41 PM Eastern Daylight Time, squinn@ writes:
Hi all-
Does anyone have an electronic cheat sheet for lab waste and what goes where? I would like to make up some posters for the labs to help my scientists determine what kind of waste they have (non-haz, biohaz/medical, chemical) and how they need to handle it (what is a sharp and how is it handled, etc.?).
I have all the information, but if someone has already put something similar together for their people and would be willing to share it I would really appreciate it!
Thanks!
Sue
Suzanne M. Quinn
Manager, Environmental Health and Safety
Exelixis, Inc.
PO Box 511
South San Francisco, CA 94083-0511
Edward Krisiunas, MT(ASCP), CIC, MPH
President
WNWN International
PO Box 1164
Burlington, Connecticut
06013
860-675-1217
860-675-1311(fax)
860-944-2373(mobile)
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=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 15 Apr 2002 08:03:19 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: David Silberman
Subject: Safeguarding Buildings Against Biological (and Chemical) Attacks
Mime-Version: 1.0
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The following web site from the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory
contains useful and practical "Advice for Safeguarding Buildings
Against Chemical or Biological Attack." Take a look at the site and
if you believe it would be helpful, pass it along to those in your
organization who deal with facility planning:
--
David H. Silberman
Director, Health and Safety Programs
Stanford University School of Medicine
Medical School Office Building
Stanford, CA 94305 Mail Code: 5460
650 723-6336 (DIRECT LINE)
650 725-7878 (FAX)
silberman@stanford.edu
--============_-1193239491==_ma============
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
The following web site from the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory contains useful and practical "Advice for Safeguarding Buildings Against Chemical or Biological Attack." Take a look at the site and if you believe it would be helpful, pass it along to those in your organization who deal with facility planning:
--
David H. Silberman
Director, Health and Safety Programs
Stanford University School of Medicine
Medical School Office Building
Stanford, CA 94305 Mail Code: 5460
650 723-6336 (DIRECT LINE)
650 725-7878 (FAX)
silberman@stanford.edu
--============_-1193239491==_ma============--
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 15 Apr 2002 13:45:00 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Greg Merkle
Organization: Wright State University
Subject: Looking for HBV Immunization and Titers Information
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Last June there was a question about the need for future
titers and long term immunization asked of the discussion
group. I have been trying to search the CDC site for a
reference on what the CDC recommendations are for titers
after 7 - 10 years and whether boosters are
recommended/needed if the titer is not detectable (after the
7 - 10 year period) but was detectable after the original
series). Are there references that you can direct me to
that will provide the information?
Also, another question that has passed through the
discussion group more than once, do organizations providing
the HBV vaccinations also provide for serum archiving?
There is nothing stating that archiving is required in the
BBP OSHA Std. to be compliant with the standard.
I greatly appreciate any help that you can provide.
Thanks for your help.
Greg Merkle
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Date: Mon, 15 Apr 2002 14:27:24 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Erik A. Talley"
Subject: Biological Waste Disposal Companies
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
Hello,
I am new to the Northeast and am looking for biological waste disposal
companies that service New York City. So far I know of Stericyle and
Biosystems. If you know of any others that service New York or other parts
of the Northeast, please let me know at ert2002@med.cornell.edu.
Thanks,
Erik
___________________________________
Erik A. Talley, Director
Environmental Health and Safety
Weill Medical College of Cornell University
418 East 71st Street, Suite 62
New York, NY 10021
212-746-6201
ert2002@med.cornell.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 15 Apr 2002 13:00:33 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Sharyn Baker
Subject: Re: Looking for HBV Immunization and Titers Information
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Hello Greg,
As far as I know, there is no current recommendation by the CDC or any other
organization for routine titer checks at any time other than in high risk
situations. By that, I mean where someone is working with known HBV
contaminated blood, or is exposed via a needlestick or otherwise, it might
be reasonable to have a titer check done. In the blood borne pathogens
classes I teach I recommend that anytime someone is stuck with a blood
contaminated needle that they discuss a titer check with their medical
provider. If the titer is not sufficient, a booster is recommended.
Of the literature I have seen, including some relatively recent studies on
titers levels post immunization, there is no suggestion for routine
boosters. In my situation, again, I recommend that if someone knows they are
working with HBV contaminated blood, that they have a check of the titer
post immunization. But how often people really do this is unknown. In our
work environment, I do not believe that any serum banking/archiving is done.
It is not a requirement of the OSHA standard.
Sharyn Baker, M.S., M.A.
Instructor/Computer-Based-Training Design
Master's in Environmental Science And Engineering
University of Colorado Health Sciences Center
Department of Facilities Operations
Mailstop A078
4200 E. 9th Avenue
Denver, Colorado 80262
Email: sharyn.baker@uchsc.edu
Office phone: (303) 315-8003
> ----------
> From: Greg Merkle
> Reply To: A Biosafety Discussion List
> Sent: Monday, April 15, 2002 11:45 AM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: Looking for HBV Immunization and Titers Information
>
>
> Last June there was a question about the need for future
> titers and long term immunization asked of the discussion
> group. I have been trying to search the CDC site for a
> reference on what the CDC recommendations are for titers
> after 7 - 10 years and whether boosters are
> recommended/needed if the titer is not detectable (after the
> 7 - 10 year period) but was detectable after the original
> series). Are there references that you can direct me to
> that will provide the information?
>
> Also, another question that has passed through the
> discussion group more than once, do organizations providing
> the HBV vaccinations also provide for serum archiving?
> There is nothing stating that archiving is required in the
> BBP OSHA Std. to be compliant with the standard.
>
> I greatly appreciate any help that you can provide.
>
> Thanks for your help.
>
> Greg Merkle
>
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 15 Apr 2002 15:45:58 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Debra Hunt
Subject: Re: Looking for HBV Immunization and Titers Information
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="=_mixed 006C93FB85256B9C_="
--=_mixed 006C93FB85256B9C_=
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="=_alternative 006C93FD85256B9C_="
--=_alternative 006C93FD85256B9C_=
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Greg. You may want to review the Updated CDC Guidelines for Management of
Occupational Exposures to HBV, HCV, and HIV....which are found in the June
29, 2001 MMWR, and are also found as an attachment to the November OSHA
Compliance Document. Basically, once the initial titers for employee
response to the HBV vaccine series have been completed, and response or
non-response is documented, there is no need for further titers UNLESS
there is an occupational exposure to an HBV (+) source. The follow-up for
this is included in a nice table in this guideline. Hope this helps.
Debra L. Hunt, DrPH, CBSP
Director, Biological Safety
Assistant Clinical Professor
Duke University / Duke University Health System
Durham, NC 27710
919-684-8822
hunt0009@mc.duke.edu
Greg Merkle
Sent by: A Biosafety Discussion List
04/15/2002 01:45 PM
Please respond to A Biosafety Discussion List
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
cc:
Subject: Looking for HBV Immunization and Titers Information
Last June there was a question about the need for future
titers and long term immunization asked of the discussion
group. I have been trying to search the CDC site for a
reference on what the CDC recommendations are for titers
after 7 - 10 years and whether boosters are
recommended/needed if the titer is not detectable (after the
7 - 10 year period) but was detectable after the original
series). Are there references that you can direct me to
that will provide the information?
Also, another question that has passed through the
discussion group more than once, do organizations providing
the HBV vaccinations also provide for serum archiving?
There is nothing stating that archiving is required in the
BBP OSHA Std. to be compliant with the standard.
I greatly appreciate any help that you can provide.
Thanks for your help.
Greg Merkle
--=_alternative 006C93FD85256B9C_=
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
Greg. You may want to review the Updated CDC Guidelines for Management of Occupational Exposures to HBV, HCV, and HIV....which are found in the June 29, 2001 MMWR, and are also found as an attachment to the November OSHA Compliance Document. Basically, once the initial titers for employee response to the HBV vaccine series have been completed, and response or non-response is documented, there is no need for further titers UNLESS there is an occupational exposure to an HBV (+) source. The follow-up for this is included in a nice table in this guideline. Hope this helps.
Debra L. Hunt, DrPH, CBSP
Director, Biological Safety
Assistant Clinical Professor
Duke University / Duke University Health System
Durham, NC 27710
919-684-8822
hunt0009@mc.duke.edu
Greg Merkle <greg.merkle@WRIGHT.EDU>
Sent by: A Biosafety Discussion List <BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU>
04/15/2002 01:45 PM
Please respond to A Biosafety Discussion List
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
cc:
Subject: Looking for HBV Immunization and Titers Information
Last June there was a question about the need for future
titers and long term immunization asked of the discussion
group. I have been trying to search the CDC site for a
reference on what the CDC recommendations are for titers
after 7 - 10 years and whether boosters are
recommended/needed if the titer is not detectable (after the
7 - 10 year period) but was detectable after the original
series). Are there references that you can direct me to
that will provide the information?
Also, another question that has passed through the
discussion group more than once, do organizations providing
the HBV vaccinations also provide for serum archiving?
There is nothing stating that archiving is required in the
BBP OSHA Std. to be compliant with the standard.
I greatly appreciate any help that you can provide.
Thanks for your help.
Greg Merkle
--=_alternative 006C93FD85256B9C_=--
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Y2FyZA0K
--=_mixed 006C93FB85256B9C_=--
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 15 Apr 2002 19:16:23 EDT
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ed Krisiunas
Subject: Re: Biological Waste Disposal Companies
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="part1_184.6d1285d.29ecb947_boundary"
--part1_184.6d1285d.29ecb947_boundary
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="US-ASCII"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Not many out there at this time.
Envirotech in Syracuse is one - 1-800-448-3851
Regards,
Edward Krisiunas, MT(ASCP), CIC, MPH
President
WNWN International
PO Box 1164
Burlington, Connecticut
06013
860-675-1217
860-675-1311(fax)
860-944-2373(mobile)
In a message dated 4/15/2002 2:28:33 PM Eastern Daylight Time,
ert2002@MED.CORNELL.EDU writes:
> Hello,
>
> I am new to the Northeast and am looking for biological waste disposal
> companies that service New York City. So far I know of Stericyle and
> Biosystems. If you know of any others that service New York or other parts
> of the Northeast, please let me know at ert2002@med.cornell.edu.
>
> Thanks,
>
> Erik
>
--part1_184.6d1285d.29ecb947_boundary
Content-Type: text/html; charset="US-ASCII"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Not many out there at this time.
Envirotech in Syracuse is one - 1-800-448-3851
Regards,
Edward Krisiunas, MT(ASCP), CIC, MPH
President
WNWN International
PO Box 1164
Burlington, Connecticut
06013
860-675-1217
860-675-1311(fax)
860-944-2373(mobile)
In a message dated 4/15/2002 2:28:33 PM Eastern Daylight Time, ert2002@MED.CORNELL.EDU writes:
Hello,
I am new to the Northeast and am looking for biological waste disposal
companies that service New York City. So far I know of Stericyle and
Biosystems. If you know of any others that service New York or other parts
of the Northeast, please let me know at ert2002@med.cornell.edu.
Thanks,
Erik
--part1_184.6d1285d.29ecb947_boundary--
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 16 Apr 2002 09:27:37 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Alan Woodard
Subject: Re: Biological Waste Disposal Companies
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
New York Environmental Services (NYES) is a 96 TPD autoclave located in =
Oneonta; 303-526-9778 and Stericycle, also a 96 TPD autoclave located in =
Dunkirk, NY; 716-366-4444.
Alan G. Woodard, Ph.D.
Supervisor, Regulated Medical Waste Program
New York State
Department of Environmental Conservation
Division of Solid & Hazardous Materials
625 Broadway
Albany, NY 12233-7258
Office:(518)402-8693
Fax:(518)402-8654
E-mail:agwoodar@gw.dec.state.ny.us
>>> Ed Krisiunas 04/15/02 07:16PM >>>
Not many out there at this time.
Envirotech in Syracuse is one - 1-800-448-3851
Regards,
Edward Krisiunas, MT(ASCP), CIC, MPH
President
WNWN International
PO Box 1164
Burlington, Connecticut
06013
860-675-1217
860-675-1311(fax)
860-944-2373(mobile)
In a message dated 4/15/2002 2:28:33 PM Eastern Daylight Time,
ert2002@MED.CORNELL.EDU writes:
> Hello,
>
> I am new to the Northeast and am looking for biological waste disposal
> companies that service New York City. So far I know of Stericyle and
> Biosystems. If you know of any others that service New York or other =
parts
> of the Northeast, please let me know at ert2002@med.cornell.edu.
>
> Thanks,
>
> Erik
>
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 16 Apr 2002 08:33:41 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Francis Cole
Subject: Re: Looking for HBV Immunization and Titers Information
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Debra, Is this issue of MMWR available on-line?
Frank Cole
BSO
fcole@
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 16 Apr 2002 09:45:29 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Debra Hunt
Subject: Re: Looking for HBV Immunization and Titers Information
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="=_alternative 004B931385256B9D_="
This is a multipart message in MIME format.
--=_alternative 004B931385256B9D_=
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Yes, you can find the CDC MMWRs as a link on their home website
(). When you get to the link, you can either put in the date
(June 29, 2001) or search by subject. You can also pull it up under the
OSHA website when you search for the November OSHA Compliance Directive.
It is found as an attechment at the very end.
Hope this helps.
Debra L. Hunt, DrPH, CBSP
Director, Biological Safety
Assistant Clinical Professor
Duke University / Duke University Health System
Durham, NC 27710
919-684-8822
hunt0009@mc.duke.edu
Francis Cole
Sent by: A Biosafety Discussion List
04/16/2002 09:33 AM
Please respond to A Biosafety Discussion List
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
cc:
Subject: Re: Looking for HBV Immunization and Titers Information
Debra, Is this issue of MMWR available on-line?
Frank Cole
BSO
fcole@
--=_alternative 004B931385256B9D_=
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
Yes, you can find the CDC MMWRs as a link on their home website (). When you get to the link, you can either put in the date (June 29, 2001) or search by subject. You can also pull it up under the OSHA website when you search for the November OSHA Compliance Directive. It is found as an attechment at the very end.
Hope this helps.
Debra L. Hunt, DrPH, CBSP
Director, Biological Safety
Assistant Clinical Professor
Duke University / Duke University Health System
Durham, NC 27710
919-684-8822
hunt0009@mc.duke.edu
Francis Cole <Fcole@>
Sent by: A Biosafety Discussion List <BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU>
04/16/2002 09:33 AM
Please respond to A Biosafety Discussion List
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
cc:
Subject: Re: Looking for HBV Immunization and Titers Information
Debra, Is this issue of MMWR available on-line?
Frank Cole
BSO
fcole@
--=_alternative 004B931385256B9D_=--
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 16 Apr 2002 10:23:14 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Kim Auletta
Subject: Safety Fair request
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Our dept has decided to hava a Natl Safety Month Fair on 6/24. They'd like
us to come up with some "interactive" activity for the lab folks that will
be stopping by. I'll be setting up a biosafety table w/ handouts, photos,
etc., but would like to come up with a theme activity (think ring-toss/
carnival game). Have any of you ever done anything like this? If so, I'd
appreciate any ideas. Thanks.
Kim Auletta
Lab Safety Specialist
Environmental Health and Safety
SUNY Stony Brook
110 Suffolk Hall
Stony Brook, NY 11794-6200
PHONE: 631-632-9672
FAX: 631-632-9683
E-MAIL: kauletta@.sunysb.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 16 Apr 2002 10:30:56 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Bernholc, Nicole M"
Subject: Re: Safety Fair request
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Gloves. Blow up different types of gloves. USe them as balloons.
Try the gloves with different solvents.
You can also do an ergo setup
-----Original Message-----
From: Kim Auletta [mailto:kauletta@.SUNYSB.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, April 16, 2002 10:23 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Safety Fair request
Our dept has decided to hava a Natl Safety Month Fair on 6/24. They'd like
us to come up with some "interactive" activity for the lab folks that will
be stopping by. I'll be setting up a biosafety table w/ handouts, photos,
etc., but would like to come up with a theme activity (think ring-toss/
carnival game). Have any of you ever done anything like this? If so, I'd
appreciate any ideas. Thanks.
Kim Auletta
Lab Safety Specialist
Environmental Health and Safety
SUNY Stony Brook
110 Suffolk Hall
Stony Brook, NY 11794-6200
PHONE: 631-632-9672
FAX: 631-632-9683
E-MAIL: kauletta@.sunysb.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 16 Apr 2002 11:03:50 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Jairo Betancourt
Subject: Re: Safety Fair request
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
Content-transfer-encoding: 7bit
Kim: One of my favorite tricks when training people on biological safety is
the degloving technique. I think this technique is a common cause of
contamination because people does not do it right.
So I get a good size ketchup container (the brand is up to you), and...
1. Ask people to put on gloves (of course you carry all sizes) and
2. then squirt a fairly good amount of the red stuff on their hands.
3. ask then to rub their gloved hands, and
4. finally ask them to take the gloves off the way they normally do it.
Conclusion:
1. Since they have messy, visible stuff like ketchup, they will be as
careful as possible
2. Some will really do it the usual way they do it in a lab (sling shot
style) and sprinkle red stuff all over.
3. teach them the proper way and finally
4. Give them a lollipop or a chocolate mini-bar as a reward for
participation.
Thank you
Jairo
----- Original Message -----
From: "Kim Auletta"
To:
Sent: Tuesday, April 16, 2002 10:23 AM
Subject: Safety Fair request
> Our dept has decided to hava a Natl Safety Month Fair on 6/24. They'd like
> us to come up with some "interactive" activity for the lab folks that will
> be stopping by. I'll be setting up a biosafety table w/ handouts, photos,
> etc., but would like to come up with a theme activity (think ring-toss/
> carnival game). Have any of you ever done anything like this? If so, I'd
> appreciate any ideas. Thanks.
>
> Kim Auletta
> Lab Safety Specialist
> Environmental Health and Safety
> SUNY Stony Brook
> 110 Suffolk Hall
> Stony Brook, NY 11794-6200
> PHONE: 631-632-9672
> FAX: 631-632-9683
> E-MAIL: kauletta@.sunysb.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 16 Apr 2002 08:26:51 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Jay Herzmark
Subject: Re: Safety Fair request
In-Reply-To:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII
How much ketchup do they get on you?
On Tue, 16 Apr 2002, Jairo Betancourt wrote:
> Kim: One of my favorite tricks when training people on biological safety is
> the degloving technique. I think this technique is a common cause of
> contamination because people does not do it right.
>
> So I get a good size ketchup container (the brand is up to you), and...
> 1. Ask people to put on gloves (of course you carry all sizes) and
> 2. then squirt a fairly good amount of the red stuff on their hands.
> 3. ask then to rub their gloved hands, and
> 4. finally ask them to take the gloves off the way they normally do it.
>
> Conclusion:
>
> 1. Since they have messy, visible stuff like ketchup, they will be as
> careful as possible
> 2. Some will really do it the usual way they do it in a lab (sling shot
> style) and sprinkle red stuff all over.
> 3. teach them the proper way and finally
> 4. Give them a lollipop or a chocolate mini-bar as a reward for
> participation.
>
> Thank you
>
> Jairo
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "Kim Auletta"
> To:
> Sent: Tuesday, April 16, 2002 10:23 AM
> Subject: Safety Fair request
>
>
> > Our dept has decided to hava a Natl Safety Month Fair on 6/24. They'd like
> > us to come up with some "interactive" activity for the lab folks that will
> > be stopping by. I'll be setting up a biosafety table w/ handouts, photos,
> > etc., but would like to come up with a theme activity (think ring-toss/
> > carnival game). Have any of you ever done anything like this? If so, I'd
> > appreciate any ideas. Thanks.
> >
> > Kim Auletta
> > Lab Safety Specialist
> > Environmental Health and Safety
> > SUNY Stony Brook
> > 110 Suffolk Hall
> > Stony Brook, NY 11794-6200
> > PHONE: 631-632-9672
> > FAX: 631-632-9683
> > E-MAIL: kauletta@.sunysb.edu
>
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 16 Apr 2002 11:30:34 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: June Angle
Subject: Re: Safety Fair Request
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Several years ago at the annual ABSA meeting in St. Louis (1999?),
someone had a biosafety "Jeopardy" game used for training. It was a lot
of fun. Does anyone know where to obtain this?
June-Marie Angle
Principal Research Associate
Pharmacology Group
Gliatech Inc.
23420 Commerce Park Road
Beachwood, OH 44122
phone:(216)831-3200
fax:(216)831-4907
anglej@
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 16 Apr 2002 11:45:08 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Jairo Betancourt
Subject: Re: Safety Fair request
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
Content-transfer-encoding: 7bit
It depends on how poor your degloving technique is. It serves as a reminder
that deglovingould be a serious contamination source.
Thaks
Jairo
----- Original Message -----
From: "Jay Herzmark"
To:
Sent: Tuesday, April 16, 2002 11:26 AM
Subject: Re: Safety Fair request
> How much ketchup do they get on you?
>
> On Tue, 16 Apr 2002, Jairo Betancourt wrote:
>
> > Kim: One of my favorite tricks when training people on biological safety
is
> > the degloving technique. I think this technique is a common cause of
> > contamination because people does not do it right.
> >
> > So I get a good size ketchup container (the brand is up to you), and...
> > 1. Ask people to put on gloves (of course you carry all sizes) and
> > 2. then squirt a fairly good amount of the red stuff on their hands.
> > 3. ask then to rub their gloved hands, and
> > 4. finally ask them to take the gloves off the way they normally do it.
> >
> > Conclusion:
> >
> > 1. Since they have messy, visible stuff like ketchup, they will be as
> > careful as possible
> > 2. Some will really do it the usual way they do it in a lab (sling shot
> > style) and sprinkle red stuff all over.
> > 3. teach them the proper way and finally
> > 4. Give them a lollipop or a chocolate mini-bar as a reward for
> > participation.
> >
> > Thank you
> >
> > Jairo
> > ----- Original Message -----
> > From: "Kim Auletta"
> > To:
> > Sent: Tuesday, April 16, 2002 10:23 AM
> > Subject: Safety Fair request
> >
> >
> > > Our dept has decided to hava a Natl Safety Month Fair on 6/24. They'd
like
> > > us to come up with some "interactive" activity for the lab folks that
will
> > > be stopping by. I'll be setting up a biosafety table w/ handouts,
photos,
> > > etc., but would like to come up with a theme activity (think
ring-toss/
> > > carnival game). Have any of you ever done anything like this? If so,
I'd
> > > appreciate any ideas. Thanks.
> > >
> > > Kim Auletta
> > > Lab Safety Specialist
> > > Environmental Health and Safety
> > > SUNY Stony Brook
> > > 110 Suffolk Hall
> > > Stony Brook, NY 11794-6200
> > > PHONE: 631-632-9672
> > > FAX: 631-632-9683
> > > E-MAIL: kauletta@.sunysb.edu
> >
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 16 Apr 2002 11:45:52 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Jairo Betancourt
Subject: Re: Safety Fair Request
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
Content-transfer-encoding: 7bit
Chris Thompson from Lilly had that organnized. Contact her for imput.
Jairo
----- Original Message -----
From: "June Angle"
To:
Sent: Tuesday, April 16, 2002 11:30 AM
Subject: Re: Safety Fair Request
Several years ago at the annual ABSA meeting in St. Louis (1999?),
someone had a biosafety "Jeopardy" game used for training. It was a lot
of fun. Does anyone know where to obtain this?
June-Marie Angle
Principal Research Associate
Pharmacology Group
Gliatech Inc.
23420 Commerce Park Road
Beachwood, OH 44122
phone:(216)831-3200
fax:(216)831-4907
anglej@
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 16 Apr 2002 10:49:35 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Christina Thompson
Subject: Re: Safety Fair Request
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: multipart/alternative; boundary="=_alternative 0056F19E05256B9D_="
This is a multipart message in MIME format.
--=_alternative 0056F19E05256B9D_=
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
That would be me. And the vendor is Learning Ware. Here is their web
site:
Chris Thompson
Biosafety Officer
Eli Lilly and Company
June Angle
Sent by: A Biosafety Discussion List
04/16/02 10:30 AM
Please respond to A Biosafety Discussion List
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
cc:
Subject: Re: Safety Fair Request
Several years ago at the annual ABSA meeting in St. Louis (1999?),
someone had a biosafety "Jeopardy" game used for training. It was a lot
of fun. Does anyone know where to obtain this?
June-Marie Angle
Principal Research Associate
Pharmacology Group
Gliatech Inc.
23420 Commerce Park Road
Beachwood, OH 44122
phone:(216)831-3200
fax:(216)831-4907
anglej@
--=_alternative 0056F19E05256B9D_=
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
That would be me. And the vendor is Learning Ware. Here is their web site:
Chris Thompson
Biosafety Officer
Eli Lilly and Company
June Angle <anglej@>
Sent by: A Biosafety Discussion List <BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU>
04/16/02 10:30 AM
Please respond to A Biosafety Discussion List
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
cc:
Subject: Re: Safety Fair Request
Several years ago at the annual ABSA meeting in St. Louis (1999?),
someone had a biosafety "Jeopardy" game used for training. It was a lot
of fun. Does anyone know where to obtain this?
June-Marie Angle
Principal Research Associate
Pharmacology Group
Gliatech Inc.
23420 Commerce Park Road
Beachwood, OH 44122
phone:(216)831-3200
fax:(216)831-4907
anglej@
--=_alternative 0056F19E05256B9D_=--
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 16 Apr 2002 10:41:57 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Kyle Boyett
Subject: Re: Safety Fair Request
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
June, You can try Mark Grushka at the University of Arizona. He is the
developer of this program. I agree this is a very informative way to conduct
training. His contact information is:
Mark J. Grushka, M.S., CSP
Biosafety Officer
University of Arizona
520-621-5279
mgrushka@u.arizona.edu
Hope this helps.
Kyle G. Boyett
Asst. Director of Biosafety
Safety Short Distribution List Administrator
University of Alabama @ Birmingham
Department of Occupational Health and Safety
933 South 19th Street Suite 445
Birmingham, Alabama 35294
Phone: 205.934.9181
Fax: 205.934.7487
Visit our WEB site at: healthsafe.uab.edu
Asking me to overlook a safety violation is like asking me to reduce the
value I place on YOUR life
-----Original Message-----
From: June Angle [mailto:anglej@]
Sent: Tuesday, April 16, 2002 9:31 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Safety Fair Request
Several years ago at the annual ABSA meeting in St. Louis (1999?),
someone had a biosafety "Jeopardy" game used for training. It was a lot
of fun. Does anyone know where to obtain this?
June-Marie Angle
Principal Research Associate
Pharmacology Group
Gliatech Inc.
23420 Commerce Park Road
Beachwood, OH 44122
phone:(216)831-3200
fax:(216)831-4907
anglej@
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 16 Apr 2002 09:37:53 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Mark Grushka
Subject: Re: Safety Fair Request
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
I use software from Leaningware Inc. to conduct training sessions using
gameshow formats, including Jeopardy. Their website is .
I did a demonstration of the technique during the Poster Session at last
fall's ABSA Conference in New Orleans. If anyone would like a copy of the
paper I did on the subject, just email me.
Regards,
Mark J. Grushka, M.S., CSP
Biosafety Officer
University of Arizona
520-621-5279
mgrushka@u.arizona.edu
----- Original Message -----
From: "June Angle"
To:
Sent: Tuesday, April 16, 2002 8:30 AM
Subject: Re: Safety Fair Request
Several years ago at the annual ABSA meeting in St. Louis (1999?),
someone had a biosafety "Jeopardy" game used for training. It was a lot
of fun. Does anyone know where to obtain this?
June-Marie Angle
Principal Research Associate
Pharmacology Group
Gliatech Inc.
23420 Commerce Park Road
Beachwood, OH 44122
phone:(216)831-3200
fax:(216)831-4907
anglej@
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 16 Apr 2002 13:15:25 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Kim Auletta
Subject:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
I tried this demo today & was very impressed. Its much better than my
powerpoint jeopardy! ;)
I contacted the company to purchase the game & they're offering some great
incentives to purchase. Universities get a 10% discount, and the rep was
willing to add some of the safety games & additional new game free w/ the
original software! The contact is Carrie at 800-457-5661, ext. 14.
Kim Auletta
Lab Safety Specialist
Environmental Health and Safety
SUNY Stony Brook
110 Suffolk Hall
Stony Brook, NY 11794-6200
PHONE: 631-632-9672
FAX: 631-632-9683
E-MAIL: kauletta@.sunysb.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 16 Apr 2002 14:10:30 -0500
Reply-To: speaker@ehs.psu.edu
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Curt Speaker
Organization: UNIVERSITY SAFETY
Subject: still recapping !?!
A question for the group (especially those with agricultural animals):
I am running into a lot of resistance from Vets. and other animal
husbandry personnel about recapping of needles used for drawing
blood, giving immunizations, etc. on animals. These are normal
herd animals, not infected with any biohazard, have been tested for
the obvious pathogens, etc.
The Vets are saying to me "Bloodborne pathogen standards don't
apply to animals. I've been doing it for years and never had a
problem." I point out to them (and others) that preventing ALL
needlstick injuries is in everyone's best interest, but so far my
demands have fallen on deaf ears.
The National Research Council's "Occupational Health and Safety in
the Care and Use of Research Animals" even goes as far as to state
that we should consider "practices that reduce percutaneous
exposures", and recapping certainly goes against that.
But with the veterinarians (both employees and contract vets)
continueing to recap needles, the employees at our farms feel that
the practice is still okay.
I am speaking to our IACUC about this on Monday (along with some
other PPE issues that I won't go into now). I am curious to see if
anyone else has run into/is running into the same problem that I am,
and how you dealt with it.
Thanks in advance for any advice anyone can provide.
Curt
Curt Speaker
Biosafety Officer
Penn State University
Environmental Health and Safety
speaker@ehs.psu.edu
^...^
(O_O)
=(Y)=
"""
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 16 Apr 2002 11:39:35 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: LUKENS Carl B
Subject: Re: still recapping !?!
Curt
The only think i can think of off hand is using safer medical devices when
using needles for work with monkeys, since they can be carriers of HIV, HBV,
or even things like Ebola. How prevalent this is I do not know, but i would
want to protect myself from needlesticks with monkeys at least.
Other than that, there may be other animals who might be infected with animal
blood borne pathogens that are transmissible to humans. Others can speak to
that.
Vets i have worked with seem to know about zoonotic diseases, which pose risks
to them, and how to handle with PPE or work practices, but i have never seen
any use safer needles except with monkeys.
Carl Lukens
CIH/MSPH
Oregon OSHA consultation
>>> SPEAKER@SAFETY-1.SAFETY.PSU.EDU 04/16/02 11:22AM >>>
A question for the group (especially those with agricultural animals):
I am running into a lot of resistance from Vets. and other animal
husbandry personnel about recapping of needles used for drawing
blood, giving immunizations, etc. on animals. These are normal
herd animals, not infected with any biohazard, have been tested for
the obvious pathogens, etc.
The Vets are saying to me "Bloodborne pathogen standards don't
apply to animals. I've been doing it for years and never had a
problem." I point out to them (and others) that preventing ALL
needlstick injuries is in everyone's best interest, but so far my
demands have fallen on deaf ears.
The National Research Council's "Occupational Health and Safety in
the Care and Use of Research Animals" even goes as far as to state
that we should consider "practices that reduce percutaneous
exposures", and recapping certainly goes against that.
But with the veterinarians (both employees and contract vets)
continueing to recap needles, the employees at our farms feel that
the practice is still okay.
I am speaking to our IACUC about this on Monday (along with some
other PPE issues that I won't go into now). I am curious to see if
anyone else has run into/is running into the same problem that I am,
and how you dealt with it.
Thanks in advance for any advice anyone can provide.
Curt
Curt Speaker
Biosafety Officer
Penn State University
Environmental Health and Safety
speaker@ehs.psu.edu
^...^
(O_O)
=(Y)=
"""
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 16 Apr 2002 13:45:52 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Kyle Boyett
Subject: Re: still recapping !?!
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
I have a question for the group relating to this topic. Unless you are
separating needles from syringes (obviously NOT recommended), which takes
more effort: recapping the needle prior to disposal in a sharps container or
not recapping the needle prior to disposal into a sharps container?
Obviously this is a rhetorical question and does not take into account
potential exposures. I suppose my question basically boils down to the
question of why would anyone want to recap? Just a thought.
Kyle G. Boyett
Asst. Director of Biosafety
Safety Short Distribution List Administrator
University of Alabama @ Birmingham
Department of Occupational Health and Safety
933 South 19th Street Suite 445
Birmingham, Alabama 35294
Phone: 205.934.9181
Fax: 205.934.7487
Visit our WEB site at: healthsafe.uab.edu
Asking me to overlook a safety violation is like asking me to reduce the
value I place on YOUR life
-----Original Message-----
From: Curt Speaker [mailto:SPEAKER@SAFETY-1.SAFETY.PSU.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, April 16, 2002 1:11 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: still recapping !?!
A question for the group (especially those with agricultural animals):
I am running into a lot of resistance from Vets. and other animal
husbandry personnel about recapping of needles used for drawing
blood, giving immunizations, etc. on animals. These are normal
herd animals, not infected with any biohazard, have been tested for
the obvious pathogens, etc.
The Vets are saying to me "Bloodborne pathogen standards don't
apply to animals. I've been doing it for years and never had a
problem." I point out to them (and others) that preventing ALL
needlstick injuries is in everyone's best interest, but so far my
demands have fallen on deaf ears.
The National Research Council's "Occupational Health and Safety in
the Care and Use of Research Animals" even goes as far as to state
that we should consider "practices that reduce percutaneous
exposures", and recapping certainly goes against that.
But with the veterinarians (both employees and contract vets)
continueing to recap needles, the employees at our farms feel that
the practice is still okay.
I am speaking to our IACUC about this on Monday (along with some
other PPE issues that I won't go into now). I am curious to see if
anyone else has run into/is running into the same problem that I am,
and how you dealt with it.
Thanks in advance for any advice anyone can provide.
Curt
Curt Speaker
Biosafety Officer
Penn State University
Environmental Health and Safety
speaker@ehs.psu.edu
^...^
(O_O)
=(Y)=
"""
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 16 Apr 2002 15:23:23 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Paul Zel
Subject: Re: Safety Fair request
In-Reply-To:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Kim: We have participated for the past three years in our Center's
Employee Health Fair. For the first year, we made a modest sized
target cut out of posterboard. Concentric circles were made on the
target with velcro. Small plastic balls were also covered with
matching velcro. Each visitor to our table would get an opportunity
to throw a ball at the target and win some safety-themed prizes.
During the second year, we made a felt-lined 'craps' table with two
very large dice. The resulting number from a throw of the dice would
be matched to a prize board. Last year, we decided to challenge staff
knowledge in order to win a prize. We 'borrowed' a design and built a
pendulum device that was activated by the visitor. It would swing and
randomly connect to one of 6 magnets on a platform below. Each magnet
was labeled with a safety topic. Then a spinner was activated to
determine the level of question difficulty (1 = easy, 2 = moderate, 3
= difficult). The prizes matched the difficulty level. We have given
away ear plugs, designer safety glasses, pins, pencils, small
flashlights, calculators, keychains, zipper thermometers, and water
bottles. Last year, we budgeted for a large safety banner to hang
above our table. We are currently designing this year's table.
Please let me know if you would like further details. We've saved
everything and can send you photos.
Paul Zel
Director, Environmental Health & Safety
Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center
New York, N.Y.
(212) 639-7849
zelp@
______________________________ Reply Separator _________________________________
Subject: Safety Fair request
Author: kauletta (kauletta@.SUNYSB.EDU) at Internet
Date: 4/16/02 10:23 AM
Our dept has decided to hava a Natl Safety Month Fair on 6/24. They'd like
us to come up with some "interactive" activity for the lab folks that will
be stopping by. I'll be setting up a biosafety table w/ handouts, photos,
etc., but would like to come up with a theme activity (think ring-toss/
carnival game). Have any of you ever done anything like this? If so, I'd
appreciate any ideas. Thanks.
Kim Auletta
Lab Safety Specialist
Environmental Health and Safety
SUNY Stony Brook
110 Suffolk Hall
Stony Brook, NY 11794-6200
PHONE: 631-632-9672
FAX: 631-632-9683
E-MAIL: kauletta@.sunysb.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 16 Apr 2002 17:17:17 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Giles, Carol A."
Subject: Re: still recapping !?!
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
There are times when uncapped needles on the equipment (minor surgical)
trays is more problematic than capped needles. There are ways to cap
needles using one hand, which I prefer. Some procedures require several
needles and syringes, and there is often only one needle disposal box in a
patient's room. This leaves plenty of time and cramped space in which to
accidentally stick oneself on a used needle in the kit during the procedure.
I used to assist in bone marrow aspirates and biopsies, had to stick
patients for blood myself, have friends and co-workers and myself who have
been stuck (mine were on a small lancet left on the tray when I was new at
infant heelsticks and on a scalpel during an unfortunate autoclave run when
in safety) and have had to investigate needlestick injuries, so I am
familiar with how people can get stuck.
Recapping using both hands is a very bad idea. Too often people miss the
sheath or have broken through the sheath with the needle. One handed is
better since one slides the needle into the sheath, then one can finish
tightening the cap. Or there used to be recapping instruments one could
place on their tray or on the patients table and recap using that rather
than the hand. Then, as soon as possible, the needle should be disposed of
properly.
Walking with needles uncapped, finding uncapped needles stuck in bedding, on
patient food trays, etc. are all risky. Even capped needles can be handled
improperly--some staff had put sheathed needles in their pockets which then
became unsheathed.
While this may not help you with the veterinarians, I think you could teach
them to use a safer technique. Recapping has been made to be a pariah, but
it has been done very poorly. There are many ways to do it. There are
negatives with not re-sheathing, too.
While the BBP may not apply, if there are zoonoses they can be accidentally
inoculated with by a used animal needle, they would do well to prevent these
needlesticks.
Carol A. Giles, MPH, CIH, (and MT(ASCP))
Industrial Hygienist/Safety Specialist
Argonne National Laboratory
Argonne, IL 60439
email: cgiles@
(630) 252-3427
-----Original Message-----
From: Kyle Boyett [mailto:KBoyett@HEALTHSAFE.UAB.EDU]
Sent: April 16, 2002 1:46 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: still recapping !?!
I have a question for the group relating to this topic. Unless you are
separating needles from syringes (obviously NOT recommended), which takes
more effort: recapping the needle prior to disposal in a sharps container or
not recapping the needle prior to disposal into a sharps container?
Obviously this is a rhetorical question and does not take into account
potential exposures. I suppose my question basically boils down to the
question of why would anyone want to recap? Just a thought.
Kyle G. Boyett
Asst. Director of Biosafety
Safety Short Distribution List Administrator
University of Alabama @ Birmingham
Department of Occupational Health and Safety
-----Original Message-----
From: Curt Speaker [mailto:SPEAKER@SAFETY-1.SAFETY.PSU.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, April 16, 2002 1:11 PM
I am running into a lot of resistance from Vets. and other animal
husbandry personnel about recapping of needles used for drawing
blood, giving immunizations, etc. on animals.
...
The Vets are saying to me "Bloodborne pathogen standards don't
apply to animals. ...
But with the veterinarians (both employees and contract vets)
continueing to recap needles, the employees at our farms feel that
the practice is still okay.
I am speaking to our IACUC about this on Monday (along with some
other PPE issues that I won't go into now). I am curious to see if
anyone else has run into/is running into the same problem that I am,
and how you dealt with it.
Thanks in advance for any advice anyone can provide.
Curt
Curt Speaker
Biosafety Officer
Penn State University
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2002 08:30:10 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Larry Mendoza
Organization: VCU-OEHS-Biological/Chemical Safety Section
Subject: Aspergillus flavus
MIME-Version: 1.0
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Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Good morning,
There is aPI who is proposing work with A. flavus. In his proposal, he is
stating that he will be working under BSL-1. The canadian MSDS site says that
this fungus should be worked under BSL-2, but the BMBL does not mention anything
about this fungus. What is the norm and is there any information that could
support BSL-2 work (besides the Canadian website). Thanks.
Larry Mendoza
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n:Mendoza;Laurence
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org:VIRGINIA COMMONWEALTH UNIVERSITY;OEHS/CHEMICAL-BIOLOGICAL SAFETY
version:2.1
email;internet:lgmendoz@HSC.VCU.EDU
title:Biosafety Inspector
adr;quoted-printable:;;1101 East Marshall St.=0APO Box 980112;RICHMOND;VA;23298;USA
fn:Laurence Mendoza
end:vcard
--------------EE35D12F847D81CDA2BB0C8B--
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2002 08:51:57 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Robert N. Latsch"
Subject: Re: still recapping !?!
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Obviously you have a group that feels that this rule does not apply to them.
I would suggest the following, see if you can research a needle recapping
violation involving vets. Try the OSHA web site. It is very hard to find,
but there is a search engine that will allow one to view violations from
employers.
Post the stock fine schedule for this violation and show the calculation
for the fine. Ask who wants to pay. If I remember the fine correctly, it
is $750.00 per recapped needle x the number of people x the numbmer of days
the container is there.
What do the bosses say? Don't forget they are the ones behind the eight
ball. OSHA views problems like this as supervisory failures and frequently
acts from that viewpoint.
hope this helps,
Bob
>I have a question for the group relating to this topic. Unless you are
>separating needles from syringes (obviously NOT recommended), which takes
>more effort: recapping the needle prior to disposal in a sharps container or
>not recapping the needle prior to disposal into a sharps container?
>Obviously this is a rhetorical question and does not take into account
>potential exposures. I suppose my question basically boils down to the
>question of why would anyone want to recap? Just a thought.
>
>Kyle G. Boyett
>Asst. Director of Biosafety
>Safety Short Distribution List Administrator
>University of Alabama @ Birmingham
>Department of Occupational Health and Safety
>933 South 19th Street Suite 445
>Birmingham, Alabama 35294
>Phone: 205.934.9181
>Fax: 205.934.7487
>Visit our WEB site at: healthsafe.uab.edu
>
> Asking me to overlook a safety violation is like asking me to reduce the
>value I place on YOUR life
>
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From: Curt Speaker [mailto:SPEAKER@SAFETY-1.SAFETY.PSU.EDU]
>Sent: Tuesday, April 16, 2002 1:11 PM
>To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
>Subject: still recapping !?!
>
>A question for the group (especially those with agricultural animals):
>
>I am running into a lot of resistance from Vets. and other animal
>husbandry personnel about recapping of needles used for drawing
>blood, giving immunizations, etc. on animals. These are normal
>herd animals, not infected with any biohazard, have been tested for
>the obvious pathogens, etc.
>
>The Vets are saying to me "Bloodborne pathogen standards don't
>apply to animals. I've been doing it for years and never had a
>problem." I point out to them (and others) that preventing ALL
>needlstick injuries is in everyone's best interest, but so far my
>demands have fallen on deaf ears.
>
>The National Research Council's "Occupational Health and Safety in
>the Care and Use of Research Animals" even goes as far as to state
>that we should consider "practices that reduce percutaneous
>exposures", and recapping certainly goes against that.
>
>But with the veterinarians (both employees and contract vets)
>continueing to recap needles, the employees at our farms feel that
>the practice is still okay.
>
>I am speaking to our IACUC about this on Monday (along with some
>other PPE issues that I won't go into now). I am curious to see if
>anyone else has run into/is running into the same problem that I am,
>and how you dealt with it.
>
>Thanks in advance for any advice anyone can provide.
>
>Curt
>
>Curt Speaker
>Biosafety Officer
>Penn State University
>Environmental Health and Safety
>speaker@ehs.psu.edu
>
>^...^
>(O_O)
>=(Y)=
> """
_____________________________________________________________________
__ / _____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2002 09:36:05 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Schlank, Bliss M"
Subject: FW: Animal Allergy Questionnaire
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="----_=_NextPart_000_01C1E614.D2D51980"
This message is in MIME format. Since your mail reader does not understand
this format, some or all of this message may not be legible.
------_=_NextPart_000_01C1E614.D2D51980
Content-Type: text/plain;
charset="iso-8859-1"
A while back someone requested an animal allergy questionnaire - this is the
one we are currently using. I hope this helps.
Bliss Schlank
> Biosafety Manager
> OW Basement
> 1800 Concord Pike
> Wilmington, DE 19850
> Phone: 302.886.2185
> Fax: 302.886.2909
> Cell #: 302.218.5306
> email: bliss.schlank@
>
>
>
>
>
> >
>
>
------_=_NextPart_000_01C1E614.D2D51980
Content-Type: application/msword;
name="Baseline Medical Surveillance Questionnaire for Employees Exposed to Laboratory Animal 1.doc"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
Content-Disposition: attachment;
filename="Baseline Medical Surveillance Questionnaire for Employees Exposed to Laboratory Animal 1.doc"
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2002 10:02:29 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Don Callihan
Subject: Shipping biological indicators
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Hi folks,
Seems like a trivial matter, but I'd appreciate the collective wisdom of
the group on this one. Just want to be sure I am on the right track.
What advice do you have on packaging and shipping biological indicators (in
the form of suspensions or dried on strips)? I'm referring specifically to
Bacillus species, including B. stearothermophilus, B. atrophaeus, that are
used to measure the effectiveness of sterilization methods (autoclaving,
gamma-irradiation, EtO). The user is shipping material to an outside
contractor for sterilization and wants to include the biological indicator
(with viable spores) together with the product. After the material is
received back from the outside contractor, the biological indicators will
be processed fto attest to the effectiveness of the sterilization process.
So the question is, what labeling is needed? Does this require the full
DOT/IATA treatment, is it exempt, or somewhere in between?
Thanks in advance,
Don Callihan, Ph.D.
Biosafety Officer and Senior Clinical Microbiologist
BD Diagnostic Systems
Sparks, MD 21152
410-773-6684
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2002 10:35:41 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Richard Fink
Subject: Re: Aspergillus flavus
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="=====================_94444403==_"
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Asp. flavus is one of those border line types - right at the edge of
BL1/2. It can cause disease but usually not in a healthy person (see
attached html file - a frame from the Aspergillus website
[]). It has more pathogenic potential then
many other species of Aspergillus. Whether I would rate it as one or two
would depend upon the research - is he growing high volume, concentrating,
causing aerosolization, exploring what makes it pathogenic (and potentially
creating a more pathogenic version)?
At 08:30 AM 04/17/02 -0400, you wrote:
>Good morning,
>
>There is aPI who is proposing work with A. flavus. In his proposal, he is
>stating that he will be working under BSL-1. The canadian MSDS site says that
>this fungus should be worked under BSL-2, but the BMBL does not mention
>anything
>about this fungus. What is the norm and is there any information that could
>support BSL-2 work (besides the Canadian website). Thanks.
>
>Larry Mendoza
>
>
--=====================_94444403==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
Asp. flavus is one of those border line types - right at the edge of BL1/2. It can cause disease but usually not in a healthy person (see attached html file - a frame from the Aspergillus website []). It has more pathogenic potential then many other species of Aspergillus. Whether I would rate it as one or two would depend upon the research - is he growing high volume, concentrating, causing aerosolization, exploring what makes it pathogenic (and potentially creating a more pathogenic version)?
At 08:30 AM 04/17/02 -0400, you wrote:
Good morning,
There is aPI who is proposing work with A. flavus. In his proposal, he is
stating that he will be working under BSL-1. The canadian MSDS site says that
this fungus should be worked under BSL-2, but the BMBL does not mention anything
about this fungus. What is the norm and is there any information that could
support BSL-2 work (besides the Canadian website). Thanks.
Larry Mendoza
--=====================_94444403==_.ALT--
--=====================_94444403==_
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Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
--=====================_94444453==_.ALT
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Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
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--=====================_94444403==_--
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2002 08:00:13 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Funk, Glenn"
Subject: Re: Aspergillus flavus
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Larry -
As Richie Fink says, this is one of those "borderline" cases. It also
points out what I consider a weakness in the BMBL, the implied RG1 status of
such "disregarded" or "not discussed" microorganisms and the dumping back on
you of the requirement to do a risk assessment essentially from scratch,
without BMBL guidance. This may not be much of a problem for those with
very solid mycology or even general microbiology backgrounds but ...
In these cases, I often turn to the ABSA list of risk group classifications
for additional guidance, just to see how the rest of the world classifies a
microorganism. In this case, the Canadians, the Australians and the Belgian
Annex all classify Aspergillus flavus as a Risk Group 2 agent. The
Americans and the European Union don't classify it. This tells me that at
least some folks in the world prefer to treat it as a potential pathogen,
which it is. The fact that I have great respect for the biosafety knowledge
and programs of both the Canadians and the Aussies helps me easily accept
their more conservative approach here. It does NOT relieve me of the
responsibility to do the risk assessment Richie alluded to - what specific
"form" of A. flavus is being used, how is it being used, in what volumes,
with what manipulations, by whom, etc., etc. But it's a clearer starting
point for me than the "nothing" I would get from the BMBL for A. flavus.
I have the same problem with the BMBL's treatment of Candida albicans. No
mention, implied RG1, while everyone else in the world considers it RG2.
Reasonable, since we know it's a common cause of thrush (pharyngitis, oral
candidiasis), infections of the nail bed (onychomycosis) and vaginal
infections. Thus the importance of the individual risk assessment.
Hope this blathering helps.
-- Glenn
Glenn A. Funk
Director, EHS
MedImmune Vaccines, Inc.
-----Original Message-----
From: Larry Mendoza [mailto:lgmendoz@HSC.VCU.EDU]
Sent: Wednesday, 17 April, 2002 05:30
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Aspergillus flavus
Good morning,
There is aPI who is proposing work with A. flavus. In his proposal, he is
stating that he will be working under BSL-1. The canadian MSDS site says
that
this fungus should be worked under BSL-2, but the BMBL does not mention
anything
about this fungus. What is the norm and is there any information that could
support BSL-2 work (besides the Canadian website). Thanks.
Larry Mendoza
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2002 08:06:41 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Funk, Glenn"
Subject: Re: Shipping biological indicators
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Don -
I believe these bioindicators are unregulated for shipping purposes. They
certainly don't meet any of the criteria for Class 6.2 and they don't appear
to fall into one of the lower categories (biological products, medical
waste, GMOs, diagsnostic specimens, etc.).
-- Glenn
Glenn A. Funk
Director, EHS
MedImmune Vaccines, Inc.
-----Original Message-----
From: Don Callihan [mailto:Don_Callihan@]
Sent: Wednesday, 17 April, 2002 07:02
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Shipping biological indicators
Hi folks,
Seems like a trivial matter, but I'd appreciate the collective wisdom of
the group on this one. Just want to be sure I am on the right track.
What advice do you have on packaging and shipping biological indicators (in
the form of suspensions or dried on strips)? I'm referring specifically to
Bacillus species, including B. stearothermophilus, B. atrophaeus, that are
used to measure the effectiveness of sterilization methods (autoclaving,
gamma-irradiation, EtO). The user is shipping material to an outside
contractor for sterilization and wants to include the biological indicator
(with viable spores) together with the product. After the material is
received back from the outside contractor, the biological indicators will
be processed fto attest to the effectiveness of the sterilization process.
So the question is, what labeling is needed? Does this require the full
DOT/IATA treatment, is it exempt, or somewhere in between?
Thanks in advance,
Don Callihan, Ph.D.
Biosafety Officer and Senior Clinical Microbiologist
BD Diagnostic Systems
Sparks, MD 21152
410-773-6684
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2002 11:20:11 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Richard Fink
Subject: Re: Aspergillus flavus
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
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I will also add my 2 cents to Glenn's comments about the BMBL. For the
most part the organisms listed in the BMBL are only those that have caused
a laboratory acquired illness or illness in health care workers. This of
course leaves out many pathogens, so one cannot assume that if it is not
listed in the BMBL it is RG1.
Richie
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
--=====================_97114863==_.ALT
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I will also add my 2 cents to Glenn's comments about the BMBL. For the most part the organisms listed in the BMBL are only those that have caused a laboratory acquired illness or illness in health care workers. This of course leaves out many pathogens, so one cannot assume that if it is not listed in the BMBL it is RG1.
Richie
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
--=====================_97114863==_.ALT--
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2002 11:17:07 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Schlank, Bliss M"
Subject: SHARPS Containers
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
I am looking for a SHARPS Container that effectively disposes 10,20,50ml
serological pipettes. Does anyone have any suggestions?
Thanks
Bliss
> Biosafety Manager
> OW Basement
> 1800 Concord Pike
> Wilmington, DE 19850
> Phone: 302.886.2185
> Fax: 302.886.2909
> Cell #: 302.218.5306
> email: bliss.schlank@
>
>
>
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2002 10:26:13 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Michael Betlach
Subject: Re: Aspergillus flavus
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Richie and Glenn both highlighted aspects of risk assessment for work with
any infectious agent, as well as specific aspects of A. flavus
pathogenicity. General considerations included quantity and possibility for
aerosol generation. Would anyone care to comment on specific precautions for
work with fungal spores, or fungi that have sporulated after growth on solid
media? I'd be inclined to use a biosafety cabinet for work with dry spores
and sporulated cultures to prevent dispersion throughout the lab, in
addition to any work likely to generate aerosols.
Michael Betlach, Ph.D.
Biosafety Officer
Promega Corporation
5445 E. Cheryl Parkway
Madison, WI 53711
(608) 274-1181, Ext. 1270
-----Original Message-----
From: Larry Mendoza [mailto:lgmendoz@HSC.VCU.EDU]
Sent: Wednesday, April 17, 2002 7:30 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Aspergillus flavus
Good morning,
There is aPI who is proposing work with A. flavus. In his proposal, he is
stating that he will be working under BSL-1. The canadian MSDS site says
that
this fungus should be worked under BSL-2, but the BMBL does not mention
anything
about this fungus. What is the norm and is there any information that could
support BSL-2 work (besides the Canadian website). Thanks.
Larry Mendoza
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2002 11:24:38 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Robert N. Latsch"
Subject: Re: still recapping !?!
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Carol Giles Said:
>
>While this may not help you with the veterinarians, I think you could teach
>them to use a safer technique. Recapping has been made to be a pariah, but
>it has been done very poorly. There are many ways to do it. There are
>negatives with not re-sheathing, too.
>
I am not sure that this is true. I think that BBP can and must be applied.
To a hospital person clean, steriledirty and contaminated all have
different meanings. This is the aurgument that is coming from the
vetrenarian. BBP says to applie universal precautions. We do not know
therefore we must assume that it is.
So I want needle protocols and procedures.
Bob
_____________________________________________________________________
__ / _____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2002 08:55:03 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Funk, Glenn"
Subject: Re: Aspergillus flavus
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Michael -
I think anyone who handles a mycelial fungus (or a dimorphic growing in the
mycelial phase) outside a biosafety cabinet is just begging for a widespread
mold contamination problem in the lab. The nature of spore attachment to
the bearing structure is very fragile on purpose, to facilitate widespread
dissemination by air currents in nature. Murphy, who's alive and well and
living in most laboratories, will help ensure that the same dissemination
mechanism works like a champ in the lab.
-- Glenn
-----Original Message-----
From: Michael Betlach [mailto:MBetlach@]
Sent: Wednesday, 17 April, 2002 08:26
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Aspergillus flavus
Richie and Glenn both highlighted aspects of risk assessment for work with
any infectious agent, as well as specific aspects of A. flavus
pathogenicity. General considerations included quantity and possibility for
aerosol generation. Would anyone care to comment on specific precautions for
work with fungal spores, or fungi that have sporulated after growth on solid
media? I'd be inclined to use a biosafety cabinet for work with dry spores
and sporulated cultures to prevent dispersion throughout the lab, in
addition to any work likely to generate aerosols.
Michael Betlach, Ph.D.
Biosafety Officer
Promega Corporation
5445 E. Cheryl Parkway
Madison, WI 53711
(608) 274-1181, Ext. 1270
-----Original Message-----
From: Larry Mendoza [mailto:lgmendoz@HSC.VCU.EDU]
Sent: Wednesday, April 17, 2002 7:30 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Aspergillus flavus
Good morning,
There is aPI who is proposing work with A. flavus. In his proposal, he is
stating that he will be working under BSL-1. The canadian MSDS site says
that
this fungus should be worked under BSL-2, but the BMBL does not mention
anything
about this fungus. What is the norm and is there any information that could
support BSL-2 work (besides the Canadian website). Thanks.
Larry Mendoza
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2002 12:07:47 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Richard Fink
Subject: Re: Aspergillus flavus
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
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boundary="=====================_99971351==_.ALT"
--=====================_99971351==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
Michael,
Personally, I do all of my fungal work in a BSC or a fume hood to minimize
potential contamination of my lab and of me. Fungal infections are nasty,
I prefer to be cautious.
Richie
Would anyone care to comment on specific precautions for
>work with fungal spores, or fungi that have sporulated after growth on solid
>media? I'd be inclined to use a biosafety cabinet for work with dry spores
>and sporulated cultures to prevent dispersion throughout the lab, in
>addition to any work likely to generate aerosols.
>
>Michael Betlach, Ph.D.
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
--=====================_99971351==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
Michael,
Personally, I do all of my fungal work in a BSC or a fume hood to minimize potential contamination of my lab and of me. Fungal infections are nasty, I prefer to be cautious.
Richie
Would anyone care to comment on specific precautions for
work with fungal spores, or fungi that have sporulated after growth on solid
media? I'd be inclined to use a biosafety cabinet for work with dry spores
and sporulated cultures to prevent dispersion throughout the lab, in
addition to any work likely to generate aerosols.
Michael Betlach, Ph.D.
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
--=====================_99971351==_.ALT--
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2002 13:08:41 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Robert N. Latsch"
Subject: Re: SHARPS Containers
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
We have our labs use 7 gallon square wastebasket like sharps containers.
We have recommended that they have our plant group construct a holder that
tilts the sharps container at an angle. About 45 deg seems best. Put the
lid on and install the sharps container in it's holder. The tilt allows
the serological pippettes to,"stack", inside of the container. You can get
a lot in there now.
Bob
>I am looking for a SHARPS Container that effectively disposes 10,20,50ml
>serological pipettes. Does anyone have any suggestions?
>Thanks
>Bliss
>
>> Biosafety Manager
>> OW Basement
>> 1800 Concord Pike
>> Wilmington, DE 19850
>> Phone: 302.886.2185
>> Fax: 302.886.2909
>> Cell #: 302.218.5306
>> email: bliss.schlank@
>>
>>
>>
_____________________________________________________________________
__ / _____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2002 13:47:50 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Eric COok
Subject: Re: Shipping biological indicators
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
Most, if not all of these biological indicators are BL1 mircro-organisms.
IATA DGR specifically classify BL1 micro-organisms as not
regulated/restricted. The hazardous materials regulations of 49 CFR (US
DOT) only regulates viable micro-organisms that causes or may cause disease
in humans or animals. I'm not aware of any Bacillus species used as
biological indicators that cause disease so these would not be regulated by
the DOT.
At 10:02 AM 4/17/2002 -0400, you wrote:
>Hi folks,
>
>Seems like a trivial matter, but I'd appreciate the collective wisdom of
>the group on this one. Just want to be sure I am on the right track.
>
>What advice do you have on packaging and shipping biological indicators (in
>the form of suspensions or dried on strips)? I'm referring specifically to
>Bacillus species, including B. stearothermophilus, B. atrophaeus, that are
>used to measure the effectiveness of sterilization methods (autoclaving,
>gamma-irradiation, EtO). The user is shipping material to an outside
>contractor for sterilization and wants to include the biological indicator
>(with viable spores) together with the product. After the material is
>received back from the outside contractor, the biological indicators will
>be processed fto attest to the effectiveness of the sterilization process.
>
>So the question is, what labeling is needed? Does this require the full
>DOT/IATA treatment, is it exempt, or somewhere in between?
>
>Thanks in advance,
>
>Don Callihan, Ph.D.
>Biosafety Officer and Senior Clinical Microbiologist
>BD Diagnostic Systems
>Sparks, MD 21152
>410-773-6684
_=====_
========
| | | | | | | |
========
MIT BSP
Eric Cook, Asst. Biosafety Officer
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Biosafety Program, N52-496
77 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02139-4307
(Voice) 617-258-5648
(Fax) 617-258-6831
(E-mail)ecook@mit.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2002 14:23:40 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Le, Richard"
Subject: Re: Aspergillus flavus
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
It is interesting to note that in the BMBL, under Section V., Risk
Assessment, in the example, the BMBL mention staphylococcus aureus be
relegated to BSL-2, but does not mention staphylococcus aureus in Section
VII., Agent Summary Statement. If any one could clarify, with supporting
information, what BSL staphylococcus aureus should be performed, I would be
most thankful.
Richard N. Le
Florida State University
Biological Safety Officer
rle@admin.fsu.edu
-----Original Message-----
From: Larry Mendoza [mailto:lgmendoz@HSC.VCU.EDU]
Sent: Wednesday, April 17, 2002 8:30 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Aspergillus flavus
Good morning,
There is aPI who is proposing work with A. flavus. In his proposal, he is
stating that he will be working under BSL-1. The canadian MSDS site says
that
this fungus should be worked under BSL-2, but the BMBL does not mention
anything
about this fungus. What is the norm and is there any information that could
support BSL-2 work (besides the Canadian website). Thanks.
Larry Mendoza
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 18 Apr 2002 16:39:01 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Lefkin, Howard"
Subject: Kill Tanks
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Hi All,
Can anyone tell me where to find regulations or industry standards regarding
when, where and why "kill tanks" are used?
Thank you,
Howard
Howard Lefkin, Environmental Health and Safety Manager
UMASS Medical School-Jamaica Plain
305 South Street, Jamaica Plain, MA 02130-3523
Tel: 617-983-6207, fax: 617-983-6210
email: howard.lefkin@state.ma.us
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 18 Apr 2002 19:59:01 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Erik A. Talley"
Subject: Re: Kill Tanks
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
I am not sure if this helps much but on fishing boats I have seen "kill
tanks" where fish are placed after they have been killed. It's a fairly
common term in the sport of fishing. Notable is that the tank (or its
contents) doesn't do the killing, but rather holds the "killed." Maybe this
has similarities to the term used for fish work in laboratories?
Erik
P.S. Kill tanks also sub as beer coolers...
At 04:39 PM 4/18/2002 -0400, you wrote:
>Hi All,
>
>Can anyone tell me where to find regulations or industry standards regarding
>when, where and why "kill tanks" are used?
>
>Thank you,
>
>Howard
>
>Howard Lefkin, Environmental Health and Safety Manager
>UMASS Medical School-Jamaica Plain
>305 South Street, Jamaica Plain, MA 02130-3523
>Tel: 617-983-6207, fax: 617-983-6210
>email: howard.lefkin@state.ma.us
___________________________________
Erik A. Talley, Director
Environmental Health and Safety
Weill Medical College of Cornell University
418 East 71st Street, Suite 62
New York, NY 10021
212-746-6201
ert2002@med.cornell.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 19 Apr 2002 10:42:07 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Richard Fink
Subject: Re: Kill Tanks
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
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boundary="=====================_267630622==_.ALT"
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Hi Howard,
Being an academic, I don't know about industry standards regarding kill
tanks but there are certainly regulations regarding putting live
recombinant organisms down the tubes (it would be regarded as an
environmental release which is frowned upon). The MA State Sanitary Code
requires killing biotech/biomedical waste, many local town ordinances
require it, the NIH Guidelines requires decontamination of BL2 and higher
wastes and could be interpreted that release into the sewers without
killing would be considered a reportable environmental release.
Many, many years ago I had a client that installed a kill system primarily
to prevent industrial espionage - they didn't want rivals collecting their
bug out of the sewers.
I am sure some of the pharm. folks on the list could tackle this question
from the standpoint of GMP/GLP.
Richie
At 04:39 PM 04/18/02 -0400, you wrote:
>Hi All,
>
>Can anyone tell me where to find regulations or industry standards regarding
>when, where and why "kill tanks" are used?
>
>Thank you,
>
>Howard
>
>Howard Lefkin, Environmental Health and Safety Manager
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
--=====================_267630622==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
Hi Howard,
Being an academic, I don't know about industry standards regarding kill tanks but there are certainly regulations regarding putting live recombinant organisms down the tubes (it would be regarded as an environmental release which is frowned upon). The MA State Sanitary Code requires killing biotech/biomedical waste, many local town ordinances require it, the NIH Guidelines requires decontamination of BL2 and higher wastes and could be interpreted that release into the sewers without killing would be considered a reportable environmental release.
Many, many years ago I had a client that installed a kill system primarily to prevent industrial espionage - they didn't want rivals collecting their bug out of the sewers.
I am sure some of the pharm. folks on the list could tackle this question from the standpoint of GMP/GLP.
Richie
At 04:39 PM 04/18/02 -0400, you wrote:
Hi All,
Can anyone tell me where to find regulations or industry standards regarding
when, where and why "kill tanks" are used?
Thank you,
Howard
Howard Lefkin, Environmental Health and Safety Manager
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
--=====================_267630622==_.ALT--
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 19 Apr 2002 12:24:35 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Paul Jennette
Subject: Re: Kill Tanks
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="=====================_360166632==_.ALT"
--=====================_360166632==_.ALT
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Howard,
Requirements for the use of kill tanks appear in the CDC BMBL for BSL-4
facilities (and are suggested for consideration in some BSL-3 situations),
and in USDA's standards for BSL-3AG (large animal) facilities. The USDA
standards can be found at:
Neither of these are regulation, however. Actual regulations that might
apply could be local Sewer Use regs, but that would be unlikely unless a
municipality specifically addressed the issue (sewer use regs tend to be
pretty generic.)
That being said, just because there is little or no regulation on the issue
does not, of course, mean kill tanks shouldn't be used. I think decisions
on whether to use them (outside of the BSL-4 and BSL-3 AG requirements
mentioned above) should be made on the factors like the type and quantity
of agent, volume of wastewater to be treated, potential for exposure by
plumbers "downstream," the type of sewage treatment system in place, etc.)
Cheers
- Paul
At 04:39 PM 4/18/2002 -0400, you wrote:
>Hi All,
>
>Can anyone tell me where to find regulations or industry standards regarding
>when, where and why "kill tanks" are used?
>
>Thank you,
>
>Howard
>
>Howard Lefkin, Environmental Health and Safety Manager
>UMASS Medical School-Jamaica Plain
>305 South Street, Jamaica Plain, MA 02130-3523
>Tel: 617-983-6207, fax: 617-983-6210
>email: howard.lefkin@state.ma.us
J. Paul Jennette, P.E.
Biosafety Engineer
Cornell University
College of Veterinary Medicine
Biosafety Program
S3-010 Schurman Hall, Box 4 (607) 253-4227
Ithaca, New York 14853-6401 fax -3723
--=====================_360166632==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
Howard,
Requirements for the use of kill tanks appear in the CDC BMBL for BSL-4 facilities (and are suggested for consideration in some BSL-3 situations), and in USDA's standards for BSL-3AG (large animal) facilities. The USDA standards can be found at:
Neither of these are regulation, however. Actual regulations that might apply could be local Sewer Use regs, but that would be unlikely unless a municipality specifically addressed the issue (sewer use regs tend to be pretty generic.)
That being said, just because there is little or no regulation on the issue does not, of course, mean kill tanks shouldn't be used. I think decisions on whether to use them (outside of the BSL-4 and BSL-3 AG requirements mentioned above) should be made on the factors like the type and quantity of agent, volume of wastewater to be treated, potential for exposure by plumbers "downstream," the type of sewage treatment system in place, etc.)
Cheers
- Paul
At 04:39 PM 4/18/2002 -0400, you wrote:
Hi All,
Can anyone tell me where to find regulations or industry standards regarding
when, where and why "kill tanks" are used?
Thank you,
Howard
Howard Lefkin, Environmental Health and Safety Manager
UMASS Medical School-Jamaica Plain
305 South Street, Jamaica Plain, MA 02130-3523
Tel: 617-983-6207, fax: 617-983-6210
email: howard.lefkin@state.ma.us
J. Paul Jennette, P.E.
Biosafety Engineer
Cornell University
College of Veterinary Medicine
Biosafety Program
S3-010 Schurman Hall, Box 4 (607) 253-4227
Ithaca, New York 14853-6401 fax -3723
--=====================_360166632==_.ALT--
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 19 Apr 2002 12:49:48 EDT
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ed Krisiunas
Subject: Re: Kill Tanks
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="part1_39.25d4e4ad.29f1a4ac_boundary"
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Howard:
I can't add much to what everyone has - all good points to consider.
Questions to answer -
Where are you located? As already mentioned - one needs to speak with the
appropriate regulatory authority.
What are you killing? And why? You may need additional permits or approvals
from other agencies in your area (if you were to place this tank at your
location, you may need to speak with Howard Wensley- MDOH - Sanitation
Division - right there in your location).
All the best,
Edward Krisiunas, MT(ASCP), CIC, MPH
President
WNWN International
PO Box 1164
Burlington, Connecticut
06013
860-675-1217
860-675-1311(fax)
860-944-2373(mobile)
Good luck with the Mass. Water Resource Authority (MWRA).!
In a message dated 4/18/2002 4:59:21 PM Eastern Daylight Time,
HowardL@SLI.DPH.STATE.MA.US writes:
>
> Hi All,
>
> Can anyone tell me where to find regulations or industry standards regarding
> when, where and why "kill tanks" are used?
>
> Thank you,
>
> Howard
>
> Howard Lefkin, Environmental Health and Safety Manager
> UMASS Medical School-Jamaica Plain
> 305 South Street, Jamaica Plain, MA 02130-3523
> Tel: 617-983-6207, fax: 617-983-6210
> email: howard.lefkin@state.ma.us
>
--part1_39.25d4e4ad.29f1a4ac_boundary
Content-Type: text/html; charset="US-ASCII"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Howard:
I can't add much to what everyone has - all good points to consider.
Questions to answer -
Where are you located? As already mentioned - one needs to speak with the appropriate regulatory authority.
What are you killing? And why? You may need additional permits or approvals from other agencies in your area (if you were to place this tank at your location, you may need to speak with Howard Wensley- MDOH - Sanitation Division - right there in your location).
All the best,
Edward Krisiunas, MT(ASCP), CIC, MPH
President
WNWN International
PO Box 1164
Burlington, Connecticut
06013
860-675-1217
860-675-1311(fax)
860-944-2373(mobile)
Good luck with the Mass. Water Resource Authority (MWRA).!
In a message dated 4/18/2002 4:59:21 PM Eastern Daylight Time, HowardL@SLI.DPH.STATE.MA.US writes:
Hi All,
Can anyone tell me where to find regulations or industry standards regarding
when, where and why "kill tanks" are used?
Thank you,
Howard
Howard Lefkin, Environmental Health and Safety Manager
UMASS Medical School-Jamaica Plain
305 South Street, Jamaica Plain, MA 02130-3523
Tel: 617-983-6207, fax: 617-983-6210
email: howard.lefkin@state.ma.us
--part1_39.25d4e4ad.29f1a4ac_boundary--
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 19 Apr 2002 11:20:36 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Maeve Sowles
Subject: Human VS Animal
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; format=flowed; charset=us-ascii
Hi Bios,
I am trying to find whether there is a specific regulation covering use of
non-invasive equipment on human study subjects as well as non-human
subjects? It is a hypothetical question (at this point) for planning
phases of a research proposal. If there is no regulatory guidance, are
there SOP's for decontamination, etc.?
I have worked in a hospital setting, but never in a situation where
non-human work might commingle with human subject work. Your insight will
be greatly appreciated.
Thanks,
maeve
Maeve Sowles
Lab Safety Officer
Environmental Health and Safety
University of Oregon
1230 Franklin Blvd.
Eugene, OR 97403-5224
(541) 346-2867
Fax (541) 346-7008
maeve@oregon.uoregon.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 19 Apr 2002 13:44:44 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Elizabeth Smith
Subject: Re: Kill Tanks
In-Reply-To:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Our city has a catch all requirement, among the list of
permissible discharge concentrations: Anything which poses a
risk to the public health or the health of the employees working
on the sewer system is prohibited.
While you may think this sounds perfectly sound (and it pretty
much is) - it also leaves a great deal of latitude for
interpretation for the enforcement agents. This could be good
or bad, depending both on the agent you're discussing and on
your relationship with your POTW.
A kill tank allows for "batch discharge following verification
of compliance".
I've heard of people using chemicals to kill the microorganisms;
I've also heard of people using steam (I assumed it was used to
raise the temperature of the liquid inside it, as non-contact
water).
Specifications & regulations to consider:
If you're heat sterilizing it, and the tank will be pressurized
during the heating, you need to meet ASME pressure vessel
standards
If it is underground, it may need to meet underground storage
tank regulations (depending on what you've got in it besided
biological junk).
Your POTW will regulate whatever is released into the city's
sewer system via a permit under EPA regulations.
The EPA (or state agency) will regulate whatever is released any
other way into the environment.
Depending on your state, they may consider this material medical
waste and proscribe certain methods for treatment.
Peace,
Elizabeth
=====
Elizabeth Smith
Environmental, Health & Safety Manager
BioPort Corporation
3500 N. Martin L. King Blvd.
Lansing, MI 48906
__________________________________________________
Do You Yahoo!?
Yahoo! Tax Center - online filing with TurboTax
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 22 Apr 2002 09:15:30 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Lefkin, Howard"
Subject: Re: Kill Tanks
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Thanks for the info.
Howard
-----Original Message-----
From: Elizabeth Smith [mailto:safety_queen@]
Sent: Friday, April 19, 2002 4:45 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@mitvma.mit.edu
Subject: Re: Kill Tanks
Our city has a catch all requirement, among the list of
permissible discharge concentrations: Anything which poses a
risk to the public health or the health of the employees working
on the sewer system is prohibited.
While you may think this sounds perfectly sound (and it pretty
much is) - it also leaves a great deal of latitude for
interpretation for the enforcement agents. This could be good
or bad, depending both on the agent you're discussing and on
your relationship with your POTW.
A kill tank allows for "batch discharge following verification
of compliance".
I've heard of people using chemicals to kill the microorganisms;
I've also heard of people using steam (I assumed it was used to
raise the temperature of the liquid inside it, as non-contact
water).
Specifications & regulations to consider:
If you're heat sterilizing it, and the tank will be pressurized
during the heating, you need to meet ASME pressure vessel
standards
If it is underground, it may need to meet underground storage
tank regulations (depending on what you've got in it besided
biological junk).
Your POTW will regulate whatever is released into the city's
sewer system via a permit under EPA regulations.
The EPA (or state agency) will regulate whatever is released any
other way into the environment.
Depending on your state, they may consider this material medical
waste and proscribe certain methods for treatment.
Peace,
Elizabeth
=====
Elizabeth Smith
Environmental, Health & Safety Manager
BioPort Corporation
3500 N. Martin L. King Blvd.
Lansing, MI 48906
__________________________________________________
Do You Yahoo!?
Yahoo! Tax Center - online filing with TurboTax
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 22 Apr 2002 12:16:42 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Scott Finkernagel
Subject: Microisolator cages and HEPA ventilated cage racks
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Hello All,
Could someone tell me how they determine when HEPA filtered ventilated =
cage racks and microisolator cages would be required for research animals?
In one instance we have nude mice injected with human cell lines =
(transfected w/ gene via a viral agent) and injected with chemotherapeutic =
drugs. In another instance human and murine tumors in mice are injected =
with the complete vaccinia virus.
Would microisolater cages provide enough exclusion or retention of =
potential pathogens, assuming all cage manipulations were done in a =
certified BSC?
Is a barrier system, like a HEPA- filtered cage rack necessary under =
these circumstances?
Does someone out there have a system to guide them in determining what =
caging levels are necessary?
Thanks for your help.
Regards,
Scott
Scott W. Finkernagel, MS
Biological Safety Officer
UMDNJ- EOHSS
335 George Street Liberty Plaza *Room 2117
New Brunswick, NJ 08901-2688
Ph.# 732-235-9370 Fax 5-9371
e-mail: finkersw@umdnj.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 22 Apr 2002 14:39:43 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ken Asarch
Subject: Blood collection tube standards
MIME-Version: 1.0
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Is anyone aware of the source of standards for blood collection tubes other
than the National Committee for Clinical Laboratory Standards (H1-4A):
Evacuated Tubes and Additives for Blood Specimen Collection? Thank you and
looking forward to any leads.
ThauMDx
Director, Regulatory Affairs
7402 Hollister Avenue
Santa Barbara, California 93117
tel 805.968.3099 x 206
fax 805.968.3899
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NOTE:Director, Regulatory Affairs
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ADR;WORK:;;7402 Hollister Avenue;Santa Barbara;CA;93117;USA
LABEL;WORK;ENCODING=QUOTED-PRINTABLE:7402 Hollister Avenue=0ASanta Barbara, CA 93117=0AUSA
EMAIL;PREF;INTERNET:KAsarch@
REV:20020416T234334Z
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=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 23 Apr 2002 09:05:58 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Jeppesen, Eric R"
Subject: Maintenance on fixed equipment in BSL3
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Folks,
What type of programs do you have in place for maintenance on fixed
equipment, such as autoclaves, freezers, in BSL 3 labs?
We are currently bringing an older BSL 3 lab up to current requirements and
I have been putting the question of maintenance on the
designers.
The main point I am concerned about it is maintaining the autoclave;
i.e., working on the plumbing and bi-annual certification.
Does your facility plan to use decon procedures or build the lab in such a
way as to have access to the mechanical parts from outside the
BSL 3 lab?
Eric
Eric R. Jeppesen
Laboratory Safety Specialist
KU-EHS Dept.
jeppesen@ku.edu
(785)864-2857
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Folks,
What type of programs do you have in place for maintenance on fixed equipment, such as autoclaves, freezers, in BSL 3 labs?
We are currently bringing an older BSL 3 lab up to current requirements and I have been putting the question of maintenance on the
designers.
The main point I am concerned about it is maintaining the autoclave; i.e., working on the plumbing and bi-annual certification.
Does your facility plan to use decon procedures or build the lab in such a way as to have access to the mechanical parts from outside the
BSL 3 lab?
Eric
Eric R. Jeppesen
Laboratory Safety Specialist
KU-EHS Dept.
jeppesen@ku.edu
(785)864-2857
------_=_NextPart_001_01C1EACF.FDD32E50--
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 23 Apr 2002 13:42:13 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Paul Jennette
Subject: Re: Maintenance on fixed equipment in BSL3
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="=====================_259863503==_.ALT"
--=====================_259863503==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
Eric,
We developed a multi-tiered maintenance protocol for our BSL-3s. We
schedule our routine maintenance on fixed equipment for week-long annual PM
shutdowns, when we fumigate the facilities and open them up to the
maintenance staff. Otherwise, we bring the maintenance staff into the
BSL-3, escorted by a biosafety person and wearing the same PPE as the lab
users.
Here are 2 tips from our experience:
1) work with your own maintenance staff now to get them acquainted with the
facility and develop a maintenance protocol.
2) if the "guts" of the autoclave are outside the containment envelope of
your BSL-3 (which is advantageous for both maintenance and heat load
reasons), think about routing the condensate drain into the containment
space, or otherwise enclosing it to prevent the release of condensate
outside the BSL-3.
Cheers
- Paul
At 09:05 AM 4/23/2002 -0500, you wrote:
>Folks,
>
> What type of programs do you have in place for maintenance on fixed
> equipment, such as autoclaves, freezers, in BSL 3 labs?
>We are currently bringing an older BSL 3 lab up to current requirements
>and I have been putting the question of maintenance on the
>designers.
> The main point I am concerned about it is maintaining the autoclave;
> i.e., working on the plumbing and bi-annual certification.
>Does your facility plan to use decon procedures or build the lab in such a
>way as to have access to the mechanical parts from outside the
>BSL 3 lab?
>
>Eric
>
>
>Eric R. Jeppesen
>Laboratory Safety Specialist
>KU-EHS Dept.
>jeppesen@ku.edu
>(785)864-2857
J. Paul Jennette, P.E.
Biosafety Engineer
Cornell University
College of Veterinary Medicine
Biosafety Program
S3-010 Schurman Hall, Box 4 (607) 253-4227
Ithaca, New York 14853-6401 fax -3723
--=====================_259863503==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
Eric,
We developed a multi-tiered maintenance protocol for our BSL-3s. We schedule our routine maintenance on fixed equipment for week-long annual PM shutdowns, when we fumigate the facilities and open them up to the maintenance staff. Otherwise, we bring the maintenance staff into the BSL-3, escorted by a biosafety person and wearing the same PPE as the lab users.
Here are 2 tips from our experience:
1) work with your own maintenance staff now to get them acquainted with the facility and develop a maintenance protocol.
2) if the "guts" of the autoclave are outside the containment envelope of your BSL-3 (which is advantageous for both maintenance and heat load reasons), think about routing the condensate drain into the containment space, or otherwise enclosing it to prevent the release of condensate outside the BSL-3.
Cheers
- Paul
At 09:05 AM 4/23/2002 -0500, you wrote:
Folks,
What type of programs do you have in place for maintenance on fixed equipment, such as autoclaves, freezers, in BSL 3 labs?
We are currently bringing an older BSL 3 lab up to current requirements and I have been putting the question of maintenance on the
designers.
The main point I am concerned about it is maintaining the autoclave; i.e., working on the plumbing and bi-annual certification.
Does your facility plan to use decon procedures or build the lab in such a way as to have access to the mechanical parts from outside the
BSL 3 lab?
Eric
Eric R. Jeppesen
Laboratory Safety Specialist
KU-EHS Dept.
jeppesen@ku.edu
(785)864-2857
J. Paul Jennette, P.E.
Biosafety Engineer
Cornell University
College of Veterinary Medicine
Biosafety Program
S3-010 Schurman Hall, Box 4 (607) 253-4227
Ithaca, New York 14853-6401 fax -3723
--=====================_259863503==_.ALT--
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 23 Apr 2002 14:37:45 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Robert N. Latsch"
Subject: Re: Maintenance on fixed equipment in BSL3
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
We will take a multiple approach to this.
The lab crew must decon the item prior to repairs or removal.
If the device must be repaired in place, We ask the room around the device
to be deconned and the device. The worker will go in in appropriate ppe.
No lab work is to be done while repairs are in progress.
Bob
> Folks, What type of programs do you have in place for
>maintenance on fixed equipment, such as autoclaves, freezers, in BSL 3
>labs? We are currently bringing an older BSL 3 lab up to current
>requirements and I have been putting the question of maintenance on the
>designers. The main point I am concerned about it is maintaining the
>autoclave; i.e., working on the plumbing and bi-annual certification. Does
>your facility plan to use decon procedures or build the lab in such a way
>as to have access to the mechanical parts from outside the BSL 3 lab?
>Eric
>
>Eric R. Jeppesen
>Laboratory Safety Specialist
>KU-EHS Dept.
>jeppesen@ku.edu
>(785)864-2857
_____________________________________________________________________
__ / _____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 23 Apr 2002 15:38:45 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Paul Jennette
Subject: Re: Maintenance on fixed equipment in BSL3
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="=====================_266855137==_"
--=====================_266855137==_
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="=====================_266855137==_.ALT"
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Eric, et. al.,
I neglected to attach the protocol we developed with our skilled trade
"shops" for BSL-3 maintenance at Cornell to my previous post; here it is.
- Paul
At 09:05 AM 4/23/2002 -0500, you wrote:
>Folks,
>
> What type of programs do you have in place for maintenance on fixed
> equipment, such as autoclaves, freezers, in BSL 3 labs?
>We are currently bringing an older BSL 3 lab up to current requirements
>and I have been putting the question of maintenance on the
>designers.
> The main point I am concerned about it is maintaining the autoclave;
> i.e., working on the plumbing and bi-annual certification.
>Does your facility plan to use decon procedures or build the lab in such a
>way as to have access to the mechanical parts from outside the
>BSL 3 lab?
>
>Eric
>
>
>Eric R. Jeppesen
>Laboratory Safety Specialist
>KU-EHS Dept.
>jeppesen@ku.edu
>(785)864-2857
J. Paul Jennette, P.E.
Biosafety Engineer
Cornell University
College of Veterinary Medicine
Biosafety Program
S3-010 Schurman Hall, Box 4 (607) 253-4227
Ithaca, New York 14853-6401 fax -3723
--=====================_266855137==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
Eric, et. al.,
I neglected to attach the protocol we developed with our skilled trade "shops" for BSL-3 maintenance at Cornell to my previous post; here it is.
- Paul
At 09:05 AM 4/23/2002 -0500, you wrote:
Folks,
What type of programs do you have in place for maintenance on fixed equipment, such as autoclaves, freezers, in BSL 3 labs?
We are currently bringing an older BSL 3 lab up to current requirements and I have been putting the question of maintenance on the
designers.
The main point I am concerned about it is maintaining the autoclave; i.e., working on the plumbing and bi-annual certification.
Does your facility plan to use decon procedures or build the lab in such a way as to have access to the mechanical parts from outside the
BSL 3 lab?
Eric
Eric R. Jeppesen
Laboratory Safety Specialist
KU-EHS Dept.
jeppesen@ku.edu
(785)864-2857
J. Paul Jennette, P.E.
Biosafety Engineer
Cornell University
College of Veterinary Medicine
Biosafety Program
S3-010 Schurman Hall, Box 4 (607) 253-4227
Ithaca, New York 14853-6401 fax -3723
--=====================_266855137==_.ALT--
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Content-Type: application/msword; name="BSL-3_maintenance_protocol.doc";
x-mac-type="42494E41"; x-mac-creator="4D535744"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="BSL-3_maintenance_protocol.doc"
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 24 Apr 2002 15:58:43 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Andrew Braun
Subject: Re: Human VS Animal
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="=====================_17259273==_.ALT"
--=====================_17259273==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
Dear Biosaftyers,
We have an investigator who wishes to work with the Sterne strain
of Bacillus anthracis - an avirulent strain often used as a source of
material for an Anthrax vaccine. Before 9/11 this would not have caused a
stir. However... We do have a boilerplate e-mail from Mark Hemphill
saying the organism is exempt for the Select Agent rules. It is reproduced
below.
Some members of our IBC are concerned about security issues. In
theory it may be possible to convert the Sterne strain to pathogenicity by
moving a plasmid, pX02, into the cell. So the questions are: a) have any
other IBCs thought about security issues for this strain and what have they
suggested, and/or b) do you think there is a security issue? If so how are
they being addressed?
Thanks for your help.
Andy
--------------
Question concerning the USDA approved Anthrax vaccine (Sterne strain 34-F2)
and the Select Agent Rule:
Subpart h(1)(iii) of 42 CFR 72.6 states that Select Agents otherwise
covered by this part are exempt from its provision if, the agent(s) is an
exempted strain specified in Appendix A. The strains listed in Appendix A
are attenuated virus vaccine stains approved for human use. In addition,
Appendix A also states that vaccine strains as described in Title 9 CFR,
78.1 are exempt. Title 9 CFR, 78.1 refers solely to USDA approved live
Brucella vaccine strains. Appendix A also exempts national standard toxins
required for biologic potency testing as described in 9 CFR Part 113.
However, this part also refers to the requirements for live bacterial
vaccines approved by USDA, such as the USDA approved Anthrax vaccine
(Sterne strain 34-F2). Therefore, our office has interpreted that the
intent of Subpart h(1)(iii) was to exempt all USDA approved vaccine
strains. However, the fact that these strains are exempt from the
requirements of 42 CFR 72.6 should in no way be interpreted that these
agents should be handled under anything less than appropriate safety
conditions.
Note that any interpretations of Title 42 CFR Part 72.6 (Additional
requirements for facilities transferring or receiving select agents) that
are issued from this Office are provided for guidance purposes and are
subject to review and change. If you have any further questions or concerns
please contact me at one of the numbers listed below.
Sincerely,
Mark L. Hemphill, M.S.
Lead Safety and Occupational Health Specialist
External Activities/Office of Health and Safety
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
1600 Clifton Rd. MS A-13
Atlanta, Georgia 30333
Tel: (404) 639-4419 / FAX: (404) 639-4478 / E-mail: MLH2@
Website: od/ohs/lrsat.htm
---------------------------------------
Andrew Braun, Sc.D
Harvard Medical School, Office for Research
25 Shattuck Street
Boston, MA 02115
617-432-4899; FAX 617-432-3169
---------------------------------------
--=====================_17259273==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/html; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Dear Biosaftyers,
We have an investigator who wishes to work with the Sterne strain of Bacillus anthracis - an avirulent strain often used as a source of material for an Anthrax vaccine. Before 9/11 this would not have caused a stir. However... We do have a boilerplate e-mail from Mark Hemphill saying the organism is exempt for the Select Agent rules. It is reproduced below.
Some members of our IBC are concerned about security issues. In theory it may be possible to convert the Sterne strain to pathogenicity by moving a plasmid, pX02, into the cell. So the questions are: a) have any other IBCs thought about security issues for this strain and what have they suggested, and/or b) do you think there is a security issue? If so how are they being addressed?
Thanks for your help.
Andy
--------------
Question concerning the USDA approved Anthrax vaccine (Sterne strain 34-F2) and the Select Agent Rule:
Subpart h(1)(iii) of 42 CFR 72.6 states that Select Agents otherwise covered by this part are exempt from its provision if, the agent(s) is an exempted strain specified in Appendix A. The strains listed in Appendix A are attenuated virus vaccine stains approved for human use. In addition, Appendix A also states that vaccine strains as described in Title 9 CFR, 78.1 are exempt. Title 9 CFR, 78.1 refers solely to USDA approved live Brucella vaccine strains. Appendix A also exempts national standard toxins required for biologic potency testing as described in 9 CFR Part 113. However, this part also refers to the requirements for live bacterial vaccines approved by USDA, such as the USDA approved Anthrax vaccine (Sterne strain 34-F2). Therefore, our office has interpreted that the intent of Subpart h(1)(iii) was to exempt all USDA approved vaccine strains. However, the fact that these strains are exempt from the requirements of 42 CFR 72.6 should in no way be interpreted that these agents should be handled under anything less than appropriate safety conditions.
Note that any interpretations of Title 42 CFR Part 72.6 (Additional requirements for facilities transferring or receiving select agents) that are issued from this Office are provided for guidance purposes and are subject to review and change. If you have any further questions or concerns please contact me at one of the numbers listed below.
Sincerely,
Mark L. Hemphill, M.S.
Lead Safety and Occupational Health Specialist
External Activities/Office of Health and Safety
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
1600 Clifton Rd. MS A-13
Atlanta, Georgia 30333
Tel: (404) 639-4419 / FAX: (404) 639-4478 / E-mail: MLH2@
Website: cdc.g= ov/od/ohs/lrsat.htm
---------------------------------------
Andrew Braun, Sc.D
Harvard Medical School, Office for Research
25 Shattuck Street
Boston, MA 02115
617-432-4899; FAX 617-432-3169
---------------------------------------
--=====================_17259273==_.ALT--
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 24 Apr 2002 14:46:33 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Elizabeth Smith
Subject: Re: Human VS Animal
In-Reply-To:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Good evening, one and all,
it is my understanding that this exemption for the sterne strain
is ONLY an exemption if you are purchasing the veterinary
vaccine. If you want to buy sterne strain from ATCC or someone
else, it isn't exempt.
Yes, if you stick the missing plasmid back into the bacillus, it
can then encode for the missing protiens and cause disease.
this would not be good. If you want to buy this stuff, how does
your PI propose to prevent that from happening?
Security: we handle all anthrax bacteria, regardless of their
nature, in a secure manner. (Of course, if I told you exactly
how we do it, then I'd have to shoot you .... ;-) Basically, we
know how much there is, who has access to them, and what's being
done with them. Control is the watchword of the day.
Then, after you figure you've got it all under control ----
How can you actually document/demonstrate that it IS under
control?? If someone takes something, how long will it be
before you notice? Could you go back and figure out who took it
and when?
Caution - if the USA-PATRIOT act moves out of subcommittee and
is approved by the legislature, it is my understanding (not
being a legislator or lawyer) that all anthrax bacteria will be
subject to the provisions of that act, which will then include
an amazing amount of security (compared to the "good old days"
of last year). I don't understand how this overlaps with the
current select agent regulations... (which is why I'm going to
the Eagleson seminar in Philly in 2 weeks).
Get your corporate counsel to help you with interpreting the
law, and I would start now, rather than wait, since the proposed
law gives you 30 days to get into compliance with it.
Elizabeth --
who is not an attorney and doesn't claim that any interpretation
of pending legislation has anything to do with reality as
perceived in Washington D.C., but who wants to help as much as
she can ...
--- Andrew Braun wrote:
> Dear Biosaftyers,
> We have an investigator who wishes to work with the
> Sterne strain
> of Bacillus anthracis - an avirulent strain often used as a
> source of
> material for an Anthrax vaccine. Before 9/11 this would not
> have caused a
> stir. However... We do have a boilerplate e-mail from Mark
> Hemphill
> saying the organism is exempt for the Select Agent rules. It
> is reproduced
> below.
> Some members of our IBC are concerned about security
> issues. In
> theory it may be possible to convert the Sterne strain to
> pathogenicity by
> moving a plasmid, pX02, into the cell. So the questions are:
> a) have any
> other IBCs thought about security issues for this strain and
> what have they
> suggested, and/or b) do you think there is a security issue?
> If so how are
> they being addressed?
> Thanks for your help.
> Andy
>
>
> --------------
> Question concerning the USDA approved Anthrax vaccine (Sterne
> strain 34-F2)
> and the Select Agent Rule:
>
> Subpart h(1)(iii) of 42 CFR 72.6 states that Select Agents
> otherwise
> covered by this part are exempt from its provision if, the
> agent(s) is an
> exempted strain specified in Appendix A. The strains listed in
> Appendix A
> are attenuated virus vaccine stains approved for human use. In
> addition,
> Appendix A also states that vaccine strains as described in
> Title 9 CFR,
> 78.1 are exempt. Title 9 CFR, 78.1 refers solely to USDA
> approved live
> Brucella vaccine strains. Appendix A also exempts national
> standard toxins
> required for biologic potency testing as described in 9 CFR
> Part 113.
> However, this part also refers to the requirements for live
> bacterial
> vaccines approved by USDA, such as the USDA approved Anthrax
> vaccine
> (Sterne strain 34-F2). Therefore, our office has interpreted
> that the
> intent of Subpart h(1)(iii) was to exempt all USDA approved
> vaccine
> strains. However, the fact that these strains are exempt from
> the
> requirements of 42 CFR 72.6 should in no way be interpreted
> that these
> agents should be handled under anything less than appropriate
> safety
> conditions.
>
> Note that any interpretations of Title 42 CFR Part 72.6
> (Additional
> requirements for facilities transferring or receiving select
> agents) that
> are issued from this Office are provided for guidance purposes
> and are
> subject to review and change. If you have any further
> questions or concerns
> please contact me at one of the numbers listed below.
>
> Sincerely,
>
>
> Mark L. Hemphill, M.S.
> Lead Safety and Occupational Health Specialist
> External Activities/Office of Health and Safety
> Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
> 1600 Clifton Rd. MS A-13
> Atlanta, Georgia 30333
>
> Tel: (404) 639-4419 / FAX: (404) 639-4478 / E-mail:
> MLH2@
> Website: od/ohs/lrsat.htm
>
>
>
> ---------------------------------------
> Andrew Braun, Sc.D
> Harvard Medical School, Office for Research
> 25 Shattuck Street
> Boston, MA 02115
> 617-432-4899; FAX 617-432-3169
> ---------------------------------------
=====
Elizabeth Smith
Environmental, Health & Safety Manager
BioPort Corporation
3500 N. Martin L. King Blvd.
Lansing, MI 48906
__________________________________________________
Do You Yahoo!?
Yahoo! Games - play chess, backgammon, pool and more
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 25 Apr 2002 08:29:41 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Richard Fink
Subject: FYI - Biotechfind
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="=====================_259929328==_.ALT"
--=====================_259929328==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
FYI,
>I'm writing to suggest a link of interest in the biotechnology field,
>which you may add to your favorite links.
>
>Biotechfind - Biotech Industry Search Engine, Career and News Center
>
>
>1. The Biotechfind search engine allows searches to be made using
>Boolean operators with quotation marks (" "). This operator enables
>accurate searches to be made on the keyword(s) between quotation marks.
>
>2. Geographical searches can also be made by the search engine. The
>names of a city, a province (or state) or country may be
>included to refine the search. For example: "Proteomics San Diego"
>will help you find proteomics organizations in San Diego.
>
>3. Each link included in the Biotechfind database contains a list of
>keywords specifically describing the content of the site registered
>in the database. These keywords have been entered and hand picked and
>do not necessarily originate for the keywords included between the
>"Keywords" Meta tags of the site concerned. Thus, a site which is
>difficult to find with a conventional search engine (Google,
>Alta Vista, Lycos, Overture, etc.) because of incomplete Meta tags
>will become easy to find with Biotechfind because of the exhaustive
>list of keywords attached to the registration of the site.
>
>4. The keywords of websites contained in the database cannot be seen
>on the Biotechfind site. They can only be read by the search engine.
>
>5. Searches of companies and resource links carried out by name of
>molecule, technology, product, service or by stock quote are possible
>on Biotechfind because of the specific keywords attributed to each
>site. For example: the search Cytochrome p450 will help you find
>the company Cytochroma.
>
>With kind regards
>
>--
>
>Jean-Philippe Gravel, B.Sc
>
>Phone : 418-877-4996
>Fax : 418-877-3667
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Biosafty List Owner
rfink@mit.edu
--=====================_259929328==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
FYI,
I'm writing to suggest a link of interest in the biotechnology field,
which you may add to your favorite links.
Biotechfind - Biotech Industry Search Engine, Career and News Center
1. The Biotechfind search engine allows searches to be made using
Boolean operators with quotation marks (" "). This operator enables
accurate searches to be made on the keyword(s) between quotation marks.
2. Geographical searches can also be made by the search engine. The
names of a city, a province (or state) or country may be
included to refine the search. For example: "Proteomics San Diego"
will help you find proteomics organizations in San Diego.
3. Each link included in the Biotechfind database contains a list of
keywords specifically describing the content of the site registered
in the database. These keywords have been entered and hand picked and
do not necessarily originate for the keywords included between the
"Keywords" Meta tags of the site concerned. Thus, a site which is
difficult to find with a conventional search engine (Google,
Alta Vista, Lycos, Overture, etc.) because of incomplete Meta tags
will become easy to find with Biotechfind because of the exhaustive
list of keywords attached to the registration of the site.
4. The keywords of websites contained in the database cannot be seen
on the Biotechfind site. They can only be read by the search engine.
5. Searches of companies and resource links carried out by name of
molecule, technology, product, service or by stock quote are possible
on Biotechfind because of the specific keywords attributed to each
site. For example: the search Cytochrome p450 will help you find
the company Cytochroma.
With kind regards
--
Jean-Philippe Gravel, B.Sc
Phone : 418-877-4996
Fax : 418-877-3667
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Biosafty List Owner
rfink@mit.edu
--=====================_259929328==_.ALT--
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 25 Apr 2002 08:30:38 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Andrew Braun
Subject: USA Patriot Act
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
The USA Patriot Act was signed into law by GW Bush in late October. As far
as I know the Sterne strain remains exempt. The e-mail from Mark Hemphill
was dated after the act went in to effect. The vaccine exemption refers to
all vaccine strains.
Andy
From earlier Biosafty mailing
>Caution - if the USA-PATRIOT act moves out of subcommittee and
>is approved by the legislature, it is my understanding (not
>being a legislator or lawyer) that all anthrax bacteria will be
>subject to the provisions of that act, which will then include
>an amazing amount of security (compared to the "good old days"
>of last year). I don't understand how this overlaps with the
>current select agent regulations... (which is why I'm going to
>the Eagleson seminar in Philly in 2 weeks).
>
>Get your corporate counsel to help you with interpreting the
>law, and I would start now, rather than wait, since the proposed
>law gives you 30 days to get into compliance with it.
---------------------------------------
Andrew Braun, Sc.D
Harvard Medical School, Office for Research
25 Shattuck Street
Boston, MA 02115
617-432-4899; FAX 617-432-3169
---------------------------------------
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 26 Apr 2002 04:48:53 EDT
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Christian Nordqvist
Subject: A science resource
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="part1_189.70f5d66.29fa6e75_boundary"
--part1_189.70f5d66.29fa6e75_boundary
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="US-ASCII"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Dear Members
We have come a long way since we started just under two years ago. Our
website now has the following, and it is all free:
- The largest abbreviations database of medical, pharma, biotech, vet
abbreviations.
- Searchable database of 30 million Scientific Articles.
- The largest database of Scientific Conferences worldwide.
- A huge searchable database of medical, pharma, biotech associations
worldwide.
- A searchable database (wordwide) of 9000 pharma companies.
pharma-
Best Regards
Christian Nordqvist
--part1_189.70f5d66.29fa6e75_boundary
Content-Type: text/html; charset="US-ASCII"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Dear Members
We have come a long way since we started just under two years ago. Our website now has the following, and it is all free:
- The largest abbreviations database of medical, pharma, biotech, vet abbreviations.
- Searchable database of 30 million Scientific Articles.
- The largest database of Scientific Conferences worldwide.
- A huge searchable database of medical, pharma, biotech associations worldwide.
- A searchable database (wordwide) of 9000 pharma companies.
pharma-
Best Regards
Christian Nordqvist
--part1_189.70f5d66.29fa6e75_boundary--
=========================================================================
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 26 Apr 2002 13:23:37 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Gilpin, Richard"
Subject: New R-DNA Guidelines
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
I didn't see this on the listerv yesterday...so if you missed it...here it
is...
=======OBA NEWS========
News from the NIH Office of Biotechnology Activities
April 25, 2002
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
New Fully Indexed, Hyperlinked Version of the NIH Guidelines Available -- An
updated version of the NIH Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant DNA
Molecules has been posted to the OBA Web site and is available at
. The PDF version
of the NIH Guidelines is fully indexed and includes hyperlinks from the
index headers to the corresponding portion of the body of the document,
greatly facilitating referencing and navigation. The April 2002 version of
the NIH Guidelines includes recent changes in NIH safety reporting
requirements, as well as recent amendments modifying the RAC membership
provisions and establishing criteria for designating strains of E. coli as
risk group 1 agents.
For more information, please contact Allan C. Shipp, Director of Outreach,
NIH Office of Biotechnology Activities, 301-435-2152, or at
Richard W. Gilpin, Ph.D., RBP, CBSP
Assistant Director & Biosafety Officer
Environmental Health & Safety (EHS)
University of Maryland Baltimore
714 West Lombard Street, Room 305
Baltimore MD 21201-1084
(410) 706-7845
Fax (410) 706-1520
rgilpin@ehs.umaryland.edu
ehs.umaryland.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 26 Apr 2002 15:08:47 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Amy Barringer
Subject: Instrument Sterilization in BSCs
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
We've discussed a billion times that open flames w/gas connections are a =
bad idea in the BSC. I couldn't agree more, but how do you handle =
sterilization of instruments in the BSCs? Obviously, loops and needles =
are pretty straight forward, but I'm thinking more about scalpels, =
forceps, and necks of tissue culture flasks for instance. Does anyone =
know of any equipment that can handle these types of items and take the =
place of the Bunsen Burner/gas set-up? Thanks in advance, Amy
Amy A. Barringer
Biosafety Officer, SOHES
ARS/USDA
Beltsville Agricultural Research Center
Bldg. 003, Rm. 118
Beltsville, MD 20705
(Ph) 301-504-5557, (F) 301-504-5857
barringa@ba.ars.
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 26 Apr 2002 15:31:51 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Richard Fink
Subject: Re: Instrument Sterilization in BSCs
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
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boundary="=====================_103397948==_.ALT"
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The ceramic core heater (Bacti-cinterator) puts out enough heat at it's
mouth to do the equivalent of flame sterilization of a bottle neck, and
most other instruments can be placed inside.
At 03:08 PM 04/26/02 -0400, you wrote:
>We've discussed a billion times that open flames w/gas connections are a
>bad idea in the BSC. I couldn't agree more, but how do you handle
>sterilization of instruments in the BSCs? Obviously, loops and needles
>are pretty straight forward, but I'm thinking more about scalpels,
>forceps, and necks of tissue culture flasks for instance. Does anyone
>know of any equipment that can handle these types of items and take the
>place of the Bunsen Burner/gas set-up? Thanks in advance, Amy
>
>Amy A. Barringer
>Biosafety Officer, SOHES
>ARS/USDA
>Beltsville Agricultural Research Center
>Bldg. 003, Rm. 118
>Beltsville, MD 20705
>(Ph) 301-504-5557, (F) 301-504-5857
>barringa@ba.ars.
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
--=====================_103397948==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
The ceramic core heater (Bacti-cinterator) puts out enough heat at it's mouth to do the equivalent of flame sterilization of a bottle neck, and most other instruments can be placed inside.
At 03:08 PM 04/26/02 -0400, you wrote:
We've discussed a billion times that open flames w/gas connections are a bad idea in the BSC. I couldn't agree more, but how do you handle sterilization of instruments in the BSCs? Obviously, loops and needles are pretty straight forward, but I'm thinking more about scalpels, forceps, and necks of tissue culture flasks for instance. Does anyone know of any equipment that can handle these types of items and take the place of the Bunsen Burner/gas set-up? Thanks in advance, Amy
Amy A. Barringer
Biosafety Officer, SOHES
ARS/USDA
Beltsville Agricultural Research Center
Bldg. 003, Rm. 118
Beltsville, MD 20705
(Ph) 301-504-5557, (F) 301-504-5857
barringa@ba.ars.
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
--=====================_103397948==_.ALT--
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 26 Apr 2002 14:28:45 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Mark Campbell
Subject: Re: Instrument Sterilization in BSCs
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-transfer-encoding: 7bit
Amy, when I worked in the research lab we would place the instruments to be used in the autoclave (pouched) and then bring to the hood for use. You can autoclave a great number of instruments this way. You can also purchase disposable sterile items like loops, swabs and other equipment. Clinical micro labs also use the bacti-incinerators for non-reusable inoculating loops and some other intruments. Hope this helps. Any questions, let me know.
Mark Campbell, M.S.
Biological Safety Officer
Saint Louis University
1402 S. Grand Blvd.
Caroline Bldg. Rm. 307
(314) 577-8608
campbem@slu.edu
Amy Barringer wrote:
> We've discussed a billion times that open flames w/gas connections are a bad idea in the BSC. I couldn't agree more, but how do you handle sterilization of instruments in the BSCs? Obviously, loops and needles are pretty straight forward, but I'm thinking more about scalpels, forceps, and necks of tissue culture flasks for instance. Does anyone know of any equipment that can handle these types of items and take the place of the Bunsen Burner/gas set-up? Thanks in advance, Amy
>
> Amy A. Barringer
> Biosafety Officer, SOHES
> ARS/USDA
> Beltsville Agricultural Research Center
> Bldg. 003, Rm. 118
> Beltsville, MD 20705
> (Ph) 301-504-5557, (F) 301-504-5857
> barringa@ba.ars.
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 26 Apr 2002 14:45:03 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Betty Kupskay
Subject: Re: Instrument Sterilization in BSCs
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Hi Amy! The issue of sterilized forceps, scalpels, etc., can be dealt with by
pre-autoclaving these in covered autoclavable plastic containers or wrapping
seperately in brown craft paper or the special sleeves supplied for this use by
various companies. These can be taken into the BSC and used one by one - all you
would need is an autoclavable discard tray located in the BSC for
used/contaminated utensils.
As for the issue of flaming the necks of bottles, this is not necessary due to
the protective airflow in the BSC. Actually, using a flame for this purpose
would disturb the airflow and may result in contamination of the tissue culture
flasks.
Hope this helps! Have a great weekend!
Betty
Betty Kupskay, MSc, RBP
Senior Biosafety Officer/Health Canada
Canadian Science Centre for Human and Animal Health
1015 Arlington St., Suite A1010
Winnipeg, MB R3E 3P6
Ph: 204-789-2065
Fax: 204-789-2069
EMail: betty_kupskay@hc-sc.gc.ca
Amy Barringer on 2002/04/26 02:08:47 PM
Please respond to A Biosafety Discussion List
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
cc: (bcc: Betty Kupskay/HC-SC/GC/CA)
Subject: Instrument Sterilization in BSCs
We've discussed a billion times that open flames w/gas connections are a bad
idea in the BSC. I couldn't agree more, but how do you handle sterilization of
instruments in the BSCs? Obviously, loops and needles are pretty straight
forward, but I'm thinking more about scalpels, forceps, and necks of tissue
culture flasks for instance. Does anyone know of any equipment that can handle
these types of items and take the place of the Bunsen Burner/gas set-up? Thanks
in advance, Amy
Amy A. Barringer
Biosafety Officer, SOHES
ARS/USDA
Beltsville Agricultural Research Center
Bldg. 003, Rm. 118
Beltsville, MD 20705
(Ph) 301-504-5557, (F) 301-504-5857
barringa@ba.ars.
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 26 Apr 2002 15:46:37 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Gilpin, Richard"
Subject: FW: New R-DNA Guidelines
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Also, the new NSF/ANSI 49 - 2002 Class II (laminar flow) biosafety cabinetry
standard has been published.
Contact: NSF International
789 N. Dixboro Rd.
Ann Arbor, MI 48113-0140
(734) 769-8010 phone
(734) 769-0109 fax
Email info@
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Gilpin, Richard
> Sent: Friday, April 26, 2002 01:24 PM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: New R-DNA Guidelines
>
> I didn't see this on the listerv yesterday...so if you missed it...here it
> is...
> =======OBA NEWS========
> News from the NIH Office of Biotechnology Activities
> April 25, 2002
> ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
> New Fully Indexed, Hyperlinked Version of the NIH Guidelines Available --
> An updated version of the NIH Guidelines for Research Involving
> Recombinant DNA Molecules has been posted to the OBA Web site and is
> available at .
> The PDF version of the NIH Guidelines is fully indexed and includes
> hyperlinks from the index headers to the corresponding portion of the body
> of the document, greatly facilitating referencing and navigation. The
> April 2002 version of the NIH Guidelines includes recent changes in NIH
> safety reporting requirements, as well as recent amendments modifying the
> RAC membership provisions and establishing criteria for designating
> strains of E. coli as risk group 1 agents.
> For more information, please contact Allan C. Shipp, Director of Outreach,
> NIH Office of Biotechnology Activities, 301-435-2152, or at
>
>
>
> Richard W. Gilpin, Ph.D., RBP, CBSP
> Assistant Director & Biosafety Officer
> Environmental Health & Safety (EHS)
> University of Maryland Baltimore
> 714 West Lombard Street, Room 305
> Baltimore MD 21201-1084
> (410) 706-7845
> Fax (410) 706-1520
> rgilpin@ehs.umaryland.edu
> ehs.umaryland.edu
>
>
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 26 Apr 2002 16:28:26 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Richard J. Pollack"
Subject: Inventories
Mime-Version: 1.0
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boundary="============_-1192269588==_ma============"
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Recent statements made on this list regarding the security of certain
agents were timely and appropriate. One statement deserves further
comment, even though the correct interpretation of this issue is
generally obvious to laboratory investigators and biosafety personnel
(and to the originator of the quoted passage below. I am responsible
for the added emphasis.
>"Security: ...we know how much there is, who has access to them,
>and what's being done with them."
Some of those drafting and enforcing guidelines and regulations don't
seem to comprehend that an inventory of viable microorganisms is
unlike standard bookkeeping for office supplies. Pencils and erasers
may disappear through use and theft. Such items can be periodically
counted, and they don't generally replicate (at least not in my
desk). A lab inventory may document how many vials and boxes are in
your secure freezers, but enumerating the precise quantity of
microbes within each is, of course, impossible. At best, an
approximate concentration (plus or minus many millions) may be
estimated at the time the samples are placed into storage, and that
quantity may increase or decrease by some unknown factor during
subsequent incubation, handling, storage... or even by theft. An
apparent deficit of a few billion particles might reasonably cause
most accountants to panic, but such a "loss" might simply be
attributable to changes to the viability or infectiousness of these
agents or to estimates derived from differing assays.
I anticipate that many are confused and perhaps irritated by aspects
of new and pending legislation, and this situation is likely to
become increasingly difficult. Accordingly, we must be careful not
to give a false impression (regarding the precision of inventories)
to the non-scientists who may increasingly be asked to provide
oversight to laboratories around the country.
--============_-1192269588==_ma============
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
Recent statements made on this list regarding the security of certain agents were timely and appropriate. One statement deserves further comment, even though the correct interpretation of this issue is generally obvious to laboratory investigators and biosafety personnel (and to the originator of the quoted passage below. I am responsible for the added emphasis.
"Security: ...we know how much there is, who has access to them, and what's being done with them."
Some of those drafting and enforcing guidelines and regulations don't seem to comprehend that an inventory of viable microorganisms is unlike standard bookkeeping for office supplies. Pencils and erasers may disappear through use and theft. Such items can be periodically counted, and they don't generally replicate (at least not in my desk). A lab inventory may document how many vials and boxes are in your secure freezers, but enumerating the precise quantity of microbes within each is, of course, impossible. At best, an approximate concentration (plus or minus many millions) may be estimated at the time the samples are placed into storage, and that quantity may increase or decrease by some unknown factor during subsequent incubation, handling, storage... or even by theft. An apparent deficit of a few billion particles might reasonably cause most accountants to panic, but such a "loss" might simply be attributable to changes to the viability or infectiousness of these agents or to estimates derived from differing assays.
I anticipate that many are confused and perhaps irritated by aspects of new and pending legislation, and this situation is likely to become increasingly difficult. Accordingly, we must be careful not to give a false impression (regarding the precision of inventories) to the non-scientists who may increasingly be asked to provide oversight to laboratories around the country.
--============_-1192269588==_ma============--
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 26 Apr 2002 17:02:19 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Daniel King
Subject: Re: Instrument Sterilization in BSCs
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
An item not mentioned by previous responders is an electric dry sterilizer.
The unit is approximately a 14 cm cube in size. The cutting/contacting
surfaces of scalpels, scissors, forceps, etc. are sterilized in a well
containing glass beads heated to 260 C. These units are around $400 each. We
have used these for several years in animal rooms as well as in the lab to
cleanly and safely replace flame or flaming alcohol methods.
*************************************************
Daniel J. (Jack) King, D.V.M., Ph.D.
USDA, ARS, Southeast Poultry Research Laboratory
934 College Station Road
Athens, GA 30605
706-546-3407 Phone
706-546-3161 FAX
jking@seprl.
*************************************************
-----Original Message-----
From: Amy Barringer [mailto:BarringA@BA.ARS.]
Sent: Friday, April 26, 2002 3:09 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Instrument Sterilization in BSCs
We've discussed a billion times that open flames w/gas connections are a bad
idea in the BSC. I couldn't agree more, but how do you handle sterilization
of instruments in the BSCs? Obviously, loops and needles are pretty
straight forward, but I'm thinking more about scalpels, forceps, and necks
of tissue culture flasks for instance. Does anyone know of any equipment
that can handle these types of items and take the place of the Bunsen
Burner/gas set-up? Thanks in advance, Amy
Amy A. Barringer
Biosafety Officer, SOHES
ARS/USDA
Beltsville Agricultural Research Center
Bldg. 003, Rm. 118
Beltsville, MD 20705
(Ph) 301-504-5557, (F) 301-504-5857
barringa@ba.ars.
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 29 Apr 2002 08:43:22 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Morris, Gary"
Subject: Tissue Culturing and Safety Glasses
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
I'm interested in your view(s) and response to the following comment I've
received from a researcher. I know how I plan to respond - I just want to
see what you would say.
The researcher believes that wearing safety glasses in tissue culture labs
is conterproductive, as it requires the employee to continually take off and
put on their safety glasses as they go from the biosafety cabinet to the
microscope. The agent in question is a borderline BSL1/2 agent, with direct
eye exposure potentially causing conjectivitis. The researchers believes
that continually handling their safety glasses increases the risk of
touching their eyes with contaminated gloves. He believes that the sash on
the BSC provides protection while working under the hood. His rationale is
that it is not possible to wear safety glasses while looking under the
microscope.
How would you respond?
Thanks advance,
Gary Morris
EHS Manager
Pro-Virus, Inc.
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 29 Apr 2002 09:12:48 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Robert N. Latsch"
Subject: Re: Tissue Culturing and Safety Glasses
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
I would not reccommend safety glasses since liquids are invovled. The
point has some merit. but this problem can be overcome with a facesheild.
Bob
>I'm interested in your view(s) and response to the following comment I've
>received from a researcher. I know how I plan to respond - I just want to
>see what you would say.
>
>The researcher believes that wearing safety glasses in tissue culture labs
>is conterproductive, as it requires the employee to continually take off and
>put on their safety glasses as they go from the biosafety cabinet to the
>microscope. The agent in question is a borderline BSL1/2 agent, with direct
>eye exposure potentially causing conjectivitis. The researchers believes
>that continually handling their safety glasses increases the risk of
>touching their eyes with contaminated gloves. He believes that the sash on
>the BSC provides protection while working under the hood. His rationale is
>that it is not possible to wear safety glasses while looking under the
>microscope.
>
>How would you respond?
>
>Thanks advance,
>
>Gary Morris
>EHS Manager
>Pro-Virus, Inc.
_____________________________________________________________________
__ / _____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 29 Apr 2002 09:31:13 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Lori Keen
Subject: Re: Tissue Culturing and Safety Glasses
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
I'm interested in responses to this also.
I can tell you that the HHMI video on Mammalian cell culture hazards explicitly
says that safety glasses are not necessary because the sash provides
protection.
In our cell culture courses/research we did decide that students and employees
should wear safety glasses while working at the BSC.
We made this decision because we wanted our people to have the safety glasses
on when they stepped away from the BSC and continued their work. They do remove
the safety glasses when using the microscope. In this case, no one has
complained that this is problematic.
However,
On a related matter, we our not requiring use of safety glasses in our
microbiology courses (except for a couple of exercises where the students are
working with particularly hazardous stains). This decision was made for reasons
similar to the ones mentioned by the researcher in the original posting. Our
instructor reasoned that there was a greater risk of exposure when safety
glasses are constantly taken on and off (taken off to use the microscope) and
realizing that if taken off, the glasses would end up being placed on the work
surface. Using a neck cord to avoid laying the glasses on the bench top also is
problematic, since the glasses end up hanging at bench level and coming into
contact with the work surface, as well as catching on things on the bench top,
creating additional safety hazards. So our risk/benefit analysis led us to
decide that in this case, the use of safety glasses would increase the
likelihood of exposure rather than minimize. I welcome your collective wisdom
on this matter!
FYI, we use only BSL1/2 agents here.
Lori Keen
Lab Manager, Biology
Calvin College
616-957-6080
Member NAOSMM
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 29 Apr 2002 09:33:48 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Janeen LaPierre
Subject: Re: Tissue Culturing and Safety Glasses
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
I'm not sure I see how a face shield will deal with either concern any =
better than glasses. I wear prescription glasses and keep them on at the =
scope. No one should be removing eye or face protection with possibly =
contaminated gloves on anyway. If you need to take of the safety glasses =
then you need to remove the gloves and was hands first. Maybe they would =
rather have splash goggles since that is really what they should be using =
to protect from a liquid splash hazard.
My two cents, Janeen.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Janeen M. Lapierre
Microbiology Lab Coordinator
University of New England
College of Osteopathic Medicine
(207)283-0170 x2446
jlapierre@mailbox.une.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 29 Apr 2002 08:51:52 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Stefan Wagener
Subject: Re: Inventories & Biosecurity
Mime-Version: 1.0
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That's exactly the reason why we have organized a conference on this to=
pic (see
info below). I highly recommend all of you to participate since we will=
discuss
not only the upcoming USDA procedures but also the ABSA white paper on=
"Biosecurity" which is currently under development.
Thanks
Stefan Wagener
------------------------------
The Canadian Science Centre for Human and Animal Health (CSCHAH) is hos=
ting the
first international "Symposium on Biosecurity for Laboratories" on May =
13 and
14, 2002 at the Fairmont Hotel in Winnipeg, Manitoba (Canada). We are
partnering with Health Canada's Office of Laboratory Security, CFIA's
Biocontainment, Safety and Facilities Division, and ABSA Canada to put =
on the
event under the umbrella of the "2002 Canadian Biosafety Symposium". In=
setting
up this timely event, we will address important topics as they relate t=
o
biosecurity. Our goal is to stimulate discussion, provide ideas and ult=
imately
help in the establishment of national and international guidelines on l=
aboratory
biosecurity. We welcome your participation and look forward to seeing y=
ou in
Winnipeg in May.
For more information, please see the attached pdf file or visit the web=
site at:
"Richard J. Pollack" on 2002-04-26 03:28:26=
PM
Please respond to A Biosafety Discussion List =
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
cc: (bcc: Stefan Wagener/HC-SC/GC/CA)
Subject: Inventories
=
--0__=4or8HkK6rMkBdjeoLICIVi9FYOnI1PH99vcv1DfljcSdBqD94oWAtpRk
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Disposition: inline
Recent statements made on this list regarding the security of certain
agents were timely and appropriate. One statement deserves further
comment, even though the correct interpretation of this issue is
generally obvious to laboratory investigators and biosafety personnel
(and to the originator of the quoted passage below. I am responsible
for the added emphasis.
>"Security: ...we know how much there is, who has access to them,
>and what's being done with them."
Some of those drafting and enforcing guidelines and regulations don't
seem to comprehend that an inventory of viable microorganisms is
unlike standard bookkeeping for office supplies. Pencils and erasers
may disappear through use and theft. Such items can be periodically
counted, and they don't generally replicate (at least not in my
desk). A lab inventory may document how many vials and boxes are in
your secure freezers, but enumerating the precise quantity of
microbes within each is, of course, impossible. At best, an
approximate concentration (plus or minus many millions) may be
estimated at the time the samples are placed into storage, and that
quantity may increase or decrease by some unknown factor during
subsequent incubation, handling, storage... or even by theft. An
apparent deficit of a few billion particles might reasonably cause
most accountants to panic, but such a "loss" might simply be
attributable to changes to the viability or infectiousness of these
agents or to estimates derived from differing assays.
I anticipate that many are confused and perhaps irritated by aspects
of new and pending legislation, and this situation is likely to
become increasingly difficult. Accordingly, we must be careful not
to give a false impression (regarding the precision of inventories)
to the non-scientists who may increasingly be asked to provide
oversight to laboratories around the country.
--0__=4or8HkK6rMkBdjeoLICIVi9FYOnI1PH99vcv1DfljcSdBqD94oWAtpRk
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b3VudHJ5LjwvZGl2Pg0KPC9ib2R5Pg0KPC9odG1sPg0K
--0__=4or8HkK6rMkBdjeoLICIVi9FYOnI1PH99vcv1DfljcSdBqD94oWAtpRk--
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 29 Apr 2002 09:56:36 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Robert N. Latsch"
Subject: Re: Tissue Culturing and Safety Glasses
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Let me point out the philosophy in using ppe which is being skirted. PPE
is the last line of defense. Engineering controls and work practices are
to be in place as primary protection for the worker. In this case, eye
protection, is to be used because it must be assumed that accidents will
happen, the sash will not work, the worker will get splashed. It is the
last line of defense.
Prescription glasses are not considered safety glasses unless they are in
fact prescription safety glasses. Safety glasses will protect a worker
from particulates and dusts. Airborne solids in other words.
Safety Goggles or a facesheild will protect the worker from liquid
splashes. The facesheild can be lifted out of the way with minimal
interruption.
Why don't saftey glasses work well against liquids? Two primary reasons:
the liquids can splash and hit the worker in the face, above the glasses.
The liquid will then fall down the face into the eyes. OR, the worker will
reflexivley duck. The liquid will bounce off of the glasses and into the
eyes. If one tries, they could easily construct an aurgument that outlaws
the safety glasses.
The bottom line here is that the researcher does not want to be bothered
with eye protection.
A real good assessement needs to be made. Is there a hazard here?, Is eye
protection necessary? What other methods can be used to protect the
workers.
For that matter, how do people in a level three and four environments use a
microscope? If they can use a microscope in those environments with eye
protection, What is the problem in a level two or one environment?
My two cents.
Bob
>I'm not sure I see how a face shield will deal with either concern any
>better than glasses. I wear prescription glasses and keep them on at the
>scope. No one should be removing eye or face protection with possibly
>contaminated gloves on anyway. If you need to take of the safety glasses
>then you need to remove the gloves and was hands first. Maybe they would
>rather have splash goggles since that is really what they should be using
>to protect from a liquid splash hazard.
>
>My two cents, Janeen.
>
>~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>Janeen M. Lapierre
>Microbiology Lab Coordinator
>University of New England
>College of Osteopathic Medicine
>(207)283-0170 x2446
>jlapierre@mailbox.une.edu
_____________________________________________________________________
__ / _____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 29 Apr 2002 11:36:42 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ed Gaunt
Subject: Re: Tissue Culturing and Safety Glasses
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
A solution I have successfully used to solve the glasses/microscope issue is
to attach a digital camera to the scope and then just look at the monitor.
Edward E. Gaunt, Ph.D.
Senior Research Scientist
Analytical Sciences, Inc.
2605 Meridian Parkway, Suite 200
Durham, NC 27713
Ph: 919-313-7585 (direct)
919-544-8500 (general)
Fx: 919-544-7507
Mailto:/egaunt@
-----Original Message-----
From: Robert N. Latsch [mailto:rnl2@PO.CWRU.EDU]
Sent: Monday, April 29, 2002 9:57 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Tissue Culturing and Safety Glasses
Let me point out the philosophy in using ppe which is being skirted. PPE
is the last line of defense. Engineering controls and work practices are
to be in place as primary protection for the worker. In this case, eye
protection, is to be used because it must be assumed that accidents will
happen, the sash will not work, the worker will get splashed. It is the
last line of defense.
Prescription glasses are not considered safety glasses unless they are in
fact prescription safety glasses. Safety glasses will protect a worker
from particulates and dusts. Airborne solids in other words.
Safety Goggles or a facesheild will protect the worker from liquid
splashes. The facesheild can be lifted out of the way with minimal
interruption.
Why don't saftey glasses work well against liquids? Two primary reasons:
the liquids can splash and hit the worker in the face, above the glasses.
The liquid will then fall down the face into the eyes. OR, the worker will
reflexivley duck. The liquid will bounce off of the glasses and into the
eyes. If one tries, they could easily construct an aurgument that outlaws
the safety glasses.
The bottom line here is that the researcher does not want to be bothered
with eye protection.
A real good assessement needs to be made. Is there a hazard here?, Is eye
protection necessary? What other methods can be used to protect the
workers.
For that matter, how do people in a level three and four environments use a
microscope? If they can use a microscope in those environments with eye
protection, What is the problem in a level two or one environment?
My two cents.
Bob
>I'm not sure I see how a face shield will deal with either concern any
>better than glasses. I wear prescription glasses and keep them on at the
>scope. No one should be removing eye or face protection with possibly
>contaminated gloves on anyway. If you need to take of the safety glasses
>then you need to remove the gloves and was hands first. Maybe they would
>rather have splash goggles since that is really what they should be using
>to protect from a liquid splash hazard.
>
>My two cents, Janeen.
>
>~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>Janeen M. Lapierre
>Microbiology Lab Coordinator
>University of New England
>College of Osteopathic Medicine
>(207)283-0170 x2446
>jlapierre@mailbox.une.edu
_____________________________________________________________________
__ /
_____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 29 Apr 2002 11:56:41 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Barb Ernisse
Subject: Quick solvent question - I hope
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Does anyone in Biosafty land know if acetonitrile kills agents of
concern in blood or other potentially infectious materials and, if so,
at what concentration of acetonitrile? Yes, I know it is not and EPA
registered disinfectant and I have checked the references at hand.
Thanks in advance for you help on this question and all the past
assistance from reading the list.
Barb Ernisse
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 29 Apr 2002 12:13:50 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Lori Keen
Subject: Re: Tissue Culturing and Safety Glasses
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Unfortunately, the digital camera idea doesn't work for 24 students/scopes.
Lori Keen
Lab Manager, Biology
Calvin College
616-957-6080
Member NAOSMM
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 29 Apr 2002 11:40:17 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Liz Rohonczy
Subject: Level 3 diagnostic PM room
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Does anyone know of a routine diagnostic PM room (large animal) operating =
at Level 3 ? We have a group that wants to build one but is having =
trouble seeing how they could operate practically at Level 3 on a routine =
basis. They get about 10 cases a day, some arriving live. I am looking =
for a facility that they could visit and speak to the pathologists, =
etc.
Thanks,
Elizabeth Rohonczy D.V.M.
Head, Biocontainment and Facility Certification
Canadian Food Inspection Agency
59 Camelot Drive
Nepean, Ontario
K1A 0Y9
(613) 225-2342 ext. 3702
Tel: (613) 225-2342
Fax: (613) 228-6670
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 29 Apr 2002 13:34:48 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Richard Fink
Subject: Re: Level 3 diagnostic PM room
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="=====================_19201239==_.ALT"
--=====================_19201239==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
I would ask the folks at USDA, Plum Island. If I could find my ABSA
directory I could give you the name of the safety officer there but even
though I have cleared off 80% of my desk, it must be in the remaining 20%
pile. So, try:
Dr. David L. Huxsoll, Interim Director
Plum Island Animal Disease Center
USDA-ARS-NAA
P.O. Box 848
Greenport, NY 11944
Telephone: 631-323-3207
Email: dhuxsoll@piadc.ars.
At 11:40 AM 04/29/02 -0400, you wrote:
>Does anyone know of a routine diagnostic PM room (large animal) operating
>at Level 3 ? We have a group that wants to build one but is having
>trouble seeing how they could operate practically at Level 3 on a routine
>basis. They get about 10 cases a day, some arriving live. I am looking
>for a facility that they could visit and speak to the pathologists, etc.
>
>Thanks,
>
>
>Elizabeth Rohonczy D.V.M.
>Head, Biocontainment and Facility Certification
>Canadian Food Inspection Agency
>59 Camelot Drive
>Nepean, Ontario
>K1A 0Y9
>(613) 225-2342 ext. 3702
>Tel: (613) 225-2342
>Fax: (613) 228-6670
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
--=====================_19201239==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
I would ask the folks at USDA, Plum Island. If I could find my ABSA directory I could give you the name of the safety officer there but even though I have cleared off 80% of my desk, it must be in the remaining 20% pile. So, try:
Dr. David L. Huxsoll, Interim Director
Plum Island Animal Disease Center
USDA-ARS-NAA
P.O. Box 848
Greenport, NY 11944
Telephone: 631-323-3207
Email: dhuxsoll@piadc.ars.
At 11:40 AM 04/29/02 -0400, you wrote:
Does anyone know of a routine diagnostic PM room (large animal) operating at Level 3 ? We have a group that wants to build one but is having trouble seeing how they could operate practically at Level 3 on a routine basis. They get about 10 cases a day, some arriving live. I am looking for a facility that they could visit and speak to the pathologists, etc.
Thanks,
Elizabeth Rohonczy D.V.M.
Head, Biocontainment and Facility Certification
Canadian Food Inspection Agency
59 Camelot Drive
Nepean, Ontario
K1A 0Y9
(613) 225-2342 ext. 3702
Tel: (613) 225-2342
Fax: (613) 228-6670
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
--=====================_19201239==_.ALT--
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 29 Apr 2002 13:41:59 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Alan Woodard
Subject: Re: Level 3 diagnostic PM room
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
The biosafety Officer is Tom Sawicki
>>> Richard Fink 04/29/02 01:34PM >>>
I would ask the folks at USDA, Plum Island. If I could find my ABSA
directory I could give you the name of the safety officer there but even
though I have cleared off 80% of my desk, it must be in the remaining 20%
pile. So, try:
Dr. David L. Huxsoll, Interim Director
Plum Island Animal Disease Center
USDA-ARS-NAA
P.O. Box 848
Greenport, NY 11944
Telephone: 631-323-3207
Email: dhuxsoll@piadc.ars.
At 11:40 AM 04/29/02 -0400, you wrote:
>Does anyone know of a routine diagnostic PM room (large animal) operating
>at Level 3 ? We have a group that wants to build one but is having
>trouble seeing how they could operate practically at Level 3 on a routine
>basis. They get about 10 cases a day, some arriving live. I am looking
>for a facility that they could visit and speak to the pathologists, etc.
>
>Thanks,
>
>
>Elizabeth Rohonczy D.V.M.
>Head, Biocontainment and Facility Certification
>Canadian Food Inspection Agency
>59 Camelot Drive
>Nepean, Ontario
>K1A 0Y9
>(613) 225-2342 ext. 3702
>Tel: (613) 225-2342
>Fax: (613) 228-6670
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 29 Apr 2002 11:47:53 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Tom Sawicki
Subject: Re: Level 3 diagnostic PM room
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
I would be happy to assist with this. Please give me an email.
Thomas Sawicki, Biological Safety Officer
USDA Plum Island Animal Disease Center
tsawicki@piadc.ars.
>>> Richard Fink 4/29/02 1:34 PM >>>
I would ask the folks at USDA, Plum Island. If I could find my ABSA
directory I could give you the name of the safety officer there but even
though I have cleared off 80% of my desk, it must be in the remaining 20%
pile. So, try:
Dr. David L. Huxsoll, Interim Director
Plum Island Animal Disease Center
USDA-ARS-NAA
P.O. Box 848
Greenport, NY 11944
Telephone: 631-323-3207
Email: dhuxsoll@piadc.ars.
At 11:40 AM 04/29/02 -0400, you wrote:
>Does anyone know of a routine diagnostic PM room (large animal) operating
>at Level 3 ? We have a group that wants to build one but is having
>trouble seeing how they could operate practically at Level 3 on a routine
>basis. They get about 10 cases a day, some arriving live. I am looking
>for a facility that they could visit and speak to the pathologists, etc.
>
>Thanks,
>
>
>Elizabeth Rohonczy D.V.M.
>Head, Biocontainment and Facility Certification
>Canadian Food Inspection Agency
>59 Camelot Drive
>Nepean, Ontario
>K1A 0Y9
>(613) 225-2342 ext. 3702
>Tel: (613) 225-2342
>Fax: (613) 228-6670
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 29 Apr 2002 16:16:14 -0400
Reply-To: Isabel Jean Goldberg
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Isabel Jean Goldberg
Organization: NYU School of Medicine
Subject: Fw: URGENT - VIRUS ALERT
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
I am forwarding this message to you because I found the virus reference
below on my hard drive.
----- Original Message -----
From: "deyanira Santiago"
To: "Alex Joyner (E-mail)" ; "Arturo Zychlinsky
(E-mail)" ; "Audrey from Topaz (E-mail)"
; "Bruce Cronstein (E-mail)"
; "Bunge, Mary (E-mail)" ;
"Carol Lyden (E-mail)" ; ; "Carol Welt Ph. D. (E-mail)"
; "Cathy (E-mail)" ;
"Cristina Murphy (E-mail)" ; "Cristina Murphy
(E-mail)" ; "Cynthia Loomis (E-mail)"
; "Dan Littman (E-mail)"
; "David E Levy (E-mail)" ;
"David Ron (E-mail)" ; ; "Dr. Gilbert Grant (E-mail)"
; "Elysse Orchard (E-mail)" ;
"Esther Gardner (E-mail)" ; ; "F. Gregory Baumann (E-mail)"
; "Farooq Niazi (E-mail)"
; "Fredrick Burns (E-mail)"
; "Gerry.Griffin (E-mail)"
; "Hylton Gordon (E-mail)"
; "Ian Mohr (E-mail)"
; "Isaac Wirgin (E-mail)"
; "Jack Hessler (E-mail)" ;
"Jaun Lafaille (E-mail)" ; "Jean Goldberg
(E-mail)" ; "Jerald. Silverman (E-mail)"
; "Jerome Vanderberg (E-mail)"
; "Joellen Shaw (E-mail)"
; "John Simpson (E-mail)"
; "Jonathan D. Brodie (E-mail)"
; "Juan Lafaille (E-mail)"
; "Judy Zelikoff (E-mail)"
; "Kammy Cabral (E-mail)" ;
"Kathy Seymour (E-mail)" ; "Kerry Walton (E-mail)"
; "Kleitman, Naomi (NINDS) (E-mail)"
; "Lance McNeil (E-mail)" ;
"Maarten Bosland (E-mail)" ; "Mark Raymond
(E-mail)" ; "Martin Posner (E-mail)"
; "Mary Lou James (E-mail)" ;
"Mas@Alum.Mit.Edu (E-mail)" ; "Merdad Parsey (E-mail)"
; "Michael Nissen (E-mail)"
; "Nora. Torres (E-mail)"
; "Patricia Wolfe (E-mail)"
; "Pguider@ (E-mail)"
; "Richard. Mann (E-mail)" ;
"Rise Schwab (E-mail)" ; "Robert Fessler (E-mail)"
; "Samantha Hartford (E-mail)"
; "Sandra Fiorelli (E-mail)"
; "Turnbull (E-mail)" ;
"Xiomara Ogando (E-mail)"
Sent: Monday, April 29, 2002 3:20 PM
Subject: FW: URGENT - VIRUS ALERT
>
>
> Deyanira Santiago
> Animal Subjects Compliance Coordinator
> Tel: (212) 263-5691
> Fax (212) 263-0727
> E-mail: mailto:santid03@med.nyu.edu
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Jerome Vanderberg [mailto:Jerome.Vanderberg@med.nyu.edu]
> Sent: Monday, April 29, 2002 3:04 PM
> To: clarka01@popmail.med.nyu.edu; eichid01@popmail.med.nyu.edu;
> freveu01@popmail.med.nyu.edu; nardie01@popmail.med.nyu.edu; jr57@nyu.edu;
> photini.sinnis@med.nyu.edu; fz5@is2.nyu.edu; tsujim01@popmail.med.nyu.edu;
> vernik01@popmail.med.nyu.edu; merals01@popmail.med.nyu.edu;
> vandej01@popmail.med.nyu.edu; nusser01@popmail.med.nyu.edu;
> rodria02@popmail.med.nyu.edu; spaetg01@popmail.med.nyu.edu;
> huntlt01@popmail.med.nyu.edu; salass01@med.nyu.edu;
> hellsu01@popmail.med.nyu.edu; Andy.London@med.nyu.edu; GBOURO@;
> nachbar@popmail.med.nyu.edu; vilcej01@popmail.med.nyu.edu;
> rosenm01@popmail.med.nyu.edu; freya01@popmail.med.nyu.edu; kh9@is.nyu.edu;
> vandej01@popmail.med.nyu.edu; Gabriela; santid03@endeavor.med.nyu.edu;
> nussev01@popmail.med.nyu.edu; richag03@popmail.med.nyu.edu
> Subject: URGENT - VIRUS ALERT
> Importance: High
>
> I unknowingly received a computer virus, and it may have already been sent
> to people on my contact lists. It is important to follow instructions to
> identify and eliminate this virus. If you find this virus, please
contact
> everyone on your contact list, as you may have unknowingly passed it
along.
>
> The virus file name is jdbgmgr.exe and it is not currently detected with
> Sophos, McAfee nor Norton virus protection. It remains in your computer's
> system for 14 days before it deletes all your files.
> To eliminate it, follow these instructions:
> 1. On your computer, go to "START", then "FIND", then "FILES OR FOLDERS".
> 2. Under "NAMED", type jdbgmgr.exe , then click "FIND NOW"
> 3. If the virus appears (the icon next to it will be a small teddy bear),
> the name will be jdbgmgr.exe
> 4. DO NOT OPEN IT!!!! Instead, right-click on it and DELETE it. It will
> be sent to the recycle bin.
> 5. When you see it disappear, go to the recycle bin, and delete it from
> there too. (If possible, empty the entire recycle bin.)
> If you find this virus in your system, please send this message to
everyone
> in your address list.
> Jerry Vanderberg
>
>
>
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 29 Apr 2002 12:26:52 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Andrew J Bartel
Organization: Department of Biological Sciences
Subject: Re: URGENT - VIRUS ALERT
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
This is a hoax. See this website:
> > > > > > > > > > >
Andrew J Bartel
Laboratory Manager
Department of Biological Sciences
University of Alaska Anchorage
Science Bldg. 243
3211 Providence Drive
Anchorage AK 99508
(907)786-1268 voice
(907)786-1148 fax
ajb@uaa.alaska.edu
----- Original Message -----
From: "Isabel Jean Goldberg"
To:
Sent: Monday, April 29, 2002 12:16 PM
Subject: Fw: URGENT - VIRUS ALERT
> I am forwarding this message to you because I found the virus reference
> below on my hard drive.
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "deyanira Santiago"
> To: "Alex Joyner (E-mail)" ; "Arturo Zychlinsky
> (E-mail)" ; "Audrey from Topaz (E-mail)"
> ; "Bruce Cronstein (E-mail)"
> ; "Bunge, Mary (E-mail)" ;
> "Carol Lyden (E-mail)" ; ; "Carol Welt Ph. D. (E-mail)"
> ; "Cathy (E-mail)" ;
> "Cristina Murphy (E-mail)" ; "Cristina Murphy
> (E-mail)" ; "Cynthia Loomis (E-mail)"
> ; "Dan Littman (E-mail)"
> ; "David E Levy (E-mail)"
;
> "David Ron (E-mail)" ; ; "Dr. Gilbert Grant (E-mail)"
> ; "Elysse Orchard (E-mail)"
;
> "Esther Gardner (E-mail)" ; ; "F. Gregory Baumann (E-mail)"
> ; "Farooq Niazi (E-mail)"
> ; "Fredrick Burns (E-mail)"
> ; "Gerry.Griffin (E-mail)"
> ; "Hylton Gordon (E-mail)"
> ; "Ian Mohr (E-mail)"
> ; "Isaac Wirgin (E-mail)"
> ; "Jack Hessler (E-mail)" ;
> "Jaun Lafaille (E-mail)" ; "Jean Goldberg
> (E-mail)" ; "Jerald. Silverman (E-mail)"
> ; "Jerome Vanderberg (E-mail)"
> ; "Joellen Shaw (E-mail)"
> ; "John Simpson (E-mail)"
> ; "Jonathan D. Brodie (E-mail)"
> ; "Juan Lafaille (E-mail)"
> ; "Judy Zelikoff (E-mail)"
> ; "Kammy Cabral (E-mail)" ;
> "Kathy Seymour (E-mail)" ; "Kerry Walton
(E-mail)"
> ; "Kleitman, Naomi (NINDS) (E-mail)"
> ; "Lance McNeil (E-mail)" ;
> "Maarten Bosland (E-mail)" ; "Mark Raymond
> (E-mail)" ; "Martin Posner (E-mail)"
> ; "Mary Lou James (E-mail)" ;
> "Mas@Alum.Mit.Edu (E-mail)" ; "Merdad Parsey (E-mail)"
> ; "Michael Nissen (E-mail)"
> ; "Nora. Torres (E-mail)"
> ; "Patricia Wolfe (E-mail)"
> ; "Pguider@ (E-mail)"
> ; "Richard. Mann (E-mail)" ;
> "Rise Schwab (E-mail)" ; "Robert Fessler (E-mail)"
> ; "Samantha Hartford (E-mail)"
> ; "Sandra Fiorelli (E-mail)"
> ; "Turnbull (E-mail)" ;
> "Xiomara Ogando (E-mail)"
> Sent: Monday, April 29, 2002 3:20 PM
> Subject: FW: URGENT - VIRUS ALERT
>
>
> >
> >
> > Deyanira Santiago
> > Animal Subjects Compliance Coordinator
> > Tel: (212) 263-5691
> > Fax (212) 263-0727
> > E-mail: mailto:santid03@med.nyu.edu
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Jerome Vanderberg [mailto:Jerome.Vanderberg@med.nyu.edu]
> > Sent: Monday, April 29, 2002 3:04 PM
> > To: clarka01@popmail.med.nyu.edu; eichid01@popmail.med.nyu.edu;
> > freveu01@popmail.med.nyu.edu; nardie01@popmail.med.nyu.edu;
jr57@nyu.edu;
> > photini.sinnis@med.nyu.edu; fz5@is2.nyu.edu;
tsujim01@popmail.med.nyu.edu;
> > vernik01@popmail.med.nyu.edu; merals01@popmail.med.nyu.edu;
> > vandej01@popmail.med.nyu.edu; nusser01@popmail.med.nyu.edu;
> > rodria02@popmail.med.nyu.edu; spaetg01@popmail.med.nyu.edu;
> > huntlt01@popmail.med.nyu.edu; salass01@med.nyu.edu;
> > hellsu01@popmail.med.nyu.edu; Andy.London@med.nyu.edu;
GBOURO@;
> > nachbar@popmail.med.nyu.edu; vilcej01@popmail.med.nyu.edu;
> > rosenm01@popmail.med.nyu.edu; freya01@popmail.med.nyu.edu;
kh9@is.nyu.edu;
> > vandej01@popmail.med.nyu.edu; Gabriela; santid03@endeavor.med.nyu.edu;
> > nussev01@popmail.med.nyu.edu; richag03@popmail.med.nyu.edu
> > Subject: URGENT - VIRUS ALERT
> > Importance: High
> >
> > I unknowingly received a computer virus, and it may have already been
sent
> > to people on my contact lists. It is important to follow instructions
to
> > identify and eliminate this virus. If you find this virus, please
> contact
> > everyone on your contact list, as you may have unknowingly passed it
> along.
> >
> > The virus file name is jdbgmgr.exe and it is not currently detected with
> > Sophos, McAfee nor Norton virus protection. It remains in your
computer's
> > system for 14 days before it deletes all your files.
> > To eliminate it, follow these instructions:
> > 1. On your computer, go to "START", then "FIND", then "FILES OR
FOLDERS".
> > 2. Under "NAMED", type jdbgmgr.exe , then click "FIND NOW"
> > 3. If the virus appears (the icon next to it will be a small teddy
bear),
> > the name will be jdbgmgr.exe
> > 4. DO NOT OPEN IT!!!! Instead, right-click on it and DELETE it. It
will
> > be sent to the recycle bin.
> > 5. When you see it disappear, go to the recycle bin, and delete it from
> > there too. (If possible, empty the entire recycle bin.)
> > If you find this virus in your system, please send this message to
> everyone
> > in your address list.
> > Jerry Vanderberg
> >
> >
> >
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 29 Apr 2002 16:30:00 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Erik A. Talley"
Subject: Re: Fw: URGENT - VIRUS ALERT
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
That is a hoax. Please discard the message and don't forward it. From
McAfee's Website:
-----------------
AVERT HOAX Notice!!
McAfee AVERT Labs would like to inform you of a new email HOAX.
This email message is just a HOAX. Although, the JDBGMGR.EXE file may
become infected by a number of valid viruses (most commonly W32/Magistr@MM,
the details of this HOAX message are not based on actual events.
We are advising users who receive the email to delete the message and DO
NOT pass it on as this is how an email HOAX propagates.
JDBGMGR.EXE is the Microsoft Debugger Registrar for Java.
-------------------
At 04:16 PM 4/29/2002 -0400, you wrote:
>I am forwarding this message to you because I found the virus reference
>below on my hard drive.
>----- Original Message -----
>From: "deyanira Santiago"
>To: "Alex Joyner (E-mail)" ; "Arturo Zychlinsky
>(E-mail)" ; "Audrey from Topaz (E-mail)"
>; "Bruce Cronstein (E-mail)"
>; "Bunge, Mary (E-mail)" ;
>"Carol Lyden (E-mail)" ; ; "Carol Welt Ph. D. (E-mail)"
>; "Cathy (E-mail)" ;
>"Cristina Murphy (E-mail)" ; "Cristina Murphy
>(E-mail)" ; "Cynthia Loomis (E-mail)"
>; "Dan Littman (E-mail)"
>; "David E Levy (E-mail)" ;
>"David Ron (E-mail)" ; ; "Dr. Gilbert Grant (E-mail)"
>; "Elysse Orchard (E-mail)" ;
>"Esther Gardner (E-mail)" ; ; "F. Gregory Baumann (E-mail)"
>; "Farooq Niazi (E-mail)"
>; "Fredrick Burns (E-mail)"
>; "Gerry.Griffin (E-mail)"
>; "Hylton Gordon (E-mail)"
>; "Ian Mohr (E-mail)"
>; "Isaac Wirgin (E-mail)"
>; "Jack Hessler (E-mail)" ;
>"Jaun Lafaille (E-mail)" ; "Jean Goldberg
>(E-mail)" ; "Jerald. Silverman (E-mail)"
>; "Jerome Vanderberg (E-mail)"
>; "Joellen Shaw (E-mail)"
>; "John Simpson (E-mail)"
>; "Jonathan D. Brodie (E-mail)"
>; "Juan Lafaille (E-mail)"
>; "Judy Zelikoff (E-mail)"
>; "Kammy Cabral (E-mail)" ;
>"Kathy Seymour (E-mail)" ; "Kerry Walton (E-mail)"
>; "Kleitman, Naomi (NINDS) (E-mail)"
>; "Lance McNeil (E-mail)" ;
>"Maarten Bosland (E-mail)" ; "Mark Raymond
>(E-mail)" ; "Martin Posner (E-mail)"
>; "Mary Lou James (E-mail)" ;
>"Mas@Alum.Mit.Edu (E-mail)" ; "Merdad Parsey (E-mail)"
>; "Michael Nissen (E-mail)"
>; "Nora. Torres (E-mail)"
>; "Patricia Wolfe (E-mail)"
>; "Pguider@ (E-mail)"
>; "Richard. Mann (E-mail)" ;
>"Rise Schwab (E-mail)" ; "Robert Fessler (E-mail)"
>; "Samantha Hartford (E-mail)"
>; "Sandra Fiorelli (E-mail)"
>; "Turnbull (E-mail)" ;
>"Xiomara Ogando (E-mail)"
>Sent: Monday, April 29, 2002 3:20 PM
>Subject: FW: URGENT - VIRUS ALERT
>
>
> >
> >
> > Deyanira Santiago
> > Animal Subjects Compliance Coordinator
> > Tel: (212) 263-5691
> > Fax (212) 263-0727
> > E-mail: mailto:santid03@med.nyu.edu
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Jerome Vanderberg [mailto:Jerome.Vanderberg@med.nyu.edu]
> > Sent: Monday, April 29, 2002 3:04 PM
> > To: clarka01@popmail.med.nyu.edu; eichid01@popmail.med.nyu.edu;
> > freveu01@popmail.med.nyu.edu; nardie01@popmail.med.nyu.edu; jr57@nyu.edu;
> > photini.sinnis@med.nyu.edu; fz5@is2.nyu.edu; tsujim01@popmail.med.nyu.edu;
> > vernik01@popmail.med.nyu.edu; merals01@popmail.med.nyu.edu;
> > vandej01@popmail.med.nyu.edu; nusser01@popmail.med.nyu.edu;
> > rodria02@popmail.med.nyu.edu; spaetg01@popmail.med.nyu.edu;
> > huntlt01@popmail.med.nyu.edu; salass01@med.nyu.edu;
> > hellsu01@popmail.med.nyu.edu; Andy.London@med.nyu.edu; GBOURO@;
> > nachbar@popmail.med.nyu.edu; vilcej01@popmail.med.nyu.edu;
> > rosenm01@popmail.med.nyu.edu; freya01@popmail.med.nyu.edu; kh9@is.nyu.edu;
> > vandej01@popmail.med.nyu.edu; Gabriela; santid03@endeavor.med.nyu.edu;
> > nussev01@popmail.med.nyu.edu; richag03@popmail.med.nyu.edu
> > Subject: URGENT - VIRUS ALERT
> > Importance: High
> >
> > I unknowingly received a computer virus, and it may have already been sent
> > to people on my contact lists. It is important to follow instructions to
> > identify and eliminate this virus. If you find this virus, please
>contact
> > everyone on your contact list, as you may have unknowingly passed it
>along.
> >
> > The virus file name is jdbgmgr.exe and it is not currently detected with
> > Sophos, McAfee nor Norton virus protection. It remains in your computer's
> > system for 14 days before it deletes all your files.
> > To eliminate it, follow these instructions:
> > 1. On your computer, go to "START", then "FIND", then "FILES OR FOLDERS".
> > 2. Under "NAMED", type jdbgmgr.exe , then click "FIND NOW"
> > 3. If the virus appears (the icon next to it will be a small teddy bear),
> > the name will be jdbgmgr.exe
> > 4. DO NOT OPEN IT!!!! Instead, right-click on it and DELETE it. It will
> > be sent to the recycle bin.
> > 5. When you see it disappear, go to the recycle bin, and delete it from
> > there too. (If possible, empty the entire recycle bin.)
> > If you find this virus in your system, please send this message to
>everyone
> > in your address list.
> > Jerry Vanderberg
> >
> >
> >
___________________________________
Erik A. Talley, Director
Environmental Health and Safety
Weill Medical College of Cornell University
418 East 71st Street, Suite 62
New York, NY 10021
212-746-6201
ert2002@med.cornell.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 29 Apr 2002 16:28:41 -0400
Reply-To: Isabel Jean Goldberg
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Isabel Jean Goldberg
Organization: NYU School of Medicine
Subject: virus hoax
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="----=_NextPart_000_000B_01C1EF9A.EC742040"
This is a multi-part message in MIME format.
------=_NextPart_000_000B_01C1EF9A.EC742040
Content-Type: text/plain;
charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
I was just told the virus alert I just sent you was a hoax. My =
apologies. - Jean
------=_NextPart_000_000B_01C1EF9A.EC742040
Content-Type: text/html;
charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
I was just told the virus alert I just = sent you was a hoax. My apologies. - Jean
------=_NextPart_000_000B_01C1EF9A.EC742040--
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 29 Apr 2002 16:40:49 -0400
Reply-To: Isabel Jean Goldberg
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Isabel Jean Goldberg
Organization: NYU School of Medicine
Subject: Re: URGENT - VIRUS ALERT
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Thanks - I'm a little red in the face right now. - Jean
----- Original Message -----
From: "Andrew J Bartel"
To:
Sent: Monday, April 29, 2002 4:26 PM
Subject: Re: URGENT - VIRUS ALERT
> This is a hoax. See this website:
>
>
> > > > > > > > > > > >
> Andrew J Bartel
> Laboratory Manager
> Department of Biological Sciences
> University of Alaska Anchorage
> Science Bldg. 243
> 3211 Providence Drive
> Anchorage AK 99508
>
> (907)786-1268 voice
> (907)786-1148 fax
>
> ajb@uaa.alaska.edu
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "Isabel Jean Goldberg"
> To:
> Sent: Monday, April 29, 2002 12:16 PM
> Subject: Fw: URGENT - VIRUS ALERT
>
>
> > I am forwarding this message to you because I found the virus reference
> > below on my hard drive.
> > ----- Original Message -----
> > From: "deyanira Santiago"
> > To: "Alex Joyner (E-mail)" ; "Arturo
Zychlinsky
> > (E-mail)" ; "Audrey from Topaz (E-mail)"
> > ; "Bruce Cronstein (E-mail)"
> > ; "Bunge, Mary (E-mail)"
;
> > "Carol Lyden (E-mail)" ; ; "Carol Welt Ph. D. (E-mail)"
> > ; "Cathy (E-mail)" ;
> > "Cristina Murphy (E-mail)" ; "Cristina Murphy
> > (E-mail)" ; "Cynthia Loomis (E-mail)"
> > ; "Dan Littman (E-mail)"
> > ; "David E Levy (E-mail)"
> ;
> > "David Ron (E-mail)" ; ; "Dr. Gilbert Grant (E-mail)"
> > ; "Elysse Orchard (E-mail)"
> ;
> > "Esther Gardner (E-mail)" ; ; "F. Gregory Baumann (E-mail)"
> > ; "Farooq Niazi (E-mail)"
> > ; "Fredrick Burns (E-mail)"
> > ; "Gerry.Griffin (E-mail)"
> > ; "Hylton Gordon (E-mail)"
> > ; "Ian Mohr (E-mail)"
> > ; "Isaac Wirgin (E-mail)"
> > ; "Jack Hessler (E-mail)"
;
> > "Jaun Lafaille (E-mail)" ; "Jean Goldberg
> > (E-mail)" ; "Jerald. Silverman (E-mail)"
> > ; "Jerome Vanderberg (E-mail)"
> > ; "Joellen Shaw (E-mail)"
> > ; "John Simpson (E-mail)"
> > ; "Jonathan D. Brodie (E-mail)"
> > ; "Juan Lafaille (E-mail)"
> > ; "Judy Zelikoff (E-mail)"
> > ; "Kammy Cabral (E-mail)"
;
> > "Kathy Seymour (E-mail)" ; "Kerry Walton
> (E-mail)"
> > ; "Kleitman, Naomi (NINDS) (E-mail)"
> > ; "Lance McNeil (E-mail)"
;
> > "Maarten Bosland (E-mail)" ; "Mark Raymond
> > (E-mail)" ; "Martin Posner (E-mail)"
> > ; "Mary Lou James (E-mail)" ;
> > "Mas@Alum.Mit.Edu (E-mail)" ; "Merdad Parsey (E-mail)"
> > ; "Michael Nissen (E-mail)"
> > ; "Nora. Torres (E-mail)"
> > ; "Patricia Wolfe (E-mail)"
> > ; "Pguider@ (E-mail)"
> > ; "Richard. Mann (E-mail)"
;
> > "Rise Schwab (E-mail)" ; "Robert Fessler (E-mail)"
> > ; "Samantha Hartford (E-mail)"
> > ; "Sandra Fiorelli (E-mail)"
> > ; "Turnbull (E-mail)"
;
> > "Xiomara Ogando (E-mail)"
> > Sent: Monday, April 29, 2002 3:20 PM
> > Subject: FW: URGENT - VIRUS ALERT
> >
> >
> > >
> > >
> > > Deyanira Santiago
> > > Animal Subjects Compliance Coordinator
> > > Tel: (212) 263-5691
> > > Fax (212) 263-0727
> > > E-mail: mailto:santid03@med.nyu.edu
> > >
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: Jerome Vanderberg [mailto:Jerome.Vanderberg@med.nyu.edu]
> > > Sent: Monday, April 29, 2002 3:04 PM
> > > To: clarka01@popmail.med.nyu.edu; eichid01@popmail.med.nyu.edu;
> > > freveu01@popmail.med.nyu.edu; nardie01@popmail.med.nyu.edu;
> jr57@nyu.edu;
> > > photini.sinnis@med.nyu.edu; fz5@is2.nyu.edu;
> tsujim01@popmail.med.nyu.edu;
> > > vernik01@popmail.med.nyu.edu; merals01@popmail.med.nyu.edu;
> > > vandej01@popmail.med.nyu.edu; nusser01@popmail.med.nyu.edu;
> > > rodria02@popmail.med.nyu.edu; spaetg01@popmail.med.nyu.edu;
> > > huntlt01@popmail.med.nyu.edu; salass01@med.nyu.edu;
> > > hellsu01@popmail.med.nyu.edu; Andy.London@med.nyu.edu;
> GBOURO@;
> > > nachbar@popmail.med.nyu.edu; vilcej01@popmail.med.nyu.edu;
> > > rosenm01@popmail.med.nyu.edu; freya01@popmail.med.nyu.edu;
> kh9@is.nyu.edu;
> > > vandej01@popmail.med.nyu.edu; Gabriela; santid03@endeavor.med.nyu.edu;
> > > nussev01@popmail.med.nyu.edu; richag03@popmail.med.nyu.edu
> > > Subject: URGENT - VIRUS ALERT
> > > Importance: High
> > >
> > > I unknowingly received a computer virus, and it may have already been
> sent
> > > to people on my contact lists. It is important to follow instructions
> to
> > > identify and eliminate this virus. If you find this virus, please
> > contact
> > > everyone on your contact list, as you may have unknowingly passed it
> > along.
> > >
> > > The virus file name is jdbgmgr.exe and it is not currently detected
with
> > > Sophos, McAfee nor Norton virus protection. It remains in your
> computer's
> > > system for 14 days before it deletes all your files.
> > > To eliminate it, follow these instructions:
> > > 1. On your computer, go to "START", then "FIND", then "FILES OR
> FOLDERS".
> > > 2. Under "NAMED", type jdbgmgr.exe , then click "FIND NOW"
> > > 3. If the virus appears (the icon next to it will be a small teddy
> bear),
> > > the name will be jdbgmgr.exe
> > > 4. DO NOT OPEN IT!!!! Instead, right-click on it and DELETE it. It
> will
> > > be sent to the recycle bin.
> > > 5. When you see it disappear, go to the recycle bin, and delete it
from
> > > there too. (If possible, empty the entire recycle bin.)
> > > If you find this virus in your system, please send this message to
> > everyone
> > > in your address list.
> > > Jerry Vanderberg
> > >
> > >
> > >
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 30 Apr 2002 10:00:23 +1000
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Peter.LeBlancSmith@CSIRO.AU
Subject: Re: Tissue Culturing and Safety Glasses
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Consider using 'high focal point' eyepieces designed for use with
spectacles. I recall that many years ago at least two microscope
manufacturers supplied them. Spectacles can then remain in place on the
face.
Peter Le Blanc Smith
Biocontainment Microbiologist
CSIRO Livestock Industries
Australian Animal Health Laboratory (AAHL)
Private Bag 24
Geelong Vic 3220
Australia
Ph: +61 3 5227 5451
Fax: +61 3 5227 5555
E-mail address. Peter.LeBlancSmith@csiro.au
-----Original Message-----
From: Morris, Gary [mailto:gmorris@PRO-]
Sent: Monday, 29 April 2002 10:43 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Tissue Culturing and Safety Glasses
I'm interested in your view(s) and response to the following comment I've
received from a researcher. I know how I plan to respond - I just want to
see what you would say.
The researcher believes that wearing safety glasses in tissue culture labs
is conterproductive, as it requires the employee to continually take off and
put on their safety glasses as they go from the biosafety cabinet to the
microscope. The agent in question is a borderline BSL1/2 agent, with direct
eye exposure potentially causing conjectivitis. The researchers believes
that continually handling their safety glasses increases the risk of
touching their eyes with contaminated gloves. He believes that the sash on
the BSC provides protection while working under the hood. His rationale is
that it is not possible to wear safety glasses while looking under the
microscope.
How would you respond?
Thanks advance,
Gary Morris
EHS Manager
Pro-Virus, Inc.
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 30 Apr 2002 01:00:31 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Betsy Daniels
Subject: Betsy Daniels/BOS/US/Vpharm is out of the office.
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
I will be out of the office starting 04/29/2002 and will not return until
05/02/2002.
I will respond to your message when I return.
Thanks,
Betsy
Thanks!
Betsy
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 30 Apr 2002 05:00:00 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Dave Gelpke
Subject: Dave Gelpke/US/CANBERRA/GRCOG is out of the office.
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
I will be out of the office starting 04/30/2002 and will not return until
05/03/2002.
I will respond to your message when I return.
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 30 Apr 2002 08:18:03 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Richard Fink
Subject: Re: Fw: URGENT - VIRUS ALERT--MYTH
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="=====================_86596639==_.ALT"
--=====================_86596639==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
At 04:16 PM 04/29/02 -0400, Isabel Jean Goldberg wrote:
>I am forwarding this message to you because I found the virus reference
>below on my hard drive.
>
> > The virus file name is jdbgmgr.exe and it is not currently detected with
> > Sophos, McAfee nor Norton virus protection. It remains in your computer's
> > system for 14 days before it deletes all your files.
> > To eliminate it, follow these instructions:
> > 1. On your computer, go to "START", then "FIND", then "FILES OR FOLDERS".
> > 2. Under "NAMED", type jdbgmgr.exe , then click "FIND NOW"
THIS IS A MYTH!! The file is legit see below:
Hoaxes A - Z
New to
?
0-9 A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W
X Y Z
jdbgmgr.exe virus
(Not to be confused with the Honor System
virus...)
A hysterical urban legend -- nearly identical to the
sulfnbk.exe mass hysteria of 2001. The
JDBGMGR.EXE file is a legit Windows operating
system file, just like sulfnbk.exe. Some rules of thumb:
if you merely find
JDBGMGR.EXE on your
computer, then it's
probably not infected; but
if you receive
JDBGMGR.EXE as an
email attachment, then it
probably is infected.
This urban legend started in
early April 2002 among
Spanish-speaking computer
users. The hysteria spilled
over to the English-speaking community by mid-April
2002. Well-meaning users fall prey to False Authority
Syndrome when they use their eyeballs to "detect"
viruses.
Vmyths surmises a clueless, well-meaning user (not a
hoaxster) adapted an old sulfnbk.exe alert by simply
changing one instruction to look for JDBGMGR.EXE.
History suggests many clueless people will rewrite the
alert in various forms & languages & dialects.
Historically, users don't seem content to just forward
the original warning if they think they "found" the virus
on their own computer. Vmyths predicts this urban
legend will someday turn into mass hysteria for the
following reasons:
1.The basic chain letter identifies an obscure file
found on tens of millions of PCs -- and it offers
simple instructions on how to find the file in
question.
2.The file uses a teddy bear as its associated icon,
giving the impression an immature hacker drew
it.
3.Gullible users will assume they found a
dangerous virus -- simply because they found a
file on their PC. They will then fell victim to False
Authority Syndrome when they rewrite the chain
letter before sending it to their friends.
We also believe another set of reasons will contribute
to the hysteria. Consider the following:
1.Antivirus software regularly fails to detect newly
discovered viruses. Examples include Melissa,
ExploreZip, MiniZip, BubbleBoy, ILoveYou,
NewLove, KillerResume, Kournikova, and
NakedWife.
2.When antivirus software fails, it fails
spectacularly. Examples include all the
end-of-the-world stories about Melissa,
ILoveYou, and Kournikova.
3.Customers buy antivirus software knowing it will
fail spectacularly.
So you're staring at a file on your PC. It's
JDBGMGR.EXE, just like your podiatrist's secretary
warned. Your antivirus software says "no viruses
found," but it said the same thing when Melissa &
ILoveYou struck. What would you do in this situation?
Vmyths believes gullible users will trust their eyeballs
over their antivirus software.
Okay, let's say you deleted the
file before you learned of this
web page. How much
self-inflicted damage did
you bring on yourself? Vmyths
posed this very question to
Microsoft. Their answer:
If a user has Visual
J++ 1.x installed but
JDBGMGR.EXE is
missing, the net
result would be that
some Java
programs wouldn't
run. In all other
cases, there would
be no effect from
deleting the file.
Microsoft's response raises two philosophical
questions:
1.How many more files will gullible users delete
before they finally self-crash their own
computers?
2.Will gullible people blame themselves for
self-crashing their own computers?
We repeat -- the basic JDBGMGR.EXE alert shows
the markers of an urban legend, not a "hoax." We've
seen this type of mass hysteria before and we'll
probably see it again.
Obtain expert virus advice directly from virus
experts. Stay calm. Stay reasoned. And stay tuned
to Vmyths.
--04/23/02
Related Links
McAfee dispels jdbgmgr virus alert
Symantec dispels jdbgmgr virus alert
dispels jdbgmgr virus alert
Sophos, McAfee nor Norton virus protection. It remains in your computer's
> system for 14 days before it deletes all your files.
> To eliminate it, follow these instructions:
> 1. On your computer, go to "START", then "FIND", then "FILES OR FOLDERS".
> 2. Under "NAMED", type jdbgmgr.exe , then click "FIND NOW"
THIS IS A MYTH!! The file is legit see below:
Hoaxes A - Z
New to
?
0-9 A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W
X Y Z
jdbgmgr.exe virus
(Not to be confused with the Honor System
virus...)
A hysterical urban legend -- nearly identical to the
sulfnbk.exe mass hysteria of 2001. The
JDBGMGR.EXE file is a legit Windows operating
system file, just like sulfnbk.exe. Some rules of thumb:
if you merely find
JDBGMGR.EXE on your
computer, then it's
probably not infected; but
if you receive
JDBGMGR.EXE as an
email attachment, then it
probably is infected.
This urban legend started in
early April 2002 among
Spanish-speaking computer
users. The hysteria spilled
over to the English-speaking community by mid-April
2002. Well-meaning users fall prey to False Authority
Syndrome when they use their eyeballs to "detect"
viruses.
Vmyths surmises a clueless, well-meaning user (not a
hoaxster) adapted an old sulfnbk.exe alert by simply
changing one instruction to look for JDBGMGR.EXE.
History suggests many clueless people will rewrite the
alert in various forms & languages & dialects.
Historically, users don't seem content to just forward
the original warning if they think they "found" the virus
on their own computer. Vmyths predicts this urban
legend will someday turn into mass hysteria for the
following reasons:
1.The basic chain letter identifies an obscure file
found on tens of millions of PCs -- and it offers
simple instructions on how to find the file in
question.
2.The file uses a teddy bear as its associated icon,
giving the impression an immature hacker drew
it.
3.Gullible users will assume they found a
dangerous virus -- simply because they found a
file on their PC. They will then fell victim to False
Authority Syndrome when they rewrite the chain
letter before sending it to their friends.
We also believe another set of reasons will contribute
to the hysteria. Consider the following:
1.Antivirus software regularly fails to detect newly
discovered viruses. Examples include Melissa,
ExploreZip, MiniZip, BubbleBoy, ILoveYou,
NewLove, KillerResume, Kournikova, and
NakedWife.
2.When antivirus software fails, it fails
spectacularly. Examples include all the
end-of-the-world stories about Melissa,
ILoveYou, and Kournikova.
3.Customers buy antivirus software knowing it will
fail spectacularly.
So you're staring at a file on your PC. It's
JDBGMGR.EXE, just like your podiatrist's secretary
warned. Your antivirus software says "no viruses
found," but it said the same thing when Melissa &
ILoveYou struck. What would you do in this situation?
Vmyths believes gullible users will trust their eyeballs
over their antivirus software.
Okay, let's say you deleted the
file before you learned of this
web page. How much
self-inflicted damage did
you bring on yourself? Vmyths
posed this very question to
Microsoft. Their answer:
If a user has Visual
J++ 1.x installed but
JDBGMGR.EXE is
missing, the net
result would be that
some Java
programs wouldn't
run. In all other
cases, there would
be no effect from
deleting the file.
Microsoft's response raises two philosophical
questions:
1.How many more files will gullible users delete
before they finally self-crash their own
computers?
2.Will gullible people blame themselves for
self-crashing their own computers?
We repeat -- the basic JDBGMGR.EXE alert shows
the markers of an urban legend, not a "hoax." We've
seen this type of mass hysteria before and we'll
probably see it again.
Obtain expert virus advice directly from virus
experts. Stay calm. Stay reasoned. And stay tuned
to Vmyths.
--04/23/02
Related Links
McAfee dispels jdbgmgr virus alert
Symantec dispels jdbgmgr virus alert
dispels jdbgmgr virus alert
> Gillian
>
> --
> ------------------------------------------------------------------
> Gillian Norton
> Biosafety Officer
> The University of Western Ontario
> Occupational Health and Safety
> Stevenson Lawson Building, Rm. 60
> Phone: (519)661-2036 Ext. 84747
> FAX: (519)661-3420
> -------------------------------------------------------------------
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 30 Apr 2002 16:03:12 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Lefkin, Howard"
Subject: EH&S Training
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Dear Biosafety Folks,
I'm re-developing the training program for our biological laboratories
vaccine production facility. There are approximately 200 employees in a
variety work settings: production, laboratory, facilities, etc. I'm curious
as to what other biotech companies have in place with respect to training.
Specifically, what EH&S training is provided to which employees, length of
sessions, how is the training delivered, etc. Any insight that you can
provide would be much appreciated.
Thank you.
Also, many thanks to the folks that already told me about their programs.
Howard
Howard Lefkin, Environmental Health and Safety Manager
UMASS Medical School-Jamaica Plain
305 South Street, Jamaica Plain, MA 02130-3523
Tel: 617-983-6207, fax: 617-983-6210,
email: howard.lefkin@state.ma.us
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 30 Apr 2002 17:57:36 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Paul Rubock
Subject: Re: question on disinfectants
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
I don't know about inactivation in this case, but I also suspect that NaOH
would bring the pH of what they're dumping above what their local water
authority would allow.
----- Original Message -----
From: "Gill Norton"
To:
Sent: Tuesday, April 30, 2002 3:53 PM
Subject: question on disinfectants
> Has anyone heard of using sodium hydroxide as a disinfectant for liquid
> wastes from cell culture and recombinant virus work at BSL1 and 2?
>
> I found a researcher adding sdium hydroxide pellets ( 20g/ 3litres of
> waste growth medium i.e 0.18M). The researcher maintained that this
> inactivated any virus or bacteria ( lab E coli) before he tipped it down
> the sink.
>
> I asked if they had ever done any testing to see if they could recover
> anythinng live - but no!
>
> . I'm sceptical but can anyone help?
>
> Gillian
>
> --
> ------------------------------------------------------------------
> Gillian Norton
> Biosafety Officer
> The University of Western Ontario
> Occupational Health and Safety
> Stevenson Lawson Building, Rm. 60
> Phone: (519)661-2036 Ext. 84747
> FAX: (519)661-3420
> -------------------------------------------------------------------
>
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 1 May 2002 09:19:01 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Robert N. Latsch"
Subject: Re: question on disinfectants
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
What is the pH of his mixture? This could be either a hazardous waste or
regulated by some other agency.
Bob
> Has anyone heard of using sodium hydroxide as a disinfectant for liquid
>wastes from cell culture and recombinant virus work at BSL1 and 2?
>
> I found a researcher adding sdium hydroxide pellets ( 20g/ 3litres of
>waste growth medium i.e 0.18M). The researcher maintained that this
>inactivated any virus or bacteria ( lab E coli) before he tipped it down
>the sink.
>
> I asked if they had ever done any testing to see if they could recover
>anythinng live - but no!
>
>. I'm sceptical but can anyone help?
>
>Gillian
>
>--
>------------------------------------------------------------------
>Gillian Norton
>Biosafety Officer
>The University of Western Ontario
>Occupational Health and Safety
>Stevenson Lawson Building, Rm. 60
>Phone: (519)661-2036 Ext. 84747
>FAX: (519)661-3420
>-------------------------------------------------------------------
_____________________________________________________________________
__ / _____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 2 May 2002 11:30:55 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Mark Campbell
Subject: Practice exams for CBSP?
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-transfer-encoding: 7bit
Does anyone know if previous exams for CBSP certification are available
anywhere? I have been through the materials provided in the
Certification Review Course and the materials on the NRM website and was
looking for additional testing materials.
Thanks,
Mark Campbell, M.S.
Biological Safety Officer
Saint Louis University
1402 S. Grand Blvd.
Caroline Bldg. Rm. 307
(314) 577-8608
campbem@slu.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 2 May 2002 14:35:52 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Amy Quattrocchi
Subject: Biosafety Cabinet Leasing?
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT
Hello all!
My institution is currently preparing an emergency response plan to
to allow for uninterrupted diagnostic activities in the event that an
accident or terrorist action renders the existing lab space
inaccessible. The plan calls for the use of currently unoccupied lab
space to temporarily house the diagnostic lab.
The unoccupied lab is not equipped with biosafety cabinets, yet their
use is an integral part of the diagnostic lab SOPs. Thus, we thought
that leasing cabinets might be a viable solution to this problem. Any
thoughts or suggestions would be appreciated. Thanks!
Amy
Amy Quattrocchi
Health and Safety Specialist
Laboratory and Biological Safety
Rutgers Environmental Health and Safety
24 Street 1603
Building 4127 Livingston Campus
Piscataway, NJ 08854
Phone: 732/445-2550
Fax: 732/445-3109
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 2 May 2002 15:12:43 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Liz Rohonczy
Subject: Needlestick with FCA
Mime-Version: 1.0
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Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Anyone have a protocol for, or experience with, the medical follow up to a =
needle stick injury involving heat killed mycobacteria in oil? I would =
expect possible skin test conversion and granuloma formation.
Elizabeth Rohonczy D.V.M.
Head, Biocontainment and Facility Certification=20
Canadian Food Inspection Agency
59 Camelot Drive
Nepean, Ontario
K1A 0Y9
(613) 225-2342 ext. 3702
Tel: (613) 225-2342
Fax: (613) 228-6670
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 2 May 2002 15:27:30 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Scott, Rick"
Subject: Re: Biosafety Cabinet Leasing?
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Amy, one thought... (and I'm sure you've thought of this)- is to make sure
if you plan on installing hard ducted (B2's) or even a thimbled (A/B3 for
example) that you have provisions for the exhaust. Thimbled A/B3's are not
SO bad, but B2's (especially the big 6 footers) are exhaust hungry monsters!
If your SOPs call for recirculating (type A or A/B3) BSCs, then you don't
need to worry about it. I would be interested to know where you are leasing
from?
Rick Scott
Biological Safety Officer
Biological Safety Cabinet Field Certifier
East Carolina University
Greenville, NC
27858
scottwi@mail.ecu.edu
> ----------
> From: Amy Quattrocchi
> Reply To: A Biosafety Discussion List
> Sent: Friday, May 3, 2002 2:35 AM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: Biosafety Cabinet Leasing?
>
> Hello all!
>
> My institution is currently preparing an emergency response plan to
> to allow for uninterrupted diagnostic activities in the event that an
> accident or terrorist action renders the existing lab space
> inaccessible. The plan calls for the use of currently unoccupied lab
> space to temporarily house the diagnostic lab.
>
> The unoccupied lab is not equipped with biosafety cabinets, yet their
> use is an integral part of the diagnostic lab SOPs. Thus, we thought
> that leasing cabinets might be a viable solution to this problem. Any
> thoughts or suggestions would be appreciated. Thanks!
>
> Amy
>
>
> Amy Quattrocchi
> Health and Safety Specialist
> Laboratory and Biological Safety
> Rutgers Environmental Health and Safety
> 24 Street 1603
> Building 4127 Livingston Campus
> Piscataway, NJ 08854
> Phone: 732/445-2550
> Fax: 732/445-3109
>
>
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 2 May 2002 14:01:49 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Elizabeth Smith
Subject: Re: Inventories & Biosecurity
In-Reply-To:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Howdy, one and all,
The thought never crossed my mind that someone would ask for an
accounting of every single bacteria (... naive of me, I guess).
You may not think there's much difference between 5.0 * 10^9 and
4.5 * 10^9 cfu/mL - but Fox-TV or your favorite activist will
be explaining to the oppressed masses that you're missing 50
million bacteria and estimating how many people could be
infected by the "missing" bugs, based on the most conservative
estimate for infectious doses.
I was once trying to explain our inventory control system for B.
anthracis to someone (who didn't really understand what he was
asking for). He expected: X milliliters of Y concentration
stored in Z location. Sounds good. He was just thinking of
laboratory analytical work. Now, I pointed out to him, what
about the 100 L fermentation tank we've got cranking out our
vaccine product (which of course starts with B. anthracis)?
I suppose people with R&D labs might give some consideration to
how you want to explain fluctuating inventories (e.g. from
fermentation work).
Peace
Elizabeth
=====
Elizabeth Smith
Environmental, Health & Safety Manager
BioPort Corporation
3500 N. Martin L. King Blvd.
Lansing, MI 48906
__________________________________________________
Do You Yahoo!?
Yahoo! Tax Center - online filing with TurboTax
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 3 May 2002 13:55:31 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Schlank, Bliss M"
Subject: Checklist for ordering human tissue
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Hello! Thank God it is Friday - right!
Have any of you developed checklist to assist the researcher when ordering
human tissue? basically focusing on the following questions:
What Tissue Procurement Centers are used
What testing is done on the tissue
Clinical History - is it provided?
Serology Testing - is it provided?
If you had - would you like to share the standard review application?
Thanks!!!
> Biosafety Manager
> OW Basement
> 1800 Concord Pike
> Wilmington, DE 19850
> Phone: 302.886.2185
> Fax: 302.886.2909
> Cell #: 302.218.5306
> email: bliss.schlank@
>
>
>
=========================================================================
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 6 May 2002 14:53:31 -0400
Reply-To: Isabel Jean Goldberg
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Isabel Jean Goldberg
Organization: NYU School of Medicine
Subject: Soft-walled BSL3 Facilities
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We are in desperate need of an animal biosafety level 3 facility and a =
biosafety level 3 lab - and are investigating the possibility of using =
negative pressure, HEPA-filtered containment tents within a large room. =
The project involves whole body exposures of mice to aerosolized TB =
(within a small contained aerosol exposure chamber); centrifuging of =
specimens; and the use of a cryostat to cut infected tissue. We are =
thinking of placing the aerosol chamber and cryostat in one tent; =
housing the animals in another; and having the lab in a third tent. =
This would all happen within a large room in which some BSL2 work would =
also be done. I'd appreciate the thoughts of members of this list. Has =
anyone gone this route? Can anyone recommend vendors of such units? =
What important issues should we be thinking about? Thanks in advance. - =
Jean
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 6 May 2002 14:27:51 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Judy Pointer
Subject: Re: Tissue Culturing and Safety Glasses
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
I had poor eyesight when I cultured viruses in tissue culture. I got Radial
Keratonomy (sp?) - so no longer a problem. Anyway, I always had to take off my
glasses and adjust the oculars, to see well enough through the scope to
determine CPE, etc. I was only worried when I had a live wet mount and fluid
could seep out from beneath a coverslip. If the material was still in a flask,
or fixed then I didn't think it was a problem. If the wet mount was sealed
around the edge then it was pretty well contained and I didn't worry. I don't
think splashes would be a problem with that little amount of fluid, but hand to
eye or face transfer could be.
I think some of these things need simple common sense applied to them and if
your folks are not using common sense, then you need to do a job hazard analysis
(view the operation as it happens) and discuss it with them. I wouldn't make
hard rules about safety glass wearing in micro labs, because that may make the
risk greater and add little to the safety. The chemical guys will disagree with
this I'm sure.
The point is, to do the work, researchers have to see. If they have non-sealed
coverslip wet mounts with infectious orgs in them - they need to wear gloves AND
disinfect the scope turning wheels and stage after they handle the
containers/slides and before someone else does. If they are using an inverted
phase scope for flask/plate viewing - they need to disinfect the outside of the
flask before they take it out of the hood. You can pick up things from a scope.
One time, I burnt my thumbs and index fingers down to the lower epidermal layers
with quiniquine mustard stain that someone else had left on the scope. So I
know that fomite transfer is possible from scopes.
Just my 2 cents.
Judy Pointer
Janeen LaPierre on 04/29/2002 08:33:48 AM
Please respond to A Biosafety Discussion List
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
cc: (bcc: Judy M. Pointer/MDACC)
Subject: Re: Tissue Culturing and Safety Glasses
I'm not sure I see how a face shield will deal with either concern any better
than glasses. I wear prescription glasses and keep them on at the scope. No
one should be removing eye or face protection with possibly contaminated gloves
on anyway. If you need to take of the safety glasses then you need to remove
the gloves and was hands first. Maybe they would rather have splash goggles
since that is really what they should be using to protect from a liquid splash
hazard.
My two cents, Janeen.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Janeen M. Lapierre
Microbiology Lab Coordinator
University of New England
College of Osteopathic Medicine
(207)283-0170 x2446
jlapierre@mailbox.une.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 7 May 2002 11:04:06 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Morris, Gary"
Subject: Disinfecting of Clean Rooms
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Not sure if this is the right venue for this question, but any input would
be appreciable.
We are looking for a way to disinfect a clean room. The room is under
strict temperature/relative humidity control with a operating RH range of
60-80%. The floors, walls and ceiling is manually disinfected by cleaning
techs; however, we haven't figured out a way to disinfect areas that we
can't mannually clean (i.e. insides ducts and other spaces). The HVAC
recirculates 100% of the return air back into into the room (but not back
into the building HVAC). The HVAC is HEPA filtered and there are various
electrical components in the room that would be sensitive to corrosive
compounds.
As such, our goal is find a method to disinfectant areas that we can't
mannually clean that will not damage electrical components or the HEPA
filter. Fogging was one choice, but most of the fogging compounds we have
seen are on the low pH range.
Any suggestions/experience?
Thanks in advance,
Gary Morris
Pro-Virus, Inc.
Gaithersburg, MD
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 7 May 2002 13:40:03 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Richard Fink
Subject: Re: Disinfecting of Clean Rooms
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
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boundary="=====================_19581606==_.ALT"
--=====================_19581606==_.ALT
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The big trouble is that the air does not exhaust to the outside, so any
agent would have to be something that you can break down into harmless
chemicals. The first one that come to mind is vaporized hydrogen peroxide,
but you would have to check on the materials present to
compatibility. H2O2 is easily broken down into water and oxygen. Chlorine
dioxide is also a powerful decontaminant and relatively unstable so you can
catalyze it into innocent stuff. Then there is everyone's "favorite" -
formaldehyde gas. This one is a bit tricky to get into the harmless
catagory. You can combine it with ammonia (ammonium carb or bicarb is
usually used) to get a much less toxic material in lower concentration, and
use activated charcoal to remove that. Activated charcoal will also absorb
the formaldehyde directly without the need for releasing ammonia. A way or
rendering formaldehyde into carbon dioxide and water is to pass the gas
thru a hot automobile catalytic converter. You would have to design your
own though as I know of no commercial source. Ozone is that last gas that
I know that has been used for large space decon. Ozone is somewhat
unstable naturally going back to oxygen and that can be hurried
on. However, ozone is alot more reactive to other materials then the other
gases listed.
Best of luck!
At 11:04 AM 5/7/2002 -0400, you wrote:
>Not sure if this is the right venue for this question, but any input would
>be appreciable.
>
>We are looking for a way to disinfect a clean room. The room is under
>strict temperature/relative humidity control with a operating RH range of
>60-80%. The floors, walls and ceiling is manually disinfected by cleaning
>techs; however, we haven't figured out a way to disinfect areas that we
>can't mannually clean (i.e. insides ducts and other spaces). The HVAC
>recirculates 100% of the return air back into into the room (but not back
>into the building HVAC). The HVAC is HEPA filtered and there are various
>electrical components in the room that would be sensitive to corrosive
>compounds.
>
>As such, our goal is find a method to disinfectant areas that we can't
>mannually clean that will not damage electrical components or the HEPA
>filter. Fogging was one choice, but most of the fogging compounds we have
>seen are on the low pH range.
>
>Any suggestions/experience?
>
>Thanks in advance,
>
>Gary Morris
>Pro-Virus, Inc.
>Gaithersburg, MD
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 8 May 2002 15:27:43 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Larry Mendoza
Organization: VCU-OEHS-Biological/Chemical Safety Section
Subject: Bunsen Burners in BSCs
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="------------3ECF80589DD004FC9DF9D47B"
This is a multi-part message in MIME format.
--------------3ECF80589DD004FC9DF9D47B
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Hello everyone,
Just a curiousity. Is keeping a burning bunsen burner in the BSC to
"sterilize the air" common practice? As I understand it, BSCs are designed to
keep a sterile environment for the tissue cultures in the first place (HEPA
and laminar air flow). There is a lab tech that keeps the bunsen burner on
almost all day long (and sometimes all night) which brought on a fire hazard
issue.
--------------3ECF80589DD004FC9DF9D47B
Content-Type: text/x-vcard; charset=us-ascii;
name="lgmendoz.vcf"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Content-Description: Card for Larry Mendoza
Content-Disposition: attachment;
filename="lgmendoz.vcf"
--------------3ECF80589DD004FC9DF9D47B--
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 8 May 2002 15:53:42 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Robert N. Latsch"
Subject: Re: Bunsen Burners in BSCs
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
larry this should never be allowed. a correct one word description for
this parctice is, "TIMEBOMB"
Bob
>Hello everyone,
>Just a curiousity. Is keeping a burning bunsen burner in the BSC to
>"sterilize the air" common practice? As I understand it, BSCs are designed to
>keep a sterile environment for the tissue cultures in the first place (HEPA
>and laminar air flow). There is a lab tech that keeps the bunsen burner on
>almost all day long (and sometimes all night) which brought on a fire hazard
>issue.
>
>Content-Type: text/x-vcard; charset=us-ascii;
> name="lgmendoz.vcf"
>Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
>Content-Description: Card for Larry Mendoza
>Content-Disposition: attachment;
> filename="lgmendoz.vcf"
>
>Attachment converted: Siberia:lgmendoz.vcf (TEXT/MSWD) (0001826F)
_____________________________________________________________________
__ / _____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 8 May 2002 16:08:22 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "David N. Easton"
Subject: Re: Bunsen Burners in BSCs
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="------------0B23169E47AB2D15FFAE3965"
--------------0B23169E47AB2D15FFAE3965
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Larry,
I have pictures of a (previously) new BSC that was totally destroyed by this
practice in the company of a squeeze bottle of alcohol.
Scenario:
* Interior of cabinet heats up
* Alcohol expands and drips out of the spout
* Alcohol runs over to burner
* Alcohol ignites
* Latex gas supply tube burns/melts
* Bunsen burner goes out, but
* Gas at stopcock is now a roaring torch
* Damages = ~ $20,000
We're very annoyed when people so much as consider this practice.
David N. Easton
University of Virginia
Larry Mendoza wrote:
> Hello everyone,
> Just a curiousity. Is keeping a burning bunsen burner in the BSC to
> "sterilize the air" common practice? As I understand it, BSCs are designed to
> keep a sterile environment for the tissue cultures in the first place (HEPA
> and laminar air flow). There is a lab tech that keeps the bunsen burner on
> almost all day long (and sometimes all night) which brought on a fire hazard
> issue.
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 8 May 2002 16:24:21 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Moravek, Paula"
Subject: Re: Bunsen Burners in BSCs
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Hello,
Hmmm, according to my recollection of training from Baker on their =
Sterilgard
hoods, a bunsen burner in a BSC actually creates disruptive eddies in =
the
"protective" sterile air flow onto the work surface. Thus there is =
likely to
be more contamination, rather than less, in the scenario you describe.
Also, I've seen heat damage to the HEPA filters above where bunsen =
burners
were kept running in BSC's. Sterility is certainly gone when there are =
gaps
in the filter media.
Aside from that, what about the old, old, old, fire safety practice =
"never
turn your back on a lit bunsen burner"?
'Bye for now.
--P. Moravek
Laboratory Manager, Biology & Biotechnology Department
Biosafety Officer, Office of Environmental & Occupational Safety
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Worcester, MA 01609 U.S.A.
pmoravek@wpi.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 8 May 2002 17:17:06 EDT
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ed Krisiunas
Subject: Fwd: [APIC] Bioterrorism tabletop drill (03)
MIME-Version: 1.0
Sonething I saw on the APIC listserv that may be of interest to the group.
Edward Krisiunas, MT(ASCP), CIC, MPH
President
WNWN International
PO Box 1164
Burlington, Connecticut
06013
860-675-1217
860-675-1311(fax)
860-944-2373(mobile)
In a message dated 5/7/2002 7:38:36 PM Eastern Daylight Time,
kwittman@ writes:
> From: Cameale Johnson
> Sent: Thu 5/2/2002 12:51 PM
> Subject: Bioterrorism tabletop drill (03)
> ================
>
> Anchorage recently completed a community wide "tabletop" smallpox
> exercise. All the hospitals were involved. The exercise lasted several
> weeks with daily messages being sent to the participants. As the
> exercise went on, more participants got pulled in (FBI, CDC, FEMA,
> school superintendant, etc). After a certain period of time, there were
> daily teleconferences amongst the participants. It was a very valuable
> exercise.
>
> Here is the weblink for all the messages that took place during our
> exercise. There is lots of good educational info imbedded in the daily
> messages. It will give you an idea of how we conducted the exercise.
>
>
>
> The reality is, if you truly want to test your bioterrorism response
> plan, you cannot do it separate from the community. The exercise
> really helped us come up with a policy for how we would respond to a
> bioterrorist event.
>
> Cameale Johnson, PharmD
> Infection Control Program Director
> Alaska Regional Hospital
> Anchorage, AK
> (907) 264-1185
> cameale@
> ......kw
>
Edward Krisiunas, MT(ASCP), CIC, MPH
President
WNWN International
PO Box 1164
Burlington, Connecticut
06013
860-675-1217
860-675-1311(fax)
860-944-2373(mobile)
==========================================================
APIC-list
Postings should be addressed to ICPlist@. Postings are strictly
the opinion of their authors and never the official position of APIC.
To unsubscribe to the APIClist, send an e-mail message to:
LISTSERV@PEACH.EASE. with the command:
SIGNOFF APIC
in the body of the message.
For further information or assistance, contact jleshner@.
==========================================================
--part1_64.1eceb50d.2a0aefd2_boundary--
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 8 May 2002 19:17:00 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Lindsey Kayman
Subject: incidents involving use of gas in biosafety cabinets
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="0-408611527-1020910620=:47573"
--0-408611527-1020910620=:47573
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
There are some incidents involving the use of bunsen burners in biosafety cabinets described at the AIHA Lab Health and Safety Committee site:
Lindsey
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 9 May 2002 07:52:16 -0400
Reply-To: bacteria@
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Bacteriology MMRL USV
Subject: Re: Bunsen Burners in BSCs
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: Text/Plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Hi everyone,
As I understand a burner in a BSC can be used for sterilizing
loops used for spreading bacterial cultures. How would you
propose to do this in the absence of a burner?
Dr MILIND PRABHAKAR NIPHADKAR
Research Scientist,
MMRL, USV Limited,
B. S. D. Marg,
Govandi,
Mumbai-400 088
INDIA.
________________________________________________
Get your own "800" number
Voicemail, fax, email, and a lot more
---- On , Larry Mendoza (lgmendoz@HSC.VCU.EDU) wrote:
>
>
> Hello everyone,
> Just a curiousity. Is keeping a burning bunsen burner in the
BSC to
> "sterilize the air" common practice? As I understand it,
BSCs are designed to
> keep a sterile environment for the tissue cultures in the
first place (HEPA
> and laminar air flow). There is a lab tech that keeps the
bunsen burner on
> almost all day long (and sometimes all night) which brought
on a fire hazard
> issue.
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 9 May 2002 08:50:58 -0400
Reply-To: pr18@columbia.edu
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: paul rubock
Organization: EH&S
Subject: Re: Bunsen Burners in BSCs
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="------------87AA999519B3306DE3DDB98C"
Can this picture be posted; it would help a lot of us with our training.
Thank you.
"Petuch, Brian R." wrote:
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: David N. Easton [mailto:dne2a@VIRGINIA.EDU]
> Sent: Wednesday, May 08, 2002 4:08 PM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: Re: Bunsen Burners in BSCs
>
> Larry,
>
> I have pictures of a (previously) new BSC that was totally destroyed
> by this practice in the company of a squeeze bottle of alcohol.
>
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 9 May 2002 09:38:18 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "David N. Easton"
Subject: Bunsen Burners
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="------------BDFCACACF837B279D853F0F1"
This is a multi-part message in MIME format.
--------------BDFCACACF837B279D853F0F1
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
To those folks requesting the pictures of the BSC fire damage:
I didn't attach these photos originally because I was unsure of Richie's
policies on attachments. He indicates, however, that they may be
posted. As I told him, they are not spectacular, but they do indicate
the potential for disaster. Note, in particular, the latex tubing that
was used for the gas delivery.
David N. Easton
University of Virginia
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 9 May 2002 11:39:05 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Joseph P. Kozlovac"
Subject: Re: Bunsen Burners
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="=====================_10682670==_"
I have a similar mishap photo that I use in an engineering control lecture
of mine.
Laboratory Flambe.jpg
At 09:38 AM 5/9/02 -0400, you wrote:
>To those folks requesting the pictures of the BSC fire damage:
>
>I didn't attach these photos originally because I was unsure of Richie's
>policies on attachments. He indicates, however, that they may be
>posted. As I told him, they are not spectacular, but they do indicate
>the potential for disaster. Note, in particular, the latex tubing that
>was used for the gas delivery.
>
>David N. Easton
>University of Virginia
>Content-Type: image/jpeg;
> name="NewJordBSC05.jpg"
>Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
>
>
I have a similar mishap photo that I use in an engineering control lecture of mine.
[]
At 09:38 AM 5/9/02 -0400, you wrote:
To those folks requesting the pictures of the BSC fire damage:
I didn't attach these photos originally because I was unsure of Richie's
policies on attachments. He indicates, however, that they may be
posted. As I told him, they are not spectacular, but they do indicate
the potential for disaster. Note, in particular, the latex tubing that
was used for the gas delivery.
David N. Easton
University of Virginia
Content-Type: image/jpeg;
name="NewJordBSC05.jpg"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
Biological Safety Officer
Environment, Health, Safety
SAIC-Frederick
National Cancer Institute - Frederick
(301)846-1451 fax: (301)846-6619
email: jkozlovac@mail.
______________________________________________________________________________
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 9 May 2002 10:48:13 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Marcham, Cheri"
Subject: Re: Bunsen Burners
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Whoa - what's the story on this one? I would love to use in training as =
well.
Cheri Marcham, CIH, CSP, CHMM=20
The University of Oklahoma Health Sciences Center=20
cheri-marcham@ouhsc.edu=20
-----Original Message-----
From: Joseph P. Kozlovac [mailto:jkozlovac@]
Sent: Thursday, May 09, 2002 10:39 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Bunsen Burners
I have a similar mishap photo that I use in an engineering control =
lecture of mine. =20
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 9 May 2002 08:38:53 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Andrew J Bartel
Organization: Department of Biological Sciences
Subject: Re: Bunsen Burners in BSCs
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
My apologies for sending this twice...
Dr Niphadkar,
Use disposable plastic loops instead of nichrome wire loops. Autoclave them
before disposal of course.
ajb
> > > > > > > > > > >
Andrew J Bartel
Laboratory Manager
Department of Biological Sciences
University of Alaska Anchorage
Science Bldg. 243
3211 Providence Drive
Anchorage AK 99508
(907)786-1268 voice
(907)786-1148 fax
ajb@uaa.alaska.edu
----- Original Message -----
From: "Bacteriology MMRL USV"
To:
Sent: Thursday, May 09, 2002 3:52 AM
Subject: Re: Bunsen Burners in BSCs
> Hi everyone,
>
> As I understand a burner in a BSC can be used for sterilizing
> loops used for spreading bacterial cultures. How would you
> propose to do this in the absence of a burner?
>
> Dr MILIND PRABHAKAR NIPHADKAR
> Research Scientist,
> MMRL, USV Limited,
> B. S. D. Marg,
> Govandi,
> Mumbai-400 088
> INDIA.
>
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 9 May 2002 12:52:18 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: William Lorenzen
Subject: Re: Bunsen Burners
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: multipart/mixed; boundary="Boundary_(ID_Gb/D85PKImc7e61x+a+5MQ)"
This is a multi-part message in MIME format.
--Boundary_(ID_Gb/D85PKImc7e61x+a+5MQ)
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT
See attached - Tissue Culture Hood Fire 8/23/01
=========================================================================
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 9 May 2002 16:02:21 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Hofherr, Leslie"
Subject: Mouse Cage systems for Biohazard Containment
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Greetings,
Anyone have experience using the micro isolator cage rack systems for
containing BSL 3 bacteria inoculated into mice? Can the HEPA filtered
supply and exhaust caging systems contain pathogens that can be excreted in
urine, or respiratory secretions by the mice? Or is using a HEPA filtered
tenting unit better?
Any information on experience would be helpful.
Thanks,
Leslie Hofherr
UCLA, EH&S
leslie@admin.ucla.edu
(310) 206-3929 phone
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 9 May 2002 16:18:02 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "David A. Bunzow"
Subject: Re: Mouse Cage systems for Biohazard Containment
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Leslie:
Look at the rating of the HEPA filter and see what it's capture efficiencies are
at the proposed flows and mean particle sizes. Then determine how you want to
regard the flow beyond the filter. For example, do you want to do any scrubbing
or treatment of the exhausted air? And what would be your proposal if the
filtration leaks around the edges or develops a small pinhole (this happens in
the real world).
My point is that HEPA or UHEPA filtration alone may not address your problem or
concerns adequately.
"Hofherr, Leslie" wrote:
> Greetings,
>
> Anyone have experience using the micro isolator cage rack systems for
> containing BSL 3 bacteria inoculated into mice? Can the HEPA filtered
> supply and exhaust caging systems contain pathogens that can be excreted in
> urine, or respiratory secretions by the mice? Or is using a HEPA filtered
> tenting unit better?
>
> Any information on experience would be helpful.
> Thanks,
> Leslie Hofherr
> UCLA, EH&S
> leslie@admin.ucla.edu
> (310) 206-3929 phone
--
David A. Bunzow CET; CHMM; REM
University of Alaska
Many Traditions One Alaska
Statewide Office of Risk Management
Environmental, Health and Safety Manager
1-907-474-5005 (phone)
1-907-474-5634 (fax)
sndab1@alaska.edu
alaska.edu/swrisk
Please Note:
The statements, opinions and views expressed
in this communication are mine alone. They
should not be construed as necessarily being
those of the University of Alaska System, or
any of its other employees.
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 10 May 2002 12:20:09 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Mark Campbell
Subject: Histoplasma question
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: multipart/alternative;
boundary=------------7625D74304C49A6DF7D0612E
--------------7625D74304C49A6DF7D0612E
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Can someone tell me if H. capsulatum grown at room temperature, in
liquid culture, and shaken can still form infectious conidiophores. I
have read through the BMBL and other sources. They extensively cover
the temperature issue for this dimorphic fungi but not what happens at
room temp. in liquid with agitation.
Thanks,
Mark Campbell, M.S.
Biological Safety Officer
Saint Louis University
1402 S. Grand Blvd.
Caroline Bldg. Rm. 307
St. Louis, MO 63104
(314) 577-8608
campbem@slu.edu
--------------7625D74304C49A6DF7D0612E
Content-Type: text/html; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Can someone tell me if H. capsulatum grown at room temperature, in liquid culture, and shaken can still form infectious conidiophores. I have read through the BMBL and other sources. They extensively cover the temperature issue for this dimorphic fungi but not what happens at room temp. in liquid with agitation.
Thanks,
Mark Campbell, M.S.
Biological Safety Officer
Saint Louis University
1402 S. Grand Blvd.
Caroline Bldg. Rm. 307
St. Louis, MO 63104
(314) 577-8608
campbem@slu.edu
--------------7625D74304C49A6DF7D0612E--
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 10 May 2002 13:45:06 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Doob, Peter (NIDA/IRP)"
Subject: NIOSH/CDC document on bulding protection
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="----_=_NextPart_000_01C1F84A.6C126DE0"
This message is in MIME format. Since your mail reader does not understand
this format, some or all of this message may not be legible.
------_=_NextPart_000_01C1F84A.6C126DE0
Content-Type: text/plain;
charset="iso-8859-1"
Thought some of this NIOSH/CDC document might be of interest, since your
counsel may be sought by facilities folks. Deals with protective measures
for buildings.
Enjoy!
Peter A. Doob, MPH, JD
Chief, Safety and Operations Support Section, ASB
National Institute for Drug Abuse, NIH
Intramural Research Program
5500 Nathan Shock Drive
Baltimore, MD 21224
vc: 410-550-1675
------_=_NextPart_000_01C1F84A.6C126DE0
Content-Type: application/pdf;
name="2002-139.pdf"
Content-Disposition: attachment;
filename="2002-139.pdf"
------_=_NextPart_000_01C1F84A.6C126DE0--
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 10 May 2002 12:59:20 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Jeppesen, Eric R"
Subject: Re: NIOSH/CDC document on bulding protection
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
I couldn't open the pdf file. Acrobat said it had a read file error.
Could you re-send please.
Eric
Eric R. Jeppesen
Laboratory Safety Specialist
KU-EHS Department
105 Burt Hall, 1540 W. 15th Street
Lawrence, Kansas 66045-7610
(785)864-2857
jeppesen@ku.edu
-----Original Message-----
From: Doob, Peter (NIDA/IRP) [mailto:PDOOB@INTRA.NIDA.]
Sent: Friday, May 10, 2002 12:45 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: NIOSH/CDC document on bulding protection
Thought some of this NIOSH/CDC document might be of interest, since your
counsel may be sought by facilities folks. Deals with protective measures
for buildings.
Enjoy!
Peter A. Doob, MPH, JD
Chief, Safety and Operations Support Section, ASB
National Institute for Drug Abuse, NIH
Intramural Research Program
5500 Nathan Shock Drive
Baltimore, MD 21224
vc: 410-550-1675
=========================================================================
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 10 May 2002 11:40:33 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Snyder_Sam
Subject: Re: NIOSH/CDC document on bulding protection
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
The file is corrupted?
-----Original Message-----
From: Doob, Peter (NIDA/IRP) [mailto:PDOOB@INTRA.NIDA.]
Sent: Friday, May 10, 2002 12:45 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: NIOSH/CDC document on bulding protection
Thought some of this NIOSH/CDC document might be of interest, since your
counsel may be sought by facilities folks. Deals with protective measures
for buildings.
Enjoy!
Peter A. Doob, MPH, JD
Chief, Safety and Operations Support Section, ASB
National Institute for Drug Abuse, NIH
Intramural Research Program
5500 Nathan Shock Drive
Baltimore, MD 21224
vc: 410-550-1675
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 10 May 2002 13:49:41 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Jeppesen, Eric R"
Subject: Re: NIOSH/CDC document on bulding protection
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
The file was NIOSH/CDC document on building protection.
Peter A. Doob sent it off today in pdf format.
When I try to open it with Adobe Acrobat reader it gives
me a "read file error" and is unable to open the document.
So I asked if Peter could re-send the document again.
Eric
Eric R. Jeppesen
Laboratory Safety Specialist
KU-EHS Department
105 Burt Hall, 1540 W. 15th Street
Lawrence, Kansas 66045-7610
(785)864-2857
jeppesen@ku.edu
-----Original Message-----
From: Snyder_Sam [mailto:Snyder_Sam@LACOE.EDU]
Sent: Friday, May 10, 2002 1:41 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: NIOSH/CDC document on bulding protection
The file is corrupted?
-----Original Message-----
From: Doob, Peter (NIDA/IRP) [mailto:PDOOB@INTRA.NIDA.]
Sent: Friday, May 10, 2002 12:45 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: NIOSH/CDC document on bulding protection
Thought some of this NIOSH/CDC document might be of interest, since your
counsel may be sought by facilities folks. Deals with protective measures
for buildings.
Enjoy!
Peter A. Doob, MPH, JD
Chief, Safety and Operations Support Section, ASB
National Institute for Drug Abuse, NIH
Intramural Research Program
5500 Nathan Shock Drive
Baltimore, MD 21224
vc: 410-550-1675
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 10 May 2002 15:08:18 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Doob, Peter (NIDA/IRP)"
Subject: Re: NIOSH/CDC document on bulding protection
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="----_=_NextPart_000_01C1F856.0B713910"
This message is in MIME format. Since your mail reader does not understand
this format, some or all of this message may not be legible.
------_=_NextPart_000_01C1F856.0B713910
Content-Type: text/plain;
charset="iso-8859-1"
Sorry for the currupted PDF file.
Here is the URL for NIOSH/CDC document on protecting ventilation systems
against intentional contamination:
Will try the PDF one more time . . .
Peter A. Doob, MPH, JD
Chief, Safety and Operations Support Section, ASB
National Institute for Drug Abuse, NIH
Intramural Research Program
5500 Nathan Shock Drive
Baltimore, MD 21224
vc: 410-550-1675
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 10 May 2002 12:26:34 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Snyder_Sam
Subject: Re: NIOSH/CDC document on bulding protection
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
COOL!
-----Original Message-----
From: Doob, Peter (NIDA/IRP) [mailto:PDOOB@INTRA.NIDA.]
Sent: Friday, May 10, 2002 2:08 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: NIOSH/CDC document on bulding protection
Sorry for the currupted PDF file.
Here is the URL for NIOSH/CDC document on protecting ventilation systems
against intentional contamination:
Will try the PDF one more time . . .
Peter A. Doob, MPH, JD
Chief, Safety and Operations Support Section, ASB
National Institute for Drug Abuse, NIH
Intramural Research Program
5500 Nathan Shock Drive
Baltimore, MD 21224
vc: 410-550-1675
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 10 May 2002 14:31:11 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Jeppesen, Eric R"
Subject: Re: NIOSH/CDC document on bulding protection
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Thanks Peter.
It worked this time.
Maybe my computer got scared when I smacked it the last time;^)
Eric R. Jeppesen
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 10 May 2002 16:24:09 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ed Gaunt
Subject: Re: NIOSH/CDC document on bulding protection
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
You may need to get Acrobat Reader version 5 if you do not have it. Version
4 will not open documents created in Acrobat 5. Click here for a free copy:
Ed Gaunt
=========================================================================
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 13 May 2002 08:48:49 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Hawkins, Lawrence J"
Subject: Re: Mouse Cage systems for Biohazard Containment
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
This information courtesy of Brian Gordon DVM, OMRF.
Be cautious using vent racks for BSL-3. Most systems are
positive pressure! They were made for the barrier system not for BSL3. Some
manufactures claim their systems can be adjusted to become negative but
there is no published
solid data. You should stay with static microisolators for BSL3.
Lawrence J. Hawkins
Manager, Environmental & Radiation Safety
Department of Risk Management and Safety Services
University of Oklahoma
905 Asp Ave, Room 112
Norman, OK 73019
Phone: 405.325.0820
Fax: 405.325. 7238
ljhawkins@ou.edu
-----Original Message-----
From: Hofherr, Leslie [mailto:leslie@FACNET.UCLA.EDU]
Sent: Thursday, May 09, 2002 6:02 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Mouse Cage systems for Biohazard Containment
Greetings,
Anyone have experience using the micro isolator cage rack systems for
containing BSL 3 bacteria inoculated into mice? Can the HEPA filtered
supply and exhaust caging systems contain pathogens that can be excreted in
urine, or respiratory secretions by the mice? Or is using a HEPA filtered
tenting unit better?
Any information on experience would be helpful.
Thanks,
Leslie Hofherr
UCLA, EH&S
leslie@admin.ucla.edu
(310) 206-3929 phone
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 13 May 2002 15:56:45 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Lenore Koliha
Subject: BSL 3 labs
In-Reply-To:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII
Good day,
I believe this was discussed on the list not so very long ago, so forgive
me for bringing it up again, but I am looking for a protocol for
maintenance/facilities personnel for work in BSL-3 labs. This would
include cabinet recertification to changing a light bulb. Do you have
sign-off sheets from the primary investigators regarding decontamination
before any scheduled work, etc.? All information is much appreciated.
Thank you,
Lenore Koliha
Chemical Coordinator
Creighton U.
*****************************************************************
* *
* Lenore Koliha e-mail: lkoliha@creighton.edu *
* Chemical Coordinator ph#: (402)546-6404 *
* Dept. EH&S fax: (402)546-6403 *
* Creighton U. *
* Jahn Bldg., Rm-110 *
* 2204 Burt St. *
* Omaha, NE 68178 *
*****************************************************************
The true measure of a man is not by the life he leads...
but by the memory he leaves behind.
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 14 May 2002 14:42:03 -0400
Reply-To: pr18@columbia.edu
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: paul rubock
Organization: EH&S
Subject: Preparation of HGT products
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="------------5E706D2A66B6874C2DE16228"
This is a multi-part message in MIME format.
--------------5E706D2A66B6874C2DE16228
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
I am interested in finding out WHERE and BY WHOM gene therapy products
are prepared (diluted, the syringes filled) just prior to
administration. At the institution's pharmacy? in the PI's laboratory?
by someone from pharmacy? by the PI or his/her staff?
Thanks in advance for your input.
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 14 May 2002 13:51:12 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Johnson, Julie A."
Subject: Institutional Biosafety Committees charging for review of project
s from outside institutions
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
A couple months ago I posted a question regarding university IBCs reviewing
projects for outside institutions. Many university IBCs did this,
especially for small university research park companies and small associated
USDA facilities.
Now I have another related question: do any of your IBCs ever charge for
reviewing projects for outside institutions?
We are considering this option if requests begin to overwhelm the university
IBC. Examples of our situations include research park companies that are
large enough to develop their own IBC, and outside institutions that use our
biotechnology core facilities to do plasmid preps for them as part of
recombinant DNA projects at their institution.
Thanks in advance for sharing your experiences in this area.
Julie A. Johnson, Ph.D., CBSP
Biosafety Officer
Environmental Health and Safety
118 Agronomy Lab
Iowa State University
Ames, IA 50011
Phone: 515-294-7657
Fax: 515-294-9357
Email: jajohns@iastate.edu
Web site: ehs.iastate.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 14 May 2002 16:00:16 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Pitts, Jonathan"
Subject: FDA or OSHA definition
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
All,
This is a little of the beaten track, but I was curious if anyone had come
across a definition (FDA, OSHA or otherwise) for "clean". Certainly
disinfected has a definition, but what about things that just need to be
clean?
Thank you all for your time
Jon
Jonathan Pitts Ph.D.
MediSpectra Inc.
45 Hartwell Ave.
Lexington, MA 02421
Tel: (781) 372-2300 x354
Direct Tel. Line: (781) 372-2354
Fax: (781) 674-0002
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 14 May 2002 16:50:41 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Richard J. Pollack"
Subject: Re: FDA or OSHA definition
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="============_-1190713053==_ma============"
--============_-1190713053==_ma============
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed"
Jon (and others who may be interested),
"Clean" is in the eye of the beholder, so to speak. I don't have a
FDA or OSHA definition, but your question seems to extend beyond
disinfection to non-biologic decontamination. You may find it of
value to read through an on-going discussion on this matter in a
trade publication (Advancing Applications in Contamination Control)
targeted at the clean-room crowd. To subscribe (free) or to access
info on line, visit
Just keep in mind that those folks are primarily interested in
keeping manufacturing processes and products 'clean'.
>All,
>
>This is a little of the beaten track, but I was curious if anyone had come
>across a definition (FDA, OSHA or otherwise) for "clean". Certainly
>disinfected has a definition, but what about things that just need to be
>clean?
>
>Thank you all for your time
>
>Jon
>
>Jonathan Pitts Ph.D.
>MediSpectra Inc.
>45 Hartwell Ave.
>Lexington, MA 02421
>Tel: (781) 372-2300 x354
>Direct Tel. Line: (781) 372-2354
>Fax: (781) 674-0002
>
--
Richard J. Pollack, Ph.D.
Laboratory of Public Health Entomology
Dept. of Immunology & Infectious Diseases
Harvard School of Public Health
665 Huntington Ave.
Boston, MA 02115 USA
phone: (617) 432-1587
fax: (617) 432-1796
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 14 May 2002 15:02:52 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Millis, Nick"
Subject: Re: FDA or OSHA definition
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="windows-1252"
Jon
FDA defines sanitizer as follows:
> Sanitizer
Chemical or physical agents that reduce microorganism contamination levels
present on inanimate environmental surfaces.
Food Safety Implication: Using hot, soapy water is sufficient for cleaning
food-contact surfaces, cutting boards, utensils, etc. Periodically, kitchen
sanitizers can be used for added protection against bacteria. Sanitizers
help kill bacteria, so that bacteria doesn't spread to food.
Two Classes of Sanitizers:
1. Sanitizers of Non-Food Contact Surfaces - Traditionally, the performance
standard used by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for these
sanitizers has required a reduction of the target microorganism by 99.9% or
3 logs (1000, 1/1000, or 103) after 5 minutes of contact time.
2. Sanitizing Rinses for Previously Cleaned Food-Contact Surfaces -
Traditionally, the EPA performance standard for these sanitizers has
required a 99.999% or 5-log (105) reduction of the target microorganism in
30 seconds. (See Log Reduction.)
Disinfectants: In comparison, disinfectants come in a variety of categories
and are also agents that help eliminate undesirable microorganisms from
inanimate environmental surfaces. Because these surfaces are inanimate, they
are considered contaminated, not infected. Measurement of disinfectant
performance varies by product type (spray, dilution product, impregnated
wipe, etc.).
Disinfectant performance is typically not defined in terms of a specific
percentage or log-reduction target, and unlike the sanitizers for
food-contact surfaces, products that are termed disinfectants are usually
not intended for use in association with food-contact surfaces.
Note: Read and follow label directions to determine the specific
microorganism a product kills and how to use the product effectively.
Sanitizers and disinfectants must remain in contact with a surface for a
specified period of time in order to kill organisms. Be sure to check the
label.
This was taken from the following web site:
I could not find a definition in OSHA.
Nick S. Millis, RBP
Texas Tech University Health Sciences Center
3601 4th St., Mail Stop 9020
Lubbock, Texas 79430
Phone: (806) 743-2597
Fax: (806) 743-1299
e-mail: Nick.Millis@TTMC.TTUHSC.EDU
-----Original Message-----
From: Pitts, Jonathan [mailto:jpitts@]
Sent: Tuesday, May 14, 2002 3:00 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: FDA or OSHA definition
All,
This is a little of the beaten track, but I was curious if anyone had come
across a definition (FDA, OSHA or otherwise) for "clean". Certainly
disinfected has a definition, but what about things that just need to be
clean?
Thank you all for your time
Jon
Jonathan Pitts Ph.D.
MediSpectra Inc.
45 Hartwell Ave.
Lexington, MA 02421
Tel: (781) 372-2300 x354
Direct Tel. Line: (781) 372-2354
Fax: (781) 674-0002
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 14 May 2002 16:31:15 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Kyle Boyett
Subject: Re: FDA or OSHA definition
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Jonathan, There are a couple of ways to look at your question. One way would
be to look at the word "clean" from the perspective of Federal Standard 209
or ISO 14644-1. In these standards clean is defined very precisely but more
in the context of clean room operations. As far as surfaces are concerned,
in the context of infection control, you would perhaps need to define
"clean" as not being able to cause infection in a healthy adult population.
Obviously, the previous comment is from a microbiological point of view. Hey
other readers of this question, am I missing something?
I noticed from the current draft membership directory that you are not a
member of ABSA. Have you considered membership in ABSA? If you are
interested feel free to let me know and I can help.
Kyle G. Boyett
Asst. Director of Biosafety
Safety Short Distribution List Administrator
University of Alabama @ Birmingham
Department of Occupational Health and Safety
933 South 19th Street Suite 445
Birmingham, Alabama 35294
Phone: 205.934.9181
Fax: 205.934.7487
Visit our WEB site at: healthsafe.uab.edu
Asking me to overlook a safety violation is like asking me to reduce the
value I place on YOUR life
-----Original Message-----
From: Pitts, Jonathan [mailto:jpitts@]
Sent: Tuesday, May 14, 2002 2:00 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: FDA or OSHA definition
All,
This is a little of the beaten track, but I was curious if anyone had come
across a definition (FDA, OSHA or otherwise) for "clean". Certainly
disinfected has a definition, but what about things that just need to be
clean?
Thank you all for your time
Jon
Jonathan Pitts Ph.D.
MediSpectra Inc.
45 Hartwell Ave.
Lexington, MA 02421
Tel: (781) 372-2300 x354
Direct Tel. Line: (781) 372-2354
Fax: (781) 674-0002
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 15 May 2002 08:25:55 +0100
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Stuart Thompson
Subject: Re: Institutional Biosafety Committees charging for review of
project s from outside institutions
In-Reply-To:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
My Department provides advice on general safety management, specific safety
matters (radioactive substances, infectious materials, genetically modified
organisms) pre-employment medicals, health surveillance, advice on medical
aspects of foreign travel, and assistance with obtaining permissions from
government agencies, e.g. licences to carry out genetic modification work.
As part of this process, I attend meetings of science park companies at
which they review risk assessments for genetic modification work.
When we provide advice to organisations outside the University, e.g. small
research park companies, we charge an economic rate that is competitive,
though comparable with rates charged on the open market. Start-up companies
expect to pay market rates to lawyers, accountants and patent agents and we
regard ourselves as providing a similar professional service.
By generating income in this way, we can recover some of our costs from
outside the University community and use the income to improve the service
we provide to all clients, including the University. For example, we spend
the income to buy better computer facilities and keep ourselves up to date
by paying for our staff to attend professional courses and conferences.
Best wishes
Stuart
Dr Stuart Thompson
University Biological Safety Officer
Health & Safety Services
University of Manchester
Waterloo Place
182/184 Oxford Road
Manchester M13 9GP
tel: +44 (0)161 275 5069
fax: +44 (0)161 275 6989
mobile 07946 022 698
stuart.thompson@man.ac.uk
-----Original Message-----
From: A Biosafety Discussion List [mailto:BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU]On
Behalf Of Johnson, Julie A.
Sent: 14 May 2002 19:51
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Institutional Biosafety Committees charging for review of
project s from outside institutions
A couple months ago I posted a question regarding university IBCs reviewing
projects for outside institutions. Many university IBCs did this,
especially for small university research park companies and small associated
USDA facilities.
Now I have another related question: do any of your IBCs ever charge for
reviewing projects for outside institutions?
We are considering this option if requests begin to overwhelm the university
IBC. Examples of our situations include research park companies that are
large enough to develop their own IBC, and outside institutions that use our
biotechnology core facilities to do plasmid preps for them as part of
recombinant DNA projects at their institution.
Thanks in advance for sharing your experiences in this area.
Julie A. Johnson, Ph.D., CBSP
Biosafety Officer
Environmental Health and Safety
118 Agronomy Lab
Iowa State University
Ames, IA 50011
Phone: 515-294-7657
Fax: 515-294-9357
Email: jajohns@iastate.edu
Web site: ehs.iastate.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 15 May 2002 11:40:26 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Carl Pike
Subject: etiologic agents shipping label
In-Reply-To:
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; format=flowed; charset=us-ascii
does anyone know a web site to download the CDC's etiologic agent
shipping label in color. it is described on their site and is
supposed to be illustrated but the illustration isn't there. I want
to print it to affix to a package once I have the permit. I found a
black and white version in the CFR.
thanks
carl
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 15 May 2002 10:56:10 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Klenner, James"
Subject: Re: etiologic agents shipping label
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="----_=_NextPart_000_01C1FC29.0874DE20"
This message is in MIME format. Since your mail reader does not understand
this format, some or all of this message may not be legible.
------_=_NextPart_000_01C1FC29.0874DE20
Content-Type: text/plain
Carl,
If this attachment does not come across, let me know and I will email you
directly.
Jim
James W. Klenner, MSc, MPH, MPA
Biological Safety Manager
Environmental Health & Safety, IUPUI
620 Union Drive, Room 043
Indianapolis, IN 46202
(317) 274-2830
Fax (317) 278-2158
-----Original Message-----
From: Carl Pike [mailto:c_pike@ACAD.FANDM.EDU]
Sent: Wednesday, May 15, 2002 11:40 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: etiologic agents shipping label
does anyone know a web site to download the CDC's etiologic agent
shipping label in color. it is described on their site and is
supposed to be illustrated but the illustration isn't there. I want
to print it to affix to a package once I have the permit. I found a
black and white version in the CFR.
thanks
carl
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 15 May 2002 09:11:31 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Gergis, Nasr"
Subject: Re: etiologic agents shipping label
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="----_=_NextPart_001_01C1FC2B.2CF45D50"
This message is in MIME format. Since your mail reader does not understand
this format, some or all of this message may not be legible.
------_=_NextPart_001_01C1FC2B.2CF45D50
Content-Type: text/plain;
charset=iso-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Jim:
I am interested of this label. the attached file does not work on my
computer. please let me knwo the other file. thanks.
Nasr Gergis, Ph.D., DVM
Biological Safety Officer
Occupational Safety and Health
City of Hope/BRI
Ph: 626-539-8111 Ext. 64262
Fax: 626-301-8970
Pager: 626-423-5454
E-mail: ngergis@
-----Original Message-----
From: Klenner, James [mailto:jklenner@IUPUI.EDU]
Sent: Wednesday, May 15, 2002 8:56 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: etiologic agents shipping label
Carl,
If this attachment does not come across, let me know and I will email you
directly.
Jim
James W. Klenner, MSc, MPH, MPA
Biological Safety Manager
Environmental Health & Safety, IUPUI
620 Union Drive, Room 043
Indianapolis, IN 46202
(317) 274-2830
Fax (317) 278-2158
-----Original Message-----
From: Carl Pike [mailto:c_pike@ACAD.FANDM.EDU]
Sent: Wednesday, May 15, 2002 11:40 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: etiologic agents shipping label
does anyone know a web site to download the CDC's etiologic agent
shipping label in color. it is described on their site and is
supposed to be illustrated but the illustration isn't there. I want
to print it to affix to a package once I have the permit. I found a
black and white version in the CFR.
thanks
carl
------_=_NextPart_001_01C1FC2B.2CF45D50
Content-Type: text/html;
charset=iso-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
RE: etiologic agents shipping label
Jim:
I am interested of this label. the attached file = does not work on my computer. please let me knwo the other file. = thanks.
Nasr Gergis, Ph.D., DVM
Biological Safety Officer
Occupational Safety and Health
City of Hope/BRI
Ph: 626-539-8111 Ext. 64262
Fax: 626-301-8970
Pager: 626-423-5454
E-mail: ngergis@
-----Original Message-----
From: Klenner, James [mailto:jklenner@IUPUI.EDU]=
Sent: Wednesday, May 15, 2002 8:56 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: etiologic agents shipping label
Carl,
If this attachment does not come across, let me know = and I will email you
directly.
Jim
James W. Klenner, MSc, MPH, MPA
Biological Safety Manager
Environmental Health & Safety, IUPUI
620 Union Drive, Room 043
Indianapolis, IN 46202
(317) 274-2830
Fax (317) 278-2158
-----Original Message-----
From: Carl Pike [mailto:c_pike@ACAD.FANDM.EDU]
Sent: Wednesday, May 15, 2002 11:40 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: etiologic agents shipping label
does anyone know a web site to download the CDC's = etiologic agent
shipping label in color. it is described on = their site and is
supposed to be illustrated but the illustration = isn't there. I want
to print it to affix to a package once I have the = permit. I found a
black and white version in the CFR.
thanks
carl
------_=_NextPart_001_01C1FC2B.2CF45D50--
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 15 May 2002 12:11:43 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Elizabeth Gilman
Subject: Q Fever
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Dear Group:
Does anyone have any experience with the biosafety protocols for working =
safely with sheep body parts? I have an investigator who would like to =
obtain from a collaborator just the shoulders of sheep. These are adult =
female sheep, from a Q-fever negative farm, however the sheep were not =
tested individually. Given this information, am I correct in thinking =
that the risk of Q Fever infection is low but not zero, and BL2 facilities/=
precautions are acceptable. I know that BL3 is the way to go for necropsy =
when you are dealing with animals known to be infected. We do not have =
BL3 facilities but could easily require BL2+ (BL3 practices/procedures) if =
necessary. Thanks in advance for any information you may be able to =
share.
Betsy
Elizabeth A. Gilman, MS, RBP, SM(NRM), CBSP
Biosafety Officer
Wyeth
87 CambridgePark Drive, t-2025C
Cambridge, MA 02140
egilman@
617-665-5233 (office)
617-665-5262 (fax)
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 15 May 2002 09:34:47 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Gergis, Nasr"
Subject: Re: Q Fever
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="----_=_NextPart_001_01C1FC2E.6D3FD6C0"
This message is in MIME format. Since your mail reader does not understand
this format, some or all of this message may not be legible.
------_=_NextPart_001_01C1FC2E.6D3FD6C0
Content-Type: text/plain;
charset=iso-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Liz:
I believe that UCSF had a good info regarding Q fever. please contact the
biosafety officer there. Good luck.
Nasr Gergis, Ph.D., DVM
Biological Safety Officer
Occupational Safety and Health
City of Hope/BRI
-----Original Message-----
From: Elizabeth Gilman [mailto:EGilman@]
Sent: Wednesday, May 15, 2002 9:12 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Q Fever
Dear Group:
Does anyone have any experience with the biosafety protocols for working
safely with sheep body parts? I have an investigator who would like to
obtain from a collaborator just the shoulders of sheep. These are adult
female sheep, from a Q-fever negative farm, however the sheep were not
tested individually. Given this information, am I correct in thinking that
the risk of Q Fever infection is low but not zero, and BL2
facilities/precautions are acceptable. I know that BL3 is the way to go for
necropsy when you are dealing with animals known to be infected. We do not
have BL3 facilities but could easily require BL2+ (BL3 practices/procedures)
if necessary. Thanks in advance for any information you may be able to
share.
Betsy
Elizabeth A. Gilman, MS, RBP, SM(NRM), CBSP
Biosafety Officer
Wyeth
87 CambridgePark Drive, t-2025C
Cambridge, MA 02140
egilman@
617-665-5233 (office)
617-665-5262 (fax)
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 15 May 2002 09:59:27 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Funk, Glenn"
Subject: Re: Q Fever
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Betsy -
Based on my experience with Q-fever precautions at UCSF, I believe your
approach is reasonable. BSL2 facilities and practices should suffice but
you should be prepared to go to your locally-defined BSL2+ if an animal
comes up positive. Bear in mind that "Q-fever negative flock" may be a
meaningless term if the testing statistics are inadequate to provide
detection of individual animal and herd infection on a timely basis. I
suggest you have the individual animals that will be yours serologically
tested before killing to buy a little extra confidence. You can extend this
confidence level a bit by attempting isolation of C. burnetii from
post-mortem samples of reproductive tract tissues. I assume the sheep
you'll acquire are not pregnant - if they are, they'll pose a higher risk.
-- Glenn
Glenn A. Funk, Ph.D., CBSP
Director and Biosafety Officer
Environment, Health & Safety
MedImmune Vaccines, Inc.
408-845-8857
-----Original Message-----
From: Elizabeth Gilman [mailto:EGilman@]
Sent: Wednesday, 15 May, 2002 09:12
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Q Fever
Dear Group:
Does anyone have any experience with the biosafety protocols for working
safely with sheep body parts? I have an investigator who would like to
obtain from a collaborator just the shoulders of sheep. These are adult
female sheep, from a Q-fever negative farm, however the sheep were not
tested individually. Given this information, am I correct in thinking that
the risk of Q Fever infection is low but not zero, and BL2
facilities/precautions are acceptable. I know that BL3 is the way to go for
necropsy when you are dealing with animals known to be infected. We do not
have BL3 facilities but could easily require BL2+ (BL3 practices/procedures)
if necessary. Thanks in advance for any information you may be able to
share.
Betsy
Elizabeth A. Gilman, MS, RBP, SM(NRM), CBSP
Biosafety Officer
Wyeth
87 CambridgePark Drive, t-2025C
Cambridge, MA 02140
egilman@
617-665-5233 (office)
617-665-5262 (fax)
=========================================================================
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 15 May 2002 14:49:35 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Carl Pike
Subject: Re: etiologic agents shipping label
In-Reply-To:
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; format=flowed; charset=us-ascii
thanks!
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 15 May 2002 15:09:35 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Debra Hunt
Subject: viral vectors in animals
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="=_alternative 00694E8685256BBA_="
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Good afternoon. Do those of you who sit on IBCs and review viral vector
protocols require that the PIs submit screening test information regarding
replication competence prior to injection into animals? If so, are there
any standard tests for any of the most commonly used vectors (ex,
adenoviruses), and are there any recommendations for "safe" levels of
replication competence? We discussed this today at our IBC meeting
because it is clear that our PIs are assuming that viral vectors they
obtain from catalogs or from other researchers are not going to replicate
because they are classified as "replication incompetent". In other words,
they are treating them as reagents and not as organisms with the potential
for recombination events.
Thanks for any help anyone may have.
Debra L. Hunt, DrPH, CBSP
Director, Biological Safety
Assistant Clinical Professor
Duke University / Duke University Health System
Durham, NC 27710
919-684-8822
hunt0009@mc.duke.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 15 May 2002 12:30:40 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Funk, Glenn"
Subject: Re: viral vectors in animals
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Hi, Debbie -
At UCSF, as part of our standard biological use authorization process, we
routinely asked all viral vector users how they planned to demonstrate the
absence of replication-competent virus in their replication-defective viral
vector stocks. It's very difficult to get a vector stock totally free of RC
virus and, as you imply, most PIs are completely in the dark about
homologous recombination and the generation of RC virus during vector stock
expansion. So there is generally some low level of RCV present that must be
accounted for. We also asked PIs what level of RCV was acceptable to them
for their work. Based on that and the proposed concentration of the vector
and the dosages being administered or handled, we could better define the
risk level. On very few occasions did that added risk assessment factor
result in an increase in the containment level of the work but it often led
to cautionary statements in the approval emphasizing the importance of good
biosafety practices, especially where the handling of oncogenes or other
cell cycle regulators was concerned. If nothing else, asking these
questions made the PIs think about the problem and its potential
implications.
There are no standard procedures for RCV detection that I'm aware of,
although none of the procedures that can be used should pose any technical
hurdles to most labs. You can always use PCR to look for the presence of a
gene that shouldn't be there, such as E1A and E1B in most adenovirus 5
vectors. You can do infectivity determinations but this may require blind
passaging or a considerable volume of vector stock, especially in systems
(like adeno) where the levels of RCV tend to be quite low. Also high levels
of adenovirions, whether complete or incomplete (i.e., RC or RD), often
exhibit toxicity associated with the viral capsid; caution in interpreting
CPE versus toxic effect in cell cultures is required.
-- Glenn
Glenn A. Funk, Ph.D., CBSP
Director and Biosafety Officer
Environment, Health & Safety
MedImmune Vaccines, Inc.
408-845-8857
-----Original Message-----
From: Debra Hunt [mailto:hunt0009@MC.DUKE.EDU]
Sent: Wednesday, 15 May, 2002 12:10
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: viral vectors in animals
Good afternoon. Do those of you who sit on IBCs and review viral vector
protocols require that the PIs submit screening test information regarding
replication competence prior to injection into animals? If so, are there
any standard tests for any of the most commonly used vectors (ex,
adenoviruses), and are there any recommendations for "safe" levels of
replication competence? We discussed this today at our IBC meeting because
it is clear that our PIs are assuming that viral vectors they obtain from
catalogs or from other researchers are not going to replicate because they
are classified as "replication incompetent". In other words, they are
treating them as reagents and not as organisms with the potential for
recombination events.
Thanks for any help anyone may have.
Debra L. Hunt, DrPH, CBSP
Director, Biological Safety
Assistant Clinical Professor
Duke University / Duke University Health System
Durham, NC 27710
919-684-8822
hunt0009@mc.duke.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 15 May 2002 15:57:16 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Gill Norton
Organization: University of Western Ontario
Subject: Re: viral vectors in animals
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Hallo,
I am very interested in a discussion on this topic as our biosafety
committee ( and I) have wrestled with this one many times.
Our approach has been to start with the presumption of the Biosafety
Level for the wild type virus and then ask the researcher for documented
evidence e.g literature references and genetic maps of the recombinant
citing how many deletions are made in the apparatus of the virus
responsible for replication and integration inthe host cell.
We also require full details of the inserted DNA sections. Using this
information a decision is made on the containment required. The default
for adenoviruses is Level 2 if the researcher cannot provide, or does
not want to spend the time working out the frequency of RCV.
If animal work is involved for the sake of the animal care staff Level
2 is usually the decision( microisolator cages, BSC for cage changing,
injection and necropsy) disinfectant dunking for all materials leaving
the room etc.
We have always taken the conservative approach so I would be interested
to hear how other folks are coping with this.
Gillian
Debra Hunt wrote:
>
> Good afternoon. Do those of you who sit on IBCs and review viral
> vector protocols require that the PIs submit screening test
> information regarding replication competence prior to injection into
> animals? If so, are there any standard tests for any of the most
> commonly used vectors (ex, adenoviruses), and are there any
> recommendations for "safe" levels of replication competence? We
> discussed this today at our IBC meeting because it is clear that our
> PIs are assuming that viral vectors they obtain from catalogs or from
> other researchers are not going to replicate because they are
> classified as "replication incompetent". In other words, they are
> treating them as reagents and not as organisms with the potential for
> recombination events.
>
> Thanks for any help anyone may have.
>
> Debra L. Hunt, DrPH, CBSP
> Director, Biological Safety
> Assistant Clinical Professor
> Duke University / Duke University Health System
> Durham, NC 27710
> 919-684-8822
> hunt0009@mc.duke.edu
--
------------------------------------------------------------------
Gillian Norton
Biosafety Officer
The University of Western Ontario
Occupational Health and Safety
Stevenson Lawson Building, Rm. 60
Phone: (519)661-2036 Ext. 84747
FAX: (519)661-3420
-------------------------------------------------------------------
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 15 May 2002 15:57:17 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Debra Hunt
Subject: Re: viral vectors in animals
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="=_alternative 006DAC9E85256BBA_="
This is a multipart message in MIME format.
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Thanks, Glenn..as usual, a very thorough and scientifically-based answer
from you. We are back to using our basic training in risk assessment
based on type of vector, risk of recombination events, concentration and
amount of use, and types of gene inserts. I think we use this question
mainly to require the PI to stop and think about what he/she is doing. I
like the idea of throwing the question back to the researcher to determine
if levels of RCV are acceptable from the safety standpoint as well as the
effect on the animals! Thanks, Glenn.
Debra L. Hunt, DrPH, CBSP
Director, Biological Safety
Assistant Clinical Professor
Duke University / Duke University Health System
Durham, NC 27710
919-684-8822
hunt0009@mc.duke.edu
"Funk, Glenn"
Sent by: A Biosafety Discussion List
05/15/2002 03:30 PM
Please respond to A Biosafety Discussion List
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
cc:
Subject: Re: viral vectors in animals
Hi, Debbie -
At UCSF, as part of our standard biological use authorization process, we
routinely asked all viral vector users how they planned to demonstrate the
absence of replication-competent virus in their replication-defective
viral vector stocks. It's very difficult to get a vector stock totally
free of RC virus and, as you imply, most PIs are completely in the dark
about homologous recombination and the generation of RC virus during
vector stock expansion. So there is generally some low level of RCV
present that must be accounted for. We also asked PIs what level of RCV
was acceptable to them for their work. Based on that and the proposed
concentration of the vector and the dosages being administered or handled,
we could better define the risk level. On very few occasions did that
added risk assessment factor result in an increase in the containment
level of the work but it often led to cautionary statements in the
approval emphasizing the importance of good biosafety practices,
especially where the handling of oncogenes or other cell cycle regulators
was concerned. If nothing else, asking these questions made the PIs think
about the problem and its potential implications.
There are no standard procedures for RCV detection that I'm aware of,
although none of the procedures that can be used should pose any technical
hurdles to most labs. You can always use PCR to look for the presence of
a gene that shouldn't be there, such as E1A and E1B in most adenovirus 5
vectors. You can do infectivity determinations but this may require blind
passaging or a considerable volume of vector stock, especially in systems
(like adeno) where the levels of RCV tend to be quite low. Also high
levels of adenovirions, whether complete or incomplete (i.e., RC or RD),
often exhibit toxicity associated with the viral capsid; caution in
interpreting CPE versus toxic effect in cell cultures is required.
-- Glenn
Glenn A. Funk, Ph.D., CBSP
Director and Biosafety Officer
Environment, Health & Safety
MedImmune Vaccines, Inc.
408-845-8857
-----Original Message-----
From: Debra Hunt [mailto:hunt0009@MC.DUKE.EDU]
Sent: Wednesday, 15 May, 2002 12:10
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: viral vectors in animals
Good afternoon. Do those of you who sit on IBCs and review viral vector
protocols require that the PIs submit screening test information regarding
replication competence prior to injection into animals? If so, are there
any standard tests for any of the most commonly used vectors (ex,
adenoviruses), and are there any recommendations for "safe" levels of
replication competence? We discussed this today at our IBC meeting
because it is clear that our PIs are assuming that viral vectors they
obtain from catalogs or from other researchers are not going to replicate
because they are classified as "replication incompetent". In other words,
they are treating them as reagents and not as organisms with the potential
for recombination events.
Thanks for any help anyone may have.
Debra L. Hunt, DrPH, CBSP
Director, Biological Safety
Assistant Clinical Professor
Duke University / Duke University Health System
Durham, NC 27710
919-684-8822
hunt0009@mc.duke.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 15 May 2002 14:57:28 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Donald Mosier
Subject: Re: viral vectors in animals
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
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Debra,
We have had so many questions about the safety of viral vectors that I
have drafted a short review of the issues for retrovirus-based vectors. I
have attached a copy for your information.
Donald Mosier
IBC Chairperson
>Good afternoon. Do those of you who sit on IBCs and review viral vector
>protocols require that the PIs submit screening test information regarding
>replication competence prior to injection into animals? If so, are there
>any standard tests for any of the most commonly used vectors (ex,
>adenoviruses), and are there any recommendations for "safe" levels of
>replication competence? We discussed this today at our IBC meeting
>because it is clear that our PIs are assuming that viral vectors they
>obtain from catalogs or from other researchers are not going to replicate
>because they are classified as "replication incompetent". In other words,
>they are treating them as reagents and not as organisms with the potential
>for recombination events.
>
>Thanks for any help anyone may have.
>
>Debra L. Hunt, DrPH, CBSP
>Director, Biological Safety
>Assistant Clinical Professor
>Duke University / Duke University Health System
>Durham, NC 27710
>919-684-8822
>hunt0009@mc.duke.edu
--============_-1190622644==_ma============
Content-Type: text/enriched; charset="us-ascii"
Debra,
We have had so many questions about the safety of viral vectors that I
have drafted a short review of the issues for retrovirus-based vectors.
I have attached a copy for your information.
Donald Mosier
IBC Chairperson
Good afternoon. Do those of you who sit on IBCs and review
viral vector protocols require that the PIs submit screening test
information regarding replication competence prior to injection into
animals? If so, are there any standard tests for any of the most
commonly used vectors (ex, adenoviruses), and are there any
recommendations for "safe" levels of replication competence? We
discussed this today at our IBC meeting because it is clear that our
PIs are assuming that viral vectors they obtain from catalogs or from
other researchers are not going to replicate because they are
classified as "replication incompetent". In other words, they are
treating them as reagents and not as organisms with the potential for
recombination events.
Thanks for any help anyone may have.
Debra L. Hunt, DrPH, CBSP
Director, Biological Safety
Assistant Clinical Professor
Duke University / Duke University Health System
Durham, NC 27710
919-684-8822
hunt0009@mc.duke.edu
[] Safety of Retroviral Vectors.doc
_______________________________________________________________________________
Donald E. Mosier, PhD, MD
Professor
Department of Immunology, IMM-7
The Scripps Research Institute
10550 North Torrey Pines Road
La Jolla, CA 92037, USA
858 784-9121 phone
858 784-9190 fax
This email and any files transmitted with it are confidential and
intended solely for the use of the individual or entity to whom they
are addressed. If you have received this email in error please notify
Dr. Mosier by telephone or fax.
--============_-1190622644==_============--
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 16 May 2002 10:53:32 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Byers, Karen B"
Subject: Re: viral vectors in animals
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
I would love to read the advice in the attached file. But I have windows 97
and I can't open a bin file. Would someone who can open the file re-post in
a pc format which can be opened with windows 97 programs? Thank you!
Karen Byers, MS, RBP, CBSP
Biosafety Officer/Containment Suite Manager
Dana-Farber Cancer Institute
44 Binney Street - SWG350
Boston, MA 02115
phone:617-632-3890
fax:617-632-1932
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Donald Mosier [SMTP:dmosier@SCRIPPS.EDU]
> Sent: Wednesday, May 15, 2002 5:57 PM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: Re: viral vectors in animals
>
> Debra,
>
> We have had so many questions about the safety of viral vectors that I
> have drafted a short review of the issues for retrovirus-based vectors. I
> have attached a copy for your information.
>
> Donald Mosier
> IBC Chairperson
>
> Good afternoon. Do those of you who sit on IBCs and review viral
> vector protocols require that the PIs submit screening test information
> regarding replication competence prior to injection into animals? If so,
> are there any standard tests for any of the most commonly used vectors
> (ex, adenoviruses), and are there any recommendations for "safe" levels of
> replication competence? We discussed this today at our IBC meeting
> because it is clear that our PIs are assuming that viral vectors they
> obtain from catalogs or from other researchers are not going to replicate
> because they are classified as "replication incompetent". In other words,
> they are treating them as reagents and not as organisms with the potential
> for recombination events.
>
> Thanks for any help anyone may have.
>
> Debra L. Hunt, DrPH, CBSP
> Director, Biological Safety
> Assistant Clinical Professor
> Duke University / Duke University Health System
> Durham, NC 27710
> 919-684-8822
> hunt0009@mc.duke.edu
> > >
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 16 May 2002 09:52:09 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Kyle Boyett
Subject: Re: viral vectors in animals
MIME-Version: 1.0
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------_=_NextPart_000_01C1FCE9.4124B9F0
Content-Type: text/plain
Here you go Karen.
Kyle G. Boyett
Asst. Director of Biosafety
Safety Short Distribution List Administrator
University of Alabama @ Birmingham
Department of Occupational Health and Safety
933 South 19th Street Suite 445
Birmingham, Alabama 35294
Phone: 205.934.9181
Fax: 205.934.7487
Visit our WEB site at: healthsafe.uab.edu
Asking me to overlook a safety violation is like asking me to reduce the
value I place on YOUR life
-----Original Message-----
From: Byers, Karen B [mailto:Karen_Byers@DFCI.HARVARD.EDU]
Sent: Thursday, May 16, 2002 8:54 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: viral vectors in animals
I would love to read the advice in the attached file. But I have windows 97
and I can't open a bin file. Would someone who can open the file re-post in
a pc format which can be opened with windows 97 programs? Thank you!
Karen Byers, MS, RBP, CBSP
Biosafety Officer/Containment Suite Manager
Dana-Farber Cancer Institute
44 Binney Street - SWG350
Boston, MA 02115
phone:617-632-3890
fax:617-632-1932
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Donald Mosier [SMTP:dmosier@SCRIPPS.EDU]
> Sent: Wednesday, May 15, 2002 5:57 PM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: Re: viral vectors in animals
>
> Debra,
>
> We have had so many questions about the safety of viral vectors that I
> have drafted a short review of the issues for retrovirus-based vectors. I
> have attached a copy for your information.
>
> Donald Mosier
> IBC Chairperson
>
> Good afternoon. Do those of you who sit on IBCs and review viral
> vector protocols require that the PIs submit screening test information
> regarding replication competence prior to injection into animals? If so,
> are there any standard tests for any of the most commonly used vectors
> (ex, adenoviruses), and are there any recommendations for "safe" levels of
> replication competence? We discussed this today at our IBC meeting
> because it is clear that our PIs are assuming that viral vectors they
> obtain from catalogs or from other researchers are not going to replicate
> because they are classified as "replication incompetent". In other words,
> they are treating them as reagents and not as organisms with the potential
> for recombination events.
>
> Thanks for any help anyone may have.
>
> Debra L. Hunt, DrPH, CBSP
> Director, Biological Safety
> Assistant Clinical Professor
> Duke University / Duke University Health System
> Durham, NC 27710
> 919-684-8822
> hunt0009@mc.duke.edu
> > >
------_=_NextPart_000_01C1FCE9.4124B9F0
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name="Safety of Retroviral Vectors.doc"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
Content-Disposition: attachment;
filename="Safety of Retroviral Vectors.doc"
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 16 May 2002 10:06:57 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Judy Pointer
Subject: Re: viral vectors in animals
Mime-Version: 1.0
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Hi Debra,
You asked ... require PIs submit screening test information regarding
replication competence...?
I know of at least one other institute that does and they base their risk
determinations on submission of test results - therefore they approve handling
some of these vectors at lower BL levels.
We had many of the same questions/concerns you do - replication competent test
sensitivity?, potential of endogenous helper virus in vivo?, possibility of
competent virus contamination during propagation in research labs?, etc. So we
decided to handle all viral vectors that are amphotrophic (capable of infecting
human cells) even if they are listed as replication incompetent by the vendor
(or proclaimed to be so, by the PI), as if they could replicate in human cells.
That means replication incompetent or defective Adenoviral vectors in research
applications, are still handled at BSL2 or ABSL2. So we do not RCA or RCR
(replication competent retrovirus) test submissions and rely on the physical
barriers more than the biological barriers for containment of these vectors.
Once a vector is past initial Phase I and II human trails and after it is made
under GMP per FDA requirements, by an outside sponsor, we back off of that some,
if there are no vector related adverse advents indicating replication
restoration in human trial patients.
That said, I often question whether we are being too strict. Many of the newer
vectors are very safe and often need several events to take place before
replication can be restored. However, just about the time I start thinking we
should relax this requirement, some new vector comes along with enhanced
targeting, iffy gene inserts, or some other feature that scares me off of
pursuing this further.
The bottom line is - as long as it is still in the research lab - it is still
research! That implies some unknowns still exist. Also, I figure, it's not that
difficult to do BL2 anyway.
I suspicion the push to down-regulate the physical containment barriers of some
viral vectors is investor driven in the drug business, the implication that an
agent needs "biosafety containment" is interpreted as "it is unsafe." That can
be a poison pill for a start-up biotech firm with a new drug. I'm more
comfortable with the idea that "we are just not completely sure yet that it is
safe" and in the meanwhile, we will be cautious.
Judy Pointer,
Biosafety Officer at MD Anderson Cancer Center
Debra Hunt on 05/15/2002 02:09:35 PM
Please respond to A Biosafety Discussion List
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
cc: (bcc: Judy M. Pointer/MDACC)
Subject: viral vectors in animals
Good afternoon. Do those of you who sit on IBCs and review viral vector
protocols require that the PIs submit screening test information regarding
replication competence prior to injection into animals? If so, are there
any standard tests for any of the most commonly used vectors (ex,
adenoviruses), and are there any recommendations for "safe" levels of
replication competence? We discussed this today at our IBC meeting
because it is clear that our PIs are assuming that viral vectors they
obtain from catalogs or from other researchers are not going to replicate
because they are classified as "replication incompetent". In other words,
they are treating them as reagents and not as organisms with the potential
for recombination events.
Thanks for any help anyone may have.
Debra L. Hunt, DrPH, CBSP
Director, Biological Safety
Assistant Clinical Professor
Duke University / Duke University Health System
Durham, NC 27710
919-684-8822
hunt0009@mc.duke.edu
--0__=zx7iB1QNqKg9FGNwHPiyZ7WE2DYKbseLxbqyWfrNPSm0DZAVL4rhtbA7
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name="att1.htm"
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="att1.htm"
Content-transfer-encoding: base64
Content-Description: Internet HTML
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 16 May 2002 10:21:31 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Donald Mosier
Subject: Re: viral vectors in animals
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/mixed;
boundary="============_-1190552803==_============"
--============_-1190552803==_============
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Karen,
You are not alone in requesting an earlier Word format. Here it is.
Don Mosier
>I would love to read the advice in the attached file. But I have windows 97
>and I can't open a bin file. Would someone who can open the file re-post in
>a pc format which can be opened with windows 97 programs? Thank you!
>
>Karen Byers, MS, RBP, CBSP
>Biosafety Officer/Containment Suite Manager
>Dana-Farber Cancer Institute
>44 Binney Street - SWG350
>Boston, MA 02115
>phone:617-632-3890
>fax:617-632-1932
>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Donald Mosier [SMTP:dmosier@SCRIPPS.EDU]
>> Sent: Wednesday, May 15, 2002 5:57 PM
>> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
>> Subject: Re: viral vectors in animals
>>
>> Debra,
>>
>> We have had so many questions about the safety of viral vectors that I
>> have drafted a short review of the issues for retrovirus-based vectors. I
>> have attached a copy for your information.
>>
>> Donald Mosier
>> IBC Chairperson
>>
>> Good afternoon. Do those of you who sit on IBCs and review viral
>> vector protocols require that the PIs submit screening test information
>> regarding replication competence prior to injection into animals? If so,
>> are there any standard tests for any of the most commonly used vectors
>> (ex, adenoviruses), and are there any recommendations for "safe" levels of
>> replication competence? We discussed this today at our IBC meeting
>> because it is clear that our PIs are assuming that viral vectors they
>> obtain from catalogs or from other researchers are not going to replicate
>> because they are classified as "replication incompetent". In other words,
>> they are treating them as reagents and not as organisms with the potential
>> for recombination events.
>>
>> Thanks for any help anyone may have.
>>
>> Debra L. Hunt, DrPH, CBSP
>> Director, Biological Safety
>> Assistant Clinical Professor
>> Duke University / Duke University Health System
>> Durham, NC 27710
>> 919-684-8822
>> hunt0009@mc.duke.edu
>> > >
--============_-1190552803==_============
Content-Id:
Content-Type: application/msword; name="Safety_of_Retroviral_Vector.doc"
; x-mac-type="5736424E"
; x-mac-creator="4D535744"
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="Safety_of_Retroviral_Vector.doc"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
_______________________________________________________________________________
Donald E. Mosier, PhD, MD
Professor
Department of Immunology, IMM-7
The Scripps Research Institute
10550 North Torrey Pines Road
La Jolla, CA 92037, USA
858 784-9121 phone
858 784-9190 fax
This email and any files transmitted with it are confidential and
intended solely for the use of the individual or entity to whom they
are addressed. If you have received this email in error please notify
Dr. Mosier by telephone or fax.
--============_-1190552803==_============--
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 16 May 2002 13:31:44 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Byers, Karen B"
Subject: Re: viral vectors in animals
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Thank you for sharing this excellent resource.
Karen Byers, MS, RBP, CBSP
Biosafety Officer/Containment Suite Manager
Dana-Farber Cancer Institute
44 Binney Street - SWG350
Boston, MA 02115
phone:617-632-3890
fax:617-632-1932
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Donald Mosier [SMTP:dmosier@SCRIPPS.EDU]
> Sent: Thursday, May 16, 2002 1:22 PM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: Re: viral vectors in animals
>
> Karen,
>
> You are not alone in requesting an earlier Word format. Here it is.
>
> Don Mosier
>
>
> >> > > File: Safety_of_Retroviral_Vector.doc >> >
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 16 May 2002 10:52:10 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Sue Quinn
Subject: two questions
MIME-Version: 1.0
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boundary="----=_NextPart_000_297B_01C1FCC7.BAF8BF00"
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charset="iso-8859-1"
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I have two questions for the group...
1) I would like to install an O2 sensor in a small room containing a =
liquid nitrogen tank. Does anyone recommend any specific type/brand of =
sensor? Our gases vendor is pushing one that is almost $2K while my =
catalogues have them ranging from $200-2000.
2) Has anyone ever come across a cell counter that is more ergonomic =
than the standard counters? We have some scientists with RSI who find =
that excessive cell counting to be very painful in fingers and across =
the top of hand.
Thanks!
Sue
Suzanne M. Quinn
Manager, Environmental Health and Safety
Exelixis, Inc.
PO Box 511
South San Francisco, CA 94083-0511
Thanks!
Sue
Suzanne M. Quinn
Manager, = Environmental Health=20 and Safety
Exelixis, Inc.
PO Box 511
South San Francisco, = CA =20 94083-0511
------=_NextPart_000_297B_01C1FCC7.BAF8BF00--
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 16 May 2002 13:53:48 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Petuch, Brian R."
Subject: Re: two questions
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="----_=_NextPart_001_01C1FD02.A15C7EC0"
MSA is a quality brand. Their line has modular options for remote sensing,
alarm, control.
-----Original Message-----
From: Sue Quinn [mailto:squinn@]
Sent: Thursday, May 16, 2002 1:52 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: two questions
I have two questions for the group...
1) I would like to install an O2 sensor in a small room containing a liquid
nitrogen tank. Does anyone recommend any specific type/brand of sensor?
Our gases vendor is pushing one that is almost $2K while my catalogues have
them ranging from $200-2000.
2) Has anyone ever come across a cell counter that is more ergonomic than
the standard counters? We have some scientists with RSI who find that
excessive cell counting to be very painful in fingers and across the top of
hand.
Thanks!
Sue
Suzanne M. Quinn
Manager, Environmental Health and Safety
Exelixis, Inc.
PO Box 511
South San Francisco, CA 94083-0511
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notice: This e-mail message, together with any attachments, contains information of Merck & Co., Inc. (Whitehouse Station, New Jersey, USA) that may be confidential, proprietary copyrighted and/or legally privileged, and is intended solely for the use of the individual or entity named on this message. If you are not the intended recipient, and have received this message in error, please immediately return this by e-mail and then delete it.
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 16 May 2002 13:55:02 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Kim Auletta
Subject: Re: two questions
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
We intalled the Biosystems "Zoneguard" fixed gas detection system in our
magent/LN2 cooled pits. We have audiovisual alarms in the room & remote
alarm in the office. This was acceptable to our researcher because it had
non-magnetic casing, etc.
Fisher Safety lists for $1395
Kim Auletta
Lab Safety Specialist
Environmental Health and Safety
SUNY Stony Brook
110 Suffolk Hall
Stony Brook, NY 11794-6200
PHONE: 631-632-9672
FAX: 631-632-9683
E-MAIL: kauletta@.sunysb.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 17 May 2002 08:36:55 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Richard Fink
Subject: Fwd: Q Fever
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="=====================_1817583==_.ALT"
--=====================_1817583==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
>Date: Tue, 14 May 2002 16:47:16 -0400
>From: "Elizabeth Gilman"
>Subject: Q Fever
>Mime-Version: 1.0
>Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
>Content-Disposition: inline
>
>Dear Group:
>
>Does anyone have any experience with the biosafety protocols for working
>safely with sheep body parts? I have an investigator who would like to
>obtain from a collaborator just the shoulders of sheep. These are adult
>female sheep, from a Q-fever negative farm, however the sheep were not
>tested individually. Given this information, am I correct in thinking
>that the risk of Q Fever infection is low but not zero, and BL2
>facilities/precautions are acceptable. I know that BL3 is the way to go
>for necropsy when you are dealing with animals known to be infected. We
>do not have BL3 facilities but could easily require BL2+ (BL3
>practices/procedures) if necessary. Thanks in advance for any information
>you may be able to share.
>
>Betsy
>
>Elizabeth A. Gilman, MS, RBP, SM(NRM), CBSP
>Biosafety Officer
>Wyeth
>87 CambridgePark Drive, t-2025C
>Cambridge, MA 02140
>egilman@
>617-665-5233 (office)
>617-665-5262 (fax)
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 17 May 2002 11:34:59 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Doob, Peter (NIDA/IRP)"
Subject: Re: two questions
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
A few thoughts on Sue's LN2 querry I thought I'd share based on our
experience with LN2 manifolded for freezer backup . . .
It can come as a surprise to unpack a low-end O2 monitor only to
find it conspicuously marked as "Not for Protection of Human Life" or
something similar. Hmmm.
Finding a monitor that doesn't drift too much is valuable, as
instability confuses the situation; staff really want to believe the readout
is accurate and reliable once they understand what is being measured.
Many O2 monitors use a chemical cell sensor that needs infrequent
but periodic replacement, so they need to be included on a changeout
schedule. Recalibration on site is required for ours when the cell is
replaced.
We teach staff (research and facilities) to both understand the O2
monitor's function and to recognize (and report) signs of significant LN2
leaks. That way they get a little extra peace of mind and we get early
warning on plumbing problems.
O2 displacement by N2 is admittedly pretty basic, but it has always
struck me as rather insidious. They say you don't feel a thing.
Enjoy!
Peter A. Doob, MPH, JD
Chief, Safety and Operations Support Section, ASB
National Institute for Drug Abuse, NIH
Intramural Research Program
5500 Nathan Shock Drive
Baltimore, MD 21224
vc: 410-550-1675
> ----------
> From: Sue Quinn
> Reply To: A Biosafety Discussion List
> Sent: Thursday, May 16, 2002 1:52 PM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: two questions
>
> I have two questions for the group...
>
> 1) I would like to install an O2 sensor in a small room containing a
> liquid nitrogen tank. Does anyone recommend any specific type/brand of
> sensor? Our gases vendor is pushing one that is almost $2K while my
> catalogues have them ranging from $200-2000.
>
> 2) Has anyone ever come across a cell counter that is more ergonomic than
> the standard counters? We have some scientists with RSI who find that
> excessive cell counting to be very painful in fingers and across the top
> of hand.
>
> Thanks!
> Sue
>
> Suzanne M. Quinn
> Manager, Environmental Health and Safety
> Exelixis, Inc.
> PO Box 511
> South San Francisco, CA 94083-0511
>
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 17 May 2002 13:18:40 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Rosenberger, Sonia"
Subject: Preferred incubator shaker for BL-2?
MIME-Version: 1.0
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Does anyone have a recommendation for an incubator shaker providing adequate
primary containment for BL-2 work?
Thank you kindly,
Sonia Rosenberger DVM
Biosafety Officer
Chiron Corporation
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=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 20 May 2002 14:31:10 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Kim Auletta
Subject: Glove training
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Awhile ago, someone posted their on-line glove donning/doffing training.
Does anyone have this link still? Thanks.
Kim Auletta
Lab Safety Specialist
Environmental Health and Safety
SUNY Stony Brook
110 Suffolk Hall
Stony Brook, NY 11794-6200
PHONE: 631-632-9672
FAX: 631-632-9683
E-MAIL: kauletta@.sunysb.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 20 May 2002 15:36:55 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Barbara Benton St. Gelais"
Subject: Re: Glove training
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed"
This is the website:
Barbara
>Awhile ago, someone posted their on-line glove donning/doffing training.
>Does anyone have this link still? Thanks.
>
>Kim Auletta
>Lab Safety Specialist
>Environmental Health and Safety
>SUNY Stony Brook
>110 Suffolk Hall
>Stony Brook, NY 11794-6200
>PHONE: 631-632-9672
>FAX: 631-632-9683
>E-MAIL: kauletta@.sunysb.edu
--
Barbara Benton St. Gelais
Environmental Safety Facility
University of Vermont
Burlington, VT 05405-0570
(802)656-5402
bbsg@esf.uvm.edu
=========================================================================
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 22 May 2002 16:53:29 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Lori Keen
Subject: disposal of plates
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
When of our science ed professors wants to know what advice he should give
prospective (and current) biology teachers regarding disposal of the
used/contaminated agar plates used in "fallout" type experiments. What does the
group recommend a teacher do when they do not have access to an autoclave?
Double bag, close securely and discard in trash?
(Anytime I make plates for a local teacher I tell them to bring the used plates
back to me for disposal, but obviously not everyone comes to me for plates)
Lori Keen
Lab Manager, Biology
Calvin College
616-957-6080
Member NAOSMM
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 23 May 2002 08:54:34 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Robert N. Latsch"
Subject: Re: disposal of plates
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
These item will look bad. Even if there is no biohazard present. People
will automaticlay make the assumption that they are. We demand that trash
of this nature be treated as biohazardous. Less hassles that way.
Bob
>When of our science ed professors wants to know what advice he should give
>prospective (and current) biology teachers regarding disposal of the
>used/contaminated agar plates used in "fallout" type experiments. What
>does the
>group recommend a teacher do when they do not have access to an autoclave?
>Double bag, close securely and discard in trash?
>
>(Anytime I make plates for a local teacher I tell them to bring the used
>plates
>back to me for disposal, but obviously not everyone comes to me for plates)
>
>
>
>Lori Keen
>Lab Manager, Biology
>Calvin College
>616-957-6080
>Member NAOSMM
_____________________________________________________________________
__ / _____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 23 May 2002 09:25:32 EDT
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ed Krisiunas
Subject: Re: disposal of plates
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="part1_129.11b6e0b0.2a1e47cc_boundary"
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Lori:
I agree with Bob's perspective - one additional point -Where are you located
(state)? State regs. may also provide some guidance.
Edward Krisiunas, MT(ASCP), CIC, MPH
President
WNWN International
PO Box 1164
Burlington, Connecticut
06013
860-675-1217
860-675-1311(fax)
860-944-2373(mobile)
In a message dated 5/22/2002 4:55:12 PM Eastern Daylight Time,
keel@CALVIN.EDU writes:
> When of our science ed professors wants to know what advice he should give
> prospective (and current) biology teachers regarding disposal of the
> used/contaminated agar plates used in "fallout" type experiments. What
> does the
> group recommend a teacher do when they do not have access to an autoclave?
> Double bag, close securely and discard in trash?
>
> (Anytime I make plates for a local teacher I tell them to bring the used
> plates
> back to me for disposal, but obviously not everyone comes to me for plates)
>
>
>
> Lori Keen
> Lab Manager, Biology
> Calvin College
> 616-957-6080
> Member NAOSMM
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 23 May 2002 09:24:45 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: June Angle
Subject: monkey questions
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Hi all:
I have a researcher who has proposed work involving cynomolgus monkey
blood and also rhesus monkey brain. Any suggestions regarding what sort
of certifications or testing we should require from the source? This
particular researcher has been through annual BBP training and has
signed a HEP B declination.
I would appreciate any information.
Thanks.
June
June-Marie Angle
Principal Research Associate
Pharmacology Group
Gliatech Inc.
23420 Commerce Park Road
Beachwood, OH 44122
phone:(216)831-3200
fax:(216)831-4907
anglej@
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 23 May 2002 09:25:14 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Lori Keen
Subject: PLATES
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Folks,
I appreciate much of your advice, but my question is not who do I handle this
on-campus. That's easy - autoclave. The question regards teachers doing this
kind of experiment at the high school level and then needing to get rid of the
plates. They make these plates on their own using pressure cookers or simply by
boiling the media or they purchase prepared plates from a vendor.. They do not
have access to autoclaves and certainly don't have the budget for medical waste
disposal.
I/we can strongly suggest they not do these kinds of experiments but I can't
demand or prohibit anything. Perhaps the bleach suggestion is the way to go.
Lori Keen
Lab Manager, Biology
Calvin College
616-957-6080
Member NAOSMM
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 23 May 2002 09:57:35 -0500
Reply-To: speaker@ehs.psu.edu
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Curt Speaker
Organization: UNIVERSITY SAFETY
Subject: Re: plate disposal
Lori:
Points taken, and you are correct in saying that they should not do
this kind of experimentation; but the fact of the matter is that they
do. The "no budget" excuse, however, just does not fly. Picture
this...
They stuff a bunch of petri dishes into a garbage bag and send it to
the local landfill. A piece of heavy equipment runs over the bag and
tears it open, exposing the petri dishes. The landfill operator, now
concerned at the potential of improperly disposed medial waste,
examines the material more closely and is able to trace it to the
school. By this time, the school is going to be hard pressed to prove
that the organisms on the plates are benign; they have had the
opportunity to be exposed to airborne and soil microbes, and if you
look hard enough, you will find a pathogen in there (Staph, Strep,
etc.). If the school is unwilling or unable to cover the cost of
disposing of this type of material properly, how are they going to
deal with the potential citations, fines and negative publicity that
could result???
My infectious waste vendor (here in PA) works closely with small
clients on this type of thing, and often will give them the option of
disposing of up to 50 pounds of medical waste for $50 --- money
well spent in my opinion.
Remeber here we are talking about perception, not real risk. There
is little, if any health risk from the plates. But the landfill operator
and the general public will likely not understand this.
Just my $0.02
Curt
Curt Speaker
Biosafety Officer
Penn State University
Environmental Health and Safety
speaker@ehs.psu.edu
^...^
(O_O)
=(Y)=
"""
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 23 May 2002 08:00:22 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Therese M. Stinnett"
Subject: Re: disposal of plates
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
regarding Bob's comments--and disposal of infectious waste vs. =
biological
waste--I must vehemently disagree
usually the state has jurisdiction over what is categorized as =
infectious
waste; check what your state requires. The EPA med waste tracking act
expired in 1999, I believe, but check out their website, if you need =
more
info
for example in Colorado, it is a special type of solid waste--therefor =
NOT a
hazardous waste
certain infectious materials must have a treatment and disposal in
accordance with the level of risk it presents to public health, route =
of
exposure, and so on
this is a science professor teaching soon-to-be science teachers
what purpose does it serve to mis-educate them about the infectious =
nature
of the material? the general public has so many misperceptions and a =
lack
of understanding, what purpose does it serve to continue to pander to =
that?
IF a material is not infectious, there are costs to treating it as =
though it
were, whether it is the cost of continuing to mislead others or the =
cost of
actually putting it into an inappropriate waste stream
THESE ARE MY OPINIONS AND IN NO WAY SHOULD BE CONSTRUED AS THE OFFICIAL
OPINION OF MY EMPLOYER.
Therese M. Stinnett=20
Biosafety Officer=20
Health and Safety Division=20
UCHSC, Mailstop C275
4200 E. 9th Avenue
Denver, CO=A0 80262
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 23 May 2002 08:11:59 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Therese M. Stinnett"
Subject: Re: monkey questions
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Simian herpes B is written up in the CDC BMBL.
It infects macaques which includes rhesus, don't know about =
cynomologous
We presume all macaques are infected--so all blood, bodily fluids and
tissues, especially CNS tissues are handled as though they are =
infectious.
There's no vaccine and the lab acquired infections that are documented =
are
virtually always fatal or with significant morbidity, so the most =
important
effort is to prevent accidental exposures and to report any and all
potential exposures. We require our researchers to have annual =
training
specific to this lab and their work with the materials, over and above =
any
other BBP training.
Therese M. Stinnett=20
Biosafety Officer=20
Health and Safety Division=20
UCHSC, Mailstop C275
4200 E. 9th Avenue
Denver, CO=A0 80262
Voice:=A0 303-315-6754=20
Pager:=A0=A0 303-266-5402=20
Fax:=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 303-315-8026=20
email:=A0=A0=A0 therese.stinnett@uchsc.edu =
-----Original Message-----
From: June Angle [mailto:anglej@]
Sent: Thursday, May 23, 2002 7:25 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: monkey questions
Hi all:
I have a researcher who has proposed work involving cynomolgus monkey
blood and also rhesus monkey brain. Any suggestions regarding what =
sort
of certifications or testing we should require from the source? This
particular researcher has been through annual BBP training and has
signed a HEP B declination.
I would appreciate any information.
Thanks.
June
June-Marie Angle
Principal Research Associate
Pharmacology Group
Gliatech Inc.
23420 Commerce Park Road
Beachwood, OH 44122
phone:(216)831-3200
fax:(216)831-4907
anglej@
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 23 May 2002 09:15:08 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Johnson, Julie A."
Subject: Re: PLATES
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Autoclaving isn't the only way to decon plates. They should be
decontaminated in some way before disposal, however. I see no reason why
they can't use bleach on the plates overnight, then pour off and put the
plates in the trash (preferably in a sealed bag or box). I would also
suggest that they meet with their garbage hauler ahead of time to explain
that the waste is decontaminated, in case a bag ever breaks open.
Julie A. Johnson, Ph.D., CBSP
Biosafety Officer
Environmental Health and Safety
118 Agronomy Lab
Iowa State University
Ames, IA 50011
Phone: 515-294-7657
Fax: 515-294-9357
Email: jajohns@iastate.edu
Web site: ehs.iastate.edu
-----Original Message-----
From: Lori Keen [mailto:keel@CALVIN.EDU]
Sent: Thursday, May 23, 2002 8:25 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: PLATES
Folks,
I appreciate much of your advice, but my question is not who do I handle
this
on-campus. That's easy - autoclave. The question regards teachers doing
this
kind of experiment at the high school level and then needing to get rid of
the
plates. They make these plates on their own using pressure cookers or
simply by
boiling the media or they purchase prepared plates from a vendor.. They do
not
have access to autoclaves and certainly don't have the budget for medical
waste
disposal.
I/we can strongly suggest they not do these kinds of experiments but I can't
demand or prohibit anything. Perhaps the bleach suggestion is the way to
go.
Lori Keen
Lab Manager, Biology
Calvin College
616-957-6080
Member NAOSMM
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 23 May 2002 07:20:02 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Melinda Young
Subject: Re: monkey questions
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
If you asked me for certification of the source I might respond as such:
Biohazard safety consideration:The sources of these materials are animals =
that are clinically free of disease or with no gross lesions of disease at =
necropsy. However, the animals are not pathogen free and the specimens =
may contain infectious agents communicable to humans. CDC/NIH recommend =
that all nonhuman primate cells, tissues, and body fluids be handled using =
Biosafety Level 2 practices and containment, including safe work practices =
and the use of personal protective equipment. Each person handling these =
materials should be offered an opportunity to bank a baseline serum =
sample, and be trained in the steps to take to seek immediate first aid =
and evaluation by a health care professional following a potential =
exposure incident. Additional information is available at od/o=
hs/biosfty/bmbl4/bmbl4toc.htm or books.nap.edu/books/0309052998/html/65.h=
tml#pagetop
Make sure they understand the difference between Hep B and Cercopithecine =
herpesvirus [CHV-1], B-virus)
You could run tests for specific pathogens like B-Virus but just because =
the materials are free of a specific pathogen should not change how you =
handle the material.=20
Melinda Young
Melinda Young
Health & Safety Coordinator
Wa National Primate Research Center
Box 357330=20
Phone: 206-543-8686=20
Fax: 206-685-0305
melinday@bart.rprc.washington.edu
biosafe@u.washington.edu
=20
>>> anglej@ 05/23/02 06:24AM >>>
Hi all:
I have a researcher who has proposed work involving cynomolgus monkey
blood and also rhesus monkey brain. Any suggestions regarding what sort
of certifications or testing we should require from the source? This
particular researcher has been through annual BBP training and has
signed a HEP B declination.
I would appreciate any information.
Thanks.
June
June-Marie Angle
Principal Research Associate
Pharmacology Group
Gliatech Inc.
23420 Commerce Park Road
Beachwood, OH 44122
phone:(216)831-3200
fax:(216)831-4907
anglej@
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 23 May 2002 10:20:54 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Lori Keen
Subject: Re: disposal of plates
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Thanks for all the advice (still willing to listen to more, of course). The
professor teaching this course (science ed) is trained in the physical sciences,
not biology (this course falls under the physics dept), . You've made me
realize that one of our microbiology professors and I need to sit down with him
and help him think through all of the ramifications of suggesting this type of
lab exercise to teachers.
Lori Keen
Lab Manager, Biology
Calvin College
616-957-6080
Member NAOSMM
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 23 May 2002 07:23:56 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Melinda Young
Subject: Cyno is Macaque
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Macaca fascicularis (Crab eating macaque) (Cynomolgus monkey)
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 23 May 2002 10:24:33 EDT
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ed Krisiunas
Subject: Re: disposal of plates
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Where is Calvin College located (what state??)?
Edward Krisiunas, MT(ASCP), CIC, MPH
President
WNWN International
PO Box 1164
Burlington, Connecticut
06013
860-675-1217
860-675-1311(fax)
860-944-2373(mobile)
--part1_f6.1b9d5fb4.2a1e55a1_boundary
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Where is Calvin College located (what state??)?
Edward Krisiunas, MT(ASCP), CIC, MPH
President
WNWN International
PO Box 1164
Burlington, Connecticut
06013
860-675-1217
860-675-1311(fax)
860-944-2373(mobile)
--part1_f6.1b9d5fb4.2a1e55a1_boundary--
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 23 May 2002 08:24:21 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Madeline J. Dalrymple"
Subject: Import permits
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="Boundary_(ID_A+PAAl3ueu0W4vk/zO73Nw)"
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Good morning
How do you find out if an import permit is needed for a researcher to receive biological samples from another country? I am thinking of animal or plant tissues. Fixed or not.
Are there one or two good websites that list biological samples that require permitting?
I am not asking about how to ship, but rather about the permitting aspect.
Madeline Dalrymple
Biological Safety Officer
Environmental Health and Safety
University of Wyoming, Laramie, Wyoming, USA
766-2723, fax 766-5678, dalrympl@uwyo.edu
--Boundary_(ID_A+PAAl3ueu0W4vk/zO73Nw)
Content-type: text/html; charset=iso-8859-1
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Good morning
How do you find out if an import permit is needed for a researcher to receive biological samples from another country? I am thinking of animal or plant tissues. Fixed or not.
Are there one or two good websites that list biological samples that require permitting?
I am not asking about how to ship, but rather about the permitting aspect.
Madeline Dalrymple
Biological Safety Officer
Environmental Health and Safety
University of Wyoming, Laramie, Wyoming, USA
766-2723, fax 766-5678, dalrympl@uwyo.edu
--Boundary_(ID_A+PAAl3ueu0W4vk/zO73Nw)--
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 23 May 2002 10:21:21 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Robert N. Latsch"
Subject: Re: PLATES
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Aprise them of the PR problems that can arise then step back. If they want
the fallout you cannot stop them. Let them deal with the headaches.
I know this sounds crass. But, your friends obviously do not appreciate
the minefield they are walking into. It is not that they are doing
anything wrong. They are going to have a tough time selling it.
Bob
>Folks,
>I appreciate much of your advice, but my question is not who do I handle this
>on-campus. That's easy - autoclave. The question regards teachers doing this
>kind of experiment at the high school level and then needing to get rid of the
>plates. They make these plates on their own using pressure cookers or
>simply by
>boiling the media or they purchase prepared plates from a vendor.. They
>do not
>have access to autoclaves and certainly don't have the budget for medical
>waste
>disposal.
>I/we can strongly suggest they not do these kinds of experiments but I can't
>demand or prohibit anything. Perhaps the bleach suggestion is the way to go.
>
>
>
>Lori Keen
>Lab Manager, Biology
>Calvin College
>616-957-6080
>Member NAOSMM
_____________________________________________________________________
__ / _____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 23 May 2002 10:27:00 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Lori Keen
Subject: Re: disposal of plates
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Grand Rapids, Michigan
Lori Keen
Lab Manager, Biology
Calvin College
616-957-6080
Member NAOSMM
>>> EKrisiunas@ 05/23/02 10:24AM >>>
Where is Calvin College located (what state??)?
Edward Krisiunas, MT(ASCP), CIC, MPH
President
WNWN International
PO Box 1164
Burlington, Connecticut
06013
860-675-1217
860-675-1311(fax)
860-944-2373(mobile)
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 23 May 2002 09:32:54 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Burnett, LouAnn Crawford"
Subject: Re: Import permits
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="----_=_NextPart_001_01C20266.B9DD0178"
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charset="us-ascii"
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Madeline -
=20
Here's what you want (I hope). =20
=20
=20
=20
LouAnn
=20
LouAnn C. Burnett, MS, CBSP =20
Biosafety Program Manager & Biological Safety Officer =20
Vanderbilt University Environmental Health & Safety
Nashville, Tennessee
615/322-0927 (direct & voice mail)
615/343-4951 (fax) =20
-----Original Message-----
From: Madeline J. Dalrymple [mailto:Dalrympl@UWYO.EDU]=20
Sent: Thursday, May 23, 2002 9:24 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Import permits
=09
=09
Good morning=20
=20
How do you find out if an import permit is needed for a
researcher to receive biological samples from another country? I am
thinking of animal or plant tissues. Fixed or not.
Are there one or two good websites that list biological
samples that require permitting? =20
I am not asking about how to ship, but rather about the
permitting aspect.=20
Madeline Dalrymple=20
Biological Safety Officer=20
Environmental Health and Safety=20
University of Wyoming, Laramie, Wyoming, USA=20
766-2723, fax 766-5678, dalrympl@uwyo.edu=20
------_=_NextPart_001_01C20266.B9DD0178
Content-Type: text/html;
charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Madeline -
Here's=20 what you want (I hope).
ncie/
LouAnn
LouAnn C. Burnett, MS, CBSP =20 =20
Biosafety Program Manager = &=20 Biological Safety Officer
Vanderbilt University = Environmental=20 Health & Safety
Nashville, Tennessee
615/322-0927 (direct = & voice=20 mail)
615/343-4951 (fax) =20 =20 =20
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 23 May 2002 07:34:28 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Melinda Young
Subject: Re: Import permits
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
>>> Dalrympl@UWYO.EDU 05/23/02 07:24AM >>>
Good morning
How do you find out if an import permit is needed for a researcher =
to receive biological samples from another country? I am thinking of =
animal or plant tissues. Fixed or not.
Are there one or two good websites that list biological samples =
that require permitting?
I am not asking about how to ship, but rather about the permitting =
aspect.
Madeline Dalrymple
Biological Safety Officer
Environmental Health and Safety
University of Wyoming, Laramie, Wyoming, USA
766-2723, fax 766-5678, dalrympl@uwyo.edu=20
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 23 May 2002 10:37:53 EDT
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ed Krisiunas
Subject: Re: disposal of plates
MIME-Version: 1.0
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boundary="part1_15c.dc2e0ab.2a1e58c1_boundary"
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You are in a state where the governor has pulled the plug on funding for the
Medical Waste Regulatory Program. Statutes are still in place but there is
discussion for them to be repealed. One still needs to manage their medical
waste (if they in fact have medical waste by definition) but there is not
likely to be enforcement from the Michigan DEC.
The Michigan State Police enforcement transportation of hazardous materials.
The regulatory contact - John Gohlke - has been moved to another division but
is still the point of contact should you have questions - 517-241-1320
Edward Krisiunas, MT(ASCP), CIC, MPH
President
WNWN International
PO Box 1164
Burlington, Connecticut
06013
860-675-1217
860-675-1311(fax)
860-944-2373(mobile)
In a message dated 5/23/2002 10:30:24 AM Eastern Daylight Time,
keel@CALVIN.EDU writes:
>
> Grand Rapids, Michigan
>
> Lori Keen
> Lab Manager, Biology
> Calvin College
> 616-957-6080
> Member NAOSMM
--part1_15c.dc2e0ab.2a1e58c1_boundary
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You are in a state where the governor has pulled the plug on funding for the Medical Waste Regulatory Program. Statutes are still in place but there is discussion for them to be repealed. One still needs to manage their medical waste (if they in fact have medical waste by definition) but there is not likely to be enforcement from the Michigan DEC.
The Michigan State Police enforcement transportation of hazardous materials.
The regulatory contact - John Gohlke - has been moved to another division but is still the point of contact should you have questions - 517-241-1320
Edward Krisiunas, MT(ASCP), CIC, MPH
President
WNWN International
PO Box 1164
Burlington, Connecticut
06013
860-675-1217
860-675-1311(fax)
860-944-2373(mobile)
In a message dated 5/23/2002 10:30:24 AM Eastern Daylight Time, keel@CALVIN.EDU writes:
Grand Rapids, Michigan
Lori Keen
Lab Manager, Biology
Calvin College
616-957-6080
Member NAOSMM
--part1_15c.dc2e0ab.2a1e58c1_boundary--
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 23 May 2002 08:36:46 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Roland Leitner
Organization: University of Calgary
Subject: Re: PLATES
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Hello Lori,
Lori Keen wrote:
> Folks,
> I appreciate much of your advice, but my question is not who do I handle this
> on-campus. That's easy - autoclave. The question regards teachers doing this
> kind of experiment at the high school level and then needing to get rid of the
> plates. They make these plates on their own using pressure cookers or simply by
> boiling the media or they purchase prepared plates from a vendor.. They do not
> have access to autoclaves and certainly don't have the budget for medical waste
> disposal.
Is "autoclaving" the plates in the pressure cookers an option? Take away the fancy
add-ons on autoclaves and you end up with a pressure cooker. I worked with a
researcher years ago who, due to the lack of access to an autoclave and the
requirement to inactivate the biological hazard, was stuck. I advised him to
purchase a pressure cooker, and to keep records of the autoclaving. Worked like a
charm.
Hope it could also work for you.
Roland
--
Roland Leitner
Biosafety / Laboratory Safety Officer
Safety Services
University of Calgary
2500 University Drive N.W.
Calgary, AB T2N 1N4
Ph: 403-220-4612 Fax: 403-284-1332
------------------------
Ex factis, non ex dictis amici pensandi. Titus Livius
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 23 May 2002 08:42:15 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Therese M. Stinnett"
Subject: Re: disposal of plates
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
NEW RESOURCE LISTINGS
EPA ANTIMICROBIALS LIST
The long awaited EPA ABCD Antimicrobials list, is now online and
is posted yesterday on the Agency website.
These are listings of EPA=3Ds registered antimicrobial products
effective against tubercle bacteria, human HIV-1 virus, or Hepatitis B
virus as well as products classified as sterilants and products used =
for
medical wastes. The lists are organized alphabetically by product =
names
and were updated on March 2, 2002.
List A: EPA=3Ds Registered Antimicrobial Products as =
Sterilants.
List B: EPA Registered Tuberculocide Products Effective Against
Mycobacterium spp .
List C: EPA=3Ds Registered Antimicrobial Products Effective =
Against
Human HIV-1 Virus
List D: EPA=3Ds Registered Antimicrobial Products Effective =
Against
Human HIV-1 and
Hepatitis B virus
List E: EPA=3Ds Registered Antimicrobial Products Effective =
Against
Mycobacterium spp, Human HIV-1 and Hepatitis B virus
List F: EPA=3Ds Registered Antimicrobial Products for Medical =
Waste
Treatment
Only antimicrobial products from the primary registrants are
included in the lists. All EPA=3Ds registered pesticides must have an
EPA registration number (EPA Reg# or ID#). The EPA Registration =
number
for primary registrants consists of two set of numbers separated by a
hyphen (-), for example EPA Reg#001234-000012. The first set of
numbers refers to the registrant=3Ds identification number and the =
second
set of numbers represents the product identification number. A
distributor=3Ds product may use a different name, but must have the =
first
two sets of EPA Reg# of the primary registrant, plus a third set of
numbers that represents the Distributor/ Relabeler Identification
number, for example EPA Reg#001234-000012-000567. An establishment
number (EPA Est#) is the place where the pesticide, formulation or
device is produced and it is indicated by a set of codes which consist
of the registrant=3Ds number followed by the State where the product is
made and facility number.
The above lists are updated periodically to reflect label =
changes,
cancellations, and transfers of product registrations. Future =
versions
will be upgraded. The approved label of a particular antimicrobial
product can be found in the Pesticide Product Label System (PPLS)
database posted at . To obtain
a pesticide product label enter the EPA Reg# of the primary product in
the search query bar of the PPLS database.
=20
Therese M. Stinnett=20
Biosafety Officer=20
Health and Safety Division=20
UCHSC, Mailstop C275
4200 E. 9th Avenue
Denver, CO=A0 80262
Voice:=A0 303-315-6754=20
Pager:=A0=A0 303-266-5402=20
Fax:=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 303-315-8026=20
email:=A0=A0=A0 therese.stinnett@uchsc.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 23 May 2002 09:43:05 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Johnson, Julie A."
Subject: Re: plate disposal
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
I have to strongly disagree with Curt's comment that science teachers should
not be doing this kind of experimentation. Even things that have been
autoclaved often appear to the general public as if they are "biohazardous".
Must we require everything that might be perceived to be biohazardous to be
rendered unrecognizable? I think we need to strongly consider educating
the public and our waste haulers as to what is and is not biohazardous waste
instead of going overboard in treating everything that might possibly be
perceived as in some way hazardous as if it is. If we, the supposed
experts, treat everything as if it is hazardous, the public will think that
it is hazardous.
I very much realize that we do sometimes have to do things because of public
perception, but why don't we use our professional knowledge to educate the
public and not to add to unrealistic fears. If we react only to perception
and not reality, we are doing the public a disservice. Are we as biosafety
professionals going to let things get to the point where no one can use even
a sterile petri unless they have a Ph.D. and work in a high security lab
with all waste autoclave, ground to make it unrecognizable, then incinerated
because a petri dish might be perceived as biohazardous waste?
We, as biosafety professionals must make decisions that keep people safe,
while also allowing needed teaching and research in these areas to continue.
We can do both if we are willing to make the effort.
Julie A. Johnson, Ph.D., CBSP
Biosafety Officer
Environmental Health and Safety
118 Agronomy Lab
Iowa State University
Ames, IA 50011
Phone: 515-294-7657
Fax: 515-294-9357
Email: jajohns@iastate.edu
Web site: ehs.iastate.edu
THESE ARE MY OPINIONS AND IN NO WAY SHOULD BE CONSTRUED AS THE OFFICIAL
OPINION OF MY EMPLOYER.
-----Original Message-----
From: Curt Speaker [mailto:SPEAKER@SAFETY-1.SAFETY.PSU.EDU]
Sent: Thursday, May 23, 2002 9:58 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: plate disposal
Lori:
Points taken, and you are correct in saying that they should not do
this kind of experimentation; but the fact of the matter is that they
do. The "no budget" excuse, however, just does not fly. Picture
this...
They stuff a bunch of petri dishes into a garbage bag and send it to
the local landfill. A piece of heavy equipment runs over the bag and
tears it open, exposing the petri dishes. The landfill operator, now
concerned at the potential of improperly disposed medial waste,
examines the material more closely and is able to trace it to the
school. By this time, the school is going to be hard pressed to prove
that the organisms on the plates are benign; they have had the
opportunity to be exposed to airborne and soil microbes, and if you
look hard enough, you will find a pathogen in there (Staph, Strep,
etc.). If the school is unwilling or unable to cover the cost of
disposing of this type of material properly, how are they going to
deal with the potential citations, fines and negative publicity that
could result???
My infectious waste vendor (here in PA) works closely with small
clients on this type of thing, and often will give them the option of
disposing of up to 50 pounds of medical waste for $50 --- money
well spent in my opinion.
Remeber here we are talking about perception, not real risk. There
is little, if any health risk from the plates. But the landfill operator
and the general public will likely not understand this.
Just my $0.02
Curt
Curt Speaker
Biosafety Officer
Penn State University
Environmental Health and Safety
speaker@ehs.psu.edu
^...^
(O_O)
=(Y)=
"""
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 23 May 2002 09:18:03 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Madeline J. Dalrymple"
Subject: Re: Import permits
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT
Thanks!
-----Original Message-----
From: Melinda Young [mailto:melinday@BART.RPRC.WASHINGTON.EDU]
Sent: Thursday, May 23, 2002 8:34 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Import permits
>>> Dalrympl@UWYO.EDU 05/23/02 07:24AM >>>
Good morning
How do you find out if an import permit is needed for a
researcher to receive biological samples from another country? I am
thinking of animal or plant tissues. Fixed or not.
Are there one or two good websites that list biological samples
that require permitting?
I am not asking about how to ship, but rather about the
permitting aspect.
Madeline Dalrymple
Biological Safety Officer
Environmental Health and Safety
University of Wyoming, Laramie, Wyoming, USA
766-2723, fax 766-5678, dalrympl@uwyo.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 23 May 2002 09:18:19 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Madeline J. Dalrymple"
Subject: Re: Import permits
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="Boundary_(ID_iQN3SQxN1ei24Znwm8dBpQ)"
This is a multi-part message in MIME format.
--Boundary_(ID_iQN3SQxN1ei24Znwm8dBpQ)
Content-type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT
Thanks LouAnn!
-----Original Message-----
From: Burnett, LouAnn Crawford [mailto:louann.burnett@VANDERBILT.EDU]
Sent: Thursday, May 23, 2002 8:33 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Import permits
Madeline -
Here's what you want (I hope).
LouAnn
LouAnn C. Burnett, MS, CBSP
Biosafety Program Manager & Biological Safety Officer
Vanderbilt University Environmental Health & Safety
Nashville, Tennessee
615/322-0927 (direct & voice mail)
615/343-4951 (fax)
-----Original Message-----
From: Madeline J. Dalrymple [mailto:Dalrympl@UWYO.EDU]
Sent: Thursday, May 23, 2002 9:24 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Import permits
Good morning
How do you find out if an import permit is needed for a
researcher to receive biological samples from another country? I am
thinking of animal or plant tissues. Fixed or not.
Are there one or two good websites that list biological samples
that require permitting?
I am not asking about how to ship, but rather about the
permitting aspect.
Madeline Dalrymple
Biological Safety Officer
Environmental Health and Safety
University of Wyoming, Laramie, Wyoming, USA
766-2723, fax 766-5678, dalrympl@uwyo.edu
--Boundary_(ID_iQN3SQxN1ei24Znwm8dBpQ)
Content-type: text/html; charset=US-ASCII
Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT
Thanks LouAnn!
-----Original Message-----
From: Burnett, LouAnn Crawford [mailto:louann.burnett@VANDERBILT.EDU]
Sent: Thursday, May 23, 2002 8:33 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Import permits
Madeline -
Here's what you want (I hope).
LouAnn
LouAnn C. Burnett, MS, CBSP
Biosafety Program Manager & Biological Safety Officer
Vanderbilt University Environmental Health & Safety
Nashville, Tennessee
615/322-0927 (direct & voice mail)
615/343-4951 (fax)
-----Original Message-----
From: Madeline J. Dalrymple [mailto:Dalrympl@UWYO.EDU]
Sent: Thursday, May 23, 2002 9:24 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Import permits
Good morning
How do you find out if an import permit is needed for a researcher to receive biological samples from another country? I am thinking of animal or plant tissues. Fixed or not.
Are there one or two good websites that list biological samples that require permitting?
I am not asking about how to ship, but rather about the permitting aspect.
Madeline Dalrymple
Biological Safety Officer
Environmental Health and Safety
University of Wyoming, Laramie, Wyoming, USA
766-2723, fax 766-5678, dalrympl@uwyo.edu
--Boundary_(ID_iQN3SQxN1ei24Znwm8dBpQ)--
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 23 May 2002 08:57:21 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Hall, Christine"
Subject: Re: disposal of plates
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Lori,
I checked the "ultimate authority" - Carolina Biological Supply. On Page
129 of their current catalog (right in the middle of the microbiology
section where they sell the kits) they address the question "What do I do if
I don't have an autoclave?" Their official answer is: "Household bleach
diluted to 5% with tap water, is an inexpensive yet very effective
disinfectant. Flood the cultures with the bleach solution overnight. Then
the wastes can be safely incinerated. Caution: Protect your clothing.
It's still bleach! You can also use 70% ethanol or a phenol solution as a
disinfectant." I would suggest to the future science teachers that help is
just a phone call away by calling tech help at the company supplying the
products. Granted they aren't experts on specific laws in each state but
they are a good place to start.
When you and the micro teacher are talking to the science ed prof I would
make sure that you go over things like - don't just buy the kit, make sure
that there is a spray bottle of disinfectant in the classroom to disinfect
surfaces after the experiment. Those kinds of things are generally not
supplied with the kit. There is also the chance that if they are doing any
kind of experiment where the students are culturing from themselves (eg
under the fingernails) there may be a significant number of them with
antibiotic resistant strains. While this kind of an experiment really
impresses the students, it is probably best to get kits where the bacteria
you are working with is known.
Just a few thoughts,
Chris
PS Good Luck
Chris Hall
Instructional Support Assistant IV
Palomar College - Life Sciences
1140 W Mission Rd
San Marcos, CA 92069
(760) 744-1150 x2726
-----Original Message-----
From: Lori Keen [mailto:keel@CALVIN.EDU]
Sent: Wednesday, May 22, 2002 1:53 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: disposal of plates
When of our science ed professors wants to know what advice he should give
prospective (and current) biology teachers regarding disposal of the
used/contaminated agar plates used in "fallout" type experiments. What does
the
group recommend a teacher do when they do not have access to an autoclave?
Double bag, close securely and discard in trash?
(Anytime I make plates for a local teacher I tell them to bring the used
plates
back to me for disposal, but obviously not everyone comes to me for plates)
Lori Keen
Lab Manager, Biology
Calvin College
616-957-6080
Member NAOSMM
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 23 May 2002 09:10:24 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: David Silberman
Subject: Re: plate disposal
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed"
I suggest that entering into discussions with your landfill operator.
Bring him to your site, show him/her what you are doing. Allay
his/her fears. If there are any regulatory folks with whom you have
a good relationship, bring them along. This process of engagement
works very well in Northern California and, I suspect, if it has
positive results here, it has a high probability of being successful
anywhere.
>I have to strongly disagree with Curt's comment that science teachers should
>not be doing this kind of experimentation. Even things that have been
>autoclaved often appear to the general public as if they are "biohazardous".
>Must we require everything that might be perceived to be biohazardous to be
>rendered unrecognizable? I think we need to strongly consider educating
>the public and our waste haulers as to what is and is not biohazardous waste
>instead of going overboard in treating everything that might possibly be
>perceived as in some way hazardous as if it is. If we, the supposed
>experts, treat everything as if it is hazardous, the public will think that
>it is hazardous.
>
>I very much realize that we do sometimes have to do things because of public
>perception, but why don't we use our professional knowledge to educate the
>public and not to add to unrealistic fears. If we react only to perception
>and not reality, we are doing the public a disservice. Are we as biosafety
>professionals going to let things get to the point where no one can use even
>a sterile petri unless they have a Ph.D. and work in a high security lab
>with all waste autoclave, ground to make it unrecognizable, then incinerated
>because a petri dish might be perceived as biohazardous waste?
>
>We, as biosafety professionals must make decisions that keep people safe,
>while also allowing needed teaching and research in these areas to continue.
>We can do both if we are willing to make the effort.
>
>
>Julie A. Johnson, Ph.D., CBSP
>Biosafety Officer
>Environmental Health and Safety
>118 Agronomy Lab
>Iowa State University
>Ames, IA 50011
>Phone: 515-294-7657
>Fax: 515-294-9357
>Email: jajohns@iastate.edu
>Web site: ehs.iastate.edu
>
>THESE ARE MY OPINIONS AND IN NO WAY SHOULD BE CONSTRUED AS THE OFFICIAL
>OPINION OF MY EMPLOYER.
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From: Curt Speaker [mailto:SPEAKER@SAFETY-1.SAFETY.PSU.EDU]
>Sent: Thursday, May 23, 2002 9:58 AM
>To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
>Subject: Re: plate disposal
>
>
>Lori:
>
>Points taken, and you are correct in saying that they should not do
>this kind of experimentation; but the fact of the matter is that they
>do. The "no budget" excuse, however, just does not fly. Picture
>this...
>
>They stuff a bunch of petri dishes into a garbage bag and send it to
>the local landfill. A piece of heavy equipment runs over the bag and
>tears it open, exposing the petri dishes. The landfill operator, now
>concerned at the potential of improperly disposed medial waste,
>examines the material more closely and is able to trace it to the
>school. By this time, the school is going to be hard pressed to prove
>that the organisms on the plates are benign; they have had the
>opportunity to be exposed to airborne and soil microbes, and if you
>look hard enough, you will find a pathogen in there (Staph, Strep,
>etc.). If the school is unwilling or unable to cover the cost of
>disposing of this type of material properly, how are they going to
>deal with the potential citations, fines and negative publicity that
>could result???
>
>My infectious waste vendor (here in PA) works closely with small
>clients on this type of thing, and often will give them the option of
>disposing of up to 50 pounds of medical waste for $50 --- money
>well spent in my opinion.
>
>Remeber here we are talking about perception, not real risk. There
>is little, if any health risk from the plates. But the landfill operator
>and the general public will likely not understand this.
>
>Just my $0.02
>
>Curt
>
>Curt Speaker
>Biosafety Officer
>Penn State University
>Environmental Health and Safety
>speaker@ehs.psu.edu
>
>^...^
>(O_O)
>=(Y)=
> """
--
David H. Silberman
Director, Health and Safety Programs
Stanford University School of Medicine
Medical School Office Building
Stanford, CA 94305 Mail Code: 5460
650 723-6336 (DIRECT LINE)
650 725-7878 (FAX)
silberman@stanford.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 23 May 2002 09:25:39 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Melinda Young
Subject: Laboratory-acquired HCV infections
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
I have been having an email discussion with one of our Biosafety Committee =
members who happens to supervise a laboratory where they are beginning to =
work with HCV. He is looking for information on laboratory-acquired HCV =
infections. =20
Does anyone know of a reference where these types of exposures are =
described a little better -to say whether there was direct contact with =
patients or their serum/plasma to determine the role of these factors with =
lab infections. =20
Melinda Young
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 23 May 2002 12:49:14 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Mann, Richard"
Subject: Re: monkey questions
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Don't forget Herpes B virus this is not hep B. Herpes B Virus is lethal on
humans!
Richard Mann,DVM
Veterinary Medical Officer
VA Medical Centers
Northport and Bronx NY
631 261 4400 x 2878
-----Original Message-----
From: June Angle [mailto:anglej@]
Sent: Thursday, May 23, 2002 9:25 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: monkey questions
Hi all:
I have a researcher who has proposed work involving cynomolgus monkey
blood and also rhesus monkey brain. Any suggestions regarding what sort
of certifications or testing we should require from the source? This
particular researcher has been through annual BBP training and has
signed a HEP B declination.
I would appreciate any information.
Thanks.
June
June-Marie Angle
Principal Research Associate
Pharmacology Group
Gliatech Inc.
23420 Commerce Park Road
Beachwood, OH 44122
phone:(216)831-3200
fax:(216)831-4907
anglej@
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 23 May 2002 13:09:08 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Lori Keen
Subject: Re: plate disposal
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Understandable advice, however, I can't a imagine a high school science teacher
who would go through all of what you suggest as far as meeting with landfill
people, etc - that would be a huge obstacle and they'd just find a different lab
exercise.
Lori Keen
Lab Manager, Biology
Calvin College
616-957-6080
Member NAOSMM
>>> davidhs@STANFORD.EDU 05/23/02 12:10PM >>>
I suggest that entering into discussions with your landfill operator.
Bring him to your site, show him/her what you are doing. Allay
his/her fears. If there are any regulatory folks with whom you have
a good relationship, bring them along. This process of engagement
works very well in Northern California and, I suspect, if it has
positive results here, it has a high probability of being successful
anywhere.
>I have to strongly disagree with Curt's comment that science teachers should
>not be doing this kind of experimentation. Even things that have been
>autoclaved often appear to the general public as if they are "biohazardous".
>Must we require everything that might be perceived to be biohazardous to be
>rendered unrecognizable? I think we need to strongly consider educating
>the public and our waste haulers as to what is and is not biohazardous waste
>instead of going overboard in treating everything that might possibly be
>perceived as in some way hazardous as if it is. If we, the supposed
>experts, treat everything as if it is hazardous, the public will think that
>it is hazardous.
>
>I very much realize that we do sometimes have to do things because of public
>perception, but why don't we use our professional knowledge to educate the
>public and not to add to unrealistic fears. If we react only to perception
>and not reality, we are doing the public a disservice. Are we as biosafety
>professionals going to let things get to the point where no one can use even
>a sterile petri unless they have a Ph.D. and work in a high security lab
>with all waste autoclave, ground to make it unrecognizable, then incinerated
>because a petri dish might be perceived as biohazardous waste?
>
>We, as biosafety professionals must make decisions that keep people safe,
>while also allowing needed teaching and research in these areas to continue.
>We can do both if we are willing to make the effort.
>
>
>Julie A. Johnson, Ph.D., CBSP
>Biosafety Officer
>Environmental Health and Safety
>118 Agronomy Lab
>Iowa State University
>Ames, IA 50011
>Phone: 515-294-7657
>Fax: 515-294-9357
>Email: jajohns@iastate.edu
>Web site: ehs.iastate.edu
>
>THESE ARE MY OPINIONS AND IN NO WAY SHOULD BE CONSTRUED AS THE OFFICIAL
>OPINION OF MY EMPLOYER.
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From: Curt Speaker [mailto:SPEAKER@SAFETY-1.SAFETY.PSU.EDU]
>Sent: Thursday, May 23, 2002 9:58 AM
>To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
>Subject: Re: plate disposal
>
>
>Lori:
>
>Points taken, and you are correct in saying that they should not do
>this kind of experimentation; but the fact of the matter is that they
>do. The "no budget" excuse, however, just does not fly. Picture
>this...
>
>They stuff a bunch of petri dishes into a garbage bag and send it to
>the local landfill. A piece of heavy equipment runs over the bag and
>tears it open, exposing the petri dishes. The landfill operator, now
>concerned at the potential of improperly disposed medial waste,
>examines the material more closely and is able to trace it to the
>school. By this time, the school is going to be hard pressed to prove
>that the organisms on the plates are benign; they have had the
>opportunity to be exposed to airborne and soil microbes, and if you
>look hard enough, you will find a pathogen in there (Staph, Strep,
>etc.). If the school is unwilling or unable to cover the cost of
>disposing of this type of material properly, how are they going to
>deal with the potential citations, fines and negative publicity that
>could result???
>
>My infectious waste vendor (here in PA) works closely with small
>clients on this type of thing, and often will give them the option of
>disposing of up to 50 pounds of medical waste for $50 --- money
>well spent in my opinion.
>
>Remeber here we are talking about perception, not real risk. There
>is little, if any health risk from the plates. But the landfill operator
>and the general public will likely not understand this.
>
>Just my $0.02
>
>Curt
>
>Curt Speaker
>Biosafety Officer
>Penn State University
>Environmental Health and Safety
>speaker@ehs.psu.edu
>
>^...^
>(O_O)
>=(Y)=
> """
--
David H. Silberman
Director, Health and Safety Programs
Stanford University School of Medicine
Medical School Office Building
Stanford, CA 94305 Mail Code: 5460
650 723-6336 (DIRECT LINE)
650 725-7878 (FAX)
silberman@stanford.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 23 May 2002 11:59:48 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Mike Sturgeon
Subject: Re: plate disposal
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Actually in Missouri, yes, we are required to render unrecognizable
everything that might be perceived to be biohazardous before disposing.
That includes culture plates, collection tubes, transfer pipettes, blood
bags, sterile saline bags, syringes, etc. And that's regardless of whether
they are used or unused.
As Julie strongly disagreed with Curt, I am certain Julie expected strong
disagreement with her comments, as well. Given the current state of world
affairs and some of the boneheaded judgments I've seen made by eminently
qualified and competent individuals with respect to the handling of
potentially infectious materials, I think I can say with a fair degree of
certainty that I do not want John or Jane Q. Public, even if educated,
deciding that a particular culture dish contains an infectious agent, a
pathogenic material, or that the dish is simply innocuous. And that's even
more true if they ride public transit, go to large public events, or even
if they just pick up their kid from the local school now and again.
Of course, my opinion may be influenced by a particular episode involving a
member of the public in Missouri who, despite education, instruction and
the availability of professional expertise as to the proper management of
used oil, failed to recognize the presence of dioxin in the used oil he was
spraying on roads for the purpose dust suppression. Our tax dollars are
still paying to clean that mess up. Not to mention the tragic consequences
to the people who lived in Times Beach.
And speaking of strictly perceptual issues, consider your response to this
situation as the waste generator. Because those who discount perception in
favor of education and training may very well get the opportunity to
respond to a similar situation at some point.
Whether $50 or $500, I consider it worth every penny to dispose of
"perceptually" infectious waste as if it were the real thing. But to each
their own.
Just my humble opinion.
Mike Sturgeon
Environmental Specialist
Quintiles, Inc.
Kansas City, Missouri
mike.sturgeon@
"Johnson, Julie A." @MITVMA.MIT.EDU> on 05/23/2002
09:43:05 AM
Please respond to A Biosafety Discussion List
Sent by: A Biosafety Discussion List
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
cc: (bcc: Mike Sturgeon/QKAN/Quintiles)
Subject: Re: plate disposal
I have to strongly disagree with Curt's comment that science teachers
should
not be doing this kind of experimentation. Even things that have been
autoclaved often appear to the general public as if they are
"biohazardous".
Must we require everything that might be perceived to be biohazardous to be
rendered unrecognizable? I think we need to strongly consider educating
the public and our waste haulers as to what is and is not biohazardous
waste
instead of going overboard in treating everything that might possibly be
perceived as in some way hazardous as if it is. If we, the supposed
experts, treat everything as if it is hazardous, the public will think that
it is hazardous.
I very much realize that we do sometimes have to do things because of
public
perception, but why don't we use our professional knowledge to educate the
public and not to add to unrealistic fears. If we react only to perception
and not reality, we are doing the public a disservice. Are we as biosafety
professionals going to let things get to the point where no one can use
even
a sterile petri unless they have a Ph.D. and work in a high security lab
with all waste autoclave, ground to make it unrecognizable, then
incinerated
because a petri dish might be perceived as biohazardous waste?
We, as biosafety professionals must make decisions that keep people safe,
while also allowing needed teaching and research in these areas to
continue.
We can do both if we are willing to make the effort.
Julie A. Johnson, Ph.D., CBSP
Biosafety Officer
Environmental Health and Safety
118 Agronomy Lab
Iowa State University
Ames, IA 50011
Phone: 515-294-7657
Fax: 515-294-9357
Email: jajohns@iastate.edu
Web site: ehs.iastate.edu
THESE ARE MY OPINIONS AND IN NO WAY SHOULD BE CONSTRUED AS THE OFFICIAL
OPINION OF MY EMPLOYER.
-----Original Message-----
From: Curt Speaker [mailto:SPEAKER@SAFETY-1.SAFETY.PSU.EDU]
Sent: Thursday, May 23, 2002 9:58 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: plate disposal
Lori:
Points taken, and you are correct in saying that they should not do
this kind of experimentation; but the fact of the matter is that they
do. The "no budget" excuse, however, just does not fly. Picture
this...
They stuff a bunch of petri dishes into a garbage bag and send it to
the local landfill. A piece of heavy equipment runs over the bag and
tears it open, exposing the petri dishes. The landfill operator, now
concerned at the potential of improperly disposed medial waste,
examines the material more closely and is able to trace it to the
school. By this time, the school is going to be hard pressed to prove
that the organisms on the plates are benign; they have had the
opportunity to be exposed to airborne and soil microbes, and if you
look hard enough, you will find a pathogen in there (Staph, Strep,
etc.). If the school is unwilling or unable to cover the cost of
disposing of this type of material properly, how are they going to
deal with the potential citations, fines and negative publicity that
could result???
My infectious waste vendor (here in PA) works closely with small
clients on this type of thing, and often will give them the option of
disposing of up to 50 pounds of medical waste for $50 --- money
well spent in my opinion.
Remeber here we are talking about perception, not real risk. There
is little, if any health risk from the plates. But the landfill operator
and the general public will likely not understand this.
Just my $0.02
Curt
Curt Speaker
Biosafety Officer
Penn State University
Environmental Health and Safety
speaker@ehs.psu.edu
^...^
(O_O)
=(Y)=
"""
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 23 May 2002 13:36:53 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Lori Keen
Subject: Re: plate disposal
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
I didn't expect my seemingly simple request to generate such discussion.
I went to this group because I knew I would get good advice, and I did. You
made me think of things I hadn't thought of when the prof asked me the question.
As I said previously, I will use this opportunity to educate him and
hopefully, in turn, his students to think through all of the implications of the
lab exercises they decide to teach.
It certainly is much easier here at the college/university level where access
to equipment such as autoclaves really makes much of the discussion moot.
Lori Keen
Lab Manager, Biology
Calvin College
616-957-6080
Member NAOSMM
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 23 May 2002 11:55:41 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Therese M. Stinnett"
Subject: Re: Laboratory-acquired HCV infections
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
I may still have a newspaper article at home on this topic. Colorado =
state
legislators considered (and finally passed) legislation to cover =
emergency
responders (police, fire, EMS/ambulance) under workers comp laws for
exposure to HCV. =20
The driving force has been one man, a firefighter I believe, who is in =
dire
need of a liver transplant, because he was exposed to and contracted =
HCV
about 10 years ago, while working on an accident victim who was =
bleeding
profusely, an HCV-positive IV drug abuser. (not known at the time)=20
The gentleman affected, demonstrably had no other identifiable contacts =
for
HCV but has not been, and will not be, covered under WC policies. He =
has
had to foot the bill for this disease on his own or under his medical
policy. He did not become noticeably ill until a couple of years ago. =
He
has been unable to work since that time. There could be others in that
service population who have also been exposed. CDC may have data on =
Health
care professionals who've been exposed.
Some time back there was a study done on some 50 year old serum samples =
from
inductees into the Army during WWII. It turned out that the =
researchers
were able to isolate HCV positive samples from these specimens. I =
think it
may have been a CDC study also.
Therese M. Stinnett=20
Biosafety Officer=20
Health and Safety Division=20
UCHSC, Mailstop C275
4200 E. 9th Avenue
Denver, CO=A0 80262
Voice:=A0 303-315-6754=20
Pager:=A0=A0 303-266-5402=20
Fax:=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 303-315-8026=20
email:=A0=A0=A0 therese.stinnett@uchsc.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 23 May 2002 15:10:23 -0400
Reply-To: tom@ehrs.upenn.edu
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Tom Boyle
Subject: Re: Laboratory-acquired HCV infections
In-Reply-To:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
The City of Philadelphia and paramedic Lt. Mary Kohler went toe-to-toe over
a similar situation. International Association of Fire Fighters (IAFF)
Local #22 (Philadelphia, PA) has a Hepatitis C link that may be of some
interest .
The CDC performed a study of several fire departments with high numbers of
Hep C+ members. The response was not favorable with the IAFF. I will try
to find the reference for this comment and pass it along.
Pennsylvania also passed a law on December 20, 2001.
Tom
-----Original Message-----
From: A Biosafety Discussion List [mailto:BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU]On
Behalf Of Therese M. Stinnett
Sent: Thursday, May 23, 2002 1:56 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Laboratory-acquired HCV infections
I may still have a newspaper article at home on this topic. Colorado state
legislators considered (and finally passed) legislation to cover emergency
responders (police, fire, EMS/ambulance) under workers comp laws for
exposure to HCV.
The driving force has been one man, a firefighter I believe, who is in dire
need of a liver transplant, because he was exposed to and contracted HCV
about 10 years ago, while working on an accident victim who was bleeding
profusely, an HCV-positive IV drug abuser. (not known at the time)
The gentleman affected, demonstrably had no other identifiable contacts for
HCV but has not been, and will not be, covered under WC policies. He has
had to foot the bill for this disease on his own or under his medical
policy. He did not become noticeably ill until a couple of years ago. He
has been unable to work since that time. There could be others in that
service population who have also been exposed. CDC may have data on Health
care professionals who've been exposed.
Some time back there was a study done on some 50 year old serum samples from
inductees into the Army during WWII. It turned out that the researchers
were able to isolate HCV positive samples from these specimens. I think it
may have been a CDC study also.
Therese M. Stinnett
Biosafety Officer
Health and Safety Division
UCHSC, Mailstop C275
4200 E. 9th Avenue
Denver, CO 80262
Voice: 303-315-6754
Pager: 303-266-5402
Fax: 303-315-8026
email: therese.stinnett@uchsc.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 23 May 2002 15:53:34 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Robert N. Latsch"
Subject: Re: plate disposal
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Everybody is missing an important point here. We can educate. In a lot of
cases it will not matter.
Apply universal precautions and hazard communication principals.
Unless you can prove it has been decontaminated, it must be assumed that it
is infectious. What would you say if you found a pile of agar plates or a
syringe and needle, say on the way home?
BTW-that is exactly what our educated populace will do.
Bob
_____________________________________________________________________
__ / _____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 23 May 2002 15:13:06 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Mary Cipriano
Subject: Re: Laboratory-acquired HCV infections
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Melinda, I have found the following sites useful, plus they have good
references.
NIOSH Alert on preventing needlesticks has some good info. and references:
There's a CDC course on HCV for clinicians on their web site:
Mary Cipriano
Abbott Laboratories
Melinda Young
cc:
Sent by: A Biosafety Subject: Laboratory-acquired HCV infections
Discussion List
05/23/02 11:25 AM
Please respond to A
Biosafety Discussion List
I have been having an email discussion with one of our Biosafety Committee
members who happens to supervise a laboratory where they are beginning to work
with HCV. He is looking for information on laboratory-acquired HCV
infections.
Does anyone know of a reference where these types of exposures are described
a little better -to say whether there was direct contact with patients or
their serum/plasma to determine the role of these factors with lab infections.
Melinda Young
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 24 May 2002 08:50:38 +0100
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Thomas Lilin
Subject: prion waste disposal
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Dear all,
after reading with some interest the BMBL manual
(), i have still
some practical questions concerning prions, especially the disposal
of animal room waste:
- WHO recommends two successive decontaminations with a validated
method for high risk materials - which of the following would you
consider as high risk ?
- prion in solution
- materials which ha ve contained/been in contact with
prion in solution
- animals/animal brains/animal spleen...
- animal caging equipment
- animal beddings
- others
- do you treat separately animal caging equipement in the days
following intracerebral inoculation (and if yes for how long ?) ?
- what procedures do you consider as aerosol forming ?
- inoculation
- necropsic procedures
- cage change
- others
- what equipment do you use for the above aerosol forming procedures ?
- facial shield
- glasses and paper mask
- respirator
- BSC
- other
Thanks for any input !
Thomas
--
Thomas Lilin
DVM, MSc
charg=E9 de la mise en oeuvre de l'hygi=E8ne et de la s=E9curit=E9 du travai=
l
__________________________
Service Commun des Animaleries
Ecole Nationale Veterinaire d'Alfort
7, avenue du General de Gaulle
=46-94704 Maisons-Alfort cedex
Tel: 33+ 01 43 96 70 14
=46ax: 33+ 01 43 96 72 79
__________________________
mailto:tlilin@vet-alfort.fr
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 24 May 2002 08:52:26 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Richard Fink
Subject: Re: prion waste disposal
In-Reply-To:
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At 08:50 AM 5/24/2002 +0100, you wrote:
>i have still some practical questions concerning prions, especially the
>disposal
>of animal room waste:
>
>- WHO recommends two successive decontaminations with a validated
>method for high risk materials - which of the following would you
>consider as high risk ?
> - prion in solution
> - materials which ha ve contained/been in contact with
>prion in solution
> - animals/animal brains/animal spleen...
> - animal caging equipment
> - animal beddings
> - others
I would consider high risk - prion in solution, materials contaminated with
prions and animals, esp, brains and spleens of prion infected
animals. Though I would consider mouse/hamster/mink prions as less of a
risk then primate, cattle, sheep. I would not consider caging and bedding
as being particularly hazardous as prions are not known to be excreted in
urine or feces.
>- what procedures do you consider as aerosol forming ?
> - inoculation
> - necropsic procedures
> - cage change
> - others
All of the above are aerosol forming with inoculation being the easiest to
control/reduce.
>- what equipment do you use for the above aerosol forming procedures ?
> - facial shield
> - glasses and paper mask
> - respirator
> - BSC
> - other
BSC, HEPA respirator if BSC is not possible or it is likely that aerosol
could escape from the BSC. Paper mask - never for personnel
protection. Face shield, safety goggles/glasses possibly, depending upon
the procedure and where it is taking place. Face shield should always be
worn with safety goggles/glasses as materials can go under the edge the
shield into the eyes. Other - gloves, lab coat.
I am sure that others will chime in on this topic with other
perspective. I tend to approach prions cautiously as the routes of
infection are not well known (i.e.: can it infect via an aersol - unknown,
via splash to intact skin - unknown), infectious dose - unknown, length of
time between exposure and disease in humans - generally unknown.
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
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At 08:50 AM 5/24/2002 +0100, you wrote:
i have still some practical questions concerning prions, especially the disposal
of animal room waste:
- WHO recommends two successive decontaminations with a validated
method for high risk materials - which of the following would you
consider as high risk ?
- prion in solution
- materials which ha ve contained/been in contact with
prion in solution
- animals/animal brains/animal spleen...
- animal caging equipment
- animal beddings
- others
I would consider high risk - prion in solution, materials contaminated with prions and animals, esp, brains and spleens of prion infected animals. Though I would consider mouse/hamster/mink prions as less of a risk then primate, cattle, sheep. I would not consider caging and bedding as being particularly hazardous as prions are not known to be excreted in urine or feces.
- what procedures do you consider as aerosol forming ?
- inoculation
- necropsic procedures
- cage change
- others
All of the above are aerosol forming with inoculation being the easiest to control/reduce.
- what equipment do you use for the above aerosol forming procedures ?
- facial shield
- glasses and paper mask
- respirator
- BSC
- other
BSC, HEPA respirator if BSC is not possible or it is likely that aerosol could escape from the BSC. Paper mask - never for personnel protection. Face shield, safety goggles/glasses possibly, depending upon the procedure and where it is taking place. Face shield should always be worn with safety goggles/glasses as materials can go under the edge the shield into the eyes. Other - gloves, lab coat.
I am sure that others will chime in on this topic with other perspective. I tend to approach prions cautiously as the routes of infection are not well known (i.e.: can it infect via an aersol - unknown, via splash to intact skin - unknown), infectious dose - unknown, length of time between exposure and disease in humans - generally unknown.
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
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Date: Fri, 24 May 2002 09:09:21 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Barbara Benton St. Gelais"
Subject: Re: Laboratory-acquired HCV infections
In-Reply-To:
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Melinda and others on the list,
I have a hard copy (from an OSHA workshop) of the report that can be
found at the recommended CDC website:
I did notice that the whole report does not seem to be on the
website. In my hard copy there are 2 extra paragraphs under
Epidemiology - Nosocomial and Occupational Exposures. The last
sentence in the section on the website says "In a single study that
evaluated risk factors for infection, a history of unintentinal
needle-stick injury was the only occupational risk factor
independently associated with HCV infection." The reference makes it
clear that this is among health care workers.
I quote something from the extra paragraphs which may be pertinent:
"Although no incidence studies have documented transmission
associated with mucous membrane or nonintact skin exposures,
transmission of HCV from blood splashes to the conjuctive have been
described." Two references are cited:
Sartori M, La Terra G, Aglietta M, Manzin A, Navino C, Verzetti G.
Transmission of hepatitis C via blood splash into conjunctiva
(Letter) Scand J Infect Dis 1993;25:270-1.
Ippolito G, Puro V, Petrosillo N, et al. Simultaneous infection with
HIV and hepatitis C virus following occupational conjunctival blood
exposure (Letter) JAMA 1998;280:28.
The report mostly focuses on "health care workers" but does list
"employment in patient care or clinical laboratory work" as a risk
for transmission.
Hope this helps,
Barbara Benton St. Gelais
>I have been having an email discussion with one of our Biosafety
>Committee members who happens to supervise a laboratory where they
>are beginning to work with HCV. He is looking for information on
>laboratory-acquired HCV infections.
>
>Does anyone know of a reference where these types of exposures are
>described a little better -to say whether there was direct contact
>with patients or their serum/plasma to determine the role of these
>factors with lab infections.
>
>Melinda Young
--
Barbara Benton St. Gelais
Environmental Safety Facility
University of Vermont
Burlington, VT 05405-0570
(802)656-5402
bbsg@esf.uvm.edu
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Date: Fri, 24 May 2002 09:32:16 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Andrew Braun
Subject: New Bioterrorism Legislation
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FYI:
From Academe Today.
Friday, May 24, 2002
Bioterrorism Legislation Puts New
Scrutiny on Researchers, Allows Current
Projects to Continue
By RON SOUTHWICK
Washington
Congress approved bioterrorism legislation this
week that would give universities more responsibility
for guarding biological agents they use in research,
but would not greatly disrupt such studies, college
lobbyists say.
The legislation, HR 3448, would provide
$4.6-billion to state programs and improve federal
laboratories. It represents a compromise of
competing bills that had previously passed the
House of Representatives and the Senate. The
Senate approved the compromise measure on
Thursday, a day after the House overwhelmingly
passed it by a vote of 425 to 1. President Bush is
expected to sign the bill.
Under the legislation, every university and laboratory
that works with "select agents" -- defined as
biological material that could be used to pose a
public health threat -- would have to be registered
with the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services or the U.S. Department of Agriculture.
Current law requires only laboratories that ship such
materials to be listed with the government.
Lawmakers have complained that they do not have
a clear idea of how many people are working with
potentially dangerous biological materials.
The legislation would impose new steps designed to
limit access to 42 biological agents, including
anthrax, the Ebola virus, and smallpox. The bill
would bar from working with those materials any
scientists from countries that are listed as sponsoring
terrorism, including Iraq and Iran, and any
researchers with criminal records. However, all
scientists handling such agents -- including U.S.
citizens -- would have to be screened by the
government.
College lobbyists say it is unlikely that a university
researcher currently working with biological
materials or toxins would be restricted from such
work in the future. Lobbyists said they were
especially pleased that the legislation spells out that
scientists who are in the midst of a research project
will be allowed to continue their work while the
government performs its background checks.
"We were very concerned that there would be a
period of time when research would come to a halt,"
said Janet Shoemaker, director of public affairs for
the American Society for Microbiology.
Under the terms of the bill, colleges would have to
submit the names of researchers studying biological
agents to the Department of Health and Human
Services. Universities would also have to get
clearance for scientists doing research on plant and
animal pathogens for the U.S. Department of
Agriculture. The U.S. attorney general's office
would conduct the background checks, a step
sought by college lobbyists, who had feared that
research institutions would have to perform
screening themselves.
If a university wished to hire a new scientist to work
on select agents, that person would not be allowed
to begin work on those materials until the screening
is complete. The legislation also includes provisions
for an appeals process if the government denies
approval.
While college lobbyists are glad that universities
themselves will not be responsible for screening
employees, some wonder how long the government
reviews will take, Ms. Shoemaker said.
In the event of an emergency, the measure would
allow scientists to work on biological agents without
being screened. Researchers had feared that in a
crisis involving bioterrorism, scientists would lose
valuable time waiting to gain clearance.
The Health and Human Services Department and
the Agriculture Department would each have to
draw up regulations regarding the study of biological
agents. College lobbyists said they would work with
the agencies to see that those rules do not go
beyond the protections spelled out in the
bioterrorism legislation.
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
would get $300-million to modernize its laboratories
under the legislation. Lawmakers in Congress,
chiefly Sen. Arlen Specter, a Pennsylvania
Republican, have said that the center's facilities are
in dire need of upgrades.
---------------------------------------
Andrew Braun, Sc.D
Harvard Medical School, Office for Research
25 Shattuck Street
Boston, MA 02115
617-432-4899; FAX 617-432-3169
---------------------------------------
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 24 May 2002 09:54:18 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Richard J. Pollack"
Subject: Re: New Bioterrorism Legislation
In-Reply-To:
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Andy,
Thanks for the news. Kim Budd beat you to the punch by 63 minutes.
Any news regarding the OIG report? I suppose it was good advice that
I shouldn't hold my breath.
Have a good long weekend.
-Rich
--
Richard J. Pollack, Ph.D.
Laboratory of Public Health Entomology
Dept. of Immunology & Infectious Diseases
Harvard School of Public Health
665 Huntington Ave.
Boston, MA 02115 USA
phone: (617) 432-1587
fax: (617) 432-1796
Information on head lice:
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 24 May 2002 10:26:30 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Kim Auletta
Subject: New Bioterrorism Legislation
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(hr481):
Committee Report - House Rpt. 107-481 -
PUBLIC HEALTH SECURITY AND BIOTERRORISM PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE ACT OF
2002
Subtitle A--Department of Health and Human Services
SEC. 201. REGULATION OF CERTAIN BIOLOGICAL AGENTS AND TOXINS.
(a) BIOLOGICAL AGENTS PROVISIONS OF THE ANTITERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE
DEATH
PENALTY ACT OF 1996; CODIFICATION IN THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE ACT,
WITH
AMENDMENTS- Subpart 1 of part F of title III of the Public Health
Service Act (42 U.S.C. 262 et seq.) is
amended by inserting after section 351 the following:
`SEC. 351A. ENHANCED CONTROL OF DANGEROUS BIOLOGICAL AGENTS AND
TOXINS.
`(a) REGULATORY CONTROL OF CERTAIN BIOLOGICAL AGENTS AND TOXINS-
`(1) LIST OF BIOLOGICAL AGENTS AND TOXINS-
`(A) IN GENERAL- The Secretary shall by regulation establish
and maintain a list of each
biological agent and each toxin that has the potential to
pose a severe threat to public health
and safety.
`(B) CRITERIA- In determining whether to include an agent or
toxin on the list under
subparagraph (A), the Secretary shall--
`(i) consider--
`(I) the effect on human health of exposure to the
agent or toxin;
`(II) the degree of contagiousness of the agent or
toxin and the methods by which
the agent or toxin is transferred to humans;
`(III) the availability and effectiveness of
pharmacotherapies and immunizations to
treat and prevent any illness resulting from
infection by the agent or toxin; and
`(IV) any other criteria, including the needs of
children and other vulnerable
populations, that the Secretary considers
appropriate; and
`(ii) consult with appropriate Federal departments and
agencies and with scientific
experts representing appropriate professional groups,
including groups with pediatric
expertise.
`(2) BIENNIAL REVIEW- The Secretary shall review and republish
the list under paragraph (1)
biennially, or more often as needed, and shall by regulation
revise the list as necessary in accordance
with such paragraph.
`(b) REGULATION OF TRANSFERS OF LISTED AGENTS AND TOXINS- The
Secretary shall by
regulation provide for--
`(1) the establishment and enforcement of safety procedures for
the transfer of listed agents and
toxins, including measures to ensure--
`(A) proper training and appropriate skills to handle such
agents and toxins; and
`(B) proper laboratory facilities to contain and dispose of
such agents and toxins;
`(2) the establishment and enforcement of safeguard and security
measures to prevent access to such
agents and toxins for use in domestic or international terrorism
or for any other criminal purpose;
`(3) the establishment of procedures to protect the public safety
in the event of a transfer or potential
transfer of such an agent or toxin in violation of the safety
procedures established under paragraph
(1) or the safeguard and security measures established under
paragraph (2); and
`(4) appropriate availability of biological agents and toxins for
research, education, and other
legitimate purposes.
`(c) POSSESSION AND USE OF LISTED AGENTS AND TOXINS- The Secretary
shall by regulation
provide for the establishment and enforcement of standards and
procedures governing the possession and
use of listed agents and toxins, including the provisions described in
paragraphs (1) through (4) of
subsection (b), in order to protect the public health and safety.
`(d) REGISTRATION; IDENTIFICATION; DATABASE-
`(1) REGISTRATION- Regulations under subsections (b) and (c)
shall require registration with the
Secretary of the possession, use, and transfer of listed agents
and toxins, and shall include provisions
to ensure that persons seeking to register under such regulations
have a lawful purpose to possess,
use, or transfer such agents and toxins, including provisions in
accordance with subsection (e)(6).
`(2) IDENTIFICATION; DATABASE- Regulations under subsections (b)
and (c) shall require that
registration include (if available to the person registering)
information regarding the
characterization of listed agents and toxins to facilitate their
identification, including their source.
The Secretary shall maintain a national database that includes
the names and locations of registered
persons, the listed agents and toxins such persons are
possessing, using, or transferring, and
information regarding the characterization of such agents and
toxins.
`(e) SAFEGUARD AND SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR REGISTERED PERSONS-
`(1) IN GENERAL- Regulations under subsections (b) and (c) shall
include appropriate safeguard and
security requirements for persons possessing, using, or
transferring a listed agent or toxin
commensurate with the risk such agent or toxin poses to public
health and safety (including the risk
of use in domestic or international terrorism). The Secretary
shall establish such requirements in
consultation with the Attorney General, and shall ensure
compliance with such requirements as part
of the registration system under such regulations.
`(2) LIMITING ACCESS TO LISTED AGENTS AND TOXINS- Requirements
under paragraph (1)
shall include provisions to ensure that registered persons--
`(A) provide access to listed agents and toxins to only
those individuals whom the registered
person involved determines have a legitimate need to handle
or use such agents and toxins;
`(B) submit the names and other identifying information for
such individuals to the Secretary
and the Attorney General, promptly after first determining
that the individuals need access
under subparagraph (A), and periodically thereafter while
the individuals have such access,
not less frequently than once every five years;
`(C) deny access to such agents and toxins by individuals
whom the Attorney General has
identified as restricted persons; and
`(D) limit or deny access to such agents and toxins by
individuals whom the Attorney General
has identified as within any category under paragraph
(3)(B)(ii), if limiting or denying such
access by the individuals involved is determined appropriate
by the Secretary, in consultation
with the Attorney General.
`(3) SUBMITTED NAMES; USE OF DATABASES BY ATTORNEY GENERAL-
`(A) IN GENERAL- Upon the receipt of names and other
identifying information under
paragraph (2)(B), the Attorney General shall, for the sole
purpose of identifying whether the
individuals involved are within any of the categories
specified in subparagraph (B), promptly
use criminal, immigration, national security, and other
electronic databases that are available
to the Federal Government and are appropriate for such
purpose.
`(B) CERTAIN INDIVIDUALS- For purposes of subparagraph (A),
the categories specified in
this subparagraph regarding an individual are that--
`(i) the individual is a restricted person; or
`(ii) the individual is reasonably suspected by any
Federal law enforcement or
intelligence agency of--
`(I) committing a crime set forth in section
2332b(g)(5) of title 18, United States
Code;
`(II) knowing involvement with an organization
that engages in domestic or
international terrorism (as defined in section
2331 of such title 18) or with any
other organization that engages in intentional
crimes of violence; or
`(III) being an agent of a foreign power (as
defined in section 1801 of title 50,
United States Code).
`(C) NOTIFICATION BY ATTORNEY GENERAL REGARDING SUBMITTED
NAMES- After
the receipt of a name and other identifying information
under paragraph (2)(B), the Attorney
General shall promptly notify the Secretary whether the
individual is within any of the
categories specified in subparagraph (B).
`(4) NOTIFICATIONS BY SECRETARY- The Secretary, after receiving
notice under paragraph (3)
regarding an individual, shall promptly notify the registered
person involved of whether the
individual is granted or denied access under paragraph (2). If
the individual is denied such access,
the Secretary shall promptly notify the individual of the denial.
`(5) EXPEDITED REVIEW- Regulations under subsections (b) and (c)
shall provide for a procedure
through which, upon request to the Secretary by a registered
person who submits names and other
identifying information under paragraph (2)(B) and who
demonstrates good cause, the Secretary
may, as determined appropriate by the Secretary--
`(A) request the Attorney General to expedite the process of
identification under paragraph
(3)(A) and notification of the Secretary under paragraph
(3)(C); and
`(B) expedite the notification of the registered person by
the Secretary under paragraph (4).
`(6) PROCESS REGARDING PERSONS SEEKING TO REGISTER-
`(A) INDIVIDUALS- Regulations under subsections (b) and (c)
shall provide that an individual
who seeks to register under either of such subsections is
subject to the same processes
described in paragraphs (2) through (4) as apply to names
and other identifying information
submitted to the Attorney General under paragraph (2)(B).
Paragraph (5) does not apply for
purposes of this subparagraph.
`(B) OTHER PERSONS- Regulations under subsections (b) and
(c) shall provide that, in
determining whether to deny or revoke registration by a
person other than an individual, the
Secretary shall submit the name of such person to the
Attorney General, who shall use
criminal, immigration, national security, and other
electronic databases available to the
Federal Government, as appropriate for the purpose of
promptly notifying the Secretary
whether the person, or, where relevant, the individual who
owns or controls such person, is a
restricted person or is reasonably suspected by any Federal
law enforcement or intelligence
agency of being within any category specified in paragraph
(3)(B)(ii) (as applied to persons,
including individuals). Such regulations shall provide that
a person who seeks to register under
either of such subsections is subject to the same processes
described in paragraphs (2) and (4)
as apply to names and other identifying information
submitted to the Attorney General under
paragraph (2)(B). Paragraph (5) does not apply for purposes
of this subparagraph. The
Secretary may exempt Federal, State, or local governmental
agencies from the requirements of
this subparagraph.
`(7) REVIEW-
`(A) ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW-
`(i) IN GENERAL- Regulations under subsections (b) and
(c) shall provide for an
opportunity for a review by the Secretary--
`(I) when requested by the individual involved, of
a determination under
paragraph (2) to deny the individual access to
listed agents and toxins; and
`(II) when requested by the person involved, of a
determination under paragraph
(6) to deny or revoke registration for such
person.
`(ii) EX PARTE REVIEW- During a review under clause
(i), the Secretary may consider
information relevant to the review ex parte to the
extent that disclosure of the
information could compromise national
security or an investigation by any law enforcement agency.
`(iii) FINAL AGENCY ACTION- The decision of the
Secretary in a review under clause
(i) constitutes final agency action for purposes of
section 702 of title 5, United States
Code.
`(B) CERTAIN PROCEDURES-
`(i) SUBMISSION OF EX PARTE MATERIALS IN JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS- When
reviewing a decision of the Secretary under
subparagraph (A), and upon request made
ex parte and in writing by the United States, a court,
upon a sufficient showing, may
review and consider ex parte documents containing
information the disclosure of which
could compromise national security or an investigation
by any law enforcement agency.
If the court determines that portions of the documents
considered ex parte should be
disclosed to the person involved to allow a response,
the court shall authorize the United
States to delete from such documents specified items of
information the disclosure of
which could compromise national security or an
investigation by any law enforcement
agency, or to substitute a summary of the information
to which the person may respond.
Any order by the court authorizing the disclosure of
information that the United States
believes could compromise national security or an
investigation by any law enforcement
agency shall be subject to the processes set forth in
subparagraphs (A) and (B)(i) of
section 2339B(f)(5) of title 18, United States Code
(relating to interlocutory appeal and
expedited consideration).
`(ii) DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION- In a review under
subparagraph (A), and in any
judical proceeding conducted pursuant to such review,
neither the Secretary nor the
Attorney General may be required to disclose to the
public any information that under
subsection (h) shall not be disclosed under section 552
of title 5, United States Code.
`(8) NOTIFICATIONS REGARDING THEFT OR LOSS OF AGENTS-
Requirements under paragraph
(1) shall include the prompt notification of the Secretary, and
appropriate Federal, State, and local
law enforcement agencies, of the theft or loss of listed agents
and toxins.
`(9) TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FOR REGISTERED PERSONS- The Secretary,
in consultation with
the Attorney General, may provide technical assistance to
registered persons to improve security of
the facilities of such persons.
`(f) INSPECTIONS- The Secretary shall have the authority to inspect
persons subject to regulations under
subsection (b) or (c) to ensure their compliance with such
regulations, including prohibitions on restricted
persons and other provisions of subsection (e).
`(g) EXEMPTIONS-
`(1) CLINICAL OR DIAGNOSTIC LABORATORIES- Regulations under
subsections (b) and (c) shall
exempt clinical or diagnostic laboratories and other persons who
possess, use, or transfer listed
agents or toxins that are contained in specimens presented for
diagnosis, verification, or proficiency
testing, provided that--
`(A) the identification of such agents or toxins is reported
to the Secretary, and when required
under Federal, State, or local law, to other appropriate
authorities; and
`(B) such agents or toxins are transferred or destroyed in a
manner set forth by the Secretary
by regulation.
`(2) PRODUCTS-
`(A) IN GENERAL- Regulations under subsections (b) and (c)
shall exempt products that are,
bear, or contain listed agents or toxins and are cleared,
approved, licensed, or registered under
any of the Acts specified in subparagraph (B), unless the
Secretary by order determines that
applying additional regulation under subsection (b) or (c)
to a specific product is necessary to
protect public health and safety.
`(B) RELEVANT LAWS- For purposes of subparagraph (A), the
Acts specified in this
subparagraph are the following:
`(i) The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.
`(ii) Section 351 of this Act.
`(iii) The Act commonly known as the Virus-Serum-Toxin
Act (the eighth paragraph
under the heading `Bureau of Animal Industry' in the
Act of March 4, 1913; 21 U.S.C.
151-159).
`(iv) The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act.
`(C) INVESTIGATIONAL USE-
`(i) IN GENERAL- The Secretary may exempt an
investigational product that is, bears,
or contains a listed agent or toxin from the
applicability of provisions of regulations
under subsection (b) or (c) when such product is being
used in an investigation
authorized under any Federal Act and the Secretary
determines that applying additional
regulation under subsection (b) or (c) to such product
is not necessary to protect public
health and safety.
`(ii) CERTAIN PROCESSES- Regulations under subsections
(b) and (c) shall set forth the
procedures for applying for an exemption under clause
(i). In the case of investigational
products authorized under any of the Acts specified in
subparagraph (B), the Secretary
shall make a determination regarding a request for an
exemption not later than 14 days
after the first date on which both of the following
conditions have been met by the
person requesting the exemption:
`(I) The person has submitted to the Secretary an
application for the exemption
meeting the requirements established by the
Secretary.
`(II) The person has notified the Secretary that
the investigation has been
authorized under such an Act.
`(3) PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCIES- The Secretary may temporarily
exempt a person from the
applicability of the requirements of this section, in whole or in
part, if the Secretary determines that
such exemption is necessary to provide for the timely
participation of the person in a response to a
domestic or foreign public health emergency (whether determined
under section 319(a) or otherwise)
that involves a listed agent or toxin. With respect to the
emergency involved, such exemption for a
person may not exceed 30 days, except that the Secretary, after
review of whether such exemption
remains necessary, may provide one extension of an additional 30
days.
`(4) AGRICULTURAL EMERGENCIES- Upon request of the Secretary of
Agriculture, after the
granting by such Secretary of an exemption under section
212(g)(1)(D) of the Agricultural
Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002 pursuant to a finding that
there is an agricultural emergency,
the Secretary of Health and Human Services may temporarily exempt
a person from the applicability
of the requirements of this section, in whole or in part, to
provide for the timely participation of the
person in a response to the agricultural emergency. With respect
to the emergency involved, the
exemption under this paragraph for a person may not exceed 30
days, except that upon request of
the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of Health and Human
Services may, after review of
whether such exemption remains necessary, provide one extension
of an additional 30 days.
`(h) DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION-
`(1) NONDISCLOSURE OF CERTAIN INFORMATION- No Federal agency
specified in paragraph
(2) shall disclose under section 552 of title 5, United States
Code, any of the following:
`(A) Any registration or transfer documentation submitted
under subsections (b) and (c) for the
possession, use, or transfer of a listed agent or toxin; or
information derived therefrom to the
extent that it identifies the listed agent or toxin
possessed, used, or transferred by a specific
registered person or discloses the identity or location of a
specific registered person.
`(B) The national database developed pursuant to subsection
(d), or any other compilation of
the registration or transfer information submitted under
subsections (b) and (c) to the extent
that such compilation discloses site-specific registration
or transfer information.
`(C) Any portion of a record that discloses the
site-specific or transfer-specific safeguard and
security measures used by a registered person to prevent
unauthorized access to listed agents
and toxins.
`(D) Any notification of a release of a listed agent or
toxin submitted under subsections (b) and
(c), or any notification of theft or loss submitted under
such subsections.
`(E) Any portion of an evaluation or report of an inspection
of a specific registered person
conducted under subsection (f) that identifies the listed
agent or toxin possessed by a specific
registered person or that discloses the identity or location
of a specific registered person if the
agency determines that public disclosure of the information
would endanger public health or
safety.
`(2) COVERED AGENCIES- For purposes of paragraph (1) only, the
Federal agencies specified in
this paragraph are the following:
`(A) The Department of Health and Human Services, the
Department of Justice, the
Department of Agriculture, and the Department of
Transportation.
`(B) Any Federal agency to which information specified in
paragraph (1) is transferred by any
agency specified in subparagraph (A) of this paragraph.
`(C) Any Federal agency that is a registered person, or has
a sub-agency component that is a
registered person.
`(D) Any Federal agency that awards grants or enters into
contracts or cooperative
agreements involving listed agents and toxins to or with a
registered person, and to which
information specified in paragraph (1) is transferred by any
such registered person.
`(3) OTHER EXEMPTIONS- This subsection may not be construed as
altering the application of any
exemptions to public disclosure under section 552 of title 5,
United States Code, except as to
subsection 552(b)(3) of such title, to any of the information
specified in paragraph (1).
`(4) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION- Except as specifically provided in
paragraph (1), this subsection
may not be construed as altering the authority of any Federal
agency to withhold under section 552
of title 5, United States Code, or the obligation of any Federal
agency to disclose under section 552
of title 5, United States Code, any information, including
information relating to--
`(A) listed agents and toxins, or individuals seeking access
to such agents and toxins;
`(B) registered persons, or persons seeking to register
their possession, use, or transfer of such
agents and toxins;
`(C) general safeguard and security policies and
requirements under regulations under
subsections (b) and (c); or
`(D) summary or statistical information concerning
registrations, registrants, denials or
revocations of registrations, listed agents and toxins,
inspection evaluations and reports, or
individuals seeking access to such agents and toxins.
`(5) DISCLOSURES TO CONGRESS; OTHER DISCLOSURES- This subsection
may not be construed
as providing any authority--
`(A) to withhold information from the Congress or any
committee or subcommittee thereof; or
`(B) to withhold information from any person under any other
Federal law or treaty.
`(i) CIVIL MONEY PENALTY-
`(1) IN GENERAL- In addition to any other penalties that may
apply under law, any person who
violates any provision of regulations under subsection (b) or (c)
shall be subject to the United States
for a civil money penalty in an amount not exceeding $250,000 in
the case of an individual and
$500,000 in the case of any other person.
`(2) APPLICABILITY OF CERTAIN PROVISIONS- The provisions of
section 1128A of the Social
Security Act (other than subsections (a), (b), (h), and (i), the
first sentence of subsection (c), and
paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection (f)) shall apply to a civil
money penalty under paragraph (1) in
the same manner as such provisions apply to a penalty or
proceeding under section 1128A(a) of such
Act. The Secretary may delegate authority under this subsection
in the same manner as provided in
section 1128A(j)(2) of the Social Security Act, and such
authority shall include all powers as
contained in section 6 of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5
U.S.C. App.).
`(j) NOTIFICATION IN EVENT OF RELEASE- Regulations under subsections
(b) and (c) shall require the
prompt notification of the Secretary by a registered person whenever a
release, meeting criteria established
by the Secretary, of a listed agent or toxin has occurred outside of
the biocontainment area of a facility of
the registered person. Upon receipt of such notification and a finding
by the Secretary that the release
poses a threat to public health or safety, the Secretary shall take
appropriate action to notify relevant State
and local public health authorities, other relevant Federal
authorities, and, if necessary, other appropriate
persons (including the public). If the released listed agent or toxin
is an overlap agent or toxin (as defined
in subsection (l)), the Secretary shall promptly notify the Secretary
of Agriculture upon notification by the
registered person.
`(k) REPORTS- The Secretary shall report to the Congress annually on
the number and nature of
notifications received under subsection (e)(8) (relating to theft or
loss) and subsection (j) (relating to
releases).
`(l) DEFINITIONS- For purposes of this section:
`(1) The terms `biological agent' and `toxin' have the meanings
given such terms in section 178 of
title 18, United States Code.
`(2) The term `listed agents and toxins' means biological agents
and toxins listed pursuant to
subsection (a)(1).
`(3) The term `listed agents or toxins' means biological agents
or toxins listed pursuant to subsection
(a)(1).
`(4) The term `overlap agents and toxins' means biological agents
and toxins that--
`(A) are listed pursuant to subsection (a)(1); and
`(B) are listed pursuant to section 212(a)(1) of the
Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of
2002.
`(5) The term `overlap agent or toxin' means a biological agent
or toxin that--
`(A) is listed pursuant to subsection (a)(1); and
`(B) is listed pursuant to section 212(a)(1) of the
Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of
2002.
`(6) The term `person' includes Federal, State, and local
governmental entities.
`(7) The term `registered person' means a person registered under
regulations under subsection (b) or
(c).
`(8) The term `restricted person' has the meaning given such term
in section 175b of title 18, United
States Code.
`(m) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS- For the purpose of carrying out
this section, there are
authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary for each
of the fiscal years 2002 through
2007.'.
(b) REPORT TO CONGRESS- Not later than one year after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the
Secretary of Health and Human Services, after consultation with other
appropriate Federal agencies, shall
submit to the Congress a report that--
(1) describes the extent to which there has been compliance by
governmental and private entities
with applicable regulations under section 351A of the Public
Health Service Act (as added by
subsection (a) of this section), including the extent of
compliance before the date of the enactment of
this Act, and including the extent of compliance with regulations
promulgated after such date of
enactment;
(2) describes the actions to date and future plans of the
Secretary for updating the list of biological
agents and toxins under such section 351A;
(3) describes the actions to date and future plans of the
Secretary for determining compliance with
regulations under such section 351A and for taking appropriate
enforcement actions;
(4) evaluates the impact of such section 351A on research on
biological agents and toxins listed
pursuant to such section; and
(5) provides any recommendations of the Secretary for
administrative or legislative initiatives
regarding such section 351A.
Kim Auletta
Lab Safety Specialist
Environmental Health and Safety
SUNY Stony Brook
110 Suffolk Hall
Stony Brook, NY 11794-6200
PHONE: 631-632-9672
FAX: 631-632-9683
E-MAIL: kauletta@.sunysb.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 24 May 2002 11:15:38 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Robin Newberry
Subject: Re: New Bioterrorism Legislation
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed"
Anyone seen a copy of the Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002? I
can't find it on the web site under than name.
--
Robin
--------------------------------------------------------------
W. Robert Newberry, IV CIH, CHMM
Chief Environmental Health and Safety Officer
Clemson University
wnewber@clemson.edu ehs@clemson.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 24 May 2002 10:27:38 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Burnett, LouAnn Crawford"
Subject: Re: New Bioterrorism Legislation
MIME-Version: 1.0
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This new legislation is called The Public Health Security and
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act. The conference report can
be found at:
LouAnn
LouAnn C. Burnett, MS, CBSP =09
Biosafety Program Manager & Biological Safety Officer=09
Vanderbilt University Environmental Health & Safety
Nashville, Tennessee
615/322-0927 (direct & voice mail)
615/343-4951 (fax) =09
-----Original Message-----
From: Robin Newberry [mailto:wnewber@CLEMSON.EDU]=20
Sent: Friday, May 24, 2002 10:16 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: New Bioterrorism Legislation
Anyone seen a copy of the Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002? I can't
find it on the web site under than name.
--
Robin
--------------------------------------------------------------
W. Robert Newberry, IV CIH, CHMM
Chief Environmental Health and Safety Officer
Clemson University
wnewber@clemson.edu ehs@clemson.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 24 May 2002 10:08:20 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Richard J. Pollack"
Subject: apologies
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
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Sorry for cluttering the list with this last message. Friday morning
lapse of thought.
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 24 May 2002 09:27:08 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Hofherr, Leslie"
Subject: History of NIH Guidelines/BMBL
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Anyone know of a good reference that gives the history of the creation of
the NIH Guidelines and/or BMBL?
Thanks in advance for any references.
Sincerely,
Leslie Hofherr
UCLA, EH&S
(310) 206-3929 phone
leslie@admin.ucla.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 24 May 2002 13:05:05 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Barry Cohen
Organization: Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc.
Subject: Re: History of NIH Guidelines/BMBL
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
The Recombinant DNA Controversy: A Memoir. Science,
Politics and the Public Interest, 1974-1981.
By Donald S. Frederickson, MD and former Dir, NIH
ASM Press
Regards,
Barry Cohen, MPH, CBSP
Director, Environmental Health and Safety
Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc.
195 Albany Street
Cambridge, MA 02139
(V): 617/613-4385
(F): 617/613-4492
(E): bcohen@
"Hofherr, Leslie" wrote:
>
> Anyone know of a good reference that gives the history of the creation of
> the NIH Guidelines and/or BMBL?
> Thanks in advance for any references.
> Sincerely,
> Leslie Hofherr
> UCLA, EH&S
> (310) 206-3929 phone
> leslie@admin.ucla.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 24 May 2002 13:12:16 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Robert N. Latsch"
Subject: Re: prion waste disposal
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
On this one I defer to my prion experts for decontamination advice.
Wash with 1 N sodium hydroxide and soak for 10 min.
Wash with 40% bleach/water.
Wash with water.
We are also attempting to purchase a device called the alkanizer which
works by dessolving all organic tissue in caustic. We have not convinced
administration to do this yet.
Bob
> At 08:50 AM 5/24/2002 +0100, you wrote:
>
>
>i have still some practical questions concerning prions, especially the
>disposal
> of animal room waste:
>
> - WHO recommends two successive decontaminations with a validated
> method for high risk materials - which of the following would you
> consider as high risk ?
> - prion in solution
> - materials which ha ve contained/been in contact with
> prion in solution
> - animals/animal brains/animal spleen...
> - animal caging equipment
> - animal beddings
> - others
>
>
>I would consider high risk - prion in solution, materials contaminated
>with prions and animals, esp, brains and spleens of prion infected
>animals. Though I would consider mouse/hamster/mink prions as less of a
>risk then primate, cattle, sheep. I would not consider caging and bedding
>as being particularly hazardous as prions are not known to be excreted in
>urine or feces.
>
>
>
>- what procedures do you consider as aerosol forming ?
> - inoculation
> - necropsic procedures
> - cage change
> - others
>
>
> All of the above are aerosol forming with inoculation being the easiest
>to control/reduce.
>
>
>
>
>- what equipment do you use for the above aerosol forming procedures ?
> - facial shield
> - glasses and paper mask
> - respirator
> - BSC
> - other
>
>
> BSC, HEPA respirator if BSC is not possible or it is likely that aerosol
>could escape from the BSC. Paper mask - never for personnel protection.
>Face shield, safety goggles/glasses possibly, depending upon the procedure
>and where it is taking place. Face shield should always be worn with
>safety goggles/glasses as materials can go under the edge the shield into
>the eyes. Other - gloves, lab coat.
>
> I am sure that others will chime in on this topic with other
>perspective. I tend to approach prions cautiously as the routes of
>infection are not well known (i.e.: can it infect via an aersol - unknown,
>via splash to intact skin - unknown), infectious dose - unknown, length of
>time between exposure and disease in humans - generally unknown.
>
>
>
> Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
> Senior Biosafety Officer
> Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
> 617-258-5647
> rfink@mit.edu
>
_____________________________________________________________________
__ / _____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 24 May 2002 12:18:54 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Judy Pointer
Subject: Re: History of NIH Guidelines/BMBL
Mime-Version: 1.0
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I can't give you the history but I can give you some personal experience before
it all began. In the mid 70's, (~76) there was a lot of concern among the
scientific community that the lab creation of E. coli's, with something other
than their natural genes, could be a disaster for the public and the
environment, if they escaped from the lab. It was around then that E. coli's
first started churning out protein products from other species in big shaker
cultures.
The Texas medical center had a meeting about it (fall of 1977) - and I went.
There was a lot of heated debate and doubt among many scientist that they could
create these critters and keep them contained. Fears were that the "artificial
constructs" could colonize people's guts and intermix with their natural flora
or escape into sewer systems, etc. No one knew what the consequences might be
if that happened. There was a "self-declared moratorium" on the creation of
recombinants until scientists could determine if they could make them "safer".
The moratorium lasted about 2 years, while scientists designed E. coli's that
would not grow outside of the labs, in the natural environment, or in people. I
left the country around then so I'm not certain how they came up with the
decision that new constructs were safe. When I came back from overseas, the
first NIH Guidelines for Recombinant DNA Molecules was out - from NIH - and all
NIH funded research had to go by this Guide. I think that was 1986.
I remember reading something about recombinant DNA history in a book by French
Anderson, that had a bit about the history. But I can't remember the name. The
publication date was in the early 90s. I might still have it at home. I'll
look and let you know.
Judy Pointer
"Hofherr, Leslie" on 05/24/2002 11:27:08 AM
Please respond to A Biosafety Discussion List
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
cc: (bcc: Judy M. Pointer/MDACC)
Subject: History of NIH Guidelines/BMBL
Anyone know of a good reference that gives the history of the creation of
the NIH Guidelines and/or BMBL?
Thanks in advance for any references.
Sincerely,
Leslie Hofherr
UCLA, EH&S
(310) 206-3929 phone
leslie@admin.ucla.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 24 May 2002 10:35:34 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Funk, Glenn"
Subject: Re: prion waste disposal
MIME-Version: 1.0
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Thomas -
I would second Richie's assessment in general. Certainly the highest risk
materials are central nervous system tissues from infected animals. Then
would come reticuloendothelial tissues (spleen, liver, etc.), peripheral
nervous tissues and eyes. When you refer to "prions in solution", what
material is solubilized? If it's CNS tissue homogenates, the risk is higher
than, say, animal excreta. Animal cages, bedding and other inanimate
surfaces are not only lower risk and surfaces are much easier to
decontaminate. Surfaces should be deconned with 1N NaOH, liquids made 1N
NaOH and held for 24 hours, then autoclaved if possible. The basic
guidelines in the BMBL are solid, and you might also check the new prion
chapter in the 5th edition of Seymour Block's tome Disinfection,
Sterilization and Preservation (2001).
That having been said, prions are extremely difficult to inactivate (i.e.,
to eliminate their infectivity) and methods to measure infectivity are still
largely limited to bioassay in susceptible animals, looking for signs of
illness that may take weeks to months to develop. There are newer, more
rapid procedures available to some well-equipped research labs and some
methods in commercial development but not yet available on the market.
Autoclaving at 132 degrees C for 4.5 hours reduces infectivity, as does
exposure to 1N NaOH for 24 hours, but neither eliminates infectivity.
Concurrent autoclaving in 1N NaOH reduces infectivity to below the current
threshold of detectability but many people are reluctant to subject their
autoclaves to that treatment, assuming they even have an autoclave that can
generate 30 psi, the approx. pressure required to reach 132 degrees C. The
bottom line is that most procedures aim toward reducing the infectivity to
as low a level as possible (a sort of biological ALARA concept), and
hopefully below the threshold dose to initiate the disease process.
All of the procedures you list can generate aerosols and the best
protections against biological aerosols are non-vented goggles that seal to
the face around the entire periphery, and fit-verified HEPA respiratory
protection. We have not yet clearly demonstrated that prion diseases are
naturally transmitted by any means other than consumption and iatrogenically
(by medical procedures such as corneal transplantation). Nevertheless,
Cal-OSHA retains prions on their list of bloodborne pathogens partly because
it has not been demonstrated that prions CAN'T be transmitted by other
routes. We're up against the dilemma of proving the null hypothesis - how
many instances of failure to demonstrate something must you document before
you can say with any statistical certainty that the event WON'T happen.
It's almost an infinite monkeys/infinite typewriters scenario. So full
protective precautions are appropriate in all tasks involving prions.
Just my typical rambling penny's worth ...
-- Glenn
Glenn A. Funk, Ph.D., CBSP
Director and Biosafety Officer
Environment, Health & Safety
MedImmune Vaccines, Inc.
408-845-8857
-----Original Message-----
From: Thomas Lilin [mailto:tlilin@VET-ALFORT.FR]
Sent: Friday, 24 May, 2002 00:51
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: prion waste disposal
Dear all,
after reading with some interest the BMBL manual
(), i have still
some practical questions concerning prions, especially the disposal
of animal room waste:
- WHO recommends two successive decontaminations with a validated
method for high risk materials - which of the following would you
consider as high risk ?
- prion in solution
- materials which ha ve contained/been in contact with
prion in solution
- animals/animal brains/animal spleen...
- animal caging equipment
- animal beddings
- others
- do you treat separately animal caging equipement in the days
following intracerebral inoculation (and if yes for how long ?) ?
- what procedures do you consider as aerosol forming ?
- inoculation
- necropsic procedures
- cage change
- others
- what equipment do you use for the above aerosol forming procedures ?
- facial shield
- glasses and paper mask
- respirator
- BSC
- other
Thanks for any input !
Thomas
--
Thomas Lilin
DVM, MSc
chargi de la mise en oeuvre de l'hygihne et de la sicuriti du travail
__________________________
Service Commun des Animaleries
Ecole Nationale Veterinaire d'Alfort
7, avenue du General de Gaulle
F-94704 Maisons-Alfort cedex
Tel: 33+ 01 43 96 70 14
Fax: 33+ 01 43 96 72 79
__________________________
mailto:tlilin@vet-alfort.fr
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 24 May 2002 12:54:03 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ellyn Segal
Subject: anthrax survey for Dept. of Justice
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
I have a question concerning a request from the Dept. of Justice for
information regarding anthrax on site. How have your particular
institutions handled the issue of survaying for anthrax? Additionally, if
you recieved a subpoena along with the request for information, who at your
institute signed off?
Thanks in advance for your help.
If you would like to respond to me directly instead of the listserv, please
do so. Use esegal@stanford.edu.
Ellyn Segal
Biosafety Manager
Stanford University
Ellyn Segal, Ph.D.
Biosafety Manager
Stanford University
ph: 650.725.1473
fax: 650.725.3468
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 24 May 2002 15:44:34 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Mahjoub Labyad
Subject: Re: History of NIH Guidelines/BMBL
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..........
In his 1979 review,(20) Pike concluded that "the knowledge, the techniques,
and the equipment to prevent most laboratory infections are available." In
the United States, however, no single code of practice, standards,
guidelines, or other publication provided detailed descriptions of
techniques, equipment, and other considerations or recommendations for the
broad scope of laboratory activities conducted with a variety of indigenous
and exotic infectious agents. The booklet, Classification of Etiologic
Agents on the Basis of Hazard,(21) served as a general reference for some
laboratory activities utilizing infectious agents. This booklet, and the
concept of categorizing infectious agents and laboratory activities into
four classes or levels, served as a basic format for earlier editions of
Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories (BMBL). ....
For full article go to:
Other historical fact could be viewed at:
Regards
Mahjoub Labyad
Env. Health Specialist
University of Minnesota Duluth
----- Original Message -----
From: "Barry Cohen"
To:
Sent: Friday, May 24, 2002 12:05 PM
Subject: Re: History of NIH Guidelines/BMBL
> The Recombinant DNA Controversy: A Memoir. Science,
> Politics and the Public Interest, 1974-1981.
>
> By Donald S. Frederickson, MD and former Dir, NIH
>
> ASM Press
>
> Regards,
>
> Barry Cohen, MPH, CBSP
> Director, Environmental Health and Safety
> Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc.
> 195 Albany Street
> Cambridge, MA 02139
> (V): 617/613-4385
> (F): 617/613-4492
> (E): bcohen@
>
>
>
> "Hofherr, Leslie" wrote:
> >
> > Anyone know of a good reference that gives the history of the creation
of
> > the NIH Guidelines and/or BMBL?
> > Thanks in advance for any references.
> > Sincerely,
> > Leslie Hofherr
> > UCLA, EH&S
> > (310) 206-3929 phone
> > leslie@admin.ucla.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 24 May 2002 13:41:01 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Chris Carlson
Subject: Re: History of NIH Guidelines/BMBL
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from the former chair of our IBC.
>Date: Fri, 24 May 2002 12:56:41 -0700
>From: Michael Chamberlin
>X-Accept-Language: en-us
>To: Chris Carlson
>Subject: Re: Fwd: History of NIH Guidelines/BMBL
>
>Dear Chris,
> I was not at the Asilomar Conference; Paul Berg and Maxine Singer
>were the convenors, and Paul is pretty approachable. There are two
>books that I am familiar with that present the story of the
>recombinant DNA controversy from a nonscientific point of view. One
>is Invisible Frontiers, by Stephen S. Hall, the other is Recombinant
>DNA; the Untold Story, by John Lear. I have copies of the books if
>you cannot find them in the library.
> I hope that your world is going well.
>Michael Chamberlin
>
--
******************************************************************************
Chris Carlson
Biosafety Officer, CBSP (ABSA)
Office of Environment, Health & Safety
317 University Hall - #1150
University of California
Berkeley, CA 94720-1150
phone: (510) 643-6562
e-mail: ccarlson@uclink4.berkeley.edu
fax: (510) 643-7595
******************************************************************************
Visit our Web Site at
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=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 27 May 2002 16:13:19 +0200
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Mike Kirby
Subject: Viability of HIV in a freeze dried sample.
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Question:
What are the chances that the virus will survive, if a HIV positive serum
sample is freeze dried and then reconstituted at a later date?
We recently had a needle stick injury concerning the above, and we advised
the victim to follow all prophylactic procedures.
Were we right in our approach?
Mr.M.Kirby
Safety Office
N.H.L.S
Johannesburg
South Africa.
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 28 May 2002 10:24:27 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "NSIAH,YAW A. (Biology)"
Subject: Re: Viability of HIV in a freeze dried sample.
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Yes! You were right with the prophylactic advice. Recent studies from the
Yale School of Epidemiology and Public Health have shown/demonstrated that
HIV virus can survive in old syringes left outside for extended periods.
I can you the paper if you are interested.
bye
Nsiah
Department of Biology
Eastern Connecticut State University
83 Windham Street,
Willimantic, CT 06226
Tel: 1-860-465-4524/4488
-----Original Message-----
From: Mike Kirby [mailto:mikek@MAIL.SAIMR.WITS.AC.ZA]
Sent: Monday, May 27, 2002 10:13 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Viability of HIV in a freeze dried sample.
Question:
What are the chances that the virus will survive, if a HIV positive serum
sample is freeze dried and then reconstituted at a later date?
We recently had a needle stick injury concerning the above, and we advised
the victim to follow all prophylactic procedures.
Were we right in our approach?
Mr.M.Kirby
Safety Office
N.H.L.S
Johannesburg
South Africa.
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 28 May 2002 07:34:25 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Funk, Glenn"
Subject: Re: Viability of HIV in a freeze dried sample.
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Mike -
Freeze-drying, or lyophilization, is a common method of preserving
biological materials, including microorganisms and viruses. It's efficacy
varies depending on the specific microorganism, the conditions of
lyophilization, storage and reconstitution, and several other factors.
While one can never expect to recover 100% of the original infectivity, I
would expect such treatment to virtually ensure infective virions,
especially when the virus is suspended in protein-rich serum. In the
absence of any antiviral treatment or events occurring to this serum sample,
I believe your advice was right on the money - treat an exposure to this
material as you would an exposure to the original unprocessed serum.
-- Glenn
Glenn A. Funk, Ph.D., CBSP
Director and Biosafety Officer
Environment, Health & Safety
MedImmune Vaccines, Inc.
408-845-8857
-----Original Message-----
From: Mike Kirby [mailto:mikek@MAIL.SAIMR.WITS.AC.ZA]
Sent: Monday, 27 May, 2002 07:13
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Viability of HIV in a freeze dried sample.
Question:
What are the chances that the virus will survive, if a HIV positive serum
sample is freeze dried and then reconstituted at a later date?
We recently had a needle stick injury concerning the above, and we advised
the victim to follow all prophylactic procedures.
Were we right in our approach?
Mr.M.Kirby
Safety Office
N.H.L.S
Johannesburg
South Africa.
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 28 May 2002 09:36:45 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Therese M. Stinnett"
Subject: FW: [alloprimate] Fatal Infection of a Pet Monkey with Human herp
esvirus 1.
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
I don't recall who asked this question, but here is another reference.
Therese M. Stinnett=20
Biosafety Officer=20
Health and Safety Division=20
UCHSC, Mailstop C275
4200 E. 9th Avenue
Denver, CO=A0 80262
Voice:=A0 303-315-6754=20
Pager:=A0=A0 303-266-5402=20
Fax:=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 303-315-8026=20
email:=A0=A0=A0 therese.stinnett@uchsc.edu
-----Original Message-----
Hi Folks,
Most of us are aware of the threat posed by Simian Herpes B, a =
naturally
occurring virus found in Old World monkeys, especially macaques. =
Simian
Herpes B has something like a 70 percent fatality rate among humans who
become infected with the virus.
Below is the title and abstract for a report describing a reverse route
of infection. The complete EID 'Dispatch' can be viewed at the CDC
Emerging Infectious Diseases website via the URL provided below the
abstract.
Dale E. Reddick
________________________________
Emerging Infectious Diseases
Vol. 8, No. 6, June 2002
Fatal Infection of a Pet Monkey with Human herpesvirus 1
Hartwig P. Huemer,* Clara Larcher,* Thomas Czedik-Eysenberg,? Norbert
Nowotny,?=A7 and Martin Reifinger?
*University of Innsbruck, Innsbruck, Austria; ?Tierklinik Rodaun,
Vienna, Austria; ?University of Veterinary Medicine, Vienna, Austria;
and =A7United Arab Emirates University, Al Ain, United Arab Emirates
"Concerns have been raised about pet monkeys as a potential threat to
humans. We report the opposite situation, a danger to pets that arises
from humans. Similar to herpesvirus B (Cercopithecine herpesvirus 1),
which endangers humans but not its host species, Human herpesvirus 1 =
can
act as a "killer virus" when crossing the species barrier to New World
monkeys."
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 28 May 2002 13:44:21 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Morgan Margaret-AMM076
Subject: Re: plate disposal
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
My understanding is that if it looks like medical waste to a "reasonable man on the street" it has to be disposed of as if it is medical waste. That's a law I think.
Margaret Morgan, PhD,
Senior Scientist and Biosafety Officer,
Motorola Life Sciences,
Pasadena, CA.
Ph. 626 584 5900 ext 432.
-----Original Message-----
From: Johnson, Julie A. [mailto:jajohns@IASTATE.EDU]
Sent: Thursday, May 23, 2002 7:43 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: plate disposal
I have to strongly disagree with Curt's comment that science teachers should
not be doing this kind of experimentation. Even things that have been
autoclaved often appear to the general public as if they are "biohazardous".
Must we require everything that might be perceived to be biohazardous to be
rendered unrecognizable? I think we need to strongly consider educating
the public and our waste haulers as to what is and is not biohazardous waste
instead of going overboard in treating everything that might possibly be
perceived as in some way hazardous as if it is. If we, the supposed
experts, treat everything as if it is hazardous, the public will think that
it is hazardous.
I very much realize that we do sometimes have to do things because of public
perception, but why don't we use our professional knowledge to educate the
public and not to add to unrealistic fears. If we react only to perception
and not reality, we are doing the public a disservice. Are we as biosafety
professionals going to let things get to the point where no one can use even
a sterile petri unless they have a Ph.D. and work in a high security lab
with all waste autoclave, ground to make it unrecognizable, then incinerated
because a petri dish might be perceived as biohazardous waste?
We, as biosafety professionals must make decisions that keep people safe,
while also allowing needed teaching and research in these areas to continue.
We can do both if we are willing to make the effort.
Julie A. Johnson, Ph.D., CBSP
Biosafety Officer
Environmental Health and Safety
118 Agronomy Lab
Iowa State University
Ames, IA 50011
Phone: 515-294-7657
Fax: 515-294-9357
Email: jajohns@iastate.edu
Web site: ehs.iastate.edu
THESE ARE MY OPINIONS AND IN NO WAY SHOULD BE CONSTRUED AS THE OFFICIAL
OPINION OF MY EMPLOYER.
-----Original Message-----
From: Curt Speaker [mailto:SPEAKER@SAFETY-1.SAFETY.PSU.EDU]
Sent: Thursday, May 23, 2002 9:58 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: plate disposal
Lori:
Points taken, and you are correct in saying that they should not do
this kind of experimentation; but the fact of the matter is that they
do. The "no budget" excuse, however, just does not fly. Picture
this...
They stuff a bunch of petri dishes into a garbage bag and send it to
the local landfill. A piece of heavy equipment runs over the bag and
tears it open, exposing the petri dishes. The landfill operator, now
concerned at the potential of improperly disposed medial waste,
examines the material more closely and is able to trace it to the
school. By this time, the school is going to be hard pressed to prove
that the organisms on the plates are benign; they have had the
opportunity to be exposed to airborne and soil microbes, and if you
look hard enough, you will find a pathogen in there (Staph, Strep,
etc.). If the school is unwilling or unable to cover the cost of
disposing of this type of material properly, how are they going to
deal with the potential citations, fines and negative publicity that
could result???
My infectious waste vendor (here in PA) works closely with small
clients on this type of thing, and often will give them the option of
disposing of up to 50 pounds of medical waste for $50 --- money
well spent in my opinion.
Remeber here we are talking about perception, not real risk. There
is little, if any health risk from the plates. But the landfill operator
and the general public will likely not understand this.
Just my $0.02
Curt
Curt Speaker
Biosafety Officer
Penn State University
Environmental Health and Safety
speaker@ehs.psu.edu
^...^
(O_O)
=(Y)=
"""
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 29 May 2002 10:04:56 +0200
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Serprortezione
Subject: Eupean manual on Bisafety
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
New european manual "safety manual for researchers in biotechnology
laboratories" is free on
http:\\safeman.istge.it. languages italian and english. Its' a collaboration
between french, italian and spanish researchers and safety manager with the
subvention of Directorate General Works and Social Affairs of EC
Dimitri Sossai
Prof Dimitri Sossai
R-SPP A.O. Ospedale San MArtiono di Genova e Cliniche Universitarie
Convenzionate
L.go R. Benzi 10
16132 Genova
Italia
tel. +39 0105552293
fax +39 010 5556756
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 29 May 2002 07:22:56 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: William Lorenzen
Subject: Re: Eupean manual on Bisafety
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT
This address does not appear to work. Is it correct?
Thanks
Serprortezione wrote:
> New european manual "safety manual for researchers in biotechnology
> laboratories" is free on
> http:\\safeman.istge.it. languages italian and english. Its' a collaboration
> between french, italian and spanish researchers and safety manager with the
> subvention of Directorate General Works and Social Affairs of EC
>
> Dimitri Sossai
>
> Prof Dimitri Sossai
> R-SPP A.O. Ospedale San MArtiono di Genova e Cliniche Universitarie
> Convenzionate
> L.go R. Benzi 10
> 16132 Genova
> Italia
> tel. +39 0105552293
> fax +39 010 5556756
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 29 May 2002 08:16:36 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: David Gillum
Subject: Re: Eupean manual on Bisafety
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
It works fine for me.
--
David R. Gillum
Laboratory Safety Officer
Environmental Health and Safety
11 Leavitt Lane, Perpetuity Hall
Durham, NH 03824
Telephone #: 603-862-0197
Facsimile #: 603-862-0047
-----Original Message-----
From: William Lorenzen [mailto:William.Lorenzen@TCH.HARVARD.EDU]
Sent: Wednesday, May 29, 2002 7:23 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Eupean manual on Bisafety
This address does not appear to work. Is it correct?
Thanks
Serprortezione wrote:
> New european manual "safety manual for researchers in biotechnology
> laboratories" is free on
> http:\\safeman.istge.it. languages italian and english. Its' a
collaboration
> between french, italian and spanish researchers and safety manager with
the
> subvention of Directorate General Works and Social Affairs of EC
>
> Dimitri Sossai
>
> Prof Dimitri Sossai
> R-SPP A.O. Ospedale San MArtiono di Genova e Cliniche Universitarie
> Convenzionate
> L.go R. Benzi 10
> 16132 Genova
> Italia
> tel. +39 0105552293
> fax +39 010 5556756
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 29 May 2002 14:01:44 +0200
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Thomas Binz
Subject: AW: Eupean manual on Bisafety
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
It does, but the document is very large. Just wait a moment.
Regards
Thomas
> -----Urspr=FCngliche Nachricht-----
> Von: William Lorenzen [SMTP:William.Lorenzen@TCH.HARVARD.EDU]
> Gesendet am: Mittwoch, 29. Mai 2002 13:23
> An: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Betreff: Re: Eupean manual on Bisafety
>=20
> This address does not appear to work. Is it correct?
>=20
> Thanks
>=20
> Serprortezione wrote:
>=20
> > New european manual "safety manual for researchers in biotechnology
> > laboratories" is free on
> > http:\\safeman.istge.it. languages italian and english. Its' a
> collaboration
> > between french, italian and spanish researchers and safety manager =
with
> the
> > subvention of Directorate General Works and Social Affairs of EC
> >
> > Dimitri Sossai
> >
> > Prof Dimitri Sossai
> > R-SPP A.O. Ospedale San MArtiono di Genova e Cliniche Universitarie
> > Convenzionate
> > L.go R. Benzi 10
> > 16132 Genova
> > Italia
> > tel. +39 0105552293
> > fax +39 010 5556756
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 29 May 2002 08:54:34 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Sue Pedrick
Subject: Re: Eupean manual on Bisafety
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
Try
At 07:22 AM 5/29/02 -0400, you wrote:
>This address does not appear to work. Is it correct?
>
>Thanks
>
>Serprortezione wrote:
>
> > New european manual "safety manual for researchers in biotechnology
> > laboratories" is free on
> > http:\\safeman.istge.it. languages italian and english. Its' a
> collaboration
> > between french, italian and spanish researchers and safety manager with the
> > subvention of Directorate General Works and Social Affairs of EC
> >
> > Dimitri Sossai
> >
> > Prof Dimitri Sossai
> > R-SPP A.O. Ospedale San MArtiono di Genova e Cliniche Universitarie
> > Convenzionate
> > L.go R. Benzi 10
> > 16132 Genova
> > Italia
> > tel. +39 0105552293
> > fax +39 010 5556756
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 29 May 2002 08:26:08 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: David Silberman
Subject: Re: plate disposal
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed"
In California, the Medical Waste Management Act (MWMA) defines what
is and what is not Medical Waste. There are, for example, exemptions
for non-infectious material (e.g., cultures and the containers that
hold them) that "look like" medical waste but are generated from the
food processing or biotechnology. Although I have great respect for
reasonable men (and women) of the street, they will not be able to
determine when something is truly medical waste, at least not in
California. That decision needs to be left to the reasonable people
who are regulators and those who are regulated. Dialogues between
these two groups can ultimately lead to a rationale approach that
takes science, safety and public perception into account.
In an earlier email I suggested that one engage in a dialogue with
one's landfill operator. The response was that it would be a huge
obstacle for a high school teacher, who would find another lab
exercise instead. With all due respect, my perception of "teaching"
extends beyond the confines of a classroom. It seems to me that
there are more than just biology lessons that need to be taught.
Wouldn't it be a wonderful, real world experience for high schoolers
to witness a constructive dialogue among all groups who share the
same goal (safety) but have different approaches to achieving it? It
is what we, as biosafety professionals, do nearly every day... it
appears we still have some training to do.
Paraphrasing John Stuart Mill (I think):
All that is necessary for evil regulations to succeed in this world,
is for enough good men (and women) to do nothing.
Happy to hear your thoughts.
Sincerely,
>My understanding is that if it looks like medical waste to a
>"reasonable man on the street" it has to be disposed of as if it is
>medical waste. That's a law I think.
>
>Margaret Morgan, PhD,
>Senior Scientist and Biosafety Officer,
>Motorola Life Sciences,
>Pasadena, CA.
>Ph. 626 584 5900 ext 432.
>
>
>
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From: Johnson, Julie A. [mailto:jajohns@IASTATE.EDU]
>Sent: Thursday, May 23, 2002 7:43 AM
>To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
>Subject: Re: plate disposal
>
>
>I have to strongly disagree with Curt's comment that science teachers should
>not be doing this kind of experimentation. Even things that have been
>autoclaved often appear to the general public as if they are "biohazardous".
>Must we require everything that might be perceived to be biohazardous to be
>rendered unrecognizable? I think we need to strongly consider educating
>the public and our waste haulers as to what is and is not biohazardous waste
>instead of going overboard in treating everything that might possibly be
>perceived as in some way hazardous as if it is. If we, the supposed
>experts, treat everything as if it is hazardous, the public will think that
>it is hazardous.
>
>I very much realize that we do sometimes have to do things because of public
>perception, but why don't we use our professional knowledge to educate the
>public and not to add to unrealistic fears. If we react only to perception
>and not reality, we are doing the public a disservice. Are we as biosafety
>professionals going to let things get to the point where no one can use even
>a sterile petri unless they have a Ph.D. and work in a high security lab
>with all waste autoclave, ground to make it unrecognizable, then incinerated
>because a petri dish might be perceived as biohazardous waste?
>
>We, as biosafety professionals must make decisions that keep people safe,
>while also allowing needed teaching and research in these areas to continue.
>We can do both if we are willing to make the effort.
>
>
>Julie A. Johnson, Ph.D., CBSP
>Biosafety Officer
>Environmental Health and Safety
>118 Agronomy Lab
>Iowa State University
>Ames, IA 50011
>Phone: 515-294-7657
>Fax: 515-294-9357
>Email: jajohns@iastate.edu
>Web site: ehs.iastate.edu
>
>THESE ARE MY OPINIONS AND IN NO WAY SHOULD BE CONSTRUED AS THE OFFICIAL
>OPINION OF MY EMPLOYER.
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From: Curt Speaker [mailto:SPEAKER@SAFETY-1.SAFETY.PSU.EDU]
>Sent: Thursday, May 23, 2002 9:58 AM
>To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
>Subject: Re: plate disposal
>
>
>Lori:
>
>Points taken, and you are correct in saying that they should not do
>this kind of experimentation; but the fact of the matter is that they
>do. The "no budget" excuse, however, just does not fly. Picture
>this...
>
>They stuff a bunch of petri dishes into a garbage bag and send it to
>the local landfill. A piece of heavy equipment runs over the bag and
>tears it open, exposing the petri dishes. The landfill operator, now
>concerned at the potential of improperly disposed medial waste,
>examines the material more closely and is able to trace it to the
>school. By this time, the school is going to be hard pressed to prove
>that the organisms on the plates are benign; they have had the
>opportunity to be exposed to airborne and soil microbes, and if you
>look hard enough, you will find a pathogen in there (Staph, Strep,
>etc.). If the school is unwilling or unable to cover the cost of
>disposing of this type of material properly, how are they going to
>deal with the potential citations, fines and negative publicity that
>could result???
>
>My infectious waste vendor (here in PA) works closely with small
>clients on this type of thing, and often will give them the option of
>disposing of up to 50 pounds of medical waste for $50 --- money
>well spent in my opinion.
>
>Remeber here we are talking about perception, not real risk. There
>is little, if any health risk from the plates. But the landfill operator
>and the general public will likely not understand this.
>
>Just my $0.02
>
>Curt
>
>Curt Speaker
>Biosafety Officer
>Penn State University
>Environmental Health and Safety
>speaker@ehs.psu.edu
>
>^...^
>(O_O)
>=(Y)=
> """
--
David H. Silberman
Director, Health and Safety Programs
Stanford University School of Medicine
Medical School Office Building
Stanford, CA 94305 Mail Code: 5460
650 723-6336 (DIRECT LINE)
650 725-7878 (FAX)
silberman@stanford.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 29 May 2002 09:18:35 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Snyder_Sam
Subject: Re: Eupean manual on Bisafety
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
I can't get the PDF file to open??
Sam S. Snyder Ph.D. MPH
Risk Management Coordinator
Risk Management Services
Division of Business Operations
Business Phone: (562) 803-8297
Business Fax: (562) 940-1898
-----Original Message-----
From: William Lorenzen [mailto:William.Lorenzen@TCH.HARVARD.EDU]
Sent: Wednesday, May 29, 2002 6:23 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Eupean manual on Bisafety
This address does not appear to work. Is it correct?
Thanks
Serprortezione wrote:
> New european manual "safety manual for researchers in biotechnology
> laboratories" is free on
> http:\\safeman.istge.it. languages italian and english. Its' a
collaboration
> between french, italian and spanish researchers and safety manager with
the
> subvention of Directorate General Works and Social Affairs of EC
>
> Dimitri Sossai
>
> Prof Dimitri Sossai
> R-SPP A.O. Ospedale San MArtiono di Genova e Cliniche Universitarie
> Convenzionate
> L.go R. Benzi 10
> 16132 Genova
> Italia
> tel. +39 0105552293
> fax +39 010 5556756
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 29 May 2002 11:31:49 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Phipps, Patricia"
Subject: Re: Eupean manual on Bisafety
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
It takes a really long time, at least 30-45 minutes.
-----Original Message-----
From: Snyder_Sam [mailto:Snyder_Sam@LACOE.EDU]
Sent: Wednesday, May 29, 2002 11:19 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Eupean manual on Bisafety
I can't get the PDF file to open??
Sam S. Snyder Ph.D. MPH
Risk Management Coordinator
Risk Management Services
Division of Business Operations
Business Phone: (562) 803-8297
Business Fax: (562) 940-1898
-----Original Message-----
From: William Lorenzen [mailto:William.Lorenzen@TCH.HARVARD.EDU]
Sent: Wednesday, May 29, 2002 6:23 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Eupean manual on Bisafety
This address does not appear to work. Is it correct?
Thanks
Serprortezione wrote:
> New european manual "safety manual for researchers in biotechnology
> laboratories" is free on
> http:\\safeman.istge.it. languages italian and english. Its' a
collaboration
> between french, italian and spanish researchers and safety manager with
the
> subvention of Directorate General Works and Social Affairs of EC
>
> Dimitri Sossai
>
> Prof Dimitri Sossai
> R-SPP A.O. Ospedale San MArtiono di Genova e Cliniche Universitarie
> Convenzionate
> L.go R. Benzi 10
> 16132 Genova
> Italia
> tel. +39 0105552293
> fax +39 010 5556756
This e-mail, facsimile, or letter and any files or attachments=20
transmitted with it contains information that is confidential and=20
privileged. This information is intended only for the use of the=20
individual(s) and entity(ies) to whom it is addressed. If you are=20
the intended recipient, further disclosures are prohibited without=20
proper authorization. If you are not the intended recipient, any=20
disclosure, copying, printing, or use of this information is=20
strictly prohibited and possibly a violation of federal or state=20
law and regulations. If you have received this information in=20
error, please notify Baylor Health Care System immediately at=20
1-866-402-1661 or via e-mail at privacy@baylorhealth.edu. Baylor=20
Health Care System, its subsidiaries, and affiliates hereby claim=20
all applicable privileges related to this information.
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 29 May 2002 11:43:33 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Michael Betlach
Subject: Re: Eupean manual on Bisafety
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
The server is slow (took me about 15 minutes to download at 11:30 am CDT).
Try downloading the pdf file to your computer first, then open the pdf. The
file is 228 pages.
Michael Betlach, Ph.D.
Biosafety Officer
Promega Corporation
5445 E. Cheryl Parkway
Madison, WI 53711
(608) 274-1181, Ext. 1270
-----Original Message-----
From: Snyder_Sam [mailto:Snyder_Sam@LACOE.EDU]
Sent: Wednesday, May 29, 2002 11:19 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Eupean manual on Bisafety
I can't get the PDF file to open??
Sam S. Snyder Ph.D. MPH
Risk Management Coordinator
Risk Management Services
Division of Business Operations
Business Phone: (562) 803-8297
Business Fax: (562) 940-1898
-----Original Message-----
From: William Lorenzen [mailto:William.Lorenzen@TCH.HARVARD.EDU]
Sent: Wednesday, May 29, 2002 6:23 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Eupean manual on Bisafety
This address does not appear to work. Is it correct?
Thanks
Serprortezione wrote:
> New european manual "safety manual for researchers in biotechnology
> laboratories" is free on
> http:\\safeman.istge.it. languages italian and english. Its' a
collaboration
> between french, italian and spanish researchers and safety manager with
the
> subvention of Directorate General Works and Social Affairs of EC
>
> Dimitri Sossai
>
> Prof Dimitri Sossai
> R-SPP A.O. Ospedale San MArtiono di Genova e Cliniche Universitarie
> Convenzionate
> L.go R. Benzi 10
> 16132 Genova
> Italia
> tel. +39 0105552293
> fax +39 010 5556756
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 29 May 2002 12:46:40 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Gilpin, Richard"
Subject: Re: Eupean manual on Bisafety
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
this had better be good
-----Original Message-----
From: Michael Betlach [mailto:MBetlach@]
Sent: Wednesday, May 29, 2002 12:44 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Eupean manual on Bisafety
The server is slow (took me about 15 minutes to download at 11:30 am CDT).
Try downloading the pdf file to your computer first, then open the pdf. The
file is 228 pages.
Michael Betlach, Ph.D.
Biosafety Officer
Promega Corporation
5445 E. Cheryl Parkway
Madison, WI 53711
(608) 274-1181, Ext. 1270
-----Original Message-----
From: Snyder_Sam [mailto:Snyder_Sam@LACOE.EDU]
Sent: Wednesday, May 29, 2002 11:19 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Eupean manual on Bisafety
I can't get the PDF file to open??
Sam S. Snyder Ph.D. MPH
Risk Management Coordinator
Risk Management Services
Division of Business Operations
Business Phone: (562) 803-8297
Business Fax: (562) 940-1898
-----Original Message-----
From: William Lorenzen [mailto:William.Lorenzen@TCH.HARVARD.EDU]
Sent: Wednesday, May 29, 2002 6:23 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Eupean manual on Bisafety
This address does not appear to work. Is it correct?
Thanks
Serprortezione wrote:
> New european manual "safety manual for researchers in biotechnology
> laboratories" is free on
> http:\\safeman.istge.it. languages italian and english. Its' a
collaboration
> between french, italian and spanish researchers and safety manager with
the
> subvention of Directorate General Works and Social Affairs of EC
>
> Dimitri Sossai
>
> Prof Dimitri Sossai
> R-SPP A.O. Ospedale San MArtiono di Genova e Cliniche Universitarie
> Convenzionate
> L.go R. Benzi 10
> 16132 Genova
> Italia
> tel. +39 0105552293
> fax +39 010 5556756
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 29 May 2002 12:48:55 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Kim Auletta
Subject: Re: Eupean manual on Bisafety
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
I downloaded the pdf file, it took abt 15 minutes. Its abt 230 pages. Now
my computer doesn't want to open the saved file! Its abt 2 mb in size.
Kim Auletta
Lab Safety Specialist
Environmental Health and Safety
SUNY Stony Brook
110 Suffolk Hall
Stony Brook, NY 11794-6200
PHONE: 631-632-9672
FAX: 631-632-9683
E-MAIL: kauletta@.sunysb.edu
Michael Betlach
cc:
Sent by: A Subject: Re: Eupean manual on Bisafety
Biosafety
Discussion List
05/29/2002 12:43
PM
Please respond to
A Biosafety
Discussion List
The server is slow (took me about 15 minutes to download at 11:30 am CDT).
Try downloading the pdf file to your computer first, then open the pdf. The
file is 228 pages.
Michael Betlach, Ph.D.
Biosafety Officer
Promega Corporation
5445 E. Cheryl Parkway
Madison, WI 53711
(608) 274-1181, Ext. 1270
-----Original Message-----
From: Snyder_Sam [mailto:Snyder_Sam@LACOE.EDU]
Sent: Wednesday, May 29, 2002 11:19 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Eupean manual on Bisafety
I can't get the PDF file to open??
Sam S. Snyder Ph.D. MPH
Risk Management Coordinator
Risk Management Services
Division of Business Operations
Business Phone: (562) 803-8297
Business Fax: (562) 940-1898
-----Original Message-----
From: William Lorenzen [mailto:William.Lorenzen@TCH.HARVARD.EDU]
Sent: Wednesday, May 29, 2002 6:23 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Eupean manual on Bisafety
This address does not appear to work. Is it correct?
Thanks
Serprortezione wrote:
> New european manual "safety manual for researchers in biotechnology
> laboratories" is free on
> http:\\safeman.istge.it. languages italian and english. Its' a
collaboration
> between french, italian and spanish researchers and safety manager with
the
> subvention of Directorate General Works and Social Affairs of EC
>
> Dimitri Sossai
>
> Prof Dimitri Sossai
> R-SPP A.O. Ospedale San MArtiono di Genova e Cliniche Universitarie
> Convenzionate
> L.go R. Benzi 10
> 16132 Genova
> Italia
> tel. +39 0105552293
> fax +39 010 5556756
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 29 May 2002 13:09:29 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Erik A. Talley"
Subject: Leishmania in animals
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
If you are working with Leishmania in animals and are willing to talk to me
about your procedures, please contact me at ert2002@med.cornell.edu or
212-746-6201. I would like to compare some of our procedures with others
currently working with this parasite. We are using L. donovani in hamsters
and mice at the moment.
Sincerely,
Erik
___________________________________
Erik A. Talley, Director
Environmental Health and Safety
Weill Medical College of Cornell University
418 East 71st Street, Suite 62
New York, NY 10021
212-746-6201
ert2002@med.cornell.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 29 May 2002 12:56:38 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Judy Pointer
Subject: Re: Eupean manual on Bisafety
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Why don't all of you who finally get it open - read it, summarize it, and tell
the rest of us what it says!
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 29 May 2002 14:10:11 -0400
Reply-To: pr18@columbia.edu
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: paul rubock
Organization: EH&S
Subject: Re: Eupean manual on Bisafety
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
I wish I'd thought of that.
Judy Pointer wrote:
> Why don't all of you who finally get it open - read it, summarize it, and tell
> the rest of us what it says!
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 29 May 2002 14:12:15 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Mann, Richard"
Subject: Re: Eupean manual on Bisafety
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="----_=_NextPart_000_01C2073C.5CA40340"
This message is in MIME format. Since your mail reader does not understand
this format, some or all of this message may not be legible.
------_=_NextPart_000_01C2073C.5CA40340
Content-Type: text/plain;
charset="iso-8859-1"
Kim here it is
Richard Mann, DVM
VAMC Northport
-----Original Message-----
From: Kim Auletta [mailto:kauletta@.SUNYSB.EDU]
Sent: Wednesday, May 29, 2002 12:49 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Eupean manual on Bisafety
I downloaded the pdf file, it took abt 15 minutes. Its abt 230 pages. Now
my computer doesn't want to open the saved file! Its abt 2 mb in size.
Kim Auletta
Lab Safety Specialist
Environmental Health and Safety
SUNY Stony Brook
110 Suffolk Hall
Stony Brook, NY 11794-6200
PHONE: 631-632-9672
FAX: 631-632-9683
E-MAIL: kauletta@.sunysb.edu
Michael Betlach
cc:
Sent by: A Subject: Re: Eupean manual
on Bisafety
Biosafety
Discussion List
05/29/2002 12:43
PM
Please respond to
A Biosafety
Discussion List
The server is slow (took me about 15 minutes to download at 11:30 am CDT).
Try downloading the pdf file to your computer first, then open the pdf. The
file is 228 pages.
Michael Betlach, Ph.D.
Biosafety Officer
Promega Corporation
5445 E. Cheryl Parkway
Madison, WI 53711
(608) 274-1181, Ext. 1270
-----Original Message-----
From: Snyder_Sam [mailto:Snyder_Sam@LACOE.EDU]
Sent: Wednesday, May 29, 2002 11:19 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Eupean manual on Bisafety
I can't get the PDF file to open??
Sam S. Snyder Ph.D. MPH
Risk Management Coordinator
Risk Management Services
Division of Business Operations
Business Phone: (562) 803-8297
Business Fax: (562) 940-1898
-----Original Message-----
From: William Lorenzen [mailto:William.Lorenzen@TCH.HARVARD.EDU]
Sent: Wednesday, May 29, 2002 6:23 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Eupean manual on Bisafety
This address does not appear to work. Is it correct?
Thanks
Serprortezione wrote:
> New european manual "safety manual for researchers in biotechnology
> laboratories" is free on
> http:\\safeman.istge.it. languages italian and english. Its' a
collaboration
> between french, italian and spanish researchers and safety manager with
the
> subvention of Directorate General Works and Social Affairs of EC
>
> Dimitri Sossai
>
> Prof Dimitri Sossai
> R-SPP A.O. Ospedale San MArtiono di Genova e Cliniche Universitarie
> Convenzionate
> L.go R. Benzi 10
> 16132 Genova
> Italia
> tel. +39 0105552293
> fax +39 010 5556756
*** Attachment of file "istpdfeng.pdf" deleted due to large size
------_=_NextPart_000_01C2073C.5CA40340
Content-Type: application/octet-stream;
name="istpdfeng.pdf"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
Content-Disposition: attachment;
filename="istpdfeng.pdf"
------_=_NextPart_000_01C2073C.5CA40340--
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 29 May 2002 16:52:42 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Kuchera, Mary"
Subject: Re: Eupean manual on Bisafety
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Got it on the first try. No problems. I haven't had a chance to read
through the whole document, but after a quick scan, I found it most
interesting. Definitely worth any downloading
delays............and......it's free. Thank-you Prof. Sossai.
Mary J. Kuchera
EHS Specialist/Radiation Safety Manager
Wellstat Therapeutics Corporation
mkuchera@
-----Original Message-----
From: Gilpin, Richard [mailto:rgilpin@ADMIN1.UMARYLAND.EDU]
Sent: Wednesday, May 29, 2002 12:47 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Eupean manual on Bisafety
this had better be good
-----Original Message-----
From: Michael Betlach [mailto:MBetlach@]
Sent: Wednesday, May 29, 2002 12:44 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Eupean manual on Bisafety
The server is slow (took me about 15 minutes to download at 11:30 am CDT).
Try downloading the pdf file to your computer first, then open the pdf. The
file is 228 pages.
Michael Betlach, Ph.D.
Biosafety Officer
Promega Corporation
5445 E. Cheryl Parkway
Madison, WI 53711
(608) 274-1181, Ext. 1270
-----Original Message-----
From: Snyder_Sam [mailto:Snyder_Sam@LACOE.EDU]
Sent: Wednesday, May 29, 2002 11:19 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Eupean manual on Bisafety
I can't get the PDF file to open??
Sam S. Snyder Ph.D. MPH
Risk Management Coordinator
Risk Management Services
Division of Business Operations
Business Phone: (562) 803-8297
Business Fax: (562) 940-1898
-----Original Message-----
From: William Lorenzen [mailto:William.Lorenzen@TCH.HARVARD.EDU]
Sent: Wednesday, May 29, 2002 6:23 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Eupean manual on Bisafety
This address does not appear to work. Is it correct?
Thanks
Serprortezione wrote:
> New european manual "safety manual for researchers in biotechnology
> laboratories" is free on
> http:\\safeman.istge.it. languages italian and english. Its' a
collaboration
> between french, italian and spanish researchers and safety manager with
the
> subvention of Directorate General Works and Social Affairs of EC
>
> Dimitri Sossai
>
> Prof Dimitri Sossai
> R-SPP A.O. Ospedale San MArtiono di Genova e Cliniche Universitarie
> Convenzionate
> L.go R. Benzi 10
> 16132 Genova
> Italia
> tel. +39 0105552293
> fax +39 010 5556756
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 29 May 2002 14:27:11 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Teresa Robertson
Subject: Re: Eupean manual on Bisafety
In-Reply-To:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Eupean sounds like a trip to the "rest room".....might you mean European?
Sorry....one time is human error, but to do it repeatedly....sorry, just
bugs me.
Teresa
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 30 May 2002 10:10:12 +0200
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Serprortezione
Subject: European manual
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="----=_NextPart_000_0052_01C207C2.2FC22E20"
Messaggio in formato MIME composto da piy parti.
------=_NextPart_000_0052_01C207C2.2FC22E20
Content-Type: text/plain;
charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
I'm very sorry to all the correct adress is=20
Dimitri=20
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Content-Type: text/html;
charset="iso-8859-1"
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I'm very sorry to all the correct = adress is=20
Dimitri
------=_NextPart_000_0052_01C207C2.2FC22E20--
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 30 May 2002 10:56:19 +0200
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Serprortezione
Subject: European manual
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="----=_NextPart_000_0111_01C207C8.A0D54420"
Messaggio in formato MIME composto da piy parti.
------=_NextPart_000_0111_01C207C8.A0D54420
Content-Type: text/plain;
charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Dimitri
------=_NextPart_000_0111_01C207C8.A0D54420
Content-Type: text/html;
charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
=
Dimitri
------=_NextPart_000_0111_01C207C8.A0D54420--
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 30 May 2002 09:54:02 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Byers, Karen B"
Subject: Re: European manual
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Not a problem; its a great resource. Thank you.
Karen Byers, MS, RBP, CBSP
Biosafety Officer/Containment Suite Manager
Dana-Farber Cancer Institute
44 Binney Street - SWG350
Boston, MA 02115
phone:617-632-3890
fax:617-632-1932
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Serprortezione [SMTP:serprotezione@SMARTINO.GE.IT]
> Sent: Thursday, May 30, 2002 4:10 AM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: European manual
>
> I'm very sorry to all the correct adress is
>
> Dimitri
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 30 May 2002 09:56:11 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ed Gaunt
Subject: Re: European manual
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
If you still have troubles opening the PDF, check your version of Acrobat
Reader. If you do not have version 5.0, go to the Acrobat Reader Web site
() and get an updated
copy. Previous versions of the reader are not always backwards compatible.
EEG
-----Original Message-----
From: Byers, Karen B [mailto:Karen_Byers@DFCI.HARVARD.EDU]
Sent: Thursday, May 30, 2002 9:54 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: European manual
Not a problem; its a great resource. Thank you.
Karen Byers, MS, RBP, CBSP
Biosafety Officer/Containment Suite Manager
Dana-Farber Cancer Institute
44 Binney Street - SWG350
Boston, MA 02115
phone:617-632-3890
fax:617-632-1932
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Serprortezione [SMTP:serprotezione@SMARTINO.GE.IT]
> Sent: Thursday, May 30, 2002 4:10 AM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: European manual
>
> I'm very sorry to all the correct adress is
>
> Dimitri
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 30 May 2002 12:16:59 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Ives, Janet"
Subject: Question about bleach
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
> Dear group,
>
> I have a quick question.
>
> Can anyone provide a reference indicating a how long 10% diluted bleach
> solution should be allowed to disinfect hard environmental surfaces? The
> time range seems to be between 5 and 20 minutes.
>
> Thanks.
>
> Janet
>
> Janet M. Ives
> Industrial Hygienist
> Biosafety Officer, IBC
> University of Rochester
> University Risk Management & Environmental Safety
> 300 East River Road, room 23
> Rochester, New York 14623
> Voice: (585) 275-3014 or -3241
> Fax: (585) 274-0001
>
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 30 May 2002 09:36:39 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Carolyn Keierleber
Subject: Sterne strain
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="=====================_177323640==_.ALT"
--=====================_177323640==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
Hello,
I know there has been some discussion on the list regarding the Bacillus
anthracis Sterne strain. I have a question for those of you who use this
at your facility. Does anyone use this material at BSL-1 and, if so, what
is the rationale used in your risk assessment (briefly).
I know that it lacks the pXO2 plasmid and, therefore, the lacks capsule
genes. I know that the toxin genes are present on pXO1 and that Sterne is
NOT a CDC select agent. My question is not one of understanding the
biology of the organism but just: If you use it as BSL-1, why did you
and/or your IBC decide that.
Please direct your response to ckeier@scripps.edu NOT to the list and I
will post results (if there are any) anonymously and reply directly to
anyone who wants to discuss.
Thanks so much, Carolyn
Carolyn Keierleber, Ph.D.
Associate Director & Biosafety Officer
Environmental Health & Safety
Scripps Research Institute (TSRI)
Mail Code BCC 078
La Jolla, CA 92037
Phone: 858 784-8240
Fax: 858 784-8490
--=====================_177323640==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
Hello,
I know there has been some discussion on the list regarding the Bacillus anthracis Sterne strain. I have a question for those of you who use this at your facility. Does anyone use this material at BSL-1 and, if so, what is the rationale used in your risk assessment (briefly).
I know that it lacks the pXO2 plasmid and, therefore, the lacks capsule genes. I know that the toxin genes are present on pXO1 and that Sterne is NOT a CDC select agent. My question is not one of understanding the biology of the organism but just: If you use it as BSL-1, why did you and/or your IBC decide that.
Please direct your response to ckeier@scripps.edu NOT to the list and I will post results (if there are any) anonymously and reply directly to anyone who wants to discuss.
Thanks so much, Carolyn
Carolyn Keierleber, Ph.D.
Associate Director & Biosafety Officer
Environmental Health & Safety
Scripps Research Institute (TSRI)
Mail Code BCC 078
La Jolla, CA 92037
Phone: 858 784-8240
Fax: 858 784-8490
--=====================_177323640==_.ALT--
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 31 May 2002 08:53:52 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Richard Fink
Subject: Re: Question about bleach
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="=====================_76750911==_.ALT"
--=====================_76750911==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
At 12:16 PM 5/30/2002 -0400, you wrote:
> > Dear group,
> >
> > I have a quick question.
> >
> > Can anyone provide a reference indicating a how long 10% diluted bleach
> > solution should be allowed to disinfect hard environmental surfaces? The
> > time range seems to be between 5 and 20 minutes.
> >
> > Thanks.
> >
> > Janet
The range is due to a number of factors. Probably the primary one being
whether one is going for a low level disinfection or a high level. If you
just want to knock off ordinary (i.e. no Mtb) vegetative cells, 5 minutes
will due it. If you want to reduce the number of spores, at least 20
minutes will be needed. The other factors that play into the disinfection
time is temperature, pH of the solution (neutral to acid being much faster
kill then alkaline), how much organic matter is present, whether the
material is dry or wet.
A good reference is Block's book on Disinfection, Preservation and
sterilization.
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
--=====================_76750911==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
At 12:16 PM 5/30/2002 -0400, you wrote:
> Dear group,
>
> I have a quick question.
>
> Can anyone provide a reference indicating a how long 10% diluted bleach
> solution should be allowed to disinfect hard environmental surfaces? The
> time range seems to be between 5 and 20 minutes.
>
> Thanks.
>
> Janet
The range is due to a number of factors. Probably the primary one being whether one is going for a low level disinfection or a high level. If you just want to knock off ordinary (i.e. no Mtb) vegetative cells, 5 minutes will due it. If you want to reduce the number of spores, at least 20 minutes will be needed. The other factors that play into the disinfection time is temperature, pH of the solution (neutral to acid being much faster kill then alkaline), how much organic matter is present, whether the material is dry or wet.
A good reference is Block's book on Disinfection, Preservation and sterilization.
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
--=====================_76750911==_.ALT--
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 31 May 2002 16:14:45 +0200
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Mike Kirby
Subject: Disposal of ethidium bromide
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
To the Biosafety Team:
Question: Is there a chemical way of neutralizing (detoxifying) Ethidium
Bromide in solution?
Mike Kirby
Safety Office
N.H.L.S
Johannesburg
South Africa.
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 31 May 2002 11:13:31 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Lori Keen
Subject: Re: Disposal of ethidium bromide
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Yes, activated charcoal is used. Various companies sell charcoal filter devices
(Shleicher and Schuell) and others sell charcoal filled bags (like a tea bag)
that you drop into the solution and stir for several hours/overnite. The
solution is no longer hazardous (at least not from the EtBr); the filter/bag is
disposed of in your hazardous waste stream.
My preference is for the bags, the filters always seemed to clog from little
bits of agarose gel and I could rarely use them to the stated capacity.
Lori Keen
Lab Manager, Biology
Calvin College
616-957-6080
Member NAOSMM
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 3 Jun 2002 08:24:13 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Gergis, Nasr"
Subject: Re: CD Biosafety Signs
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Hi everyone,
I am looking for a CD program covers all Safety signs, which includes but
not limited to Biosafety, Chemical Safety, Radiation Safety, Life/Fire
Safety.
Thanks
Nasr Gergis, Ph.D., DVM
Biological Safety Officer
Occupational Safety and Health
City of Hope/BRI
Ph: 626-539-8111 Ext. 64262
Fax: 626-301-8970
Pager: 626-423-5454
E-mail: ngergis@
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RE: CD Biosafety Signs
Hi everyone,
I am looking for a CD program covers all Safety = signs, which includes but not limited to Biosafety, Chemical Safety, = Radiation Safety, Life/Fire Safety.
Thanks
Nasr Gergis, Ph.D., DVM
Biological Safety Officer
Occupational Safety and Health
City of Hope/BRI
Ph: 626-539-8111 Ext. 64262
Fax: 626-301-8970
Pager: 626-423-5454
E-mail: ngergis@
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Date: Mon, 3 Jun 2002 11:32:55 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Kim Auletta
Subject: Re: CD Biosafety Signs
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-type: multipart/mixed;
Go to the Envirowin website () - we've been using their
Safety clip art CDs. One is $299 and the other is $399, or you can get
smaller "collections" for a particular topic that are less $$.
(Embedded image moved to file: pic19037.pcx)
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 3 Jun 2002 11:38:03 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Amy Quattrocchi
Subject: Select Agent Registration Numbers
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Hello all,
My institution recently received its first Select Agent Registration
Number from the CDC. There has been some discussion in the
safety office about assignment of Registration Numbers to our
institution in the future--I hope that the list will help us put this
discussion to rest.
Will investigators who register select agent research on a completely
different project than our initially approved protocol be assigned their
own registration numbers?
Or, is the registration number we have just received a blanket
number for the whole institution? (I recognize that we must notify the
CDC of any new PIs, new agents, or new protocols as they pertain to
our existing registration number.)
Any insight into this question would be appreciated. Best regards,
Amy Quattrocchi
Health and Safety Specialist
Laboratory and Biological Safety
Rutgers Environmental Health and Safety
24 Street 1603
Building 4127 Livingston Campus
Piscataway, NJ 08854
Phone: 732/445-2550
Fax: 732/445-3109
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 3 Jun 2002 11:34:11 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "KLEIN, Jan"
Subject: Seeking recommendation for bench top autoclave
> Dear Biosafty Group:
>
> An investigator is planning to replace a table-top autoclave that has been
> unsatisfactory, but he is having trouble locating one that will
> accommodate his needs. The one he is replacing was selected based on its
> size, but evidently was designed more for dental office applications
> rather than waste from a BL3 facility where some runs at 121'C could last
> an hour. Their current system fails due to agar overflows and melts
> biohazard bags that touch the walls. Their current system just involves
> manually filling the autoclave with water for each load; the steam is
> released into the room and there is no drain. They may be able to remodel
> to provide plumbing (water inlet and drainage). A built-in wall unit is
> not an option. Any suggestions you have will be greatly appreciated.
>
> Please direct your responses directly to me (jklein@fpm.wisc.edu) rather
> than the whole list. If there is sufficient interest, I will provide a
> summary to the list.
>
> Thanks,
> Jan
> //
> Jan Klein
> Office of Biological Safety
> UW - Madison
> 608-263-9026
>
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 3 Jun 2002 11:06:32 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Therese M. Stinnett"
Subject: Re: Select Agent Registration Numbers
MIME-Version: 1.0
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It is my understanding that the Institution recieves a single =
registration
number. Therefore, it is NOT the PI's number. It should likely be =
kept
confidential by the RFO and only shared as absolutely necessary. It =
does
end up appearing on some paperwork with the EA 101 (I think that's the
ordering form number). And if you have geographically separated =
campuses
for one institution, each geographic location needs their individual
registration.
Therese M. Stinnett
Biosafety Officer
Health and Safety Division
UCHSC, Mailstop C275
4200 E. 9th Avenue
Denver, CO=A0 80262
Voice:=A0 303-315-6754
Pager:=A0 303-266-5402
Fax:=A0 303-315-8026
email:=A0 therese.stinnett@uchsc.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 3 Jun 2002 16:04:57 -0600
Reply-To: campbem@SLU.EDU
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: campbem
Subject: Re: Select Agent Registration Numbers
>Hi Amy,
Under the current Select Agent rule, you will receive one
registration number which represents your facilites
registration with the CDC's Select Agent program. This
covers the entire facility. The registration will be
amended to include additional agents as they added to your
facility. Please contact me if you have additional
questions.
Mark J. Campbell, M.S.
Biological Safety Officer
Saint Louis University
1402 S. Grand Blvd.
Caroline Bldg. Rm. 307
St. Louis, MO 63104
(314) 577-8608
campbem@slu.edu
Hello all,
>
> My institution recently received its first Select Agent
> Registration
> Number from the CDC. There has been some discussion in
> the
> safety office about assignment of Registration Numbers to
> our
> institution in the future--I hope that the list will help
> us put this
> discussion to rest.
>
> Will investigators who register select agent research on a
> completely
> different project than our initially approved protocol be
> assigned their
> own registration numbers?
>
> Or, is the registration number we have just received a
> blanket
> number for the whole institution? (I recognize that we
> must notify the
> CDC of any new PIs, new agents, or new protocols as they
> pertain to
> our existing registration number.)
>
> Any insight into this question would be appreciated. Best
> regards,
>
>
> Amy Quattrocchi
> Health and Safety Specialist
> Laboratory and Biological Safety
> Rutgers Environmental Health and Safety
> 24 Street 1603
> Building 4127 Livingston Campus
> Piscataway, NJ 08854
> Phone: 732/445-2550
> Fax: 732/445-3109
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 4 Jun 2002 10:58:32 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Cheryl L Hildreth
Subject: Legislative Alert from ASM on Bioterrorism Act HR3448
Mime-Version: 1.0
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Dr. Ronald Atlas, President of American Society of Microbiology and
Grad. Dean at the University of Louisville, sent me a draft copy of the
legislative alert that ASM just posted on Friday re: Public Health
Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness Act HR 3448 that congress passed
on 5/23/02. President Bush has indicated that he will sign it into law.
While the legislation appears reasonable, there is no way to tell what
we'll end up with in terms of regulations.
For those interested, the legislative alert prepared by ASM is
available at
Thanks,Cheri
Cheri Hildreth Watts, Director
Department of Environmental Health &Safety
University of Louisville
(502) 852-2954
e-mail: cheri.hildreth@louisville.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 4 Jun 2002 10:33:09 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Francis Cole
Subject: Re: Legislative Alert from ASM on Bioterrorism Act HR3448
Mime-Version: 1.0
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Does anyone have a site for the most recent Select Agent List?
Francis E. Cole
BSO
OCF
fcole@
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 4 Jun 2002 11:52:22 -0400
Reply-To: Vinita Kumar
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Vinita Kumar
Subject: Animal BSL 3
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; CHARSET=US-ASCII
A student wants to work on whole body exposure of mice to
aerosolized TB (within a small contained aerosol exposure
chamber; centrifuging of specimens; and the use of a
cryostat to cut infected tissue. Now would static
microisolator cage rack system or the ventilated cages be
better for containing BSL 3 TB bacteria inoculated into
mice?
Can a CryoJane be used to cut tissues which may release
infectious aerosols? Any comments would be useful.
Please reply at my email address.
Thanks.
----------------------------------------
Vinita Kumar
Email: Vinita.Kumar@Med.Nyu.Edu
"NYU Medical Center"
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 4 Jun 2002 12:35:57 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Norman, Randy"
Subject: Re: Legislative Alert from ASM on Bioterrorism Act HR3448
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
It seems to me to be a welcome improvement over and builds upon the
USAPATRIOT Act, which currently requires a lot of the same things covered in
HR 3448, but which lacks detail and makes no provisions for implementing
regulations. As many are aware, the Justice Department (FBI) has been
actively trying to enforce the USAPATRIOT Act, and everyone is trying to
meet the broad requirements in their own way.
For example, in regards to background checks: right now companies and
institutions are doing their own and praying they're doing it right, in
order to comply with the USAPATRIOT Act. Under this HR 3448, the Attorney
General will be doing it for you. Resulting in (one hopes) much less cost
and hassle for the regulated community.
Personally I think HR 3448 gives a very good amount of detail, when coupled
with the existing requirements of the USAPATRIOT Act. Though of course we'll
be watching to see exactly what we get in terms of regulations. I expect
that for most, one major concern has got to be exactly what winds up on the
select agent list.
Randy Norman
Safety Specialist Sr.
BioReliance Corporation
Rockville, MD 20850
Rnorman@
"Success is a journey, not a destination" - Ben Sweetland
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 4 Jun 2002 14:29:12 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: David Gillum
Subject: HR 3448
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Dear Biosafety Group,
Re: Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness Act, HR 3448
Does anyone know if researchers currently using select agents will have to
re-register their work with the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS)
under this new (proposed) law? If so, how soon will they need to register?
Thank you in advance!
--
David R. Gillum
Laboratory Safety Officer
Environmental Health and Safety
11 Leavitt Lane, Perpetuity Hall
Durham, NH 03824
Telephone #: 603-862-0197
Facsimile #: 603-862-0047
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 4 Jun 2002 12:34:14 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Therese M. Stinnett"
Subject: Re: HR 3448/re-registration
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
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it appears possession will now be covered, vs. transfer, under the old =
law
if you had possession but had not transfered you were exempt from
registration
those "grandfathered" under that rule, are no longer going to be
grandfathered
however, Secty DHHS has to make the rules and whether those will go =
thru the
extensive process of publication in the Federal Register, public =
comment,etc
remains to be seen
I believe it will be a very abbreviated public comment period if the =
process
is adhered to
(just my opinion, not that of my employer's)
Therese M. Stinnett
Biosafety Officer
Health and Safety Division
UCHSC, Mailstop C275
4200 E. 9th Avenue
Denver, CO=A0 80262
Voice:=A0 303-315-6754
Pager:=A0 303-266-5402
Fax:=A0 303-315-8026
email:=A0 therese.stinnett@uchsc.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2002 08:43:50 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Carolyn Keierleber
Subject: Sterne strain
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Hello again,
I promised to post results from my little survey. I asked if anyone uses
the B. anthracis Sterne strain at BSL-1 and, if so, what was the rationale
used in the risk assessment.
There were 7 responses. All use this strain at BSL-2. Various reasons
were given. Some of these were 1) Bacillus anthracis is such a buzz word -
scary PR, 2) it would be trigger a positive in a PCR test, 3) the
institution that sent it to them required it, 4) it could possibly revert
(remote chance).
One responder's IBC considers it a risk group one agent but they use it at
biosafety level 2.
It has never been shown to cause disease in humans but BSL-2 seems to be
the standard.
Well, anyway, I can think of some other reasons such as 1) it IS infectious
for humans, AND spores probably germinate, just does not cause disease, and
2) plasmid transfer possibilities.
Thanks to all who responded. Carolyn
Carolyn Keierleber, Ph.D.
Associate Director & Biosafety Officer
Environmental Health & Safety
Scripps Research Institute (TSRI)
Mail Code BCC 078
La Jolla, CA 92037
Phone: 858 784-8240
Fax: 858 784-8490
--=====================_692554609==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
Hello again,
I promised to post results from my little survey. I asked if anyone uses the B. anthracis Sterne strain at BSL-1 and, if so, what was the rationale used in the risk assessment.
There were 7 responses. All use this strain at BSL-2. Various reasons were given. Some of these were 1) Bacillus anthracis is such a buzz word - scary PR, 2) it would be trigger a positive in a PCR test, 3) the institution that sent it to them required it, 4) it could possibly revert (remote chance).
One responder's IBC considers it a risk group one agent but they use it at biosafety level 2.
It has never been shown to cause disease in humans but BSL-2 seems to be the standard.
Well, anyway, I can think of some other reasons such as 1) it IS infectious for humans, AND spores probably germinate, just does not cause disease, and 2) plasmid transfer possibilities.
Thanks to all who responded. Carolyn
Carolyn Keierleber, Ph.D.
Associate Director & Biosafety Officer
Environmental Health & Safety
Scripps Research Institute (TSRI)
Mail Code BCC 078
La Jolla, CA 92037
Phone: 858 784-8240
Fax: 858 784-8490
--=====================_692554609==_.ALT--
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2002 11:54:18 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Don Callihan
Subject: Re: Sterne strain
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
Content-transfer-encoding: quoted-printable
Carolyn ... and colleagues,
In my opinion, this question falls under the category of protecting pro=
duct
and the environment more than safe personal protection. I suggest this
strain should be handled at BSL-2 in a biosafety cabinet to prevent
contamination of other cultures and the environment by spores. It's the=
same with Bacillus stearothermophilus or other Bacillus species. Cultur=
e of
any Bacillus species using BSL-2 containment in a BSC is good laborator=
y
practice in the research and teaching laboratory. The other public heal=
th
perception, false positive PCR, and environmental control support this
level of practice.
Thanks for putting together the survey. It's always good to know what i=
s
actually happening in the "real world".
Best wishes,
Don Callihan, Ph.D.
Senior Clinical Microbiologist and Biosafety Officer
BD Diagnostic Systems
7 Loveton Circle MC924
Sparks, MD 21152
410-773-6684
Carolyn Keierleber @MITVMA.MIT.EDU> on 06/05/2002
11:43:50 AM
Please respond to A Biosafety Discussion List =
Sent by: A Biosafety Discussion List
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
cc:
Subject: Sterne strain
Hello again,
I promised to post results from my little survey.=A0 I asked if anyone =
uses
the B. anthracis Sterne strain at BSL-1 and, if so, what was the ration=
ale
used in the risk assessment.
There were 7 responses.=A0 All use this strain at BSL-2.=A0 Various rea=
sons
were given.=A0 Some of these were 1) Bacillus anthracis is such a buzz =
word -
scary PR, 2) it would be trigger a positive in a PCR test, 3) the
institution that sent it to them required it, 4) it could possibly reve=
rt
(remote chance).
One responder's IBC considers it a risk group one agent but they use it=
at
biosafety level 2.
It has never been shown to cause disease in humans but BSL-2 seems to b=
e
the standard.
Well, anyway, I can think of some other reasons such as 1) it IS infect=
ious
for humans, AND spores probably germinate, just does not cause disease,=
and
2) plasmid transfer possibilities.
Thanks to all who responded. Carolyn
Carolyn Keierleber, Ph.D.
Associate Director & Biosafety Officer
Environmental Health & Safety
Scripps Research Institute (TSRI)
Mail Code BCC 078
La Jolla, CA 92037
Phone: 858 784-8240
Fax: 858 784-8490
=
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2002 10:49:01 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Stefan Wagener
Subject: Re: Sterne strain
Mime-Version: 1.0
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Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
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Thanks for the summary!
Stefan
Carolyn Keierleber on 2002-06-05 10:43:50 AM
Please respond to A Biosafety Discussion List
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
cc: (bcc: Stefan Wagener/HC-SC/GC/CA)
Subject: Sterne strain
Hello again,
I promised to post results from my little survey. I asked if anyone uses
the B. anthracis Sterne strain at BSL-1 and, if so, what was the rationale
used in the risk assessment.
There were 7 responses. All use this strain at BSL-2. Various reasons
were given. Some of these were 1) Bacillus anthracis is such a buzz word -
scary PR, 2) it would be trigger a positive in a PCR test, 3) the
institution that sent it to them required it, 4) it could possibly revert
(remote chance).
One responder's IBC considers it a risk group one agent but they use it at
biosafety level 2.
It has never been shown to cause disease in humans but BSL-2 seems to be
the standard.
Well, anyway, I can think of some other reasons such as 1) it IS infectious
for humans, AND spores probably germinate, just does not cause disease, and
2) plasmid transfer possibilities.
Thanks to all who responded. Carolyn
Carolyn Keierleber, Ph.D.
Associate Director & Biosafety Officer
Environmental Health & Safety
Scripps Research Institute (TSRI)
Mail Code BCC 078
La Jolla, CA 92037
Phone: 858 784-8240
Fax: 858 784-8490
--0__=j2FHWuVX415L0ufCynfaMO5iscHURmRB62xzG7ElJDwBDUGev3qP3B8v
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Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2002 18:35:09 +0200
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Peter Mani
Subject: Re: Sterne strain
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
sorry for my mistake.
Wanted to mail to Stefan only
Peter
Dr. Peter Mani______________________tecrisk GmbH
POB 298,3047 Bremgarten______________SWITZERLAND
phone:+41-31-305 53 83_________ tecrisk@smile.ch
fax:+41-31-305 53 84_____________
mobile:+41-079 675 05 81__________biorisk.ch
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2002 18:33:45 +0200
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Peter Mani
Subject: visit
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Hallo Stefan
Habe dir Ende Mai ein mail geschickt betr. m=F6glichem Besuch in Woche 39=
=2E
Ist vermutlich bei dir im Stress des Kurses den du geg. hast in
Winnipeg, untergegangen. Hast du das mail noch?
Es geht darum, dass ich vorsondieren m=F6chte ob ein Besuch mit
Ingenieuren in W. 39 m=F6glich w=E4re.
Mit freundlichen Gr=FCssen
P,
Dr. Peter Mani______________________tecrisk GmbH
POB 298,3047 Bremgarten______________SWITZERLAND
phone:+41-31-305 53 83_________ tecrisk@smile.ch
fax:+41-31-305 53 84_____________
mobile:+41-079 675 05 81__________biorisk.ch
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2002 09:49:28 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Snyder_Sam
Subject: Re: Sterne strain
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Du sind verziehen!
Sam S. Snyder Ph.D.
Risk Management Coordinator
Risk Management Services
Division of Business Operations
Business Phone: (562) 803-8297
Business Fax: (562) 940-1898
-----Original Message-----
From: Peter Mani [mailto:tecrisk@SMILE.CH]
Sent: Wednesday, June 05, 2002 11:35 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Sterne strain
sorry for my mistake.
Wanted to mail to Stefan only
Peter
Dr. Peter Mani______________________tecrisk GmbH
POB 298,3047 Bremgarten______________SWITZERLAND
phone:+41-31-305 53 83_________ tecrisk@smile.ch
fax:+41-31-305 53 84_____________
mobile:+41-079 675 05 81__________biorisk.ch
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2002 12:09:29 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Morgan Margaret-AMM076
Subject: BSL 2 lab advice required
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Hello everyone,
We are working with human blood, and our biohazard area has been moved. In
our new location, the room we are in is under slight positive pressure, to
prevent amplicon contamination from the adjacent room. Blood work is
infrequent and is carried out in a Class II Type A safety hood, not on the
bench. We do not carry out procedures which are likely to produce
aerosolization. Do you think this set up is OK? It's the slight positive
pressure of the room that I am worried about - is this OK for a room in
which BSL2 work is carried out in a safety hood?
Margaret Morgan,
Senior Scientist,
Motorola Life Sciences,
Pasadena CA.
=========================================================================
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2002 19:56:50 +0200
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Peter Mani
Subject: Re: Sterne strain
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Snyder_Sam wrote:
> Du sind verziehen!
Wow, first american I know who speaks some german.
What's a Risk Management Coordinator?
Sounds interesting.
regards, P.
Dr. Peter Mani______________________tecrisk GmbH
POB 298,3047 Bremgarten______________SWITZERLAND
phone:+41-31-305 53 83_________ tecrisk@smile.ch
fax:+41-31-305 53 84_____________
mobile:+41-079 675 05 81__________biorisk.ch
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2002 10:54:30 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Snyder_Sam
Subject: Re: Sterne strain
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
My Father is German. I am in charge of all environmental health and =
safety,
emergency management, threat assessment and assist the Risk Manager in
placing insurance.
>Sam
Sam S. Snyder Ph.D.
Risk Management Coordinator
Risk Management Services
Division of Business Operations
Business Phone: (562) 803-8297
Business Fax: (562) 940-1898
-----Original Message-----
From: Peter Mani [mailto:tecrisk@SMILE.CH]
Sent: Wednesday, June 05, 2002 12:57 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Sterne strain
Snyder_Sam wrote:
> Du sind verziehen!
Wow, first american I know who speaks some german.
What's a Risk Management Coordinator?
Sounds interesting.
regards, P.
Dr. Peter Mani______________________tecrisk GmbH
POB 298,3047 Bremgarten______________SWITZERLAND
phone:+41-31-305 53 83_________ tecrisk@smile.ch
fax:+41-31-305 53 84_____________
mobile:+41-079 675 05 81__________biorisk.ch
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2002 20:09:00 +0200
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Peter Mani
Subject: Re: Sterne strain
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
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Having seen, that everybody makes the same stupid mistake like me I am
wondering whether it would not be appropriate to change the Reply-To of
the list to the sender instead of to the list. As a risk analyst it
seems to me the risk of boring a whole group would be far less than the
other way where only one member would be bored to get the same message
twice after the sender regonzizes the mistake which happens always when
seeing the message "..has been sent to..."
Just a proposal.
P.
Dr. Peter Mani______________________tecrisk GmbH
POB 298,3047 Bremgarten______________SWITZERLAND
phone:+41-31-305 53 83_________ tecrisk@smile.ch
fax:+41-31-305 53 84_____________
mobile:+41-079 675 05 81__________biorisk.ch
=========================================================================
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2002 13:31:29 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Kyle Boyett
Subject: Re: BSL 2 lab advice required
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
In my opinion in day to day operations this does not appear to be a problem,
however, what would happen to aerosols generated by a spill of this material
outside the confines of controlled air environment of the BSC. Obviously, we
are charged with viewing worst case scenarios more often than not and
therefore would need to consider this in making our decisions. I think that
any positive pressure relationship relative to an area where contamination
could cause problems would be disastrous. Perhaps your engineering group
could adjust the balancing of the air in that area and achieve a more
desirable pressure differential. As you mentioned, it is only slightly
positive and that would lead me to believe that this change could probably
be accomplished relatively easily. Hope this helps.
Kyle G. Boyett
Asst. Director of Biosafety
Safety Short Distribution List Administrator
University of Alabama @ Birmingham
Department of Occupational Health and Safety
933 South 19th Street Suite 445
Birmingham, Alabama 35294
Phone: 205.934.9181
Fax: 205.934.7487
Visit our WEB site at: healthsafe.uab.edu
Asking me to overlook a safety violation is like asking me to reduce the
value I place on YOUR life
-----Original Message-----
From: Morgan Margaret-AMM076 [mailto:Peggy@]
Sent: Wednesday, June 05, 2002 11:09 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: BSL 2 lab advice required
Hello everyone,
We are working with human blood, and our biohazard area has been moved. In
our new location, the room we are in is under slight positive pressure, to
prevent amplicon contamination from the adjacent room. Blood work is
infrequent and is carried out in a Class II Type A safety hood, not on the
bench. We do not carry out procedures which are likely to produce
aerosolization. Do you think this set up is OK? It's the slight positive
pressure of the room that I am worried about - is this OK for a room in
which BSL2 work is carried out in a safety hood?
Margaret Morgan,
Senior Scientist,
Motorola Life Sciences,
Pasadena CA.
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2002 16:50:58 -0500
Reply-To: speaker@ehs.psu.edu
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Curt Speaker
Organization: UNIVERSITY SAFETY
Subject: bacteria in air?
Good afternoon:
A VERY broad question for the group...(I'm not even sure this is the
right group, but...)
I was asked today to list the most common bacteria that we would
anticipate finding in indoor building air (under normal conditions). I
do a fair bit of IAQ work, and took an independent study course to
learn to identify the common molds/fungi in indoor air, but I don't
even know where to begin with this question.
Does anyone know the dozen or so most common bacteria found in
indoor air, or know a resource that I could check to find such a list?
I have already scoured the EPA IAQ page, but found little that I
didn't already know.
Any help would be most appreciated.
TIA
Curt
Curt Speaker
Biosafety Officer
Penn State University
Environmental Health and Safety
speaker@ehs.psu.edu
^...^
(O_O)
=(Y)=
"""
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2002 14:50:20 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Sue Quinn
Subject: lab chairs with arms??
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I have had an ergonomist suggest a lab chair with arms for one of my lab =
people. Has anyone seen this? Can you recommend a vendor? Quick web =
searches have yielded many lab chairs and many ergo chairs with arms, =
but none with both.
Thanks-
Sue
Suzanne M. Quinn
Manager, Environmental Health and Safety
Exelixis, Inc.
PO Box 511
South San Francisco, CA 94083-0511
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I have had an ergonomist suggest a lab = chair with arms for one of my lab people. Has anyone seen this? Can you = recommend a vendor? Quick web searches have yielded many lab = chairs and many ergo chairs with arms, but none with both.
Thanks-
Sue
Suzanne M. Quinn
Manager, = Environmental Health and Safety
Exelixis, Inc.
PO Box 511
South San Francisco, = CA 94083-0511
------=_NextPart_000_0BF2_01C20CA0.50ADBFE0--
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 6 Jun 2002 13:46:58 +0200
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Sullivan Christine
Subject: Re: lab chairs with arms??
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Hello Sue,
Try < > I've been ordering
mouse caddy's for keyboard trays from this company and was just told about
these chairs last week... Don't know anything more about them other than
looking around on their website briefly - they look great.
Christine
-----Original Message-----
From: Sue Quinn [mailto:squinn@]
Sent: Wednesday, June 05, 2002 5:50 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: lab chairs with arms??
I have had an ergonomist suggest a lab chair with arms for one of my lab
people. Has anyone seen this? Can you recommend a vendor? Quick web
searches have yielded many lab chairs and many ergo chairs with arms, but
none with both.
Thanks-
Sue
Suzanne M. Quinn
Manager, Environmental Health and Safety
Exelixis, Inc.
PO Box 511
South San Francisco, CA 94083-0511
---------------------------------------------------------
Legal Notice: This electronic mail and its attachments are intended solely
for the person(s) to whom they are addressed and contain information which
is confidential or otherwise protected from disclosure, except for the
purpose they are intended to. Dissemination, distribution, or reproduction
by anyone other than their intended recipients is prohibited and may be
illegal. If you are not an intended recipient, please immediately inform the
sender and send him/her back the present e-mail and its attachments and
destroy any copies which may be in your possession.
---------------------------------------------------------
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 6 Jun 2002 08:26:50 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Faison, Brendlyn"
Subject: Re: bacteria in air?
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
the right people to ask are the guys at american type culture collection
(), tho the answer isn't in the "faq" link. they also
have a special "biosafety" section; mostly it's for their shipping
procedures (w/ a link to absa). or check
(ask timothy paustian, the
webmaster).
i personally would guess fungi (penicillium, aspergillus, and mucor spp.)
and bacteria (micrococcus, pseudomonas, and bacillus spp., and maybe
actinomycetes). can't give you relative concentrations; but probably more
fungi than bacteria, if you count individual propagules. most of these bugs
are nonpathogenic, except maybe to the immunocompromised (including
otherwise "normal" people outside the 15-45 yr age group).
if you get better info, pls send to the listserv? thx.
|-----Original Message-----
|From: Curt Speaker [mailto:SPEAKER@SAFETY-1.SAFETY.PSU.EDU]
|Sent: Wednesday, 05 June 2002 5:51 PM
|To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
|Subject: bacteria in air?
|
|
|Good afternoon:
|
|A VERY broad question for the group...(I'm not even sure this is the
|right group, but...)
|
|I was asked today to list the most common bacteria that we would
|anticipate finding in indoor building air (under normal conditions). I
|do a fair bit of IAQ work, and took an independent study course to
|learn to identify the common molds/fungi in indoor air, but I don't
|even know where to begin with this question.
|
|Does anyone know the dozen or so most common bacteria found in
|indoor air, or know a resource that I could check to find such a list?
|I have already scoured the EPA IAQ page, but found little that I
|didn't already know.
|
|Any help would be most appreciated.
|
|TIA
|
|Curt
|Curt Speaker
|Biosafety Officer
|Penn State University
|Environmental Health and Safety
|speaker@ehs.psu.edu
|
|^...^
|(O_O)
|=(Y)=
| """
|
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 6 Jun 2002 10:40:39 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Brenda Barry
Subject: Re: bacteria in air?
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Curt,
I could suggest that you refer to an ACGIH publication, Bioaerosols
Assessment and Control. Chapter 18 by James Otten and Harriet Burge is on
bacteria.
Brenda
Brenda E. Barry, Ph.D.
Senior Associate
Environmental Health & Engineering, Inc.
60 Wells Avenue
Newton, MA 02459
Phone: 617-964-8550
FAX: 617-964-8556
Web Site:
> ----------
> From: Curt Speaker[SMTP:SPEAKER@SAFETY-1.SAFETY.PSU.EDU]
> Sent: Wednesday, June 05, 2002 5:50 PM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: bacteria in air?
>
> Good afternoon:
>
> A VERY broad question for the group...(I'm not even sure this is the
> right group, but...)
>
> I was asked today to list the most common bacteria that we would
> anticipate finding in indoor building air (under normal conditions). I
> do a fair bit of IAQ work, and took an independent study course to
> learn to identify the common molds/fungi in indoor air, but I don't
> even know where to begin with this question.
>
> Does anyone know the dozen or so most common bacteria found in
> indoor air, or know a resource that I could check to find such a list?
> I have already scoured the EPA IAQ page, but found little that I
> didn't already know.
>
> Any help would be most appreciated.
>
> TIA
>
> Curt
> Curt Speaker
> Biosafety Officer
> Penn State University
> Environmental Health and Safety
> speaker@ehs.psu.edu
>
> ^...^
> (O_O)
> =(Y)=
> """
>
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 6 Jun 2002 13:49:00 EDT
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ed Krisiunas
Subject: Public Health Dispatch: Update: Cutaneous Anthrax in a Laboratory
Worker
MIME-Version: 1.0
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Public Health Dispatch: Update: Cutaneous Anthrax in a Laboratory Worker ---
Texas, 2002
MMWR June 7, 2002
Edward Krisiunas, MT(ASCP), CIC, MPH
President
WNWN International
PO Box 1164
Burlington, Connecticut
06013
860-675-1217
860-675-1311(fax)
860-944-2373(mobile)
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Public Health Dispatch: Update: Cutaneous Anthrax in a Laboratory Worker ---
Texas, 2002
MMWR June 7, 2002
Edward Krisiunas, MT(ASCP), CIC, MPH
President
WNWN International
PO Box 1164
Burlington, Connecticut
06013
860-675-1217
860-675-1311(fax)
860-944-2373(mobile)
--part1_9.290ef78b.2a30fa8c_boundary--
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 7 Jun 2002 11:02:40 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Dade, Aurali"
Subject: Ducting BSC
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
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Content-Type: text/plain
Hello All,
I am wondering if anyone can recommend a contractor in the SW United
States that has experience with ducting Biological Safety Cabinets. We are
having difficulty finding local contractors that know what a BSC is & how
they need to duct one. Any contacts are appreciated.
Aurali Dade
Laboratory Safety Manager
TTUHSC Safety Services
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Hello All,
I am wondering if anyone can recommend a contractor in the SW United States that has experience with ducting Biological Safety Cabinets. We are having difficulty finding local contractors that know what a BSC is & how they need to duct one. Any contacts are appreciated.
Aurali Dade
Laboratory Safety Manager
TTUHSC Safety Services
------_=_NextPart_001_01C20E3C.C018C2B0--
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 7 Jun 2002 11:20:11 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Kyle Boyett
Subject: Re: Ducting BSC
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="----_=_NextPart_001_01C20E3F.32D8C230"
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this format, some or all of this message may not be legible.
------_=_NextPart_001_01C20E3F.32D8C230
Content-Type: text/plain
Aurali, In my experience it's not so much the contractor that's the ticket
but the engineer to design the system. Just about any commercial HVAC
contractor can run the duct and install the fan set. The trick is finding an
engineer that can size the duct as well as the fan set and make sure local
codes are adhered to. You may want to check with Jack Kelly in Texas for
some information. He is the Director of Environmental Health and Safety at
SW Foundation Biomedical Research. His number is 210-258-9473. Hope this
helps.
Kyle G. Boyett
Asst. Director of Biosafety
Safety Short Distribution List Administrator
University of Alabama @ Birmingham
Department of Occupational Health and Safety
933 South 19th Street Suite 445
Birmingham, Alabama 35294
Phone: 205.934.9181
Fax: 205.934.7487
Visit our WEB site at: healthsafe.uab.edu
Asking me to overlook a safety violation is like asking me to reduce the
value I place on YOUR life
-----Original Message-----
From: Dade, Aurali [mailto:Aurali.Dade@TTMC.TTUHSC.EDU]
Sent: Friday, June 07, 2002 10:03 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Ducting BSC
Hello All,
I am wondering if anyone can recommend a contractor in the SW United
States that has experience with ducting Biological Safety Cabinets. We are
having difficulty finding local contractors that know what a BSC is & how
they need to duct one. Any contacts are appreciated.
Aurali Dade
Laboratory Safety Manager
TTUHSC Safety Services
------_=_NextPart_001_01C20E3F.32D8C230
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xmlns:w=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:word" = xmlns:st1=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags" = xmlns=3D"">
Aurali, In my experience it's not so much the contractor that's the ticket but the engineer to design the system. Just about any commercial HVAC contractor can run = the duct and install the fan set. The trick is finding an engineer that can = size the duct as well as the fan set and make sure local codes are adhered = to. You may want to check with Jack Kelly in = Texas for some information. He is the Director of Environmental = Health and Safety at SW Foundation Biomedical Research. His number is = 210-258-9473. Hope this helps.
=
Kyle G. Boyett
Asst. Director of Biosafety
Safety Short Distribution List Administrator
University of Alabama @ Birmingham
Department of Occupational Health and Safety
933 South 19th Street Suite 445
Birmingham, Alabama 35294
Phone: 205.934.9181
Fax: 205.934.7487
Visit our WEB site at: healthsafe.uab.edu
Asking me to overlook a safety violation is like asking me to = reduce the value I place on YOUR life
-----Original = Message-----
From: Dade, Aurali [mailto:Aurali.Dade@TTMC.TTUHSC.EDU]
Sent: Friday, June 07, 2002 10:03 = AM
To: = BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Ducting = BSC
Hello = All,
I am wondering if = anyone can recommend a contractor in the SW United States that has experience with = ducting Biological Safety Cabinets. We are having difficulty finding = local contractors that know what a BSC is & how they need to duct = one. Any contacts are appreciated.
Aurali = Dade
Laboratory Safety = Manager
TTUHSC Safety = Services
------_=_NextPart_001_01C20E3F.32D8C230--
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 7 Jun 2002 10:41:40 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Elizabeth Smith
Subject: out door risk assessment for bio
In-Reply-To:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Good Day,
I got a phone call from a firm, which does environmental
assessments who I interact with a few years back. They have a
client in Michigan who, in our jargon, needs (wants? asked for?)
a risk assessment in order to further develop a piece of
property. The property previously housed a slaughter house,
which is no longer present, having been torn down about 18 years
ago. As far as anyone knows, the place only slaughtered beef.
Due to the recent media attention, the client (or perhaps the
local government?) is concerned about the potential for the
presence of Bacillus anthracis in the soil, due to the previous
use of the land (slaughtering cattle).
The firm wants a short (1 page) synopsis of the risk.
I told them that they should simply ask for a risk assessment,
and not focus on B. anthracis, since that isn't the only
potentially hazardous microorganism associated with
agri-business. However, my experience in performing risk
assessments for biological issues has to date been limited to
the industrial/laboratory applications, not the great outdoors.
Would you be able to recommend somone, an individual or a firm,
which could provide this service? Maybe someone in the USDA or
an Ag-related company who does this? The concern is that the
person who performs the risk assessment be qualified to do it.
If all else fails, I am willing to do it for them - but I can't
do it "on the job", and without professional liability
insurance, I'm not willing to do it "on my own time".
As always, thank you
Elizabeth
=====
Elizabeth Smith
Environmental, Health & Safety Manager
BioPort Corporation
3500 N. Martin L. King Blvd.
Lansing, MI 48906
__________________________________________________
Do You Yahoo!?
Yahoo! - Official partner of 2002 FIFA World Cup
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 7 Jun 2002 11:37:46 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Karen E.S. Shaw"
Subject: Re: Ducting BSC
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
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boundary="=====================_470137328==_.ALT"
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Aurali,
I had terrible experiences with our ducted 100% exhaust BSCs. I second Kyle's
comments, the contractor can duct it - no problem, and, in our case, air
balancing was fine too. However, our exhaust fan/drive shaft was undersized
(just enough is not enough - give yourself some "breathing" room), even though
they had all the equipment information when they designed the system. We still
had problems after beefing up the system which were finally resolved when we
got all the players in one BSL3 room. The players were: our facilities
ventilation control staff (who maintain our facility), Technical Safety
Services (who certify the BSCs) and the Phoenix Control Corp (airflow control
system). We have not had a problem since. My point is that you need more than
the contractor - make sure the subs are in on the deal, as well as the company
who will certify your BSCs.
For example, the air sub-contractor (heating/cooling etc - not Phoenix - they
know the difference between a fume hood and a BSC!!) drilled holes into the BSC
- to mount some conduit - fortunately in a place that was okay (Baker
thankfully still honored our warranty).
Phoenix Controls' website is:
I don't know if TSS is in the SW - they seem to be San Francisco area
company(?): 510-845-5591. Whoever you use now for certification would probably
work.
Good luck, Karen
At 11:02 AM 6/7/02 -0500, you wrote:
>
> Hello All,
> I am wondering if anyone can recommend a contractor in the SW United States
> that has experience with ducting Biological Safety Cabinets. We are having
> difficulty finding local contractors that know what a BSC is & how they need
> to duct one. Any contacts are appreciated.
> Aurali Dade
> Laboratory Safety Manager
> TTUHSC Safety Services
Karen E.S. Shaw
Center for Comparative Medicine
County Rd 98 and Hutchison Dr
University of California, Davis
Davis, CA 95616
(530) 752-1561
(530) 752-7914
Facilities Coordinator
kesshaw@ucdavis.edu
--=====================_470137328==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
Aurali,
I had terrible experiences with our ducted 100% exhaust BSCs. I second Kyle's comments, the contractor can duct it - no problem, and, in our case, air balancing was fine too. However, our exhaust fan/drive shaft was undersized (just enough is not enough - give yourself some "breathing" room), even though they had all the equipment information when they designed the system. We still had problems after beefing up the system which were finally resolved when we got all the players in one BSL3 room. The players were: our facilities ventilation control staff (who maintain our facility), Technical Safety Services (who certify the BSCs) and the Phoenix Control Corp (airflow control system). We have not had a problem since. My point is that you need more than the contractor - make sure the subs are in on the deal, as well as the company who will certify your BSCs.
For example, the air sub-contractor (heating/cooling etc - not Phoenix - they know the difference between a fume hood and a BSC!!) drilled holes into the BSC - to mount some conduit - fortunately in a place that was okay (Baker thankfully still honored our warranty).
Phoenix Controls' website is:
I don't know if TSS is in the SW - they seem to be San Francisco area company(?): 510-845-5591. Whoever you use now for certification would probably work.
Good luck, Karen
At 11:02 AM 6/7/02 -0500, you wrote:
Hello All,
I am wondering if anyone can recommend a contractor in the SW United States that has experience with ducting Biological Safety Cabinets. We are having difficulty finding local contractors that know what a BSC is & how they need to duct one. Any contacts are appreciated.
Aurali Dade
Laboratory Safety Manager
TTUHSC Safety Services
Karen E.S. Shaw
Center for Comparative Medicine
County Rd 98 and Hutchison Dr
University of California, Davis
Davis, CA 95616
(530) 752-1561
(530) 752-7914
Facilities Coordinator
kesshaw@ucdavis.edu
--=====================_470137328==_.ALT--
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 7 Jun 2002 14:32:08 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Therese M. Stinnett"
Subject: Re: out door risk assessment for bio
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
That really sounds more like a due diligence environmental survey (I =
think
the EPA website has info) It would be prudent to look at what their =
local
zoning/planning requires as well. May need to look for contamination =
by
PCBs, asbestos, etc. And there are firms that specialize in those =
kinds of
surveys.
Therese M. Stinnett
Biosafety Officer
Health and Safety Division
UCHSC, Mailstop C275
4200 E. 9th Avenue
Denver, CO=A0 80262
Voice:=A0 303-315-6754
Pager:=A0 303-266-5402
Fax:=A0 303-315-8026
email:=A0 therese.stinnett@uchsc.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 11 Jun 2002 08:40:31 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Pitts, Jonathan"
Subject: Biological Waste
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="windows-1252"
Hello All,
Can anyone point me to Federal or State (specifically Massachusetts)
regulations for the short term storage of biological waste that has been
decontaminated? We have a service to dispose of the waste, but I am curious
about the best way to store it prior to pick-up.
Thanks for the help.
Jon
Jonathan Pitts Ph.D.
MediSpectra Inc.
45 Hartwell Ave.
Lexington, MA 02421
Tel: (781) 372-2300 x354
Direct Tel. Line: (781) 372-2354
Fax: (781) 674-0002
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 11 Jun 2002 09:39:35 EDT
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Ira F. Salkin"
Subject: Re: Biological Waste
MIME-Version: 1.0
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Jon:
I would suggest that you contact Howard Wensley who is the individual
responsible for medical/biological waste in your state. He can be reached at
howard.wensley@state.ma.us.
Good luck.
Ira
Ira F. Salkin, Ph.D., F(AAM)
Information From Science, LLC
P.O. Box 408
West Sand Lake, NY 12196
Voice/Fax - 518-674-1713
Cellphone - 518-791-7969
E-Mail - irasalkin@
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Jon:
I would suggest that you contact Howard Wensley who is the individual responsible for medical/biological waste in your state. He can be reached at howard.wensley@state.ma.us.
Good luck.
Ira
Ira F. Salkin, Ph.D., F(AAM)
Information From Science, LLC
P.O. Box 408
West Sand Lake, NY 12196
Voice/Fax - 518-674-1713
Cellphone - 518-791-7969
E-Mail - irasalkin@
--part1_1bf.43cf6ec.2a375797_boundary--
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 11 Jun 2002 09:55:43 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Burnett, LouAnn Crawford"
Subject: new DOT security proposal?
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Last Friday (6/7/02), I became aware of a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
by the Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA) of the US
Department of Transportation called "Hazardous Materials: Security
Requirements for Offerors and Transporters of Hazardous Materials". It
was published on May 2 in the Federal Register (67 Fed Reg 22028). Oh
yeah - the comment period ended June 3.
Among other things, it would require persons who offer or transport
infectious substances listed as select agents by the CDC to develop and
implement written plans to assure the security of hazardous materials
shipments. Also anyone needing a security plan is required to add that
to their HazMat training and train all HazMat employees within 3 months
of the final rule. [There are other HazMat categories that fall into
this as well - I mainly focused on biologicals.] They estimate that it
will take one hour (!) to provide the security part of the training.
Is anyone out there more informed on this? Did anyone submit comments?
Seems like there's a big difference in a security plan between a 10 mL
vial of infectious substance via FedEx and a truckload of something
else. They mention a Risk Management Self-Evaluation Framework that is
available on their website - I haven't gone to that yet - perhaps that
will help, but I'm skeptical.
LouAnn
LouAnn C. Burnett, MS, CBSP
Biosafety Program Manager & Biological Safety Officer
Vanderbilt University Environmental Health & Safety
Nashville, Tennessee
615/322-0927 (direct & voice mail)
615/343-4951 (fax)
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 11 Jun 2002 10:12:25 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Burnett, LouAnn Crawford"
Subject: Re: new DOT security proposal?
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Quick update - I did just find out that the ABSA Technical Review
Committee has prepared comments on this - when they are released they'll
be posted on the ABSA website (). Bill Homovec, the chair
of that committee, also tells me that the comment period may have been
extended.
LouAnn
LouAnn C. Burnett, MS, CBSP
Biosafety Program Manager & Biological Safety Officer
Vanderbilt University Environmental Health & Safety
Nashville, Tennessee
615/322-0927 (direct & voice mail)
615/343-4951 (fax)
-----Original Message-----
From: Burnett, LouAnn Crawford
Sent: Tuesday, June 11, 2002 9:56 AM
To: 'A Biosafety Discussion List'
Subject: new DOT security proposal?
=09
=09
Last Friday (6/7/02), I became aware of a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking by the Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA) of
the US Department of Transportation called "Hazardous Materials:
Security Requirements for Offerors and Transporters of Hazardous
Materials". It was published on May 2 in the Federal Register (67 Fed
Reg 22028). Oh yeah - the comment period ended June 3.
Among other things, it would require persons who offer or
transport infectious substances listed as select agents by the CDC to
develop and implement written plans to assure the security of hazardous
materials shipments. Also anyone needing a security plan is required to
add that to their HazMat training and train all HazMat employees within
3 months of the final rule. [There are other HazMat categories that fall
into this as well - I mainly focused on biologicals.] They estimate
that it will take one hour (!) to provide the security part of the
training.
Is anyone out there more informed on this? Did anyone submit
comments? Seems like there's a big difference in a security plan
between a 10 mL vial of infectious substance via FedEx and a truckload
of something else. They mention a Risk Management Self-Evaluation
Framework that is available on their website - I haven't gone to that
yet - perhaps that will help, but I'm skeptical.
LouAnn
LouAnn C. Burnett, MS, CBSP
Biosafety Program Manager & Biological Safety Officer
Vanderbilt University Environmental Health & Safety
Nashville, Tennessee
615/322-0927 (direct & voice mail)
615/343-4951 (fax)
=09
=09
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Quick update - I did just find out that the ABSA Technical Review Committee = has prepared comments on this - when they are released they'll be = posted on the ABSA website (). = Bill Homovec, the chair of that committee, also tells me that the comment = period may have been extended.
LouAnn
LouAnn C. Burnett, MS, CBSP
Biosafety Program Manager = & Biological Safety Officer
Vanderbilt University = Environmental Health & Safety
Nashville, Tennessee
615/322-0927 (direct = & voice mail)
615/343-4951 (fax)
-----Original Message-----
From: = Burnett, LouAnn Crawford
Sent: Tuesday, June 11, 2002 9:56 AM
To: = 'A Biosafety Discussion List'
Subject: new DOT security proposal?
Last Friday (6/7/02), I became aware of a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking by = the Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA) of the US = Department of Transportation called "Hazardous Materials: Security = Requirements for Offerors and Transporters of Hazardous Materials". It was = published on May 2 in the Federal Register (67 Fed Reg 22028). Oh yeah - the = comment period ended June 3.
Among other things, it would require persons who offer or = transport infectious substances listed as select agents by the CDC to develop = and implement written plans to assure the security of hazardous materials shipments. Also anyone needing a security plan is required to = add that to their HazMat training and train all HazMat employees within 3 = months of the final rule. [There are other HazMat categories that fall into this as = well - I mainly focused on biologicals.] They estimate that it will take = one hour (!) to provide the security part of the training.
Is anyone out there more informed on this? Did anyone submit comments? Seems like there's a big difference in a security plan = between a 10 mL vial of infectious substance via FedEx and a truckload of = something else. They mention a Risk Management Self-Evaluation Framework = that is available on their website - I haven't gone to that yet - perhaps that = will help, but I'm skeptical.
LouAnn
LouAnn C. Burnett, MS, CBSP
Biosafety Program = Manager & Biological Safety Officer
Vanderbilt University = Environmental Health & Safety
Nashville, Tennessee
615/322-0927 (direct = & voice mail)
615/343-4951 (fax)
=00
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=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 11 Jun 2002 09:15:38 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Therese M. Stinnett"
Subject: Re: ABSA Tech Review Committee
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Can anyone tell me if they are watching for NPRM on the Select
Agents/bioterrorism changes that may come down from DHHS and/or USDA once HR
3448 is signed? Is there an easy(?) way to sign up for a listserve from the
Federal Register, that would be topic specific?
thanks in advance.
Therese M. Stinnett
Biosafety Officer
Health and Safety Division
UCHSC, Mailstop C275
4200 E. 9th Avenue
Denver, CO 80262
Voice: 303-315-6754
Pager: 303-266-5402
Fax: 303-315-8026
email: therese.stinnett@uchsc.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 11 Jun 2002 11:29:46 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Gilpin, Richard"
Subject: Re: new DOT security proposal?
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the comment period has been extended to July 3, 2002
Richard W. Gilpin, Ph.D., RBP, CBSP
Assistant Director & Biosafety Officer
Environmental Health & Safety (EHS)
University of Maryland Baltimore
714 West Lombard Street, Room 305
Baltimore MD 21201-1084
(410) 706-7845
Fax (410) 706-1520
rgilpin@ehs.umaryland.edu < mailto:rgilpin@ehs.umaryland.edu
>
ehs.umaryland.edu <
>
-----Original Message-----
From: Burnett, LouAnn Crawford [mailto:louann.burnett@VANDERBILT.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, June 11, 2002 11:12 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: new DOT security proposal?
Quick update - I did just find out that the ABSA Technical Review Committee
has prepared comments on this - when they are released they'll be posted on
the ABSA website ( ). Bill Homovec, the
chair of that committee, also tells me that the comment period may have been
extended.
LouAnn
LouAnn C. Burnett, MS, CBSP
Biosafety Program Manager & Biological Safety Officer
Vanderbilt University Environmental Health & Safety
Nashville, Tennessee
615/322-0927 (direct & voice mail)
615/343-4951 (fax)
-----Original Message-----
From: Burnett, LouAnn Crawford
Sent: Tuesday, June 11, 2002 9:56 AM
To: 'A Biosafety Discussion List'
Subject: new DOT security proposal?
Last Friday (6/7/02), I became aware of a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking by
the Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA) of the US Department
of Transportation called "Hazardous Materials: Security Requirements for
Offerors and Transporters of Hazardous Materials". It was published on May
2 in the Federal Register (67 Fed Reg 22028). Oh yeah - the comment period
ended June 3.
Among other things, it would require persons who offer or transport
infectious substances listed as select agents by the CDC to develop and
implement written plans to assure the security of hazardous materials
shipments. Also anyone needing a security plan is required to add that to
their HazMat training and train all HazMat employees within 3 months of the
final rule. [There are other HazMat categories that fall into this as well -
I mainly focused on biologicals.] They estimate that it will take one hour
(!) to provide the security part of the training.
Is anyone out there more informed on this? Did anyone submit comments?
Seems like there's a big difference in a security plan between a 10 mL vial
of infectious substance via FedEx and a truckload of something else. They
mention a Risk Management Self-Evaluation Framework that is available on
their website - I haven't gone to that yet - perhaps that will help, but I'm
skeptical.
LouAnn
LouAnn C. Burnett, MS, CBSP
Biosafety Program Manager & Biological Safety Officer
Vanderbilt University Environmental Health & Safety
Nashville, Tennessee
615/322-0927 (direct & voice mail)
615/343-4951 (fax)
------_=_NextPart_001_01C2115C.D1764E10
Content-Type: text/html;
charset="iso-8859-1"
the comment period has been extended to July 3, 2002
Richard W. Gilpin, Ph.D., RBP, CBSP
Assistant Director & Biosafety Officer
Environmental Health & Safety (EHS)
University of Maryland Baltimore
714 West Lombard Street, Room 305
Baltimore MD 21201-1084
(410) 706-7845
Fax (410) 706-1520
rgilpin@ehs.umaryland.edu
ehs.umaryland.edu
-----Original Message-----
From: Burnett, LouAnn Crawford [mailto:louann.burnett@VANDERBILT.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, June 11, 2002 11:12 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: new DOT security proposal?
Quick update - I did just find out that the ABSA Technical Review Committee has prepared comments on this - when they are released they'll be posted on the ABSA website (). Bill Homovec, the chair of that committee, also tells me that the comment period may have been extended.
LouAnn
LouAnn C. Burnett, MS, CBSP
Biosafety Program Manager & Biological Safety Officer
Vanderbilt University Environmental Health & Safety
Nashville, Tennessee
615/322-0927 (direct & voice mail)
615/343-4951 (fax)
-----Original Message-----
From: Burnett, LouAnn Crawford
Sent: Tuesday, June 11, 2002 9:56 AM
To: 'A Biosafety Discussion List'
Subject: new DOT security proposal?
Last Friday (6/7/02), I became aware of a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking by the Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA) of the US Department of Transportation called "Hazardous Materials: Security Requirements for Offerors and Transporters of Hazardous Materials". It was published on May 2 in the Federal Register (67 Fed Reg 22028). Oh yeah - the comment period ended June 3.
Among other things, it would require persons who offer or transport infectious substances listed as select agents by the CDC to develop and implement written plans to assure the security of hazardous materials shipments. Also anyone needing a security plan is required to add that to their HazMat training and train all HazMat employees within 3 months of the final rule. [There are other HazMat categories that fall into this as well - I mainly focused on biologicals.] They estimate that it will take one hour (!) to provide the security part of the training.
Is anyone out there more informed on this? Did anyone submit comments? Seems like there's a big difference in a security plan between a 10 mL vial of infectious substance via FedEx and a truckload of something else. They mention a Risk Management Self-Evaluation Framework that is available on their website - I haven't gone to that yet - perhaps that will help, but I'm skeptical.
LouAnn
LouAnn C. Burnett, MS, CBSP
Biosafety Program Manager & Biological Safety Officer
Vanderbilt University Environmental Health & Safety
Nashville, Tennessee
615/322-0927 (direct & voice mail)
615/343-4951 (fax)
------_=_NextPart_001_01C2115C.D1764E10--
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 11 Jun 2002 17:02:42 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Marcham, Cheri"
Subject: Re: New Bioterrorism Legislation
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What is the status of this Legislation? If I understand the process, =
this has to be signed by the President (done yet?), then regulations =
will be promulgated to put in place the provisions of this Bill/Act, =
which I assume will take some time. Do we know which agency will =
promulgate these regulations?
Any insight would be appreciated?
Cheri Marcham, CIH, CSP, CHMM
Environmental Health and Safety Officer
The University of Oklahoma Health Sciences Center
P. O. Box 26901 ROB-301
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73190
405/271-3000
FAX 405/271-1606
cheri-marcham@ouhsc.edu
-----Original Message-----
From: Burnett, LouAnn Crawford [mailto:louann.burnett@VANDERBILT.EDU]
Sent: Friday, May 24, 2002 10:28 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: New Bioterrorism Legislation
This new legislation is called The Public Health Security and
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act. The conference report can
be found at:
LouAnn
LouAnn C. Burnett, MS, CBSP =09
Biosafety Program Manager & Biological Safety Officer=09
Vanderbilt University Environmental Health & Safety
Nashville, Tennessee
615/322-0927 (direct & voice mail)
615/343-4951 (fax) =09
-----Original Message-----
From: Robin Newberry [mailto:wnewber@CLEMSON.EDU]
Sent: Friday, May 24, 2002 10:16 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: New Bioterrorism Legislation
Anyone seen a copy of the Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002? I can't
find it on the web site under than name.
--
Robin
--------------------------------------------------------------
W. Robert Newberry, IV CIH, CHMM
Chief Environmental Health and Safety Officer
Clemson University
wnewber@clemson.edu ehs@clemson.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 11 Jun 2002 16:19:49 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Therese M. Stinnett"
Subject: Re: New Bioterrorism Legislation
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the bill, HR 3448, has been presented to the President
there is no date for his signature to the best of my knowledge
I doubt he would decline to sign it
the federal rule-making process would happen after that, but there are =
some
very short deadlines within the bill, for reports from Secretary DHHS =
and
USDA, so I suspect they will be moving with all due haste
AAU had delivered a set of suggestions to DHHS back in May, for the =
rule
making; I suspect ASM is also staying on top of it.
Therese M. Stinnett
Biosafety Officer
Health and Safety Division
UCHSC, Mailstop C275
4200 E. 9th Avenue
Denver, CO=A0 80262
Voice:=A0 303-315-6754
Pager:=A0 303-266-5402
Fax:=A0 303-315-8026
email:=A0 therese.stinnett@uchsc.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 12 Jun 2002 09:27:21 +1000
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Peter.LeBlancSmith@CSIRO.AU
Subject: Cryostat Biosafety
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I am looking for information about cryostats and any advances in biosafety
and biocontainment for cutting frozen histological sections. I would be
grateful for any information or pointers to new information.
Thank you, in anticipation.
Peter
Peter Le Blanc Smith
Biocontainment Microbiologist
CSIRO Livestock Industries
Australian Animal Health Laboratory (AAHL)
Private Bag 24
Geelong Vic 3220
Australia
Ph: +61 3 5227 5451
Fax: +61 3 5227 5555
E-mail address. Peter.LeBlancSmith@csiro.au
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 11 Jun 2002 19:53:57 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Cheryl L Hildreth
Subject: Re: New Bioterrorism Legislation
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I received a call this afternoon from Dr. Ron Atlas, President of
American Society of Microbiology and Dean of UofL Grad. School re:
bioterrorism bill status and signing. Indications are that it will be
signed tomorrow (6/12) by Pres. Bush. The promulgation of the
regulations, agency responsibility,etc. is undoubtedly more complicated
by the reorganization of the new Homeland Security Cabinet. Parts of CDC
and NIH relating to bioterrorism are now moved to this new agency which
is still being formed.
I think some time next week Dr. Atlas may be able to give me a better
understanding of process and his take on this whole matter including
time frames since ASM is the primary group ( 42,000+ strong) that is
being consulted by the powers in DC,etc. I will immediately post any
information I receive for the benefit of the group... Thanks, Cheri
Cheri Hildreth Watts, Director
Department of Environmental Health &Safety
University of Louisville
(502) 852-2954
e-mail: cheri.hildreth@louisville.edu
>>> Cheryl-Marcham@OUHSC.EDU 06/11/02 18:06 PM >>>
What is the status of this Legislation? If I understand the process,
this has to be signed by the President (done yet?), then regulations
will be promulgated to put in place the provisions of this Bill/Act,
which I assume will take some time. Do we know which agency will
promulgate these regulations?
Any insight would be appreciated?
Cheri Marcham, CIH, CSP, CHMM
Environmental Health and Safety Officer
The University of Oklahoma Health Sciences Center
P. O. Box 26901 ROB-301
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73190
405/271-3000
FAX 405/271-1606
cheri-marcham@ouhsc.edu
-----Original Message-----
From: Burnett, LouAnn Crawford [mailto:louann.burnett@VANDERBILT.EDU]
Sent: Friday, May 24, 2002 10:28 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: New Bioterrorism Legislation
This new legislation is called The Public Health Security and
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act. The conference report can
be found at:
LouAnn
LouAnn C. Burnett, MS, CBSP
Biosafety Program Manager & Biological Safety Officer
Vanderbilt University Environmental Health & Safety
Nashville, Tennessee
615/322-0927 (direct & voice mail)
615/343-4951 (fax)
-----Original Message-----
From: Robin Newberry [mailto:wnewber@CLEMSON.EDU]
Sent: Friday, May 24, 2002 10:16 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: New Bioterrorism Legislation
Anyone seen a copy of the Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002? I can't
find it on the web site under than name.
--
Robin
--------------------------------------------------------------
W. Robert Newberry, IV CIH, CHMM
Chief Environmental Health and Safety Officer
Clemson University
wnewber@clemson.edu ehs@clemson.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 12 Jun 2002 08:44:34 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Kim Auletta
Subject: Re: New Bioterrorism Legislation
MIME-Version: 1.0
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The Pres. is scheduled to sign this bill this morning - announcement on CBS
Newsradio 88/NY. Of course, the news announcement only mentioned the money
for vaccines, etc, and nothing about this aspect of the bill.
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=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 12 Jun 2002 08:58:32 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Robin Newberry
Subject: From the ''Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness
and Response Act of 2002''.
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From the bill the Pres signed this morning:
Subtitle D-Criminal Penalties Regarding Certain Biological Agents and Toxins
SEC. 231. CRIMINAL PENALTIES.
(a) IN GENERAL.-Section 175b of title 18, United States Code,
as added by section 817 of Public Law 107-56, is amended-
(1) by striking ''(a)'' and inserting ''(a)(1)'';
(2) by transferring subsection (c) from the current placement
of the subsection and inserting the subsection before
subsection (b);
(3) by striking ''(c)'' and inserting ''(2);
(4) by redesignating subsection (b) as subsection (d); and
(5) by inserting before subsection (d) (as so redesignated)
the following subsections:
''(b) TRANSFER TO UNREGISTERED PERSON.-
''(1) SELECT AGENTS.-Whoever transfers a select agent
to a person who the transferor knows or has reasonable cause
to believe is not registered as required by regulations under
subsection (b) or (c) of section 351A of the Public Health Service
Act shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned for not more
than 5 years, or both.
''(2) CERTAIN OTHER BIOLOGICAL AGENTS AND TOXINS.-Whoever
transfers a biological agent or toxin listed pursuant to
section 212(a)(1) of the Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection
Act of 2002 to a person who the transferor knows or has
reasonable cause to believe is not registered as required by
regulations under subsection (b) or (c) of section 212 of such
Act shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned for not more
than 5 years, or both.
''(c) UNREGISTERED FOR POSSESSION.-
''(1) SELECT AGENTS.-Whoever knowingly possesses a
biological agent or toxin where such agent or toxin is a select
agent for which such person has not obtained a registration
required by regulations under section 351A(c) of the Public
Health Service Act shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned
for not more than 5 years, or both.
''(2) CERTAIN OTHER BIOLOGICAL AGENTS AND TOXINS.-Whoever
knowingly possesses a biological agent or toxin where
such agent or toxin is a biological agent or toxin listed pursuant
to section 212(a)(1) of the Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection
Act of 2002 for which such person has not obtained a registration
required by regulations under section 212(c) of such Act
shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned for not more
than 5 years, or both.''.
(b) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.-Chapter 10 of title 18, United
States Code, is amended-
(1) in section 175b (as added by section 817 of Public
Law 107-56 and amended by subsection (a) of this section)-
(A) in subsection (d)(1), by striking ''The term'' and
all that follows through ''does not include'' and inserting
the following: ''The term 'select agent' means a biological
agent or toxin to which subsection (a) applies. Such term
(including for purposes of subsection (a)) does not include'';
and (B) in the heading for the section, by striking ''Possession
by restricted persons'' and inserting ''Select
agents; certain other agents''; and
(2) in the chapter analysis, in the item relating to section
175b, by striking ''Possession by restricted persons.'' and
inserting ''Select agents; certain other agents.''.
(c) TECHNICAL CORRECTIONS.-Chapter 10 of title 18, United
States Code, as amended by section 817 of Public Law 107-56
and subsections (a) and (b) of this section, is amended-
(1) in section 175(c), by striking ''protective'' and all that
follows and inserting ''protective, bona fide research, or other
peaceful purposes.'';
(2) in section 175b-
(A) in subsection (a)(1), by striking ''described in subsection
(b)'' and all that follows and inserting the following:
''shall ship or transport in or affecting interstate or foreign
commerce, or possess in or affecting interstate or foreign
commerce, any biological agent or toxin, or receive any
biological agent or toxin that has been shipped or transported
in interstate or foreign commerce, if the biological
agent or toxin is listed as a select agent in Appendix
A of part 72 of title 42, Code of Federal Regulations,
pursuant to section 351A of the Public Health Service
Act, and is not exempted under subsection (h) of section
72.6, or Appendix A of part 72, of title 42, Code of Federal
Regulations.''; and
(B) in subsection (d)(3), by striking ''section 1010(a)(3)''
and inserting ''section 101(a)(3)'';
(3) in section 176(a)(1)(A), by striking ''exists by reason
of'' and inserting ''pertains to''; and
(4) in section 178-
(A) in paragraph (1), by striking ''means any microorganism''
and all that follows through ''product, capable
of'' and inserting the following: ''means any microorganism
(including, but not limited to, bacteria, viruses, fungi,
rickettsiae or protozoa), or infectious substance, or any
naturally occurring, bioengineered or synthesized component
of any such microorganism or infectious substance,
capable of'';
(B) in paragraph (2), by striking ''means the toxic''
and all that follows through ''including-'' and inserting
the following: ''means the toxic material or product of
plants, animals, microorganisms (including, but not limited
to, bacteria, viruses, fungi, rickettsiae or protozoa), or infectious
substances, or a recombinant or synthesized molecule,
whatever their origin and method of production, and
includes-''; and
(C) in paragraph (4), by striking ''recombinant molecule,''
and all that follows through ''biotechnology,'' and
inserting ''recombinant or synthesized molecule,''.
(d) ADDITIONAL TECHNICAL CORRECTION.-Section 2332a of title
18, United States Code, is amended-
(1) in subsection (a), in the matter preceding paragraph
(1), by striking ''section 229F)'' and all that follows through
''section 178)-'' and inserting ''section 229F)-''; and
(2) in subsection (c)(2)(C), by striking ''a disease organism''
and inserting ''a biological agent, toxin, or vector (as those
terms are defined in section 178 of this title)''.
--
Robin
--------------------------------------------------------------
W. Robert Newberry, IV CIH, CHMM
Chief Environmental Health and Safety Officer
Clemson University
wnewber@clemson.edu ehs@clemson.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 12 Jun 2002 08:58:51 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Robin Newberry
Subject: Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002
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O.K., maybe it's because I haven't had enough coffee this morning,
but I've been all over the U.S. Congress web site looking for the
"Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002" as referenced in
the bill to be signed by the President today, but I can't find
anything by that title. Anyone got a Public Law Number for this one?
--
Robin
--------------------------------------------------------------
W. Robert Newberry, IV CIH, CHMM
Chief Environmental Health and Safety Officer
Clemson University
wnewber@clemson.edu ehs@clemson.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 12 Jun 2002 08:13:20 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Michael Betlach
Subject: Re: Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002
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Search "Thomas" under bioterrorism:
2 . Agricultural Bioterrorism Countermeasures Act of 2001 (Introduced in
House)[H.R.3293.IH]
3 . Agricultural Bioterrorism Countermeasures Act of 2001 (Introduced in
Senate)[S.1563.IS]
Senate bill has been referred to subcommittee. Action on the House bill
awaits Executive Branch response from USDA
Michael Betlach, Ph.D.
Biosafety Officer
Promega Corporation
5445 E. Cheryl Parkway
Madison, WI 53711
(608) 274-1181, Ext. 1270
-----Original Message-----
From: Robin Newberry [mailto:wnewber@CLEMSON.EDU]
Sent: Wednesday, June 12, 2002 7:59 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002
O.K., maybe it's because I haven't had enough coffee this morning,
but I've been all over the U.S. Congress web site looking for the
"Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002" as referenced in
the bill to be signed by the President today, but I can't find
anything by that title. Anyone got a Public Law Number for this one?
--
Robin
--------------------------------------------------------------
W. Robert Newberry, IV CIH, CHMM
Chief Environmental Health and Safety Officer
Clemson University
wnewber@clemson.edu ehs@clemson.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 12 Jun 2002 09:26:02 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Robin Newberry
Subject: Re: Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed"
>Search "Thomas" under bioterrorism:
>2 . Agricultural Bioterrorism Countermeasures Act of 2001 (Introduced in
>House)[H.R.3293.IH]
>3 . Agricultural Bioterrorism Countermeasures Act of 2001 (Introduced in
>Senate)[S.1563.IS]
So the " Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002" hasn't
been passed, and is currently called the "Agricultural Bioterrorism
Countermeasures Act of 2001"?
--
Robin
--------------------------------------------------------------
W. Robert Newberry, IV CIH, CHMM
Chief Environmental Health and Safety Officer
Clemson University
wnewber@clemson.edu ehs@clemson.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 12 Jun 2002 08:34:32 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Johnson, Julie A."
Subject: Re: Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
I believe the Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002 is part of
HR3448.
-----Original Message-----
From: Robin Newberry [mailto:wnewber@CLEMSON.EDU]
Sent: Wednesday, June 12, 2002 8:26 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002
>Search "Thomas" under bioterrorism:
>2 . Agricultural Bioterrorism Countermeasures Act of 2001 (Introduced in
>House)[H.R.3293.IH]
>3 . Agricultural Bioterrorism Countermeasures Act of 2001 (Introduced in
>Senate)[S.1563.IS]
So the " Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002" hasn't
been passed, and is currently called the "Agricultural Bioterrorism
Countermeasures Act of 2001"?
--
Robin
--------------------------------------------------------------
W. Robert Newberry, IV CIH, CHMM
Chief Environmental Health and Safety Officer
Clemson University
wnewber@clemson.edu ehs@clemson.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 12 Jun 2002 09:57:18 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Moulvi, Farah"
Subject: Hazardous material database
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Hello all:
My Institution is beginning the developmental phase to construct a single
database capable of managing the inventory and use of all hazardous
materials and one that will also indicate the hazards (health risk)
associated with the use of a particular agent. At this point, we would like
to determine if such a database or software package already exists,
preliminary information indicate that other indicates that are institutions
are using several different database, each specific for a different type of
hazardous material. So, I am really interested in knowing if anyone is
using or aware of a single database system will inventory and track the use
of all hazardous materials including not only biologicals but radiological
and and chemical substances as well. Please respond to me directly at email
fmoulvi@research.usf.edu . I will gladly
compile the information and post the results to the listserver if there is
great interest in this subject.
Thank you for your time and attention
Farah I Moulvi, M.S.P.H.
Coordinator and Institutional Biosafety Officer
Research Compliance
12901 Bruce.B.Downs Blvd.,
MDC35,
Tampa, FL 33612-4799
(813) 974-0954
(813) 974-7091 Fax
fmoulvi@research.usf.edu
Office Location:
University Professional Center
3500 East Fletcher Avenue, Suite 523
Tampa, Florida
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Hello all:
My Institution is beginning the developmental phase to construct a single database capable of managing the inventory and use of all hazardous materials and one that will also indicate the hazards (health risk) associated with the use of a particular agent. At this point, we would like to determine if such a database or software package already exists, preliminary information indicate that other indicates that are institutions are using several different database, each specific for a different type of hazardous material. So, I am really interested in knowing if anyone is using or aware of a single database system will inventory and track the use of all hazardous materials including not only biologicals but radiological and and chemical substances as well. Please respond to me directly at email fmoulvi@research.usf.edu. I will gladly compile the information and post the results to the listserver if there is great interest in this subject.
Thank you for your time and attention
Farah I Moulvi, M.S.P.H.
Coordinator and Institutional Biosafety Officer
Research Compliance
12901 Bruce.B.Downs Blvd.,
MDC35,
Tampa, FL 33612-4799
(813) 974-0954
(813) 974-7091 Fax
fmoulvi@research.usf.edu
Office Location:
University Professional Center
3500 East Fletcher Avenue, Suite 523
Tampa, Florida
------_=_NextPart_001_01C21219.10AE0E80--
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 12 Jun 2002 22:12:15 +0200
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Petr Markl
Subject: Suitable disinfectants?
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Hello all,
I am a biosafety newbie and I am looking for suitable
disinfectants which meet following criteria and which
are also potentially distributed over Europe.
a) surface disinfectant (tables, dishes, tools, floors etc)
- which does not attack stainles steel,
- which can be sprayed and left to dry out,
- which are not irritating because of an frequent use,
b) volume disinfectant
- which in certain conc. can kill all microorganisms in a
10 litres vessel within certain period of time
- which can secure hazardous materials before transportation
to an outside disposal site
---
We use veterinary and human serums (usually with certification)
ans sometimes for limited analytical purposes we also use some
samples from patients.
Any information which could lead to an appropriate disinfectants
is welcome.
Thank you in advance.
Best wishes
Petr Markl
pmarkl@markl.cz
Czech Republic
P.S.: Best wishes for the upcoming holiday season. PM.
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 12 Jun 2002 17:16:42 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Cheryl L Hildreth
Subject: Re: Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002
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Dr. Ronald Atlas said that the previous senate and house versions of
agriculture bioterrorism filed in 2001 are indeed now incorporated in
HR3448 which was signed into law this morning as you know. Due to
negotiation and compromise, the final version of the agriculture
provisions are likely to be quite different from 2001 bills listed
below that did not pass.
Cheri Hildreth Watts, Director
Department of Environmental Health &Safety
University of Louisville
(502) 852-2954
e-mail: cheri.hildreth@louisville.edu
>>> jajohns@IASTATE.EDU 06/12/02 09:34AM >>>
I believe the Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002 is part
of
HR3448.
-----Original Message-----
From: Robin Newberry [mailto:wnewber@CLEMSON.EDU]
Sent: Wednesday, June 12, 2002 8:26 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002
>Search "Thomas" under bioterrorism:
>2 . Agricultural Bioterrorism Countermeasures Act of 2001 (Introduced
in
>House)[H.R.3293.IH]
>3 . Agricultural Bioterrorism Countermeasures Act of 2001 (Introduced
in
>Senate)[S.1563.IS]
So the " Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002" hasn't
been passed, and is currently called the "Agricultural Bioterrorism
Countermeasures Act of 2001"?
--
Robin
--------------------------------------------------------------
W. Robert Newberry, IV CIH, CHMM
Chief Environmental Health and Safety Officer
Clemson University
wnewber@clemson.edu ehs@clemson.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 12 Jun 2002 14:21:36 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Mike Grogan
Subject: Light sensitive assay in a BSC for product protection
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
I have an investigator that needs to perform an assay on a irregular basis
which involves a murine cell line and fluorescent protein. The assay must
be performed with the fluorescent light off. Unfortunately the brand new
Labconco cabinet has one three position toggle switch (blower+fluorescent,
off, or blower+UV). My obvious solution fell by the wayside when I
discovered that the fluorescent lamp is not easy to remove and reinstall. I
am hesitant to alter the brand new cabinet. Any ideas?
Thanks in advance,
Mike
---------------------------------------
Michael J. Grogan
Director, Institutional Compliance
Sidney Kimmel Cancer Center
10835 Altman Row
San Diego, CA 92121
> (858) 410-4182
> (858) 450-3251 FAX
> mgrogan@
>
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 12 Jun 2002 14:25:23 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Mike Grogan
Subject: Light sensitive assay in a BSC for product protection
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
I have an investigator that needs to perform an assay on a irregular basis
which involves a murine cell line and fluorescent protein. The assay must
be performed with the fluorescent light off. Unfortunately the brand new
Labconco cabinet has one three position toggle switch (blower+fluorescent,
off, or blower+UV). My obvious solution fell by the wayside when I
discovered that the fluorescent lamp is not easy to remove and reinstall. I
am hesitant to alter the brand new cabinet. Any ideas?
Thanks in advance,
Mike
---------------------------------------
Michael J. Grogan
Director, Institutional Compliance
Sidney Kimmel Cancer Center
10835 Altman Row
San Diego, CA 92121
> (858) 410-4182
> (858) 450-3251 FAX
> mgrogan@
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 12 Jun 2002 17:02:26 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: William Lorenzen
Subject: Re: Light sensitive assay in a BSC for product protection
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT
cover it up...
Mike Grogan wrote:
> I have an investigator that needs to perform an assay on a irregular basis
> which involves a murine cell line and fluorescent protein. The assay must
> be performed with the fluorescent light off. Unfortunately the brand new
> Labconco cabinet has one three position toggle switch (blower+fluorescent,
> off, or blower+UV). My obvious solution fell by the wayside when I
> discovered that the fluorescent lamp is not easy to remove and reinstall. I
> am hesitant to alter the brand new cabinet. Any ideas?
>
> Thanks in advance,
>
> Mike
>
> ---------------------------------------
> Michael J. Grogan
> Director, Institutional Compliance
> Sidney Kimmel Cancer Center
> 10835 Altman Row
> San Diego, CA 92121
> > (858) 410-4182
> > (858) 450-3251 FAX
> > mgrogan@
> >
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 12 Jun 2002 17:42:35 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Richard Pollack
Subject: Re: Light sensitive assay in a BSC for product protection
In-Reply-To:
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The simplest (but least effective) method would be to slide a
light-opaque panel in place to block most of the light generated.
Avoid electrically-conductive materials (e.g. aluminum foil) near the
ends of the bulb... or you may trade one problem for another. A
cleaver tinkerer could easily install another electrical switch or
replace the current switch so that the light can be turned on or off
as desired.
>I have an investigator that needs to perform an assay on a irregular basis
>which involves a murine cell line and fluorescent protein. The assay must
>be performed with the fluorescent light off. Unfortunately the brand new
>Labconco cabinet has one three position toggle switch (blower+fluorescent,
>off, or blower+UV). My obvious solution fell by the wayside when I
>discovered that the fluorescent lamp is not easy to remove and reinstall. I
>am hesitant to alter the brand new cabinet. Any ideas?
>
>Thanks in advance,
>
>Mike
>
>---------------------------------------
>Michael J. Grogan
>Director, Institutional Compliance
>Sidney Kimmel Cancer Center
>10835 Altman Row
>San Diego, CA 92121
>> (858) 410-4182
>> (858) 450-3251 FAX
>> mgrogan@
>>
--
Richard J. Pollack, Ph.D.
Laboratory of Public Health Entomology
Harvard School of Public Health
665 Huntington Ave.
Boston, Massachusetts 02115 U.S.A.
phone: 617-432-1587
fax: 617-432-1796
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 13 Jun 2002 08:14:38 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Richard Fink
Subject: Re: Light sensitive assay in a BSC for product protection
In-Reply-To:
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>Mike Grogan wrote:
>
> > I have an investigator that needs to perform an assay on a irregular basis
> > which involves a murine cell line and fluorescent protein. The assay must
> > be performed with the fluorescent light off.
Find out what wavelenght interferes and use a filtering media around the
bulb. Many years ago we were performing an experiment in which UV and near
UV would interfere and we covered the windows and fluorescents with a
transparent yellow mylar. We still got light but no UV or near UV.
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
--=====================_173023043==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
Mike Grogan wrote:
> I have an investigator that needs to perform an assay on a irregular basis
> which involves a murine cell line and fluorescent protein. The assay must
> be performed with the fluorescent light off.
Find out what wavelenght interferes and use a filtering media around the bulb. Many years ago we were performing an experiment in which UV and near UV would interfere and we covered the windows and fluorescents with a transparent yellow mylar. We still got light but no UV or near UV.
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
--=====================_173023043==_.ALT--
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 13 Jun 2002 08:45:37 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Richard Fink
Subject: Re: Suitable disinfectants?
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
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At 10:12 PM 6/12/2002 +0200, you wrote:
>Hello all,
>
>I am a biosafety newbie and I am looking for suitable
>disinfectants which meet following criteria and which
>are also potentially distributed over Europe.
>
>a) surface disinfectant (tables, dishes, tools, floors etc)
>
>- which does not attack stainles steel,
>- which can be sprayed and left to dry out,
>- which are not irritating because of an frequent use,
The best bet to meet all of the above would be a quaternary ammonia
disinfectant (s.a. dimethyl benzyl- ammonium chloride). In use
concentration they are generally nonirritating though in concentrated form
are irritating. Quats are low level disinfectants (i.e. never kill spores,
do not kill Mycobacteria, do not kill all viruses, kills most fungi, most
vegetative bacteria).
>b) volume disinfectant
>
>- which in certain conc. can kill all microorganisms in a
> 10 litres vessel within certain period of time
>- which can secure hazardous materials before transportation
> to an outside disposal site
To kill all microorganisms you are looking for a cold chemical sterilant of
which you have very limited choices. The recognized liquid sterilants are:
gluteraldehyde, chlorine dioxide, peracetic acid, >6% hydrogen peroxide,
combinations of some of the listed sterilants. If there are also chemicals
mixed into the picture, you will need to check compatiblity of the
sterilants with the chemicals in the vessel. I've attached a PDF file
listing US EPA approved sterilants.
>Petr Markl
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
--=====================_174881806==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
At 10:12 PM 6/12/2002 +0200, you wrote:
Hello all,
I am a biosafety newbie and I am looking for suitable
disinfectants which meet following criteria and which
are also potentially distributed over Europe.
a) surface disinfectant (tables, dishes, tools, floors etc)
- which does not attack stainles steel,
- which can be sprayed and left to dry out,
- which are not irritating because of an frequent use,
The best bet to meet all of the above would be a quaternary ammonia disinfectant (s.a. dimethyl benzyl- ammonium chloride). In use concentration they are generally nonirritating though in concentrated form are irritating. Quats are low level disinfectants (i.e. never kill spores, do not kill Mycobacteria, do not kill all viruses, kills most fungi, most vegetative bacteria).
b) volume disinfectant
- which in certain conc. can kill all microorganisms in a
10 litres vessel within certain period of time
- which can secure hazardous materials before transportation
to an outside disposal site
To kill all microorganisms you are looking for a cold chemical sterilant of which you have very limited choices. The recognized liquid sterilants are: gluteraldehyde, chlorine dioxide, peracetic acid, >6% hydrogen peroxide, combinations of some of the listed sterilants. If there are also chemicals mixed into the picture, you will need to check compatiblity of the sterilants with the chemicals in the vessel. I've attached a PDF file listing US EPA approved sterilants.
Petr Markl
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
--=====================_174881806==_.ALT--
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Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="list_a_sterilizer.pdf"
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 13 Jun 2002 09:00:24 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Randall Morin
Subject: Rational Interpretation of New Legislation
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At the risk of stating the obvious, I sincerely hope the Biosafety Community
is, or will be engaged in the drafting of implementing guidance for the
development of the statutes in response to the recently signed
antibioterrorism legislation. This law, if misinterpreted, could result in
such a flood of administrative minutia, that we will all be buried in
paperwork, unable to do our real jobs.
Randall S. Morin, Dr.P.H., RBP, REHS, CHCM, DAAS
Director; Environment, Safety & Health Program
SAIC Frederick, Inc.
National Cancer Institute at Frederick
Fort Detrick, Frederick, MD 21702
Tel: 301 846-1740(V), 301 846-6619(F)
email: morin@
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At the risk of = stating the obvious, I sincerely hope the Biosafety Community is, or will be engaged = in the drafting of implementing guidance for the development of the statutes in = response to the recently signed antibioterrorism legislation. This = law, if misinterpreted, could result in such a flood of administrative minutia, = that we will all be buried in paperwork, unable to do our real = jobs.
Randall S. Morin, Dr.P.H., RBP, REHS, CHCM, DAAS
Director; Environment, Safety & Health Program
SAIC Frederick, Inc.
National Cancer Institute at Frederick
Fort Detrick, Frederick, MD 21702
Tel: 301 846-1740(V), 301 = 846-6619(F)
email: morin@
------=_NextPart_000_0010_01C212B8.C0F6AFF0--
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 13 Jun 2002 09:11:14 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Richard Fink
Subject: Re: Rational Interpretation of New Legislation
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
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> This law, if misinterpreted, could result in such a flood of
> administrative minutia, that we will all be buried in paperwork, unable
> to do our real jobs.
You mean we aren't currently!?!? Sorry, couldn't resist. :)).
ABSA is having input into this situation but I fear science will lose out
to hysteria.
>
>Randall S. Morin, Dr.P.H., RBP, REHS, CHCM, DAAS
>Director; Environment, Safety & Health Program
>SAIC Frederick, Inc.
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Biosafty List Owner
rfink@mit.edu
--=====================_176419047==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
This law, if misinterpreted, could result in such a flood of administrative minutia, that we will all be buried in paperwork, unable to do our real jobs.
You mean we aren't currently!?!? Sorry, couldn't resist. :)).
ABSA is having input into this situation but I fear science will lose out to hysteria.
Randall S. Morin, Dr.P.H., RBP, REHS, CHCM, DAAS
Director; Environment, Safety & Health Program
SAIC Frederick, Inc.
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Biosafty List Owner
rfink@mit.edu
--=====================_176419047==_.ALT--
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 13 Jun 2002 08:36:13 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Francis Cole
Subject: Re: Rational Interpretation of New Legislation
Mime-Version: 1.0
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Thursday, 6/13/02, 8:26AM.
Richard, This is the first response I am aware of from a Biosafety =
Professional on the ABSA List Serve regarding the "recently signed =
antibioterrorism legislation". As I suggested yesterday, I predict =
there will be lots additional commentary on ABSA list serve as Biosafety =
Professionals obtain and digest this material. You can be sure that I =
will keep you informed... "drafting of implementing guidance for the the =
development......", to help develop appropriate implementation at OCF. =
In my opinion, first, we become educated. Kin Pankey, IBC Chairman, also =
receives the ABSA list serve.
Best wishes.
Frank
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 13 Jun 2002 07:09:54 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Mike Grogan
Subject: Re: Light sensitive assay in a BSC for product protection
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Richard,
Great idea! Thank you.
Mike
-----Original Message-----
From: Richard Fink [mailto:rfink@MIT.EDU]
Sent: Thursday, June 13, 2002 5:15 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Light sensitive assay in a BSC for product protection
Mike Grogan wrote:
> I have an investigator that needs to perform an assay on a irregular basis
> which involves a murine cell line and fluorescent protein. The assay must
> be performed with the fluorescent light off.
Find out what wavelenght interferes and use a filtering media around the
bulb. Many years ago we were performing an experiment in which UV and near
UV would interfere and we covered the windows and fluorescents with a
transparent yellow mylar. We still got light but no UV or near UV.
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
------_=_NextPart_001_01C212E3.FDF0FB60
Content-Type: text/html;
charset="iso-8859-1"
Richard,
Great idea! Thank you.
Mike
-----Original Message-----
From: Richard Fink [mailto:rfink@MIT.EDU]
Sent: Thursday, June 13, 2002 5:15 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Light sensitive assay in a BSC for product protection
Mike Grogan wrote:
> I have an investigator that needs to perform an assay on a irregular basis
> which involves a murine cell line and fluorescent protein. The assay must
> be performed with the fluorescent light off.
Find out what wavelenght interferes and use a filtering media around the bulb. Many years ago we were performing an experiment in which UV and near UV would interfere and we covered the windows and fluorescents with a transparent yellow mylar. We still got light but no UV or near UV.
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
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=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 13 Jun 2002 11:06:17 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Lori Keen
Subject: Re: Hazardous material database
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Check out ChemInventory (CHiM) by Vertere. ()
We purchased and implemented use of this software last summer. While we don't
currently use it specifically for tracking hazardous materials, it is very
powerful and can be used in the way you want. Our next phase in use of the
database is to incorporate the MSDS function of the database to simply our
maintenance of MSDS records and simplify our hazard labelling per HazCom
requirements.
Lori Keen
Lab Manager, Biology
Calvin College
616-957-6080
Member NAOSMM
>>> FMOULVI@RESEARCH.USF.EDU 06/12/02 10:11 AM >>>
Hello all:
My Institution is beginning the developmental phase to construct a single
database capable of managing the inventory and use of all hazardous
materials and one that will also indicate the hazards (health risk)
associated with the use of a particular agent. At this point, we would like
to determine if such a database or software package already exists,
preliminary information indicate that other indicates that are institutions
are using several different database, each specific for a different type of
hazardous material. So, I am really interested in knowing if anyone is
using or aware of a single database system will inventory and track the use
of all hazardous materials including not only biologicals but radiological
and and chemical substances as well. Please respond to me directly at email
fmoulvi@research.usf.edu . I will gladly
compile the information and post the results to the listserver if there is
great interest in this subject.
Thank you for your time and attention
Farah I Moulvi, M.S.P.H.
Coordinator and Institutional Biosafety Officer
Research Compliance
12901 Bruce.B.Downs Blvd.,
MDC35,
Tampa, FL 33612-4799
(813) 974-0954
(813) 974-7091 Fax
fmoulvi@research.usf.edu
Office Location:
University Professional Center
3500 East Fletcher Avenue, Suite 523
Tampa, Florida
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 13 Jun 2002 11:26:39 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Robert N. Latsch"
Subject: Re: Light sensitive assay in a BSC for product protection
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
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Remove the lamp?
bob
>I have an investigator that needs to perform an assay on a irregular basis
>which involves a murine cell line and fluorescent protein. The assay must
>be performed with the fluorescent light off. Unfortunately the brand new
>Labconco cabinet has one three position toggle switch (blower+fluorescent,
>off, or blower+UV). My obvious solution fell by the wayside when I
>discovered that the fluorescent lamp is not easy to remove and reinstall. I
>am hesitant to alter the brand new cabinet. Any ideas?
>
>Thanks in advance,
>
>Mike
>
>---------------------------------------
>Michael J. Grogan
>Director, Institutional Compliance
>Sidney Kimmel Cancer Center
>10835 Altman Row
>San Diego, CA 92121
>> (858) 410-4182
>> (858) 450-3251 FAX
>> mgrogan@
>>
_____________________________________________________________________
__ / _____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 13 Jun 2002 08:39:58 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Stefan Wagener
Subject: Re: Rational Interpretation of New Legislation
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Good point!
Last year, ABSA initiated a biosecurity task force under the leadership of
Barbara Johnson (SAIC). One of the very early successes of this group is a
document called the "Biosecurity White Paper" which will soon be published in
the ABSA journal and hopefully assist in a reasonable approach to biosecurity.
However, I would consider it a responsibility of every biosafety professional to
very carefully read the new regulations and inform their managers and
administrators about the potential impact on your institution or company. ASM
has already taken a lead in assessing the potential impact and providing
feedback to regulatory authorities. It would be in our best interest to support
these activities directly and indirectly through education and lobbying. In the
meantime we need to get ready for the impact and take a close look at our own
operations. The ABSA document on biosecurity will assist all of us, and in
addition, the task force is currently planning on expanding this document into
a more practical "Biosecurity 101" document. If you would like more information
contact Barbara Johnson through the ABSA National Office. The ABSA president and
the council is fully supportive of these activities and we hope to bring more
and more tools into the hands of our members. Your feedback is greatly
appreciated.
Stefan Wagener, PhD., CBSP
Scientific Director, CAO
CSCHAH
Richard Fink on 2002-06-13 08:11:14 AM
Please respond to A Biosafety Discussion List
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
cc: (bcc: Stefan Wagener/HC-SC/GC/CA)
Subject: Re: Rational Interpretation of New Legislation
> This law, if misinterpreted, could result in such a flood of
> administrative minutia, that we will all be buried in paperwork, unable
> to do our real jobs.
You mean we aren't currently!?!? Sorry, couldn't resist. :)).
ABSA is having input into this situation but I fear science will lose out
to hysteria.
>
>Randall S. Morin, Dr.P.H., RBP, REHS, CHCM, DAAS
>Director; Environment, Safety & Health Program
>SAIC Frederick, Inc.
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Biosafty List Owner
rfink@mit.edu
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Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2002 15:44:05 +0200
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Mike Kirby
Subject: Monitoring sensitivity to snake venom
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
A slightly exotic question for the panel.
One of our Departments produces anti-venoms from snakes, scorpions, spiders,
etc, and one of the big problems in this business, is
to monitor the Staff members who work with the stuff on a daily basis, in
order to check for possible sensitization to these venoms. (They are all
supplied with full PPE and work in Class 1 extraction hoods).
One possibility is to monitor their IgE levels at regular intervals, the
only problem being that a raised IgE level only tells you that you are
allergic to something! (house dust, cat hairs, your mother-in-law, etc).
Does anyone have any other suggestions on how one could monitor their health
using specific Lab tests or physical examination?
Mike Kirby
Safety Officer
National Health Laboratory Service
Johannesburg
South Africa.
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2002 11:28:32 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: David Gillum
Subject: Human Cell Lines
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Does anyone know where I can find if OSHA requires research with human cell
lines to be treated as BSL-2 (as potential bloodborne pathogens)? A specific
OSHA (or other) requirement would be very helpful.
Thanks!
--
David R. Gillum
Laboratory Safety Officer
Environmental Health and Safety
11 Leavitt Lane, Perpetuity Hall
Durham, NH 03824
Telephone #: 603-862-0197
Facsimile #: 603-862-0047
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2002 10:43:46 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: J Coggin
Subject: Re: Human Cell Lines
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David: Standard is drafted to cover human blood, body fluids and
TISSUES. Human Cells comprise TISSUE! Human cells grow in tissue
culture [sometimes] .
Joe Coggin
David Gillum wrote:
>Does anyone know where I can find if OSHA requires research with human cell
>lines to be treated as BSL-2 (as potential bloodborne pathogens)? A specific
>OSHA (or other) requirement would be very helpful.
>
>Thanks!
>
>--
>David R. Gillum
>
>Laboratory Safety Officer
>Environmental Health and Safety
>11 Leavitt Lane, Perpetuity Hall
>Durham, NH 03824
>Telephone #: 603-862-0197
>Facsimile #: 603-862-0047
>
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2002 10:42:59 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Johnson, Julie A."
Subject: Re: Human Cell Lines
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
this web site is the OSHA interpretation letter regarding established human
cell line.
S&p_id=21519&p_text_version=FALSE
Julie A. Johnson, Ph.D., CBSP
Biosafety Officer
Environmental Health and Safety
118 Agronomy Lab
Iowa State University
Ames, IA 50011
Phone: 515-294-7657
Fax: 515-294-9357
Email: jajohns@iastate.edu
Web site: ehs.iastate.edu
-----Original Message-----
From: David Gillum [mailto:David.Gillum@UNH.EDU]
Sent: Friday, June 14, 2002 10:29 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Human Cell Lines
Does anyone know where I can find if OSHA requires research with human cell
lines to be treated as BSL-2 (as potential bloodborne pathogens)? A specific
OSHA (or other) requirement would be very helpful.
Thanks!
--
David R. Gillum
Laboratory Safety Officer
Environmental Health and Safety
11 Leavitt Lane, Perpetuity Hall
Durham, NH 03824
Telephone #: 603-862-0197
Facsimile #: 603-862-0047
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2002 11:45:05 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Richard Fink
Subject: Re: Human Cell Lines
In-Reply-To:
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At 11:28 AM 6/14/2002 -0400, you wrote:
>Does anyone know where I can find if OSHA requires research with human cell
>lines to be treated as BSL-2 (as potential bloodborne pathogens)? A specific
>OSHA (or other) requirement would be very helpful.
>
>Thanks!
>
>--
>David R. Gillum
David: below is from the OSHA website regarding human cell lines (and yes
they are covered):
Standard Interpretations
06/21/1994 - Applicability of 1910.1030 to
establish human cell lines.
June 21, 1994
Dr. Diane Fleming
President
University of South Alabama
College of Medicine
CSAB 170
Mobile, Alabama 36688
Dear Dr. Fleming:
This is in response to a September 23, 1993 letter from Joseph H. Coggin,
an American Biological
Safety Association member, requesting clarification of our August 3, 1993
letter of interpretation to
the former ABSA President Dr. Jerome P. Schmidt. That letter attempted to
explain the
applicability of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration's
(OSHA) standard 29 CFR
1910.1030, "Occupational Exposure to Bloodborne Pathogens," to establish
human cell lines.
Dr. Coggin informed us that our August 3, 1993 letter may be more
confusing rather than
enlightening to biological safety professionals.
We have reconsidered our earlier comments and are providing a more
detailed letter of
interpretation. We regret any misunderstanding our earlier response may
have caused.
As you know, the Bloodborne Pathogens standard (BPS) provides protection
to employees who
have occupational exposure to human blood or other potentially infectious
materials (OPIM).
Established human cell lines* (see attachment) which are characterized**
(see attachment) to be
free of contamination from human hepatitis viruses, human
immunodeficiency viruses, and other
recognized bloodborne pathogens, are not considered to be OPIM and are
not covered by BPS.
Established human or other animal cell lines which are known to be or
likely infected/contaminated
with human microbes or agents classed as bloodborne pathogens, especially
hepatitis viruses and
human immunodeficiency viruses are covered by the BPS. The final
judgement for making the
determination that human or other animal cell lines in culture are free
of bloodborne pathogens must
be made by a Bio-safety Professional or other qualified scientist with
the background and
experience to review such potential contamination and risk, in accordance
with the requirements of
the BPS. Documentation that such cell lines are not OPIM should be a
matter of written record and
on file with the employer for OSHA review.
All primary human cell explants from tissues and subsequent in vitro
passages of human tissue
explant cultures (human cell "strains" ***, see attachment) must be
regarded as containing potential
bloodborne pathogens and should be handled in accordance with the BPS.
Non-transformed,
human cell "strains", characterized by documented, reasonable laboratory
testing as described in the
attachment, to be free of human immunodeficiency virus, hepatitis
viruses, or other bloodborne
pathogens may be exempted from the standard's requirements. However, if
such tissue explants or
subsequent cultures are derived from human subjects known to carry
bloodborne pathogens, such
as hepatitis viruses or human immunodeficiency viruses or are
deliberately infected with bloodborne
pathogens, they must be handled in accordance with the precautions noted
in the BPS. Likewise,
animal tissues, explants or cell cultures known to be contaminated by
deliberate infection with
human immunodeficiency virus or Hepatitis B virus are also subject to the
BPS.
All laboratory work with primary human tissues or body fluids is covered
by the BPS.
We hope this information is responsive to your concerns and thank you for
your interest in worker
safety and health.
Sincerely,
Ruth E. McCully, Director
Office of Health Compliance Assistance
Enclosure
DEFINITIONS
* A Human Cell LINE is defined as in vitro or animal passaged (e.g., nude
mouse) cultures or
human cells that fulfill traditional requirements of a cell line
designation. That is, the cells are
immortalized cells, transformed by spontaneous mutation or natural or
laboratory infection with an
immortalizating agent such as Epstein-Barr virus (EBV). EBV is a
bloodborne pathogen. It should
be noted that human cervical carcinoma cells or other transformed human
cell lines like HeLa cells
are sometimes adulterated with laboratory pathogens accidentally
introduced by cultivation with
other cell cultures, or physically contaminated by other cell cultures
handled in the same lab. In
order to handle human HeLa cells, without having to comply with the
requirements of the
bloodborne pathogens standard (BPS), human HeLa cells should be
documented to be pure HeLa
cells and shown to be free of bloodborne pathogens by testing.
**Characterization of human cells, for inclusion or exclusion from
compliance with the BPS, would
include screening of the cells lines or "strains" for viruses
characterized as bloodborne pathogens by
the Standard, including human immunodeficiency viruses, hepatitis viruses
or EBV, if the cells are
capable of propagating such viruses. Most cell lines are screened for
human mycoplasmas and are
free of bacterial and mycotic contaminants. Testing may include antigenic
screening for viral or agent
markers, co-cultivation with various indicator cells that allow
contaminants to grow, or using
molecular technology (polymerase chain reaction or nucleic acid
hybridization) to identify latent
viruses capable of infecting humans such as Herpesviruses(e.g., EBV), or
papilloma members of the
Papovavirus group, etc. Cell lines that are procured from commercial
vendors or other sources
with documented testing to be free of human bloodborne pathogens and
which have been protected
by the employer from environmental contamination may be excluded from the
BPS.
*** Human cell STRAINS are defined as cells propagated in vitro from
primary explants of human
tissue or body fluids which have finite lifetime (non-transformed) in
tissue culture for 20-70
passages. Human cell "strains" must be handled as potential biohazards
unless characterized by
testing to be free of bloodborne pathogens (i.e., WI-38 cells are often
so documented).
September 23, 1993
Dr. Roger A. Clark, Director
Directorate of Compliance Programs
Occupational Safety and Health Administration
Washington, DC 20210
Dear Dr. Clark:
The American Biological Safety Association [ABSA], of which I am a
member, recently contacted
your office concerning the inclusion of "well established human cell
lines" under the OSHA 29 CFR
1910.1030. I have a copy of your response letter dated August 3, 1993 to
Dr. Jerome Schmidt,
President of ABSA. Dr. Schmidt had submitted the inquiry letter at the
request of ABSA's
Technical Review Committee. ABSA was seeking exclusion for the use of
well characterized
human cells lines from the Standard when the lines have been proven
virus/agent free by rigorous
techniques. Dr. Schmidt's letter to you of March 25, 1993 acknowledges
that "primary cultures" of
human cells are potentially risky and require Universal Precautions. Well
characterized human cells
referenced in the ABSA inquiry means, I believe, transformed lines of
human cells that have been
tested with rigorous methods [e.g., culture, viral or agent antigen or
markers, PCR in the case of
human lymphocytes or epithelial cells for HIV or HBV, respectively].
Two statements in your response cause me grave concerns as a biological
safety professional. First,
your statements go much further than ABSA members ever expected when you
included, by
implication, that "protected" established cell lines, "primary cell
lines" [Strains?] as well as secondary
or higher passaged human cells were excluded from the Standard. According
to your letter, cell
strains cultured from primary explants or subcultures after passage 1
would not be covered by the
BBP Standard. Most virologists recognize that many such human subcultures
of primary cells,
endogenously infected in the donor with silent HTLV viruses, papilloma,
JC, BK, CJ, herpes,
hepatitis and other viruses, as well as possible intracellular bacterial
pathogens may represent a real
and present source for human infection. A person receiving secondary or
subsequent cultures of
human lymphocytes, fetal cell mixtures, or hepatocytes from a vendor or
laboratory may be
obtaining human cells that contain a myriad of human viruses including
hepatitis viruses and even
HIV without any knowledge that the agents are present. Recall that 1 in
every 250 American
donors of tissue today may have HIV and that many more persons may harbor
HBV. Such human
cell "strains" would not require careful testing to determine their
status as infectious agent free
cultures so long as they are not "primary cultures" or deliberately
infected with HIV. According to
your recommendation, these passages of cells can now be handled by
personnel without compliance
with 29 CFR 1919.1030. Rest assured, if this door is left open, many will
use your statement in this
way, even though I do not believe that is what you and OSHA meant to
happen. All human cell
primary explants, derived cell strains from these explants, at any
passage, and established
human cell lines should be included under the standard unless well
characterized by
rigorous techniques and shown to be free of the BBP agents.
The second statement of concern in your letter is that "Established cell
lines, which are protected
from contamination with environmental organisms to ensure their integrity
for research purposes, are
not considered OPIM and, are therefore not covered under the Bloodborne
Pathogen Standard".
You then clarify this statement implying that if HIV is [deliberately]
cultured in the cells, the
established cell lines are included under the Standard. It is my
considered opinion that your official
interpretation will now cause great confusion. Human cell lines from the
American Type Culture
Collection [ATCC] and other sources bear clear warning that they may
contain BBP. ATCC
recommends that these cells must be handled at BL-2 and in compliance
with the BBP Standard. It
is clear that some BBPs, especially endogenous human retroviruses can be
harbored in established
cells. If taken literally, your statement says that these cells may be
considered excluded from the
BBP Standard as long as they are kept protected from contamination in the
laboratory handling
them. In fact, they may already be contaminated with a spectrum of
viruses, some of which can only
be detected with nucleic acid blotting techniques that are not used
routinely to screen for common
viruses. So long as the receiving lab protects them from contamination
with environmental pathogens
in that lab, handling them does not require compliance with the BBP
Standard. This is a potentially
dangerous precedent that will almost surely lead to a laboratory exposure
to BBP in the American
work place. Such established cells showing no active viral replication,
may be induced by a variety
of agents to replicate endogenous viruses that are capable of infecting
humans, especially if a worker
is cut handling the cultures. I know you meant to be helpful in making
the statement; however, many
lab workers and especially their supervisors are more interested in
getting around having to comply
with the Standard than in seriously considering the true risk. They will
contend that they did not
expose the cells to environmental pathogens in their handling and this
may be true, but not relevant,
if the cultures are already contaminated upon receipt in the lab. Many
labs do not have
knowledgeable biosafety professionals with real expertise to correctly
advise them about the
requirements for characterization of established cell lines to reasonably
establish the lines are likely
to be viral or agent free. Now these labs will have license to do so
without fear of regulation so long
as they do not culture the cells with other cultures of BBPs.
ABSA was only asking for permission to exclude only well characterized
human cell lines. Your
letter gives authorization to exclude any human cell line, including
secondary explants, so long as it
is protected from environmental contamination with BBP in the recipient
laboratory. Again, the cell
line may already harbor BBP when received, but ignorance in this case
would be adequate excuse
to avoid compliance with the BBP Standard.
Please reconsider these two statements in your letter very carefully. I
support ABSA's request for
excluding rigorously characterized human cell lines, proven to contain no
BBPs by stringent
techniques [PCR, sensitive antigen detection, stimulation and co-culture
assays, enzyme analysis,
etc], but the wording of your letter will generate great confusion when I
know that you were
attempting to be helpful and cooperative.
Sincerely yours,
Joseph H. Coggin, Jr. Ph.D.
Professor and Chair, Microbiology and
Immunology, Professor of Pathology, and Associate Dean
November 10, 1993
Dr. Jessica Sandler
OSHA
Office of Compliance Programs
Occupational Safety and Health Administration
Washington, DC 20210
Dear Dr Sandler:
Thank you for your phone call regarding my letter of September 23, 1993
to Dr. Roger Clark,
Director of The Directorate of Compliance Programs of OSHA. A copy of his
response to Dr.
Schmidt of ABSA is enclosed for your reference, along with a suggested
redraft that I composed to
deal with the issues of concern raised in my letter to Dr. Clark. As you
can see I kept to the theme
of his letter, but believe I used more traditionally accepted definitions
of terms used to refer to tissue
cultures.
I hope that these changes will be specific enough to be clarifying and
faithful to the classic, widely
accepted definitions of the terms "cell line" and "cell strain". The
draft I enclose, hopefully will avoid
the confusion I noted in the letter from Dr. Clark. I also defined the
term "Characterization" to
provide employers with a clear indication of the general laboratory
testing criteria which should be
used to establish human cell lines and strains as safe from the most
problematic, non-treatable
human blood borne pathogens.
Thank you for this opportunity to be of service.
Sincerely,
Joseph H. Coggin, Jr. Ph.D.
Professor and Chair and Professor of Pathology
August 3, 1993
Mr. Jerome P. Schmidt
President
American Biological Safety Association
1202 Allanson Road
Mundelein, IL 60060
Dear Mr. Schmidt:
This is in response to your letter of March 25, requesting an
interpretation of the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) standard 29 CFR 1910.1030,
"Occupational Exposure
to Bloodborne Pathogens." Specifically, you requested information as to
the applicability of
established human cell lines to the bloodborne pathogens standard.
As you know, the standard provides protections to employees who have
occupational exposure to
blood or other potentially infectious materials (OPIM). Established cell
lines, which are protected
from contamination with environmental organisms to ensure their integrity
for research purposed, are
not considered to be OPIM, and are therefore not covered under the
bloodborne pathogens
standard. However, please bear in mind that established cell lines
containing the human
immunodeficiency virus (HIV) are covered by the standard.
Primary cell lines, except those containing HIV, are also not covered by
the standard. However,
employees who initially handle the tissue from which any human cell lines
are derived and do the
initial steps in the culture of the cells are covered by the standard
because of their reasonably
anticipated exposure to unfixed tissues and blood.
We hope this information is responsive to your concerns. Thank you for
your interest in employee
safety and health.
Sincerely,
Roger A. Clark, Director
Directorate of Compliance Programs
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
--=====================_272050708==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
At 11:28 AM 6/14/2002 -0400, you wrote:
Does anyone know where I can find if OSHA requires research with human cell
lines to be treated as BSL-2 (as potential bloodborne pathogens)? A specific
OSHA (or other) requirement would be very helpful.
Thanks!
--
David R. Gillum
David: below is from the OSHA website regarding human cell lines (and yes they are covered):
Standard Interpretations
06/21/1994 - Applicability of 1910.1030 to
establish human cell lines.
June 21, 1994
Dr. Diane Fleming
President
University of South Alabama
College of Medicine
CSAB 170
Mobile, Alabama 36688
Dear Dr. Fleming:
This is in response to a September 23, 1993 letter from Joseph H. Coggin, an American Biological
Safety Association member, requesting clarification of our August 3, 1993 letter of interpretation to
the former ABSA President Dr. Jerome P. Schmidt. That letter attempted to explain the
applicability of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration's (OSHA) standard 29 CFR
1910.1030, "Occupational Exposure to Bloodborne Pathogens," to establish human cell lines.
Dr. Coggin informed us that our August 3, 1993 letter may be more confusing rather than
enlightening to biological safety professionals.
We have reconsidered our earlier comments and are providing a more detailed letter of
interpretation. We regret any misunderstanding our earlier response may have caused.
As you know, the Bloodborne Pathogens standard (BPS) provides protection to employees who
have occupational exposure to human blood or other potentially infectious materials (OPIM).
Established human cell lines* (see attachment) which are characterized** (see attachment) to be
free of contamination from human hepatitis viruses, human immunodeficiency viruses, and other
recognized bloodborne pathogens, are not considered to be OPIM and are not covered by BPS.
Established human or other animal cell lines which are known to be or likely infected/contaminated
with human microbes or agents classed as bloodborne pathogens, especially hepatitis viruses and
human immunodeficiency viruses are covered by the BPS. The final judgement for making the
determination that human or other animal cell lines in culture are free of bloodborne pathogens must
be made by a Bio-safety Professional or other qualified scientist with the background and
experience to review such potential contamination and risk, in accordance with the requirements of
the BPS. Documentation that such cell lines are not OPIM should be a matter of written record and
on file with the employer for OSHA review.
All primary human cell explants from tissues and subsequent in vitro passages of human tissue
explant cultures (human cell "strains" ***, see attachment) must be regarded as containing potential
bloodborne pathogens and should be handled in accordance with the BPS. Non-transformed,
human cell "strains", characterized by documented, reasonable laboratory testing as described in the
attachment, to be free of human immunodeficiency virus, hepatitis viruses, or other bloodborne
pathogens may be exempted from the standard's requirements. However, if such tissue explants or
subsequent cultures are derived from human subjects known to carry bloodborne pathogens, such
as hepatitis viruses or human immunodeficiency viruses or are deliberately infected with bloodborne
pathogens, they must be handled in accordance with the precautions noted in the BPS. Likewise,
animal tissues, explants or cell cultures known to be contaminated by deliberate infection with
human immunodeficiency virus or Hepatitis B virus are also subject to the BPS.
All laboratory work with primary human tissues or body fluids is covered by the BPS.
We hope this information is responsive to your concerns and thank you for your interest in worker
safety and health.
Sincerely,
Ruth E. McCully, Director
Office of Health Compliance Assistance
Enclosure
DEFINITIONS
* A Human Cell LINE is defined as in vitro or animal passaged (e.g., nude mouse) cultures or
human cells that fulfill traditional requirements of a cell line designation. That is, the cells are
immortalized cells, transformed by spontaneous mutation or natural or laboratory infection with an
immortalizating agent such as Epstein-Barr virus (EBV). EBV is a bloodborne pathogen. It should
be noted that human cervical carcinoma cells or other transformed human cell lines like HeLa cells
are sometimes adulterated with laboratory pathogens accidentally introduced by cultivation with
other cell cultures, or physically contaminated by other cell cultures handled in the same lab. In
order to handle human HeLa cells, without having to comply with the requirements of the
bloodborne pathogens standard (BPS), human HeLa cells should be documented to be pure HeLa
cells and shown to be free of bloodborne pathogens by testing.
**Characterization of human cells, for inclusion or exclusion from compliance with the BPS, would
include screening of the cells lines or "strains" for viruses characterized as bloodborne pathogens by
the Standard, including human immunodeficiency viruses, hepatitis viruses or EBV, if the cells are
capable of propagating such viruses. Most cell lines are screened for human mycoplasmas and are
free of bacterial and mycotic contaminants. Testing may include antigenic screening for viral or agent
markers, co-cultivation with various indicator cells that allow contaminants to grow, or using
molecular technology (polymerase chain reaction or nucleic acid hybridization) to identify latent
viruses capable of infecting humans such as Herpesviruses(e.g., EBV), or papilloma members of the
Papovavirus group, etc. Cell lines that are procured from commercial vendors or other sources
with documented testing to be free of human bloodborne pathogens and which have been protected
by the employer from environmental contamination may be excluded from the BPS.
*** Human cell STRAINS are defined as cells propagated in vitro from primary explants of human
tissue or body fluids which have finite lifetime (non-transformed) in tissue culture for 20-70
passages. Human cell "strains" must be handled as potential biohazards unless characterized by
testing to be free of bloodborne pathogens (i.e., WI-38 cells are often so documented).
September 23, 1993
Dr. Roger A. Clark, Director
Directorate of Compliance Programs
Occupational Safety and Health Administration
Washington, DC 20210
Dear Dr. Clark:
The American Biological Safety Association [ABSA], of which I am a member, recently contacted
your office concerning the inclusion of "well established human cell lines" under the OSHA 29 CFR
1910.1030. I have a copy of your response letter dated August 3, 1993 to Dr. Jerome Schmidt,
President of ABSA. Dr. Schmidt had submitted the inquiry letter at the request of ABSA's
Technical Review Committee. ABSA was seeking exclusion for the use of well characterized
human cells lines from the Standard when the lines have been proven virus/agent free by rigorous
techniques. Dr. Schmidt's letter to you of March 25, 1993 acknowledges that "primary cultures" of
human cells are potentially risky and require Universal Precautions. Well characterized human cells
referenced in the ABSA inquiry means, I believe, transformed lines of human cells that have been
tested with rigorous methods [e.g., culture, viral or agent antigen or markers, PCR in the case of
human lymphocytes or epithelial cells for HIV or HBV, respectively].
Two statements in your response cause me grave concerns as a biological safety professional. First,
your statements go much further than ABSA members ever expected when you included, by
implication, that "protected" established cell lines, "primary cell lines" [Strains?] as well as secondary
or higher passaged human cells were excluded from the Standard. According to your letter, cell
strains cultured from primary explants or subcultures after passage 1 would not be covered by the
BBP Standard. Most virologists recognize that many such human subcultures of primary cells,
endogenously infected in the donor with silent HTLV viruses, papilloma, JC, BK, CJ, herpes,
hepatitis and other viruses, as well as possible intracellular bacterial pathogens may represent a real
and present source for human infection. A person receiving secondary or subsequent cultures of
human lymphocytes, fetal cell mixtures, or hepatocytes from a vendor or laboratory may be
obtaining human cells that contain a myriad of human viruses including hepatitis viruses and even
HIV without any knowledge that the agents are present. Recall that 1 in every 250 American
donors of tissue today may have HIV and that many more persons may harbor HBV. Such human
cell "strains" would not require careful testing to determine their status as infectious agent free
cultures so long as they are not "primary cultures" or deliberately infected with HIV. According to
your recommendation, these passages of cells can now be handled by personnel without compliance
with 29 CFR 1919.1030. Rest assured, if this door is left open, many will use your statement in this
way, even though I do not believe that is what you and OSHA meant to happen. All human cell
primary explants, derived cell strains from these explants, at any passage, and established
human cell lines should be included under the standard unless well characterized by
rigorous techniques and shown to be free of the BBP agents.
The second statement of concern in your letter is that "Established cell lines, which are protected
from contamination with environmental organisms to ensure their integrity for research purposes, are
not considered OPIM and, are therefore not covered under the Bloodborne Pathogen Standard".
You then clarify this statement implying that if HIV is [deliberately] cultured in the cells, the
established cell lines are included under the Standard. It is my considered opinion that your official
interpretation will now cause great confusion. Human cell lines from the American Type Culture
Collection [ATCC] and other sources bear clear warning that they may contain BBP. ATCC
recommends that these cells must be handled at BL-2 and in compliance with the BBP Standard. It
is clear that some BBPs, especially endogenous human retroviruses can be harbored in established
cells. If taken literally, your statement says that these cells may be considered excluded from the
BBP Standard as long as they are kept protected from contamination in the laboratory handling
them. In fact, they may already be contaminated with a spectrum of viruses, some of which can only
be detected with nucleic acid blotting techniques that are not used routinely to screen for common
viruses. So long as the receiving lab protects them from contamination with environmental pathogens
in that lab, handling them does not require compliance with the BBP Standard. This is a potentially
dangerous precedent that will almost surely lead to a laboratory exposure to BBP in the American
work place. Such established cells showing no active viral replication, may be induced by a variety
of agents to replicate endogenous viruses that are capable of infecting humans, especially if a worker
is cut handling the cultures. I know you meant to be helpful in making the statement; however, many
lab workers and especially their supervisors are more interested in getting around having to comply
with the Standard than in seriously considering the true risk. They will contend that they did not
expose the cells to environmental pathogens in their handling and this may be true, but not relevant,
if the cultures are already contaminated upon receipt in the lab. Many labs do not have
knowledgeable biosafety professionals with real expertise to correctly advise them about the
requirements for characterization of established cell lines to reasonably establish the lines are likely
to be viral or agent free. Now these labs will have license to do so without fear of regulation so long
as they do not culture the cells with other cultures of BBPs.
ABSA was only asking for permission to exclude only well characterized human cell lines. Your
letter gives authorization to exclude any human cell line, including secondary explants, so long as it
is protected from environmental contamination with BBP in the recipient laboratory. Again, the cell
line may already harbor BBP when received, but ignorance in this case would be adequate excuse
to avoid compliance with the BBP Standard.
Please reconsider these two statements in your letter very carefully. I support ABSA's request for
excluding rigorously characterized human cell lines, proven to contain no BBPs by stringent
techniques [PCR, sensitive antigen detection, stimulation and co-culture assays, enzyme analysis,
etc], but the wording of your letter will generate great confusion when I know that you were
attempting to be helpful and cooperative.
Sincerely yours,
Joseph H. Coggin, Jr. Ph.D.
Professor and Chair, Microbiology and
Immunology, Professor of Pathology, and Associate Dean
November 10, 1993
Dr. Jessica Sandler
OSHA
Office of Compliance Programs
Occupational Safety and Health Administration
Washington, DC 20210
Dear Dr Sandler:
Thank you for your phone call regarding my letter of September 23, 1993 to Dr. Roger Clark,
Director of The Directorate of Compliance Programs of OSHA. A copy of his response to Dr.
Schmidt of ABSA is enclosed for your reference, along with a suggested redraft that I composed to
deal with the issues of concern raised in my letter to Dr. Clark. As you can see I kept to the theme
of his letter, but believe I used more traditionally accepted definitions of terms used to refer to tissue
cultures.
I hope that these changes will be specific enough to be clarifying and faithful to the classic, widely
accepted definitions of the terms "cell line" and "cell strain". The draft I enclose, hopefully will avoid
the confusion I noted in the letter from Dr. Clark. I also defined the term "Characterization" to
provide employers with a clear indication of the general laboratory testing criteria which should be
used to establish human cell lines and strains as safe from the most problematic, non-treatable
human blood borne pathogens.
Thank you for this opportunity to be of service.
Sincerely,
Joseph H. Coggin, Jr. Ph.D.
Professor and Chair and Professor of Pathology
August 3, 1993
Mr. Jerome P. Schmidt
President
American Biological Safety Association
1202 Allanson Road
Mundelein, IL 60060
Dear Mr. Schmidt:
This is in response to your letter of March 25, requesting an interpretation of the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) standard 29 CFR 1910.1030, "Occupational Exposure
to Bloodborne Pathogens." Specifically, you requested information as to the applicability of
established human cell lines to the bloodborne pathogens standard.
As you know, the standard provides protections to employees who have occupational exposure to
blood or other potentially infectious materials (OPIM). Established cell lines, which are protected
from contamination with environmental organisms to ensure their integrity for research purposed, are
not considered to be OPIM, and are therefore not covered under the bloodborne pathogens
standard. However, please bear in mind that established cell lines containing the human
immunodeficiency virus (HIV) are covered by the standard.
Primary cell lines, except those containing HIV, are also not covered by the standard. However,
employees who initially handle the tissue from which any human cell lines are derived and do the
initial steps in the culture of the cells are covered by the standard because of their reasonably
anticipated exposure to unfixed tissues and blood.
We hope this information is responsive to your concerns. Thank you for your interest in employee
safety and health.
Sincerely,
Roger A. Clark, Director
Directorate of Compliance Programs
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
--=====================_272050708==_.ALT--
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 17 Jun 2002 14:01:01 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Marcham, Cheri"
Subject: IATA shipping/receiving requirements
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Need some quick help on shipping and receiving infectious materials. =
All the documents I have refer to IATA 1.3.3.1, to the effect of "Prior =
arrangements as required by IATA Dangerous Goods Regulations 1.3.3.1 =
have been made."
My problem is, I would like to see exactly what 1.3.3.1 says.
Can anyone quote the verbiage please?
Thanks.
Cheri Marcham, CIH, CSP, CHMM
Environmental Health and Safety Officer
The University of Oklahoma Health Sciences Center
P. O. Box 26901 ROB-301
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73190
405/271-3000
FAX 405/271-1606
cheri-marcham@ouhsc.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 17 Jun 2002 15:11:42 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Larry Mendoza
Organization: VCU-OEHS-Biological/Chemical Safety Section
Subject: New Bioterrorism legislation
MIME-Version: 1.0
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--------------965F328A22A80418AC454F78
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Good day to all...
A couple questions about the new legislation(s) dealing with select agents and
bioterrorism. It has come to our attention that some PI's at our university have been
using various toxins (some exempt and some not). The question is, under new
legislation, are all exemptions for biomedical research (LD50s etc...) still in place?
I thought I read somewhere that they were doing away with exemptions but when the new
legislation keeps referring to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996, it implies that the exemptions are still in place. Also, the other question is,
if exemptions are still in place, is tetrodotoxin citrate buffer not exempt? According
to the RTECs, the LD50 for TTX citrate buffer is 8ng/kg, which is well under the
100ng/kg limit for the exemption. Thank you for clarifying this.
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 17 Jun 2002 15:11:12 -0400
Reply-To: mkinsey@
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Melina Kinsey
Subject: Re: IATA shipping/receiving requirements
In-Reply-To:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Cheri-
Here is what my 41st Edition, 1/1/00, IATA Dangerous Goods Regulation book
states:
1.3.3.1 Infectious Substance
"Before offering any infectious substance for carriage, the shipper must
have made advance arrangements with the consignee; receive confirmation that
the substance may be legally imported without delay in delivery; made
advance arrangements with the operator to ensure expeditious carriage; and
notified the consignee of all shipping details."
Hope this helps.
Melina
Melina Kinsey
Safety Officer
Midwest Research Institute
Florida Division
1470 Treeland Blvd. S.E.
Palm Bay, Florida 32909-2211
mkinsey@
(321) 723-4547 ext. 404
> -----Original Message-----
> From: A Biosafety Discussion List [mailto:BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU]On
> Behalf Of Marcham, Cheri
> Sent: Monday, June 17, 2002 3:01 PM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: IATA shipping/receiving requirements
>
>
> Need some quick help on shipping and receiving infectious
> materials. All the documents I have refer to IATA 1.3.3.1,
> to the effect of "Prior arrangements as required by IATA
> Dangerous Goods Regulations 1.3.3.1 have been made."
>
> My problem is, I would like to see exactly what 1.3.3.1 says.
>
> Can anyone quote the verbiage please?
>
> Thanks.
>
> Cheri Marcham, CIH, CSP, CHMM
> Environmental Health and Safety Officer
> The University of Oklahoma Health Sciences Center
> P. O. Box 26901 ROB-301
> Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73190
> 405/271-3000
> FAX 405/271-1606
> cheri-marcham@ouhsc.edu
>
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 17 Jun 2002 15:13:34 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Essala Lowe
Subject: Re: IATA shipping/receiving requirements
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Cheri,
That is the section of the regulations in your IATA DGR manual.Its on page
3 in your IATA manual(2002)edition. It basically says that the shipper has
made prior arrangements with the consignee and that the substance is
legally imported, and that the consignee knows the way that the shipment
will arrive. (I am paraphrasing here)
Just making sure that all shipment arrangements and regulations are known
by both shipper and consignee.
hope this helps.
At 02:01 PM 6/17/2002 -0500, you wrote:
>Need some quick help on shipping and receiving infectious materials. All
the documents I have refer to IATA 1.3.3.1, to the effect of "Prior
arrangements as required by IATA Dangerous Goods Regulations 1.3.3.1 have
been made."
>
>My problem is, I would like to see exactly what 1.3.3.1 says.
>
>Can anyone quote the verbiage please?
>
>Thanks.
>
>Cheri Marcham, CIH, CSP, CHMM
>Environmental Health and Safety Officer
>The University of Oklahoma Health Sciences Center
>P. O. Box 26901 ROB-301
>Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73190
>405/271-3000
>FAX 405/271-1606
>cheri-marcham@ouhsc.edu
>
>
Essala D. Lowe
Biological Safety Officer
Laboratory Safety and Environmental Health
The Rockefeller University
1230 York Avenue
New York, NY 10021
(212)327-8324/(212)27-8340 fax
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 17 Jun 2002 20:14:13 +0000
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Stephen D'Alessandro
Subject: Re: IATA shipping/receiving requirements
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; format=flowed
Cheri,
The IATA regs often refer to other sections when you are reading one.
That is the case with 1.3.3.1; it refers to 9.1.2 as well. I've written out
1.3.3.1 as well as 9.1.2 from the 2001 regs. I'll also try to explain it in
plain english.
1.3.3.1 Infectious Substances
1.3.3.1.1 Before offering any infectious substances for carriage, the
shipper must have made advance arrangements with the consignee; received
confirmation that the substance may be legally imported without delay in
delivery; made advance arrangements with the operatorto ensure expeditious
carriage; and notify the consignee of all shipping details (see also 9.1.2).
1.3.3.1.2 Live vertebrate or invertebrate animals must not be used to
consign infectious substances unless such substance scannot be consigned by
any other means. Infected live animals must not be transported by air
unless exempted in accordance with 2.1.2
9.1.2 Special Responsibilities in Accepting Infectious Substances
9.1.2.1 Advance arrangements must be made between the shipper and operator
before each shipment of infectious substances takes place. The operator
must ensure expeditious carriage. If an operator finds any error in
labeling or documentation he must immediately notify the shipper or
consignee so that corrective measures can be taken.
9.1.2.2 Shipments by any mode of transport must be made by the quickest
possible routing. When transfers are necessary, precautions must be taken
to assure special care, expeditious handling and monitoring of the
substances in transit. Shipping papers must show commercial transport
flight numbers with date and destination and any airport(s) of
trans-shipment.
9.1.2.3 (this is 1.3.3.1.2 almost word for word)
So, what does it mean? The first part of 1.3.3.1 tells you that before you
ship any infectious substance, you have to make sure that the
person/institution you are shipping it to can handle the material safely and
that there will be no restrictions to their receipt of it. The
airlines/freight company also must be willing to ship the material. Unless
you are shipping live infected animals, 1.3.3.1.2 and 9.1.2.3 don't apply.
In 9.1.2, you have to be sure that the airline can ship the material quickly
and without delays. If there are any errors on the shipping papers or the
shipping box, the airline/freight company has to notify you so that it can
be fixed. In 9.1.2.2, the carrier must use the quickest route to ship it and
take all safety precautions.
To complicate things further, shipments to Australia and shipments by Alaska
Airlines, FedEx, and Hawaiian Airlines have further restrictions.
If this seems complicated, it is. I hoped this helped.
Sincerely,
Steve D'Alessandro
EH&S Manager
Shire Biologics Inc.
>From: "Marcham, Cheri"
>Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
>To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
>Subject: IATA shipping/receiving requirements
>Date: Mon, 17 Jun 2002 14:01:01 -0500
>
>Need some quick help on shipping and receiving infectious materials. All
>the documents I have refer to IATA 1.3.3.1, to the effect of "Prior
>arrangements as required by IATA Dangerous Goods Regulations 1.3.3.1 have
>been made."
>
>My problem is, I would like to see exactly what 1.3.3.1 says.
>
>Can anyone quote the verbiage please?
>
>Thanks.
>
>Cheri Marcham, CIH, CSP, CHMM
>Environmental Health and Safety Officer
>The University of Oklahoma Health Sciences Center
>P. O. Box 26901 ROB-301
>Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73190
>405/271-3000
>FAX 405/271-1606
>cheri-marcham@ouhsc.edu
_________________________________________________________________
Send and receive Hotmail on your mobile device:
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 17 Jun 2002 16:38:49 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Therese M. Stinnett"
Subject: Re: New Bioterrorism legislation
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
I've looked at the Federal Register on-line today, 6/17, for any notice =
of
proposed rule-making on the bioterrorism law, and so far found nothing. =
The
Secretary, DHHS, has 30 days from the day the President signed it to =
issue
guidance on registration for possession. I suspect that will be the =
first
big news to watch for.
Therese M. Stinnett
Biosafety Officer
Health and Safety Division
UCHSC, Mailstop C275
4200 E. 9th Avenue
Denver, CO=A0 80262
Voice:=A0 303-315-6754
Pager:=A0 303-266-5402
Fax:=A0 303-315-8026
email:=A0 therese.stinnett@uchsc.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 18 Jun 2002 10:49:13 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Robert N. Latsch"
Subject: Children in the workplace.
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Good morning to all,
This is not just a a biosafety question. It is more of a general
laboratory protocol question.
What rules or protocols are in place in your institution for dealing with
children in the workplace. I.E. laboratory?
1) If the child is under 14 and a worker?
2) If the child is under fourteen and a student?
3) If the child is under fourteen and the child is with a poarent in the
lab?(no babysitter today for example)
4) If the child is over 14 and a worker?
5) If the child is over fourteen and a student?
6) If the child is over fourteen and the child is with a parent in the lab?
7) Are you a private business or a school?
Thanks,
Bob
_____________________________________________________________________
__ / _____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 18 Jun 2002 10:58:12 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Robin Newberry
Subject: Re: Children in the workplace.
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed"
>What rules or protocols are in place in your institution for dealing with
>children in the workplace. I.E. laboratory?
>
>1) If the child is under 14 and a worker?
>
>2) If the child is under fourteen and a student?
>
>3) If the child is under fourteen and the child is with a poarent in the
>lab?(no babysitter today for example)
>
>4) If the child is over 14 and a worker?
>
>5) If the child is over fourteen and a student?
>
>6) If the child is over fourteen and the child is with a parent in the lab?
No children under the age of sixteen are allowed in the lab, period.
Children between 16 and 18 years of age are allowed only with
constant direct supervision by an authorized person.
We're a public University.
--
Robin
--------------------------------------------------------------
W. Robert Newberry, IV CIH, CHMM
Chief Environmental Health and Safety Officer
Clemson University
wnewber@clemson.edu ehs@clemson.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 18 Jun 2002 10:48:34 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Doob, Peter (NIDA/IRP)"
Subject: Re: Children in the workplace.
MIME-Version: 1.0
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Bob-
I don't think that one size will fit all, as some labs/facilities are
considerably less problematic than others, but here is what we use, for what
it's worth.
-Pete
Peter A. Doob, MPH, JD
Chief, Safety and Operations Support Section, ASB
National Institute for Drug Abuse, NIH
Intramural Research Program
5500 Nathan Shock Drive
Baltimore, MD 21224
vc: 410-550-1675
> ----------
> From: Robert N. Latsch
> Reply To: A Biosafety Discussion List
> Sent: Tuesday, June 18, 2002 10:49 AM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: Children in the workplace.
>
> Good morning to all,
>
> This is not just a a biosafety question. It is more of a general
> laboratory protocol question.
>
> What rules or protocols are in place in your institution for dealing with
> children in the workplace. I.E. laboratory?
>
> 1) If the child is under 14 and a worker?
>
> 2) If the child is under fourteen and a student?
>
> 3) If the child is under fourteen and the child is with a poarent in the
> lab?(no babysitter today for example)
>
> 4) If the child is over 14 and a worker?
>
> 5) If the child is over fourteen and a student?
>
> 6) If the child is over fourteen and the child is with a parent in the
> lab?
>
> 7) Are you a private business or a school?
>
> Thanks,
>
> Bob
>
>
>
>
> _____________________________________________________________________
> __ /
> _____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
> _ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
> \ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
> \ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental
> Safety
> \__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
>
>
------_=_NextPart_000_01C216D7.38BF0E20
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name="minors s 2000.pdf"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
Content-Disposition: attachment;
filename="minors s 2000.pdf"
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 18 Jun 2002 10:55:55 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Kuchera, Mary"
Subject: Re: Children in the workplace.
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
In my small pharma laboratories (private business): NO kids allowed,
period.
I wish I could find an apartment complex like this.
-----Original Message-----
From: Robert N. Latsch [mailto:rnl2@PO.CWRU.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, June 18, 2002 10:49 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Children in the workplace.
Good morning to all,
This is not just a a biosafety question. It is more of a general
laboratory protocol question.
What rules or protocols are in place in your institution for dealing with
children in the workplace. I.E. laboratory?
1) If the child is under 14 and a worker?
2) If the child is under fourteen and a student?
3) If the child is under fourteen and the child is with a poarent in the
lab?(no babysitter today for example)
4) If the child is over 14 and a worker?
5) If the child is over fourteen and a student?
6) If the child is over fourteen and the child is with a parent in the lab?
7) Are you a private business or a school?
Thanks,
Bob
_____________________________________________________________________
__ /
_____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 18 Jun 2002 09:19:16 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Therese M. Stinnett"
Subject: Re: Children in the workplace.
MIME-Version: 1.0
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First, there are federal and state statutes regarding what materials =
and/or
equipment a minor (under the age of 18) may work with or be exposed to.
Student workers are subject to the same rules as all other minors.
Volunteer (unpaid) work, may be interpreted differently from state to =
state.
We endeavor to treat it exactly the same as paid work.
At our institution, no one under the age of 14 is supposed to be a paid =
or
unpaid worker. However, there are grants available out there to bring
middle school aged children in for "experience" in the sciences,
particularly for underrepresented groups. It might be important to ask =
your
office of sponsored research if anyone on your campus has such a grant.
Children under the age of 14 (ie. not a paid or unpaid worker) are not =
to be
in the lab. If the parent has them on campus for a reason, they may =
stay in
the parent's office--even if that means walking through a lab. But =
they may
not be in the lab. They should not be unsupervised.
In addition, any lab with radioactive materials will have even further
restrictions imposed under the terms of our license and/or the =
Radiation
Safety Office.
Therese M. Stinnett
Biosafety Officer
Health and Safety Division
UCHSC, Mailstop C275
4200 E. 9th Avenue
Denver, CO=A0 80262
Voice:=A0 303-315-6754
Pager:=A0 303-266-5402
Fax:=A0 303-315-8026
email:=A0 therese.stinnett@uchsc.edu
4
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filename="Minor worker policy-sample.doc"
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 18 Jun 2002 10:31:46 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Michael Betlach
Subject: Re: Children in the workplace.
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Our policy as a private company incorporates a specific exception for
programs involving students as part of their education (see below). The BTCI
mentioned in the policy (more info at ) has separate
laboratory space for instructional purposes within one of our buildings. It
offers science experiences for youth as well as professional short courses
for adults, and hosts lab experiences for "Take Your Child to Work" days.
People/visitors in Labs:
1.Visitors in the labs may include individuals, tours, and participants in
BTCI programs. All visitors in the labs, production areas, or lab support
service area must be accompanied by an employee or teacher and must follow
all safety precautions as outlined in our Safety Policy. No one under age
18 is allowed in the labs, production areas, or lab support service area
(see exceptions below). The only reasons for visitors to be in the labs,
production areas, or lab support service areas are for educational purposes
and for mechanical reasons (authorized contractors).
Current exceptions to visitors in the Promega labs, production areas, or lab
support service areas include the following (must be 14 years of age or
older):
YAP (Youth Apprenticeship Program) (state funded program coordinated through
the local CESA 2 office for 1-2 high school juniors and seniors per year to
work 10-15 hours per week for a 2 year period with a Promega scientist).
Other educational programs as authorized by Human Resources and the Safety
and Health Coordinator (i.e., arrangement for Job Shadowing experiences with
direct supervision by a Promega employee, etc.).
These and other special student programs require approval of a Human
Resources Representative and the Safety and Health Coordinator prior to the
start of the program. They in turn will notify all of the appropriate
parties. Some of these programs are coordinated and authorized by the BTCI
in conjunction with Promega management.
Michael Betlach, Ph.D.
Biosafety Officer
Promega Corporation
5445 E. Cheryl Parkway
Madison, WI 53711
(608) 274-1181, Ext. 1270
-----Original Message-----
From: Robert N. Latsch [mailto:rnl2@PO.CWRU.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, June 18, 2002 9:49 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Children in the workplace.
Good morning to all,
This is not just a a biosafety question. It is more of a general
laboratory protocol question.
What rules or protocols are in place in your institution for dealing with
children in the workplace. I.E. laboratory?
1) If the child is under 14 and a worker?
2) If the child is under fourteen and a student?
3) If the child is under fourteen and the child is with a poarent in the
lab?(no babysitter today for example)
4) If the child is over 14 and a worker?
5) If the child is over fourteen and a student?
6) If the child is over fourteen and the child is with a parent in the lab?
7) Are you a private business or a school?
Thanks,
Bob
_____________________________________________________________________
__ /
_____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 18 Jun 2002 10:14:24 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Sue Quinn
Subject: Re: Children in the workplace.
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="----=_NextPart_000_13B3_01C216B0.EBB70310"
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My company is a biotech company and we have no workers 14 and under. =
Our policy has been that there are no kids allowed in the labs. One =
possible exception would be in some combined office/microscope areas =
where we have fly and worm genetics going on. These are chemical-free =
zones with cool scope stuff happening so for these areas we wouldn't =
worry too much if someone's child was hanging out (with supervision). =
As a rule, though we do not have kids onsite.
Sue
----- Original Message -----
From: Robert N. Latsch
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Sent: Tuesday, June 18, 2002 7:49 AM
Subject: Children in the workplace.
Good morning to all,
This is not just a a biosafety question. It is more of a general
laboratory protocol question.
What rules or protocols are in place in your institution for dealing =
with
children in the workplace. I.E. laboratory?
1) If the child is under 14 and a worker?
2) If the child is under fourteen and a student?
3) If the child is under fourteen and the child is with a poarent in =
the
lab?(no babysitter today for example)
4) If the child is over 14 and a worker?
5) If the child is over fourteen and a student?
6) If the child is over fourteen and the child is with a parent in =
the lab?
7) Are you a private business or a school?
Thanks,
Bob
_____________________________________________________________________
__ / =
_____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental =
Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail =
rlatsch@
------=_NextPart_000_13B3_01C216B0.EBB70310
Content-Type: text/html;
charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
My company is a biotech company and we = have no workers 14 and under. Our policy has been that there are no kids = allowed in the labs. One possible exception would be in some = combined office/microscope areas where we have fly and worm genetics going = on. These are chemical-free zones with cool scope stuff happening so for = these areas we wouldn't worry too much if someone's child was hanging out (with supervision). As a rule, though we do not have kids onsite.
Sue
----- Original Message -----
Robert N. = Latsch
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Sent: Tuesday, June 18, 2002 = 7:49 AM
Subject: Children in the = workplace.
Good morning to all,
This is not just a a = biosafety question. It is more of a general
laboratory protocol question.
What rules or protocols are in place in your = institution for dealing with
children in the workplace. I.E. laboratory?
1) If the child is under 14 and a worker?
2) If the child is under fourteen and a student?
3) If the child is under fourteen and the child = is with a poarent in the
lab?(no babysitter today for = example)
4) If the child is over 14 and a worker?
5) If the child is = over fourteen and a student?
6) If the child is over fourteen = and the child is with a parent in the lab?
7) Are you a private = business or a = school?
Thanks,
Bob
____________________= _________________________________________________
__ = / = _____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_= \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF = State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 = Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental = Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member = Personal e-mail rlatsch@
------=_NextPart_000_13B3_01C216B0.EBB70310--
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 18 Jun 2002 14:45:23 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Burgener, Jyl A"
Subject: Re: Children in the workplace.
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
We do not allow anyone under the age of 18 in our laboratories. The
rationale is that children are far more affected by chemicals than adults as
their enzyme systems are not mature. A child alcoholic in one year can do
more damage to their liver than an adult counterpart can do in 20.
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Sue Quinn [SMTP:squinn@]
> Sent: Tuesday, June 18, 2002 1:14 PM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: Re: Children in the workplace.
>
> My company is a biotech company and we have no workers 14 and under. Our
> policy has been that there are no kids allowed in the labs. One possible
> exception would be in some combined office/microscope areas where we have
> fly and worm genetics going on. These are chemical-free zones with cool
> scope stuff happening so for these areas we wouldn't worry too much if
> someone's child was hanging out (with supervision). As a rule, though we
> do not have kids onsite.
>
> Sue
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: Robert N. Latsch
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Sent: Tuesday, June 18, 2002 7:49 AM
> Subject: Children in the workplace.
>
> Good morning to all,
>
> This is not just a a biosafety question. It is more of a general
> laboratory protocol question.
>
> What rules or protocols are in place in your institution for dealing
> with
> children in the workplace. I.E. laboratory?
>
> 1) If the child is under 14 and a worker?
>
> 2) If the child is under fourteen and a student?
>
> 3) If the child is under fourteen and the child is with a poarent
> in the
> lab?(no babysitter today for example)
>
> 4) If the child is over 14 and a worker?
>
> 5) If the child is over fourteen and a student?
>
> 6) If the child is over fourteen and the child is with a parent in
> the lab?
>
> 7) Are you a private business or a school?
>
> Thanks,
>
> Bob
>
>
>
>
>
> _____________________________________________________________________
> __ /
> _____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
> _ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
> \ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational
> &
> \ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor
> Environmental Safety
> \__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail
> rlatsch@
>
>
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 18 Jun 2002 14:43:11 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Amy Barringer
Subject: Immunosuppressed Employees
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Another question concerning lab policy...
The BMBL states "In general persons, who are at increased risk of =
acquiring infection or for whom infection may have serious consequences, =
are not allowed in the laboratory or animal rooms" and "that the Laboratory=
director has the final responsibility for assessing each circumstance and =
determining who may enter or work in the laboratory or animal room".
How do your institutions deal with immunosuppressed employees? Does =
anyone have a written policy for handling this situation in a BSL2 =
laboratory setting? Thanks in advance.
Amy A. Barringer
Biosafety Officer, SOHES
ARS/USDA
Beltsville Agricultural Research Center
Bldg. 003, Rm. 118
Beltsville, MD 20705
(Ph) 301-504-5557, (F) 301-504-5857
barringa@ba.ars.
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 18 Jun 2002 14:15:52 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Giles, Carol A."
Subject: Re: Children in the workplace.
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
You might want to discuss this with your Human Resources and Legal Depts.
Federal laws regulate minors at work, at least for pay. Might want to check
Safetynet archives as well, since they have discussed this topic several
times over the past few years.
Carol A. Giles, MPH, CIH
EQO-Industrial Hygiene
Building 200, C-133
Argonne National Laboratory
9700 S. Cass Avenue
Argonne, IL 60439
(630) 252-3427
-----Original Message-----
From: Burgener, Jyl A [mailto:jab19768@]
Sent: June 18, 2002 1:45 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Children in the workplace.
We do not allow anyone under the age of 18 in our laboratories. The
rationale is that children are far more affected by chemicals than adults as
their enzyme systems are not mature. A child alcoholic in one year can do
more damage to their liver than an adult counterpart can do in 20.
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Sue Quinn [SMTP:squinn@]
> Sent: Tuesday, June 18, 2002 1:14 PM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: Re: Children in the workplace.
>
> My company is a biotech company and we have no workers 14 and under.
> Our policy has been that there are no kids allowed in the labs. One
> possible exception would be in some combined office/microscope areas
> where we have fly and worm genetics going on. These are chemical-free
> zones with cool scope stuff happening so for these areas we wouldn't
> worry too much if someone's child was hanging out (with supervision).
> As a rule, though we do not have kids onsite.
>
> Sue
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: Robert N. Latsch
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Sent: Tuesday, June 18, 2002 7:49 AM
> Subject: Children in the workplace.
>
> Good morning to all,
>
> This is not just a a biosafety question. It is more of a general
> laboratory protocol question.
>
> What rules or protocols are in place in your institution for
> dealing with
> children in the workplace. I.E. laboratory?
>
> 1) If the child is under 14 and a worker?
>
> 2) If the child is under fourteen and a student?
>
> 3) If the child is under fourteen and the child is with a
> poarent in the
> lab?(no babysitter today for example)
>
> 4) If the child is over 14 and a worker?
>
> 5) If the child is over fourteen and a student?
>
> 6) If the child is over fourteen and the child is with a parent
> in the lab?
>
> 7) Are you a private business or a school?
>
> Thanks,
>
> Bob
>
>
>
>
>
> _____________________________________________________________________
> __ /
> _____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
> _ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
> \ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational
> &
> \ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental
> Safety
> \__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail
> rlatsch@
>
>
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 18 Jun 2002 15:27:23 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "LeBoeuf, Steve"
Subject: Shared BSL 2 Facilities
I have been asked by our IBC Chairperson, who will be overseeing the
operation of a common use BSL 2 facilities in Microbiology, if I could find
any existing procedures at other locations for using such a facility. Any
help would be appreciated. Please reply to my e-mail address.
Steve LeBoeuf
Manager, EH&S
Biosafety Officer
Oregon State University
541-737-2276
541-737-9090 fax
steve.leboeuf@orst.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 18 Jun 2002 16:27:36 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Mike Grogan
Subject: Termination of Serum Banking Program
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
During a recent freezer replacement, I discovered the remains of a serum
banking program with samples from current and past employees. Currently the
Center does not have a serum banking program and employees have never worked
with agents assigned to Biosafety Level 3 or 4 at the Center. Upon
inspection of the vials, appearance of the freezer and a discussion with the
previous IBC chair, the storage of the vials is questionable at best.
Are suggestions for documenting or otherwise memorializing the disposal?
Any pitfalls to be wary of?
Thanks in advance,
Mike
---------------------------------------
Michael J. Grogan
Director of Institutional Compliance
Sidney Kimmel Cancer Center
10835 Altman Row
San Diego, CA 92121
> (858) 410-4182
> (858) 450-3251 FAX
> mgrogan@
>
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 19 Jun 2002 09:35:33 +0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Dr. Bruce M. Whitney"
Subject: Re: Shared BSL 2 Facilities
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Dear Steve,
I oversee a shared BL2 facility. Most of the work done here is tissue
culture but a large part of this would involve Hep. B/C positive human
tissue.
Can I help with an specific questions? Our facility in a medium sized
room that opens to 5 smaller rooms. The small rooms contain the hoods
and incubators. The larger, central room contains microscopes,
centrifuges, and other equipment.
Regards,
Bruce
"LeBoeuf, Steve" wrote:
>
> I have been asked by our IBC Chairperson, who will be overseeing the
> operation of a common use BSL 2 facilities in Microbiology, if I could find
> any existing procedures at other locations for using such a facility. Any
> help would be appreciated. Please reply to my e-mail address.
>
> Steve LeBoeuf
> Manager, EH&S
> Biosafety Officer
> Oregon State University
> 541-737-2276
> 541-737-9090 fax
> steve.leboeuf@orst.edu
--
Dr. Bruce M. Whitney
Cancer Centre, Prince of Wales Hospital
Chinese University of Hong Kong
Shatin, N.T. Hong Kong
Tel. (852) 2632 1152
Fax. (852) 2648 8842
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 19 Jun 2002 09:15:22 -0500
Reply-To: speaker@ehs.psu.edu
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Curt Speaker
Organization: UNIVERSITY SAFETY
Subject: incinerator woes
Morning:
I need some input from some of my counterparts, especially those in
the mid-atlantic region (PA, NY, NJ, MD, DE) who deal with large
animals (i.e., cattle).
We have just received word that our pathological incinerator did not
pass its emissions test. To aviod costly citations from the State
DEP, we have decided to suspend operations. We believe that the
testing company may have botched the test, but until we know for
sure, we will not operate the unit.
Our alternative for medical waste is simple - box up the material and
have our standby vendor remove it and dispose of it. But our
incinerator is connected to a veterinary diagnostic laboratory, which
generates thousands of pounds of potentially infected animal
carcasses per week. Disarticulating this type of waste into 50
pound increments (the maximum that our vendor will allow per box)
is just not a viable option. Contact with other incinerators that I
know of within a 3 hour drive from State College has yielded no
results.
Is anyone aware of a company the specializes in large animal
disposal on the East Coast??? We may be able to send some
material to rendering, but they will not accept any carcass that is
suspected of having neurological issues (scrapie sheep, BSE-like
cows, etc.) I am trying my best to assist our diagnostic laboratory
with this problem, but I am about at the end of my rope.
Any suggestions are most welcomed...
thanks
Curt
Curt Speaker
Biosafety Officer
Penn State University
Environmental Health and Safety
speaker@ehs.psu.edu
^...^
(O_O)
=(Y)=
"""
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 19 Jun 2002 09:17:58 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Robert N. Latsch"
Subject: Re: Shared BSL 2 Facilities
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
We insist that all such facilities be centralized in terms of
administration and that a combined chp/ecp be written if needed.
1) When there is a problem we want one person in charge to avoid the old
see that guy routine.
2) A combined cocument is necessary since all personnel in the area will
be at risk.
Bob
>I have been asked by our IBC Chairperson, who will be overseeing the
>operation of a common use BSL 2 facilities in Microbiology, if I could find
>any existing procedures at other locations for using such a facility. Any
>help would be appreciated. Please reply to my e-mail address.
>
>Steve LeBoeuf
>Manager, EH&S
>Biosafety Officer
>Oregon State University
>541-737-2276
>541-737-9090 fax
>steve.leboeuf@orst.edu
_____________________________________________________________________
__ / _____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 19 Jun 2002 09:41:22 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Alan Woodard
Subject: Re: incinerator woes
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
You may wish to pursue an emergency exemption from the USDOT RSPA Office
to use larger containers. USDOT 49 CFR preempts State regulations
pertaining to the packaging and transport of regulated
medical/infectious waste. Such exemption would allow you to package the
waste in carts or roll-off boxes and these could be transported to one
of the commercial medical waste incinerators providing they are willing
to accept the waste. You may still need to contain the animals in
plastic bags. There are at least 3 medical waste incinerators in the
East.
Alan G. Woodard, Ph.D.
Supervisor, Regulated Medical Waste Program
New York State
Department of Environmental Conservation
Division of Solid & Hazardous Materials
625 Broadway
Albany, NY 12233-7258
Office:(518)402-8693
Fax:(518)402-8654
E-mail:agwoodar@gw.dec.state.ny.us
>>> SPEAKER@SAFETY-1.SAFETY.PSU.EDU 06/19/02 10:15AM >>>
Morning:
I need some input from some of my counterparts, especially those in
the mid-atlantic region (PA, NY, NJ, MD, DE) who deal with large
animals (i.e., cattle).
We have just received word that our pathological incinerator did not
pass its emissions test. To aviod costly citations from the State
DEP, we have decided to suspend operations. We believe that the
testing company may have botched the test, but until we know for
sure, we will not operate the unit.
Our alternative for medical waste is simple - box up the material and
have our standby vendor remove it and dispose of it. But our
incinerator is connected to a veterinary diagnostic laboratory, which
generates thousands of pounds of potentially infected animal
carcasses per week. Disarticulating this type of waste into 50
pound increments (the maximum that our vendor will allow per box)
is just not a viable option. Contact with other incinerators that I
know of within a 3 hour drive from State College has yielded no
results.
Is anyone aware of a company the specializes in large animal
disposal on the East Coast??? We may be able to send some
material to rendering, but they will not accept any carcass that is
suspected of having neurological issues (scrapie sheep, BSE-like
cows, etc.) I am trying my best to assist our diagnostic laboratory
with this problem, but I am about at the end of my rope.
Any suggestions are most welcomed...
thanks
Curt
Curt Speaker
Biosafety Officer
Penn State University
Environmental Health and Safety
speaker@ehs.psu.edu
^...^
(O_O)
=(Y)=
"""
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 19 Jun 2002 10:05:50 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Robert N. Latsch"
Subject: Re: incinerator woes
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
>Date: Wed, 19 Jun 2002 10:05:16 -0400
>To: speaker@ehs.psu.edu
>From: "Robert N. Latsch"
>Subject: Re: incinerator woes
>Cc:
>Bcc:
>X-Attachments:
>
>Good Morning,
>
>We went through exactly the same situation years ago. BTW, do not be
>suprised if your incinerator never comes back up. Ours didn't. We even
>thought about replacing the whole unit. HaHa! you should see the cost.
>
>We now ship all of our biohazardous waste and research animals out for
>disposal to an incinerator which takes only 50 lbs max. We do not have a
>diagnostic labs such as you describe however.
>
>Bob
>
>>Morning:
>>
>>I need some input from some of my counterparts, especially those in
>>the mid-atlantic region (PA, NY, NJ, MD, DE) who deal with large
>>animals (i.e., cattle).
>>
>>We have just received word that our pathological incinerator did not
>>pass its emissions test. To aviod costly citations from the State
>>DEP, we have decided to suspend operations. We believe that the
>>testing company may have botched the test, but until we know for
>>sure, we will not operate the unit.
>>
>>Our alternative for medical waste is simple - box up the material and
>>have our standby vendor remove it and dispose of it. But our
>>incinerator is connected to a veterinary diagnostic laboratory, which
>>generates thousands of pounds of potentially infected animal
>>carcasses per week. Disarticulating this type of waste into 50
>>pound increments (the maximum that our vendor will allow per box)
>>is just not a viable option. Contact with other incinerators that I
>>know of within a 3 hour drive from State College has yielded no
>>results.
>>
>>Is anyone aware of a company the specializes in large animal
>>disposal on the East Coast??? We may be able to send some
>>material to rendering, but they will not accept any carcass that is
>>suspected of having neurological issues (scrapie sheep, BSE-like
>>cows, etc.) I am trying my best to assist our diagnostic laboratory
>>with this problem, but I am about at the end of my rope.
>>
>>Any suggestions are most welcomed...
>>
>>thanks
>>
>>Curt
>>
>>Curt Speaker
>>Biosafety Officer
>>Penn State University
>>Environmental Health and Safety
>>speaker@ehs.psu.edu
>>
>>^...^
>>(O_O)
>>=(Y)=
>> """
>
>
>
_____________________________________________________________________
__ / _____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 19 Jun 2002 10:18:39 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Gilpin, Richard"
Subject: Re: incinerator woes
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
yes...GTS Scientific
Gaithersburg, MD WR2 system.
you may also want to look into the best medical waste system
Richard W. Gilpin, Ph.D., RBP, CBSP
Assistant Director & Biosafety Officer
Environmental Health & Safety (EHS)
University of Maryland Baltimore
714 West Lombard Street, Room 305
Baltimore MD 21201-1084
(410) 706-7845
Fax (410) 706-1520
rgilpin@ehs.umaryland.edu
ehs.umaryland.edu
-----Original Message-----
From: Robert N. Latsch [mailto:rnl2@PO.CWRU.EDU]
Sent: Wednesday, June 19, 2002 10:06 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: incinerator woes
>Date: Wed, 19 Jun 2002 10:05:16 -0400
>To: speaker@ehs.psu.edu
>From: "Robert N. Latsch"
>Subject: Re: incinerator woes
>Cc:
>Bcc:
>X-Attachments:
>
>Good Morning,
>
>We went through exactly the same situation years ago. BTW, do not be
>suprised if your incinerator never comes back up. Ours didn't. We even
>thought about replacing the whole unit. HaHa! you should see the cost.
>
>We now ship all of our biohazardous waste and research animals out for
>disposal to an incinerator which takes only 50 lbs max. We do not have a
>diagnostic labs such as you describe however.
>
>Bob
>
>>Morning:
>>
>>I need some input from some of my counterparts, especially those in
>>the mid-atlantic region (PA, NY, NJ, MD, DE) who deal with large
>>animals (i.e., cattle).
>>
>>We have just received word that our pathological incinerator did not
>>pass its emissions test. To aviod costly citations from the State
>>DEP, we have decided to suspend operations. We believe that the
>>testing company may have botched the test, but until we know for
>>sure, we will not operate the unit.
>>
>>Our alternative for medical waste is simple - box up the material and
>>have our standby vendor remove it and dispose of it. But our
>>incinerator is connected to a veterinary diagnostic laboratory, which
>>generates thousands of pounds of potentially infected animal
>>carcasses per week. Disarticulating this type of waste into 50
>>pound increments (the maximum that our vendor will allow per box)
>>is just not a viable option. Contact with other incinerators that I
>>know of within a 3 hour drive from State College has yielded no
>>results.
>>
>>Is anyone aware of a company the specializes in large animal
>>disposal on the East Coast??? We may be able to send some
>>material to rendering, but they will not accept any carcass that is
>>suspected of having neurological issues (scrapie sheep, BSE-like
>>cows, etc.) I am trying my best to assist our diagnostic laboratory
>>with this problem, but I am about at the end of my rope.
>>
>>Any suggestions are most welcomed...
>>
>>thanks
>>
>>Curt
>>
>>Curt Speaker
>>Biosafety Officer
>>Penn State University
>>Environmental Health and Safety
>>speaker@ehs.psu.edu
>>
>>^...^
>>(O_O)
>>=(Y)=
>> """
>
>
>
_____________________________________________________________________
__ /
_____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 19 Jun 2002 10:48:02 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Don Callihan
Subject: Re: incinerator woes
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Hi all,
Richard's opinion that Antaeus' solution is the "best medical waste system"
should be interpreted cautiously.
In my recent experience, the Antaeus autoclave has some issues handling
material that is outside of the realm that a typical medical center
clinical lab generates. The types and volume of biohazardous waste from a
veterinary diagnostic lab (with an associated large animal necropsy
facility) is very different from that of a
clinical/biotechnology/pharmaceutical animal facility. Picture a
thoroughbred horse, Holstein bull, or exotic zoo animal (giraffe, elephant,
killer whale) as biohazardous waste!
Incineration is still the best method for sterilizing animal body parts,
especially with concerns of BSE and chronic wasting disease of elk.
Curt, you have a challenging road ahead.
Don Callihan, Ph.D.
Senior Clinical Microbiologist and Biosafety Officer
BD Diagnostic Systems
7 Loveton Circle MC924
Sparks, MD 21152
410-773-6684
"Gilpin, Richard" @MITVMA.MIT.EDU> on
06/19/2002 10:18:39 AM
Please respond to A Biosafety Discussion List
Sent by: A Biosafety Discussion List
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
cc:
Subject: Re: incinerator woes
yes...GTS Scientific
Gaithersburg, MD WR2 system.
you may also want to look into the best medical waste system
Richard W. Gilpin, Ph.D., RBP, CBSP
Assistant Director & Biosafety Officer
Environmental Health & Safety (EHS)
University of Maryland Baltimore
714 West Lombard Street, Room 305
Baltimore MD 21201-1084
(410) 706-7845
Fax (410) 706-1520
rgilpin@ehs.umaryland.edu
ehs.umaryland.edu
-----Original Message-----
From: Robert N. Latsch [mailto:rnl2@PO.CWRU.EDU]
Sent: Wednesday, June 19, 2002 10:06 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: incinerator woes
>Date: Wed, 19 Jun 2002 10:05:16 -0400
>To: speaker@ehs.psu.edu
>From: "Robert N. Latsch"
>Subject: Re: incinerator woes
>Cc:
>Bcc:
>X-Attachments:
>
>Good Morning,
>
>We went through exactly the same situation years ago. BTW, do not be
>suprised if your incinerator never comes back up. Ours didn't. We even
>thought about replacing the whole unit. HaHa! you should see the cost.
>
>We now ship all of our biohazardous waste and research animals out for
>disposal to an incinerator which takes only 50 lbs max. We do not have a
>diagnostic labs such as you describe however.
>
>Bob
>
>>Morning:
>>
>>I need some input from some of my counterparts, especially those in
>>the mid-atlantic region (PA, NY, NJ, MD, DE) who deal with large
>>animals (i.e., cattle).
>>
>>We have just received word that our pathological incinerator did not
>>pass its emissions test. To aviod costly citations from the State
>>DEP, we have decided to suspend operations. We believe that the
>>testing company may have botched the test, but until we know for
>>sure, we will not operate the unit.
>>
>>Our alternative for medical waste is simple - box up the material and
>>have our standby vendor remove it and dispose of it. But our
>>incinerator is connected to a veterinary diagnostic laboratory, which
>>generates thousands of pounds of potentially infected animal
>>carcasses per week. Disarticulating this type of waste into 50
>>pound increments (the maximum that our vendor will allow per box)
>>is just not a viable option. Contact with other incinerators that I
>>know of within a 3 hour drive from State College has yielded no
>>results.
>>
>>Is anyone aware of a company the specializes in large animal
>>disposal on the East Coast??? We may be able to send some
>>material to rendering, but they will not accept any carcass that is
>>suspected of having neurological issues (scrapie sheep, BSE-like
>>cows, etc.) I am trying my best to assist our diagnostic laboratory
>>with this problem, but I am about at the end of my rope.
>>
>>Any suggestions are most welcomed...
>>
>>thanks
>>
>>Curt
>>
>>Curt Speaker
>>Biosafety Officer
>>Penn State University
>>Environmental Health and Safety
>>speaker@ehs.psu.edu
>>
>>^...^
>>(O_O)
>>=(Y)=
>> """
>
>
>
_____________________________________________________________________
__ /
_____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental
Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 19 Jun 2002 10:57:13 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Dan Liberman
Subject: need help
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Greetings subscribers.
I would like to know if there are health and safety regulations governing
work with hazardous chemicals and/or infectious agents(including BBP) in
Japan. Is there an equivalent agency to OSHA there?
Dan
Daniel F. Liberman, Ph.D.
Associate Director
Environmental Affairs and Safety
Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
900 Ridgebury Road, P.O. Box 368
Ridgefield, CT 06877-0368
Telephone (203) 798-4081
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 19 Jun 2002 11:07:50 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Gilpin, Richard"
Subject: Re: incinerator woes
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
no I would go for the WR Squared system for animals, Antaeus for medical
waste
Richard W. Gilpin, Ph.D., RBP, CBSP
Assistant Director & Biosafety Officer
Environmental Health & Safety (EHS)
University of Maryland Baltimore
714 West Lombard Street, Room 305
Baltimore MD 21201-1084
(410) 706-7845
Fax (410) 706-1520
rgilpin@ehs.umaryland.edu
ehs.umaryland.edu
-----Original Message-----
From: Don Callihan [mailto:Don_Callihan@]
Sent: Wednesday, June 19, 2002 10:48 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: incinerator woes
Hi all,
Richard's opinion that Antaeus' solution is the "best medical waste system"
should be interpreted cautiously.
In my recent experience, the Antaeus autoclave has some issues handling
material that is outside of the realm that a typical medical center
clinical lab generates. The types and volume of biohazardous waste from a
veterinary diagnostic lab (with an associated large animal necropsy
facility) is very different from that of a
clinical/biotechnology/pharmaceutical animal facility. Picture a
thoroughbred horse, Holstein bull, or exotic zoo animal (giraffe, elephant,
killer whale) as biohazardous waste!
Incineration is still the best method for sterilizing animal body parts,
especially with concerns of BSE and chronic wasting disease of elk.
Curt, you have a challenging road ahead.
Don Callihan, Ph.D.
Senior Clinical Microbiologist and Biosafety Officer
BD Diagnostic Systems
7 Loveton Circle MC924
Sparks, MD 21152
410-773-6684
"Gilpin, Richard" @MITVMA.MIT.EDU> on
06/19/2002 10:18:39 AM
Please respond to A Biosafety Discussion List
Sent by: A Biosafety Discussion List
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
cc:
Subject: Re: incinerator woes
yes...GTS Scientific
Gaithersburg, MD WR2 system.
you may also want to look into the best medical waste system
Richard W. Gilpin, Ph.D., RBP, CBSP
Assistant Director & Biosafety Officer
Environmental Health & Safety (EHS)
University of Maryland Baltimore
714 West Lombard Street, Room 305
Baltimore MD 21201-1084
(410) 706-7845
Fax (410) 706-1520
rgilpin@ehs.umaryland.edu
ehs.umaryland.edu
-----Original Message-----
From: Robert N. Latsch [mailto:rnl2@PO.CWRU.EDU]
Sent: Wednesday, June 19, 2002 10:06 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: incinerator woes
>Date: Wed, 19 Jun 2002 10:05:16 -0400
>To: speaker@ehs.psu.edu
>From: "Robert N. Latsch"
>Subject: Re: incinerator woes
>Cc:
>Bcc:
>X-Attachments:
>
>Good Morning,
>
>We went through exactly the same situation years ago. BTW, do not be
>suprised if your incinerator never comes back up. Ours didn't. We even
>thought about replacing the whole unit. HaHa! you should see the cost.
>
>We now ship all of our biohazardous waste and research animals out for
>disposal to an incinerator which takes only 50 lbs max. We do not have a
>diagnostic labs such as you describe however.
>
>Bob
>
>>Morning:
>>
>>I need some input from some of my counterparts, especially those in
>>the mid-atlantic region (PA, NY, NJ, MD, DE) who deal with large
>>animals (i.e., cattle).
>>
>>We have just received word that our pathological incinerator did not
>>pass its emissions test. To aviod costly citations from the State
>>DEP, we have decided to suspend operations. We believe that the
>>testing company may have botched the test, but until we know for
>>sure, we will not operate the unit.
>>
>>Our alternative for medical waste is simple - box up the material and
>>have our standby vendor remove it and dispose of it. But our
>>incinerator is connected to a veterinary diagnostic laboratory, which
>>generates thousands of pounds of potentially infected animal
>>carcasses per week. Disarticulating this type of waste into 50
>>pound increments (the maximum that our vendor will allow per box)
>>is just not a viable option. Contact with other incinerators that I
>>know of within a 3 hour drive from State College has yielded no
>>results.
>>
>>Is anyone aware of a company the specializes in large animal
>>disposal on the East Coast??? We may be able to send some
>>material to rendering, but they will not accept any carcass that is
>>suspected of having neurological issues (scrapie sheep, BSE-like
>>cows, etc.) I am trying my best to assist our diagnostic laboratory
>>with this problem, but I am about at the end of my rope.
>>
>>Any suggestions are most welcomed...
>>
>>thanks
>>
>>Curt
>>
>>Curt Speaker
>>Biosafety Officer
>>Penn State University
>>Environmental Health and Safety
>>speaker@ehs.psu.edu
>>
>>^...^
>>(O_O)
>>=(Y)=
>> """
>
>
>
_____________________________________________________________________
__ /
_____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental
Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 19 Jun 2002 11:10:29 EDT
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ed Krisiunas
Subject: Re: incinerator woes
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="part1_f8.1d22e68a.2a41f8e5_boundary"
--part1_f8.1d22e68a.2a41f8e5_boundary
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="US-ASCII"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Curt:
I've forwarded your e-mail to two large medical waste incinerators - one in
Baltimore (Phoenix) one in Norfolk, Virginia (American Medical). There is
also on in Long Island (S&G).
Your first issues appears to be whether they are willing to take larger
parts. Then who will transport such large material.
You may be receiving a call from them.
All the best!
Edward Krisiunas, MT(ASCP), CIC, MPH
President
WNWN International
PO Box 1164
Burlington, Connecticut
06013
860-675-1217
860-675-1311(fax)
860-944-2373(mobile)
--part1_f8.1d22e68a.2a41f8e5_boundary
Content-Type: text/html; charset="US-ASCII"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Curt:
I've forwarded your e-mail to two large medical waste incinerators - one in Baltimore (Phoenix) one in Norfolk, Virginia (American Medical). There is also on in Long Island (S&G).
Your first issues appears to be whether they are willing to take larger parts. Then who will transport such large material.
You may be receiving a call from them.
All the best!
Edward Krisiunas, MT(ASCP), CIC, MPH
President
WNWN International
PO Box 1164
Burlington, Connecticut
06013
860-675-1217
860-675-1311(fax)
860-944-2373(mobile)
--part1_f8.1d22e68a.2a41f8e5_boundary--
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 19 Jun 2002 11:16:16 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Gilpin, Richard"
Subject: Re: incinerator woes
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="----_=_NextPart_001_01C217A4.419A45A0"
This message is in MIME format. Since your mail reader does not understand
this format, some or all of this message may not be legible.
------_=_NextPart_001_01C217A4.419A45A0
Content-Type: text/plain;
charset="iso-8859-1"
The WR2 system sold by GTS Scientific can take up to two intact horses per
run...if you really need something that large
Richard W. Gilpin, Ph.D., RBP, CBSP
Assistant Director & Biosafety Officer
Environmental Health & Safety (EHS)
University of Maryland Baltimore
714 West Lombard Street, Room 305
Baltimore MD 21201-1084
(410) 706-7845
Fax (410) 706-1520
rgilpin@ehs.umaryland.edu < mailto:rgilpin@ehs.umaryland.edu
>
ehs.umaryland.edu <
>
-----Original Message-----
From: Ed Krisiunas [mailto:EKrisiunas@]
Sent: Wednesday, June 19, 2002 11:10 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: incinerator woes
Curt:
I've forwarded your e-mail to two large medical waste incinerators - one in
Baltimore (Phoenix) one in Norfolk, Virginia (American Medical). There is
also on in Long Island (S&G).
Your first issues appears to be whether they are willing to take larger
parts. Then who will transport such large material.
You may be receiving a call from them.
All the best!
Edward Krisiunas, MT(ASCP), CIC, MPH
President
WNWN International
PO Box 1164
Burlington, Connecticut
06013
860-675-1217
860-675-1311(fax)
860-944-2373(mobile)
------_=_NextPart_001_01C217A4.419A45A0
Content-Type: text/html;
charset="iso-8859-1"
The WR2 system sold by GTS Scientific can take up to two intact horses per run...if you really need something that large
Richard W. Gilpin, Ph.D., RBP, CBSP
Assistant Director & Biosafety Officer
Environmental Health & Safety (EHS)
University of Maryland Baltimore
714 West Lombard Street, Room 305
Baltimore MD 21201-1084
(410) 706-7845
Fax (410) 706-1520
rgilpin@ehs.umaryland.edu
ehs.umaryland.edu
-----Original Message-----
From: Ed Krisiunas [mailto:EKrisiunas@]
Sent: Wednesday, June 19, 2002 11:10 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: incinerator woes
Curt:
I've forwarded your e-mail to two large medical waste incinerators - one in Baltimore (Phoenix) one in Norfolk, Virginia (American Medical). There is also on in Long Island (S&G).
Your first issues appears to be whether they are willing to take larger parts. Then who will transport such large material.
You may be receiving a call from them.
All the best!
Edward Krisiunas, MT(ASCP), CIC, MPH
President
WNWN International
PO Box 1164
Burlington, Connecticut
06013
860-675-1217
860-675-1311(fax)
860-944-2373(mobile)
------_=_NextPart_001_01C217A4.419A45A0--
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 19 Jun 2002 08:18:49 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Mike Grogan
Subject: Termination of Serum Banking Program
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
During a recent freezer replacement, I discovered the remains of a serum
banking program with samples from current and past employees. Currently the
Center does not have a serum banking program and employees have never worked
with agents assigned to Biosafety Level 3 or 4 at the Center. Upon
inspection of the vials, appearance of the freezer and a discussion with the
previous IBC chair, the storage of the vials is questionable at best.
Are suggestions for documenting or otherwise memorializing the disposal?
Any pitfalls to be wary of?
Thanks in advance,
Mike
---------------------------------------
Michael J. Grogan
Director, Institutional Compliance
Sidney Kimmel Cancer Center
10835 Altman Row
San Diego, CA 92121
> (858) 410-4182
> (858) 450-3251 FAX
> mgrogan@
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 19 Jun 2002 11:26:52 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Alan Woodard
Subject: Re: incinerator woes
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
My understanding is this is roughly 10,000 pounds per/week.
>>> rgilpin@ADMIN1.UMARYLAND.EDU 06/19/02 11:16AM >>>
The WR2 system sold by GTS Scientific can take up to two intact horses
per
run...if you really need something that large
Richard W. Gilpin, Ph.D., RBP, CBSP
Assistant Director & Biosafety Officer
Environmental Health & Safety (EHS)
University of Maryland Baltimore
714 West Lombard Street, Room 305
Baltimore MD 21201-1084
(410) 706-7845
Fax (410) 706-1520
rgilpin@ehs.umaryland.edu < mailto:rgilpin@ehs.umaryland.edu
>
ehs.umaryland.edu <
>
-----Original Message-----
From: Ed Krisiunas [mailto:EKrisiunas@]
Sent: Wednesday, June 19, 2002 11:10 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: incinerator woes
Curt:
I've forwarded your e-mail to two large medical waste incinerators -
one in
Baltimore (Phoenix) one in Norfolk, Virginia (American Medical). There
is
also on in Long Island (S&G).
Your first issues appears to be whether they are willing to take
larger
parts. Then who will transport such large material.
You may be receiving a call from them.
All the best!
Edward Krisiunas, MT(ASCP), CIC, MPH
President
WNWN International
PO Box 1164
Burlington, Connecticut
06013
860-675-1217
860-675-1311(fax)
860-944-2373(mobile)
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 19 Jun 2002 11:38:44 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Gilpin, Richard"
Subject: Re: incinerator woes
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
nope...they can run 7,000 pounds per cycle.
From website, WR2 link: Standard Tissue Digesters
range in size from 30 pounds (14 kg) capacity through 7,000 pounds (3,200
kg) capacity. Any standard system may be reduced in capacity; this will be
reflected by a reduction in cost for the system.
Richard W. Gilpin, Ph.D., RBP, CBSP
Assistant Director & Biosafety Officer
Environmental Health & Safety (EHS)
University of Maryland Baltimore
714 West Lombard Street, Room 305
Baltimore MD 21201-1084
(410) 706-7845
Fax (410) 706-1520
rgilpin@ehs.umaryland.edu
ehs.umaryland.edu
-----Original Message-----
From: Alan Woodard [mailto:agwoodar@GW.DEC.STATE.NY.US]
Sent: Wednesday, June 19, 2002 11:27 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: incinerator woes
My understanding is this is roughly 10,000 pounds per/week.
>>> rgilpin@ADMIN1.UMARYLAND.EDU 06/19/02 11:16AM >>>
The WR2 system sold by GTS Scientific can take up to two intact horses
per
run...if you really need something that large
Richard W. Gilpin, Ph.D., RBP, CBSP
Assistant Director & Biosafety Officer
Environmental Health & Safety (EHS)
University of Maryland Baltimore
714 West Lombard Street, Room 305
Baltimore MD 21201-1084
(410) 706-7845
Fax (410) 706-1520
rgilpin@ehs.umaryland.edu < mailto:rgilpin@ehs.umaryland.edu
>
ehs.umaryland.edu <
>
-----Original Message-----
From: Ed Krisiunas [mailto:EKrisiunas@]
Sent: Wednesday, June 19, 2002 11:10 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: incinerator woes
Curt:
I've forwarded your e-mail to two large medical waste incinerators -
one in
Baltimore (Phoenix) one in Norfolk, Virginia (American Medical). There
is
also on in Long Island (S&G).
Your first issues appears to be whether they are willing to take
larger
parts. Then who will transport such large material.
You may be receiving a call from them.
All the best!
Edward Krisiunas, MT(ASCP), CIC, MPH
President
WNWN International
PO Box 1164
Burlington, Connecticut
06013
860-675-1217
860-675-1311(fax)
860-944-2373(mobile)
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 19 Jun 2002 11:57:00 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "R. Thomas Leonard"
Subject: Re: Termination of Serum Banking Program
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
I'm familiar with a similar situation. Legal counsel advised to provide
current employees with a memorandum presenting the option of recovering
their sample vial by X date; after which time all samples would be
destroyed. A few folks actually opted to retrieve their sample.
Former employee samples were incinerated.
At 08:18 AM 6/19/2002 -0700, you wrote:
>During a recent freezer replacement, I discovered the remains of a serum
>banking program with samples from current and past employees. Currently the
>Center does not have a serum banking program and employees have never worked
>with agents assigned to Biosafety Level 3 or 4 at the Center. Upon
>inspection of the vials, appearance of the freezer and a discussion with the
>previous IBC chair, the storage of the vials is questionable at best.
>
>Are suggestions for documenting or otherwise memorializing the disposal?
>Any pitfalls to be wary of?
>
>Thanks in advance,
>
>Mike
>
>---------------------------------------
>Michael J. Grogan
>Director, Institutional Compliance
>Sidney Kimmel Cancer Center
>10835 Altman Row
>San Diego, CA 92121
> > (858) 410-4182
> > (858) 450-3251 FAX
> > mgrogan@
***********************************
R. Thomas Leonard, M.S., CSP, CBSP
Safety Officer
The Wistar Institute
3601 Spruce Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104
(ph)215-898-3712
(fx)215-898-3868
wistar.upenn.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 19 Jun 2002 09:15:23 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Funk, Glenn"
Subject: Re: Termination of Serum Banking Program
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
We have also terminated our serum banking program that was begun long before
my arrival. I sent a memo to all employees earlier this year explaining the
termination and advising them that their sera and all documentation would be
destroyed shortly after 01 January 2003. I was careful to point out that
only the routine, all-employees program was being halted; certain
higher-risk projects would be evaluated on a case-by-case basis and, if a
serum sample program appeared to be important, all aspects of the program
would be documented in the project plan, including a schedule for
resampling, termination of the program and sample destruction. I asked
anyone who had any concerns or wanted to preserve their serum samples to
contact me prior to then. So far, no one has and I don't expect anyone
will.
-- Glenn
Glenn A. Funk
Director, EHS
MedImmune Vaccines, Inc.
SAFETY ... MedImmune's best vaccine against accidents
-----Original Message-----
From: R. Thomas Leonard [mailto:tleonard@MAIL.WISTAR.UPENN.EDU]
Sent: Wednesday, 19 June, 2002 08:57
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Termination of Serum Banking Program
I'm familiar with a similar situation. Legal counsel advised to provide
current employees with a memorandum presenting the option of recovering
their sample vial by X date; after which time all samples would be
destroyed. A few folks actually opted to retrieve their sample.
Former employee samples were incinerated.
At 08:18 AM 6/19/2002 -0700, you wrote:
>During a recent freezer replacement, I discovered the remains of a serum
>banking program with samples from current and past employees. Currently
the
>Center does not have a serum banking program and employees have never
worked
>with agents assigned to Biosafety Level 3 or 4 at the Center. Upon
>inspection of the vials, appearance of the freezer and a discussion with
the
>previous IBC chair, the storage of the vials is questionable at best.
>
>Are suggestions for documenting or otherwise memorializing the disposal?
>Any pitfalls to be wary of?
>
>Thanks in advance,
>
>Mike
>
>---------------------------------------
>Michael J. Grogan
>Director, Institutional Compliance
>Sidney Kimmel Cancer Center
>10835 Altman Row
>San Diego, CA 92121
> > (858) 410-4182
> > (858) 450-3251 FAX
> > mgrogan@
***********************************
R. Thomas Leonard, M.S., CSP, CBSP
Safety Officer
The Wistar Institute
3601 Spruce Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104
(ph)215-898-3712
(fx)215-898-3868
wistar.upenn.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 19 Jun 2002 13:50:31 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Cheryl L Hildreth
Subject: Detailed summary of Bioterrorism Act
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="=_14483495.7213739C"
--=_14483495.7213739C
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Content-Disposition: inline
For your reading enjoyment, a detailed summary of the Public Health
Security and Bioterrorim Preparedness and Response Act ,aka. PL
107-188
that was signed by Pres. Bush last week. It will print out at about 11
pages and most of us are only concerned with Title II which is 2
pages.
I took off the first 5 pages which was a blow by blow of the the
various bills and sponsors,etc from Dec. until now. IF anyone wants to
have this , let meknow and I will send to you.. Thanks, Cheri
Cheri Hildreth Watts, Director
Department of Environmental Health &Safety
University of Louisville
(502) 852-2954
e-mail: cheri.hildreth@louisville.edu
--=_14483495.7213739C
Content-Type: application/msword; name="HR3348 detailed summary.doc"
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 19 Jun 2002 14:09:50 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Kuchera, Mary"
Subject: Re: incinerator woes
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Greetings,
Just a caution concerning the Antaeus macerator:
With the experience at my corporation, I'd say that (for us) "best medical
waste system" is the overstatement of the millennium.
After a year's possession, the dump is looking like an ideal location.
Mary Kuchera
Wellstat Therapeutics and Wellstat Biologics Corporations
mkuchera@
-----Original Message-----
From: Don Callihan [mailto:Don_Callihan@]
Sent: Wednesday, June 19, 2002 10:48 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: incinerator woes
Hi all,
Richard's opinion that Antaeus' solution is the "best medical waste system"
should be interpreted cautiously.
In my recent experience, the Antaeus autoclave has some issues handling
material that is outside of the realm that a typical medical center
clinical lab generates. The types and volume of biohazardous waste from a
veterinary diagnostic lab (with an associated large animal necropsy
facility) is very different from that of a
clinical/biotechnology/pharmaceutical animal facility. Picture a
thoroughbred horse, Holstein bull, or exotic zoo animal (giraffe, elephant,
killer whale) as biohazardous waste!
Incineration is still the best method for sterilizing animal body parts,
especially with concerns of BSE and chronic wasting disease of elk.
Curt, you have a challenging road ahead.
Don Callihan, Ph.D.
Senior Clinical Microbiologist and Biosafety Officer
BD Diagnostic Systems
7 Loveton Circle MC924
Sparks, MD 21152
410-773-6684
"Gilpin, Richard" @MITVMA.MIT.EDU> on
06/19/2002 10:18:39 AM
Please respond to A Biosafety Discussion List
Sent by: A Biosafety Discussion List
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
cc:
Subject: Re: incinerator woes
yes...GTS Scientific
Gaithersburg, MD WR2 system.
you may also want to look into the best medical waste system
Richard W. Gilpin, Ph.D., RBP, CBSP
Assistant Director & Biosafety Officer
Environmental Health & Safety (EHS)
University of Maryland Baltimore
714 West Lombard Street, Room 305
Baltimore MD 21201-1084
(410) 706-7845
Fax (410) 706-1520
rgilpin@ehs.umaryland.edu
ehs.umaryland.edu
-----Original Message-----
From: Robert N. Latsch [mailto:rnl2@PO.CWRU.EDU]
Sent: Wednesday, June 19, 2002 10:06 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: incinerator woes
>Date: Wed, 19 Jun 2002 10:05:16 -0400
>To: speaker@ehs.psu.edu
>From: "Robert N. Latsch"
>Subject: Re: incinerator woes
>Cc:
>Bcc:
>X-Attachments:
>
>Good Morning,
>
>We went through exactly the same situation years ago. BTW, do not be
>suprised if your incinerator never comes back up. Ours didn't. We even
>thought about replacing the whole unit. HaHa! you should see the cost.
>
>We now ship all of our biohazardous waste and research animals out for
>disposal to an incinerator which takes only 50 lbs max. We do not have a
>diagnostic labs such as you describe however.
>
>Bob
>
>>Morning:
>>
>>I need some input from some of my counterparts, especially those in
>>the mid-atlantic region (PA, NY, NJ, MD, DE) who deal with large
>>animals (i.e., cattle).
>>
>>We have just received word that our pathological incinerator did not
>>pass its emissions test. To aviod costly citations from the State
>>DEP, we have decided to suspend operations. We believe that the
>>testing company may have botched the test, but until we know for
>>sure, we will not operate the unit.
>>
>>Our alternative for medical waste is simple - box up the material and
>>have our standby vendor remove it and dispose of it. But our
>>incinerator is connected to a veterinary diagnostic laboratory, which
>>generates thousands of pounds of potentially infected animal
>>carcasses per week. Disarticulating this type of waste into 50
>>pound increments (the maximum that our vendor will allow per box)
>>is just not a viable option. Contact with other incinerators that I
>>know of within a 3 hour drive from State College has yielded no
>>results.
>>
>>Is anyone aware of a company the specializes in large animal
>>disposal on the East Coast??? We may be able to send some
>>material to rendering, but they will not accept any carcass that is
>>suspected of having neurological issues (scrapie sheep, BSE-like
>>cows, etc.) I am trying my best to assist our diagnostic laboratory
>>with this problem, but I am about at the end of my rope.
>>
>>Any suggestions are most welcomed...
>>
>>thanks
>>
>>Curt
>>
>>Curt Speaker
>>Biosafety Officer
>>Penn State University
>>Environmental Health and Safety
>>speaker@ehs.psu.edu
>>
>>^...^
>>(O_O)
>>=(Y)=
>> """
>
>
>
_____________________________________________________________________
__ /
_____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental
Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 19 Jun 2002 16:58:45 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Pitts, Jonathan"
Subject: Decontamination Recommendations
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Hello all,
I would like to poll the group on a topic that has recently come up in our
workplace.
Prior to removing instruments that have been in a hospital clinic, we
decontaminate all of the exposed hard surfaces with several viricide wipes.
It is required that the person doing the decontaminating wear gloves. The
question that has come up is should the person also wear goggles and/or a
lab coat.
There is minimal risk of splashing anything and the instrument that they are
decontaminating is "supposed" to be non-contact. It certainly has potential
to get body fluids on it in small quantities.
I would appreciate any suggestions or experience that the group may have in
such situations.
A quick poll of nurses cleaning OR rooms would suggest all three PPE's be
used.....certainly we are not in an OR setting.
Best Regards
Jon
Jonathan Pitts Ph.D.
MediSpectra Inc.
45 Hartwell Ave.
Lexington, MA 02421
Tel: (781) 372-2300 x354
Direct Tel. Line: (781) 372-2354
Fax: (781) 674-0002
-----Original Message-----
From: Cheryl L Hildreth [mailto:cheri.hildreth@LOUISVILLE.EDU]
Sent: Wednesday, June 19, 2002 1:51 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Detailed summary of Bioterrorism Act
For your reading enjoyment, a detailed summary of the Public Health
Security and Bioterrorim Preparedness and Response Act ,aka. PL
107-188
that was signed by Pres. Bush last week. It will print out at about 11
pages and most of us are only concerned with Title II which is 2
pages.
I took off the first 5 pages which was a blow by blow of the the
various bills and sponsors,etc from Dec. until now. IF anyone wants to
have this , let meknow and I will send to you.. Thanks, Cheri
Cheri Hildreth Watts, Director
Department of Environmental Health &Safety
University of Louisville
(502) 852-2954
e-mail: cheri.hildreth@louisville.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 20 Jun 2002 08:45:29 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Robert N. Latsch"
Subject: Re: Decontamination Recommendations
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
I am not sure that wiping the instruments is the best way to go. This is
time consuming with potential to miss an area or even cause a contact or
puncture with the instruments.
What about submersion and soaking in your favorite disinfectant?
i would then reccomend gloves, labcoat & goggles/faceshield.
Bob
>Hello all,
>
>I would like to poll the group on a topic that has recently come up in our
>workplace.
>
>Prior to removing instruments that have been in a hospital clinic, we
>decontaminate all of the exposed hard surfaces with several viricide wipes.
>It is required that the person doing the decontaminating wear gloves. The
>question that has come up is should the person also wear goggles and/or a
>lab coat.
>
>There is minimal risk of splashing anything and the instrument that they are
>decontaminating is "supposed" to be non-contact. It certainly has potential
>to get body fluids on it in small quantities.
>
>I would appreciate any suggestions or experience that the group may have in
>such situations.
>
>A quick poll of nurses cleaning OR rooms would suggest all three PPE's be
>used.....certainly we are not in an OR setting.
>
>Best Regards
>Jon
>
>
>Jonathan Pitts Ph.D.
>MediSpectra Inc.
>45 Hartwell Ave.
>Lexington, MA 02421
>Tel: (781) 372-2300 x354
>Direct Tel. Line: (781) 372-2354
>Fax: (781) 674-0002
>
>
>
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From: Cheryl L Hildreth [mailto:cheri.hildreth@LOUISVILLE.EDU]
>Sent: Wednesday, June 19, 2002 1:51 PM
>To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
>Subject: Detailed summary of Bioterrorism Act
>
>
>For your reading enjoyment, a detailed summary of the Public Health
>Security and Bioterrorim Preparedness and Response Act ,aka. PL
>107-188
>that was signed by Pres. Bush last week. It will print out at about 11
>pages and most of us are only concerned with Title II which is 2
>pages.
>
> I took off the first 5 pages which was a blow by blow of the the
>various bills and sponsors,etc from Dec. until now. IF anyone wants to
>have this , let meknow and I will send to you.. Thanks, Cheri
>
>Cheri Hildreth Watts, Director
>Department of Environmental Health &Safety
>University of Louisville
>(502) 852-2954
>e-mail: cheri.hildreth@louisville.edu
_____________________________________________________________________
__ / _____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 20 Jun 2002 09:00:57 -0400
Reply-To: Earthlink
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Earthlink
Subject: Re: incinerator woes
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Or .
----- Original Message -----
From: "Gilpin, Richard"
To:
Sent: Wednesday, June 19, 2002 10:18 AM
Subject: Re: incinerator woes
> yes...GTS Scientific
>
> Gaithersburg, MD WR2 system.
>
> you may also want to look into the best medical waste system
>
>
> Richard W. Gilpin, Ph.D., RBP, CBSP
> Assistant Director & Biosafety Officer
> Environmental Health & Safety (EHS)
> University of Maryland Baltimore
> 714 West Lombard Street, Room 305
> Baltimore MD 21201-1084
> (410) 706-7845
> Fax (410) 706-1520
> rgilpin@ehs.umaryland.edu
> ehs.umaryland.edu
>
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Robert N. Latsch [mailto:rnl2@PO.CWRU.EDU]
> Sent: Wednesday, June 19, 2002 10:06 AM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: Re: incinerator woes
>
>
> >Date: Wed, 19 Jun 2002 10:05:16 -0400
> >To: speaker@ehs.psu.edu
> >From: "Robert N. Latsch"
> >Subject: Re: incinerator woes
> >Cc:
> >Bcc:
> >X-Attachments:
> >
> >Good Morning,
> >
> >We went through exactly the same situation years ago. BTW, do not be
> >suprised if your incinerator never comes back up. Ours didn't. We even
> >thought about replacing the whole unit. HaHa! you should see the cost.
> >
> >We now ship all of our biohazardous waste and research animals out for
> >disposal to an incinerator which takes only 50 lbs max. We do not have a
> >diagnostic labs such as you describe however.
> >
> >Bob
> >
> >>Morning:
> >>
> >>I need some input from some of my counterparts, especially those in
> >>the mid-atlantic region (PA, NY, NJ, MD, DE) who deal with large
> >>animals (i.e., cattle).
> >>
> >>We have just received word that our pathological incinerator did not
> >>pass its emissions test. To aviod costly citations from the State
> >>DEP, we have decided to suspend operations. We believe that the
> >>testing company may have botched the test, but until we know for
> >>sure, we will not operate the unit.
> >>
> >>Our alternative for medical waste is simple - box up the material and
> >>have our standby vendor remove it and dispose of it. But our
> >>incinerator is connected to a veterinary diagnostic laboratory, which
> >>generates thousands of pounds of potentially infected animal
> >>carcasses per week. Disarticulating this type of waste into 50
> >>pound increments (the maximum that our vendor will allow per box)
> >>is just not a viable option. Contact with other incinerators that I
> >>know of within a 3 hour drive from State College has yielded no
> >>results.
> >>
> >>Is anyone aware of a company the specializes in large animal
> >>disposal on the East Coast??? We may be able to send some
> >>material to rendering, but they will not accept any carcass that is
> >>suspected of having neurological issues (scrapie sheep, BSE-like
> >>cows, etc.) I am trying my best to assist our diagnostic laboratory
> >>with this problem, but I am about at the end of my rope.
> >>
> >>Any suggestions are most welcomed...
> >>
> >>thanks
> >>
> >>Curt
> >>
> >>Curt Speaker
> >>Biosafety Officer
> >>Penn State University
> >>Environmental Health and Safety
> >>speaker@ehs.psu.edu
> >>
> >>^...^
> >>(O_O)
> >>=(Y)=
> >> """
> >
> >
> >
>
>
> _____________________________________________________________________
> __ /
> _____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
> _ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
> \ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
> \ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental
Safety
> \__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 20 Jun 2002 08:55:20 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Pitts, Jonathan"
Subject: Re: Decontamination Recommendations
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Let me point out that submersion is not an option as the instrument is large
and full of electronics/optics.
Thanks for the suggestion.
Jon
Jonathan Pitts Ph.D.
MediSpectra Inc.
45 Hartwell Ave.
Lexington, MA 02421
Tel: (781) 372-2300 x354
Direct Tel. Line: (781) 372-2354
Fax: (781) 674-0002
-----Original Message-----
From: Robert N. Latsch [mailto:rnl2@PO.CWRU.EDU]
Sent: Thursday, June 20, 2002 8:45 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Decontamination Recommendations
I am not sure that wiping the instruments is the best way to go. This is
time consuming with potential to miss an area or even cause a contact or
puncture with the instruments.
What about submersion and soaking in your favorite disinfectant?
i would then reccomend gloves, labcoat & goggles/faceshield.
Bob
>Hello all,
>
>I would like to poll the group on a topic that has recently come up in our
>workplace.
>
>Prior to removing instruments that have been in a hospital clinic, we
>decontaminate all of the exposed hard surfaces with several viricide wipes.
>It is required that the person doing the decontaminating wear gloves. The
>question that has come up is should the person also wear goggles and/or a
>lab coat.
>
>There is minimal risk of splashing anything and the instrument that they
are
>decontaminating is "supposed" to be non-contact. It certainly has
potential
>to get body fluids on it in small quantities.
>
>I would appreciate any suggestions or experience that the group may have in
>such situations.
>
>A quick poll of nurses cleaning OR rooms would suggest all three PPE's be
>used.....certainly we are not in an OR setting.
>
>Best Regards
>Jon
>
>
>Jonathan Pitts Ph.D.
>MediSpectra Inc.
>45 Hartwell Ave.
>Lexington, MA 02421
>Tel: (781) 372-2300 x354
>Direct Tel. Line: (781) 372-2354
>Fax: (781) 674-0002
>
>
>
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From: Cheryl L Hildreth [mailto:cheri.hildreth@LOUISVILLE.EDU]
>Sent: Wednesday, June 19, 2002 1:51 PM
>To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
>Subject: Detailed summary of Bioterrorism Act
>
>
>For your reading enjoyment, a detailed summary of the Public Health
>Security and Bioterrorim Preparedness and Response Act ,aka. PL
>107-188
>that was signed by Pres. Bush last week. It will print out at about 11
>pages and most of us are only concerned with Title II which is 2
>pages.
>
> I took off the first 5 pages which was a blow by blow of the the
>various bills and sponsors,etc from Dec. until now. IF anyone wants to
>have this , let meknow and I will send to you.. Thanks, Cheri
>
>Cheri Hildreth Watts, Director
>Department of Environmental Health &Safety
>University of Louisville
>(502) 852-2954
>e-mail: cheri.hildreth@louisville.edu
_____________________________________________________________________
__ /
_____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 20 Jun 2002 08:54:15 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Mary Cipriano
Subject: Re: Decontamination Recommendations
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Since the instrument is contaminated with potentially infectious material, it
must be handled with the PPE you would use for Bloodborne Pathogen protection.
Although the bloodborne pathogen risk may be minimal from a splash, the safety
glasses/goggles/face shield can serve to prevent/minimize the individual from
touching their eyes while working. In addition, the disinfectant may recommend
that PPE be worn when their products are used.
FYI - Many laboratory instrument manufacturers provide decontamination
procedures in their operator manuals.
Mary Cipriano
Abbott Laboratories
mary.cipriano@
"Pitts,
Jonathan" To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Decontamination Recommendations
Sent by: A
Biosafety
Discussion List
06/20/02 07:55
AM
Please respond
to A Biosafety
Discussion List
Let me point out that submersion is not an option as the instrument is large
and full of electronics/optics.
Thanks for the suggestion.
Jon
Jonathan Pitts Ph.D.
MediSpectra Inc.
45 Hartwell Ave.
Lexington, MA 02421
Tel: (781) 372-2300 x354
Direct Tel. Line: (781) 372-2354
Fax: (781) 674-0002
-----Original Message-----
From: Robert N. Latsch [mailto:rnl2@PO.CWRU.EDU]
Sent: Thursday, June 20, 2002 8:45 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Decontamination Recommendations
I am not sure that wiping the instruments is the best way to go. This is
time consuming with potential to miss an area or even cause a contact or
puncture with the instruments.
What about submersion and soaking in your favorite disinfectant?
i would then reccomend gloves, labcoat & goggles/faceshield.
Bob
>Hello all,
>
>I would like to poll the group on a topic that has recently come up in our
>workplace.
>
>Prior to removing instruments that have been in a hospital clinic, we
>decontaminate all of the exposed hard surfaces with several viricide wipes.
>It is required that the person doing the decontaminating wear gloves. The
>question that has come up is should the person also wear goggles and/or a
>lab coat.
>
>There is minimal risk of splashing anything and the instrument that they
are
>decontaminating is "supposed" to be non-contact. It certainly has
potential
>to get body fluids on it in small quantities.
>
>I would appreciate any suggestions or experience that the group may have in
>such situations.
>
>A quick poll of nurses cleaning OR rooms would suggest all three PPE's be
>used.....certainly we are not in an OR setting.
>
>Best Regards
>Jon
>
>
>Jonathan Pitts Ph.D.
>MediSpectra Inc.
>45 Hartwell Ave.
>Lexington, MA 02421
>Tel: (781) 372-2300 x354
>Direct Tel. Line: (781) 372-2354
>Fax: (781) 674-0002
>
>
>
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From: Cheryl L Hildreth [mailto:cheri.hildreth@LOUISVILLE.EDU]
>Sent: Wednesday, June 19, 2002 1:51 PM
>To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
>Subject: Detailed summary of Bioterrorism Act
>
>
>For your reading enjoyment, a detailed summary of the Public Health
>Security and Bioterrorim Preparedness and Response Act ,aka. PL
>107-188
>that was signed by Pres. Bush last week. It will print out at about 11
>pages and most of us are only concerned with Title II which is 2
>pages.
>
> I took off the first 5 pages which was a blow by blow of the the
>various bills and sponsors,etc from Dec. until now. IF anyone wants to
>have this , let meknow and I will send to you.. Thanks, Cheri
>
>Cheri Hildreth Watts, Director
>Department of Environmental Health &Safety
>University of Louisville
>(502) 852-2954
>e-mail: cheri.hildreth@louisville.edu
_____________________________________________________________________
__ /
_____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 20 Jun 2002 12:55:03 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Elizabeth Smith
Subject: Re: Termination of Serum Banking Program
In-Reply-To:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
We had exactly the same situation which occurred here with a
freezer which had been unplugged during switch of "ownership" of
the lab area. Utterly worthless, in most opinions solicited
(there's always going to be one person who says "buy what if we
might want it later?")
We did not have any written plan/program for the serum banking
project (which was started billons and billions of years ago).
There was no record of why these people had serum samples taken,
for the vast majority of them, there was no scientific reason to
keep them (based on what they were working with and subsequent
vaccinations).
We simply disposed of all of the samples as we would any
clinical sample (according to state medical waste practices).
I can't swear that we told our employees about the planned
disposal, but I'm pretty sure we did. No one was interested,
and several expressed the opinion that they never understood
what the samples were for (which substantiated my belief that
there really wasn't a "plan" when it was implemented).
I would, however, recommend:
Get your staff physician (or failing that, the lawyer) to sign
off on you planned disposal before implementation.
Elizabeth
=====
Elizabeth Smith
Environmental, Health & Safety Manager
BioPort Corporation
3500 N. Martin L. King Blvd.
Lansing, MI 48906
__________________________________________________
Do You Yahoo!?
Yahoo! - Official partner of 2002 FIFA World Cup
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2002 11:17:24 +0100
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Stuart Thompson
Subject: Re: Decontamination Recommendations
In-Reply-To:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="Windows-1252"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
I recently met with a representative of Steris, who I understand are a US
company from Ohio, to discuss their hydrogen peroxide system for
decontamination of rooms and microbiological safety cabinets. He claimed
that it is possible to fill a room with lab equipment, including computers,
and decontaminate it with the peroxide vapour without damage and that this
has been done on a large scale by pharmaceutical manufacturers.
Best wishes
Stuart
Dr Stuart Thompson
University Biological Safety Officer
Health & Safety Services
University of Manchester
Waterloo Place
182/184 Oxford Road
Manchester M13 9GP
tel: +44 (0)161 275 5069
fax: +44 (0)161 275 6989
mobile 07946 022 698
stuart.thompson@man.ac.uk
-----Original Message-----
From: A Biosafety Discussion List [mailto:BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU]On
Behalf Of Robert N. Latsch
Sent: 20 June 2002 13:45
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Decontamination Recommendations
I am not sure that wiping the instruments is the best way to go. This is
time consuming with potential to miss an area or even cause a contact or
puncture with the instruments.
What about submersion and soaking in your favorite disinfectant?
i would then reccomend gloves, labcoat & goggles/faceshield.
Bob
>Hello all,
>
>I would like to poll the group on a topic that has recently come up in our
>workplace.
>
>Prior to removing instruments that have been in a hospital clinic, we
>decontaminate all of the exposed hard surfaces with several viricide wipes.
>It is required that the person doing the decontaminating wear gloves. The
>question that has come up is should the person also wear goggles and/or a
>lab coat.
>
>There is minimal risk of splashing anything and the instrument that they
are
>decontaminating is "supposed" to be non-contact. It certainly has
potential
>to get body fluids on it in small quantities.
>
>I would appreciate any suggestions or experience that the group may have in
>such situations.
>
>A quick poll of nurses cleaning OR rooms would suggest all three PPE's be
>used.....certainly we are not in an OR setting.
>
>Best Regards
>Jon
>
>
>Jonathan Pitts Ph.D.
>MediSpectra Inc.
>45 Hartwell Ave.
>Lexington, MA 02421
>Tel: (781) 372-2300 x354
>Direct Tel. Line: (781) 372-2354
>Fax: (781) 674-0002
>
>
>
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From: Cheryl L Hildreth [mailto:cheri.hildreth@LOUISVILLE.EDU]
>Sent: Wednesday, June 19, 2002 1:51 PM
>To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
>Subject: Detailed summary of Bioterrorism Act
>
>
>For your reading enjoyment, a detailed summary of the Public Health
>Security and Bioterrorim Preparedness and Response Act ,aka. PL
>107-188
>that was signed by Pres. Bush last week. It will print out at about 11
>pages and most of us are only concerned with Title II which is 2
>pages.
>
> I took off the first 5 pages which was a blow by blow of the the
>various bills and sponsors,etc from Dec. until now. IF anyone wants to
>have this , let meknow and I will send to you.. Thanks, Cheri
>
>Cheri Hildreth Watts, Director
>Department of Environmental Health &Safety
>University of Louisville
>(502) 852-2954
>e-mail: cheri.hildreth@louisville.edu
_____________________________________________________________________
__ /
_____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2002 08:19:59 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Richard Fink
Subject: Re: Decontamination Recommendations
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="=====================_345770371==_.ALT"
--=====================_345770371==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
At 11:17 AM 6/21/2002 +0100, Dr Stuart Thompson wrote:
>I recently met with a representative of Steris, who I understand are a US
>company from Ohio, to discuss their hydrogen peroxide system for
>decontamination of rooms and microbiological safety cabinets. He claimed
>that it is possible to fill a room with lab equipment, including computers,
>and decontaminate it with the peroxide vapour without damage and that this
>has been done on a large scale by pharmaceutical manufacturers.
Sales reps are marvelous. Yes it is possible BUT one had better be damn
sure that none of the equipment have materials attacked by hydrogen
peroxide (chiefly rubber, rubber like material, some electrical insulation).
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
--=====================_345770371==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
At 11:17 AM 6/21/2002 +0100, Dr Stuart Thompson wrote:
I recently met with a representative of Steris, who I understand are a US
company from Ohio, to discuss their hydrogen peroxide system for
decontamination of rooms and microbiological safety cabinets. He claimed
that it is possible to fill a room with lab equipment, including computers,
and decontaminate it with the peroxide vapour without damage and that this
has been done on a large scale by pharmaceutical manufacturers.
Sales reps are marvelous. Yes it is possible BUT one had better be damn sure that none of the equipment have materials attacked by hydrogen peroxide (chiefly rubber, rubber like material, some electrical insulation).
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
--=====================_345770371==_.ALT--
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2002 10:38:22 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Joseph P. Kozlovac"
Subject: Re: Decontamination Recommendations
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="=====================_4518386==_.ALT"
--=====================_4518386==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
I have had a little experience with VHP. Because of the very low amount of
peroxide actually used when performing vapor phase decontamination,
chemical compatibility of susceptible materials only becomes an issue after
repeated exposure over time.....the amount of degradation that occurs
during any one cycle is minimal. I agree that chemical compatibility
becomes a significant issue if the equipment or area will be frequently
decontaminated such as the case with a BSC. I have heard of a study
exposing computers to chlorine dioxide decontamination and a computer after
5 runs was inoperable with increasing degrees of degradation prior to
that. I believe Steris has done studies on electronic equipment (including
computers) as well with no adverse effects after many exposures. I am not
the first to say this and many of my more learned colleagues have stated in
the past, that when it comes to decontamination there is no magic bullet,
it is application and agent specific, each method has pluses and
minuses. We as biosafety professionals must determine what is the best
disinfecting agent to use for a specific application. Just My two cents.
At 08:19 AM 6/21/02 -0400, you wrote:
>At 11:17 AM 6/21/2002 +0100, Dr Stuart Thompson wrote:
>>I recently met with a representative of Steris, who I understand are a US
>>company from Ohio, to discuss their hydrogen peroxide system for
>>decontamination of rooms and microbiological safety cabinets. He claimed
>>that it is possible to fill a room with lab equipment, including computers,
>>and decontaminate it with the peroxide vapour without damage and that this
>>has been done on a large scale by pharmaceutical manufacturers.
>
>Sales reps are marvelous. Yes it is possible BUT one had better be damn
>sure that none of the equipment have materials attacked by hydrogen
>peroxide (chiefly rubber, rubber like material, some electrical insulation).
>
>Senior Biosafety Officer
>Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
>617-258-5647
>rfink@mit.edu
>
______________________________________________________________________________
Biological Safety Officer
Environment, Health, Safety
SAIC-Frederick
National Cancer Institute -
Frederick
(301)846-1451 fax: (301)846-6619
email: jkozlovac@mail.
______________________________________________________________________________
--=====================_4518386==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/html; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
I have had a little experience with VHP. Because of the very low amount of peroxide actually used when performing vapor phase decontamination, chemical compatibility of susceptible materials only becomes an issue after repeated exposure over time.....the amount of degradation that occurs during any one cycle is minimal. I agree that chemical compatibility becomes a significant issue if the equipment or area will be frequently decontaminated such as the case with a BSC. I have heard of a study exposing computers to chlorine dioxide decontamination and a computer after 5 runs was inoperable with increasing degrees of degradation prior to that. I believe Steris has done studies on electronic equipment (including computers) as well with no adverse effects after many exposures. I am not the first to say this and many of my more learned colleagues have stated in the past, that when it comes to decontamination there is no magic bullet, it is application and agent specific, each method has pluses and minuses. We as biosafety professionals must determine what is the best disinfecting agent to use for a specific application. Just My two cents.
At 08:19 AM 6/21/02 -0400, you wrote:
At 11:17 AM 6/21/2002 +0100, Dr Stuart Thompson wrote:
I recently met with a representative of Steris, who I understand are a US
company from Ohio, to discuss their hydrogen peroxide system for
decontamination of rooms and microbiological safety cabinets. He claimed
that it is possible to fill a room with lab equipment, including computers,
and decontaminate it with the peroxide vapour without damage and that this
has been done on a large scale by pharmaceutical manufacturers.
Sales reps are marvelous. Yes it is possible BUT one had better be damn sure that none of the equipment have materials attacked by hydrogen peroxide (chiefly rubber, rubber like material, some electrical insulation).
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
____________________________________________________________________________= __
Biological Safety Officer
Environment, Health, Safety
SAIC-Frederick
National Cancer Institute -= Frederick = &nbs=
p; =
(301)846-1451 fax: (301)846-6619
email: jkozlovac@mail.
_________________________________________________________________= _____________
--=====================_4518386==_.ALT--
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2002 11:12:36 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Stefan Wagener
Subject: Re: Decontamination Recommendations
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-type: multipart/mixed;
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--0__=br5Hvdrlh2zmurtGCHtldmvAKwgDCuOUU34qA3b1N9iWOaMjdF7ly6q8
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Disposition: inline
Very well stated!
Thanks.
Stefan
"Joseph P. Kozlovac" on 2002-06-21 09:38:22 AM
Please respond to A Biosafety Discussion List
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
cc: (bcc: Stefan Wagener/HC-SC/GC/CA)
Subject: Re: Decontamination Recommendations
I have had a little experience with VHP. Because of the very low amount of
peroxide actually used when performing vapor phase decontamination,
chemical compatibility of susceptible materials only becomes an issue after
repeated exposure over time.....the amount of degradation that occurs
during any one cycle is minimal. I agree that chemical compatibility
becomes a significant issue if the equipment or area will be frequently
decontaminated such as the case with a BSC. I have heard of a study
exposing computers to chlorine dioxide decontamination and a computer after
5 runs was inoperable with increasing degrees of degradation prior to
that. I believe Steris has done studies on electronic equipment (including
computers) as well with no adverse effects after many exposures. I am not
the first to say this and many of my more learned colleagues have stated in
the past, that when it comes to decontamination there is no magic bullet,
it is application and agent specific, each method has pluses and
minuses. We as biosafety professionals must determine what is the best
disinfecting agent to use for a specific application. Just My two cents.
At 08:19 AM 6/21/02 -0400, you wrote:
>At 11:17 AM 6/21/2002 +0100, Dr Stuart Thompson wrote:
>>I recently met with a representative of Steris, who I understand are a US
>>company from Ohio, to discuss their hydrogen peroxide system for
>>decontamination of rooms and microbiological safety cabinets. He claimed
>>that it is possible to fill a room with lab equipment, including computers,
>>and decontaminate it with the peroxide vapour without damage and that this
>>has been done on a large scale by pharmaceutical manufacturers.
>
>Sales reps are marvelous. Yes it is possible BUT one had better be damn
>sure that none of the equipment have materials attacked by hydrogen
>peroxide (chiefly rubber, rubber like material, some electrical insulation).
>
>Senior Biosafety Officer
>Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
>617-258-5647
>rfink@mit.edu
>
______________________________________________________________________________
Biological Safety Officer
Environment, Health, Safety
SAIC-Frederick
National Cancer Institute -
Frederick
(301)846-1451 fax: (301)846-6619
email: jkozlovac@mail.
______________________________________________________________________________
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2002 14:48:38 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Paul Rubock
Subject: shipping GMOs
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
In shipping material that meets the IATA criteria: "genetically modified
microorganisms: (not infectious substances)...capable of altering animals,
plants, or microbiological substances...in a way not normally the result of
natural reproduction" it is stated that if such material(s) IF "authorized
for unconditional use by the States of origin" they are exempt from DRG
regs. Any one know what this "authorized use" statement is about.
Seems that the way to go on such shipments is the same as Infectious
Substances (Packing Instruction 602). I know there is the exemption from
the packaging having to meet the testing criteria (10 meter drop, etc.) but
I imagine that if the spirit of reg. was to allow for anything much less
protective than the packaging used for infectious substances, than the reg.
would tell us that Packing Instruction 650 (Diagnostic Specimens) was OK,
which it does not. Any thoughts??
Thanks,
Paul Rubock
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2002 15:17:09 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Richard Fink
Subject: VHP
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="=====================_370800532==_.ALT"
--=====================_370800532==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
>
>>From:
>>Subject: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
>>To: Richard Fink
>>X-Mailer: Lotus Notes Release 5.0.2c February 2, 2000
>>Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2002 11:07:32 -0700
>>X-MIMETrack: Serialize by Router on AHSC WebServer/AHSC/US(Release
>>5.0.1|July 16, 1999) at
>> 06/21/2002 02:16:44 PM
>>
>>Richard,
>>
>>I am not sure how I got on the list serve for biosafety, however I do have
>>some experience with VHP. In the case mentioned it is important that the
>>room temp and humidity be controlled to prevent condensation which would
>>wreck havoc with electronics. I am with a lab consulting groupo and we are
>>recommending VHP for a major BSL-4 facility in Georgia. I would be happy to
>>share any infromation with the group but I am not authorized.
>>
>>Nolan W. Watson
>>Managing Principal
>>AHSC-McLellan Copenhagen,LLC
>>Voice: 206.624.5300
>>Fax: 206.624-5190
>
>Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
>Senior Biosafety Officer
>Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
>617-258-5647
>rfink@mit.edu
>
--=====================_370800532==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
From:
Subject: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
To: Richard Fink
X-Mailer: Lotus Notes Release 5.0.2c February 2, 2000
Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2002 11:07:32 -0700
X-MIMETrack: Serialize by Router on AHSC WebServer/AHSC/US(Release 5.0.1|July 16, 1999) at
06/21/2002 02:16:44 PM
Richard,
I am not sure how I got on the list serve for biosafety, however I do have
some experience with VHP. In the case mentioned it is important that the
room temp and humidity be controlled to prevent condensation which would
wreck havoc with electronics. I am with a lab consulting groupo and we are
recommending VHP for a major BSL-4 facility in Georgia. I would be happy to
share any infromation with the group but I am not authorized.
Nolan W. Watson
Managing Principal
AHSC-McLellan Copenhagen,LLC
Voice: 206.624.5300
Fax: 206.624-5190
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
--=====================_370800532==_.ALT--
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2002 12:39:22 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Ton, Mimi"
Subject: Hamilton Syringes - Safety Mechanisms Available?
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Dear all,
Does anyone know of any safety mechanisms/devices available for Hamilton
syringes? If not, what are some alternatives to using hamilton syringes?
Thanks for everyone's help,
---------------------------------------------
Mimi C. Ton
Safety Engineer
California Institute of Technology
Environment, Health & Safety Office
M/C 25-6
1200 E. California Boulevard
Pasadena, CA 91125
Phone: 626.395.2430
Fax: 626.577.6028
E-mail: mimi.ton@caltech.edu
-----Original Message-----
From: Richard Fink [mailto:rfink@MIT.EDU]
Sent: Friday, June 21, 2002 12:17 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: VHP
From:
Subject: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
To: Richard Fink
X-Mailer: Lotus Notes Release 5.0.2c February 2, 2000
Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2002 11:07:32 -0700
X-MIMETrack: Serialize by Router on AHSC WebServer/AHSC/US(Release
5.0.1|July 16, 1999) at
06/21/2002 02:16:44 PM
Richard,
I am not sure how I got on the list serve for biosafety, however I do have
some experience with VHP. In the case mentioned it is important that the
room temp and humidity be controlled to prevent condensation which would
wreck havoc with electronics. I am with a lab consulting groupo and we are
recommending VHP for a major BSL-4 facility in Georgia. I would be happy to
share any infromation with the group but I am not authorized.
Nolan W. Watson
Managing Principal
AHSC-McLellan Copenhagen,LLC
Voice: 206.624.5300
Fax: 206.624-5190
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 26 Jun 2002 08:15:36 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Gilpin, Richard"
Subject: Re: incinerator woes
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
FYI
a individual at Wellstat Therapeutics (previously Pro-Virus) who worked
directly with Antaeus was concerned that such comments would be communicated
to so many people by an individual who was not directly involved in the
testing and contracting...and would be happy to speak with individuals
regarding their experience with the Antaeus technology.
Richard W. Gilpin, Ph.D., RBP, CBSP
Assistant Director & Biosafety Officer
Environmental Health & Safety (EHS)
University of Maryland Baltimore
714 West Lombard Street, Room 305
Baltimore MD 21201-1084
(410) 706-7845
Fax (410) 706-1520
rgilpin@ehs.umaryland.edu
ehs.umaryland.edu
-----Original Message-----
From: Kuchera, Mary [mailto:mkuchera@]
Sent: Wednesday, June 19, 2002 02:10 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: incinerator woes
Greetings,
Just a caution concerning the Antaeus macerator:
With the experience at my corporation, I'd say that (for us) "best medical
waste system" is the overstatement of the millennium.
After a year's possession, the dump is looking like an ideal location.
Mary Kuchera
Wellstat Therapeutics and Wellstat Biologics Corporations
mkuchera@
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 26 Jun 2002 07:25:16 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "BERGER, Darren"
Subject: FW: Compatibilty of VHP on Medical Devices
> Group,
>
> This is a reference our departments chemist referred me to.
>
>
> Compatibility of Medical Devices and Materials with Low-Temperature
> Hydrogen Peroxide Gas Plasma
>
>
>
>
> Darren Berger
> Facilities Engineer, BSME
> Office of Biological Safety
> 30 N. Murray Street
> Madison, WI 53715-1227
> dberger@fpm.wisc.edu
> (608) 263-2187 phone
> (608) 262-9059 fax
>
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 26 Jun 2002 13:39:17 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Schlank, Bliss M"
Subject: Waste vendors
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
I am looking to possibly of changing or Biohazardous waste vendors - can you
provide me with the waste vendors you use - preferably on the East Coast?
Thanks!
> Biosafety Manager
> OW Basement
> 1800 Concord Pike
> Wilmington, DE 19850
> Phone: 302.886.2185
> Fax: 302.886.2909
> Cell #: 302.218.5306
> email: bliss.schlank@
>
>
>
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 26 Jun 2002 13:49:45 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Larry Mendoza
Organization: VCU-OEHS-Biological/Chemical Safety Section
Subject: Surgical Suites and Infectious Agents
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="------------612A8239FA757C2D9964480E"
This is a multi-part message in MIME format.
--------------612A8239FA757C2D9964480E
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Good day to all.
Can anyone tell me if there is any regulation against perfroming a major
survival surgery (in Ferrets) in a BSC. The scope of the surgery is to inject
a recombinant herpes simplex virus (replicative deficient) in the brain. I
know that the USDA wants specific surgery suites for major surgeries, but what
about safety for the operator? One would think that a BSC would be sterile
enough for surgery and would protect both the animal and the operator.
Thanks in Advance
Larry Mendoza
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 26 Jun 2002 10:53:25 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Funk, Glenn"
Subject: Re: Surgical Suites and Infectious Agents
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Larry -
The procedure you plan to use, as well as the location of the surgery and
your assessment of any adverse impacts of that location, should be clearly
stated in your IACUC application. After that, it's up to the Committee to
determine whether the location is acceptable or not. Actually, a properly
operating and certified biosafety cabinet is an excellent place to do such
surgery because of the sterile field it can provide. One drawback is that
the airflow velocities that make the cabinet efficient also contribute to
drying of moist tissue surfaces and increased cooling of the anesthetized
animal but these are both factors that can be controlled (for example, more
frequent irrigation of the surgical field with sterile saline, use of a
heating pad beneath the animal). Again, it should be up to your IACUC and
attending vet to determine whether these controls are adequate.
-- Glenn
Glenn A. Funk, Ph.D., CBSP
Director and Biosafety Officer
Environment, Health & Safety
MedImmune Vaccines, Inc.
408-845-8857
-----Original Message-----
From: Larry Mendoza [mailto:lgmendoz@HSC.VCU.EDU]
Sent: Wednesday, 26 June, 2002 10:50
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Surgical Suites and Infectious Agents
Good day to all.
Can anyone tell me if there is any regulation against perfroming a major
survival surgery (in Ferrets) in a BSC. The scope of the surgery is to
inject
a recombinant herpes simplex virus (replicative deficient) in the brain. I
know that the USDA wants specific surgery suites for major surgeries, but
what
about safety for the operator? One would think that a BSC would be sterile
enough for surgery and would protect both the animal and the operator.
Thanks in Advance
Larry Mendoza
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 26 Jun 2002 15:56:39 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Morris, Gary"
Subject: Biosafety Certification Question
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
The electronic face board on one of our biosafety cabinets is upgraded (i.e.
replaced). No work will done to or in the body of the cabinet. Work
involves replacing the electronic board with a manual board. We've had
constant problems with the electronic board alarming.
Should this BSC be re-certified? Our vendor doesn't think a
re-certification is needed, but I want to do what is prudent.
Thanks.
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 26 Jun 2002 20:46:30 +0000
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Stephen D'Alessandro
Subject: Re: Waste vendors
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; format=flowed
We use Biosystems, out of Farmingdale, NY. Their Customer Service number is
800-220-2057. We switched to them from Stericycle. We had problems with
Stericycle missing pickups. Hope this helps.
Steve D'Alessandro
EH&S Manager
Shire Biologics
sdalessandro@ca.
>From: "Schlank, Bliss M"
>Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
>To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
>Subject: Waste vendors
>Date: Wed, 26 Jun 2002 13:39:17 -0400
>
>I am looking to possibly of changing or Biohazardous waste vendors - can
>you
>provide me with the waste vendors you use - preferably on the East Coast?
>
>Thanks!
>
> > Biosafety Manager
> > OW Basement
> > 1800 Concord Pike
> > Wilmington, DE 19850
> > Phone: 302.886.2185
> > Fax: 302.886.2909
> > Cell #: 302.218.5306
> > email: bliss.schlank@
> >
> >
> >
_________________________________________________________________
Get your FREE download of MSN Explorer at .
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 26 Jun 2002 17:44:44 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: YK Wan
Organization: The Chinese University of Hong Kong
Subject: Re: Biosafety Certification Question
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
If you get a constant problems on alarm, it may be due to the incorrect
set points for high and low flow. I recommend to check the airflows
again and recalibrate the set points. I always required the
re-certification if there is parts replaced. I think this is the only
means to assure the performance of the cabinets.
YK Wan
Safety Officer & NSF Field Certifier
The Chinese University of Hong Kong
Morris, Gary wrote:
>The electronic face board on one of our biosafety cabinets is upgraded (i.e.
>replaced). No work will done to or in the body of the cabinet. Work
>involves replacing the electronic board with a manual board. We've had
>constant problems with the electronic board alarming.
>
>Should this BSC be re-certified? Our vendor doesn't think a
>re-certification is needed, but I want to do what is prudent.
>
>Thanks.
>
>
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 27 Jun 2002 07:59:41 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Scott, Rick"
Subject: Re: Biosafety Certification Question
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Gary, I agree with YK Wan here. And I am assuming the manual board you are
talking about is also some sort of high/low flow alarm system? In which
case the new system needs to be calibrated. You weren't too specific about
what type of cabinet it is or what exactly you did. ? It's also nice to
verify that whenever you change out parts (that may or may not be linked to
an electronic speed controller)- that you have not inadvertantly tweaked
your fan speed. You could just have your certifier verify your air flow
velocities are still correct. That only takes 15 minutes to do a quick spot
check, and they'd probably do it for free if they are already in the
building certifying other cabinets. Just some thoughts...
One question for you- is this a B2 cabinet that is hard ducted to a building
exhaust system?
Rick Scott
Biological Safety Officer
Biological Safety Cabinet Field Certifier
East Carolina University
Greenville, NC
27858
scottwi@mail.ecu.edu
> ----------
> From: YK Wan
> Reply To: A Biosafety Discussion List
> Sent: Thursday, June 27, 2002 9:44 AM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: Re: Biosafety Certification Question
>
> If you get a constant problems on alarm, it may be due to the incorrect
> set points for high and low flow. I recommend to check the airflows
> again and recalibrate the set points. I always required the
> re-certification if there is parts replaced. I think this is the only
> means to assure the performance of the cabinets.
>
> YK Wan
> Safety Officer & NSF Field Certifier
> The Chinese University of Hong Kong
>
> Morris, Gary wrote:
>
> >The electronic face board on one of our biosafety cabinets is upgraded
> (i.e.
> >replaced). No work will done to or in the body of the cabinet. Work
> >involves replacing the electronic board with a manual board. We've had
> >constant problems with the electronic board alarming.
> >
> >Should this BSC be re-certified? Our vendor doesn't think a
> >re-certification is needed, but I want to do what is prudent.
> >
> >Thanks.
> >
> >
>
>
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 27 Jun 2002 16:03:31 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Nicole H. Lehman"
Subject: Tamper-evidence and -70C storage
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
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I am seeking a method of sealing small plastic boxes (5" x 3" x 1") with
tamper-evident or resistant tape. The problem is that the boxes are
stored at -70C and the three types of tamper-evident tape I have tried
all come off cleanly (some even off the room temp. boxes). Is anyone
successfully using something under these conditions? Thanks for your
input, Nicole
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 27 Jun 2002 16:47:35 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Michael Betlach
Subject: Re: Tamper-evidence and -70C storage
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Marsh BioProducts lists laser cryovial labels in various
sizes that may fill the bill for you: e.g.,
CB05-LAS-LG labels, laser cryobabies tags, large tags, 1" x 2-5/8", (I
don't have any direct experience with these, so don't know how well they
will stick.)
Alternatively, consider 'seal-a-meal' bags or foil (heat-fused seal). These
will make stacking the boxes more difficult, though.
We've had good luck with Avery laser label stock for cryovials themselves,
provided we wrap completely around the vial so that the label adheres to
itself. That may work with your tamper-evident tape as well.
Michael Betlach, Ph.D.
Biosafety Officer
Promega Corporation
5445 E. Cheryl Parkway
Madison, WI 53711
(608) 274-1181, Ext. 1270
-----Original Message-----
From: Nicole H. Lehman [mailto:nlehman@NADC.ARS.]
Sent: Thursday, June 27, 2002 4:04 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Tamper-evidence and -70C storage
I am seeking a method of sealing small plastic boxes (5" x 3" x 1") with
tamper-evident or resistant tape. The problem is that the boxes are
stored at -70C and the three types of tamper-evident tape I have tried
all come off cleanly (some even off the room temp. boxes). Is anyone
successfully using something under these conditions? Thanks for your
input, Nicole
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 28 Jun 2002 10:06:19 +1000
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Adam Janssen
Subject: Immunisation question
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Dear group
We are just putting together our immunisation policy and I am seeking your
advice on the following question.
When immunisation is required for laboratory staff - say Hep B immunisation
etc - and the staff member refuses the immunisation. What measures do you
take besides a signed declaration? Do you restrict their work tasks (eg no
blood work) or is the signed declaration enough?
Any help would be most appreciated
Adam
******************************************************************
Adam Janssen
OH&S Coordinator
Risk Management Unit
University of New South Wales
Sydney 2052 AUSTRALIA
Tel: 61 2 9385 2214 Fax 61 2 9385 2365
email: d.janssen@unsw.edu.au
*******************************************************************
Visit our website at
for details of the services provided by UNSW Risk Management
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 28 Jun 2002 10:37:34 EDT
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Christian Nordqvist
Subject: Abbreviations used in science and healthcare
MIME-Version: 1.0
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Dear Members
This website has great search facilities:
- Medical/Pharma abbreviations search
- Pharma companies wordwide search
- Drug search
- Medical/Pharma associations search
- Medical articles search
- Merck manual search
pharma-
Best regards
Christian Nordqvist
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Dear Members
This website has great search facilities:
- Medical/Pharma abbreviations search
- Pharma companies wordwide search
- Drug search
- Medical/Pharma associations search
- Medical articles search
- Merck manual search
pharma-
Best regards
Christian Nordqvist
--part1_18e.9dca3f7.2a4dceae_boundary--
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 28 Jun 2002 10:12:10 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Sue Quinn
Subject: Re: Immunisation question
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Can we require that someone be immunized? My understanding is that we =
are required to offer the series, but our scientists have the right to =
decline it for whatever reason (provided they sign a formal declination =
form).
Sue
----- Original Message -----
From: Adam Janssen
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Sent: Thursday, June 27, 2002 5:06 PM
Subject: Immunisation question
Dear group
We are just putting together our immunisation policy and I am seeking =
your
advice on the following question.
When immunisation is required for laboratory staff - say Hep B =
immunisation
etc - and the staff member refuses the immunisation. What measures do =
you
take besides a signed declaration? Do you restrict their work tasks =
(eg no
blood work) or is the signed declaration enough?
Any help would be most appreciated
Adam
******************************************************************
Adam Janssen
OH&S Coordinator
Risk Management Unit
University of New South Wales
Sydney 2052 AUSTRALIA
Tel: 61 2 9385 2214 Fax 61 2 9385 2365
email: d.janssen@unsw.edu.au
*******************************************************************
Visit our website at
for details of the services provided by UNSW Risk Management
------=_NextPart_000_004F_01C21E8C.43BF2410
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Can we require that someone be = immunized? My understanding is that we are required to offer the series, but our = scientists have the right to decline it for whatever reason (provided they sign a = formal declination form).
Sue
----- Original Message -----
Adam Janssen
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Sent: Thursday, June 27, 2002 = 5:06 PM
Subject: Immunisation = question
Dear group
We are just putting together our = immunisation policy and I am seeking your
advice on the following = question.
When immunisation is required for laboratory staff - say Hep B = immunisation
etc - and the staff member refuses the immunisation. What measures do = you
take besides a signed declaration? Do you restrict their work tasks (eg = no
blood work) or is the signed declaration enough?
Any help would be = most = appreciated
Adam
**************************************= ****************************
Adam Janssen
OH&S Coordinator
Risk Management Unit
University = of New South Wales
Sydney 2052 AUSTRALIA
Tel: 61 2 9385 = 2214 Fax 61 2 9385 2365
email: d.janssen@unsw.edu.au
**= *****************************************************************
= Visit our website at
for details of the services provided by UNSW Risk Management
------=_NextPart_000_004F_01C21E8C.43BF2410--
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 28 Jun 2002 14:12:57 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Erik A. Talley"
Subject: Re: Immunisation question
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
If you restrict the work tasks to remove the hazard, there is no need to have the employee sign a declaration stating they are declining the immunization (since they are no longer exposed to the hazard).
With BBP -- OSHA, the purpose of the declination is to note the employee was offered the vaccination and made a personal determination not to accept it. The employee's position responsibilities do not change because they declined the immunization. From an employer's perspective this is very important. If an employee knew they could get out of performing more hazardous work tasks by declining an immunization, the number of declinations might go up.
When you get out of the realm of a common and acceptable vaccination like Hep B, I think there are some variances to consider.
Erik
At 10:12 AM 6/28/2002 -0700, you wrote:
Can we require that someone be immunized? My understanding is that we are required to offer the series, but our scientists have the right to decline it for whatever reason (provided they sign a formal declination form).
Sue
----- Original Message -----
From: Adam Janssen
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Sent: Thursday, June 27, 2002 5:06 PM
Subject: Immunisation question
Dear group
We are just putting together our immunisation policy and I am seeking your
advice on the following question.
When immunisation is required for laboratory staff - say Hep B immunisation
etc - and the staff member refuses the immunisation. What measures do you
take besides a signed declaration? Do you restrict their work tasks (eg no
blood work) or is the signed declaration enough?
Any help would be most appreciated
Adam
******************************************************************
Adam Janssen
OH&S Coordinator
Risk Management Unit
University of New South Wales
Sydney 2052 AUSTRALIA
Tel: 61 2 9385 2214 Fax 61 2 9385 2365
email: d.janssen@unsw.edu.au
*******************************************************************
Visit our website at
for details of the services provided by UNSW Risk Management
___________________________________
Erik A. Talley, Director
Environmental Health and Safety
Weill Medical College of Cornell University
418 East 71st Street, Suite 62
New York, NY 10021
212-746-6201
ert2002@med.cornell.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 28 Jun 2002 13:28:34 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Kyle Boyett
Subject: Re: Immunisation question
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Restricting work based on personal decisions like whether or not to accept a
vaccine is a very tricky legal issue. If you take that philosophy to its
logical conclusion then if some one's work is restricted due to pregnancy
status changing (a personal decision) you would be looking at a law suit
waiting to happen. The best that we can do is inform the individual as to
the risk, let then sign a disclaimer and make sure we keep good records.
Ultimately the decision to accept the vaccine or work with particular
materials lies with the employee. OSHA's declination form is precisely for
this purpose. It clearly states what the risk is in terms of Hepatitis B.
My dimes worth (inflation you know).
Kyle G. Boyett
Asst. Director of Biosafety
Safety Short Distribution List Administrator
University of Alabama @ Birmingham
Department of Occupational Health and Safety
933 South 19th Street Suite 445
Birmingham, Alabama 35294
Phone: 205.934.9181
Fax: 205.934.7487
Visit our WEB site at: healthsafe.uab.edu
Asking me to overlook a safety violation is like asking me to reduce the
value I place on YOUR life
-----Original Message-----
From: Erik A. Talley [mailto:ert2002@MED.CORNELL.EDU]
Sent: Friday, June 28, 2002 12:13 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Immunisation question
If you restrict the work tasks to remove the hazard, there is no need to
have the employee sign a declaration stating they are declining the
immunization (since they are no longer exposed to the hazard).
With BBP -- OSHA, the purpose of the declination is to note the employee was
offered the vaccination and made a personal determination not to accept it.
The employee's position responsibilities do not change because they declined
the immunization. From an employer's perspective this is very important. If
an employee knew they could get out of performing more hazardous work tasks
by declining an immunization, the number of declinations might go up.
When you get out of the realm of a common and acceptable vaccination like
Hep B, I think there are some variances to consider.
Erik
At 10:12 AM 6/28/2002 -0700, you wrote:
Can we require that someone be immunized? My understanding is that we are
required to offer the series, but our scientists have the right to decline
it for whatever reason (provided they sign a formal declination form).
Sue
----- Original Message -----
From: Adam Janssen
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Sent: Thursday, June 27, 2002 5:06 PM
Subject: Immunisation question
Dear group
We are just putting together our immunisation policy and I am seeking your
advice on the following question.
When immunisation is required for laboratory staff - say Hep B immunisation
etc - and the staff member refuses the immunisation. What measures do you
take besides a signed declaration? Do you restrict their work tasks (eg no
blood work) or is the signed declaration enough?
Any help would be most appreciated
Adam
******************************************************************
Adam Janssen
OH&S Coordinator
Risk Management Unit
University of New South Wales
Sydney 2052 AUSTRALIA
Tel: 61 2 9385 2214 Fax 61 2 9385 2365
email: d.janssen@unsw.edu.au
*******************************************************************
Visit our website at
for details of the services provided by UNSW Risk Management
___________________________________
Erik A. Talley, Director
Environmental Health and Safety
Weill Medical College of Cornell University
418 East 71st Street, Suite 62
New York, NY 10021
212-746-6201
ert2002@med.cornell.edu
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Restricting work based on personal decisions like whether or not to accept a vaccine is a very tricky = legal issue. If you take that philosophy to its logical conclusion then if some = one's work is restricted due to pregnancy status changing (a personal = decision) you would be looking at a law suit waiting to happen. The best that we can = do is inform the individual as to the risk, let then sign a disclaimer and = make sure we keep good records. Ultimately the decision to accept the vaccine or = work with particular materials lies with the employee. OSHA's declination = form is precisely for this purpose. It clearly states what the risk is in = terms of Hepatitis B. My dimes = worth (inflation you know).
=
Kyle G. Boyett
Asst. Director of Biosafety
Safety Short Distribution List Administrator
University of Alabama @ Birmingham
Department of Occupational Health and Safety
933 South 19th Street Suite 445
Birmingham, Alabama 35294
Phone: 205.934.9181
Fax: 205.934.7487
Visit our WEB site at: healthsafe.uab.edu
Asking me to overlook a safety violation is like asking me to = reduce the value I place on YOUR life
-----Original = Message-----
From: Erik A. Talley [mailto:ert2002@MED.CORNELL.EDU]
Sent: Friday, June 28, 2002 12:13 = PM
To: = BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: = Immunisation question
If you restrict the work tasks to remove the = hazard, there is no need to have the employee sign a declaration stating they = are declining the immunization (since they are no longer exposed to the = hazard).
With BBP -- OSHA, the purpose of the declination is to note the = employee was offered the vaccination and made a personal determination not to accept = it. The employee's position responsibilities do not change because they = declined the immunization. From an employer's perspective this is very important. If = an employee knew they could get out of performing more hazardous work = tasks by declining an immunization, the number of declinations might go up.
When you get out of the realm of a common and acceptable vaccination = like Hep B, I think there are some variances to consider.
Erik
At 10:12 AM 6/28/2002 -0700, you wrote:
Can we require that = someone be immunized? My understanding is that we are required to offer the = series, but our scientists have the right to decline it for whatever reason = (provided they sign a formal declination form).
Sue
----- Original Message -----
From: Adam Janssen
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU =
Sent: Thursday, June 27, = 2002 5:06 PM
Subject: Immunisation = question
Dear group
We are just putting together our immunisation policy and I am seeking = your
advice on the following question.
When immunisation is required for laboratory staff - say Hep B = immunisation
etc - and the staff member refuses the immunisation. What measures do = you
take besides a signed declaration? Do you restrict their work tasks (eg = no
blood work) or is the signed declaration enough?
Any help would be most appreciated
Adam
******************************************************************
Adam Janssen
OH&S Coordinator
Risk Management Unit
University of New South Wales
Sydney 2052 AUSTRALIA
Tel: 61 2 9385 2214 Fax 61 2 9385 2365
email: d.janssen@unsw.edu.au
*******************************************************************
Visit our website at
for details of the services provided by UNSW Risk = Management
___________________________________
Erik A. Talley, Director
Environmental Health and Safety
Weill Medical College of Cornell University
418 East 71st Street, Suite 62
New York, NY 10021
212-746-6201
ert2002@med.cornell.edu
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=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 28 Jun 2002 17:56:47 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Barbara Owen
Organization: Bristol-Myers Squibb
Subject: Lentiviral Systems
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-transfer-encoding: 7bit
Question:
Has anyone had experience working with ViraPower Lentiviral
Expression Systems (Invitrogen life technologies)? Other than
working at BSL2 are there any other specific biosafety
precautions that should be taken? Also, the question was raised
by one of our researchers, "can the Lentivirus particles produced
in this system infect human skin, and thus transfer the DNA
packaged in the Lentivirus, into the skin of the scientist?"
Project Background:
A member of our research team would like to make recombinant
viruses using the Lentivirus system instead of the Adenovirus or
other Retrovirus systems. The project goal is to incorporate
into the Lentivirus vector a number of cDNA clones encoding human
genes, e.g. kinases, transcription factors, G-proteins and
others. Once the recombinant virus is prepared it will be used
to transfect various human cell lines to express the gene of
interest. This will only occur after integration of the provirus
DNA into the genome. The resulting cell lines will then be used
for various purposes depending on the necessary functional
assay. This could be, but is not restricted to, assaying of
transcriptional reporter systems, influence of the expressed gene
on cell cycle activity, apoptosis, intracellular localization of
the gene product of interest, and others. Combinations of
individual virus stock might also be used to achieve high
expressions of protein heterodimers.
Kit Safety Features:
Reading through the kit manual there seem to be adequate safety
features built into this HIV-based expression system to make it
safe for handling at BSL2. According to the vendor, the viral
packaging functions are supplied in trans by three different
packaging plasmids. There are no long terminal repeats (LTRs)
present in the packaging mix which are cis-acting sequences
needed for production of infectious virions. The viral particles
produced are replication incompetent, and once the pro-viral DNA
integrates into the host cell genone, the normal viral life cycle
would be halted.
Thanks for your help.
Barbara Owen
Manager Safety & IH
Bristol-Myers Squibb
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 1 Jul 2002 08:18:32 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Kim Auletta
Subject: Re: Immunisation question
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
At least for the OSHA required Hep B offer, you can make it a condition of
work and require that the employees ALL be immunized or they can not be
offered the job - ie a condition of employment. The legal issues become
more difficult when you are offering the vaccine to pre-existing employees.
The question of current employees who cannot take the vaccine for health
reasons and what to do with them needs to be resolved.
Kim Auletta
Lab Safety Specialist
Environmental Health and Safety
SUNY Stony Brook
110 Suffolk Hall
Stony Brook, NY 11794-6200
phone: 631-632-9672
fax: 631-632-9683
email: kauletta@.sunysb.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 1 Jul 2002 10:30:31 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Robert N. Latsch"
Subject: Re: Tamper-evidence and -70C storage
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Here is an old trick that may help.
Use tape that is designed to be used in the freezer and will not come off.
Place something in the lid of the box and shut the box on the item. This
traps the item in the lid. When the lid is opened, the item falls out.
So, If you examine your box before opening, and the item is there, you know
it has not been opened. A piece of hair works great.
OR
Do you want to use a wax seal?
Bob
>I am seeking a method of sealing small plastic boxes (5" x 3" x 1") with
>tamper-evident or resistant tape. The problem is that the boxes are
>stored at -70C and the three types of tamper-evident tape I have tried
>all come off cleanly (some even off the room temp. boxes). Is anyone
>successfully using something under these conditions? Thanks for your
>input, Nicole
_____________________________________________________________________
__ / _____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 1 Jul 2002 09:48:20 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Giles, Carol A."
Subject: Re: Tamper-evidence and -70C storage
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Can the freezer or the lab be locked and only certain authorized personnel
be given access to it? While the hair idea might work, it is not likely to
stand up in court if you need to present something for legal purposes.
Have you tried contacting laboratory supply houses to ask for their
recommendations for these labels or chain-of-custody seals?
Carol A. Giles, MPH, CIH
EQO-Industrial Hygiene
Building 200, C-133
Argonne National Laboratory
9700 S. Cass Avenue
Argonne, IL 60439
(630) 252-3427
-----Original Message-----
From: Robert N. Latsch [mailto:rnl2@PO.CWRU.EDU]
Sent: July 01, 2002 9:31 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Tamper-evidence and -70C storage
Here is an old trick that may help.
Use tape that is designed to be used in the freezer and will not come off.
Place something in the lid of the box and shut the box on the item. This
traps the item in the lid. When the lid is opened, the item falls out. So,
If you examine your box before opening, and the item is there, you know it
has not been opened. A piece of hair works great.
OR
Do you want to use a wax seal?
Bob
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 1 Jul 2002 11:07:16 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Paul Jennette
Subject: Re: Waste vendors
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="=====================_3806503==_.ALT"
--=====================_3806503==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
We currently use Envirotech of America in Syracuse, NY. Their number is
800-448-3851. BFI/Stericycle has also won our contract in the past.
Good Luck!
- Paul
At 08:46 PM 6/26/2002 +0000, you wrote:
>We use Biosystems, out of Farmingdale, NY. Their Customer Service number is
>800-220-2057. We switched to them from Stericycle. We had problems with
>Stericycle missing pickups. Hope this helps.
>
>Steve D'Alessandro
>EH&S Manager
>Shire Biologics
>sdalessandro@ca.
>
>
>>From: "Schlank, Bliss M"
>>Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
>>To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
>>Subject: Waste vendors
>>Date: Wed, 26 Jun 2002 13:39:17 -0400
>>
>>I am looking to possibly of changing or Biohazardous waste vendors - can
>>you
>>provide me with the waste vendors you use - preferably on the East Coast?
>>
>>Thanks!
>>
>> > Biosafety Manager
>> > OW Basement
>> > 1800 Concord Pike
>> > Wilmington, DE 19850
>> > Phone: 302.886.2185
>> > Fax: 302.886.2909
>> > Cell #: 302.218.5306
>> > email: bliss.schlank@
>> >
>> >
>> >
>
>
>_________________________________________________________________
>Get your FREE download of MSN Explorer at .
J. Paul Jennette, P.E.
Biosafety Engineer
Cornell University
College of Veterinary Medicine
Biosafety Program
S3-010 Schurman Hall, Box 4 (607) 253-4227
Ithaca, New York 14853-6401 fax -3723
--=====================_3806503==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
We currently use Envirotech of America in Syracuse, NY. Their number is 800-448-3851. BFI/Stericycle has also won our contract in the past.
Good Luck!
- Paul
At 08:46 PM 6/26/2002 +0000, you wrote:
We use Biosystems, out of Farmingdale, NY. Their Customer Service number is
800-220-2057. We switched to them from Stericycle. We had problems with
Stericycle missing pickups. Hope this helps.
Steve D'Alessandro
EH&S Manager
Shire Biologics
sdalessandro@ca.
From: "Schlank, Bliss M"
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Waste vendors
Date: Wed, 26 Jun 2002 13:39:17 -0400
I am looking to possibly of changing or Biohazardous waste vendors - can
you
provide me with the waste vendors you use - preferably on the East Coast?
Thanks!
> Biosafety Manager
> OW Basement
> 1800 Concord Pike
> Wilmington, DE 19850
> Phone: 302.886.2185
> Fax: 302.886.2909
> Cell #: 302.218.5306
> email: bliss.schlank@
>
>
>
_________________________________________________________________
Get your FREE download of MSN Explorer at .
J. Paul Jennette, P.E.
Biosafety Engineer
Cornell University
College of Veterinary Medicine
Biosafety Program
S3-010 Schurman Hall, Box 4 (607) 253-4227
Ithaca, New York 14853-6401 fax -3723
--=====================_3806503==_.ALT--
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 1 Jul 2002 08:25:39 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: David Silberman
Subject: Re: Immunisation question
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed"
For the legal experts out there: Can an employer require a medical
procedure, such as an HBV immunization, as a condition of employment
in all cases?
At Stanford, employees are given a choice: either become vaccinated
(if not already vaccinated) OR sign a declination form. Employees
must do one or the other as a condition of employment.
>At least for the OSHA required Hep B offer, you can make it a condition of
>work and require that the employees ALL be immunized or they can not be
>offered the job - ie a condition of employment. The legal issues become
>more difficult when you are offering the vaccine to pre-existing employees.
>The question of current employees who cannot take the vaccine for health
>reasons and what to do with them needs to be resolved.
>
>
>Kim Auletta
>Lab Safety Specialist
>Environmental Health and Safety
>SUNY Stony Brook
>110 Suffolk Hall
>Stony Brook, NY 11794-6200
>phone: 631-632-9672
>fax: 631-632-9683
>email: kauletta@.sunysb.edu
--
David H. Silberman
Director, Health and Safety Programs
Stanford University School of Medicine
Medical School Office Building
Stanford, CA 94305 Mail Code: 5460
650 723-6336 (DIRECT LINE)
650 725-7878 (FAX)
silberman@stanford.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 1 Jul 2002 10:36:21 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Christina Thompson
Subject: Re: Immunisation question
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: multipart/alternative; boundary="=_alternative 0055BA0805256BE9_="
This is a multipart message in MIME format.
--=_alternative 0055BA0805256BE9_=
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
I don't think you can make a medical procedure a condition of employment.
I think that is part of the rationale behind the requirement for having a
declination form. Besides that, you're only protecting against one
disease here. Making it a condition and insisting that people get the HBV
vaccine could give a false sense of security. Universal precautions and
following your local safety policies and procedures should be conditions
for employment.
My humble opinion - not an official statement of my employer.
Chris Thompson
Biosafety Officer
Eli Lilly and Company
David Silberman
Sent by: A Biosafety Discussion List
07/01/2002 10:25 AM
Please respond to A Biosafety Discussion List
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
cc:
Subject: Re: Immunisation question
For the legal experts out there: Can an employer require a medical
procedure, such as an HBV immunization, as a condition of employment
in all cases?
At Stanford, employees are given a choice: either become vaccinated
(if not already vaccinated) OR sign a declination form. Employees
must do one or the other as a condition of employment.
>At least for the OSHA required Hep B offer, you can make it a condition
of
>work and require that the employees ALL be immunized or they can not be
>offered the job - ie a condition of employment. The legal issues become
>more difficult when you are offering the vaccine to pre-existing
employees.
>The question of current employees who cannot take the vaccine for health
>reasons and what to do with them needs to be resolved.
>
>
>Kim Auletta
>Lab Safety Specialist
>Environmental Health and Safety
>SUNY Stony Brook
>110 Suffolk Hall
>Stony Brook, NY 11794-6200
>phone: 631-632-9672
>fax: 631-632-9683
>email: kauletta@.sunysb.edu
--
David H. Silberman
Director, Health and Safety Programs
Stanford University School of Medicine
Medical School Office Building
Stanford, CA 94305 Mail Code: 5460
650 723-6336 (DIRECT LINE)
650 725-7878 (FAX)
silberman@stanford.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 1 Jul 2002 11:10:28 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Mary Cipriano
Subject: HBV Vaccination as a Condition of Employment
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
We make HBV vaccination a condition of employment for those employees who work
with HBV at a BSL-2 and BSL-3. It is voluntary for individuals working with
unscreened clinical samples. other infectious agents, or other potentially
infectious materials. (The waiver is, of course, required if they choose not
to be vaccinated.)
We felt that the risk for the individuals working with known HBV positive
samples / HBV concentrated materials was extremely high. Since that risk can
be virtually eliminated by vaccination, we require it. Legal and HR agreed as
long as it was only applied to new employees. We did that about 17 years ago
and it has not proven to be a problem.
Mary Cipriano
Abbott Labs
mary.cipriano@
Christina Thompson
cc:
Sent by: A Biosafety Subject: Re: Immunisation question
Discussion List
07/01/02 10:36 AM
Please respond to A
Biosafety Discussion
List
I don't think you can make a medical procedure a condition of employment. I
think that is part of the rationale behind the requirement for having a
declination form. Besides that, you're only protecting against one disease
here. Making it a condition and insisting that people get the HBV vaccine
could give a false sense of security. Universal precautions and following
your local safety policies and procedures should be conditions for employment.
My humble opinion - not an official statement of my employer.
Chris Thompson
Biosafety Officer
Eli Lilly and Company
David Silberman
Sent by: A Biosafety Discussion List To:
BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
cc:
Subject: Re:
07/01/2002 10:25 AM Immunisation question
Please respond to A Biosafety Discussion
List
For the legal experts out there: Can an employer require a medical
procedure, such as an HBV immunization, as a condition of employment
in all cases?
At Stanford, employees are given a choice: either become vaccinated
(if not already vaccinated) OR sign a declination form. Employees
must do one or the other as a condition of employment.
>At least for the OSHA required Hep B offer, you can make it a condition of
>work and require that the employees ALL be immunized or they can not be
>offered the job - ie a condition of employment. The legal issues become
>more difficult when you are offering the vaccine to pre-existing employees.
>The question of current employees who cannot take the vaccine for health
>reasons and what to do with them needs to be resolved.
>
>
>Kim Auletta
>Lab Safety Specialist
>Environmental Health and Safety
>SUNY Stony Brook
>110 Suffolk Hall
>Stony Brook, NY 11794-6200
>phone: 631-632-9672
>fax: 631-632-9683
>email: kauletta@.sunysb.edu
--
David H. Silberman
Director, Health and Safety Programs
Stanford University School of Medicine
Medical School Office Building
Stanford, CA 94305 Mail Code: 5460
650 723-6336 (DIRECT LINE)
650 725-7878 (FAX)
silberman@stanford.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 1 Jul 2002 13:11:14 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Robert N. Latsch"
Subject: Re: Immunisation question
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Personally, I like this approach. BUT, it is not supported by the
law(BBP), which allows a choice. In Ohio, all dental workers must be
vaccinated or they do not work, a state rule. So dental workers only must
be vaccinated. Everybody else has a choice. You could have some legal
issues if someone decides to fight this.
Bob
>At least for the OSHA required Hep B offer, you can make it a condition of
>work and require that the employees ALL be immunized or they can not be
>offered the job - ie a condition of employment. The legal issues become
>more difficult when you are offering the vaccine to pre-existing employees.
>The question of current employees who cannot take the vaccine for health
>reasons and what to do with them needs to be resolved.
>
>
>Kim Auletta
>Lab Safety Specialist
>Environmental Health and Safety
>SUNY Stony Brook
>110 Suffolk Hall
>Stony Brook, NY 11794-6200
>phone: 631-632-9672
>fax: 631-632-9683
>email: kauletta@.sunysb.edu
_____________________________________________________________________
__ / _____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 1 Jul 2002 12:08:03 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Millis, Nick"
Subject: Re: Immunisation question
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="windows-1252"
This may be of interest to some.
"High Court Says Employers Can Deny Risky Jobs"
"The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that employees are not entitled to jobs that
might worsen their health."
You can read more about this in Business & Legal Reports free EHS e-lert
article, June 18, 2002, located at:
Nick S. Millis, RBP
Occupational Safety Manager
Texas Tech University Health Sciences
3601 4th Street, Mail Stop 9020
Lubbock, Texas 79430
Phone: (806) 743-2597
Fax: (806) 743-1299
E-Mail: Nick.Millis@ttmc.ttuhsc.edu
-----Original Message-----
From: Kim Auletta [mailto:kauletta@.SUNYSB.EDU]
Sent: Monday, July 01, 2002 7:19 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Immunisation question
At least for the OSHA required Hep B offer, you can make it a condition of
work and require that the employees ALL be immunized or they can not be
offered the job - ie a condition of employment. The legal issues become
more difficult when you are offering the vaccine to pre-existing employees.
The question of current employees who cannot take the vaccine for health
reasons and what to do with them needs to be resolved.
Kim Auletta
Lab Safety Specialist
Environmental Health and Safety
SUNY Stony Brook
110 Suffolk Hall
Stony Brook, NY 11794-6200
phone: 631-632-9672
fax: 631-632-9683
email: kauletta@.sunysb.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 2 Jul 2002 09:20:26 +1000
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Adam Janssen
Subject: Re: HBV Vaccination as a Condition of Employment
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Mary your approach is sound and similar to what I would like to include in
our policy but!
Our main concern with this type of approach is the response from the
University insurance underwriters (our University is a self-insurer). We
are currently checking to see if they will except the risk of a new
employee refusing immunisation. If the answer is no then any insurance
that our University has will not cover a claim. This may force our hand
requiring immunisation as an employment condition.
Adam
At 11:10 AM 1/07/02 -0500, you wrote:
>We make HBV vaccination a condition of employment for those employees who
work
>with HBV at a BSL-2 and BSL-3. It is voluntary for individuals working with
>unscreened clinical samples. other infectious agents, or other potentially
>infectious materials. (The waiver is, of course, required if they choose not
>to be vaccinated.)
>We felt that the risk for the individuals working with known HBV positive
>samples / HBV concentrated materials was extremely high. Since that risk can
>be virtually eliminated by vaccination, we require it. Legal and HR agreed as
>long as it was only applied to new employees. We did that about 17 years ago
>and it has not proven to be a problem.
>
>Mary Cipriano
>Abbott Labs
>mary.cipriano@
>
>
>
>
> Christina Thompson
> > cc:
> Sent by: A Biosafety Subject: Re:
Immunisation question
> Discussion List
> DU>
>
>
> 07/01/02 10:36 AM
> Please respond to A
> Biosafety Discussion
> List
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>I don't think you can make a medical procedure a condition of employment. I
>think that is part of the rationale behind the requirement for having a
>declination form. Besides that, you're only protecting against one disease
>here. Making it a condition and insisting that people get the HBV vaccine
>could give a false sense of security. Universal precautions and following
>your local safety policies and procedures should be conditions for
employment.
>
>
>My humble opinion - not an official statement of my employer.
>
>Chris Thompson
>Biosafety Officer
>Eli Lilly and Company
>
>
>
> David Silberman
> Sent by: A Biosafety Discussion List To:
> BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> cc:
> Subject: Re:
> 07/01/2002 10:25 AM Immunisation question
> Please respond to A Biosafety Discussion
> List
>
>
>
>
>
>
>For the legal experts out there: Can an employer require a medical
>procedure, such as an HBV immunization, as a condition of employment
>in all cases?
>
>At Stanford, employees are given a choice: either become vaccinated
>(if not already vaccinated) OR sign a declination form. Employees
>must do one or the other as a condition of employment.
>
>
>>At least for the OSHA required Hep B offer, you can make it a condition of
>>work and require that the employees ALL be immunized or they can not be
>>offered the job - ie a condition of employment. The legal issues become
>>more difficult when you are offering the vaccine to pre-existing employees.
>>The question of current employees who cannot take the vaccine for health
>>reasons and what to do with them needs to be resolved.
>>
>>
>>Kim Auletta
>>Lab Safety Specialist
>>Environmental Health and Safety
>>SUNY Stony Brook
>>110 Suffolk Hall
>>Stony Brook, NY 11794-6200
>>phone: 631-632-9672
>>fax: 631-632-9683
>>email: kauletta@.sunysb.edu
>
>
>--
>
>David H. Silberman
>Director, Health and Safety Programs
>Stanford University School of Medicine
>Medical School Office Building
>Stanford, CA 94305 Mail Code: 5460
>
>650 723-6336 (DIRECT LINE)
>650 725-7878 (FAX)
>silberman@stanford.edu
>
>
>
******************************************************************
Adam Janssen
OH&S Coordinator
Risk Management Unit
University of New South Wales
Sydney 2052 AUSTRALIA
Tel: 61 2 9385 2214 Fax 61 2 9385 2365
email: d.janssen@unsw.edu.au
*******************************************************************
Visit our website at
for details of the services provided by UNSW Risk Management
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 2 Jul 2002 11:01:11 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Richard Fink
Subject: Fwd: FW: Immunisation question
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="=====================_435690539==_.ALT"
--=====================_435690539==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
From our good friend Nick Millis:
>From: "Millis, Nick"
>To: "Richard Fink (E-mail)"
>Subject: FW: Immunisation question
>Date: Mon, 1 Jul 2002 11:44:14 -0500
>X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2653.19)
>
>Richard
>I attempted to send this to the list, but our institution has standardized
>our e-mail addresses and apparently the Listserv no longer recognizes my
>address which has changed from ssdnsm@ttuhsc.edu to
>Nick.Millis@ttmc.ttuhsc.edu . I'm in the process of re-subscribing, but in
>the meantime would you be willing to forward this to the Biosafty List.
>Thanks
>
>Nick
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From: Millis, Nick
>Sent: Monday, July 01, 2002 8:50 AM
>To: 'A Biosafety Discussion List'
>Subject: RE: Immunisation question
>
>This may be of interest to some.
>"High Court Says Employers Can Deny Risky Jobs"
>"The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that employees are not entitled to jobs that
>might worsen their health."
>You can read more about this in Business & Legal Reports free EHS e-lert
>article, June 18, 2002, located at:
>
>Nick S. Millis, RBP
>Occupational Safety Manager
>Texas Tech University Health Sciences
>3601 4th Street, Mail Stop 9020
>Lubbock, Texas 79430
>Phone: (806) 743-2597
>Fax: (806) 743-1299
>E-Mail: Nick.Millis@ttmc.ttuhsc.edu
>
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From: Kim Auletta [mailto:kauletta@.SUNYSB.EDU]
>Sent: Monday, July 01, 2002 7:19 AM
>To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
>Subject: Re: Immunisation question
>
>At least for the OSHA required Hep B offer, you can make it a condition of
>work and require that the employees ALL be immunized or they can not be
>offered the job - ie a condition of employment. The legal issues become more
>difficult when you are offering the vaccine to pre-existing employees. The
>question of current employees who cannot take the vaccine for health reasons
>and what to do with them needs to be resolved.
>
>Kim Auletta
>Lab Safety Specialist
>Environmental Health and Safety
>SUNY Stony Brook
>110 Suffolk Hall
>Stony Brook, NY 11794-6200
>phone: 631-632-9672
>fax: 631-632-9683
>email: kauletta@.sunysb.edu
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Biosafty List Owner
rfink@mit.edu
--=====================_435690539==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
From our good friend Nick Millis:
From: "Millis, Nick"
To: "Richard Fink (E-mail)"
Subject: FW: Immunisation question
Date: Mon, 1 Jul 2002 11:44:14 -0500
X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2653.19)
Richard
I attempted to send this to the list, but our institution has standardized
our e-mail addresses and apparently the Listserv no longer recognizes my
address which has changed from ssdnsm@ttuhsc.edu to
Nick.Millis@ttmc.ttuhsc.edu . I'm in the process of re-subscribing, but in
the meantime would you be willing to forward this to the Biosafty List.
Thanks
Nick
-----Original Message-----
From: Millis, Nick
Sent: Monday, July 01, 2002 8:50 AM
To: 'A Biosafety Discussion List'
Subject: RE: Immunisation question
This may be of interest to some.
"High Court Says Employers Can Deny Risky Jobs"
"The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that employees are not entitled to jobs that
might worsen their health."
You can read more about this in Business & Legal Reports free EHS e-lert
article, June 18, 2002, located at:
Nick S. Millis, RBP
Occupational Safety Manager
Texas Tech University Health Sciences
3601 4th Street, Mail Stop 9020
Lubbock, Texas 79430
Phone: (806) 743-2597
Fax: (806) 743-1299
E-Mail: Nick.Millis@ttmc.ttuhsc.edu
-----Original Message-----
From: Kim Auletta [mailto:kauletta@.SUNYSB.EDU]
Sent: Monday, July 01, 2002 7:19 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Immunisation question
At least for the OSHA required Hep B offer, you can make it a condition of
work and require that the employees ALL be immunized or they can not be
offered the job - ie a condition of employment. The legal issues become more
difficult when you are offering the vaccine to pre-existing employees. The
question of current employees who cannot take the vaccine for health reasons
and what to do with them needs to be resolved.
Kim Auletta
Lab Safety Specialist
Environmental Health and Safety
SUNY Stony Brook
110 Suffolk Hall
Stony Brook, NY 11794-6200
phone: 631-632-9672
fax: 631-632-9683
email: kauletta@.sunysb.edu
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Biosafty List Owner
rfink@mit.edu
--=====================_435690539==_.ALT--
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 2 Jul 2002 10:58:45 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Schlank, Bliss M"
Subject: Handling Peptides
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="----_=_NextPart_000_01C221D8.F6CD08C0"
This message is in MIME format. Since your mail reader does not understand
this format, some or all of this message may not be legible.
------_=_NextPart_000_01C221D8.F6CD08C0
Content-Type: text/plain;
charset="iso-8859-1"
Has anyone developed a guidance document (similar to the attached COSHH
Guidance) relevant to US standards fro handling peptides?
Thanks!
Bliss Schlank
> Biosafety Manager
> OW Basement
> 1800 Concord Pike
> Wilmington, DE 19850
> Phone: 302.886.2185
> Fax: 302.886.2909
> Cell #: 302.218.5306
> email: bliss.schlank@
>
>
>
------_=_NextPart_000_01C221D8.F6CD08C0
Content-Type: application/msword;
name="COSHH peptides etc.doc"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
Content-Disposition: attachment;
filename="COSHH peptides etc.doc"
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 2 Jul 2002 17:04:52 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Amy Barringer
Subject: Quiz Software Company
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
A few months ago, someone put up a link for a company that produced a =
software package that assisted the user in developing online quiz and =
training programs. Does anyone have the link to that company? Thanks =
for your assistance. Amy
Amy A. Barringer
Biosafety Officer, SOHES
ARS/USDA
Beltsville Agricultural Research Center
Bldg. 003, Rm. 118
Beltsville, MD 20705
(Ph) 301-504-5557, (F) 301-504-5857
barringa@ba.ars.
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 2 Jul 2002 17:22:05 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Mark Grushka
Subject: Re: Quiz Software Company
MIME-Version: 1.0
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Dear Biosafety Discussion List,
Its nice to know folks are still interested in looking at different ways of
doing training. The name of the company that markets the gameshow software
is Learningware, Inc at . I do not have any financial
interest in their organization.
Another good resource for alternative learning methodology is author Eric
Jensen who wrote a book entitled Brain-Based Learning. His research is very
enlightening. I do have a paper which is available by request on my
experience with using the format in an industrial setting. Please feel free
to contact me.
Yours in safety,
Mark Grushka
Biosafety Officer
University of Arizona
520-621-5279
mgrushka@u.arizona.edu
----- Original Message -----
From: "Amy Barringer"
To:
Sent: Tuesday, July 02, 2002 2:04 PM
Subject: Quiz Software Company
A few months ago, someone put up a link for a company that produced a
software package that assisted the user in developing online quiz and
training programs. Does anyone have the link to that company? Thanks for
your assistance. Amy
Amy A. Barringer
Biosafety Officer, SOHES
ARS/USDA
Beltsville Agricultural Research Center
Bldg. 003, Rm. 118
Beltsville, MD 20705
(Ph) 301-504-5557, (F) 301-504-5857
barringa@ba.ars.
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 3 Jul 2002 08:40:10 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Kim Auletta
Subject: Re: Quiz Software Company
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I had asked this "list" abt the training company & we purchased the
Learningware software. It is very impressive & we've used it a few times.
We bought "call bells" for $5 ea instead of the more expensive call in
system the company sells. Just as useful, but it doesn't "lock out" the
others, which can add to the excitment. We also purchased the
discovery school "puzzlemaker" which makes crosswords, word searches, etc.
This has also been great for training & very easy to use.
We also used the word searches in the Natl Safety Month "carnival" we
hosted last week. I used some great ideas others on this list provided -
ketchup contaminated gloves to demonstrate glove removal, golf putting for
radiation, and a bean bag toss for DOT shipping. Thanks to everyone on this
list who provided me with the ideas. If anyone is interested in the
biosafety display I did (Biosafety Overview, How to Wash Your Hands, and/or
How to Remove Contaminated Gloves - all powerpoint slides) let me know off
line & I'll email it to you.
Kim Auletta
Lab Safety Specialist
Environmental Health and Safety
SUNY Stony Brook
110 Suffolk Hall
Stony Brook, NY 11794-6200
phone: 631-632-9672
fax: 631-632-9683
email: kauletta@.sunysb.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 3 Jul 2002 11:10:44 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Cheri L Hildreth
Subject: CDC select agent notice in Fed. Register
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The CDC has published in the July 2nd Federal Register proposed data
collection for notification of select agents. Public comment is due in
14 days and CDC is requesting emergency clearance from OMB to collect
data under the PublicHealth Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and
Response Act of 2002. OMB is expected to act on the request of CDC
within 21 days of
publication of this notice.
Section 202(a) of the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism
Preparedness Response Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-188) requires that
all persons in possession of a Select Agent notify the Secretary of
Health and Human Services by September 10, 2002.
Excerpt from FR notice "In order to complete the application, the RFO
will need to inventory its facility and consult with others (e.g.,
principal
investigators) as necessary to obtain the information required for this
application. The Responsible Facility Official(RFO) must review and
sign the application and will be the point of contact if CDC has
questions concerning the application or other matters related to the
Public Law. Facilities that do not possess a listed biological agent or
toxin are required to complete the
declaration of non-possession and submit the form.
This notice also talks about application for notice of possesion for
single geograhpic sites at single mailing addresses and rsponsibilities
of the RFO. Further it states that facilities that have listed
biological agents and/or toxins that are a threat to public health must
submit notifications to CDC while those with biological agents or toxins
that are threat to animal health and products are required to submit
their notifications to US Dept. of Agriculture. If you have both,you
must submit to both agencies.
I have attached the PDF version of the FR notice for those that want to
read it.
Cheri Hildreth Watts, Director
Department of Environmental Health &Safety
University of Louisville
(502) 852-2954
e-mail: cheri.hildreth@louisville.edu
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Date: Wed, 3 Jul 2002 11:23:36 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Gilpin, Richard"
Subject: Re: CDC select agent notice in Fed. Register
MIME-Version: 1.0
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This message is in MIME format. Since your mail reader does not understand
this format, some or all of this message may not be legible.
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charset="iso-8859-1"
try this pdf attachment
-----Original Message-----
From: Cheri L Hildreth [mailto:cheri.hildreth@LOUISVILLE.EDU]
Sent: Wednesday, July 03, 2002 11:11 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: CDC select agent notice in Fed. Register
The CDC has published in the July 2nd Federal Register proposed data
collection for notification of select agents. Public comment is due in
14 days and CDC is requesting emergency clearance from OMB to collect
data under the PublicHealth Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and
Response Act of 2002. OMB is expected to act on the request of CDC
within 21 days of
publication of this notice.
Section 202(a) of the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism
Preparedness Response Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-188) requires that
all persons in possession of a Select Agent notify the Secretary of
Health and Human Services by September 10, 2002.
Excerpt from FR notice "In order to complete the application, the RFO
will need to inventory its facility and consult with others (e.g.,
principal
investigators) as necessary to obtain the information required for this
application. The Responsible Facility Official(RFO) must review and
sign the application and will be the point of contact if CDC has
questions concerning the application or other matters related to the
Public Law. Facilities that do not possess a listed biological agent or
toxin are required to complete the
declaration of non-possession and submit the form.
This notice also talks about application for notice of possesion for
single geograhpic sites at single mailing addresses and rsponsibilities
of the RFO. Further it states that facilities that have listed
biological agents and/or toxins that are a threat to public health must
submit notifications to CDC while those with biological agents or toxins
that are threat to animal health and products are required to submit
their notifications to US Dept. of Agriculture. If you have both,you
must submit to both agencies.
I have attached the PDF version of the FR notice for those that want to
read it.
Cheri Hildreth Watts, Director
Department of Environmental Health &Safety
University of Louisville
(502) 852-2954
e-mail: cheri.hildreth@louisville.edu
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Date: Wed, 3 Jul 2002 10:25:51 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Burnett, LouAnn Crawford"
Subject: Re: CDC select agent notice in Fed. Register
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Thanks Cheri!
I've read it through - does it really say anything? Has anyone seen the
"notification form"? Do we know the list yet - especially the Ag list?
Do we know when we will?
LouAnn
LouAnn C. Burnett, MS, CBSP =09
Biosafety Program Manager & Biological Safety Officer=09
Vanderbilt University Environmental Health & Safety
Nashville, Tennessee
615/322-0927 (direct & voice mail)
615/343-4951 (fax) =09
-----Original Message-----
From: Cheri L Hildreth [mailto:cheri.hildreth@LOUISVILLE.EDU]
Sent: Wednesday, July 03, 2002 10:11 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: CDC select agent notice in Fed. Register
The CDC has published in the July 2nd Federal Register proposed data
collection for notification of select agents. Public comment is due in
14 days and CDC is requesting emergency clearance from OMB to collect
data under the PublicHealth Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and
Response Act of 2002. OMB is expected to act on the request of CDC
within 21 days of publication of this notice.
Section 202(a) of the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism
Preparedness Response Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-188) requires that
all persons in possession of a Select Agent notify the Secretary of
Health and Human Services by September 10, 2002.
Excerpt from FR notice "In order to complete the application, the RFO
will need to inventory its facility and consult with others (e.g.,
principal
investigators) as necessary to obtain the information required for this
application. The Responsible Facility Official(RFO) must review and sign
the application and will be the point of contact if CDC has questions
concerning the application or other matters related to the Public Law.
Facilities that do not possess a listed biological agent or toxin are
required to complete the declaration of non-possession and submit the
form.
This notice also talks about application for notice of possesion for
single geograhpic sites at single mailing addresses and rsponsibilities
of the RFO. Further it states that facilities that have listed
biological agents and/or toxins that are a threat to public health must
submit notifications to CDC while those with biological agents or toxins
that are threat to animal health and products are required to submit
their notifications to US Dept. of Agriculture. If you have both,you
must submit to both agencies.
I have attached the PDF version of the FR notice for those that want to
read it.
Cheri Hildreth Watts, Director
Department of Environmental Health &Safety
University of Louisville
(502) 852-2954
e-mail: cheri.hildreth@louisville.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 3 Jul 2002 11:38:05 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Norman, Randy"
Subject: Re: CDC select agent notice in Fed. Register
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Ag Deadlines:
1. The Secretary of Ag was given 60 days (i.e., until August 11th) to
come out with the Ag list.
2. Once the Ag list is out, anyone affected has 60 days to notify
Secretary of Ag of possession etc.
3. Secretary of Ag was given 180 days (until early December) to
promulgate the comprehensive set of regs as an interim final rule (IFR) and
enter into a MOU with HHS for overlap agents.
4. Once the IFR is promulgated, it goes into effect 60 days later.
HHS Deadlines:
1. Secretary of HHS was given 30 days (i.e., until July 12th) to
provide guidance on reporting possession & use of currently-listed agents.
2. Anyone affected was given another 60 days (i.e., until no later than
Sept. 10th) to report possession & use to HHS.
3. Secretary of HHS was given 180 days (until early December) to
promulgate the comprehensive set of regs as an IFR and enter into a MOU with
Ag regarding overlap agents.
4. Once the IFR is promulgated, it goes into effect 60 days later.
I didn't see any specific deadline for HHS (CDC) to revise their list of
select agents, though a biennial review is required.
At least that's what I gleaned from my review of the law.
Randy Norman
Safety Specialist Sr.
BioReliance Corporation
Rockville, MD 20850
Rnorman@
"Success is a journey, not a destination" - Ben Sweetland
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 3 Jul 2002 12:33:47 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Elizabeth Smith
Subject: Re: Immunisation question
In-Reply-To:
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My understanding is that employment rules vary from state to
state.
Yes, you can require medical clearance as a condition of
employment. Drug screening, for example. This is similar to
stating "you must be able to pick up and carry 35 pounds and
wear a respirator." If you don't pass the physical, you don't
get the job. The test, and the criteria must be part of
offering the job.
Vaccination -
our policy is based on OSHA's BBP. There are 3 parts:
1. If you are at risk of exposure,
2. the agent is infectious/disease causing, and
3. the agent/exposure is job related.
If all 3 apply, you must participate in a vaccination program.
So we don't have to offer diphtheria-tetanus boosters, since it
is not a work-related exposure concern.
Sometimes vaccination is mandatory. When working with virulent
B. anthracis, for example. Sometimes it is "strongly
recommended" (read: can opt out of vaccination), as with human
blood products.
EH&S manager determines who is at risk of exposure based on a
risk assessment.
Staff physician and attorney determine what level of risk
requires/stronggly reccomneds vaccination - as a
If someone cannot keep their vaccination status current, their
assigned jobs are modified within reason. E.g. pregnancy - if
you can't get vaccinated because you're pregnant, we don't fire
you. things like that are dealt with on a case-by-case basis,
since the employee's personal physician might be interested in
participating in the decision.
Best regards,
Elizabeth
=====
Elizabeth Smith
Environmental, Health & Safety Manager
BioPort Corporation
3500 N. Martin L. King Blvd.
Lansing, MI 48906
__________________________________________________
Do You Yahoo!?
Sign up for SBC Yahoo! Dial - First Month Free
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 3 Jul 2002 12:49:01 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Elizabeth Smith
Subject: EH&S Manager - biopharm
In-Reply-To:
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hello, everyone.
BioPort Corporation has a position open in the Environmental,
Health & Safety Department.
The job posting and related information is available at
- go to "Careers" on the right hand menu. It's
at the top of the list.
Please respond to this via the information posted on our
web-site, not to me. As I will be involved in the hiring
process, I don't want to get HR mad at me for violating some
obscure Dept. of Labor law.
Cheers,
Elizabeth
=====
Elizabeth Smith
Environmental, Health & Safety Manager
BioPort Corporation
3500 N. Martin L. King Blvd.
Lansing, MI 48906
__________________________________________________
Do You Yahoo!?
Sign up for SBC Yahoo! Dial - First Month Free
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 8 Jul 2002 17:33:33 +1000
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Peter.LeBlancSmith@CSIRO.AU
Subject: Glyoxal as a disinfectant
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Does anyone have information or references as to the efficacy of glyoxal as
a disinfectant/sterilant?
I have not found information in standard disinfection & sterilisation texts.
Electronic databases and a wider Internet search turns up lots of
disinfectants. None, so far, have glyoxal as the sole component, let alone
information about its efficacy.
I would be grateful for any leads.
Thanks in anticipation.
Peter.
Peter Le Blanc Smith
Biocontainment Microbiologist
CSIRO Livestock Industries
Australian Animal Health Laboratory (AAHL)
Private Bag 24
Geelong Vic 3220
Australia
Ph: +61 3 5227 5451
Fax: +61 3 5227 5555
E-mail address. Peter.LeBlancSmith@csiro.au
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 8 Jul 2002 09:33:52 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Richard Fink
Subject: Re: Glyoxal as a disinfectant
In-Reply-To:
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At 05:33 PM 7/8/2002 +1000, you wrote:
>Does anyone have information or references as to the efficacy of glyoxal as
>a disinfectant/sterilant?
>
>Peter.
>
>Peter Le Blanc Smith
Couldn't find it in the US EPA lists of approved disinfectants.
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
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At 05:33 PM 7/8/2002 +1000, you wrote:
Does anyone have information or references as to the efficacy of glyoxal as
a disinfectant/sterilant?
Peter.
Peter Le Blanc Smith
Couldn't find it in the US EPA lists of approved disinfectants.
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
--=====================_1591828==_.ALT--
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 8 Jul 2002 13:57:10 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Robin Newberry
Subject: A Comparison and Analysis of "Public Health Security and
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002"
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--
Robin
--------------------------------------------------------------
W. Robert Newberry, IV CIH, CHMM
Chief Environmental Health and Safety Officer
Clemson University
wnewber@clemson.edu ehs@clemson.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 9 Jul 2002 09:51:05 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Therese M. Stinnett"
Subject: infectious materials policies
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Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
I don't recall if we've discussed this subject before, but I am looking for
policies regarding the arrival of infectious materials at a
facility--primarily academic facilities. How do you account for
investigators reporting new materials in their labs? Is there a difference
if they are human, animal or even plant pathogens? What do you do about
occupational exposure issues?
Therese M. Stinnett
Biosafety Officer
Health and Safety Division
UCHSC, Mailstop C275
4200 E. 9th Avenue
Denver, CO 80262
Voice: 303-315-6754
Pager: 303-266-5402
Fax: 303-315-8026
email: therese.stinnett@uchsc.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 9 Jul 2002 15:39:25 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Robin Newberry
Subject: Office of Research Compliance
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Sorry for the cross posting.
For the College University folks - do you all have an Office of
Research Compliance at your institution? If so, what do they do?
--
Robin
--------------------------------------------------------------
W. Robert Newberry, IV CIH, CHMM
Chief Environmental Health and Safety Officer
Clemson University
wnewber@clemson.edu ehs@clemson.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 9 Jul 2002 15:46:23 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Kim Auletta
Subject: Re: Office of Research Compliance
MIME-Version: 1.0
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Here's our office's web site:
Kim Auletta
Lab Safety Specialist
Environmental Health and Safety
SUNY Stony Brook
110 Suffolk Hall
Stony Brook, NY 11794-6200
phone: 631-632-9672
fax: 631-632-9683
email: kauletta@.sunysb.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 9 Jul 2002 16:11:22 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Gillian Norton
Organization: Biohazard Management Services
Subject: Re: Office of Research Compliance
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Hi Kim,
Thanks very much. I used to be the Biosafety Officer at the Unoversity
of Western Ontario in London, Ontario, Canada. I recently left the
university and am setting up a biosafety consulting company and am
hoping to make a business out of training and facilities consulting.
I very much appreciate your sharing you material with me. I had to
leave all my previously worked up training courses at the university as
it was regarded as their property as I developed the material while I
was there.
Once again, thanks a lot,
Gillian
Kim Auletta wrote:
> Here's our office's web site:
>
>
>
> Kim Auletta
> Lab Safety Specialist
> Environmental Health and Safety
> SUNY Stony Brook
> 110 Suffolk Hall
> Stony Brook, NY 11794-6200
> phone: 631-632-9672
> fax: 631-632-9683
> email: kauletta@.sunysb.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 9 Jul 2002 17:25:00 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Cheri L Hildreth
Subject: Re: Office of Research Compliance
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At the University of Louisville, we have a fairly new Office of
Research Integtrity that reports to the Vice President of Research(
currently about a 3 person operation). A Research Integrity Committee
has been formed and is composed of the chairs of seven (7) Research
Integrity Task Forces on issues such as animal welfare; human studies;
conflict of interest and biological and environmental safety; award
administration, etc.
I believe that UofL's interest in establishing the Office of Research
Integrity stems from an article titled" Creating Effective Research
Compliance Program in Academic Institutions" published in Academic
Medicine in 1999
(Vol. 74 No. 9).
For those interested I have 9 page document that includes an org chart
covering committee organization for the research integrity program and
a one page description of the charge of each of the 7 task forces ,etc.
that I would be willing to share. Hope this helps..Thanks, Cheri
Cheri Hildreth Watts, Director
Department of Environmental Health &Safety
University of Louisville
(502) 852-2954
e-mail: cheri.hildreth@louisville.edu
>>> wnewber@CLEMSON.EDU 07/09/02 03:39PM >>>
Sorry for the cross posting.
For the College University folks - do you all have an Office of
Research Compliance at your institution? If so, what do they do?
--
Robin
--------------------------------------------------------------
W. Robert Newberry, IV CIH, CHMM
Chief Environmental Health and Safety Officer
Clemson University
wnewber@clemson.edu ehs@clemson.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 9 Jul 2002 14:35:03 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Steve Stauffer
Subject: UV light racks
In-Reply-To:
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Do any of you employ UV light racks as a supplementary means of
sterilization? Is there a standard design and/or protocol for their
construction and use? Under what circumstances are they most useful? What
problems, if any, have you encountered with their use?
Thanks
Steve
-------------------------------------------------
Steve Stauffer
Quarantine Officer: Contained Research Facility
University of California at Davis
(530) 867-4420 (voice); (530) 754-7757 (fax)
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 10 Jul 2002 10:08:12 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Essala Lowe
Subject: Re: UV light racks
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Steve,
Here at RU we dont use UV at all as supplementary means of sterilization.
There are no studies that have shown that UV light really assists in
sterilization or decontamination
So that is why we dont use them, as well as
At 02:35 PM 7/9/2002 -0700, you wrote:
>Do any of you employ UV light racks as a supplementary means of
>sterilization? Is there a standard design and/or protocol for their
>construction and use? Under what circumstances are they most useful? What
>problems, if any, have you encountered with their use?
>
>Thanks
>Steve
>-------------------------------------------------
>Steve Stauffer
>Quarantine Officer: Contained Research Facility
>University of California at Davis
>(530) 867-4420 (voice); (530) 754-7757 (fax)
>
>
Essala D. Lowe
Biological Safety Officer/BL3 Facilities Manager
Laboratory Safety and Environmental Health
The Rockefeller University
1230 York Avenue
New York, NY 10021
(212)327-8324/(212)27-8340 fax
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 10 Jul 2002 10:31:00 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ray Hackney
Subject: Biosafety Course - August 7-9
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
For those who may be looking for a two and a half day course in basic
biosafety, the following course is offered August 7-9 in Norfolk, VA.:
Biosafety for Safety and Health Professionals
more information and registration can be found at:
The course is also offered January 23-25, 2003 in Daytona Beach.
Raymond W. Hackney, Jr. , DrPH, CIH, CBSP
Industrial Hygiene Manager
Dept. of Environment Health and Safety
212 Finley Golf Course Rd.
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Chapel Hill, NC 27514
(919) 962-5712
(919) 962-0227 (fax)
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 10 Jul 2002 15:32:05 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Steve Stauffer
Subject: Re: UV light racks
In-Reply-To:
Mime-version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset="US-ASCII"
Content-transfer-encoding: 7bit
>> Do any of you employ UV light racks as a supplementary means of
>> sterilization? Is there a standard design and/or protocol for their
>> construction and use? Under what circumstances are they most useful? What
>> problems, if any, have you encountered with their use?
>
Thanks to those of you that have replied to my query. As a follow-up, do any
of you know of a technology that can reliably decontaminate equipment such
as microscopes, illuminators, electronic test equipment, etc., that cannot
be autoclaved? I'm wondering, for instance, whether low temperature hydrogen
peroxide plasma could be used in this instance?
Thanks,
Steve
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 11 Jul 2002 08:56:26 +0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Jong Teck Keong
Subject: Re: UV light racks
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Hi Steve,
Recently i attended a talk by Steris on a new gadget they have:- Vaporized
Hydrogen Peroxide for sterilization of rooms, biohazard cabinets, and
equipments, like those you mentioned. But one of those generators will cost
around 40-100 thousands US$ (that's the price they quoted me here in
Singapore).
Jong Teck Keong
Safety Office
Institute of Molecular and Cell Biology
30, Medical Drive, Singapore 117609
----- Original Message -----
From: "Steve Stauffer"
To:
Sent: Thursday, July 11, 2002 6:32 AM
Subject: Re: UV light racks
> >> Do any of you employ UV light racks as a supplementary means of
> >> sterilization? Is there a standard design and/or protocol for their
> >> construction and use? Under what circumstances are they most useful?
What
> >> problems, if any, have you encountered with their use?
> >
>
> Thanks to those of you that have replied to my query. As a follow-up, do
any
> of you know of a technology that can reliably decontaminate equipment such
> as microscopes, illuminators, electronic test equipment, etc., that cannot
> be autoclaved? I'm wondering, for instance, whether low temperature
hydrogen
> peroxide plasma could be used in this instance?
>
> Thanks,
> Steve
>
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 11 Jul 2002 10:53:03 -0400
Reply-To: Isabel Jean Goldberg
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Isabel Jean Goldberg
Organization: NYU School of Medicine
Subject: Moving a Refrigerator full of Biologicals
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I believe this issue was discussed on the list in the past - but can't =
locate any of the old messages. I have a researcher who would like to =
move a refrigerator full of clinical specimens to a lab approximately 50 =
miles away. He wants to keep the specimens in the refrigerator during =
the move. I have a couple of questions: 1) do we need to double- or =
triple-package everything in the refrigerator and label it all in =
accordance with the regs in order to move it? 2) can we use our =
in-house movers, if we provide them with appropriate training (i.e. on =
shipping/transporting biologicals)? 3) do the vehicles need to be =
placarded (Infectious Substance)? and 4) is there anything else I should =
be thinking about? Thanks in advance. - Jean
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I believe this issue was discussed on the list = in the past - but can't locate any of the old messages. I have a researcher = who would like to move a refrigerator full of clinical specimens to a lab = approximately 50 miles away. He wants to keep the specimens in the refrigerator = during the move. I have a couple of questions: 1) do we need to double- = or triple-package everything in the refrigerator and label it all in = accordance with the regs in order to move it? 2) can we use our in-house = movers, if we provide them with appropriate training (i.e. on shipping/transporting = biologicals)? 3) do the vehicles need to be placarded (Infectious Substance)? and 4) is there anything else I should be thinking = about? Thanks in advance. - Jean
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=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 11 Jul 2002 08:44:34 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Steve Stauffer
Subject: Re: UV light racks
In-Reply-To:
Mime-version: 1.0
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On 7/10/02 5:56 PM, "Jong Teck Keong" wrote:
> Hi Steve,
> Recently i attended a talk by Steris on a new gadget they have:- Vaporized
> Hydrogen Peroxide for sterilization of rooms, biohazard cabinets, and
> equipments, like those you mentioned. But one of those generators will cost
> around 40-100 thousands US$ (that's the price they quoted me here in
> Singapore).
>
> Jong Teck Keong
> Safety Office
> Institute of Molecular and Cell Biology
> 30, Medical Drive, Singapore 117609
>
>
>
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "Steve Stauffer"
> To:
> Sent: Thursday, July 11, 2002 6:32 AM
> Subject: Re: UV light racks
>
>
>>>> Do any of you employ UV light racks as a supplementary means of
>>>> sterilization? Is there a standard design and/or protocol for their
>>>> construction and use? Under what circumstances are they most useful?
> What
>>>> problems, if any, have you encountered with their use?
>>>
>>
>> Thanks to those of you that have replied to my query. As a follow-up, do
>> any
>> of you know of a technology that can reliably decontaminate equipment such
>> as microscopes, illuminators, electronic test equipment, etc., that cannot
>> be autoclaved? I'm wondering, for instance, whether low temperature
>> hydrogen
>> peroxide plasma could be used in this instance?
>>
>> Thanks,
>> Steve
>>
>
Yes, this equipment cost is significant but apparently, when you factor in
such things as maintenance, training, risk management issues, etc., first
year operating costs are about half those for comparable EtO systems. See
.
Steve
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 11 Jul 2002 15:16:24 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ginger Brown
Subject: BL3 Estimates
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Does anyone have any current cost estimates for construction of a BL3 lab?
What I need is a rough estimate for cost per square foot that one could =
use to for budgeting purposes.
Thanks in advance.
Ginger Brown, CBSP
Env Health & Safety
TX A&M University
College Station, TX 77843
979/862-4038
gingerbrown@tamu.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 12 Jul 2002 09:31:25 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Klenner, James"
Subject: BSC use and posture
MIME-Version: 1.0
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Good morning group,
Is anyone aware of past studies that considered the effect of posture on =
the air flow within a BSC? I had heard that a study using mannequins and =
smoke emitters was published but I was unable to locate it. Any =
assistance would be appreciated.
Thanks and have a good weekend.
James W. Klenner, MSc, MPH, MPA
Biological Safety Manager
INDIANA UNIVERSITY - PURDUE UNIVERSITY INDIANAPOLIS
Department of Environmental Health & Safety
620 Union Drive, Room 043
Indianapolis, IN 46202
(317) 274-2830
Fax (317) 278-2158
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 12 Jul 2002 10:45:12 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Brian Waters
Subject: Re: BSC use and posture
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Baker Company or Eagleson Institute may be good places to start your =
search. They have done some work in recent years on ergonomics for BSC's =
and have incorporated ergonomic features in most of their BSC's. I have =
visited the applications lab at Eagleson and seen mannequins and other =
apparatus related to ASHRAE 110 testing. Eagleson's number is (207) =
490-1076. Good luck.
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=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 12 Jul 2002 10:46:00 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Brian Waters
Subject: Re: BSC use and posture
Mime-Version: 1.0
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Baker Company or Eagleson Institute may be good places to start your =
search. They have done some work in recent years on ergonomics for BSC's =
and have incorporated ergonomic features in most of their BSC's. I have =
visited the applications lab at Eagleson and seen mannequins and other =
apparatus related to ASHRAE 110 testing. Eagleson's number is (207) =
490-1076. Good luck.
Brian A. Waters
Director of Facilities
Trudeau Institute
PO Box 59
Saranac Lake, NY 12983
bwaters@
(518) 891-3080 voice
(518) 891-5126 fax
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Baker Company or Eagleson Institute may be good places to start = your search. They have done some work in recent years on ergonomics for BSC's = and have incorporated ergonomic features in most of their BSC's. I have = visited the applications lab at Eagleson and seen mannequins and other apparatus = related to ASHRAE 110 testing. Eagleson's number is (207) 490-1076. Good luck.
Brian A. Waters
Director of Facilities
Trudeau Institute
PO = Box 59
Saranac Lake, NY 12983
bwaters@
(5= 18) 891-3080 voice
(518) 891-5126 fax
--=_396527A9.86E783C9--
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 12 Jul 2002 13:35:01 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Hauck, Philip"
Subject: Re: BSC use and posture
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
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I seem to remember that Eagleson has a video that shows a number of =
factors(actual demonstrations, of position of body, hand movements =
within and outside of hood.
Phil Hauck
Mount Sinai School of Medicine
-----Original Message-----
From: Klenner, James [mailto:jklenner@IUPUI.EDU]
Sent: Friday, July 12, 2002 10:31 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: BSC use and posture
Good morning group,
Is anyone aware of past studies that considered the effect of posture on =
the air flow within a BSC? I had heard that a study using mannequins and =
smoke emitters was published but I was unable to locate it. Any =
assistance would be appreciated.
Thanks and have a good weekend.
James W. Klenner, MSc, MPH, MPA
Biological Safety Manager
INDIANA UNIVERSITY - PURDUE UNIVERSITY INDIANAPOLIS
Department of Environmental Health & Safety
620 Union Drive, Room 043
Indianapolis, IN 46202
(317) 274-2830
Fax (317) 278-2158
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 12 Jul 2002 13:55:12 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Dave Stuart
Subject: Re: BSC use and posture
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Hi James,
Use and practice makes a great difference in whether or not the cabinet can
provide personnel or product protection from biohazards.
The Eagleson Institute regularly uses a smoke generator and a single
particle counter to demonstrate the dramatic impacts of improper use and
practice on the performance of a BSC.
Section V, "BSC Use by the Investigator: Work Practices and Procedures" in
the CDC/NIH publication: "Primary Containment for Biohazards: Selection,
Installation and Use of Biological Safety Cabinets" is a good source of
information on how to use the BSC correctly and avoid such problems.
This document can be viewed at .
The Eagleson Institute also has a video "The Case of the Contaminated
Cultures" that speaks to this issue.
eagleson@
Hope this helps,
I would be happy to visit with you about this. Tel # 800-992-2537
Dave
David G. Stuart, Ph.D.
The Baker Company, Inc.
-----Original Message-----
From: Klenner, James [mailto:jklenner@IUPUI.EDU]
Sent: Friday, July 12, 2002 10:31 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: BSC use and posture
Good morning group,
Is anyone aware of past studies that considered the effect of posture on the
air flow within a BSC? I had heard that a study using mannequins and smoke
emitters was published but I was unable to locate it. Any assistance would
be appreciated.
Thanks and have a good weekend.
James W. Klenner, MSc, MPH, MPA
Biological Safety Manager
INDIANA UNIVERSITY - PURDUE UNIVERSITY INDIANAPOLIS
Department of Environmental Health & Safety
620 Union Drive, Room 043
Indianapolis, IN 46202
(317) 274-2830
Fax (317) 278-2158
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 12 Jul 2002 16:09:17 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ray Hackney
Subject: Select Agent registration deadline: 9/10/02
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
I know many of you are aware of this, but I think it bears repeating.
Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of
2002 (P.L. 107-188) became effective with the President's signature on June
12. CDC has not finalized the form yet (see 7/2/02 FR), but Sec. 202(a) of
the Act will likely require all universities to certify positively or
negatively their possession of a select agent. Institutions with select
agents must register with U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
(DHHS) or the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)-even if the agent is not
transferred.
If you haven't already done so, prepare for registration by surveying your
institution for select agents. Get started now, because the statutory
deadline for notification of possession of select agents to DHHS is
September 10, and a thorough, complete inventory is extremely time consuming
and labor intensive. Principal investigators often require several weeks to
thoroughly review their inventories. Microbiologists tend to collect many
samples over their careers. Many departments have archival collections of
chemicals and microbiological agents for which no principal investigator is
responsible. When found, you may need to do additional investigation to
determine if the agent falls within a CDC exemption. Our survey of UNC last
winter -- done to comply with a state law -- took six weeks of concentrated
effort.
Pete
Peter A. Reinhardt, Director
Department of Environment, Health & Safety
University of North Carolina
212 Finley Golf Course Rd., CB# 1650
Chapel Hill, NC 27517-4440
peter_reinhardt@unc.edu
919-843-5913
Raymond W. Hackney, Jr. , DrPH, CIH, CBSP
Industrial Hygiene Manager
Dept. of Environment Health and Safety
212 Finley Golf Course Rd.
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Chapel Hill, NC 27514
(919) 962-5712
(919) 962-0227 (fax)
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 12 Jul 2002 16:38:36 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Greg Merkle
Organization: Wright State University
Subject: Re: Select Agent registration deadline: 9/10/02
MIME-version: 1.0
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Thanks for the information on the pending deadline. It
would appear that a lot of us have a bit of work to complete
in the next seven weeks.
To initiate the process of registration for possession of
select agents what forms are to be completed? If new forms
where do you find all of the new paperwork to complete? Who
is making sure that all academic institutions are made aware
of the timetable and requirements to file with the DHHS
and/or USDA? It would seem that if compliance with this law
is really important there would be a formal notification
going out from the DHHS and USDA telling institutions what
needs to be done. This is like being on a speeding bus
minus the driver.
Greg Merkle
Ray Hackney wrote:
>
> I know many of you are aware of this, but I think it bears repeating.
>
> Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of
> 2002 (P.L. 107-188) became effective with the President's signature on June
> 12. CDC has not finalized the form yet (see 7/2/02 FR), but Sec. 202(a) of
> the Act will likely require all universities to certify positively or
> negatively their possession of a select agent. Institutions with select
> agents must register with U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
> (DHHS) or the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)-even if the agent is not
> transferred.
>
> If you haven't already done so, prepare for registration by surveying your
> institution for select agents. Get started now, because the statutory
> deadline for notification of possession of select agents to DHHS is
> September 10, and a thorough, complete inventory is extremely time consuming
> and labor intensive. Principal investigators often require several weeks to
> thoroughly review their inventories. Microbiologists tend to collect many
> samples over their careers. Many departments have archival collections of
> chemicals and microbiological agents for which no principal investigator is
> responsible. When found, you may need to do additional investigation to
> determine if the agent falls within a CDC exemption. Our survey of UNC last
> winter -- done to comply with a state law -- took six weeks of concentrated
> effort.
>
> Pete
>
> Peter A. Reinhardt, Director
> Department of Environment, Health & Safety
> University of North Carolina
> 212 Finley Golf Course Rd., CB# 1650
> Chapel Hill, NC 27517-4440
> peter_reinhardt@unc.edu
> 919-843-5913
>
> Raymond W. Hackney, Jr. , DrPH, CIH, CBSP
> Industrial Hygiene Manager
> Dept. of Environment Health and Safety
> 212 Finley Golf Course Rd.
> University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
> Chapel Hill, NC 27514
> (919) 962-5712
> (919) 962-0227 (fax)
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 12 Jul 2002 15:52:55 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Burnett, LouAnn Crawford"
Subject: Re: Select Agent registration deadline: 9/10/02
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Greg - the notification form is still in development (per a phone call I
had with a CDC rep earlier this week). They expect it to be done in a
couple weeks. I was told that we can expect to check boxes saying "Yes"
we have this agent or "No" we don't have this agent. I'm pretty
comfortable checking the "yes" boxes - it's the "no" boxes that I'm
worried about. So, in my opinion, a pretty complete inventory, not just
of Select Agents, is prudent. My understanding is that the list may be
a bit different from the SA list and the USDA list is still to come. I
didn't used to be paranoid, but I foresee a list (or lists) that is a
moving target depending on the mood of the moment. I hope I'm wrong.
There is a ABSA Biosecurity Task Force report on the ABSA website
() that also talks about this. I think it's going to be up
to all of us to keep each other informed. I know I'm going to be
meeting with a lot of our higher-ups in the next couple weeks to make
sure that THEY are the ones asking the faculty to comply with our need
for the inventories. Top-down awareness is essential.
Someday we'll actually get to do biosafety again. Happy weekend.
LouAnn
LouAnn C. Burnett, MS, CBSP =09
Biosafety Program Manager & Biological Safety Officer=09
Vanderbilt University Environmental Health & Safety
Nashville, Tennessee
615/322-0927 (direct & voice mail)
615/343-4951 (fax) =09
-----Original Message-----
From: Greg Merkle [mailto:greg.merkle@WRIGHT.EDU]
Sent: Friday, July 12, 2002 3:39 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Select Agent registration deadline: 9/10/02
Thanks for the information on the pending deadline. It
would appear that a lot of us have a bit of work to complete
in the next seven weeks.
To initiate the process of registration for possession of select agents
what forms are to be completed? If new forms where do you find all of
the new paperwork to complete? Who is making sure that all academic
institutions are made aware of the timetable and requirements to file
with the DHHS and/or USDA? It would seem that if compliance with this
law is really important there would be a formal notification going out
from the DHHS and USDA telling institutions what needs to be done. This
is like being on a speeding bus minus the driver.
Greg Merkle
Ray Hackney wrote:
>
> I know many of you are aware of this, but I think it bears repeating.
>
> Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act
> of 2002 (P.L. 107-188) became effective with the President's signature
> on June 12. CDC has not finalized the form yet (see 7/2/02 FR), but
> Sec. 202(a) of the Act will likely require all universities to certify
> positively or negatively their possession of a select agent.
> Institutions with select agents must register with U.S. Department of
> Health and Human Services
> (DHHS) or the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)-even if the agent
is not
> transferred.
>
> If you haven't already done so, prepare for registration by surveying
> your institution for select agents. Get started now, because the
> statutory deadline for notification of possession of select agents to
> DHHS is September 10, and a thorough, complete inventory is extremely
> time consuming and labor intensive. Principal investigators often
> require several weeks to thoroughly review their inventories.
> Microbiologists tend to collect many samples over their careers. Many
> departments have archival collections of chemicals and microbiological
> agents for which no principal investigator is responsible. When found,
> you may need to do additional investigation to determine if the agent
> falls within a CDC exemption. Our survey of UNC last winter -- done to
> comply with a state law -- took six weeks of concentrated effort.
>
> Pete
>
> Peter A. Reinhardt, Director
> Department of Environment, Health & Safety
> University of North Carolina
> 212 Finley Golf Course Rd., CB# 1650
> Chapel Hill, NC 27517-4440
> peter_reinhardt@unc.edu
> 919-843-5913
>
> Raymond W. Hackney, Jr. , DrPH, CIH, CBSP
> Industrial Hygiene Manager
> Dept. of Environment Health and Safety
> 212 Finley Golf Course Rd.
> University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
> Chapel Hill, NC 27514
> (919) 962-5712
> (919) 962-0227 (fax)
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 12 Jul 2002 17:06:36 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Hauck, Philip"
Subject: Select Agent registration deadline: 9/10/02
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Hello to all list viewers:
We decided to do a Biohazard Survey after 9/11 last year, and probably =
the easiest approach...for the researchers, was to take the entire list =
from the Appendix B, NIH Guidelines, and to reformat it as a check-list, =
with lines for listing quantities. What we did further was to give a =
second list giving a range of the various types of containers such as =
NUNC vials up to 500 ml rotary flasks, and of course, "Other" which they =
had to fill in. "A" containers equaled 100 ml Tissue Culture Flasks, "B" =
containers 50 ml Falcon screw-cap tubes, etc.
We asked for entries of the number of containers such as "20 "A" =
containers"( we gave examples in the instructions). And It worked! =
After the initial lag and a second request for data, the survey came =
back. Feedback from the majority of researchers was that it was easy to =
give what we asked for. Of course the virologists gave us plaque forming =
units, but that's okay, too. The main thing was we had about 85% =
compliance in about five weeks.
I'm not saying it will work for everybody, but for the poor BSO's at =
large institutions, this may be one quick-and dirty method to use for =
getting the data by 9/10/02.
Philip Hauck, MS CIH CBSP
Mt Sinai School of Medicine
Box 1155
One Gustave L. Levy Place
New York, NewYork 10029
--Boundary_(ID_Uw0wAiugKGSEtHsFRDuDdA)
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=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:word" xmlns:st1=3D"urn:schemas-m= icrosoft-com:office:smarttags" xmlns=3D" 40">
= =A0 Hello to all list viewers:
We decided to do a Bioha= zard Survey after 9/11 last year, and probably the easiest approach&for the researchers, was to take the entire list from the Appendix B, NIH Gui= delines, and to reformat it as a check-list, with lines for listing quantities. Wh= at we did further was to give a second list giving a range of the various types= of containers such as NUNC vials up to 500 ml rotary flasks, and of cour= se, Other which they had to fill in. A containers equaled 100 ml = Tissue Culture Flasks, B containers 50 ml Falcon screw-cap tubes, etc.=
=
We asked for entries of = the number of containers such as 20 A containers ( we gave examples in the instructions). =A0And It worked! After the initial lag and a sec= ond request for data, the survey came back. Feedback from the majority of researc= hers was that it was easy to give what we asked for. Of course the virologists= gave us plaque forming units, but that s okay, too. The main thing was = we had about 85% compliance in about five weeks.
=
I m not saying it = will work for everybody, but for the poor BSO s at large institutions, this may be one quick-and dirty method to use for getti= ng the data by = 9/10= /02.
=
Philip Hauck, MS CIH CBS= P
Mt Sinai School of Medicine
Box 1155
One Gustave L. Levy Place
New= York, NewYork 10029
--Boundary_(ID_Uw0wAiugKGSEtHsFRDuDdA)--
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 15 Jul 2002 08:51:21 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ray Hackney
Subject: Select Agent registration deadline: 9/10/02
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Published in the Federal Register on Friday July 12, was "Primlinary
Guidance for Notification of Possession of Select Agents", giving a draft of
a notification form. A final version of the form is expected in about 2
weeks.
Raymond W. Hackney, Jr. , DrPH, CIH, CBSP
Industrial Hygiene Manager
Dept. of Environment Health and Safety
212 Finley Golf Course Rd.
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Chapel Hill, NC 27514
(919) 962-5712
(919) 962-0227 (fax)
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=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 15 Jul 2002 15:43:10 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Larry Mendoza
Organization: VCU-OEHS-Biological/Chemical Safety Section
Subject: Select Agent Hazard Signage
MIME-Version: 1.0
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> Good afternoon to all,
> I have a question concerning signage for Select Agents. I am assuming
> that signage will be required as per CDC/NIH guidelines, although
> advertising where select agents are, is probably not in the best
> intentions of a PI. Could you please advise on how everyone else is
> handling the situation?
Thank you
Larry Mendoza
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 15 Jul 2002 17:10:18 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Hauck, Philip"
Subject: Re: Select Agent Hazard Signage
MIME-version: 1.0
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I too am concerned about flagging these areas. I am proposing the use of =
color-coded backgrounds with the standard Biosafety sign. I am NOT going =
to have a sign that says "Select Agents live here!"
Phil Hauck
-----Original Message-----
From: Larry Mendoza [mailto:lgmendoz@HSC.VCU.EDU]
Sent: Mon 7/15/2002 3:43 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Cc:=09
Subject: Select Agent Hazard Signage
> Good afternoon to all,
> I have a question concerning signage for Select Agents. I am assuming
> that signage will be required as per CDC/NIH guidelines, although
> advertising where select agents are, is probably not in the best
> intentions of a PI. Could you please advise on how everyone else is
> handling the situation?
Thank you
Larry Mendoza
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 15 Jul 2002 20:27:47 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Erik A. Talley"
Subject: Re: Select Agent registration deadline: 9/10/02
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
I take it by the format of the columns in the notification document we will
have to notify for all forms of the agents listed (including USDA/FDA
approved vaccine strains, etc.). Do we know if this means the impending
regulations (due in December) will no longer exempt approved vaccines, etc.
from the additional requirements of the select agents program we have in
place now? If nothing else, it looks like we will have to at least notify.
Also, does anyone possibly have all the agents in text form? They only
published the form as a scanned PDF so I can't pull the text from it. If
someone else has typed them, it would save us some time.
Cheers!
Erik
At 08:51 AM 7/15/2002 -0400, you wrote:
>Published in the Federal Register on Friday July 12, was "Primlinary
>Guidance for Notification of Possession of Select Agents", giving a draft of
>a notification form. A final version of the form is expected in about 2
>weeks.
>
>
>Raymond W. Hackney, Jr. , DrPH, CIH, CBSP
>Industrial Hygiene Manager
>Dept. of Environment Health and Safety
>212 Finley Golf Course Rd.
>University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
>Chapel Hill, NC 27514
>(919) 962-5712
>(919) 962-0227 (fax)
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 15 Jul 2002 18:57:20 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: John Read
Subject: Testing for Replication Competent Retrovirus (RCR)
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Hi Listserv members,
I have a somewhat elaborate question...
I'm working with a research group who will be using a replicant incompetent
retrovirus for phenotypic selection screening. They will be using a wide
range of vector inserts and we are now grappling with a procedure for
verifying the absence of infectious particles post-transduction.
Once this protocol is off and running they will be cranking out new
transduced target cells on a weekly basis and it may be difficult to test
each target cell culture.
The researchers have suggested running initial tests using GFP as an insert
and testing the resulting supernatant and transduced cells for GFP and other
critical viral components (via PCR). After running a few (yet to be
determined) "tests" they would then like to be able to operate under the
assumption that the transduced cells are free of RCR or free infectious
particles. They would then transport the transduced cells to another
building on campus for cell sorting.
I'm a little apprehensive due to the slight risk of RCR being generated in
subsequent transductions but would like to know what others are doing in
this situation?
Thanks,
John Read
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 16 Jul 2002 08:45:21 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Jairo Betancourt
Subject: Re: Select Agent Hazard Signage
In-Reply-To:
MIME-version: 1.0
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Gentleman: here is my two cents on this issue:
First you implement all your security measures as in "levels", such as:
(1) access to the building, (2) access to the lab and finally (3) access
to the select agent (freezers), including your culture and/or stock
vials labeled with an internal (only recognized by the lab
personnel)code, Then you will make a sign for your door according the
known guidelines (BMBL, etc.) with the usual biohazard logo, the
scientific name of the agent, biosafety level, required PPE, emergency
phone numbers, P.I. name, etc.
My point is that the most important issue here is security to control
the access to the building, lab and agent, using special key, access
card, code, etc. whatever is ore feasible for your institution or your
preference.
Thank you
Jairo Betancourt, RBP
Laboratory Safety Specialist
University of Miami
305) 243-3400
-----Original Message-----
From: A Biosafety Discussion List [mailto:BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU] On
Behalf Of Larry Mendoza
Sent: Monday, July 15, 2002 3:43 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Select Agent Hazard Signage
> Good afternoon to all,
> I have a question concerning signage for Select Agents. I am assuming
> that signage will be required as per CDC/NIH guidelines, although
> advertising where select agents are, is probably not in the best
> intentions of a PI. Could you please advise on how everyone else is
> handling the situation?
Thank you
Larry Mendoza
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 16 Jul 2002 09:29:41 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Andrew Braun
Subject: New Select Agent form
In-Reply-To:
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Has anyone asked the CDC whether clinical uses of select agents have to be
reported? Many medical procedures involve the use of toxins, particularly
botulinum toxins.
Andy Braun
---------------------------------------
Andrew Braun, Sc.D
Harvard Medical School, Office for Research
25 Shattuck Street
Boston, MA 02115
617-432-4899; FAX 617-432-3169
---------------------------------------
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 16 Jul 2002 09:22:54 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Isabel Jean Goldberg
Subject: Re: Select Agent registration deadline: 9/10/02
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Eric - I've attached our checklist as a rich text file
----- Original Message -----
From: "Erik A. Talley"
To:
Sent: Monday, July 15, 2002 8:27 PM
Subject: Re: Select Agent registration deadline: 9/10/02
> I take it by the format of the columns in the notification document we
will
> have to notify for all forms of the agents listed (including USDA/FDA
> approved vaccine strains, etc.). Do we know if this means the impending
> regulations (due in December) will no longer exempt approved vaccines,
etc.
> from the additional requirements of the select agents program we have in
> place now? If nothing else, it looks like we will have to at least notify.
>
> Also, does anyone possibly have all the agents in text form? They only
> published the form as a scanned PDF so I can't pull the text from it. If
> someone else has typed them, it would save us some time.
>
> Cheers!
>
> Erik
>
> At 08:51 AM 7/15/2002 -0400, you wrote:
> >Published in the Federal Register on Friday July 12, was "Primlinary
> >Guidance for Notification of Possession of Select Agents", giving a draft
of
> >a notification form. A final version of the form is expected in about 2
> >weeks.
> >
> >
> >Raymond W. Hackney, Jr. , DrPH, CIH, CBSP
> >Industrial Hygiene Manager
> >Dept. of Environment Health and Safety
> >212 Finley Golf Course Rd.
> >University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
> >Chapel Hill, NC 27514
> >(919) 962-5712
> >(919) 962-0227 (fax)
>
------=_NextPart_000_0053_01C22CAA.5DD27010
Content-Type: application/msword;
name="revised form1.rtf"
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filename="revised form1.rtf"
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 16 Jul 2002 09:18:44 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Hauck, Philip"
Subject: Re: Testing for Replication Competent Retrovirus (RCR)
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="Windows-1252"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
-----Original Message-----
From: John Read [mailto:ReadJ@]
Sent: Mon 7/15/2002 9:57 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Cc:=09
Subject: Testing for Replication Competent Retrovirus (RCR)
Hi Listserv members,
I have a somewhat elaborate question...
I'm working with a research group who will be using a replicant =
incompetent
retrovirus for phenotypic selection screening. They will be using a =
wide
range of vector inserts and we are now grappling with a procedure for
verifying the absence of infectious particles post-transduction.
Once this protocol is off and running they will be cranking out new
transduced target cells on a weekly basis and it may be difficult to =
test
each target cell culture.
The researchers have suggested running initial tests using GFP as an =
insert
and testing the resulting supernatant and transduced cells for GFP and =
other
critical viral components (via PCR). After running a few (yet to be
determined) "tests" they would then like to be able to operate under the
assumption that the transduced cells are free of RCR or free infectious
particles. They would then transport the transduced cells to another
building on campus for cell sorting.
I'm a little apprehensive due to the slight risk of RCR being generated =
in
subsequent transductions but would like to know what others are doing in
this situation?
Thanks,
John Read
Hi John: If you check the CDC's section in the BMBL on Lentiviruses, =
because of the ability of any Lentivirus to infect any cell, it would =
still serve you well to uses BSL-2 precautions when handling the virus. =
I know the Molecular Biologists want to play on bench top with these =
m.o.'s, like bacteria and yeast, but using a Bio Safety cabinet and =
sticking with good technic shouldn't be a problem.
Phil hauck
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 16 Jul 2002 09:47:43 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Andrew Braun
Subject: Latest list
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
CHECK SPELLING!
Viruses
1. Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever virus
2. Eastern Equine Encephalitis virus
3. Ebola viruses
4. Equine Morbillivirus
5. Lassa fever virus
6. Marburg virus
7. Rift Valley fever virus
8. South American Haemorrhagic fever viruses (Junin, Machupo, Sabia,
Flexal, Guanarito)
9. Tick-borne encephalitis complex viruses
10. Variola major virus (Smallpox virus)
11. Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis virus
12. Viruses causing hantavirus pulmonary syndrome
13. Yellow fever virus
Exemptions: Vaccine strains of viral agents (Junin Virus strain candid #1,
Rift Valley fever virus strain MP-12, Venezuelan Equine encephalitis virus
strain TC-83, Yellow fever virus strain 17-D) are exempt.
Bacteria
1. Bacillus anthracis
2. Brucella abortus, B. melitensis, B. suis
3. Burkholderia (Pseudomonas) mallei
4. Burkholderia (Pseudomonas) pseudomallei
5. Clostridium botulinum
6. Francisella tularensis
7. Yersinia pestis
Exemptions: vaccine strains as described in Title 9 CFR, 78.1 are exempt.
Rickettsiae
1. Coxiella burnetii
2. Rickettsia prowazekii
3. Rickettsia rickettsii
Fungi
1. Coccidioides immitis
Toxins
1. Abrin
2. Aflatoxins
3. Botulinum toxins
4. Clostridium perfringens epsilon toxin
5. Conotoxins
6. Diacetoxyscirpenol
7. Ricin
8. Saxitoxin
9. Shigatoxin
10. Staphylococcal enterotoxins
11. Tetrodotoxin
12. T-2 toxin
NEW:
1. African Horse Sickness virus
2. African Swine Fever
3. Akabane Virus
4. Avian Influenza Virus (Highly Pathogenic)
5. Blue Tounge Virus
6. Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy agent
7. Camel Pox virus
8. Classical Swine Fever
9. Cowdria Ruminantium (Heart Water)
10. Foot and Mouth Disease Virus
11. Goat Pox Virus
12. Japanese Encephalitis Virus
13. Lump Skin Disease Virus
14. Malignant Catarrhal Fever
15. Menangle Virus
16. Mycoplasmia Capricolu/M.F 38/M.M Ycoides Capri
Contagious Caprine Pleuropneumonia Agent
17. Newcastle Disease Virus (Exotic)
18. Peste des Petitis Ruminants
19. Rinderpest Virus
20. Sheep Pox
21. Swine vesicular disease virus
22. Vesicular stomatitis virus
---------------------------------------
Andrew Braun, Sc.D
Harvard Medical School, Office for Research
25 Shattuck Street
Boston, MA 02115
617-432-4899; FAX 617-432-3169
---------------------------------------
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 16 Jul 2002 09:47:28 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: David Gillum
Subject: New Draft CDC/USDA Select Agent List
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
HHS Select Agents
Crimean-Congo Haemorrhagic Fever Virus
Ebola Viruses
Lassa Fever Virus
Marburg Virus
Richettsia prowazeki
Rickettsia rickettsii
South American Haemorrhagic Fever Viruses
Tick-Borne Enciphalitis Complex Viruses
Variola Major Viruses (Smallpox Virus)
Viruses Causing Hantavirus Pulmonary Syndrome
Yellow Fever Virus
Yersinia pestis
Abrin
Conotoxins
Diacetoxyscirpenol
Ricin
Saxitoxin
Tetrodotoxin
USDA-HHS Overlap Agents
Bacillus anthracis
Brucella abortus
Brucella melitensis
Brucella suis
Burkholderia (Pseudomonas) mallei
Burkholderia (Pseudomonas) pseudomallei
Clostridium botulinum
Coccidioides immitis
Coxiella burnettii
Eastern Equine Encephalitis Virus
Equine Morbillivirus (Hendra Virus)/Nipah Virus
Francisella tularensis
Rift Valley Fever Virus
Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis Virus
Aflatoxins
Botulinum Toxins
Clostridium perfringens epsilon Toxin
Shigatoxin
Staphlococcal enterotoxin
T-2 Toxin
USDA High Consequence of Livestock Pathogens and Toxins
African Horse Sickness Virus
African Swine Fever
Akabane Virus
Avian Influenza Virus (Highly Pathogenic)
Blue Tongue Virus (Exotic)
Bovine Spongiform Encepalopathy Agent
Camel Pox Virus
Classical Swine Fever
Cowdria ruminantium (Heartwater)
Foot and Mouth Disease Virus
Goat Pox Virus
Japanese Encephalitis Virus
Lumpy Skin Disease Virus
Malignant Catarrhal Fever
Menangle Virus
Mycoplasma capricolum/M.F 38/M. mycoides capri (Contagious Caprine
Pleuropneumonia Agent)
Mycoplasma mycoides mycoides (Contagious Bovine Pleuropneumonia Agent)
Newcastle Disease Virus (Exotic)
Peste Des Petits Ruminants
Rinderpest Virus
Sheep Pox
Swine Vesicular Disease Virus
Vesicular Stomatitis Virus
--
David R. Gillum
Laboratory Safety Officer
Environmental Health and Safety
11 Leavitt Lane, Perpetuity Hall
Durham, NH 03824
Telephone #: 603-862-0197
Facsimile #: 603-862-0047
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 16 Jul 2002 09:51:51 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: David Gillum
Subject: Same Table With Dashes
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
HHS Select Agents
- Crimean-Congo Haemorrhagic Fever Virus
- Ebola Viruses
- Lassa Fever Virus
- Marburg Virus
- Richettsia prowazeki
- Rickettsia rickettsii
- South American Haemorrhagic Fever Viruses
- Tick-Borne Enciphalitis Complex Viruses
- Variola Major Viruses (Smallpox Virus)
- Viruses Causing Hantavirus Pulmonary Syndrome
- Yellow Fever Virus
- Yersinia pestis
- Abrin
- Conotixins
- Diacetoxyscirpenol
- Ricin
- Saxitoxin
- Tetrodotoxin
USDA-HHS Overlap Agents
- Bacillus anthracis
- Brucella abortus
- Brucella melitensis
- Brucella suis
- Burkholderia (Pseudomonas) mallei
- Burkholderia (Pseudomonas) pseudomallei
- Clostridium botulinum
- Coccidioides immitis
- Coxiella burnettii
- Eastern Equine Encephalitis Virus
- Equine Morbillivirus (Hendra Virus)/Nipah Virus
- Francisella tularensis
- Rift Valley Fever Virus
- Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis Virus
- Aflatoxins
- Botulinum Toxins
- Clostridium perfringens epsilon Toxin
- Shigatoxin
- Staphlococcal enterotoxin
- T-2 Toxin
USDA High Consequence of Livestock Pathogens and Toxins
- African Horse Sickness Virus
- African Swine Fever
- Akabane Virus
- Avian Influenza Virus (Highly Pathogenic)
- Blue Tongue Virus (Exotic)
- Bovine Spongiform Encepalopathy Agent
- Camel Pox Virus
- Classical Swine Fever
- Cowdria ruminantium (Heartwater)
- Foot and Mouth Disease Virus
- Goat Pox Virus
- Japanese Encephalitis Virus
- Lumpy Skin Disease Virus
- Malignant Catarrhal Fever
- Menangle Virus
- Mycoplasma capricolum/M.F 38/M. mycoides capri (Contagious Caprine
Pleuropneumonia Agent)
- Mycoplasma mycoides mycoides (Contagious Bovine Pleuropneumonia Agent)
- Newcastle Disease Virus (Exotic)
- Peste Des Petits Ruminants
- Rinderpest Virus
- Sheep Pox
- Swine Vesicular Disease Virus
- Vesicular Stomatitis Virus
--
David R. Gillum
Laboratory Safety Officer
Environmental Health and Safety
11 Leavitt Lane, Perpetuity Hall
Durham, NH 03824
Telephone #: 603-862-0197
Facsimile #: 603-862-0047
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 16 Jul 2002 09:11:48 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Christina Thompson
Subject: Select agents - toxin exemption?
MIME-version: 1.0
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I would ask these questions of CDC, if I could get anyone to return my
phone calls!
Does anyone know if the former toxin exemption based on LD50 still
applies? The original Appendix A of the select agent rule stated that
toxins with an oral LD50 > 100ng/kg were exempt from the regulation. The
form that came out Friday in the Federal Register mentions nothing to that
effect.
I also have a problem with how to use that form for toxins. None of the
columns apply - they are geared toward organisms.
And another question: Are we supposed to report quantities of toxins? If
so, there is no place indicated on the form for quantity.
Any help and information will be very much appreciated!
Chris Thompson
Corporate Biosafety Officer
Eli Lilly and Company
--=_alternative 004DFC1305256BF8_=
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
I would ask these questions of CDC, if I could get anyone to return my phone calls!
Does anyone know if the former toxin exemption based on LD50 still applies? The original Appendix A of the select agent rule stated that toxins with an oral LD50 > 100ng/kg were exempt from the regulation. The form that came out Friday in the Federal Register mentions nothing to that effect.
I also have a problem with how to use that form for toxins. None of the columns apply - they are geared toward organisms.
And another question: Are we supposed to report quantities of toxins? If so, there is no place indicated on the form for quantity.
Any help and information will be very much appreciated!
Chris Thompson
Corporate Biosafety Officer
Eli Lilly and Company
--=_alternative 004DFC1305256BF8_=--
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 16 Jul 2002 11:36:56 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Robert N. Latsch"
Subject: Re: Select agents - toxin exemption?
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Good point,
I have raised this issue with my boss and he says that we have nothing
further to do.
His reasons are:
1) We already told them, we are not covered by this rule.
2) Our researchers do not have enough of this stuff.
3) Straight research and clinical use is exempt from regulation.
I have to follow the leader since I have nothing to contradict my bosses
reasons.
Bob
>
>I would ask these questions of CDC, if I could get anyone to return my
>phone calls!
>
>Does anyone know if the former toxin exemption based on LD50 still
>applies? The original Appendix A of the select agent rule stated that
>toxins with an oral LD50 > 100ng/kg were exempt from the regulation. The
>form that came out Friday in the Federal Register mentions nothing to that
>effect.
>
>I also have a problem with how to use that form for toxins. None of the
>columns apply - they are geared toward organisms.
>
>And another question: Are we supposed to report quantities of toxins? If
>so, there is no place indicated on the form for quantity.
>
>Any help and information will be very much appreciated!
>
>Chris Thompson
>Corporate Biosafety Officer
>Eli Lilly and Company
_____________________________________________________________________
__ / _____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 16 Jul 2002 11:53:18 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: NIH
Subject: Re: Select agents - toxin exemption?
In-Reply-To:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Hey folks, Read the Fed Reg notice. This was a draft and they asked for
public comment to be submitted by today (July 16th). If you have problems
with the draft, get your comments in to them TODAY!!! Maybe, just Maybe,
you could make a difference.
John H. Keene, Dr. P.H., CBSP
Biohaztec Associates, Inc.
924 Castle Hollow Road
Midlothian, VA 23114
Phone/Fax (804) 379-9192
E-mail jkeene@
Web Site:
-----Original Message-----
From: A Biosafety Discussion List [mailto:BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU]On
Behalf Of Robert N. Latsch
Sent: Tuesday, July 16, 2002 11:37 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Select agents - toxin exemption?
Good point,
I have raised this issue with my boss and he says that we have nothing
further to do.
His reasons are:
1) We already told them, we are not covered by this rule.
2) Our researchers do not have enough of this stuff.
3) Straight research and clinical use is exempt from regulation.
I have to follow the leader since I have nothing to contradict my bosses
reasons.
Bob
>
>I would ask these questions of CDC, if I could get anyone to return my
>phone calls!
>
>Does anyone know if the former toxin exemption based on LD50 still
>applies? The original Appendix A of the select agent rule stated that
>toxins with an oral LD50 > 100ng/kg were exempt from the regulation. The
>form that came out Friday in the Federal Register mentions nothing to that
>effect.
>
>I also have a problem with how to use that form for toxins. None of the
>columns apply - they are geared toward organisms.
>
>And another question: Are we supposed to report quantities of toxins? If
>so, there is no place indicated on the form for quantity.
>
>Any help and information will be very much appreciated!
>
>Chris Thompson
>Corporate Biosafety Officer
>Eli Lilly and Company
_____________________________________________________________________
__ /
_____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 16 Jul 2002 12:01:53 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Erik A. Talley"
Subject: Re: Select agents - toxin exemption?
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
Be sure to send comments about the form in to John Moore at CDC (jrm3@) as listed on the FR notice. The last day for comments is today, July 16th. I emailed John my comments last night and he replied this morning that they were sent to the right person. We have to provide our input if we hope to have anything changed.
Erik
At 09:11 AM 7/16/2002 -0500, you wrote:
I would ask these questions of CDC, if I could get anyone to return my phone calls!
Does anyone know if the former toxin exemption based on LD50 still applies? The original Appendix A of the select agent rule stated that toxins with an oral LD50 > 100ng/kg were exempt from the regulation. The form that came out Friday in the Federal Register mentions nothing to that effect.
I also have a problem with how to use that form for toxins. None of the columns apply - they are geared toward organisms.
And another question: Are we supposed to report quantities of toxins? If so, there is no place indicated on the form for quantity.
Any help and information will be very much appreciated!
Chris Thompson
Corporate Biosafety Officer
Eli Lilly and Company
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 16 Jul 2002 11:55:15 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Christina Thompson
Subject: Re: Select agents - toxin exemption?
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: multipart/alternative; boundary="=_alternative 005CF30F05256BF8_="
This is a multipart message in MIME format.
--=_alternative 005CF30F05256BF8_=
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
I also sent my comments and questions to John Moore at CDC. I was able to
get him on the phone, and he gave me his e-mail address prior to Erik
sending out his message.
Chris
--=_alternative 005CF30F05256BF8_=
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
I also sent my comments and questions to John Moore at CDC. I was able to get him on the phone, and he gave me his e-mail address prior to Erik sending out his message.
Chris
--=_alternative 005CF30F05256BF8_=--
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 16 Jul 2002 10:04:43 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ken Asarch
Subject: Help defiining whether a biohazardous item requires disposal as a
sharp
MIME-Version: 1.0
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This message is in MIME format. Since your mail reader does not understand
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For waste disposal purposes, should the following be packaged for disposal
as routine biohazardous waste or as biohazardous sharps: a plastic
disposable cartridge used for blood testing contains needles that are fully
recessed.
When placed into a plastic biohazard disposal bag, there are no sharps
capable of piercing the bag or someone who contacts the bag or the
cartrdiges directly.
A reference or citation to support the requirement would be appreciated.
Thanks for the advice.
ThauMDx
Director, Regulatory Affairs
7402 Hollister Avenue
Santa Barbara, California 93117
tel 805.968.3099 x 206
fax 805.968.3899
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 16 Jul 2002 13:40:12 -0500
Reply-To: speaker@ehs.psu.edu
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Curt Speaker
Organization: UNIVERSITY SAFETY
Subject: "New" Select Agent List
Good afternoon:
These are certainly interesting times to be a BSO!!! :-)
Can anyone tell me where (what regulation or publication exactly)
that the most recent select agent list that David Gillum and Andy
Braun posted came from???
The new additions at the end of the list are what I am most
interested in. I currently have no one working with select agents at
Penn State (thank God!), but I do have a couple of Veterinary
Science/Dairy and Animal Science PIs that use Vesicular Stomatitis
Virus in a tissue-culture based interferon assay. This is a lab
adapted strain with very low virulence.
But it doesn't sound like there are (at the moment) any exemptions
for VSV used in this context. This is an entirely different beast than
wild-type VSV, which could be devistating to a dairy herd.
If anyone knows where these additions to the select agent list came
from, and where I can find this in an "official" document, please let
me know.
thanks!
Curt
Curt Speaker
Biosafety Officer
Penn State University
Environmental Health and Safety
speaker@ehs.psu.edu
^...^
(O_O)
=(Y)=
"""
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 16 Jul 2002 13:49:43 -0500
Reply-To: speaker@ehs.psu.edu
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Curt Speaker
Organization: UNIVERSITY SAFETY
Subject: I found it!
Sorry for not looking harder!
It is in the 7/12/02 Federal Register.
Oh boy!...
Curt
Curt Speaker
Biosafety Officer
Penn State University
Environmental Health and Safety
speaker@ehs.psu.edu
^...^
(O_O)
=(Y)=
"""
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 16 Jul 2002 14:16:57 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Thompson, Larry"
Subject: modular BL3 labs
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Hello Biosafety listers,
Could the ever-knowledgable group please guide me toward sources of pre-fab
type BL3 laboratories?
One possiblility of recent USDA funding is the quick setup of a BL3
laboratory. We want to look into the possibility of setting up a new
stand-alone modular unit rather than renovating existing old buildings.
Thanks
For big bonus points, please include some ballpark figures on costs involved
or your experience with such units. (-;
Thanks again,
Larry
Larry J. Thompson DVM PhD DABVT CBSP
Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory
Univ of Georgia - College of Vet Med
43 Brighton Road
Tifton, GA 31793-3000
phone (229) 386-3340 fax (229) 386-7128
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 16 Jul 2002 14:18:34 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Robin Newberry
Subject: Re: Select agents - toxin exemption?
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed"
It is my understanding (I think I get this from Richard Gilpin -
speak up if I'm wrong) that the exemptions provided in the original
Select Agent List (in the "Antiterrorism & Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996") DO NOT APPLY to the USA Patriot Act (the Act which
spawned the recent CDC FedReg notice and notification form).
If that is the case, there is NO exemption for research or clinical
use, there is NO de minimus concentration, and there is NO de minimus
amount. If you have it in any form, in any concentration, you must
report you have it. That would seem to be consistent with the draft
form the CDC put out, as you either have to state what you have in
your possession, or issue a blanket denial. There are no exceptions
noted on the draft notification form.
--
Robin
--------------------------------------------------------------
W. Robert Newberry, IV CIH, CHMM
Chief Environmental Health and Safety Officer
Clemson University
wnewber@clemson.edu ehs@clemson.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 16 Jul 2002 14:36:39 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Heather Gonsoulin
Subject: Re: modular BL3 labs
In-Reply-To:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
We just had delivery (3 weeks) of a very nice modular unit for primate
housing from Britz-Heidbrink. From start to installation was 155 days. I
will attempt to obtain more details, but they could probably give you all of
the low-down on it. I would venture to guess they may be able to help with a
laboratory unit also. Their site is index.html
Heather H. Gonsoulin, RHIA
Safety Officer
UL-Lafayette, NIRC
-----Original Message-----
From: A Biosafety Discussion List [mailto:BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU]On
Behalf Of Thompson, Larry
Sent: Tuesday, July 16, 2002 1:17 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: modular BL3 labs
Hello Biosafety listers,
Could the ever-knowledgable group please guide me toward sources of pre-fab
type BL3 laboratories?
One possiblility of recent USDA funding is the quick setup of a BL3
laboratory. We want to look into the possibility of setting up a new
stand-alone modular unit rather than renovating existing old buildings.
Thanks
For big bonus points, please include some ballpark figures on costs involved
or your experience with such units. (-;
Thanks again,
Larry
Larry J. Thompson DVM PhD DABVT CBSP
Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory
Univ of Georgia - College of Vet Med
43 Brighton Road
Tifton, GA 31793-3000
phone (229) 386-3340 fax (229) 386-7128
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 16 Jul 2002 17:40:52 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: NIH
Subject: Re: modular BL3 labs
In-Reply-To:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
After looking at the website provided by Heather, I would caution anyone
that might be interested in this company that the units that they have
advertised on the website do not meet any biosafety "containment"
requirements.
John H. Keene, Dr. P.H., CBSP
Biohaztec Associates, Inc.
924 Castle Hollow Road
Midlothian, VA 23114
Phone/Fax (804) 379-9192
E-mail jkeene@
Web Site:
-----Original Message-----
From: A Biosafety Discussion List [mailto:BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU]On
Behalf Of Heather Gonsoulin
Sent: Tuesday, July 16, 2002 3:37 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: modular BL3 labs
We just had delivery (3 weeks) of a very nice modular unit for primate
housing from Britz-Heidbrink. From start to installation was 155 days. I
will attempt to obtain more details, but they could probably give you all of
the low-down on it. I would venture to guess they may be able to help with a
laboratory unit also. Their site is index.html
Heather H. Gonsoulin, RHIA
Safety Officer
UL-Lafayette, NIRC
-----Original Message-----
From: A Biosafety Discussion List [mailto:BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU]On
Behalf Of Thompson, Larry
Sent: Tuesday, July 16, 2002 1:17 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: modular BL3 labs
Hello Biosafety listers,
Could the ever-knowledgable group please guide me toward sources of pre-fab
type BL3 laboratories?
One possiblility of recent USDA funding is the quick setup of a BL3
laboratory. We want to look into the possibility of setting up a new
stand-alone modular unit rather than renovating existing old buildings.
Thanks
For big bonus points, please include some ballpark figures on costs involved
or your experience with such units. (-;
Thanks again,
Larry
Larry J. Thompson DVM PhD DABVT CBSP
Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory
Univ of Georgia - College of Vet Med
43 Brighton Road
Tifton, GA 31793-3000
phone (229) 386-3340 fax (229) 386-7128
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 16 Jul 2002 14:07:14 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Andrew J Bartel
Organization: Department of Biological Sciences
Subject: general biosafety courses
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="----=_NextPart_000_00B7_01C22CD2.164E26D0"
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charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Hello list members,
I'm looking to attend a general biosafety course this fall (and I am =
unable to make it to the ACS convention in August.) Any suggestions for =
New England, mid-atlantic region?
> > > > > > > > > > >
Andrew J Bartel
Laboratory Manager
Department of Biological Sciences
University of Alaska Anchorage
Science Bldg. 243
3211 Providence Drive
Anchorage AK 99508
(907)786-1268 voice
(907)786-1148 fax
ajb@uaa.alaska.edu
------=_NextPart_000_00B7_01C22CD2.164E26D0
Content-Type: text/html;
charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Hello list members,
I'm looking to attend a general = biosafety course this fall (and I am unable to make it to the ACS convention in = August.) Any suggestions for New England, mid-atlantic region?
> > > = > > > > > > = > >
Andrew J Bartel
Laboratory Manager
Department of Biological Sciences
University of Alaska Anchorage
Science Bldg. 243
3211 Providence Drive
Anchorage AK 99508
(907)786-1268 voice
(907)786-1148 fax
ajb@uaa.alaska.edu
------=_NextPart_000_00B7_01C22CD2.164E26D0--
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 16 Jul 2002 15:18:37 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Funk, Glenn"
Subject: Re: Help defiining whether a biohazardous item requires disposal
as a sharp
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
We dispose of ESIP sharps with the safety feature activated as we would any
other standard sharp, i.e., in a proper sharps waste container. I suggest
the same treatment for these devices. Murphy is alive and well and living
in laboratories. Someone, somewhere, sometime, will do something unexpected
that exposes your recessed needles and creates a problem. Better to buy the
extra insurance and use a rigid, puncture-resistant, leak-proof sharps waste
container.
Glenn A. Funk, Ph.D., CBSP
Director and Biosafety Officer
Environment, Health & Safety
MedImmune Vaccines, Inc.
408-845-8857
-----Original Message-----
From: Ken Asarch [mailto:KAsarch@]
Sent: Tuesday, 16 July, 2002 10:05
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Help defiining whether a biohazardous item requires disposal as
a sharp
For waste disposal purposes, should the following be packaged for disposal
as routine biohazardous waste or as biohazardous sharps: a plastic
disposable cartridge used for blood testing contains needles that are fully
recessed.
When placed into a plastic biohazard disposal bag, there are no sharps
capable of piercing the bag or someone who contacts the bag or the
cartrdiges directly.
A reference or citation to support the requirement would be appreciated.
Thanks for the advice.
ThauMDx
Director, Regulatory Affairs
7402 Hollister Avenue
Santa Barbara, California 93117
tel 805.968.3099 x 206
fax 805.968.3899
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 16 Jul 2002 15:32:19 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: LUKENS Carl B
Subject: Re: Help defiining whether a biohazardous item requires disposal
as a sharp
Glenn
I agree. I ran across a recent incident where a worker in a linen firm that
services hospitals ran across an unusual (to her) device in some laundry.
Since sharps are not always disposed of properly by hospitals, it turned up in
the laundry picked up by the linen service firm. She tossed it towards a
trash container, and it broke when it missed and hit the ground. She then
picked it up and stuck herself. Turns out is was unusual to her because the
hospital had recently begun using safer medical devices, and her prior
training to recognize sharps did not cover the newer devices hospitals were
using.
So the point being they can break if mishandled, and once they do, they are
like the normal "unsafe" sharps.
....and, if this applies to you, make sure those who can come across sharps
accidentally know what the newer devices are that are used elsewhere
Carl Lukens
CIH/MSPH
Oregon OSHA consultation
>>> funkg@ 07/16/02 03:21PM >>>
We dispose of ESIP sharps with the safety feature activated as we would any
other standard sharp, i.e., in a proper sharps waste container. I suggest
the same treatment for these devices. Murphy is alive and well and living
in laboratories. Someone, somewhere, sometime, will do something unexpected
that exposes your recessed needles and creates a problem. Better to buy the
extra insurance and use a rigid, puncture-resistant, leak-proof sharps waste
container.
Glenn A. Funk, Ph.D., CBSP
Director and Biosafety Officer
Environment, Health & Safety
MedImmune Vaccines, Inc.
408-845-8857
-----Original Message-----
From: Ken Asarch [mailto:KAsarch@]
Sent: Tuesday, 16 July, 2002 10:05
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Help defiining whether a biohazardous item requires disposal as
a sharp
For waste disposal purposes, should the following be packaged for disposal
as routine biohazardous waste or as biohazardous sharps: a plastic
disposable cartridge used for blood testing contains needles that are fully
recessed.
When placed into a plastic biohazard disposal bag, there are no sharps
capable of piercing the bag or someone who contacts the bag or the
cartrdiges directly.
A reference or citation to support the requirement would be appreciated.
Thanks for the advice.
ThauMDx
Director, Regulatory Affairs
7402 Hollister Avenue
Santa Barbara, California 93117
tel 805.968.3099 x 206
fax 805.968.3899
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 16 Jul 2002 16:46:32 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Roland Leitner
Organization: University of Calgary
Subject: How to decontaminate?
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Dear colleagues,
Have any of you ever participated in the decontamination of archival
material? Environmental fungi, moulds, and bacteria are the culprits,
and we are looking for effective, and non-destructive, means of getting
rid of the microorganisms, while preserving the extensive collection. It
consists of paper documents, and old and new "blue-prints".
If you have any experience, words of wisdom, or suggestions that we may
use please let me know.
As this is a very narrow topic that is probably of little interest for
the vast majority of users, could you please reply to me directly rather
than inconvenience the rest of the users.
Your help is much appreciated, and I thank you in advance.
Regards,
Roland
--
Roland Leitner
Biosafety / Laboratory Safety Officer
Safety Services
University of Calgary
2500 University Drive N.W.
Calgary, AB T2N 1N4
Ph: 403-220-4612 Fax: 403-284-1332
------------------------
Ex factis, non ex dictis amici pensandi. Titus Livius
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 17 Jul 2002 09:03:15 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Jeppesen, Eric R"
Subject: Re: New Draft CDC/USDA Select Agent List
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Where exactly is the new list published?
I checked the FR but didn't see an actual list.
Any help would be appreciated.
Eric R. Jeppesen
Laboratory Safety Specialist
KU-EHS Dept.
(785) 864-2857 phone
(785) 864-2852 fax
jeppesen@ku.edu
-----Original Message-----
From: David Gillum [mailto:David.Gillum@UNH.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, July 16, 2002 8:47 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: New Draft CDC/USDA Select Agent List
HHS Select Agents
Crimean-Congo Haemorrhagic Fever Virus
Ebola Viruses
Lassa Fever Virus
Marburg Virus
Richettsia prowazeki
Rickettsia rickettsii
South American Haemorrhagic Fever Viruses
Tick-Borne Enciphalitis Complex Viruses
Variola Major Viruses (Smallpox Virus)
Viruses Causing Hantavirus Pulmonary Syndrome
Yellow Fever Virus
Yersinia pestis
Abrin
Conotoxins
Diacetoxyscirpenol
Ricin
Saxitoxin
Tetrodotoxin
USDA-HHS Overlap Agents
Bacillus anthracis
Brucella abortus
Brucella melitensis
Brucella suis
Burkholderia (Pseudomonas) mallei
Burkholderia (Pseudomonas) pseudomallei
Clostridium botulinum
Coccidioides immitis
Coxiella burnettii
Eastern Equine Encephalitis Virus
Equine Morbillivirus (Hendra Virus)/Nipah Virus
Francisella tularensis
Rift Valley Fever Virus
Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis Virus
Aflatoxins
Botulinum Toxins
Clostridium perfringens epsilon Toxin
Shigatoxin
Staphlococcal enterotoxin
T-2 Toxin
USDA High Consequence of Livestock Pathogens and Toxins
African Horse Sickness Virus
African Swine Fever
Akabane Virus
Avian Influenza Virus (Highly Pathogenic)
Blue Tongue Virus (Exotic)
Bovine Spongiform Encepalopathy Agent
Camel Pox Virus
Classical Swine Fever
Cowdria ruminantium (Heartwater)
Foot and Mouth Disease Virus
Goat Pox Virus
Japanese Encephalitis Virus
Lumpy Skin Disease Virus
Malignant Catarrhal Fever
Menangle Virus
Mycoplasma capricolum/M.F 38/M. mycoides capri (Contagious Caprine
Pleuropneumonia Agent)
Mycoplasma mycoides mycoides (Contagious Bovine Pleuropneumonia Agent)
Newcastle Disease Virus (Exotic)
Peste Des Petits Ruminants
Rinderpest Virus
Sheep Pox
Swine Vesicular Disease Virus
Vesicular Stomatitis Virus
--
David R. Gillum
Laboratory Safety Officer
Environmental Health and Safety
11 Leavitt Lane, Perpetuity Hall
Durham, NH 03824
Telephone #: 603-862-0197
Facsimile #: 603-862-0047
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 17 Jul 2002 10:10:34 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Richard Fink
Subject: Re: How to decontaminate?
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="=====================_77920463==_.ALT"
--=====================_77920463==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
The best places I know of for this type of information are:
(Northeast Document Conservation Center)
(Southeastern Library Network, Inc.)
Best of luck.
At 04:46 PM 7/16/2002 -0600, you wrote:
>Dear colleagues,
>
>Have any of you ever participated in the decontamination of archival
>material? Environmental fungi, moulds, and bacteria are the culprits,
>and we are looking for effective, and non-destructive, means of getting
>rid of the microorganisms, while preserving the extensive collection. It
>consists of paper documents, and old and new "blue-prints".
>If you have any experience, words of wisdom, or suggestions that we may
>use please let me know.
>As this is a very narrow topic that is probably of little interest for
>the vast majority of users, could you please reply to me directly rather
>than inconvenience the rest of the users.
>
>Your help is much appreciated, and I thank you in advance.
>
>Regards,
>Roland
>--
>Roland Leitner
>Biosafety / Laboratory Safety Officer
>Safety Services
>University of Calgary
>2500 University Drive N.W.
>Calgary, AB T2N 1N4
>Ph: 403-220-4612 Fax: 403-284-1332
>------------------------
>Ex factis, non ex dictis amici pensandi. Titus Livius
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
--=====================_77920463==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
The best places I know of for this type of information are:
(Northeast Document Conservation Center)
(Southeastern Library Network, Inc.)
Best of luck.
At 04:46 PM 7/16/2002 -0600, you wrote:
Dear colleagues,
Have any of you ever participated in the decontamination of archival
material? Environmental fungi, moulds, and bacteria are the culprits,
and we are looking for effective, and non-destructive, means of getting
rid of the microorganisms, while preserving the extensive collection. It
consists of paper documents, and old and new "blue-prints".
If you have any experience, words of wisdom, or suggestions that we may
use please let me know.
As this is a very narrow topic that is probably of little interest for
the vast majority of users, could you please reply to me directly rather
than inconvenience the rest of the users.
Your help is much appreciated, and I thank you in advance.
Regards,
Roland
--
Roland Leitner
Biosafety / Laboratory Safety Officer
Safety Services
University of Calgary
2500 University Drive N.W.
Calgary, AB T2N 1N4
Ph: 403-220-4612 Fax: 403-284-1332
------------------------
Ex factis, non ex dictis amici pensandi. Titus Livius
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
--=====================_77920463==_.ALT--
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 17 Jul 2002 08:25:52 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Roland Leitner
Organization: University of Calgary
Subject: Re: How to decontaminate?
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="------------49448C004D6C3DFE1249EC6F"
--------------49448C004D6C3DFE1249EC6F
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Hello Richie,
Richard Fink wrote:
> The best places I know of for this type of information are:
>
> (Northeast Document Conservation Center)
> (Southeastern Library Network, Inc.)
I'll check them out.
Cheers,
Roland
--
Roland Leitner
Biosafety / Laboratory Safety Officer
Safety Services
University of Calgary
2500 University Drive N.W.
Calgary, AB T2N 1N4
Ph: 403-220-4612 Fax: 403-284-1332
------------------------
Ex factis, non ex dictis amici pensandi. Titus Livius
--------------49448C004D6C3DFE1249EC6F
Content-Type: text/html; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Hello Richie,
Richard Fink wrote:
The best places I know of for this type of information are:
(Northeast Document Conservation Center)
(Southeastern Library Network, Inc.)
I'll check them out.
Cheers,
Roland
--
Roland Leitner
Biosafety / Laboratory Safety Officer
Safety Services
University of Calgary
2500 University Drive N.W.
Calgary, AB T2N 1N4
Ph: 403-220-4612 Fax: 403-284-1332
------------------------
Ex factis, non ex dictis amici pensandi. Titus Livius
--------------49448C004D6C3DFE1249EC6F--
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 17 Jul 2002 10:44:35 EDT
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ed Krisiunas
Subject: Fwd: Help defiining whether a biohazardous item requires disposal
as a sharp
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="part1_13.e7cad09.2a66dcd3_boundary"
--part1_13.e7cad09.2a66dcd3_boundary
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="part1_13.e7cad09.2a66dcd3_alt_boundary"
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Content-Type: text/plain; charset="US-ASCII"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
In a message dated 7/17/2002 1:20:13 AM Eastern Daylight Time, EKrisiunas
writes:
> Since you are dealing with a state as well as federal issue, most important
> to contact California Dept. of Health Service as well as OSHA.
>
> The sharps must be disposed of in an approved sharps container. Even
> though this device becomes fully recessed it is still a sharp and needs to
> be handled as one. If it were to become fully contained with no open end,
> it could be considered for approval as an individual sharps container as
> the SafeSnap syringe of San Diego has been (accepted by CDHS as well as
> OSHA at the Federal level).
>
>
> Edward Krisiunas, MT(ASCP), CIC, MPH
> President
> WNWN International, Inc.
> PO Box 1164
> Burlington, Connecticut
> USA
> Phone: 001-860-675-1217
> Fax: 001-860-675-1311
> Mobile: 001-860-944-2373
>
>
>
>
> >> Subj: Re: Help defiining whether a biohazardous item requires disposal as
>> a sharp
>> Date: 7/16/2002 6:22:15 PM Eastern Daylight Time
>> From: funkg@ (Funk, Glenn)
>> Sender: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU (A Biosafety Discussion List)
>> Reply-to: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU (A Biosafety Discussion List)
>> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> We dispose of ESIP sharps with the safety feature activated as we would any
>> other standard sharp, i.e., in a proper sharps waste container. I suggest
>> the same treatment for these devices. Murphy is alive and well and living
>> in laboratories. Someone, somewhere, sometime, will do something
>> unexpected
>> that exposes your recessed needles and creates a problem. Better to buy
>> the
>> extra insurance and use a rigid, puncture-resistant, leak-proof sharps
>> waste
>> container.
>>
>> Glenn A. Funk, Ph.D., CBSP
>> Director and Biosafety Officer
>> Environment, Health & Safety
>> MedImmune Vaccines, Inc.
>> 408-845-8857
>>
>>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Ken Asarch [mailto:KAsarch@]
>> Sent: Tuesday, 16 July, 2002 10:05
>> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
>> Subject: Help defiining whether a biohazardous item requires disposal as
>> a sharp
>>
>>
>> For waste disposal purposes, should the following be packaged for disposal
>> as routine biohazardous waste or as biohazardous sharps: a plastic
>> disposable cartridge used for blood testing contains needles that are fully
>> recessed.
>>
>> When placed into a plastic biohazard disposal bag, there are no sharps
>> capable of piercing the bag or someone who contacts the bag or the
>> cartrdiges directly.
>>
>> A reference or citation to support the requirement would be appreciated.
>> Thanks for the advice.
>>
>> ThauMDx
>> Director, Regulatory Affairs
>> 7402 Hollister Avenue
>> Santa Barbara, California 93117
>> tel 805.968.3099 x 206
>> fax 805.968.3899
>>
>>
>>
>
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In a message dated 7/17/2002 1:20:13 AM Eastern Daylight Time, EKrisiunas writes:
Since you are dealing with a state as well as federal issue, most important to contact California Dept. of Health Service as well as OSHA.
The sharps must be disposed of in an approved sharps container. Even though this device becomes fully recessed it is still a sharp and needs to be handled as one. If it were to become fully contained with no open end, it could be considered for approval as an individual sharps container as the SafeSnap syringe of San Diego has been (accepted by CDHS as well as OSHA at the Federal level).
Edward Krisiunas, MT(ASCP), CIC, MPH
President
WNWN International, Inc.
PO Box 1164
Burlington, Connecticut
USA
Phone: 001-860-675-1217
Fax: 001-860-675-1311
Mobile: 001-860-944-2373
Subj: Re: Help defiining whether a biohazardous item requires disposal as a sharp
Date: 7/16/2002 6:22:15 PM Eastern Daylight Time
From: funkg@ (Funk, Glenn)
Sender: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU (A Biosafety Discussion List)
Reply-to: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU (A Biosafety Discussion List)
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
We dispose of ESIP sharps with the safety feature activated as we would any
other standard sharp, i.e., in a proper sharps waste container. I suggest
the same treatment for these devices. Murphy is alive and well and living
in laboratories. Someone, somewhere, sometime, will do something unexpected
that exposes your recessed needles and creates a problem. Better to buy the
extra insurance and use a rigid, puncture-resistant, leak-proof sharps waste
container.
Glenn A. Funk, Ph.D., CBSP
Director and Biosafety Officer
Environment, Health & Safety
MedImmune Vaccines, Inc.
408-845-8857
-----Original Message-----
From: Ken Asarch [mailto:KAsarch@]
Sent: Tuesday, 16 July, 2002 10:05
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Help defiining whether a biohazardous item requires disposal as
a sharp
For waste disposal purposes, should the following be packaged for disposal
as routine biohazardous waste or as biohazardous sharps: a plastic
disposable cartridge used for blood testing contains needles that are fully
recessed.
When placed into a plastic biohazard disposal bag, there are no sharps
capable of piercing the bag or someone who contacts the bag or the
cartrdiges directly.
A reference or citation to support the requirement would be appreciated.
Thanks for the advice.
ThauMDx
Director, Regulatory Affairs
7402 Hollister Avenue
Santa Barbara, California 93117
tel 805.968.3099 x 206
fax 805.968.3899
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Return-path:
From: EKrisiunas@
Full-name: EKrisiunas
Message-ID:
Date: Wed, 17 Jul 2002 01:20:13 EDT
Subject: Re: Help defiining whether a biohazardous item requires disposal as a sharp
To: EKrisiunas@
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="part2_13.e7cad09.2a66588d_boundary"
X-Mailer: AOL 6.0 for Windows US sub 10572
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Content-Type: text/plain; charset="ISO-8859-1"
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Since you are dealing with a state as well as federal issue, most important
to contact California Dept. of Health Service as well as OSHA.
The sharps must be disposed of in an approved sharps container.=A0 Even
though this device becomes fully recessed it is still a sharp and needs to b=
e
handled as one.=A0 If it were to become fully contained with no open end, it=
could be considered for approval as an individual sharps container as the
SafeSnap syringe of San Diego has been (accepted by CDHS as well as OSHA at
the Federal level).
Edward Krisiunas, MT(ASCP), CIC, MPH
President
WNWN International, Inc.
PO Box 1164
Burlington, Connecticut
USA
Phone: 001-860-675-1217
Fax: 001-860-675-1311
Mobile: 001-860-944-2373
> Subj: Re: Help defiining whether a biohazardous item requires disposal as =
a
> sharp
> Date: 7/16/2002 6:22:15 PM Eastern Daylight Time
> From: funkg@ (Funk, Glenn)
> Sender: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU (A Biosafety Discussion List)
> Reply-to: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU (A Biosafety Discussion List)
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
>
>
>
>
> We dispose of ESIP sharps with the safety feature activated as we would an=
y
> other standard sharp, i.e., in a proper sharps waste container. I suggest
> the same treatment for these devices. Murphy is alive and well and living
> in laboratories. Someone, somewhere, sometime, will do something unexpect=
ed
> that exposes your recessed needles and creates a problem. Better to buy t=
he
> extra insurance and use a rigid, puncture-resistant, leak-proof sharps was=
te
> container.
>
> Glenn A. Funk, Ph.D., CBSP
> Director and Biosafety Officer
> Environment, Health & Safety
> MedImmune Vaccines, Inc.
> 408-845-8857
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Ken Asarch [mailto:KAsarch@]
> Sent: Tuesday, 16 July, 2002 10:05
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: Help defiining whether a biohazardous item requires disposal as
> a sharp
>
>
> For waste disposal purposes, should the following be packaged for disposal
> as routine biohazardous waste or as biohazardous sharps: a plastic
> disposable cartridge used for blood testing contains needles that are full=
y
> recessed.
>
> When placed into a plastic biohazard disposal bag, there are no sharps
> capable of piercing the bag or someone who contacts the bag or the
> cartrdiges directly.
>
> A reference or citation to support the requirement would be appreciated.
> Thanks for the advice.
>
> ThauMDx
> Director, Regulatory Affairs
> 7402 Hollister Avenue
> Santa Barbara, California 93117
> tel 805.968.3099 x 206
> fax 805.968.3899
>
>
>
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Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Since y= ou are dealing with a state as well as federal issue, most important to cont= act California Dept. of Health Service as well as OSHA.
The sharps must be disposed of in an approved sharps contain= er.=A0 Even though this device becomes fully recessed it is still a sharp an= d needs to be handled as one.=A0 If it were to become fully contained with n= o open end, it could be considered for approval as an individual sharps cont= ainer as the SafeSnap syringe of San Diego has been (accepted by CDHS as wel= l as OSHA at the Federal level).
Edward Krisiunas, MT(ASCP), CIC, MPH
President
WNWN International, Inc.
PO Box 1164
Burlington, Connecticut
USA
Phone: 001-860-675-1217
Fax: 001-860-675-1311
Mobile: 001-860-944-2373
Date: 7/16/2002 6:22:15 PM Eastern Daylight Time
From: funkg@ (Funk, Glenn)
Sender: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU (A Biosafety Discussio= n List)
Reply-to: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU (A Biosafety Discuss= ion List)
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
We dispose of ESIP sharps with the safety feature activated as we would = any
other standard sharp, i.e., in a proper sharps waste container. I = suggest
the same treatment for these devices. Murphy is alive and well and= living
in laboratories. Someone, somewhere, sometime, will do something u= nexpected
that exposes your recessed needles and creates a problem. Better t= o buy the
extra insurance and use a rigid, puncture-resistant, leak-proof sharps w= aste
container.
Glenn A. Funk, Ph.D., CBSP
Director and Biosafety Officer
Environment, Health & Safety
MedImmune Vaccines, Inc.
408-845-8857
-----Original Message-----
From: Ken Asarch [mailto:KAsarch@]
Sent: Tuesday, 16 July, 2002 10:05
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Help defiining whether a biohazardous item requires disposal as
a sharp
For waste disposal purposes, should the following be packaged for dispos= al
as routine biohazardous waste or as biohazardous sharps: a plastic
disposable cartridge used for blood testing contains needles that are fu= lly
recessed.
When placed into a plastic biohazard disposal bag, there are no sharps
capable of piercing the bag or someone who contacts the bag or the
cartrdiges directly.
A reference or citation to support the requirement would be appreciated.
Thanks for the advice.
ThauMDx
Director, Regulatory Affairs
7402 Hollister Avenue
Santa Barbara, California 93117
tel 805.968.3099 x 206
fax 805.968.3899
--part2_13.e7cad09.2a66588d_boundary--
--part1_13.e7cad09.2a66dcd3_boundary--
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 17 Jul 2002 09:44:38 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Francis Cole
Subject: Re: New Draft CDC/USDA Select Agent List
Mime-Version: 1.0
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Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
I think it would also be helpful if included with the new list of SA, were =
included MSDS documentation of SA toxic properties and uses. Where; =
opinions solicited, within the Biomedical Research communities, SA should =
be inventoried? To my mind a list might include, pharmacies, oncology =
and pathology depts, animal care and research facilities, pathology =
departments, research departments.
The reason these questions come to mind is that, if memory serves, Ricin =
derivatives were at one point suggested for investigational drugs when =
coupled to chemotherapeutic agents to target certain types of tumors. I =
have not kept up with this area of investigation. This question pertains =
primarily to the list of SA toxins.
Frank Cole, Ph. D.
BSO
fcole@
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 17 Jul 2002 11:40:59 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Enoch, Harry"
Subject: Re: Select agents - toxin exemption?
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Comment:
As I read the USA Patriot Act, it does include the exemptions for toxins
provided for in the Antiterrorism & Effective Death Penalty Act. Sec. 175b
of the Patriot Act states:
No restricted person described in subsection (b) shall ship or transport
interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any
biological agent or toxin, or receive any biological agent or toxin that has
been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce, if the
biological agent or toxin is listed as a select agent in subsection (j) of
section 72.6 of title 42, Code of Federal Regulations, pursuant to section
511(d)(l) of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(Public Law 104-132), and is not exempted under subsection (h) of such
section 72.6, or appendix A of part 72 of the Code of Regulations.
i.e. The bill makes it illegal for restricted persons to possess an agent or
toxin if (1) it is listed as a select agent and (2) it is not exempt under
subsection h or appendix A of the regs.
We will have to wait and see what exemptions, if any, will be allowed under
HR3448.
Question:
I have heard and read many comments that refer to "de minimus" levels of
toxin being exempt, but cannot find any reference to this terminology in the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act or its regs. Exemptions are
provided for
o toxins used for medical use
o toxins inactivated for use in vaccines and
o toxins used for research if the LD50 is greater than 100ng/kg
Can someone explain the "de minimus exemption" and tell where to find it in
the law or regs?
Harry Enoch
EH&S Director
University of Kentucky
-----Original Message-----
From: Robin Newberry [mailto:wnewber@CLEMSON.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, July 16, 2002 2:19 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Select agents - toxin exemption?
It is my understanding (I think I get this from Richard Gilpin -
speak up if I'm wrong) that the exemptions provided in the original
Select Agent List (in the "Antiterrorism & Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996") DO NOT APPLY to the USA Patriot Act (the Act which
spawned the recent CDC FedReg notice and notification form).
If that is the case, there is NO exemption for research or clinical
use, there is NO de minimus concentration, and there is NO de minimus
amount. If you have it in any form, in any concentration, you must
report you have it. That would seem to be consistent with the draft
form the CDC put out, as you either have to state what you have in
your possession, or issue a blanket denial. There are no exceptions
noted on the draft notification form.
--
Robin
--------------------------------------------------------------
W. Robert Newberry, IV CIH, CHMM
Chief Environmental Health and Safety Officer
Clemson University
wnewber@clemson.edu ehs@clemson.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 17 Jul 2002 11:51:28 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Robin Newberry
Subject: Re: Select agents - toxin exemption?
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed"
De minimus is a term used frequently in the environmental arena,
which means essentially "if it's below this level, then we won't
worry about enforcing on it (just yet)". In our context:
>o toxins used for research if the LD50 is greater than 100ng/kg
ergo, toxins used for research with an LD50 of less than 100 ng/g
would be "de minimus."
--
Robin
--------------------------------------------------------------
W. Robert Newberry, IV CIH, CHMM
Chief Environmental Health and Safety Officer
Clemson University
wnewber@clemson.edu ehs@clemson.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 17 Jul 2002 15:13:54 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Larry Mendoza
Organization: VCU-OEHS-Biological/Chemical Safety Section
Subject: Select Agent vendors.
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="------------979CAED939BE60271B6D5945"
This is a multi-part message in MIME format.
--------------979CAED939BE60271B6D5945
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Three more questions...
1. Can anyone tell me how many vendors sell select agents, especially the
toxins?. I know that Sigma-Aldrich sells most if not all of them.
2. Also, how is your instition going to handle the procurement of select
agents once exemptions or approval upon registration with the CDC is
granted? As I understand it, the regulation says that the person using
these agents, cannot recieve them personally. I'm figuring that the safety
office is going to be in charge of procuring these agents and then
distributing them appropriately.
3. Any suggestions in getting PIs to be in compliance with responding to a
survey on select agents? I believe I am going to have to go on a door to
door man-hunt which is going to be extremely time consuming.
Thanks in advance.
Larry Mendoza
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 17 Jul 2002 14:39:34 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Jeppesen, Eric R"
Subject: Re: Select Agent vendors.
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
I can't answer number 1.
As for number 2. We (EHS) is going to handle the ordering and shipping.
The select agents will come into our office, I'll finalize the paperwork,
deliver them to the PI, and have them sign for them.
For number 3 we went to the department chairs and emphasized the
need for a comprehensive survey. The department chairs distributed the
questionnaire and had their PI's sign them indicating whether they had a
select agent or not.
We will have to do this again since the Dept of Ag has their list now.
The problem that I am having now is due to the timeline and that this is
the summer months.
Eric
Eric R. Jeppesen
Laboratory Safety Specialist
KU-EHS Dept.
(785) 864-2857 phone
(785) 864-2852 fax
jeppesen@ku.edu
-----Original Message-----
From: Larry Mendoza [mailto:lgmendoz@HSC.VCU.EDU]
Sent: Wednesday, July 17, 2002 2:14 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Select Agent vendors.
Three more questions...
1. Can anyone tell me how many vendors sell select agents, especially the
toxins?. I know that Sigma-Aldrich sells most if not all of them.
2. Also, how is your instition going to handle the procurement of select
agents once exemptions or approval upon registration with the CDC is
granted? As I understand it, the regulation says that the person using
these agents, cannot recieve them personally. I'm figuring that the safety
office is going to be in charge of procuring these agents and then
distributing them appropriately.
3. Any suggestions in getting PIs to be in compliance with responding to a
survey on select agents? I believe I am going to have to go on a door to
door man-hunt which is going to be extremely time consuming.
Thanks in advance.
Larry Mendoza
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 17 Jul 2002 15:47:08 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Kim Auletta
Subject: Re: Select Agent vendors.
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Some of our researchers get their TTX from:
Alomone Labs Unlimited
POB 4287
Bet Mercazim
Jerusalem, Isreal 91402
Ph#800-618-1644
There is a big price difference between this vendor & Sigma.
Kim Auletta
Lab Safety Specialist
Environmental Health and Safety
SUNY Stony Brook
110 Suffolk Hall
Stony Brook, NY 11794-6200
phone: 631-632-9672
fax: 631-632-9683
email: kauletta@.sunysb.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 17 Jul 2002 15:06:07 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "KLEIN, Jan"
Subject: Re: Select Agent vendors.
Larry and group -
The issue raised in the email below with regard to controlling procurement
catches me off guard. Please point me to the pertinent section of the new
regulations. The closest reference I am aware of is the requirement that the
RFO may not possess select agents.
Thanks,
Jan
//
Jan Klein
Biological Safety Officer
UU-Madison
-----Original Message-----
From: Larry Mendoza [mailto:lgmendoz@HSC.VCU.EDU]
Sent: Wednesday, July 17, 2002 2:14 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Select Agent vendors.
Three more questions...
1. Can anyone tell me how many vendors sell select agents, especially the
toxins?. I know that Sigma-Aldrich sells most if not all of them.
2. Also, how is your instition going to handle the procurement of select
agents once exemptions or approval upon registration with the CDC is
granted? As I understand it, the regulation says that the person using
these agents, cannot recieve them personally. I'm figuring that the safety
office is going to be in charge of procuring these agents and then
distributing them appropriately.
3. Any suggestions in getting PIs to be in compliance with responding to a
survey on select agents? I believe I am going to have to go on a door to
door man-hunt which is going to be extremely time consuming.
Thanks in advance.
Larry Mendoza
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 17 Jul 2002 15:22:06 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Klenner, James"
Subject: Re: Select Agent vendors.
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Here in Indy we are following SOPs seen in Radiation Safety. The RFO or =
Alternate approves purchases/procurement and personally receives orders. =
These are then hand-delivered to the lab. As the Alternate RFO I will be =
the one receiving materials but I never actually "possess" any Select =
Agents, thus satisfying the issue below. Furthermore, illegal purchasing =
should almost never take place as vendors (all I've spoken to) require =
the CDC registration number for processing. As such, I would advise all =
RFOs to not make your registration number known to PIs.
James W. Klenner, MSc, MPH, MPA
Biological Safety Manager
INDIANA UNIVERSITY - PURDUE UNIVERSITY INDIANAPOLIS
Department of Environmental Health & Safety
620 Union Drive, Room 043
Indianapolis, IN 46202
(317) 274-2830
Fax (317) 278-2158
-----Original Message-----
From: KLEIN, Jan [mailto:JKLEIN@FPM.WISC.EDU]
Sent: Wednesday, July 17, 2002 3:06 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Select Agent vendors.
Larry and group -
The issue raised in the email below with regard to controlling =
procurement
catches me off guard. Please point me to the pertinent section of the =
new
regulations. The closest reference I am aware of is the requirement that =
the
RFO may not possess select agents.
Thanks,
Jan
//
Jan Klein
Biological Safety Officer
UU-Madison
-----Original Message-----
From: Larry Mendoza [mailto:lgmendoz@HSC.VCU.EDU]
Sent: Wednesday, July 17, 2002 2:14 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Select Agent vendors.
Three more questions...
1. Can anyone tell me how many vendors sell select agents, especially =
the
toxins?. I know that Sigma-Aldrich sells most if not all of them.
2. Also, how is your instition going to handle the procurement of select
agents once exemptions or approval upon registration with the CDC is
granted? As I understand it, the regulation says that the person using
these agents, cannot recieve them personally. I'm figuring that the =
safety
office is going to be in charge of procuring these agents and then
distributing them appropriately.
3. Any suggestions in getting PIs to be in compliance with responding to =
a
survey on select agents? I believe I am going to have to go on a door =
to
door man-hunt which is going to be extremely time consuming.
Thanks in advance.
Larry Mendoza
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 17 Jul 2002 16:47:00 EDT
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Jim Kaufman
Subject: School Stockroom Fire
MIME-Version: 1.0
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There was a fire in the chemical storeroom of a high school in Wichita,
Kansas on Sunday, July 7th that did over one million dollars in damage
according to the fire chief. The cause of the fire remains unknown due to
the extensiveness of the damage. No injuries were reported. The chemicals
had been segregated and boxed for moving. Outside temperature that day
reached about 95 degrees.
... Jim
James A. Kaufman, Ph.D., Director
The Laboratory Safety Institute
A National Center for Science Safety
192 Worcester Road, Natick, MA 01760-2252
508-647-1900 Fax: 508-647-0062
Cell: 508-574-6264 Res: 781-237-1335
labsafe@
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There was a fire in the chemical storeroom of a high school in Wichita, Kansas on Sunday, July 7th that did over one million dollars in damage according to the fire chief. The cause of the fire remains unknown due to the extensiveness of the damage. No injuries were reported. The chemicals had been segregated and boxed for moving. Outside temperature that day reached about 95 degrees.
... Jim
James A. Kaufman, Ph.D., Director
The Laboratory Safety Institute
A National Center for Science Safety
192 Worcester Road, Natick, MA 01760-2252
508-647-1900 Fax: 508-647-0062
Cell: 508-574-6264 Res: 781-237-1335
labsafe@
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=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 18 Jul 2002 08:42:39 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Kim Auletta
Subject: Adenovirus news
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
For discussion:
Today's local paper
()
had an article citing a story in yesterday's journal Nature that "The
hidden damage left by the virus may cripple the cell's vital gene-repair
system." "It may be that adenoviruses are triggering cancer, but the
infections are cleared long before cancer is diagnosed." ... "these new
results hint that adenovirus may be more dangerous than anticipated.. if
we're going to use virual systems for gene delivery, we should understand
as much as possible about the effects of viral genes on the cell."
How will this affect the use of adenovirus in our labs? Will you be
providing closer scrutiny to this virus? When I discuss it with a
researcher here, they often refuse to believe that adenovirus is BSL 2
since "its a common virus" and "only causes colds".
Kim Auletta
Lab Safety Specialist
Environmental Health and Safety
SUNY Stony Brook
110 Suffolk Hall
Stony Brook, NY 11794-6200
phone: 631-632-9672
fax: 631-632-9683
email: kauletta@.sunysb.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 18 Jul 2002 07:58:45 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ginger Brown
Subject: USDA Inspections
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
A few days ago, there was a posting asking about USDA inspections
at land grant universities. I responded directly to that individual, but =
then
deleted the email. I have more information to pass along to that
person....... whoever you are ! Please contact me directly at
gingerbrown@tamu.edu.
Ginger Brown, CBSP
Env Health & Safety
TX A&M University
979/862-4038
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 18 Jul 2002 10:02:11 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Norman, Randy"
Subject: Re: New Draft CDC/USDA Select Agent List
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
I do not believe there are any NEW lists yet. In order for HHS to change
their SA list, and as the USDA prepares (for the first time) their SA list,
they are required by the new law to "consult with . . . scientific experts
representing appropriate professional groups". I have heard of no such
consultations. Have any of you?
The animal agents on that draft form which CDC published for comment, are
not true "Select Agents" to my understanding, because USDA has not yet
promulgated a of "Select Agents", unless I missed the related FR notice. The
agents on the draft form seem to derive from the list of "Restricted Animal
Pathogens" in preexisting USDA regulations. Chances are very good that they
will eventually be named as Select Agents", but as far as I can tell, that
has not yet happened. If I am wrong, please, somebody, provide the proof.
Randy Norman
Safety Specialist Sr.
BioReliance Corporation
Rockville, MD 20850
Rnorman@
"Success is a journey, not a destination" - Ben Sweetland
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 18 Jul 2002 11:16:50 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: David Gillum
Subject: Unknown Specimens
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Dear Biosafety Group,
Our institution has a veterinary diagnostic laboratory that offers
bacteriology, mycology and parasitology services. Animal tissue or cultures
are often sent to this laboratory for diagnosis and study.
My questions to the group are:
1) Do you test all samples for potentially infectious agents that need to be
worked with at a higher biosafety level?
2) At what biosafety level do you address unknowns? Do you have procedures
to reduce exposures (just in case)?
3) How do you deal with samples sent in (as unknowns) that turn up to be
positive for an agent that needs to be worked with at a higher biological
safety level?
4) How do you rate this facility? Is it a BSL-2 because it has the potential
to receive BSL-2 agents (maybe even BSL-3...)?
5) What regulations apply to this type of facility?
6) Does anyone have any operating procedures that I may be able to review
that deal with this type of facility?
Thanks!
--
David R. Gillum
Laboratory Safety Officer
Environmental Health and Safety
11 Leavitt Lane, Perpetuity Hall
Durham, NH 03824
Telephone #: 603-862-0197
Facsimile #: 603-862-0047
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 18 Jul 2002 08:16:44 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Gergis, Nasr"
Subject: Re: CMV and Pregnant Female Worker
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Good morning, I look for information on Cytomegalovirus (CMV). A pregnant
female worker concerns about her work with CMV and her pregnancy. I
understand that the virus is important to a certain high risk groups and
most frequently is transmitted to a developing child before birth. Does
anyone has info on the CMV biohazard. Thanks in advance.
Nasr Gergis, Ph.D., DVM
Biological Safety Officer
Occupational Safety and Health
City of Hope/BRI
Ph: 626-539-8111 Ext. 64262
Fax: 626-301-8970
Pager: 626-423-5454
E-mail: ngergis@
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Good morning, I look for information on Cytomegalovirus (CMV). A pregnant female worker concerns about her work with CMV and her pregnancy. I understand that the virus is important to a certain high risk groups and most frequently is transmitted to a developing child before birth. Does anyone has info on the CMV biohazard. Thanks in advance.
Nasr Gergis, Ph.D., DVM
Biological Safety Officer
Occupational Safety and Health
City of Hope/BRI
Ph: 626-539-8111 Ext. 64262
Fax: 626-301-8970
Pager: 626-423-5454
E-mail: ngergis@
------_=_NextPart_001_01C22E6E.209410D0--
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 18 Jul 2002 10:25:28 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Burnett, LouAnn Crawford"
Subject: Re: CMV and Pregnant Female Worker
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="----_=_NextPart_001_01C22E6F.58EE92D6"
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The CDC has some good information. Look at :
.
The document that they talk about at the end (from St. Paul's Children's
Hospital) is also good.
Good luck. LouAnn
LouAnn C. Burnett, MS, CBSP
Biosafety Program Manager & Biological Safety Officer
Vanderbilt University Environmental Health & Safety
Nashville, Tennessee
615/322-0927 (direct & voice mail)
615/343-4951 (fax)
-----Original Message-----
From: Gergis, Nasr [mailto:NGergis@]
Sent: Thursday, July 18, 2002 10:17 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: CMV and Pregnant Female Worker
=09
=09
Good morning, I look for information on Cytomegalovirus (CMV). A
pregnant female worker concerns about her work with CMV and her
pregnancy. I understand that the virus is important to a certain high
risk groups and most frequently is transmitted to a developing child
before birth. Does anyone has info on the CMV biohazard. Thanks in
advance.
Nasr Gergis, Ph.D., DVM
Biological Safety Officer
Occupational Safety and Health
City of Hope/BRI
Ph: 626-539-8111 Ext. 64262
Fax: 626-301-8970
Pager: 626-423-5454
E-mail: ngergis@
------_=_NextPart_001_01C22E6F.58EE92D6
Content-Type: text/html;
charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
The CDC has some good information. Look at :
The document that they talk about at the end (from St. Paul's Children's Hospital) is also good.
Good luck. LouAnn
LouAnn C. Burnett, MS, CBSP
Biosafety Program Manager = & Biological Safety Officer
Vanderbilt University = Environmental Health & Safety
Nashville, Tennessee
615/322-0927 (direct = & voice mail)
615/343-4951 (fax)
-----Original Message-----
From: = Gergis, Nasr [mailto:NGergis@]
Sent: Thursday, July 18, 2002 = 10:17 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: CMV = and Pregnant Female Worker
Good morning, I look for information on Cytomegalovirus (CMV). A pregnant = female worker concerns about her work with CMV and her pregnancy. I = understand that the virus is important to a certain high risk groups and most = frequently is transmitted to a developing child before birth. Does anyone = has info on the CMV biohazard. Thanks in advance.
Nasr Gergis, Ph.D., = DVM
Biological Safety = Officer
Occupational Safety = and Health
City of Hope/BRI
Ph: = 626-539-8111 Ext. 64262
Fax: = 626-301-8970
Pager: 626-423-5454
E-mail: ngergis@
=00
------_=_NextPart_001_01C22E6F.58EE92D6--
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 18 Jul 2002 12:09:02 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Thompson, Larry"
Subject: Re: Unknown Specimens
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David,
My answers (opinions) are under your questions, in bold italics. Write me
off-list if you need more.
TTFN,
Larry
Larry J. Thompson DVM PhD DABVT CBSP
Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory
Univ of Georgia - College of Vet Med
43 Brighton Road
Tifton, GA 31793-3000
phone (229) 386-3340 fax (229) 386-7128
LJThompson@tifton.cpes.peachnet.edu
-----Original Message-----
From: David Gillum [
mailto:David.Gillum@UNH.EDU]
Sent: Thursday, July 18, 2002 11:17 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Unknown Specimens
Dear Biosafety Group,
Our institution has a veterinary diagnostic laboratory that offers
bacteriology, mycology and parasitology services. Animal tissue or cultures
are often sent to this laboratory for diagnosis and study.
My questions to the group are:
1) Do you test all samples for potentially infectious agents that need to be
worked with at a higher biosafety level?
ANS: You can't test for everything. The laboratorians usually have
experience in the clinical presentations associated with the different
common agents in veterinary medicine. They should have a history of the
animal or sample, and thus form a plan on how to analyze. In my experience,
these laboratorians also use good microbiological techniques, which goes a
long way in helping them protect themselves and others. You, of course,
should visit the lab to see for yourself.
2) At what biosafety level do you address unknowns? Do you have procedures
to reduce exposures (just in case)?
ANS: I don't know what you mean by "unknowns." Technically, all samples
sent in anywhere for testing are unknowns. The lab should have a workup in
place for different histories and specimens. You might review this with the
lab. Remember that HIV and hepatitis are not concerns, except for certain
RESEARCH situations. One thing that I stress is that the folks in the
receiving department (who open the packages for sign-in and routing) have a
BS cabinet available to them, but it is not necessary to open all the
packages there. Also, see answer for #4.
3) How do you deal with samples sent in (as unknowns) that turn up to be
positive for an agent that needs to be worked with at a higher biological
safety level?
ANS: At that point you either work with it at a higher level, you send it
somewhere else, or you destroy it using accepted microbiological methods.
Remember that in most cases, once they have identified the problem, their
job is completed.
4) How do you rate this facility? Is it a BSL-2 because it has the potential
to receive BSL-2 agents (maybe even BSL-3...)?
ANS: At a minimum it should be BL-2. You can always design protocols to do
some "BL-2+" work, where the work is at a higher containment than normal,
but is not the full BL-3.
5) What regulations apply to this type of facility?
ANS: The usual fire, OSHA and EPA stuff to start with. The national
organization is the AAVLD (American Association of Veterinary Laboratory
Diagnosticians). If they are AAVLD certified, they get inspected and
reviewed. If they do human public health work, they may have other folks
looking at them.
6) Does anyone have any operating procedures that I may be able to review
that deal with this type of facility?
ANS: This October at the national meeting in St Louis I will be (again)
leading the Safety Committee. I will be trying to have a Safety Manual
exchange and encourage plagerism. I might have some examples after that.
With your question to the listserve, you might get some bites from BS folks
at Vet Schools.
LT
Thanks!
--
David R. Gillum
Laboratory Safety Officer
Environmental Health and Safety
11 Leavitt Lane, Perpetuity Hall
Durham, NH 03824
Telephone #: 603-862-0197
Facsimile #: 603-862-0047
------_=_NextPart_001_01C22E75.6EFEFB30
Content-Type: text/html;
charset="windows-1252"
David,
My answers (opinions) are under your questions, in bold italics. Write me off-list if you need more.
TTFN,
Larry
Larry J. Thompson DVM PhD DABVT CBSP
Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory
Univ of Georgia - College of Vet Med
43 Brighton Road
Tifton, GA 31793-3000
phone (229) 386-3340 fax (229) 386-7128
LJThompson@tifton.cpes.peachnet.edu
-----Original Message-----
From: David Gillum [mailto:David.Gillum@UNH.EDU]
Sent: Thursday, July 18, 2002 11:17 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Unknown Specimens
Dear Biosafety Group,
Our institution has a veterinary diagnostic laboratory that offers
bacteriology, mycology and parasitology services. Animal tissue or cultures
are often sent to this laboratory for diagnosis and study.
My questions to the group are:
1) Do you test all samples for potentially infectious agents that need to be
worked with at a higher biosafety level?
ANS: You can't test for everything. The laboratorians usually have experience in the clinical presentations associated with the different common agents in veterinary medicine. They should have a history of the animal or sample, and thus form a plan on how to analyze. In my experience, these laboratorians also use good microbiological techniques, which goes a long way in helping them protect themselves and others. You, of course, should visit the lab to see for yourself.
2) At what biosafety level do you address unknowns? Do you have procedures
to reduce exposures (just in case)?
ANS: I don't know what you mean by "unknowns." Technically, all samples sent in anywhere for testing are unknowns. The lab should have a workup in place for different histories and specimens. You might review this with the lab. Remember that HIV and hepatitis are not concerns, except for certain RESEARCH situations. One thing that I stress is that the folks in the receiving department (who open the packages for sign-in and routing) have a BS cabinet available to them, but it is not necessary to open all the packages there. Also, see answer for #4.
3) How do you deal with samples sent in (as unknowns) that turn up to be
positive for an agent that needs to be worked with at a higher biological
safety level?
ANS: At that point you either work with it at a higher level, you send it somewhere else, or you destroy it using accepted microbiological methods. Remember that in most cases, once they have identified the problem, their job is completed.
4) How do you rate this facility? Is it a BSL-2 because it has the potential
to receive BSL-2 agents (maybe even BSL-3...)?
ANS: At a minimum it should be BL-2. You can always design protocols to do some "BL-2+" work, where the work is at a higher containment than normal, but is not the full BL-3.
5) What regulations apply to this type of facility?
ANS: The usual fire, OSHA and EPA stuff to start with. The national organization is the AAVLD (American Association of Veterinary Laboratory Diagnosticians). If they are AAVLD certified, they get inspected and reviewed. If they do human public health work, they may have other folks looking at them.
6) Does anyone have any operating procedures that I may be able to review
that deal with this type of facility?
ANS: This October at the national meeting in St Louis I will be (again) leading the Safety Committee. I will be trying to have a Safety Manual exchange and encourage plagerism. I might have some examples after that. With your question to the listserve, you might get some bites from BS folks at Vet Schools.
LT
Thanks!
--
David R. Gillum
Laboratory Safety Officer
Environmental Health and Safety
11 Leavitt Lane, Perpetuity Hall
Durham, NH 03824
Telephone #: 603-862-0197
Facsimile #: 603-862-0047
------_=_NextPart_001_01C22E75.6EFEFB30--
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 18 Jul 2002 14:19:25 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Enoch, Harry"
Subject: Re: New Draft CDC/USDA Select Agent List
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
I am confused as to why USDA agents are listed on CDC's notification form.
As I understand the law calls for CDC/HHS notification by Sept 10, while
USDA notification is not due until ~Oct 10. USDA's list is not due out
until mid August. Also, CDC's July 2 FR Notice stated that APHIS would be
the agency to notify at USDA (and not CDC). One reason for asking this
question is that we would like to know if we must do two separate rounds of
inventories, or can we get it all done in one pass.
Harry G. Enoch
Director, Environmental Health & Safety
University of Kentucky
-----Original Message-----
From: Norman, Randy [mailto:RNorman@]
Sent: Thursday, July 18, 2002 10:02 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: New Draft CDC/USDA Select Agent List
I do not believe there are any NEW lists yet. In order for HHS to change
their SA list, and as the USDA prepares (for the first time) their SA list,
they are required by the new law to "consult with . . . scientific experts
representing appropriate professional groups". I have heard of no such
consultations. Have any of you?
The animal agents on that draft form which CDC published for comment, are
not true "Select Agents" to my understanding, because USDA has not yet
promulgated a of "Select Agents", unless I missed the related FR notice. The
agents on the draft form seem to derive from the list of "Restricted Animal
Pathogens" in preexisting USDA regulations. Chances are very good that they
will eventually be named as Select Agents", but as far as I can tell, that
has not yet happened. If I am wrong, please, somebody, provide the proof.
Randy Norman
Safety Specialist Sr.
BioReliance Corporation
Rockville, MD 20850
Rnorman@
"Success is a journey, not a destination" - Ben Sweetland
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 18 Jul 2002 14:56:56 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Burnett, LouAnn Crawford"
Subject: Re: CMV and Pregnant Female Worker
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="----_=_NextPart_001_01C22E95.452E2407"
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charset="US-ASCII"
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The link I posted earlier has an extra period (.) Here is the correct
URL:
Sorry for any inconvenience.
LouAnn
LouAnn C. Burnett, MS, CBSP
Biosafety Program Manager & Biological Safety Officer
Vanderbilt University Environmental Health & Safety
Nashville, Tennessee
615/322-0927 (direct & voice mail)
615/343-4951 (fax)
-----Original Message-----
From: Burnett, LouAnn Crawford
Sent: Thursday, July 18, 2002 10:25 AM
To: 'A Biosafety Discussion List'
Subject: RE: Re: CMV and Pregnant Female Worker
=09
=09
The CDC has some good information. Look at :
.
The document that they talk about at the end (from St. Paul's
Children's Hospital) is also good.
Good luck. LouAnn
LouAnn C. Burnett, MS, CBSP
Biosafety Program Manager & Biological Safety Officer
Vanderbilt University Environmental Health & Safety
Nashville, Tennessee
615/322-0927 (direct & voice mail)
615/343-4951 (fax)
=09
=09
-----Original Message-----
From: Gergis, Nasr [mailto:NGergis@]
Sent: Thursday, July 18, 2002 10:17 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: CMV and Pregnant Female Worker
=09
=09
Good morning, I look for information on Cytomegalovirus
(CMV). A pregnant female worker concerns about her work with CMV and her
pregnancy. I understand that the virus is important to a certain high
risk groups and most frequently is transmitted to a developing child
before birth. Does anyone has info on the CMV biohazard. Thanks in
advance.
Nasr Gergis, Ph.D., DVM
Biological Safety Officer
Occupational Safety and Health
City of Hope/BRI
Ph: 626-539-8111 Ext. 64262
Fax: 626-301-8970
Pager: 626-423-5454
E-mail: ngergis@
------_=_NextPart_001_01C22E95.452E2407
Content-Type: text/html;
charset="US-ASCII"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
The link I posted earlier has an extra period = (.) Here is the correct URL:
idod/diseases/cmv.htm
Sorry for any inconvenience.
LouAnn
=
LouAnn C. Burnett, MS, CBSP
Biosafety Program Manager = & Biological Safety Officer
Vanderbilt University = Environmental Health & Safety
Nashville, Tennessee
615/322-0927 (direct = & voice mail)
615/343-4951 (fax)
-----Original Message-----
From: = Burnett, LouAnn Crawford
Sent: Thursday, July 18, 2002 10:25 = AM
To: 'A Biosafety Discussion List'
Subject: RE: Re: CMV and Pregnant = Female Worker
The CDC has some good information. Look at :
The document that they talk about at the end (from St. Paul's Children's Hospital) is also good.
Good luck. LouAnn
LouAnn C. Burnett, MS, CBSP
Biosafety Program = Manager & Biological Safety Officer
Vanderbilt University = Environmental Health & Safety
Nashville, Tennessee
615/322-0927 (direct = & voice mail)
615/343-4951 (fax)
-----Original Message-----
From: = Gergis, Nasr [mailto:NGergis@]
Sent: Thursday, July 18, 2002 = 10:17 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: CMV = and Pregnant Female Worker
Good morning, I look for information on Cytomegalovirus (CMV). A pregnant female worker concerns about = her work with CMV and her pregnancy. I understand that the virus is important = to a certain high risk groups and most frequently is transmitted to a = developing child before birth. Does anyone has info on the CMV biohazard. = Thanks in advance.
Nasr Gergis, = Ph.D., DVM
Biological Safety Officer
Occupational Safety and Health
City of Hope/BRI
Ph: = 626-539-8111 Ext. 64262
Fax: 626-301-8970
Pager: 626-423-5454
E-mail: ngergis@
=00
------_=_NextPart_001_01C22E95.452E2407--
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 19 Jul 2002 09:35:51 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Hollingsworth, N J"
Subject: ENROLLLING ON MAILING LIST
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Hello, could you please send enroll my assistant Beth Reeves, =
bereeves@indiana.edu on the mailing list?
Thank you,
Norma Hollingsworth
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 19 Jul 2002 10:52:27 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ken Asarch
Subject: Where can I find out which UL safety standard (if any) would be r
equired by a blood analyzer that is used in an emergency room
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Where can I find out which UL safety standard (if any) would be required by
a blood analyzer that is used in an emergency room. This type of equipment
has traditionally been used in the laboratory and in the past has had
laboratory safety certification (UL 3101). This still may apply or a
medical safety certification (UL 2601) may come into play because of the
proximity to other patient oriented equipment and patients themselves.
What do hospitals and emergency rooms actually require.
Thanks in advance for the input.
ThauMDx
Director, Regulatory Affairs
7402 Hollister Avenue
Santa Barbara, California 93117
tel 805.968.3099 x 206
fax 805.968.3899
=========================================================================
Date: Sat, 20 Jul 2002 08:16:00 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Paul Rubock
Subject: BSC location
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We are in the final construction phases of a BL-3 suite. The plans call for
the BSC to be located on the back wall (opposite the door) of the actual
work room-a small space about 8' deep and 7' wide.
Now, the user wants to generate a bit more work space by moving the cabinet
to a side wall. At first glance this certainly flies in the face of
"locating cabinets to avoid disruption by personnel walking across the
face..."
But the dimensions make it so that occupancy by more than one person would
really crowd the room and the PI will prohibit (signage, training, SOPs)
entry by anyone else when the BSC is use. The door does have a clear vision
panel. And, while making this change would be costly to the institution, I
am hard pressed to see a 'biosafety reason' to prohibit it because of what I
see as the very low likelihood of "personnel traffic disrupting..." Am I
being TOO accommodating to the PI?
All advice greatly appreciated.
BTW, exterior to the room in question is a prep area, outside of that is the
change/gowning room, and then the corridor.
Thank you,
Paul Rubock
=========================================================================
Date: Sat, 20 Jul 2002 11:49:52 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Greg Merkle
Subject: Re: BSC location
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-transfer-encoding: 7bit
You ask, "Am I being TOO accommodating to the PI?"
Accomodate within reason. Who pays for the change order for construction?
Institution or PI? May be the PI should be asked to help defray costs for last
minute changes.
If the PI wants this change where were they earlier in the planning and early
construction phases? They should have been invovled in the design and planning.
Is there any impact from the location of the room lighting and the ventilation
ducts for supply and return air? What about the exhaust for theBSC, is it hard
duct or recirculate back to the room? Does the facility have supplied house
vacuum or other services that would have been served the BSC that would have to
be relocated?
I work at a university and these same things come up at times and have to be
addressed.
Just my opinion
Greg Merkle
Paul Rubock wrote:
> We are in the final construction phases of a BL-3 suite. The plans call for
> the BSC to be located on the back wall (opposite the door) of the actual
> work room-a small space about 8' deep and 7' wide.
>
> Now, the user wants to generate a bit more work space by moving the cabinet
> to a side wall. At first glance this certainly flies in the face of
> "locating cabinets to avoid disruption by personnel walking across the
> face..."
>
> But the dimensions make it so that occupancy by more than one person would
> really crowd the room and the PI will prohibit (signage, training, SOPs)
> entry by anyone else when the BSC is use. The door does have a clear vision
> panel. And, while making this change would be costly to the institution, I
> am hard pressed to see a 'biosafety reason' to prohibit it because of what I
> see as the very low likelihood of "personnel traffic disrupting..." Am I
> being TOO accommodating to the PI?
>
> All advice greatly appreciated.
>
> BTW, exterior to the room in question is a prep area, outside of that is the
> change/gowning room, and then the corridor.
>
> Thank you,
> Paul Rubock
=========================================================================
Date: Sun, 21 Jul 2002 19:24:40 EDT
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Jim Kaufman
Subject: High School Chemistry Accidents
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Content-Type: text/plain; charset="US-ASCII"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Date: Sat, 20 Jul 2002 10:33:50 -0400
From: "Brion G. Patterson"
Subject: High school chemistry accidents
The associated press ran an article July 6 which contains photos and
descriptions illustrating the problem that we high school chemistry teachers
sometimes are not as up-to-date on hazards as we should be. The article
"features" an accident using methyl alcohol to do flame tests. The article
is still available online at
This might be worth printing out and distributing at departmental
meetings...
-Brion Patterson, Fauquier H.S., Warrenton, VA bpatters@pen.k12.va.us
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 22 Jul 2002 08:34:24 -0400
Reply-To: mkinsey@
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Melina Kinsey
Subject: Botulinum Toxin
In-Reply-To:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
I have a researcher that would like to work with Bot toxin. He will be
working in our BSL-3 lab in a thimble connected BSC with minute amounts
(picograms/kg). However, he is testing a new piece of equipment that will
require decontamination prior to leaving the BSL-3 and returning to the
manufacturer. Most of the information I have been able to gather from DoA
sites and others, tells me that a 10% bleach solution with be adequate for a
surface decontamination, but we need to make sure the inner workings are
also decontaminated. This piece of equipment can not go through the
autoclave. Does anyone know if formaldehyde, ethylene oxide or hydrogen
peroxide decontamination systems will inactivate Bot. toxin? If so, please
lead me to the written word. Thanks.
Melina Kinsey
Safety Officer
Midwest Research Institute
Florida Division
1470 Treeland Blvd. S.E.
Palm Bay, Florida 32909-2211
mkinsey@
(321) 723-4547 ext. 404
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 22 Jul 2002 09:05:10 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Robin Newberry
Subject: Toxin vs. toxoid
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed"
Probably a dumb question, but...
One of our researchers has proposed using botulinum toxoid rather
than the toxin in an effort to skirt the CDC reporting requirement.
What is the practical difference between the toxin and the toxoid?
--
Robin
--------------------------------------------------------------
W. Robert Newberry, IV CIH, CHMM
Chief Environmental Health and Safety Officer
Clemson University
wnewber@clemson.edu ehs@clemson.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 22 Jul 2002 08:13:51 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Francis Cole
Subject: Final Form
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Colleagues, Has anyone seen the "final" registration form in the FR yet =
with the updated SA toxin list and an address to send the completed form?
Francis Cole, Ph.D.
BSO
fcole@
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 22 Jul 2002 09:32:59 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Debra Hunt
Subject: FW: New Draft CDC/USDA Select Agent List
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="=_alternative 004A18A485256BFE_="
This is a multipart message in MIME format.
--=_alternative 004A18A485256BFE_=
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Good Morning all on the list. I have received the latest information from
very knowledgeable sources involved with the new law regarding reporting
of select agents and the USDA info. The following is exactly what I
received:
RFOs will only be required to fill out one Notification form indicating
facility possession of HHS agents, USDA/APHIS agents or both. This form
will be mailed out around the first of August and will have a suspense
date
of September 10 for BOTH HHS and USDA/APHIS agents. USDA consented to
this
earlier date in order to simplify the mailing. All forms will be returned
to one secure address and will be processed as quickly as possible. The
processing contractor will provide CDC and APHIS with the provided
information about laboratories possessing HHS agents, APHIS agents or
both.
Good Luck to us all!
Debra L. Hunt, DrPH, CBSP
Director, Biological Safety
Assistant Clinical Professor
Duke University / Duke University Health System
Durham, NC 27710
919-684-8822
hunt0009@mc.duke.edu
--=_alternative 004A18A485256BFE_=
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
Good Morning all on the list. I have received the latest information from very knowledgeable sources involved with the new law regarding reporting of select agents and the USDA info. The following is exactly what I received:
RFOs will only be required to fill out one Notification form indicating
facility possession of HHS agents, USDA/APHIS agents or both. This form
will be mailed out around the first of August and will have a suspense date
of September 10 for BOTH HHS and USDA/APHIS agents. USDA consented to this
earlier date in order to simplify the mailing. All forms will be returned
to one secure address and will be processed as quickly as possible. The
processing contractor will provide CDC and APHIS with the provided
information about laboratories possessing HHS agents, APHIS agents or both.
Good Luck to us all!
Debra L. Hunt, DrPH, CBSP
Director, Biological Safety
Assistant Clinical Professor
Duke University / Duke University Health System
Durham, NC 27710
919-684-8822
hunt0009@mc.duke.edu
--=_alternative 004A18A485256BFE_=--
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 22 Jul 2002 09:40:40 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Cheri L Hildreth
Subject: Re: FW: New Draft CDC/USDA Select Agent List
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
thanks for the update! Does this mean that now we won't have to notify
of "non-possession" as specified in the 7/12 Federal Register?? Many
have expressed concern over that point.
Cheri Hildreth Watts, Director
Department of Environmental Health &Safety
University of Louisville
(502) 852-2954
e-mail: cheri.hildreth@louisville.edu
>>> hunt0009@MC.DUKE.EDU 07/22/02 09:32AM >>>
Good Morning all on the list. I have received the latest information
from
very knowledgeable sources involved with the new law regarding
reporting
of select agents and the USDA info. The following is exactly what I
received:
RFOs will only be required to fill out one Notification form
indicating
facility possession of HHS agents, USDA/APHIS agents or both. This
form
will be mailed out around the first of August and will have a suspense
date
of September 10 for BOTH HHS and USDA/APHIS agents. USDA consented to
this
earlier date in order to simplify the mailing. All forms will be
returned
to one secure address and will be processed as quickly as possible.
The
processing contractor will provide CDC and APHIS with the provided
information about laboratories possessing HHS agents, APHIS agents or
both.
Good Luck to us all!
Debra L. Hunt, DrPH, CBSP
Director, Biological Safety
Assistant Clinical Professor
Duke University / Duke University Health System
Durham, NC 27710
919-684-8822
hunt0009@mc.duke.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 22 Jul 2002 08:11:00 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Therese M. Stinnett"
Subject: Re: Toxin vs. toxoid
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
from "Basic Medical Microbiology"
4th ed.
"toxoid--a modified exotoxin that has been treated to destroy its =
toxicity
and retain immunogenicity."
Therese M. Stinnett
Biosafety Officer
Health and Safety Division
UCHSC, Mailstop C275
4200 E. 9th Avenue
Denver, CO=A0 80262
Voice:=A0 303-315-6754
Pager:=A0 303-266-5402
Fax:=A0 303-315-8026
email:=A0 therese.stinnett@uchsc.edu =
-----Original Message-----
From: Robin Newberry [mailto:wnewber@CLEMSON.EDU]
Sent: Monday, July 22, 2002 7:05 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Toxin vs. toxoid
Probably a dumb question, but...
One of our researchers has proposed using botulinum toxoid rather
than the toxin in an effort to skirt the CDC reporting requirement.
What is the practical difference between the toxin and the toxoid?
--
Robin
--------------------------------------------------------------
W. Robert Newberry, IV CIH, CHMM
Chief Environmental Health and Safety Officer
Clemson University
wnewber@clemson.edu ehs@clemson.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 22 Jul 2002 10:24:55 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Richard Fink
Subject: Fwd: FW: PRO/AH> Anthrax, unreliable test - USA
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="=====================_1612058==_.ALT"
--=====================_1612058==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
FYI:
>-----Original Message-----
>From: ProMED-mail [mailto:promed@promed.isid.harvard.edu]
>Sent: Saturday, July 20, 2002 10:36 PM
>To: promed-ahead@
>Subject: PRO/AH> Anthrax, unreliable test - USA
>
>
>
>ANTHRAX, UNRELIABLE TEST - USA
>********************************
>A ProMED-mail post
>
>ProMED-mail, a program of the
>International Society for Infectious Diseases
>
>
>Date: 19 Jul 2002
>From: ProMED-mail
>Source: 19 Jul 2002 5:59 PM [edited]
>6_1da9001
>26d0ed528>
>
>
>White House Warns on Anthrax Tests
>------------------------
>WASHINGTON -The White House is warning that anthrax field tests widely used
>since last fall's attacks give fast but often incorrect results, prompting
>authorities to shut down buildings prematurely and hand out unneeded
>antibiotics.
>
>In a memo being sent Monday to more than 250 federal agencies and to
>firefighters, police, and local officials across the country, authorities
>say none of the commercially available field tests are reliable. They
>advise federal agencies to stop buying them and to cancel any pending
>contracts.
>
>"This equipment does not pass acceptable standards for effectiveness," said
>the memo from John H. Marburger III, director of the White House Office of
>Science and Technology Policy. "Field testing ... is not recommended and
>should not be used."
>
>The advisory comes after an extensive study of the tests by the Centers for
>Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) for the Federal Bureau of
>Investigation (FBI). The study, the first of its kind, found that all tests
>on the market are prone to miss small amounts of anthrax and to detect
>anthrax when there was none there.
>
>The memo advises authorities to send results to a lab, where they can get
>initial readings within 6 hours. A 17-page set of guidelines offers
>detailed suggestions for how to handle suspicious mail.
>
>The guidelines also recommend federal agencies stop routinely testing their
>mailrooms for anthrax, given that most mail is being irradiated, low levels
>of anthrax do not pose a significant risk and the tests used are not
>reliable.
>
>The field tests, which cost about $35 each, are designed to determine
>quickly whether a suspicious white powder could be anthrax, and hundreds of
>thousands of them were sold during and after last fall's attacks-by-mail.
>
>But false results cause real problems, officials say.
>
>In May 2002, for instance, field tests indicated anthrax in the mailrooms
>of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The World Bank shut
>down the ventilation system in the entire building and sent 1200 workers
>home because it was too hot to work inside. The IMF gave about 100 people
>antibiotics, though many held off taking them. In the end, anthrax was not
>confirmed at either location.
>
>"Bad information is worse than no information," said Dr. Michael Osterholm,
>a bioterrorism expert at the University of Minnesota who has been serving
>as an adviser to HHS.
>
>Still, at the World Bank, there are no regrets. "The bank will always err
>on the side of caution," said spokesman Damian Milverton. Milverson said
>forcing staff to work from home is "nothing" compared to the risk of
>ignoring what could actually be anthrax. But he added officials will
>consider the guidelines.
>
>Field tests are easy to use. A sample of suspicious powder is dissolved
>into a special fluid and run through a gadget to check for genetic markers
>from the Bacillus family, which includes anthrax. But they also pick up
>other bacteria in the Bacillus family that is not anthrax. And they won't
>register anthrax if there are fewer than 100 000 spores, more than enough
>to kill someone.
>
>The manufacturer of the most popular field test, Smart Ticket, responded it
>is designed for use only if a visible powder is present. It's not designed
>to pick up anthrax floating invisibly through the air, said Cheryl Trudil,
>marketing manage of New Horizons of Columbia, Maryland. "If you have white
>powder on your desk and you're scared to death it's anthrax, someone can
>come and in 15 minutes tell you it's not anthrax," she said.
>
>But administration officials say that even with a powder, the test could
>miss a small amount of anthrax if it were mixed with other material.
>
>Trudil allows the test produces some "false positives," but said it's no
>big deal because the truth will come out when further testing is done in
>the lab. Without the field test, local officials would have to assume all
>suspicious powders are anthrax and send them to the lab, which would cause
>severe backups, she said.
>
>Administration officials said the FBI looked at lab capacity and determined
>it was sufficient to handle the demand.
>
>--
>ProMED-mail
>
>
>[see also:
>Anthrax, human - USA: laboratory screening 20020109.3210
>Anthrax, human - USA 20020109.3213
>Anthrax, human, laboratory diagnosis: correction 20011227.3120
>Anthrax, airborne, prophylaxis (04) 20011227.3121
>Anthrax, airborne, prophylaxis (03) 20011221.3082
>Anthrax, human - USA (41) 20011219.3067
>Anthrax, airborne, prophylaxis (02): vaccine 20011219.3063
>Anthrax, human, laboratory diagnosis 20011218.3057]
>............................mpp/tg/pg
>
>
>
>*##########################################################*
>ProMED-mail makes every effort to verify the reports that
>are posted, but the accuracy and completeness of the
>information, and of any statements or opinions based
>thereon, are not guaranteed. The reader assumes all risks in
>using information posted or archived by ProMED-mail. ISID
>and its associated service providers shall not be held
>responsible for errors or omissions or held liable for any
>damages incurred as a result of use or reliance upon posted
>or archived material.
>************************************************************
>Visit ProMED-mail's web site at .
>Send all items for posting to: promed@
>(NOT to an individual moderator). If you do not give your
>full name and affiliation, it may not be posted. Send
>commands to subscribe/unsubscribe, get archives, help,
>etc. to: majordomo@. For assistance from a
>human being send mail to: owner-majordomo@.
>############################################################
>############################################################
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Biosafty List Owner
rfink@mit.edu
--=====================_1612058==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
FYI:
-----Original Message-----
From: ProMED-mail [mailto:promed@promed.isid.harvard.edu]
Sent: Saturday, July 20, 2002 10:36 PM
To: promed-ahead@
Subject: PRO/AH> Anthrax, unreliable test - USA
ANTHRAX, UNRELIABLE TEST - USA
********************************
A ProMED-mail post
ProMED-mail, a program of the
International Society for Infectious Diseases
Date: 19 Jul 2002
From: ProMED-mail
Source: 19 Jul 2002 5:59 PM [edited]
White House Warns on Anthrax Tests
------------------------
WASHINGTON -The White House is warning that anthrax field tests widely used
since last fall's attacks give fast but often incorrect results, prompting
authorities to shut down buildings prematurely and hand out unneeded
antibiotics.
In a memo being sent Monday to more than 250 federal agencies and to
firefighters, police, and local officials across the country, authorities
say none of the commercially available field tests are reliable. They
advise federal agencies to stop buying them and to cancel any pending
contracts.
"This equipment does not pass acceptable standards for effectiveness," said
the memo from John H. Marburger III, director of the White House Office of
Science and Technology Policy. "Field testing ... is not recommended and
should not be used."
The advisory comes after an extensive study of the tests by the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) for the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI). The study, the first of its kind, found that all tests
on the market are prone to miss small amounts of anthrax and to detect
anthrax when there was none there.
The memo advises authorities to send results to a lab, where they can get
initial readings within 6 hours. A 17-page set of guidelines offers
detailed suggestions for how to handle suspicious mail.
The guidelines also recommend federal agencies stop routinely testing their
mailrooms for anthrax, given that most mail is being irradiated, low levels
of anthrax do not pose a significant risk and the tests used are not
reliable.
The field tests, which cost about $35 each, are designed to determine
quickly whether a suspicious white powder could be anthrax, and hundreds of
thousands of them were sold during and after last fall's attacks-by-mail.
But false results cause real problems, officials say.
In May 2002, for instance, field tests indicated anthrax in the mailrooms
of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The World Bank shut
down the ventilation system in the entire building and sent 1200 workers
home because it was too hot to work inside. The IMF gave about 100 people
antibiotics, though many held off taking them. In the end, anthrax was not
confirmed at either location.
"Bad information is worse than no information," said Dr. Michael Osterholm,
a bioterrorism expert at the University of Minnesota who has been serving
as an adviser to HHS.
Still, at the World Bank, there are no regrets. "The bank will always err
on the side of caution," said spokesman Damian Milverton. Milverson said
forcing staff to work from home is "nothing" compared to the risk of
ignoring what could actually be anthrax. But he added officials will
consider the guidelines.
Field tests are easy to use. A sample of suspicious powder is dissolved
into a special fluid and run through a gadget to check for genetic markers
from the Bacillus family, which includes anthrax. But they also pick up
other bacteria in the Bacillus family that is not anthrax. And they won't
register anthrax if there are fewer than 100 000 spores, more than enough
to kill someone.
The manufacturer of the most popular field test, Smart Ticket, responded it
is designed for use only if a visible powder is present. It's not designed
to pick up anthrax floating invisibly through the air, said Cheryl Trudil,
marketing manage of New Horizons of Columbia, Maryland. "If you have white
powder on your desk and you're scared to death it's anthrax, someone can
come and in 15 minutes tell you it's not anthrax," she said.
But administration officials say that even with a powder, the test could
miss a small amount of anthrax if it were mixed with other material.
Trudil allows the test produces some "false positives," but said it's no
big deal because the truth will come out when further testing is done in
the lab. Without the field test, local officials would have to assume all
suspicious powders are anthrax and send them to the lab, which would cause
severe backups, she said.
Administration officials said the FBI looked at lab capacity and determined
it was sufficient to handle the demand.
--
ProMED-mail
[see also:
Anthrax, human - USA: laboratory screening 20020109.3210
Anthrax, human - USA 20020109.3213
Anthrax, human, laboratory diagnosis: correction 20011227.3120
Anthrax, airborne, prophylaxis (04) 20011227.3121
Anthrax, airborne, prophylaxis (03) 20011221.3082
Anthrax, human - USA (41) 20011219.3067
Anthrax, airborne, prophylaxis (02): vaccine 20011219.3063
Anthrax, human, laboratory diagnosis 20011218.3057]
............................mpp/tg/pg
*##########################################################*
ProMED-mail makes every effort to verify the reports that
are posted, but the accuracy and completeness of the
information, and of any statements or opinions based
thereon, are not guaranteed. The reader assumes all risks in
using information posted or archived by ProMED-mail. ISID
and its associated service providers shall not be held
responsible for errors or omissions or held liable for any
damages incurred as a result of use or reliance upon posted
or archived material.
************************************************************
Visit ProMED-mail's web site at .
Send all items for posting to: promed@
(NOT to an individual moderator). If you do not give your
full name and affiliation, it may not be posted. Send
commands to subscribe/unsubscribe, get archives, help,
etc. to: majordomo@. For assistance from a
human being send mail to: owner-majordomo@.
############################################################
############################################################
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Biosafty List Owner
rfink@mit.edu
--=====================_1612058==_.ALT--
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 22 Jul 2002 13:05:34 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ron Morales
Subject: New Biosafety Position
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
New Biosafety Position at Harvard University. The position is responsible for the implementation of Biosafety programs at the Harvard University, Longwood and Cambridge/Allston Campuses. Interested candidates should apply on line at: hr.harvard.edu/employment
Ron Morales
Manager
Biosafety\ Food Safety & Public Health
Harvard University
46 Oxford Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
Phone No. (617) 495-9342
Fax No. (617) 495-0593
Please visit our WEB Site -
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 22 Jul 2002 14:00:20 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Debra Hunt
Subject: FW: FW: New Draft CDC/USDA Select Agent List
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="=_alternative 0062921885256BFE_="
This is a multipart message in MIME format.
--=_alternative 0062921885256BFE_=
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
More regarding the need to report "non-possession" from sources involved
with "the list":
Notification forms are being mailed out to approximately 200,000 labs. ALL
labs receiving a form are required to respond, indicating either
possession
or non-possession.
Debra L. Hunt, DrPH, CBSP
Director, Biological Safety
Assistant Clinical Professor
Duke University / Duke University Health System
Durham, NC 27710
919-684-8822
hunt0009@mc.duke.edu
thanks for the update! Does this mean that now we won't have to notify
of "non-possession" as specified in the 7/12 Federal Register?? Many
have expressed concern over that point.
Cheri Hildreth Watts, Director
Department of Environmental Health &Safety
University of Louisville
(502) 852-2954
e-mail: cheri.hildreth@louisville.edu
>>> hunt0009@MC.DUKE.EDU 07/22/02 09:32AM >>>
Good Morning all on the list. I have received the latest information
from
very knowledgeable sources involved with the new law regarding
reporting
of select agents and the USDA info. The following is exactly what I
received:
RFOs will only be required to fill out one Notification form
indicating
facility possession of HHS agents, USDA/APHIS agents or both. This
form
will be mailed out around the first of August and will have a suspense
date
of September 10 for BOTH HHS and USDA/APHIS agents. USDA consented to
this
earlier date in order to simplify the mailing. All forms will be
returned
to one secure address and will be processed as quickly as possible.
The
processing contractor will provide CDC and APHIS with the provided
information about laboratories possessing HHS agents, APHIS agents or
both.
Good Luck to us all!
Debra L. Hunt, DrPH, CBSP
Director, Biological Safety
Assistant Clinical Professor
Duke University / Duke University Health System
Durham, NC 27710
919-684-8822
hunt0009@mc.duke.edu
--=_alternative 0062921885256BFE_=
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
More regarding the need to report "non-possession" from sources involved with "the list":
Notification forms are being mailed out to approximately 200,000 labs. ALL
labs receiving a form are required to respond, indicating either possession
or non-possession.
Debra L. Hunt, DrPH, CBSP
Director, Biological Safety
Assistant Clinical Professor
Duke University / Duke University Health System
Durham, NC 27710
919-684-8822
hunt0009@mc.duke.edu
thanks for the update! Does this mean that now we won't have to notify
of "non-possession" as specified in the 7/12 Federal Register?? Many
have expressed concern over that point.
Cheri Hildreth Watts, Director
Department of Environmental Health &Safety
University of Louisville
(502) 852-2954
e-mail: cheri.hildreth@louisville.edu
>>> hunt0009@MC.DUKE.EDU 07/22/02 09:32AM >>>
Good Morning all on the list. I have received the latest information
from
very knowledgeable sources involved with the new law regarding
reporting
of select agents and the USDA info. The following is exactly what I
received:
RFOs will only be required to fill out one Notification form
indicating
facility possession of HHS agents, USDA/APHIS agents or both. This
form
will be mailed out around the first of August and will have a suspense
date
of September 10 for BOTH HHS and USDA/APHIS agents. USDA consented to
this
earlier date in order to simplify the mailing. All forms will be
returned
to one secure address and will be processed as quickly as possible.
The
processing contractor will provide CDC and APHIS with the provided
information about laboratories possessing HHS agents, APHIS agents or
both.
Good Luck to us all!
Debra L. Hunt, DrPH, CBSP
Director, Biological Safety
Assistant Clinical Professor
Duke University / Duke University Health System
Durham, NC 27710
919-684-8822
hunt0009@mc.duke.edu
--=_alternative 0062921885256BFE_=--
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 22 Jul 2002 13:34:34 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: William Lorenzen
Subject: Re: New Biosafety Position
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="Boundary_(ID_ej4Ml2kCtT6QXXx+puMP/g)"
--Boundary_(ID_ej4Ml2kCtT6QXXx+puMP/g)
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT
What about Cathy???
Ron Morales wrote:
> New Biosafety Position at Harvard University. The position is
> responsible for the implementation of Biosafety programs at the
> Harvard University, Longwood and Cambridge/Allston Campuses.
> Interested candidates should apply on line at:
> hr.harvard.edu/employment
>
> Ron Morales
>
> Manager
> Biosafety\ Food Safety & Public Health
> Harvard University
> 46 Oxford Street
> Cambridge, MA 02138
>
> Phone No. (617) 495-9342
> Fax No. (617) 495-0593
> Please visit our WEB Site -
>
--Boundary_(ID_ej4Ml2kCtT6QXXx+puMP/g)
Content-type: text/html; charset=us-ascii
Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT
What about Cathy???
Ron Morales wrote:
New Biosafety Position at Harvard University. The position is responsible for the implementation of Biosafety programs at the Harvard University, Longwood and Cambridge/Allston Campuses. Interested candidates should apply on line at: hr.harvard.edu/employment
Ron Morales
Manager
Biosafety\ Food Safety & Public Health
Harvard University
46 Oxford Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
Phone No. (617) 495-9342
Fax No. (617) 495-0593
Please visit our WEB Site -
--Boundary_(ID_ej4Ml2kCtT6QXXx+puMP/g)--
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 22 Jul 2002 13:19:33 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Christina Thompson
Subject: Legislative reference for countries of "restricted persons"
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: MULTIPART/ALTERNATIVE;
BOUNDARY="Boundary_(ID_3yceGuLf3lSoBXUl5YhgmQ)"
This is a multipart message in MIME format.
--Boundary_(ID_3yceGuLf3lSoBXUl5YhgmQ)
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Does anyone have a link to the legislative reference for the seven
countries from which persons are restricted from use of select agents? I have the list of countries - but just need the actual reference!
Thanks in advance for your help -
Chris Thompson
Eli Lilly and Company
--Boundary_(ID_3yceGuLf3lSoBXUl5YhgmQ)
Content-type: text/html; charset=us-ascii
Does anyone have a link to the legislative reference for the seven countries from which persons are restricted from use of select agents? I have the list of countries - but just need the actual reference!
Thanks in advance for your help -
Chris Thompson
Eli Lilly and Company
--Boundary_(ID_3yceGuLf3lSoBXUl5YhgmQ)--
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 22 Jul 2002 14:25:22 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Lori Keen
Subject: Re: FW: New Draft CDC/USDA Select Agent List
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
More info.
Lori Keen
Lab Manager, Biology
Calvin College
616-957-6080
Member NAOSMM
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 22 Jul 2002 10:32:27 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "David A. Bunzow"
Subject: Re: FW: FW: New Draft CDC/USDA Select Agent List
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="------------1A7D797D2FD9F319845A2F16"
--------------1A7D797D2FD9F319845A2F16
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And a followup question (worth 50 points): To whom will these 200K notification
forms be sent, since the RFO may not always be clearly identified for a lab?
Will a form be sent to a designated person at a specific campus, or just to a
system office? Perhaps to a Grants and Programs office or directly to a PI or
even PIO? With minimal time for our responding comprehensively and accurately,
I see opportunities for not meeting the 9/10 date, particularly with the
negative assertion scenario still in place. Any knowledgeable comments from
this list?
David
Debra Hunt wrote:
>
> More regarding the need to report "non-possession" from sources involved with
> "the list":
>
>
>
> Notification forms are being mailed out to approximately 200,000 labs. ALL
> labs receiving a form are required to respond, indicating either possession
> or non-possession.
>
> Debra L. Hunt, DrPH, CBSP
> Director, Biological Safety
> Assistant Clinical Professor
> Duke University / Duke University Health System
> Durham, NC 27710
> 919-684-8822
> hunt0009@mc.duke.edu
> thanks for the update! Does this mean that now we won't have to notify
> of "non-possession" as specified in the 7/12 Federal Register?? Many
> have expressed concern over that point.
>
> Cheri Hildreth Watts, Director
> Department of Environmental Health &Safety
> University of Louisville
> (502) 852-2954
> e-mail: cheri.hildreth@louisville.edu
>
> >>> hunt0009@MC.DUKE.EDU 07/22/02 09:32AM >>>
> Good Morning all on the list. I have received the latest information
> from
> very knowledgeable sources involved with the new law regarding
> reporting
> of select agents and the USDA info. The following is exactly what I
> received:
>
>
>
> RFOs will only be required to fill out one Notification form
> indicating
> facility possession of HHS agents, USDA/APHIS agents or both. This
> form
> will be mailed out around the first of August and will have a suspense
> date
> of September 10 for BOTH HHS and USDA/APHIS agents. USDA consented to
> this
> earlier date in order to simplify the mailing. All forms will be
> returned
> to one secure address and will be processed as quickly as possible.
> The
> processing contractor will provide CDC and APHIS with the provided
> information about laboratories possessing HHS agents, APHIS agents or
> both.
>
>
> Good Luck to us all!
>
> Debra L. Hunt, DrPH, CBSP
> Director, Biological Safety
> Assistant Clinical Professor
> Duke University / Duke University Health System
> Durham, NC 27710
> 919-684-8822
> hunt0009@mc.duke.edu
>
--
David A. Bunzow CET; CHMM; REM
University of Alaska
Many Traditions One Alaska
Statewide Office of Risk Management
Environmental, Health and Safety Manager
1-907-474-5005 (phone)
1-907-474-5634 (fax)
sndab1@alaska.edu
alaska.edu/swrisk
Please Note:
The statements, opinions and views expressed
in this communication are mine alone. They
should not be construed as necessarily being
those of the University of Alaska System, or
any of its other employees.
--------------1A7D797D2FD9F319845A2F16
Content-Type: text/html; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
And a followup question (worth 50 points): To whom will these 200K notification forms be sent, since the RFO may not always be clearly identified for a lab? Will a form be sent to a designated person at a specific campus, or just to a system office? Perhaps to a Grants and Programs office or directly to a PI or even PIO? With minimal time for our responding comprehensively and accurately, I see opportunities for not meeting the 9/10 date, particularly with the negative assertion scenario still in place. Any knowledgeable comments from this list?
David
Debra Hunt wrote:
More regarding the need to report "non-possession" from sources involved with "the list":
Notification forms are being mailed out to approximately 200,000 labs. ALL
labs receiving a form are required to respond, indicating either possession
or non-possession.
Debra L. Hunt, DrPH, CBSP
Director, Biological Safety
Assistant Clinical Professor
Duke University / Duke University Health System
Durham, NC 27710
919-684-8822
hunt0009@mc.duke.edu
thanks for the update! Does this mean that now we won't have to notify
of "non-possession" as specified in the 7/12 Federal Register?? Many
have expressed concern over that point.
Cheri Hildreth Watts, Director
Department of Environmental Health &Safety
University of Louisville
(502) 852-2954
e-mail: cheri.hildreth@louisville.edu
>>> hunt0009@MC.DUKE.EDU 07/22/02 09:32AM >>>
Good Morning all on the list. I have received the latest information
from
very knowledgeable sources involved with the new law regarding
reporting
of select agents and the USDA info. The following is exactly what I
received:
RFOs will only be required to fill out one Notification form
indicating
facility possession of HHS agents, USDA/APHIS agents or both. This
form
will be mailed out around the first of August and will have a suspense
date
of September 10 for BOTH HHS and USDA/APHIS agents. USDA consented to
this
earlier date in order to simplify the mailing. All forms will be
returned
to one secure address and will be processed as quickly as possible.
The
processing contractor will provide CDC and APHIS with the provided
information about laboratories possessing HHS agents, APHIS agents or
both.
Good Luck to us all!
Debra L. Hunt, DrPH, CBSP
Director, Biological Safety
Assistant Clinical Professor
Duke University / Duke University Health System
Durham, NC 27710
919-684-8822
hunt0009@mc.duke.edu
--
David A. Bunzow CET; CHMM; REM
University of Alaska
Many Traditions One Alaska
Statewide Office of Risk Management
Environmental, Health and Safety Manager
1-907-474-5005 (phone)
1-907-474-5634 (fax)
sndab1@alaska.edu
alaska.edu/swrisk
Please Note:
The statements, opinions and views expressed
in this communication are mine alone. They
should not be construed as necessarily being
those of the University of Alaska System, or
any of its other employees.
--------------1A7D797D2FD9F319845A2F16--
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 22 Jul 2002 14:37:33 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Erik A. Talley"
Subject: Re: Legislative reference for countries of "restricted persons"
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
Section 175b. Possession by Restricted Persons (b)(2)(G) references the countries involved. The list actually comes from several lists:
(G) is an alien (other than an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence) who is a national of a country as to which the Secretary of State, pursuant to section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2405(j)), section 620A of chapter 1 of part M of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371), or section 40(d) of chapter 3 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2780(d)), has made a determination (that remains in effect) that such country has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism; or
At 01:19 PM 7/22/2002 -0500, you wrote:
Does anyone have a link to the legislative reference for the seven countries from which persons are restricted from use of select agents? I have the list of countries - but just need the actual reference!
Thanks in advance for your help -
Chris Thompson
Eli Lilly and Company
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 22 Jul 2002 13:41:55 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Marcham, Cheri"
Subject: Re: FW: FW: New Draft CDC/USDA Select Agent List
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="----_=_NextPart_001_01C231AF.74110226"
This is a multi-part message in MIME format.
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charset="us-ascii"
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My concern exactly. Plus, how will they know who the RFO is if the
institution hasn't sent any information in yet because it was previously
exempt since no transfer had occurred?
Cheri Marcham
OUHSC
-----Original Message-----
From: David A. Bunzow [mailto:sndab1@ALASKA.EDU]
Sent: Monday, July 22, 2002 1:32 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: FW: FW: New Draft CDC/USDA Select Agent List
And a followup question (worth 50 points): To whom will these 200K
notification forms be sent, since the RFO may not always be clearly
identified for a lab? Will a form be sent to a designated person at a
specific campus, or just to a system office? Perhaps to a Grants and
Programs office or directly to a PI or even PIO? With minimal time for
our responding comprehensively and accurately, I see opportunities for
not meeting the 9/10 date, particularly with the negative assertion
scenario still in place. Any knowledgeable comments from this list?
David
Debra Hunt wrote:
More regarding the need to report "non-possession" from sources involved
with "the list":
Notification forms are being mailed out to approximately 200,000 labs.
ALL
labs receiving a form are required to respond, indicating either
possession
or non-possession.
Debra L. Hunt, DrPH, CBSP
Director, Biological Safety
Assistant Clinical Professor
Duke University / Duke University Health System
Durham, NC 27710
919-684-8822
hunt0009@mc.duke.edu
thanks for the update! Does this mean that now we won't have to notify
of "non-possession" as specified in the 7/12 Federal Register?? Many
have expressed concern over that point.
Cheri Hildreth Watts, Director
Department of Environmental Health &Safety
University of Louisville
(502) 852-2954
e-mail: cheri.hildreth@louisville.edu
>>> hunt0009@MC.DUKE.EDU 07/22/02 09:32AM >>>
Good Morning all on the list. I have received the latest information
from
very knowledgeable sources involved with the new law regarding
reporting
of select agents and the USDA info. The following is exactly what I
received:
RFOs will only be required to fill out one Notification form
indicating
facility possession of HHS agents, USDA/APHIS agents or both. This
form
will be mailed out around the first of August and will have a suspense
date
of September 10 for BOTH HHS and USDA/APHIS agents. USDA consented to
this
earlier date in order to simplify the mailing. All forms will be
returned
to one secure address and will be processed as quickly as possible.
The
processing contractor will provide CDC and APHIS with the provided
information about laboratories possessing HHS agents, APHIS agents or
both.
Good Luck to us all!
Debra L. Hunt, DrPH, CBSP
Director, Biological Safety
Assistant Clinical Professor
Duke University / Duke University Health System
Durham, NC 27710
919-684-8822
hunt0009@mc.duke.edu
--
David A. Bunzow CET; CHMM; REM
University of Alaska
Many Traditions One Alaska
Statewide Office of Risk Management
Environmental, Health and Safety Manager
1-907-474-5005 (phone)
1-907-474-5634 (fax)
sndab1@alaska.edu
alaska.edu/swrisk
Please Note:
The statements, opinions and views expressed
in this communication are mine alone. They
should not be construed as necessarily being
those of the University of Alaska System, or
any of its other employees.
------_=_NextPart_001_01C231AF.74110226
Content-Type: text/html;
charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Message
My concern exactly. Plus, how will they know who the RFO is if the institution hasn't sent any information in yet because it was = previously exempt since no transfer had occurred?
Cheri Marcham
OUHSC
-----Original Message-----
From: = David A. Bunzow [mailto:sndab1@ALASKA.EDU]
Sent: Monday, July 22, 2002 1:32 = PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: FW: = FW: New Draft CDC/USDA Select Agent List
And a followup = question (worth 50 points): To whom will these 200K notification forms be sent, = since the RFO may not always be clearly identified for a lab? Will a = form be sent to a designated person at a specific campus, or just to a system office? Perhaps to a Grants and Programs office or directly to a = PI or even PIO? With minimal time for our responding comprehensively = and accurately, I see opportunities for not meeting the 9/10 date, = particularly with the negative assertion scenario still in place. Any = knowledgeable comments from this list?
David
Debra Hunt wrote:
More regarding the need to report "non-possession" from sources involved = with "the list":
Notification forms are = being mailed out to approximately 200,000 labs. ALL =
labs receiving a form are = required to respond, indicating either possession
or = non-possession.
Debra L. Hunt, DrPH, CBSP
Director, Biological Safety
Assistant Clinical Professor
Duke University / Duke = University Health System
Durham, NC 27710
919-684-8822
hunt0009@mc.duke.edu
thanks for the update! = Does this mean that now we won't have to notify
of "non-possession" as = specified in the 7/12 Federal Register?? Many
have expressed concern over = that point.
Cheri Hildreth = Watts, Director
Department of Environmental Health &Safety
University of = Louisville
(502) = 852-2954
e-mail: cheri.hildreth@louisville.edu
>>> = hunt0009@MC.DUKE.EDU 07/22/02 09:32AM >>>
Good Morning all on the = list. I have received the latest information
from
very knowledgeable sources = involved with the new law regarding
reporting
of select agents and the USDA info. The following is = exactly what I
received:
RFOs will only be = required to fill out one Notification form
indicating
facility possession of HHS agents, USDA/APHIS agents or = both. This
form
will be mailed out around the first of August and will have a suspense
date
of September 10 for BOTH HHS and USDA/APHIS agents. USDA = consented to
this
earlier date in order to simplify the mailing. All = forms will be
returned
The
processing contractor will provide CDC and APHIS with the provided
information about laboratories possessing HHS agents, = APHIS agents or
both.
Good Luck to us = all!
Debra L. Hunt, DrPH, CBSP
Director, Biological Safety
Assistant Clinical Professor
Duke University / Duke = University Health System
Durham, NC 27710
919-684-8822
hunt0009@mc.duke.edu =
--
David A. Bunzow CET; CHMM; REM
University of = Alaska
Many Traditions One Alaska
Statewide Office of Risk Management =
Environmental, Health and Safety Manager
1-907-474-5005 = (phone)
1-907-474-5634 (fax)
sndab1@alaska.edu =
alaska.edu/swrisk
Please Note:
The statements, opinions and views expressed =
in this communication are mine alone. They
should not be construed = as necessarily being
those of the University of Alaska System, or =
any of its other employees.
------_=_NextPart_001_01C231AF.74110226--
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 22 Jul 2002 13:33:35 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Elaine Broussard
Subject: Re: Legislative reference for countries of "restricted persons"
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="----_=_NextPart_001_01C231AE.49CA7230"
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this format, some or all of this message may not be legible.
------_=_NextPart_001_01C231AE.49CA7230
Content-Type: text/plain;
charset="iso-8859-1"
There are related references on the US Department of State's web site; see
this link in particular:
Hope this helps :-)
Elaine
Elaine E. Broussard, Director of Biosafety
UAB Occupational Health & Safety
CH19, Suite 445
933 S. 19th Street
Birmingham, Al 35294-2041
Ph: (205) 934-2487
Fax: (205) 934-7487
Visit the OH&S Website at
-----Original Message-----
From: Christina Thompson [mailto:THOMPSON_CHRISTINA_Z@]
Sent: Monday, July 22, 2002 1:20 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Legislative reference for countries of "restricted persons"
Does anyone have a link to the legislative reference for the seven countries
from which persons are restricted from use of select agents? I have the
list of countries - but just need the actual reference!
Thanks in advance for your help -
Chris Thompson
Eli Lilly and Company
------_=_NextPart_001_01C231AE.49CA7230
Content-Type: text/html;
charset="iso-8859-1"
There are related references on the US Department of State's web site; see this link in particular:
Hope this helps :-)
Elaine
Elaine E. Broussard, Director of Biosafety
UAB Occupational Health & Safety
CH19, Suite 445
933 S. 19th Street
Birmingham, Al 35294-2041
Ph: (205) 934-2487
Fax: (205) 934-7487
Visit the OH&S Website at
-----Original Message-----
From: Christina Thompson [mailto:THOMPSON_CHRISTINA_Z@]
Sent: Monday, July 22, 2002 1:20 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Legislative reference for countries of "restricted persons"
Does anyone have a link to the legislative reference for the seven countries from which persons are restricted from use of select agents? I have the list of countries - but just need the actual reference!
Thanks in advance for your help -
Chris Thompson
Eli Lilly and Company
------_=_NextPart_001_01C231AE.49CA7230--
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 22 Jul 2002 14:59:04 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Lori Keen
Subject: Re: FW: FW: New Draft CDC/USDA Select Agent List
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
I'm wondering the same thing. How will "they" determine who needs to report?
It could come to campus but disappear into a black hole. I'm thinking we need
to alert our president, provost, and deans to be on the lookout for this
mailing.
FYI- I am at an undergraduate school of 4000 students, but with active science
research - although, happily, no select agents!
Lori Keen
Lab Manager, Biology
Calvin College
616-957-6080
Member NAOSMM
>>> Cheryl-Marcham@OUHSC.EDU 07/22/02 02:41PM >>>
My concern exactly. Plus, how will they know who the RFO is if the
institution hasn't sent any information in yet because it was previously
exempt since no transfer had occurred?
Cheri Marcham
OUHSC
-----Original Message-----
From: David A. Bunzow [mailto:sndab1@ALASKA.EDU]
Sent: Monday, July 22, 2002 1:32 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: FW: FW: New Draft CDC/USDA Select Agent List
And a followup question (worth 50 points): To whom will these 200K
notification forms be sent, since the RFO may not always be clearly
identified for a lab? Will a form be sent to a designated person at a
specific campus, or just to a system office? Perhaps to a Grants and
Programs office or directly to a PI or even PIO? With minimal time for
our responding comprehensively and accurately, I see opportunities for
not meeting the 9/10 date, particularly with the negative assertion
scenario still in place. Any knowledgeable comments from this list?
David
Debra Hunt wrote:
More regarding the need to report "non-possession" from sources involved
with "the list":
Notification forms are being mailed out to approximately 200,000 labs.
ALL
labs receiving a form are required to respond, indicating either
possession
or non-possession.
Debra L. Hunt, DrPH, CBSP
Director, Biological Safety
Assistant Clinical Professor
Duke University / Duke University Health System
Durham, NC 27710
919-684-8822
hunt0009@mc.duke.edu
thanks for the update! Does this mean that now we won't have to notify
of "non-possession" as specified in the 7/12 Federal Register?? Many
have expressed concern over that point.
Cheri Hildreth Watts, Director
Department of Environmental Health &Safety
University of Louisville
(502) 852-2954
e-mail: cheri.hildreth@louisville.edu
>>> hunt0009@MC.DUKE.EDU 07/22/02 09:32AM >>>
Good Morning all on the list. I have received the latest information
from
very knowledgeable sources involved with the new law regarding
reporting
of select agents and the USDA info. The following is exactly what I
received:
RFOs will only be required to fill out one Notification form
indicating
facility possession of HHS agents, USDA/APHIS agents or both. This
form
will be mailed out around the first of August and will have a suspense
date
of September 10 for BOTH HHS and USDA/APHIS agents. USDA consented to
this
earlier date in order to simplify the mailing. All forms will be
returned
to one secure address and will be processed as quickly as possible.
The
processing contractor will provide CDC and APHIS with the provided
information about laboratories possessing HHS agents, APHIS agents or
both.
Good Luck to us all!
Debra L. Hunt, DrPH, CBSP
Director, Biological Safety
Assistant Clinical Professor
Duke University / Duke University Health System
Durham, NC 27710
919-684-8822
hunt0009@mc.duke.edu
--
David A. Bunzow CET; CHMM; REM
University of Alaska
Many Traditions One Alaska
Statewide Office of Risk Management
Environmental, Health and Safety Manager
1-907-474-5005 (phone)
1-907-474-5634 (fax)
sndab1@alaska.edu
alaska.edu/swrisk
Please Note:
The statements, opinions and views expressed
in this communication are mine alone. They
should not be construed as necessarily being
those of the University of Alaska System, or
any of its other employees.
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 22 Jul 2002 15:11:34 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Hauck, Philip"
Subject: Re: FW: FW: New Draft CDC/USDA Select Agent List
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
Content-transfer-encoding: quoted-printable
My 2-cents! Maybe( I'm sorry, Maureen) the Presidents of ABSA, and the =
ASM can send letters to the two regulatory entities and inform them of =
these issues before they become problematic! One of the big criticisms =
of the EPA and OSHA in the past is the promulgation of regulations =
without taking into account the effects on the regulated community. We =
cannot wait for the regulatory agencies to anticipate- or promulgate =
then anticipate, the problems that will ensue. Any effort before-hand =
will offset a lot more effort after the damage is done.
Phil Hauck
Mount Sinai School of Medicine
-----Original Message-----
From: Lori Keen [mailto:keel@CALVIN.EDU]
Sent: Monday, July 22, 2002 2:59 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: FW: FW: New Draft CDC/USDA Select Agent List
I'm wondering the same thing. How will "they" determine who needs to =
report?
It could come to campus but disappear into a black hole. I'm thinking =
we need
to alert our president, provost, and deans to be on the lookout for this
mailing.
FYI- I am at an undergraduate school of 4000 students, but with active =
science
research - although, happily, no select agents!
Lori Keen
Lab Manager, Biology
Calvin College
616-957-6080
Member NAOSMM
>>> Cheryl-Marcham@OUHSC.EDU 07/22/02 02:41PM >>>
My concern exactly. Plus, how will they know who the RFO is if the
institution hasn't sent any information in yet because it was previously
exempt since no transfer had occurred?
Cheri Marcham
OUHSC
-----Original Message-----
From: David A. Bunzow [mailto:sndab1@ALASKA.EDU]
Sent: Monday, July 22, 2002 1:32 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: FW: FW: New Draft CDC/USDA Select Agent List
And a followup question (worth 50 points): To whom will these 200K
notification forms be sent, since the RFO may not always be clearly
identified for a lab? Will a form be sent to a designated person at a
specific campus, or just to a system office? Perhaps to a Grants and
Programs office or directly to a PI or even PIO? With minimal time for
our responding comprehensively and accurately, I see opportunities for
not meeting the 9/10 date, particularly with the negative assertion
scenario still in place. Any knowledgeable comments from this list?
David
Debra Hunt wrote:
More regarding the need to report "non-possession" from sources involved
with "the list":
Notification forms are being mailed out to approximately 200,000 labs.
ALL
labs receiving a form are required to respond, indicating either
possession
or non-possession.
Debra L. Hunt, DrPH, CBSP
Director, Biological Safety
Assistant Clinical Professor
Duke University / Duke University Health System
Durham, NC 27710
919-684-8822
hunt0009@mc.duke.edu
thanks for the update! Does this mean that now we won't have to notify
of "non-possession" as specified in the 7/12 Federal Register?? Many
have expressed concern over that point.
Cheri Hildreth Watts, Director
Department of Environmental Health &Safety
University of Louisville
(502) 852-2954
e-mail: cheri.hildreth@louisville.edu
>>> hunt0009@MC.DUKE.EDU 07/22/02 09:32AM >>>
Good Morning all on the list. I have received the latest information
from
very knowledgeable sources involved with the new law regarding
reporting
of select agents and the USDA info. The following is exactly what I
received:
RFOs will only be required to fill out one Notification form
indicating
facility possession of HHS agents, USDA/APHIS agents or both. This
form
will be mailed out around the first of August and will have a suspense
date
of September 10 for BOTH HHS and USDA/APHIS agents. USDA consented to
this
earlier date in order to simplify the mailing. All forms will be
returned
to one secure address and will be processed as quickly as possible.
The
processing contractor will provide CDC and APHIS with the provided
information about laboratories possessing HHS agents, APHIS agents or
both.
Good Luck to us all!
Debra L. Hunt, DrPH, CBSP
Director, Biological Safety
Assistant Clinical Professor
Duke University / Duke University Health System
Durham, NC 27710
919-684-8822
hunt0009@mc.duke.edu
--
David A. Bunzow CET; CHMM; REM
University of Alaska
Many Traditions One Alaska
Statewide Office of Risk Management
Environmental, Health and Safety Manager
1-907-474-5005 (phone)
1-907-474-5634 (fax)
sndab1@alaska.edu
alaska.edu/swrisk
Please Note:
The statements, opinions and views expressed
in this communication are mine alone. They
should not be construed as necessarily being
those of the University of Alaska System, or
any of its other employees.
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 22 Jul 2002 16:55:38 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Therese M. Stinnett"
Subject: contact person
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Anyone got a contact name/number for regulatory affairs for Sigma-Aldrich?
thanks
Therese M. Stinnett
Biosafety Officer
Health and Safety Division
UCHSC, Mailstop C275
4200 E. 9th Avenue
Denver, CO 80262
Voice: 303-315-6754
Pager: 303-266-5402
Fax: 303-315-8026
email: therese.stinnett@uchsc.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 22 Jul 2002 20:52:07 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Paul Rubock
Subject: Re: Toxin vs. toxoid
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
I would first reread the SA rule to make sure this qualifies as an
exemption. (My experience is that the CDC SA folks can be helpful if there
is any question) Back in the day when I was in the laboratory, toxoid was
the product of toxin + dilute formalin. The latter would react w/lysine
protein residues with the result being that the product was still
immnunogenic but orers of magnitude less 'toxic' (as determ. by LD 50 etc.
Paul Rubock
----- Original Message -----
From: "Robin Newberry"
To:
Sent: Monday, July 22, 2002 9:05 AM
Subject: Toxin vs. toxoid
> Probably a dumb question, but...
>
> One of our researchers has proposed using botulinum toxoid rather
> than the toxin in an effort to skirt the CDC reporting requirement.
> What is the practical difference between the toxin and the toxoid?
> --
> Robin
> --------------------------------------------------------------
> W. Robert Newberry, IV CIH, CHMM
> Chief Environmental Health and Safety Officer
> Clemson University
>
> wnewber@clemson.edu ehs@clemson.edu
>
>
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 23 Jul 2002 09:50:49 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Norman, Randy"
Subject: Re: New Select Agent List - Regulating Non-possession
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
"ALL labs receiving a form are required to respond, indicating either
possession
or non-possession."
Anyone know what's the basis of their authority to require this reporting by
those whose activities are NOT covered by the new law? It's not found in the
new law or the existing SA rule, as far as I can tell. Or are they acting
beyond the bounds of their authority in regards to those who do not possess?
Randy Norman
Safety Specialist Sr.
BioReliance Corporation
Rockville, MD 20850
Rnorman@
"Success is a journey, not a destination" - Ben Sweetland
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 23 Jul 2002 10:15:09 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Doob, Peter (NIDA/IRP)"
Subject: Re: New Select Agent List - Regulating Non-possession
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Randy and colleagues=
Considering the stake we all have in the success of this statute--including
the confidence of the public that our investigators can be entrusted with
highly hazardous agents needed for bona fide research--what purpose would be
served by challenging authority under the statute to require reporting "none
here"? Maybe I am missing something.
Peter A. Doob, MPH, JD
Chief, Safety and Operations Support Section, ASB
National Institute for Drug Abuse, NIH
Intramural Research Program
5500 Nathan Shock Drive
Baltimore, MD 21224
vc: 410-550-1675
> ----------
> From: Norman, Randy
> Reply To: A Biosafety Discussion List
> Sent: Tuesday, July 23, 2002 9:50 AM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: Re: New Select Agent List - Regulating Non-possession
>
> "ALL labs receiving a form are required to respond, indicating either
> possession
> or non-possession."
>
> Anyone know what's the basis of their authority to require this reporting
> by
> those whose activities are NOT covered by the new law? It's not found in
> the
> new law or the existing SA rule, as far as I can tell. Or are they acting
> beyond the bounds of their authority in regards to those who do not
> possess?
>
> Randy Norman
> Safety Specialist Sr.
> BioReliance Corporation
> Rockville, MD 20850
> Rnorman@
>
> "Success is a journey, not a destination" - Ben Sweetland
>
>
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 23 Jul 2002 10:30:22 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Norman, Randy"
Subject: Re: New Select Agent List - Regulating Non-possession
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
My point is this:
Our resources are not unlimited. Making unnecessary reports to government
agencies wastes resources that would be better spent protecting employees
and the public welfare.
Randy Norman
Safety Specialist Sr.
BioReliance Corporation
Rockville, MD 20850
Rnorman@
"Success is a journey, not a destination" - Ben Sweetland
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 23 Jul 2002 11:59:35 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Cheri L Hildreth
Subject: DOJ press release-- UConn student charged
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Just a quick note to let you know that Dept of Justice issued a press
release yesterday 7/22 stating that the UConn grad student, Tomas Foral,
was charged with unlawful possession of anthrax. The investigation and
incident occurred last Oct- Nov. The U.S. Attorney also indicated that
Mr. Foral would be allowed to participate in a pre-trial diversion
program. If he participates and successfully completes "the program",
criminal prosecution will be deferred. If he doesn't participate, he
will be formally charged with the anthrax offense and the case will
proceed to trial.
Also, here's a story on same posted on Fox News courtesy of Max
Richard at UAB.
Cheri Hildreth Watts, Director
Department of Environmental Health &Safety
University of Louisville
(502) 852-2954
e-mail: cheri.hildreth@louisville.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 23 Jul 2002 12:20:17 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Michele Crase
Subject: Re: DOJ press release-- UConn student charged
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
I am one to follow the regs to the best of my ability BUT hasn't this
gone a little too far?
Michele Crase
Biosafety Specialist
******************************************
Michele Crase
Environmental Health and Safety
Northern Illinois University
DeKalb, IL
mcrase@niu.edu
815-753-9251
>>> cheri.hildreth@LOUISVILLE.EDU 07/23/02 10:59AM >>>
Just a quick note to let you know that Dept of Justice issued a press
release yesterday 7/22 stating that the UConn grad student, Tomas
Foral,
was charged with unlawful possession of anthrax. The investigation
and
incident occurred last Oct- Nov. The U.S. Attorney also indicated that
Mr. Foral would be allowed to participate in a pre-trial diversion
program. If he participates and successfully completes "the program",
criminal prosecution will be deferred. If he doesn't participate, he
will be formally charged with the anthrax offense and the case will
proceed to trial.
Also, here's a story on same posted on Fox News courtesy of Max
Richard at UAB.
Cheri Hildreth Watts, Director
Department of Environmental Health &Safety
University of Louisville
(502) 852-2954
e-mail: cheri.hildreth@louisville.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 23 Jul 2002 16:18:21 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Byers, Karen B"
Subject: Re: DOJ press release-- UConn student charged
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="ISO-8859-1"
Thank you, Cheri, Deb, and all of the other listservers who share news,
websites, opinion, information, etc. I am struggling to add additional SA
responsibilities on top of "the usual" biosafety responsibilites, so I am more
appreciative than ever of the information exchange.
Karen Byers, MS, RBP, CBSP-ABSA
Dana-Farber Cancer Institute
44 Binney St.
Boston, MA 02115
karen_byers@dfci.harvard.edu
phone: 617-632-3890
-----Original Message-----
From: Cheri L Hildreth [mailto:cheri.hildreth@LOUISVILLE.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, July 23, 2002 12:00 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: DOJ press release-- UConn student charged
Just a quick note to let you know that Dept of Justice issued a press
release yesterday 7/22 stating that the UConn grad student, Tomas Foral,
was charged with unlawful possession of anthrax. The investigation and
incident occurred last Oct- Nov. The U.S. Attorney also indicated that
Mr. Foral would be allowed to participate in a pre-trial diversion
program. If he participates and successfully completes "the program",
criminal prosecution will be deferred. If he doesn't participate, he
will be formally charged with the anthrax offense and the case will
proceed to trial.
Also, here's a story on same posted on Fox News courtesy of Max
Richard at UAB.
Cheri Hildreth Watts, Director
Department of Environmental Health &Safety
University of Louisville
(502) 852-2954
e-mail: cheri.hildreth@louisville.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 23 Jul 2002 16:20:55 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Hauck, Philip"
Subject: Re: DOJ press release-- UConn student charged
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
Content-transfer-encoding: quoted-printable
Hey Folks! I'm starting to get a little worried, now!
Gosh, this will sound corny, but back in the year 1977, when I was a =
(young) Graduate TA, at the University of Kentucky, one of the students =
in the Microbiology 401 course took his soil isolation plate out and =
obtained a bacterial culture. He did such a good job of isolating the =
bacteria, and characterizing it on blood agar plate, biochemical tests, =
Gram Stain, Spore culture....that there was NO DOUBT AT ALL that the =
long chains of Gram +, square ended box-cars in long medusa head's was =
Bacillus anthracis. His isolate was from an area where the old cow barns =
were pulled down and burned in the '50's as a result of a B.a. outbreak =
in the cow herd, as per one of the Microbiology professors.
With the current hysteria present out in the world today, would that =
student, who albeit had a morbid curiosity, be considered a risk, a =
felon, a criminal today? He was curious as to whether it (B.a.) was =
still in the soil after some 20 odd years. He also wanted to see if he =
was good enough to isolate the bacterium (needless to say, he got an "A" =
for effort, and his TA and I spent two-hours killing everything in the =
autoclave!). When does the hysteria stop and sensibility begin? We have =
all had our microbiological "pets" if you are seriously interested in =
microorganisms - I played around with a Fusarium contaminate that I =
isolated, and provoked to form cleistothecium--something I found out =
later from a Mycology Prof that no one had done with that species =
before--but I discarded everything and had no proof that it =
occurred--because "it was fooling around outside the normal activities =
of the teaching lab", and was not related to my research project.
What I'm worrying about, is that any of the practices and procedures =
outlined in any of the Manual of General Bacteriology Methods books, can =
be cleverly twisted to make a case that someone was bent on "evil". What =
I'm worried about is that this modern era of "witch-hunts" will stifle =
creative thinking and research. Many a discovery was made by someone =
playing with a clinical isolate that did not have immediate bearing on =
the research at hand. Louis Pasteur comes to mind, as one example. Sir =
Alexander Fleming (lousy micro. Technique, is another). Serendipity =
favors a prepared mind, but intellectual curiosity may succumb to =
Orwellian "Newthink" if we don't tread carefully. Solely my own thoughts =
and opinions!
Philip G. Hauck, MS, MSHS, CIH, CBSP, SM(NRM)
-----Original Message-----
From: Cheri L Hildreth [mailto:cheri.hildreth@LOUISVILLE.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, July 23, 2002 12:00 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: DOJ press release-- UConn student charged
Just a quick note to let you know that Dept of Justice issued a press
release yesterday 7/22 stating that the UConn grad student, Tomas Foral,
was charged with unlawful possession of anthrax. The investigation and
incident occurred last Oct- Nov. The U.S. Attorney also indicated that
Mr. Foral would be allowed to participate in a pre-trial diversion
program. If he participates and successfully completes "the program",
criminal prosecution will be deferred. If he doesn't participate, he
will be formally charged with the anthrax offense and the case will
proceed to trial.
Also, here's a story on same posted on Fox News courtesy of Max
Richard at UAB.
Cheri Hildreth Watts, Director
Department of Environmental Health &Safety
University of Louisville
(502) 852-2954
e-mail: cheri.hildreth@louisville.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 23 Jul 2002 16:29:43 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Hauck, Philip"
Subject: Re: New Select Agent List - Regulating Non-possession
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
Content-transfer-encoding: quoted-printable
If one thinks about this, carefully.....IF YOU say you have no SLA's, =
and old Doc XYZ (emeritus) had one sitting in His freezer, and it is =
discovered on a site visit...remember, that this is supposed to be part =
of the process, are you as the RFO a criminal, felon, =
co-conspirator,etc...because YOU falsely reported or are you planning to =
use "to the best of my knowledge" as a mea culpa and plead the mercy of =
the court. My 2-cents-worth!
Phil Hauck
-----Original Message-----
From: Doob, Peter (NIDA/IRP) [mailto:PDOOB@INTRA.NIDA.]
Sent: Tuesday, July 23, 2002 10:15 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: New Select Agent List - Regulating Non-possession
Randy and colleagues=3D
Considering the stake we all have in the success of this =
statute--including
the confidence of the public that our investigators can be entrusted =
with
highly hazardous agents needed for bona fide research--what purpose =
would be
served by challenging authority under the statute to require reporting =
"none
here"? Maybe I am missing something.
Peter A. Doob, MPH, JD
Chief, Safety and Operations Support Section, ASB
National Institute for Drug Abuse, NIH
Intramural Research Program
5500 Nathan Shock Drive
Baltimore, MD 21224
vc: 410-550-1675
> ----------
> From: Norman, Randy
> Reply To: A Biosafety Discussion List
> Sent: Tuesday, July 23, 2002 9:50 AM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: Re: New Select Agent List - Regulating Non-possession
>
> "ALL labs receiving a form are required to respond, indicating either
> possession
> or non-possession."
>
> Anyone know what's the basis of their authority to require this =
reporting
> by
> those whose activities are NOT covered by the new law? It's not found =
in
> the
> new law or the existing SA rule, as far as I can tell. Or are they =
acting
> beyond the bounds of their authority in regards to those who do not
> possess?
>
> Randy Norman
> Safety Specialist Sr.
> BioReliance Corporation
> Rockville, MD 20850
> Rnorman@
>
> "Success is a journey, not a destination" - Ben Sweetland
>
>
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 23 Jul 2002 16:35:01 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Norman, Randy"
Subject: Re: DOJ press release-- UConn student charged
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
From the story as told on :
"Foral had reportedly been told to destroy the samples, but kept them
instead."
To me this is the issue that got the guy in trouble. Not so much having it
as not having got rid of it.
Randy Norman
Safety Specialist Sr.
BioReliance Corporation
Rockville, MD 20850
Rnorman@
"Success is a journey, not a destination" - Ben Sweetland
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 24 Jul 2002 07:19:13 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Doob, Peter (NIDA/IRP)"
Subject: Re: New Select Agent List - Regulating Non-possession
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Phil and Randy=
Points well taken. I am requiring every PI to sign a statement as
to what if any select agents they or those they supervise/direct have at
this time, and a pledge to get my written permission before they or their
staff bring any listed items on board. That way the RFO can demonstrate due
diligence by getting those that are in the best position to certify what
they have to own up. Hope it works. If it doesn't, maybe we can get
adjoining cells?
Peter A. Doob, MPH, JD
Chief, Safety and Operations Support Section, ASB
National Institute for Drug Abuse, NIH
Intramural Research Program
5500 Nathan Shock Drive
Baltimore, MD 21224
vc: 410-550-1675
> ----------
> From: Hauck, Philip
> Reply To: A Biosafety Discussion List
> Sent: Tuesday, July 23, 2002 4:29 PM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: Re: New Select Agent List - Regulating Non-possession
>
> If one thinks about this, carefully.....IF YOU say you have no SLA's, and
> old Doc XYZ (emeritus) had one sitting in His freezer, and it is
> discovered on a site visit...remember, that this is supposed to be part of
> the process, are you as the RFO a criminal, felon,
> co-conspirator,etc...because YOU falsely reported or are you planning to
> use "to the best of my knowledge" as a mea culpa and plead the mercy of
> the court. My 2-cents-worth!
> Phil Hauck
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Doob, Peter (NIDA/IRP) [mailto:PDOOB@INTRA.NIDA.]
> Sent: Tuesday, July 23, 2002 10:15 AM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: Re: New Select Agent List - Regulating Non-possession
>
> Randy and colleagues=
>
> Considering the stake we all have in the success of this
> statute--including
> the confidence of the public that our investigators can be entrusted with
> highly hazardous agents needed for bona fide research--what purpose would
> be
> served by challenging authority under the statute to require reporting
> "none
> here"? Maybe I am missing something.
>
> Peter A. Doob, MPH, JD
> Chief, Safety and Operations Support Section, ASB
> National Institute for Drug Abuse, NIH
> Intramural Research Program
> 5500 Nathan Shock Drive
> Baltimore, MD 21224
> vc: 410-550-1675
>
>
>
>
> > ----------
> > From: Norman, Randy
> > Reply To: A Biosafety Discussion List
> > Sent: Tuesday, July 23, 2002 9:50 AM
> > To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> > Subject: Re: New Select Agent List - Regulating Non-possession
> >
> > "ALL labs receiving a form are required to respond, indicating either
> > possession
> > or non-possession."
> >
> > Anyone know what's the basis of their authority to require this
> reporting
> > by
> > those whose activities are NOT covered by the new law? It's not found in
> > the
> > new law or the existing SA rule, as far as I can tell. Or are they
> acting
> > beyond the bounds of their authority in regards to those who do not
> > possess?
> >
> > Randy Norman
> > Safety Specialist Sr.
> > BioReliance Corporation
> > Rockville, MD 20850
> > Rnorman@
> >
> > "Success is a journey, not a destination" - Ben Sweetland
> >
> >
>
>
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 24 Jul 2002 07:45:50 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Debra Hunt
Subject: Re: New Select Agent List - Regulating Non-possession
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="=_alternative 0040477385256C00_="
This is a multipart message in MIME format.
--=_alternative 0040477385256C00_=
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Hi, Phil. One method we have used here at Duke is to have every
researcher check yes or no that he/she posesses the agents on the list and
sign the form and send it in. We started this last winter because North
Carolina adopted a similar law effective last January. We are still
tracking down researchers who have not turned in their forms. Needless to
say, we did not ask about the USDA agents back then. Good Luck to us all
in obtaining all this information (possession or non-) by September 10!
Debra L. Hunt, DrPH, CBSP
Director, Biological Safety
Assistant Clinical Professor
Duke University / Duke University Health System
Durham, NC 27710
919-684-8822
hunt0009@mc.duke.edu
"Hauck, Philip"
Sent by: A Biosafety Discussion List
07/23/2002 04:29 PM
Please respond to A Biosafety Discussion List
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
cc:
Subject: Re: New Select Agent List - Regulating Non-possession
If one thinks about this, carefully.....IF YOU say you have no SLA's, and
old Doc XYZ (emeritus) had one sitting in His freezer, and it is
discovered on a site visit...remember, that this is supposed to be part of
the process, are you as the RFO a criminal, felon,
co-conspirator,etc...because YOU falsely reported or are you planning to
use "to the best of my knowledge" as a mea culpa and plead the mercy of
the court. My 2-cents-worth!
Phil Hauck
-----Original Message-----
From: Doob, Peter (NIDA/IRP) [mailto:PDOOB@INTRA.NIDA.]
Sent: Tuesday, July 23, 2002 10:15 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: New Select Agent List - Regulating Non-possession
Randy and colleagues=
Considering the stake we all have in the success of this
statute--including
the confidence of the public that our investigators can be entrusted with
highly hazardous agents needed for bona fide research--what purpose would
be
served by challenging authority under the statute to require reporting
"none
here"? Maybe I am missing something.
Peter A. Doob, MPH, JD
Chief, Safety and Operations Support Section, ASB
National Institute for Drug Abuse, NIH
Intramural Research Program
5500 Nathan Shock Drive
Baltimore, MD 21224
vc: 410-550-1675
> ----------
> From: Norman, Randy
> Reply To: A Biosafety Discussion List
> Sent: Tuesday, July 23, 2002 9:50 AM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: Re: New Select Agent List - Regulating Non-possession
>
> "ALL labs receiving a form are required to respond, indicating either
> possession
> or non-possession."
>
> Anyone know what's the basis of their authority to require this
reporting
> by
> those whose activities are NOT covered by the new law? It's not found in
> the
> new law or the existing SA rule, as far as I can tell. Or are they
acting
> beyond the bounds of their authority in regards to those who do not
> possess?
>
> Randy Norman
> Safety Specialist Sr.
> BioReliance Corporation
> Rockville, MD 20850
> Rnorman@
>
> "Success is a journey, not a destination" - Ben Sweetland
>
>
--=_alternative 0040477385256C00_=
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
Hi, Phil. One method we have used here at Duke is to have every researcher check yes or no that he/she posesses the agents on the list and sign the form and send it in. We started this last winter because North Carolina adopted a similar law effective last January. We are still tracking down researchers who have not turned in their forms. Needless to say, we did not ask about the USDA agents back then. Good Luck to us all in obtaining all this information (possession or non-) by September 10!
Debra L. Hunt, DrPH, CBSP
Director, Biological Safety
Assistant Clinical Professor
Duke University / Duke University Health System
Durham, NC 27710
919-684-8822
hunt0009@mc.duke.edu
"Hauck, Philip" <philip.hauck@MSSM.EDU>
Sent by: A Biosafety Discussion List <BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU>
07/23/2002 04:29 PM
Please respond to A Biosafety Discussion List
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
cc:
Subject: Re: New Select Agent List - Regulating Non-possession
If one thinks about this, carefully.....IF YOU say you have no SLA's, and old Doc XYZ (emeritus) had one sitting in His freezer, and it is discovered on a site visit...remember, that this is supposed to be part of the process, are you as the RFO a criminal, felon, co-conspirator,etc...because YOU falsely reported or are you planning to use "to the best of my knowledge" as a mea culpa and plead the mercy of the court. My 2-cents-worth!
Phil Hauck
-----Original Message-----
From: Doob, Peter (NIDA/IRP) [mailto:PDOOB@INTRA.NIDA.]
Sent: Tuesday, July 23, 2002 10:15 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: New Select Agent List - Regulating Non-possession
Randy and colleagues=
Considering the stake we all have in the success of this statute--including
the confidence of the public that our investigators can be entrusted with
highly hazardous agents needed for bona fide research--what purpose would be
served by challenging authority under the statute to require reporting "none
here"? Maybe I am missing something.
Peter A. Doob, MPH, JD
Chief, Safety and Operations Support Section, ASB
National Institute for Drug Abuse, NIH
Intramural Research Program
5500 Nathan Shock Drive
Baltimore, MD 21224
vc: 410-550-1675
> ----------
> From: Norman, Randy
> Reply To: A Biosafety Discussion List
> Sent: Tuesday, July 23, 2002 9:50 AM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: Re: New Select Agent List - Regulating Non-possession
>
> "ALL labs receiving a form are required to respond, indicating either
> possession
> or non-possession."
>
> Anyone know what's the basis of their authority to require this reporting
> by
> those whose activities are NOT covered by the new law? It's not found in
> the
> new law or the existing SA rule, as far as I can tell. Or are they acting
> beyond the bounds of their authority in regards to those who do not
> possess?
>
> Randy Norman
> Safety Specialist Sr.
> BioReliance Corporation
> Rockville, MD 20850
> Rnorman@ <mailto:Rnorman@>
>
> "Success is a journey, not a destination" - Ben Sweetland
>
>
--=_alternative 0040477385256C00_=--
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 24 Jul 2002 07:59:48 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Judy Pointer
Subject: Re: New Select Agent List - Regulating Non-possession
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-type: multipart/mixed;
Boundary="0__=XxZrrMQWt848FRPFjOpcoq6ldGpBEgwDh453n4ls0Xh8kINX6SBz56DI"
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If I were a member of a "sleeper" bioterrorist cell and I had one of the SAs
squirreled away in my lab, I would check "NO - I don't have any". And I
certainly wouldn't label the vials I had with the real name of the agent. Think
about it.
Debra Hunt on 07/24/2002 06:45:50 AM
Please respond to A Biosafety Discussion List
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
cc: (bcc: Judy M. Pointer/MDACC)
Subject: Re: New Select Agent List - Regulating Non-possession
Hi, Phil. One method we have used here at Duke is to have every
researcher check yes or no that he/she posesses the agents on the list and
sign the form and send it in. We started this last winter because North
Carolina adopted a similar law effective last January. We are still
tracking down researchers who have not turned in their forms. Needless to
say, we did not ask about the USDA agents back then. Good Luck to us all
in obtaining all this information (possession or non-) by September 10!
Debra L. Hunt, DrPH, CBSP
Director, Biological Safety
Assistant Clinical Professor
Duke University / Duke University Health System
Durham, NC 27710
919-684-8822
hunt0009@mc.duke.edu
"Hauck, Philip"
Sent by: A Biosafety Discussion List
07/23/2002 04:29 PM
Please respond to A Biosafety Discussion List
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
cc:
Subject: Re: New Select Agent List - Regulating Non-possession
If one thinks about this, carefully.....IF YOU say you have no SLA's, and
old Doc XYZ (emeritus) had one sitting in His freezer, and it is
discovered on a site visit...remember, that this is supposed to be part of
the process, are you as the RFO a criminal, felon,
co-conspirator,etc...because YOU falsely reported or are you planning to
use "to the best of my knowledge" as a mea culpa and plead the mercy of
the court. My 2-cents-worth!
Phil Hauck
-----Original Message-----
From: Doob, Peter (NIDA/IRP) [mailto:PDOOB@INTRA.NIDA.]
Sent: Tuesday, July 23, 2002 10:15 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: New Select Agent List - Regulating Non-possession
Randy and colleagues=
Considering the stake we all have in the success of this
statute--including
the confidence of the public that our investigators can be entrusted with
highly hazardous agents needed for bona fide research--what purpose would
be
served by challenging authority under the statute to require reporting
"none
here"? Maybe I am missing something.
Peter A. Doob, MPH, JD
Chief, Safety and Operations Support Section, ASB
National Institute for Drug Abuse, NIH
Intramural Research Program
5500 Nathan Shock Drive
Baltimore, MD 21224
vc: 410-550-1675
> ----------
> From: Norman, Randy
> Reply To: A Biosafety Discussion List
> Sent: Tuesday, July 23, 2002 9:50 AM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: Re: New Select Agent List - Regulating Non-possession
>
> "ALL labs receiving a form are required to respond, indicating either
> possession
> or non-possession."
>
> Anyone know what's the basis of their authority to require this
reporting
> by
> those whose activities are NOT covered by the new law? It's not found in
> the
> new law or the existing SA rule, as far as I can tell. Or are they
acting
> beyond the bounds of their authority in regards to those who do not
> possess?
>
> Randy Norman
> Safety Specialist Sr.
> BioReliance Corporation
> Rockville, MD 20850
> Rnorman@
>
> "Success is a journey, not a destination" - Ben Sweetland
>
>
--0__=XxZrrMQWt848FRPFjOpcoq6ldGpBEgwDh453n4ls0Xh8kINX6SBz56DI
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Date: Wed, 24 Jul 2002 09:25:50 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Hauck, Philip"
Subject: Re: New Select Agent List - Regulating Non-possession
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="Boundary_(ID_wqCKRBwMtE+2Z+Pg8hW8ng)"
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We did, too. The PI or Faculty member had to check-off Yes I do, and =
these are the specimens, or I do not have/presently work with any of =
these agents. I'm trying to find my original forms...they were on a =
borrowed computer, and I think they are still in that cache! As soon as =
I recover the forms, I'll e-mail the group with the attachment. It's not =
lost...it's in my boss's computer...now I just have to find him!
Phil Hauck
-----Original Message-----
From: Debra Hunt [mailto:hunt0009@MC.DUKE.EDU]
Sent: Wednesday, July 24, 2002 7:46 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: New Select Agent List - Regulating Non-possession
Hi, Phil. One method we have used here at Duke is to have every =
researcher check yes or no that he/she posesses the agents on the list =
and sign the form and send it in. We started this last winter because =
North Carolina adopted a similar law effective last January. We are =
still tracking down researchers who have not turned in their forms. =
Needless to say, we did not ask about the USDA agents back then. Good =
Luck to us all in obtaining all this information (possession or non-) by =
September 10!
Debra L. Hunt, DrPH, CBSP
Director, Biological Safety
Assistant Clinical Professor
Duke University / Duke University Health System
Durham, NC 27710
919-684-8822
hunt0009@mc.duke.edu
"Hauck, Philip"
Sent by: A Biosafety Discussion List
07/23/2002 04:29 PM
Please respond to A Biosafety Discussion List
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
cc:
Subject: Re: New Select Agent List - Regulating =
Non-possession
If one thinks about this, carefully.....IF YOU say you have no SLA's, =
and old Doc XYZ (emeritus) had one sitting in His freezer, and it is =
discovered on a site visit...remember, that this is supposed to be part =
of the process, are you as the RFO a criminal, felon, =
co-conspirator,etc...because YOU falsely reported or are you planning to =
use "to the best of my knowledge" as a mea culpa and plead the mercy of =
the court. My 2-cents-worth!
Phil Hauck
-----Original Message-----
From: Doob, Peter (NIDA/IRP) [mailto:PDOOB@INTRA.NIDA.]
Sent: Tuesday, July 23, 2002 10:15 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: New Select Agent List - Regulating Non-possession
Randy and colleagues=3D
Considering the stake we all have in the success of this =
statute--including
the confidence of the public that our investigators can be entrusted =
with
highly hazardous agents needed for bona fide research--what purpose =
would be
served by challenging authority under the statute to require reporting =
"none
here"? Maybe I am missing something.
Peter A. Doob, MPH, JD
Chief, Safety and Operations Support Section, ASB
National Institute for Drug Abuse, NIH
Intramural Research Program
5500 Nathan Shock Drive
Baltimore, MD 21224
vc: 410-550-1675
> ----------
> From: Norman, Randy
> Reply To: A Biosafety Discussion List
> Sent: Tuesday, July 23, 2002 9:50 AM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: Re: New Select Agent List - Regulating Non-possession
>
> "ALL labs receiving a form are required to respond, indicating either
> possession
> or non-possession."
>
> Anyone know what's the basis of their authority to require this =
reporting
> by
> those whose activities are NOT covered by the new law? It's not found =
in
> the
> new law or the existing SA rule, as far as I can tell. Or are they =
acting
> beyond the bounds of their authority in regards to those who do not
> possess?
>
> Randy Norman
> Safety Specialist Sr.
> BioReliance Corporation
> Rockville, MD 20850
> Rnorman@
>
> "Success is a journey, not a destination" - Ben Sweetland
>
>
--Boundary_(ID_wqCKRBwMtE+2Z+Pg8hW8ng)
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=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:word" xmlns=3D" /TR/REC-html40">
We did, too. = The PI or Faculty member had to check-off Yes I do, = and these are the specimens, or I do not have/presently work with any of these = agents. I m trying to find my original forms&they were on a borrowed comput= er, and I think they are still in that cache! As soon as I recover the forms, I= ll e-mail the group with the attachment. It s not lost&it=
217;s in my boss s computer&now I just have to find him!
Phil Hauck
-----Original Message--= ---
From: Debra Hunt [mailto:hunt0009@MC.DUKE.EDU]
Sent: Wednesday, July = 24, 2002 7:46 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MI= T.EDU
Subject: Re: New Selec= t Agent List - Regulating Non-possession
Hi, Phil. One method we have used here = at Duke is to have every researcher check yes or no that he/she posesses the age= nts on the list and sign the form and send it in. We started this last win= ter because North Carolina adopted a similar law effective last January. = We are still tracking down researchers who have not turned in their form= s. Needless to say, we did not ask about the USDA agents back then. Good Lu= ck to us all in obtaining all this information (possession or non-) by September 1= 0!
Debra L. Hunt, DrPH, CBSP
Director, Biological Safety
Assistant Clinical Professor
Duke University / Duke University Health System
Durham, NC 27710
919-684-8822
hunt0009@mc.duke.edu
"Hauck, Philip&=
quot;
Sent by: A Biosafety Discussion List
07/23/2002 04:29 PM
Please respond to A Biosafety Discussion List
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA= .MIT.EDU
cc: =
Subject: Re: New Se= lect Agent List - Regulating Non-possession
If one thinks about this, carefully.....IF= YOU say you have no SLA's, and old Doc XYZ (emeritus) had one sitting in His = freezer, and it is discovered on a site visit...remember, that this is suppose= d to be part of the process, are you as the RFO a criminal, felon, co-conspirator,etc...because YOU falsely reported or are you planning= to use "to the best of my knowledge" as a mea culpa and plead the = mercy of the court. My 2-cents-worth!
Phil Hauck
-----Original Message-----
=46rom: Doob, Peter (NIDA/IRP) [mailto:PDOOB@INTRA.NIDA.]
Sent: Tuesday, July 23, 2002 10:15 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: New Select Agent List - Regulating Non-possession
Randy and colleagues=3D
Considering the stake we all have in the success of this statute--inc= luding
the confidence of the public that our investigators can be entrusted = with
highly hazardous agents needed for bona fide research--what purpose w= ould be
served by challenging authority under the statute to require reportin= g "none
here"? Maybe I am missing something.
Peter A. Doob, MPH, JD
Chief, Safety and Operations Support Section, ASB
National Institute for Drug Abuse, NIH
Intramural Research Program
5500 Nathan Shock Drive
Baltimore, MD 21224
vc: 410-550-1675
> ----------
> From: Norman, Randy
> Reply To: A Biosafety Discussion List
> Sent: Tuesday, July 23, 2002 9:50 AM=
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: Re: New Select Agent List - Regulat= ing Non-possession
>
> "ALL labs receiving a form are required to respond, indicat= ing either
> possession
> or non-possession."
>
> Anyone know what's the basis of their authority to require this = reporting
> by
> those whose activities are NOT covered by the new law? It's not = found in
> the
> new law or the existing SA rule, as far as I can tell. Or are th= ey acting
> beyond the bounds of their authority in regards to those who do = not
> possess?
>
> Randy Norman
> Safety Specialist Sr.
> BioReliance Corporation
> Rockville, MD 20850
> Rnorman@ >
> "Success is a journey, not a destination" - Ben Sweetl= and
>
>
--Boundary_(ID_wqCKRBwMtE+2Z+Pg8hW8ng)--
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 24 Jul 2002 09:27:27 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Hauck, Philip"
Subject: FW: DOJ press release-- UConn student charged
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
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-----Original Message-----
From: Hauck, Philip
Sent: Tuesday, July 23, 2002 4:21 PM
To: 'A Biosafety Discussion List'
Subject: RE: DOJ press release-- UConn student charged
Hey Folks! I'm starting to get a little worried, now!
Gosh, this will sound corny, but back in the year 1977, when I was a =
(young) Graduate TA, at the University of Kentucky, one of the students =
in the Microbiology 401 course took his soil isolation plate out and =
obtained a bacterial culture. He did such a good job of isolating the =
bacteria, and characterizing it on blood agar plate, biochemical tests, =
Gram Stain, Spore culture....that there was NO DOUBT AT ALL that the =
long chains of Gram +, square ended box-cars in long medusa head's was =
Bacillus anthracis. His isolate was from an area where the old cow barns =
were pulled down and burned in the '50's as a result of a B.a. outbreak =
in the cow herd, as per one of the Microbiology professors.
With the current hysteria present out in the world today, would that =
student, who albeit had a morbid curiosity, be considered a risk, a =
felon, a criminal today? He was curious as to whether it (B.a.) was =
still in the soil after some 20 odd years. He also wanted to see if he =
was good enough to isolate the bacterium (needless to say, he got an "A" =
for effort, and his TA and I spent two-hours killing everything in the =
autoclave!). When does the hysteria stop and sensibility begin? We have =
all had our microbiological "pets" if you are seriously interested in =
microorganisms - I played around with a Fusarium contaminate that I =
isolated, and provoked to form cleistothecium--something I found out =
later from a Mycology Prof that no one had done with that species =
before--but I discarded everything and had no proof that it =
occurred--because "it was fooling around outside the normal activities =
of the teaching lab", and was not related to my research project.
What I'm worrying about, is that any of the practices and procedures =
outlined in any of the Manual of General Bacteriology Methods books, can =
be cleverly twisted to make a case that someone was bent on "evil". What =
I'm worried about is that this modern era of "witch-hunts" will stifle =
creative thinking and research. Many a discovery was made by someone =
playing with a clinical isolate that did not have immediate bearing on =
the research at hand. Louis Pasteur comes to mind, as one example. Sir =
Alexander Fleming (lousy micro. Technique, is another). Serendipity =
favors a prepared mind, but intellectual curiosity may succumb to =
Orwellian "Newthink" if we don't tread carefully. Solely my own thoughts =
and opinions!
Philip G. Hauck, MS, MSHS, CIH, CBSP, SM(NRM)
-----Original Message-----
From: Cheri L Hildreth [mailto:cheri.hildreth@LOUISVILLE.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, July 23, 2002 12:00 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: DOJ press release-- UConn student charged
Just a quick note to let you know that Dept of Justice issued a press
release yesterday 7/22 stating that the UConn grad student, Tomas Foral,
was charged with unlawful possession of anthrax. The investigation and
incident occurred last Oct- Nov. The U.S. Attorney also indicated that
Mr. Foral would be allowed to participate in a pre-trial diversion
program. If he participates and successfully completes "the program",
criminal prosecution will be deferred. If he doesn't participate, he
will be formally charged with the anthrax offense and the case will
proceed to trial.
Also, here's a story on same posted on Fox News courtesy of Max
Richard at UAB.
Cheri Hildreth Watts, Director
Department of Environmental Health &Safety
University of Louisville
(502) 852-2954
e-mail: cheri.hildreth@louisville.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 24 Jul 2002 09:49:59 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Jairo Betancourt
Subject: Re: New Select Agent List - Regulating Non-possession
In-Reply-To:
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-transfer-encoding: 7bit
I agreed with all those concerned about this issue. However, this is the
opportunity to get your Vice-Provost for Research to launch a survey
with legal wording heavy enough to force the P.I.'s to complete it. The
response to this survey must assure (with signature) that they (the
P.I.'s) do not possess, in any way, shape, or form) any of these Select
Agents, in any freezer hidden somewhere over the raimbow.
My 2 pesos worth for this discussion.
Jairo
-----Original Message-----
From: A Biosafety Discussion List [mailto:BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU] On
Behalf Of Hauck, Philip
Sent: Tuesday, July 23, 2002 4:30 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: New Select Agent List - Regulating Non-possession
If one thinks about this, carefully.....IF YOU say you have no SLA's,
and old Doc XYZ (emeritus) had one sitting in His freezer, and it is
discovered on a site visit...remember, that this is supposed to be part
of the process, are you as the RFO a criminal, felon,
co-conspirator,etc...because YOU falsely reported or are you planning to
use "to the best of my knowledge" as a mea culpa and plead the mercy of
the court. My 2-cents-worth!
Phil Hauck
-----Original Message-----
From: Doob, Peter (NIDA/IRP) [mailto:PDOOB@INTRA.NIDA.]
Sent: Tuesday, July 23, 2002 10:15 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: New Select Agent List - Regulating Non-possession
Randy and colleagues=
Considering the stake we all have in the success of this
statute--including
the confidence of the public that our investigators can be entrusted
with
highly hazardous agents needed for bona fide research--what purpose
would be
served by challenging authority under the statute to require reporting
"none
here"? Maybe I am missing something.
Peter A. Doob, MPH, JD
Chief, Safety and Operations Support Section, ASB
National Institute for Drug Abuse, NIH
Intramural Research Program
5500 Nathan Shock Drive
Baltimore, MD 21224
vc: 410-550-1675
> ----------
> From: Norman, Randy
> Reply To: A Biosafety Discussion List
> Sent: Tuesday, July 23, 2002 9:50 AM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: Re: New Select Agent List - Regulating Non-possession
>
> "ALL labs receiving a form are required to respond, indicating either
> possession
> or non-possession."
>
> Anyone know what's the basis of their authority to require this
reporting
> by
> those whose activities are NOT covered by the new law? It's not found
in
> the
> new law or the existing SA rule, as far as I can tell. Or are they
acting
> beyond the bounds of their authority in regards to those who do not
> possess?
>
> Randy Norman
> Safety Specialist Sr.
> BioReliance Corporation
> Rockville, MD 20850
> Rnorman@
>
> "Success is a journey, not a destination" - Ben Sweetland
>
>
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 24 Jul 2002 09:38:39 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Hauck, Philip"
Subject: Re: New Select Agent List - Regulating Non-possession
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
Content-transfer-encoding: quoted-printable
Sounds plausible to me. If I were a terrorist, I just might put down I =
have SLA's...it's like checking-off I am a fugitive from Justice... or I =
am a felon ...on a gun-purchase document!
Phil Hauck
-----Original Message-----
From: Judy Pointer [mailto:jpointer@MAIL.]
Sent: Wednesday, July 24, 2002 9:00 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: New Select Agent List - Regulating Non-possession
If I were a member of a "sleeper" bioterrorist cell and I had one of the =
SAs
squirreled away in my lab, I would check "NO - I don't have any". And I
certainly wouldn't label the vials I had with the real name of the =
agent. Think
about it.
Debra Hunt on 07/24/2002 06:45:50 AM
Please respond to A Biosafety Discussion List
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
cc: (bcc: Judy M. Pointer/MDACC)
Subject: Re: New Select Agent List - Regulating Non-possession
Hi, Phil. One method we have used here at Duke is to have every
researcher check yes or no that he/she posesses the agents on the list =
and
sign the form and send it in. We started this last winter because North
Carolina adopted a similar law effective last January. We are still
tracking down researchers who have not turned in their forms. Needless =
to
say, we did not ask about the USDA agents back then. Good Luck to us =
all
in obtaining all this information (possession or non-) by September 10!
Debra L. Hunt, DrPH, CBSP
Director, Biological Safety
Assistant Clinical Professor
Duke University / Duke University Health System
Durham, NC 27710
919-684-8822
hunt0009@mc.duke.edu
"Hauck, Philip"
Sent by: A Biosafety Discussion List
07/23/2002 04:29 PM
Please respond to A Biosafety Discussion List
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
cc:
Subject: Re: New Select Agent List - Regulating =
Non-possession
If one thinks about this, carefully.....IF YOU say you have no SLA's, =
and
old Doc XYZ (emeritus) had one sitting in His freezer, and it is
discovered on a site visit...remember, that this is supposed to be part =
of
the process, are you as the RFO a criminal, felon,
co-conspirator,etc...because YOU falsely reported or are you planning to
use "to the best of my knowledge" as a mea culpa and plead the mercy of
the court. My 2-cents-worth!
Phil Hauck
-----Original Message-----
From: Doob, Peter (NIDA/IRP) [mailto:PDOOB@INTRA.NIDA.]
Sent: Tuesday, July 23, 2002 10:15 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: New Select Agent List - Regulating Non-possession
Randy and colleagues=3D
Considering the stake we all have in the success of this
statute--including
the confidence of the public that our investigators can be entrusted =
with
highly hazardous agents needed for bona fide research--what purpose =
would
be
served by challenging authority under the statute to require reporting
"none
here"? Maybe I am missing something.
Peter A. Doob, MPH, JD
Chief, Safety and Operations Support Section, ASB
National Institute for Drug Abuse, NIH
Intramural Research Program
5500 Nathan Shock Drive
Baltimore, MD 21224
vc: 410-550-1675
> ----------
> From: Norman, Randy
> Reply To: A Biosafety Discussion List
> Sent: Tuesday, July 23, 2002 9:50 AM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: Re: New Select Agent List - Regulating Non-possession
>
> "ALL labs receiving a form are required to respond, indicating either
> possession
> or non-possession."
>
> Anyone know what's the basis of their authority to require this
reporting
> by
> those whose activities are NOT covered by the new law? It's not found =
in
> the
> new law or the existing SA rule, as far as I can tell. Or are they
acting
> beyond the bounds of their authority in regards to those who do not
> possess?
>
> Randy Norman
> Safety Specialist Sr.
> BioReliance Corporation
> Rockville, MD 20850
> Rnorman@
>
> "Success is a journey, not a destination" - Ben Sweetland
>
>
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 24 Jul 2002 10:37:08 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Marcham, Cheri"
Subject: Re: New Select Agent List - Regulating Non-possession
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OK, I know this has been covered, but now I am completely confused.
Since the very brief preliminary guidance document doesn't go into
detail about exemptions like the previous select agent regulation does,
tell me again where can I find info about potential exemptions (like
CLIA, vaccine use, research use at an LD50 level, etc.)? Are there any
exemptions?
The list in the guidance document just says "nucleic acid or genetic
elements from agents." In the past, if we had genetic elements but they
didn't code for a toxin, that was not a problem. Is it now?
Thanks for your help.
Cheri Marcham
The University of Oklahoma Health Sciences Center
cheri-marcham@ouhsc.edu
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OK, I know this has been covered, but now I am completely = confused.
Since the very brief preliminary guidance document doesn't go = into detail about exemptions like the previous select agent regulation does, tell me = again where can I find info about potential exemptions (like CLIA, = vaccine use, research use at an LD50 level, etc.)? Are there = any exemptions?
The list in the guidance document just says "nucleic acid = or genetic elements from agents." In the past, if we had genetic elements but = they didn't code for a toxin, that was not a problem. Is it now?
Thanks for your help.
Cheri Marcham
The University of Oklahoma Health Sciences Center
cheri-marcham@ouhsc.edu
------_=_NextPart_001_01C23327.F8823DE3--
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 25 Jul 2002 10:16:25 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Cheri L Hildreth
Subject: CDC response to NC State's comments on 7/12 notice
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All-
Dave Ranier, Vice Chancellor at NC State submitted comments to CDC's
7/12 FR notice and just received a very interesting response re: the
issue of "non-possession" of select agents-- see attached word document.
Even though many of us don't like CDC's final position that we must
declare "non-possession" of select agents, I think Dave's comments on
other aspects of the data collection notice may have influenced CDC.
Thank you Dave! Please see his note below that was posted to the CSHEMA
list serve re: his comments to CDC. If you have trouble opening the
attached doc, please let me know. Thanks, Cheri
*******************************
I commented to CDC on the proposed rules and I have attached the CDC
response.
To undersstand the context of the response my comments addressed the
following issues:
1). A better definition of facility (rather than mailing address) is
needed so a university could report by campus.
2). I asked that a ":negative declaration" not be required.
3). I asked that reporting be to one agency rather than CDC & APHIS.
4). I outlined our cost for compliance (CDC said there was minimal or
no cost).
Cheri Hildreth Watts, Director
Department of Environmental Health &Safety
University of Louisville
(502) 852-2954
e-mail: cheri.hildreth@louisville.edu
--=_FDA18DE0.E584CD08
Content-Type: application/msword; name="HHS.doc"
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 25 Jul 2002 08:51:20 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Hofherr, Leslie"
Subject: Courier in Cambodia
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Anyone know of a courier based in Cambodia that can import biological materials from Cambodia to Los Angeles, CA?
Thanks for any suggestions.
Sincerely,
Leslie Hofherr
UCLA
EH&S, Biosafety
(310) 206-3929 phone
(310) 825-7076 fax
leslie@admin.ucla.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 25 Jul 2002 08:55:53 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Elizabeth Smith
Subject: Re: Select Agent vendors.
In-Reply-To:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
--- Larry Mendoza wrote:
> 1. Can anyone tell me how many vendors sell select agents,
> especially the toxins?.
We've gotten Bot toxin from Wako Chemical. I don't know if they
stock other toxins or how it compares to Sig-Aldrich in price,
which lead into the other response,
> 2. Also, how is your instition going to handle the procurement
> of select
> agents once exemptions or approval upon registration with the
> CDC is granted?
Our PI initiates the purchase request for the monetary matters.
The PI then contacts me (the RFO) for the EA-101 forms and
attendant matters. If the material is shipped here, it is
shipped directly to the PI. The vendors we have dealt with will
not ship without the EA-101 confirming the authorization of the
shipment. I don't forsee this changing in the near future,
unless we get a new facility or expand significantly.
> 3. Any suggestions in getting PIs to be in compliance with
> responding to a survey on select agents?
As mentioned, get the department heads to back you, or the
deans/presidents/other important VIPs.
Perhaps make your instituion have a registration (like with your
IBC). If the PI hasn't registered with the IBC - which would
include all pathogenic organisms and bio-toxins - then you, as
the RFO don't let her/him ship & receive any select agents.
I've heard from someone in the nuclear side of the business that
a PI who failed to follow all the rules had his sources taken
away by the department pending correction of deficiencies ...
Peace,
=====
Elizabeth Smith
Environmental, Health & Safety Manager
BioPort Corporation
3500 N. Martin L. King Blvd.
Lansing, MI 48906
__________________________________________________
Do You Yahoo!?
Yahoo! Health - Feel better, live better
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 25 Jul 2002 12:10:24 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Larry Mendoza
Organization: VCU-OEHS-Biological/Chemical Safety Section
Subject: Re: Select Agent vendors.
MIME-Version: 1.0
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This is a multi-part message in MIME format.
--------------A2D61220F235D8E9F37F46ED
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
We've been having problems with PI's filling out the "Select Agent
Questionnaire and Registration Form" We sent the letter out to
Chairmen, Deans, etc... to delegate down to their faculty and so far we
have less than 10% compliance. It's been hard to get people to respond.
I think one of the problems is that PI's feel that they don't have to
fill out the questionnaire if they do not possess. Of course, this
makes it hard for us to know who has and who hasn't select agents.
September 10 is coming up soon!!!
Elizabeth Smith wrote:
> --- Larry Mendoza wrote:
>
> > 1. Can anyone tell me how many vendors sell select agents,
> > especially the toxins?.
>
> We've gotten Bot toxin from Wako Chemical. I don't know if they
> stock other toxins or how it compares to Sig-Aldrich in price,
> which lead into the other response,
>
> > 2. Also, how is your instition going to handle the procurement
> > of select
> > agents once exemptions or approval upon registration with the
> > CDC is granted?
>
> Our PI initiates the purchase request for the monetary matters.
> The PI then contacts me (the RFO) for the EA-101 forms and
> attendant matters. If the material is shipped here, it is
> shipped directly to the PI. The vendors we have dealt with will
> not ship without the EA-101 confirming the authorization of the
> shipment. I don't forsee this changing in the near future,
> unless we get a new facility or expand significantly.
>
> > 3. Any suggestions in getting PIs to be in compliance with
> > responding to a survey on select agents?
>
> As mentioned, get the department heads to back you, or the
> deans/presidents/other important VIPs.
>
> Perhaps make your instituion have a registration (like with your
> IBC). If the PI hasn't registered with the IBC - which would
> include all pathogenic organisms and bio-toxins - then you, as
> the RFO don't let her/him ship & receive any select agents.
>
> I've heard from someone in the nuclear side of the business that
> a PI who failed to follow all the rules had his sources taken
> away by the department pending correction of deficiencies ...
>
> Peace,
>
> =====
> Elizabeth Smith
> Environmental, Health & Safety Manager
> BioPort Corporation
> 3500 N. Martin L. King Blvd.
> Lansing, MI 48906
>
> __________________________________________________
> Do You Yahoo!?
> Yahoo! Health - Feel better, live better
>
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 25 Jul 2002 13:01:34 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "William A. Lorenzen"
Organization: Children's Hospital Boston
Subject: Re: Select Agent vendors.
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="Boundary_(ID_yYj/YdpyvxIyhbH6CAP3gQ)"
--Boundary_(ID_yYj/YdpyvxIyhbH6CAP3gQ)
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
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I would suggest not issuing it or referring to it as a "questionnaire"...
This is a formal and mandatory regulatory compliance report.
I worked for us!
Regards,
Larry Mendoza wrote:
> We've been having problems with PI's filling out the "Select Agent
> Questionnaire and Registration Form" We sent the letter out to
> Chairmen, Deans, etc... to delegate down to their faculty and so far we
> have less than 10% compliance. It's been hard to get people to respond.
> I think one of the problems is that PI's feel that they don't have to
> fill out the questionnaire if they do not possess. Of course, this
> makes it hard for us to know who has and who hasn't select agents.
> September 10 is coming up soon!!!
>
> Elizabeth Smith wrote:
>
> > --- Larry Mendoza wrote:
> >
> > > 1. Can anyone tell me how many vendors sell select agents,
> > > especially the toxins?.
> >
> > We've gotten Bot toxin from Wako Chemical. I don't know if they
> > stock other toxins or how it compares to Sig-Aldrich in price,
> > which lead into the other response,
> >
> > > 2. Also, how is your instition going to handle the procurement
> > > of select
> > > agents once exemptions or approval upon registration with the
> > > CDC is granted?
> >
> > Our PI initiates the purchase request for the monetary matters.
> > The PI then contacts me (the RFO) for the EA-101 forms and
> > attendant matters. If the material is shipped here, it is
> > shipped directly to the PI. The vendors we have dealt with will
> > not ship without the EA-101 confirming the authorization of the
> > shipment. I don't forsee this changing in the near future,
> > unless we get a new facility or expand significantly.
> >
> > > 3. Any suggestions in getting PIs to be in compliance with
> > > responding to a survey on select agents?
> >
> > As mentioned, get the department heads to back you, or the
> > deans/presidents/other important VIPs.
> >
> > Perhaps make your instituion have a registration (like with your
> > IBC). If the PI hasn't registered with the IBC - which would
> > include all pathogenic organisms and bio-toxins - then you, as
> > the RFO don't let her/him ship & receive any select agents.
> >
> > I've heard from someone in the nuclear side of the business that
> > a PI who failed to follow all the rules had his sources taken
> > away by the department pending correction of deficiencies ...
> >
> > Peace,
> >
> > =====
> > Elizabeth Smith
> > Environmental, Health & Safety Manager
> > BioPort Corporation
> > 3500 N. Martin L. King Blvd.
> > Lansing, MI 48906
> >
> > __________________________________________________
> > Do You Yahoo!?
> > Yahoo! Health - Feel better, live better
> >
--Boundary_(ID_yYj/YdpyvxIyhbH6CAP3gQ)
Content-type: text/html; charset=us-ascii
Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT
I would suggest not issuing it or referring to it as a "questionnaire"...
This is a formal and mandatory regulatory compliance report.
I worked for us!
Regards,
Larry Mendoza wrote:
We've been having problems with PI's filling out the "Select Agent
Questionnaire and Registration Form" We sent the letter out to
Chairmen, Deans, etc... to delegate down to their faculty and so far we
have less than 10% compliance. It's been hard to get people to respond.
I think one of the problems is that PI's feel that they don't have to
fill out the questionnaire if they do not possess. Of course, this
makes it hard for us to know who has and who hasn't select agents.
September 10 is coming up soon!!!
Elizabeth Smith wrote:
> --- Larry Mendoza wrote:
>
> > 1. Can anyone tell me how many vendors sell select agents,
> > especially the toxins?.
>
> We've gotten Bot toxin from Wako Chemical. I don't know if they
> stock other toxins or how it compares to Sig-Aldrich in price,
> which lead into the other response,
>
> > 2. Also, how is your instition going to handle the procurement
> > of select
> > agents once exemptions or approval upon registration with the
> > CDC is granted?
>
> Our PI initiates the purchase request for the monetary matters.
> The PI then contacts me (the RFO) for the EA-101 forms and
> attendant matters. If the material is shipped here, it is
> shipped directly to the PI. The vendors we have dealt with will
> not ship without the EA-101 confirming the authorization of the
> shipment. I don't forsee this changing in the near future,
> unless we get a new facility or expand significantly.
>
> > 3. Any suggestions in getting PIs to be in compliance with
> > responding to a survey on select agents?
>
> As mentioned, get the department heads to back you, or the
> deans/presidents/other important VIPs.
>
> Perhaps make your instituion have a registration (like with your
> IBC). If the PI hasn't registered with the IBC - which would
> include all pathogenic organisms and bio-toxins - then you, as
> the RFO don't let her/him ship & receive any select agents.
>
> I've heard from someone in the nuclear side of the business that
> a PI who failed to follow all the rules had his sources taken
> away by the department pending correction of deficiencies ...
>
> Peace,
>
> =====
> Elizabeth Smith
> Environmental, Health & Safety Manager
> BioPort Corporation
> 3500 N. Martin L. King Blvd.
> Lansing, MI 48906
>
> __________________________________________________
> Do You Yahoo!?
> Yahoo! Health - Feel better, live better
>
--Boundary_(ID_yYj/YdpyvxIyhbH6CAP3gQ)--
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 25 Jul 2002 12:54:09 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Heather Gonsoulin
Subject: Azoxymethane
In-Reply-To:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="US-ASCII"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
We have a researcher here that wants to use small quantities of azoxymethane
(10mg injection). Do any of you have specific references or a procedure for
handling this carcinogen that you would be willing to share. I know it
should be handled in a BSC, but what about during injection? Is excreted in
waste? If so, how long after injection? Are there special PPE
requirements? I don't know much about this compound except that it is a
carcinogen, any help would be greatly appreciated.
Heather H. Gonsoulin, RHIA
Safety Officer
UL-Lafayette, NIRC
hah8377@louisiana.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 25 Jul 2002 13:57:11 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Hauck, Philip"
Subject: Biohazard Agent Survey Form
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: multipart/mixed; boundary="Boundary_(ID_khOUV3SoyLBqu2ch9bHhZw)"
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boundary="Boundary_(ID_BcG2+Oy9/ubxXHRdHoNLuA)"
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Content-transfer-encoding: quoted-printable
WOW! So many people asked me for a copy of my survey, I decided to post =
it for everyone! Feel free to pick it apart, change it, modify any way =
you can. IT IS A BIG DOCUMENT!! A total of 18 pages, but one way around =
it, is to have the PIs and Researchers send only those pages that they =
made entries on...it is automatically understood that a "missing" page =
means no entries for those agents. Good luck to everyone, and yes even =
though I did mine a year ago, there are new people who have come on =
board, so I guess this means this will be an "evergreen" operation for =
all of us! Talk about job security!
Philip G. Hauck, MS, MSHS, CIH, CBSP, SM(NRM)
Mount Sinai School of Medicine
212 241-1451
Fax: 212 241 5550
e-mail: philip.hauck@mssm.edu
Website: =
--Boundary_(ID_BcG2+Oy9/ubxXHRdHoNLuA)
Content-type: text/html; charset=iso-8859-1
Content-transfer-encoding: QUOTED-PRINTABLE
=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:word" xmlns:st1=3D"urn:schemas-m= icrosoft-com:office:smarttags" xmlns=3D" 40">
WOW! So many people asked me for a copy of my surv= ey, I decided to post it for everyone! Feel free to pick it apart, change i= t, modify any way you can. IT IS A BIG DOCUMENT!! A= total of 18 pages, but one way around it, is to have the PIs and Researchers send= only those pages that they made entries on&it is automatically under= stood that a missing page means no entries for those agents. Good = luck to everyone, and yes even though I did mine a year ago, there are new pe= ople who have come on board, so I guess this means this will be an ever= green operation for all of us! Talk about job security!
Philip G. Hauck, MS, MSHS, CIH, CBSP, SM(NRM)
Mount Sinai School of Medicine
212 241-1451
Fax: 212 241 5550
= e-mail:=A0 philip.hauck@mssm.edu
Website: = =A0
--Boundary_(ID_BcG2+Oy9/ubxXHRdHoNLuA)--
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Content-type: application/msword; name=BIOHZAGNTFORM2001.doc
Content-transfer-encoding: BASE64
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 25 Jul 2002 14:29:11 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Essala Lowe
Subject: Re: Courier in Cambodia
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Leslie,
Try world courier... they have impeccable service for biologicals overseas
and in southeast asia. We have used them for southeast asia and were very
satisfied.
At 08:51 AM 7/25/2002 -0700, you wrote:
>Anyone know of a courier based in Cambodia that can import biological
materials from Cambodia to Los Angeles, CA?
>Thanks for any suggestions.
>
>Sincerely,
>Leslie Hofherr
>UCLA
>EH&S, Biosafety
>(310) 206-3929 phone
>(310) 825-7076 fax
>leslie@admin.ucla.edu
>
>
Essala D. Lowe
Biological Safety Officer/BL3 Facilities Manager
Laboratory Safety and Environmental Health
The Rockefeller University
1230 York Avenue
New York, NY 10021
(212)327-8324/(212)27-8340 fax
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 25 Jul 2002 15:21:43 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Robert N. Latsch"
Subject: Re: Azoxymethane
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
I think that a chemical fume hood would be better.
>We have a researcher here that wants to use small quantities of azoxymethane
>(10mg injection). Do any of you have specific references or a procedure for
>handling this carcinogen that you would be willing to share. I know it
>should be handled in a BSC, but what about during injection? Is excreted in
>waste? If so, how long after injection? Are there special PPE
>requirements? I don't know much about this compound except that it is a
>carcinogen, any help would be greatly appreciated.
>
>Heather H. Gonsoulin, RHIA
>Safety Officer
>UL-Lafayette, NIRC
>hah8377@louisiana.edu
_____________________________________________________________________
__ / _____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 25 Jul 2002 14:15:14 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Elizabeth Smith
Subject: Re: Go Green! Biosafety Position at MSU
In-Reply-To:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Robin,
I couldn't find this posting on MSU's HR website. Is the job
position still open? I'm interested in applying, and the
closing date mentioned below is 8/2. Or has the position
already been filled?
Elizabeth
--- Robin Mecklem wrote:
> Biosafety Discussion List Members:
>
> Michigan State University's Office of Radiation, Chemical and
> Biological
> Safety (ORCBS) is seeking an experienced and motivated
individual to join its team of health and safety professionals
as an Industrial Hygienist in the area of biosafety. This highly
visible and responsible position will assist in the development,
implementation and maintenance of a comprehensive biological
safety program.
> To apply for this position, call the Michigan State University
Employment Office at (517) 353-3720 or visit the MSU Human
Resources website (hr.msu.edu). Refer to Posting Number
P20233-KB. The closing date is August 2, 2002.
=====
Elizabeth Smith
Environmental, Health & Safety Manager
BioPort Corporation
3500 N. Martin L. King Blvd.
Lansing, MI 48906
__________________________________________________
Do You Yahoo!?
Yahoo! Health - Feel better, live better
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 25 Jul 2002 16:37:31 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Hofherr, Leslie"
Subject: Select Agent List
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Hi Everyone,
I have just started to work on implementing the new select agent requirements. As part of the new Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness Act, I read that we are required to submit to HHS a list of names of individuals who have access to the select agents. I noticed that VSV (vesicular stomatitis virus) is on the USDA list. Does the USDA know that the VSVg genetic element is very commonly used to pseudotype lentivirus vectors?
Are we required to notify USDA/HHS of every person who possesses, has access to the VSVg genetic element? The list of people from UCLA that have access to this element would be very long. It may contain over a hundred names and each quarter of the year new names would need to be added as new post docs., grad students, undergrads, come to labs here.
Did I miss something or am I right that we would need to provide HHS with a list of the names of all the people who have access to the VSVg element?
Thanks for any information,
Sincerely,
Leslie Hofherr
UCLA, Biosafety
Leslie@admin.ucla.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 25 Jul 2002 16:39:57 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Bruce Hanley
Subject: Re: Select Agent List
In-Reply-To:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Hi Leslie,
I ran into the same thing yesterday, called Brynte for advice and he was as
surprised as we were. I got in touch with Al Jin and he seems to have a
pretty good grip on this, complete with agency contact info (no surprise).
It appears that since this is on the USDA-only list, it may be simply a
matter of verifying that your folks have a current USDA permit and doing
the notification to that agency alone. It doesn't look like VSV will
invoke the full spectrum of Patriot Act requirements. Al said that he may
be able to creat a fact sheet for this. I have a call in to California
CDFA as well. Let's all stay in touch on this.
Bruce
--On Thursday, July 25, 2002 4:37 PM -0700 "Hofherr, Leslie"
wrote:
> Hi Everyone,
>
> I have just started to work on implementing the new select agent
> requirements. As part of the new Public Health Security and Bioterrorism
> Preparedness Act, I read that we are required to submit to HHS a list of
> names of individuals who have access to the select agents. I noticed that
> VSV (vesicular stomatitis virus) is on the USDA list. Does the USDA know
> that the VSVg genetic element is very commonly used to pseudotype
> lentivirus vectors? Are we required to notify USDA/HHS of every person
> who possesses, has access to the VSVg genetic element? The list of people
> from UCLA that have access to this element would be very long. It may
> contain over a hundred names and each quarter of the year new names would
> need to be added as new post docs., grad students, undergrads, come to
> labs here.
>
> Did I miss something or am I right that we would need to provide HHS with
> a list of the names of all the people who have access to the VSVg element?
>
> Thanks for any information,
> Sincerely,
> Leslie Hofherr
> UCLA, Biosafety
> Leslie@admin.ucla.edu
----------------------
Bruce Hanley
UCSB Biosafety Officer
Bruce.Hanley@ehs.ucsb.edu
(805) 893-8894
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 26 Jul 2002 08:05:19 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Brenda Wong
Subject: Select Agent List
In-Reply-To:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="----=_NextPart_000_0014_01C2347B.2EF7F8E0"
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charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Leslie et al:
I'm thinking that only the complete VSV agent would be involved and not
the g envelope protein of those people pseudotyping vectors. The agent
because of its potential to devastate not only herds of cattle, but
horses and swine, which is what the USDA is so concerned about. I don't
think that people using the g envelope fall into this category and it
would absurd for all of us to turn in what would amount to be up to 10
times as many names. That's my 2 cents worth on this lovely Friday.
Have a good weekend!
Brenda
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Brenda J. Wong
Biosafety Officer
PH - 858 534-6059
FAX - 858 534-7982
CELL - 858 967-5165
bwong@ucsd.edu
alpha numeric page:
-----Original Message-----
From: A Biosafety Discussion List [mailto:BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU] On
Behalf Of Bruce Hanley
Sent: Thursday, July 25, 2002 4:40 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Select Agent List
Hi Leslie,
I ran into the same thing yesterday, called Brynte for advice and he was
as surprised as we were. I got in touch with Al Jin and he seems to
have a pretty good grip on this, complete with agency contact info (no
surprise). It appears that since this is on the USDA-only list, it may
be simply a matter of verifying that your folks have a current USDA
permit and doing the notification to that agency alone. It doesn't look
like VSV will invoke the full spectrum of Patriot Act requirements. Al
said that he may be able to creat a fact sheet for this. I have a call
in to California CDFA as well. Let's all stay in touch on this.
Bruce
--On Thursday, July 25, 2002 4:37 PM -0700 "Hofherr, Leslie"
wrote:
> Hi Everyone,
>
> I have just started to work on implementing the new select agent
> requirements. As part of the new Public Health Security and
> Bioterrorism Preparedness Act, I read that we are required to submit
> to HHS a list of names of individuals who have access to the select
> agents. I noticed that VSV (vesicular stomatitis virus) is on the USDA
> list. Does the USDA know that the VSVg genetic element is very
> commonly used to pseudotype lentivirus vectors? Are we required to
> notify USDA/HHS of every person who possesses, has access to the VSVg
> genetic element? The list of people from UCLA that have access to this
> element would be very long. It may contain over a hundred names and
> each quarter of the year new names would need to be added as new post
> docs., grad students, undergrads, come to labs here.
>
> Did I miss something or am I right that we would need to provide HHS
> with a list of the names of all the people who have access to the VSVg
> element?
>
> Thanks for any information,
> Sincerely,
> Leslie Hofherr
> UCLA, Biosafety
> Leslie@admin.ucla.edu
----------------------
Bruce Hanley
UCSB Biosafety Officer
Bruce.Hanley@ehs.ucsb.edu
(805) 893-8894
------=_NextPart_000_0014_01C2347B.2EF7F8E0
Content-Type: text/html;
charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Leslie et = al:
I'm thinking that only the complete VSV agent would be = involved and not the g envelope protein of those people pseudotyping vectors. = The agent because of its potential to devastate not only herds of cattle, but = horses and swine, which is what the USDA is so concerned about. I don't think = that people using the g envelope fall into this category and it would absurd = for all of us to turn in what would amount to be up to 10 times as many = names. That's my 2 cents worth on this lovely Friday. Have a good weekend!
Brenda
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Brenda J. Wong
Biosafety Officer
PH - 858 = 534-6059
FAX - 858 534-7982
CELL - 858 967-5165
bwong@ucsd.edu
alpha numeric page:
=
-----Original Message-----
From: A Biosafety Discussion List [mailto:BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU] On Behalf Of Bruce Hanley
Sent: Thursday, July 25, 2002 4:40 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Select Agent List
Hi Leslie,
I ran into the same thing yesterday, called Brynte for = advice and he was as surprised as we were. I got in touch with Al Jin and he = seems to have a pretty good grip on this, complete with agency contact info (no surprise). It appears that since this is on the USDA-only list, it may = be simply a matter of verifying that your folks have a current USDA permit and = doing the notification to that agency alone. It doesn't look like VSV will = invoke the full spectrum of Patriot Act requirements. Al said that he may = be able to creat a fact sheet for this. I have a call in to California = CDFA as well. Let's all stay in touch on this.
Bruce
--On = Thursday, July 25, 2002 4:37 PM -0700 "Hofherr, Leslie" = wrote:
> Hi Everyone,
>
> I have just started to = work on implementing the new select agent
> requirements. As part of the = new Public Health Security and
> Bioterrorism Preparedness Act, I read = that we are required to submit
> to HHS a list of names of individuals who = have access to the select
> agents. I noticed that VSV (vesicular = stomatitis virus) is on the USDA
> list. Does the USDA know that the VSVg = genetic element is very
> commonly used to pseudotype lentivirus vectors? = Are we required to
> notify USDA/HHS of every person who possesses, has = access to the VSVg
> genetic element? The list of people from UCLA that have = access to this
> element would be very long. It may contain over a = hundred names and
> each quarter of the year new names would need to be = added as new post
> docs., grad students, undergrads, come to labs here.
>
> Did I miss something or am I right that we would = need to provide HHS
> with a list of the names of all the people who have = access to the VSVg
> element?
>
> Thanks for any = information,
> Sincerely,
> Leslie Hofherr
> UCLA, Biosafety
> Leslie@admin.ucla.edu
----------------------
Bruce Hanley
UCSB Biosafety Officer
Bruce.Hanley@ehs.ucsb.edu
(805) 893-8894
------=_NextPart_000_0014_01C2347B.2EF7F8E0--
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 26 Jul 2002 12:56:58 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Richard Fink
Subject: Re: Select Agent List
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
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At 08:05 AM 7/26/2002 -0700, you wrote:
>Leslie et al:
>
>I'm thinking that only the complete VSV agent would be involved and not
>the g envelope protein of those people pseudotyping vectors.
Hi Brenda,
The concern over the envelop protein is due to the wording of the select
agent reg. which considers genetic elements involved in pathogenicity as
select agents. Hence under that consideration an expressed envelop protein
of VSV would be considered the same as a select agent.
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
--=====================_356334912==_.ALT
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At 08:05 AM 7/26/2002 -0700, you wrote:
Leslie et al:
I'm thinking that only the complete VSV agent would be involved and not the g envelope protein of those people pseudotyping vectors.
Hi Brenda,
The concern over the envelop protein is due to the wording of the select agent reg. which considers genetic elements involved in pathogenicity as select agents. Hence under that consideration an expressed envelop protein of VSV would be considered the same as a select agent.
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
--=====================_356334912==_.ALT--
=========================================================================
Date: Sat, 27 Jul 2002 13:33:41 EDT
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Diane Fleming
Subject: Re: Proceedings Available on-line
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="US-ASCII"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Hi Otto,
Is the proceedings of: Strengthened Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention * Potential Implications for Biotechnology from the 28. - 29. May
1998 at the
Institute of Applied Microbiology,Vienna, Austriafrom 1998 still available
online? I should have downloaded it years ago, but didn't.
I am enjoying the summer. I had my left hip replaced in March and am
going to have the right one done on August 21st. After I rehab from that, I
hope I will have less pain and be able to get around for awhile. Old age is
the pits.
Diane Fleming
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 29 Jul 2002 11:34:14 -0400
Reply-To: pr18@columbia.edu
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: paul rubock
Organization: EH&S
Subject: select agents notification-exemptions??
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Will the "Notification of Possession..." submittal, due on 9/10, require
SAs, that are currently exempt (e.g., LD50>100 ng) for research
purposes, be listed? The 7/12/02 Draft makes no mention and had it not
been for prior knowledge of the exemptions, one would think that the
answer would be 'yes'.
Thank you.
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 29 Jul 2002 10:46:52 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Marcham, Cheri"
Subject: Re: select agents notification-exemptions??
MIME-Version: 1.0
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I'm still looking for the answer to Paul's question as well.
And what is the status of the previous CLIA exemption? No longer
exempt?
Cheri Marcham
OUHSC
Cheri-marcham@ouhsc.edu
-----Original Message-----
From: paul rubock [mailto:pr18@COLUMBIA.EDU]
Sent: Monday, July 29, 2002 10:34 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: select agents notification-exemptions??
Will the "Notification of Possession..." submittal, due on 9/10, require
SAs, that are currently exempt (e.g., LD50>100 ng) for research
purposes, be listed? The 7/12/02 Draft makes no mention and had it not
been for prior knowledge of the exemptions, one would think that the
answer would be 'yes'.
Thank you.
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 29 Jul 2002 13:55:01 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Morris, Gary"
Subject: TSDF Audits
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Listserve Members,
We are thinking about conducting an audit of our TSDF. I was wondering if
anybody else had ever participated in a TSDF audit and if so, would they
have a protocol that they could share.
For those of you who have conducted a TSDF audit, did you look at the
financial well-being of the facility and if so, did you take along with you
some from your internal finance department? Was health and safety a
component of the audit, or were you just concerned with environmental
liabilities?
Any additional suggestions/recommendations/resources would be welcomed.
Thanks in advance,
Gary Morris, MS, CIH, CSP
EHS Manager
Wellstat Biologics/Wellstat Therapeutics
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 29 Jul 2002 16:14:56 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Hauck, Philip"
Subject: Re: TSDF Audits
MIME-version: 1.0
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Content-type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-transfer-encoding: quoted-printable
Hey Gary:
Try this it's straight from the horse's mouth
Phil Hauck
Mount Sinai School of Medicine
212 241 1451
-----Original Message-----
From: Morris, Gary [mailto:gmorris@]
Sent: Monday, July 29, 2002 1:55 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: TSDF Audits
Listserve Members,
We are thinking about conducting an audit of our TSDF. I was wondering =
if
anybody else had ever participated in a TSDF audit and if so, would they
have a protocol that they could share.
For those of you who have conducted a TSDF audit, did you look at the
financial well-being of the facility and if so, did you take along with =
you
some from your internal finance department? Was health and safety a
component of the audit, or were you just concerned with environmental
liabilities?
Any additional suggestions/recommendations/resources would be welcomed.
Thanks in advance,
Gary Morris, MS, CIH, CSP
EHS Manager
Wellstat Biologics/Wellstat Therapeutics
--Boundary_(ID_Xu6MmPdf8MBBlmJoUIbKFg)
Content-type: application/octet-stream; name=tsdf.pdf
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=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 29 Jul 2002 15:46:28 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Terry Lawrin
Subject: MTB H37Ra
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
Hello Everyone,
I need to know as much as I can about a strain of tubercle bacilli:
Mycobacterium tuberculosis (Zopf) Lehmann and Neumann, Designation H37Ra
[TMC 201]. What's the level of containment? Medical testing? etc. ATCC
in it's description gives it a 2 (I guess that's BSL), but I'd like more.
Thanks,
Terry Lawrin
Terrance J. Lawrin, MT. (ASCP) SLS, CBSP (ABSA)
Biosafety Officer / Sanitarian
University of Illinois at Chicago
Environmental Health and Safety Office
Telephone: 312-413-3701
email: tlawrin@uic.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 29 Jul 2002 16:51:40 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Michelle DeStefano
Subject: Re: MTB H37Ra
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Hi Terry,
Mtb H37Ra is the "avirulent" (hence "a") form of H37Rv ("v" for virulent).
However, the avirulence of that strain of Mtb is in reference to not causing
virulence in animals. I believe the original test animal was guinea pigs.
It will grow in mice and can be harvested from the target organs. It just
doesn't make them ill from the infection. I am unaware of any information on
the virulence factor in humans, although the implication is there.
The "2" in the description from ATCC does refer to BSL 2 due to its
attenuated form. (Aside: I find this really interesting since the ATCC
upgraded BCG to a level 3 due to the fact that it is a M. bovis, regardless
of the fact that it is also attenuated!). Direct exposure to H37Ra or BCG
has the potential to cause your ppd (skin test) to become positive
regardless of the virulence factor, so strict adherence to BSL 2 practices
is warrented.
There is quite a bit of information on H37Ra in the literature, it is often
used to evaluate antigenic properties etc of tuberculosis. Some labs use it
as a "pre-screen" for antimycobacterial activities of compounds ahead of
evaluating virulent strains. Its growth requirements/conditions are the
same as the virulent strains of Mtb.
Hope that this helps!
Michelle
At 03:46 PM 7/29/2002 -0500, you wrote:
>Hello Everyone,
>
>I need to know as much as I can about a strain of tubercle bacilli:
>Mycobacterium tuberculosis (Zopf) Lehmann and Neumann, Designation H37Ra
>[TMC 201]. What's the level of containment? Medical testing? etc. ATCC
>in it's description gives it a 2 (I guess that's BSL), but I'd like more.
>
>Thanks,
>
>Terry Lawrin
>
>
>
>Terrance J. Lawrin, MT. (ASCP) SLS, CBSP (ABSA)
>Biosafety Officer / Sanitarian
>University of Illinois at Chicago
>Environmental Health and Safety Office
>Telephone: 312-413-3701
>email: tlawrin@uic.edu
>
Michelle DeStefano, CBSP
Laboratory Supervisor
CNY Research Corp
800 Irving Ave
Syracuse, NY 13212
email: destefam@
phone: (315) 477-4597
fax: (315) 476-5348
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 30 Jul 2002 08:52:14 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Morris, Gary"
Subject: Re: TSDF Audits
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Phil,
I should have thought of this first.
Thanks.
-----Original Message-----
From: Hauck, Philip [mailto:philip.hauck@MSSM.EDU]
Sent: Monday, July 29, 2002 4:15 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: TSDF Audits
Hey Gary:
Try this it's straight from the horse's mouth
Phil Hauck
Mount Sinai School of Medicine
212 241 1451
-----Original Message-----
From: Morris, Gary [mailto:gmorris@]
Sent: Monday, July 29, 2002 1:55 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: TSDF Audits
Listserve Members,
We are thinking about conducting an audit of our TSDF. I was wondering if
anybody else had ever participated in a TSDF audit and if so, would they
have a protocol that they could share.
For those of you who have conducted a TSDF audit, did you look at the
financial well-being of the facility and if so, did you take along with you
some from your internal finance department? Was health and safety a
component of the audit, or were you just concerned with environmental
liabilities?
Any additional suggestions/recommendations/resources would be welcomed.
Thanks in advance,
Gary Morris, MS, CIH, CSP
EHS Manager
Wellstat Biologics/Wellstat Therapeutics
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 30 Jul 2002 10:30:20 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Hauck, Philip"
Subject: Re: TSDF Audits
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
Content-transfer-encoding: quoted-printable
I think we all get risk-adverse at the meer mention of EPA...but they do =
have good guidance...hard to believe, but true!. If we all read their =
small laboratory waste guide, we could shut this Multi-media assault on =
colleges and Universities down!
Phil
-----Original Message-----
From: Morris, Gary [mailto:gmorris@]
Sent: Tuesday, July 30, 2002 8:52 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: TSDF Audits
Phil,
I should have thought of this first.
Thanks.
-----Original Message-----
From: Hauck, Philip [mailto:philip.hauck@MSSM.EDU]
Sent: Monday, July 29, 2002 4:15 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: TSDF Audits
Hey Gary:
Try this it's straight from the horse's mouth
Phil Hauck
Mount Sinai School of Medicine
212 241 1451
-----Original Message-----
From: Morris, Gary [mailto:gmorris@]
Sent: Monday, July 29, 2002 1:55 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: TSDF Audits
Listserve Members,
We are thinking about conducting an audit of our TSDF. I was wondering =
if
anybody else had ever participated in a TSDF audit and if so, would they
have a protocol that they could share.
For those of you who have conducted a TSDF audit, did you look at the
financial well-being of the facility and if so, did you take along with =
you
some from your internal finance department? Was health and safety a
component of the audit, or were you just concerned with environmental
liabilities?
Any additional suggestions/recommendations/resources would be welcomed.
Thanks in advance,
Gary Morris, MS, CIH, CSP
EHS Manager
Wellstat Biologics/Wellstat Therapeutics
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 30 Jul 2002 12:13:32 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Burnett, LouAnn Crawford"
Subject: Re: select agents notification-exemptions??
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Note: This is merely my impression of this law/regs and in no way
represents a definitive interpretation. . .
Because the CDC/USDA notification is just that - a NOTIFICATION of
possession - I am guessing that we need to tell them what we possess -
regardless of previous exemption. When they release the regulations in
December on what and how we are required to REGISTER (and use and
secure) this agents - I'm guessing we'll see the exemptions again. The
Public Health Security et al. Act says that HHS should regulate these
agents with regard to risk. This notification step is merely a data
collection, so they know where to put the most effort. My advice? If
it's on the notification form and you have it (for any reason) - report
it. We won't know until December what that really means for us as far as
real inventories (locations, amounts, etc.), extra security provisions,
background checks, etc.
Just my two cents. . .
Have fun! LouAnn
LouAnn C. Burnett, MS, CBSP =09
Biosafety Program Manager & Biological Safety Officer=09
Vanderbilt University Environmental Health & Safety
Nashville, Tennessee
615/322-0927 (direct & voice mail)
615/343-4951 (fax) =09
-----Original Message-----
From: Marcham, Cheri [mailto:Cheryl-Marcham@OUHSC.EDU]
Sent: Monday, July 29, 2002 10:47 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: select agents notification-exemptions??
I'm still looking for the answer to Paul's question as well. And what is
the status of the previous CLIA exemption? No longer exempt?
Cheri Marcham
OUHSC
Cheri-marcham@ouhsc.edu
-----Original Message-----
From: paul rubock [mailto:pr18@COLUMBIA.EDU]
Sent: Monday, July 29, 2002 10:34 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: select agents notification-exemptions??
Will the "Notification of Possession..." submittal, due on 9/10, require
SAs, that are currently exempt (e.g., LD50>100 ng) for research
purposes, be listed? The 7/12/02 Draft makes no mention and had it not
been for prior knowledge of the exemptions, one would think that the
answer would be 'yes'.
Thank you.
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 30 Jul 2002 10:09:27 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Sheila Hedayati
Subject: background screenings
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
What are universities planning to do to comply with the background =
screening portion of the new act? Who will be administering the screenings =
and how will they be administered? I have seen disclosure forms from a few =
schools, but others have told me that the Attorney General's office will =
be doing the legwork.
Any suggestions or examples would be greatly appreciated.
Sheila Hedayati
Sheila Hedayati, MPH
Biological Safety Officer
University of Southern California
Los Angeles, CA 90033
shedayati@busaff.usc.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 30 Jul 2002 13:39:34 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Erik A. Talley"
Subject: Re: background screenings
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
For those currently transferring select agents, do any of you have a
consultant performing the "restricted user" check under the PATRIOT Act? So
far, I have only seen policies which call for campus public safety to make
the determination using their resources. I am looking for a consultant who
might do this.
Thanks,
Erik
At 10:09 AM 7/30/2002 -0700, you wrote:
>What are universities planning to do to comply with the background
>screening portion of the new act? Who will be administering the screenings
>and how will they be administered? I have seen disclosure forms from a few
>schools, but others have told me that the Attorney General's office will
>be doing the legwork.
>
>Any suggestions or examples would be greatly appreciated.
>
>Sheila Hedayati
>
>
>
>Sheila Hedayati, MPH
>Biological Safety Officer
>University of Southern California
> Los Angeles, CA 90033
>shedayati@busaff.usc.edu
___________________________________
Erik A. Talley, Director
Environmental Health and Safety
Weill Medical College of Cornell University
418 East 71st Street, Suite 62
New York, NY 10021
212-746-6201
ert2002@med.cornell.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 30 Jul 2002 13:27:03 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ed Gaunt
Subject: Re: select agents notification-exemptions??
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
The points that LouAnn makes are exactly right! The notification is to
assist DHHS and USDA with formulating the final regulations. The
notification forms will be mailed out early August. They are currently
undergoing final OMB approval.
EEG
-----Original Message-----
From: Burnett, LouAnn Crawford [mailto:louann.burnett@VANDERBILT.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, July 30, 2002 1:14 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: select agents notification-exemptions??
Note: This is merely my impression of this law/regs and in no way
represents a definitive interpretation. . .
Because the CDC/USDA notification is just that - a NOTIFICATION of
possession - I am guessing that we need to tell them what we possess -
regardless of previous exemption. When they release the regulations in
December on what and how we are required to REGISTER (and use and
secure) this agents - I'm guessing we'll see the exemptions again. The
Public Health Security et al. Act says that HHS should regulate these
agents with regard to risk. This notification step is merely a data
collection, so they know where to put the most effort. My advice? If
it's on the notification form and you have it (for any reason) - report
it. We won't know until December what that really means for us as far as
real inventories (locations, amounts, etc.), extra security provisions,
background checks, etc.
Just my two cents. . .
Have fun! LouAnn
LouAnn C. Burnett, MS, CBSP
Biosafety Program Manager & Biological Safety Officer
Vanderbilt University Environmental Health & Safety
Nashville, Tennessee
615/322-0927 (direct & voice mail)
615/343-4951 (fax)
-----Original Message-----
From: Marcham, Cheri [mailto:Cheryl-Marcham@OUHSC.EDU]
Sent: Monday, July 29, 2002 10:47 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: select agents notification-exemptions??
I'm still looking for the answer to Paul's question as well. And what is
the status of the previous CLIA exemption? No longer exempt?
Cheri Marcham
OUHSC
Cheri-marcham@ouhsc.edu
-----Original Message-----
From: paul rubock [mailto:pr18@COLUMBIA.EDU]
Sent: Monday, July 29, 2002 10:34 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: select agents notification-exemptions??
Will the "Notification of Possession..." submittal, due on 9/10, require
SAs, that are currently exempt (e.g., LD50>100 ng) for research
purposes, be listed? The 7/12/02 Draft makes no mention and had it not
been for prior knowledge of the exemptions, one would think that the
answer would be 'yes'.
Thank you.
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 30 Jul 2002 13:40:29 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Sickles, Sharon"
Subject: Re: MTB H37Ra
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
I don't know about the specific strain, is it attenuated somehow? ABSA
reports "generic" Mtb a risk group 3 according to BMBL-93 CDC, NIH rDNA-96,
LCDC -96 Canada, EU-96, etc.
The BMBL, 4th edition, 1999, put out by PHS, CDC and NIH recommends BSL2 or
BSL3 practices, containment and facilities, depending upon quantities,
manipulations, etc. That is it depends upon what you are going to be doing
with it. I would suggest referring to the BMBL and contacting the CDC with
any questions you might have.
Good luck.
Sharon A. Sickles, PhD, DVM
University Veterinarian
Director of Research Compliance
211 Couper Administration Bldg
Binghamton University
Binghamton, NY 13902
(607) 777-4170
e-mail ssickles@binghamton.edu
-----Original Message-----
From: A Biosafety Discussion List [mailto:BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU]On
Behalf Of Terry Lawrin
Sent: Monday, July 29, 2002 4:46 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: MTB H37Ra
Hello Everyone,
I need to know as much as I can about a strain of tubercle bacilli:
Mycobacterium tuberculosis (Zopf) Lehmann and Neumann, Designation H37Ra
[TMC 201]. What's the level of containment? Medical testing? etc. ATCC
in it's description gives it a 2 (I guess that's BSL), but I'd like more.
Thanks,
Terry Lawrin
Terrance J. Lawrin, MT. (ASCP) SLS, CBSP (ABSA)
Biosafety Officer / Sanitarian
University of Illinois at Chicago
Environmental Health and Safety Office
Telephone: 312-413-3701
email: tlawrin@uic.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 30 Jul 2002 09:10:17 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Murray, Krista"
Subject: Biosafety program enforcement
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------_=_NextPart_001_01C237CA.7319FE40
Content-Type: text/plain
Hello Everyone-
I had a question particularly for the academic institutions out there.
How do you enforce your biosafety regulations- either for general biosafety
or your bloodborne pathogens program? This could include infractions
ranging from not completing required training, finding food in the lab,
wearing dirty lab coats in the break areas, etc. to not registering the
biological work taking place in the lab. Who does the enforcing- the safety
office, the department chair/dean, your research office, etc? Do repeat
offenses get escalated?
Our last internal program audit raised the concern that we didn't have a
formal procedure in writing for addressing infractions. We were hoping to
get a feel for the "industry standard", especially with all the impending
changes in biosecurity!
Please respond to me directly- I'd be happy to share responses if anyone
else is interested. Thanks for your assistance. Krista
Krista Murray, MS, RBP
Biosafety Officer
Occupational Health & Safety
University of Delaware
132 GSB, 222 S. Chapel St.
Newark, DE 19716
302-831-1433
302-831-1528 fax
klmurray@udel.edu
------_=_NextPart_001_01C237CA.7319FE40
Content-Type: text/html
Hello Everyone-
I had a question particularly for the academic institutions out there. How do you enforce your biosafety regulations- either for general biosafety or your bloodborne pathogens program? This could include infractions ranging from not completing required training, finding food in the lab, wearing dirty lab coats in the break areas, etc. to not registering the biological work taking place in the lab. Who does the enforcing- the safety office, the department chair/dean, your research office, etc? Do repeat offenses get escalated?
Our last internal program audit raised the concern that we didn't have a formal procedure in writing for addressing infractions. We were hoping to get a feel for the "industry standard", especially with all the impending changes in biosecurity!
Please respond to me directly- I'd be happy to share responses if anyone else is interested. Thanks for your assistance. Krista
Krista Murray, MS, RBP
Biosafety Officer
Occupational Health & Safety
University of Delaware
132 GSB, 222 S. Chapel St.
Newark, DE 19716
302-831-1433
302-831-1528 fax
klmurray@udel.edu
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=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 30 Jul 2002 15:11:54 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Carol T Whetstone
Subject: Re: Biosafety program enforcement
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Hi Krista:
I would appreciate knowing the range of responses that you receive on
this timely subject.
Thanks,
Carol
Carol T. Whetstone, Ph.D., MCLS (NCA)
Biological Safety Officer
University of Louisville
Environmental Health and Safety
1800 Arthur Street
Louisville, KY 40208-2729
Direct: (502) 852-2959
DEHS: (502) 852-6670
FAX: (502) 852-0880
ctwhet01@gwise.louisville.edu
>>> K_Murray@FACILITIES.UDEL.EDU 07/30/02 09:10AM >>>
Hello Everyone-
I had a question particularly for the academic institutions out
there.
How do you enforce your biosafety regulations- either for general
biosafety
or your bloodborne pathogens program? This could include infractions
ranging from not completing required training, finding food in the
lab,
wearing dirty lab coats in the break areas, etc. to not registering
the
biological work taking place in the lab. Who does the enforcing- the
safety
office, the department chair/dean, your research office, etc? Do
repeat
offenses get escalated?
Our last internal program audit raised the concern that we didn't
have a
formal procedure in writing for addressing infractions. We were hoping
to
get a feel for the "industry standard", especially with all the
impending
changes in biosecurity!
Please respond to me directly- I'd be happy to share responses if
anyone
else is interested. Thanks for your assistance. Krista
Krista Murray, MS, RBP
Biosafety Officer
Occupational Health & Safety
University of Delaware
132 GSB, 222 S. Chapel St.
Newark, DE 19716
302-831-1433
302-831-1528 fax
klmurray@udel.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 30 Jul 2002 12:53:00 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Steve Stauffer
Subject: Re: Biosafety program enforcement
In-Reply-To:
Mime-version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset="US-ASCII"
Content-transfer-encoding: 7bit
On 7/30/02 6:10 AM, "Murray, Krista" wrote:
> Hello Everyone-
> I had a question particularly for the academic institutions out there. How
> do you enforce your biosafety regulations- either for general biosafety or
> your bloodborne pathogens program? This could include infractions ranging
> from not completing required training, finding food in the lab, wearing dirty
> lab coats in the break areas, etc. to not registering the biological work
> taking place in the lab. Who does the enforcing- the safety office, the
> department chair/dean, your research office, etc? Do repeat offenses get
> escalated?
>
> Our last internal program audit raised the concern that we didn't have a
> formal procedure in writing for addressing infractions. We were hoping to get
> a feel for the "industry standard", especially with all the impending changes
> in biosecurity!
>
> Please respond to me directly- I'd be happy to share responses if anyone else
> is interested. Thanks for your assistance. Krista
>
I am interested in the responses you receive.
Steve
-------------------------------------------------
Steve Stauffer
Quarantine Officer: Contained Research Facility
University of California at Davis
(530) 752-6920 (voice); (530) 754-7757 (fax)
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 30 Jul 2002 15:57:01 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Essala Lowe
Subject: Re: background screenings
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Eric,
We have the PI's do it for the staff that has access.. and they give us the
list from there. We at RU are giving the PI's the responsibility of
reporting the correct information to us for restricted users. And any one
dealing with select agents here at RU is a part of the BL3 program and they
are known by the LSEH office.
At 01:39 PM 7/30/2002 -0400, you wrote:
>For those currently transferring select agents, do any of you have a
>consultant performing the "restricted user" check under the PATRIOT Act? So
>far, I have only seen policies which call for campus public safety to make
>the determination using their resources. I am looking for a consultant who
>might do this.
>
>Thanks,
>
>Erik
>
>At 10:09 AM 7/30/2002 -0700, you wrote:
>>What are universities planning to do to comply with the background
>>screening portion of the new act? Who will be administering the screenings
>>and how will they be administered? I have seen disclosure forms from a few
>>schools, but others have told me that the Attorney General's office will
>>be doing the legwork.
>>
>>Any suggestions or examples would be greatly appreciated.
>>
>>Sheila Hedayati
>>
>>
>>
>>Sheila Hedayati, MPH
>>Biological Safety Officer
>>University of Southern California
>> Los Angeles, CA 90033
>>shedayati@busaff.usc.edu
>
>
>
>___________________________________
>Erik A. Talley, Director
>Environmental Health and Safety
>Weill Medical College of Cornell University
>418 East 71st Street, Suite 62
>New York, NY 10021
>
>212-746-6201
>ert2002@med.cornell.edu
>
>
Essala D. Lowe
Biological Safety Officer/BL3 Facilities Manager
Laboratory Safety and Environmental Health
The Rockefeller University
1230 York Avenue
New York, NY 10021
(212)327-8324/(212)27-8340 fax
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 31 Jul 2002 09:02:50 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Jennifer Minogue
Subject: Re: Biosafety program enforcement
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="------------8DE15998AB98C36E0D975480"
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"Enforcement". Sounds like brownshirts, unfortunately. However, it
does mean that there must be consequences as a result of someone's
choices.
I have several general comments about this topic.
Firstly, the "safety office" is not line management. Persons in the
safety office (at least in academia) do not hire, fire, discipline,
promote, demote, etc. You can't tell lab people to "do xxx or else"
because what is the "or else"? You did not interview or hire anyone and
so have no control over knowledge or experience of the lab personnel.
You will not even know if they have received training (you probably
won't even know if someone has been hired). This leads to my second
comment.
Only lab supervisors/professors have authority over the workers under
their supervision. You can go up the line as well to include chairs of
departments. If the chair does not want to exert his/her authority,
then the Dean may need to, right up to VP. I doubt you would find a
President or Board (of Regents, Governors or whatever they are called)
willing to deal with an issue. Hopefully it is resolved before it goes
that high anyway. The corollary to all this is the lab supervisor /
professor is responsible for the state of his/her lab. People may like
to point fingers and say "it is all the lab tech's fault the place is a
mess." The supervisor just needs to be reminded "just who is the boss
here with control of the workplace." It is not the safety officer.
Safety Departments are advisory. You can point out to a professor/lab
supervisor deficiencies in the lab. You can do it in writing with
copies up the line (more effective). In certain jurisdictions, safety
committees have the right to inspect and make recommendations to the
supervisor/chair of the department (in writing). The supervisor/chair
must then respond (in writing) to the recommendation. This can be a
very powerful motivator.
External agencies have a lot of authority. Your local fire department,
labor department, and nuclear safety reps have authority to shut down
facilities - either an individual lab or an entire building if they are
really cranked. This is guaranteed to get changes made. Or
Accreditation Committees can get changes made as well if the program
wants to stay accredited (esp important for professional programs such
as MD, DVM, Engineering where no accreditation = no registration = no
practice)
Colleagues may have a lot of authority - it depends. A VP may be
willing to be the policeman and shut down facilities upon your
recommendation. It depends on the political environment of each
individual institution.
Faculty and supervisory staff are ultimately responsible for any
incidents in their areas. If there are injuries/fatalities/property
loss/citations by authorities, it is the faculty/supervisor who will be
held responsible and be sitting in the witness box. Safety officers are
there to help keep them out of court. Neither you nor an insurance
policy can go to jail for the convicted supervisor.
So what to do? Here are some ideas:
1. If you are vested with authority of the highest order (VP or above),
then you can shut down facilities (sometimes called "locking them out by
changing the locks"). This gets very quick action. I wouldn't try it
without being specifically authorized.
2. If you have Central Purchasing, you can stop purchase orders from
going through. However, not every place has central purchasing and
there is no way to tell what is being ordered. This also results in
quick action.
3. If you have safety committees with authority to inspect/make
recommendations, make sure they are inspecting for biohazard issues as
well as fire extinguishers and extension cords. Inspections are in
writing (at least a checklist) so there is a paper trail created.
Unresolved deficincies look very bad in a supervisor's file, but only if
his/her supervisor cares about what is happening in the area.
4. If there is a central budget office, funds can be "seized" or
"frozen" until deficiencies are corrected. This is guaranteed to get
someone's attention. You, again, will need authority from on high.
5. Have health and safety accountability written into employment
contracts for supervisors and faculty members. (Does anyone out there
currently have this???) This becomes a line item when being reviewed
for tenure, promotion, and pay raises.
6. If biohazards are used in conjunction with animal/human projects,
develop a strong liaison with your Animal Care Committee and Human
Subjects/Ethics Committee. On some campuses these are very powerful
committees that can stop work on a dime.
7. Make sure you have an active training program in liability and due
diligence issues so that faculty/supervisors are aware of their
responsibilities and what happens if things go wrong (just how many of
those students have lawyers for parents??). Once it clicks in, they
will be running to you to register projects and get training materials.
However, don't expect a stampede at first.
8. Town Hall meetings with chairs/deans explaining the importance of
the paper trail and due diligence intiatives may be useful. After all,
they are the next-in-line for the lawsuits since they weren't
supervising their supervisors.
9. If you have a union(s), make sure you are seen as an ally and not a
pawn of management. Never pooh-pooh a concern or complaint even if it
seems silly to you.
10. Have a "departmental safety officer" (a faculty member) in each
academic department. Make biohazards part of the portfolio (plus
chemical safety, radiation safety, etc). Try to make sure that this
person has some respect, standing, and authority with other members of
the department - not the low person on the totem pole. The dept safety
officer needs to be in a mentoring role - not policeman. "Enforcement"
should be a last ditch effort and should only be done with the
involvement of the chair/dean. Because faculty do not like to play the
heavy with colleagues this is a difficult point to implement with any
effectiveness. Since chairs eventually return to the ranks, they often
are reluctant to do any thing that might be considered "disciplinary" or
give "orders" to faculty under their supervision. Even deans can be
reluctant as they sometimes return to the ranks as well.
If you can get the dean to walk around and wander into labs and
cafeterias and give direction, this is worth its weight in gold. A
chair is good too. Imagine the scenario in the cafeteria - Prof walks
up to technician wearing a lab coat in the cafeteria "I'm Prof
So-and-so. We require that lab coats be left in the laboratory. You
are potentially contaminating this cafeteria with biohazardous
organisms. Please take your lab coat back to the laboratory." OK, so
it's a bit far-fetched but I can dream :-)
Bottom Line:
I am not a big fan of the safety officers running around with clipboards
looking officious. It just causes people to act like cockroaches - when
they see you, they scatter. You will never be able to be everywhere at
the same time seeing "infractions" anyway. It is better to be the
person the worker calls from a pay phone with a complaint - you want
them to call you with concerns, not hide them.
I find today's new grad students much more safety aware (students from
some overseas areas excepted because of the low safety awareness in
their home countries) and will often call about waste questions, safety
equipment questions etc.
Get yourself invited to local safety committee meetings. Go along with
the committee members when they do inspections. They welcome your moral
support and feel like they have an expert to help them. (Even if you
don't feel like an expert, believe me, you are compared to the average
person in an academic department.) Workers often feel powerless and you
are seen as a neutral third party that can be a buffer between the lab
supervisors and the workers in the lab who are afraid to speak up.
Universities are notorious for using contract labor and they all fear
for their jobs.
If you can get a true safety culture in place, "enforcement" becomes
unnecessary as people will just "do it". If you have no safety
culture, then that is where you need to start. Enforcement is too
little too late.
My opinions only (natch).
--
Jennifer Minogue
Hazardous Materials Safety Officer
Environmental Health and Safety
University of Guelph
Guelph, Ontario N1G 2W1 Canada
519-824-4120-x3190
--------------8DE15998AB98C36E0D975480
Content-Type: text/html; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
"Enforcement". Sounds like brownshirts, unfortunately. However, it does mean that there must be consequences as a result of someone's choices.
I have several general comments about this topic.
Firstly, the "safety office" is not line management. Persons in the safety office (at least in academia) do not hire, fire, discipline, promote, demote, etc. You can't tell lab people to "do xxx or else" because what is the "or else"? You did not interview or hire anyone and so have no control over knowledge or experience of the lab personnel. You will not even know if they have received training (you probably won't even know if someone has been hired). This leads to my second comment.
Only lab supervisors/professors have authority over the workers under their supervision. You can go up the line as well to include chairs of departments. If the chair does not want to exert his/her authority, then the Dean may need to, right up to VP. I doubt you would find a President or Board (of Regents, Governors or whatever they are called) willing to deal with an issue. Hopefully it is resolved before it goes that high anyway. The corollary to all this is the lab supervisor / professor is responsible for the state of his/her lab. People may like to point fingers and say "it is all the lab tech's fault the place is a mess." The supervisor just needs to be reminded "just who is the boss here with control of the workplace." It is not the safety officer.
Safety Departments are advisory. You can point out to a professor/lab supervisor deficiencies in the lab. You can do it in writing with copies up the line (more effective). In certain jurisdictions, safety committees have the right to inspect and make recommendations to the supervisor/chair of the department (in writing). The supervisor/chair must then respond (in writing) to the recommendation. This can be a very powerful motivator.
External agencies have a lot of authority. Your local fire department, labor department, and nuclear safety reps have authority to shut down facilities - either an individual lab or an entire building if they are really cranked. This is guaranteed to get changes made. Or Accreditation Committees can get changes made as well if the program wants to stay accredited (esp important for professional programs such as MD, DVM, Engineering where no accreditation = no registration = no practice)
Colleagues may have a lot of authority - it depends. A VP may be willing to be the policeman and shut down facilities upon your recommendation. It depends on the political environment of each individual institution.
Faculty and supervisory staff are ultimately responsible for any incidents in their areas. If there are injuries/fatalities/property loss/citations by authorities, it is the faculty/supervisor who will be held responsible and be sitting in the witness box. Safety officers are there to help keep them out of court. Neither you nor an insurance policy can go to jail for the convicted supervisor.
So what to do? Here are some ideas:
1. If you are vested with authority of the highest order (VP or above), then you can shut down facilities (sometimes called "locking them out by changing the locks"). This gets very quick action. I wouldn't try it without being specifically authorized.
2. If you have Central Purchasing, you can stop purchase orders from going through. However, not every place has central purchasing and there is no way to tell what is being ordered. This also results in quick action.
3. If you have safety committees with authority to inspect/make recommendations, make sure they are inspecting for biohazard issues as well as fire extinguishers and extension cords. Inspections are in writing (at least a checklist) so there is a paper trail created. Unresolved deficincies look very bad in a supervisor's file, but only if his/her supervisor cares about what is happening in the area.
4. If there is a central budget office, funds can be "seized" or "frozen" until deficiencies are corrected. This is guaranteed to get someone's attention. You, again, will need authority from on high.
5. Have health and safety accountability written into employment contracts for supervisors and faculty members. (Does anyone out there currently have this???) This becomes a line item when being reviewed for tenure, promotion, and pay raises.
6. If biohazards are used in conjunction with animal/human projects, develop a strong liaison with your Animal Care Committee and Human Subjects/Ethics Committee. On some campuses these are very powerful committees that can stop work on a dime.
7. Make sure you have an active training program in liability and due diligence issues so that faculty/supervisors are aware of their responsibilities and what happens if things go wrong (just how many of those students have lawyers for parents??). Once it clicks in, they will be running to you to register projects and get training materials. However, don't expect a stampede at first.
8. Town Hall meetings with chairs/deans explaining the importance of the paper trail and due diligence intiatives may be useful. After all, they are the next-in-line for the lawsuits since they weren't supervising their supervisors.
9. If you have a union(s), make sure you are seen as an ally and not a pawn of management. Never pooh-pooh a concern or complaint even if it seems silly to you.
10. Have a "departmental safety officer" (a faculty member) in each academic department. Make biohazards part of the portfolio (plus chemical safety, radiation safety, etc). Try to make sure that this person has some respect, standing, and authority with other members of the department - not the low person on the totem pole. The dept safety officer needs to be in a mentoring role - not policeman. "Enforcement" should be a last ditch effort and should only be done with the involvement of the chair/dean. Because faculty do not like to play the heavy with colleagues this is a difficult point to implement with any effectiveness. Since chairs eventually return to the ranks, they often are reluctant to do any thing that might be considered "disciplinary" or give "orders" to faculty under their supervision. Even deans can be reluctant as they sometimes return to the ranks as well.
If you can get the dean to walk around and wander into labs and cafeterias and give direction, this is worth its weight in gold. A chair is good too. Imagine the scenario in the cafeteria - Prof walks up to technician wearing a lab coat in the cafeteria "I'm Prof So-and-so. We require that lab coats be left in the laboratory. You are potentially contaminating this cafeteria with biohazardous organisms. Please take your lab coat back to the laboratory." OK, so it's a bit far-fetched but I can dream :-)
Bottom Line:
I am not a big fan of the safety officers running around with clipboards looking officious. It just causes people to act like cockroaches - when they see you, they scatter. You will never be able to be everywhere at the same time seeing "infractions" anyway. It is better to be the person the worker calls from a pay phone with a complaint - you want them to call you with concerns, not hide them.
I find today's new grad students much more safety aware (students from some overseas areas excepted because of the low safety awareness in their home countries) and will often call about waste questions, safety equipment questions etc.
Get yourself invited to local safety committee meetings. Go along with the committee members when they do inspections. They welcome your moral support and feel like they have an expert to help them. (Even if you don't feel like an expert, believe me, you are compared to the average person in an academic department.) Workers often feel powerless and you are seen as a neutral third party that can be a buffer between the lab supervisors and the workers in the lab who are afraid to speak up. Universities are notorious for using contract labor and they all fear for their jobs.
If you can get a true safety culture in place, "enforcement" becomes unnecessary as people will just "do it". If you have no safety culture, then that is where you need to start. Enforcement is too little too late.
My opinions only (natch).
--
Jennifer Minogue
Hazardous Materials Safety Officer
Environmental Health and Safety
University of Guelph
Guelph, Ontario N1G 2W1 Canada
519-824-4120-x3190
--------------8DE15998AB98C36E0D975480--
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 31 Jul 2002 08:03:25 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Ton, Mimi"
Subject: Recall: Biosafety program enforcement
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Ton, Mimi would like to recall the message, "Biosafety program enforcement".
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 31 Jul 2002 11:10:02 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Donald G. Robasser"
Organization: Princeton University
Subject: Re: Select Agent List
MIME-Version: 1.0
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Richard and All,
Regarding the USDA agents included on the notification document,
particularly the VSV, I am trying to determine if there are current
regulations and permitting requirements in place (USDA regs) about
possession or transfer even of the laboratory strains, like the Indiana
strain. Can you lead me to the right documents or code for this.
Thanks.
Don Robasser
Princeton University
Richard Fink wrote:
> At 08:05 AM 7/26/2002 -0700, you wrote:
>
>
>> Leslie et al:
>>
>> I'm thinking that only the complete VSV agent would be involved and
>> not the g envelope protein of those people pseudotyping vectors.
>
>
> Hi Brenda,
>
> The concern over the envelop protein is due to the wording of the
> select agent reg. which considers genetic elements involved in
> pathogenicity as select agents. Hence under that consideration an
> expressed envelop protein of VSV would be considered the same as a
> select agent.
>
> Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
> Senior Biosafety Officer
> Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
> 617-258-5647
> rfink@mit.edu
>
--------------BC8D18839085B83E0B71D7ED
Content-Type: text/html; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Richard and All,
Regarding the USDA agents included on the notification document, particularly the VSV, I am trying to determine if there are current regulations and permitting requirements in place (USDA regs) about possession or transfer even of the laboratory strains, like the Indiana strain. Can you lead me to the right documents or code for this. Thanks.
Don Robasser
Princeton University
Richard Fink wrote:
At 08:05 AM 7/26/2002 -0700, you wrote:
Leslie et al:
I'm thinking that only the complete VSV agent would be involved and not the g envelope protein of those people pseudotyping vectors.
Hi Brenda,
The concern over the envelop protein is due to the wording of the select agent reg. which considers genetic elements involved in pathogenicity as select agents. Hence under that consideration an expressed envelop protein of VSV would be considered the same as a select agent.
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
--------------BC8D18839085B83E0B71D7ED--
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 31 Jul 2002 10:21:44 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Michael Betlach
Subject: Re: Select Agent List
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="----_=_NextPart_001_01C238A5.FA6AAE90"
This message is in MIME format. Since your mail reader does not understand
this format, some or all of this message may not be legible.
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Content-Type: text/plain;
charset="iso-8859-1"
ATCC has the following statement regarding the Indiana strain of VSV:
"These items are listed on the Department of Commerce, Commerce Control List
(CCL) and are distributed only within the 50 United States. They are not
available for international distribution.; Hawaiian Department of
Agriculture permit required for recipients in Hawaii; Requires Customer
Acceptance of Responsibility (CAR) for Commerce Control List (CCL)
Biological; USDA veterinary service permit (VS 16-6 or 16-6A)"
The Veterinary Service permits are available on the USDA web site, which
includes the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS). I haven't
checked to see if they have the actually statutory references, but would
start there.
Michael Betlach, Ph.D.
Biosafety Officer
Promega Corporation
5445 E. Cheryl Parkway
Madison, WI 53711
(608) 274-1181, Ext. 1270
-----Original Message-----
From: Donald G. Robasser [mailto:robasser@PRINCETON.EDU]
Sent: Wednesday, July 31, 2002 10:10 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Select Agent List
Richard and All,
Regarding the USDA agents included on the notification document,
particularly the VSV, I am trying to determine if there are current
regulations and permitting requirements in place (USDA regs) about
possession or transfer even of the laboratory strains, like the Indiana
strain. Can you lead me to the right documents or code for this. Thanks.
Don Robasser
Princeton University
Richard Fink wrote:
At 08:05 AM 7/26/2002 -0700, you wrote:
Leslie et al:
I'm thinking that only the complete VSV agent would be involved and not the
g envelope protein of those people pseudotyping vectors.
Hi Brenda,
The concern over the envelop protein is due to the wording of the select
agent reg. which considers genetic elements involved in pathogenicity as
select agents. Hence under that consideration an expressed envelop protein
of VSV would be considered the same as a select agent.
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
------_=_NextPart_001_01C238A5.FA6AAE90
Content-Type: text/html;
charset="iso-8859-1"
ATCC has the following statement regarding the Indiana strain of VSV:
"These items are listed on the Department of Commerce, Commerce Control List (CCL) and are distributed only within the 50 United States. They are not available for international distribution.; Hawaiian Department of Agriculture permit required for recipients in Hawaii; Requires Customer Acceptance of Responsibility (CAR) for Commerce Control List (CCL) Biological; USDA veterinary service permit (VS 16-6 or 16-6A)"
The Veterinary Service permits are available on the USDA web site, which includes the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS). I haven't checked to see if they have the actually statutory references, but would start there.
Michael Betlach, Ph.D.
Biosafety Officer
Promega Corporation
5445 E. Cheryl Parkway
Madison, WI 53711
(608) 274-1181, Ext. 1270
-----Original Message-----
From: Donald G. Robasser [mailto:robasser@PRINCETON.EDU]
Sent: Wednesday, July 31, 2002 10:10 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Select Agent List
Richard and All,
Regarding the USDA agents included on the notification document, particularly the VSV, I am trying to determine if there are current regulations and permitting requirements in place (USDA regs) about possession or transfer even of the laboratory strains, like the Indiana strain. Can you lead me to the right documents or code for this. Thanks.
Don Robasser
Princeton University
Richard Fink wrote:
At 08:05 AM 7/26/2002 -0700, you wrote:
Leslie et al:
I'm thinking that only the complete VSV agent would be involved and not the g envelope protein of those people pseudotyping vectors.
Hi Brenda,
The concern over the envelop protein is due to the wording of the select agent reg. which considers genetic elements involved in pathogenicity as select agents. Hence under that consideration an expressed envelop protein of VSV would be considered the same as a select agent.
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
------_=_NextPart_001_01C238A5.FA6AAE90--
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 31 Jul 2002 11:18:13 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Michele Crase
Subject: Re: Biosafety program enforcement
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Jennifer,
This was very well said. You have done a great job of explaining what
all safety depts should be doing at the University level. I passed it
around to all of my coworkers here at NIU. Sometime we need a little
reminder!
Thanks
Michele Crase, RBP
Biosafety Specialist
******************************************
Michele Crase
Environmental Health and Safety
Northern Illinois University
DeKalb, IL
mcrase@niu.edu
815-753-9251
>>> jminogue@UOGUELPH.CA 07/31/02 08:02AM >>>
"Enforcement". Sounds like brownshirts, unfortunately. However, it
does mean that there must be consequences as a result of someone's
choices.
I have several general comments about this topic.
Firstly, the "safety office" is not line management. Persons in the
safety office (at least in academia) do not hire, fire, discipline,
promote, demote, etc. You can't tell lab people to "do xxx or else"
because what is the "or else"? You did not interview or hire anyone
and
so have no control over knowledge or experience of the lab personnel.
You will not even know if they have received training (you probably
won't even know if someone has been hired). This leads to my second
comment.
Only lab supervisors/professors have authority over the workers under
their supervision. You can go up the line as well to include chairs
of
departments. If the chair does not want to exert his/her authority,
then the Dean may need to, right up to VP. I doubt you would find a
President or Board (of Regents, Governors or whatever they are called)
willing to deal with an issue. Hopefully it is resolved before it
goes
that high anyway. The corollary to all this is the lab supervisor /
professor is responsible for the state of his/her lab. People may
like
to point fingers and say "it is all the lab tech's fault the place is
a
mess." The supervisor just needs to be reminded "just who is the boss
here with control of the workplace." It is not the safety officer.
Safety Departments are advisory. You can point out to a professor/lab
supervisor deficiencies in the lab. You can do it in writing with
copies up the line (more effective). In certain jurisdictions, safety
committees have the right to inspect and make recommendations to the
supervisor/chair of the department (in writing). The supervisor/chair
must then respond (in writing) to the recommendation. This can be a
very powerful motivator.
External agencies have a lot of authority. Your local fire
department,
labor department, and nuclear safety reps have authority to shut down
facilities - either an individual lab or an entire building if they
are
really cranked. This is guaranteed to get changes made. Or
Accreditation Committees can get changes made as well if the program
wants to stay accredited (esp important for professional programs such
as MD, DVM, Engineering where no accreditation = no registration = no
practice)
Colleagues may have a lot of authority - it depends. A VP may be
willing to be the policeman and shut down facilities upon your
recommendation. It depends on the political environment of each
individual institution.
Faculty and supervisory staff are ultimately responsible for any
incidents in their areas. If there are injuries/fatalities/property
loss/citations by authorities, it is the faculty/supervisor who will
be
held responsible and be sitting in the witness box. Safety officers
are
there to help keep them out of court. Neither you nor an insurance
policy can go to jail for the convicted supervisor.
So what to do? Here are some ideas:
1. If you are vested with authority of the highest order (VP or
above),
then you can shut down facilities (sometimes called "locking them out
by
changing the locks"). This gets very quick action. I wouldn't try it
without being specifically authorized.
2. If you have Central Purchasing, you can stop purchase orders from
going through. However, not every place has central purchasing and
there is no way to tell what is being ordered. This also results in
quick action.
3. If you have safety committees with authority to inspect/make
recommendations, make sure they are inspecting for biohazard issues as
well as fire extinguishers and extension cords. Inspections are in
writing (at least a checklist) so there is a paper trail created.
Unresolved deficincies look very bad in a supervisor's file, but only
if
his/her supervisor cares about what is happening in the area.
4. If there is a central budget office, funds can be "seized" or
"frozen" until deficiencies are corrected. This is guaranteed to get
someone's attention. You, again, will need authority from on high.
5. Have health and safety accountability written into employment
contracts for supervisors and faculty members. (Does anyone out there
currently have this???) This becomes a line item when being reviewed
for tenure, promotion, and pay raises.
6. If biohazards are used in conjunction with animal/human projects,
develop a strong liaison with your Animal Care Committee and Human
Subjects/Ethics Committee. On some campuses these are very powerful
committees that can stop work on a dime.
7. Make sure you have an active training program in liability and due
diligence issues so that faculty/supervisors are aware of their
responsibilities and what happens if things go wrong (just how many of
those students have lawyers for parents??). Once it clicks in, they
will be running to you to register projects and get training
materials.
However, don't expect a stampede at first.
8. Town Hall meetings with chairs/deans explaining the importance of
the paper trail and due diligence intiatives may be useful. After
all,
they are the next-in-line for the lawsuits since they weren't
supervising their supervisors.
9. If you have a union(s), make sure you are seen as an ally and not
a
pawn of management. Never pooh-pooh a concern or complaint even if it
seems silly to you.
10. Have a "departmental safety officer" (a faculty member) in each
academic department. Make biohazards part of the portfolio (plus
chemical safety, radiation safety, etc). Try to make sure that this
person has some respect, standing, and authority with other members of
the department - not the low person on the totem pole. The dept
safety
officer needs to be in a mentoring role - not policeman.
"Enforcement"
should be a last ditch effort and should only be done with the
involvement of the chair/dean. Because faculty do not like to play
the
heavy with colleagues this is a difficult point to implement with any
effectiveness. Since chairs eventually return to the ranks, they
often
are reluctant to do any thing that might be considered "disciplinary"
or
give "orders" to faculty under their supervision. Even deans can be
reluctant as they sometimes return to the ranks as well.
If you can get the dean to walk around and wander into labs and
cafeterias and give direction, this is worth its weight in gold. A
chair is good too. Imagine the scenario in the cafeteria - Prof
walks
up to technician wearing a lab coat in the cafeteria "I'm Prof
So-and-so. We require that lab coats be left in the laboratory. You
are potentially contaminating this cafeteria with biohazardous
organisms. Please take your lab coat back to the laboratory." OK, so
it's a bit far-fetched but I can dream :-)
Bottom Line:
I am not a big fan of the safety officers running around with
clipboards
looking officious. It just causes people to act like cockroaches -
when
they see you, they scatter. You will never be able to be everywhere
at
the same time seeing "infractions" anyway. It is better to be the
person the worker calls from a pay phone with a complaint - you want
them to call you with concerns, not hide them.
I find today's new grad students much more safety aware (students from
some overseas areas excepted because of the low safety awareness in
their home countries) and will often call about waste questions,
safety
equipment questions etc.
Get yourself invited to local safety committee meetings. Go along
with
the committee members when they do inspections. They welcome your
moral
support and feel like they have an expert to help them. (Even if you
don't feel like an expert, believe me, you are compared to the average
person in an academic department.) Workers often feel powerless and
you
are seen as a neutral third party that can be a buffer between the lab
supervisors and the workers in the lab who are afraid to speak up.
Universities are notorious for using contract labor and they all fear
for their jobs.
If you can get a true safety culture in place, "enforcement" becomes
unnecessary as people will just "do it". If you have no safety
culture, then that is where you need to start. Enforcement is too
little too late.
My opinions only (natch).
--
Jennifer Minogue
Hazardous Materials Safety Officer
Environmental Health and Safety
University of Guelph
Guelph, Ontario N1G 2W1 Canada
519-824-4120-x3190
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 31 Jul 2002 15:58:10 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Hauck, Philip"
Subject: Re: Biosafety program enforcement
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: multipart/mixed; boundary="Boundary_(ID_Uiw2tQc4MKz1Diovh/ZX3g)"
This is a multi-part message in MIME format.
--Boundary_(ID_Uiw2tQc4MKz1Diovh/ZX3g)
Content-type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-transfer-encoding: quoted-printable
I will give you two of my tools that I use, and explain how they work.
I will use the BIOAUDITFORM to investigate the activities and practices =
in a laboratory. If I find minor issues I try and get the issue =
corrected on the spot.
If it is a serious incident or I perceive resistance in complying with =
the request, I will document the occurrence with the Compliance =
Correction Request, and request a response in a reasonable time.
If I do not get a response from this form, I resend the form with a c to =
the Dean of Research. Failure inaction will be addressed by the Dean.
I used this same approach and forms at another institution. Only once in =
22 Years did a situation arise where the Dean of Research and Sponsored =
Programs withheld a researcher's grant internally. We decided against =
notifying the NIH since this would affect the overall program. The only =
money released was to cover the technical staff's salary. When the BSC =
was finally certified, the grant money was released again. (The BSC was =
used in a HIV Research laboratory which requires annual certification as =
per OSHA, and the researcher did not think this requirement fair!)
I hope this helps,
Philip G. Hauck, MS, MSHS, CIH, SM(NRM)
-----Original Message-----
From: Steve Stauffer [mailto:rsstauffer@UCDAVIS.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, July 30, 2002 3:53 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Biosafety program enforcement
On 7/30/02 6:10 AM, "Murray, Krista" =
wrote:
> Hello Everyone-
> I had a question particularly for the academic institutions out =
there. How
> do you enforce your biosafety regulations- either for general =
biosafety or
> your bloodborne pathogens program? This could include infractions =
ranging
> from not completing required training, finding food in the lab, =
wearing dirty
> lab coats in the break areas, etc. to not registering the biological =
work
> taking place in the lab. Who does the enforcing- the safety office, =
the
> department chair/dean, your research office, etc? Do repeat offenses =
get
> escalated?
>
> Our last internal program audit raised the concern that we didn't =
have a
> formal procedure in writing for addressing infractions. We were =
hoping to get
> a feel for the "industry standard", especially with all the impending =
changes
> in biosecurity!
>
> Please respond to me directly- I'd be happy to share responses if =
anyone else
> is interested. Thanks for your assistance. Krista
>
I am interested in the responses you receive.
Steve
-------------------------------------------------
Steve Stauffer
Quarantine Officer: Contained Research Facility
University of California at Davis
(530) 752-6920 (voice); (530) 754-7757 (fax)
--Boundary_(ID_Uiw2tQc4MKz1Diovh/ZX3g)
Content-type: application/msword; name=BIOAUDITFRM.doc
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 31 Jul 2002 16:21:53 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Hauck, Philip"
Subject: Re: background screenings
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
Content-transfer-encoding: quoted-printable
Your immigration coordinator at WMC-CU (Ruth Golden)in HR should have a =
list of people at the College who have valid visas, and what countries =
they come from (this is an INA requirement for student visas). This =
should be matched to those areas reporting SLAs present.
Where we all run into problems is with native-borne Americans. Doing =
background screens on citizens can involve problems with discrimination =
issues, profiling, civil liberties violations, and invasion of privacy. =
I guess the key would be if you had "probable cause to suspect an =
individual", then you could examine his/her background.
Philip G. Hauck MS, MSHS, CIH, SM(NRM)
-----Original Message-----
From: Erik A. Talley [mailto:ert2002@MED.CORNELL.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, July 30, 2002 1:40 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: background screenings
For those currently transferring select agents, do any of you have a
consultant performing the "restricted user" check under the PATRIOT Act? =
So
far, I have only seen policies which call for campus public safety to =
make
the determination using their resources. I am looking for a consultant =
who
might do this.
Thanks,
Erik
At 10:09 AM 7/30/2002 -0700, you wrote:
>What are universities planning to do to comply with the background
>screening portion of the new act? Who will be administering the =
screenings
>and how will they be administered? I have seen disclosure forms from a =
few
>schools, but others have told me that the Attorney General's office =
will
>be doing the legwork.
>
>Any suggestions or examples would be greatly appreciated.
>
>Sheila Hedayati
>
>
>
>Sheila Hedayati, MPH
>Biological Safety Officer
>University of Southern California
> Los Angeles, CA 90033
>shedayati@busaff.usc.edu
___________________________________
Erik A. Talley, Director
Environmental Health and Safety
Weill Medical College of Cornell University
418 East 71st Street, Suite 62
New York, NY 10021
212-746-6201
ert2002@med.cornell.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 31 Jul 2002 16:23:52 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Hauck, Philip"
Subject: FW: background screenings
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
Content-transfer-encoding: quoted-printable
-----Original Message-----
From: Hauck, Philip
Sent: Wednesday, July 31, 2002 4:22 PM
To: 'A Biosafety Discussion List'
Subject: RE: background screenings
Your immigration coordinator at WMC-CU in Human Resources should have a =
list of people at the College who have valid visas, and what countries =
they come from (this is an INA requirement for student visas). This =
should be matched to those areas reporting SLAs present.
Where we all run into problems is with native-borne Americans. Doing =
background screens on citizens can involve problems with discrimination =
issues, profiling, civil liberties violations, and invasion of privacy. =
I guess the key would be if you had "probable cause to suspect an =
individual", then you could examine his/her background.
Philip G. Hauck MS, MSHS, CIH, SM(NRM)
-----Original Message-----
From: Erik A. Talley [mailto:ert2002@MED.CORNELL.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, July 30, 2002 1:40 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: background screenings
For those currently transferring select agents, do any of you have a
consultant performing the "restricted user" check under the PATRIOT Act? =
So
far, I have only seen policies which call for campus public safety to =
make
the determination using their resources. I am looking for a consultant =
who
might do this.
Thanks,
Erik
At 10:09 AM 7/30/2002 -0700, you wrote:
>What are universities planning to do to comply with the background
>screening portion of the new act? Who will be administering the =
screenings
>and how will they be administered? I have seen disclosure forms from a =
few
>schools, but others have told me that the Attorney General's office =
will
>be doing the legwork.
>
>Any suggestions or examples would be greatly appreciated.
>
>Sheila Hedayati
>
>
>
>Sheila Hedayati, MPH
>Biological Safety Officer
>University of Southern California
> Los Angeles, CA 90033
>shedayati@busaff.usc.edu
___________________________________
Erik A. Talley, Director
Environmental Health and Safety
Weill Medical College of Cornell University
418 East 71st Street, Suite 62
New York, NY 10021
212-746-6201
ert2002@med.cornell.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 31 Jul 2002 17:24:14 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Hauck, Philip"
Subject: Re: Biosafety program enforcement
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
Content-transfer-encoding: quoted-printable
Your points are well taken, and are mostly true! However, in the States, =
we have the OSHA General Duty Clause, 5b which everyone =
forgets...Employees are required to adhere to all safety standards and =
directives issued by the Employer. If an employee (and that includes =
Faculty, Deans, etc)does not adhere, and you have had the foresight to =
include this passage in your over all Top-down safety policies, you can =
FIRE the employee for employee misconduct, or at least recommend that =
the employee be terminated by the HR Director. You can also withhold =
grants internally since your researchers and PIs all signed agreements =
on their RO1's and other NIH grants that they would abide by all OSHA, =
EPA regulations, and the Institution also enters into that agreement as =
the receiving institution. There are mechanisms to obtain compliance.
Philip G. Hauck, MS,MSHS, CIH, SM(NRM)
-----Original Message-----
From: Michele Crase [mailto:E00MMC1@WPO.CSO.NIU.EDU]
Sent: Wednesday, July 31, 2002 12:18 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Biosafety program enforcement
Jennifer,
This was very well said. You have done a great job of explaining what
all safety depts should be doing at the University level. I passed it
around to all of my coworkers here at NIU. Sometime we need a little
reminder!
Thanks
Michele Crase, RBP
Biosafety Specialist
******************************************
Michele Crase
Environmental Health and Safety
Northern Illinois University
DeKalb, IL
mcrase@niu.edu
815-753-9251
>>> jminogue@UOGUELPH.CA 07/31/02 08:02AM >>>
"Enforcement". Sounds like brownshirts, unfortunately. However, it
does mean that there must be consequences as a result of someone's
choices.
I have several general comments about this topic.
Firstly, the "safety office" is not line management. Persons in the
safety office (at least in academia) do not hire, fire, discipline,
promote, demote, etc. You can't tell lab people to "do xxx or else"
because what is the "or else"? You did not interview or hire anyone
and
so have no control over knowledge or experience of the lab personnel.
You will not even know if they have received training (you probably
won't even know if someone has been hired). This leads to my second
comment.
Only lab supervisors/professors have authority over the workers under
their supervision. You can go up the line as well to include chairs
of
departments. If the chair does not want to exert his/her authority,
then the Dean may need to, right up to VP. I doubt you would find a
President or Board (of Regents, Governors or whatever they are called)
willing to deal with an issue. Hopefully it is resolved before it
goes
that high anyway. The corollary to all this is the lab supervisor /
professor is responsible for the state of his/her lab. People may
like
to point fingers and say "it is all the lab tech's fault the place is
a
mess." The supervisor just needs to be reminded "just who is the boss
here with control of the workplace." It is not the safety officer.
Safety Departments are advisory. You can point out to a professor/lab
supervisor deficiencies in the lab. You can do it in writing with
copies up the line (more effective). In certain jurisdictions, safety
committees have the right to inspect and make recommendations to the
supervisor/chair of the department (in writing). The supervisor/chair
must then respond (in writing) to the recommendation. This can be a
very powerful motivator.
External agencies have a lot of authority. Your local fire
department,
labor department, and nuclear safety reps have authority to shut down
facilities - either an individual lab or an entire building if they
are
really cranked. This is guaranteed to get changes made. Or
Accreditation Committees can get changes made as well if the program
wants to stay accredited (esp important for professional programs such
as MD, DVM, Engineering where no accreditation =3D no registration =3D =
no
practice)
Colleagues may have a lot of authority - it depends. A VP may be
willing to be the policeman and shut down facilities upon your
recommendation. It depends on the political environment of each
individual institution.
Faculty and supervisory staff are ultimately responsible for any
incidents in their areas. If there are injuries/fatalities/property
loss/citations by authorities, it is the faculty/supervisor who will
be
held responsible and be sitting in the witness box. Safety officers
are
there to help keep them out of court. Neither you nor an insurance
policy can go to jail for the convicted supervisor.
So what to do? Here are some ideas:
1. If you are vested with authority of the highest order (VP or
above),
then you can shut down facilities (sometimes called "locking them out
by
changing the locks"). This gets very quick action. I wouldn't try it
without being specifically authorized.
2. If you have Central Purchasing, you can stop purchase orders from
going through. However, not every place has central purchasing and
there is no way to tell what is being ordered. This also results in
quick action.
3. If you have safety committees with authority to inspect/make
recommendations, make sure they are inspecting for biohazard issues as
well as fire extinguishers and extension cords. Inspections are in
writing (at least a checklist) so there is a paper trail created.
Unresolved deficincies look very bad in a supervisor's file, but only
if
his/her supervisor cares about what is happening in the area.
4. If there is a central budget office, funds can be "seized" or
"frozen" until deficiencies are corrected. This is guaranteed to get
someone's attention. You, again, will need authority from on high.
5. Have health and safety accountability written into employment
contracts for supervisors and faculty members. (Does anyone out there
currently have this???) This becomes a line item when being reviewed
for tenure, promotion, and pay raises.
6. If biohazards are used in conjunction with animal/human projects,
develop a strong liaison with your Animal Care Committee and Human
Subjects/Ethics Committee. On some campuses these are very powerful
committees that can stop work on a dime.
7. Make sure you have an active training program in liability and due
diligence issues so that faculty/supervisors are aware of their
responsibilities and what happens if things go wrong (just how many of
those students have lawyers for parents??). Once it clicks in, they
will be running to you to register projects and get training
materials.
However, don't expect a stampede at first.
8. Town Hall meetings with chairs/deans explaining the importance of
the paper trail and due diligence intiatives may be useful. After
all,
they are the next-in-line for the lawsuits since they weren't
supervising their supervisors.
9. If you have a union(s), make sure you are seen as an ally and not
a
pawn of management. Never pooh-pooh a concern or complaint even if it
seems silly to you.
10. Have a "departmental safety officer" (a faculty member) in each
academic department. Make biohazards part of the portfolio (plus
chemical safety, radiation safety, etc). Try to make sure that this
person has some respect, standing, and authority with other members of
the department - not the low person on the totem pole. The dept
safety
officer needs to be in a mentoring role - not policeman.
"Enforcement"
should be a last ditch effort and should only be done with the
involvement of the chair/dean. Because faculty do not like to play
the
heavy with colleagues this is a difficult point to implement with any
effectiveness. Since chairs eventually return to the ranks, they
often
are reluctant to do any thing that might be considered "disciplinary"
or
give "orders" to faculty under their supervision. Even deans can be
reluctant as they sometimes return to the ranks as well.
If you can get the dean to walk around and wander into labs and
cafeterias and give direction, this is worth its weight in gold. A
chair is good too. Imagine the scenario in the cafeteria - Prof
walks
up to technician wearing a lab coat in the cafeteria "I'm Prof
So-and-so. We require that lab coats be left in the laboratory. You
are potentially contaminating this cafeteria with biohazardous
organisms. Please take your lab coat back to the laboratory." OK, so
it's a bit far-fetched but I can dream :-)
Bottom Line:
I am not a big fan of the safety officers running around with
clipboards
looking officious. It just causes people to act like cockroaches -
when
they see you, they scatter. You will never be able to be everywhere
at
the same time seeing "infractions" anyway. It is better to be the
person the worker calls from a pay phone with a complaint - you want
them to call you with concerns, not hide them.
I find today's new grad students much more safety aware (students from
some overseas areas excepted because of the low safety awareness in
their home countries) and will often call about waste questions,
safety
equipment questions etc.
Get yourself invited to local safety committee meetings. Go along
with
the committee members when they do inspections. They welcome your
moral
support and feel like they have an expert to help them. (Even if you
don't feel like an expert, believe me, you are compared to the average
person in an academic department.) Workers often feel powerless and
you
are seen as a neutral third party that can be a buffer between the lab
supervisors and the workers in the lab who are afraid to speak up.
Universities are notorious for using contract labor and they all fear
for their jobs.
If you can get a true safety culture in place, "enforcement" becomes
unnecessary as people will just "do it". If you have no safety
culture, then that is where you need to start. Enforcement is too
little too late.
My opinions only (natch).
--
Jennifer Minogue
Hazardous Materials Safety Officer
Environmental Health and Safety
University of Guelph
Guelph, Ontario N1G 2W1 Canada
519-824-4120-x3190
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 2 Sep 2002 08:57:12 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ginger Brown
Subject: Discarded Form
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Ed,
One of our PIs received the Notification form and threw it away.
What corrective action is needed?
Ginger Brown, CBSP
TX A&M University
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 2 Sep 2002 14:12:21 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ginger Brown
Subject: USDA Veterinary Permits
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
I am assuming that in box 16 of the Notification form, we would only enter =
numbers of any permits that are still
current......... .i.e, has not expired yet. Is this assumption correct?
Ginger Brown, CBSP
TX A&M University
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 3 Sep 2002 08:55:43 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Jeppesen, Eric R"
Subject: Re: Child forms
MIME-Version: 1.0
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Here's another couple of questions. I'm not sure if they have been answered
yet.
Does the form have to be in by the 10th or postmarked by the 10th? I still
have forms coming in, even
with an EHS deadline of Aug 30th (last Friday) and a full page of PI's who
have not responded. I'm looking
at getting the form out to ASI on Friday the 6th.
What happens if the form(s) are not in by the 10th but come in the 11th or
12th? Is there a penalty, a notice,
a strong tongue lashing?
Eric R. Jeppesen
Laboratory Safety Specialist
KU-EHS Dept.
(785) 864-2857 phone
(785) 864-2852 fax
jeppesen@ku.edu
-----Original Message-----
From: Ed Gaunt [mailto:egaunt@]
Sent: Friday, August 30, 2002 2:46 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Child forms
It means that the non-respondents will be sent 8 reminder postcards after
September 13. They will be bright pink and I will post what they will look
like on the list. Hopefully you can round them up and return them.
Ed
-----Original Message-----
From: Jeppesen, Eric R [mailto:jeppesen@KU.EDU]
Sent: Friday, August 30, 2002 11:10 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Child forms
So what exactly happens if only a couple of forms make it to me (RFO) and
the rest are thrown away?
If I only receive two and there were ten sent out, what does that mean for
our institution?
Eric
Eric R. Jeppesen
Laboratory Safety Specialist
KU-EHS Dept.
(785) 864-2857 phone
(785) 864-2852 fax
jeppesen@ku.edu
-----Original Message-----
From: Ed Gaunt [mailto:egaunt@]
Sent: Friday, August 30, 2002 9:43 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Child forms
We're finding out that a lot of folks (men?) are filling out the forms and
THEN reading the instructions!!! Depends on what isn't well erased.
White-out is allowed!. Mainly what needs to be erased/whited out on the
child forms is the signature and anything in Box 12. These will definitely
generate errors on a child form.
Ed
-----Original Message-----
From: Jaeger, James [mailto:jjaeger@ADMIN1.UMARYLAND.EDU]
Sent: Friday, August 30, 2002 10:38 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Child forms
I am getting "child" forms that individuals have filled in completely before
deciding to send them to me (the RFO). Erasing their marks will not be
completely successful. Will these generate error letters?
James J. Jaeger, Ph.D.
RFO, Univ. MD Baltimore
-----Original Message-----
From: Ed Gaunt [mailto:egaunt@]
Sent: Friday, August 30, 2002 10:12 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Child forms
The only thing that needs to be filled in on the "Child" forms is the
information requested in Box 2. All other information provided on these
forms is ignored--unless you sign the form, which will then generate an
error letter, since we are unable to discern your intentions. This will
result in another form being sent for completion.
Ed
------_=_NextPart_001_01C25351.98359520
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charset="iso-8859-1"
Here's another couple of questions. I'm not sure if they have been answered yet.
Does the form have to be in by the 10th or postmarked by the 10th? I still have forms coming in, even
with an EHS deadline of Aug 30th (last Friday) and a full page of PI's who have not responded. I'm looking
at getting the form out to ASI on Friday the 6th.
What happens if the form(s) are not in by the 10th but come in the 11th or 12th? Is there a penalty, a notice,
a strong tongue lashing?
Eric R. Jeppesen
Laboratory Safety Specialist
KU-EHS Dept.
(785) 864-2857 phone
(785) 864-2852 fax
jeppesen@ku.edu
-----Original Message-----
From: Ed Gaunt [mailto:egaunt@]
Sent: Friday, August 30, 2002 2:46 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Child forms
It means that the non-respondents will be sent 8 reminder postcards after September 13. They will be bright pink and I will post what they will look like on the list. Hopefully you can round them up and return them.
Ed
-----Original Message-----
From: Jeppesen, Eric R [mailto:jeppesen@KU.EDU]
Sent: Friday, August 30, 2002 11:10 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Child forms
So what exactly happens if only a couple of forms make it to me (RFO) and the rest are thrown away?
If I only receive two and there were ten sent out, what does that mean for our institution?
Eric
Eric R. Jeppesen
Laboratory Safety Specialist
KU-EHS Dept.
(785) 864-2857 phone
(785) 864-2852 fax
jeppesen@ku.edu
-----Original Message-----
From: Ed Gaunt [mailto:egaunt@]
Sent: Friday, August 30, 2002 9:43 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Child forms
We're finding out that a lot of folks (men?) are filling out the forms and THEN reading the instructions!!! Depends on what isn't well erased. White-out is allowed!. Mainly what needs to be erased/whited out on the child forms is the signature and anything in Box 12. These will definitely generate errors on a child form.
Ed
-----Original Message-----
From: Jaeger, James [mailto:jjaeger@ADMIN1.UMARYLAND.EDU]
Sent: Friday, August 30, 2002 10:38 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Child forms
I am getting "child" forms that individuals have filled in completely before deciding to send them to me (the RFO). Erasing their marks will not be completely successful. Will these generate error letters?
James J. Jaeger, Ph.D.
RFO, Univ. MD Baltimore
-----Original Message-----
From: Ed Gaunt [mailto:egaunt@]
Sent: Friday, August 30, 2002 10:12 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Child forms
The only thing that needs to be filled in on the "Child" forms is the information requested in Box 2. All other information provided on these forms is ignored--unless you sign the form, which will then generate an error letter, since we are unable to discern your intentions. This will result in another form being sent for completion.
Ed
------_=_NextPart_001_01C25351.98359520--
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 3 Sep 2002 11:03:56 -0500
Reply-To: speaker@ehs.psu.edu
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Curt Speaker
Organization: UNIVERSITY SAFETY
Subject: SAs - Clear as Mud!
Morning:
Okay, here we go. I called the CDC hotline this morning because I
need an additional 17 machine-readable forms to cover all 20 of my
institutions locations (or so I thought). I was quite surprised to get
through with almost no wait. I spoke to a polite gentleman named
Lee who proceeded to tell me that I needed to submit one summary
form for our main campus (where we have SAs), but DID NOT need
to submit for the other 19 locations were we do not. He said that we
did, however, have to account for all of the forms that have been
sent to University faculty, staff and nurses (this is the kicker - our
campus nurses received the forms because they purchase USDA
blood testing kits or vaccines).
Does this sound totally contrary to what Ed has been telling us for
the past 3 weeks??? Anyone care to clarify, or does my subject line
pretty much say it all ?!?!?
I really want to do the right thing here (especially since our Vice
President for Research and Dean of the Graduate School is going to
sign off on these as the RFO), but this is getting more and more
difficult to understand...
...
Curt
Curt Speaker
Biosafety Officer
Penn State University
Environmental Health and Safety
speaker@ehs.psu.edu
^...^
(O_O)
=(Y)=
"""
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 3 Sep 2002 11:02:51 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Leila Khatib
Subject: Re: E. coli
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed"
Enterohemmorhagic E. coli produces shiga-like toxin (SLT) as opposed
to shiga toxin (ST). People call ithe E. coli version shiga toxin
but that is not accurate. The theory is that at some point in
evolutionary history E. coli acquired the shiga toxin from Shigella
but at this time the toxins have diverged and now produce similar
symptoms but the DNA sequences are distinct and therefore considered
different toxins. There are references for this if needed.
Leila Khatib, Ph.D.
Biosafety
Environment Health and Safety
UC Berkeley
>Good morning and thank you very much for all the help that's been given on the
>Select Agents issue. I have one question and I apologize if it has been asked
>already: Enterohemorrhagic E. coli is not on the Select Agent list,
>but it does
>produce Shigatoxin, do you have to claim the shigatoxin in the laboratory even
>though it is not collected or used, but just simply a by-product for E. coli
>research?
>
>Thanks in advance.
>
>Larry Mendoza
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 3 Sep 2002 15:35:25 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "OLINGER, PATRICIA L [S&C/0216]"
Subject: Permit Numbers
MIME-Version: 1.0
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this format, some or all of this message may not be legible.
--------------InterScan_NT_MIME_Boundary
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boundary="----_=_NextPart_001_01C25380.88F07718"
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charset="iso-8859-1"
I need an interpretation.
Permit numbers?
The official form asks for USDA permit numbers and expiration dates (if
applicable). Does it actually mean ALL USDA permit numbers a facility
might have? Regardless if you have SAs or not? What is meant by "if
applicable"?
Thanks!
Patty Olinger
Pharmacia, Kalamazoo Corporate Services - ESH
Biosafety Officer
------_=_NextPart_001_01C25380.88F07718
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charset="iso-8859-1"
I need an interpretation.
Permit numbers?
The official form asks for USDA permit numbers and expiration dates (if applicable). Does it actually mean ALL USDA permit numbers a facility might have? Regardless if you have SAs or not? What is meant by "if applicable"?
Thanks!
Patty Olinger
Pharmacia, Kalamazoo Corporate Services - ESH
Biosafety Officer
------_=_NextPart_001_01C25380.88F07718--
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=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 3 Sep 2002 15:50:38 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Janet Peterson
Subject: Re: Child forms
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="------------A05A0C6AA7FDADE54EBA3C86"
--------------A05A0C6AA7FDADE54EBA3C86
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Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Ed:
One more question has arisen as I fill out the form: Question 16
asks for veterinary permit numbers for importation and transportation of
"controlled materials, organisms, and vectors." I presume you only want
permit numbers for the USDA agents and overlap agents we are reporting
on the form, is that correct? Many thanks.
Janet Peterson, Biosafety Officer and RFO
University of Maryland, College Park
Ed Gaunt wrote:
> We're finding out that a lot of folks (men?) are filling out the
> forms and THEN reading the instructions!!! Depends on what isn't well
> erased. White-out is allowed!. Mainly what needs to be erased/whited
> out on the child forms is the signature and anything in Box 12. These
> will definitely generate errors on a child form.Ed
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Jaeger, James [mailto:jjaeger@ADMIN1.UMARYLAND.EDU]
> Sent: Friday, August 30, 2002 10:38 AM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: Re: Child forms
>
> I am getting "child" forms that individuals have filled in
> completely before deciding to send them to me (the RFO).
> Erasing their marks will not be completely successful. Will
> these generate error letters?
> James J. Jaeger, Ph.D.
>
> RFO, Univ. MD Baltimore
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Ed Gaunt [mailto:egaunt@]
> Sent: Friday, August 30, 2002 10:12 AM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: Re: Child forms
>
> The only thing that needs to be filled in on the
> "Child" forms is the information requested in Box
> 2. All other information provided on these forms
> is ignored--unless you sign the form, which will
> then generate an error letter, since we are unable
> to discern your intentions. This will result in
> another form being sent for completion.Ed
>
>
>
--------------A05A0C6AA7FDADE54EBA3C86
Content-Type: text/html; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Ed:
One more question has arisen as I fill out the form: Question 16 asks for veterinary permit numbers for importation and transportation of "controlled materials, organisms, and vectors." I presume you only want permit numbers for the USDA agents and overlap agents we are reporting on the form, is that correct? Many thanks.
Janet Peterson, Biosafety Officer and RFO
University of Maryland, College Park
Ed Gaunt wrote:
We're finding out that a lot of folks (men?) are filling out the forms and THEN reading the instructions!!! Depends on what isn't well erased. White-out is allowed!. Mainly what needs to be erased/whited out on the child forms is the signature and anything in Box 12. These will definitely generate errors on a child form.Ed
-----Original Message-----
From: Jaeger, James [mailto:jjaeger@ADMIN1.UMARYLAND.EDU]
Sent: Friday, August 30, 2002 10:38 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Child forms
I am getting "child" forms that individuals have filled in completely before deciding to send them to me (the RFO). Erasing their marks will not be completely successful. Will these generate error letters?
James J. Jaeger, Ph.D.
RFO, Univ. MD Baltimore
-----Original Message-----
From: Ed Gaunt [mailto:egaunt@]
Sent: Friday, August 30, 2002 10:12 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Child forms
The only thing that needs to be filled in on the "Child" forms is the information requested in Box 2. All other information provided on these forms is ignored--unless you sign the form, which will then generate an error letter, since we are unable to discern your intentions. This will result in another form being sent for completion.Ed
--------------A05A0C6AA7FDADE54EBA3C86--
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 3 Sep 2002 15:55:52 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ed Gaunt
Subject: Re: Discarded Form
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
All...
Tell the folks who threw away their forms, they should read the fine print
first!!!
If they threw away forms and they are non-possessors, just tell them to fill
out and return the pink post cards when they get it. Tell them NOT to
ignore the postcard!!!
We are up to our ears in forms today (over 10,000 received so far today), so
it may be a while before I can respond to my other 50 e-mails...
Ed
-----Original Message-----
From: Ginger Brown [mailto:gingerbrown@TAMU.EDU]
Sent: Monday, September 02, 2002 9:57 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Discarded Form
Ed,
One of our PIs received the Notification form and threw it away.
What corrective action is needed?
Ginger Brown, CBSP
TX A&M University
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 3 Sep 2002 16:12:24 -0400
Reply-To: elizabeth.st-louis@mcgill.ca
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "ELizabeth St. Louis"
Subject: Testing for animal allergens
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT
Good afternoon,
Do any of you have experience in testing for rodent allergens (air,
bulk samples)? If so, I would be interested in your testing
methodology and interpretation. Please contact me directly.
Thanks in advance,
Elizabeth St.Louis, Biosafety & WHMIS Officer
Environmental Safety Office, McGill University
Chancellor Day Hall, 3644 Peel, Rm. 618
Montreal QC H3A 1W9
Tel.: (514) 398-1657 Fax.: (514) 398-8047
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 3 Sep 2002 16:39:25 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Janet Peterson
Subject: Another form question
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Hi Ed,
Sorry you are drowning in forms today. Unfortunately, actually filling out
the form seems to generate questions. In item 14, should we indicate work that
is done at our facility if it does not include select agents? For example, the
university is involved in teaching, but none of the select agents are used for
teaching purposes. Should teaching be selected?
Many thanks,
Janet Peterson, Biosafety Officer and RFO
University of Maryland, College Park
Ed Gaunt wrote:
> All...
>
> Tell the folks who threw away their forms, they should read the fine print
> first!!!
>
> If they threw away forms and they are non-possessors, just tell them to fill
> out and return the pink post cards when they get it. Tell them NOT to
> ignore the postcard!!!
>
> We are up to our ears in forms today (over 10,000 received so far today), so
> it may be a while before I can respond to my other 50 e-mails...
>
> Ed
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Ginger Brown [mailto:gingerbrown@TAMU.EDU]
> Sent: Monday, September 02, 2002 9:57 AM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: Discarded Form
>
> Ed,
> One of our PIs received the Notification form and threw it away.
> What corrective action is needed?
>
> Ginger Brown, CBSP
> TX A&M University
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 3 Sep 2002 19:54:30 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ed Gaunt
Subject: Re: USDA Veterinary Permits
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Only enter I/E permits for any possessed agent on the list, whether they are
expired or not.
Ed
-----Original Message-----
From: Ginger Brown [mailto:gingerbrown@TAMU.EDU]
Sent: Monday, September 02, 2002 3:12 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: USDA Veterinary Permits
I am assuming that in box 16 of the Notification form, we would only enter
numbers of any permits that are still
current......... .i.e, has not expired yet. Is this assumption correct?
Ginger Brown, CBSP
TX A&M University
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 3 Sep 2002 20:01:47 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ed Gaunt
Subject: Re: Child forms
MIME-Version: 1.0
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boundary="----_=_NextPart_001_01C253A6.42ED9C20"
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this format, some or all of this message may not be legible.
------_=_NextPart_001_01C253A6.42ED9C20
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charset="iso-8859-1"
Shoot for having the forms POSTMARKED by September 10. We will query our
database at COB (or whenever the processing for the day has been completed)
on Friday Sept 13 to determine who has not responded. Reminder postcards
will be mailed out On Monday, 9/16, to everyone we have not heard back from
yet.
Ed
-----Original Message-----
From: Jeppesen, Eric R [mailto:jeppesen@KU.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, September 03, 2002 9:56 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Child forms
Here's another couple of questions. I'm not sure if they have been answered
yet.
Does the form have to be in by the 10th or postmarked by the 10th? I still
have forms coming in, even
with an EHS deadline of Aug 30th (last Friday) and a full page of PI's who
have not responded. I'm looking
at getting the form out to ASI on Friday the 6th.
What happens if the form(s) are not in by the 10th but come in the 11th or
12th? Is there a penalty, a notice,
a strong tongue lashing?
Eric R. Jeppesen
Laboratory Safety Specialist
KU-EHS Dept.
(785) 864-2857 phone
(785) 864-2852 fax
jeppesen@ku.edu
-----Original Message-----
From: Ed Gaunt [mailto:egaunt@]
Sent: Friday, August 30, 2002 2:46 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Child forms
It means that the non-respondents will be sent 8 reminder postcards after
September 13. They will be bright pink and I will post what they will look
like on the list. Hopefully you can round them up and return them.
Ed
-----Original Message-----
From: Jeppesen, Eric R [mailto:jeppesen@KU.EDU]
Sent: Friday, August 30, 2002 11:10 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Child forms
So what exactly happens if only a couple of forms make it to me (RFO) and
the rest are thrown away?
If I only receive two and there were ten sent out, what does that mean for
our institution?
Eric
Eric R. Jeppesen
Laboratory Safety Specialist
KU-EHS Dept.
(785) 864-2857 phone
(785) 864-2852 fax
jeppesen@ku.edu
-----Original Message-----
From: Ed Gaunt [mailto:egaunt@]
Sent: Friday, August 30, 2002 9:43 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Child forms
We're finding out that a lot of folks (men?) are filling out the forms and
THEN reading the instructions!!! Depends on what isn't well erased.
White-out is allowed!. Mainly what needs to be erased/whited out on the
child forms is the signature and anything in Box 12. These will definitely
generate errors on a child form.
Ed
-----Original Message-----
From: Jaeger, James [mailto:jjaeger@ADMIN1.UMARYLAND.EDU]
Sent: Friday, August 30, 2002 10:38 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Child forms
I am getting "child" forms that individuals have filled in completely before
deciding to send them to me (the RFO). Erasing their marks will not be
completely successful. Will these generate error letters?
James J. Jaeger, Ph.D.
RFO, Univ. MD Baltimore
-----Original Message-----
From: Ed Gaunt [mailto:egaunt@]
Sent: Friday, August 30, 2002 10:12 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Child forms
The only thing that needs to be filled in on the "Child" forms is the
information requested in Box 2. All other information provided on these
forms is ignored--unless you sign the form, which will then generate an
error letter, since we are unable to discern your intentions. This will
result in another form being sent for completion.
Ed
------_=_NextPart_001_01C253A6.42ED9C20
Content-Type: text/html;
charset="iso-8859-1"
Shoot for having the forms POSTMARKED by September 10. We will query our database at COB (or whenever the processing for the day has been completed) on Friday Sept 13 to determine who has not responded. Reminder postcards will be mailed out On Monday, 9/16, to everyone we have not heard back from yet.
Ed
-----Original Message-----
From: Jeppesen, Eric R [mailto:jeppesen@KU.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, September 03, 2002 9:56 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Child forms
Here's another couple of questions. I'm not sure if they have been answered yet.
Does the form have to be in by the 10th or postmarked by the 10th? I still have forms coming in, even
with an EHS deadline of Aug 30th (last Friday) and a full page of PI's who have not responded. I'm looking
at getting the form out to ASI on Friday the 6th.
What happens if the form(s) are not in by the 10th but come in the 11th or 12th? Is there a penalty, a notice,
a strong tongue lashing?
Eric R. Jeppesen
Laboratory Safety Specialist
KU-EHS Dept.
(785) 864-2857 phone
(785) 864-2852 fax
jeppesen@ku.edu
-----Original Message-----
From: Ed Gaunt [mailto:egaunt@]
Sent: Friday, August 30, 2002 2:46 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Child forms
It means that the non-respondents will be sent 8 reminder postcards after September 13. They will be bright pink and I will post what they will look like on the list. Hopefully you can round them up and return them.
Ed
-----Original Message-----
From: Jeppesen, Eric R [mailto:jeppesen@KU.EDU]
Sent: Friday, August 30, 2002 11:10 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Child forms
So what exactly happens if only a couple of forms make it to me (RFO) and the rest are thrown away?
If I only receive two and there were ten sent out, what does that mean for our institution?
Eric
Eric R. Jeppesen
Laboratory Safety Specialist
KU-EHS Dept.
(785) 864-2857 phone
(785) 864-2852 fax
jeppesen@ku.edu
-----Original Message-----
From: Ed Gaunt [mailto:egaunt@]
Sent: Friday, August 30, 2002 9:43 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Child forms
We're finding out that a lot of folks (men?) are filling out the forms and THEN reading the instructions!!! Depends on what isn't well erased. White-out is allowed!. Mainly what needs to be erased/whited out on the child forms is the signature and anything in Box 12. These will definitely generate errors on a child form.
Ed
-----Original Message-----
From: Jaeger, James [mailto:jjaeger@ADMIN1.UMARYLAND.EDU]
Sent: Friday, August 30, 2002 10:38 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Child forms
I am getting "child" forms that individuals have filled in completely before deciding to send them to me (the RFO). Erasing their marks will not be completely successful. Will these generate error letters?
James J. Jaeger, Ph.D.
RFO, Univ. MD Baltimore
-----Original Message-----
From: Ed Gaunt [mailto:egaunt@]
Sent: Friday, August 30, 2002 10:12 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Child forms
The only thing that needs to be filled in on the "Child" forms is the information requested in Box 2. All other information provided on these forms is ignored--unless you sign the form, which will then generate an error letter, since we are unable to discern your intentions. This will result in another form being sent for completion.
Ed
------_=_NextPart_001_01C253A6.42ED9C20--
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 3 Sep 2002 20:15:55 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ed Gaunt
Subject: Re: Permit Numbers
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="----_=_NextPart_001_01C253A8.3CC6AE20"
This message is in MIME format. Since your mail reader does not understand
this format, some or all of this message may not be legible.
------_=_NextPart_001_01C253A8.3CC6AE20
Content-Type: text/plain;
charset="iso-8859-1"
Only report import/export permit numbers if you have them for any possessed
agents, If you do not have permit numbers for the possessed agents, Box 16
is not applicable.
Ed
-----Original Message-----
From: OLINGER, PATRICIA L [S&C/0216]
[mailto:patricia.l.olinger@]
Sent: Tuesday, September 03, 2002 3:35 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Permit Numbers
I need an interpretation.
Permit numbers?
The official form asks for USDA permit numbers and expiration dates (if
applicable). Does it actually mean ALL USDA permit numbers a facility might
have? Regardless if you have SAs or not? What is meant by "if applicable"?
Thanks!
Patty Olinger
Pharmacia, Kalamazoo Corporate Services - ESH
Biosafety Officer
------_=_NextPart_001_01C253A8.3CC6AE20
Content-Type: text/html;
charset="iso-8859-1"
Only report import/export permit numbers if you have them for any possessed agents, If you do not have permit numbers for the possessed agents, Box 16 is not applicable.
Ed
-----Original Message-----
From: OLINGER, PATRICIA L [S&C/0216] [mailto:patricia.l.olinger@]
Sent: Tuesday, September 03, 2002 3:35 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Permit Numbers
I need an interpretation.
Permit numbers?
The official form asks for USDA permit numbers and expiration dates (if applicable). Does it actually mean ALL USDA permit numbers a facility might have? Regardless if you have SAs or not? What is meant by "if applicable"?
Thanks!
Patty Olinger
Pharmacia, Kalamazoo Corporate Services - ESH
Biosafety Officer
------_=_NextPart_001_01C253A8.3CC6AE20--
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 3 Sep 2002 20:18:19 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ed Gaunt
Subject: Re: Another form question
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
The intent for Box 14 was to determine what was being done with the
possessed agents. If none are possessed, you do not need to fill out boxes
12-16.
Ed
-----Original Message-----
From: Janet Peterson [mailto:peterson@WAM.UMD.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, September 03, 2002 4:39 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Another form question
Hi Ed,
Sorry you are drowning in forms today. Unfortunately, actually filling
out
the form seems to generate questions. In item 14, should we indicate work
that
is done at our facility if it does not include select agents? For example,
the
university is involved in teaching, but none of the select agents are used
for
teaching purposes. Should teaching be selected?
Many thanks,
Janet Peterson, Biosafety Officer and RFO
University of Maryland, College Park
Ed Gaunt wrote:
> All...
>
> Tell the folks who threw away their forms, they should read the fine print
> first!!!
>
> If they threw away forms and they are non-possessors, just tell them to
fill
> out and return the pink post cards when they get it. Tell them NOT to
> ignore the postcard!!!
>
> We are up to our ears in forms today (over 10,000 received so far today),
so
> it may be a while before I can respond to my other 50 e-mails...
>
> Ed
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Ginger Brown [mailto:gingerbrown@TAMU.EDU]
> Sent: Monday, September 02, 2002 9:57 AM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: Discarded Form
>
> Ed,
> One of our PIs received the Notification form and threw it away.
> What corrective action is needed?
>
> Ginger Brown, CBSP
> TX A&M University
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 4 Sep 2002 09:55:51 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Kim Auletta
Subject: Plant Pathogens
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
With the new inventory list being circulated for plant pathogens, our
Greenhouse would like to develop guidelines/SOPs, etc for any researcher
wanting to begin work on a plant pathogen (so far, we haven't found any on
campus!). Have any of you developed plant pathogen SOPs? I'm aware of the
rDNA NIH guidelines, but haven't found much else. I'd appreciate any help
you can provide.
Kim Auletta
Lab Safety Specialist
Environmental Health and Safety
SUNY Stony Brook
110 Suffolk Hall
Stony Brook, NY 11794-6200
phone: 631-632-9672
fax: 631-632-9683
email: kauletta@.sunysb.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 4 Sep 2002 09:57:16 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Michael Betlach
Subject: Re: Plant Pathogens
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Kim,
I'd start with the permit conditions on a PPQ526. Generally, the permits
require that materials shipped from another facility be opened in a
biosafety cabinet; that packing materials be decontaminated (autoclaved)
before disposal; that transfers of live organisms occur in a biosafety
cabinet (obviously will require modification for greenhouse use); and that
cultures be destroyed and glassware decontaminated at the conclusion of
experiments. Other materials that may be helpful are listed below (see also
the chapter and references in Biological Safety: Principles and Practices).
APHIS has several inspection guides that the agency uses when evaluating
facilities for permits. They provide a series of questions emphasizing
facility and procedural details for plant biosafety level 2 and 3
facilities. You should be able to get them from your APHIS state plant
health director or from APHIS headquarters. One is titled "Inspection
checklist/report for medium security plant pathogen containment facility".
Another is "Inventory of Containment Facility for Plant Pathogens (revised
11/01)". The latter is used primarily for high containment facilities. A
copy of APHIS 81-61 (June 1983) "Safeguard Guidelines for containment of
Plant Pests Under Permit" also provides some specific information, primarily
on facility design.
The APHIS site aphis. has several inspection manuals available
as pdf files, including BIOTECHNOLOGY INSPECTION MANUAL FOR NOTIFICATION
FIELD RELEASE--which focuses on planned releases (field trials) of
genetically modified plants. The site also lists "Manual for Regulating
Plant Pests", which is supposed to be published in FY2002 and appears by
title to be directly applicable to work with plant pathogens.
"Containment Facilities and Safeguards for Exotic Plant Pathogens and
Pests."
edited by Robert P. Kahn, S.B. Mathur. Publisher: St. Paul, Minn. :
American Phytopathological Society, c1998. Chapters present design examples
of facilities from throughout the world, but there is also a section on risk
assessment. The society's web site is - but it appears not to
be accessible this morning.
Michael Betlach, Ph.D.
Biosafety Officer
Promega Corporation
5445 E. Cheryl Parkway
Madison, WI 53711
(608) 274-1181, Ext. 1270
-----Original Message-----
From: Kim Auletta [mailto:kauletta@.SUNYSB.EDU]
Sent: Wednesday, September 04, 2002 8:56 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Plant Pathogens
With the new inventory list being circulated for plant pathogens, our
Greenhouse would like to develop guidelines/SOPs, etc for any researcher
wanting to begin work on a plant pathogen (so far, we haven't found any on
campus!). Have any of you developed plant pathogen SOPs? I'm aware of the
rDNA NIH guidelines, but haven't found much else. I'd appreciate any help
you can provide.
Kim Auletta
Lab Safety Specialist
Environmental Health and Safety
SUNY Stony Brook
110 Suffolk Hall
Stony Brook, NY 11794-6200
phone: 631-632-9672
fax: 631-632-9683
email: kauletta@.sunysb.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 4 Sep 2002 11:50:48 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Kim Auletta
Subject: SA - Bot Tox
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Is the "botox" that is used in Dermatology required to be reported or does
it meet the FDA exemptions?
Kim Auletta
Lab Safety Specialist
Environmental Health and Safety
SUNY Stony Brook
110 Suffolk Hall
Stony Brook, NY 11794-6200
phone: 631-632-9672
fax: 631-632-9683
email: kauletta@.sunysb.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 4 Sep 2002 12:58:55 -0400
Reply-To: pr18@columbia.edu
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: paul rubock
Organization: EH&S
Subject: CDC Survey
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
In a few weeks, we will be 'inspected' by the CDC as part of our
triennial facility registration renewal for Select Agents. Do any
BSOs/RFOs have any advice, pointers, comments, etc. that they would like
to share as far as what to expect.
Thank you,
Paul Rubock
Columbia University
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 4 Sep 2002 12:29:04 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Terry Lawrin
Subject: SA: Ricin A
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
To All,
Does Ricin A need to be reported? I don't remember if this was discussed
before.
Thanks,
Terry Lawrin
Terrance J. Lawrin, MT. (ASCP) SLS, CBSP (ABSA)
Biosafety Officer / Sanitarian
University of Illinois at Chicago
Environmental Health and Safety Office
Telephone: 312-413-3701
email: tlawrin@uic.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 4 Sep 2002 12:32:15 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Terry Lawrin
Subject: SA: Ricin B
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
To All,
Sorry, got the wrong Ricin in the 1st message. Does Ricin B need to be
reported?
Thanks,
Terry Lawrin
Terrance J. Lawrin, MT. (ASCP) SLS, CBSP (ABSA)
Biosafety Officer / Sanitarian
University of Illinois at Chicago
Environmental Health and Safety Office
Telephone: 312-413-3701
email: tlawrin@uic.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 4 Sep 2002 14:07:20 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Andrew Braun
Subject: Re: E. coli
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
One of our investigators working with Shigatoxon sent this note to clarify
shigs vs shiga-like.
Dear Andy: The nomenclature has changed somewhat over the years. Shiga
toxin (Stx) from Shigella is virtually identical to the Stx1 carried by E.
coli strains. My laboratory has shown that the toxin in Shigella was
originally carried on a lambdoid phage, just as it is in many E. coli
strains. So Stx and Stx1 are really the same protein, with just a few
nucleotide differences. Stx2 is another member of the same family which
has several variants, now called Stx2b, 2c, 2d, 2e, etc. They are about
50% homologous to Stx1, and have the same mode of action. They are also
carried by phages among E. coli strains (and probably other
Enterobacteriaceae). The phrase "Shiga-like" is no longer used, now that
we think of all of these toxins as being variants in the same family.
Hope this helps,
Andy
At 11:02 AM 9/3/02 -0700, you wrote:
>Enterohemmorhagic E. coli produces shiga-like toxin (SLT) as opposed
>to shiga toxin (ST). People call ithe E. coli version shiga toxin
>but that is not accurate. The theory is that at some point in
>evolutionary history E. coli acquired the shiga toxin from Shigella
>but at this time the toxins have diverged and now produce similar
>symptoms but the DNA sequences are distinct and therefore considered
>different toxins. There are references for this if needed.
>
>Leila Khatib, Ph.D.
>Biosafety
>Environment Health and Safety
>UC Berkeley
>
>>Good morning and thank you very much for all the help that's been given
>>on the
>>Select Agents issue. I have one question and I apologize if it has been
>>asked
>>already: Enterohemorrhagic E. coli is not on the Select Agent list,
>>but it does
>>produce Shigatoxin, do you have to claim the shigatoxin in the laboratory
>>even
>>though it is not collected or used, but just simply a by-product for E. coli
>>research?
>>
>>Thanks in advance.
>>
>>Larry Mendoza
---------------------------------------
Andrew Braun, Sc.D
Harvard Medical School, Office for Research
25 Shattuck Street
Boston, MA 02115
617-432-4899; FAX 617-432-3169
---------------------------------------
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 4 Sep 2002 13:02:06 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Charles H. Ray, Jr."
Subject: RSO Position at Auburn University
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY OFFICER
The Auburn University Office of Safety and Environmental Health is seeking
candidates for the position of Radiological Safety Officer.
Responsibilities include but are not limited to: maintaining compliance of
the University's radiation safety program with the permit conditions and
regulations of the Alabama Department of Public Health, Division of
Radiation Control; and ensuring exposure to ionizing radiation is
maintained as low as reasonably achievable.
Minimum qualifications are a Bachelor's degree (physical science,
biological science or engineering desired) with a strong background in
chemistry, physics, biology and mathematics and five years of experience in
radiation safety. Experience may be as either a member of the regulated
community or as a regulator. Experience in an academic setting and
knowledge of laser safety is also desired. Successful candidate must have
strong interpersonal and written communication skills. In addition, the
selected candidate's training and experience must be reviewed and approved
by the Alabama Department of Public Health, Division of Radiation Control
before an offer can be extended. Salary will be commensurate with
education and experience.
Minorities and women are encouraged to apply.
Candidates should submit a letter of application, names of three references
and resume' to:
Radiological Safety Officer #16826
Human Resources
Langdon Hall
Auburn University, AL 36849
PH: (334)844-4145
FAX: (334)844-1617
Review of applicants will begin after September 20, 2002.
Auburn University is an Affirmative Action/Equal Opportunity Employer.
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 4 Sep 2002 12:07:23 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Therese M. Stinnett"
Subject: Re: SA - Bot Tox
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
IF it is used per the FDA license and package insert, it is exempt.
IF it is being used off-license, for example, an investigational new =
drug
study, then it must be reported--as I understand it.
Therese M. Stinnett
Biosafety Officer
Health and Safety Division
UCHSC, Mailstop C275
4200 E. 9th Avenue
Denver, CO=A0 80262
Voice:=A0 303-315-6754
Pager:=A0 303-266-5402
Fax:=A0 303-315-8026
email:=A0 therese.stinnett@uchsc.edu =
-----Original Message-----
From: Kim Auletta [mailto:kauletta@.SUNYSB.EDU]
Sent: Wednesday, September 04, 2002 9:51 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: SA - Bot Tox
Is the "botox" that is used in Dermatology required to be reported or =
does
it meet the FDA exemptions?
Kim Auletta
Lab Safety Specialist
Environmental Health and Safety
SUNY Stony Brook
110 Suffolk Hall
Stony Brook, NY 11794-6200
phone: 631-632-9672
fax: 631-632-9683
email: kauletta@.sunysb.edu
=========================================================================
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 4 Sep 2002 16:04:04 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ed Gaunt
Subject: Re: SA - Bot Tox
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
If BoTox is being used EXACTLY as prescribed in the FDA-approved package
insert for the product that contains it, it is exempt from reporting. If,
however, anything is done that is "off-label" it is no longer exempt and
must be reported.
Ed
-----Original Message-----
From: Kim Auletta [mailto:kauletta@.SUNYSB.EDU]
Sent: Wednesday, September 04, 2002 11:51 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: SA - Bot Tox
Is the "botox" that is used in Dermatology required to be reported or does
it meet the FDA exemptions?
Kim Auletta
Lab Safety Specialist
Environmental Health and Safety
SUNY Stony Brook
110 Suffolk Hall
Stony Brook, NY 11794-6200
phone: 631-632-9672
fax: 631-632-9683
email: kauletta@.sunysb.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 4 Sep 2002 17:10:49 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Don Callihan
Subject: Re: E. coli
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Hi all,
Just wanted to add that strains of E. coli expressing the Shigella toxin
are now more commonly referred to as STEC (Shiga-toxin producing E. coli)
or VTEC (Verocytotoxigenic E. coli). This includes O157 strains and many
more E. coli strains of various O (somatic) and H (flagellar). For those
interested in more invormation, check out ==>
.
The recent Notice of intent to publish regulations on 42 CFR Part 72,
Appendix A proposes adding "Shiga-like toxin" to Shigatoxin on the Select
Agent Toxins list. Intact organisms are not included on the list and are
not proposed to be added. (It's too easy to isolate them from animals and
people.)
My apologies if I am stating the obvious.
Don Callihan, Ph.D.
Biosafety Officer
BD Diagnostic Systems
Sparks, MD
Andrew Braun @MITVMA.MIT.EDU> on 09/04/2002
02:07:20 PM
Please respond to A Biosafety Discussion List
Sent by: A Biosafety Discussion List
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
cc:
Subject: Re: E. coli
One of our investigators working with Shigatoxon sent this note to clarify
shigs vs shiga-like.
Dear Andy: The nomenclature has changed somewhat over the years. Shiga
toxin (Stx) from Shigella is virtually identical to the Stx1 carried by E.
coli strains. My laboratory has shown that the toxin in Shigella was
originally carried on a lambdoid phage, just as it is in many E. coli
strains. So Stx and Stx1 are really the same protein, with just a few
nucleotide differences. Stx2 is another member of the same family which
has several variants, now called Stx2b, 2c, 2d, 2e, etc. They are about
50% homologous to Stx1, and have the same mode of action. They are also
carried by phages among E. coli strains (and probably other
Enterobacteriaceae). The phrase "Shiga-like" is no longer used, now that
we think of all of these toxins as being variants in the same family.
Hope this helps,
Andy
At 11:02 AM 9/3/02 -0700, you wrote:
>Enterohemmorhagic E. coli produces shiga-like toxin (SLT) as opposed
>to shiga toxin (ST). People call ithe E. coli version shiga toxin
>but that is not accurate. The theory is that at some point in
>evolutionary history E. coli acquired the shiga toxin from Shigella
>but at this time the toxins have diverged and now produce similar
>symptoms but the DNA sequences are distinct and therefore considered
>different toxins. There are references for this if needed.
>
>Leila Khatib, Ph.D.
>Biosafety
>Environment Health and Safety
>UC Berkeley
>
>>Good morning and thank you very much for all the help that's been given
>>on the
>>Select Agents issue. I have one question and I apologize if it has been
>>asked
>>already: Enterohemorrhagic E. coli is not on the Select Agent list,
>>but it does
>>produce Shigatoxin, do you have to claim the shigatoxin in the laboratory
>>even
>>though it is not collected or used, but just simply a by-product for E.
coli
>>research?
>>
>>Thanks in advance.
>>
>>Larry Mendoza
---------------------------------------
Andrew Braun, Sc.D
Harvard Medical School, Office for Research
25 Shattuck Street
Boston, MA 02115
617-432-4899; FAX 617-432-3169
---------------------------------------
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 4 Sep 2002 18:16:50 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Gergis, Nasr"
Subject: Re: Lentiviral vectors
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="----_=_NextPart_001_01C25479.E948622A"
This message is in MIME format. Since your mail reader does not understand
this format, some or all of this message may not be legible.
------_=_NextPart_001_01C25479.E948622A
Content-Type: text/plain;
charset=iso-8859-1
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Good afternoon;
I have P.I. who will do preliminary experiments on producing transgenic mice
with lentiviral vectors ala Lois et al (2002). The institutional bio-safety
committee here asking the P.I. to provide procedures for the sub-zonal
injection of
the lentiviral vectors, and in particular what bio-safety level/safeguards
will be used; BSL-1, BSL-2, High BSL-2 or BSL-3. Also, the campus
veterinarian
wants to know if the mice will be maintained in containment for the duration
of their lives, or if they will be released into the "general" colony after
being tested for the presence of replication-competent retrovirus. Any
information you provide on the BSL and mouse housing issues, and any
problems you may have encountered will be greatly appreciated. Thanks,
Nasr Gergis, Ph.D., DVM
Biological Safety Officer
Occupational Safety and Health
City of Hope/BRI
Ph: 626-539-8111 Ext. 64262
Fax: 626-301-8970
Pager: 626-423-5454
E-mail: ngergis@
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charset=iso-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
RE: Lentiviral vectors
Good afternoon;
I have P.I. who will do preliminary experiments on = producing transgenic mice
with lentiviral vectors ala Lois et al (2002). = The institutional bio-safety
committee here asking the P.I. to provide procedures = for the sub-zonal injection of
the lentiviral vectors, and in particular what = bio-safety level/safeguards
will be used; BSL-1, BSL-2, High BSL-2 or = BSL-3. Also, the campus veterinarian
wants to know if the mice will be maintained in = containment for the duration
of their lives, or if they will be released into the = "general" colony after
being tested for the presence of = replication-competent retrovirus. Any
information you provide on the BSL and mouse housing = issues, and any problems you may have encountered will be = greatly appreciated. Thanks,
Nasr Gergis, Ph.D., DVM
Biological Safety Officer
Occupational Safety and Health
City of Hope/BRI
Ph: 626-539-8111 Ext. 64262
Fax: 626-301-8970
Pager: 626-423-5454
E-mail: ngergis@
------_=_NextPart_001_01C25479.E948622A--
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 5 Sep 2002 08:43:01 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: David Gillum
Subject: Non-possession
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
I am forwarding an e-mail from a colleague in New Hampshire. Can someone
please clarify if this "facility" should keep calling to get a notification
form? Is the statement from the CDC contractor true?
Thanks!
David Gillum
UNH
BEGIN FORWARDED MESSAGE:
I have requested a Select Agent form from the (CDC) contractor but have not
received it. Today, I called them again and was told by Lee Crocker that we
DO NOT have to declare non-possession if we did not receive a form. I asked
him for this exception in writing and he could not give it to me. He could
not even email me with this statement. The only pertinent thing I could
find online was a FAQ question that asks "Why are DHHS and USDA requiring
facilities that have been mailed the form to provide a declaration signature
certifying non-possession of select agents?" He assured me that there would
be no repercussions if we do not return this form.
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 5 Sep 2002 08:52:23 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Richard Fink
Subject: Re: Lentiviral vectors
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="=====================_171064758==_.ALT"
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After looking into the issues with lentiviral vectors (either the 3 or 5
plasmid systems) our biosafety committee decided that it made no sense to
treat them differently then any other retroviral vector. In fact, the
lenti. system appears to be much safer as mutation to replication competent
has not been seen (Dr. Baltimore and others have regularly looked for that
for more then a year and have not found any). The lenti. vector is far
more crippled then MMLV. What is being required is that each stock of
virus that is prepared be test for the presence of replication competent
virus (and destroyed if any found).
Our animal care folks are wrestling with the containment issue, but looks
like that it will be treated as other retroviral vectors. So looking at
ABSL1 or 2 depending upon the insert(s) and experiment as a whole.
At 06:16 PM 9/4/2002 -0700, you wrote:
>Good afternoon;
>I have P.I. who will do preliminary experiments on producing transgenic mice
>with lentiviral vectors ala Lois et al (2002). The institutional bio-safety
>committee here asking the P.I. to provide procedures for the sub-zonal
>injection of
>the lentiviral vectors, and in particular what bio-safety level/safeguards
>will be used; BSL-1, BSL-2, High BSL-2 or BSL-3. Also, the campus
>veterinarian
>wants to know if the mice will be maintained in containment for the duration
>of their lives, or if they will be released into the "general" colony after
>being tested for the presence of replication-competent retrovirus. Any
>information you provide on the BSL and mouse housing issues, and any
>problems you may have encountered will be greatly appreciated. Thanks,
>
>Nasr Gergis, Ph.D., DVM
>Biological Safety Officer
>Occupational Safety and Health
>City of Hope/BRI
>Ph: 626-539-8111 Ext. 64262
>Fax: 626-301-8970
>Pager: 626-423-5454
>E-mail: ngergis@
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
--=====================_171064758==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
After looking into the issues with lentiviral vectors (either the 3 or 5 plasmid systems) our biosafety committee decided that it made no sense to treat them differently then any other retroviral vector. In fact, the lenti. system appears to be much safer as mutation to replication competent has not been seen (Dr. Baltimore and others have regularly looked for that for more then a year and have not found any). The lenti. vector is far more crippled then MMLV. What is being required is that each stock of virus that is prepared be test for the presence of replication competent virus (and destroyed if any found).
Our animal care folks are wrestling with the containment issue, but looks like that it will be treated as other retroviral vectors. So looking at ABSL1 or 2 depending upon the insert(s) and experiment as a whole.
At 06:16 PM 9/4/2002 -0700, you wrote:
Good afternoon;
I have P.I. who will do preliminary experiments on producing transgenic mice
with lentiviral vectors ala Lois et al (2002). The institutional bio-safety
committee here asking the P.I. to provide procedures for the sub-zonal injection of
the lentiviral vectors, and in particular what bio-safety level/safeguards
will be used; BSL-1, BSL-2, High BSL-2 or BSL-3. Also, the campus veterinarian
wants to know if the mice will be maintained in containment for the duration
of their lives, or if they will be released into the "general" colony after
being tested for the presence of replication-competent retrovirus. Any
information you provide on the BSL and mouse housing issues, and any problems you may have encountered will be greatly appreciated. Thanks,
Nasr Gergis, Ph.D., DVM
Biological Safety Officer
Occupational Safety and Health
City of Hope/BRI
Ph: 626-539-8111 Ext. 64262
Fax: 626-301-8970
Pager: 626-423-5454
E-mail: ngergis@
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
--=====================_171064758==_.ALT--
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 5 Sep 2002 09:10:39 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Michael Wendeler
Organization: Incyte Genomics
Subject: Re: Non-possession
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I have received the same information when I called the hotline number. I stated
that we didn't receive a form and we do not posess any of the listed agents. I
was told that as long as I wasn't mailed the form I didn't have to respond.
Mike Wendeler
Environmental Health and Safety Engineer
Incyte Genomics
Newark, DE
David Gillum wrote:
> I am forwarding an e-mail from a colleague in New Hampshire. Can someone
> please clarify if this "facility" should keep calling to get a notification
> form? Is the statement from the CDC contractor true?
>
> Thanks!
> David Gillum
> UNH
>
> BEGIN FORWARDED MESSAGE:
>
> I have requested a Select Agent form from the (CDC) contractor but have not
> received it. Today, I called them again and was told by Lee Crocker that we
> DO NOT have to declare non-possession if we did not receive a form. I asked
> him for this exception in writing and he could not give it to me. He could
> not even email me with this statement. The only pertinent thing I could
> find online was a FAQ question that asks "Why are DHHS and USDA requiring
> facilities that have been mailed the form to provide a declaration signature
> certifying non-possession of select agents?" He assured me that there would
> be no repercussions if we do not return this form.
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 5 Sep 2002 09:36:58 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Richard Fink
Subject: lentiviral vector
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Oops, made a slight error on the testing of stocks, the committee wants the
first 2 stocks tested and then the freq. of testing depends upon how often
the investigator prepares new stock, so the testing can go down to 1 in 3
stocks.
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
--=====================_173740655==_.ALT
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Oops, made a slight error on the testing of stocks, the committee wants the first 2 stocks tested and then the freq. of testing depends upon how often the investigator prepares new stock, so the testing can go down to 1 in 3 stocks.
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
--=====================_173740655==_.ALT--
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 5 Sep 2002 10:15:01 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Erik A. Talley"
Subject: Re: Non-possession
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
If you don't receive a form and don't have any agents present, it is only
logical that you do not have to complete a form. Otherwise, every single
corporation, institution, agency, etc. in the United States would have to
complete a form.
I have the main medical campus and 100's of satellite locations throughout
the NYC area that are separate facilities. Unless those satellite locations
1)received a form or 2)have any of the agents, we will not complete/request
forms for them.
Of course, the difficulty with a location of any size is being assured no
one received a form.
Erik
At 08:43 AM 9/5/2002 -0400, you wrote:
>I am forwarding an e-mail from a colleague in New Hampshire. Can someone
>please clarify if this "facility" should keep calling to get a notification
>form? Is the statement from the CDC contractor true?
>
>Thanks!
>David Gillum
>UNH
>
>
>BEGIN FORWARDED MESSAGE:
>
>I have requested a Select Agent form from the (CDC) contractor but have not
>received it. Today, I called them again and was told by Lee Crocker that we
>DO NOT have to declare non-possession if we did not receive a form. I asked
>him for this exception in writing and he could not give it to me. He could
>not even email me with this statement. The only pertinent thing I could
>find online was a FAQ question that asks "Why are DHHS and USDA requiring
>facilities that have been mailed the form to provide a declaration signature
>certifying non-possession of select agents?" He assured me that there would
>be no repercussions if we do not return this form.
___________________________________
Erik A. Talley, Director
Environmental Health and Safety
Weill Medical College of Cornell University
418 East 71st Street, Suite 62
New York, NY 10021
212-746-6201
ert2002@med.cornell.edu
(Cornell Access Only)
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 5 Sep 2002 10:06:14 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Alain Garnier
Subject: RE : Lentiviral vectors
In-Reply-To:
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Hi everyone,
Very useful information Richard. A question though: Isn=92t testing each
viral stock for RCR a very tedious task? What level of sensitivity is
required? Do anyone have a protocole for that?
Thanks
Alain
Alain Garnier, Ing., Ph.D.
Professeur agr=E9g=E9
Bureau 3568
Pavilon Pouliot
Universit=E9 Laval
Qu=E9bec, Qu=E9bec, Canada, G1K 7P4
tel: 418-656-3106
fax: 418-656-5993
e-mail: alain.garnier@gch.ulaval.ca
-----Message d'origine-----
De : A Biosafety Discussion List [mailto:BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU] De la
part de Richard Fink
Envoy=E9 : 5 septembre, 2002 08:52
=C0 : BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Objet : Re: Lentiviral vectors
After looking into the issues with lentiviral vectors (either the 3 or 5
plasmid systems) our biosafety committee decided that it made no sense
to treat them differently then any other retroviral vector. In fact,
the lenti. system appears to be much safer as mutation to replication
competent has not been seen (Dr. Baltimore and others have regularly
looked for that for more then a year and have not found any). The
lenti. vector is far more crippled then MMLV. What is being required is
that each stock of virus that is prepared be test for the presence of
replication competent virus (and destroyed if any found).
Our animal care folks are wrestling with the containment issue, but
looks like that it will be treated as other retroviral vectors. So
looking at ABSL1 or 2 depending upon the insert(s) and experiment as a
whole.
At 06:16 PM 9/4/2002 -0700, you wrote:
Good afternoon;
I have P.I. who will do preliminary experiments on producing transgenic
mice
with lentiviral vectors ala Lois et al (2002). The institutional
bio-safety
committee here asking the P.I. to provide procedures for the sub-zonal
injection of
the lentiviral vectors, and in particular what bio-safety
level/safeguards
will be used; BSL-1, BSL-2, High BSL-2 or BSL-3. Also, the campus
veterinarian
wants to know if the mice will be maintained in containment for the
duration
of their lives, or if they will be released into the "general" colony
after
being tested for the presence of replication-competent retrovirus. Any
information you provide on the BSL and mouse housing issues, and any
problems you may have encountered will be greatly appreciated. Thanks,
Nasr Gergis, Ph.D., DVM
Biological Safety Officer
Occupational Safety and Health
City of Hope/BRI
Ph: 626-539-8111 Ext. 64262
Fax: 626-301-8970
Pager: 626-423-5454
E-mail: ngergis@
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
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Hi everyone,
Very useful = information Richard. A question though: Isn t testing each viral stock for RCR = a very tedious task? What level of sensitivity is required? Do anyone have a = protocole for that?
Thanks =
Alain
Alain Garnier, Ing., Ph.D.
Professeur agr=E9g=E9
Bureau 3568
Pavilon Pouliot
Universit=E9 Laval
Qu=E9bec, Qu=E9bec, Canada, G1K 7P4
tel: 418-656-3106
fax: 418-656-5993
e-mail: alain.garnier@gch.ulaval.ca
-----Message = d'origine-----
De : A Biosafety = Discussion List [mailto:BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU] De la part de Richard Fink
Envoy=E9 : 5 = septembre, 2002 08:52
=C0 : = BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Objet : Re: = Lentiviral vectors
After looking = into the issues with lentiviral vectors (either the 3 or 5 plasmid systems) our biosafety committee decided that it made no sense to treat them = differently then any other retroviral vector. In fact, the lenti. system = appears to be much safer as mutation to replication competent has not been seen = (Dr. Baltimore and others have regularly looked for that for more then a year = and have not found any). The lenti. vector is far more crippled then MMLV. What is being required is that each stock of virus that is = prepared be test for the presence of replication competent virus (and destroyed = if any found).
Our animal care folks are wrestling with the containment issue, but = looks like that it will be treated as other retroviral vectors. So looking at = ABSL1 or 2 depending upon the insert(s) and experiment as a whole.
At 06:16 PM 9/4/2002 -0700, you wrote:
Good = afternoon;
I have P.I. who will do = preliminary experiments on producing transgenic mice
with lentiviral vectors = ala Lois et al (2002). The institutional bio-safety
committee here asking = the P.I. to provide procedures for the sub-zonal injection of
the lentiviral vectors, = and in particular what bio-safety level/safeguards
will be used; BSL-1, = BSL-2, High BSL-2 or BSL-3. Also, the campus veterinarian
wants to know if the = mice will be maintained in containment for the duration
of their lives, or if = they will be released into the "general" colony after
being tested for the = presence of replication-competent retrovirus. Any
information you provide = on the BSL and mouse housing issues, and any problems you may have = encountered will be greatly appreciated. Thanks,
Nasr Gergis, Ph.D., = DVM
Biological Safety = Officer
Occupational Safety and = Health
City of = Hope/BRI
Ph: 626-539-8111 Ext. = 64262
Fax: = 626-301-8970
Pager: = 626-423-5454
E-mail: = ngergis@
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
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=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 5 Sep 2002 11:51:12 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ed Gaunt
Subject: Re: Non-possession
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
If a facility did not receive a form and does not possess any agents on the
list, they do not need to request a form to send in declaring
non-possession...unless they want to! Basically, getting non-possession
forms allows us to better identify the universe of labs that COULD have
agents. Our "shotgun" mailing approach was to try and identify as many
possessing labs as possible, realizing that many would be non-possessors and
that we would probably miss some who did possess. REMEMBER...this
notification process is to collect information for CDC and APHIS to be able
to make the rules that implement the law and is NOT the registration process
(which will follow after the rules are written). We will continue to
accept forms as long as folks send them in to us.
The noted penalties, etc., are for folks who intentionally misrepresent what
they are reporting or who intentionally ignore the reporting requirement.
If forms are delayed in the mail or are received after the HHS or USDA
dates, we will still receive and process them. CDC and USDA realize that
these forms did not go out until the week before last (for a whole variety
of reasons) and that this is not a trivial task for you to pull all of this
information together. However, the due date was provided in the law so that
reporting would be timely, so that the collected information could be taken
in to consideration BEFORE the rules were written.
Ed Gaunt
(Notification Manager)
-----Original Message-----
From: David Gillum [mailto:David.Gillum@UNH.EDU]
Sent: Thursday, September 05, 2002 8:43 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Non-possession
I am forwarding an e-mail from a colleague in New Hampshire. Can someone
please clarify if this "facility" should keep calling to get a notification
form? Is the statement from the CDC contractor true?
Thanks!
David Gillum
UNH
BEGIN FORWARDED MESSAGE:
I have requested a Select Agent form from the (CDC) contractor but have not
received it. Today, I called them again and was told by Lee Crocker that we
DO NOT have to declare non-possession if we did not receive a form. I asked
him for this exception in writing and he could not give it to me. He could
not even email me with this statement. The only pertinent thing I could
find online was a FAQ question that asks "Why are DHHS and USDA requiring
facilities that have been mailed the form to provide a declaration signature
certifying non-possession of select agents?" He assured me that there would
be no repercussions if we do not return this form
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 5 Sep 2002 12:21:31 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Kathleen Gilbert
Subject: Re: SA: Ricin A
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="Windows-1252"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
According to the hotline it does need to be reported.
-Original Message-----
From: Terry Lawrin [mailto:tlawrin@UIC.EDU]
Sent: Wed 9/4/2002 1:29 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Cc:=09
Subject: SA: Ricin A
To All,
Does Ricin A need to be reported? I don't remember if this was discussed
before.
Thanks,
Terry Lawrin
Terrance J. Lawrin, MT. (ASCP) SLS, CBSP (ABSA)
Biosafety Officer / Sanitarian
University of Illinois at Chicago
Environmental Health and Safety Office
Telephone: 312-413-3701
email: tlawrin@uic.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 5 Sep 2002 12:49:30 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Margaret Rakas
Subject: Select Agents Exemption from Notification
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Dear Colleagues,
I have just joined this listserver and am having trouble accessing last
month's postings. I apologize for asking questions which were almost
certainly dealt with during that time, but perhaps your time could be
minimized by simply forwarding me the relevant postings.
Question #1, Regarding whether a Toxin is a "Select Agent": 42 CFR
Part 72 Appendix A is 'the list' referred to in the notification
guidance. That Appendix states that "Exemptions: Toxins for medical
use, inactivated for use as vaccines or toxin preparations for
biomedical research use at an LD50 for vertebrates of more than 100
nanograms per kilogram body weight are exempt." Does this mean that
those entities with LD50's greater than 100ng/kg, used in biomedical
research, are not Select Agents? For example, the LD50 for
diacetoxyscirpenol is roughly 8,000,000 ng/kg (as shown in the LD50
table )
So, if that substance were used in biomedical research, is it
considered a Select Agent? Would notification (as per the August 6 FR)
be required?
Many thanks for your patience and clarification. If anyone can explain
why my "GET BIOSAFTY LOG0208" is resent to me by the server, and no log
follows in a subsequent email, I would very much appreciate it.
Margaret Rakas
Manager, Inventory & Regulatory Affairs
Clark Science Center
Smith College
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Dear Colleagues,
I have just joined this listserver and am having trouble accessing last month's postings. I apologize for asking questions which were almost certainly dealt with during that time, but perhaps your time could be minimized by simply forwarding me the relevant postings.
Question #1, Regarding whether a Toxin is a "Select Agent": 42 CFR Part 72 Appendix A is 'the list' referred to in the notification guidance. That Appendix states that "Exemptions: Toxins for medical use, inactivated for use as vaccines or toxin preparations for biomedical research use at an LD50 for vertebrates of more than 100 nanograms per kilogram body weight are exempt." Does this mean that those entities with LD50's greater than 100ng/kg, used in biomedical research, are not Select Agents? For example, the LD50 for diacetoxyscirpenol is roughly 8,000,000 ng/kg (as shown in the LD50 table )
So, if that substance were used in biomedical research, is it considered a Select Agent? Would notification (as per the August 6 FR) be required?
Many thanks for your patience and clarification. If anyone can explain why my "GET BIOSAFTY LOG0208" is resent to me by the server, and no log follows in a subsequent email, I would very much appreciate it.
Margaret Rakas
Manager, Inventory & Regulatory Affairs
Clark Science Center
Smith College
--=_9EC2D937.D9B86ECF--
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 5 Sep 2002 13:33:22 -0400
Reply-To: pr18@columbia.edu
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: paul rubock
Organization: EH&S
Subject: Re: USDA Veterinary Permits
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Do we enter I/E permits for agents that are NOT on the list?
Thank you,
Paul Rubock
Ed Gaunt wrote:
> Only enter I/E permits for any possessed agent on the list, whether they are
> expired or not.
>
> Ed
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Ginger Brown [mailto:gingerbrown@TAMU.EDU]
> Sent: Monday, September 02, 2002 3:12 PM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: USDA Veterinary Permits
>
> I am assuming that in box 16 of the Notification form, we would only enter
> numbers of any permits that are still
> current......... .i.e, has not expired yet. Is this assumption correct?
>
> Ginger Brown, CBSP
> TX A&M University
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 5 Sep 2002 13:38:51 -0400
Reply-To: pr18@columbia.edu
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: paul rubock
Organization: EH&S
Subject: Vaccinia Reportable CDC/USDA Notification
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Has an answer to this been posted yet for purposes of 9/10?
Thank you
Paul Rubock
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 5 Sep 2002 14:40:46 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ed Gaunt
Subject: Possession of Plant Pathogens
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All,
In the event you have questions about notification of possession of PLANT
PATHOGENS (which are NOT on the mailed Notification List), here is a Web
site where you can go to download USDA Form PPG-655 (attached) to report
possession directly to USDA (and NOT to ASI).
Ed
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=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 5 Sep 2002 15:04:38 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Cheri L Hildreth
Subject: Re: Possession of Plant Pathogens
Mime-Version: 1.0
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Ed-
per page 2 of the attachede APHIS fact sheet (Q&A) dated August 2002
they have indicated that these forms should be mailed to ASI!
Cheri Hildreth Watts, Director
Department of Environmental Health &Safety
University of Louisville
(502) 852-2954
e-mail: cheri.hildreth@louisville.edu
>>> egaunt@ 09/05/02 02:40PM >>>
All,
In the event you have questions about notification of possession of
PLANT
PATHOGENS (which are NOT on the mailed Notification List), here is a
Web
site where you can go to download USDA Form PPG-655 (attached) to
report
possession directly to USDA (and NOT to ASI).
Ed
--=_702C37F8.0D6C4633
Content-Type: application/pdf; name="qabioterr[1].pdf"
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 5 Sep 2002 15:56:13 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ed Gaunt
Subject: Re: Possession of Plant Pathogens
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
You sure know how to give a guy heart failure! That address (in the FAQ
list you sent) is for the current DHHS Select Agent and USDA High
Consequence Pathogens and Toxins Notification and NOT the plant pathogen
notification. Plant pathogen notification forms (PPG-655) should be sent to
the address on top of the form:
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
ANIMAL AND PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERVICE
PLANT PROTECTION AND QUARANTINE
4700 RIVER ROAD, UNIT 133
RIVERDALE, MD 20737
Ed
-----Original Message-----
From: Cheri L Hildreth [mailto:cheri.hildreth@LOUISVILLE.EDU]
Sent: Thursday, September 05, 2002 3:05 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Possession of Plant Pathogens
Ed-
per page 2 of the attachede APHIS fact sheet (Q&A) dated August 2002
they have indicated that these forms should be mailed to ASI!
Cheri Hildreth Watts, Director
Department of Environmental Health &Safety
University of Louisville
(502) 852-2954
e-mail: cheri.hildreth@louisville.edu
>>> egaunt@ 09/05/02 02:40PM >>>
All,
In the event you have questions about notification of possession of
PLANT
PATHOGENS (which are NOT on the mailed Notification List), here is a
Web
site where you can go to download USDA Form PPG-655 (attached) to
report
possession directly to USDA (and NOT to ASI).
Ed
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 6 Sep 2002 11:45:00 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Jairo Betancourt
Subject: Re: E. coli
In-Reply-To:
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-transfer-encoding: 7bit
Dear friends: on this issue of toxins, and I have my forms ready to be
sent today! I have not been able to find out the LD50 for Omega
Conotoxin GVIA. Does any of you more experienced Toxin handlers (not
snake handlers) have any idea of the LD50 for this toxin?. Any help
would be more than appreciated.
Cordially yours,
Jairo
Jairo Betancourt, RBP
Laboratory Safety Specialist
(305) 243-3400 Fax : (305) 243-3272
E-mail: jairob@miami.edu
-----Original Message-----
From: A Biosafety Discussion List [mailto:BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU] On
Behalf Of Don Callihan
Sent: Wednesday, September 04, 2002 5:11 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: E. coli
Hi all,
Just wanted to add that strains of E. coli expressing the Shigella toxin
are now more commonly referred to as STEC (Shiga-toxin producing E.
coli)
or VTEC (Verocytotoxigenic E. coli). This includes O157 strains and many
more E. coli strains of various O (somatic) and H (flagellar). For those
interested in more invormation, check out ==>
.
The recent Notice of intent to publish regulations on 42 CFR Part 72,
Appendix A proposes adding "Shiga-like toxin" to Shigatoxin on the
Select
Agent Toxins list. Intact organisms are not included on the list and are
not proposed to be added. (It's too easy to isolate them from animals
and
people.)
My apologies if I am stating the obvious.
Don Callihan, Ph.D.
Biosafety Officer
BD Diagnostic Systems
Sparks, MD
Andrew Braun @MITVMA.MIT.EDU> on
09/04/2002
02:07:20 PM
Please respond to A Biosafety Discussion List
Sent by: A Biosafety Discussion List
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
cc:
Subject: Re: E. coli
One of our investigators working with Shigatoxon sent this note to
clarify
shigs vs shiga-like.
Dear Andy: The nomenclature has changed somewhat over the years. Shiga
toxin (Stx) from Shigella is virtually identical to the Stx1 carried by
E.
coli strains. My laboratory has shown that the toxin in Shigella was
originally carried on a lambdoid phage, just as it is in many E. coli
strains. So Stx and Stx1 are really the same protein, with just a few
nucleotide differences. Stx2 is another member of the same family which
has several variants, now called Stx2b, 2c, 2d, 2e, etc. They are about
50% homologous to Stx1, and have the same mode of action. They are also
carried by phages among E. coli strains (and probably other
Enterobacteriaceae). The phrase "Shiga-like" is no longer used, now
that
we think of all of these toxins as being variants in the same family.
Hope this helps,
Andy
At 11:02 AM 9/3/02 -0700, you wrote:
>Enterohemmorhagic E. coli produces shiga-like toxin (SLT) as opposed
>to shiga toxin (ST). People call ithe E. coli version shiga toxin
>but that is not accurate. The theory is that at some point in
>evolutionary history E. coli acquired the shiga toxin from Shigella
>but at this time the toxins have diverged and now produce similar
>symptoms but the DNA sequences are distinct and therefore considered
>different toxins. There are references for this if needed.
>
>Leila Khatib, Ph.D.
>Biosafety
>Environment Health and Safety
>UC Berkeley
>
>>Good morning and thank you very much for all the help that's been
given
>>on the
>>Select Agents issue. I have one question and I apologize if it has
been
>>asked
>>already: Enterohemorrhagic E. coli is not on the Select Agent list,
>>but it does
>>produce Shigatoxin, do you have to claim the shigatoxin in the
laboratory
>>even
>>though it is not collected or used, but just simply a by-product for
E.
coli
>>research?
>>
>>Thanks in advance.
>>
>>Larry Mendoza
>>
---------------------------------------
Andrew Braun, Sc.D
Harvard Medical School, Office for Research
25 Shattuck Street
Boston, MA 02115
617-432-4899; FAX 617-432-3169
---------------------------------------
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 6 Sep 2002 08:53:23 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Ton, Mimi"
Subject: References for Lab Furniture Requirements
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Dear all,
Does anyone have references for the requirement that lab furniture,
especially chairs and stools, must be covered with impermeable surfaces
that facilitate decontamination and cleanup procedures in the event of a
spill. For example chairs and stools must not be covered in cloth but
instead in plastic, vinyl or leather finish.
I've already checked the BMBL and it states that:
1. The laboratory is designed so that it can be easily cleaned. Carpets and
rugs in laboratories are not appropriate.
2. Laboratory furniture is capable of supporting anticipated loading and
uses.
However, I need to find references stating specifically that the chairs and
stools must not be covered in cloth. Please help!
Thanks in advance
Mimi Ton
---------------------------------------------
Mimi C. Ton
Safety Engineer
California Institute of Technology
Environment, Health & Safety Office
M/C 25-6
1200 E. California Boulevard
Pasadena, CA 91125
Phone: 626.395.2430
Fax: 626.577.6028
E-mail: mimi.ton@caltech.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 6 Sep 2002 13:49:41 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Janice Flesher
Organization: Bristol-Myers Squibb
Subject: no form yet
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-transfer-encoding: 7bit
Ed,
Even though I requested a form on August 23 and have called the
hot line (the mail out date is a moving target) I have NOT yet
received it, despite alerts to all mailrooms. I have items to
report, what am I to do? Should I send the copy on Federal
Register so I don't miss the deadline?
Janice
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 6 Sep 2002 11:37:13 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Steve Stauffer
Subject: Re: Plant Pathogens
In-Reply-To:
Mime-version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset="US-ASCII"
Content-transfer-encoding: 7bit
On 9/4/02 7:57 AM, "Michael Betlach" wrote:
> Kim,
>
> I'd start with the permit conditions on a PPQ526. Generally, the permits
> require that materials shipped from another facility be opened in a
> biosafety cabinet; that packing materials be decontaminated (autoclaved)
> before disposal; that transfers of live organisms occur in a biosafety
> cabinet (obviously will require modification for greenhouse use); and that
> cultures be destroyed and glassware decontaminated at the conclusion of
> experiments. Other materials that may be helpful are listed below (see also
> the chapter and references in Biological Safety: Principles and Practices).
>
> APHIS has several inspection guides that the agency uses when evaluating
> facilities for permits. They provide a series of questions emphasizing
> facility and procedural details for plant biosafety level 2 and 3
> facilities. You should be able to get them from your APHIS state plant
> health director or from APHIS headquarters. One is titled "Inspection
> checklist/report for medium security plant pathogen containment facility".
> Another is "Inventory of Containment Facility for Plant Pathogens (revised
> 11/01)". The latter is used primarily for high containment facilities. A
> copy of APHIS 81-61 (June 1983) "Safeguard Guidelines for containment of
> Plant Pests Under Permit" also provides some specific information, primarily
> on facility design.
>
> The APHIS site aphis. has several inspection manuals available
> as pdf files, including BIOTECHNOLOGY INSPECTION MANUAL FOR NOTIFICATION
> FIELD RELEASE--which focuses on planned releases (field trials) of
> genetically modified plants. The site also lists "Manual for Regulating
> Plant Pests", which is supposed to be published in FY2002 and appears by
> title to be directly applicable to work with plant pathogens.
>
> "Containment Facilities and Safeguards for Exotic Plant Pathogens and
> Pests."
> edited by Robert P. Kahn, S.B. Mathur. Publisher: St. Paul, Minn. :
> American Phytopathological Society, c1998. Chapters present design examples
> of facilities from throughout the world, but there is also a section on risk
> assessment. The society's web site is - but it appears not to
> be accessible this morning.
>
> Michael Betlach, Ph.D.
> Biosafety Officer
> Promega Corporation
> 5445 E. Cheryl Parkway
> Madison, WI 53711
> (608) 274-1181, Ext. 1270
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Kim Auletta [mailto:kauletta@.SUNYSB.EDU]
> Sent: Wednesday, September 04, 2002 8:56 AM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: Plant Pathogens
>
>
> With the new inventory list being circulated for plant pathogens, our
> Greenhouse would like to develop guidelines/SOPs, etc for any researcher
> wanting to begin work on a plant pathogen (so far, we haven't found any on
> campus!). Have any of you developed plant pathogen SOPs? I'm aware of the
> rDNA NIH guidelines, but haven't found much else. I'd appreciate any help
> you can provide.
>
>
> Kim Auletta
> Lab Safety Specialist
> Environmental Health and Safety
> SUNY Stony Brook
> 110 Suffolk Hall
> Stony Brook, NY 11794-6200
> phone: 631-632-9672
> fax: 631-632-9683
> email: kauletta@.sunysb.edu
>
Kim,
In addition to the references pointed out in the above post, APHIS has a
companion PPQ form (PPQ Form 626-1) "Application to Move Non-Genetically
Engineered Live Plant Pathogens" that you should take a look at.
Steve
-------------------------------------------------
Steve Stauffer
Quarantine Officer: Contained Research Facility
University of California at Davis
(530) 752-6920 (voice); (530) 754-7757 (fax)
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 6 Sep 2002 14:03:43 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Burnett, LouAnn Crawford"
Subject: Re: References for Lab Furniture Requirements
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Hi Mimi!
I guess I've always interpreted that "easily cleaned" statement in the
BMBL as a performance standard. No one in a lab has ever satisfactorily
answered me how they would clean and/or decontaminate a fabric
upholstered chair if they spilled something that required
decontamination on it. Certainly the bloodborne pathogen standard
would require "appropriate" decontamination/housekeeping after a spill
of blood or OPIM (including untested human cell lines), but I don't
think OSHA spells it out either.
Good luck!
LouAnn
LouAnn C. Burnett, MS, CBSP =09
Biosafety Program Manager & Biological Safety Officer=09
Vanderbilt University Environmental Health & Safety
Nashville, Tennessee
615/322-0927 (direct & voice mail)
615/343-4951 (fax) =09
-----Original Message-----
From: Ton, Mimi [mailto:Mimi.Ton@CALTECH.EDU]
Sent: Friday, September 06, 2002 10:53 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: References for Lab Furniture Requirements
Dear all,
Does anyone have references for the requirement that lab furniture,
especially chairs and stools, must be covered with impermeable surfaces
that facilitate decontamination and cleanup procedures in the event of a
spill. For example chairs and stools must not be covered in cloth but
instead in plastic, vinyl or leather finish.
I've already checked the BMBL and it states that:
1. The laboratory is designed so that it can be easily cleaned. Carpets
and rugs in laboratories are not appropriate. 2. Laboratory furniture is
capable of supporting anticipated loading and uses.
However, I need to find references stating specifically that the chairs
and stools must not be covered in cloth. Please help!
Thanks in advance
Mimi Ton
---------------------------------------------
Mimi C. Ton
Safety Engineer
California Institute of Technology
Environment, Health & Safety Office
M/C 25-6
1200 E. California Boulevard
Pasadena, CA 91125
Phone: 626.395.2430
Fax: 626.577.6028
E-mail: mimi.ton@caltech.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 6 Sep 2002 15:00:50 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Dianne Fightmaster
Subject: Re: References for Lab Furniture Requirements
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
You won't find it listed under BL1, look in the BMBL under BL2, Laboratory
facilities, #7 page 26. "Chairs and other furniture used in laboratory work
should be covered with a non-fabric material that can be easily decontaminated.
Also find it under Bl3 page 34 #5.
Hope this helps.
"Ton, Mimi" on 09/06/2002 10:53:23 AM
Please respond to A Biosafety Discussion List
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
cc: (bcc: Dianne L. Fightmaster/MDACC)
Subject: References for Lab Furniture Requirements
Dear all,
Does anyone have references for the requirement that lab furniture,
especially chairs and stools, must be covered with impermeable surfaces
that facilitate decontamination and cleanup procedures in the event of a
spill. For example chairs and stools must not be covered in cloth but
instead in plastic, vinyl or leather finish.
I've already checked the BMBL and it states that:
1. The laboratory is designed so that it can be easily cleaned. Carpets and
rugs in laboratories are not appropriate.
2. Laboratory furniture is capable of supporting anticipated loading and
uses.
However, I need to find references stating specifically that the chairs and
stools must not be covered in cloth. Please help!
Thanks in advance
Mimi Ton
---------------------------------------------
Mimi C. Ton
Safety Engineer
California Institute of Technology
Environment, Health & Safety Office
M/C 25-6
1200 E. California Boulevard
Pasadena, CA 91125
Phone: 626.395.2430
Fax: 626.577.6028
E-mail: mimi.ton@caltech.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 6 Sep 2002 16:05:36 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Moravek, Paula"
Subject: Re: References for Lab Furniture Requirements
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Suggestion: Remove the chair/stool from the lab and spill a cup of =
coffee
(cream and sugar obligatory) on the "cleanable" fabric upholstery and =
have
the advocate of fabric coverings demonstrate how easily cleaned it =
really is.
Oh...maybe that's a little too militant...I take it back. (It's Friday =
after
a frustrating week, sorry.)
I've referred to the "cleanable surface" standard in the past to have =
fabric
covered chairs removed from the lab. It worked for me when I mentioned =
that
those chairs would not pass biosafety or chemical safety inspections due =
to
the BMBL standard. YMMV.
Cheers!
P. Moravek
Laboratory Manager, Biology & Biotechnology Department
Biosafety Officer, Office of Environmental & Occupational Safety
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Worcester, MA 01609 U.S.A.
pmoravek@wpi.edu
-----Original Message-----
From: Burnett, LouAnn Crawford [mailto:louann.burnett@VANDERBILT.EDU]
Sent: Friday, September 06, 2002 3:04 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: References for Lab Furniture Requirements
Hi Mimi!
I guess I've always interpreted that "easily cleaned" statement in the
BMBL as a performance standard. No one in a lab has ever satisfactorily
answered me how they would clean and/or decontaminate a fabric
upholstered chair if they spilled something that required
decontamination on it. Certainly the bloodborne pathogen standard
would require "appropriate" decontamination/housekeeping after a spill
of blood or OPIM (including untested human cell lines), but I don't
think OSHA spells it out either.
Good luck!
LouAnn
LouAnn C. Burnett, MS, CBSP =09
Biosafety Program Manager & Biological Safety Officer=09
Vanderbilt University Environmental Health & Safety
Nashville, Tennessee
615/322-0927 (direct & voice mail)
615/343-4951 (fax) =09
-----Original Message-----
From: Ton, Mimi [mailto:Mimi.Ton@CALTECH.EDU]
Sent: Friday, September 06, 2002 10:53 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: References for Lab Furniture Requirements
Dear all,
Does anyone have references for the requirement that lab furniture,
especially chairs and stools, must be covered with impermeable surfaces
that facilitate decontamination and cleanup procedures in the event of a
spill. For example chairs and stools must not be covered in cloth but
instead in plastic, vinyl or leather finish.
I've already checked the BMBL and it states that:
1. The laboratory is designed so that it can be easily cleaned. Carpets
and rugs in laboratories are not appropriate. 2. Laboratory furniture is
capable of supporting anticipated loading and uses.
However, I need to find references stating specifically that the chairs
and stools must not be covered in cloth. Please help!
Thanks in advance
Mimi Ton
---------------------------------------------
Mimi C. Ton
Safety Engineer
California Institute of Technology
Environment, Health & Safety Office
M/C 25-6
1200 E. California Boulevard
Pasadena, CA 91125
Phone: 626.395.2430
Fax: 626.577.6028
E-mail: mimi.ton@caltech.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 6 Sep 2002 15:33:59 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Morgan Margaret-AMM076
Subject: Arrangement of biosafety cabinets
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Colleagues, I require advice on the following.
In our BSL facility we would like to locate to BSC II cabinets opposite one
another, so that if a person is working in each hood they would be sitting
back to back. The distance between the two hoods would be five feet, and we
expect low usage, so that both hoods would not often be in use at the same
time.
Would this present a problem? Is this arrangement legal? safe? advisable?
Thanks,
Margaret (Peggy) Morgan, Ph.D,
Senior Scientist and BioSafety Officer,
Motorola Life Sciences,
Pasadena CA 91105.
ph. 626 584 5900 ext 432
cell 626 484 2589.
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 6 Sep 2002 16:04:13 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Morgan Margaret-AMM076
Subject: Clarification of arrangement of BSC hoods
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Hi again,
Thanks for this response.
Actually it is not a thoroughfare. The two cabinets will be at the end of
the room occupying the corners flush against the back wall, facing each
other, so no one will need to walk between them to get somewhere else. The
only reason someone will go there is to sit down and use the cabinet.
In this case would would the arrangement be OK?
Margaret (Peggy) Morgan, Ph.D,
Senior Scientist and BioSafety Officer,
Motorola Life Sciences,
Pasadena CA 91105.
ph. 626 584 5900 ext 432
cell 626 484 2589.
-----Original Message-----
From: Catherine Walker [mailto:cmwalker@bama.ua.edu]
Sent: Saturday, September 07, 2002 1:54 AM
To: Morgan Margaret-AMM076
Subject: arrangement
Our Safety Coordinator would not recommend the arrangement you
describe. On the (rare) occasion when a person was sitting at each
BSC, approximately 40-48 inches of the available 60 inches would be
occupied. That would leave 12-20 inches thoroughfare space. Not
really enough. She usually recommends that the knee spaces by
alternated so that each person backs up to a counter or wall. Good
luck.
--
Catherine M. Walker
University of Alabama
Environmental Health and Safety
Box 870178
Tuscaloosa, AL 35487-0178
Phone (205) 348-5905
FAX (205) 348-7773
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 6 Sep 2002 18:24:32 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Lori Keen
Subject: Re: Clarification of arrangement of BSC hoods
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
We have a similar arrangement for our BSC's although the space in between is a
bit wider because we also have a bench with centrifuge, pipets, etc. so that the
people working at the BSC's only have to turn their chairs to spin cells, access
supplies, etc. This greatly reduces the amount of walking around in the lab;
this in turn minimizes the disruption of the airflow across the face of the BSC.
Like yours, the space in between the hoods is not a thoroughfare - the only
reason to go there is to work at the BSC.
We have not found this arrangement to be problematic in the 10 or so years that
this lab has been in use.
Lori Keen
Lab Manager, Biology
Calvin College
616-957-6080
Member NAOSMM
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 9 Sep 2002 08:33:43 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Kim Auletta
Subject: Parent & Child forms
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Ed -
As the deadline draws near.....we still have not recd our "official" form
for the university. I do have 2 forms that were sent to individual
researchers & was going to include as "child" forms. Can I use one of these
forms to report for the University?
Kim Auletta
Lab Safety Specialist
Environmental Health and Safety
SUNY Stony Brook
110 Suffolk Hall
Stony Brook, NY 11794-6200
phone: 631-632-9672
fax: 631-632-9683
email: kauletta@.sunysb.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 9 Sep 2002 08:50:39 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Richard Fink
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
del biosafty ecrisk@smile.ch
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 9 Sep 2002 08:07:47 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ernest Stracener
Organization: Univ. of WI System Administration
Subject: Re: Parent & Child forms
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Many Univ. of WI schools have also not received a form, except from
individual faculty members--none from Chancellors/Presidents.
Kim Auletta wrote:
>
> Ed -
> As the deadline draws near.....we still have not recd our "official" form
> for the university. I do have 2 forms that were sent to individual
> researchers & was going to include as "child" forms. Can I use one of these
> forms to report for the University?
>
> Kim Auletta
> Lab Safety Specialist
> Environmental Health and Safety
> SUNY Stony Brook
> 110 Suffolk Hall
> Stony Brook, NY 11794-6200
> phone: 631-632-9672
> fax: 631-632-9683
> email: kauletta@.sunysb.edu
--
Ernest Stracener
Occupational Safety Manager
University of Wisconsin System Administration
780 Regent Street
P.O. Box 8010
Madison, WI 53708-8010
Phone: (608) 265-5790
Fax: (608) 263-7330
Email: estracener@uwsa.edu
Web:
AOL Instant Messenger: estracener
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 9 Sep 2002 08:58:31 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Michelle Federici
Subject: Re: no form yet
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Ed,
I'm in the same boat. We are trying to get forms for multiple institutions
out today and the form I requested from the help line over a week ago isn't
in yet. What should institutions that have requested these forms and are in
possession of select agents do if they don't receive the forms by the
deadline?
Thank you,
Michelle Federici
-----Original Message-----
From: Janice Flesher [mailto:janice.flesher@]
Sent: Friday, September 06, 2002 1:50 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: no form yet
Ed,
Even though I requested a form on August 23 and have called the
hot line (the mail out date is a moving target) I have NOT yet
received it, despite alerts to all mailrooms. I have items to
report, what am I to do? Should I send the copy on Federal
Register so I don't miss the deadline?
Janice
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 9 Sep 2002 09:41:24 -0500
Reply-To: speaker@ehs.psu.edu
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Curt Speaker
Organization: UNIVERSITY SAFETY
Subject: Re: forms to presidents
Morning:
I finally got the form addressed to our president. Even though Ed
said they were mailed a couple weeks ago, the one to my president
was postmarked Sept. 3rd (last Tuesday) and arrived last Thursday
(9/5).
I can understand why folks are getting frustrated and concerned.
Curt
Curt Speaker
Biosafety Officer
Penn State University
Environmental Health and Safety
speaker@ehs.psu.edu
^...^
(O_O)
=(Y)=
"""
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 9 Sep 2002 11:13:12 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ed Gaunt
Subject: FW: Washington Fax story
MIME-Version: 1.0
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boundary="----_=_NextPart_001_01C25813.69C18BB0"
This message is in MIME format. Since your mail reader does not understand
this format, some or all of this message may not be legible.
------_=_NextPart_001_01C25813.69C18BB0
Content-Type: text/plain;
charset="iso-8859-1"
FYI
Ed
WASHINGTON FAX
September 6, 2002
Updated select agent rule likely to incorporate security advice from 1999
biosafety document
Updated requirements being formulated by a CDC-convened governmentwide
committee for handling the 36 HHS-administered bioagents and toxins deemed
capable of causing serious or fatal illness to humans or animals likely will
draw upon an appendix to the 1999 Biosafety in Microbiological and
Biomedical Laboratories (BMBL) 4th edition, according to a CDC official.
While traditional laboratory biosafety guidelines have emphasized safety,
guidance offered in "Appendix F" of the 1999 document addresses laboratory
security concerns: prohibiting unauthorized entry and authorized removal
of
dangerous biological agents.
Because the rulemaking process is underway, officials cannot comment on the
process or its likely outcome, says Stephen Ostroff, acting deputy
director
of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's National Center for
Infectious Diseases (NCID), where the cross-government committee is
formulating the final rule.
The rulemaking is called for under the Public Health Security and
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2000 (PL107-188) which directs
the Health and Human Services Secretary to establish and maintain a
list of biological agents and toxins that have the potential to pose a
severe threat to public health and safety. CDC has been delegated this
responsibility since earlier legislation was passed in 1996. The Secretary
of Agriculture also is directed by the same law to establish and maintain a
list of the 23 select livestock agents the 9 plant select agents that are
considered dangerous to human, animal or plant life.
Currently, CDC is seeking public comment on changes under consideration for
the current list of select agents and toxins. The notice of intent to
issue
regulations was published in the Federal Register August 23 [Vol. 67, No.
164; pages 54605-54607]. The final rule will be published December 9. The
August 23 publication is the only publication that will be made.
Meanwhile, by September 10, researchers and research institutions are asked
simply to notify CDC and USDA if they have possession of any of the human,
livestock, or plant selected agents. In an effort to make this notification
process easier for the scientific community, CDC and USDA have developed
one common reporting form.
This is a one-time notification request for the user community, Ostroff
assured. "Another important point," he said, "is the notification
of the possession does not mean the researcher or the research institution
may ultimately have to register under the program once the final rule comes
out" because there are a series of exemptions that need to be modified
or retained that are based on the current legislation.
Title II of the Preparedness and Response Act authorizes, among other
exemptions, for clinical or diagnostic laboratories and other persons to
possess, use or transfer listed agents or toxins if the identity of the
agents or toxins is reported to the secretary. For example, the title
authorizes exemption for an investigational product that contains listed
agents or toxins that are being used in an investigation that is authorized
under any Federal Act.
There is concern in some quarters of the scientific community that the
"select agents" rule being formulated could delay work on some new
grants being awarded in January by NIH's National Institute of Allergy and
Infectious Diseases because of what may be required in the way of biosafety
and biosecurity measures. The rule becomes effective December 9, and NIAID
will begin awarding about $1.5 billion a month later.
Work on new grants where any of the listed biological agents and toxins are
part of the research process cannot begin until grant recipients are in
compliance with the final rule, which includes registering with CDC.
Continuation grants can move forward pending their proper registration.
According to Ostroff, "the law requires us to revise and strengthen the
security requirements. I can't comment on how exactly that is to be done.
But researchers and institutions understanding that Appendix F is a likely
starting place for biosafety modifications and knowing what currently is
written in BMBL that concerns security -- I think these are things that
applicants for the NIAID funds need to take into account as they apply for
these resources. They need to recognize that if they are conducting research
on these select agents and actually working with the live agents or certain
of their genetic components that they have to register and they have to
comply."
"From our perspective we think that these are prudent measures to enhance
the security around these agents, and I think anybody who would be working
with these agents ought to be making sure they have the appropriate security
to make sure that they can work with them both safely and securely."
NIAID Director Anthony Fauci, commenting August 27 at the first meeting of
the HHS Council on Public Health Preparedness, agreed. "Clearly, you need
to have monitoring, careful monitoring, of select agents, the use of
select
agents and the transportation of select agents," Fauci said.
But the NIAID director did add a qualifying perspective: "We would hope,
those of us in the scientific community, that this is done with a heavy
dose of common sense that parallels the safety issue, because what we don't
want obviously is an interference with the capability of people who are
trying to do things in a biodefense way, to not be able to do that
smoothly."
Fauci acknowledged that you really do have to be very careful when you're
dealing with these agents, but he said, "we've got to make sure that we
have a forum to be able to say, this may appear to be something you'd want
to really be careful with, but the benefit of going in this direction
(researching the dangerous biological agent or toxin) is much greater than
not, so it's more just use the old common sense."
The American Society for Microbiology (ASM) has been working continuously
since the 1980s to monitor proposed legislation involving the control of
select agents to ensure laws passed would not hamper research and would
protect legitimate researchers from running afoul of the law in the daily
business of purchasing and possessing research materials.
Once incident that started the latest round of legislation to close
loopholes in the law governing possession of select agents occurred in 1995
in Nevada when Larry Wayne Harris was caught with a vile of plague in his
car and the FBI couldn't prosecute him. Harris had obtained the agent from
the American Type Culture Collection. At the time, while there was a law
that allowed criminal prosecution for the transfer of a select agent from
place to place, there was no law that made it a criminal offense for an
individual to have in possession a select agent.
ASM's Janet Shoemaker, who has been the society's point person in protecting
the freedom of research and researchers in these matters, indicated ASM
decided in 1999 that it would favor registration not only for
transfer but for possession of select agents "because we thought that it
was the right thing to do."
Sources tell Washington Fax a case can be made that Iraq has select agents
because the American Type Culture Collection shipped them to Iraq in
1980s.
ASM and other research societies are concerned that other federal agencies
will go further than the 2000 law, ignoring congressional intent, which
was
to not interfere with research. In fact, Congress has mandated in the law
that the agencies report back to Congress in a year on whether there has
been interference with biomedical research.
The pan-agency work group is reviewing the current list of biological agents
and toxins to see which ones need to be removed and to review similar agents
not on the list and determine if they should be added. The group has as
members, in addition to NIH, CDC, FDA and other agencies with science or
public health interests, the FBI, the CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency
and the U.S. Postal Service.
One of the purposes of Public Law 107-188 is to amend federal criminal code
provisions concerning the possession of listed biological agents and
toxins
so anyone who transfers a select agent to a person the transferor knows or
has reasonable cause to believe is not registered as required can be fined
or imprisoned for not more than five years or both. A person who knowingly
possesses a biological agent or toxin for which the individual has not
obtained a required registration will suffer the same punishment.
-- Bradie Metheny
Appendix F of Biosafety
in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories, 4e, can be found on the
CDC web site at
[
]
CDC's Laboratory Registration/Select
Agent Transfer Program has a web page at
[
]
The Federal Register
Notice and notification response form are available as a .pdf document
from the ASM site at
[
]
(C) 1998 WASHINGTON FAX, an established news and information service
specializing in science policy [
]. Apply for a
free trial subscription at [
], or
e-mail [trial@].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
------_=_NextPart_001_01C25813.69C18BB0
Content-Type: text/html;
charset="iso-8859-1"
FYI
Ed
WASHINGTON FAX
September 6, 2002
Updated select agent rule likely to incorporate security advice from 1999
biosafety document
Updated requirements being formulated by a CDC-convened governmentwide
committee for handling the 36 HHS-administered bioagents and toxins deemed
capable of causing serious or fatal illness to humans or animals likely will
draw upon an appendix to the 1999 Biosafety in Microbiological and
Biomedical Laboratories (BMBL) 4th edition, according to a CDC official.
While traditional laboratory biosafety guidelines have emphasized safety,
guidance offered in "Appendix F" of the 1999 document addresses laboratory
security concerns: prohibiting unauthorized entry and authorized removal
of
dangerous biological agents.
Because the rulemaking process is underway, officials cannot comment on the
process or its likely outcome, says Stephen Ostroff, acting deputy
director
of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's National Center for
Infectious Diseases (NCID), where the cross-government committee is
formulating the final rule.
The rulemaking is called for under the Public Health Security and
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2000 (PL107-188) which directs
the Health and Human Services Secretary to establish and maintain a
list of biological agents and toxins that have the potential to pose a
severe threat to public health and safety. CDC has been delegated this
responsibility since earlier legislation was passed in 1996. The Secretary
of Agriculture also is directed by the same law to establish and maintain a
list of the 23 select livestock agents the 9 plant select agents that are
considered dangerous to human, animal or plant life.
Currently, CDC is seeking public comment on changes under consideration for
the current list of select agents and toxins. The notice of intent to
issue
regulations was published in the Federal Register August 23 [Vol. 67, No.
164; pages 54605-54607]. The final rule will be published December 9. The
August 23 publication is the only publication that will be made.
Meanwhile, by September 10, researchers and research institutions are asked
simply to notify CDC and USDA if they have possession of any of the human,
livestock, or plant selected agents. In an effort to make this notification
process easier for the scientific community, CDC and USDA have developed
one common reporting form.
This is a one-time notification request for the user community, Ostroff
assured. "Another important point," he said, "is the notification
of the possession does not mean the researcher or the research institution
may ultimately have to register under the program once the final rule comes
out" because there are a series of exemptions that need to be modified
or retained that are based on the current legislation.
Title II of the Preparedness and Response Act authorizes, among other
exemptions, for clinical or diagnostic laboratories and other persons to
possess, use or transfer listed agents or toxins if the identity of the
agents or toxins is reported to the secretary. For example, the title
authorizes exemption for an investigational product that contains listed
agents or toxins that are being used in an investigation that is authorized
under any Federal Act.
There is concern in some quarters of the scientific community that the
"select agents" rule being formulated could delay work on some new
grants being awarded in January by NIH's National Institute of Allergy and
Infectious Diseases because of what may be required in the way of biosafety
and biosecurity measures. The rule becomes effective December 9, and NIAID
will begin awarding about $1.5 billion a month later.
Work on new grants where any of the listed biological agents and toxins are
part of the research process cannot begin until grant recipients are in
compliance with the final rule, which includes registering with CDC.
Continuation grants can move forward pending their proper registration.
According to Ostroff, "the law requires us to revise and strengthen the
security requirements. I can't comment on how exactly that is to be done.
But researchers and institutions understanding that Appendix F is a likely
starting place for biosafety modifications and knowing what currently is
written in BMBL that concerns security -- I think these are things that
applicants for the NIAID funds need to take into account as they apply for
these resources. They need to recognize that if they are conducting research
on these select agents and actually working with the live agents or certain
of their genetic components that they have to register and they have to
comply."
"From our perspective we think that these are prudent measures to enhance
the security around these agents, and I think anybody who would be working
with these agents ought to be making sure they have the appropriate security
to make sure that they can work with them both safely and securely."
NIAID Director Anthony Fauci, commenting August 27 at the first meeting of
the HHS Council on Public Health Preparedness, agreed. "Clearly, you need
to have monitoring, careful monitoring, of select agents, the use of
select
agents and the transportation of select agents," Fauci said.
But the NIAID director did add a qualifying perspective: "We would hope,
those of us in the scientific community, that this is done with a heavy
dose of common sense that parallels the safety issue, because what we don't
want obviously is an interference with the capability of people who are
trying to do things in a biodefense way, to not be able to do that
smoothly."
Fauci acknowledged that you really do have to be very careful when you're
dealing with these agents, but he said, "we've got to make sure that we
have a forum to be able to say, this may appear to be something you'd want
to really be careful with, but the benefit of going in this direction
(researching the dangerous biological agent or toxin) is much greater than
not, so it's more just use the old common sense."
The American Society for Microbiology (ASM) has been working continuously
since the 1980s to monitor proposed legislation involving the control of
select agents to ensure laws passed would not hamper research and would
protect legitimate researchers from running afoul of the law in the daily
business of purchasing and possessing research materials.
Once incident that started the latest round of legislation to close
loopholes in the law governing possession of select agents occurred in 1995
in Nevada when Larry Wayne Harris was caught with a vile of plague in his
car and the FBI couldn't prosecute him. Harris had obtained the agent from
the American Type Culture Collection. At the time, while there was a law
that allowed criminal prosecution for the transfer of a select agent from
place to place, there was no law that made it a criminal offense for an
individual to have in possession a select agent.
ASM's Janet Shoemaker, who has been the society's point person in protecting
the freedom of research and researchers in these matters, indicated ASM
decided in 1999 that it would favor registration not only for
transfer but for possession of select agents "because we thought that it
was the right thing to do."
Sources tell Washington Fax a case can be made that Iraq has select agents
because the American Type Culture Collection shipped them to Iraq in
1980s.
ASM and other research societies are concerned that other federal agencies
will go further than the 2000 law, ignoring congressional intent, which
was
to not interfere with research. In fact, Congress has mandated in the law
that the agencies report back to Congress in a year on whether there has
been interference with biomedical research.
The pan-agency work group is reviewing the current list of biological agents
and toxins to see which ones need to be removed and to review similar agents
not on the list and determine if they should be added. The group has as
members, in addition to NIH, CDC, FDA and other agencies with science or
public health interests, the FBI, the CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency
and the U.S. Postal Service.
One of the purposes of Public Law 107-188 is to amend federal criminal code
provisions concerning the possession of listed biological agents and
toxins
so anyone who transfers a select agent to a person the transferor knows or
has reasonable cause to believe is not registered as required can be fined
or imprisoned for not more than five years or both. A person who knowingly
possesses a biological agent or toxin for which the individual has not
obtained a required registration will suffer the same punishment.
-- Bradie Metheny
Appendix F of Biosafety
in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories, 4e, can be found on the
CDC web site at
[]
CDC's Laboratory Registration/Select
Agent Transfer Program has a web page at
[]
The Federal Register
Notice and notification response form are available as a .pdf document
from the ASM site at
[]
(C) 1998 WASHINGTON FAX, an established news and information service
specializing in science policy []. Apply for a
free trial subscription at [], or
e-mail [trial@].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
------_=_NextPart_001_01C25813.69C18BB0--
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 9 Sep 2002 11:15:15 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ed Gaunt
Subject: Re: Parent & Child forms
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Yes...just mark one as the summary form and the other as the "child form"
If any forms show up later, send them back as child forms as well, referring
back to the original Form ID selected as the Summary Form (remember to write
down the summary form ID before sending it in!).
Ed
-----Original Message-----
From: Kim Auletta [mailto:kauletta@.SUNYSB.EDU]
Sent: Monday, September 09, 2002 8:34 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Parent & Child forms
Ed -
As the deadline draws near.....we still have not recd our "official" form
for the university. I do have 2 forms that were sent to individual
researchers & was going to include as "child" forms. Can I use one of these
forms to report for the University?
Kim Auletta
Lab Safety Specialist
Environmental Health and Safety
SUNY Stony Brook
110 Suffolk Hall
Stony Brook, NY 11794-6200
phone: 631-632-9672
fax: 631-632-9683
email: kauletta@.sunysb.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 9 Sep 2002 11:28:44 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ed Gaunt
Subject: Re: no form yet
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="----_=_NextPart_001_01C25815.955D6A80"
This message is in MIME format. Since your mail reader does not understand
this format, some or all of this message may not be legible.
------_=_NextPart_001_01C25815.955D6A80
Content-Type: text/plain;
charset="iso-8859-1"
We will process forms that are sent in that are not on the machine-readable
form, but these forms take 300 times longer to process (~5 minutes versus
0.5 sec for the machine-readable forms), so please do not bury us with these
forms!!
We will process all forms received, even if they are received after the
deadline. REMEMBER...If you only possess C list agents (USDA agents only),
the deadline is now October 11th (as opposed to the 8th originally
publicized).
Ed
-----Original Message-----
From: Michelle Federici [ mailto:MFederici@
]
Sent: Monday, September 09, 2002 8:59 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: no form yet
Ed,
I'm in the same boat. We are trying to get forms for multiple institutions
out today and the form I requested from the help line over a week ago isn't
in yet. What should institutions that have requested these forms and are in
possession of select agents do if they don't receive the forms by the
deadline?
Thank you,
Michelle Federici
-----Original Message-----
From: Janice Flesher [ mailto:janice.flesher@
]
Sent: Friday, September 06, 2002 1:50 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: no form yet
Ed,
Even though I requested a form on August 23 and have called the
hot line (the mail out date is a moving target) I have NOT yet
received it, despite alerts to all mailrooms. I have items to
report, what am I to do? Should I send the copy on Federal
Register so I don't miss the deadline?
Janice
------_=_NextPart_001_01C25815.955D6A80
Content-Type: text/html;
charset="iso-8859-1"
We will process forms that are sent in that are not on the machine-readable form, but these forms take 300 times longer to process (~5 minutes versus 0.5 sec for the machine-readable forms), so please do not bury us with these forms!!
We will process all forms received, even if they are received after the deadline. REMEMBER...If you only possess C list agents (USDA agents only), the deadline is now October 11th (as opposed to the 8th originally publicized).
Ed
-----Original Message-----
From: Michelle Federici [mailto:MFederici@]
Sent: Monday, September 09, 2002 8:59 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: no form yet
Ed,
I'm in the same boat. We are trying to get forms for multiple institutions
out today and the form I requested from the help line over a week ago isn't
in yet. What should institutions that have requested these forms and are in
possession of select agents do if they don't receive the forms by the
deadline?
Thank you,
Michelle Federici
-----Original Message-----
From: Janice Flesher [mailto:janice.flesher@]
Sent: Friday, September 06, 2002 1:50 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: no form yet
Ed,
Even though I requested a form on August 23 and have called the
hot line (the mail out date is a moving target) I have NOT yet
received it, despite alerts to all mailrooms. I have items to
report, what am I to do? Should I send the copy on Federal
Register so I don't miss the deadline?
Janice
------_=_NextPart_001_01C25815.955D6A80--
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 9 Sep 2002 22:46:57 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Catherine Walker
Subject: Re: no form yet
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="------------3644522D33F600914EBBB3F3"
--------------3644522D33F600914EBBB3F3
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Well, somebody may have called us ugly names, but it would have
worked.
Ed Gaunt wrote:
>
>
> We will process forms that are sent in that are not on the
> machine-readable form, but these forms take 300 times longer to
> process (~5 minutes versus 0.5 sec for the machine-readable
> forms), so please do not bury us with these forms!!
>
> We will process all forms received, even if they are received
> after the deadline. REMEMBER...If you only possess C list agents
> (USDA agents only), the deadline is now October 11th (as opposed
> to the 8th originally publicized).
>
>
> Ed
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Michelle Federici [mailto:MFederici@]
> Sent: Monday, September 09, 2002 8:59 AM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: Re: no form yet
>
>
> Ed,
> I'm in the same boat. We are trying to get forms for multiple
> institutions
> out today and the form I requested from the help line over a week
> ago isn't
> in yet. What should institutions that have requested these forms
> and are in
> possession of select agents do if they don't receive the forms by
> the
> deadline?
>
> Thank you,
> Michelle Federici
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Janice Flesher [mailto:janice.flesher@]
> Sent: Friday, September 06, 2002 1:50 PM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: no form yet
>
>
> Ed,
>
> Even though I requested a form on August 23 and have called the
> hot line (the mail out date is a moving target) I have NOT yet
> received it, despite alerts to all mailrooms. I have items to
> report, what am I to do? Should I send the copy on Federal
> Register so I don't miss the deadline?
>
> Janice
--
Catherine M. Walker
University of Alabama
Environmental Health and Safety
Box 870178
Tuscaloosa, AL 35487-0178
Phone (205) 348-5905
FAX (205) 348-7773
--------------3644522D33F600914EBBB3F3
Content-Type: text/html; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Well, somebody may have called us ugly names, but it would have worked.
Ed Gaunt wrote:
We will process forms that are sent in that are not on the machine-readable form, but these forms take 300 times longer to process (~5 minutes versus 0.5 sec for the machine-readable forms), so please do not bury us with these forms!!
We will process all forms received, even if they are received after the deadline. REMEMBER...If you only possess C list agents (USDA agents only), the deadline is now October 11th (as opposed to the 8th originally publicized).
Ed
-----Original Message-----
From: Michelle Federici [mailto:MFederici@]
Sent: Monday, September 09, 2002 8:59 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: no form yet
Ed,
I'm in the same boat. We are trying to get forms for multiple institutions
out today and the form I requested from the help line over a week ago isn't
in yet. What should institutions that have requested these forms and are in
possession of select agents do if they don't receive the forms by the
deadline?
Thank you,
Michelle Federici
-----Original Message-----
From: Janice Flesher [mailto:janice.flesher@]
Sent: Friday, September 06, 2002 1:50 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: no form yet
Ed,
Even though I requested a form on August 23 and have called the
hot line (the mail out date is a moving target) I have NOT yet
received it, despite alerts to all mailrooms. I have items to
report, what am I to do? Should I send the copy on Federal
Register so I don't miss the deadline?
Janice
--
Catherine M. Walker
University of Alabama
Environmental Health and Safety
Box 870178
Tuscaloosa, AL 35487-0178
Phone (205) 348-5905
FAX (205) 348-7773
--------------3644522D33F600914EBBB3F3--
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 9 Sep 2002 11:21:14 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Kelly, Jess P."
Subject: Re: forms to presidents
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
We received uor Presidents form over the weekend. It was also =
postmarked September 3, 2002. We sent it off today with the others.
Jess Kelly
Baylor University
-----Original Message-----
From: Curt Speaker [mailto:SPEAKER@SAFETY-1.SAFETY.PSU.EDU]
Sent: Monday, September 09, 2002 9:41 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: forms to presidents
Morning:
I finally got the form addressed to our president. Even though Ed
said they were mailed a couple weeks ago, the one to my president
was postmarked Sept. 3rd (last Tuesday) and arrived last Thursday
(9/5).
I can understand why folks are getting frustrated and concerned.
Curt
Curt Speaker
Biosafety Officer
Penn State University
Environmental Health and Safety
speaker@ehs.psu.edu
^...^
(O_O)
=3D(Y)=3D
"""
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 9 Sep 2002 12:36:29 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Francis Churchill
Subject: acetone as fixative
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed"
I have a question about the use of acetone as a tissue fixative. I
am making an assumption that acetone's disinfective properties are
related to dehydration and that it is similar to ethanol in kill
times. I have reviewed many protocols for acetone fixing samples
that turned up in a google search.
My questions are: Will acetone (10 minutes for slides, 30 minutes for
tissues blocks) kill hepatitis B (or C for that matter)? Will it
kill spore forming organisms like TB?
Thanks for your advice and good luck with the SA forms (we're still
tracking down the one sent to our President too).
Francis
--
Francis Churchill
University of Vermont - Environmental Safety Facility
667 Spear Street, UVM, Burlington, VT 05405-3010
(802) 656-5405
Francis.Churchill@uvm.edu
"Show me pollution and I'll show you a subsidy." Robert F Kennedy Jr
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 9 Sep 2002 09:54:24 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Shiozaki, Debbie J"
Subject: IBC and gene therapy
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
For those of you involved with IBCs that review gene therapy protocols
involving human study subjects, what does the membership of your committee
look like?? What expertise do you members bring to the committee? Who
provides the administrative support for the committee? What role does the
BSO have on this committee?
Thank you,
Debbie Shiozaki, MPH, CIH
Manager, EH&S
Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center
206-667-6200
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 9 Sep 2002 11:57:19 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Edwin Jackson
Subject: Re: acetone as fixative
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
I checked the California Pesticide Product Database for any registered products
containing acetone. I didn't find any that were registered for bacterial or
viral agents (one fungicide included acetone). Since the EPA cosponsors the
California site I would bet that acetone is not registered by the EPA for HBV,
HIV, or HCV. Under the Blood Borne Pathogen Standard, I don't believe that
you can claim efficacy for an unregistered disinfectant.
Mycobacterium does not form spores, but it does have an unusual cell wall
consisting of N-glycolylmuramic acid and a high concentration of lipids bound to
proteins and polysaccharides. Mycobacteria is unusually resistant to drying and
a number of disinfectants due to the unusual cell wall.
Spores are typically more resistant than Mycobacteria to disinfectants and
environmental degradation.
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 9 Sep 2002 13:55:36 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Hauck, Philip"
Subject: Re: Parent & Child forms
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
Content-transfer-encoding: quoted-printable
To all Listers: (no pun or reference to J.Lister intended)
Keep photocopies of what you sent in for your records and for marking up =
additional forms as they come in...Get ready, Ed, I have ten coming in =
to you!
Phil Hauck
-----Original Message-----
From: Ed Gaunt [mailto:egaunt@]
Sent: Monday, September 09, 2002 11:15 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Parent & Child forms
Yes...just mark one as the summary form and the other as the "child =
form"
If any forms show up later, send them back as child forms as well, =
referring
back to the original Form ID selected as the Summary Form (remember to =
write
down the summary form ID before sending it in!).
Ed
-----Original Message-----
From: Kim Auletta [mailto:kauletta@.SUNYSB.EDU]
Sent: Monday, September 09, 2002 8:34 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Parent & Child forms
Ed -
As the deadline draws near.....we still have not recd our "official" =
form
for the university. I do have 2 forms that were sent to individual
researchers & was going to include as "child" forms. Can I use one of =
these
forms to report for the University?
Kim Auletta
Lab Safety Specialist
Environmental Health and Safety
SUNY Stony Brook
110 Suffolk Hall
Stony Brook, NY 11794-6200
phone: 631-632-9672
fax: 631-632-9683
email: kauletta@.sunysb.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 9 Sep 2002 15:36:27 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Mark Campbell
Subject: Last minute question for Ed G.
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-transfer-encoding: 7bit
Hi,
After I started filling this form out, I realized the confusion everyone
was having. I have a couple questions to ask and forgive me if they
have been asked before.
1. Are the toxin exemptions of >100ng/kg in effect for this
possession document?
2. I know it was mentioned that the VSV Indian strain was not
considered
exotic. Is the Newcastle Disease Virus B1 strain considered exotic?
Thanks,
Mark J. Campbell, MS, SM(NRM)
Biological Safety Officer
Saint Louis University
1402 S. Grand Blvd.
Caroline Bldg. Rm. 307
St. Louis, MO 63104
(314) 577-8608
campbem@slu.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 9 Sep 2002 15:45:16 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Burnett, LouAnn Crawford"
Subject: Re: Last minute question for Ed G.
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Mark -
If you are having the same problem I did with how to report toxins that
are exempt under the Select Agent rule, I called the Hot Line. You need
to darken the circle to the left of the agent for all agents reported.
You don't have to fill out one of the circles to the right of the agent,
if it doesn't apply. So you don't have to say that tetrodotoxin, for
example, was registered with the CDC if, in fact, it was being used
under the biomedical research exemption. Instead, you just darken the
circle to the left and leave the ones to the right blank.
Can't help you with the Newcastle question.
Good luck! LouAnn
LouAnn C. Burnett, MS, CBSP =09
Biosafety Program Manager & Biological Safety Officer=09
Vanderbilt University Environmental Health & Safety
Nashville, Tennessee
615/322-0927 (direct & voice mail)
615/343-4951 (fax) =09
-----Original Message-----
From: Mark Campbell [mailto:campbem@SLU.EDU]
Sent: Monday, September 09, 2002 3:36 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Last minute question for Ed G.
Hi,
After I started filling this form out, I realized the confusion everyone
was having. I have a couple questions to ask and forgive me if they
have been asked before.
1. Are the toxin exemptions of >100ng/kg in effect for this
possession document?
2. I know it was mentioned that the VSV Indian strain was not
considered
exotic. Is the Newcastle Disease Virus B1 strain considered exotic?
Thanks,
Mark J. Campbell, MS, SM(NRM)
Biological Safety Officer
Saint Louis University
1402 S. Grand Blvd.
Caroline Bldg. Rm. 307
St. Louis, MO 63104
(314) 577-8608
campbem@slu.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 9 Sep 2002 16:11:25 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Mark Campbell
Subject: Re: Last minute question for Ed G.
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-transfer-encoding: 7bit
Hi LouAnn,
Hate to say this, but I was just told over the phone by the help line people
that if it falls above the 100ng/kg, I am not required to list it on the
notification form.
Mark C.
"Burnett, LouAnn Crawford" wrote:
> Mark -
>
> If you are having the same problem I did with how to report toxins that
> are exempt under the Select Agent rule, I called the Hot Line. You need
> to darken the circle to the left of the agent for all agents reported.
> You don't have to fill out one of the circles to the right of the agent,
> if it doesn't apply. So you don't have to say that tetrodotoxin, for
> example, was registered with the CDC if, in fact, it was being used
> under the biomedical research exemption. Instead, you just darken the
> circle to the left and leave the ones to the right blank.
>
> Can't help you with the Newcastle question.
>
> Good luck! LouAnn
>
> LouAnn C. Burnett, MS, CBSP
> Biosafety Program Manager & Biological Safety Officer
> Vanderbilt University Environmental Health & Safety
> Nashville, Tennessee
> 615/322-0927 (direct & voice mail)
> 615/343-4951 (fax)
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Mark Campbell [mailto:campbem@SLU.EDU]
> Sent: Monday, September 09, 2002 3:36 PM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: Last minute question for Ed G.
>
> Hi,
>
> After I started filling this form out, I realized the confusion everyone
> was having. I have a couple questions to ask and forgive me if they
> have been asked before.
>
> 1. Are the toxin exemptions of >100ng/kg in effect for this
> possession document?
>
> 2. I know it was mentioned that the VSV Indian strain was not
> considered
> exotic. Is the Newcastle Disease Virus B1 strain considered exotic?
>
> Thanks,
>
> Mark J. Campbell, MS, SM(NRM)
> Biological Safety Officer
> Saint Louis University
> 1402 S. Grand Blvd.
> Caroline Bldg. Rm. 307
> St. Louis, MO 63104
> (314) 577-8608
> campbem@slu.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 9 Sep 2002 17:41:08 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ed Gaunt
Subject: Re: Parent & Child forms
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Apparently, everybody is waiting until the last minute to send in their
forms...we've received less than 50,000 forms so far as of today, which
means there is 150K forms lurking out there SOMEWHERE! I'm afraid they are
all going to arrive Thursday and Friday (and so if the Rockville Post
Office!) :>(
Ed
-----Original Message-----
From: Hauck, Philip [mailto:philip.hauck@MSSM.EDU]
Sent: Monday, September 09, 2002 1:56 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Parent & Child forms
To all Listers: (no pun or reference to J.Lister intended)
Keep photocopies of what you sent in for your records and for marking up
additional forms as they come in...Get ready, Ed, I have ten coming in to
you!
Phil Hauck
-----Original Message-----
From: Ed Gaunt [mailto:egaunt@]
Sent: Monday, September 09, 2002 11:15 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Parent & Child forms
Yes...just mark one as the summary form and the other as the "child form"
If any forms show up later, send them back as child forms as well, referring
back to the original Form ID selected as the Summary Form (remember to write
down the summary form ID before sending it in!).
Ed
-----Original Message-----
From: Kim Auletta [mailto:kauletta@.SUNYSB.EDU]
Sent: Monday, September 09, 2002 8:34 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Parent & Child forms
Ed -
As the deadline draws near.....we still have not recd our "official" form
for the university. I do have 2 forms that were sent to individual
researchers & was going to include as "child" forms. Can I use one of these
forms to report for the University?
Kim Auletta
Lab Safety Specialist
Environmental Health and Safety
SUNY Stony Brook
110 Suffolk Hall
Stony Brook, NY 11794-6200
phone: 631-632-9672
fax: 631-632-9683
email: kauletta@.sunysb.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 9 Sep 2002 17:44:22 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ed Gaunt
Subject: Re: Last minute question for Ed G.
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
If there is a question about whether or not to report...err on the safe side
and report an agent...we'll sort it our with you later as we get into the
registration process and once the rules have been written to specifically
define what is and what is not exempt, etc...
Ed
-----Original Message-----
From: Burnett, LouAnn Crawford [mailto:louann.burnett@VANDERBILT.EDU]
Sent: Monday, September 09, 2002 4:45 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Last minute question for Ed G.
Mark -
If you are having the same problem I did with how to report toxins that
are exempt under the Select Agent rule, I called the Hot Line. You need
to darken the circle to the left of the agent for all agents reported.
You don't have to fill out one of the circles to the right of the agent,
if it doesn't apply. So you don't have to say that tetrodotoxin, for
example, was registered with the CDC if, in fact, it was being used
under the biomedical research exemption. Instead, you just darken the
circle to the left and leave the ones to the right blank.
Can't help you with the Newcastle question.
Good luck! LouAnn
LouAnn C. Burnett, MS, CBSP
Biosafety Program Manager & Biological Safety Officer
Vanderbilt University Environmental Health & Safety
Nashville, Tennessee
615/322-0927 (direct & voice mail)
615/343-4951 (fax)
-----Original Message-----
From: Mark Campbell [mailto:campbem@SLU.EDU]
Sent: Monday, September 09, 2002 3:36 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Last minute question for Ed G.
Hi,
After I started filling this form out, I realized the confusion everyone
was having. I have a couple questions to ask and forgive me if they
have been asked before.
1. Are the toxin exemptions of >100ng/kg in effect for this
possession document?
2. I know it was mentioned that the VSV Indian strain was not
considered
exotic. Is the Newcastle Disease Virus B1 strain considered exotic?
Thanks,
Mark J. Campbell, MS, SM(NRM)
Biological Safety Officer
Saint Louis University
1402 S. Grand Blvd.
Caroline Bldg. Rm. 307
St. Louis, MO 63104
(314) 577-8608
campbem@slu.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 10 Sep 2002 01:00:29 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Betsy Daniels
Subject: Betsy Daniels/BOS/US/Vpharm is out of the office.
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
I will be out of the office starting 09/09/2002 and will not return until
09/16/2002.
I will respond to your message when I return.
Thanks,
Betsy
Thanks!
Betsy
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 10 Sep 2002 11:43:54 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "OLINGER, PATRICIA L [S&C/0216]"
Subject: Re: Parent & Child forms
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Ed,
I sent in all of my forms yesterday. Parent and many children. Today I
received another child form. Along with filling in box #2 and indicating
the summary form ID no. (from parent Form, should we also fill in boxes 3-11
since it is not being sent with the Parent form?
Thank you,
Patty Olinger
Biosafety Officer
Pharmacia Corp.
Kalamazoo, MI
269-833-7931
-----Original Message-----
From: Ed Gaunt [mailto:egaunt@]
Sent: Monday, September 09, 2002 11:15 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Parent & Child forms
Yes...just mark one as the summary form and the other as the "child form"
If any forms show up later, send them back as child forms as well, referring
back to the original Form ID selected as the Summary Form (remember to write
down the summary form ID before sending it in!).
Ed
-----Original Message-----
From: Kim Auletta [mailto:kauletta@.SUNYSB.EDU]
Sent: Monday, September 09, 2002 8:34 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Parent & Child forms
Ed -
As the deadline draws near.....we still have not recd our "official" form
for the university. I do have 2 forms that were sent to individual
researchers & was going to include as "child" forms. Can I use one of these
forms to report for the University?
Kim Auletta
Lab Safety Specialist
Environmental Health and Safety
SUNY Stony Brook
110 Suffolk Hall
Stony Brook, NY 11794-6200
phone: 631-632-9672
fax: 631-632-9683
email: kauletta@.sunysb.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 10 Sep 2002 13:27:25 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Robin Newberry
Subject: APHIS forms
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed"
Any word yet on reporting the APHIS listed agents? Any form in sight?
--
Robin
--------------------------------------------------------------
W. Robert Newberry, IV CIH, CHMM
Chief Environmental Health and Safety Officer
Clemson University
wnewber@clemson.edu ehs@clemson.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 10 Sep 2002 13:38:54 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ed Gaunt
Subject: Re: APHIS forms
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="----_=_NextPart_000_01C258F0.EF3A0EB0"
This message is in MIME format. Since your mail reader does not understand
this format, some or all of this message may not be legible.
------_=_NextPart_000_01C258F0.EF3A0EB0
Content-Type: text/plain;
charset="iso-8859-1"
attached...
Send to APHIS and not ASI!
Ed
-----Original Message-----
From: Robin Newberry [mailto:wnewber@CLEMSON.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, September 10, 2002 1:27 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: APHIS forms
Any word yet on reporting the APHIS listed agents? Any form in sight?
--
Robin
--------------------------------------------------------------
W. Robert Newberry, IV CIH, CHMM
Chief Environmental Health and Safety Officer
Clemson University
wnewber@clemson.edu ehs@clemson.edu
------_=_NextPart_000_01C258F0.EF3A0EB0
Content-Type: application/octet-stream;
name="ppq655-plant pathogens .pdf"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
Content-Disposition: attachment;
filename="ppq655-plant pathogens .pdf"
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 10 Sep 2002 14:09:55 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Robin Newberry
Subject: Re: APHIS forms
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed"
>Send to APHIS and not ASI!
I suppose I should have been following this more closely; is this the
final form? Due when?
--
Robin
--------------------------------------------------------------
W. Robert Newberry, IV CIH, CHMM
Chief Environmental Health and Safety Officer
Clemson University
wnewber@clemson.edu ehs@clemson.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 10 Sep 2002 17:04:23 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "John W. Latimer"
Subject: Re: APHIS forms
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
I have questions also -
1] Is this attached PDF form the form that is to be completed or will the
official form be mailed?
2] Are the same facilities that received the CDC/APHIS "Notification of
Possession" form required to respond to this form?
3] This form doesn't seem to require a negative response, is that true?
**************************************************
John W. Latimer
Southeast Poultry Research Laboratory
voice: 706.546.3435
fax: 706.546.3161
jlatimer@seprl.
**************************************************
-----Original Message-----
From: Ed Gaunt [mailto:egaunt@]
Sent: Tuesday, September 10, 2002 1:39 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: APHIS forms
attached...
Send to APHIS and not ASI!
Ed
-----Original Message-----
From: Robin Newberry [mailto:wnewber@CLEMSON.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, September 10, 2002 1:27 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: APHIS forms
Any word yet on reporting the APHIS listed agents? Any form in sight?
--
Robin
--------------------------------------------------------------
W. Robert Newberry, IV CIH, CHMM
Chief Environmental Health and Safety Officer
Clemson University
wnewber@clemson.edu ehs@clemson.edu
>
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 10 Sep 2002 17:52:10 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ed Gaunt
Subject: Re: APHIS forms
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Go to and click on PPQ Form 655. You
can call the Permits section at 877-770-5990 with questions. That's about
the extent of what I know about it. Sorry.
Ed
-----Original Message-----
From: John W. Latimer [mailto:jlatimer@SEPRL.]
Sent: Tuesday, September 10, 2002 5:04 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: APHIS forms
I have questions also -
1] Is this attached PDF form the form that is to be completed or will the
official form be mailed?
2] Are the same facilities that received the CDC/APHIS "Notification of
Possession" form required to respond to this form?
3] This form doesn't seem to require a negative response, is that true?
**************************************************
John W. Latimer
Southeast Poultry Research Laboratory
voice: 706.546.3435
fax: 706.546.3161
jlatimer@seprl.
**************************************************
-----Original Message-----
From: Ed Gaunt [mailto:egaunt@]
Sent: Tuesday, September 10, 2002 1:39 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: APHIS forms
attached...
Send to APHIS and not ASI!
Ed
-----Original Message-----
From: Robin Newberry [mailto:wnewber@CLEMSON.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, September 10, 2002 1:27 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: APHIS forms
Any word yet on reporting the APHIS listed agents? Any form in sight?
--
Robin
--------------------------------------------------------------
W. Robert Newberry, IV CIH, CHMM
Chief Environmental Health and Safety Officer
Clemson University
wnewber@clemson.edu ehs@clemson.edu
>
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 11 Sep 2002 08:16:58 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Andrew Cockburn
Subject: extra forms
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="=_5D011243.AACB31C4"
This is a MIME message. If you are reading this text, you may want to
consider changing to a mail reader or gateway that understands how to
properly handle MIME multipart messages.
--=_5D011243.AACB31C4
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
I sent in our summary form last week but did not keep a copy.
Yesterday I got another blank form from a faculty member and discovered =
that I am supposed to fill in the Summary Form ID. Should I just send it =
in with box 2 marked?
Andrew Cockburn, PhD
Director of Research Compliance
309 I Chesnut Ridge Research Bldg
Box 6845
West Virginia University
Morgantown, WV 26506-6845
telephone: 304-293-7157
--=_5D011243.AACB31C4
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
I sent in our summary form last week but did not keep a copy.
Yesterday I got another blank form from a faculty member and = discovered that I am supposed to fill in the Summary Form ID. Should I just = send it in with box 2 marked?
Andrew Cockburn, PhD
Director of Research Compliance
309 I = Chesnut Ridge Research Bldg
Box 6845
West Virginia University
Morgantown, = WV 26506-6845
telephone: 304-293-7157
--=_5D011243.AACB31C4--
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 11 Sep 2002 08:37:07 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Kim Auletta
Subject: BSL Level?
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
One of our researchers would like to work "almost exclusively" (I'm not
sure what that means!) with the DNA of Burkholderia (Pseudomonas) Mallei
and Burkholderia (Pseudomonas) Pseudomallei.
Would this:
1. still be BSL 3 work?
2. require CDC SA registration?
Thanks for your input.
Kim Auletta
Lab Safety Specialist
Environmental Health and Safety
SUNY Stony Brook
110 Suffolk Hall
Stony Brook, NY 11794-6200
phone: 631-632-9672
fax: 631-632-9683
email: kauletta@.sunysb.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 11 Sep 2002 08:47:21 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Richard Fink
Subject: Re: BSL Level?
In-Reply-To:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Quoting Kim Auletta :
> One of our researchers would like to work "almost exclusively" (I'm not
> sure what that means!) with the DNA of Burkholderia (Pseudomonas) Mallei
> and Burkholderia (Pseudomonas) Pseudomallei.
>
> Would this:
> 1. still be BSL 3 work?
> 2. require CDC SA registration?
>
The answer to 1 would depend upon which genes and what the host is.
For #2, if the genes are involved in pathogenicity then yes, if not then no.
The last time I asked the CDC about that, they said that it was up to the
investigator to make that determination and that the investigator should be
confident that it would survive a Dep't. of Justice review. I don't know if
that has changed any with the more recent laws.
Richie Fink
MIT
=========================================================================
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 11 Sep 2002 11:32:26 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: John Read
Subject: Cell Fixing for Cytometry
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
I'm in search of a tissue fixing technique that leaves the cell wall intact
for sorting. Additionally, the researchers need to be able to recover
intact plasmids from the cells following the sort.
Has anyone 1- used/proven ethanol precipitation in this situation? or, 2-
discovered another suitable fixing procedure in the interest of biosafety?
Thanks for any feedback,
John
_______________________
John S. Read, MPH, CBSP
Sr. EHS Consultant
EORM, Inc.
(408) 822-8157
Cell (408) 594-4118
Fx (408) 822-8001
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 11 Sep 2002 08:53:10 -1000
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Thomas Goob
Subject: Pathology Residency Training
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
PLEASE EXCUSE THE CROSS POSTING
List members;
I have been asked my opinion on what topics related to lab safety should
be covered as part of a pathology residency training curriculum segment
that will cover "Regulations, Safety and Quality in the Medical
Laboratory". I am looking for similar curriculum descriptions, goals,
objectives, etc. that you may be willing to share. Otherwise, I would
welcome suggestions as to what the goals/objectives of such a course for
such an audience should be. Thanks in advance,
Tom
****************************************
Thomas C. Goob, MPH, MBA, CSP
Manager
Safety, Health & Environmental Affairs
DIAGNOSTIC LABORATORY SERVICES, INC.
650 Iwilei Road, Suite 300
Honolulu, Hawaii 96817
(808) 589-5100 Fax: (808) 593-8357
email: tgoob@dls.
****************************************
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 11 Sep 2002 16:35:37 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Judy Pointer
Subject: APHIS PERMIT question
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Hello Biosafety experts,
I want to announce that I've changed jobs (states) and I have a
question too.
I accepted the position of University Biosafety Officer at University
of New Mexico. I now live in a humidity-free environment (Albuquerque
NM) and I can breath again (I'm the former Houston area BSO for MD
Anderson Cancer Center - for you that didn't know). No more griping
about the weather and traffic - it's beautiful in NM.
Anyway I've been here less than 4 weeks and I have spent all of it
doing UNMs Select Agent "Possession" Survey in fast forward.
Finally that is ALMOST DONE! HURRAH! But I've got one problem.
One of the PIs from my new place has messed up and brought one of the
select agents (VSV) with her from a former employer in another state -
without updating her permit. She did this before 1994 and before it was
ever a select agent - but now I am back-tracking for her. I can get her
squared away with CDC & USDA select agent stuff - but need to figure out
what to do about this APHIS permit she has that expired in 1994. She's
not going to transport it anymore - does she need a new APHIS permit
too? There is no FAQ on their site that answers questions like this.
And their site no longer has telephone numbers on it. I'd like to ask
someone that works there in the "permit" department to see what/if she
needs to do to get squared away.
Do any of you have any contacts or phone numbers of the folks there?
Her old permit says it is located in Hyattsville, Maryland - but I can't
find a phone number for APHIS in that city. Any contact leads would be
very much appreciated.
On another subject - I see that everyone is getting ready for the
conference in Oct. I can't go this time - it conflicts with the
Albuquerque balloon festival X-Comment: mitvma.mit.edu: Mail was sent by
>Date: Thu, 12 Sep 2002 09:01:00 -0400
>From: Chris Hubert
>X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.7 [en] (WinNT; U)
>X-Accept-Language: en
>To: biosafty-request@mitvma.mit.edu
>Subject: Lentivirus and adenovirus containing oncogenes
>
>I'm new to using the listserv and was curious if anyone has experience
>classifying research involving lentiviruses and adenoviruses containing
>oncogenes. The lentivirus proposed to be used by one of our researchers
>is a third generation lentivirus that has been engineered to be
>self-inactivating. The adenovirus being used will also contain
>oncogenes and is capable of infecting humans. Both viruses containing
>oncogenes will be introduced into human cell lines. Should this work be
>coducted with BL2 or BL3 containment? Has anyone on a IBC had to review
>similar research?
>
>Thanks for any feedback,
>
>Chris
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Biosafty List Owner
rfink@mit.edu
--=====================_76249250==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
X-Comment: mitvma.mit.edu: Mail was sent by
Date: Thu, 12 Sep 2002 09:01:00 -0400
From: Chris Hubert
X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.7 [en] (WinNT; U)
X-Accept-Language: en
To: biosafty-request@mitvma.mit.edu
Subject: Lentivirus and adenovirus containing oncogenes
I'm new to using the listserv and was curious if anyone has experience
classifying research involving lentiviruses and adenoviruses containing
oncogenes. The lentivirus proposed to be used by one of our researchers
is a third generation lentivirus that has been engineered to be
self-inactivating. The adenovirus being used will also contain
oncogenes and is capable of infecting humans. Both viruses containing
oncogenes will be introduced into human cell lines. Should this work be
coducted with BL2 or BL3 containment? Has anyone on a IBC had to review
similar research?
Thanks for any feedback,
Chris
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Biosafty List Owner
rfink@mit.edu
--=====================_76249250==_.ALT--
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 12 Sep 2002 08:26:47 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Michael Betlach
Subject: Re: APHIS PERMIT question
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Judy,
The conditions of the APHIS permits now include statements regarding
maintaining permits.
"You are responsible for safeguarding the organisms throughout the
duration of your permit. You must keep your permit valid as long as the
organisms are in your possession. If you leave the institution where the
organisms are held, you must either: (1) designate a qualified individual...
(2) apply for a new permit to move the organism to a new facility; or (3)
destroy the organisms. In any case, you must notify APHIS to cancel the
original permit."
The current address for APHIS is 4700 River Road, Riverdale, MD 20737 Laura
Redmond is the contact name I have for plant permits...not sure about the
Veterinary Service. 301 734-4302.
The Veterinary Service web site lists the NM office and contact as:
APHIS Area Veterinarian In Charge: Michael T. Greenlee
Service Area: New Mexico
Hours of Operation: Monday - Friday 7:30 am - 4:30 pm
Hours for Certificate Endorsement: Between 8:00 am - 3:30 pm (by appointment
only)
Telephone Numbers:
Voice: (505) 761-3160
Fax: (505) 761-3176
E-Mail
vsnm@aphis.
Street Address:
6200 Jefferson St. NE, Suite 117
Albuquerque, NM 87109
Good luck in your quest, and enjoy the balloon festival!
Michael Betlach, Ph.D.
Biosafety Officer
Promega Corporation
5445 E. Cheryl Parkway
Madison, WI 53711
(608) 274-1181, Ext. 1270
-----Original Message-----
From: Judy Pointer [mailto:jpointer@SALUD.UNM.EDU]
Sent: Wednesday, September 11, 2002 5:36 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: APHIS PERMIT question
Hello Biosafety experts,
I want to announce that I've changed jobs (states) and I have a
question too.
I accepted the position of University Biosafety Officer at University
of New Mexico. I now live in a humidity-free environment (Albuquerque
NM) and I can breath again (I'm the former Houston area BSO for MD
Anderson Cancer Center - for you that didn't know). No more griping
about the weather and traffic - it's beautiful in NM.
Anyway I've been here less than 4 weeks and I have spent all of it
doing UNMs Select Agent "Possession" Survey in fast forward.
Finally that is ALMOST DONE! HURRAH! But I've got one problem.
One of the PIs from my new place has messed up and brought one of the
select agents (VSV) with her from a former employer in another state -
without updating her permit. She did this before 1994 and before it was
ever a select agent - but now I am back-tracking for her. I can get her
squared away with CDC & USDA select agent stuff - but need to figure out
what to do about this APHIS permit she has that expired in 1994. She's
not going to transport it anymore - does she need a new APHIS permit
too? There is no FAQ on their site that answers questions like this.
And their site no longer has telephone numbers on it. I'd like to ask
someone that works there in the "permit" department to see what/if she
needs to do to get squared away.
Do any of you have any contacts or phone numbers of the folks there?
Her old permit says it is located in Hyattsville, Maryland - but I can't
find a phone number for APHIS in that city. Any contact leads would be
very much appreciated.
On another subject - I see that everyone is getting ready for the
conference in Oct. I can't go this time - it conflicts with the
Albuquerque balloon festival
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 12 Sep 2002 09:04:26 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Johnson, Julie A."
Subject: Re: APHIS PERMIT question
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
I would try starting with your state APHIS office. You can find that number
at:
-----Original Message-----
From: Judy Pointer [mailto:jpointer@SALUD.UNM.EDU]
Sent: Wednesday, September 11, 2002 5:36 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: APHIS PERMIT question
Hello Biosafety experts,
I want to announce that I've changed jobs (states) and I have a
question too.
I accepted the position of University Biosafety Officer at University
of New Mexico. I now live in a humidity-free environment (Albuquerque
NM) and I can breath again (I'm the former Houston area BSO for MD
Anderson Cancer Center - for you that didn't know). No more griping
about the weather and traffic - it's beautiful in NM.
Anyway I've been here less than 4 weeks and I have spent all of it
doing UNMs Select Agent "Possession" Survey in fast forward.
Finally that is ALMOST DONE! HURRAH! But I've got one problem.
One of the PIs from my new place has messed up and brought one of the
select agents (VSV) with her from a former employer in another state -
without updating her permit. She did this before 1994 and before it was
ever a select agent - but now I am back-tracking for her. I can get her
squared away with CDC & USDA select agent stuff - but need to figure out
what to do about this APHIS permit she has that expired in 1994. She's
not going to transport it anymore - does she need a new APHIS permit
too? There is no FAQ on their site that answers questions like this.
And their site no longer has telephone numbers on it. I'd like to ask
someone that works there in the "permit" department to see what/if she
needs to do to get squared away.
Do any of you have any contacts or phone numbers of the folks there?
Her old permit says it is located in Hyattsville, Maryland - but I can't
find a phone number for APHIS in that city. Any contact leads would be
very much appreciated.
On another subject - I see that everyone is getting ready for the
conference in Oct. I can't go this time - it conflicts with the
Albuquerque balloon festival
At a minimum we have folks worki= ng at BSL-2 for these vectors, for small quantity protocols. The main trick= here is not so much hanging on to a BSL as much as hanging on to GOOD MICROBI= OLOGICAL HANDLING PROCEDURES. If your researchers are handling the vectors and= the cells as infectious agents&which they should, regardless of whether t= he viral vector is attenuated, non-replicating or not&your level of anxi= ety should drop directly proportional to the amount of risk of exposure to the r= esearchers.
The problem is, AND THIS IS A GE= NERAL OBSERVATION, the knowledge of what constitutes good microbiological h= andling procedures varies with the training and the individual and their area= of scientific expertise. I love Molecular Biologists, but their training does not g= ive them more than a basic knowledge of microbes. (I joke about them not seeing the microorganism for the genes). It is hard for some individuals to see = the microbes as more than a cloning / expression vehicle or a vector. Thi= s is the battle&to overcome this deficiency in a mutually beneficial way= so that everyone benefits. So while telling them to work at BSL-2 or -3 is fi= ne, more than likely they have to be shown what are the actual safe procedures to follow under the= se levels.
I hope this helps&.I got l= ong winded and PHILosophical!
Phil Hauck
Mt. Sinai School of Medicine
-----Original Message--= ---
From: Richard Fink [mailto:rfink@MIT.EDU]
Sent: Thursday, Septem= ber 12, 2002 9:23 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MI= T.EDU
Subject: Fwd: Lentivir= us and adenovirus containing oncogenes
X-Comment: mitvma.mit.edu: Mail was sent b= y
Date: Thu, 12 Sep 2002 09:01:00 -0400
=46rom: Chris Hubert
X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.7 [en] (WinNT; U)
X-Accept-Language: en
To: biosafty-request@mitvma.mit.edu
Subject: Lentivirus and adenovirus containing oncogenes
I'm new to using the listserv and was curious if anyone has experienc= e
classifying research involving lentiviruses and adenoviruses containi= ng
oncogenes. The lentivirus proposed to be used by one of our res= earchers
is a third generation lentivirus that has been engineered to be
self-inactivating. The adenovirus being used will also contain oncogenes and is capable of infecting humans. Both viruses cont= aining
oncogenes will be introduced into human cell lines. Should this= work be
coducted with BL2 or BL3 containment? Has anyone on a IBC had t= o review
similar research?
Thanks for any feedback,
Chris
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Biosafty List Owner=
rfink@mit.e= du
--Boundary_(ID_BZk2BVJyCNHsVuQp6rpieQ)--
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 12 Sep 2002 10:00:08 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ed Gaunt
Subject: Re: Child forms again
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Hopefully you recorded the number of the summary form that was sent in (or
photocopied it). Just record the Form ID number (located above Box 2) in
Box 2 of the Child form and darken the second bubble in Box 2 (...this is
not the summary form...). That's is...do not bubble in anything else on the
form and do not sign boxes 17 or 18.
Ed
-----Original Message-----
From: Jeppesen, Eric R [mailto:jeppesen@KU.EDU]
Sent: Thursday, September 12, 2002 9:43 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Child forms again
I know this has been covered (I think) but
I can't find the email discussing it.
What are we to do with the extra child forms that came
in after we had already sent in the main form (plus child forms)?
I just got a form yesterday (9-11-02) from our Chancellor's office
and am not sure what to do with it.
Eric R. Jeppesen
Laboratory Safety Specialist
KU-EHS Dept.
(785) 864-2857 phone
(785) 864-2852 fax
jeppesen@ku.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 12 Sep 2002 10:21:54 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Michael Kiley
Subject: Re: APHIS forms
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="=_7428C402.44254D36"
This is a MIME message. If you are reading this text, you may want to
consider changing to a mail reader or gateway that understands how to
properly handle MIME multipart messages.
--=_7428C402.44254D36
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Content-Disposition: inline
BACKGROUND
The attached files explain a recent Federal Register entry pertaining to =
the Notification of Possession of certain biological agents and toxins =
affected by the Agricultural Bio-terrorism Protection Act of 2002 (signed =
June 12, 2002). Machine readable registration forms may have mailed to =
your facility by the contractor performing the registration services for =
APHIS. Also attached APHIS Form PPQ Form 655 "plant pathogens". The =
forms list exactly where to send
Please use Acrobat Reader to read and print the attachments.
>>> wnewber@CLEMSON.EDU 09/10/02 02:09PM >>>
>Send to APHIS and not ASI!
I suppose I should have been following this more closely; is this the
final form? Due when?
--
Robin
--------------------------------------------------------------
W. Robert Newberry, IV CIH, CHMM
Chief Environmental Health and Safety Officer
Clemson University
wnewber@clemson.edu ehs@clemson.edu
--=_7428C402.44254D36
Content-Type: application/pdf; name="guidvs16.pdf"
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 12 Sep 2002 09:46:20 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Johnson, Julie A."
Subject: Re: APHIS PERMIT question
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
I found this number for further information at the Riverdale Animal Products
office on the instructions for an APHIS import permit: (301) 734-3277.
(this is the form where I found the number
)
-----Original Message-----
From: Judy Pointer [mailto:jpointer@SALUD.UNM.EDU]
Sent: Wednesday, September 11, 2002 5:36 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: APHIS PERMIT question
Hello Biosafety experts,
I want to announce that I've changed jobs (states) and I have a
question too.
I accepted the position of University Biosafety Officer at University
of New Mexico. I now live in a humidity-free environment (Albuquerque
NM) and I can breath again (I'm the former Houston area BSO for MD
Anderson Cancer Center - for you that didn't know). No more griping
about the weather and traffic - it's beautiful in NM.
Anyway I've been here less than 4 weeks and I have spent all of it
doing UNMs Select Agent "Possession" Survey in fast forward.
Finally that is ALMOST DONE! HURRAH! But I've got one problem.
One of the PIs from my new place has messed up and brought one of the
select agents (VSV) with her from a former employer in another state -
without updating her permit. She did this before 1994 and before it was
ever a select agent - but now I am back-tracking for her. I can get her
squared away with CDC & USDA select agent stuff - but need to figure out
what to do about this APHIS permit she has that expired in 1994. She's
not going to transport it anymore - does she need a new APHIS permit
too? There is no FAQ on their site that answers questions like this.
And their site no longer has telephone numbers on it. I'd like to ask
someone that works there in the "permit" department to see what/if she
needs to do to get squared away.
Do any of you have any contacts or phone numbers of the folks there?
Her old permit says it is located in Hyattsville, Maryland - but I can't
find a phone number for APHIS in that city. Any contact leads would be
very much appreciated.
On another subject - I see that everyone is getting ready for the
conference in Oct. I can't go this time - it conflicts with the
Albuquerque balloon festival ----------
> From: Don Callihan
> Reply To: A Biosafety Discussion List
> Sent: Thursday, September 12, 2002 7:04 AM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: Re: APHIS PERMIT question
>
> Judy,
> You have moved to an interesting area. If you ever visit the Sonoran
> Desert
> region near Tuscon, Arizona you may experience an acute, flu-like illness
> that's primary Coccidioides immitis. Don't recall off hand if Albuquerque,
> NM is in the "coccidioides zone" or not. Most of the clinical labs in the
> Tuscon area isolate C. immitis routinely from respiratory specimens of
> people who recently moved there. It will be an interesting challenge for
> these labs to document destruction of isolates whenever the exemption
> rules
> for clinical specimens are available for compliance with the new law. You
> may want to contact the laboratory at your medical center to learn the
> extent of this situation before you have to face the new regulations.
> I'd be interested in hearing from other biosafety folks in the southwest
> desert regions what their experiences with C. immitis from clinical or
> environmental specimens has been.
> A humidity-free environment has it's drawbacks, too. Hope there are more
> plusses than minuses for you.
> Best regards,
> Don Callihan
> BD Diagnostic Systems
> Sparks, MD
> 410-773-6684
>
>
>
>
> Judy Pointer @MITVMA.MIT.EDU> on 09/11/2002
> 06:35:37 PM
>
> Please respond to A Biosafety Discussion List
>
> Sent by: A Biosafety Discussion List
>
>
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> cc:
> Subject: APHIS PERMIT question
>
>
> Hello Biosafety experts,
>
> I want to announce that I've changed jobs (states) and I have a
> question too.
>
> I accepted the position of University Biosafety Officer at University
> of New Mexico. I now live in a humidity-free environment (Albuquerque
> NM) and I can breath again (I'm the former Houston area BSO for MD
> Anderson Cancer Center - for you that didn't know). No more griping
> about the weather and traffic - it's beautiful in NM.
>
> Anyway I've been here less than 4 weeks and I have spent all of it
> doing UNMs Select Agent "Possession" Survey in fast forward.
>
> Finally that is ALMOST DONE! HURRAH! But I've got one problem.
>
> One of the PIs from my new place has messed up and brought one of the
> select agents (VSV) with her from a former employer in another state -
> without updating her permit. She did this before 1994 and before it was
> ever a select agent - but now I am back-tracking for her. I can get her
> squared away with CDC & USDA select agent stuff - but need to figure out
> what to do about this APHIS permit she has that expired in 1994. She's
> not going to transport it anymore - does she need a new APHIS permit
> too? There is no FAQ on their site that answers questions like this.
> And their site no longer has telephone numbers on it. I'd like to ask
> someone that works there in the "permit" department to see what/if she
> needs to do to get squared away.
>
> Do any of you have any contacts or phone numbers of the folks there?
> Her old permit says it is located in Hyattsville, Maryland - but I can't
> find a phone number for APHIS in that city. Any contact leads would be
> very much appreciated.
>
> On another subject - I see that everyone is getting ready for the
> conference in Oct. I can't go this time - it conflicts with the
> Albuquerque balloon festival desert regions what their experiences with C. immitis from clinical or
> environmental specimens has been.
> A humidity-free environment has it's drawbacks, too. Hope there are =
more
> plusses than minuses for you.
> Best regards,
> Don Callihan
> BD Diagnostic Systems
> Sparks, MD
> 410-773-6684
>
>
>
>
> Judy Pointer @MITVMA.MIT.EDU> on 09/11/2002
> 06:35:37 PM
>
> Please respond to A Biosafety Discussion List =
>
> Sent by: A Biosafety Discussion List
>
>
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> cc:
> Subject: APHIS PERMIT question
>
>
> Hello Biosafety experts,
>
> I want to announce that I've changed jobs (states) and I have a
> question too.
>
> I accepted the position of University Biosafety Officer at University
> of New Mexico. I now live in a humidity-free environment (Albuquerque
> NM) and I can breath again (I'm the former Houston area BSO for MD
> Anderson Cancer Center - for you that didn't know). No more griping
> about the weather and traffic - it's beautiful in NM.
>
> Anyway I've been here less than 4 weeks and I have spent all of it
> doing UNMs Select Agent "Possession" Survey in fast forward.
>
> Finally that is ALMOST DONE! HURRAH! But I've got one problem.
>
> One of the PIs from my new place has messed up and brought one of the
> select agents (VSV) with her from a former employer in another state -
> without updating her permit. She did this before 1994 and before it =
was
> ever a select agent - but now I am back-tracking for her. I can get =
her
> squared away with CDC & USDA select agent stuff - but need to figure =
out
> what to do about this APHIS permit she has that expired in 1994. =
She's
> not going to transport it anymore - does she need a new APHIS permit
> too? There is no FAQ on their site that answers questions like this.
> And their site no longer has telephone numbers on it. I'd like to =
ask
> someone that works there in the "permit" department to see what/if she
> needs to do to get squared away.
>
> Do any of you have any contacts or phone numbers of the folks there?
> Her old permit says it is located in Hyattsville, Maryland - but I =
can't
> find a phone number for APHIS in that city. Any contact leads would =
be
> very much appreciated.
>
> On another subject - I see that everyone is getting ready for the
> conference in Oct. I can't go this time - it conflicts with the
> Albuquerque balloon festival Dear Group,
>
>I am looking to develop an "Infectious Agent Shipping Training" for my
>employer. I have been researching the appropriate regulations and rules
>(DOT, IATA, etc.) but I am having a hard time trying to find out what
should
>specifically be included in such training. I am especially interested in
>finding out the recordkeeping requirements and what level of detail is
>required during the trainings.
>
>Any thoughts?
>
>--
>David R. Gillum, MS
>
>Laboratory Safety Officer
>Environmental Health and Safety
>11 Leavitt Lane, Perpetuity Hall
>Durham, NH 03824
>Telephone #: 603-862-0197
>Facsimile #: 603-862-0047
_____________________________________________________________________
__ /
_____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 13 Sep 2002 09:14:15 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: David Gillum
Subject: Re: Infectious Agent Shipping Training
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="----_=_NextPart_001_01C25B27.75E836C0"
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this format, some or all of this message may not be legible.
------_=_NextPart_001_01C25B27.75E836C0
Content-Type: text/plain
Dear Group,
Thanks to a kind listserve member, I have answers to my questions (see
below). I took this information from LION Technology, Inc.
-David
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Who must be trained?
Each "hazmat employer" is required to train each of his or her "hazmat
employees." Hazmat employee is defined as any employee "...who in the course
of employment directly affects hazardous materials transportation safety." A
brief list of employees who are likely to fit that definition includes
anyone who:
* classifies materials (analyzes or researches literature)
* determines ORM-D status
* determines if a material is an infectious waste, hazardous waste, or
hazardous substance (determines RQs)
* assigns packing groups or hazard zones
* identifies vapor pressures, specific gravities, viscosities, or
other properties
* determines emergency response information to be included with
shipping papers, including determining when shipping papers or emergency
response information may not be necessary
* is involved in selecting shipping descriptions
* designs, selects, purchases, or fills packages
* determines which packages are compatible or meet the prescribed
standards
* determines if a package can be reused, if a package is empty, or if
a package needs reconditioning (tank cars, cargo tanks, drums, etc.)
* determines any markings to be applied to a package
* determines which labels and how many must be applied to the package,
including determining when labeling may not be necessary
* determines how many of which placards are required, provides
placards, and affixes placards
* determines what should appear on shipping papers or actually fills
out shipping papers
* selects carriers or modes of transportation to be used
* loads, unloads, moves, handles, or works around hazardous materials
(warehouses, loading docks)
* responds to damaged containers, spills, or leaks and reports
incidents
* operates any vehicle or equipment used to transport hazardous
materials
and SUPERVISORS of those performing any of the above activities.
What training is required?
Details of training required per job function are determined by the hazmat
employer. The DOT does, however, require certain categories of training.
* General Awareness Training: At a minimum, all hazmat employees must
be given a general understanding of the entire hazardous materials
transportation program, so that they know how their jobs fit into the
system.
* Function-Specific Training: Each employee (by job function) also
must be trained on any requirements that he or she must meet in performing
transportation-related duties.
* Safety Training: Persons handling or potentially exposed to
hazardous materials during the cycle of transportation (e.g., drivers,
loaders, loading dock workers, warehousemen, etc.) must be trained in safe
handling and emergency response procedures applicable to the hazards to
which they may be exposed.
* Driver Training: In addition, specific requirements for training of
hazardous materials drivers are found at 49 CFR Part 177 and Parts 350-399.
The first three categories are generally referred to as "hazmat employee"
training.
------_=_NextPart_001_01C25B27.75E836C0
Content-Type: text/html
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Re: Infectious Agent Shipping Training
Dear Group,
listserve member, I have answers to my questions (see below). I took this information = from LION Technology, Inc.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~= ~~
Who must be = trained?
Each "hazmat = employer" is required to train each of his or her "hazmat = employees." Hazmat employee is defined as any employee = "...who in the course of employment directly affects hazardous = materials transportation safety." A brief list of employees who = are likely to fit that definition includes anyone who:
· = classifies materials = (analyzes or researches literature)
· = determines ORM-D = status
· = determines if a = material is an infectious waste, hazardous waste, or hazardous = substance (determines RQs)
· = assigns packing groups = or hazard zones =
· = identifies vapor = pressures, specific gravities, viscosities, or other = properties
· = determines emergency = response information to be included with shipping papers, including = determining when shipping papers or emergency response information may = not be necessary =
· = is involved in = selecting shipping descriptions
· = designs, selects, = purchases, or fills packages
· = determines which = packages are compatible or meet the prescribed standards
· = determines if a package = can be reused, if a package is empty, or if a package needs = reconditioning (tank cars, cargo tanks, drums, etc.)
· = determines any markings = to be applied to a package
· = determines which labels = and how many must be applied to the package, including determining when = labeling may not be necessary
· = determines how many of = which placards are required, provides placards, and affixes = placards
· = determines what should = appear on shipping papers or actually fills out shipping = papers
· = selects carriers or = modes of transportation to be used
· = loads, unloads, moves, = handles, or works around hazardous materials (warehouses, loading = docks)
· = responds to damaged = containers, spills, or leaks and reports incidents
· = operates any vehicle or = equipment used to transport hazardous materials
and SUPERVISORS of those = performing any of the above = activities.
What training is required?
Details of training = required per job function are determined by the hazmat employer. The = DOT does, however, require certain categories of training.
· General = Awareness Training: At a minimum, all hazmat employees must be given a = general understanding of the entire hazardous materials transportation = program, so that they know how their jobs fit into the = system.
· Function-Specific Training: Each employee (by job = function) also must be trained on any requirements that he or she must = meet in performing transportation-related duties.
· Safety = Training: = Persons handling or potentially exposed to hazardous materials during = the cycle of transportation (e.g., drivers, loaders, loading dock = workers, warehousemen, etc.) must be trained in safe handling and = emergency response procedures applicable to the hazards to which they = may be exposed. =
· Driver = Training: In = addition, specific requirements for training of hazardous materials = drivers are found at 49 CFR Part 177 and Parts 350-399.
The first three = categories are generally referred to as "hazmat employee" = training.
------_=_NextPart_001_01C25B27.75E836C0--
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 13 Sep 2002 09:47:10 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Margaret Rakas
Subject: Re: Infectious Agent Shipping Training
Mime-Version: 1.0
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--=_5804E960.FC9D4C84
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When I was re-certified by attending a Fedex 3-day seminar I met the
Director of Training at World Courier, a company who has a major portion
of their business shipping infectious materials. She seemed really
sharp, you might want to give them a call. They give seminars onsite,
might be able to customize a program for you or at least point you in
the right direction. Potential legal disclaimer: I haven't used them.
The website is .
Margaret Rakas
>>> David.Gillum@UNH.EDU 09/13/02 08:29AM >>>
I would like to thank those individuals that responded to my question.
This
Listserve is a great place to receive information about biosafety
issues.
It seems that Saf-T-Pak is the best way to go. However, Saf-T-Pak has a
lot
of (useless) information that doesn't apply to most of my folks. Hence,
I
was looking for some specific information about training requirements
and
who must be trained.
Thanks again!
--
David R. Gillum
Laboratory Safety Officer
Environmental Health and Safety
11 Leavitt Lane, Perpetuity Hall
Durham, NH 03824
Telephone #: 603-862-0197
Facsimile #: 603-862-0047
-----Original Message-----
From: Robert N. Latsch [mailto:rnl2@PO.CWRU.EDU]
Sent: Friday, September 13, 2002 8:11 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Infectious Agent Shipping Training
Your question suggests that you have not recieved hazardous materials
training yourself. Take a class in both DOT and IATA. They will teach
you
the ins and outs of shipping and what you will need to teach others
This
qualifies you to teach them.
Who trains your people now?
Bob
>Dear Group,
>
>I am looking to develop an "Infectious Agent Shipping Training" for
my
>employer. I have been researching the appropriate regulations and
rules
>(DOT, IATA, etc.) but I am having a hard time trying to find out what
should
>specifically be included in such training. I am especially interested
in
>finding out the recordkeeping requirements and what level of detail
is
>required during the trainings.
>
>Any thoughts?
>
>--
>David R. Gillum, MS
>
>Laboratory Safety Officer
>Environmental Health and Safety
>11 Leavitt Lane, Perpetuity Hall
>Durham, NH 03824
>Telephone #: 603-862-0197
>Facsimile #: 603-862-0047
_____________________________________________________________________
__ /
_____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental
Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail
rlatsch@
--=_5804E960.FC9D4C84
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
When I was re-certified by attending a Fedex 3-day seminar I met the Director of Training at World Courier, a company who has a major portion of their business shipping infectious materials. She seemed really sharp, you might want to give them a call. They give seminars onsite, might be able to customize a program for you or at least point you in the right direction. Potential legal disclaimer: I haven't used them. The website is .
Margaret Rakas
>>> David.Gillum@UNH.EDU 09/13/02 08:29AM >>>
I would like to thank those individuals that responded to my question. This
Listserve is a great place to receive information about biosafety issues.
It seems that Saf-T-Pak is the best way to go. However, Saf-T-Pak has a lot
of (useless) information that doesn't apply to most of my folks. Hence, I
was looking for some specific information about training requirements and
who must be trained.
Thanks again!
--
David R. Gillum
Laboratory Safety Officer
Environmental Health and Safety
11 Leavitt Lane, Perpetuity Hall
Durham, NH 03824
Telephone #: 603-862-0197
Facsimile #: 603-862-0047
-----Original Message-----
From: Robert N. Latsch [mailto:rnl2@PO.CWRU.EDU]
Sent: Friday, September 13, 2002 8:11 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Infectious Agent Shipping Training
Your question suggests that you have not recieved hazardous materials
training yourself. Take a class in both DOT and IATA. They will teach you
the ins and outs of shipping and what you will need to teach others This
qualifies you to teach them.
Who trains your people now?
Bob
>Dear Group,
>
>I am looking to develop an "Infectious Agent Shipping Training" for my
>employer. I have been researching the appropriate regulations and rules
>(DOT, IATA, etc.) but I am having a hard time trying to find out what
should
>specifically be included in such training. I am especially interested in
>finding out the recordkeeping requirements and what level of detail is
>required during the trainings.
>
>Any thoughts?
>
>--
>David R. Gillum, MS
>
>Laboratory Safety Officer
>Environmental Health and Safety
>11 Leavitt Lane, Perpetuity Hall
>Durham, NH 03824
>Telephone #: 603-862-0197
>Facsimile #: 603-862-0047
_____________________________________________________________________
__ /
_____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
--=_5804E960.FC9D4C84--
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 13 Sep 2002 09:27:41 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Jennifer Jones
Subject: Re: Planning a new biology building
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
There is one book I would recommend in the beginning - Blueprint Reading for
Commercial Construction by Charles D. Willis. When I started reviewing plans
for our group I set up a Blueprint Reading class. It helped immensely in
reviewing the drawings as they passed through the design development stages to
the construction design stages.
Jennifer
Jennifer H. Jones
Biosafety Specialist
UT MD Anderson Cancer Center
Carl Pike on 09/13/2002 07:22:07 AM
Please respond to A Biosafety Discussion List
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
cc: (bcc: Jennifer Jones/MDACC)
Subject: Planning a new biology building
We are in the early stages of planning a new undergraduate
teaching/research building. I would like to ask for suggestions on
books or other materials that we and the design team could use to
understand safety issues (of the sort that are often discussed on
this list) - ventilation, design of teaching and research labs,
specification of appropriate materials for furnishings, space and
traffic issues, etc. Are there consulting firms you can recommend on
these sorts of topics? (As a liberal arts college we do not have
this sort of expertise in-house.)
Thank you
--
Carl S. Pike ***Note new email address as of 26 June 2002
Harry W. and Mary B. Huffnagle Professor of Botany
Department of Biology Phone (717) 291-3958
Franklin and Marshall College email CARL.PIKE@FANDM.EDU
P.O. Box 3003 fax (717) 358-4548
Lancaster, PA 17604-3003 USA
Physical address (for UPS, etc.)
501 Harrisburg Ave.
Lancaster, PA 17603
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 13 Sep 2002 11:02:18 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Dennis Eagleson
Subject: Re: Planning a new biology building
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
for Lab design try "Handbook of Facilities Planning Volume 1 Laboratory
Facilities" edited by Theodore Ruys. Publisher: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 115
Fifth Ave, New York 10003. May be a bit dated but plenty in there to get
basic understandings of these issues.
-----Original Message-----
From: Carl Pike [mailto:carl.pike@FANDM.EDU]
Sent: Friday, September 13, 2002 8:22 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Planning a new biology building
We are in the early stages of planning a new undergraduate
teaching/research building. I would like to ask for suggestions on
books or other materials that we and the design team could use to
understand safety issues (of the sort that are often discussed on
this list) - ventilation, design of teaching and research labs,
specification of appropriate materials for furnishings, space and
traffic issues, etc. Are there consulting firms you can recommend on
these sorts of topics? (As a liberal arts college we do not have
this sort of expertise in-house.)
Thank you
--
Carl S. Pike ***Note new email address as of 26 June 2002
Harry W. and Mary B. Huffnagle Professor of Botany
Department of Biology Phone (717) 291-3958
Franklin and Marshall College email CARL.PIKE@FANDM.EDU
P.O. Box 3003 fax (717) 358-4548
Lancaster, PA 17604-3003 USA
Physical address (for UPS, etc.)
501 Harrisburg Ave.
Lancaster, PA 17603
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 13 Sep 2002 10:22:34 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Joseph H. Coggin, Jr. Ph.D., Professor"
Organization: Department of Microbiology & Immunology,
University of South Alabama, College of Medicine, Mobile,
AL 36688 Phone (251) 460-6314; Fax (251) 460-7269
Subject: Re: Fwd: Lentivirus and adenovirus containing oncogenes
MIME-Version: 1.0
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Richard: Without regard for the lentivirus or adv recombinants this is
BSL-2 because of the human cells to be used as targets. Wild-type
infectious ADV's are BSL-2 maximum. As the latest BMBL instructs on p.81
"selection of an appropriate BSL for work with any virus used to make
recombinant viruses now routinely begins by establishing the
classification of the non-modified virus--- used to express the
heterologous gene product". "However, the nature of the genetic
modification and the quantity of virus must be carefully considered."
Unlikely BSL-3, but you need more info on the lentivirus.
Joe Coggin
Richard Fink wrote:
>
>> X-Comment: mitvma.mit.edu: Mail was sent by
>> Date: Thu, 12 Sep 2002 09:01:00 -0400
>> From: Chris Hubert
>> X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.7 [en] (WinNT; U)
>> X-Accept-Language: en
>> To: biosafty-request@mitvma.mit.edu
>> Subject: Lentivirus and adenovirus containing oncogenes
>>
>> I'm new to using the listserv and was curious if anyone has experience
>> classifying research involving lentiviruses and adenoviruses containing
>> oncogenes. The lentivirus proposed to be used by one of our researchers
>> is a third generation lentivirus that has been engineered to be
>> self-inactivating. The adenovirus being used will also contain
>> oncogenes and is capable of infecting humans. Both viruses containing
>> oncogenes will be introduced into human cell lines. Should this work be
>> coducted with BL2 or BL3 containment? Has anyone on a IBC had to review
>> similar research?
>>
>> Thanks for any feedback,
>>
>> Chris
>
> Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
> Biosafty List Owner
> rfink@mit.edu
>
--------------050001000406040707050804
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Richard: Without regard for the lentivirus or adv recombinants this is BSL-2 because of the human cells to be used as targets. Wild-type infectious ADV's are BSL-2 maximum. As the latest BMBL instructs on p.81 "selection of an appropriate BSL for work with any virus used to make recombinant viruses now routinely begins by establishing the classification of the non-modified virus--- used to express the heterologous gene product". "However, the nature of the genetic modification and the quantity of virus must be carefully considered." Unlikely BSL-3, but you need more info on the lentivirus.
Joe Coggin
Richard Fink wrote:
X-Comment: mitvma.mit.edu: Mail was sent by
Date: Thu, 12 Sep 2002 09:01:00 -0400
From: Chris Hubert
X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.7 [en] (WinNT; U)
X-Accept-Language: en
To: biosafty-request@mitvma.mit.edu
Subject: Lentivirus and adenovirus containing oncogenes
I'm new to using the listserv and was curious if anyone has experience
classifying research involving lentiviruses and adenoviruses containing
oncogenes. The lentivirus proposed to be used by one of our researchers
is a third generation lentivirus that has been engineered to be
self-inactivating. The adenovirus being used will also contain
oncogenes and is capable of infecting humans. Both viruses containing
oncogenes will be introduced into human cell lines. Should this work be
coducted with BL2 or BL3 containment? Has anyone on a IBC had to review
similar research?
Thanks for any feedback,
Chris
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Biosafty List Owner
rfink@mit.edu
--------------050001000406040707050804--
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 13 Sep 2002 11:21:27 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Wickland, Tim"
Subject: Re: Planning a new biology building
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
We found Lou DiBerardinis's book, _Guidelines for Laboratory Design:
Health and Safety Considerations_ (Wiley) to be quite helpful as we were
planning our recent science building.
I recommend working with a space planner or architect to help you develop
your building program early in the planning process before you hire your
building architect. (We used Dober, Lidsky, Craig and Associates out of
Boston.) Project Kaleidoscope in DC () has information
and resources relevant to science programs at undergraduate institutions,
including lists of consultants..
Finally, when you choose any architect or planner, be sure they are
experienced in laboratory design Before your final selection or an
architectural firm, visit several lab buildings they have designed. This may
seem obvious, but sometimes can be overlooked by a board of trustees focused
on priorities different than yours as an end user.
Timothy H. Wickland
Director, Sciences Support Services
Bicentennial Hall 333
Middlebury College
Middlebury, VT 05753
twickland@middlebury.edu
(802) 443-5421 (voice)
(802) 443-2072 (FAX)
> ----------
> From: Carl Pike
> Reply To: A Biosafety Discussion List
> Sent: Friday, September 13, 2002 8:22 AM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: Planning a new biology building
>
> We are in the early stages of planning a new undergraduate
> teaching/research building. I would like to ask for suggestions on
> books or other materials that we and the design team could use to
> understand safety issues (of the sort that are often discussed on
> this list) - ventilation, design of teaching and research labs,
> specification of appropriate materials for furnishings, space and
> traffic issues, etc. Are there consulting firms you can recommend on
> these sorts of topics? (As a liberal arts college we do not have
> this sort of expertise in-house.)
>
> Thank you
> --
> Carl S. Pike ***Note new email address as of 26 June 2002
> Harry W. and Mary B. Huffnagle Professor of Botany
> Department of Biology Phone (717) 291-3958
> Franklin and Marshall College email CARL.PIKE@FANDM.EDU
> P.O. Box 3003 fax (717) 358-4548
> Lancaster, PA 17604-3003 USA
>
> Physical address (for UPS, etc.)
> 501 Harrisburg Ave.
> Lancaster, PA 17603
>
>
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 13 Sep 2002 09:35:54 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Judy Pointer
Subject: Re: APHIS PERMIT question
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Dear Don,
Thanks for the info about the "hazards" of living in a dry zone. Guess
even Eden would have it's drawbacks! So far I've not gotten sick and
the opportunity to go outside and hike without being bitten by disease
carrying mosquitos at 50/minute seems to be paying off with my waistline
and hopefully my health. One PI here is working with Coccidioides
immitis and several are working with Hantavirus. Don't know much about
them yet. After a few years here maybe I'll become a desert disease
expert.
Judy
>>> Don_Callihan@ 09/11/02 05:04PM >>>
Judy,
You have moved to an interesting area. If you ever visit the Sonoran
Desert
region near Tuscon, Arizona you may experience an acute, flu-like
illness
that's primary Coccidioides immitis. Don't recall off hand if
Albuquerque,
NM is in the "coccidioides zone" or not. Most of the clinical labs in
the
Tuscon area isolate C. immitis routinely from respiratory specimens of
people who recently moved there. It will be an interesting challenge
for
these labs to document destruction of isolates whenever the exemption
rules
for clinical specimens are available for compliance with the new law.
You
may want to contact the laboratory at your medical center to learn the
extent of this situation before you have to face the new regulations.
I'd be interested in hearing from other biosafety folks in the
southwest
desert regions what their experiences with C. immitis from clinical or
environmental specimens has been.
A humidity-free environment has it's drawbacks, too. Hope there are
more
plusses than minuses for you.
Best regards,
Don Callihan
BD Diagnostic Systems
Sparks, MD
410-773-6684
Judy Pointer @MITVMA.MIT.EDU> on 09/11/2002
06:35:37 PM
Please respond to A Biosafety Discussion List
Sent by: A Biosafety Discussion List
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
cc:
Subject: APHIS PERMIT question
Hello Biosafety experts,
I want to announce that I've changed jobs (states) and I have a
question too.
I accepted the position of University Biosafety Officer at University
of New Mexico. I now live in a humidity-free environment (Albuquerque
NM) and I can breath again (I'm the former Houston area BSO for MD
Anderson Cancer Center - for you that didn't know). No more griping
about the weather and traffic - it's beautiful in NM.
Anyway I've been here less than 4 weeks and I have spent all of it
doing UNMs Select Agent "Possession" Survey in fast forward.
Finally that is ALMOST DONE! HURRAH! But I've got one problem.
One of the PIs from my new place has messed up and brought one of the
select agents (VSV) with her from a former employer in another state -
without updating her permit. She did this before 1994 and before it
was
ever a select agent - but now I am back-tracking for her. I can get
her
squared away with CDC & USDA select agent stuff - but need to figure
out
what to do about this APHIS permit she has that expired in 1994.
She's
not going to transport it anymore - does she need a new APHIS permit
too? There is no FAQ on their site that answers questions like this.
And their site no longer has telephone numbers on it. I'd like to
ask
someone that works there in the "permit" department to see what/if she
needs to do to get squared away.
Do any of you have any contacts or phone numbers of the folks there?
Her old permit says it is located in Hyattsville, Maryland - but I
can't
find a phone number for APHIS in that city. Any contact leads would
be
very much appreciated.
On another subject - I see that everyone is getting ready for the
conference in Oct. I can't go this time - it conflicts with the
Albuquerque balloon festival I have a question for the group regarding the Transport of a Division
>6.2 diagnostic specimen, biological product, or regulated medical waste
>via personal motor vehicle. My conversations with the Hazardous
>Materials Specialists within the DOT indicate that as of September 13,
>2002 (today), it is 30 days post notice of the newly revised 49 CFR 171
>et.al. and this newly revised CFR now provides Division 6.2 Materials of
>trade exceptions. A person can now transport a Division 6.2 material
>within their own personal vehicle without some sort of declaration as
>long as the specimen is packaged and marked appropriately and it meets
>the stated capacity limitations?
>
>It states in 49 CFR 173.6 that when transported by motor vehicle in
>conformance with this section, a material of trade is not subject to any
>other requirements of this subchapter besides those set forth or
>referenced in this section. Being a material of trade exception, do the
>packages still need to be officially secured during shipment as stated
>in 49 CFR? Can these materials of trade be transported in a person's
>car that they will then use to drive home and haul the kids to soccer
>practice? I cannot the information in 49 CFR which prevents this from
>occurring.
>
>Any help would be apprectiated!
>
>Thanks,
>
>Mark C.
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 13 Sep 2002 13:43:31 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Robert N. Latsch"
Subject: Re: The new DOT regs
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Be careful HERE! The transportation regs deal with commercial carriers! I
do not think that they apply to private personal vehicles.
They will regulate transportation for work reasons
Don't get caught doing this to circumvent the regs(If you do, get a plane
ticket, use your passport, try Argintina. I do not think that they have an
extradition treaty with the USA:)
A material of trade excemption is to be used when one transports an item
that they use in their work because they have to go to the worksite. One
example is a portable welding rig on work vehicle(truck) not personal autos.
The bbp standard provides for transportation in autos that one is using say
for work. This also appears to apply to a worker who transports as part of
their employment using their personal vehicles. The materials are excempt
from 6.2 regulation. Remeber what I said about personal vehicles?
The old DOT did not address this form of 6.2 material.
The new DOT does. I have not had time or opportunity to review this new
regulation in depth. Implementation has been pushed back to February?
2003. So it has not taken effect yet.
Has any body had a chance to read this through?
Bob
>I have a question for the group regarding the Transport of a Division
>6.2 diagnostic specimen, biological product, or regulated medical waste
>via personal motor vehicle. My conversations with the Hazardous
>Materials Specialists within the DOT indicate that as of September 13,
>2002 (today), it is 30 days post notice of the newly revised 49 CFR 171
>et.al. and this newly revised CFR now provides Division 6.2 Materials of
>trade exceptions. A person can now transport a Division 6.2 material
>within their own personal vehicle without some sort of declaration as
>long as the specimen is packaged and marked appropriately and it meets
>the stated capacity limitations?
>
>It states in 49 CFR 173.6 that when transported by motor vehicle in
>conformance with this section, a material of trade is not subject to any
>other requirements of this subchapter besides those set forth or
>referenced in this section. Being a material of trade exception, do the
>packages still need to be officially secured during shipment as stated
>in 49 CFR? Can these materials of trade be transported in a person's
>car that they will then use to drive home and haul the kids to soccer
>practice? I cannot the information in 49 CFR which prevents this from
>occurring.
>
>Any help would be apprectiated!
>
>Thanks,
>
>Mark C.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>-------------------------------------
>Mark J. Campbell, MS, SM(NRM)
>Biological Safety Officer
>Office of Environmental Safety
>Saint Louis University
>1402 S. Grand Blvd.
>Caroline Bldg. Rm. 307
>St. Louis, MO 63104
>(314) 577-8608
>campbem@slu.edu
_____________________________________________________________________
__ / _____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 13 Sep 2002 09:58:17 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "David A. Bunzow"
Subject: Re: Planning a new biology building
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Carl and others:
Three indispensable references come to mind:
1] "Code Compliance for Advanced Technology Facilities" by Bill Acorn
2] "NFPA 101 Life Safety Code" (and "Life Safety Code Handbook")
Carl Pike wrote:
> We are in the early stages of planning a new undergraduate
> teaching/research building. I would like to ask for suggestions on
> books or other materials that we and the design team could use to
> understand safety issues (of the sort that are often discussed on
> this list) - ventilation, design of teaching and research labs,
> specification of appropriate materials for furnishings, space and
> traffic issues, etc. Are there consulting firms you can recommend on
> these sorts of topics? (As a liberal arts college we do not have
> this sort of expertise in-house.)
>
> Thank you
> --
> Carl S. Pike ***Note new email address as of 26 June 2002
> Harry W. and Mary B. Huffnagle Professor of Botany
> Department of Biology Phone (717) 291-3958
> Franklin and Marshall College email CARL.PIKE@FANDM.EDU
> P.O. Box 3003 fax (717) 358-4548
> Lancaster, PA 17604-3003 USA
>
> Physical address (for UPS, etc.)
> 501 Harrisburg Ave.
> Lancaster, PA 17603
--
David A. Bunzow CET; CHMM; REM
University of Alaska
Many Traditions One Alaska
Statewide Office of Risk Management
Environmental, Health and Safety Manager
1-907-474-5005 (phone)
1-907-474-5634 (fax)
sndab1@alaska.edu
alaska.edu/swrisk
Please Note:
The statements, opinions and views expressed
in this communication are mine alone. They
should not be construed as necessarily being
those of the University of Alaska System, or
any of its other employees.
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 13 Sep 2002 20:14:35 +0200
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Sullivan Christine
Subject: DT
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Hello All,
I just had a researcher as me how he can destroy a solution of media and
cells containing diptheria toxin. I've searched the web and looked in the
BMBL and have not found any specific procedures for DT. The researcher had
one option of adjusting the pH to either 1 or 13 and then boiling the
solution for an hour. I'm sure this would destroy the toxin, but also
sounds pretty hazardous to me and I'd rathr not do this in the lab.
Any help would be appreciated,
Christine
---------------------------------------------------------
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for the person(s) to whom they are addressed and contain information which
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by anyone other than their intended recipients is prohibited and may be
illegal. If you are not an intended recipient, please immediately inform the
sender and send him/her back the present e-mail and its attachments and
destroy any copies which may be in your possession.
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=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 13 Sep 2002 14:49:08 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Margaret Rakas
Subject: Re: The new DOT regs
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="=_C69A7422.D5B465D7"
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If this were my personal vehicle, I would check to determine if my auto
insurance policy would be voided if I used it for such business
purposes....may have nothing to do with DOT regs, but I'd sure hate to
be blindsided on this one...
>>> rnl2@PO.CWRU.EDU 09/13/02 01:43PM >>>
Be careful HERE! The transportation regs deal with commercial
carriers! I
do not think that they apply to private personal vehicles.
They will regulate transportation for work reasons
Don't get caught doing this to circumvent the regs(If you do, get a
plane
ticket, use your passport, try Argintina. I do not think that they
have an
extradition treaty with the USA:)
A material of trade excemption is to be used when one transports an
item
that they use in their work because they have to go to the worksite.
One
example is a portable welding rig on work vehicle(truck) not personal
autos.
The bbp standard provides for transportation in autos that one is using
say
for work. This also appears to apply to a worker who transports as
part of
their employment using their personal vehicles. The materials are
excempt
from 6.2 regulation. Remeber what I said about personal vehicles?
The old DOT did not address this form of 6.2 material.
The new DOT does. I have not had time or opportunity to review this
new
regulation in depth. Implementation has been pushed back to February?
2003. So it has not taken effect yet.
Has any body had a chance to read this through?
Bob
>I have a question for the group regarding the Transport of a Division
>6.2 diagnostic specimen, biological product, or regulated medical
waste
>via personal motor vehicle. My conversations with the Hazardous
>Materials Specialists within the DOT indicate that as of September
13,
>2002 (today), it is 30 days post notice of the newly revised 49 CFR
171
>et.al. and this newly revised CFR now provides Division 6.2 Materials
of
>trade exceptions. A person can now transport a Division 6.2 material
>within their own personal vehicle without some sort of declaration as
>long as the specimen is packaged and marked appropriately and it
meets
>the stated capacity limitations?
>
>It states in 49 CFR 173.6 that when transported by motor vehicle in
>conformance with this section, a material of trade is not subject to
any
>other requirements of this subchapter besides those set forth or
>referenced in this section. Being a material of trade exception, do
the
>packages still need to be officially secured during shipment as
stated
>in 49 CFR? Can these materials of trade be transported in a person's
>car that they will then use to drive home and haul the kids to soccer
>practice? I cannot the information in 49 CFR which prevents this
from
>occurring.
>
>Any help would be apprectiated!
>
>Thanks,
>
>Mark C.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>-------------------------------------
>Mark J. Campbell, MS, SM(NRM)
>Biological Safety Officer
>Office of Environmental Safety
>Saint Louis University
>1402 S. Grand Blvd.
>Caroline Bldg. Rm. 307
>St. Louis, MO 63104
>(314) 577-8608
>campbem@slu.edu
_____________________________________________________________________
__ /
_____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental
Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail
rlatsch@
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If this were my personal vehicle, I would check to determine if my auto insurance policy would be voided if I used it for such business purposes....may have nothing to do with DOT regs, but I'd sure hate to be blindsided on this one...
>>> rnl2@PO.CWRU.EDU 09/13/02 01:43PM >>>
Be careful HERE! The transportation regs deal with commercial carriers! I
do not think that they apply to private personal vehicles.
They will regulate transportation for work reasons
Don't get caught doing this to circumvent the regs(If you do, get a plane
ticket, use your passport, try Argintina. I do not think that they have an
extradition treaty with the USA:)
A material of trade excemption is to be used when one transports an item
that they use in their work because they have to go to the worksite. One
example is a portable welding rig on work vehicle(truck) not personal autos.
The bbp standard provides for transportation in autos that one is using say
for work. This also appears to apply to a worker who transports as part of
their employment using their personal vehicles. The materials are excempt
from 6.2 regulation. Remeber what I said about personal vehicles?
The old DOT did not address this form of 6.2 material.
The new DOT does. I have not had time or opportunity to review this new
regulation in depth. Implementation has been pushed back to February?
2003. So it has not taken effect yet.
Has any body had a chance to read this through?
Bob
>I have a question for the group regarding the Transport of a Division
>6.2 diagnostic specimen, biological product, or regulated medical waste
>via personal motor vehicle. My conversations with the Hazardous
>Materials Specialists within the DOT indicate that as of September 13,
>2002 (today), it is 30 days post notice of the newly revised 49 CFR 171
>et.al. and this newly revised CFR now provides Division 6.2 Materials of
>trade exceptions. A person can now transport a Division 6.2 material
>within their own personal vehicle without some sort of declaration as
>long as the specimen is packaged and marked appropriately and it meets
>the stated capacity limitations?
>
>It states in 49 CFR 173.6 that when transported by motor vehicle in
>conformance with this section, a material of trade is not subject to any
>other requirements of this subchapter besides those set forth or
>referenced in this section. Being a material of trade exception, do the
>packages still need to be officially secured during shipment as stated
>in 49 CFR? Can these materials of trade be transported in a person's
>car that they will then use to drive home and haul the kids to soccer
>practice? I cannot the information in 49 CFR which prevents this from
>occurring.
>
>Any help would be apprectiated!
>
>Thanks,
>
>Mark C.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>-------------------------------------
>Mark J. Campbell, MS, SM(NRM)
>Biological Safety Officer
>Office of Environmental Safety
>Saint Louis University
>1402 S. Grand Blvd.
>Caroline Bldg. Rm. 307
>St. Louis, MO 63104
>(314) 577-8608
>campbem@slu.edu
_____________________________________________________________________
__ / _____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
--=_C69A7422.D5B465D7--
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 13 Sep 2002 12:08:51 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Melinda Young
Subject: Re: Vaccinia Lab Worker Training
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I read this with a different twist...Is your IBC member concerned about =
informing the workers working with vaccinia or recombinant vaccina.
This is probably outdated since I have not been involved since the changes =
were made in the vaccine but... this was from an older imported informatio=
n sheet about vaccinia.
The vaccinia vaccine licensed in the United States contains live vaccinia =
virus, derived from the New York City Board of Health strain of vaccinia. =
Vaccine is administered using the multiple puncture technique with a =
bifurcated needle. More than 95% of primary vaccines (i.e., persons =
receiving their first dose of vaccine) will develop neutralizing and/or =
hemagglutination inhibition antibody at a titer of > 1:10. Neutralizing =
antibody appears to persist for many years, with antibody titers of > 1:10 =
found in 75% of persons 10 years following a second dose, and up to 30 =
years following three doses of vaccine. The level of antibody required for =
protection against vaccinia infections is not known. However, fewer than =
10% of persons with neutralizing titers of > 1:10 will have a primary-type =
response to revaccination, suggesting that these persons are protected =
from viral replication, and presumably infection.
I see things like >95% (that's not 100%)...presumably infection...
So we added some information to the standard information on the benefits/ha=
zards of vaccinia immunizations.
Are there Additional Risks when working with recombinant vaccinia vectors?
Vaccinia is used as a recombinant vector in vaccine development. In =
other words, the vaccinia virus is modified to contain inserted genetic =
material from another organism. If an occupational exposure to this =
recombinant vector occurs, it is possible for the exposed person to =
serconvert to the antigens of the other material inserted into the vector. =
If the inserted material is from another viral agent this seroconversion =
could mean that the exposed person might test positive for that viral =
agent when certain antigen tests are done. Although seroconversion does =
not mean that the person will have clinical disease, it does mean that =
when certain tests are done it may appear as if the person is infected. =
Since much of the work done at __________ deals with vaccine development =
for HIV/AIDS this can have long term consequences. Prior vaccination =
with vaccinia virus decreases the likelihood of seroconversion.
Melinda Young
>>> rnl2@PO.CWRU.EDU 09/13/02 05:17AM >>>
Be careful with this. I have had PI's use the same approach. The idea is
to shift the responsibility from the Prof. to the worker. OSHA will not
buy that. PI's that have attempted things like this here will have this
sign off and then say it is up to the worker to prtect him/herself. Bad
idea.
Bob
>
>
>A question about research using vaccinia--
>
>
>One IBC member at my institution wants the following:
>"Workers need to sign a document showing they gave informed consent about
>working with vaccinia virus harboring a human protein and other risks of
>vaccinia research."
>
>
>This seems to be different from workers reading a document about the
>hazards and safety procedures and signing that they have read and
>understood the document.
>
>
>How do you document training of vaccinia hazards to lab workers? Do you
>ask for "informed consent?"
>
>
>Thanks in advance --
>
>
>Madeline Dalrymple
>Biological Safety Officer
>Environmental Health and Safety
>University of Wyoming, Laramie, Wyoming, USA
>766-2723, fax 766-5678, dalrympl@uwyo.edu
>
>
_____________________________________________________________________
__ / _____________________AMIGA_LIVES!________________________________=
___
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental =
Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
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I read this with a different twist...Is your IBC member concerned = about informing the workers working with vaccinia or recombinant vaccina. =
This is probably outdated since I have not been involved since the changes were made in the vaccine but... this = was from an older imported information sheet about vaccinia.
More than 95% of = primary vaccines (i.e., persons receiving their first dose of vaccine) will = develop neutralizing and/or hemagglutination inhibition antibody at a titer of = > 1:10. Neutralizing antibody appears to persist for many years, with = antibody titers of > 1:10 found in 75% of persons 10 years following a second = dose, and up to 30 years following three doses of vaccine. The level of = antibody required for protection against vaccinia infections is not known. However, = fewer than 10% of persons with neutralizing titers of > 1:10 will have a primary-type response to revaccination, suggesting that these persons = are protected from viral replication, and presumably infection.
So we added some information to = the standard information on the benefits/hazards of vaccinia immunizations.
Are there Additional = Risks when working with recombinant vaccinia vectors?
=
Vaccinia is used as = a recombinant vector in vaccine development.In other words, the vaccinia virus is modified to contain = inserted genetic material from another organism.If an occupational exposure to this recombinant vector occurs, it = is possible for the exposed person to serconvert to the antigens of the = other material inserted into the vector. = If the inserted material is from another viral agent this seroconver= sion could mean that the exposed person for that viral agent when certain antigen tests are = done. Although seroconversion does not = mean that the person will have clinical disease, it does mean that when certain = tests are done it may appear as if the person is infected. Since much of the work done = at __________ deals with vaccine development for HIV/AIDS this can have long = term consequences. Prior vaccination with vaccinia virus decreases = the likelihood of seroconversion.
Melinda Young
>>> rnl2@PO.CWRU.EDU 09/13/02 05:17AM >>>
Be= careful with this. I have had PI's use the same approach. The = idea is
to shift the responsibility from the Prof. to the worker. OSHA = will not
buy that. PI's that have attempted things like this here will = have this
sign off and then say it is up to the worker to prtect him/herself. Bad
idea.
Bob
>
>
>A = question about research using vaccinia--
>
>
>One IBC member at = my institution wants the following:
>"Workers need to sign a document = showing they gave informed consent about
>working with vaccinia virus = harboring a human protein and other risks of
>vaccinia research."
>
>
>This seems to be different from = workers reading a document about the
>hazards and safety procedures and = signing that they have read and
>understood the document.
>
>
>How do you document training of = vaccinia hazards to lab workers? Do you
>ask for "informed consent?"
>
>
>Thanks in advance --
>
>
>Madeline Dalrymple
>Biological Safety Officer
>Environmental Health and Safety
>University of = Wyoming, Laramie, Wyoming, USA
>766-2723, fax 766-5678, dalrympl@uwyo.edu
>
>
__________________________= ___________________________________________
__ &n=
bsp; / _____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_= \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF = State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
= \__/ U.S.A. RA Member = Personal e-mail rlatsch@
--=_267A94C6.B2D3BF9C--
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 13 Sep 2002 15:15:25 -0400
Reply-To: dave@ehrs.upenn.edu
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Dave Reed
Subject: Out of town...
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Hello. I am leaving town from 9/13/02 until 9/23/02. Can I get
unsubscribed from this listserver for this time so that my auto-return
message will not be sent out over the listserver while I m away?
Thanks
David C. Reed
Biological Safety Officer
University of Pennsylvania
Environmental Health and Radiation Safety
(215) 746-6641
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Hello. I am = leaving town from 9/13/02 until 9/23/02. = Can I get unsubscribed from this listserver for this time so that my = auto-return message will not be sent out over the listserver while I m = away?
Thanks&
David C. = Reed
Biological Safety = Officer
University of = Pennsylvania
Environmental Health and = Radiation Safety
(215) 746-6641
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Date: Mon, 16 Sep 2002 09:01:04 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
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From: "Stetz, Sharon"
Subject: Infectious Agent Transport policies/programs
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Would anyone be willing to share their policy or program on the transport of
infectious specimens/diagnostic specimens in either personal vehicles,
commercial vehicles or through commercial couriers? We were hoping not to
have to start from scratch if there was something already available that we
could just tailor to our facility and operations. Any help would be greatly
appreciated!
Sharon Stetz
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Infectious Agent Transport policies/programs
Would anyone be willing to share their = policy or program on the transport of infectious specimens/diagnostic = specimens in either personal vehicles, commercial vehicles or through = commercial couriers? We were hoping not to have to start from = scratch if there was something already available that we could just = tailor to our facility and operations. Any help would be greatly = appreciated!
Sharon Stetz
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=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 16 Sep 2002 08:47:42 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Mark Campbell
Subject: Re: Infectious Agent Transport policies/programs
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I am looking for similar information.
Thanks,
Mark C.
Env. Safety
"Stetz, Sharon" wrote:
>
>
> Would anyone be willing to share their policy or program on the
> transport of infectious specimens/diagnostic specimens in either
> personal vehicles, commercial vehicles or through commercial
> couriers? We were hoping not to have to start from scratch if there
> was something already available that we could just tailor to our
> facility and operations. Any help would be greatly appreciated!
>
> Sharon Stetz
--------------89D69BF4CBA4AEEA0804D73C
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I am looking for similar information.
Thanks,
Mark C.
Env. Safety
"Stetz, Sharon" wrote:
Would anyone be willing to share their policy or program on the transport of infectious specimens/diagnostic specimens in either personal vehicles, commercial vehicles or through commercial couriers? We were hoping not to have to start from scratch if there was something already available that we could just tailor to our facility and operations. Any help would be greatly appreciated!
Sharon Stetz
--------------89D69BF4CBA4AEEA0804D73C--
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 16 Sep 2002 11:34:55 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Eric Cook
Subject: Re: The new DOT regs
In-Reply-To:
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It is important to note that the material of trade (MOT) exception only applies to materials that meet the definition of diagnostic specimens, biological products and regulated medical waste (RMW) and does not apply to materials that are known or reasonably expected to contain pathogens (i.e. infectious substances).
A careful reading will reveal that this is not a relaxing of the regs but actually an increase in the requirements that were not there previously. Under the old 49 CFR, diagnostic specimens and biological products were completely excepted from the hazardous materials regulations, other than the limited requirements for them found in 42 CFR Part 72, there was no packaging, marking, labeling or documentation requirements. Under the new final rule, there are now packaging requirements that must meet certain minimum standards and quantity limitations.
If I understand the final rule correctly there are actually four exceptions for diagnostic specimens and biological products. The first is an exception for nonhazardous specimens and must meet the following criteria (see 49 CFR 173.134 (b)(1) and (2))
1. Meets the definition of a biological product or diagnostic specimen and;
2. is known to or suspected of (being tested for) only Risk Group (RG) 1 micro-organism or; is known not to contain pathogens or; the pathogen has been neutralized or has been inactivated so it cannot cause disease.
Such materials are excepted from the Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMR)
The second exception is for diagnostic specimens or biological products transported by private or contract carrier in a motor vehicle that is exclusively used to transport diagnostic specimens or biological products. These materials are also not subject to the HMR (see 49 CFR 173.134(b)(6)).
RMW aside, the Third exception is the MOT exception found in 173.6 (a)(4). In order to qualify for this exception, you must meet the following:
1. Meet the definition of a biological product or diagnostic specimen
2. Transportation by a private motor carrier (including vehicles operated by a rail carrier) in direct support of a principal business that is other than transportation by motor vehicle.
3. Not RG 4 or testing for RG 4
4. In combination packaging with inner receptacles not to exceed 500 mL (or g) each and each package not to exceed 4 L (or kg). For liquids inner packaging must be leak tight and include sufficient absorbent between inner and outer packaging.
5. Hazard communication: A non-bulk packaging must be marked with a common name or proper shipping name to identify the material it contains, and the operator of a motor vehicle that contains a material of trade must be informed of the presence of the hazardous material and must be informed of the requirements of this section.
If you meet all of the above then the material is excepted from the rest of the packaging, marking, labeling, documentation and training requirements of the HMR.
The fourth exception is not really and exception but if the diagnostic specimen that you are shipping is not in a private vehicle, or dedicated contract carrier (that only ships diagnostic specimens) and the RG exceeds RG 1 then it is excepted from the rest of the HMR provided that it meets the packaging, marking and training requirements that are found in 49 CFR 173.199. If you are familiar with the diagnostic specimen transportation requirements of IATA and PI 650 then there is nothing really different except for the 95 kPa pressure requirement for primary or secondary packaging of liquid diagnostic specimens.
Finally, for your last question: Can these materials of trade be transported in a person's car that they will then use to drive home and haul the kids to soccer practice? I have spoken on numerous occasions to people from the DOT on the help line (1-800-467-4922) regarding the MOT exception and have asked very similar questions and the answers that I have received have indicated that such a scenario is acceptable.
At 11:13 AM 9/13/2002 -0500, you wrote:
I have a question for the group regarding the Transport of a Division
6.2 diagnostic specimen, biological product, or regulated medical waste
via personal motor vehicle. My conversations with the Hazardous
Materials Specialists within the DOT indicate that as of September 13,
2002 (today), it is 30 days post notice of the newly revised 49 CFR 171
et.al. and this newly revised CFR now provides Division 6.2 Materials of
trade exceptions. A person can now transport a Division 6.2 material
within their own personal vehicle without some sort of declaration as
long as the specimen is packaged and marked appropriately and it meets
the stated capacity limitations?
It states in 49 CFR 173.6 that when transported by motor vehicle in
conformance with this section, a material of trade is not subject to any
other requirements of this subchapter besides those set forth or
referenced in this section. Being a material of trade exception, do the
packages still need to be officially secured during shipment as stated
in 49 CFR? Can these materials of trade be transported in a person's
car that they will then use to drive home and haul the kids to soccer
practice? I cannot the information in 49 CFR which prevents this from
occurring.
Any help would be apprectiated!
Thanks,
Mark C.
-------------------------------------
Mark J. Campbell, MS, SM(NRM)
Biological Safety Officer
Office of Environmental Safety
Saint Louis University
1402 S. Grand Blvd.
Caroline Bldg. Rm. 307
St. Louis, MO 63104
(314) 577-8608
campbem@slu.edu
_=====_
========
| | | | | | | |
========
MIT BSP
Eric Cook, Asst. Biosafety Officer
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Biosafety Program, N52-496
77 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02139-4307
(Voice) 617-258-5648
(Fax) 617-258-6831
(E-mail)ecook@mit.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 16 Sep 2002 10:46:48 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Burnett, LouAnn Crawford"
Subject: Re: ABSA Meetings
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Phil and others -
For two years, I have chaired a subcommittee for the ABSA Training and
Education committee looking into expansion of the pre-conference
courses that ABSA offers. So that initiative is well underway. Our
first assignment from the Council was to assess the feasibility and then
develop a comprehensive, roving 40-hour Fundamentals of Biosafety course
and to base subsequent packaging of courses on more detailed and
advanced topics so that there is essentially a biosafety curriculum - 1)
the Fundamentals course, then 2) more detailed coursework in either a
pre-conference, roving, and/or distance learning format and, finally,
3) a review course for the certification exam. As you might imagine,
this is a huge effort for a strictly volunteer organization. The first
Fundamentals course will be offered next year sometime, with other
smaller courses to follow shortly. Stay tuned.
LouAnn
LouAnn C. Burnett, MS, CBSP =09
Biosafety Program Manager & Biological Safety Officer=09
Vanderbilt University Environmental Health & Safety
Nashville, Tennessee
615/322-0927 (direct & voice mail)
615/343-4951 (fax) =09
-----Original Message-----
From: Hauck, Philip [mailto:philip.hauck@MSSM.EDU]
Sent: Monday, September 16, 2002 8:46 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: ABSA Meetings
Hey! That's a great idea, and a way to make some revenue for ABSA, too!
Either a correspondence or distance learning program for people who
need courses, but can't make the meeting for various reasons. We have a
lot of talented folks who probably could put some of these together.
Another possible mechanism would be a "roving" course that could be
sponsored by local chapters. Just some brain-storming on a
Monday(rainy)Morning! Phil Hauck Mt, Sinai School of Medicine
-----Original Message-----
From: Tina Charbonneau [mailto:tcharbonneau@]
Sent: Saturday, September 14, 2002 11:12 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: ABSA Meetings
I am very interested in some of the workshops being conducted but
cannot attend the meetings. Are these workshops ever conducted outside
of an annual meeting?
Any info would be appreciated.
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 16 Sep 2002 11:10:27 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Christina Thompson
Subject: Re: APHIS PERMIT question
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You all -
Look at your maps! Tucson is a day's drive from Albuquerque. Arizona and
New Mexico are reeeeally big states. C. immitis is endemic in the Sonoran desert area around Tucson (causes what is
locally known as "valley fever") - but Albuquerque is not in the Sonoran
desert!
Here's a really good web site on valley fever:
Chris Thompson
(a New Mexico native)
Don Callihan
Sent by: A Biosafety Discussion List
09/11/2002 06:04 PM
Please respond to A Biosafety Discussion List
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
cc:
Subject: Re: APHIS PERMIT question
Judy,
You have moved to an interesting area. If you ever visit the Sonoran
Desert
region near Tuscon, Arizona you may experience an acute, flu-like illness
that's primary Coccidioides immitis. Don't recall off hand if Albuquerque,
NM is in the "coccidioides zone" or not. Most of the clinical labs in the
Tuscon area isolate C. immitis routinely from respiratory specimens of
people who recently moved there. It will be an interesting challenge for
these labs to document destruction of isolates whenever the exemption
rules
for clinical specimens are available for compliance with the new law. You
may want to contact the laboratory at your medical center to learn the
extent of this situation before you have to face the new regulations.
I'd be interested in hearing from other biosafety folks in the southwest
desert regions what their experiences with C. immitis from clinical or
environmental specimens has been.
A humidity-free environment has it's drawbacks, too. Hope there are more
plusses than minuses for you.
Best regards,
Don Callihan
BD Diagnostic Systems
Sparks, MD
410-773-6684
Judy Pointer @MITVMA.MIT.EDU> on 09/11/2002
06:35:37 PM
Please respond to A Biosafety Discussion List
Sent by: A Biosafety Discussion List
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
cc:
Subject: APHIS PERMIT question
Hello Biosafety experts,
I want to announce that I've changed jobs (states) and I have a
question too.
I accepted the position of University Biosafety Officer at University
of New Mexico. I now live in a humidity-free environment (Albuquerque
NM) and I can breath again (I'm the former Houston area BSO for MD
Anderson Cancer Center - for you that didn't know). No more griping
about the weather and traffic - it's beautiful in NM.
Anyway I've been here less than 4 weeks and I have spent all of it
doing UNMs Select Agent "Possession" Survey in fast forward.
Finally that is ALMOST DONE! HURRAH! But I've got one problem.
One of the PIs from my new place has messed up and brought one of the
select agents (VSV) with her from a former employer in another state -
without updating her permit. She did this before 1994 and before it was
ever a select agent - but now I am back-tracking for her. I can get her
squared away with CDC & USDA select agent stuff - but need to figure out
what to do about this APHIS permit she has that expired in 1994. She's
not going to transport it anymore - does she need a new APHIS permit
too? There is no FAQ on their site that answers questions like this.
And their site no longer has telephone numbers on it. I'd like to ask
someone that works there in the "permit" department to see what/if she
needs to do to get squared away.
Do any of you have any contacts or phone numbers of the folks there?
Her old permit says it is located in Hyattsville, Maryland - but I can't
find a phone number for APHIS in that city. Any contact leads would be
very much appreciated.
On another subject - I see that everyone is getting ready for the
conference in Oct. I can't go this time - it conflicts with the
Albuquerque balloon festival Biosafety Manager
> OW Basement
> 1800 Concord Pike
> Wilmington, DE 19850
> Phone: 302.886.2185
> Fax: 302.886.2909
> Cell #: 302.218.5306
> email: bliss.schlank@
>
>
>
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 16 Sep 2002 11:38:03 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
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From: Dina Sassone
Subject: Question from a new list serve participant
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Hi, all. I am new to the list serve. I am the BSO for Los Alamos National
Laboratory, and also a member of the AIHA Biosafety Committee.
I hope this is an appropriate question. If not, I sincerely apologize!
I am putting together a round table (along with another member of the AIHA
Biosafety committee) for the AIHA Industrial Hygiene Conference next
year. We've got several requests out to some people we know that would be
good, but I would appreciate it if anyone knows of someone good/available,
or can themselves participate? The conference is next May (10-15, 2003) in
Dallas? Topic: facility design of BSL-3 and BSL-4.
Here's the draft abstract: Interest in biological laboratories has
increased in the last year, due to recent world events, as well as critical
needs and breakthroughs in biological research. This roundtable will focus
on new directions and requirements for design, building, commissioning, and
operation of BSL-3 and BSL-4 in this post 9/11 world. It includes a
discussion of uses/purposes, design objectives, materials, issues and
lessons learned from recent facilities designed and/or built for
government, private industry, and universities. Perspectives will be from
architectural, government, academia, industry and consulting.
My timeline is getting a little tight, so anyone who has suggestions--thanks!
Dina M. Sassone, CIH, CSP, SM (NRM)
University of California
Los Alamos National Laboratory
HSR-5
MS K486
Los Alamos, NM 87545
(505) 665-2977 (voice)
((505) 996-3807 (pager)
"To infinity and beyond"-Buzz Lightyear
--=====================_13706138==.ALT
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
Hi, all. I am new to the list serve. I am the BSO for Los Alamos National Laboratory, and also a member of the AIHA Biosafety Committee.
I hope this is an appropriate question. If not, I sincerely apologize!
I am putting together a round table (along with another member of the AIHA Biosafety committee) for the AIHA Industrial Hygiene Conference next year. We've got several requests out to some people we know that would be good, but I would appreciate it if anyone knows of someone good/available, or can themselves participate? The conference is next May (10-15, 2003) in Dallas? Topic: facility design of BSL-3 and BSL-4.
Here's the draft abstract: Interest in biological laboratories has increased in the last year, due to recent world events, as well as critical needs and breakthroughs in biological research. This roundtable will focus on new directions and requirements for design, building, commissioning, and operation of BSL-3 and BSL-4 in this post 9/11 world. It includes a discussion of uses/purposes, design objectives, materials, issues and lessons learned from recent facilities designed and/or built for government, private industry, and universities. Perspectives will be from architectural, government, academia, industry and consulting.
My timeline is getting a little tight, so anyone who has suggestions--thanks!
Dina M. Sassone, CIH, CSP, SM (NRM)
University of California
Los Alamos National Laboratory
HSR-5
MS K486
Los Alamos, NM 87545
(505) 665-2977 (voice)
((505) 996-3807 (pager)
"To infinity and beyond"-Buzz Lightyear
--=====================_13706138==.ALT--
Date: Mon, 16 Sep 2002 13:38:11 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Hauck, Philip"
Subject: Re: ABSA Meetings
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
Content-transfer-encoding: quoted-printable
I will stay tuned! And I also know how hard it is to pull resources and =
people together to get courses off-the-ground. I hope these comments =
will help reinforce that you folks are headed in the right direction on =
this. As I said, we have some great resource-people in ABSA, and I know =
that a distance-learning program can be accomplished. Stefan's comment =
on lack of contact/networking underscores the problem with =
correspondence / computer-based learning, with the exception of =
satellite connected training ala CDC.
But at least some training is better than none, and a reason I mentioned =
that the local chapters could help to sponsor these, meeting the =
deficiency in human contact, and having the "local" resource handy to =
either teach, or at least field comments/ questions. We all know,there =
is no substitute for direct one-on-one interaction!
Phil Hauck
-----Original Message-----
From: Burnett, LouAnn Crawford [mailto:louann.burnett@VANDERBILT.EDU]
Sent: Monday, September 16, 2002 11:47 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: ABSA Meetings
Phil and others -
For two years, I have chaired a subcommittee for the ABSA Training and
Education committee looking into expansion of the pre-conference
courses that ABSA offers. So that initiative is well underway. Our
first assignment from the Council was to assess the feasibility and then
develop a comprehensive, roving 40-hour Fundamentals of Biosafety course
and to base subsequent packaging of courses on more detailed and
advanced topics so that there is essentially a biosafety curriculum - 1)
the Fundamentals course, then 2) more detailed coursework in either a
pre-conference, roving, and/or distance learning format and, finally,
3) a review course for the certification exam. As you might imagine,
this is a huge effort for a strictly volunteer organization. The first
Fundamentals course will be offered next year sometime, with other
smaller courses to follow shortly. Stay tuned.
LouAnn
LouAnn C. Burnett, MS, CBSP =09
Biosafety Program Manager & Biological Safety Officer=09
Vanderbilt University Environmental Health & Safety
Nashville, Tennessee
615/322-0927 (direct & voice mail)
615/343-4951 (fax) =09
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 16 Sep 2002 15:16:17 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Mike Durham
Subject: Re: Question from a new list serve participant
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="----=_NextPart_000_0031_01C25D94.01475430"
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Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Content-Type: text/plain;
charset="iso-8859-1"
Dina, I think the abstract is ok, however, I also think that you should =
not limit yourself to BSL 3 and above, as anthrax and some other agents =
are appropriately handled currently in BSL 2 labs. The issue might =
better be positioned around the security regulations if 9/11 is the =
thrust of the conference.
Mike Durham
LSU
----- Original Message -----
From: A Biosafety Discussion List
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Sent: Monday, September 16, 2002 12:38 PM
Subject: Question from a new list serve participant
Hi, all. I am new to the list serve. I am the BSO for Los Alamos =
National Laboratory, and also a member of the AIHA Biosafety Committee. =
I hope this is an appropriate question. If not, I sincerely =
apologize!
I am putting together a round table (along with another member of the =
AIHA Biosafety committee) for the AIHA Industrial Hygiene Conference =
next year. We've got several requests out to some people we know that =
would be good, but I would appreciate it if anyone knows of someone =
good/available, or can themselves participate? The conference is next =
May (10-15, 2003) in Dallas? Topic: facility design of BSL-3 and =
BSL-4.
Here's the draft abstract: Interest in biological laboratories has =
increased in the last year, due to recent world events, as well as =
critical needs and breakthroughs in biological research. This =
roundtable will focus on new directions and requirements for design, =
building, commissioning, and operation of BSL-3 and BSL-4 in this post =
9/11 world. It includes a discussion of uses/purposes, design =
objectives, materials, issues and lessons learned from recent facilities =
designed and/or built for government, private industry, and =
universities. Perspectives will be from architectural, government, =
academia, industry and consulting.
My timeline is getting a little tight, so anyone who has =
suggestions--thanks!
Dina M. Sassone, CIH, CSP, SM (NRM)
University of California
Los Alamos National Laboratory
HSR-5
MS K486
Los Alamos, NM 87545
(505) 665-2977 (voice)
((505) 996-3807 (pager)
"To infinity and beyond"-Buzz Lightyear
------=_NextPart_000_0031_01C25D94.01475430
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Content-Type: text/html;
charset="iso-8859-1"
Dina, I think the abstract is ok, = however, I also think that you should not limit yourself to BSL 3 and above, as anthrax = and some other agents are appropriately handled currently in BSL 2 labs. The = issue might better be positioned around the security regulations if 9/11 is the = thrust of the conference.
Mike Durham
LSU
----- Original Message -----
A Biosafety Discussion List
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Sent: Monday, September 16, = 2002 12:38 PM
Subject: Question from a new = list serve participant
Hi, all. I am new to the list serve. I am = the BSO for Los Alamos National Laboratory, and also a member of the AIHA = Biosafety Committee.
I hope this is an appropriate question. = If not, I sincerely apologize!
I am putting together a round = table (along with another member of the AIHA Biosafety committee) for the = AIHA Industrial Hygiene Conference next year. We've got several = requests out to some people we know that would be good, but I would appreciate it = if anyone knows of someone good/available, or can themselves participate? The = conference is next May (10-15, 2003) in Dallas? Topic: facility = design of BSL-3 and BSL-4.
Here's the draft abstract: = Interest in biological laboratories has increased in the last year, due to recent = world events, as well as critical needs and breakthroughs in biological research. This roundtable will focus on new directions and = requirements for design, building, commissioning, and operation of BSL-3 and BSL-4 = in this post 9/11 world. It includes a discussion of uses/purposes, = design objectives, materials, issues and lessons learned from recent = facilities designed and/or built for government, private industry, and universities. Perspectives will be from architectural, = government, academia, industry and consulting.
My timeline is getting a = little tight, so anyone who has = suggestions--thanks!
Dina M. Sassone, CIH, CSP, SM (NRM)
University of California
Los Alamos National Laboratory
HSR-5
MS = K486
Los Alamos, NM 87545
(505) 665-2977 (voice)
((505) 996-3807 = (pager)
"To infinity and beyond"-Buzz = Lightyear
------=_NextPart_000_0031_01C25D94.01475430--
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 16 Sep 2002 13:12:04 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Johnson, Brynte"
Subject: Medical Waste Vendor Recommendations
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
To All - UCSF is facing a difficult situation regarding medical waste.
Only one vendor currently operates in this area, having bought out and
closed the previous vendor's facilities, and we are very dissatisfied with
the service we have received. One local company is gearing up to create
some competition, but it will be a very long time before they would be able
to handle the amount of waste we generate. We have no space to create our
own treatment facility. I would very much appreciate any suggestions for
vendors you have had success with that we could talk to. Please include
their contact information, and if you can suggest a specific person for us
to speak with that would be even better.
I don't know if other list members have any interest in this, so please
reply to me directly at the address below. If there is interest from
others I can compile the responses and either send them to individuals or if
interest is sufficient I could post them to the list.
Many thanks in advance,
Brynte
------------------------------------------
Brynte H. Johnson, M.S.
Biological Safety Officer
University of California
Office of Environmental Health and Safety
50 Medical Center Way, Box 0942
San Francisco, CA 94143-0942
phone: (415) 476-2097
e-mail: bjohnson@ehs.ucsf.edu
OEH&S website: ehs.ucsf.edu
fax: (415) 476-0581
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 16 Sep 2002 14:50:44 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Dina Sassone
Subject: Re: Question from a new list serve participant
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="=====================_25267472==.ALT"
--=====================_25267472==.ALT
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
good point. I will explore it with the panel, as it forms. Thanks for the
input.
At 03:16 PM 09/16/2002 -0500, you wrote:
>Dina, I think the abstract is ok, however, I also think that you should
>not limit yourself to BSL 3 and above, as anthrax and some other agents
>are appropriately handled currently in BSL 2 labs. The issue might better
>be positioned around the security regulations if 9/11 is the thrust of the
>conference.
>Mike Durham
>LSU
>>----- Original Message -----
>>From: A Biosafety Discussion List
>>To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
>>Sent: Monday, September 16, 2002 12:38 PM
>>Subject: Question from a new list serve participant
>>
>>Hi, all. I am new to the list serve. I am the BSO for Los Alamos
>>National Laboratory, and also a member of the AIHA Biosafety Committee.
>>
>>I hope this is an appropriate question. If not, I sincerely apologize!
>>
>>I am putting together a round table (along with another member of the
>>AIHA Biosafety committee) for the AIHA Industrial Hygiene Conference next
>>year. We've got several requests out to some people we know that would
>>be good, but I would appreciate it if anyone knows of someone
>>good/available, or can themselves participate? The conference is next May
>>(10-15, 2003) in Dallas? Topic: facility design of BSL-3 and BSL-4.
>>
>>Here's the draft abstract: Interest in biological laboratories has
>>increased in the last year, due to recent world events, as well as
>>critical needs and breakthroughs in biological research. This roundtable
>>will focus on new directions and requirements for design, building,
>>commissioning, and operation of BSL-3 and BSL-4 in this post 9/11
>>world. It includes a discussion of uses/purposes, design objectives,
>>materials, issues and lessons learned from recent facilities designed
>>and/or built for government, private industry, and
>>universities. Perspectives will be from architectural, government,
>>academia, industry and consulting.
>>
>>My timeline is getting a little tight, so anyone who has suggestions--thanks!
>>
>>
>>Dina M. Sassone, CIH, CSP, SM (NRM)
>>University of California
>>Los Alamos National Laboratory
>>HSR-5
>>MS K486
>>Los Alamos, NM 87545
>>(505) 665-2977 (voice)
>>((505) 996-3807 (pager)
>>"To infinity and beyond"-Buzz Lightyear
>
>Dina M. Sassone, CIH, CSP, SM (NRM)
>University of California
>Los Alamos National Laboratory
>HSR-5
>MS K486
>Los Alamos, NM 87545
>(505) 665-2977 (voice)
>((505) 996-3807 (pager)
>"To infinity and beyond"-Buzz Lightyear
>
--=====================_25267472==.ALT
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
good point. I will explore it with the panel, as it forms. Thanks for the input.
At 03:16 PM 09/16/2002 -0500, you wrote:
Dina, I think the abstract is ok, however, I also think that you should not limit yourself to BSL 3 and above, as anthrax and some other agents are appropriately handled currently in BSL 2 labs. The issue might better be positioned around the security regulations if 9/11 is the thrust of the conference.
Mike Durham
LSU
----- Original Message -----
From: A Biosafety Discussion List
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Sent: Monday, September 16, 2002 12:38 PM
Subject: Question from a new list serve participant
Hi, all. I am new to the list serve. I am the BSO for Los Alamos National Laboratory, and also a member of the AIHA Biosafety Committee.
I hope this is an appropriate question. If not, I sincerely apologize!
I am putting together a round table (along with another member of the AIHA Biosafety committee) for the AIHA Industrial Hygiene Conference next year. We've got several requests out to some people we know that would be good, but I would appreciate it if anyone knows of someone good/available, or can themselves participate? The conference is next May (10-15, 2003) in Dallas? Topic: facility design of BSL-3 and BSL-4.
Here's the draft abstract: Interest in biological laboratories has increased in the last year, due to recent world events, as well as critical needs and breakthroughs in biological research. This roundtable will focus on new directions and requirements for design, building, commissioning, and operation of BSL-3 and BSL-4 in this post 9/11 world. It includes a discussion of uses/purposes, design objectives, materials, issues and lessons learned from recent facilities designed and/or built for government, private industry, and universities. Perspectives will be from architectural, government, academia, industry and consulting.
My timeline is getting a little tight, so anyone who has suggestions--thanks!
Dina M. Sassone, CIH, CSP, SM (NRM)
University of California
Los Alamos National Laboratory
HSR-5
MS K486
Los Alamos, NM 87545
(505) 665-2977 (voice)
((505) 996-3807 (pager)
"To infinity and beyond"-Buzz Lightyear
Dina M. Sassone, CIH, CSP, SM (NRM)
University of California
Los Alamos National Laboratory
HSR-5
MS K486
Los Alamos, NM 87545
(505) 665-2977 (voice)
((505) 996-3807 (pager)
"To infinity and beyond"-Buzz Lightyear
--=====================_25267472==.ALT--
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 16 Sep 2002 15:59:02 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: David Lumby
Subject: Re: Question from a new list serve participant
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Dina,
I've been to an ABSA sponsored training put on by Karen Byers from Dana
Farber Cancer Institute about BSL 3 labs. She has all kinds of real-world
examples of what doesn;t work. I enjoyed her talk and walked away with things
to think about. If she's not interested, she'll probably have ideas for you.
Her phone is 617-632-3890.
As an FYI, in the round table submission you can request AIHA-paid travel for
non-AIHA/ACGIH members (at least you could a couple of years ago). Sorrry if
I'm, telling you things you know.
Dave
David Lumby, CIH, CSP
Abbott Labs
847-936-3440
Dina Sassone
cc:
Sent by: A Subject: Re: Question from a new list serve
Biosafety participant
Discussion List
09/16/2002
03:50 PM
Please respond
to A Biosafety
Discussion List
good point. I will explore it with the panel, as it forms. Thanks for the
input.
At 03:16 PM 09/16/2002 -0500, you wrote:
Dina, I think the abstract is ok, however, I also think that you should
not limit yourself to BSL 3 and above, as anthrax and some other agents
are appropriately handled currently in BSL 2 labs. The issue might better
be positioned around the security regulations if 9/11 is the thrust of
the conference.
Mike Durham
LSU
----- Original Message -----
From: A Biosafety Discussion List
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Sent: Monday, September 16, 2002 12:38 PM
Subject: Question from a new list serve participant
Hi, all. I am new to the list serve. I am the BSO for Los Alamos
National Laboratory, and also a member of the AIHA Biosafety
Committee.
I hope this is an appropriate question. If not, I sincerely
apologize!
I am putting together a round table (along with another member of
the AIHA Biosafety committee) for the AIHA Industrial Hygiene
Conference next year. We've got several requests out to some people
we know that would be good, but I would appreciate it if anyone
knows of someone good/available, or can themselves participate? The
conference is next May (10-15, 2003) in Dallas? Topic: facility
design of BSL-3 and BSL-4.
Here's the draft abstract: Interest in biological laboratories has
increased in the last year, due to recent world events, as well as
critical needs and breakthroughs in biological research. This
roundtable will focus on new directions and requirements for design,
building, commissioning, and operation of BSL-3 and BSL-4 in this
post 9/11 world. It includes a discussion of uses/purposes, design
objectives, materials, issues and lessons learned from recent
facilities designed and/or built for government, private industry,
and universities. Perspectives will be from architectural,
government, academia, industry and consulting.
My timeline is getting a little tight, so anyone who has
suggestions--thanks!
Dina M. Sassone, CIH, CSP, SM (NRM)
University of California
Los Alamos National Laboratory
HSR-5
MS K486
Los Alamos, NM 87545
(505) 665-2977 (voice)
((505) 996-3807 (pager)
"To infinity and beyond"-Buzz Lightyear
Dina M. Sassone, CIH, CSP, SM (NRM)
University of California
Los Alamos National Laboratory
HSR-5
MS K486
Los Alamos, NM 87545
(505) 665-2977 (voice)
((505) 996-3807 (pager)
"To infinity and beyond"-Buzz Lightyear
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 16 Sep 2002 17:24:34 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ed Gaunt
Subject: Notification Error Letters
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="----_=_NextPart_000_01C25DC7.73C60EB0"
This message is in MIME format. Since your mail reader does not understand
this format, some or all of this message may not be legible.
------_=_NextPart_000_01C25DC7.73C60EB0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="----_=_NextPart_001_01C25DC7.73C60EB0"
------_=_NextPart_001_01C25DC7.73C60EB0
Content-Type: text/plain;
charset="iso-8859-1"
Hi Ya'll
Some of you (or folks at your institutions) may be receiving error letters
that resemble the attached file. We have minimized the number of things
that will cause us to reject a form so that there are only 7 messages that
appear on the letter. One or more of these error messages may be checked.
You'd be SURPRISED how many folks read the instructions AFTER they filled
out the form...in ink usually (actually we have had several forms that have
been TYPED...yup,...right on the bubble form!). In all cases, we have
tried to discern the respondent's intentions on the original form, but we
will not guess what they are. If we have to guess, we generate an error
letter. Most of these error messages revolve around improperly signing (or
not signing) the forms. Others have to do with only getting half a form
back (either the front page or the back page, but not both) or due to other
damage making the form unreadable (generally the post office's fault). The
one common feature of these error letters is that the recipient gets to fill
them out AGAIN! Because of security concerns, we cannot send back the
original form for correction. Also, because of security concerns, the
wording of the responses is a little opaque. For example, error 1 could
occur when the respondent was reporting non-possession, but signed Box 17 as
if something were possessed, or if a possessor checked items in Box 12 but
signed box 18 indicating non-possession. To figure out which case applies,
the respondent needs to look at the photocopy of the original submission
(which I'm sure everyone made and saved) to figure it out.
Please DO NOT CALL the Help Line folks to find out what was filled out
incorrectly on a particular form. They do not have access to the data and
cannot tell you what the problem was.
Ed
------_=_NextPart_001_01C25DC7.73C60EB0
Content-Type: text/html;
charset="iso-8859-1"
Hi Ya'll
Some of you (or folks at your institutions) may be receiving error letters that resemble the attached file. We have minimized the number of things that will cause us to reject a form so that there are only 7 messages that appear on the letter. One or more of these error messages may be checked. You'd be SURPRISED how many folks read the instructions AFTER they filled out the form...in ink usually (actually we have had several forms that have been TYPED...yup,...right on the bubble form!). In all cases, we have tried to discern the respondent's intentions on the original form, but we will not guess what they are. If we have to guess, we generate an error letter. Most of these error messages revolve around improperly signing (or not signing) the forms. Others have to do with only getting half a form back (either the front page or the back page, but not both) or due to other damage making the form unreadable (generally the post office's fault). The one common feature of these error letters is that the recipient gets to fill them out AGAIN! Because of security concerns, we cannot send back the original form for correction. Also, because of security concerns, the wording of the responses is a little opaque. For example, error 1 could occur when the respondent was reporting non-possession, but signed Box 17 as if something were possessed, or if a possessor checked items in Box 12 but signed box 18 indicating non-possession. To figure out which case applies, the respondent needs to look at the photocopy of the original submission (which I'm sure everyone made and saved) to figure it out.
Please DO NOT CALL the Help Line folks to find out what was filled out incorrectly on a particular form. They do not have access to the data and cannot tell you what the problem was.
Ed
------_=_NextPart_001_01C25DC7.73C60EB0--
------_=_NextPart_000_01C25DC7.73C60EB0
Content-Type: application/msword;
name="Notification Error Letter.doc"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
Content-Disposition: attachment;
filename="Notification Error Letter.doc"
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 16 Sep 2002 17:37:20 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ed Gaunt
Subject: Notification Reminder Post Cards
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="----_=_NextPart_000_01C25DC9.3C4798D0"
This message is in MIME format. Since your mail reader does not understand
this format, some or all of this message may not be legible.
------_=_NextPart_000_01C25DC9.3C4798D0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="----_=_NextPart_001_01C25DC9.3C4798D0"
------_=_NextPart_001_01C25DC9.3C4798D0
Content-Type: text/plain;
charset="iso-8859-1"
Me again...
At 4:30 this afternoon, we mailed out reminder post cards to everyone
receiving the intial notification mailing who had not returned a completed
Notification Form as of close-of-business Friday afternoon, September 13,
2002 (only about a 40% response rate thus far). The post cards look like
the attached file, except that they are PINK. Recipients should complete
and return the orginal Notification Form as soon as possible, or if they do
not possess any agents on the list, they can sign and return JUST THE POST
CARD (please do not send back both...it just complicates my day). Folks who
DID NOT receive a post cards was anyone requesting that a form be resent, or
who requested a new form (i.e., anyone who did not receive the intial
mailing--if your form ID was 200000 or less).
Ed
------_=_NextPart_001_01C25DC9.3C4798D0
Content-Type: text/html;
charset="iso-8859-1"
Me again...
At 4:30 this afternoon, we mailed out reminder post cards to everyone receiving the intial notification mailing who had not returned a completed Notification Form as of close-of-business Friday afternoon, September 13, 2002 (only about a 40% response rate thus far). The post cards look like the attached file, except that they are PINK. Recipients should complete and return the orginal Notification Form as soon as possible, or if they do not possess any agents on the list, they can sign and return JUST THE POST CARD (please do not send back both...it just complicates my day). Folks who DID NOT receive a post cards was anyone requesting that a form be resent, or who requested a new form (i.e., anyone who did not receive the intial mailing--if your form ID was 200000 or less).
Ed
------_=_NextPart_001_01C25DC9.3C4798D0--
------_=_NextPart_000_01C25DC9.3C4798D0
Content-Type: application/octet-stream;
name="Reminder Postcard FINAL.pdf"
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 16 Sep 2002 17:11:53 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Mike Durham
Subject: Re: Notification Reminder Post Cards
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="----=_NextPart_000_00F0_01C25DA4.27952260"
This is a multi-part message in MIME format.
------=_NextPart_000_00F0_01C25DA4.27952260
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Content-Type: text/plain;
charset="iso-8859-1"
Ed, I got an error on the pdf file attachment, and could not open it. =
Others may have the same problem.
Mike Durham
LSU
----- Original Message -----
From: A Biosafety Discussion List
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Sent: Monday, September 16, 2002 4:37 PM
Subject: Notification Reminder Post Cards
Me again...
At 4:30 this afternoon, we mailed out reminder post cards to everyone =
receiving the intial notification mailing who had not returned a =
completed Notification Form as of close-of-business Friday afternoon, =
September 13, 2002 (only about a 40% response rate thus far). The post =
cards look like the attached file, except that they are PINK. =
Recipients should complete and return the orginal Notification Form as =
soon as possible, or if they do not possess any agents on the list, they =
can sign and return JUST THE POST CARD (please do not send back =
both...it just complicates my day). Folks who DID NOT receive a post =
cards was anyone requesting that a form be resent, or who requested a =
new form (i.e., anyone who did not receive the intial mailing--if your =
form ID was 200000 or less).
Ed
------=_NextPart_000_00F0_01C25DA4.27952260
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Content-Type: text/html;
charset="iso-8859-1"
Ed, I got an error on the pdf file = attachment, and could not open it. Others may have the same problem.
Mike Durham
LSU
----- Original Message -----
A Biosafety Discussion List
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Sent: Monday, September 16, = 2002 4:37 PM
Subject: Notification Reminder = Post Cards
Me again...
At 4:30 this afternoon, we mailed out reminder post cards to = everyone receiving the intial notification mailing who had not returned a = completed Notification Form as of close-of-business Friday afternoon, September = 13, 2002 (only about a 40% response rate thus far). The post cards = look like the attached file, except that they are PINK. = Recipients should complete and return the orginal Notification Form as soon as possible, = or if they do not possess any agents on the list, they can sign and = return JUST THE POST CARD (please do not send back both...it just complicates my day). Folks who DID NOT receive a post cards was anyone = requesting that a form be resent, or who requested a new form (i.e., anyone who did = not receive the intial mailing--if your form ID was 200000 or less).
Ed
=
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=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 17 Sep 2002 07:27:39 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Kim Auletta
Subject: Re: Notification Error Letters
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Too bad you don't work for the Florida Election Boards! Thanks again, Ed,
for keeping us all informed about this process!
Kim Auletta
Lab Safety Specialist
Environmental Health and Safety
SUNY Stony Brook
110 Suffolk Hall
Stony Brook, NY 11794-6200
phone: 631-632-9672
fax: 631-632-9683
email: kauletta@.sunysb.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 17 Sep 2002 08:17:36 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Gilpin, Richard"
Subject: Medical Waste Vendor Recommendations
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
I suggest Antaeus Group Inc for onsite medical and lab waste treatment. One
unit will handle up to two tons (4,000 pounds) of waste per day.
Contact Bill Norton at (443) 524-0225
mailto:info@
Richard W. Gilpin, Ph.D., RBP, CBSP
Assistant Director & Biosafety Officer
Environmental Health & Safety (EHS)
University of Maryland Baltimore
714 West Lombard Street, Room 305
Baltimore MD 21201-1084
(410) 706-7845
Fax (410) 706-1520
rgilpin@ehs.umaryland.edu
ehs.umaryland.edu
-----Original Message-----
From: Johnson, Brynte [mailto:BJohnson@EHS.UCSF.EDU]
Sent: Monday, September 16, 2002 04:12 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Medical Waste Vendor Recommendations
To All - UCSF is facing a difficult situation regarding medical waste.
Only one vendor currently operates in this area, having bought out and
closed the previous vendor's facilities, and we are very dissatisfied with
the service we have received. One local company is gearing up to create
some competition, but it will be a very long time before they would be able
to handle the amount of waste we generate. We have no space to create our
own treatment facility. I would very much appreciate any suggestions for
vendors you have had success with that we could talk to. Please include
their contact information, and if you can suggest a specific person for us
to speak with that would be even better.
I don't know if other list members have any interest in this, so please
reply to me directly at the address below. If there is interest from
others I can compile the responses and either send them to individuals or if
interest is sufficient I could post them to the list.
Many thanks in advance,
Brynte
------------------------------------------
Brynte H. Johnson, M.S.
Biological Safety Officer
University of California
Office of Environmental Health and Safety
50 Medical Center Way, Box 0942
San Francisco, CA 94143-0942
phone: (415) 476-2097
e-mail: bjohnson@ehs.ucsf.edu
OEH&S website: ehs.ucsf.edu
fax: (415) 476-0581
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 17 Sep 2002 09:17:38 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Kim Auletta
Subject: Site Security
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
There recently was a discussion thread on site security. I came across this
resource today. SOCMA is sponsoring a security workshop that may benefit
our labs, and they have additional resources on their web page:
Kim Auletta
Lab Safety Specialist
Environmental Health and Safety
SUNY Stony Brook
110 Suffolk Hall
Stony Brook, NY 11794-6200
phone: 631-632-9672
fax: 631-632-9683
email: kauletta@.sunysb.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 17 Sep 2002 10:00:48 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Morris, Gary"
Subject: BSC Noise and Light Levels and Certifications
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
If a BSC certification report indicates that the noise level and light
intensity are too high and too low (respectively), does the BSC not meet the
NSF certification standard, or would these parameters be considered not
critical to the operation of the BSC? What does NSF say about these two
parameters?
Your thoughts and opinions are appreciated.
Gary Morris
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 17 Sep 2002 10:35:34 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Hauck, Philip"
Subject: Re: BSC Noise and Light Levels and Certifications
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
Content-transfer-encoding: quoted-printable
You are not going to affect the efficacy of the BSC with respect to =
biosafety, but you are exposing anyone working at that BSC to a two fold =
problem. If the measured dB A is greater than 80 dB, then you are going =
to have an impact on the individual's hearing with eventual permanent =
hearing loss over time. Some of the older models had high noise levels.
The reduced light intensity of the white light bulb, can result in eye =
strain and fatigue, which cuts down on the individual's ability to make =
accurate measurements and work effectively. This happens over time with =
all light bulbs toward the end of their service life, but again, some of =
the older models positioned the lights in strange places, and produced a =
glare problem as well as bad illumination of the work zone.
Both conditions working in concert will set up a general inattentiveness =
to the task at hand as the individual concentrates on his / her =
perceived noise fatigue and eye-strain. If it sounds like I have been =
there, I have, with older equipment in my past life as a researcher.
I didn't address the uv light, since we never relied on it as a =
sterilization device, just as an adjunct to wiping down the cabinet and =
letting the cabinet stand "idle" overnight
Phil Hauck, CIH, CBSP
Mt Sinai School of Medicine
-----Original Message-----
From: Morris, Gary [mailto:gmorris@]
Sent: Tuesday, September 17, 2002 10:01 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: BSC Noise and Light Levels and Certifications
If a BSC certification report indicates that the noise level and light
intensity are too high and too low (respectively), does the BSC not meet =
the
NSF certification standard, or would these parameters be considered not
critical to the operation of the BSC? What does NSF say about these two
parameters?
Your thoughts and opinions are appreciated.
Gary Morris
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 17 Sep 2002 10:05:29 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Mike Durham
Subject: Patriot Act
MIME-Version: 1.0
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boundary="----=_NextPart_000_011B_01C25E31.C0965000"
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charset="iso-8859-1"
I have been asked to make a presentation on the Patriot Act, and by =
extension the Bioterrorism law. Has anyone prepared a similar program in =
powerpoint or other presentation softwear that would be willing to share =
it with me?
Mike Durham
LSU
mdurham@lsu.edu
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========================================================================= Date: Tue, 17 Sep 2002 13:53:42 -0400 Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List From: Francis Churchill Subject: Re: Medical Waste Vendor Recommendations In-Reply-To: Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed" We ran into the same issue a few years back. Our local medical waste incinerator closed and sold the customer list to BFI which was almost immediately purchased by Stericycle. Stericycle spent the next couple of years reorganizing their offices in new England and our service was terrible. They were the only game in town, so we kept calling. Finally, we found the right people to talk to, and now things work great. My advise is to first get to know the drivers who pick up the waste; get their most direct contact info and have them contact you. The driver was the key to our issues, he likes to have somebody to contact and as long as he picks the waste up and delivers it, then we are pretty happy. Next, get to know your drivers' boss. your driver may tell you things that can make his or her job easier, but you may need to talk to his or her boss to set up the procedure. After that, the tracking and paperwork processes came along pretty easily. Especially when we said we would pay no bills until all the paperwork was in order. Now I can even recommend Stericycle as a vendor. Francis -- Francis Churchill University of Vermont - Environmental Safety Facility 667 Spear Street, UVM, Burlington, VT 05405-3010 (802) 656-5405 Francis.Churchill@uvm.edu "Show me pollution and I'll show you a subsidy." Robert F Kennedy Jr ========================================================================= Date: Tue, 17 Sep 2002 14:15:44 -0400 Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List From: "Robert N. Latsch" Subject: Re: Medical Waste Vendor Recommendations In-Reply-To: Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" We have our own industrial sized autoclave. It is called a Sanipak. I do not know who makes it or how to contact them. A majority of your biomedical waste can be sterilised and then disposed of as regular trash IF a landfill will take it, a hauler will haul it and the regulators are not upset about it. It will reduce your headache by making your dealings with the problem vendor less critical by reducing the size of the problem. I present this as an alternative because of the other headaches it can cause in terms of setting up and maintaining operations. It is up to you to evaluate if this will help in your situation. Bob _____________________________________________________________________ __ / _____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________ _ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU \ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety \__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@ ========================================================================= Date: Tue, 17 Sep 2002 08:42:56 -1000 Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List From: Thomas Goob Subject: Re: BSC Noise and Light Levels and Certifications In-Reply-To: Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" According to NSF/ANSI 49-2002, Annex F - Field Testing Annex: F.1.1 The following physical tests shall be conducted on-site for a certification to be considered for the statement "Field Certified in accordance with NSF/ANSI 49": -downflow velocity profile test; -inflow velocity test; -airflow smoke patterns test; -HEPA filter leak test; -cabinet integrity test (A1 cabinets only); and -site installation assessment tests. F.1.2 The following tests are for worker comfort and safety and are performed at the request of the customer or at the discretion of the certification provider: -lighting intensity; -vibration; -noise level; -electrical leakage, ground circuit resistance, and polarity tests. The 2002 standard does not mention UV measurements because the 2002 standard does not recommend the use of UV lights. I hope this is what you were looking for... Tom At 10:00 AM 9/17/02 -0400, Morris, Gary wrote: >If a BSC certification report indicates that the noise level and light >intensity are too high and too low (respectively), does the BSC not meet the >NSF certification standard, or would these parameters be considered not >critical to the operation of the BSC? What does NSF say about these two >parameters? > >Your thoughts and opinions are appreciated. > >Gary Morris > **************************************** Thomas C. Goob, MPH, MBA, CSP Manager Safety, Health & Environmental Affairs DIAGNOSTIC LABORATORY SERVICES, INC. 650 Iwilei Road, Suite 300 Honolulu, Hawaii 96817 (808) 589-5100 Fax: (808) 593-8357 email: tgoob@dls. **************************************** ========================================================================= Date: Tue, 17 Sep 2002 13:45:13 -0500 Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List From: Morgan Margaret-AMM076 Subject: foreign nationals and select agents. MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="----_=_NextPart_001_01C25E7A.5B49A7D0" This message is in MIME format. Since your mail reader does not understand this format, some or all of this message may not be legible. ------_=_NextPart_001_01C25E7A.5B49A7D0 Content-Type: text/plain Can anyone clarify this for me - do I have to complete some kind of registration or permit for any foreign national in my facility who will be working with select agents, or only those from restricted countries. I have one Canadian, one Australian and one Indian who will be working with select agents. I was at the control of biohazards course in Baltimore last week and it was mentioned that an export permit was required for any foregn national working with select agents. How do I go about getting them? Margaret (Peggy) Morgan, Ph.D, Senior Scientist and BioSafety Officer, Motorola Life Sciences, Pasadena CA 91105. ph. 626 584 5900 ext 432 cell 626 484 2589. ------_=_NextPart_001_01C25E7A.5B49A7D0 Content-Type: text/html
Can anyone clarify this for me - do I have to complete some kind of registration or permit for any foreign national in my facility who will be working with select agents, or only those from restricted countries. I have one Canadian, one Australian and one Indian who will be working with select agents. I was at the control of biohazards course in Baltimore last week and it was mentioned that an export permit was required for any foregn national working with select agents. How do I go about getting them?
Margaret (Peggy) Morgan, Ph.D,
Senior Scientist and BioSafety Officer,
Motorola Life Sciences,
Pasadena CA 91105.
ph. 626 584 5900 ext 432
cell 626 484 2589.
------_=_NextPart_001_01C25E7A.5B49A7D0--
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 17 Sep 2002 14:42:18 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ed Gaunt
Subject: Re: foreign nationals and select agents.
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="----_=_NextPart_001_01C25E79.F362AFE0"
This message is in MIME format. Since your mail reader does not understand
this format, some or all of this message may not be legible.
------_=_NextPart_001_01C25E79.F362AFE0
Content-Type: text/plain;
charset="iso-8859-1"
This is currently being worked out between DHHS, USDA and DOJ as part of the
rule-making process for section 202(a) of PL 107-188. The proposed rules
will be published on or about December 9, 2002 with a 90-day comment period.
The rules should go into effect on or about March 9, 2003. At that point,
we will provide all "possessors" from the notification with instructions on
how to proceed with registration of your facilities, to include submitting
clearance forms for personnel who will be working with select agents.
Ed Gaunt
-----Original Message-----
From: Morgan Margaret-AMM076 [mailto:Peggy@]
Sent: Tuesday, September 17, 2002 2:45 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: foreign nationals and select agents.
Can anyone clarify this for me - do I have to complete some kind of
registration or permit for any foreign national in my facility who will be
working with select agents, or only those from restricted countries. I have
one Canadian, one Australian and one Indian who will be working with select
agents. I was at the control of biohazards course in Baltimore last week
and it was mentioned that an export permit was required for any foregn
national working with select agents. How do I go about getting them?
Margaret (Peggy) Morgan, Ph.D,
Senior Scientist and BioSafety Officer,
Motorola Life Sciences,
Pasadena CA 91105.
ph. 626 584 5900 ext 432
cell 626 484 2589.
------_=_NextPart_001_01C25E79.F362AFE0
Content-Type: text/html;
charset="iso-8859-1"
This is currently being worked out between DHHS, USDA and DOJ as part of the rule-making process for section 202(a) of PL 107-188. The proposed rules will be published on or about December 9, 2002 with a 90-day comment period. The rules should go into effect on or about March 9, 2003. At that point, we will provide all "possessors" from the notification with instructions on how to proceed with registration of your facilities, to include submitting clearance forms for personnel who will be working with select agents.
Ed Gaunt
-----Original Message-----
From: Morgan Margaret-AMM076 [mailto:Peggy@]
Sent: Tuesday, September 17, 2002 2:45 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: foreign nationals and select agents.
Can anyone clarify this for me - do I have to complete some kind of registration or permit for any foreign national in my facility who will be working with select agents, or only those from restricted countries. I have one Canadian, one Australian and one Indian who will be working with select agents. I was at the control of biohazards course in Baltimore last week and it was mentioned that an export permit was required for any foregn national working with select agents. How do I go about getting them?
Margaret (Peggy) Morgan, Ph.D,
Senior Scientist and BioSafety Officer,
Motorola Life Sciences,
Pasadena CA 91105.
ph. 626 584 5900 ext 432
cell 626 484 2589.
------_=_NextPart_001_01C25E79.F362AFE0--
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 17 Sep 2002 15:27:52 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Hauck, Philip"
Subject: Re: foreign nationals and select agents.
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="Boundary_(ID_mM1QQPc/S+ZDfuxtS8kp9A)"
This is a multi-part message in MIME format.
--Boundary_(ID_mM1QQPc/S+ZDfuxtS8kp9A)
Content-type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-transfer-encoding: quoted-printable
One thing everyone should be doing, is making sure that your =
Human Resources / Graduate Sciences people are checking to make sure =
that all visiting foreign nationals have valid visas / entry permits / =
other necessary documentation. INS has been leaning on some Universities =
in the NYC area recently, with the NIH getting involved as far as =
considering pulling grants for non-compliance. Remember, all those PIs =
agreed to abide by all Federal and State laws when they took their =
funding from the NIH....and INS laws come under all applicable Federal =
Laws!
Phil Hauck
-----Original Message-----
From: Ed Gaunt [mailto:egaunt@]
Sent: Tuesday, September 17, 2002 2:42 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: foreign nationals and select agents.
This is currently being worked out between DHHS, USDA and DOJ as part of =
the rule-making process for section 202(a) of PL 107-188. The proposed =
rules will be published on or about December 9, 2002 with a 90-day =
comment period. The rules should go into effect on or about March 9, =
2003. At that point, we will provide all "possessors" from the =
notification with instructions on how to proceed with registration of =
your facilities, to include submitting clearance forms for personnel who =
will be working with select agents.
Ed Gaunt
-----Original Message-----
From: Morgan Margaret-AMM076 [mailto:Peggy@]
Sent: Tuesday, September 17, 2002 2:45 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: foreign nationals and select agents.
Can anyone clarify this for me - do I have to complete some kind of =
registration or permit for any foreign national in my facility who will =
be working with select agents, or only those from restricted countries. =
I have one Canadian, one Australian and one Indian who will be working =
with select agents. I was at the control of biohazards course in =
Baltimore last week and it was mentioned that an export permit was =
required for any foregn national working with select agents. How do I go =
about getting them?
Margaret (Peggy) Morgan, Ph.D,
Senior Scientist and BioSafety Officer,
Motorola Life Sciences,
Pasadena CA 91105.
ph. 626 584 5900 ext 432
cell 626 484 2589.
-----Original Message--= ---
From: Ed Gaunt [mailto:egaunt@]
Sent: Tuesday, Septemb= er 17, 2002 2:42 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MI= T.EDU
Subject: Re: foreign n= ationals and select agents.
This is curre= ntly being worked out between DHHS, USDA and DOJ as part of the rule-making proc= ess for section 202(a) of PL 107-188. The proposed rules will be published on= or about December 9, 2002 with a 90-day comment period. The rules should= go into effect on or about March 9, 2003. At that point, we will provide all "possessors" from the notification with instructions on how= to proceed with registration of your facilities, to include submitting c= learance forms for personnel who will be working with select agents.
Ed Gaunt
-----Original Message-----
From: Morgan Margaret-= AMM076 [mailto:Peggy@]
Sent: Tuesday, Septemb= er 17, 2002 2:45 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MI= T.EDU
Subject: foreign natio= nals and select agents.
Can anyone cl= arify this for me - do I have to complete some kind of registration or permit fo= r any foreign national in my facility who will be working with select agent= s, or only those from restricted countries. I have one Canadian, one Austr= alian and one Indian who will be working with select agents. I was at the con= trol of biohazards course in Baltimore last week and it was mentioned th= at an export permit was required for any foregn national working with selec= t agents. How do I go about getting them?
Margaret (Peg= gy) Morgan, Ph.D,
Senior Scientist and BioSafety Officer,
Motorola Life Sciences,
Pasadena CA 91105.
ph. 626 584 5900 ext 432
cell 626 484 2589.
--Boundary_(ID_mM1QQPc/S+ZDfuxtS8kp9A)--
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 17 Sep 2002 15:34:59 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Hauck, Philip"
Subject: Re: Medical Waste Vendor Recommendations
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
Content-transfer-encoding: quoted-printable
It would also be worthwhile to contact your State Environmental =
Protection / Solid Waste Management / Department of Health offices, and =
obtain information on approved waste haulers / TSD facilities. If the =
Office(s) will not recommend a hauler(s) to you then compile a list, and =
ask them if they have any impending legal / regulatory actions against =
them - this they do have to answer...even the Department of Justice had =
to reveal that they had a "pending criminal investigation" against a TSD =
we were about to use, and when I asked them if they would recommend =
using this TSD off the record, they said an emphatic "cannot recommend =
at this time".
-----Original Message-----
From: Robert N. Latsch [mailto:rnl2@PO.CWRU.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, September 17, 2002 2:16 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Medical Waste Vendor Recommendations
We have our own industrial sized autoclave. It is called a Sanipak. I =
do
not know who makes it or how to contact them. A majority of your
biomedical waste can be sterilised and then disposed of as regular trash =
IF
a landfill will take it, a hauler will haul it and the regulators are =
not
upset about it. It will reduce your headache by making your dealings =
with
the problem vendor less critical by reducing the size of the problem.
I present this as an alternative because of the other headaches it can
cause in terms of setting up and maintaining operations. It is up to =
you
to evaluate if this will help in your situation.
Bob
_____________________________________________________________________
__ / =
_____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental =
Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail =
rlatsch@
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 17 Sep 2002 17:19:12 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Donald G. Robasser"
Organization: Princeton University
Subject: Re: Notification Reminder Post Cards
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="------------03BC8784C8A75899D52ACFFA"
--------------03BC8784C8A75899D52ACFFA
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Ed,
I was unable to open the reminder post card document. Could this be
sent again?
Thanks for your help.
Ed Gaunt wrote:
> Me again...At 4:30 this afternoon, we mailed out reminder post cards
> to everyone receiving the intial notification mailing who had not
> returned a completed Notification Form as of close-of-business Friday
> afternoon, September 13, 2002 (only about a 40% response rate thus
> far). The post cards look like the attached file, except that they
> are PINK. Recipients should complete and return the orginal
> Notification Form as soon as possible, or if they do not possess any
> agents on the list, they can sign and return JUST THE POST CARD
> (please do not send back both...it just complicates my day). Folks
> who DID NOT receive a post cards was anyone requesting that a form be
> resent, or who requested a new form (i.e., anyone who did not receive
> the intial mailing--if your form ID was 200000 or less).Ed
--------------03BC8784C8A75899D52ACFFA
Content-Type: text/html; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Ed,
I was unable to open the reminder post card document. Could this be sent again?
Thanks for your help.
Ed Gaunt wrote:
Me again...At 4:30 this afternoon, we mailed out reminder post cards to everyone receiving the intial notification mailing who had not returned a completed Notification Form as of close-of-business Friday afternoon, September 13, 2002 (only about a 40% response rate thus far). The post cards look like the attached file, except that they are PINK. Recipients should complete and return the orginal Notification Form as soon as possible, or if they do not possess any agents on the list, they can sign and return JUST THE POST CARD (please do not send back both...it just complicates my day). Folks who DID NOT receive a post cards was anyone requesting that a form be resent, or who requested a new form (i.e., anyone who did not receive the intial mailing--if your form ID was 200000 or less).Ed
--------------03BC8784C8A75899D52ACFFA--
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 17 Sep 2002 23:41:17 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ed Gaunt
Subject: Re: Notification Reminder Post Cards
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="----_=_NextPart_000_01C25EC5.3EFA6240"
This message is in MIME format. Since your mail reader does not understand
this format, some or all of this message may not be legible.
------_=_NextPart_000_01C25EC5.3EFA6240
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="----_=_NextPart_001_01C25EC5.3EFA6240"
------_=_NextPart_001_01C25EC5.3EFA6240
Content-Type: text/plain;
charset="iso-8859-1"
All,
Here is a Word version. Don't know why the PDF is a problem. Will try to
get it posted on the CDC LRSAT Web page tomorrow
EEG
-----Original Message-----
From: Donald G. Robasser [mailto:robasser@PRINCETON.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, September 17, 2002 5:19 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Notification Reminder Post Cards
Ed,
I was unable to open the reminder post card document. Could this be sent
again?
Thanks for your help.
Ed Gaunt wrote:
Me again...At 4:30 this afternoon, we mailed out reminder post cards to
everyone receiving the intial notification mailing who had not returned a
completed Notification Form as of close-of-business Friday afternoon,
September 13, 2002 (only about a 40% response rate thus far). The post
cards look like the attached file, except that they are PINK. Recipients
should complete and return the orginal Notification Form as soon as
possible, or if they do not possess any agents on the list, they can sign
and return JUST THE POST CARD (please do not send back both...it just
complicates my day). Folks who DID NOT receive a post cards was anyone
requesting that a form be resent, or who requested a new form (i.e., anyone
who did not receive the intial mailing--if your form ID was 200000 or
less).Ed
------_=_NextPart_001_01C25EC5.3EFA6240
Content-Type: text/html;
charset="iso-8859-1"
All,
Here is a Word version. Don't know why the PDF is a problem. Will try to get it posted on the CDC LRSAT Web page tomorrow
EEG
-----Original Message-----
From: Donald G. Robasser [mailto:robasser@PRINCETON.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, September 17, 2002 5:19 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Notification Reminder Post Cards
Ed,
I was unable to open the reminder post card document. Could this be sent again?
Thanks for your help.
Ed Gaunt wrote:
Me again...At 4:30 this afternoon, we mailed out reminder post cards to everyone receiving the intial notification mailing who had not returned a completed Notification Form as of close-of-business Friday afternoon, September 13, 2002 (only about a 40% response rate thus far). The post cards look like the attached file, except that they are PINK. Recipients should complete and return the orginal Notification Form as soon as possible, or if they do not possess any agents on the list, they can sign and return JUST THE POST CARD (please do not send back both...it just complicates my day). Folks who DID NOT receive a post cards was anyone requesting that a form be resent, or who requested a new form (i.e., anyone who did not receive the intial mailing--if your form ID was 200000 or less).Ed
------_=_NextPart_001_01C25EC5.3EFA6240--
------_=_NextPart_000_01C25EC5.3EFA6240
Content-Type: application/msword;
name="2002.09.03 Postcard-FINAL.doc"
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 18 Sep 2002 08:27:42 -0500
Reply-To: speaker@ehs.psu.edu
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Curt Speaker
Organization: UNIVERSITY SAFETY
Subject: P.L. 107-188 vs. Patriot Act
Morning:
Can anyone explain to me what exactly is going on between the
Select Agent Possession Law and the Patriot Act??? The Select
Agent regs are law (we have all been living them the last couple
weeks), but I am unsure what to do about Patriot Act issues?
Are we supposed to be doing background checks of persons with
access to SAs? Or is HHS going to do that? Is the Patriot Act law
yet?
I tried emailing the CDC a couple of times, but was given the name
of a lawyer with CDCs General Counsel, who I don' t particularly
want to talk to.
If anyone can clarify this issue, it would be most appreciated.
thanks
Curt
Curt Speaker
Biosafety Officer
Penn State University
Environmental Health and Safety
speaker@ehs.psu.edu
^...^
(O_O)
=(Y)=
"""
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 18 Sep 2002 08:48:49 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Morris, Gary"
Subject: Re: BSC Noise and Light Levels and Certifications
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Bingo.
Thanks Tom.
-----Original Message-----
From: Thomas Goob [mailto:tgoob@DLS.]
Sent: Tuesday, September 17, 2002 2:43 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: BSC Noise and Light Levels and Certifications
According to NSF/ANSI 49-2002, Annex F - Field Testing Annex:
F.1.1
The following physical tests shall be conducted on-site for a certification
to be considered for the statement "Field Certified in accordance with
NSF/ANSI 49":
-downflow velocity profile test;
-inflow velocity test;
-airflow smoke patterns test;
-HEPA filter leak test;
-cabinet integrity test (A1 cabinets only); and
-site installation assessment tests.
F.1.2
The following tests are for worker comfort and safety and are performed at
the request of the customer or at the discretion of the certification
provider:
-lighting intensity;
-vibration;
-noise level;
-electrical leakage, ground circuit resistance, and polarity tests.
The 2002 standard does not mention UV measurements because the 2002
standard does not recommend the use of UV lights.
I hope this is what you were looking for...
Tom
At 10:00 AM 9/17/02 -0400, Morris, Gary wrote:
>If a BSC certification report indicates that the noise level and light
>intensity are too high and too low (respectively), does the BSC not meet
the
>NSF certification standard, or would these parameters be considered not
>critical to the operation of the BSC? What does NSF say about these two
>parameters?
>
>Your thoughts and opinions are appreciated.
>
>Gary Morris
>
****************************************
Thomas C. Goob, MPH, MBA, CSP
Manager
Safety, Health & Environmental Affairs
DIAGNOSTIC LABORATORY SERVICES, INC.
650 Iwilei Road, Suite 300
Honolulu, Hawaii 96817
(808) 589-5100 Fax: (808) 593-8357
email: tgoob@dls.
****************************************
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 18 Sep 2002 09:31:54 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Delia Vieira-Cruz
Subject: Re: Notification Reminder Post Cards
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="=====================_65031300==_.ALT"
--=====================_65031300==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
Hi Ed,
One investigator received 4 forms, he threw out 3, therefore I don't know
what his ID number is until I receive the postcard. I assumed I would be
able to write my summary form ID number on the postcard and send it back
and link up any missing forms. Looking at the postcard, I don't think I
can do that therefore, when I receive the postcard I will take the ID
number call the help line and ask for a form. This way I can link up the
form to the summary form. Is this correct or is there an easier way.
At 11:41 PM 9/17/02 -0400, you wrote:
>All,
>
>Here is a Word version. Don't know why the PDF is a problem. Will try to
>get it posted on the CDC LRSAT Web page tomorrow
>
>EEG
>-----Original Message-----
>From: Donald G. Robasser [mailto:robasser@PRINCETON.EDU]
>Sent: Tuesday, September 17, 2002 5:19 PM
>To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
>Subject: Re: Notification Reminder Post Cards
>
>Ed,
>I was unable to open the reminder post card document. Could this be sent
>again?
>Thanks for your help.
>
>
>Ed Gaunt wrote:
>> Me again...At 4:30 this afternoon, we mailed out reminder post cards to
>> everyone receiving the intial notification mailing who had not returned
>> a completed Notification Form as of close-of-business Friday afternoon,
>> September 13, 2002 (only about a 40% response rate thus far). The post
>> cards look like the attached file, except that they are
>> PINK. Recipients should complete and return the orginal Notification
>> Form as soon as possible, or if they do not possess any agents on the
>> list, they can sign and return JUST THE POST CARD (please do not send
>> back both...it just complicates my day). Folks who DID NOT receive a
>> post cards was anyone requesting that a form be resent, or who requested
>> a new form (i.e., anyone who did not receive the intial mailing--if your
>> form ID was 200000 or less).Ed
Delia M. Vieira-Cruz
Lab Safety Officer
Albert Einstein College of Medicine
1300 Morris Park Avenue, Forch 800
Bronx, NY 10461
(718)430-3560
vieira@aecom.yu.edu
--=====================_65031300==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/html; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Hi Ed,
One investigator received 4 forms, he threw out 3, therefore I don't know what his ID number is until I receive the postcard. I assumed I would be able to write my summary form ID number on the postcard and send it back and link up any missing forms. Looking at the postcard, I don't think I can do that therefore, when I receive the postcard I will take the ID number call the help line and ask for a form. This way I can link up the form to the summary form. Is this correct or is there an easier way.
At 11:41 PM 9/17/02 -0400, you wrote:
All,
Here is a Word version. Don't know why the PDF is a problem. Will try to get it posted on the CDC LRSAT Web page tomorrow
EEG
-----Original Message-----
From: Donald G. Robasser [mailto:robasser@PRINCETON.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, September 17, 2002 5:19 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Notification Reminder Post Cards
Ed,
I was unable to open the reminder post card document. Could this be sent again?
Thanks for your help.
Ed Gaunt wrote:
Me again...= At 4:30 this afternoon, we mailed out reminder post cards to everyone receiving the intial notification mailing who had not returned a completed Notification Form as of close-of-business Friday afternoon, September 13, 2002 (only about a 40% response rate thus far). The post cards look like the attached file, except that they are PINK. Recipients sho= uld complete and return the orginal Notification Form as soon as possible, or if they do not possess any agents on the list, they can sign and return JUST THE POST CARD (please do not send back both...it just complicates my day). Folks who DID NOT receive a post cards was anyone requesting that a form be resent, or who requested a new form (i.e., anyone who did not receive the intial mailing--if your form ID was 200000 or less).Ed
Delia M. Vieira-Cruz
Lab Safety Officer
Albert Einstein College of Medicine
1300 Morris Park Avenue, Forch 800
Bronx, NY 10461
(718)430-3560
vieira@aecom.yu.edu
--=====================_65031300==_.ALT--
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 18 Sep 2002 08:29:28 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Greg Fey
Subject: Re: BSC Noise and Light Levels and Certifications
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
The New NSF/ANSI 49-2002 pertains to BSC manufactured and listed by NSF
after March 19, 2002. All BSC's manufactured before March 19, 2002 should
be tested to the old standard.
The old standard NSF-49 states:
The following physical tests should be performed on-site:
A. Tests directly related to containment, (i.e. personnel and
environmental protection) and product protection.
1. Downflow velocity profile
2. Inflow velocity profile
3. Airflow smoke patterns
4. HEPA filter leak test
5. Cabinet leak test (when cabinet is newly installed, relocated,
or after maintenance procedures that require the removal of panels)
B. Tests related to worker comfort and safety
1. Electrical leakage, ground circuit resistance and polarity
tests
2. Lighting intensity test
3. Vibration test
4. Noise level test
"Morris, Gary" on 09/18/2002 07:48:49 AM
Please respond to A Biosafety Discussion List
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
cc: (bcc: Greg Fey/HC-SC/GC/CA)
Subject: Re: BSC Noise and Light Levels and Certifications
Bingo.
Thanks Tom.
-----Original Message-----
From: Thomas Goob [mailto:tgoob@DLS.]
Sent: Tuesday, September 17, 2002 2:43 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: BSC Noise and Light Levels and Certifications
According to NSF/ANSI 49-2002, Annex F - Field Testing Annex:
F.1.1
The following physical tests shall be conducted on-site for a certification
to be considered for the statement "Field Certified in accordance with
NSF/ANSI 49":
-downflow velocity profile test;
-inflow velocity test;
-airflow smoke patterns test;
-HEPA filter leak test;
-cabinet integrity test (A1 cabinets only); and
-site installation assessment tests.
F.1.2
The following tests are for worker comfort and safety and are performed at
the request of the customer or at the discretion of the certification
provider:
-lighting intensity;
-vibration;
-noise level;
-electrical leakage, ground circuit resistance, and polarity tests.
The 2002 standard does not mention UV measurements because the 2002
standard does not recommend the use of UV lights.
I hope this is what you were looking for...
Tom
At 10:00 AM 9/17/02 -0400, Morris, Gary wrote:
>If a BSC certification report indicates that the noise level and light
>intensity are too high and too low (respectively), does the BSC not meet
the
>NSF certification standard, or would these parameters be considered not
>critical to the operation of the BSC? What does NSF say about these two
>parameters?
>
>Your thoughts and opinions are appreciated.
>
>Gary Morris
>
****************************************
Thomas C. Goob, MPH, MBA, CSP
Manager
Safety, Health & Environmental Affairs
DIAGNOSTIC LABORATORY SERVICES, INC.
650 Iwilei Road, Suite 300
Honolulu, Hawaii 96817
(808) 589-5100 Fax: (808) 593-8357
email: tgoob@dls.
****************************************
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 18 Sep 2002 10:25:48 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Morris, Gary"
Subject: Re: BSC Noise and Light Levels and Certifications
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Thanks Greg. Didn't have the NSF standard in hand.
Gary Morris
-----Original Message-----
From: Greg Fey [mailto:Greg_Fey@HC-SC.GC.CA]
Sent: Wednesday, September 18, 2002 9:29 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: BSC Noise and Light Levels and Certifications
The New NSF/ANSI 49-2002 pertains to BSC manufactured and listed by NSF
after March 19, 2002. All BSC's manufactured before March 19, 2002 should
be tested to the old standard.
The old standard NSF-49 states:
The following physical tests should be performed on-site:
A. Tests directly related to containment, (i.e. personnel and
environmental protection) and product protection.
1. Downflow velocity profile
2. Inflow velocity profile
3. Airflow smoke patterns
4. HEPA filter leak test
5. Cabinet leak test (when cabinet is newly installed, relocated,
or after maintenance procedures that require the removal of panels)
B. Tests related to worker comfort and safety
1. Electrical leakage, ground circuit resistance and polarity
tests
2. Lighting intensity test
3. Vibration test
4. Noise level test
"Morris, Gary" on 09/18/2002 07:48:49 AM
Please respond to A Biosafety Discussion List
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
cc: (bcc: Greg Fey/HC-SC/GC/CA)
Subject: Re: BSC Noise and Light Levels and Certifications
Bingo.
Thanks Tom.
-----Original Message-----
From: Thomas Goob [mailto:tgoob@DLS.]
Sent: Tuesday, September 17, 2002 2:43 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: BSC Noise and Light Levels and Certifications
According to NSF/ANSI 49-2002, Annex F - Field Testing Annex:
F.1.1
The following physical tests shall be conducted on-site for a certification
to be considered for the statement "Field Certified in accordance with
NSF/ANSI 49":
-downflow velocity profile test;
-inflow velocity test;
-airflow smoke patterns test;
-HEPA filter leak test;
-cabinet integrity test (A1 cabinets only); and
-site installation assessment tests.
F.1.2
The following tests are for worker comfort and safety and are performed at
the request of the customer or at the discretion of the certification
provider:
-lighting intensity;
-vibration;
-noise level;
-electrical leakage, ground circuit resistance, and polarity tests.
The 2002 standard does not mention UV measurements because the 2002
standard does not recommend the use of UV lights.
I hope this is what you were looking for...
Tom
At 10:00 AM 9/17/02 -0400, Morris, Gary wrote:
>If a BSC certification report indicates that the noise level and light
>intensity are too high and too low (respectively), does the BSC not meet
the
>NSF certification standard, or would these parameters be considered not
>critical to the operation of the BSC? What does NSF say about these two
>parameters?
>
>Your thoughts and opinions are appreciated.
>
>Gary Morris
>
****************************************
Thomas C. Goob, MPH, MBA, CSP
Manager
Safety, Health & Environmental Affairs
DIAGNOSTIC LABORATORY SERVICES, INC.
650 Iwilei Road, Suite 300
Honolulu, Hawaii 96817
(808) 589-5100 Fax: (808) 593-8357
email: tgoob@dls.
****************************************
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 18 Sep 2002 11:01:36 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Richard Fink
Subject: Re: Patriot Act
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="=====================_95216063==_.ALT"
--=====================_95216063==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
At 10:05 AM 9/17/2002 -0500, you wrote:
I have been asked to make a presentation on the Patriot Act, and by
extension the Bioterrorism law. Has anyone prepared a similar program in
powerpoint or other presentation softwear that would be willing to share it
with me?
Mike Durham
LSU
mdurham@lsu.edu
I would imagine the program going like this: slides 1 - 20 listing all of
the agents. Slide 21 a stern warning that if you even think of using any
of those agents, the institutes BSO will personally visit and kill
you. Slide 22 justification: trail, jail much easier then registering
(just kidding Ed).
This spoof has been brought to you by:
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
--=====================_95216063==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
At 10:05 AM 9/17/2002 -0500, you wrote:
I have been asked to make a presentation on the Patriot Act, and by extension the Bioterrorism law. Has anyone prepared a similar program in powerpoint or other presentation softwear that would be willing to share it with me?
Mike Durham
LSU
mdurham@lsu.edu
I would imagine the program going like this: slides 1 - 20 listing all of the agents. Slide 21 a stern warning that if you even think of using any of those agents, the institutes BSO will personally visit and kill you. Slide 22 justification: trail, jail much easier then registering (just kidding Ed).
This spoof has been brought to you by:
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
--=====================_95216063==_.ALT--
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 18 Sep 2002 11:56:10 -0700
Reply-To: baylon@wsu.edu
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Chris Baylon
Subject: SA toxin deactivation
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
My understanding is that if a select agent toxic is disposed of, it is
recommended that it be treated in house to deactivate it. Does anyone know
of a source of accepted procedures for deactivating these toxins?
Chris Baylon
Industrial Hygienist
Environmental Health and Safety
Washington State University
PO Box 641172
Pullman, WA 99164-1172
509-335-9130
baylon@wsu.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 18 Sep 2002 16:14:04 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Gerry Griffin
Subject: Y.pestis - avirulent strain
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="----=_NextPart_000_0090_01C25F2E.6838EA50"
This is a multi-part message in MIME format.
------=_NextPart_000_0090_01C25F2E.6838EA50
Content-Type: text/plain;
charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Hypothetical situation (ahem): During this notification process we find
that one of our researchers has Y. pestis in his lab. We report it, of
course. Although the registration process (the old regs.) is for
transfer and receiving not possession of agents, we find that this agent
was brought to the facility after the effective date of the law (4/97).
Do we go through the registration process now for something we already
possess. The complicating factor is that this strain of Y. pestis is
avirulent - it is missing the virulence plasmid which is required to
cause infection and according to the researcher it is considered safe to
work with it at BSL2. The organism is listed as BSL3 though and the
researcher does not have a BSL3 facility to work in. Anyone have any
experience with this situation or advice on registering? Thanks in
advance,
Gerry Griffin
Environmental Services
NYU Medical Center
------=_NextPart_000_0090_01C25F2E.6838EA50
Content-Type: text/html;
charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
xmlns:w=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:word" = xmlns:st1=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags" = xmlns=3D"">
Hypothetical situation (ahem): During this notification process we find that one of our = researchers has Y. pestis in his lab. We report it, of course. = Although the registration process (the old regs.) is = for transfer and receiving not possession of agents, we find that this agent = was brought to the facility after the effective date of the law (4/97). Do we go through the = registration process now for something we already possess. The complicating factor is that = this strain of Y. pestis is avirulent it is missing the virulence plasmid which is required to cause infection and according to the researcher it is considered safe to work = with it at BSL2. The organism is = listed as BSL3 though and the researcher does not have a BSL3 facility to work in. Anyone have any experience with = this situation or advice on registering? Thanks in advance,
Gerry = Griffin
Environmental = Services
NYU Medical Center
------=_NextPart_000_0090_01C25F2E.6838EA50--
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 18 Sep 2002 16:27:37 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ed Gaunt
Subject: Re: Notification Reminder Post Cards
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="----_=_NextPart_001_01C25F51.D407B5E0"
This message is in MIME format. Since your mail reader does not understand
this format, some or all of this message may not be legible.
------_=_NextPart_001_01C25F51.D407B5E0
Content-Type: text/plain;
charset="iso-8859-1"
Aha! Why didn't we think of that? Recording the Summary Form ID on the post
card would be a good idea, but we did not make provision for it because the
postcard text was approved by OMB. Now I need to ponder whether we can deal
with these numbers hand-written in on the post card or not. Let me get back
to you on this...
The cleanest, but not necessarily the easiest solution, would be (as you
suggested) to contact the Help Line and request that we RESEND you a form
(as long as the resent form was properly completed as a child form with the
summary form ID recorded in Box 2).
Ed
-----Original Message-----
From: Delia Vieira-Cruz [mailto:vieira@AECOM.YU.EDU]
Sent: Wednesday, September 18, 2002 9:32 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Notification Reminder Post Cards
Hi Ed,
One investigator received 4 forms, he threw out 3, therefore I don't know
what his ID number is until I receive the postcard. I assumed I would be
able to write my summary form ID number on the postcard and send it back and
link up any missing forms. Looking at the postcard, I don't think I can do
that therefore, when I receive the postcard I will take the ID number call
the help line and ask for a form. This way I can link up the form to the
summary form. Is this correct or is there an easier way.
At 11:41 PM 9/17/02 -0400, you wrote:
All,
Here is a Word version. Don't know why the PDF is a problem. Will try to
get it posted on the CDC LRSAT Web page tomorrow
EEG
-----Original Message-----
From: Donald G. Robasser [ mailto:robasser@PRINCETON.EDU
]
Sent: Tuesday, September 17, 2002 5:19 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Notification Reminder Post Cards
Ed,
I was unable to open the reminder post card document. Could this be sent
again?
Thanks for your help.
Ed Gaunt wrote:
Me again...At 4:30 this afternoon, we mailed out reminder post cards to
everyone receiving the intial notification mailing who had not returned a
completed Notification Form as of close-of-business Friday afternoon,
September 13, 2002 (only about a 40% response rate thus far). The post
cards look like the attached file, except that they are PINK. Recipients
should complete and return the orginal Notification Form as soon as
possible, or if they do not possess any agents on the list, they can sign
and return JUST THE POST CARD (please do not send back both...it just
complicates my day). Folks who DID NOT receive a post cards was anyone
requesting that a form be resent, or who requested a new form (i.e., anyone
who did not receive the intial mailing--if your form ID was 200000 or
less).Ed
Delia M. Vieira-Cruz
Lab Safety Officer
Albert Einstein College of Medicine
1300 Morris Park Avenue, Forch 800
Bronx, NY 10461
(718)430-3560
vieira@aecom.yu.edu
------_=_NextPart_001_01C25F51.D407B5E0
Content-Type: text/html;
charset="iso-8859-1"
Aha! Why didn't we think of that? Recording the Summary Form ID on the post card would be a good idea, but we did not make provision for it because the postcard text was approved by OMB. Now I need to ponder whether we can deal with these numbers hand-written in on the post card or not. Let me get back to you on this...
The cleanest, but not necessarily the easiest solution, would be (as you suggested) to contact the Help Line and request that we RESEND you a form (as long as the resent form was properly completed as a child form with the summary form ID recorded in Box 2).
Ed
-----Original Message-----
From: Delia Vieira-Cruz [mailto:vieira@AECOM.YU.EDU]
Sent: Wednesday, September 18, 2002 9:32 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Notification Reminder Post Cards
Hi Ed,
One investigator received 4 forms, he threw out 3, therefore I don't know what his ID number is until I receive the postcard. I assumed I would be able to write my summary form ID number on the postcard and send it back and link up any missing forms. Looking at the postcard, I don't think I can do that therefore, when I receive the postcard I will take the ID number call the help line and ask for a form. This way I can link up the form to the summary form. Is this correct or is there an easier way.
At 11:41 PM 9/17/02 -0400, you wrote:
All,
Here is a Word version. Don't know why the PDF is a problem. Will try to get it posted on the CDC LRSAT Web page tomorrow
EEG
-----Original Message-----
From: Donald G. Robasser [mailto:robasser@PRINCETON.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, September 17, 2002 5:19 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Notification Reminder Post Cards
Ed,
I was unable to open the reminder post card document. Could this be sent again?
Thanks for your help.
Ed Gaunt wrote:
Me again...At 4:30 this afternoon, we mailed out reminder post cards to everyone receiving the intial notification mailing who had not returned a completed Notification Form as of close-of-business Friday afternoon, September 13, 2002 (only about a 40% response rate thus far). The post cards look like the attached file, except that they are PINK. Recipients should complete and return the orginal Notification Form as soon as possible, or if they do not possess any agents on the list, they can sign and return JUST THE POST CARD (please do not send back both...it just complicates my day). Folks who DID NOT receive a post cards was anyone requesting that a form be resent, or who requested a new form (i.e., anyone who did not receive the intial mailing--if your form ID was 200000 or less).Ed
Delia M. Vieira-Cruz
Lab Safety Officer
Albert Einstein College of Medicine
1300 Morris Park Avenue, Forch 800
Bronx, NY 10461
(718)430-3560
vieira@aecom.yu.edu
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=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 18 Sep 2002 15:31:36 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Judy Pointer
Subject: Re: ? Francisella tularensis (LVS) type B strain & Aflatoxin
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Hi Biosafetynetters and Ed (our hero):
I have another hypothetical situation (ahem). Principal investigator
informs RFO they are in possession of Aflatoxin after the summary form
is mailed in. How does RFO amend the summary form? Or is that
necessary to do at this time - i.e. will there be a chance to do so
later?
Type B LVS (live vaccine strain) (from Russia) of Francisella
tularensis is appropriate to work with at BL2. Is it also considered an
exempt vaccine strain for select agent purposes? PI tells me that it is
at the IND (Investigational New Drug) stage per FDA approval process.
In this case it is used in research experiments in vitro - not as a
vaccine for patients or employees. Does this qualify it as exempted -
"cleared, approved, licensed or registered" under the Federal Food Drug
and Cosmetic Act, or the Virus-Serum-Toxin Act?
Judy Pointer, MS, CBSP
University Biosafety Officer
Office of Research Protection
UNM School of Medicine
BMSB B77
915 Camino de Salud NE
Albuquerque, NM 87131-5196
(505) 272-8001
(505) 272-0803 (Fax)
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 18 Sep 2002 14:35:21 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Gergis, Nasr"
Subject: Re: VSV-Select Agent
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="----_=_NextPart_001_01C25F5B.4A451820"
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this format, some or all of this message may not be legible.
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charset=iso-8859-1
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Good afternoon to you all.
This is a Select Agent Regulation question. Does any one know if VSV-G
pseudo-typed lentiviral vectors fall under the VSG-G category for " USDA
High Consequence Livestock Pathogens and Toxins"? is consider as a select
agent. I called the CDC Office number on the application and someone
promised to return the call, which never occurred.
Nasr Gergis, Ph.D., DVM
Biosafety & Safety Officer-Interim Director
Occupational Safety and Health
City of Hope/BRI
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application and someone promised to return = the call, which never occurred.
Nasr Gergis, Ph.D., DVM =
Biosafety & Safety = Officer-Interim Director
Occupational Safety and Health
City of Hope/BRI
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=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 19 Sep 2002 07:24:27 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Kim Auletta
Subject: F. tularensis LVS comment
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Our PIs have (already registered) the F. tularensis. They wanted to
transfer some to another lab that didn't have a registration, so I asked.
Here was there answer.
If anyone knows (Ed) who maintains the CDC web site, they could make it
easier for themselves if they put there "letters of interpretation" on the
web, like OSHA does, and then they wouldn't have to answer the same
questions over & over!
Kim Auletta
Lab Safety Specialist
Environmental Health and Safety
SUNY Stony Brook
110 Suffolk Hall
Stony Brook, NY 11794-6200
phone: 631-632-9672
fax: 631-632-9683
email: kauletta@.sunysb.edu
----- Forwarded by Kim Auletta/Admin on 09/19/2002 07:21 AM -----
"Hopkins, Andrew
S." To: "'kauletta@.sunysb.edu'"
cc:
07/17/2002 04:39 Subject: RE: Request for exemption for transfer of F.
PM tularensis LVS
The LVS strain (fixed or otherwise) of F. tularensis is currently exempt
from the select Agent Rule. A CDC statement to this effect is appended
below.
Office of Health and Safety
Etiologic Agent Import Permit Program
Laboratory Registration and Select Agent Transfer Program
Re: Questions concerning 42 CFR Part 72.6 Additional requirements
for
facilities transferring or receiving select agents: attenuated
Live
Vaccine Strain (LVS) of Francisella tularensis
Our office currently considers the attenuated Live Vaccine Strain (LVS) of
Francisella tularensis to be exempt from the requirements of the Select
Agent Rule (42 CFR 72.6).
The following statement is from the preamble of 42 CFR 72.6: "Attenuated
strains of select agents approved for human vaccination purposes by FDA or
other recognized national or international organizations will be exempt.
All
other attenuated, avirulent, or less pathogenic strains will not be exempt
at this time."
In addition, the CDC/NIH publication, "Biosafety in Microbiological and
Biomedical Laboratories," has been incorporated by reference into the Rule.
This publication recommends, under certain conditions, vaccination with
the
Investigational New Drug live attenuated vaccine (LVS) of Francisella
tularensis.
In order to be consistent with the intent of the Rule, and to maintain
immediate availability of attenuated vaccine strains, our office has
interpreted that the intent of Subpart h(1)(iii) of the Rule was to exempt
all approved attenuated vaccine strains. However, the fact that these
attenuated vaccine strains are currently exempt from the requirements of 42
CFR 72.6 should in no way be interpreted that these agents should be
handled
under anything less than appropriate safety conditions.
If you have any further questions or concerns please contact me at one of
the numbers listed below.
Sincerely,
Andrew S. Hopkins, Ph.D.
Laboratory Registration and Select Agent Transfer Program
Office of Health and Safety
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
1600 Clifton Road MS A-13
Atlanta Georgia 30333
Phone: 404-639-1434; Fax 404-639-0880; e-mail: amh7@
od/ohs/lrsat.htm
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 19 Sep 2002 08:48:42 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Richard Fink
Subject: Re: VSV-Select Agent
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="=====================_1410618==_.ALT"
--=====================_1410618==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
>
>Good afternoon to you all.
>
>This is a Select Agent Regulation question. Does any one know if VSV-G
>pseudo-typed lentiviral vectors fall under the VSG-G category for " USDA
>High Consequence Livestock Pathogens and Toxins"? is consider as a select
>agent. I called the CDC Office number on the application and someone
>promised to return the call, which never occurred.
>
>Nasr Gergis, Ph.D., DVM
>Biosafety & Safety Officer-Interim Director
>Occupational Safety and Health
>City of Hope/BRI
Nasr, Ed Gaunt forward the info below regarding VSV-G:
The notification form for possession of certain biological agents and
toxins recently published in the Federal Register, requires the reporting
of genetic elements that encode for either "a functional toxin or a
virulence factor sufficient to cause disease." Currently, there is no
evidence to suggest that the VSV G-protein is sufficient to cause disease
in the species of interest. Therefore it will not be necessary to report
possession of the genetic material encoding for the VSV G-protein.
The New Jersey and Indiana strains of Vesicular stomatitis virus are not
considered exotic to the U.S., so possession of either of these strains of
VSV do not need to be reported on the "Notification of Possession of Select
Agents or High Consequence Livestock Pathogens and Toxins" form. However,
to be in compliance with Title 9 of the Code of Federal Regulations part
122, you are required to have a permit to possess either of these strains
if they were imported from another country or transported from another
state or the District of Columbia to your facility.
Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have additional questions or
concerns.
D. Spencer
Senior Staff Veterinarian
National Center for Import and Export
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
--=====================_1410618==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
Good afternoon to you all.
This is a Select Agent Regulation question. Does any one know if VSV-G pseudo-typed lentiviral vectors fall under the VSG-G category for " USDA High Consequence Livestock Pathogens and Toxins"? is consider as a select agent. I called the CDC Office number on the application and someone promised to return the call, which never occurred.
Nasr Gergis, Ph.D., DVM
Biosafety & Safety Officer-Interim Director
Occupational Safety and Health
City of Hope/BRI
Nasr, Ed Gaunt forward the info below regarding VSV-G:
The notification form for possession of certain biological agents and
toxins recently published in the Federal Register, requires the reporting
of genetic elements that encode for either "a functional toxin or a
virulence factor sufficient to cause disease." Currently, there is no
evidence to suggest that the VSV G-protein is sufficient to cause disease
in the species of interest. Therefore it will not be necessary to report
possession of the genetic material encoding for the VSV G-protein.
The New Jersey and Indiana strains of Vesicular stomatitis virus are not
considered exotic to the U.S., so possession of either of these strains of
VSV do not need to be reported on the "Notification of Possession of Select
Agents or High Consequence Livestock Pathogens and Toxins" form. However,
to be in compliance with Title 9 of the Code of Federal Regulations part
122, you are required to have a permit to possess either of these strains
if they were imported from another country or transported from another
state or the District of Columbia to your facility.
Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have additional questions or
concerns.
D. Spencer
Senior Staff Veterinarian
National Center for Import and Export
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
--=====================_1410618==_.ALT--
=========================================================================
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 20 Sep 2002 11:02:19 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ginger Brown
Subject: Post Cards
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Ed,
Why in the world are post cards going to people whose form WAS returned?
I've already heard from three people this morning asking me what they are
supposed to do with the post card and these are folks whose form was
returned with our 'official' notification.
Really appreciate all your help during this confusing process.
Ginger Brown, CBSP
Env Health & Safety
TX A&M University
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 20 Sep 2002 09:28:24 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Chris Carlson
Subject: Re: Post Cards
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed"
I have the same problem. It makes me worry that my "official" form
was never received. I assume the Help Line can "neither confirm nor
deny" that my forms were received. What to do now?
Chris
>Ed,
>Why in the world are post cards going to people whose form WAS returned?
>I've already heard from three people this morning asking me what they are
>supposed to do with the post card and these are folks whose form was
>returned with our 'official' notification.
>
>Really appreciate all your help during this confusing process.
>
>
>Ginger Brown, CBSP
>Env Health & Safety
>TX A&M University
--
******************************************************************************
Chris Carlson
Biosafety Officer, CBSP (ABSA)
Office of Environment, Health & Safety
317 University Hall - #1150
University of California
Berkeley, CA 94720-1150
phone: (510) 643-6562
e-mail: ccarlson@uclink4.berkeley.edu
fax: (510) 643-7595
******************************************************************************
Visit our Web Site at
******************************************************************************
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 20 Sep 2002 12:39:03 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Elizabeth Gilman
Subject: Re: Post Cards
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
I am also concerned that my "return receipt" postcard was returned to me =
but does not bear a "received by" signature or date. I have no way of =
knowing that ASI actually received my forms. Maybe Ed could shed some =
light on whether or not his group actually signed return receipt postcards.=
I'm sure there were plenty of return receipt cards to sign, but some =
indication that they were received would have been nice!
Betsy
>>> ccarlson@UCLINK4.BERKELEY.EDU 09/20/02 12:28PM >>>
I have the same problem. It makes me worry that my "official" form
was never received. I assume the Help Line can "neither confirm nor
deny" that my forms were received. What to do now?
Chris
>Ed,
>Why in the world are post cards going to people whose form WAS returned?
>I've already heard from three people this morning asking me what they are
>supposed to do with the post card and these are folks whose form was
>returned with our 'official' notification.
>
>Really appreciate all your help during this confusing process.
>
>
>Ginger Brown, CBSP
>Env Health & Safety
>TX A&M University
--
***************************************************************************=
***
Chris Carlson
Biosafety Officer, CBSP (ABSA)
Office of Environment, Health & Safety
317 University Hall - #1150
University of California
Berkeley, CA 94720-1150
phone: (510) 643-6562
e-mail: ccarlson@uclink4.berkeley.edu
fax: (510) 643-7595
***************************************************************************=
***
Visit our Web Site at
u
***************************************************************************=
***
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 20 Sep 2002 12:46:43 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Larry Mendoza
Organization: VCU-OEHS-Biological/Chemical Safety Section
Subject: Nucleic Acid Sequence of Select Agent
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="------------D3D6072BD2C85983A4820E60"
This is a multi-part message in MIME format.
--------------D3D6072BD2C85983A4820E60
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Good day to all Biosafety webbers:
I have yet another Select Agent Question:
We have a researcher that is in the process of procuring a grant for researching
F. tularinensis. Now in order to get his grant, he needs preliminary data and he
wants to know if he can import from our state lab (the state lab is registered
with the CDC, but his lab is not), raw nucleic acid sequences of F. tularinensis.
I know that we had to notify the CDC if we had any part of the genome of select
agents, we already turned in our forms and this is after the fact. Under the
current law can he import the raw dna from the state lab without registration with
the CDC? And how do we go about notifying the CDC if we are allowed to import
this DNA without registering? Do we need amendment forms for notification?
Thanks in advance
Larry Mendoza
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 20 Sep 2002 13:09:04 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Hauck, Philip"
Subject: Re: NIH Guidelines
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
Content-transfer-encoding: quoted-printable
I'm getting back to you now because...............after long last you =
can go to my web-site and help yourself to what you need: =
The Manual is under "Policies". I have people say I'm nuts for not =
restricting access, but most of what is there is from government sources =
anyhow, and the little I wrote, well, I don't hold back =
info...especially safety info....someone can benefit from it.
-----Original Message-----
From: Sharyn Baker [mailto:Sharyn.Baker@UCHSC.EDU]
Sent: Friday, August 09, 2002 11:37 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: NIH Guidelines
Good morning Phil,
Any chance I could get an electronic copy of your biosafety manual? I am
looking to improve one for the university and the classes that I teach.
Sometimes seeing someone else's perspective brings things to my =
attention
that perhaps I have slighted.
Sharyn
Sharyn Baker, M.S., M.A.
Instructor/Computer-Based-Training Design
Master's in Environmental Science And Engineering
University of Colorado Health Sciences Center
Department of Research Affairs
4200 E. 9th Avenue
Denver, Colorado 80262
Email: sharyn.baker@uchsc.edu
Voicemail: (303) 315-8003
> ----------
> From: Hauck, Philip
> Reply To: A Biosafety Discussion List
> Sent: Tuesday, August 6, 2002 11:09 AM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: Re: NIH Guidelines
>
>
> Here are the sections out of my Biosafety manual that will
> help.
> Phil
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Gergis, Nasr [mailto:NGergis@]
> Sent: Tuesday, August 06, 2002 11:27 AM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: Re: NIH Guidelines
>
>
> Good morning to you all. I am looking for NIH Guidelines with all
> classified organisms to BL1, 2, 3, and 4. Thanks.
> Nasr Gergis, Ph.D., DVM
> Biological Safety Officer
> Occupational Safety and Health
> City of Hope/BRI
> Ph: 626-539-8111 Ext. 64262
> Fax: 626-301-8970
> Pager: 626-423-5454
> E-mail: ngergis@
>
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 20 Sep 2002 12:24:18 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Johnson, Julie A."
Subject: notice of possession receipt confirmation
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
According to the instructions for the Notification of Possession forms,
"If you desire confirmation of delivery, please return your completed
Notification Form using the US Postal Service Priority Mail in the 9.5" x
12" cardboard Priority Mail envelope (EP-14G) and complete and attach a
fluorescent green US Postal Service Delivery Confirmation Receipt (PS Form
152) label to the envelope. You may track the delivery of your Notification
form via the US Postal Service Web site at
or by calling
800-222-1811 toll-free.
Do not use the fluorescent pink US Postal Service Signature Confirmation
Receipt (PS Form 153) or send the form via Certified Mail (PS Form 3800) as
ASI will be unable to sign for these forms and they will be returned to
you."
We sent ours as instructed using the fluorescent green US Postal Service
Delivery Confirmation Receipt and were able to track it's receipt on the
listed postal service web site. The i.d. number you need to track is on the
fluorescent green label, which you should have gotten a copy of if the forms
were mailed that way.
Hope this helps.
Julie A. Johnson, Ph.D., CBSP
Biosafety Officer
Environmental Health and Safety
118 Agronomy Lab
Iowa State University
Ames, IA 50011
Phone: 515-294-7657
Fax: 515-294-9357
Email: jajohns@iastate.edu
Web site: ehs.iastate.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 20 Sep 2002 12:31:22 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Johnson, Julie A."
Subject: post cards
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
It may be of some comfort to those of you who aren't sure whether or not ASI
received your Notice of Possession forms to know that we have received the
postcards for most of the 40-some Notice of Possession forms that we
verified were received on time. So - hopefully this is a glitch in
postcards getting sent out that should not have been, rather than forms not
received by ASI.
Julie A. Johnson, Ph.D., CBSP
Biosafety Officer
Environmental Health and Safety
118 Agronomy Lab
Iowa State University
Ames, IA 50011
Phone: 515-294-7657
Fax: 515-294-9357
Email: jajohns@iastate.edu
Web site: ehs.iastate.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 20 Sep 2002 16:00:16 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ed Gaunt
Subject: Re: Post Cards
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
We fully expected that cards and forms would pass in the mail. It has been
taking the Post Office up to a week or more to deliver some forms. If they
sent in a form anytime after Labor Day and got a card, I would not be too
concerned. We process everything we receive on the day we receive it, so
there is no lag time in processing on our end (the list was generated after
processing was completed on the evening of the 13th).
If folks receive a card and they know they returned a form, they do not need
to do anything. We MAY be mailing out another reminder card after Oct 11th
of catch all of the USDA list possessors and anyone else who has not
responded by that date, so if they get a second postcard after mailing in a
form in early Sept, then, we'd like to know about it. REMEMBER, if there
was concern about delivery of forms, you were given an option of (and
instructions for) having delivery confirmation in the Guidance Document.
Ed
-----Original Message-----
From: Ginger Brown [mailto:gingerbrown@TAMU.EDU]
Sent: Friday, September 20, 2002 12:02 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Post Cards
Ed,
Why in the world are post cards going to people whose form WAS returned?
I've already heard from three people this morning asking me what they are
supposed to do with the post card and these are folks whose form was
returned with our 'official' notification.
Really appreciate all your help during this confusing process.
Ginger Brown, CBSP
Env Health & Safety
TX A&M University
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 20 Sep 2002 16:06:58 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ed Gaunt
Subject: Re: Post Cards
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
The Guidance Document specifically stated (see below) that we COULD NOT sign
for forms and specifically provided instructions on how to get Post Office
Delivery Confirmation that did not require us to individually sign for
thousands of documents.
"If you desire confirmation of delivery, please return your completed
Notification Form(s) using the US Postal Service Priority Mail in the 9.5" x
12" cardboard Priority Mail envelope (EP-14G) and complete and attach a
fluorescent green US Postal Service Delivery Confirmation Receipt (PS Form
152) label to the envelope. You may track the delivery of your Notification
Form(s) via the US Postal Service Web site at
or by calling 800-222-1811
toll-free. The cost for this service is $3.85 for Priority Mail and $0.45
for Delivery Confirmation.
Do not use the fluorescent pink US Postal Service Signature Confirmation
Receipt (PS Form 153) or send the form via Certified Mail (PS Form 3800), as
we will be unable to sign for these forms and they will be returned to you."
-----Original Message-----
From: Elizabeth Gilman [mailto:EGilman@]
Sent: Friday, September 20, 2002 12:39 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Post Cards
I am also concerned that my "return receipt" postcard was returned to me but
does not bear a "received by" signature or date. I have no way of knowing
that ASI actually received my forms. Maybe Ed could shed some light on
whether or not his group actually signed return receipt postcards. I'm sure
there were plenty of return receipt cards to sign, but some indication that
they were received would have been nice!
Betsy
>>> ccarlson@UCLINK4.BERKELEY.EDU 09/20/02 12:28PM >>>
I have the same problem. It makes me worry that my "official" form
was never received. I assume the Help Line can "neither confirm nor
deny" that my forms were received. What to do now?
Chris
>Ed,
>Why in the world are post cards going to people whose form WAS returned?
>I've already heard from three people this morning asking me what they are
>supposed to do with the post card and these are folks whose form was
>returned with our 'official' notification.
>
>Really appreciate all your help during this confusing process.
>
>
>Ginger Brown, CBSP
>Env Health & Safety
>TX A&M University
--
****************************************************************************
**
Chris Carlson
Biosafety Officer, CBSP (ABSA)
Office of Environment, Health & Safety
317 University Hall - #1150
University of California
Berkeley, CA 94720-1150
phone: (510) 643-6562
e-mail: ccarlson@uclink4.berkeley.edu
fax: (510) 643-7595
****************************************************************************
**
Visit our Web Site at
****************************************************************************
**
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 20 Sep 2002 15:40:54 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ginger Brown
Subject: Re: Post Cards
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
If a PI did not return a form.......... threw it away, lost it, whatever.
And, now the PI receives the pink post card, does the PI sign the
card and return it? Or does the designated RFO have to sign each
one of these cards and return it?
Ginger Brown
>>> egaunt@ 09/20/02 03:00PM >>>
We fully expected that cards and forms would pass in the mail. It has =
been
taking the Post Office up to a week or more to deliver some forms. If =
they
sent in a form anytime after Labor Day and got a card, I would not be too
concerned. We process everything we receive on the day we receive it, so
there is no lag time in processing on our end (the list was generated =
after
processing was completed on the evening of the 13th).
If folks receive a card and they know they returned a form, they do not =
need
to do anything. We MAY be mailing out another reminder card after Oct =
11th
of catch all of the USDA list possessors and anyone else who has not
responded by that date, so if they get a second postcard after mailing in =
a
form in early Sept, then, we'd like to know about it. REMEMBER, if there
was concern about delivery of forms, you were given an option of (and
instructions for) having delivery confirmation in the Guidance Document.
Ed
-----Original Message-----
From: Ginger Brown [mailto:gingerbrown@TAMU.EDU]
Sent: Friday, September 20, 2002 12:02 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Post Cards
Ed,
Why in the world are post cards going to people whose form WAS returned?
I've already heard from three people this morning asking me what they are
supposed to do with the post card and these are folks whose form was
returned with our 'official' notification.
Really appreciate all your help during this confusing process.
Ginger Brown, CBSP
Env Health & Safety
TX A&M University
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 20 Sep 2002 18:12:45 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ed Gaunt
Subject: Re: Post Cards
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
RFO signs and returns if non-possession (or if the Notification Form should
have been a child form, if the summary form was already submitted).
If possession, you must request a new form from the Help Line if the
original Notification Form was thrown away.
Ed
-----Original Message-----
From: Ginger Brown [mailto:gingerbrown@TAMU.EDU]
Sent: Friday, September 20, 2002 4:41 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Post Cards
If a PI did not return a form.......... threw it away, lost it, whatever.
And, now the PI receives the pink post card, does the PI sign the
card and return it? Or does the designated RFO have to sign each
one of these cards and return it?
Ginger Brown
>>> egaunt@ 09/20/02 03:00PM >>>
We fully expected that cards and forms would pass in the mail. It has been
taking the Post Office up to a week or more to deliver some forms. If they
sent in a form anytime after Labor Day and got a card, I would not be too
concerned. We process everything we receive on the day we receive it, so
there is no lag time in processing on our end (the list was generated after
processing was completed on the evening of the 13th).
If folks receive a card and they know they returned a form, they do not need
to do anything. We MAY be mailing out another reminder card after Oct 11th
of catch all of the USDA list possessors and anyone else who has not
responded by that date, so if they get a second postcard after mailing in a
form in early Sept, then, we'd like to know about it. REMEMBER, if there
was concern about delivery of forms, you were given an option of (and
instructions for) having delivery confirmation in the Guidance Document.
Ed
-----Original Message-----
From: Ginger Brown [mailto:gingerbrown@TAMU.EDU]
Sent: Friday, September 20, 2002 12:02 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Post Cards
Ed,
Why in the world are post cards going to people whose form WAS returned?
I've already heard from three people this morning asking me what they are
supposed to do with the post card and these are folks whose form was
returned with our 'official' notification.
Really appreciate all your help during this confusing process.
Ginger Brown, CBSP
Env Health & Safety
TX A&M University
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 20 Sep 2002 15:30:39 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Gergis, Nasr"
Subject: Re: BSC
MIME-Version: 1.0
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Good afternoon. I am reviewing floor plan for BSL-3. I understand that BSC
should be in the area away from heavy traffic. In the floor plan I observed
one of the BSC facing the door to enter and exit the laboratory. As I was
informed by the architect the distance between the BSC and the door is seven
fee. Does anyone has information if there is a certain distance. Thanks.
Nasr Gergis, Ph.D., DVM
Biosafety & Safety Officer/Interim Director
Occupational Safety and Health
City of Hope/BRI
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RE: BSC
Good afternoon. I am reviewing floor plan for BSL-3. = I understand that BSC should be in the area away from heavy traffic. In = the floor plan I observed one of the BSC facing the door to enter and = exit the laboratory. As I was informed by the architect the distance = between the BSC and the door is seven fee. Does anyone has information = if there is a certain distance. Thanks.
Nasr Gergis, Ph.D., DVM
Biosafety & Safety Officer/Interim = Director
Occupational Safety and Health
City of Hope/BRI
------_=_NextPart_001_01C260F4.C60EC09C--
=========================================================================
Date: Sat, 21 Sep 2002 13:45:35 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Paul Rubock
Subject: bleach and autoclaving
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Having looked through a number of University Biosafety websites, I see a
full range of opinions as to the advisability of autoclaving bleach-treated
materials. Some sites have explicit caveats; others, particularly when
bleach-treated spill clean-up materials are involved, urge full steam (pun
intended) ahead.
I remember the odor complaints generated when we discovered that an
investigator was autoclaving bleached toxin solutions. I don't know whether
the chlorine levels reached a level deemed hazardous by the IH folks but
perceptions are very important.
I am curious as to how others address:
1-Adequacy of bleach-only disinfection;
2-Control of noxious odors if both steps are done; and
3-Other disinfectants that may be useful in avoiding unpleasant odors in
situations where autoclaving is considering an appropriate follow-up to
chemical disinfection.
I'm talking about vegetative bacteria and lipid-enveloped viruses, the
relatively easy to kill stuff.
All comments gratefully appreciated.
Thank you,
Paul Rubock
Biosafety
Columbia University
=========================================================================
Date: Sat, 21 Sep 2002 16:27:50 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Greg Merkle
Subject: Re: Post Cards
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
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As a follow up. Will there be problems for the PI or the institution if the PI
has already signed off on the post card and put it in the mail? There is
nothing on the post card to indicate who, PI or RFO, exactly should sign off.
Greg Merkle
Dept. Env. Health and Safety
Wright Sate University
Ed Gaunt wrote:
> RFO signs and returns if non-possession (or if the Notification Form should
> have been a child form, if the summary form was already submitted).
>
> If possession, you must request a new form from the Help Line if the
> original Notification Form was thrown away.
>
> Ed
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Ginger Brown [mailto:gingerbrown@TAMU.EDU]
> Sent: Friday, September 20, 2002 4:41 PM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: Re: Post Cards
>
> If a PI did not return a form.......... threw it away, lost it, whatever.
> And, now the PI receives the pink post card, does the PI sign the
> card and return it? Or does the designated RFO have to sign each
> one of these cards and return it?
>
> Ginger Brown
>
> >>> egaunt@ 09/20/02 03:00PM >>>
> We fully expected that cards and forms would pass in the mail. It has been
> taking the Post Office up to a week or more to deliver some forms. If they
> sent in a form anytime after Labor Day and got a card, I would not be too
> concerned. We process everything we receive on the day we receive it, so
> there is no lag time in processing on our end (the list was generated after
> processing was completed on the evening of the 13th).
>
> If folks receive a card and they know they returned a form, they do not need
> to do anything. We MAY be mailing out another reminder card after Oct 11th
> of catch all of the USDA list possessors and anyone else who has not
> responded by that date, so if they get a second postcard after mailing in a
> form in early Sept, then, we'd like to know about it. REMEMBER, if there
> was concern about delivery of forms, you were given an option of (and
> instructions for) having delivery confirmation in the Guidance Document.
>
> Ed
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Ginger Brown [mailto:gingerbrown@TAMU.EDU]
> Sent: Friday, September 20, 2002 12:02 PM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: Post Cards
>
> Ed,
> Why in the world are post cards going to people whose form WAS returned?
> I've already heard from three people this morning asking me what they are
> supposed to do with the post card and these are folks whose form was
> returned with our 'official' notification.
>
> Really appreciate all your help during this confusing process.
>
> Ginger Brown, CBSP
> Env Health & Safety
> TX A&M University
=========================================================================
Date: Sun, 22 Sep 2002 18:14:43 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Gergis, Nasr"
Subject: Re: Infection Control Question
MIME-Version: 1.0
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I came across a infectious waste educator in the hospital and research
sites, who mentioned the following:
If you have bandage or paper stained with few dropped of blood, you may
dispose off as regular trash. Should we treat the infectious waste from
hospital and research sites differently than home site? Thanks for your
input.
Nasr Gergis, Ph.D., DVM
Biosafety & Safety Officer
Occupational Safety and Health
City of Hope/BRI
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RE: Infection Control Question
I came across a infectious waste educator in the = hospital and research sites, who mentioned the following:
If you have bandage or paper stained with few = dropped of blood, you may dispose off as regular trash. Should we treat = the infectious waste from hospital and research sites differently than = home site? Thanks for your input.
Nasr Gergis, Ph.D., DVM
Biosafety & Safety Officer
Occupational Safety and Health
City of Hope/BRI
------_=_NextPart_001_01C2629E.99269996--
=========================================================================
Date: Sun, 22 Sep 2002 23:28:33 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: YK Wan at CUHK
Subject: Re: BSC
MIME-Version: 1.0
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boundary="------------060605050506030501070905"
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It is hardly to estimate the effect. However, if you slam the door, the
performance of the BSC must be disturbed. Also, sometimes it may be
affected the changing room pressure when the door is suddenly opened or
closed. You must request your certifier to test the smoke pattern when
door is closed and opened.
Regards,
YK Wan
Safety Officer
& NSF Field Certifier
The Chinese University of Hong Kong
Gergis, Nasr wrote:
> Good afternoon. I am reviewing floor plan for BSL-3. I understand that
> BSC should be in the area away from heavy traffic. In the floor plan I
> observed one of the BSC facing the door to enter and exit the
> laboratory. As I was informed by the architect the distance between
> the BSC and the door is seven fee. Does anyone has information if
> there is a certain distance. Thanks.
>
> Nasr Gergis, Ph.D., DVM
> Biosafety & Safety Officer/Interim Director
> Occupational Safety and Health
> City of Hope/BRI
>
--------------060605050506030501070905
Content-Type: text/html; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
It is hardly to estimate the effect. However, if you slam the door, the performance of the BSC must be disturbed. Also, sometimes it may be affected the changing room pressure when the door is suddenly opened or closed. You must request your certifier to test the smoke pattern when door is closed and opened.
Regards,
YK Wan
Safety Officer
& NSF Field Certifier
The Chinese University of Hong Kong
Gergis, Nasr wrote:
Good afternoon. I am reviewing floor plan for BSL-3. I understand that BSC should be in the area away from heavy traffic. In the floor plan I observed one of the BSC facing the door to enter and exit the laboratory. As I was informed by the architect the distance between the BSC and the door is seven fee. Does anyone has information if there is a certain distance. Thanks.
Nasr Gergis, Ph.D., DVM
Biosafety & Safety Officer/Interim Director
Occupational Safety and Health
City of Hope/BRI
--------------060605050506030501070905--
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 23 Sep 2002 07:56:04 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Kim Auletta
Subject: Re: Infection Control Question
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
According to OSHA, red bag waste only includes material that would flunk
the "squeeze test" - IF you were to squeeze it (DO NOT REALLY DO IT), blood
or OPIM would drip out. If that's the case, then the material is red bag
waste. If the material passes the "squeeze test" - nothing drips out, then
it is regular trash. Bandages, etc, are designed to absorb small amounts of
blood and should normally pass the test.
Remember, tho, OSHA is only regulating human blood and OPIM. OSHA is also
not the final say in the waste disposal when the material is heading for
the landfill. You must check with your local and fedearl waste disposal
regs and the local landfill.
Also, OSHA only regulates employer-employee relations, so bloody material
at home would not be under their jurisdiction, unless its work practices by
a home health practitioner.
Kim Auletta
Lab Safety Specialist
Environmental Health and Safety
SUNY Stony Brook
110 Suffolk Hall
Stony Brook, NY 11794-6200
phone: 631-632-9672
fax: 631-632-9683
email: kauletta@.sunysb.edu
"Gergis, Nasr"
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Sent by: A cc:
Biosafety Subject: Re: Infection Control Question
Discussion List
09/22/2002 09:14
PM
Please respond to
A Biosafety
Discussion List
I came across a infectious waste educator in the hospital and research
sites, who mentioned the following:
If you have bandage or paper stained with few dropped of blood, you may
dispose off as regular trash. Should we treat the infectious waste from
hospital and research sites differently than home site? Thanks for your
input.
Nasr Gergis, Ph.D., DVM
Biosafety & Safety Officer
Occupational Safety and Health
City of Hope/BRI
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 23 Sep 2002 08:28:58 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Petuch, Brian R."
Subject: Re: bleach and autoclaving
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
An additional concern would be autoclave chamber corrosion due to
interactions between chlorides and nickel in the stainless steel.
Brian Petuch
Biological Pilot Plant
Safety / Regulatory Operations
Merck Research Labs
WP17-301
West Point, PA 19486-0004
Office 215-652-4039
Fax 215-993-4911
pager 800-759-8888 pin 1380162
-----Original Message-----
From: Paul Rubock [mailto:pr18@COLUMBIA.EDU]
Sent: Saturday, September 21, 2002 1:46 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: bleach and autoclaving
Having looked through a number of University Biosafety websites, I see a
full range of opinions as to the advisability of autoclaving bleach-treated
materials. Some sites have explicit caveats; others, particularly when
bleach-treated spill clean-up materials are involved, urge full steam (pun
intended) ahead.
I remember the odor complaints generated when we discovered that an
investigator was autoclaving bleached toxin solutions. I don't know whether
the chlorine levels reached a level deemed hazardous by the IH folks but
perceptions are very important.
I am curious as to how others address:
1-Adequacy of bleach-only disinfection;
2-Control of noxious odors if both steps are done; and
3-Other disinfectants that may be useful in avoiding unpleasant odors in
situations where autoclaving is considering an appropriate follow-up to
chemical disinfection.
I'm talking about vegetative bacteria and lipid-enveloped viruses, the
relatively easy to kill stuff.
All comments gratefully appreciated.
Thank you,
Paul Rubock
Biosafety
Columbia University
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notice: This e-mail message, together with any attachments, contains information of Merck & Co., Inc. (Whitehouse Station, New Jersey, USA) that may be confidential, proprietary copyrighted and/or legally privileged, and is intended solely for the use of the individual or entity named on this message. If you are not the intended recipient, and have received this message in error, please immediately return this by e-mail and then delete it.
=============================================================================
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 23 Sep 2002 14:57:28 +0200
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Mike Kirby
Subject: Infection Control Question- some more comments
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Kim Auletta wrote...
"According to OSHA, red bag waste only includes material that would flunk
the "squeeze test" - IF you were to squeeze it (DO NOT REALLY DO IT), blood
or OPIM would drip out. If that's the case, then the material is red bag
waste. If the material passes the "squeeze test" - nothing drips out, then
it is regular trash. Bandages, etc, are designed to absorb small amounts of
blood and should normally pass the test."
Surly, anything contaminated with bodily fluids (bandages, etc), no matter
how small, should still be considered as biohazard waste and disposed of
accordingly? I find it amazing that your OSHA endorses such a thing as the
"squeeze test" Does the result depend on the strength of one's hand grip?.
Sorry if I am being facetious, but to my way of thinking, biohazard waste of
any description must be destroyed.
Mr.M.Kirby
Safety Officer
National Health Laboratory Service
Johannesburg
South Africa.
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 23 Sep 2002 08:02:05 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Burnett, LouAnn Crawford"
Subject: Re: Post Cards
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
OK - new scenario on the cards:
1. We submitted one summary form plus 19 child forms (postmarked
9/9/02) that, according to the USPS website was received on the evening
of 9/11/02 (so in theory this would have been processed on 9/12/02).
2. I am now getting calls from several investigators who are getting
pink cards. Several are the same investigators for whom we submitted
child forms - several are from those who did not receive (or so they
say) an initial form.
3. I understand that for those forms that have been returned with the
summary form, I do not need to do anything. But what about the pink
cards for the investigators whose initial forms remain at large? Some of
these investigators DO possess SA/HCLP so we can't really sign-off and
say that they are "non-possessors" - however, their possession was
registered on our summary form. There does not appear to be a place on
the postcard to "link" these investigators to the summary form.
What should we do? Can I write the summary form ID number on the card?
Other suggestions?
LouAnn
LouAnn C. Burnett, MS, CBSP =09
Biosafety Program Manager & Biological Safety Officer=09
Vanderbilt University Environmental Health & Safety
Nashville, Tennessee
615/322-0927 (direct & voice mail)
615/343-4951 (fax) =09
-----Original Message-----
From: Ed Gaunt [mailto:egaunt@]
Sent: Friday, September 20, 2002 5:13 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Post Cards
RFO signs and returns if non-possession (or if the Notification Form
should have been a child form, if the summary form was already
submitted).
If possession, you must request a new form from the Help Line if the
original Notification Form was thrown away.
Ed
-----Original Message-----
From: Ginger Brown [mailto:gingerbrown@TAMU.EDU]
Sent: Friday, September 20, 2002 4:41 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Post Cards
If a PI did not return a form.......... threw it away, lost it,
whatever. And, now the PI receives the pink post card, does the PI sign
the card and return it? Or does the designated RFO have to sign each one
of these cards and return it?
Ginger Brown
>>> egaunt@ 09/20/02 03:00PM >>>
We fully expected that cards and forms would pass in the mail. It has
been taking the Post Office up to a week or more to deliver some forms.
If they sent in a form anytime after Labor Day and got a card, I would
not be too concerned. We process everything we receive on the day we
receive it, so there is no lag time in processing on our end (the list
was generated after processing was completed on the evening of the
13th).
If folks receive a card and they know they returned a form, they do not
need to do anything. We MAY be mailing out another reminder card after
Oct 11th of catch all of the USDA list possessors and anyone else who
has not responded by that date, so if they get a second postcard after
mailing in a
form in early Sept, then, we'd like to know about it. REMEMBER, if
there
was concern about delivery of forms, you were given an option of (and
instructions for) having delivery confirmation in the Guidance Document.
Ed
-----Original Message-----
From: Ginger Brown [mailto:gingerbrown@TAMU.EDU]
Sent: Friday, September 20, 2002 12:02 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Post Cards
Ed,
Why in the world are post cards going to people whose form WAS returned?
I've already heard from three people this morning asking me what they
are supposed to do with the post card and these are folks whose form was
returned with our 'official' notification.
Really appreciate all your help during this confusing process.
Ginger Brown, CBSP
Env Health & Safety
TX A&M University
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 23 Sep 2002 08:13:05 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ginger Brown
Subject: Re: Post Cards
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Gotta tell you......... I'm very hesitant to tell the Vice President who =
signed
as the RFO that now he must sign numerous pink post cards !
Ginger
>>> egaunt@ 09/20/02 05:12PM >>>
RFO signs and returns if non-possession (or if the Notification Form =
should
have been a child form, if the summary form was already submitted).
If possession, you must request a new form from the Help Line if the
original Notification Form was thrown away.
Ed
-----Original Message-----
From: Ginger Brown [mailto:gingerbrown@TAMU.EDU]
Sent: Friday, September 20, 2002 4:41 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Post Cards
If a PI did not return a form.......... threw it away, lost it, whatever.
And, now the PI receives the pink post card, does the PI sign the
card and return it? Or does the designated RFO have to sign each
one of these cards and return it?
Ginger Brown
>>> egaunt@ 09/20/02 03:00PM >>>
We fully expected that cards and forms would pass in the mail. It has =
been
taking the Post Office up to a week or more to deliver some forms. If =
they
sent in a form anytime after Labor Day and got a card, I would not be too
concerned. We process everything we receive on the day we receive it, so
there is no lag time in processing on our end (the list was generated =
after
processing was completed on the evening of the 13th).
If folks receive a card and they know they returned a form, they do not =
need
to do anything. We MAY be mailing out another reminder card after Oct =
11th
of catch all of the USDA list possessors and anyone else who has not
responded by that date, so if they get a second postcard after mailing in =
a
form in early Sept, then, we'd like to know about it. REMEMBER, if there
was concern about delivery of forms, you were given an option of (and
instructions for) having delivery confirmation in the Guidance Document.
Ed
-----Original Message-----
From: Ginger Brown [mailto:gingerbrown@TAMU.EDU]
Sent: Friday, September 20, 2002 12:02 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Post Cards
Ed,
Why in the world are post cards going to people whose form WAS returned?
I've already heard from three people this morning asking me what they are
supposed to do with the post card and these are folks whose form was
returned with our 'official' notification.
Really appreciate all your help during this confusing process.
Ginger Brown, CBSP
Env Health & Safety
TX A&M University
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 23 Sep 2002 09:16:17 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Kim Auletta
Subject: Re: Infection Control Question- some more comments
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
OSHA does not want anyone actually "squezzing" contaminated bandages, etc.
It is a way they came up with to describe the differences between something
that would need to be red bagged vs. something that would not be red
bagged. Under Universal Precautions, all contaminated material would be
handled the same, but after the risk was analyzed, there was no risk to an
employee handling regular trash that had slightly contaminated bandages
that would not leak out of a garbage bag.
Remember - I added a comment that disposal requirements may differ
depending on your local waste regulations.
From the OSHA Compliance Directive CPL2-2.69
():
Regulated Waste (d)(4)(iii). This paragraph requires regulated
waste to be properly contained and disposed of, so as not to
become a source of transmission of disease to employees.
To eliminate the implication that OSHA has determined the
"infectivity" of certain medical wastes, the bloodborne
pathogens
standard uses the term "regulated waste" to refer to the
following
categories of waste which require special handling, at a
minimum:
liquid or semi-liquid blood or OPIM; items contaminated with
blood
or OPIM and which would release these substances in a liquid
or
semi-liquid state if compressed; items that are caked with
dried
blood or OPIM and are capable of releasing these materials
during
handling; contaminated sharps; pathological and
microbiological
wastes containing blood or OPIM.
INSPECTION AND CITATION GUIDELINES. The compliance
officer should not use the actual volume of blood to
determine
whether or not a particular material is to be considered
regulated
waste, since 10 ml of blood on a disposable bed sheet would
appear as a spot (not regulated waste) while the same amount
of
blood on a cotton ball would likely cause saturation and
dripping
(regulated waste). Similarly, an item may adequately contain
these
materials when in a static state yet liberate them when
compacted
in the waste container. Instead, the compliance officer
should
consider the potential for generation of bulk blood (i.e
through
dripping or flaking off of material that may contain either
blood or
OPIM). Under no circumstances should a bag of waste be
squeezed
or shaken to determine this. The compliance officer should
exercise
professional judgment to make a determination based on
visual
factors such as a pool of liquid in the bottom of the
container or
dried blood flaking or falling off during handling, or based
on
employee interviews.
NOTE: The Compliance Officer should keep in mind that, while
OSHA specifies certain features of the regulated waste
containers,
including appropriate tagging, the ultimate disposal method
(landfilling, incinerating, and so forth) for medical waste
falls under
the purview of the EPA and possibly State and local
regulations.
Kim Auletta
Lab Safety Specialist
Environmental Health and Safety
SUNY Stony Brook
110 Suffolk Hall
Stony Brook, NY 11794-6200
phone: 631-632-9672
fax: 631-632-9683
email: kauletta@.sunysb.edu
Mike Kirby
cc:
Sent by: A Subject: Infection Control Question- some more
Biosafety comments
Discussion List
09/23/2002 08:57
AM
Please respond to
A Biosafety
Discussion List
Kim Auletta wrote...
"According to OSHA, red bag waste only includes material that would flunk
the "squeeze test" - IF you were to squeeze it (DO NOT REALLY DO IT), blood
or OPIM would drip out. If that's the case, then the material is red bag
waste. If the material passes the "squeeze test" - nothing drips out, then
it is regular trash. Bandages, etc, are designed to absorb small amounts of
blood and should normally pass the test."
Surly, anything contaminated with bodily fluids (bandages, etc), no matter
how small, should still be considered as biohazard waste and disposed of
accordingly? I find it amazing that your OSHA endorses such a thing as the
"squeeze test" Does the result depend on the strength of one's hand grip?.
Sorry if I am being facetious, but to my way of thinking, biohazard waste
of
any description must be destroyed.
Mr.M.Kirby
Safety Officer
National Health Laboratory Service
Johannesburg
South Africa.
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 23 Sep 2002 09:30:11 EDT
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ed Krisiunas
Subject: Re: Infection Control Question- some more comments
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Medical waste regulations vary throughout the world (as well as in the US).
As Kate pointed out, determine what your local authorities consider medical
/biomedical/regulated/healthcare/hazardous healthcare/clinical waste, etc...
(just a few terms to confuse the issue).
Relative to the original question, check out the California Department of
Health Services web site. Self providers of home care are exempt from medical
waste regulations. However, healthcare professionals providing care
(injections) are responsible for removal of such waste. Same applies in the
UK (To what extent is it actually removed is a different subject matter).
Ed Krisiunas, MT(ASCP), CIC, MPH
President
WNWN International
PO Box 1164
Burlington, Connecticut
06013
860-675-1217
860-675-1311(fax)
860-944-2373 (mobile)
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Medical waste regulations vary throughout the world (as well as in the US). As Kate pointed out, determine what your local authorities consider medical /biomedical/regulated/healthcare/hazardous healthcare/clinical waste, etc... (just a few terms to confuse the issue).
Relative to the original question, check out the California Department of Health Services web site. Self providers of home care are exempt from medical waste regulations. However, healthcare professionals providing care (injections) are responsible for removal of such waste. Same applies in the UK (To what extent is it actually removed is a different subject matter).
Ed Krisiunas, MT(ASCP), CIC, MPH
President
WNWN International
PO Box 1164
Burlington, Connecticut
06013
860-675-1217
860-675-1311(fax)
860-944-2373 (mobile)
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=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 23 Sep 2002 07:52:00 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Funk, Glenn"
Subject: Re: Infection Control Question- some more comments
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In my experience (emphasis!), I've found the clinical side of the house to
be more cavalier about disposal of human source material waste than the
research side. I'm sure the infection control nurses would call it
"practical" or "realistic". Nonetheless, I'm pleased to note that most
researchers are uncomfortable sink-disposing human blood or serum (even
though it's "legal" in most places to do so) and prefer to bleach it before
disposing. This had gone on so long in California as a matter of routine
that toxicity testing was finally done on bleached human blood and the
product was shown to be safe for sink disposal. As a result, the California
Medical Waste Management Act was amended a few years ago to permit chemical
treatment of liquid and semi-liquid laboratory waste. Incidentally, this is
one of the first references in a regulatory document that identifies ABSA as
a professional organization qualified to "approve" appropriate chemical
treatment.
I once accused an infection control nurse of believing that if the
blood-soaked 4x4 sponge didn't stick to the ceiling when thrown upward, it
didn't have to go in a red bag. The response to this admittedly smart-assed
comment was "Well, it really bothers patients to see red bags and biohazard
symbols in the clinic areas."
Long live biosafety!!
--- Glenn
-----Original Message-----
From: Mike Kirby [mailto:mikek@MAIL.SAIMR.WITS.AC.ZA]
Sent: Monday, September 23, 2002 5:57 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Infection Control Question- some more comments
Kim Auletta wrote...
"According to OSHA, red bag waste only includes material that would flunk
the "squeeze test" - IF you were to squeeze it (DO NOT REALLY DO IT), blood
or OPIM would drip out. If that's the case, then the material is red bag
waste. If the material passes the "squeeze test" - nothing drips out, then
it is regular trash. Bandages, etc, are designed to absorb small amounts of
blood and should normally pass the test."
Surly, anything contaminated with bodily fluids (bandages, etc), no matter
how small, should still be considered as biohazard waste and disposed of
accordingly? I find it amazing that your OSHA endorses such a thing as the
"squeeze test" Does the result depend on the strength of one's hand grip?.
Sorry if I am being facetious, but to my way of thinking, biohazard waste of
any description must be destroyed.
Mr.M.Kirby
Safety Officer
National Health Laboratory Service
Johannesburg
South Africa.
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 23 Sep 2002 11:39:22 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Hauck, Philip"
Subject: Re: Infection Control Question
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One of my caveats from my own personal experience, is, be very sure what =
your LOCAL sanitation department's regs are. Especially if the SAni-men =
have a strong, powerful union.
WE (at my former institution) put autoclaved melted containers with no =
residual liquid at all in clear bags, totally innocuous, and discarded =
them in the domestic weaste and the load was brought back because it =
"looked like biomedical waste". Mind you, no sharps, no media, no odors, =
just a ton of melted plastic Petri dishes and flasks that were in red =
bags and autoclaved, then clear bagged.
The end result? We took ALL biomedical waste out of the domestic waste =
stream, and put it into the "red bag waste stream" i.e. no clear bags in =
research, clinical areas, so that a coffee cup would wind up in red =
bags. Jacked up our waste charges?...you bet, but it was cheaper in the =
end compared to the fines we received. This occurred during the New York =
"Red Bags on the Beaches" days in the mid eighties. So check out what =
the locals will and will not accept!
Phil Hauck
-----Original Message-----
From: Kim Auletta [mailto:kauletta@.SUNYSB.EDU]
Sent: Monday, September 23, 2002 7:56 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Infection Control Question
According to OSHA, red bag waste only includes material that would flunk
the "squeeze test" - IF you were to squeeze it (DO NOT REALLY DO IT), =
blood
or OPIM would drip out. If that's the case, then the material is red bag
waste. If the material passes the "squeeze test" - nothing drips out, =
then
it is regular trash. Bandages, etc, are designed to absorb small amounts =
of
blood and should normally pass the test.
Remember, tho, OSHA is only regulating human blood and OPIM. OSHA is =
also
not the final say in the waste disposal when the material is heading for
the landfill. You must check with your local and fedearl waste disposal
regs and the local landfill.
Also, OSHA only regulates employer-employee relations, so bloody =
material
at home would not be under their jurisdiction, unless its work practices =
by
a home health practitioner.
Kim Auletta
Lab Safety Specialist
Environmental Health and Safety
SUNY Stony Brook
110 Suffolk Hall
Stony Brook, NY 11794-6200
phone: 631-632-9672
fax: 631-632-9683
email: kauletta@.sunysb.edu
"Gergis, Nasr"
To: =
BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Sent by: A cc:
Biosafety Subject: Re: Infection =
Control Question
Discussion List
09/22/2002 09:14
PM
Please respond to
A Biosafety
Discussion List
I came across a infectious waste educator in the hospital and research
sites, who mentioned the following:
If you have bandage or paper stained with few dropped of blood, you may
dispose off as regular trash. Should we treat the infectious waste from
hospital and research sites differently than home site? Thanks for your
input.
Nasr Gergis, Ph.D., DVM
Biosafety & Safety Officer
Occupational Safety and Health
City of Hope/BRI
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 23 Sep 2002 11:44:30 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Denise Boyd
Organization: Eric Mower & Associates
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Date: Mon, 23 Sep 2002 08:04:42 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
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From: Andrew J Bartel
Organization: Department of Biological Sciences
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My apologies for the mundane question, but...
How do I temporarily unsubscribe for vacation?
Thanks.
> > > > > > > > > > >
Andrew J Bartel
Laboratory Manager
Department of Biological Sciences
University of Alaska Anchorage
Science Bldg. 243
3211 Providence Drive
Anchorage AK 99508
(907)786-1268 voice
(907)786-1148 fax
ajb@uaa.alaska.edu
----- Original Message -----
From: Denise Boyd
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Sent: Monday, September 23, 2002 7:44 AM
UNSUBSCRIBE
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My apologies for the mundane question, but...
How do I temporarily unsubscribe for vacation?
Thanks.
> > > > > > > > > > >
Andrew J Bartel
Laboratory Manager
Department of Biological Sciences
University of Alaska Anchorage
Science Bldg. 243
3211 Providence Drive
Anchorage AK 99508
(907)786-1268 voice
(907)786-1148 fax
ajb@uaa.alaska.edu
----- Original Message -----
Denise Boyd
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU =
Sent: Monday, September 23, = 2002 7:44 AM
UNSUBSCRIBE
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=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 23 Sep 2002 11:01:41 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Giles, Carol A."
Subject: Re: infectious waste question
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With all of the lawsuit potential from infectious materials leaving a site,
I am surprised that some of the questions and answers sound so naive. Even
if the EPA and local governments didn't regulate this, consider the possible
consequences of letting this type of trash leave your area and your hospital
or site. If neighbors were anxious about your work in their area, they
could find much to be upset about if the potentially infectious waste were
not handled appropriately. One cannot easily undo a negative public
relations perception.
Commercial or non-profit ventures have a higher standard to the public than
an individual household, and usually deeper pockets.
Carol A. Giles, MPH, CIH
EQO-Industrial Hygiene
Argonne National Laboratory
9700 S. Cass Avenue
Argonne, IL 60439
(630) 252-3427
-----Original Message-----
From: Gergis, Nasr [mailto:NGergis@]
Sent: September 22, 2002 8:15 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Infection Control Question
I came across a infectious waste educator in the hospital and research
sites, who mentioned the following:
If you have bandage or paper stained with few dropped of blood, you may
dispose off as regular trash. Should we treat the infectious waste from
hospital and research sites differently than home site? Thanks for your
input.
Nasr Gergis, Ph.D., DVM
Biosafety & Safety Officer
Occupational Safety and Health
City of Hope/BRI
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With all of the lawsuit potential from infectious materials leaving a site, I am surprised that some of the questions and answers sound so naive. Even if the EPA and local governments didn't regulate this, consider the possible consequences of letting this type of trash leave your area and your hospital or site. If neighbors were anxious about your work in their area, they could find much to be upset about if the potentially infectious waste were not handled appropriately. One cannot easily undo a negative public relations perception.
Commercial or non-profit ventures have a higher standard to the public than an individual household, and usually deeper pockets.
Carol A. Giles, MPH, CIH
EQO-Industrial Hygiene
Argonne National Laboratory
9700 S. Cass Avenue
Argonne, IL 60439
(630) 252-3427
-----Original Message-----
From: Gergis, Nasr [mailto:NGergis@]
Sent: September 22, 2002 8:15 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Infection Control Question
I came across a infectious waste educator in the hospital and research sites, who mentioned the following:
If you have bandage or paper stained with few dropped of blood, you may dispose off as regular trash. Should we treat the infectious waste from hospital and research sites differently than home site? Thanks for your input.
Nasr Gergis, Ph.D., DVM
Biosafety & Safety Officer
Occupational Safety and Health
City of Hope/BRI
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=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 23 Sep 2002 12:03:25 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ed Gaunt
Subject: Re: Post Cards
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Okay...those pink post cards are rolling in by the thousands!!!
Although we did not provide a space on the card to record the Summary Form
ID number, we've come up with a way to deal with this. If a card is
associated with a form that SHOULD have been a "child" form, just write the
Summary Form ID in the margin on the card next to (BUT not over top of) the
barcode. We will use ID that to link it to the proper summary form.
Regarding who signs... since these indicating non-possession, we are NOT
doing data entry on the name block info (read between the lines here).
If you are submitting these cards as a child form (in lieu of a bubble form
that might have been "displaced"), we can treat them just like a child form,
which did not require a signature, since the summary form ID lets us know
who to go to for additional information. Just be sure to use a REAL summary
form ID, because we will be checking these!
Hope that helps.
Ed
-----Original Message-----
From: Burnett, LouAnn Crawford [mailto:louann.burnett@VANDERBILT.EDU]
Sent: Monday, September 23, 2002 9:02 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Post Cards
OK - new scenario on the cards:
1. We submitted one summary form plus 19 child forms (postmarked
9/9/02) that, according to the USPS website was received on the evening
of 9/11/02 (so in theory this would have been processed on 9/12/02).
2. I am now getting calls from several investigators who are getting
pink cards. Several are the same investigators for whom we submitted
child forms - several are from those who did not receive (or so they
say) an initial form.
3. I understand that for those forms that have been returned with the
summary form, I do not need to do anything. But what about the pink
cards for the investigators whose initial forms remain at large? Some of
these investigators DO possess SA/HCLP so we can't really sign-off and
say that they are "non-possessors" - however, their possession was
registered on our summary form. There does not appear to be a place on
the postcard to "link" these investigators to the summary form.
What should we do? Can I write the summary form ID number on the card?
Other suggestions?
LouAnn
LouAnn C. Burnett, MS, CBSP
Biosafety Program Manager & Biological Safety Officer
Vanderbilt University Environmental Health & Safety
Nashville, Tennessee
615/322-0927 (direct & voice mail)
615/343-4951 (fax)
-----Original Message-----
From: Ed Gaunt [mailto:egaunt@]
Sent: Friday, September 20, 2002 5:13 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Post Cards
RFO signs and returns if non-possession (or if the Notification Form
should have been a child form, if the summary form was already
submitted).
If possession, you must request a new form from the Help Line if the
original Notification Form was thrown away.
Ed
-----Original Message-----
From: Ginger Brown [mailto:gingerbrown@TAMU.EDU]
Sent: Friday, September 20, 2002 4:41 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Post Cards
If a PI did not return a form.......... threw it away, lost it,
whatever. And, now the PI receives the pink post card, does the PI sign
the card and return it? Or does the designated RFO have to sign each one
of these cards and return it?
Ginger Brown
>>> egaunt@ 09/20/02 03:00PM >>>
We fully expected that cards and forms would pass in the mail. It has
been taking the Post Office up to a week or more to deliver some forms.
If they sent in a form anytime after Labor Day and got a card, I would
not be too concerned. We process everything we receive on the day we
receive it, so there is no lag time in processing on our end (the list
was generated after processing was completed on the evening of the
13th).
If folks receive a card and they know they returned a form, they do not
need to do anything. We MAY be mailing out another reminder card after
Oct 11th of catch all of the USDA list possessors and anyone else who
has not responded by that date, so if they get a second postcard after
mailing in a
form in early Sept, then, we'd like to know about it. REMEMBER, if
there
was concern about delivery of forms, you were given an option of (and
instructions for) having delivery confirmation in the Guidance Document.
Ed
-----Original Message-----
From: Ginger Brown [mailto:gingerbrown@TAMU.EDU]
Sent: Friday, September 20, 2002 12:02 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Post Cards
Ed,
Why in the world are post cards going to people whose form WAS returned?
I've already heard from three people this morning asking me what they
are supposed to do with the post card and these are folks whose form was
returned with our 'official' notification.
Really appreciate all your help during this confusing process.
Ginger Brown, CBSP
Env Health & Safety
TX A&M University
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 23 Sep 2002 12:27:00 -0400
Reply-To: pr18@columbia.edu
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: paul rubock
Organization: EH&S
Subject: speaker wanted
MIME-Version: 1.0
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The Copper Development Association is looking for a speaker to present
on Bloodborne Pathogens in the work place at their Health and Safety
Symposium in Scottsdale, AZ on November 12. The scope is industry wide,
not limited to the copper industry.
Reply to: Emil Milker at emilker@cda.
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 23 Sep 2002 09:37:36 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Sue Quinn
Subject: Bay Area rx safety glasses suggestions?
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Hi all-
I feel like I should ask something about child forms or pink cards, but =
I'm going to have to let you down...
We have a prescription safety glasses program and I have been using the =
same vendor for several years. I am shopping around to see if there are =
other vendors in the SF Bay Area with good reps, reasonable prices, etc. =
Any suggestions?
Thanks-
Sue
Suzanne M. Quinn
Senior Manager, Environmental Health and Safety
Exelixis, Inc.
PO Box 511
South San Francisco, CA 94083-0511
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Hi all-
I feel like I should ask something = about child forms or pink cards, but I'm going to have to let you = down...
We have a prescription safety glasses = program and I have been using the same vendor for several years. I am shopping = around to see if there are other vendors in the SF Bay Area with good reps, = reasonable prices, etc. Any suggestions?
Thanks-
Sue
Suzanne M. Quinn
Senior Manager, = Environmental Health and Safety
Exelixis, Inc.
PO Box 511
South San = Francisco, CA 94083-0511
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=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 23 Sep 2002 10:14:11 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Hofherr, Leslie"
Subject: Notificaiton of Possession
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
This is a question for Ed Gaunt...
How do we update our summary form? A researcher has just received one of the organisms on the notification list and it was not included in the summary form sent by the Sept. 10 deadline. We did not possess this select agent at that time but now we do.
Please let me know how to update or amend our facilities notification of possession of Select Agents and High Consequence Livestock Pathogens and Toxins.
Thanks,
Leslie Hofherr
UCLA Biosafety
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 23 Sep 2002 14:28:02 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ed Gaunt
Subject: Re: Notification of Possession
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
If you did not possess it on 9/10, you do not need to report it for
notification, unless it is a USDA Agent (the "C" List). (If it is an USDA
Agent contact me off list and I'll let you know what to do.)
HOWEVER, if you have a DHHS Select Agent Program Registration or Certificate
Number and this is NOT one of the agents that is listed on the certificate,
you need to submit a revision to your facility's certificate. If you are
NOT already registered with the Select Agent Program and possess DHHS and/or
Overlap agents, you need to go to the LRSAT Web site and download an
application to complete and submit
(). (Apply now and avoid the
mad rush!)
Ed
-----Original Message-----
From: Hofherr, Leslie [mailto:leslie@FACNET.UCLA.EDU]
Sent: Monday, September 23, 2002 1:14 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Notificaiton of Possession
This is a question for Ed Gaunt...
How do we update our summary form? A researcher has just received one of the
organisms on the notification list and it was not included in the summary
form sent by the Sept. 10 deadline. We did not possess this select agent at
that time but now we do.
Please let me know how to update or amend our facilities notification of
possession of Select Agents and High Consequence Livestock Pathogens and
Toxins.
Thanks,
Leslie Hofherr
UCLA Biosafety
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 23 Sep 2002 15:09:18 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Hauck, Philip"
Subject: Re: bleach and autoclaving
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Hello, Paul:
One thing we worried about was sodium hypochlorite coming into contact =
with flammables, and combustibles like paper. Even though you are =
increasing temp and pressure a small amount, now that you threw in an =
oxidizer, the dynamics can change adversely!
Phi Hauck.
-----Original Message-----
From: Paul Rubock [mailto:pr18@COLUMBIA.EDU]
Sent: Saturday, September 21, 2002 1:46 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: bleach and autoclaving
Having looked through a number of University Biosafety websites, I see a
full range of opinions as to the advisability of autoclaving =
bleach-treated
materials. Some sites have explicit caveats; others, particularly when
bleach-treated spill clean-up materials are involved, urge full steam =
(pun
intended) ahead.
I remember the odor complaints generated when we discovered that an
investigator was autoclaving bleached toxin solutions. I don't know =
whether
the chlorine levels reached a level deemed hazardous by the IH folks but
perceptions are very important.
I am curious as to how others address:
1-Adequacy of bleach-only disinfection;
2-Control of noxious odors if both steps are done; and
3-Other disinfectants that may be useful in avoiding unpleasant odors in
situations where autoclaving is considering an appropriate follow-up to
chemical disinfection.
I'm talking about vegetative bacteria and lipid-enveloped viruses, the
relatively easy to kill stuff.
All comments gratefully appreciated.
Thank you,
Paul Rubock
Biosafety
Columbia University
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 23 Sep 2002 14:59:36 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "OLINGER, PATRICIA L [S&C/0216]"
Subject: Re: Post Cards
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
I have to agree with you Ginger. On the other hand, maybe if enough VPs
have to sign they'll let they're congressman know what they think of this
process.
I'd like to know the final cost of the postage alone.
Patty
-----Original Message-----
From: Ginger Brown [mailto:gingerbrown@TAMU.EDU]
Sent: Monday, September 23, 2002 9:13 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Post Cards
Gotta tell you......... I'm very hesitant to tell the Vice President who
signed
as the RFO that now he must sign numerous pink post cards !
Ginger
>>> egaunt@ 09/20/02 05:12PM >>>
RFO signs and returns if non-possession (or if the Notification Form should
have been a child form, if the summary form was already submitted).
If possession, you must request a new form from the Help Line if the
original Notification Form was thrown away.
Ed
-----Original Message-----
From: Ginger Brown [mailto:gingerbrown@TAMU.EDU]
Sent: Friday, September 20, 2002 4:41 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Post Cards
If a PI did not return a form.......... threw it away, lost it, whatever.
And, now the PI receives the pink post card, does the PI sign the
card and return it? Or does the designated RFO have to sign each
one of these cards and return it?
Ginger Brown
>>> egaunt@ 09/20/02 03:00PM >>>
We fully expected that cards and forms would pass in the mail. It has been
taking the Post Office up to a week or more to deliver some forms. If they
sent in a form anytime after Labor Day and got a card, I would not be too
concerned. We process everything we receive on the day we receive it, so
there is no lag time in processing on our end (the list was generated after
processing was completed on the evening of the 13th).
If folks receive a card and they know they returned a form, they do not need
to do anything. We MAY be mailing out another reminder card after Oct 11th
of catch all of the USDA list possessors and anyone else who has not
responded by that date, so if they get a second postcard after mailing in a
form in early Sept, then, we'd like to know about it. REMEMBER, if there
was concern about delivery of forms, you were given an option of (and
instructions for) having delivery confirmation in the Guidance Document.
Ed
-----Original Message-----
From: Ginger Brown [mailto:gingerbrown@TAMU.EDU]
Sent: Friday, September 20, 2002 12:02 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Post Cards
Ed,
Why in the world are post cards going to people whose form WAS returned?
I've already heard from three people this morning asking me what they are
supposed to do with the post card and these are folks whose form was
returned with our 'official' notification.
Really appreciate all your help during this confusing process.
Ginger Brown, CBSP
Env Health & Safety
TX A&M University
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 23 Sep 2002 13:10:03 -0700
Reply-To: info@
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Lynne Fairhurst
Organization: KnowedgeWare Comm. Corp.
Subject: Commercial - Press Release
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="Boundary_(ID_mXuTkIlC4KPQzcN7x2yiBg)"
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Content-type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
Content-transfer-encoding: quoted-printable
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Simply Safety!=AE V2.7 Incident Management Software Released
Vancouver, British Columbia - September 1, 2002 - KnowledgeWare =
Communications Corp. announces the release of Simply Safety!=AE V2.7 =
Incident Management software - the easiest-to-use OHS management =
software program. Simply Safety!=AE tracks, graphs, and reports on all =
aspects of industrial safety - including people, injuries, incident =
costs, work orders, claims, damages, employee training, MSDS expiry, =
minutes, medical tests and many other items - and includes a built-in =
action calendar/scheduling system. The latest additions to Simply =
Safety!=AE include e-mail capability, driver's license tracking, a more =
intuitive training tracking/scheduling module, regulatory incident =
report forms - and dozens of other usability enhancements. Free demo =
downloads are available at . For information call =
1-604-467-4682 (Pacific Time Zone) or E-mail: sales@
--Boundary_(ID_mXuTkIlC4KPQzcN7x2yiBg)
Content-type: text/html; charset=iso-8859-1
Content-transfer-encoding: quoted-printable
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Simply Safety!=AE V2.7 Incident Management Software Released
Vancouver, British Columbia - September 1, 2002 - KnowledgeWare Communications Corp. announces the release of Simply Safety!=AE V2.7 = Incident Management software - the easiest-to-use OHS management software = program. Simply Safety!=AE tracks, graphs, and reports on all aspects of industrial = safety - including people, injuries, incident costs, work orders, claims, = damages, employee training, MSDS expiry, minutes, medical tests and many other = items - and includes a built-in action calendar/scheduling system. The latest = additions to Simply Safety!=AE include e-mail capability, driver's license = tracking, a more intuitive training tracking/scheduling module, regulatory incident = report forms - and dozens of other usability enhancements. Free demo downloads are = available at . For information call 1-604-467-4682 (Pacific Time = Zone) or E-mail: sales@
--Boundary_(ID_mXuTkIlC4KPQzcN7x2yiBg)--
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 23 Sep 2002 16:46:19 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ed Gaunt
Subject: Re: Post Cards
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
$152,177.80 (so far)
-----Original Message-----
From: OLINGER, PATRICIA L [S&C/0216]
[mailto:patricia.l.olinger@]
Sent: Monday, September 23, 2002 4:00 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Post Cards
I have to agree with you Ginger. On the other hand, maybe if enough VPs
have to sign they'll let they're congressman know what they think of this
process.
I'd like to know the final cost of the postage alone.
Patty
-----Original Message-----
From: Ginger Brown [mailto:gingerbrown@TAMU.EDU]
Sent: Monday, September 23, 2002 9:13 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Post Cards
Gotta tell you......... I'm very hesitant to tell the Vice President who
signed
as the RFO that now he must sign numerous pink post cards !
Ginger
>>> egaunt@ 09/20/02 05:12PM >>>
RFO signs and returns if non-possession (or if the Notification Form should
have been a child form, if the summary form was already submitted).
If possession, you must request a new form from the Help Line if the
original Notification Form was thrown away.
Ed
-----Original Message-----
From: Ginger Brown [mailto:gingerbrown@TAMU.EDU]
Sent: Friday, September 20, 2002 4:41 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Post Cards
If a PI did not return a form.......... threw it away, lost it, whatever.
And, now the PI receives the pink post card, does the PI sign the
card and return it? Or does the designated RFO have to sign each
one of these cards and return it?
Ginger Brown
>>> egaunt@ 09/20/02 03:00PM >>>
We fully expected that cards and forms would pass in the mail. It has been
taking the Post Office up to a week or more to deliver some forms. If they
sent in a form anytime after Labor Day and got a card, I would not be too
concerned. We process everything we receive on the day we receive it, so
there is no lag time in processing on our end (the list was generated after
processing was completed on the evening of the 13th).
If folks receive a card and they know they returned a form, they do not need
to do anything. We MAY be mailing out another reminder card after Oct 11th
of catch all of the USDA list possessors and anyone else who has not
responded by that date, so if they get a second postcard after mailing in a
form in early Sept, then, we'd like to know about it. REMEMBER, if there
was concern about delivery of forms, you were given an option of (and
instructions for) having delivery confirmation in the Guidance Document.
Ed
-----Original Message-----
From: Ginger Brown [mailto:gingerbrown@TAMU.EDU]
Sent: Friday, September 20, 2002 12:02 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Post Cards
Ed,
Why in the world are post cards going to people whose form WAS returned?
I've already heard from three people this morning asking me what they are
supposed to do with the post card and these are folks whose form was
returned with our 'official' notification.
Really appreciate all your help during this confusing process.
Ginger Brown, CBSP
Env Health & Safety
TX A&M University
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 23 Sep 2002 16:08:58 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Katrina Doolittle
Subject: NIH Guidelines
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="------------FA309DAFF515560EA9ACD88F"
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--------------FA309DAFF515560EA9ACD88F
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Greetings from a newcomer. We have just expanded our biosafety program (that is expanded in scope, not in support) and changing the rules in the midst of ongoing research is quite the experience. Is it recognized today that PCR fragments are exempt from
NIH guidelines unless they are cloned into a vector that will replicate in a living system? Should they be registered with the Biosafety Committee even if they are exempt?
Thanks,
Katrina Doolittle, Ph.D.
Director
Environmental Health & Safety
New Mexico State University
Las Cruces, NM 88003
505.646.3327
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 23 Sep 2002 15:25:48 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ben Owens
Subject: Containment Ventilation Specifications
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When designing room ventilation for a BSL3 lab, what performance
specifications are used for the room ventilation to achieve containment
(directional airflow)? I can imagine specifications based on air volume
differential between makeup air and exhaust air (to achieve negative
pressure), or a specific pressure differential between the room and
outside areas; however, I have not seen any generally accepted criteria.
Thanks,
Ben
------------
Ben Owens
Chemical Hygiene Officer
Environmental Health and Safety Department, MS 328
University of Nevada, Reno 89557
(775) 327-5196
(775) 784-4553 fax
------=_NextPart_000_0002_01C26315.7E46D6F0
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charset="Windows-1252"
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xmlns:w=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:word" = xmlns:st1=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags" = xmlns=3D"">
When designing room = ventilation for a BSL3 lab, what performance specifications are used for the room = ventilation to achieve containment (directional airflow)? I can imagine specifications = based on air volume differential between makeup air and exhaust air (to achieve = negative pressure), or a specific pressure differential between the room and = outside areas; however, I have not seen any generally accepted = criteria.
Thanks,
Ben
------------
Ben = Owens
Chemical Hygiene = Officer
Environmental Health and = Safety Department, MS 328
University of Nevada, Reno 89557
(775) 327-5196
(775) 784-4553 fax
------=_NextPart_000_0002_01C26315.7E46D6F0--
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 23 Sep 2002 18:24:23 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Petuch, Brian R."
Subject: Re: Containment Ventilation Specifications
MIME-Version: 1.0
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0.05 to 0.07 inches of water are common values. You can go higher, but
doors will become difficult to open.
Brian Petuch
Biological Pilot Plant
Safety / Regulatory Operations
Merck Research Labs
WP17-301
West Point, PA 19486-0004
Office 215-652-4039
Fax 215-993-4911
pager 800-759-8888 pin 1380162
-----Original Message-----
From: Ben Owens [mailto:bowens@UNR.EDU]
Sent: Monday, September 23, 2002 6:26 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Containment Ventilation Specifications
When designing room ventilation for a BSL3 lab, what performance
specifications are used for the room ventilation to achieve containment
(directional airflow)? I can imagine specifications based on air volume
differential between makeup air and exhaust air (to achieve negative
pressure), or a specific pressure differential between the room and outside
areas; however, I have not seen any generally accepted criteria.
Thanks,
Ben
------------
Ben Owens
Chemical Hygiene Officer
Environmental Health and Safety Department, MS 328
University of Nevada, Reno 89557
(775) 327-5196
(775) 784-4553 fax
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notice: This e-mail message, together with any attachments, contains information of Merck & Co., Inc. (Whitehouse Station, New Jersey, USA) that may be confidential, proprietary copyrighted and/or legally privileged, and is intended solely for the use of the individual or entity named on this message. If you are not the intended recipient, and have received this message in error, please immediately return this by e-mail and then delete it.
=============================================================================
------_=_NextPart_001_01C2634F.F7C9F810
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charset=windows-1252
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office" xmlns:w =3D "urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:word" xmlns:st1 =3D "urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags">
0.05 to 0.07 inches of water are common values. You can go higher, but = doors will become difficult to open.
Brian Petuch
Biological Pilot Plant
Safety / Regulatory Operations
Merck Research= Labs
WP17-301
West Point, PA 19486-0004
Office 215-652-4039
Fax 215-993-4911=
pager 800-759-8888 pin 1380162 =
-----Original Message-----
From: Ben Owens [mailto:bowens@UNR.EDU]
Sent: Monday, September 23, 2002 6:26 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Containment Ventilation Specifications
I can imagine specifications base= d= on air volume differential between makeup air and exhaust air (to achieve = negative pressure), or a specific pressure differential between the room and outside= areas; however, I have not seen any generally accepted criteria.
Ben Owens
Chemical Hygiene Officer
Environmental Health and Safety= Department, MS 328
of Nevada, Reno 89557
(775) 327-5196
(775) 784-4553 =66ax
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 24 Sep 2002 09:53:48 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ed Gaunt
Subject: Smallpox Vaccination Guide
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="----_=_NextPart_000_01C263D1.CEAAA600"
Here is something ya'll might be interested in...especially if you read this
morning's USA Today...
Ed
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 24 Sep 2002 09:13:05 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ginger Brown
Subject: Polio Survey
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Group-
I've been reading information about the upcoming world survey of labs to =
locate polio virus samples and can't figure
out if this is mandated by any law........ or is it just a good idea that =
the U.S. is committed to? Also, the information
indicates that the national survey begins on October 1st, but I haven't =
found a due date for the inventory summary
to be submitted. I fear that great apathy is going to be generated by =
sending out yet another request for inventory
information. After the CDC/ USDA Notification, then the APHIS plant =
pathogen notification, and now this DHSS/ WHO
inventory, it is difficult to stimulate compliance. Wouldn't it be =
wonderful if everyone got together and sent out ONE
LIST....... ONE TIME....... asking about the inventory of hazardous =
biological agents?
Ginger Brown, CBSP
Env Health & Safety
TX A&M University
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 24 Sep 2002 10:57:24 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ed Gaunt
Subject: Re: Polio Survey
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Check out the following sites...
The polio initiative has been going on for a while, whereas the Notification
Process was mandated by the President's AT Bill in June so that DHHS and
USDA could get timely data to make decisions affecting the rule-making
process. The rules for implementing PL 107-188 need to be published on or
about December 9, 2003, and we could not wait for the results of the polio
survey which will not be completed until 2003...
Ed
-----Original Message-----
From: Ginger Brown [mailto:gingerbrown@TAMU.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, September 24, 2002 10:13 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Polio Survey
Group-
I've been reading information about the upcoming world survey of labs to
locate polio virus samples and can't figure
out if this is mandated by any law........ or is it just a good idea that
the U.S. is committed to? Also, the information
indicates that the national survey begins on October 1st, but I haven't
found a due date for the inventory summary
to be submitted. I fear that great apathy is going to be generated by
sending out yet another request for inventory
information. After the CDC/ USDA Notification, then the APHIS plant pathogen
notification, and now this DHSS/ WHO
inventory, it is difficult to stimulate compliance. Wouldn't it be wonderful
if everyone got together and sent out ONE
LIST....... ONE TIME....... asking about the inventory of hazardous
biological agents?
Ginger Brown, CBSP
Env Health & Safety
TX A&M University
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 24 Sep 2002 11:35:09 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Doob, Peter (NIDA/IRP)"
Subject: Re: Polio Survey
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
I understand Ginger's concern about getting bombarded with biohazard
inventory demands, but . . . in all honesty, if the agents at issue were not
infectious agents but were instead radioactive materials, we would know
their identity and where they all were located in our facilities, as they
are tracked cradle to grave. If we worked in industry, we would probably
know where all our hazardous agents of every flavor were housed, chemical,
biological and radiological.
If the effort at producing good inventory information on used/stored
biologicals seems challenging, well, perhaps that's what years of laissez
faire attitudes in our more relaxed research institutions gets us.
NIH performed one of the pilot polio stock inventory efforts, in advance of
the nationwide program rollout. For my Institute, it meant getting PI's to
examine every item on every shelf in every freezer, and then sign warranting
that they had no qualifying samples in possession. At times it felt like
the folks who take cores on glaciers and speculate on the cold chunk of
history they have melting in their hands, especially towards the back of the
shelves in uprights or at the bottom of the chest freezers.... Bottom line:
investigators threw out a lot of samples no longer needed and gained a space
windfall.
Peter A. Doob, MPH, JD
Chief, Safety and Operations Support Section, ASB
National Institute for Drug Abuse, NIH
Intramural Research Program
5500 Nathan Shock Drive
Baltimore, MD 21224
vc: 410-550-1675
> ----------
> From: Ginger Brown
> Reply To: A Biosafety Discussion List
> Sent: Tuesday, September 24, 2002 10:13 AM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: Polio Survey
>
> Group-
> I've been reading information about the upcoming world survey of labs to
> locate polio virus samples and can't figure
> out if this is mandated by any law........ or is it just a good idea that
> the U.S. is committed to? Also, the information
> indicates that the national survey begins on October 1st, but I haven't
> found a due date for the inventory summary
> to be submitted. I fear that great apathy is going to be generated by
> sending out yet another request for inventory
> information. After the CDC/ USDA Notification, then the APHIS plant
> pathogen notification, and now this DHSS/ WHO
> inventory, it is difficult to stimulate compliance. Wouldn't it be
> wonderful if everyone got together and sent out ONE
> LIST....... ONE TIME....... asking about the inventory of hazardous
> biological agents?
>
> Ginger Brown, CBSP
> Env Health & Safety
> TX A&M University
>
>
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 24 Sep 2002 12:02:17 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Paul Jennette
Subject: Re: Containment Ventilation Specifications
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="=====================_1305220147==_.ALT"
--=====================_1305220147==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
Ben,
We wrestled with this issue when we upgraded two "old" BSL-3 facilities a
couple of years ago. We found that controlling based on differential
pressures (i.e., maintaining a specific setpoint like 0.05" W.C.) did not
necessarily result in directional airflow under dynamic (i.e., doors
opening and closing, people walking in and out) conditions. Depending on
how tight a door is sealed, the differential pressure across the door can
easily be made to be whatever you want - a tightly sealed door can give you
0.05" with very little airflow, but a "normal" door requires much more flow
because the gap between the door and the jamb is larger. Either way, as
soon as the door is opened, the pressure differential goes to zero -- it's
the airflow through the doorway that provides the containment
Controlling based on airflow offsets (i.e., maintaining a specific
differential between the supply and exhaust flowrates) gave us much better
containment performance. We found that there is no one offset setpoint
that worked for every doorway, however; factors like temperature
differential between rooms, the presence of eddy currents, and the simple
size of the door all affected the amount of air flow we needed to maintain
containment. So, we tested the airflow direction at each doorway (using
smoke) and adjusted the flow offset to make sure the air moved in the
direction we wanted, under a variety of conditions. We found it was
essential to check the flow direction at several different points in the
doorway, especially when adjacent rooms are at different temperatures, as
warmer air would tend to flow "in" near the top of the doorway and cooler
air would tend to flow "out" near the floor.
Of course, higher airflow offsets can affect the ease of opening doors; we
worked around this in two ways. In some situations, it was acceptable to
simply make the door-to-jamb seal more open, so that the pressure
differential would be lower. In others, we enhanced the HVAC controls so
that the airflow offset toggles between "high" and "low" settings when the
door is opened or closed.
I hope this helps!
Cheers
- Paul
At 03:25 PM 9/23/2002 -0700, you wrote:
>When designing room ventilation for a BSL3 lab, what performance
>specifications are used for the room ventilation to achieve containment
>(directional airflow)? I can imagine specifications based on air volume
>differential between makeup air and exhaust air (to achieve negative
>pressure), or a specific pressure differential between the room and
>outside areas; however, I have not seen any generally accepted criteria.
>
>
>
>Thanks,
>
>Ben
>
>------------
>
>Ben Owens
>
>Chemical Hygiene Officer
>
>Environmental Health and Safety Department, MS 328
>
>University of Nevada, Reno 89557
>
>(775) 327-5196
>
>(775) 784-4553 fax
>
>
J. Paul Jennette, P.E.
Biosafety Engineer
Cornell University
College of Veterinary Medicine
Biosafety Program
S3-010 Schurman Hall, Box 4 (607) 253-4227
Ithaca, New York 14853-6401 fax -3723
--=====================_1305220147==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
Ben,
We wrestled with this issue when we upgraded two "old" BSL-3 facilities a couple of years ago. We found that controlling based on differential pressures (i.e., maintaining a specific setpoint like 0.05" W.C.) did not necessarily result in directional airflow under dynamic (i.e., doors opening and closing, people walking in and out) conditions. Depending on how tight a door is sealed, the differential pressure across the door can easily be made to be whatever you want - a tightly sealed door can give you 0.05" with very little airflow, but a "normal" door requires much more flow because the gap between the door and the jamb is larger. Either way, as soon as the door is opened, the pressure differential goes to zero -- it's the airflow through the doorway that provides the containment
Controlling based on airflow offsets (i.e., maintaining a specific differential between the supply and exhaust flowrates) gave us much better containment performance. We found that there is no one offset setpoint that worked for every doorway, however; factors like temperature differential between rooms, the presence of eddy currents, and the simple size of the door all affected the amount of air flow we needed to maintain containment. So, we tested the airflow direction at each doorway (using smoke) and adjusted the flow offset to make sure the air moved in the direction we wanted, under a variety of conditions. We found it was essential to check the flow direction at several different points in the doorway, especially when adjacent rooms are at different temperatures, as warmer air would tend to flow "in" near the top of the doorway and cooler air would tend to flow "out" near the floor.
Of course, higher airflow offsets can affect the ease of opening doors; we worked around this in two ways. In some situations, it was acceptable to simply make the door-to-jamb seal more open, so that the pressure differential would be lower. In others, we enhanced the HVAC controls so that the airflow offset toggles between "high" and "low" settings when the door is opened or closed.
I hope this helps!
Cheers
- Paul
At 03:25 PM 9/23/2002 -0700, you wrote:
When designing room ventilation for a BSL3 lab, what performance specifications are used for the room ventilation to achieve containment (directional airflow)? I can imagine specifications based on air volume differential between makeup air and exhaust air (to achieve negative pressure), or a specific pressure differential between the room and outside areas; however, I have not seen any generally accepted criteria.
Thanks,
Ben
------------
Ben Owens
Chemical Hygiene Officer
Environmental Health and Safety Department, MS 328
University of Nevada, Reno 89557
(775) 327-5196
(775) 784-4553 fax
J. Paul Jennette, P.E.
Biosafety Engineer
Cornell University
College of Veterinary Medicine
Biosafety Program
S3-010 Schurman Hall, Box 4 (607) 253-4227
Ithaca, New York 14853-6401 fax -3723
--=====================_1305220147==_.ALT--
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 24 Sep 2002 12:03:41 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Donald G. Robasser"
Organization: Princeton University
Subject: USA Patriot Act Rules
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Can anyone tell me the status of rules implementing the USA Patriot Act
(Public Law 107-56), particularly related to the section under HR-3162
that prohibits "restricted persons" from possessing, shipping,
transporting, or receiving select agents. I am having trouble finding
any such rules.
How does this law (and any rules that may or may not already be in
place) relate to the current application for registration and transfer
of select agents thru CDC. I see that none of the application materials
mention restricted persons and I'm wondering if there are additional
application requirements related to the USA Patriot Act that I have not
seen. In other words, what does a facility need to do right now if they
want to register for select agent possession and use (beyond what is in
the registration guidelines and forms dated March 16, 2001).
Or are the "restricted persons" issues being addressed in the rules that
are coming out later this year in follow-up to the select agent
notification procedure that we are now going thru (related to the Public
Health Security & Bioterrorism Preparedness Act)?
I would appreciate any clarification that anyone can provide.
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 24 Sep 2002 12:43:30 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Hauck, Philip"
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="Boundary_(ID_4JTB3fLG8Wv3OZXGMEYY7g)"
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This question is for Ed Gaunt:
Now that I have my feet up on the desk and am relaxed =
(ha-ha), I see there is a submission to USDA due on October =
8 (I'm reading a FR with USDA Rules published in it).
That was taken care of by the dual submission to ASI, right? =
Please say "Yes"! I'm gearing up for the Polio Questionnaire =
which is next, after the CDC visit tomorrow. (Yes, folks, if you =
register your facility under LR/SAT,
the CDC will send inspectors to inspect the site and verify =
the information submitted).
Phil Hauck
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 24 Sep 2002 12:50:03 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Robert N. Latsch"
Subject: Re: Infection Control Question
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
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A different question to consider is this. Even if the material is not BBP
or OPIM, what kind of impression is being made when it is thrown away?
This can be more important than weather or not the waste is regulated.
Bob
>According to OSHA, red bag waste only includes material that would flunk
>the "squeeze test" - IF you were to squeeze it (DO NOT REALLY DO IT), blood
>or OPIM would drip out. If that's the case, then the material is red bag
>waste. If the material passes the "squeeze test" - nothing drips out, then
>it is regular trash. Bandages, etc, are designed to absorb small amounts of
>blood and should normally pass the test.
>
>Remember, tho, OSHA is only regulating human blood and OPIM. OSHA is also
>not the final say in the waste disposal when the material is heading for
>the landfill. You must check with your local and fedearl waste disposal
>regs and the local landfill.
>
>Also, OSHA only regulates employer-employee relations, so bloody material
>at home would not be under their jurisdiction, unless its work practices by
>a home health practitioner.
>
>
>Kim Auletta
>Lab Safety Specialist
>Environmental Health and Safety
>SUNY Stony Brook
>110 Suffolk Hall
>Stony Brook, NY 11794-6200
>phone: 631-632-9672
>fax: 631-632-9683
>email: kauletta@.sunysb.edu
>
>
>
>
> "Gergis, Nasr"
> To:
>BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Sent by: A cc:
> Biosafety Subject: Re: Infection
>Control Question
> Discussion List
> MIT.EDU>
>
>
> 09/22/2002 09:14
> PM
> Please respond to
> A Biosafety
> Discussion List
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>I came across a infectious waste educator in the hospital and research
>sites, who mentioned the following:
>If you have bandage or paper stained with few dropped of blood, you may
>dispose off as regular trash. Should we treat the infectious waste from
>hospital and research sites differently than home site? Thanks for your
>input.
>
>
>Nasr Gergis, Ph.D., DVM
>Biosafety & Safety Officer
>Occupational Safety and Health
>City of Hope/BRI
_____________________________________________________________________
__ / _____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 24 Sep 2002 12:01:36 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Burnett, LouAnn Crawford"
Subject: Re: Polio Survey
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There's also information on the ABSA website. Go to the homepage:
and then click on the Nationwide Survey for Polioviruses
link under "What's New" (on the right).
I feel your pain, Ginger. I actually put polioviruses on the list of
things for our researchers to declare while we were checking for the
other stuff. Didn't get any hits, but there'll be a few investigators
that I'll revisit this with.
LouAnn
LouAnn C. Burnett, MS, CBSP =09
Biosafety Program Manager & Biological Safety Officer=09
Vanderbilt University Environmental Health & Safety
Nashville, Tennessee
615/322-0927 (direct & voice mail)
615/343-4951 (fax) =09
-----Original Message-----
From: Ed Gaunt [mailto:egaunt@]
Sent: Tuesday, September 24, 2002 9:57 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Polio Survey
Check out the following sites...
The polio initiative has been going on for a while, whereas the
Notification Process was mandated by the President's AT Bill in June so
that DHHS and USDA could get timely data to make decisions affecting the
rule-making process. The rules for implementing PL 107-188 need to be
published on or about December 9, 2003, and we could not wait for the
results of the polio survey which will not be completed until 2003...
Ed
-----Original Message-----
From: Ginger Brown [mailto:gingerbrown@TAMU.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, September 24, 2002 10:13 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Polio Survey
Group-
I've been reading information about the upcoming world survey of labs to
locate polio virus samples and can't figure out if this is mandated by
any law........ or is it just a good idea that the U.S. is committed to?
Also, the information indicates that the national survey begins on
October 1st, but I haven't found a due date for the inventory summary to
be submitted. I fear that great apathy is going to be generated by
sending out yet another request for inventory information. After the
CDC/ USDA Notification, then the APHIS plant pathogen notification, and
now this DHSS/ WHO inventory, it is difficult to stimulate compliance.
Wouldn't it be wonderful if everyone got together and sent out ONE
LIST....... ONE TIME....... asking about the inventory of hazardous
biological agents?
Ginger Brown, CBSP
Env Health & Safety
TX A&M University
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 24 Sep 2002 13:37:24 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Richard Fink
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Please send all listserv commands to: listserv@mitvma.mit.edu
At 11:44 AM 9/23/2002 -0400, you wrote:
>UNSUBSCRIBE
>
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
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Date: Tue, 24 Sep 2002 13:40:11 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Richard Fink
Subject: Re: stopping mail
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At 08:04 AM 9/23/2002 -0800, you wrote:
>My apologies for the mundane question, but...
>
>How do I temporarily unsubscribe for vacation?
>
>Thanks.
To stop mail temporarily: send an email to: listserv@mitvma.mit.edu
In the body of the email type: set biosafty nomail
To resume send an email with: set biosafty mail
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Biosafty List Owner
rfink@mit.edu
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At 08:04 AM 9/23/2002 -0800, you wrote:
My apologies for the mundane question, but...
How do I temporarily unsubscribe for vacation?
Thanks.
To stop mail temporarily: send an email to: listserv@mitvma.mit.edu
In the body of the email type: set biosafty nomail
To resume send an email with: set biosafty mail
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Biosafty List Owner
rfink@mit.edu
--=====================_81409200==_.ALT--
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 24 Sep 2002 11:55:52 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Therese M. Stinnett"
Subject: Re: Infection Control Question---public "perception" v. real scie
nce
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Please remember these are my opinions....not necessarily an official
position of my employer....
But once again, we must ask ourselves if we are pandering to =
"perceptions"
at no small cost in dollars and resources and manhours, versus using =
the
science available to us (microbiology, virology, land use, water use,
groundwater science, etc etc etc) to determine the legal, ethical and =
cost
effective route to take.
The public we serve deserves an honest and science based explanation =
for
what we do. If we are "wasting" resources, by going on perceptions, =
when do
we get out of that hole?
Therese M. Stinnett
Biosafety Officer
Health and Safety Division
UCHSC, Mailstop C275
4200 E. 9th Avenue
Denver, CO
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 24 Sep 2002 13:14:14 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Johnson, Julie A."
Subject: Re: October 8 USDA deadline
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The reporting to USDA for possession of "high consequence livestock
pathogens or toxins" was taken care of by the dual submission to ASI.
There is another deadline of October 11 to report possession of listed plant
pathogens. You can download the regulation and reporting form (
PPQ FORM 655
-Notification of Possession or use of listed Plant Pathogens) at this web
site:
By the way, CDC inspectors are also coming here on Thursday for a select
agent inspection.
Julie A. Johnson, Ph.D., CBSP
Biosafety Officer
Environmental Health and Safety
118 Agronomy Lab
Iowa State University
Ames, IA 50011
Phone: 515-294-7657
Fax: 515-294-9357
Email: jajohns@iastate.edu
Web site: ehs.iastate.edu
-----Original Message-----
From: Hauck, Philip [mailto:philip.hauck@MSSM.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, September 24, 2002 11:44 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject:
This question is for Ed Gaunt:
Now that I have my feet up on the desk and am relaxed (ha-ha), I
see there is a submission to USDA due on October 8 (I'm reading
a FR with USDA Rules published in it).
That was taken care of by the dual submission to ASI, right?
Please say "Yes"! I'm gearing up for the Polio Questionnaire
which is next, after the CDC visit tomorrow. (Yes, folks, if you register
your facility under LR/SAT,
the CDC will send inspectors to inspect the site and verify the
information submitted).
Phil Hauck
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The reporting to USDA for possession of "high consequence livestock = pathogens or toxins" was taken care of by the dual submission to ASI.
There is another deadline of October 11 to report = possession of listed plant pathogens. You can download the regulation and = reporting form (PPQ FORM 655 -Notification of Possession or use of listed Plant Pathogens) at this web site:
aphis.ppq/permits/bioterrorism/
By the way, CDC inspectors are also coming here on Thursday for a select = agent inspection.
Julie A. Johnson, = Ph.D., CBSP
Biosafety Officer =
Environmental Health and Safety
118 Agronomy Lab
Iowa = State University
Ames, IA = 50011
Phone: 515-294-7657 =
Fax: 515-294-9357
Email: jajohns@iastate.edu
Web site: ehs.iastate.edu =
-----Original = Message-----
From: Hauck, Philip [mailto:philip.hauck@MSSM.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, = September 24, 2002 11:44 AM
To: = BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject:
This question is for Ed Gaunt:
Now that I have my feet up on the desk and am relaxed (ha-ha), I = see there is a submission to USDA due on October 8 (I'm reading a FR with USDA Rules published in it).
That was taken care of by the dual submission to ASI, right? = Please say "Yes"! I'm gearing up for the Polio Questionnaire which is next, after the CDC visit tomorrow. (Yes, = folks, if you register your facility under LR/SAT, =
the CDC
Phil Hauck
------_=_NextPart_001_01C263F6.30923CB0--
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 24 Sep 2002 14:23:49 EDT
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Ira F. Salkin"
Subject: Re: Polio Survey
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The next issue of Applied Biosafety contains two articles on the polio
survey, one which relates the history behind the legislation and the second
describes the procedures used by two large facilities to conduct the polio
survey. The journal should be in the mail by the end of this week or at the
beginning of next week.
Ira F. Salkin, Ph.D., F(AAM)
Editor
Applied Biosafety
irasalkin@
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The next issue of Applied Biosafety contains two articles on the polio survey, one which relates the history behind the legislation and the second describes the procedures used by two large facilities to conduct the polio survey. The journal should be in the mail by the end of this week or at the beginning of next week.
Ira F. Salkin, Ph.D., F(AAM)
Editor
Applied Biosafety
irasalkin@
--part1_4d.249ba4e4.2ac207b5_boundary--
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 24 Sep 2002 14:24:24 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ed Gaunt
Subject: Re: USA Patriot Act Rules
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Rules for personnel background investigations, etc (to determine restricted
persons) are being developed even as I type....
The draft will be published Dec 9th for 60-day comment (several days ago, I
indicated that the comment period would be 90 days...I was wrong). The
registration application will be changed once the rules are in place...
Ed
-----Original Message-----
From: Donald G. Robasser [mailto:robasser@PRINCETON.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, September 24, 2002 12:04 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: USA Patriot Act Rules
Can anyone tell me the status of rules implementing the USA Patriot Act
(Public Law 107-56), particularly related to the section under HR-3162
that prohibits "restricted persons" from possessing, shipping,
transporting, or receiving select agents. I am having trouble finding
any such rules.
How does this law (and any rules that may or may not already be in
place) relate to the current application for registration and transfer
of select agents thru CDC. I see that none of the application materials
mention restricted persons and I'm wondering if there are additional
application requirements related to the USA Patriot Act that I have not
seen. In other words, what does a facility need to do right now if they
want to register for select agent possession and use (beyond what is in
the registration guidelines and forms dated March 16, 2001).
Or are the "restricted persons" issues being addressed in the rules that
are coming out later this year in follow-up to the select agent
notification procedure that we are now going thru (related to the Public
Health Security & Bioterrorism Preparedness Act)?
I would appreciate any clarification that anyone can provide.
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 24 Sep 2002 14:31:53 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ed Gaunt
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The October 8 (or 11th) deadline is ONLY for folks who ONLY possess agents
on the "C" List (High Consequence Livestock Pathogens and Toxins). If you
already submitted your forms, you're golden... Only Ag folks who posses Ag
agents (and not any overlap [B list] or DHHS agents [A List]) have until Oct
to report...IF anyone had agents on the C List as well as the A and/or B
lists (or non-possession), the notification deadline was 9/10.
USDA recalculated the due date from 10/8 to 10/11 because of a weekend that
had not been accounted for when the original date (10/8) was set.
Ed
-----Original Message-----
From: Hauck, Philip [mailto:philip.hauck@MSSM.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, September 24, 2002 12:44 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject:
This question is for Ed Gaunt:
Now that I have my feet up on the desk and am relaxed (ha-ha), I
see there is a submission to USDA due on October 8 (I'm reading
a FR with USDA Rules published in it).
That was taken care of by the dual submission to ASI, right?
Please say "Yes"! I'm gearing up for the Polio Questionnaire
which is next, after the CDC visit tomorrow. (Yes, folks, if you register
your facility under LR/SAT,
the CDC will send inspectors to inspect the site and verify the
information submitted).
Phil Hauck
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"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office" xmlns:w =3D "urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:word">
The October 8 (or 11th) deadline is ONLY for folks who ONLY possess agents = on the "C" List (High Consequence Livestock Pathogens and Toxins). If = you already submitted your forms, you're golden... Only Ag folks who = posses Ag agents (and not any overlap [B list] or DHHS agents [A List]) have = until Oct to report...IF anyone had agents on the C List as well as the A = and/or B lists (or non-possession), the notification deadline was 9/10.
USDA recalculated the due date from 10/8 to 10/11 because of a weekend that = had not been accounted for when the original date (10/8) was set.
Ed
-----Original Message-----
From: Hauck, Philip [mailto:philip.hauck@MSSM.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, September 24, = 2002 12:44 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject:
This question is for Ed Gaunt:
Now that I have my feet up on the desk and am relaxed (ha-ha), = I see there is a submission to USDA due on October 8 (I'm reading a FR with USDA Rules published in it).
That was taken care of by the dual submission to ASI, right? = Please say "Yes"! I'm gearing up for the Polio Questionnaire which is next, after the CDC visit tomorrow. = (Yes, folks, if you register your facility under LR/SAT, =
the CDC
Phil Hauck
------_=_NextPart_001_01C263F8.A7C91E50-- ========================================================================= Date: Tue, 24 Sep 2002 14:46:37 -0400 Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List From: David Gillum Subject: Plant Pathogen Registration Questions MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Please forgive me if these questions have already been asked and answered? In regard to the plant pathogen reporting, will we be getting another notification form? If yes, who will it come from? Also, do we have to report non-possession? Liberobacter africanus, Liberobacter asiaticus Peronosclerospora philippinensis Phakopsora pachyrhizi Plum pox potyvirus Ralstonia solanacearum Race 3 Sclerophthora rayssiae var. zeae Synchytrium endobioticum Xanthomonas oryzae pv. oryzicola Xylella fastidiosa (citrus variegated chlorosis strain) Thank you in advance! -- David R. Gillum Laboratory Safety Officer Environmental Health and Safety 11 Leavitt Lane, Perpetuity Hall Durham, NH 03824 Telephone #: 603-862-0197 Facsimile #: 603-862-0047 ========================================================================= Date: Tue, 24 Sep 2002 11:51:56 -0700 Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List From: "Gergis, Nasr" Subject: Re: Red Card MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="----_=_NextPart_001_01C263FA.F071301E" This message is in MIME format. Since your mail reader does not understand this format, some or all of this message may not be legible. ------_=_NextPart_001_01C263FA.F071301E Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Good morning to you all. I understand this question was raised before on the Biosafety Discussion. I have a P.I. received the pink card and he does not possess any SA. DO I have to ask the P.I. to fill the red send card and then I send it back to the preprinted address. Thanks. Nasr Gergis, Ph.D., DVM Biosafety & Safety Officer/Interim Director Occupational Safety and Health City of Hope/BRI ------_=_NextPart_001_01C263FA.F071301E Content-Type: text/html; charset=iso-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable RE: Red Card
Good morning to you all. I understand this question = was raised before on the Biosafety Discussion. I have a P.I. received = the pink card and he does not possess any SA. DO I have to ask the P.I. = to fill the red send card and then I send it back to the preprinted = address. Thanks.
Nasr Gergis, Ph.D., DVM
Biosafety & Safety Officer/Interim = Director
Occupational Safety and Health
City of Hope/BRI
------_=_NextPart_001_01C263FA.F071301E--
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 24 Sep 2002 15:13:14 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Robert N. Latsch"
Subject: Re: Infection Control Question---public "perception" v. real scie
nce
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
The correct answer is absolutley!
But many of us have no choice. For various reasons mistrust is a part of
our interactions with our communities. You can have all of the trust in
the world with the best of intentions to be good and responsible corporate
citizens. And it will all be wiped out in a second due to
misunderstandings and apprehensions. We are not the miscreants, BUT, we
must work to avoid being painted with that brush.
The most latest local issue of this nature is the local nuclear power
plant. You would not believe the public pating they are taking in the
papers along with the NRC. The management team has been fired. The
workers have publicly stated that they do not trust anybody at corporate
since they are profit driven.
This is by nature a defensive approach but it is necessary in these times.
Bob
>Please remember these are my opinions....not necessarily an official
>position of my employer....
>
>But once again, we must ask ourselves if we are pandering to "perceptions"
>at no small cost in dollars and resources and manhours, versus using the
>science available to us (microbiology, virology, land use, water use,
>groundwater science, etc etc etc) to determine the legal, ethical and cost
>effective route to take.
>
>The public we serve deserves an honest and science based explanation for
>what we do. If we are "wasting" resources, by going on perceptions, when do
>we get out of that hole?
>
>Therese M. Stinnett
>Biosafety Officer
>Health and Safety Division
>UCHSC, Mailstop C275
>4200 E. 9th Avenue
>Denver, CO 80262
>Voice: 303-315-6754
>Pager: 303-266-5402
>Fax: 303-315-8026
>email: therese.stinnett@uchsc.edu
_____________________________________________________________________
__ / _____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
=========================================================================
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 24 Sep 2002 15:56:53 -0500
Reply-To: speaker@ehs.psu.edu
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Curt Speaker
Organization: UNIVERSITY SAFETY
Subject: Re: USA Patriot Act Rules
In-Reply-To:
Ed (et. al.):
I really appreciate your sharing of information to our listserv.
However, you do not work for the Federal government, and some of
us have directors that will not be satisfied until they get the
information from the government first-hand.
Can anyone at CDC or another Federal Agency back up Ed's post
about the PATRIOT Act? My last resort (since they will not call me
back) is to send a registered letter to the CDC Office of General
Counsel asking for clarification on this matter. My director will be
satisfied with nothing less...
These questions regarding the PATRIOT Act have been posted to
numerous times by numerous people (including me)
and no one except Ed has taken a stab at answering them. There is
a real information/knowledge void here. The PATRIOT Act was
signed into law 6/12/02, yet no one seems to be too concerned
about complying with it yet (compared to the SA regs.)
Curt
Curt Speaker
Biosafety Officer
Penn State University
Environmental Health and Safety
speaker@ehs.psu.edu
^...^
(O_O)
=(Y)=
"""
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 24 Sep 2002 16:14:24 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ed Gaunt
Subject: Re: Red Card
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Correct...if non-possession, just sign and return the card. If you would
like to link the address on the postcard to a summary form already
submitted, you may write the summary form ID in the blank space on the
center panel of the post card and send it back. We will treat it like a
"child" form.
EEG
-----Original Message-----
From: Gergis, Nasr [mailto:NGergis@]
Sent: Tuesday, September 24, 2002 2:52 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Red Card
Good morning to you all. I understand this question was raised before on the
Biosafety Discussion. I have a P.I. received the pink card and he does not
possess any SA. DO I have to ask the P.I. to fill the red send card and then
I send it back to the preprinted address. Thanks.
Nasr Gergis, Ph.D., DVM
Biosafety & Safety Officer/Interim Director
Occupational Safety and Health
City of Hope/BRI
------_=_NextPart_001_01C26406.F99C59F0
Content-Type: text/html;
charset="iso-8859-1"
Correct...if non-possession, just sign and return the card. If you would like to link the address on the postcard to a summary form already submitted, you may write the summary form ID in the blank space on the center panel of the post card and send it back. We will treat it like a "child" form.
EEG
-----Original Message-----
From: Gergis, Nasr [mailto:NGergis@]
Sent: Tuesday, September 24, 2002 2:52 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Red Card
Good morning to you all. I understand this question was raised before on the Biosafety Discussion. I have a P.I. received the pink card and he does not possess any SA. DO I have to ask the P.I. to fill the red send card and then I send it back to the preprinted address. Thanks.
Nasr Gergis, Ph.D., DVM
Biosafety & Safety Officer/Interim Director
Occupational Safety and Health
City of Hope/BRI
------_=_NextPart_001_01C26406.F99C59F0--
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 24 Sep 2002 16:31:11 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ed Gaunt
Subject: Re: USA Patriot Act Rules
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Folks at CDC and USDA that are working on the rules to implement the
regulations have been officially "embargoed" from discussing them with the
public (including me!) until they have been posted for public comment in
December...PLUS they are extremely busy (maybe even busier than me!) trying
to pull it all together by Dec.
Ed
-----Original Message-----
From: Curt Speaker [mailto:SPEAKER@SAFETY-1.SAFETY.PSU.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, September 24, 2002 4:57 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: USA Patriot Act Rules
Ed (et. al.):
I really appreciate your sharing of information to our listserv.
However, you do not work for the Federal government, and some of
us have directors that will not be satisfied until they get the
information from the government first-hand.
Can anyone at CDC or another Federal Agency back up Ed's post
about the PATRIOT Act? My last resort (since they will not call me
back) is to send a registered letter to the CDC Office of General
Counsel asking for clarification on this matter. My director will be
satisfied with nothing less...
These questions regarding the PATRIOT Act have been posted to
numerous times by numerous people (including me)
and no one except Ed has taken a stab at answering them. There is
a real information/knowledge void here. The PATRIOT Act was
signed into law 6/12/02, yet no one seems to be too concerned
about complying with it yet (compared to the SA regs.)
Curt
Curt Speaker
Biosafety Officer
Penn State University
Environmental Health and Safety
speaker@ehs.psu.edu
^...^
(O_O)
=(Y)=
"""
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 24 Sep 2002 17:27:24 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Carl Pike
Subject: Re: October 8 USDA deadline
In-Reply-To:
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="============_-1179219614==_ma============"
--============_-1179219614==_ma============
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed"
Can I confirm something about the USDA Plant Pathogen form? We are
only to file this form if we possess the listed agents, correct?
That is unlike the recent CDC/USDA form which had to be filed (with
different lines signed) whether or not we possessed the listed
agents. Thanks - this group is a great resource!
--============_-1179219614==_ma============
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
Can I confirm something about the USDA Plant Pathogen form? We are only to file this form if we possess the listed agents, correct? That is unlike the recent CDC/USDA form which had to be filed (with different lines signed) whether or not we possessed the listed agents. Thanks - this group is a great resource!
--============_-1179219614==_ma============--
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 24 Sep 2002 17:56:39 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ed Gaunt
Subject: Re: October 8 USDA deadline
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="----_=_NextPart_001_01C26415.4266F650"
This message is in MIME format. Since your mail reader does not understand
this format, some or all of this message may not be legible.
------_=_NextPart_001_01C26415.4266F650
Content-Type: text/plain;
charset="iso-8859-1"
Correct...submit only if possess.
Ed
-----Original Message-----
From: Carl Pike [mailto:carl.pike@FANDM.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, September 24, 2002 5:27 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: October 8 USDA deadline
Can I confirm something about the USDA Plant Pathogen form? We are only to
file this form if we possess the listed agents, correct? That is unlike
the recent CDC/USDA form which had to be filed (with different lines signed)
whether or not we possessed the listed agents. Thanks - this group is a
great resource!
------_=_NextPart_001_01C26415.4266F650
Content-Type: text/html;
charset="iso-8859-1"
Correct...submit only if possess.
Ed
-----Original Message-----
From: Carl Pike [mailto:carl.pike@FANDM.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, September 24, 2002 5:27 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: October 8 USDA deadline
Can I confirm something about the USDA Plant Pathogen form? We are only to file this form if we possess the listed agents, correct? That is unlike the recent CDC/USDA form which had to be filed (with different lines signed) whether or not we possessed the listed agents. Thanks - this group is a great resource!
------_=_NextPart_001_01C26415.4266F650--
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 25 Sep 2002 07:20:18 EDT
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Jim Kaufman
Subject: Not Receiving the full Digest
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="part1_f3.21c3b4bf.2ac2f5f2_boundary"
--part1_f3.21c3b4bf.2ac2f5f2_boundary
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="US-ASCII"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Can someone help correct the problem I'm having. I'm only receiving part of
the Digest message and nothing to download if I want the rest. Thanks. ...
Jim
James A. Kaufman, Ph.D., Director
The Laboratory Safety Institute
A Nonprofit Organization Dedicated to
Safety in Science and Science Education
192 Worcester Road, Natick, MA 01760-2252
508-647-1900 Fax: 508-647-0062
Cell: 508-574-6264 Res: 781-237-1335
labsafe@
--part1_f3.21c3b4bf.2ac2f5f2_boundary
Content-Type: text/html; charset="US-ASCII"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Can someone help correct the problem I'm having. I'm only receiving part of the Digest message and nothing to download if I want the rest. Thanks. ... Jim
James A. Kaufman, Ph.D., Director
The Laboratory Safety Institute
A Nonprofit Organization Dedicated to
Safety in Science and Science Education
192 Worcester Road, Natick, MA 01760-2252
508-647-1900 Fax: 508-647-0062
Cell: 508-574-6264 Res: 781-237-1335
labsafe@
--part1_f3.21c3b4bf.2ac2f5f2_boundary--
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 25 Sep 2002 08:23:01 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Rhonda O'Keefe
Organization: Variagenics
Subject: Re: Not Receiving the full Digest
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="------------DE98B295944B5BB7604FEE20"
--------------DE98B295944B5BB7604FEE20
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Jim, you're not alone. I've been having that same problem (I just get
the list of topics) for about a week. I finally turned off the Digest
function to get around the problem. -Rhonda
Rhonda O'Keefe
Director of Health and Safety
Variagenics, Inc.
rokeefe@
Jim Kaufman wrote:
> Can someone help correct the problem I'm having. I'm only receiving
> part of the Digest message and nothing to download if I want the
> rest. Thanks. ... Jim
>
--------------DE98B295944B5BB7604FEE20
Content-Type: text/html; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Jim, you're not alone. I've been having that same problem (I just get the list of topics) for about a week. I finally turned off the Digest function to get around the problem. -Rhonda
Rhonda O'Keefe
Director of Health and Safety
Variagenics, Inc.
rokeefe@
Jim Kaufman wrote:
Can someone help correct the problem I'm having. I'm only receiving part of the Digest message and nothing to download if I want the rest. Thanks. ... Jim
--------------DE98B295944B5BB7604FEE20--
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 25 Sep 2002 08:16:50 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Burnett, LouAnn Crawford"
Subject: Re: Polio Survey
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="----_=_NextPart_001_01C26495.CEF43320"
This is a multi-part message in MIME format.
------_=_NextPart_001_01C26495.CEF43320
Content-Type: text/plain;
charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Good morning all!
ABSA just received a request this morning from HHS to provide our
members and colleagues with the following information:
ABSA has been informed by the Department of Health and Human Services
that the Assistant Secretary for Health will send a letter this week
notifying your institution of the National Inventory of Wild Poliovirus
Materials with a reporting date of December 31, 2002. The inventory
package will be sent to the offices of presidents and CEOs the week of
October 11. Because of the limited time for the inventory, you and your
Biosafety colleagues may wish to inquire as to the status of the
inventory package within your institution. In the meantime, all
information pertaining to the inventory is available at
od/nvpo/polio .
Information has also been posted on the ABSA website
().
Have fun! LouAnn
LouAnn C. Burnett, MS, CBSP
Biosafety Program Manager & Biological Safety Officer
Vanderbilt University Environmental Health & Safety
Nashville, Tennessee
615/322-0927 (direct & voice mail)
615/343-4951 (fax)
-----Original Message-----
From: Ira F. Salkin [mailto:Irasalkin@]
Sent: Tuesday, September 24, 2002 1:24 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Polio Survey
=09
=09
The next issue of Applied Biosafety contains two articles on the
polio survey, one which relates the history behind the legislation and
the second describes the procedures used by two large facilities to
conduct the polio survey. The journal should be in the mail by the end
of this week or at the beginning of next week.
=09
Ira F. Salkin, Ph.D., F(AAM)
Editor
Applied Biosafety
irasalkin@
------_=_NextPart_001_01C26495.CEF43320
Content-Type: text/html;
charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Good morning all!
ABSA just received a request this morning from HHS to provide our = members and colleagues with the following information:
ABSA = has been informed by the Department of Health and Human Services that the = Assistant Secretary for Health will send a letter this week notifying your = institution of the National Inventory of Wild Poliovirus Materials with a reporting = date of December 31, 2002. The = inventory package will be sent to the offices of presidents and CEOs the week of = October 11. Because of the = limited time for the inventory, you and your Biosafety colleagues may wish to inquire as = to the status of the inventory package within your institution. In the meantime, all = information pertaining to the inventory is available at od/nvpo/polio.
ruses.htm).
Have fun! LouAnn
LouAnn C. Burnett, MS, CBSP
Biosafety Program Manager = & Biological Safety Officer
Vanderbilt University = Environmental Health & Safety
Nashville, Tennessee
615/322-0927 (direct = & voice mail)
615/343-4951 (fax)
-----Original Message-----
From: Ira = F. Salkin [mailto:Irasalkin@]
Sent: Tuesday, September 24, = 2002 1:24 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Polio Survey
The next issue of Applied Biosafety contains two articles on the polio survey, = one which relates the history behind the legislation and the second = describes the procedures used by two large facilities to conduct the polio survey. = The journal should be in the mail by the end of this week or at the = beginning of next week.
Ira F. Salkin, Ph.D., F(AAM)
Editor
Applied = Biosafety
irasalkin@ =
=00
------_=_NextPart_001_01C26495.CEF43320--
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 25 Sep 2002 08:24:34 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Christina Thompson
Subject: Re: Pink Card
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: multipart/alternative; boundary="=_alternative 0049A90305256C3F_="
This is a multipart message in MIME format.
--=_alternative 0049A90305256C3F_=
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Ed -
I know this has been asked before, but I never got it straight. Can the
person receiving a pink card sign it and return it indicating
nonpossession - or does the RFO for that facility/address need to sign it?
The wording on the card indicates it should be the RFO, but I thought you
said the recipient could return it.
Thanks ** again ** for the clarification and advice!
Chris Thompson
Ed Gaunt
Sent by: A Biosafety Discussion List
09/24/2002 03:14 PM
Please respond to A Biosafety Discussion List
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
cc:
Subject: Re: Red Card
Correct...if non-possession, just sign and return the card. If you would
like to link the address on the postcard to a summary form already
submitted, you may write the summary form ID in the blank space on the
center panel of the post card and send it back. We will treat it like a
"child" form.
EEG
-----Original Message-----
From: Gergis, Nasr [mailto:NGergis@]
Sent: Tuesday, September 24, 2002 2:52 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Red Card
Good morning to you all. I understand this question was raised before on
the Biosafety Discussion. I have a P.I. received the pink card and he does
not possess any SA. DO I have to ask the P.I. to fill the red send card
and then I send it back to the preprinted address. Thanks.
Nasr Gergis, Ph.D., DVM
Biosafety & Safety Officer/Interim Director
Occupational Safety and Health
City of Hope/BRI
--=_alternative 0049A90305256C3F_=
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
Ed -
I know this has been asked before, but I never got it straight. Can the person receiving a pink card sign it and return it indicating nonpossession - or does the RFO for that facility/address need to sign it? The wording on the card indicates it should be the RFO, but I thought you said the recipient could return it.
Thanks ** again ** for the clarification and advice!
Chris Thompson
Ed Gaunt <egaunt@>
Sent by: A Biosafety Discussion List <BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU>
09/24/2002 03:14 PM
Please respond to A Biosafety Discussion List
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
cc:
Subject: Re: Red Card
Correct...if non-possession, just sign and return the card. If you would like to link the address on the postcard to a summary form already submitted, you may write the summary form ID in the blank space on the center panel of the post card and send it back. We will treat it like a "child" form.
EEG
-----Original Message-----
From: Gergis, Nasr [mailto:NGergis@]
Sent: Tuesday, September 24, 2002 2:52 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Red Card
Good morning to you all. I understand this question was raised before on the Biosafety Discussion. I have a P.I. received the pink card and he does not possess any SA. DO I have to ask the P.I. to fill the red send card and then I send it back to the preprinted address. Thanks.
Nasr Gergis, Ph.D., DVM
Biosafety & Safety Officer/Interim Director
Occupational Safety and Health
City of Hope/BRI
--=_alternative 0049A90305256C3F_=--
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 25 Sep 2002 08:20:26 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Marian Downing
Subject: Marian M Downing/ADD_LAKE_HUB/ADD_HUB/ADD/US is out of the office.
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
I will be out of the office starting 09/25/2002 and will not return until
09/26/2002.
If you have an urgent biosafety issue, please contact Mary Cipriano (7-2225)
or Rita D'Angelo (6-0604).Otherwise, I will respond when I return.
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 25 Sep 2002 09:41:02 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Joseph P. Kozlovac"
Subject: An interesting meeting on decon strategies sponsored by the EPA
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="=====================_176802000==_.ALT"
--=====================_176802000==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
More information is available at the below website
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency has called this working meeting to=
identify assets and interest across the federal agencies that could be
harnessed to evaluate technologies for decontaminating buildings and items.=
Through this working meeting, EPA hopes to identify components of other
civilian and defense agencies willing to collaborate on:
=B7 Development of scientifically valid test methods for evaluating
building decontamination technologies for biological agents, especially
Bacillus anthracis (B.a.)
=B7 Testing and evaluation of federally developed and
commercial-off-the-shelf decontamination technologies for B.a. and other
biological agents
=B7 Research needed to establish which bacillus species would be
appropriate surrogates for B.a. when testing various decontamination
technologies
____________________________________________________________________________=
__
Biological Safety Officer
Environment, Health, Safety
SAIC-Frederick
National Cancer Institute -
Frederick
(301)846-1451 fax: (301)846-6619
email: jkozlovac@mail.
____________________________________________________________________________=
__
--=====================_176802000==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/html; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
More information is available at the below website
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency has called this working meeting to identify assets and interest across the federal agencies that could be harnessed to evaluate technologies for decontaminating buildings and items. Through this working meeting, EPA hopes to identify components of other civilian and defense agencies willing to collaborate on:
=B7 Development of scientifically valid test methods for evaluating building decontamination technologies for biological agents, especially Bacillus anthracis (B.a.)
=B7 Testing and evaluation of federally developed and commercial-off-the-shelf decontamination technologies for B.a. and other biological agents
=B7 Research needed to establish which bacillus species would be appropriate surrogates for B.a. when testing various decontamination technologies
____________________________________________________________________________= __
Biological Safety Officer
Environment, Health, Safety
SAIC-Frederick
National Cancer Institute - Frederick &=
nbsp; = ;
(301)846-1451 fax: (301)846-6619
email: jkozlovac@mail.
_________________________________________________________________= _____________
--=====================_176802000==_.ALT--
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 25 Sep 2002 09:57:33 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ed Gaunt
Subject: Re: Pink Card
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="----_=_NextPart_001_01C2649B.7EDD3550"
This message is in MIME format. Since your mail reader does not understand
this format, some or all of this message may not be legible.
------_=_NextPart_001_01C2649B.7EDD3550
Content-Type: text/plain;
charset="iso-8859-1"
We expect that the folks who get reminder post cards probably did not know
who (or what) the RFO was when they received the original forms, and that
they will likely not know now either. If the addressee can find out who the
RFO is and that other (summary) forms were sent previously, the individual
cab write the Summary Form ID number on the card and send it back. It can
be signed by either the RFO or addressee (we are not recording signature
block info...just whether or not they were signed). Obviously if the
addressee has no clue about the RFO or whether other forms were received or
sent in by the facility, they can sign for themselves and return the card if
they do not possess.
Remember, we are mainly concerned about finding out about FACILITIES that
POSSESS select agents. Even if a facility possesses agents and some rogue
researcher send in a form indicating non-possession, we will only be
communicating with the possessor RFOs in the future; It will be incumbent
on the RFOs to find out who the individual possessor/researchers are within
their facilities for registration purposes, should that be necessary. Clear
as mud?
Ed
-----Original Message-----
From: Christina Thompson [mailto:THOMPSON_CHRISTINA_Z@]
Sent: Wednesday, September 25, 2002 9:25 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Pink Card
Ed -
I know this has been asked before, but I never got it straight. Can the
person receiving a pink card sign it and return it indicating nonpossession
- or does the RFO for that facility/address need to sign it? The wording on
the card indicates it should be the RFO, but I thought you said the
recipient could return it.
Thanks ** again ** for the clarification and advice!
Chris Thompson
Ed Gaunt
Sent by: A Biosafety Discussion List
09/24/2002 03:14 PM
Please respond to A Biosafety Discussion List
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
cc:
Subject: Re: Red Card
Correct...if non-possession, just sign and return the card. If you would
like to link the address on the postcard to a summary form already
submitted, you may write the summary form ID in the blank space on the
center panel of the post card and send it back. We will treat it like a
"child" form.
EEG
-----Original Message-----
From: Gergis, Nasr [mailto:NGergis@]
Sent: Tuesday, September 24, 2002 2:52 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Red Card
Good morning to you all. I understand this question was raised before on the
Biosafety Discussion. I have a P.I. received the pink card and he does not
possess any SA. DO I have to ask the P.I. to fill the red send card and then
I send it back to the preprinted address. Thanks.
Nasr Gergis, Ph.D., DVM
Biosafety & Safety Officer/Interim Director
Occupational Safety and Health
City of Hope/BRI
------_=_NextPart_001_01C2649B.7EDD3550
Content-Type: text/html;
charset="iso-8859-1"
We expect that the folks who get reminder post cards probably did not know who (or what) the RFO was when they received the original forms, and that they will likely not know now either. If the addressee can find out who the RFO is and that other (summary) forms were sent previously, the individual cab write the Summary Form ID number on the card and send it back. It can be signed by either the RFO or addressee (we are not recording signature block info...just whether or not they were signed). Obviously if the addressee has no clue about the RFO or whether other forms were received or sent in by the facility, they can sign for themselves and return the card if they do not possess.
Remember, we are mainly concerned about finding out about FACILITIES that POSSESS select agents. Even if a facility possesses agents and some rogue researcher send in a form indicating non-possession, we will only be communicating with the possessor RFOs in the future; It will be incumbent on the RFOs to find out who the individual possessor/researchers are within their facilities for registration purposes, should that be necessary. Clear as mud?
Ed
-----Original Message-----
From: Christina Thompson [mailto:THOMPSON_CHRISTINA_Z@]
Sent: Wednesday, September 25, 2002 9:25 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Pink Card
Ed -
I know this has been asked before, but I never got it straight. Can the person receiving a pink card sign it and return it indicating nonpossession - or does the RFO for that facility/address need to sign it? The wording on the card indicates it should be the RFO, but I thought you said the recipient could return it.
Thanks ** again ** for the clarification and advice!
Chris Thompson
Ed Gaunt
Sent by: A Biosafety Discussion List
09/24/2002 03:14 PM
Please respond to A Biosafety Discussion List
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
cc:
Subject: Re: Red Card
Correct...if non-possession, just sign and return the card. If you would like to link the address on the postcard to a summary form already submitted, you may write the summary form ID in the blank space on the center panel of the post card and send it back. We will treat it like a "child" form.
EEG
-----Original Message-----
From: Gergis, Nasr [mailto:NGergis@]
Sent: Tuesday, September 24, 2002 2:52 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Red Card
Good morning to you all. I understand this question was raised before on the Biosafety Discussion. I have a P.I. received the pink card and he does not possess any SA. DO I have to ask the P.I. to fill the red send card and then I send it back to the preprinted address. Thanks.
Nasr Gergis, Ph.D., DVM
Biosafety & Safety Officer/Interim Director
Occupational Safety and Health
City of Hope/BRI
------_=_NextPart_001_01C2649B.7EDD3550--
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 25 Sep 2002 09:12:13 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Christina Thompson
Subject: Re: Pink Card
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: multipart/alternative; boundary="=_alternative 004E05D905256C3F_="
This is a multipart message in MIME format.
--=_alternative 004E05D905256C3F_=
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Yes, that is very clear! Thank you again for your time.
Chris
--=_alternative 004E05D905256C3F_=
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
Yes, that is very clear! Thank you again for your time.
Chris
--=_alternative 004E05D905256C3F_=--
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 25 Sep 2002 09:19:50 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ginger Brown
Subject: Re: Pink Card
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
This is very confusing !
The signature block is for non-possession. If we have already sent in a
signed summary form indicating possession and any extraneous pink
cards now being returned are considered as "child" forms, then it is NOT
necessary for the RFO to sign the cards. Just like it was not necessary
for the RFO to sign the previously mailed "child" forms.
Ginger Brown
>>> egaunt@ 09/25/02 08:57AM >>>
We expect that the folks who get reminder post cards probably did not know
who (or what) the RFO was when they received the original forms, and that
they will likely not know now either. If the addressee can find out who =
the
RFO is and that other (summary) forms were sent previously, the individual
cab write the Summary Form ID number on the card and send it back. It can
be signed by either the RFO or addressee (we are not recording signature
block info...just whether or not they were signed). Obviously if the
addressee has no clue about the RFO or whether other forms were received =
or
sent in by the facility, they can sign for themselves and return the card =
if
they do not possess.
Remember, we are mainly concerned about finding out about FACILITIES that
POSSESS select agents. Even if a facility possesses agents and some rogue
researcher send in a form indicating non-possession, we will only be
communicating with the possessor RFOs in the future; It will be incumbent
on the RFOs to find out who the individual possessor/researchers are =
within
their facilities for registration purposes, should that be necessary. =
Clear
as mud?
Ed
-----Original Message-----
From: Christina Thompson [mailto:THOMPSON_CHRISTINA_Z@]
Sent: Wednesday, September 25, 2002 9:25 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Pink Card
Ed -
I know this has been asked before, but I never got it straight. Can the
person receiving a pink card sign it and return it indicating nonpossession=
- or does the RFO for that facility/address need to sign it? The wording =
on
the card indicates it should be the RFO, but I thought you said the
recipient could return it.
Thanks ** again ** for the clarification and advice!
Chris Thompson
Ed Gaunt
Sent by: A Biosafety Discussion List
09/24/2002 03:14 PM
Please respond to A Biosafety Discussion List
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
cc:
Subject: Re: Red Card
Correct...if non-possession, just sign and return the card. If you would
like to link the address on the postcard to a summary form already
submitted, you may write the summary form ID in the blank space on the
center panel of the post card and send it back. We will treat it like a
"child" form.
EEG
-----Original Message-----
From: Gergis, Nasr [mailto:NGergis@]
Sent: Tuesday, September 24, 2002 2:52 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Red Card
Good morning to you all. I understand this question was raised before on =
the
Biosafety Discussion. I have a P.I. received the pink card and he does not
possess any SA. DO I have to ask the P.I. to fill the red send card and =
then
I send it back to the preprinted address. Thanks.
Nasr Gergis, Ph.D., DVM
Biosafety & Safety Officer/Interim Director
Occupational Safety and Health
City of Hope/BRI
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 25 Sep 2002 10:14:37 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Carl Pike
Subject: Re: Polio Survey
In-Reply-To:
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: multipart/alternative;
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I hope HHS will make sure that every institutional president/CEO gets
this document. We are still waiting for the select agent form to
arrive (and our college has been in existence since 1787).
--============_-1179158828==_ma============
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
I hope HHS will make sure that every institutional president/CEO gets this document. We are still waiting for the select agent form to arrive (and our college has been in existence since 1787).
--============_-1179158828==_ma============--
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 25 Sep 2002 12:55:51 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Klenner, James"
Subject: Spumavirus
MIME-Version: 1.0
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Greetings all.
As a break from our CDC/USDA reporting duties, I wish to solicit input =
from the group. We have a PI that wants to use a human foamy virus as a =
vector. This of course is not in the BMBL and info is actually quite =
limited. There is also no biosafety level determination which led the PI =
to believe BL1 was appropriate. I found a reference that indicated =
simian foamy virus can be found (PCR) in multiple organ systems in =
asymptomatic humans working with primates. From this I determined that =
the virus can infect various organ systems, even without apparent =
disease, and felt a minimum of BL2 was reasonable. Given the lack of =
info on transmission I would even argue for BL2+ to further limit =
aerosols. If the virus can infect different human tissues, my concern is =
the use of it as a vector - and any cDNA within it.
I would really like to hear from any of you with experience or =
additional info.
Thanks,
Jim
James W. Klenner, MSc, MPH, MPA
Biological Safety Manager
INDIANA UNIVERSITY - PURDUE UNIVERSITY INDIANAPOLIS
Department of Environmental Health & Safety
620 Union Drive, Room 043
Indianapolis, IN 46202
(317) 274-2830
Fax (317) 278-2158
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As a break from our CDC/USDA = reporting duties, I wish to solicit input from the group. We have a PI that wants = to use a human foamy virus as a vector. This of course is not in the BMBL and = info is actually quite limited. There is also no biosafety level determination which led the PI to believe BL1 was appropriate. I = found a reference that indicated simian foamy virus can be found (PCR) in = multiple organ systems in asymptomatic humans working with primates. From this I = determined that the virus can infect various organ systems, even without apparent = disease, and felt a minimum of BL2 was reasonable. Given the lack of info on = transmission I would even argue for BL2+ to further limit aerosols. If the virus can = infect different human tissues, my concern is the use of it as a vector - and = any cDNA within it.
I would really like to hear from = any of you with experience or additional info.
Thanks,
Jim
620 Union = Drive, Room 043
(317) 274-2830
Fax (317) = 278-2158
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=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 25 Sep 2002 14:55:48 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Kirk Martin
Subject: Disinfecting Biologicals mixed with I125
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
Is anyone familiar with an effective disinfectant that can be used on a
biological agent that is labelled with Iodine 125? I have been advised
never to use Chorine bleach on Iodine 125 due to the potential radioactive
release that could result and am looking for a suitable replacement.
Thank you,
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 25 Sep 2002 15:23:50 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Byers, Karen B"
Subject: Re: Disinfecting Biologicals mixed with I125
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
We have used Wescodyne previously.
Karen B. Byers, MS, RBP, CBSP-ABSA
Biosafety Officer
Dana Farber Cancer Institute
44 Binney Street-SW350
Boston, MA 02115
Phone: 617-632-3890
Fax: 617-632-1932
-----Original Message-----
From: Kirk Martin [mailto:kirk_martin@HARVARD.EDU]
Sent: Wednesday, September 25, 2002 2:56 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Disinfecting Biologicals mixed with I125
Is anyone familiar with an effective disinfectant that can be used on a
biological agent that is labelled with Iodine 125? I have been advised
never to use Chorine bleach on Iodine 125 due to the potential radioactive
release that could result and am looking for a suitable replacement.
Thank you,
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 25 Sep 2002 15:27:36 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Gilpin, Richard"
Subject: Re: Disinfecting Biologicals mixed with I125
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
ditto
Richard W. Gilpin, Ph.D., RBP, CBSP
Assistant Director & Biosafety Officer
Environmental Health & Safety (EHS)
University of Maryland Baltimore
714 West Lombard Street, Room 305
Baltimore MD 21201-1084
(410) 706-7845
Fax (410) 706-1520
rgilpin@ehs.umaryland.edu
ehs.umaryland.edu
-----Original Message-----
From: Byers, Karen B [mailto:Karen_Byers@DFCI.HARVARD.EDU]
Sent: Wednesday, September 25, 2002 03:24 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Disinfecting Biologicals mixed with I125
We have used Wescodyne previously.
Karen B. Byers, MS, RBP, CBSP-ABSA
Biosafety Officer
Dana Farber Cancer Institute
44 Binney Street-SW350
Boston, MA 02115
Phone: 617-632-3890
Fax: 617-632-1932
-----Original Message-----
From: Kirk Martin [mailto:kirk_martin@HARVARD.EDU]
Sent: Wednesday, September 25, 2002 2:56 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Disinfecting Biologicals mixed with I125
Is anyone familiar with an effective disinfectant that can be used on a
biological agent that is labelled with Iodine 125? I have been advised
never to use Chorine bleach on Iodine 125 due to the potential radioactive
release that could result and am looking for a suitable replacement.
Thank you,
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 25 Sep 2002 12:37:14 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Karen E.S. Shaw"
Subject: Re: Spumavirus
In-Reply-To:
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Jim,
Our lab previously did alot of work with simian foamy virus (SFV). I think
most of the human work was done by Dieter Neuman-Haeflin (University of
Freiberg). I realize that you are asking about human foamy virus - what is
published in the literature is now considered to be a simian foamy virus
contaminant. My remembrance of the simian foamy virus is that we were unable
to find a cell line that it did not grow in. Simian foamy virus exists
naturally in the non-human primates without pathology. Walid Heine at the CDC
should also be consulted on the issue of foamy virus infection of humans. It
can be a nuisance in tissue culture (highly cytopathic). We actually submitted
a grant to use it as a vector years ago, but it was not funded. Dr Ayalew
Mergia in Gainsville, Florida continued work with foamy when he left our lab,
and may be a more up-to-date resource on foamy virus vectors.
People have tried to connect spumaviruses with all kinds of diseases but none
have panned out (we actually started calling it "phony" virus instead of
"foamy" virus). I'd be more worried about what it is engineered to carry than
the virus itself.
The field has moved on, so my information may be dated. However, I am not
surprised to see interest in this virus as a vector.
A basic, but dated, reference: Mergia, A. and P.A. Luciw, "Replication and
Regualtion of Primate Foamy Viruses", 1991, Virology 184: 475-482.
Hope this helps, Karen
At 12:55 PM 9/25/02 -0500, you wrote:
>
> Greetings all.
> As a break from our CDC/USDA reporting duties, I wish to solicit input from
> the group. We have a PI that wants to use a human foamy virus as a vector.
> This of course is not in the BMBL and info is actually quite limited. There
> is also no biosafety level determination which led the PI to believe BL1 was
> appropriate. I found a reference that indicated simian foamy virus can be
> found (PCR) in multiple organ systems in asymptomatic humans working with
> primates. From this I determined that the virus can infect various organ
> systems, even without apparent disease, and felt a minimum of BL2 was
> reasonable. Given the lack of info on transmission I would even argue for
> BL2+ to further limit aerosols. If the virus can infect different human
> tissues, my concern is the use of it as a vector - and any cDNA within it.
> I would really like to hear from any of you with experience or additional
> info.
> Thanks,
> Jim
>
> 9a3f8a8.gifJames W. Klenner, MSc, MPH, MPA
> Biological Safety Manager
> INDIANA UNIVERSITY - PURDUE UNIVERSITY INDIANAPOLIS
> Department of Environmental Health & Safety
> 620 Union Drive, Room 043
> Indianapolis, IN 46202
> (317) 274-2830
> Fax (317) 278-2158
>
>
> Embedded Content: image002.gif: 00000001,1bb8f1e5,00000000,60b15b20
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Jim,
Our lab previously did alot of work with simian foamy virus (SFV). I think most of the human work was done by Dieter Neuman-Haeflin (University of Freiberg). I realize that you are asking about human foamy virus - what is published in the literature is now considered to be a simian foamy virus contaminant. My remembrance of the simian foamy virus is that we were unable to find a cell line that it did not grow in. Simian foamy virus exists naturally in the non-human primates without pathology. Walid Heine at the CDC should also be consulted on the issue of foamy virus infection of humans. It can be a nuisance in tissue culture (highly cytopathic). We actually submitted a grant to use it as a vector years ago, but it was not funded. Dr Ayalew Mergia in Gainsville, Florida continued work with foamy when he left our lab, and may be a more up-to-date resource on foamy virus vectors.
People have tried to connect spumaviruses with all kinds of diseases but none have panned out (we actually started calling it "phony" virus instead of "foamy" virus). I'd be more worried about what it is engineered to carry than the virus itself.
The field has moved on, so my information may be dated. However, I am not surprised to see interest in this virus as a vector.
A basic, but dated, reference: Mergia, A. and P.A. Luciw, "Replication and Regualtion of Primate Foamy Viruses", 1991, Virology 184: 475-482.
Hope this helps, Karen
At 12:55 PM 9/25/02 -0500, you wrote:
Greetings all.
As a break from our CDC/USDA reporting duties, I wish to solicit input from the group. We have a PI that wants to use a human foamy virus as a vector. This of course is not in the BMBL and info is actually quite limited. There is also no biosafety level determination which led the PI to believe BL1 was appropriate. I found a reference that indicated simian foamy virus can be found (PCR) in multiple organ systems in asymptomatic humans working with primates. From this I determined that the virus can infect various organ systems, even without apparent disease, and felt a minimum of BL2 was reasonable. Given the lack of info on transmission I would even argue for BL2+ to further limit aerosols. If the virus can infect different human tissues, my concern is the use of it as a vector - and any cDNA within it.
I would really like to hear from any of you with experience or additional info.
Thanks,
Jim
[]James W. Klenner, MSc, MPH, MPA
Biological Safety Manager
INDIANA UNIVERSITY - PURDUE UNIVERSITY INDIANAPOLIS
Department of Environmental Health & Safety
620 Union Drive, Room 043
Indianapolis, IN 46202
(317) 274-2830
Fax (317) 278-2158
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*******************************
Karen E.S. Shaw
Center for Comparative Medicine
County Rd 98 and Hutchison Dr
University of California, Davis
Davis, CA 95616
(530) 752-1561
(530) 752-7914 fax
Facilities Coordinator
kesshaw@ucdavis.edu
--=====================_161741312==_--
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 25 Sep 2002 17:08:19 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Hauck, Philip"
Subject: FW: CDC visit/LRSAT Inspection
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This is a short synopsis of the visit by inspectors from =
ASI. ASI is the Sub-contractor working for the CDC on various =
aspects of the Select Agent program that regulates the transfer and use =
of microbes and toxins which could be used by terrorists as =
biological weapons. One aspect is to conduct the LR/SAT inspection of =
the facility for CDC.
The visit was engendered as a result of a researcher's =
submission to the CDC (circa Dec, 2000) for approval to obtain =
a select agent toxin as part of a research protocol. The follow-up =
visit is part of the standard investigation that CDC =
performs to verify the Researcher, the Responsible Facility Official, =
the facilities and the over-all safety and security program =
for safe-guarding these materials. (This has always been contained in =
the LR/SAT submissions from its inception).
The visit began at 09 05 hrs and ended 11 45 hrs. The scope =
of the visit was the researcher's Laboratory, the =
Containment Animal Laboratory, and the Biosafety Officer's Office. No =
other sites were inspected.
Specific items that the inspectors were concerned with were;
- toxin storage and use practices
- documented inventory (hand written or formally =
typed-out)
- locations where toxin is used
- warning signs where the toxin is reconstituted =
/ used
- location of safety devices such as eyewashes =
and safety showers
- Shipping and Receiving practices and Chain of =
Custody issues (who opens,
inspects, documents the receipt of shipment)
- Toxin inactivation and disposal procedures
- Availability of a Chemical Hygiene Plan for =
the institution
- An actual detailed Standard Operating =
Procedure for that specific use of bot-tox in that laboratory.
- Disaster and Emergency Plans for the facility.
- Various training records, documents and =
training materials were reviewed and copies retained by the =
inspectors for their records
Some of the above points that stood out (were mentioned in a =
closing discussion):
- need to develop an SOP by the PI specific for the toxin work
- need to have signs within the lab identifying the presence of =
a toxin
- need to have a written inventory of all aliquots of the =
toxin.
- need to inventory stocks at (PI or lab staff) at least =
quarterly, especially where multiple numbers of researchers share a =
space.
Mentioned to me directly as the RFO, since we have toxins on =
site that were not registered formerly under the LR/SAT =
program, I will need to verify and document that the researcher's use =
of these toxins are consistent with commercial uses, or =
these labs will also have to register these toxins under the LR/SAT as =
well. Since the institution already has a Certificate of =
Registration, it should not take long to submit the necessary documents =
and receive an amendment from the CDC.
One final point to conclude on is that the researcher is not =
active with respect to using the toxin so the noted =
deficiencies are somewhat moot. However, if the lab was actively using =
the toxin some of these noted deficiencies could engender =
more than concern with regulatory compliance.
Hopefully, this will help those of you with pending =
inspections, to prepare and have in place the items mentioned above. =
Although the inspection was specific for toxins, biological =
agents would be handled in a similar manner. SOP's are very =
important, specifically detailing the procedures in a given protocol or =
project. The Institutional Biosafety Manuals and Chemical =
Hygiene plans that you have are not sufficient alone. Therefore, make =
sure your PI's have written, specific SOP's. Make sure that =
emergency contact information is available i.e. security's phone number, =
the Chem Hygienist's number etc. in each location where =
these agents are stored / handled.
Hopefully, some of the other folks who are inspected will =
make available as much as can be revealed of their =
experiences. My inspectors were courteous, cordial, very professional =
(both were Ph.D. microbiologists) and very knowledgeable. Do =
not think you can bamboozle them! Not that any body tried here, but =
their knowledge is thorough just from the observations they =
made and their comments, and I don't think anyone trying to evade an =
issue would succeed. Overall, it was a learning experience =
for myself and the inspectors, and was as pleasant an experience as an =
inspection can be.
Philip Hauck, MS, MSHS CBSP, SM(NRM)
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 25 Sep 2002 14:27:23 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Elizabeth Smith
Subject: Polio: Wild or Tame?
In-Reply-To:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Howdy all,
while engaged with compliance for HHS/APHIS stuff, I simply
requested that all researchers provide an inventory of ALL
viable microbiological organisms, regardless of pathogenicity,
virulence, etc. A great leverage tool was the reminder that if
they did this big inventory once, I wouldn't come back and
pester them after HHS revises the Select Agent list.
As it turns out, we have polio virus here. But what exactly
makes the virus "Wild Type"? Responses are welcome directly to
me off-line if this is a "well, duh" kind of question.
Elizabeth
=====
Elizabeth Smith
Environmental, Health & Safety Manager
BioPort Corporation
3500 N. Martin L. King Blvd.
Lansing, MI 48906
__________________________________________________
Do you Yahoo!?
New DSL Internet Access from SBC & Yahoo!
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 25 Sep 2002 15:02:40 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Chris Carlson
Subject: Re: Bay Area rx safety glasses suggestions?
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="============_-1179129809==_ma============"
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Hi Sue - We use the UC School of Optometry, since they are right here
on campus. But you might try calling them to see if they can
accommodate you either on-site or at their clinics (510-642-2020). I
get VERY good personal care from them.
Chris
>Hi all-
>
>I feel like I should ask something about child forms or pink cards,
>but I'm going to have to let you down...
>
>We have a prescription safety glasses program and I have been using
>the same vendor for several years. I am shopping around to see if
>there are other vendors in the SF Bay Area with good reps,
>reasonable prices, etc. Any suggestions?
>
>Thanks-
>Sue
--
******************************************************************************
Chris Carlson
Biosafety Officer, CBSP (ABSA)
Office of Environment, Health & Safety
317 University Hall - #1150
University of California
Berkeley, CA 94720-1150
phone: (510) 643-6562
e-mail: ccarlson@uclink4.berkeley.edu
fax: (510) 643-7595
******************************************************************************
Visit our Web Site at
******************************************************************************
--============_-1179129809==_ma============
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
Hi Sue - We use the UC School of Optometry, since they are right here on campus. But you might try calling them to see if they can accommodate you either on-site or at their clinics (510-642-2020). I get VERY good personal care from them.
Chris
Hi all-
I feel like I should ask something about child forms or pink cards, but I'm going to have to let you down...
We have a prescription safety glasses program and I have been using the same vendor for several years. I am shopping around to see if there are other vendors in the SF Bay Area with good reps, reasonable prices, etc. Any suggestions?
Thanks-
Sue
--
******************************************************************************
Chris Carlson
Biosafety Officer, CBSP (ABSA)
Office of Environment, Health & Safety
317 University Hall - #1150
University of California
Berkeley, CA 94720-1150
phone: (510) 643-6562
e-mail: ccarlson@uclink4.berkeley.edu
fax: (510) 643-7595
******************************************************************************
Visit our Web Site at
******************************************************************************
--============_-1179129809==_ma============--
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 25 Sep 2002 15:43:42 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Chris Carlson
Subject: Re: Polio Survey
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="============_-1179128668==_ma============"
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Carl - Maybe they are working backward from the newest universities
and colleges to the oldest! You gotta smile at this or you'll go
crazy.
Chris
>I hope HHS will make sure that every institutional president/CEO
>gets this document. We are still waiting for the select agent form
>to arrive (and our college has been in existence since 1787).
--
******************************************************************************
Chris Carlson
Biosafety Officer, CBSP (ABSA)
Office of Environment, Health & Safety
317 University Hall - #1150
University of California
Berkeley, CA 94720-1150
phone: (510) 643-6562
e-mail: ccarlson@uclink4.berkeley.edu
fax: (510) 643-7595
******************************************************************************
Visit our Web Site at
******************************************************************************
--============_-1179128668==_ma============
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
Carl - Maybe they are working backward from the newest universities and colleges to the oldest! You gotta smile at this or you'll go crazy.
Chris
I hope HHS will make sure that every institutional president/CEO gets this document. We are still waiting for the select agent form to arrive (and our college has been in existence since 1787).
--
******************************************************************************
Chris Carlson
Biosafety Officer, CBSP (ABSA)
Office of Environment, Health & Safety
317 University Hall - #1150
University of California
Berkeley, CA 94720-1150
phone: (510) 643-6562
e-mail: ccarlson@uclink4.berkeley.edu
fax: (510) 643-7595
******************************************************************************
Visit our Web Site at
******************************************************************************
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Date: Thu, 26 Sep 2002 08:21:09 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Dan Hurley
Subject: Re: FW: CDC visit/LRSAT Inspection
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thanks phil
-----Original Message-----
From: Hauck, Philip [mailto:philip.hauck@MSSM.EDU]
Sent: Wednesday, September 25, 2002 5:08 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: FW: CDC visit/LRSAT Inspection
This is a short synopsis of the visit by inspectors from =
ASI. ASI is the Sub-contractor working for the CDC on various =
aspects of the Select Agent program that regulates the transfer and use =
of microbes and toxins which could be used by terrorists as =
biological weapons. One aspect is to conduct the LR/SAT inspection of =
the facility for CDC.
The visit was engendered as a result of a researcher's =
submission to the CDC (circa Dec, 2000) for approval to obtain =
a select agent toxin as part of a research protocol. The follow-up =
visit is part of the standard investigation that CDC =
performs to verify the Researcher, the Responsible Facility Official, =
the facilities and the over-all safety and security program =
for safe-guarding these materials. (This has always been contained in =
the LR/SAT submissions from its inception).
The visit began at 09 05 hrs and ended 11 45 hrs. The scope =
of the visit was the researcher's Laboratory, the =
Containment Animal Laboratory, and the Biosafety Officer's Office. No =
other sites were inspected.
Specific items that the inspectors were concerned with were;
- toxin storage and use practices
- documented inventory (hand written or formally =
typed-out)
- locations where toxin is used
- warning signs where the toxin is reconstituted =
/ used
- location of safety devices such as eyewashes =
and safety showers
- Shipping and Receiving practices and Chain of =
Custody issues (who opens,
inspects, documents the receipt of shipment)
- Toxin inactivation and disposal procedures
- Availability of a Chemical Hygiene Plan for =
the institution
- An actual detailed Standard Operating =
Procedure for that specific use of bot-tox in that laboratory.
- Disaster and Emergency Plans for the facility.
- Various training records, documents and =
training materials were reviewed and copies retained by the =
inspectors for their records
Some of the above points that stood out (were mentioned in a =
closing discussion):
- need to develop an SOP by the PI specific for the toxin work
- need to have signs within the lab identifying the presence of =
a toxin
- need to have a written inventory of all aliquots of the =
toxin.
- need to inventory stocks at (PI or lab staff) at least =
quarterly, especially where multiple numbers of researchers share a =
space.
Mentioned to me directly as the RFO, since we have toxins on =
site that were not registered formerly under the LR/SAT =
program, I will need to verify and document that the researcher's use =
of these toxins are consistent with commercial uses, or =
these labs will also have to register these toxins under the LR/SAT as =
well. Since the institution already has a Certificate of =
Registration, it should not take long to submit the necessary documents =
and receive an amendment from the CDC.
One final point to conclude on is that the researcher is not =
active with respect to using the toxin so the noted =
deficiencies are somewhat moot. However, if the lab was actively using =
the toxin some of these noted deficiencies could engender =
more than concern with regulatory compliance.
Hopefully, this will help those of you with pending =
inspections, to prepare and have in place the items mentioned above. =
Although the inspection was specific for toxins, biological =
agents would be handled in a similar manner. SOP's are very =
important, specifically detailing the procedures in a given protocol or =
project. The Institutional Biosafety Manuals and Chemical =
Hygiene plans that you have are not sufficient alone. Therefore, make =
sure your PI's have written, specific SOP's. Make sure that =
emergency contact information is available i.e. security's phone number, =
the Chem Hygienist's number etc. in each location where =
these agents are stored / handled.
Hopefully, some of the other folks who are inspected will =
make available as much as can be revealed of their =
experiences. My inspectors were courteous, cordial, very professional =
(both were Ph.D. microbiologists) and very knowledgeable. Do =
not think you can bamboozle them! Not that any body tried here, but =
their knowledge is thorough just from the observations they =
made and their comments, and I don't think anyone trying to evade an =
issue would succeed. Overall, it was a learning experience =
for myself and the inspectors, and was as pleasant an experience as an =
inspection can be.
Philip Hauck, MS, MSHS CBSP, SM(NRM)
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thanks phil
-----Original Message-----
From: = Hauck, Philip [mailto:philip.hauck@MSSM.EDU]
Sent: Wednesday, September = 25, 2002 5:08 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: FW: = CDC visit/LRSAT Inspection
This is a short synopsis of the visit by inspectors from ASI. ASI = is the Sub-contractor working for the CDC on various aspects of the Select Agent program that = regulates the transfer and use of microbes and toxins which could be used by terrorists as biological weapons. One aspect is = to conduct the LR/SAT inspection of the facility for CDC.
The visit was engendered as a result of a researcher s submission to = the CDC (circa Dec, 2000) = for approval to obtain = a select agent toxin as part of a research protocol. The follow-up = visit is part of the standard investigation that CDC performs to verify the Researcher, the Responsible Facility = Official, the facilities and the over-all safety and security program for safe-guarding these materials. (This has = always been contained in the LR/SAT submissions from its inception).
The visit began at 09 05 hrs and ended 11 45 hrs. The scope of = the visit was the researcher s Laboratory, the Containment Animal Laboratory, and the Biosafety = Officer s Office. No other = sites were inspected.
Specific items that the inspectors were concerned with were;
- toxin storage and use practices
- documented inventory (hand written or formally typed-out)
- locations where toxin is used
- warning signs where the toxin is reconstituted / used
- location of safety devices such as eyewashes and safety showers
- Shipping and Receiving practices and Chain of Custody issues = (who opens,
inspects, = documents the receipt of shipment)
- Toxin inactivation and disposal procedures
- Availability of a Chemical Hygiene Plan for the institution
- An actual detailed Standard Operating Procedure for that = specific use of bot-tox in that laboratory.
- Disaster and Emergency Plans for the facility.
- Various training records, documents and training materials = were reviewed and copies retained by the
Some of the above points that stood out (were mentioned in a = closing discussion):
-need to develop an SOP = by the PI specific for the toxin work
-need to have signs = within the lab identifying the presence of a toxin
-
-
Mentioned to me directly as the RFO, since we have toxins on = site that were not registered formerly under the LR/SAT program, Iwill need to verify and document that the researcher s = use of these toxins are consistent with commercial uses, or these labs will also have to register = these toxins under the LR/SAT as well. Since the institution already has a = Certificate of Registration, it should not take = long to submit the necessary documents and receive an amendment from the CDC.
One final point to conclude on is that the researcher is not = active with respect to using thetoxin so the noted deficiencies are somewhat moot. However, if the = lab was actively using the toxin some of these noted deficiencies could engender more than concern with regulatory compliance.
Hopefully, this will = help those of you with pending inspections, to prepare and have in place the items = mentioned above. Although the inspection was specific for toxins, biological = agents would be handled in a similar manner. SOP s are very important, specifically detailing the procedures in a given = protocol or project. The Institutional Biosafety = Manuals and Chemical Hygiene plans that you have are not = sufficient alone. Therefore, make sure your PI s have written, = specific SOP s. Make sure = that emergency contact information is available i.e. security s phone number, = the Chem Hygienist s number etc. in each location where these agents are stored / = handled.
Hopefully, some of the other folks who are inspected will make available as much as can be revealed of their experiences. My inspectors were courteous, cordial, very = professional (both were Ph.D. microbiologists) and very knowledgeable. Do not think you can bamboozle them! Not that = any body tried here, but their knowledge is thorough just from the observations they made and their comments, and I = don t think anyone trying to evade an issue would succeed. Overall, it was a learning experience for myself and = the inspectors, and was as pleasant an experience as an inspection can be.
Philip Hauck, MS, MSHS CBSP, = SM(NRM)
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Date: Thu, 26 Sep 2002 10:57:45 -0400
Reply-To: pr18@columbia.edu
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: paul rubock
Organization: EH&S
Subject: Re: FW: CDC visit/LRSAT Inspection
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We had a visit here also, with the surveyors interests being pretty much
identical to those who visited Phil. Also, (as expected) they
immediately checked fume hoods and BSCs for certification.
I would also suggest that during the initial meeting, before you go out
to the labs, that the institutional folk communicate the type of SA
present. Also, make sure that investigators have not moved upholstered
chairs into the lab. They like cleanable surfaces.
"Hauck, Philip" wrote:
> This is a short synopsis of the visit by inspectorsfrom ASI. ASI is
> the Sub-contractorworking for the CDC on various aspects of the Select
> Agent program that regulates the transfer and use of microbes and
> toxins which could be used by terrorists as biological weapons.One
> aspect is to conduct the LR/SAT inspection of the facility for CDC.
>
> The visit was engendered as a result of aresearcher=92s submission to
> the CDC (circa Dec, 2000)for approval to obtaina select agenttoxin as
> part of a research protocol. The follow-up visit is part of the
> standard investigation that CDC performs to verify the Researcher, the
> Responsible Facility Official, the facilities and the over-all safety
> and security program for safe-guarding these materials.(This has
> always been contained in the LR/SAT submissions from its inception).
>
> The visit began at 09 05 hrs and ended 11 45 hrs. The scope of the
> visit was the researcher=92s Laboratory, the Containment Animal
> Laboratory, and the Biosafety Officer=92s Office.No other sites were
> inspected.
>
> Specific items that the inspectors were concerned with were;
>
> -toxinstorage and use practices
>
> - documented inventory (hand written or formally typed-out)
>
> -locations where toxin is used
>
> -warning signs where the toxin is reconstituted / used
>
> - location of safety devices such as eyewashes and safety showers
>
> - Shipping and Receiving practices and Chain of Custody issues (who
> opens,
>
> inspects, documents the receipt of shipment)
>
> - Toxin inactivation and disposal procedures
>
> - Availability of a Chemical Hygiene Plan for the institution
>
> - An actual detailed Standard Operating Procedure for that specific
> use of bot-tox in that laboratory.
>
> - Disaster and Emergency Plans for the facility.
>
> - Various training records, documents and training materials were
> reviewed and copies retained by the inspectors for their records
>
> Some of the above points that stood out (were mentioned in a closing
> discussion):
>
> -need to develop an SOP by the PI specific for the toxin work
>
> -need to have signs within the lab identifying the presence of a toxin
>
> -need to have a written inventory of all aliquots of the toxin.
>
> -need to inventory stocks at (PI or lab staff) at least quarterly,
> especially where multiple numbers of researchers share a space.
>
> Mentioned to me directly as the RFO, since we have toxins on site that
> were not registered formerly under the LR/SAT program, Iwill need to
> verify and document that the researcher=92s use of these toxins are
> consistent with commercial uses, or these labs will also have to
> register these toxins under the LR/SAT as well. Since the institution
> already has a Certificate of Registration, it should not take long to
> submit the necessary documents and receive an amendment from the CDC.
>
> One final point to conclude on is that the researcher is not active
> with respect to using thetoxin so the noted deficiencies are somewhat
> moot. However, if the lab was actively using the toxin some of these
> noted deficiencies could engender more thanconcernwith regulatory
> compliance.
>
> Hopefully, this will help those of you with pending inspections, to
> prepare and have in place the items mentioned above. Although the
> inspection was specific for toxins, biological agents would be handled
> in a similar manner. SOP=92s are very important, specifically detailing
> the procedures in a given protocol or project. The
> Institutional Biosafety Manuals and Chemical Hygiene plans that you
> have are not sufficient alone. Therefore, make sure your PI=92s have
> written, specific SOP=92s.Make sure that emergency contact information
> is available i.e. security=92s phone number, the Chem Hygienist=92s num=
ber
> etc. in each location where these agents are stored / handled.
>
> Hopefully, some of the other folks who are inspected will make
> available as much as can be revealed of their experiences. My
> inspectors were courteous, cordial, very professional (both were Ph.D.
> microbiologists) and very knowledgeable. Do not think you can
> bamboozle them! Not that any body tried here, but their knowledge is
> thorough just from the observations they made and their comments, and
> I don=92t think anyone trying to evade an issue would succeed. Overall,
> it was a learning experience for myself and the inspectors, and was as
> pleasant an experience as an inspection can be.
>
> Philip Hauck, MS, MSHS CBSP, SM(NRM)
>
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I would also suggest that during the initial meeting, before you go out to the labs, that the institutional folk communicate the type of SA present. Also, make sure that investigators have not moved upholste= red chairs into the lab. They like cleanable surfaces.
"Hauck, Philip" wrote:
This is a short synopsis of the visit by inspectorsfrom ASI. ASI is the Sub-contractorworking f= or the CDC on various aspects of the Select Agent program that regulates the transfer and use of microb= es and toxins which could be used by terrorists as biological weapons.One aspect is to conduct the LR/SAT inspection of the facility for CDC.=
The visit was engendered as a result of aresearcher=92s submission to the CDC (circa Dec, 2000)= for approval to obtain= a select agenttoxin as part of a research protocol. The follow-up visit is part of the standard investigation that CDC performs to verify the Re= searcher, the Responsible Facility Official, the facilities and the over-all safety and security program for safe-guarding these materials.(This has always been contained in the LR/SAT submissions from its inception).
The visit began at 09 05 hrs and ended 11 45 hrs. The scope of the visit was the researcher=92s LaboratoryContainment Animal Laboratory, and the Biosafety Officer=92s Office.No other sites were inspected.
Specific items that the inspectors were concerned with were;
-toxi= nstorage and use practices
- documented inventory (hand written or formally typed-out)
-loca= tions where toxin is used
-warn= ing signs where the toxin is reconstituted / used
- location of safety devices such as eyewashes and safety showers
- Shipping and Receiving practices and Chain of Custody issues (who opens,
in= spects, documents the receipt of shipment)
- Toxin inactivation and disposal procedures
- Availability of a Chemical Hygiene Plan for the institution=
- An actual detailed Standard Operating Procedure for that specific use of bot-tox in that laboratory.
- Disaster and Emergency Plans for the facility.
- Various training records, documents and training materials were reviewed and copies retained by the inspectors for their records
Some of the above points that stood out (were mentioned in a closing discussio= n):
-need to develop an SOP by the PI specific for the toxin work
-need to have signs within the lab identifying the presence of a toxin
-need to have a written inventory of all aliquots of the toxin.
-need to inventory stocks at (PI or lab staff) at least quarterly, especially where multiple numbers of researchers share a space.
Mentioned to me directly as the RFO, since we have toxins on site that were not reg= istered formerly under the LR/SAT program, Iwill need to verify and document that the researcher=92s use of these toxins are consistent with commercia= l = uses, or these labs will also have to register these toxins under the LR/SAT as well. Since the institution already has a Certificate of Registration, it should not take long to submit the necessary document= s and receive an amendment from the CDC.
One final point to conclude on is that the researcher is not active with resp= ect to using thetoxin so the noted deficiencies are somewhat moot. However, if the lab was actively using the toxin some of these noted deficiencies could engender more thanconcernwith regulatory compliance.
Hopefully, this will help those of you with pending inspections, to prepare and have in place the items mentioned above. = Although the inspection was specific for toxins, biological agents would be handle= d in a similar manner. SOP=92s are very important, specifically detailing the procedures in a given protocol or project. The Institutional Biosafety Manuals and = ;Chemical Hygiene plans that you have are not sufficient alone. Therefore, make sure your PI=92s have wr= itten, specific SOP=92s.Make sure that emergency contact information is available i.e. security=92s ph= one number, the Chem Hygienist=92s number etc. in each location where these agents are stored / handled.
Hopefully, some of the other folks who are inspected will make available as much as can be revealed of their expe= riences. My inspectors were courteous, cordial, very professional (both were Ph.D. microbiologists) and very kno= wledgeable. Do not think you can bamboozle them! Not that any body tried here, but their knowledge is thorough j= ust from the observations they made and their comments, and I don=92t think a= nyone trying to evade an issue would succeed. Overall, it was a learning experience for myself and the inspectors, and was as pleasant an experience as an = inspection can be.
Philip Hauck, MS, MSHS CBSP, SM(NRM)
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Date: Thu, 26 Sep 2002 11:08:00 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Michael Wendeler
Organization: Incyte Genomics
Subject: Bartels viral transport media
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We have some folks that are going to work with Cynomolgous monkey blood
and I need to get my B-virus program in place. Does anyone know where I
can get Bartel's Viral Transport Media? I called the
number(1-800-227-8357) on the information I got from Julia Hilliard's
website but that number is not in service. Any info would be
appreciated.
Mike Wendeler
Environmental Health and Safety Engineer
Incyte Genomics
Newark, DE
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 26 Sep 2002 11:24:14 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Richard Fink
Subject: Re: Disinfecting Biologicals mixed with I125
In-Reply-To:
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Look into a phenolic based or a quat, depending upon the organism.
At 02:55 PM 9/25/2002 -0400, you wrote:
>Is anyone familiar with an effective disinfectant that can be used on a
>biological agent that is labelled with Iodine 125? I have been advised
>never to use Chorine bleach on Iodine 125 due to the potential radioactive
>release that could result and am looking for a suitable replacement.
>
>Thank you,
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
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Look into a phenolic based or a quat, depending upon the organism.
At 02:55 PM 9/25/2002 -0400, you wrote:
Is anyone familiar with an effective disinfectant that can be used on a
biological agent that is labelled with Iodine 125? I have been advised
never to use Chorine bleach on Iodine 125 due to the potential radioactive
release that could result and am looking for a suitable replacement.
Thank you,
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
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Date: Thu, 26 Sep 2002 11:23:11 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Josh Harney
Subject: Inspection reports
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Thanks to those providing the recent reports on how your inspections
have gone. This is turning out to be one of the better listserves I've
subscribed to.
Joshua M. Harney
Assistant Director, Health & Safety
Cincinnati Children's Hospital Medical Center
phone: 513-636-7286
fax: 513-636-2123
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 26 Sep 2002 11:21:16 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Hauck, Philip"
Subject: Re: Patriot Act
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You may want to add another slide to the retenue-if you have =
an SLA on-site, already, and haven't registered it as of =
yet, the BSO will hand you over to the CDC to be crucified while (s)he =
washes there hands! (Post-inspection humor)
Phil Hauck
-----Original Message-----
From: Richard Fink [mailto:rfink@MIT.EDU]
Sent: Wednesday, September 18, 2002 11:02 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Patriot Act
At 10:05 AM 9/17/2002 -0500, you wrote:
I have been asked to make a presentation on the Patriot Act, and by =
extension the Bioterrorism law. Has anyone prepared a similar program in =
powerpoint or other presentation softwear that would be willing to share =
it with me?
Mike Durham
LSU
mdurham@lsu.edu
I would imagine the program going like this: slides 1 - 20 listing all =
of the agents. Slide 21 a stern warning that if you even think of using =
any of those agents, the institutes BSO will personally visit and kill =
you. Slide 22 justification: trail, jail much easier then registering =
(just kidding Ed).
This spoof has been brought to you by:
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 26 Sep 2002 10:38:06 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Terry Lawrin
Subject: Human rDNA therapy
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Good morning everyone,
Does anyone out there have a written policy regarding human rDNA therapy
that they'd like to share. Some of my suggestions ( and eventual policy)
to the IBC are: 1) Wear an N-95 or PAPR during vector administration. 2)
Safety glasses. 3) Negative pressure room for administration. 4) Yearly
retraining of all involved. Am I asking too much?
I need to know whats' out there,
Thanks,
Terry Lawrin
Terrance J. Lawrin, MT. (ASCP) SLS, CBSP (ABSA)
Biosafety Officer / Sanitarian
University of Illinois at Chicago
Environmental Health and Safety Office
Telephone: 312-413-3701
email: tlawrin@uic.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 26 Sep 2002 10:46:52 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Mike Durham
Subject: Vaccine Strain
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A quick question. Suppose a researcher has a vaccine strain of anthrax =
which is being used as a test for a new biocide's effectiveness. Under =
the possession reporting, I believe it would have to be reported because =
of the fact that it is being used in research in a way that is not it's =
normal, approved use. First of all, is this correct?
Also, is there a need to register this agent with CDC/NIH for the same =
reason?
Mike
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A quick question. Suppose a researcher = has a vaccine strain of anthrax which is being used as a test for a new = biocide's effectiveness. Under the possession reporting, I believe it would have = to be reported because of the fact that it is being used in research in a way = that is not it's normal, approved use. First of all, is this = correct?
Also, is there a need to register = this agent with CDC/NIH for the same reason?
Mike
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Date: Thu, 26 Sep 2002 11:51:07 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Richard Fink
Subject: Digest
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There seems to be some problem for some subscribers regarding receiving the
Digest form of Biosafty, it is being looked into.
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Biosafty List Owner
rfink@mit.edu
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There seems to be some problem for some subscribers regarding receiving the Digest form of Biosafty, it is being looked into.
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Biosafty List Owner
rfink@mit.edu
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Date: Thu, 26 Sep 2002 08:54:35 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Funk, Glenn"
Subject: Re: Bay Area rx safety glasses suggestions?
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Sue -
We use Dispensers Optical, a small company based in Bethel Island and
operated by Dean (business manager) and Joy (optician). Joy comes to our
site once a month to take orders and deliver and fit product. Their number
is 925-684-3348. They've worked well for us.
-- Glenn
Glenn A. Funk, Ph.D., CBSP
Director and Biosafety Officer
Environment, Health and Safety
MedImmune Vaccines, Inc.
408-845-8847
-----Original Message-----
From: Sue Quinn [mailto:squinn@]
Sent: Monday, September 23, 2002 9:38 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Bay Area rx safety glasses suggestions?
Hi all-
I feel like I should ask something about child forms or pink cards, but I'm
going to have to let you down...
We have a prescription safety glasses program and I have been using the same
vendor for several years. I am shopping around to see if there are other
vendors in the SF Bay Area with good reps, reasonable prices, etc. Any
suggestions?
Thanks-
Sue
Suzanne M. Quinn
Senior Manager, Environmental Health and Safety
Exelixis, Inc.
PO Box 511
South San Francisco, CA 94083-0511
------_=_NextPart_001_01C26575.02B72050
Content-Type: text/html;
charset="iso-8859-1"
Sue -
We use Dispensers Optical, a small company based in Bethel Island and operated by Dean (business manager) and Joy (optician). Joy comes to our site once a month to take orders and deliver and fit product. Their number is 925-684-3348. They've worked well for us.
-- Glenn
Glenn A. Funk, Ph.D., CBSP
Director and Biosafety Officer
Environment, Health and Safety
MedImmune Vaccines, Inc.
408-845-8847
-----Original Message-----
From: Sue Quinn [mailto:squinn@]
Sent: Monday, September 23, 2002 9:38 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Bay Area rx safety glasses suggestions?
Hi all-
I feel like I should ask something about child forms or pink cards, but I'm going to have to let you down...
We have a prescription safety glasses program and I have been using the same vendor for several years. I am shopping around to see if there are other vendors in the SF Bay Area with good reps, reasonable prices, etc. Any suggestions?
Thanks-
Sue
Suzanne M. Quinn
Senior Manager, Environmental Health and Safety
Exelixis, Inc.
PO Box 511
South San Francisco, CA 94083-0511
------_=_NextPart_001_01C26575.02B72050--
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 26 Sep 2002 08:57:12 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Carolyn Keierleber
Subject: Re: Vaccine Strain
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
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boundary="=====================_868750==_.ALT"
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If it is the Sterne strain, you need to notify but not register as a select
agent.
At 10:46 AM 9/26/2002 -0500, you wrote:
>A quick question. Suppose a researcher has a vaccine strain of anthrax
>which is being used as a test for a new biocide's effectiveness. Under the
>possession reporting, I believe it would have to be reported because of
>the fact that it is being used in research in a way that is not it's
>normal, approved use. First of all, is this correct?
>Also, is there a need to register this agent with CDC/NIH for the same reason?
>Mike
Carolyn Keierleber, Ph.D.
Acting Director & Biosafety Officer
Environmental Health & Safety
The Scripps Research Institute (TSRI)
Mail Code BCC 078
La Jolla, CA 92037
Phone: 858 784-8240
Fax: 858 784-8490
--=====================_868750==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
If it is the Sterne strain, you need to notify but not register as a select agent.
At 10:46 AM 9/26/2002 -0500, you wrote:
A quick question. Suppose a researcher has a vaccine strain of anthrax which is being used as a test for a new biocide's effectiveness. Under the possession reporting, I believe it would have to be reported because of the fact that it is being used in research in a way that is not it's normal, approved use. First of all, is this correct?
Also, is there a need to register this agent with CDC/NIH for the same reason?
Mike
Carolyn Keierleber, Ph.D.
Acting Director & Biosafety Officer
Environmental Health & Safety
The Scripps Research Institute (TSRI)
Mail Code BCC 078
La Jolla, CA 92037
Phone: 858 784-8240
Fax: 858 784-8490
--=====================_868750==_.ALT--
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 26 Sep 2002 12:03:47 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Isabel Jean Goldberg
Subject: Re: Human rDNA therapy
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
Content-transfer-encoding: 7bit
See Appendices A and B of the following policy. Hope this helps. - Jean
----- Original Message -----
From: "Terry Lawrin"
To:
Sent: Thursday, September 26, 2002 11:38 AM
Subject: Human rDNA therapy
> Good morning everyone,
>
> Does anyone out there have a written policy regarding human rDNA therapy
> that they'd like to share. Some of my suggestions ( and eventual policy)
> to the IBC are: 1) Wear an N-95 or PAPR during vector administration. 2)
> Safety glasses. 3) Negative pressure room for administration. 4) Yearly
> retraining of all involved. Am I asking too much?
>
> I need to know whats' out there,
>
> Thanks,
>
> Terry Lawrin
>
>
>
> Terrance J. Lawrin, MT. (ASCP) SLS, CBSP (ABSA)
> Biosafety Officer / Sanitarian
> University of Illinois at Chicago
> Environmental Health and Safety Office
> Telephone: 312-413-3701
> email: tlawrin@uic.edu
>
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 26 Sep 2002 12:54:19 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Hauck, Philip"
Subject: Re: Human rDNA therapy
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
Content-transfer-encoding: quoted-printable
No you're not asking too much, in principle. But remember that you have =
to deal with Infection Control people at most hospitals where GT is =
administered to subjects (patients)...their language and methodology is =
a little different from ours, though the principles are the same that we =
both practice.
Also, few rooms except TB or some Respiratory Precautions rooms are =
negative pressure rooms. This can be overcome by using the portable HEPA =
traps some folks have for TB rooms, but largely by using IC's =
"Respiratory Precautions" (especially for adenoviruses, and other =
aerosol-associated agents)--most of these practices that you are =
requiring may already be required by the Hospital Sanitarian / Infection =
Control Nurse / Epidemiologist. It is advised that you get to know them =
and work with them. I work closely with my Infection Control =
Physician...we have mapped out specific areas of separate and joint =
authority with respect to handling GT safety and health issues. We look =
at protecting the workers(researchers) and support employees and the =
General Public. IC worries about the Patient, the Hospital Physicians =
and Staff, other Hospital employees, and the General Public.
Hope this helps!
Phil Hauck,
Mt. School of Medicine
-----Original Message-----
From: Terry Lawrin [mailto:tlawrin@UIC.EDU]
Sent: Thursday, September 26, 2002 11:38 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Human rDNA therapy
Good morning everyone,
Does anyone out there have a written policy regarding human rDNA therapy
that they'd like to share. Some of my suggestions ( and eventual =
policy)
to the IBC are: 1) Wear an N-95 or PAPR during vector administration. 2)
Safety glasses. 3) Negative pressure room for administration. 4) Yearly
retraining of all involved. Am I asking too much?
I need to know whats' out there,
Thanks,
Terry Lawrin
Terrance J. Lawrin, MT. (ASCP) SLS, CBSP (ABSA)
Biosafety Officer / Sanitarian
University of Illinois at Chicago
Environmental Health and Safety Office
Telephone: 312-413-3701
email: tlawrin@uic.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 26 Sep 2002 13:12:03 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Byers, Karen B"
Subject: Re: Human rDNA therapy
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Great resource! Thank you.
Karen B. Byers, MS, RBP, CBSP-ABSA
Biosafety Officer
Dana Farber Cancer Institute
44 Binney Street-SW350
Boston, MA 02115
Phone: 617-632-3890
Fax: 617-632-1932
-----Original Message-----
From: Isabel Jean Goldberg [mailto:Jean.Goldberg@MED.NYU.EDU]
Sent: Thursday, September 26, 2002 12:04 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Human rDNA therapy
See Appendices A and B of the following policy. Hope this helps. - Jean
----- Original Message -----
From: "Terry Lawrin"
To:
Sent: Thursday, September 26, 2002 11:38 AM
Subject: Human rDNA therapy
> Good morning everyone,
>
> Does anyone out there have a written policy regarding human rDNA therapy
> that they'd like to share. Some of my suggestions ( and eventual policy)
> to the IBC are: 1) Wear an N-95 or PAPR during vector administration. 2)
> Safety glasses. 3) Negative pressure room for administration. 4) Yearly
> retraining of all involved. Am I asking too much?
>
> I need to know whats' out there,
>
> Thanks,
>
> Terry Lawrin
>
>
>
> Terrance J. Lawrin, MT. (ASCP) SLS, CBSP (ABSA)
> Biosafety Officer / Sanitarian
> University of Illinois at Chicago
> Environmental Health and Safety Office
> Telephone: 312-413-3701
> email: tlawrin@uic.edu
>
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 26 Sep 2002 15:59:26 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Larry Mendoza
Organization: VCU-OEHS-Biological/Chemical Safety Section
Subject: Level 3 Select Agent
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="------------F850EEE6F298CDEBE4B570D4"
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--------------F850EEE6F298CDEBE4B570D4
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Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Does anyone know if there is a division or department within the CDC that may
offer consultation in preliminary plans for building a BSL-3 Laboratory? And
if so does anyone know the number to that specific office?
Thank you
Larry Mendoza
VCU
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 26 Sep 2002 14:36:24 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Dina Sassone
Subject: NIOSH revoked certification for 2 N95 respirators
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
Since I recently joined the list serve, I am not sure if this info got out.
There are two N95 respirators for which NIOSH (National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health) recently revoked certification:
Wen Mask Industrial Company model KR-795 N95 Filtering Facepiece Respirator
(TC-84A-2531) and the KR-808 N95 Filtering Facepiece Respirator (TC-84A-2532)
The certification was revoked because they failed to meet the performance
requirement of Title 42, CFR 84.
So if you have any of these, don't use them anymore!
Dina M. Sassone, CIH, CSP, SM (NRM)
University of California
Los Alamos National Laboratory
HSR-5
MS K486
Los Alamos, NM 87545
(505) 665-2977 (voice)
((505) 996-3807 (pager)
"To infinity and beyond"-Buzz Lightyear
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 26 Sep 2002 16:40:56 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Michael Wendeler
Organization: Incyte Genomics
Subject: Viral transport media
MIME-Version: 1.0
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I'm going to try this one more time. Does anyone know where I can get
Bartel's viral transport media for shipping specimens for Herpes B-virus
testing. The phone number for Bartel's in the information I have from
Julia Hilliard's lab is not in service. Any information would be
appreciated. I know there must be a bunch of folks out there that use
this stuff.
Mike Wendeler
EH&S Engineer
Incyte Genomics
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 26 Sep 2002 14:55:05 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Sharyn Baker
Subject: Re: Viral transport media
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Michael,
When all else fails, a simple search on the web with any search engine will
often times give you what you need.
1. 97-Ca SHIP. INST. ... Virology 1. Our laboratory suggests the use of commercially prepared
viral transport media (VTM). 2. Possible supply sources and catalog numbers: - Bartels - ...
Try this web site and there were several others.
Sharyn Baker, M.S., M.A.
Instructor/Computer-Based-Training Design
Master's in Environmental Science And Engineering
University of Colorado Health Sciences Center
Department of Research Affairs
4200 E. 9th Avenue
Denver, Colorado 80262
Email: sharyn.baker@uchsc.edu
Voicemail: (303) 315-8003
> ----------
> From: Michael Wendeler
> Reply To: A Biosafety Discussion List
> Sent: Thursday, September 26, 2002 2:40 PM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: Viral transport media
>
>
> I'm going to try this one more time. Does anyone know where I can get
> Bartel's viral transport media for shipping specimens for Herpes B-virus
> testing. The phone number for Bartel's in the information I have from
> Julia Hilliard's lab is not in service. Any information would be
> appreciated. I know there must be a bunch of folks out there that use
> this stuff.
>
> Mike Wendeler
> EH&S Engineer
> Incyte Genomics
>
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 26 Sep 2002 17:06:34 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Michael Wendeler
Organization: Incyte Genomics
Subject: Re: Viral transport media
MIME-Version: 1.0
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Sharyn,
I have searched all over the web with no luck. I also have the the information from the weblink you mentioned. The Bartel's and Micro Test
phone numbers are not in service and Biowhittaker no longer manufactures that transport media. The B-virus lab really needs to update their
information.
Sharyn Baker wrote:
> Michael,
>
> When all else fails, a simple search on the web with any search engine will
> often times give you what you need.
> 1. 97-Ca SHIP. INST. ... Virology 1. Our laboratory suggests the use of commercially prepared
> viral transport media (VTM). 2. Possible supply sources and catalog numbers: - Bartels - ...
>
> Try this web site and there were several others.
>
> Sharyn Baker, M.S., M.A.
> Instructor/Computer-Based-Training Design
> Master's in Environmental Science And Engineering
> University of Colorado Health Sciences Center
> Department of Research Affairs
> 4200 E. 9th Avenue
> Denver, Colorado 80262
> Email: sharyn.baker@uchsc.edu
> Voicemail: (303) 315-8003
>
> > ----------
> > From: Michael Wendeler
> > Reply To: A Biosafety Discussion List
> > Sent: Thursday, September 26, 2002 2:40 PM
> > To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> > Subject: Viral transport media
> >
> >
> > I'm going to try this one more time. Does anyone know where I can get
> > Bartel's viral transport media for shipping specimens for Herpes B-virus
> > testing. The phone number for Bartel's in the information I have from
> > Julia Hilliard's lab is not in service. Any information would be
> > appreciated. I know there must be a bunch of folks out there that use
> > this stuff.
> >
> > Mike Wendeler
> > EH&S Engineer
> > Incyte Genomics
> >
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 26 Sep 2002 13:57:34 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Colladay, John"
Subject: Re: Viral transport media
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
You can also try this website.
It has listings for just about everything that is life science related.
John
John S. Colladay Ph.D.
Biological Safety Officer
Environmental Health and Safety
University of California, Riverside
Riverside CA., 92651
john.colladay@ehs.ucr.edu
909.787.2648 Direct
909.787.5528 Admin
909.787.5122 Fax
-----Original Message-----
From: Sharyn Baker [mailto:Sharyn.Baker@UCHSC.EDU]
Sent: Thursday, September 26, 2002 1:55 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Viral transport media
Michael,
When all else fails, a simple search on the web with any search engine will
often times give you what you need.
1. 97-Ca SHIP. INST. ... Virology 1. Our laboratory suggests the
use of commercially prepared
viral transport media (VTM). 2. Possible supply sources and catalog
numbers: - Bartels - ...
Try this web site and there were several others.
Sharyn Baker, M.S., M.A.
Instructor/Computer-Based-Training Design
Master's in Environmental Science And Engineering
University of Colorado Health Sciences Center
Department of Research Affairs
4200 E. 9th Avenue
Denver, Colorado 80262
Email: sharyn.baker@uchsc.edu
Voicemail: (303) 315-8003
> ----------
> From: Michael Wendeler
> Reply To: A Biosafety Discussion List
> Sent: Thursday, September 26, 2002 2:40 PM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: Viral transport media
>
>
> I'm going to try this one more time. Does anyone know where I can get
> Bartel's viral transport media for shipping specimens for Herpes B-virus
> testing. The phone number for Bartel's in the information I have from
> Julia Hilliard's lab is not in service. Any information would be
> appreciated. I know there must be a bunch of folks out there that use
> this stuff.
>
> Mike Wendeler
> EH&S Engineer
> Incyte Genomics
>
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 26 Sep 2002 15:14:46 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Sharyn Baker
Subject: Re: Viral transport media
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Try this =
> ----------
> From: Michael Wendeler
> Reply To: A Biosafety Discussion List
> Sent: Thursday, September 26, 2002 3:06 PM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: Re: Viral transport media
>
>
> Sharyn,
> I have searched all over the web with no luck. I also have the the
> information from the weblink you mentioned. The Bartel's and Micro Test
> phone numbers are not in service and Biowhittaker no longer manufactures
> that transport media. The B-virus lab really needs to update their
> information.
>
>
>
> Sharyn Baker wrote:
>
> > Michael,
> >
> > When all else fails, a simple search on the web with any search engine
> will
> > often times give you what you need.
> > 1. 97-Ca SHIP. INST. ... Virology 1. Our laboratory suggests
> the use of commercially prepared
> > viral transport media (VTM). 2. Possible supply sources and catalog
> numbers: - Bartels - ...
> >
> > Try this web site and there were several others.
> >
> > Sharyn Baker, M.S., M.A.
> > Instructor/Computer-Based-Training Design
> > Master's in Environmental Science And Engineering
> > University of Colorado Health Sciences Center
> > Department of Research Affairs
> > 4200 E. 9th Avenue
> > Denver, Colorado 80262
> > Email: sharyn.baker@uchsc.edu
> > Voicemail: (303) 315-8003
> >
> > > ----------
> > > From: Michael Wendeler
> > > Reply To: A Biosafety Discussion List
> > > Sent: Thursday, September 26, 2002 2:40 PM
> > > To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> > > Subject: Viral transport media
> > >
> > >
> > > I'm going to try this one more time. Does anyone know where I can get
> > > Bartel's viral transport media for shipping specimens for Herpes
> B-virus
> > > testing. The phone number for Bartel's in the information I have
> from
> > > Julia Hilliard's lab is not in service. Any information would be
> > > appreciated. I know there must be a bunch of folks out there that use
> > > this stuff.
> > >
> > > Mike Wendeler
> > > EH&S Engineer
> > > Incyte Genomics
> > >
>
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 26 Sep 2002 15:03:50 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Janice Streisand
Subject: Re: Viral transport media
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
We order the media through MARDX Diagnostics, phone 800-331-2291-0 catalog
no. B1029-35D, 50 tubes for $62.40.
Janice Streisand
Safety Coordinator
California National Primate Research Center
At , you wrote:
>Sharyn,
>I have searched all over the web with no luck. I also have the the
>information from the weblink you mentioned. The Bartel's and Micro Test
>phone numbers are not in service and Biowhittaker no longer manufactures
>that transport media. The B-virus lab really needs to update their
>information.
>
>
>
>Sharyn Baker wrote:
>
> > Michael,
> >
> > When all else fails, a simple search on the web with any search engine will
> > often times give you what you need.
> > 1. 97-Ca SHIP. INST. ... Virology 1. Our laboratory
> suggests the use of commercially prepared
> > viral transport media (VTM). 2. Possible supply sources and catalog
> numbers: - Bartels - ...
> >
> > Try this web site and there were several others.
> >
> > Sharyn Baker, M.S., M.A.
> > Instructor/Computer-Based-Training Design
> > Master's in Environmental Science And Engineering
> > University of Colorado Health Sciences Center
> > Department of Research Affairs
> > 4200 E. 9th Avenue
> > Denver, Colorado 80262
> > Email: sharyn.baker@uchsc.edu
> > Voicemail: (303) 315-8003
> >
> > > ----------
> > > From: Michael Wendeler
> > > Reply To: A Biosafety Discussion List
> > > Sent: Thursday, September 26, 2002 2:40 PM
> > > To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> > > Subject: Viral transport media
> > >
> > >
> > > I'm going to try this one more time. Does anyone know where I can get
> > > Bartel's viral transport media for shipping specimens for Herpes B-virus
> > > testing. The phone number for Bartel's in the information I have from
> > > Julia Hilliard's lab is not in service. Any information would be
> > > appreciated. I know there must be a bunch of folks out there that use
> > > this stuff.
> > >
> > > Mike Wendeler
> > > EH&S Engineer
> > > Incyte Genomics
> > >
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 26 Sep 2002 15:41:36 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Gergis, Nasr"
Subject: Re: Level 3 Select Agent
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="----_=_NextPart_001_01C265AD.8D6A4136"
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this format, some or all of this message may not be legible.
------_=_NextPart_001_01C265AD.8D6A4136
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charset=iso-8859-1
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Larry: Yes there is an office within the CDC, Environmental Health and
Safety deals with BSL-3 and other laboratories design. You may contact
William Howard who is in-charge.
Nasr Gergis, Ph.D., DVM
Biosafety & Safety Officer/Interim Director
Occupational Safety and Health
City of Hope/BRI
-----Original Message-----
From: Larry Mendoza [mailto:lgmendoz@HSC.VCU.EDU]
Sent: Thursday, September 26, 2002 12:59 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Level 3 Select Agent
Does anyone know if there is a division or department within the CDC that
may
offer consultation in preliminary plans for building a BSL-3 Laboratory?
And
if so does anyone know the number to that specific office?
Thank you
Larry Mendoza
VCU
------_=_NextPart_001_01C265AD.8D6A4136
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charset=iso-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
RE: Level 3 Select Agent
Larry: Yes there is an office within the CDC, = Environmental Health and Safety deals with BSL-3 and other laboratories = design. You may contact William Howard who is in-charge.
Nasr Gergis, Ph.D., DVM
Biosafety & Safety Officer/Interim = Director
Occupational Safety and Health
City of Hope/BRI
-----Original Message-----
From: Larry Mendoza [mailto:lgmendoz@HSC.VCU.EDU]
Sent: Thursday, September 26, 2002 12:59 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Level 3 Select Agent
Does anyone know if there is a division or department = within the CDC that may
offer consultation in preliminary plans for building = a BSL-3 Laboratory? And
if so does anyone know the number to that specific = office?
Thank you
Larry Mendoza
VCU
------_=_NextPart_001_01C265AD.8D6A4136--
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 27 Sep 2002 07:37:55 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Heather Gonsoulin
Subject: Re: Viral transport media
In-Reply-To:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
This is the same place we get out transport media. However, you will have
to order the swabs separately. They used to be included with the media, but
the last box we received had none.
Heather H. Gonsoulin, RHIA
Safety Officer
UL-Lafayette,
New Iberia Research Center
-----Original Message-----
From: A Biosafety Discussion List [mailto:BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU]On
Behalf Of Janice Streisand
Sent: September 26, 2002 5:04 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Viral transport media
We order the media through MARDX Diagnostics, phone 800-331-2291-0 catalog
no. B1029-35D, 50 tubes for $62.40.
Janice Streisand
Safety Coordinator
California National Primate Research Center
At , you wrote:
>Sharyn,
>I have searched all over the web with no luck. I also have the the
>information from the weblink you mentioned. The Bartel's and Micro Test
>phone numbers are not in service and Biowhittaker no longer manufactures
>that transport media. The B-virus lab really needs to update their
>information.
>
>
>
>Sharyn Baker wrote:
>
> > Michael,
> >
> > When all else fails, a simple search on the web with any search engine
will
> > often times give you what you need.
> > 1. 97-Ca SHIP. INST. ... Virology 1. Our laboratory
> suggests the use of commercially prepared
> > viral transport media (VTM). 2. Possible supply sources and catalog
> numbers: - Bartels - ...
> >
> > Try this web site and there were several others.
> >
> > Sharyn Baker, M.S., M.A.
> > Instructor/Computer-Based-Training Design
> > Master's in Environmental Science And Engineering
> > University of Colorado Health Sciences Center
> > Department of Research Affairs
> > 4200 E. 9th Avenue
> > Denver, Colorado 80262
> > Email: sharyn.baker@uchsc.edu
> > Voicemail: (303) 315-8003
> >
> > > ----------
> > > From: Michael Wendeler
> > > Reply To: A Biosafety Discussion List
> > > Sent: Thursday, September 26, 2002 2:40 PM
> > > To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> > > Subject: Viral transport media
> > >
> > >
> > > I'm going to try this one more time. Does anyone know where I can get
> > > Bartel's viral transport media for shipping specimens for Herpes
B-virus
> > > testing. The phone number for Bartel's in the information I have
from
> > > Julia Hilliard's lab is not in service. Any information would be
> > > appreciated. I know there must be a bunch of folks out there that use
> > > this stuff.
> > >
> > > Mike Wendeler
> > > EH&S Engineer
> > > Incyte Genomics
> > >
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 27 Sep 2002 09:19:33 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Michael Wendeler
Organization: Incyte Genomics
Subject: Sharps Containers
MIME-Version: 1.0
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I just wanted to find out what some folks out there are using for
disposal of contaminated serological pipettes(5 and 10ml). Obviously
these could puncture a biohazard bag and should go into some sort of
sharps container. Does anyone know of a container out there that is
large enough to handle these pipettes? How do you handle these at your
facility?
Mike Wendeler
Incyte Genomics
Newark, DE
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 27 Sep 2002 09:26:12 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Petuch, Brian R."
Subject: Re: Sharps Containers
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Check Fisher Scientific. The sell containers from 1 quart to 10 gallons.
Brian Petuch
Biological Pilot Plant
Safety / Regulatory Operations
Merck Research Labs
WP17-301
West Point, PA 19486-0004
Office 215-652-4039
Fax 215-993-4911
pager 800-759-8888 pin 1380162
-----Original Message-----
From: Michael Wendeler [mailto:wendeler@]
Sent: Friday, September 27, 2002 9:20 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Sharps Containers
I just wanted to find out what some folks out there are using for
disposal of contaminated serological pipettes(5 and 10ml). Obviously
these could puncture a biohazard bag and should go into some sort of
sharps container. Does anyone know of a container out there that is
large enough to handle these pipettes? How do you handle these at your
facility?
Mike Wendeler
Incyte Genomics
Newark, DE
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notice: This e-mail message, together with any attachments, contains information of Merck & Co., Inc. (Whitehouse Station, New Jersey, USA) that may be confidential, proprietary copyrighted and/or legally privileged, and is intended solely for the use of the individual or entity named in this message. If you are not the intended recipient, and have received this message in error, please immediately return this by e-mail and then delete it.
=============================================================================
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 27 Sep 2002 07:29:05 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Sharyn Baker
Subject: Re: Sharps Containers
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
We use 5 gallon plastic paint buckets with lids. They work great.
Sharyn Baker, M.S., M.A.
Instructor/Computer-Based-Training Design
Master's in Environmental Science And Engineering
University of Colorado Health Sciences Center
Department of Research Affairs
4200 E. 9th Avenue
Denver, Colorado 80262
Email: sharyn.baker@uchsc.edu
Voicemail: (303) 315-8003
> ----------
> From: Michael Wendeler
> Reply To: A Biosafety Discussion List
> Sent: Friday, September 27, 2002 7:19 AM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: Sharps Containers
>
>
> I just wanted to find out what some folks out there are using for
> disposal of contaminated serological pipettes(5 and 10ml). Obviously
> these could puncture a biohazard bag and should go into some sort of
> sharps container. Does anyone know of a container out there that is
> large enough to handle these pipettes? How do you handle these at your
> facility?
>
> Mike Wendeler
> Incyte Genomics
> Newark, DE
>
=========================================================================
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 27 Sep 2002 09:39:04 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Norman, Randy"
Subject: Re: Sharps Containers
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
We require they be placed in a horizontal tray so that they are immersed in
disinfectant immediately after use, in the BSCabinet. The trays are covered
and the tops sealed on with autoclave indicator tape, prior to their removal
from the cabinet and transport to the autoclave. This accomplishes a good
amount of disinfection immediately. An advantage over just tossing them into
a sharps container in my opinion.
Pastuer pipettes, on the other hand, though relatively rarely used, are
handled as sharps and accumulated in sharps containers in the BSCabinet.
Randy Norman
Safety Specialist Sr.
BioReliance Corporation
Rockville, MD 20850
Rnorman@
"Success is a journey, not a destination" - Ben Sweetland
-----Original Message-----
From: Michael Wendeler [SMTP:wendeler@]
Sent: Friday, September 27, 2002 9:20 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Sharps Containers
I just wanted to find out what some folks out there are using for
disposal of contaminated serological pipettes(5 and 10ml). Obviously
these could puncture a biohazard bag and should go into some sort of
sharps container. Does anyone know of a container out there that is
large enough to handle these pipettes? How do you handle these at your
facility?
Mike Wendeler
Incyte Genomics
Newark, DE >
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 27 Sep 2002 10:05:42 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Scott Alderman
Subject: Re: Sharps Containers
MIME-Version: 1.0
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Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Mike,
Our labs use the 5x5x15" box shown below for disposal of contaminated
serological pipets. Because of its shape and size, it takes up little
space as compared to many other alternative containers. The boxes are
provided through our Materials Management so I don't have the order info;
however, I do know they are manufactured by the Durham Box Co.
Scott Alderman
Duke University
Michael Wendeler
Sent by: A Biosafety Discussion List
09/27/2002 09:19 AM
Please respond to A Biosafety Discussion List
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
cc:
Subject: Sharps Containers
I just wanted to find out what some folks out there are using for
disposal of contaminated serological pipettes(5 and 10ml). Obviously
these could puncture a biohazard bag and should go into some sort of
sharps container. Does anyone know of a container out there that is
large enough to handle these pipettes? How do you handle these at your
facility?
Mike Wendeler
Incyte Genomics
Newark, DE
Content-Type: image/gif
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 27 Sep 2002 10:57:55 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Hauck, Philip"
Subject: Re: Sharps Containers
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
Content-transfer-encoding: quoted-printable
We are lucky in the New York Area, in that Biosystems, Inc has =
containers that size in their service. What you could use, and work this =
out with your waste people, first, is a red 5-gallon pail. This works =
with all of the pipettes and any broken glass. In most states, now, =
broken and unbroken glass....slides, cover slips, beakers that are =
discarded are now considered sharps. So this helps over come the limited =
capacity of the syringe units. Another option would be a rectangular, =
closable waste can. Lab Safety Supply, VWR should have these containers.
Phi Hauck
Mt.Sinai
-----Original Message-----
From: Michael Wendeler [mailto:wendeler@]
Sent: Friday, September 27, 2002 9:20 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Sharps Containers
I just wanted to find out what some folks out there are using for
disposal of contaminated serological pipettes(5 and 10ml). Obviously
these could puncture a biohazard bag and should go into some sort of
sharps container. Does anyone know of a container out there that is
large enough to handle these pipettes? How do you handle these at your
facility?
Mike Wendeler
Incyte Genomics
Newark, DE
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 27 Sep 2002 11:37:42 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Robin Newberry
Subject: Stenotrophomonas maltophilia
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed"
Anyone who can point me to detailed info on stenotrophomonas maltophilia?
--
Robin
--------------------------------------------------------------
W. Robert Newberry, IV CIH, CHMM
Chief Environmental Health and Safety Officer
Clemson University
wnewber@clemson.edu ehs@clemson.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 27 Sep 2002 08:38:13 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: David Silberman
Subject: Re: Sharps Containers
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
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A note of caution on this approach: In California, our Medical Waste
Management Act (as interpreted by local enforcement agencies) would
not permit Scott's solution as shown. All biohazardous waste must be
covered at all times when not being actively used for disposal
(protruding pipet ends would appear to preclude the ability to close
the container. "Boxes" are not permitted if they are made of
anything other than hard-sided material that can contain leaks. If
Scott's box is made of cardboard or other pervious material, it could
not be used to hold pipets. Check with your local enforcement
agency. At Stanford, we use very large sharps containers that are
commercially available.
>Mike,
>
>Our labs use the 5x5x15" box shown below for disposal of
>contaminated serological pipets. Because of its shape and size, it
>takes up little space as compared to many other alternative
>containers. The boxes are provided through our Materials Management
>so I don't have the order info; however, I do know they are
>manufactured by the Durham Box Co.
>
>Scott Alderman
>Duke University
>
>
>Michael Wendeler
>Sent by: A Biosafety Discussion List
>
>09/27/2002 09:19 AM
>Please respond to A Biosafety Discussion List
>
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> cc:
> Subject: Sharps Containers
>
>
>
>I just wanted to find out what some folks out there are using for
>disposal of contaminated serological pipettes(5 and 10ml). Obviously
>these could puncture a biohazard bag and should go into some sort of
>sharps container. Does anyone know of a container out there that is
>large enough to handle these pipettes? How do you handle these at your
>facility?
>
>Mike Wendeler
>Incyte Genomics
>Newark, DE
>
>
>Content-Type: application/octet-stream; name="wendeler.vcf"
>Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="wendeler.vcf"
>
>Attachment converted: David's Titanium:wendeler.vcf 5 (????/----) (0002DD59)
--
David H. Silberman
Director, Health and Safety Programs
Stanford University School of Medicine
Medical School Office Building
Stanford, CA 94305 Mail Code: 5460
650 723-6336 (DIRECT LINE)
650 725-7878 (FAX)
silberman@stanford.edu
--============_-1178981401==_ma============
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
A note of caution on this approach: In California, our Medical Waste Management Act (as interpreted by local enforcement agencies) would not permit Scott's solution as shown. All biohazardous waste must be covered at all times when not being actively used for disposal (protruding pipet ends would appear to preclude the ability to close the container. "Boxes" are not permitted if they are made of anything other than hard-sided material that can contain leaks. If Scott's box is made of cardboard or other pervious material, it could not be used to hold pipets. Check with your local enforcement agency. At Stanford, we use very large sharps containers that are commercially available.
Mike,
Our labs use the 5x5x15" box shown below for disposal of contaminated serological pipets. Because of its shape and size, it takes up little space as compared to many other alternative containers. The boxes are provided through our Materials Management so I don't have the order info; however, I do know they are manufactured by the Durham Box Co.
Scott Alderman
Duke University
[]
Michael Wendeler
Sent by: A Biosafety Discussion List
09/27/2002 09:19 AM
Please respond to A Biosafety Discussion List
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
cc:
Subject: Sharps Containers
I just wanted to find out what some folks out there are using for
disposal of contaminated serological pipettes(5 and 10ml). Obviously
these could puncture a biohazard bag and should go into some sort of
sharps container. Does anyone know of a container out there that is
large enough to handle these pipettes? How do you handle these at your
facility?
Mike Wendeler
Incyte Genomics
Newark, DE
Content-Type: application/octet-stream; name="wendeler.vcf"
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="wendeler.vcf"
Attachment converted: David's Titanium:wendeler.vcf 5 (????/----) (0002DD59)
--
David H. Silberman
Director, Health and Safety Programs
Stanford University School of Medicine
Medical School Office Building
Stanford, CA 94305 Mail Code: 5460
650 723-6336 (DIRECT LINE)
650 725-7878 (FAX)
silberman@stanford.edu
--============_-1178981401==_ma============--
--============_-1178981401==_mr============
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; x-mac-type="47494666"
; x-mac-creator="6F676C65"
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=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 27 Sep 2002 11:53:00 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Michael Kiley
Subject: Re: Stenotrophomonas maltophilia
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="=_431FE7FC.99F890BB"
This is a MIME message. If you are reading this text, you may want to
consider changing to a mail reader or gateway that understands how to
properly handle MIME multipart messages.
--=_431FE7FC.99F890BB
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The internet is a marvelous tool. When you need info an an organism new to =
you you can use the search engine of your choice and type in the name. For =
this agent there are anumber of interesting articles listed on the web. =
Good hunting!
Mike Kiley
>>> wnewber@CLEMSON.EDU 09/27/02 11:37AM >>>
Anyone who can point me to detailed info on stenotrophomonas maltophilia?
--
Robin
--------------------------------------------------------------
W. Robert Newberry, IV CIH, CHMM
Chief Environmental Health and Safety Officer
Clemson University
wnewber@clemson.edu ehs@clemson.edu
--=_431FE7FC.9EFF97BC
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Content-Description: HTML
The internet is a marvelous tool. When you need info = an an organism new to you you can use the search engine of your choice and type = in the name. For this agent there are anumber of interesting articles listed on = the web. Good hunting!
Mike Kiley
>>> wnewber@CLEMSON.EDU 09/27/02 11:37AM >>>
Anyone who can point me to detailed info on stenotrophomona= s maltophilia?
--
Robin
--------------------------------------------= ------------------
W. Robert Newberry, IV CIH, CHMM
Chief Environmental Health and Safety Officer
Clemson University
wnewber@clemson.edu ehs@clemson.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 27 Sep 2002 10:55:13 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Michael Betlach
Subject: Re: Stenotrophomonas maltophilia
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Maybe this will help you get started, Robin.
Previously classified as Pseudomonas maltophilia and Xanthomonas
maltophilia. Check ATCC's bacteria collection for various strain deposits.
The older taxonomic change is referenced in Swings J et al. Transfer of
Pseudomonas maltophilia, Hugh 1981, to the genus Xanthomonas as Xanthomonas
maltophilia (Hugh 1981) comb. nov. Int. J. Syst. Bacteriol. 33: 409-413,
1983
The CDC's Emerging Infectious Diseases journal has an article in the
September 2002 issue relating to the species' role as an emerging nosocomial
pathogen:
Michael Betlach, Ph.D.
Biosafety Officer
Promega Corporation
5445 E. Cheryl Parkway
Madison, WI 53711
(608) 274-1181, Ext. 1270
-----Original Message-----
From: Robin Newberry [mailto:wnewber@CLEMSON.EDU]
Sent: Friday, September 27, 2002 10:38 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Stenotrophomonas maltophilia
Anyone who can point me to detailed info on stenotrophomonas maltophilia?
--
Robin
--------------------------------------------------------------
W. Robert Newberry, IV CIH, CHMM
Chief Environmental Health and Safety Officer
Clemson University
wnewber@clemson.edu ehs@clemson.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 27 Sep 2002 12:27:47 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Richard Pollack
Subject: sharps containers
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed"
After trying diverse containers, with and without red bags, and as a
result of dealing with several types/lots of 'autoclavable' biohazard
bags that either leaked or lost integrity (melted) below their
advertised melting point, we adopted the following solution. We now
place next to each BSC, a leakproof autoclavable polypropylene
container, and line the inside of each with a suitable autoclavable
red bag. Pipettes, tubes, and other potentially contaminated items
go right into the bag, and the hard plastic shell of the container
captures leaks that may occur if the bag is compromised. The entire
unit with the bag inside then is placed in the autoclave (you need a
tall autoclave chamber if using the larger model waste container).
After decontamination, we remove the bag with contents, place it
within another red bag, and then seal these in a burn box. The
polypropylene bin may then be washed (if necessary), re-lined and
placed back in service. The units we use are from Nalgene, and the
descriptions may be found at:
Although fairly costly to purchase, these units have saved us
considerable time in handling and cleaning of spills from such
wastes. Perhaps this may serve as a solution for some other labs.
--
Richard J. Pollack, Ph.D.
Laboratory of Public Health Entomology
Dept. of Immunology & Infectious Diseases
Harvard School of Public Health
665 Huntington Ave.
Boston, MA 02115 USA
phone: (617) 432-1587
fax: (617) 432-1796
Information on head lice:
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 27 Sep 2002 12:26:35 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Scott Alderman
Subject: Re: Sharps Containers
MIME-Version: 1.0
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This is a multipart message in MIME format.
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I agree with David in that you definitely should check your local
biomedical waste laws (and enforcement agency). However, I want to note
that our pipet boxes (lined with thick plastic bags) have worked well for
us for many years, with no problems of leaks.
Scott Alderman
David Silberman
Sent by: A Biosafety Discussion List
09/27/2002 11:38 AM
Please respond to A Biosafety Discussion List
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
cc:
Subject: Re: Sharps Containers
A note of caution on this approach: In California, our Medical Waste
Management Act (as interpreted by local enforcement agencies) would not
permit Scott's solution as shown. All biohazardous waste must be covered
at all times when not being actively used for disposal (protruding pipet
ends would appear to preclude the ability to close the container. "Boxes"
are not permitted if they are made of anything other than hard-sided
material that can contain leaks. If Scott's box is made of cardboard or
other pervious material, it could not be used to hold pipets. Check with
your local enforcement agency. At Stanford, we use very large sharps
containers that are commercially available.
Mike,
Our labs use the 5x5x15" box shown below for disposal of contaminated
serological pipets. Because of its shape and size, it takes up little
space as compared to many other alternative containers. The boxes are
provided through our Materials Management so I don't have the order info;
however, I do know they are manufactured by the Durham Box Co.
Scott Alderman
Duke University
Michael Wendeler
Sent by: A Biosafety Discussion List
09/27/2002 09:19 AM
Please respond to A Biosafety Discussion List
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
cc:
Subject: Sharps Containers
I just wanted to find out what some folks out there are using for
disposal of contaminated serological pipettes(5 and 10ml). Obviously
these could puncture a biohazard bag and should go into some sort of
sharps container. Does anyone know of a container out there that is
large enough to handle these pipettes? How do you handle these at your
facility?
Mike Wendeler
Incyte Genomics
Newark, DE
Content-Type: application/octet-stream; name="wendeler.vcf"
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="wendeler.vcf"
[] David's Titanium:wendeler.vcf 5 (????/----)
(0002DD59)
--
David H. Silberman
Director, Health and Safety Programs
Stanford University School of Medicine
Medical School Office Building
Stanford, CA 94305 Mail Code: 5460
650 723-6336 (DIRECT LINE)
650 725-7878 (FAX)
silberman@stanford.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 27 Sep 2002 09:47:37 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Sue Quinn
Subject: mouse anesthetic
MIME-Version: 1.0
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boundary="----=_NextPart_000_0016_01C2660A.E9AD25A0"
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charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Can anyone recommend a mouse anesthetic NOT DEA schedule II? I'm not =
permitted for that and have absolutely no desire to amend my current =
permit to include this schedule.
Thanks!
Sue
Suzanne M. Quinn
Senior Manager, Environmental Health and Safety
Exelixis, Inc.
PO Box 511
South San Francisco, CA 94083-0511
------=_NextPart_000_0016_01C2660A.E9AD25A0
Content-Type: text/html;
charset="iso-8859-1"
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Can anyone recommend a mouse = anesthetic NOT DEA schedule II? I'm not permitted for that and have absolutely no = desire to amend my current permit to include this schedule.
Thanks!
Sue
Suzanne M. Quinn
Senior Manager, = Environmental Health and Safety
Exelixis, Inc.
PO Box 511
South San = Francisco, CA 94083-0511
------=_NextPart_000_0016_01C2660A.E9AD25A0--
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 27 Sep 2002 12:59:24 -0400
Reply-To: newtonlb@
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "newtonlb@"
Subject: Re: Sharps Containers
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Mike, our lab waste people set up a system where a tall, vertical Nalgene
pipette holder was used, lined with the red biohazard bag=2E They would t=
hen
bundle the pipettes, bag and all, and place in the bottom of the Medical
waste box (which was lined with another red bag, so that nothing poked
through or caused leaks=2E This worked well for everyone=2E They also se=
ll
tall sharps containers, but these are about $10=2E00 apiece and fill up
quickly, so the former was more cost effective for labs that used a lot of=
disposable pipettes=2E
Laura Newton
Newton Health and Safety Assoc=2E
newtonlb@erols=2Ecom
(908) 284-0258
Original Message:
-----------------
From: Michael Wendeler wendeler@INCYTE=2ECOM
Date: Fri, 27 Sep 2002 09:19:33 -0400
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA=2EMIT=2EEDU
Subject: Sharps Containers
I just wanted to find out what some folks out there are using for
disposal of contaminated serological pipettes(5 and 10ml)=2E Obviously
these could puncture a biohazard bag and should go into some sort of
sharps container=2E Does anyone know of a container out there that is
large enough to handle these pipettes? How do you handle these at your
facility?
Mike Wendeler
Incyte Genomics
Newark, DE
--------------------------------------------------------------------
mail2web - Check your email from the web at
=2E
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 27 Sep 2002 10:14:30 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Funk, Glenn"
Subject: Re: sharps containers
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
There are at least two major problems with placing any frequently used waste
collection container outside the biosafety cabinet. One is the tendency of
many items to drip or spray their residual liquid contents as they're moved
in the necessary arc from inside to outside the cabinet. The other is that
necessitating such moves to get rid of waste increases the amount of
in-and-out arm motion of the cabinet operator. These in-and-out motions
disrupt the "air curtain" across the work opening and undermine the
containment efficacy of the cabinet. Product protection requires that 100%
of the room air entering the cabinet (which amounts to ~30% of the cabinet
flow volume) enter the front air grille; in-and-out arm motions can propel
some incoming air across the work volume to the rear grille, exposing
product in the process. Operator protection requires, among other things,
that the operator not "drag" out residual air volume entrapped in or around
his arms. In my opinion, minimizing in-and-out motions is as important a
consideration in proper BSC operation as it is in proper fume hood
operation.
Just my 0.05 Euros worth ...
-- Glenn
Glenn A. Funk, Ph.D., CBSP
Director and Biosafety Officer
Environment, Health and Safety
MedImmune Vaccines, Inc.
408-845-8847
-----Original Message-----
From: Richard Pollack [mailto:RPollack@HSPH.HARVARD.EDU]
Sent: Friday, September 27, 2002 9:28 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: sharps containers
After trying diverse containers, with and without red bags, and as a
result of dealing with several types/lots of 'autoclavable' biohazard
bags that either leaked or lost integrity (melted) below their
advertised melting point, we adopted the following solution. We now
place next to each BSC, a leakproof autoclavable polypropylene
container, and line the inside of each with a suitable autoclavable
red bag. Pipettes, tubes, and other potentially contaminated items
go right into the bag, and the hard plastic shell of the container
captures leaks that may occur if the bag is compromised. The entire
unit with the bag inside then is placed in the autoclave (you need a
tall autoclave chamber if using the larger model waste container).
After decontamination, we remove the bag with contents, place it
within another red bag, and then seal these in a burn box. The
polypropylene bin may then be washed (if necessary), re-lined and
placed back in service. The units we use are from Nalgene, and the
descriptions may be found at:
98
Although fairly costly to purchase, these units have saved us
considerable time in handling and cleaning of spills from such
wastes. Perhaps this may serve as a solution for some other labs.
--
Richard J. Pollack, Ph.D.
Laboratory of Public Health Entomology
Dept. of Immunology & Infectious Diseases
Harvard School of Public Health
665 Huntington Ave.
Boston, MA 02115 USA
phone: (617) 432-1587
fax: (617) 432-1796
Information on head lice:
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 27 Sep 2002 10:21:46 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Hall, Christine"
Subject: Re: sharps containers
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Here at Palomar College, we use largely re-usable serological pipets but to
address the problem of aerosols and dripping while the students move from
their station to the disinfectant tray we have a designated set of test
tubes that they put the pipet tip in while they walk to the front of the
classroom.
Chris
Chris Hall
Instructional Support Assistant IV
Palomar College - Life Sciences
1140 W Mission Rd
San Marcos, CA 92069
(760) 744-1150 x2726
-----Original Message-----
From: Funk, Glenn [mailto:funkg@]
Sent: Friday, September 27, 2002 10:15 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: sharps containers
There are at least two major problems with placing any frequently used waste
collection container outside the biosafety cabinet. One is the tendency of
many items to drip or spray their residual liquid contents as they're moved
in the necessary arc from inside to outside the cabinet. The other is that
necessitating such moves to get rid of waste increases the amount of
in-and-out arm motion of the cabinet operator. These in-and-out motions
disrupt the "air curtain" across the work opening and undermine the
containment efficacy of the cabinet. Product protection requires that 100%
of the room air entering the cabinet (which amounts to ~30% of the cabinet
flow volume) enter the front air grille; in-and-out arm motions can propel
some incoming air across the work volume to the rear grille, exposing
product in the process. Operator protection requires, among other things,
that the operator not "drag" out residual air volume entrapped in or around
his arms. In my opinion, minimizing in-and-out motions is as important a
consideration in proper BSC operation as it is in proper fume hood
operation.
Just my 0.05 Euros worth ...
-- Glenn
Glenn A. Funk, Ph.D., CBSP
Director and Biosafety Officer
Environment, Health and Safety
MedImmune Vaccines, Inc.
408-845-8847
-----Original Message-----
From: Richard Pollack [mailto:RPollack@HSPH.HARVARD.EDU]
Sent: Friday, September 27, 2002 9:28 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: sharps containers
After trying diverse containers, with and without red bags, and as a
result of dealing with several types/lots of 'autoclavable' biohazard
bags that either leaked or lost integrity (melted) below their
advertised melting point, we adopted the following solution. We now
place next to each BSC, a leakproof autoclavable polypropylene
container, and line the inside of each with a suitable autoclavable
red bag. Pipettes, tubes, and other potentially contaminated items
go right into the bag, and the hard plastic shell of the container
captures leaks that may occur if the bag is compromised. The entire
unit with the bag inside then is placed in the autoclave (you need a
tall autoclave chamber if using the larger model waste container).
After decontamination, we remove the bag with contents, place it
within another red bag, and then seal these in a burn box. The
polypropylene bin may then be washed (if necessary), re-lined and
placed back in service. The units we use are from Nalgene, and the
descriptions may be found at:
98
Although fairly costly to purchase, these units have saved us
considerable time in handling and cleaning of spills from such
wastes. Perhaps this may serve as a solution for some other labs.
--
Richard J. Pollack, Ph.D.
Laboratory of Public Health Entomology
Dept. of Immunology & Infectious Diseases
Harvard School of Public Health
665 Huntington Ave.
Boston, MA 02115 USA
phone: (617) 432-1587
fax: (617) 432-1796
Information on head lice:
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 27 Sep 2002 10:25:02 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ernie Avery
Subject: Re: mouse anesthetic
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
Long-Acting anaesthetic, pentobarbitone sodium.
Stock solution( 65mg./ ml.) diluted 25 times with 10%
ethyl alcohol. 0.8 ml. of this dilute solution/ 100 gm. body-weight.
This should be administered by intraperitoneal injection, the site
being just anterior to the hindmost nipple.
At 09:47 AM 9/27/02 -0700, you wrote:
>Can anyone recommend a mouse anesthetic NOT DEA schedule II? I'm not
>permitted for that and have absolutely no desire to amend my current
>permit to include this schedule.
>
>Thanks!
>Sue
>
>Suzanne M. Quinn
>Senior Manager, Environmental Health and Safety
>Exelixis, Inc.
>PO Box 511
>South San Francisco, CA 94083-0511
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 27 Sep 2002 13:30:13 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Richard Pollack
Subject: sharps containers
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed"
Glenn makes an excellent point, but the alternative is to retain in
the BSC a growing collection of contaminated pipettes and other such
items. Each person needs to carefully examine what may pose the
least risk to the operator, to others in the vicinity, and to the
product/process being manipulated within the BSC. There is no best
solution that works in every case. There certainly are times when we
would, indeed, place a few pipettes horizontally in a decontaminating
solution within the BSC, but this is no longer the general practice
by us for low-risk wastes. If one must eliminate risks posed by
such movements in and out of the BSC, then the practical solution is
to employ a glove box. But, then, this opens other cans of worms.....
>There are at least two major problems with placing any frequently used waste
>collection container outside the biosafety cabinet. One is the tendency of
>many items to drip or spray their residual liquid contents as they're moved
>in the necessary arc from inside to outside the cabinet. The other is that
>necessitating such moves to get rid of waste increases the amount of
>in-and-out arm motion of the cabinet operator. These in-and-out motions
>disrupt the "air curtain" across the work opening and undermine the
>containment efficacy of the cabinet. Product protection requires that 100%
>of the room air entering the cabinet (which amounts to ~30% of the cabinet
>flow volume) enter the front air grille; in-and-out arm motions can propel
>some incoming air across the work volume to the rear grille, exposing
>product in the process. Operator protection requires, among other things,
>that the operator not "drag" out residual air volume entrapped in or around
>his arms. In my opinion, minimizing in-and-out motions is as important a
>consideration in proper BSC operation as it is in proper fume hood
>operation.
>
>Just my 0.05 Euros worth ...
>
>-- Glenn
>
>Glenn A. Funk, Ph.D., CBSP
>Director and Biosafety Officer
>Environment, Health and Safety
>MedImmune Vaccines, Inc.
>408-845-8847
>
--
Richard J. Pollack, Ph.D.
Laboratory of Public Health Entomology
Dept. of Immunology & Infectious Diseases
Harvard School of Public Health
665 Huntington Ave.
Boston, MA 02115 USA
phone: (617) 432-1587
fax: (617) 432-1796
Information on head lice:
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 27 Sep 2002 13:44:15 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: John Bristol
Subject: NewCastle Disease Virus
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Hi,
I have a few questions to the group on registering a facility to receive
Newcastle disease virus. This virus is listed as a USDA high consequence
livestock pathogen. Can someone please provide me with the website to
obtain forms to start the registration process for this material? Also,
how long does it generally take for the registration process to be
finalized?
I am also interested in any resources related to working with this virus in
a laboratory setting.
Thanks,
John Bristol
Associate Director
Environmental Health and Safety
Eisai Research Institute
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 27 Sep 2002 14:21:17 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Paul Jennette
Subject: Re: Sharps Containers
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="=====================_1572752518==_.ALT"
--=====================_1572752518==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
We use the tall cardboard "burn boxes" that are commonly available with
biohazard logos, lined with biohazard bags. (Only for unbroken serological
pipettes, though. "Real" sharps go in sharps containers.)
Cheers
- Paul
At 09:19 AM 9/27/2002 -0400, you wrote:
>I just wanted to find out what some folks out there are using for
>disposal of contaminated serological pipettes(5 and 10ml). Obviously
>these could puncture a biohazard bag and should go into some sort of
>sharps container. Does anyone know of a container out there that is
>large enough to handle these pipettes? How do you handle these at your
>facility?
>
>Mike Wendeler
>Incyte Genomics
>Newark, DE
J. Paul Jennette, P.E.
Biosafety Engineer
Cornell University
College of Veterinary Medicine
Biosafety Program
S3-010 Schurman Hall, Box 4 (607) 253-4227
Ithaca, New York 14853-6401 fax -3723
--=====================_1572752518==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
We use the tall cardboard "burn boxes" that are commonly available with biohazard logos, lined with biohazard bags. (Only for unbroken serological pipettes, though. "Real" sharps go in sharps containers.)
Cheers
- Paul
At 09:19 AM 9/27/2002 -0400, you wrote:
I just wanted to find out what some folks out there are using for
disposal of contaminated serological pipettes(5 and 10ml). Obviously
these could puncture a biohazard bag and should go into some sort of
sharps container. Does anyone know of a container out there that is
large enough to handle these pipettes? How do you handle these at your
facility?
Mike Wendeler
Incyte Genomics
Newark, DE
J. Paul Jennette, P.E.
Biosafety Engineer
Cornell University
College of Veterinary Medicine
Biosafety Program
S3-010 Schurman Hall, Box 4 (607) 253-4227
Ithaca, New York 14853-6401 fax -3723
--=====================_1572752518==_.ALT--
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 27 Sep 2002 11:25:29 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: John Read
Subject: Re: mouse anesthetic
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="----_=_NextPart_001_01C26653.4239FB10"
This message is in MIME format. Since your mail reader does not understand
this format, some or all of this message may not be legible.
------_=_NextPart_001_01C26653.4239FB10
Content-Type: text/plain;
charset="iso-8859-1"
Hey Sue,
Have your researchers considered using an inhalable anesthetic gas (i.e.
isoflurane)? There are some health and safety concerns; however, there are
some pretty good induction chambers with built in gas scavenger systems that
reduce the hazard if used properly. As an added benefit the gas would
eliminate a procedure that requires a needle (always a good thing).
John
-----Original Message-----
From: Sue Quinn [mailto:squinn@]
Sent: Friday, September 27, 2002 9:48 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: mouse anesthetic
Can anyone recommend a mouse anesthetic NOT DEA schedule II? I'm not
permitted for that and have absolutely no desire to amend my current permit
to include this schedule.
Thanks!
Sue
Suzanne M. Quinn
Senior Manager, Environmental Health and Safety
Exelixis, Inc.
PO Box 511
South San Francisco, CA 94083-0511
------_=_NextPart_001_01C26653.4239FB10
Content-Type: text/html;
charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
xmlns:o=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office" = xmlns:w=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:word" = xmlns=3D"">
Hey = Sue,
=
Have your researchers considered = using an inhalable anesthetic gas (i.e. isoflurane)? As an added benefit the gas would eliminate a procedure that = requires a needle (always a good thing).
=
John
=
-----Original Message-----
From: Sue Quinn [mailto:squinn@]
Sent: Friday, September = 27, 2002 9:48 AM
To: = BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: mouse = anesthetic
Can anyone recommend a mouse anesthetic NOT DEA schedule II? I'm not permitted for that and have absolutely no desire to amend my current = permit to include this schedule.
Thanks!=
Sue
Suzanne M. Quinn
Senior Manager, Environmental Health and Safety
Exelixis, Inc.
PO Box 511
South San Francisco, CA 94083-0511
------_=_NextPart_001_01C26653.4239FB10--
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 27 Sep 2002 15:18:24 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "OLINGER, PATRICIA L [S&C/0216]"
Subject: Inventory Software
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
As many of you know, because I've talked with you at length, I have been
evaluating biological agent inventory / rDNA protocol tracking software that
is available for quite some time now.
It seems as though most have their own home built systems. Which some I
might add are wonderful.
The only off the shelf system that I have seen is one made by OnSite
systems. They are primarily known for their program HP Assistant (rad
safety).
In today's environment I am surprised that there aren't more. Does anyone
know of anything else that is commercially available. Our IT department
really wants us to find something that is "off the shelf" if possible.
Thanks,
Patty Olinger
Pharmacia - Kalamazoo Corporate Services - ESH
Biosafety Officer
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 27 Sep 2002 12:43:12 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: MC Hull
Subject: Re: mouse anesthetic
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
This address is no longer operable for MC Hull. Please remove it from your
list serve. At this time we do not have a forwarding address.
Thank You
Sue Blair
Director, Center for Human Resources
SDSU
At 11:25 AM 9/27/2002 -0700, John Read wrote:
>Hey Sue,
>
>
>
>Have your researchers considered using an inhalable anesthetic gas (i.e.
>isoflurane)? As an added benefit the gas would eliminate a procedure
>that requires a needle (always a good thing).
>
>
>
>John
>
>
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From: Sue Quinn [mailto:squinn@]
>Sent: Friday, September 27, 2002 9:48 AM
>To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
>Subject: mouse anesthetic
>
>
>
>Can anyone recommend a mouse anesthetic NOT DEA schedule II? I'm not
>permitted for that and have absolutely no desire to amend my current
>permit to include this schedule.
>
>
>
>Thanks!
>
>Sue
>
>
>
>Suzanne M. Quinn
>Senior Manager, Environmental Health and Safety
>Exelixis, Inc.
>PO Box 511
>South San Francisco, CA 94083-0511
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 27 Sep 2002 15:36:48 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Doob, Peter (NIDA/IRP)"
Subject: Re: Inventory Software
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Pat=
We have worked with OnSite in an attempt to convert their HPASSIST software
into a turnkey package for smaller institutions (we are only 500 strong),
that would cover chem/bio/rad under one umbrella. Had to put the effort
aside for awhile when time became scarce, but hope to return sometime.
=Pete
Peter A. Doob, MPH, JD
Chief, Safety and Operations Support Section, ASB
National Institute for Drug Abuse, NIH
Intramural Research Program
5500 Nathan Shock Drive
Baltimore, MD 21224
vc: 410-550-1675
> ----------
> From: OLINGER, PATRICIA L [S&C/0216]
> Reply To: A Biosafety Discussion List
> Sent: Friday, September 27, 2002 3:18 PM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: Inventory Software
>
> As many of you know, because I've talked with you at length, I have been
> evaluating biological agent inventory / rDNA protocol tracking software
> that
> is available for quite some time now.
>
> It seems as though most have their own home built systems. Which some I
> might add are wonderful.
>
> The only off the shelf system that I have seen is one made by OnSite
> systems. They are primarily known for their program HP Assistant (rad
> safety).
>
> In today's environment I am surprised that there aren't more. Does anyone
> know of anything else that is commercially available. Our IT department
> really wants us to find something that is "off the shelf" if possible.
>
> Thanks,
>
> Patty Olinger
> Pharmacia - Kalamazoo Corporate Services - ESH
> Biosafety Officer
>
>
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 27 Sep 2002 16:09:49 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ed Gaunt
Subject: Re: NewCastle Disease Virus
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Ed
-----Original Message-----
From: John Bristol [mailto:John_Bristol@ERI.]
Sent: Friday, September 27, 2002 1:44 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: NewCastle Disease Virus
Hi,
I have a few questions to the group on registering a facility to receive
Newcastle disease virus. This virus is listed as a USDA high consequence
livestock pathogen. Can someone please provide me with the website to
obtain forms to start the registration process for this material? Also,
how long does it generally take for the registration process to be
finalized?
I am also interested in any resources related to working with this virus in
a laboratory setting.
Thanks,
John Bristol
Associate Director
Environmental Health and Safety
Eisai Research Institute
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 27 Sep 2002 16:46:02 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Daniel King
Subject: Re: NewCastle Disease Virus
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Since the agent is an animal pathogen I believe the import/transport
permitting request should go to USDA, Animal & Plant Health Inspection
Service rather than to CDC. The online form is available at
Jack
*************************************************
Daniel J. (Jack) King, D.V.M., Ph.D.
USDA, ARS, Southeast Poultry Research Laboratory
934 College Station Road
Athens, GA 30605
706-546-3407 Phone
706-546-3161 FAX
jking@seprl.
*************************************************
-----Original Message-----
From: Ed Gaunt [mailto:egaunt@]
Sent: Friday, September 27, 2002 4:10 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: NewCastle Disease Virus
Ed
-----Original Message-----
From: John Bristol [mailto:John_Bristol@ERI.]
Sent: Friday, September 27, 2002 1:44 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: NewCastle Disease Virus
Hi,
I have a few questions to the group on registering a facility to receive
Newcastle disease virus. This virus is listed as a USDA high consequence
livestock pathogen. Can someone please provide me with the website to
obtain forms to start the registration process for this material? Also,
how long does it generally take for the registration process to be
finalized?
I am also interested in any resources related to working with this virus in
a laboratory setting.
Thanks,
John Bristol
Associate Director
Environmental Health and Safety
Eisai Research Institute
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 30 Sep 2002 10:16:51 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Robert N. Latsch"
Subject: Re: Human rDNA therapy
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Just a thought for evaluation,
Safety glasses are designed to protect from particulates and solids. They
are not designed to protect from liquids. Proper proper protection for
liquids would be either safety goggles or a face sheild.
We advise use along these lines.
Bob
>Good morning everyone,
>
>Does anyone out there have a written policy regarding human rDNA therapy
>that they'd like to share. Some of my suggestions ( and eventual policy)
>to the IBC are: 1) Wear an N-95 or PAPR during vector administration. 2)
>Safety glasses. 3) Negative pressure room for administration. 4) Yearly
>retraining of all involved. Am I asking too much?
>
>I need to know whats' out there,
>
>Thanks,
>
>Terry Lawrin
>
>
>
>Terrance J. Lawrin, MT. (ASCP) SLS, CBSP (ABSA)
>Biosafety Officer / Sanitarian
>University of Illinois at Chicago
>Environmental Health and Safety Office
>Telephone: 312-413-3701
>email: tlawrin@uic.edu
_____________________________________________________________________
__ / _____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 30 Sep 2002 10:24:03 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Robert N. Latsch"
Subject: Re: Sharps Containers
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
We use 7 gallon sharps containers. To maximise trash removal, we recommend
that the user have constructed a device that will tilt the sharps
container. This facilitates stacking of the pippettes inside of the
container witht the lid in place.
Bob
>I just wanted to find out what some folks out there are using for
>disposal of contaminated serological pipettes(5 and 10ml). Obviously
>these could puncture a biohazard bag and should go into some sort of
>sharps container. Does anyone know of a container out there that is
>large enough to handle these pipettes? How do you handle these at your
>facility?
>
>Mike Wendeler
>Incyte Genomics
>Newark, DE
>
_____________________________________________________________________
__ / _____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 30 Sep 2002 10:28:06 -0500
Reply-To: speaker@ehs.psu.edu
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Curt Speaker
Organization: UNIVERSITY SAFETY
Subject: Polio Survey ?s
Morning all:
Does anyone know anything more about the upcoming polio virus
survey coming from CDC? (Yes, I know about the ABSA links, etc.)
Will there only be one survey sent to each institution? Or is there a
chance of getting multiple copies as occurred with the SA forms
(each of our branch campuses has a CEO [campus executive
officer] who is technically the president of that campus)? Any idea
what the mailing will look like? Markings or specific wording on the
outside of the envelope?
Our president's office receives hundreds of pieces of mail every day,
and I would like to alert the mailroom folks to be on the lookout for
this the week of Oct. 11th.
Any info on this would be most appreciated.
thanks
Curt
Curt Speaker
Biosafety Officer
Penn State University
Environmental Health and Safety
speaker@ehs.psu.edu
^...^
(O_O)
=(Y)=
"""
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 30 Sep 2002 10:35:39 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Robert N. Latsch"
Subject: Re: sharps containers
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Consider how many steps are required when using such a method. We use
diposable containers. Place the sharp in there and you are done. I do not
care for the multiple handling concept. The addition of a disinfectant is
a great idea until one gets to the disposal part. My biowaste disposer
will not accept the chemical. My chemwaste broker will not accept the
pippettes in any form. This means that we must decant the disinfectant.
There is no right answer here. What ever works best for your situation.
Bob
>Glenn makes an excellent point, but the alternative is to retain in
>the BSC a growing collection of contaminated pipettes and other such
>items. Each person needs to carefully examine what may pose the
>least risk to the operator, to others in the vicinity, and to the
>product/process being manipulated within the BSC. There is no best
>solution that works in every case. There certainly are times when we
>would, indeed, place a few pipettes horizontally in a decontaminating
>solution within the BSC, but this is no longer the general practice
>by us for low-risk wastes. If one must eliminate risks posed by
>such movements in and out of the BSC, then the practical solution is
>to employ a glove box. But, then, this opens other cans of worms.....
>
>
>>There are at least two major problems with placing any frequently used waste
>>collection container outside the biosafety cabinet. One is the tendency of
>>many items to drip or spray their residual liquid contents as they're moved
>>in the necessary arc from inside to outside the cabinet. The other is that
>>necessitating such moves to get rid of waste increases the amount of
>>in-and-out arm motion of the cabinet operator. These in-and-out motions
>>disrupt the "air curtain" across the work opening and undermine the
>>containment efficacy of the cabinet. Product protection requires that 100%
>>of the room air entering the cabinet (which amounts to ~30% of the cabinet
>>flow volume) enter the front air grille; in-and-out arm motions can propel
>>some incoming air across the work volume to the rear grille, exposing
>>product in the process. Operator protection requires, among other things,
>>that the operator not "drag" out residual air volume entrapped in or around
>>his arms. In my opinion, minimizing in-and-out motions is as important a
>>consideration in proper BSC operation as it is in proper fume hood
>>operation.
>>
>>Just my 0.05 Euros worth ...
>>
>>-- Glenn
>>
>>Glenn A. Funk, Ph.D., CBSP
>>Director and Biosafety Officer
>>Environment, Health and Safety
>>MedImmune Vaccines, Inc.
>>408-845-8847
>>
>
>--
>Richard J. Pollack, Ph.D.
>Laboratory of Public Health Entomology
>Dept. of Immunology & Infectious Diseases
>Harvard School of Public Health
>665 Huntington Ave.
>Boston, MA 02115 USA
>
>phone: (617) 432-1587
>fax: (617) 432-1796
>Information on head lice:
_____________________________________________________________________
__ / _____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 30 Sep 2002 11:36:16 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Hauck, Philip"
MIME-version: 1.0
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Hey Bio Folks! Not to ruin your Monday....
Check out the rationale used for HR 3448, the House =
Conference Report No.107-481, May 21, 2002! I have attached it =
for your "amusement". This pretty clearly states that all former =
"exemptions" are off, and if the FDA permitted materials =
that have SAL components are used in any other way than to treat =
patients, your researchers will have to :
1 Register under the LR/SAT;
2 Transfer ALL their materials to a registered person (and =
don't forget to amend your Facility Registration!!!);
3 Destroy all materials....after reporting to the Secretary! =
(the forms we just sent back Sept 10, 2002)
Those seem to be the only options open...and this is what =
the ASI inspectors working for CDC hinted at when they =
visited me. I have the applicable sections that the August 6, 2002 Fed =
Reg "OMB Approval of Data Collection:Notice" cited. Please =
tell me my read of the regs is wrong, or we have more work to do...
Phil Hauck
Mt. Sinai School of Medicine
Hey Bio Folks! Not to ruin your Monday&.
= =A0 Check out the rationale used for HR 3448, the House Conference Report No.107-48= 1, May 21, 2002! I have attached it = =A0 for your amusement . This pretty clearly states that all former exemptions a= re off, and if the FDA permitted materials = =A0 that have SAL components are used in any other way than to treat patients,= your researchers will have to :
= =A0
= =A0 1 Register under the LR/SAT;
= =A0 2 Transfer ALL their materials to a registered person (and don t forget to= amend your Facility Registration!!!);
= =A0 3 Destroy all materials&.after reporting to the Secretary! (the forms we just sent back Sept 10, 2002)
= =A0 Those seem to be the only options open&and this is what the ASI inspectors= working for CDC hinted at when they = =A0 visited me. I have the applicable sections that the August 6, 2002 Fed = Reg OMB App= roval of Data Collection:Notice =A0 cited. Please tell me my = read of the regs is wrong, or we have more work to do&
= =A0 Phil Hauck
= =A0 Mt. Sinai School of Medicine
--Boundary_(ID_/TXuN7XpWUpiXj3dfi56yg)--
--Boundary_(ID_PURK0rmCyX1x9Z/mt6fseg)
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Content-disposition: attachment; filename=TileII_107_481.htm
Content-description: TileII_107_481.htm
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 30 Sep 2002 12:06:42 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Michael Wendeler
Organization: Incyte Genomics
Subject: Animal Biosafety Questions
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="------------BFD11823B9E27DAC28E0843B"
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I have a couple of questions regarding the treatment of animal bedding:
1) If you have animals infected with replication incompetent
adenovirus, is it necessary to treat the bedding as biohazard waste? It
is my understanding that wild type adenovirus can be shed in urine and
feces up to 72 hours post infection. But if it's replication
incompetent is it really necessary to treat the animal waste as a
biohazard?
2) We will also be injecting mice with primary human PBMC's. Should
the animal wastes for this experiment be handled as biohazardous? I
know that according to the BBP Standard, feces and urine are not
considered potentially infectious material unless there is visible blood
present. Can I assume this with our animal waste also, and therfore
consider it non-biohazardous?
I ask this because the people we contract with to do our animal work are
concerned about this. My opinion is that the risk to personnel
handling animal waste from the above experiments is extremely minimal.
But I'd like to hear other opinions.
Mike Wendeler
EH&S Engineer
Incyte Genomics
Newark, DE
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 30 Sep 2002 12:17:04 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Hauck, Philip"
Subject: Re: Animal Biosafety Questions
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
Content-transfer-encoding: quoted-printable
We go the extra yard and would collect the animal bedding in both cases =
and send it out for incineration. I know it costs more, but the Head DVM =
and I sleep a lot better at night knowing that the NYCDEP Police won't =
be at our door, the next day.
Phil Hauck
-----Original Message-----
From: Michael Wendeler [mailto:wendeler@]
Sent: Monday, September 30, 2002 12:07 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Animal Biosafety Questions
I have a couple of questions regarding the treatment of animal bedding:
1) If you have animals infected with replication incompetent
adenovirus, is it necessary to treat the bedding as biohazard waste? It
is my understanding that wild type adenovirus can be shed in urine and
feces up to 72 hours post infection. But if it's replication
incompetent is it really necessary to treat the animal waste as a
biohazard?
2) We will also be injecting mice with primary human PBMC's. Should
the animal wastes for this experiment be handled as biohazardous? I
know that according to the BBP Standard, feces and urine are not
considered potentially infectious material unless there is visible blood
present. Can I assume this with our animal waste also, and therfore
consider it non-biohazardous?
I ask this because the people we contract with to do our animal work are
concerned about this. My opinion is that the risk to personnel
handling animal waste from the above experiments is extremely minimal.
But I'd like to hear other opinions.
Mike Wendeler
EH&S Engineer
Incyte Genomics
Newark, DE
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 30 Sep 2002 13:11:08 EDT
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ed Krisiunas
Subject: "HIV/AIDS Surveillance Report"
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="part1_28.2d4ad7d1.2ac9dfac_boundary"
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The 2001 year-end edition (U.S. HIV and AIDS cases reported through December
2001) of the "HIV/AIDS Surveillance Report" (Vol. 13, No. 2) is now
available at .
Basic statistics on AIDS cases have been updated to reflect the new
surveillance report.=A0 They are available at
tm
Edward Krisiunas, MT(ASCP), CIC, MPH
President
WNWN International
PO Box 1164
Burlington, Connecticut
06013
860-675-1217
860-675-1311(fax)
860-944-2373(mobile)
--part1_28.2d4ad7d1.2ac9dfac_boundary
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Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
The 2001 year-end edition (U.S. HIV and AIDS cases rep= orted through December
2001) of the "HIV/AIDS Surveillance Report" (Vol. 13, No. 2) is now
available at .
Basic statistics on AIDS cases have been updated to reflect the new
surveillance report.=A0 They are available at ts.htm
Edward Krisiunas, MT(ASCP), CIC, MPH
President
WNWN International
PO Box 1164
Burlington, Connecticut
06013
860-675-1217
860-675-1311(fax)
860-944-2373(mobile)
--part1_28.2d4ad7d1.2ac9dfac_boundary--
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 30 Sep 2002 14:02:40 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "KLEIN, Jan"
Subject: Oc. Health Position Vacancy
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="----_=_NextPart_001_01C268B3.F2FE9340"
This message is in MIME format. Since your mail reader does not understand
this format, some or all of this message may not be legible.
------_=_NextPart_001_01C268B3.F2FE9340
Content-Type: text/plain
Dear Biosafety Folks:
Please post/distribute this announcement for an Occupational Health
Specialist at University of Wisconsin - Madison. Note the fast approaching
deadline for applications, October 11, 2002.
Thanks,
Jan
//
Jan Klein
Biological Safety Officer
608-263-9026
------_=_NextPart_001_01C268B3.F2FE9340
Content-Type: text/html
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Oc. Health Position Vacancy
Dear Biosafety Folks:
Please post/distribute this announcement for an = Occupational Health Specialist at University of Wisconsin - Madison. = Note the fast approaching deadline for applications, October 11, = 2002.
Thanks,
Jan
//
Jan Klein
Biological Safety Officer
608-263-9026
------_=_NextPart_001_01C268B3.F2FE9340--
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 30 Sep 2002 15:07:19 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Paul Jennette
Subject: Re: Animal Biosafety Questions
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
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boundary="=====================_1834708661==_.ALT"
--=====================_1834708661==_.ALT
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Mike,
The answer may well lie in your state's law and/or regulations on medical
waste. Here in NY, the law defines waste bedding from animals "known to be
contaminated with infectious (i.e., zoonotic) agents" or "inoculated during
research, production of biologicals, or pharmaceutical testing with
infectious agents" as Regulated Medical Waste. To the consternation of
some of our veterinarians, the law does not recognize how the agent might
be shed or whether, in the latter case, the animal actually developed (or
maybe recovered from) an infection.
We incinerate bedding that meets this definition here at Cornell.
Cheers
- Paul
At 12:06 PM 9/30/2002 -0400, you wrote:
>I have a couple of questions regarding the treatment of animal bedding:
>1) If you have animals infected with replication incompetent
>adenovirus, is it necessary to treat the bedding as biohazard waste? It
>is my understanding that wild type adenovirus can be shed in urine and
>feces up to 72 hours post infection. But if it's replication
>incompetent is it really necessary to treat the animal waste as a
>biohazard?
>
>2) We will also be injecting mice with primary human PBMC's. Should
>the animal wastes for this experiment be handled as biohazardous? I
>know that according to the BBP Standard, feces and urine are not
>considered potentially infectious material unless there is visible blood
>present. Can I assume this with our animal waste also, and therfore
>consider it non-biohazardous?
>
>I ask this because the people we contract with to do our animal work are
>concerned about this. My opinion is that the risk to personnel
>handling animal waste from the above experiments is extremely minimal.
>But I'd like to hear other opinions.
>
>Mike Wendeler
>EH&S Engineer
>Incyte Genomics
>Newark, DE
J. Paul Jennette, P.E.
Biosafety Engineer
Cornell University
College of Veterinary Medicine
Biosafety Program
S3-010 Schurman Hall, Box 4 (607) 253-4227
Ithaca, New York 14853-6401 fax -3723
--=====================_1834708661==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
Mike,
The answer may well lie in your state's law and/or regulations on medical waste. Here in NY, the law defines waste bedding from animals "known to be contaminated with infectious (i.e., zoonotic) agents" or "inoculated during research, production of biologicals, or pharmaceutical testing with infectious agents" as Regulated Medical Waste. To the consternation of some of our veterinarians, the law does not recognize how the agent might be shed or whether, in the latter case, the animal actually developed (or maybe recovered from) an infection.
We incinerate bedding that meets this definition here at Cornell.
Cheers
- Paul
At 12:06 PM 9/30/2002 -0400, you wrote:
I have a couple of questions regarding the treatment of animal bedding:
1) If you have animals infected with replication incompetent
adenovirus, is it necessary to treat the bedding as biohazard waste? It
is my understanding that wild type adenovirus can be shed in urine and
feces up to 72 hours post infection. But if it's replication
incompetent is it really necessary to treat the animal waste as a
biohazard?
2) We will also be injecting mice with primary human PBMC's. Should
the animal wastes for this experiment be handled as biohazardous? I
know that according to the BBP Standard, feces and urine are not
considered potentially infectious material unless there is visible blood
present. Can I assume this with our animal waste also, and therfore
consider it non-biohazardous?
I ask this because the people we contract with to do our animal work are
concerned about this. My opinion is that the risk to personnel
handling animal waste from the above experiments is extremely minimal.
But I'd like to hear other opinions.
Mike Wendeler
EH&S Engineer
Incyte Genomics
Newark, DE
J. Paul Jennette, P.E.
Biosafety Engineer
Cornell University
College of Veterinary Medicine
Biosafety Program
S3-010 Schurman Hall, Box 4 (607) 253-4227
Ithaca, New York 14853-6401 fax -3723
--=====================_1834708661==_.ALT--
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 30 Sep 2002 18:07:05 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Koporc, Kim"
Subject: US National Inventory of Wild Poliovirus Materials
MIME-Version: 1.0
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boundary="----_=_NextPart_001_01C268CD.B6823F2E"
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All: Your questions/comments posted this past week were forwarded to me =
by a few of your colleagues. This e-mail answers questions received so =
far.
Over 2,000 laboratories were inventoried during the pilot phase. Those =
that responded will not be inventoried again.
Inventory packets will be sent by October 11 to Laboratory Directors of =
non-academic facilities, to the Chancellors of academic institutions (or =
President if there is no Chancellor), and to CEOs of industry. Even if =
no wild poliovirus materials are retained, all institutions/laboratories =
must respond by December 31, 2002.
The inventory packet will be in a 9X12 white envelope with an address =
window. The deadline for responding will be in bold letters on the =
front of the envelope. Key to the successful completion of the =
inventory is ensuring that biosafety officers are involved early in the =
process. If you have not heard from your institution by mid October, you =
might want to inquire up the line as to the whereabouts of the forms. =
In the meantime, inventory forms may be downloaded from our new and =
improved website at od/nvpo/polio. The revised website will =
be available October 1.
I hope this helps. I will be out of the office tomorrow, but will pick =
up your e-mail on Wednesday.
Best regards,
Kim Koporc
Poliovirus Laboratory Containment Preparedness
750 Commerce Drive
Suite 400
Decatur, GA 30030
E-mail kkoporc@
od/nvpo/polio
------_=_NextPart_001_01C268CD.B6823F2E
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charset="iso-8859-1"
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US National Inventory of Wild Poliovirus Materials
All: Your questions/comments posted this past week = were forwarded to me by a few of your colleagues. This e-mail = answers questions = received so = far.
Over 2,000 laboratories were inventoried during the pilot = phase. Those that responded will not be inventoried = again.
Inventory packets will be sent by October 11 to = Laboratory Directors of non-academic facilities, to the Chancellors of = academic institutions (or President if there is no Chancellor), and to = CEOs of industry. Even if no wild poliovirus materials are = retained, all institutions/laboratories must respond by December 31, = 2002.
The inventory packet = will be in a 9X12 white envelope with an address window. The = deadline for responding will be in bold letters on the front of the = envelope. Key to the successful = completion of the inventory is ensuring that biosafety officers are = involved early in the process. If you have not heard from = your institution by mid October, you might want to inquire up the line = as to the whereabouts of the forms. In the meantime, inventory = forms may be downloaded from our new and improved website = at od/nvpo/polio. The revised website will be available = October 1.
I hope this helps. I will be out of the office = tomorrow, but will pick up your e-mail on Wednesday.
Best regards,
Kim Koporc
Poliovirus Laboratory Containment Preparedness =
750 Commerce Drive
Suite 400
Decatur, GA 30030
E-mail kkoporc@
od/nvpo/polio
------_=_NextPart_001_01C268CD.B6823F2E--
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 30 Sep 2002 18:22:38 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Bill Homovec
Subject: Re: US National Inventory of Wild Poliovirus Materials (Out of
Office)
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Thanks for the message. I will be out of the office at an off-site meeting =
on October 1, 2002. I will be back in the office on Wednesday, October 2, =
2002.
Thank you.
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 30 Sep 2002 19:13:01 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Mark Grushka
Subject: CDC High Priority List /What is the Scientific/Regulatory Basis?
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Dear Biosafety Listservers:
This may have come up in recent listserve correspondence, so at the risk of
a repeat, here goes! I saw on the CDC website under Biological Diseases and
Agents that not all Select Agent from the original 1996 list have been
listed in the "High Priority Agent" categories of A, B, or C. The CDC URL
is listed below. I can read what the CDC said each category means. However,
does anyone know where I can find either the scientific and/or regulatory
basis by which the CDC listed some and not others from the original "Select
Agent" list?
Much thanks,
Mark J. Grushka, M.S., CSP
Biosafety Officer
University of Arizona
520-621-5279
mgrushka@u.arizona.edu
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=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 1 Oct 2002 08:39:14 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Gordon, Deborah"
Subject: Facilities Revisited
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
We just received at our mailing address a SA notification form that is
obviously mailed to the wrong addressee. How do we handle this ?
Deborah Gordon
e-mail: gordon@
phone: (205) 581-2417
Fax: (205) 581-2880
Southern Research Institute
2000 9th Ave. South
P.O. Box 55305
Birmingham,Alabama 35255-5305
____________________________________________________________________________
_
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The information contained in this communication and its attachments is
intended only for the use of the individual to whom it is addressed and may
contain information that is legally privileged, confidential, or exempt from
disclosure. If the reader of this message is not the intended recipient, you
are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution, or copying of this
communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this
communication in error, please notify postmaster@ (205-581-2999) and
delete the communication without retaining any copies.
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 1 Oct 2002 08:02:02 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Therese M. Stinnett"
Subject: Re: CDC High Priority List /What is the Scientific/Regulatory Bas
is?
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
I believe the High Priority list is actually the one developed by DHHS =
under
the auspices of NIAID/NIH to determine where to put (BIG) research =
dollars,
somewhat separate and distinct from the SA issues.
for more info
Therese M. Stinnett
Biosafety Officer
Health and Safety Division
UCHSC, Mailstop C275
4200 E. 9th Avenue
Denver, CO=A0 80262
Voice:=A0 303-315-6754
Pager:=A0 303-266-5402
Fax:=A0 303-315-8026
email:=A0 therese.stinnett@uchsc.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 1 Oct 2002 10:50:43 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Meechan, Paul J."
Subject: The "Pink" blues continue
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
To all-As the flood of pink CDC/USDA cards rush in, I've run into a problem
that I haven't seen discussed on the webserver. The cards are coming in
without form ID numbers or barcodes. Some of the names and addresses don't
exactly match the forms that were returned in time, so I'm not sure if there
are duplicates that ASI is looking for. When I called the hot line, I was
told I'd get an answer yesterday. That didn't happen.
So, anyone else having this problem and how do you solve it? I can put the
summary form number on the card, but until I know the number of the form
that they are looking for, the cards will continue to arrive.
Thanks
Paul
Paul J. Meechan, Ph.D.
Biosafety Manager, WP
Merck & Co., Inc.
215-652-0744
meechan@
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notice: This e-mail message, together with any attachments, contains
information of Merck & Co., Inc. (Whitehouse Station, New Jersey, USA) that may
be confidential, proprietary copyrighted and/or legally privileged, and is
intended solely for the use of the individual or entity named in this message.
If you are not the intended recipient, and have received this message in error,
please immediately return this by e-mail and then delete it.
=============================================================================
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 1 Oct 2002 08:14:38 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Elizabeth Smith
Subject: Re: Vaccine Strain
In-Reply-To:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
It was explained to me, that if your anthrax is a *licensed*
Sterne strain, it is exempt from Select Agent stuff (but would
still need to respond to USDA/HHR reporting, as it is still B.
anthracis). If you have anything other than a *licensed* Sterne
strain, it *is* a Select Agent, regardless of whether or not it
can cause disease, etc.
I went around and around with some people who were trying to
argue that anything missing plasmids, etc. was a "vaccine
strain". (A potent argument, since we *do* make an FDA-licensed
anthrax vaccine from it... but it isn't the Sterne strain, so it
isn't exempt, go figure... as long as you also go register :~)
Elizabeth
--- Carolyn Keierleber wrote:
> If it is the Sterne strain, you need to notify but not
> register as a select
> agent.
>
> At 10:46 AM 9/26/2002 -0500, you wrote:
> >A quick question. Suppose a researcher has a vaccine strain
> of anthrax
> >which is being used as a test for a new biocide's
> effectiveness. Under the
> >possession reporting, I believe it would have to be reported
> because of
> >the fact that it is being used in research in a way that is
> not it's
> >normal, approved use. First of all, is this correct?
> >Also, is there a need to register this agent with CDC/NIH for
> the same reason?
> >Mike
>
> Carolyn Keierleber, Ph.D.
> Acting Director & Biosafety Officer
> Environmental Health & Safety
> The Scripps Research Institute (TSRI)
> Mail Code BCC 078
> La Jolla, CA 92037
>
> Phone: 858 784-8240
> Fax: 858 784-8490
>
>
=====
Elizabeth Smith
Environmental, Health & Safety Manager
BioPort Corporation
3500 N. Martin L. King Blvd.
Lansing, MI 48906
__________________________________________________
Do you Yahoo!?
New DSL Internet Access from SBC & Yahoo!
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 1 Oct 2002 11:16:01 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Robin Newberry
Subject: Re: The "Pink" blues continue
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed"
A related question:
Since I didn't receive the original form (we got several, but none to
anyone in EHS - tracking them down was a nightmare) I expect that I
won't see the pink cards either. Is there some way to determine if
our form was received?
--
Robin
--------------------------------------------------------------
W. Robert Newberry, IV CIH, CHMM
Chief Environmental Health and Safety Officer
Clemson University
wnewber@clemson.edu ehs@clemson.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 1 Oct 2002 12:48:48 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ed Gaunt
Subject: Re: The "Pink" blues continue
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
We discovered the cause of problem late yesterday afternoon. A batch of
cards that was printed on Tuesday, Sept 17 was printed incorrectly (without
IDs and barcodes as you indicated). We debated on how to deal with these
cards and will deal with it internally by looking up the IDs in our d/b as
the faulty cards are returned (i.e., we will not be remailing this batch of
cards, which would only cause more confusion). As Paul indicated, there
were numerous cases where forms were mailed to addresses that were slightly
different. This was because the addressee may have appeared on more than
one of the mailing lists we used. In de-duplicating the lists, we only
removed addresses that were exact matches, so it is possible that John Doe
at 123 Main Street also got a card mailed to J. Doe at 123 Main St. and
another to (the same) John Doe at PO Box 234. Unfortunately, we only had
several days between when we received the mailing lists and when the
notifications had to be mailed, so there was not much opportunity to do much
list "cleaning" beyond removing exact duplicates.
We suspect that folks who received multiple forms with slight address
variations only completed and returned one. The instructions were to
complete and return ALL forms received by a facility, noting which was the
summary form and which were "children" forms (as we have discussed numerous
times before). There was no provision for ignoring these "extra" forms or
for throwing them away. Hence, the reminder postcard was sent because we
did not receive these "other" forms. We want all forms returned. The only
way for folks to get off of our non-response list is to PROPERLY complete
and return the Notification forms (or post cards), unless they have gone out
of business, moved to places unknown, or died (and we have had a team of
tracers who are trying to find correct addresses for each of the forms that
were undeliverable by the post office). Folks who do not respond properly
will likely be seeing another FINAL NOTICE (these will be bright orange)
after October 11th. The moral of the story is to have your folks properly
complete and return the forms (or the postcards if non-possession) ASAP.
If you have a card without a number, you live in the northeast. If you have
submitted a summary form already, just note that on the card. We'll take
care of looking up the ID and linking the cards appropriately. If you are
not sure if the card is a reminder for a form that you already sent in
(i.e., the passed in the mail), or if the address is not exactly as it was
on the submitted form, write the summary form ID on the card and send it
back. If you are not sure about what to do, and the addressee does not
possess, sign the card and send it back. If the addressee is a possessor
and is not covered by a previously-submitted (summary) Notification Form,
find the original Notification Form sent to that person, complete it and
send it back. If you cannot find the original notification form, contact me
off list and I'll help you out (The Help Line will not be able to resend
forms without the ID number since they do not have access to the mailing
list information to be able to look up the Form ID # for you).
Ed
-----Original Message-----
From: Meechan, Paul J. [mailto:paul_meechan@]
Sent: Tuesday, October 01, 2002 10:51 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: The "Pink" blues continue
To all-As the flood of pink CDC/USDA cards rush in, I've run into a problem
that I haven't seen discussed on the webserver. The cards are coming in
without form ID numbers or barcodes. Some of the names and addresses don't
exactly match the forms that were returned in time, so I'm not sure if there
are duplicates that ASI is looking for. When I called the hot line, I was
told I'd get an answer yesterday. That didn't happen.
So, anyone else having this problem and how do you solve it? I can put the
summary form number on the card, but until I know the number of the form
that they are looking for, the cards will continue to arrive.
Thanks
Paul
Paul J. Meechan, Ph.D.
Biosafety Manager, WP
Merck & Co., Inc.
215-652-0744
meechan@
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message in error, please immediately return this by e-mail and then delete
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==
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 1 Oct 2002 12:50:11 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ed Gaunt
Subject: Re: The "Pink" blues continue
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Contact me off list
Ed
-----Original Message-----
From: Robin Newberry [mailto:wnewber@CLEMSON.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, October 01, 2002 11:16 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: The "Pink" blues continue
A related question:
Since I didn't receive the original form (we got several, but none to
anyone in EHS - tracking them down was a nightmare) I expect that I
won't see the pink cards either. Is there some way to determine if
our form was received?
--
Robin
--------------------------------------------------------------
W. Robert Newberry, IV CIH, CHMM
Chief Environmental Health and Safety Officer
Clemson University
wnewber@clemson.edu ehs@clemson.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 1 Oct 2002 15:35:21 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Jennifer Jones
Subject: Re: Inventory Software
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
I have been working with Mike DaPrato of On Site Systems for the past year to
develop an all inclusive program through the HP Assist vehicle. We wanted to
have all sections of our department talking to each other and end some of the
redundancy of multiple Access databases. We have a basic system that includes
an inspection module, chem module w/ inventory and protocols, bio module w/
inventory & protocols, Fire Extinguisher inspection module, and radiation
tracking module. The biological agent inventory that the program has was
helpful in our survey for select agents. We simply printed out the survey form
contained in the program and distributed to all of our PIs.
I am not ready to say the program is "off the shelf", but it is getting there
and Mike DaPrato is more than willing to make adjustments specific to your
needs. I think the potential is really good to become the leader in the market.
Jennifer Jones
Biosafety Specialist
UT MD Anderson Cancer Center
Houston, TX
713-792-2888
"Doob, Peter (NIDA/IRP)" on 09/27/2002 02:36:48 PM
Please respond to A Biosafety Discussion List
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
cc: (bcc: Jennifer Jones/MDACC)
Subject: Re: Inventory Software
Pat=
We have worked with OnSite in an attempt to convert their HPASSIST software
into a turnkey package for smaller institutions (we are only 500 strong),
that would cover chem/bio/rad under one umbrella. Had to put the effort
aside for awhile when time became scarce, but hope to return sometime.
=Pete
Peter A. Doob, MPH, JD
Chief, Safety and Operations Support Section, ASB
National Institute for Drug Abuse, NIH
Intramural Research Program
5500 Nathan Shock Drive
Baltimore, MD 21224
vc: 410-550-1675
> ----------
> From: OLINGER, PATRICIA L [S&C/0216]
> Reply To: A Biosafety Discussion List
> Sent: Friday, September 27, 2002 3:18 PM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: Inventory Software
>
> As many of you know, because I've talked with you at length, I have been
> evaluating biological agent inventory / rDNA protocol tracking software
> that
> is available for quite some time now.
>
> It seems as though most have their own home built systems. Which some I
> might add are wonderful.
>
> The only off the shelf system that I have seen is one made by OnSite
> systems. They are primarily known for their program HP Assistant (rad
> safety).
>
> In today's environment I am surprised that there aren't more. Does anyone
> know of anything else that is commercially available. Our IT department
> really wants us to find something that is "off the shelf" if possible.
>
> Thanks,
>
> Patty Olinger
> Pharmacia - Kalamazoo Corporate Services - ESH
> Biosafety Officer
>
>
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 1 Oct 2002 20:45:29 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Gergis, Nasr"
Subject: Re: Secondhand Chemo Alert from NIOSH
MIME-Version: 1.0
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Good afternoon:
NIOSH is putting the final touches on a dangerous-drug alert, with the
working title of " Occuaptional Exposure to Hazardous Drugs in Health Care
Settings.". The most alarming is testing urine from personnel preparing and
administering chemotherapy and finding intact alkylating agents. Also, OSHA
is also updating workplace standards and safety procedures for hazardopus
drugs.
I am looking for an information on, but not limmited to the following:
(1) Procedures for new employees,
(2) for an existing employee, what is the procedure for post-exposure to
chemo.
Thanks to you all
Nasr gergis, DVM, PhD
Biosafety & Safety Officer/Interim Director
Occupaitonal Safety and Health
COH-BRI
ngergis@
------_=_NextPart_001_01C269C5.E0852F36
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Good afternoon:
NIOSH is putting the final touches on a = dangerous-drug alert, with
the working title of " Occuaptional = Exposure to Hazardous Drugs in
Health Care Settings.". The most = alarming is testing urine from
personnel preparing and administering = chemotherapy and finding
intact alkylating agents. Also, OSHA is also = updating workplace
standards and safety procedures for hazardopus = drugs.
I am looking for an information on, but not limmited = to the
following:
(1) Procedures for new employees,
(2) for an existing employee, what is the procedure = for
post-exposure to chemo.
Thanks to you all
Nasr gergis, DVM, PhD
Biosafety & Safety Officer/Interim = Director
Occupaitonal Safety and Health
COH-BRI
ngergis@
------_=_NextPart_001_01C269C5.E0852F36--
=========================================================================
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 2 Oct 2002 08:50:12 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Hanna, Michael"
Subject: Secondhand Chemo Alert from NIOSH
MIME-Version: 1.0
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boundary="----_=_NextPart_002_01C26A12.3FA735B0"
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Nasr - I'm sure their administrative controls and some of their device =
recommendations will be sound for the hc providers, but they run into =
problems (both OSHA and NIOSH) when they delve into (what they perceive =
to be) mechanical engineering control improvements for chemo-pharm =
employees preparing cytotoxic drugs. We've been dealing with this crazy =
"movement" on the part of their consultants and group leaders (who will =
be formulating NIOSH and OSHA recommendations and possibly public =
policy) that more is better when it comes to use of Biological Safety =
Cabinets. They are pushing for all cytotox drug prep BSC's to be Hard =
Connected to exhaust. Not only is this unnecessary (there is absolutely =
no evidence that there has ever been any increased risk identified for =
the use of stand-alone, room-exhausted BSC's for this application), but =
it causes some significant and often insurmountable mechanical =
engineering challenges to those charged with designing and installing =
these "mandated" control changes.
If you have a modestly sized chemo-pharm operation in a medical center =
and they undergo a renovation or expansion, there is a good chance that =
the pharm director will request the changes I've outlined above. if =
they go to perhaps 6 BSC's in the 4' range, and they are all purchased =
as Class 2 B2 units (hard-connected 100% exh) you're talking a WHOLE =
BUNCH of air moving through that room. The road to disaster is paved =
with good intentions, as they say, so what if your BSC certif. =
contractor cannot certify the units because the air velocities in the =
room are in the 75-100 fpm range? Not to mention that any spilled or =
passively aerosolized chemo drug contamination (the only sort they've =
identified outside a BSC to date), these increased ambient velocities =
will greatly increase the risk of particulate inhalation for the staff.
We've worked the situation on our end to moderate the plans to have =
Thimble-connected Class 2 A/B3 units as our standard, but even that is =
not a complete solution, with the total exh volume reduction in changing =
from Class 2 B2 to a Class 2 A/B3 scheme, we're still looking at what =
could be prohibitive ambient velocities in the planned chemo-pharm area. =
We may have to go to CFD modeling to see if the BSC faces will be =
affected by adverse air currents. I'm interested in finding out if any =
other medical centers are dealing with this and similar issues =
surrounding the "determinations" and planned directives from OSEH and =
NIOSH. It's my contention that they're treading into an area they need =
to be VERY careful on and do ALL their homework before publishing =
anything binding. Floating these out from plenty of public comment =
first would be a REALLY good idea. mgh
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Michael G. Hanna
Mgr - Biological & Laboratory Safety
Occupational Safety & Environmental Health
University of Michigan
-----Original Message-----
From: Gergis, Nasr [mailto:NGergis@]
Sent: Tuesday, October 01, 2002 11:45 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Secondhand Chemo Alert from NIOSH
Good afternoon:
NIOSH is putting the final touches on a dangerous-drug alert, with the =
working title of " Occuaptional Exposure to Hazardous Drugs in Health =
Care Settings.". The most alarming is testing urine from personnel =
preparing and administering chemotherapy and finding intact alkylating =
agents. Also, OSHA is also updating workplace standards and safety =
procedures for hazardopus drugs.
I am looking for an information on, but not limmited to the following:
(1) Procedures for new employees,
(2) for an existing employee, what is the procedure for post-exposure to =
chemo.
Thanks to you all
Nasr gergis, DVM, PhD
Biosafety & Safety Officer/Interim Director
Occupaitonal Safety and Health
COH-BRI
ngergis@
------_=_NextPart_002_01C26A12.3FA735B0
Content-Type: text/html;
charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
class=3D194533412-02102002>Nasr - I'm sure their administrative
controls = and some of their device recommendations will be sound
for the hc providers, but = they run into problems (both OSHA and
NIOSH) when they delve into (what they = perceive to be)
mechanical engineering control improvements for = chemo-pharm
employees preparing cytotoxic drugs. We've been dealing with
this = crazy "movement" on the part of their consultants and
group leaders (who will = be formulating NIOSH and OSHA
recommendations and possibly public policy) = that more is better
when it comes to use of Biological Safety Cabinets. They = are
pushing for all cytotox drug prep BSC's to be Hard Connected to =
exhaust. Not only is this unnecessary (there is absolutely no
evidence that there = has ever been any increased risk identified
for the use of stand-alone, room-exhausted BSC's for this
application), but it causes some = significant and often
insurmountable mechanical engineering challenges to those charged =
with designing and installing these "mandated" control = changes.
class=3D194533412-02102002>
class=3D194533412-02102002>If you have a modestly sized
chemo-pharm operation in a medical center and = they undergo a
renovation or expansion, there is a good chance that the pharm =
director will request the changes I've outlined above. if they go =
to perhaps 6 BSC's in the 4' range, and they are all purchased as
Class 2 = B2 units (hard-connected 100% exh) you're talking a
WHOLE BUNCH of air moving = through that room. The road to
disaster is paved with good intentions, as = they say, so what if
your BSC certif. contractor cannot certify the units = because
the air velocities in the room are in the 75-100 fpm range? Not
to = mention that any spilled or passively aerosolized chemo drug
contamination (the = only sort they've identified outside a BSC
to date), these increased ambient velocities will greatly
increase the risk of particulate inhalation for = the staff.
class=3D194533412-02102002>
class=3D194533412-02102002>We've worked the situation on our end to
= moderate the plans to have Thimble-connected Class 2 A/B3 units
as our standard, = but even that is not a complete solution, with
the total exh = volume reduction in changing from Class 2 B2 to a
Class 2 A/B3 scheme, we're = still looking at what could be
prohibitive ambient velocities in = the planned chemo-pharm area.
We may have to go to CFD modeling to see if the = BSC faces will
be affected by adverse air currents. I'm interested in = finding
out if any other medical centers are dealing with this and similar =
issues surrounding the "determinations" and planned directives
from OSEH and NIOSH. It's my contention that they're treading
into an area they = need to be VERY careful on and do ALL their
homework before publishing anything binding. Floating these out
from plenty of public comment = first would be a REALLY good
idea. mgh
class=3D194533412-02102002>----------------------------------------------=
-------------------
class=3D194533412-02102002>Michael G. Hanna
class=3D194533412-02102002>Mgr - Biological & Laboratory Safety
class=3D194533412-02102002>Occupational Safety & Environmental
Health
class=3D194533412-02102002>University of Michigan
-----Original = Message-----
From: Gergis, Nasr [mailto:NGergis@]
Sent: Tuesday, October 01, 2002 = 11:45 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: = Secondhand Chemo Alert from NIOSH
Good afternoon:
NIOSH is putting the final touches on a = dangerous-drug alert,
with the working title of " Occuaptional Exposure to Hazardous =
Drugs in Health Care Settings.". The most alarming is testing
urine from = personnel preparing and administering chemotherapy
and finding intact alkylating = agents. Also, OSHA is also
updating workplace standards and safety procedures = for
hazardopus drugs.
I am looking for an information on, but not limmited = to the
following:
(1) Procedures for new = employees,
(2) for an existing employee, what is the procedure = for
post-exposure to chemo.
Thanks to you = all size=3D2>Biosafety & Safety
Officer/Interim Director
Occupaitonal = Safety size=3D2>ngergis@
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Subject: Michael G. Hanna
Date: Mon, 12 Nov 2001 21:26:30 -0400
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From: "Hanna, Michael"
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Biosafety - Univ. of Michigan Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC)
Biosafety - OSEH Biological & Laboratory Safety Program
NBC Countermeasures
- Wayne County, MI - Emerg Mgt Div (EMD)
- Technical Support Team (TST)
- Washtenaw County, MI - Emerg Med Serv Commiss (EMS)
- Bioterrorism Subcommittee
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charset="iso-8859-1"
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FACE=3D"Georgia">Biosafety - Univ. of = Michigan Institutional
Biosafety Committee (IBC)
HREF=3D"
ml">
FACE=3D"Georgia">Biosafety - OSEH = Biological & Laboratory Safety
Program
HREF=3D"">
io.html
NBC = Countermeasures
- Wayne County, MI = - Emerg Mgt Div (EMD)
= - Technical Support Team (TST)
- Washtenaw = County, MI - Emerg Med Serv Commiss (EMS)
= - Bioterrorism Subcommittee
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=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 2 Oct 2002 09:32:51 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Richard Fink
Subject: Re: Viral transport media
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="=====================_2439097==_.ALT"
--=====================_2439097==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
Remel, Fisher Sci., VWR, BBL all sell viral transport media but don't know
if it is specifically Bartel's.
At 04:40 PM 9/26/2002 -0400, you wrote:
>I'm going to try this one more time. Does anyone know where I can get
>Bartel's viral transport media for shipping specimens for Herpes B-virus
>testing. The phone number for Bartel's in the information I have from
>Julia Hilliard's lab is not in service. Any information would be
>appreciated. I know there must be a bunch of folks out there that use
>this stuff.
>
>Mike Wendeler
>EH&S Engineer
>Incyte Genomics
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
--=====================_2439097==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
Remel, Fisher Sci., VWR, BBL all sell viral transport media but
don't know if it is specifically Bartel's.
At 04:40 PM 9/26/2002 -0400, you wrote:
I'm going to try this one more time. Does anyone know where I can
get
Bartel's viral transport media for shipping specimens for Herpes
B-virus
testing. The phone number for Bartel's in the information I have
from
Julia Hilliard's lab is not in service. Any information would be
appreciated. I know there must be a bunch of folks out there that
use
this stuff.
Mike Wendeler
EH&S Engineer
Incyte Genomics
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
--=====================_2439097==_.ALT--
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 2 Oct 2002 09:37:21 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Bill Homovec
Subject: Re: Secondhand Chemo Alert from NIOSH
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Mike,
From what I have learned regarding the NSF Standard No. 49 revisions, many =
hard ducted BSC's would be recommended to have their exhaust ducted via an =
exhaust canopy connection (old "thimble" connection). Hard ducting the =
chemo BSC's exhaust could run counter to NSF/ANSI. You are right, NIOSH =
and OSHA are treading on very thin ice.
Bill Homovec
>>> mhanna@BF.UMICH.EDU 10/02/02 08:50AM >>>
Nasr - I'm sure their administrative controls and some of their device =
recommendations will be sound for the hc providers, but they run into =
problems (both OSHA and NIOSH) when they delve into (what they perceive to =
be) mechanical engineering control improvements for chemo-pharm employees =
preparing cytotoxic drugs. We've been dealing with this crazy "movement" =
on the part of their consultants and group leaders (who will be formulating=
NIOSH and OSHA recommendations and possibly public policy) that more is =
better when it comes to use of Biological Safety Cabinets. They are =
pushing for all cytotox drug prep BSC's to be Hard Connected to exhaust. =
Not only is this unnecessary (there is absolutely no evidence that there =
has ever been any increased risk identified for the use of stand-alone, =
room-exhausted BSC's for this application), but it causes some significant =
and often insurmountable mechanical engineering challenges to those =
charged with designing and installing these "mandated" control changes.
If you have a modestly sized chemo-pharm operation in a medical center and =
they undergo a renovation or expansion, there is a good chance that the =
pharm director will request the changes I've outlined above. if they go =
to perhaps 6 BSC's in the 4' range, and they are all purchased as Class 2 =
B2 units (hard-connected 100% exh) you're talking a WHOLE BUNCH of air =
moving through that room. The road to disaster is paved with good =
intentions, as they say, so what if your BSC certif. contractor cannot =
certify the units because the air velocities in the room are in the 75-100 =
fpm range? Not to mention that any spilled or passively aerosolized chemo =
drug contamination (the only sort they've identified outside a BSC to =
date), these increased ambient velocities will greatly increase the risk =
of particulate inhalation for the staff.
We've worked the situation on our end to moderate the plans to have =
Thimble-connected Class 2 A/B3 units as our standard, but even that is not =
a complete solution, with the total exh volume reduction in changing from =
Class 2 B2 to a Class 2 A/B3 scheme, we're still looking at what could be =
prohibitive ambient velocities in the planned chemo-pharm area. We may =
have to go to CFD modeling to see if the BSC faces will be affected by =
adverse air currents. I'm interested in finding out if any other medical =
centers are dealing with this and similar issues surrounding the "determina=
tions" and planned directives from OSEH and NIOSH. It's my contention =
that they're treading into an area they need to be VERY careful on and do =
ALL their homework before publishing anything binding. Floating these out =
from plenty of public comment first would be a REALLY good idea. mgh
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Michael G. Hanna
Mgr - Biological & Laboratory Safety
Occupational Safety & Environmental Health
University of Michigan
-----Original Message-----
From: Gergis, Nasr [mailto:NGergis@]
Sent: Tuesday, October 01, 2002 11:45 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Secondhand Chemo Alert from NIOSH
Good afternoon:
NIOSH is putting the final touches on a dangerous-drug alert, with the =
working title of " Occuaptional Exposure to Hazardous Drugs in Health Care =
Settings.". The most alarming is testing urine from personnel preparing =
and administering chemotherapy and finding intact alkylating agents. Also, =
OSHA is also updating workplace standards and safety procedures for =
hazardopus drugs.
I am looking for an information on, but not limmited to the following:
(1) Procedures for new employees,
(2) for an existing employee, what is the procedure for post-exposure to =
chemo.
Thanks to you all
Nasr gergis, DVM, PhD
Biosafety & Safety Officer/Interim Director
Occupaitonal Safety and Health
COH-BRI
ngergis@
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 2 Oct 2002 09:50:41 -0400
Reply-To: pr18@columbia.edu
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: paul rubock
Organization: EH&S
Subject: Re: Secondhand Chemo Alert from NIOSH
MIME-Version: 1.0
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Mike,
I too have wrestled with the logic of this recommendation and finally
came to the point where I dutifully passed on the OSHA and NIOSH
guidelines to our designers, despite the fact that I didn't see the
logic.
My own intutition has always been that if worker exposure were to occur,
it would be much more likely as the result of worker 'error' at the BSC
face and not through the exhaust (assuming we're dealing with
particulates and not gases/vapors, as would most likely be the case in
chemo prep).
Now as for the elevated face velocity, with a B as opposed to an A, any
IH will tell you that velocity is only one factor iun containment; we
also have to consider worker activities, distribution of items within
the BSC, etc. (And this is why we provide training to people using
these devices.)
I posted similar thought to the LIST a few years age and the only
answers I received recommended continued adherence to the OSHA/NIOSH
party line; may be it is time to revist the issue
Paul Rubock
"Hanna, Michael" wrote:
> Nasr - I'm sure their administrative controls and some of their device
> recommendations will be sound for the hc providers, but they run into
> problems (both OSHA and NIOSH) when they delve into (what they
> perceive to be) mechanical engineering control improvements for
> chemo-pharm employees preparing cytotoxic drugs. We've been dealing
> with this crazy "movement" on the part of their consultants and group
> leaders (who will be formulating NIOSH and OSHA recommendations and
> possibly public policy) that more is better when it comes to use of
> Biological Safety Cabinets. They are pushing for all cytotox drug
> prep BSC's to be Hard Connected to exhaust. Not only is this
> unnecessary (there is absolutely no evidence that there has ever been
> any increased risk identified for the use of stand-alone,
> room-exhausted BSC's for this application), but it causes some
> significant and often insurmountable mechanical engineering challenges
> to those charged with designing and installing these "mandated"
> control changes.If you have a modestly sized chemo-pharm operation in
> a medical center and they undergo a renovation or expansion, there is
> a good chance that the pharm director will request the changes I've
> outlined above. if they go to perhaps 6 BSC's in the 4' range, and
> they are all purchased as Class 2 B2 units (hard-connected 100% exh)
> you're talking a WHOLE BUNCH of air moving through that room. The
> road to disaster is paved with good intentions, as they say, so what
> if your BSC certif. contractor cannot certify the units because the
> air velocities in the room are in the 75-100 fpm range? Not to
> mention that any spilled or passively aerosolized chemo drug
> contamination (the only sort they've identified outside a BSC to
> date), these increased ambient velocities will greatly increase the
> risk of particulate inhalation for the staff.We've worked the
> situation on our end to moderate the plans to have Thimble-connected
> Class 2 A/B3 units as our standard, but even that is not a complete
> solution, with the total exh volume reduction in changing from Class 2
> B2 to a Class 2 A/B3 scheme, we're still looking at what could be
> prohibitive ambient velocities in the planned chemo-pharm area. We
> may have to go to CFD modeling to see if the BSC faces will be
> affected by adverse air currents. I'm interested in finding out if
> any other medical centers are dealing with this and similar issues
> surrounding the "determinations" and planned directives from OSEH and
> NIOSH. It's my contention that they're treading into an area they
> need to be VERY careful on and do ALL their homework before publishing
> anything binding. Floating these out from plenty of public comment
> first would be a REALLY good idea.
> mgh----------------------------------------------------------------- Michael
> G. HannaMgr - Biological & Laboratory SafetyOccupational Safety &
> Environmental HealthUniversity of Michigan-----Original Message-----
> From: Gergis, Nasr [mailto:NGergis@]
> Sent: Tuesday, October 01, 2002 11:45 PM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: Re: Secondhand Chemo Alert from NIOSH
>
>
> Good afternoon:
> NIOSH is putting the final touches on a dangerous-drug alert, with the
> working title of " Occuaptional Exposure to Hazardous Drugs in Health
> Care Settings.". The most alarming is testing urine from personnel
> preparing and administering chemotherapy and finding intact alkylating
> agents. Also, OSHA is also updating workplace standards and safety
> procedures for hazardopus drugs.
>
> I am looking for an information on, but not limmited to the
> following:
> (1) Procedures for new employees,
> (2) for an existing employee, what is the procedure for
> post-exposure to chemo.
> Thanks to you all
> Nasr gergis, DVM, PhD
> Biosafety & Safety Officer/Interim Director
> Occupaitonal Safety and Health
> COH-BRI
> ngergis@
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Subject: Michael G. Hanna
> Date: Mon, 12 Nov 2001 21:26:30 -0400
> From: "Hanna, Michael"
>
> Biosafety - Univ. of Michigan Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC)
>
> Biosafety - OSEH Biological & Laboratory Safety Program
>
>
> NBC Countermeasures
> - Wayne County, MI - Emerg Mgt Div (EMD)
> - Technical Support Team (TST)
> - Washtenaw County, MI - Emerg Med Serv Commiss (EMS)
> - Bioterrorism Subcommittee
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Mike,
I too have wrestled with the logic of this recommendation and
finally came to the point where I dutifully passed on the OSHA and
NIOSH guidelines to our designers, despite the fact that I didn't
see the logic.
My own intutition has always been that if worker exposure were to
occur, it would be much more likely as the result of worker 'error'
at the BSC face and not through the exhaust (assuming we're dealing
with particulates and not gases/vapors, as would most likely be the
case in chemo prep).
Now as for the elevated face velocity, with a B as opposed to an A,
any IH will tell you that velocity is only one factor iun
containment; we also have to consider worker activities,
distribution of items within the BSC, etc. (And this is why we
provide training to people using these devices.)
I posted similar thought to the LIST a few years age and the only
answers I received recommended continued adherence to the OSHA/NIOSH
party line; may be it is time to revist the issue
Paul Rubock
"Hanna, Michael" wrote: class=194533412-02102002>Nasr - I'm sure
their administrative controls and some of their device
recommendations will be sound for the hc providers, but they run
into problems (both OSHA and NIOSH) when they delve into (what they
perceive to be) mechanical engineering control improvements for
chemo-pharm employees preparing cytotoxic drugs. We've been dealing
with this crazy "movement" on the part of their consultants and
group leaders (who will be formulating NIOSH and OSHA
recommendations and possibly public policy) that more is better when
it comes to use of Biological Safety Cabinets. They are pushing for
all cytotox drug prep BSC's to be Hard Connected to exhaust. Not
only is this unnecessary (there is absolutely no evidence that there
has ever been any increased risk identified for the use of
stand-alone, room-exhausted BSC's for this application), but it
causes some significant and often insurmountable mechanical
engineering challenges to those charged with designing and
installing these class=194533412-02102002>If you have a modestly
sized chemo-pharm operation in a medical center and they undergo a
renovation or expansion, there is a good chance that the pharm
director will request the changes I've outlined above. if they go
to perhaps 6 BSC's in the 4' range, and they are all purchased as
Class 2 B2 units (hard-connected 100% exh) you're talking a WHOLE
BUNCH of air moving through that room. The road to disaster is
paved with good intentions, as they say, so what if your BSC certif.
contractor cannot certify the units because the air velocities in
the room are in the 75-100 fpm range? Not to mention that any
spilled or passively aerosolized chemo drug contamination (the only
sort they've identified outside a BSC to date), these increased
ambient velocities will greatly increase the
class=194533412-02102002>We've worked the situation on our end to
moderate the plans to have Thimble-connected Class 2 A/B3 units as
our standard, but even that is not a complete solution, with the
total exh volume reduction in changing from Class 2 B2 to a Class 2
A/B3 scheme, we're still looking at what could be prohibitive
ambient velocities in the planned chemo-pharm area. We may have to
go to CFD modeling to see if the BSC faces will be affected by
adverse air currents. I'm interested in finding out if any other
medical centers are dealing with this and similar issues surrounding
the "determinations" and planned directives from OSEH and NIOSH.
It's my contention that they're treading into an area they need to
be VERY careful on and do ALL their homework before publishing
anything binding. Floating these out from plenty
class=194533412-02102002>Michael G. HannaMgr - Biological &
Laboratory class=194533412-02102002>Occupational Safety &
class=194533412-02102002>University of Michigan-----Original
Message-----
From: Gergis, Nasr [mailto:NGergis@]
Sent: Tuesday, October 01, 2002 11:45 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Secondhand Chemo Alert from NIOSH
Good afternoon:
NIOSH is putting the final touches on a dangerous-drug alert, with
the working title of " Occuaptional Exposure to Hazardous Drugs in
Health Care Settings.". The most alarming is testing urine from
personnel preparing and administering chemotherapy and finding
intact alkylating agents. Also, OSHA is also updating workplace
standards and safety procedures for hazardopus drugs.
I am looking for an information on, but not limmited to the
following:
(1) Procedures for new employees,
(2) for an existing employee, what is the procedure for
post-exposure to chemo.
Thanks to you all
Nasr gergis, DVM, PhD
Biosafety & Safety Officer/Interim Director
Occupaitonal Safety and Health
COH-BRI
ngergis@
Subject: Michael G. Hanna
Date: Mon, 12 Nov 2001 21:26:30 -0400
From: "Hanna, Michael"
Biosafety - Univ. of Michigan Institutional Biosafety Committee
(IBC)
Biosafety - OSEH Biological & Laboratory Safety Program
NBC Countermeasures
- Wayne County, MI - Emerg Mgt Div (EMD)
- Technical Support Team (TST)
- Washtenaw County, MI - Emerg Med Serv Commiss (EMS)
- Bioterrorism Subcommittee
--------------A1E47BF95B383BE263838C83--
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 2 Oct 2002 09:42:59 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Hauck, Philip"
Subject: Re: Secondhand Chemo Alert from NIOSH
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At my old place of employment, we were developing an animal research =
facility with BSL-3 containment capabilities. We immediately recoiled =
away from hard-ducting the BSC's, and used thimble connections, on =
separate ducts (the latter are much easier to balance out over a wide =
range of temps and pressures). The certifier had no trouble certifying =
the balanced system, but then again, we only had two BSC's side-by-side.
One possibility, and this is technology that has been used for TB =
treatment rooms, in order to counter "hurricane" effect is to deliver =
the supply air through a plenum-ceiling arrangement to cut-down on =
air-turbulence in the room. I know this is not an economical proposal, =
but the sweep-down supply air, uniformly distributed over the entire =
room, would reduce turbulence. The other critical trick is to balance =
the discharge CFM from the BSC into the thimble unit, so that you are =
pulling adequate make-up flow from the room air, without causing =
turbulence around the canopy of the thimble unit. Some folks try to =
design "worst-case" i.e. the BSC fails, and no air is coming from the =
BSC. That complicates the equation, and realistically, a catastrophic =
failure of a BSC is fairly rare.
We designed a simple, straight-forward system with an interlock alarm =
that if the receiving duct flow drops off, the alarm would warn the BSC =
users to button up the research and shut down that BSC. There are all =
kinds of design enhancements, and each has its attendant price tag, to =
increase the overall cost of the system. In the end you are restricted =
by two things-the physics of air flow and ....finances.
Phil Hauck,
-----Original Message-----
From: Hanna, Michael [mailto:mhanna@BF.UMICH.EDU]
Sent: Wednesday, October 02, 2002 8:50 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Secondhand Chemo Alert from NIOSH
Nasr - I'm sure their administrative controls and some of their device =
recommendations will be sound for the hc providers, but they run into =
problems (both OSHA and NIOSH) when they delve into (what they perceive =
to be) mechanical engineering control improvements for chemo-pharm =
employees preparing cytotoxic drugs. We've been dealing with this crazy =
"movement" on the part of their consultants and group leaders (who will =
be formulating NIOSH and OSHA recommendations and possibly public =
policy) that more is better when it comes to use of Biological Safety =
Cabinets. They are pushing for all cytotox drug prep BSC's to be Hard =
Connected to exhaust. Not only is this unnecessary (there is absolutely =
no evidence that there has ever been any increased risk identified for =
the use of stand-alone, room-exhausted BSC's for this application), but =
it causes some significant and often insurmountable mechanical =
engineering challenges to those charged with designing and installing =
these "mandated" control changes.
If you have a modestly sized chemo-pharm operation in a medical center =
and they undergo a renovation or expansion, there is a good chance that =
the pharm director will request the changes I've outlined above. if =
they go to perhaps 6 BSC's in the 4' range, and they are all purchased =
as Class 2 B2 units (hard-connected 100% exh) you're talking a WHOLE =
BUNCH of air moving through that room. The road to disaster is paved =
with good intentions, as they say, so what if your BSC certif. =
contractor cannot certify the units because the air velocities in the =
room are in the 75-100 fpm range? Not to mention that any spilled or =
passively aerosolized chemo drug contamination (the only sort they've =
identified outside a BSC to date), these increased ambient velocities =
will greatly increase the risk of particulate inhalation for the staff.
We've worked the situation on our end to moderate the plans to have =
Thimble-connected Class 2 A/B3 units as our standard, but even that is =
not a complete solution, with the total exh volume reduction in changing =
from Class 2 B2 to a Class 2 A/B3 scheme, we're still looking at what =
could be prohibitive ambient velocities in the planned chemo-pharm area. =
We may have to go to CFD modeling to see if the BSC faces will be =
affected by adverse air currents. I'm interested in finding out if any =
other medical centers are dealing with this and similar issues =
surrounding the "determinations" and planned directives from OSEH and =
NIOSH. It's my contention that they're treading into an area they need =
to be VERY careful on and do ALL their homework before publishing =
anything binding. Floating these out from plenty of public comment =
first would be a REALLY good idea. mgh
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Michael G. Hanna
Mgr - Biological & Laboratory Safety
Occupational Safety & Environmental Health
University of Michigan
-----Original Message-----
From: Gergis, Nasr [mailto:NGergis@]
Sent: Tuesday, October 01, 2002 11:45 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Secondhand Chemo Alert from NIOSH
Good afternoon:
NIOSH is putting the final touches on a dangerous-drug alert, with the =
working title of " Occuaptional Exposure to Hazardous Drugs in Health =
Care Settings.". The most alarming is testing urine from personnel =
preparing and administering chemotherapy and finding intact alkylating =
agents. Also, OSHA is also updating workplace standards and safety =
procedures for hazardopus drugs.
I am looking for an information on, but not limmited to the
following:
(1) Procedures for new employees,
(2) for an existing employee, what is the procedure for post-exposure =
to chemo.
Thanks to you all
Nasr gergis, DVM, PhD
Biosafety & Safety Officer/Interim Director
Occupaitonal Safety and Health
COH-BRI
ngergis@
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 2 Oct 2002 10:40:24 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Gerry Griffin
Subject: Re: Secondhand Chemo Alert from NIOSH
In-Reply-To:
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In looking into this subject recently because of a concern from our
pharmacy area, I've seen several references to a study where "it has
been reported that cyclophosphamide particles sublimated from a HEPA
filter and returned to the work area." The reference is an article by
Clark C. Occupational Exposure to Cytotoxic drugs. Pharm J 1999;
26365-8. I haven't read the article so don't know exactly how they
determined that sublimation from the filter was the cause of the
contamination but I have seen that rationale in several articles as the
reason why non-exhaut BSCs are not adequate for this application.
-----Original Message-----
From: A Biosafety Discussion List [mailto:BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU] On
Behalf Of Hanna, Michael
Sent: Wednesday, October 02, 2002 8:50 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Secondhand Chemo Alert from NIOSH
Nasr - I'm sure their administrative controls and some of their device
recommendations will be sound for the hc providers, but they run into
problems (both OSHA and NIOSH) when they delve into (what they perceive
to be) mechanical engineering control improvements for chemo-pharm
employees preparing cytotoxic drugs. We've been dealing with this crazy
"movement" on the part of their consultants and group leaders (who will
be formulating NIOSH and OSHA recommendations and possibly public
policy) that more is better when it comes to use of Biological Safety
Cabinets. They are pushing for all cytotox drug prep BSC's to be Hard
Connected to exhaust. Not only is this unnecessary (there is absolutely
no evidence that there has ever been any increased risk identified for
the use of stand-alone, room-exhausted BSC's for this application), but
it causes some significant and often insurmountable mechanical
engineering challenges to those charged with designing and installing
these "mandated" control changes.
If you have a modestly sized chemo-pharm operation in a medical center
and they undergo a renovation or expansion, there is a good chance that
the pharm director will request the changes I've outlined above. if
they go to perhaps 6 BSC's in the 4' range, and they are all purchased
as Class 2 B2 units (hard-connected 100% exh) you're talking a WHOLE
BUNCH of air moving through that room. The road to disaster is paved
with good intentions, as they say, so what if your BSC certif.
contractor cannot certify the units because the air velocities in the
room are in the 75-100 fpm range? Not to mention that any spilled or
passively aerosolized chemo drug contamination (the only sort they've
identified outside a BSC to date), these increased ambient velocities
will greatly increase the risk of particulate inhalation for the staff.
We've worked the situation on our end to moderate the plans to have
Thimble-connected Class 2 A/B3 units as our standard, but even that is
not a complete solution, with the total exh volume reduction in changing
from Class 2 B2 to a Class 2 A/B3 scheme, we're still looking at what
could be prohibitive ambient velocities in the planned chemo-pharm area.
We may have to go to CFD modeling to see if the BSC faces will be
affected by adverse air currents. I'm interested in finding out if any
other medical centers are dealing with this and similar issues
surrounding the "determinations" and planned directives from OSEH and
NIOSH. It's my contention that they're treading into an area they need
to be VERY careful on and do ALL their homework before publishing
anything binding. Floating these out from plenty of public comment
first would be a REALLY good idea. mgh
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Michael G. Hanna
Mgr - Biological & Laboratory Safety
Occupational Safety & Environmental Health
University of Michigan
-----Original Message-----
From: Gergis, Nasr [mailto:NGergis@]
Sent: Tuesday, October 01, 2002 11:45 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Secondhand Chemo Alert from NIOSH
Good afternoon:
NIOSH is putting the final touches on a dangerous-drug alert, with the
working title of " Occuaptional Exposure to Hazardous Drugs in Health
Care Settings.". The most alarming is testing urine from personnel
preparing and administering chemotherapy and finding intact alkylating
agents. Also, OSHA is also updating workplace standards and safety
procedures for hazardopus drugs.
I am looking for an information on, but not limmited to the following:
(1) Procedures for new employees,
(2) for an existing employee, what is the procedure for post-exposure to
chemo.
Thanks to you all
Nasr gergis, DVM, PhD
Biosafety & Safety Officer/Interim Director
Occupaitonal Safety and Health
COH-BRI
ngergis@
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 2 Oct 2002 10:29:45 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Dave Mulligan
Subject: Re: Viral transport media
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
We had the same problem getting Bartels. We use a Viral Transport Media
called Multi-Microbe Medium (M4) made by Micro Test. The phone number is
(800) 646-6678. I checked with the NIH B virus lab last year and it is a
suitable replacement for Bartel's.
Dave
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 2 Oct 2002 13:36:24 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Mark Campbell
Subject: Pertussis toxin information
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-transfer-encoding: 7bit
Does anyone have information on the side effects of pertussis toxin in
rats or mice? or can provide references for?
Thanks for your help,
Mark C.
--------------------------------
Mark J. Campbell, MS, CBSP
Biological Safety Officer
Saint Louis University
1402 S. Grand Blvd.
Caroline Bldg. Rm. 307
St. Louis, MO 63104
(314) 577-8608 Phone
(314) 268-5560 Fax
campbem@slu.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 2 Oct 2002 15:34:48 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Gilpin, Richard"
Subject: Re: Secondhand Chemo Alert from NIOSH
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ABSA members...make sure the appropriate ABSA and other society committees
get on this before we all end up with B1 or B2 BSC's...that would be a big
mistake.
Richard W. Gilpin, Ph.D., RBP, CBSP
Assistant Director & Biosafety Officer
Environmental Health & Safety (EHS)
University of Maryland Baltimore
714 West Lombard Street, Room 305
Baltimore MD 21201-1084
(410) 706-7845
Fax (410) 706-1520
rgilpin@ehs.umaryland.edu < mailto:rgilpin@ehs.umaryland.edu
>
ehs.umaryland.edu <
>
-----Original Message-----
From: Gerry Griffin [mailto:griffg01@MED.NYU.EDU]
Sent: Wednesday, October 02, 2002 10:40 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Secondhand Chemo Alert from NIOSH
In looking into this subject recently because of a concern from our pharmacy
area, I've seen several references to a study where "it has been reported
that cyclophosphamide particles sublimated from a HEPA filter and returned
to the work area." The reference is an article by Clark C. Occupational
Exposure to Cytotoxic drugs. Pharm J 1999; 26365-8. I haven't read the
article so don't know exactly how they determined that sublimation from the
filter was the cause of the contamination but I have seen that rationale in
several articles as the reason why non-exhaut BSCs are not adequate for this
application.
-----Original Message-----
From: A Biosafety Discussion List [mailto:BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU] On Behalf
Of Hanna, Michael
Sent: Wednesday, October 02, 2002 8:50 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Secondhand Chemo Alert from NIOSH
Nasr - I'm sure their administrative controls and some of their device
recommendations will be sound for the hc providers, but they run into
problems (both OSHA and NIOSH) when they delve into (what they perceive to
be) mechanical engineering control improvements for chemo-pharm employees
preparing cytotoxic drugs. We've been dealing with this crazy "movement" on
the part of their consultants and group leaders (who will be formulating
NIOSH and OSHA recommendations and possibly public policy) that more is
better when it comes to use of Biological Safety Cabinets. They are pushing
for all cytotox drug prep BSC's to be Hard Connected to exhaust. Not only
is this unnecessary (there is absolutely no evidence that there has ever
been any increased risk identified for the use of stand-alone,
room-exhausted BSC's for this application), but it causes some significant
and often insurmountable mechanical engineering challenges to those charged
with designing and installing these "mandated" control changes.
If you have a modestly sized chemo-pharm operation in a medical center and
they undergo a renovation or expansion, there is a good chance that the
pharm director will request the changes I've outlined above. if they go to
perhaps 6 BSC's in the 4' range, and they are all purchased as Class 2 B2
units (hard-connected 100% exh) you're talking a WHOLE BUNCH of air moving
through that room. The road to disaster is paved with good intentions, as
they say, so what if your BSC certif. contractor cannot certify the units
because the air velocities in the room are in the 75-100 fpm range? Not to
mention that any spilled or passively aerosolized chemo drug contamination
(the only sort they've identified outside a BSC to date), these increased
ambient velocities will greatly increase the risk of particulate inhalation
for the staff.
We've worked the situation on our end to moderate the plans to have
Thimble-connected Class 2 A/B3 units as our standard, but even that is not a
complete solution, with the total exh volume reduction in changing from
Class 2 B2 to a Class 2 A/B3 scheme, we're still looking at what could be
prohibitive ambient velocities in the planned chemo-pharm area. We may have
to go to CFD modeling to see if the BSC faces will be affected by adverse
air currents. I'm interested in finding out if any other medical centers
are dealing with this and similar issues surrounding the "determinations"
and planned directives from OSEH and NIOSH. It's my contention that they're
treading into an area they need to be VERY careful on and do ALL their
homework before publishing anything binding. Floating these out from plenty
of public comment first would be a REALLY good idea. mgh
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Michael G. Hanna
Mgr - Biological & Laboratory Safety
Occupational Safety & Environmental Health
University of Michigan
-----Original Message-----
From: Gergis, Nasr [mailto:NGergis@]
Sent: Tuesday, October 01, 2002 11:45 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Secondhand Chemo Alert from NIOSH
Good afternoon:
NIOSH is putting the final touches on a dangerous-drug alert, with the
working title of " Occuaptional Exposure to Hazardous Drugs in Health Care
Settings.". The most alarming is testing urine from personnel preparing and
administering chemotherapy and finding intact alkylating agents. Also, OSHA
is also updating workplace standards and safety procedures for hazardopus
drugs.
I am looking for an information on, but not limmited to the following:
(1) Procedures for new employees,
(2) for an existing employee, what is the procedure for post-exposure to
chemo.
Thanks to you all
Nasr gergis, DVM, PhD
Biosafety & Safety Officer/Interim Director
Occupaitonal Safety and Health
COH-BRI
ngergis@
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 2 Oct 2002 15:03:45 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "OLINGER, PATRICIA L [S&C/0216]"
Subject: Re: Secondhand Chemo Alert from NIOSH
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This is basic potent compound handling. Small scale potent compound
handling (powers or liquids). A BSC is not the only way to handle this.
If you do not need product protection there are other containment
devices and equipment that can provide a very safe environment for
people to work in. Also, provide ventilation system protection as well.
Big issue for your maintenance personnel.
An example would be the Flow Science hood. The Pharmaceutical industry
uses devices like this as well as other vendors for activities such as
the weighing out of small quantity discovery compounds. Discovery
compounds being the new chemical entitities that safety info has yet to
be determined. Some of which will become a new pharmaceutical and some
will be chemo drugs.
They are also much cheaper to purchase, install and maintain. The one
shown in the picture attached feeds to a central HEPA. They do come
with their own HEPA/Blower unit. There is also alot of containment data
and industry experience.
Just like with Biosafety, you must do your risk assessments.
Patty Olinger
Pharmacia Kalamazoo Corporate Services - ESH
Biosafety Officer and Chemical Hygiene Officer
-----Original Message-----
From: Gilpin, Richard [mailto:rgilpin@admin1.UMARYLAND.EDU]
Sent: Wednesday, October 02, 2002 3:35 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Secondhand Chemo Alert from NIOSH
ABSA members...make sure the appropriate ABSA and other society
committees get on this before we all end up with B1 or B2 BSC's...that
would be a big mistake.
Richard W. Gilpin, Ph.D., RBP, CBSP
Assistant Director & Biosafety Officer
Environmental Health & Safety (EHS)
University of Maryland Baltimore
714 West Lombard Street, Room 305
Baltimore MD 21201-1084
(410) 706-7845
Fax (410) 706-1520
rgilpin@ehs.umaryland.edu < mailto:rgilpin@ehs.umaryland.edu
>
ehs.umaryland.edu <
>
-----Original Message-----
From: Gerry Griffin [mailto:griffg01@MED.NYU.EDU]
Sent: Wednesday, October 02, 2002 10:40 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Secondhand Chemo Alert from NIOSH
In looking into this subject recently because of a concern from our
pharmacy area, I've seen several references to a study where "it has
been reported that cyclophosphamide particles sublimated from a HEPA
filter and returned to the work area." The reference is an article by
Clark C. Occupational Exposure to Cytotoxic drugs. Pharm J 1999;
26365-8. I haven't read the article so don't know exactly how they
determined that sublimation from the filter was the cause of the
contamination but I have seen that rationale in several articles as the
reason why non-exhaut BSCs are not adequate for this application.
-----Original Message-----
From: A Biosafety Discussion List [mailto:BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU] On
Behalf Of Hanna, Michael
Sent: Wednesday, October 02, 2002 8:50 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Secondhand Chemo Alert from NIOSH
Nasr - I'm sure their administrative controls and some of their device
recommendations will be sound for the hc providers, but they run into
problems (both OSHA and NIOSH) when they delve into (what they perceive
to be) mechanical engineering control improvements for chemo-pharm
employees preparing cytotoxic drugs. We've been dealing with this crazy
"movement" on the part of their consultants and group leaders (who will
be formulating NIOSH and OSHA recommendations and possibly public
policy) that more is better when it comes to use of Biological Safety
Cabinets. They are pushing for all cytotox drug prep BSC's to be Hard
Connected to exhaust. Not only is this unnecessary (there is absolutely
no evidence that there has ever been any increased risk identified for
the use of stand-alone, room-exhausted BSC's for this application), but
it causes some significant and often insurmountable mechanical
engineering challenges to those charged with designing and installing
these "mandated" control changes.
If you have a modestly sized chemo-pharm operation in a medical center
and they undergo a renovation or expansion, there is a good chance that
the pharm director will request the changes I've outlined above. if
they go to perhaps 6 BSC's in the 4' range, and they are all purchased
as Class 2 B2 units (hard-connected 100% exh) you're talking a WHOLE
BUNCH of air moving through that room. The road to disaster is paved
with good intentions, as they say, so what if your BSC certif.
contractor cannot certify the units because the air velocities in the
room are in the 75-100 fpm range? Not to mention that any spilled or
passively aerosolized chemo drug contamination (the only sort they've
identified outside a BSC to date), these increased ambient velocities
will greatly increase the risk of particulate inhalation for the staff.
We've worked the situation on our end to moderate the plans to have
Thimble-connected Class 2 A/B3 units as our standard, but even that is
not a complete solution, with the total exh volume reduction in changing
from Class 2 B2 to a Class 2 A/B3 scheme, we're still looking at what
could be prohibitive ambient velocities in the planned chemo-pharm area.
We may have to go to CFD modeling to see if the BSC faces will be
affected by adverse air currents. I'm interested in finding out if any
other medical centers are dealing with this and similar issues
surrounding the "determinations" and planned directives from OSEH and
NIOSH. It's my contention that they're treading into an area they need
to be VERY careful on and do ALL their homework before publishing
anything binding. Floating these out from plenty of public comment
first would be a REALLY good idea. mgh
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Michael G. Hanna
Mgr - Biological & Laboratory Safety
Occupational Safety & Environmental Health
University of Michigan
-----Original Message-----
From: Gergis, Nasr [mailto:NGergis@]
Sent: Tuesday, October 01, 2002 11:45 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Secondhand Chemo Alert from NIOSH
Good afternoon:
NIOSH is putting the final touches on a dangerous-drug alert, with the
working title of " Occuaptional Exposure to Hazardous Drugs in Health
Care Settings.". The most alarming is testing urine from personnel
preparing and administering chemotherapy and finding intact alkylating
agents. Also, OSHA is also updating workplace standards and safety
procedures for hazardopus drugs.
I am looking for an information on, but not limmited to the following:
(1) Procedures for new employees,
(2) for an existing employee, what is the procedure for post-exposure to
chemo.
Thanks to you all
Nasr gergis, DVM, PhD
Biosafety & Safety Officer/Interim Director
Occupaitonal Safety and Health
COH-BRI
ngergis@
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 2 Oct 2002 16:13:01 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Andrew Cutz, CIH"
Organization: MFL Occupational Health Centre, Inc.
Subject: Immunization of Sewage Treatment Workers
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Dear BIOSAFTY List Subscribers,
What are the immunization requirements for municipal sewage treatment
workers? This seems to be a recurring question without a definitive
opinion from the public health professionals. Please contact me off the
list.
Thank you in advance,
Andrew Cutz, CIH
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 2 Oct 2002 17:46:15 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Sue Pedrick
Subject: Re: Immunization of Sewage Treatment Workers
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
See CDC guidelines (page 14 answers your question)
They mention studies done in England and Scandinavia, both of which have a
high prevalence of HAV, while in most of USA it is much lower, and I think
this is another reason CDC discounts that research (as inapplicable to USA.).
However, I think you have to use your own good sense (and also your
economic/mercenary sense. You didn't identify your locale, but I suspect
CA. The incidence there and AZ and many of the border states is greater
than the rest of the USA (we have almost "none" in most of SC). So if you
are in a state with a "lot" of HAV, and don't have a problem with spending
the money, it is probably a wise investment despite CDC
"recommendations." A sewer worker in that area who happens to contract HAV
will automatically claim it was from his employment --- rather than the
dirty little restaurant he may have visited while on vacation, and in an
area with a lot of HAV you may not be able to prove otherwise. Your money
will have been well spent and justifiable, while in my area the virtual
"non-existence" of HAV is the best reason not to immunize (if nobody has it
then the sewer workers can't get it). Also, when I called CDC personally a
few years ago they say that sewage is too cold, wet, and diluted to support
a great enough concentration of HAV to cause disease.Hope this helps. MY
opinion only -- not necessarily that of my employer.
At 04:13 PM 10/2/02 -0500, you wrote:
>Dear BIOSAFTY List Subscribers,
>
>What are the immunization requirements for municipal sewage treatment
>workers? This seems to be a recurring question without a definitive
>opinion from the public health professionals. Please contact me off the
>list.
>
>Thank you in advance,
>
>Andrew Cutz, CIH
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 3 Oct 2002 12:30:13 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Barry D. Cohen, MPH, CBSP"
Subject: Lab Safety Monograph
MIME-Version: 1.0
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Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Good Afternoon:
Several times, I have searched the internet for an
electronic copy of the Lab Safety Monograph. It is very
likely that it does not exist.
So, I had our IT Department scan a copy and make a PDF
File. Now I know why it may not be on the internet. It
takes up 18MB of space. All those high-tech images from
1979.
I do not believe any e-mail client wil allow an attachment
that big. Even zipped!
I have copied it to a disk. If anyone is interested, I am
going to bring it with me to the ABSA Conference. If you
have a laptop with you, you can copy it.
Best regards and see you in San Francisco.
Barry D. Cohen, MPH, CBSP
Director, Environmental Health and Safety
Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc.
195 Albany Street
Cambridge, MA 02139
(V): 617/613-4385
(F): 617/613-4492
(E): bcohen@
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 3 Oct 2002 14:30:00 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Kim Auletta
Subject: Re: Lab Safety Monograph
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Do you have a web site you can post it to? This way, us "poor relations"
who won't be going to the conference could still get it! If you don't have
a web site, I'd be happy to post it on ours.
Kim Auletta
Lab Safety Specialist
Environmental Health and Safety
SUNY Stony Brook
110 Suffolk Hall
Stony Brook, NY 11794-6200
phone: 631-632-9672
fax: 631-632-9683
email: kauletta@.sunysb.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 3 Oct 2002 14:32:37 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Barry D. Cohen, MPH, CBSP"
Subject: Re: Lab Safety Monograph
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
I am going to ask ABSA to post it to their web site.
Kim Auletta wrote:
>
> Do you have a web site you can post it to? This way, us "poor relations"
> who won't be going to the conference could still get it! If you don't have
> a web site, I'd be happy to post it on ours.
>
> Kim Auletta
> Lab Safety Specialist
> Environmental Health and Safety
> SUNY Stony Brook
> 110 Suffolk Hall
> Stony Brook, NY 11794-6200
> phone: 631-632-9672
> fax: 631-632-9683
> email: kauletta@.sunysb.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 3 Oct 2002 13:49:47 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Burnett, LouAnn Crawford"
Subject: Re: Lab Safety Monograph
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Barry - I'm chair of the communications committee so I can make sure
that it gets posted. Please bring me a copy of the CD to SF and I'll
make sure it's included as soon as I get back from ABSA. I'll try to
remember to post a note to the group stating its availability.
LouAnn
LouAnn C. Burnett, MS, CBSP =09
Biosafety Program Manager & Biological Safety Officer=09
Vanderbilt University Environmental Health & Safety
Nashville, Tennessee
615/322-0927 (direct & voice mail)
615/343-4951 (fax) =09
-----Original Message-----
From: Barry D. Cohen, MPH, CBSP [mailto:bcohen@]
Sent: Thursday, October 03, 2002 1:33 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Lab Safety Monograph
I am going to ask ABSA to post it to their web site.
Kim Auletta wrote:
>
> Do you have a web site you can post it to? This way, us "poor
> relations" who won't be going to the conference could still get it! If
> you don't have a web site, I'd be happy to post it on ours.
>
> Kim Auletta
> Lab Safety Specialist
> Environmental Health and Safety
> SUNY Stony Brook
> 110 Suffolk Hall
> Stony Brook, NY 11794-6200
> phone: 631-632-9672
> fax: 631-632-9683
> email: kauletta@.sunysb.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 3 Oct 2002 14:54:41 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Barry D. Cohen, MPH, CBSP"
Subject: Re: Lab Safety Monograph
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Thanks LouAnn!
"Burnett, LouAnn Crawford" wrote:
>
> Barry - I'm chair of the communications committee so I can make sure
> that it gets posted. Please bring me a copy of the CD to SF and I'll
> make sure it's included as soon as I get back from ABSA. I'll try to
> remember to post a note to the group stating its availability.
>
> LouAnn
>
> LouAnn C. Burnett, MS, CBSP
> Biosafety Program Manager & Biological Safety Officer
> Vanderbilt University Environmental Health & Safety
> Nashville, Tennessee
> 615/322-0927 (direct & voice mail)
> 615/343-4951 (fax)
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Barry D. Cohen, MPH, CBSP [mailto:bcohen@]
> Sent: Thursday, October 03, 2002 1:33 PM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: Re: Lab Safety Monograph
>
> I am going to ask ABSA to post it to their web site.
>
> Kim Auletta wrote:
> >
> > Do you have a web site you can post it to? This way, us "poor
> > relations" who won't be going to the conference could still get it! If
>
> > you don't have a web site, I'd be happy to post it on ours.
> >
> > Kim Auletta
> > Lab Safety Specialist
> > Environmental Health and Safety
> > SUNY Stony Brook
> > 110 Suffolk Hall
> > Stony Brook, NY 11794-6200
> > phone: 631-632-9672
> > fax: 631-632-9683
> > email: kauletta@.sunysb.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 3 Oct 2002 15:09:20 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Hanna, Michael"
Subject: Lab Safety Monograph - smaller size
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
I've scanned as a multipage TIF document (9.06M) which can be downloaded =
from:
(you don't =
need to log into the site to download the document)
When you get to the site, right-click on the "go to it" hypertext and =
select "Save Target As" to download it to a file. Directly clicking the =
hypertext may result in your browser attempting to run it in QuickTime, =
which won't work. mgh
Enjoy, mgh
- - - - - - - - - - -
.tif - Tagged Image Format - This file type is frequently used for scans =
of multi-page documents. Many paint programs have the ability to read =
this type of file, although sometimes as several separated files. Also, =
Windows 98 and 2000 include a program called Kodak Imaging that reads =
these files in their multi-page form. The Imaging program is normally =
found by selecting Start/Programs/Accessories/Imaging.
-----Original Message-----
From: Burnett, LouAnn Crawford [mailto:louann.burnett@VANDERBILT.EDU]
Sent: Thursday, October 03, 2002 2:50 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Lab Safety Monograph
Barry - I'm chair of the communications committee so I can make sure
that it gets posted. Please bring me a copy of the CD to SF and I'll
make sure it's included as soon as I get back from ABSA. I'll try to
remember to post a note to the group stating its availability.
LouAnn
LouAnn C. Burnett, MS, CBSP =09
Biosafety Program Manager & Biological Safety Officer=09
Vanderbilt University Environmental Health & Safety
Nashville, Tennessee
615/322-0927 (direct & voice mail)
615/343-4951 (fax) =09
-----Original Message-----
From: Barry D. Cohen, MPH, CBSP [mailto:bcohen@]
Sent: Thursday, October 03, 2002 1:33 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Lab Safety Monograph
I am going to ask ABSA to post it to their web site.
Kim Auletta wrote:
>
> Do you have a web site you can post it to? This way, us "poor
> relations" who won't be going to the conference could still get it! If
> you don't have a web site, I'd be happy to post it on ours.
>
> Kim Auletta
> Lab Safety Specialist
> Environmental Health and Safety
> SUNY Stony Brook
> 110 Suffolk Hall
> Stony Brook, NY 11794-6200
> phone: 631-632-9672
> fax: 631-632-9683
> email: kauletta@.sunysb.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 3 Oct 2002 15:37:57 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Barry D. Cohen, MPH, CBSP"
Subject: Re: Lab Safety Monograph - smaller size
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Hey Gang:
I am glad I stimulated such interest!
Michael, I can see why yours is smaller. The resolution on
the photos is quite poor. This may not be a big deal. For
9 more MB, I have better pictures.
Man, my head hurts and it is raining.
Hope all in Louisiana are fairing well, despite the weather.
Regards,
--bdc
"Hanna, Michael" wrote:
>
> I've scanned as a multipage TIF document (9.06M) which can be downloaded from:
> (you don't need to
log into the site to download the document)
>
> When you get to the site, right-click on the "go to it" hypertext and select
"Save Target As" to download it to a file. Directly clicking the hypertext may
result in your browser attempting to run it in QuickTime, which won't work. mgh
>
> Enjoy, mgh
>
> - - - - - - - - - - -
> .tif - Tagged Image Format - This file type is frequently used for scans of
multi-page documents. Many paint programs have the ability to read this type of
file, although sometimes as several separated files. Also, Windows 98 and 2000
include a program called Kodak Imaging that reads these files in their
multi-page form. The Imaging program is normally found by selecting
Start/Programs/Accessories/Imaging.
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Burnett, LouAnn Crawford [mailto:louann.burnett@VANDERBILT.EDU]
> Sent: Thursday, October 03, 2002 2:50 PM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: Re: Lab Safety Monograph
>
> Barry - I'm chair of the communications committee so I can make sure
> that it gets posted. Please bring me a copy of the CD to SF and I'll
> make sure it's included as soon as I get back from ABSA. I'll try to
> remember to post a note to the group stating its availability.
>
> LouAnn
>
> LouAnn C. Burnett, MS, CBSP
> Biosafety Program Manager & Biological Safety Officer
> Vanderbilt University Environmental Health & Safety
> Nashville, Tennessee
> 615/322-0927 (direct & voice mail)
> 615/343-4951 (fax)
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Barry D. Cohen, MPH, CBSP [mailto:bcohen@]
> Sent: Thursday, October 03, 2002 1:33 PM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: Re: Lab Safety Monograph
>
> I am going to ask ABSA to post it to their web site.
>
> Kim Auletta wrote:
> >
> > Do you have a web site you can post it to? This way, us "poor
> > relations" who won't be going to the conference could still get it! If
>
> > you don't have a web site, I'd be happy to post it on ours.
> >
> > Kim Auletta
> > Lab Safety Specialist
> > Environmental Health and Safety
> > SUNY Stony Brook
> > 110 Suffolk Hall
> > Stony Brook, NY 11794-6200
> > phone: 631-632-9672
> > fax: 631-632-9683
> > email: kauletta@.sunysb.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 3 Oct 2002 21:55:20 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Hanna, Michael"
Subject: Re: Lab Safety Monograph - smaller size
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="----_=_NextPart_001_01C26B49.18926DA0"
This is a multi-part message in MIME format.
------_=_NextPart_001_01C26B49.18926DA0
Content-Type: text/plain;
charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Barry - I wouldn't say the quality of the image is "quite poor" - it's =
300 DPI and reads/prints almost exactly like the original. What are you =
viewing it with? You must remember the original was a standard late =
'70's GPO document and the print quality (sharpeness) was nowhere near =
what is produced nowadays - so you and I were both working with =
relatively damaged goods to begin with. Given that, we can make the =
text only so sharp. You also must remember that your 20+ Mb document is =
almost prohibitively large for most people's computer/software and =
ability to download. Electronic documents is a balancing act, and will =
remain so until everyone has 2-4 GHz processors. mgh
-----Original Message-----
From: Barry D. Cohen, MPH, CBSP [mailto:bcohen@]
Sent: Thursday, October 03, 2002 3:38 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Lab Safety Monograph - smaller size
Hey Gang:
I am glad I stimulated such interest!
Michael, I can see why yours is smaller. The resolution on
the photos is quite poor. This may not be a big deal. For
9 more MB, I have better pictures.
Man, my head hurts and it is raining.
Hope all in Louisiana are fairing well, despite the weather.
Regards,
--bdc
"Hanna, Michael" wrote:
>
> I've scanned as a multipage TIF document (9.06M) which can be =
downloaded from:
> (you don't =
need to log into the site to download the document)
>
> When you get to the site, right-click on the "go to it" hypertext and =
select "Save Target As" to download it to a file. Directly clicking the =
hypertext may result in your browser attempting to run it in QuickTime, =
which won't work. mgh
>
> Enjoy, mgh
>
> - - - - - - - - - - -
> .tif - Tagged Image Format - This file type is frequently used for =
scans of multi-page documents. Many paint programs have the ability to =
read this type of file, although sometimes as several separated files. =
Also, Windows 98 and 2000 include a program called Kodak Imaging that =
reads these files in their multi-page form. The Imaging program is =
normally found by selecting Start/Programs/Accessories/Imaging.
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Burnett, LouAnn Crawford [mailto:louann.burnett@VANDERBILT.EDU]
> Sent: Thursday, October 03, 2002 2:50 PM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: Re: Lab Safety Monograph
>
> Barry - I'm chair of the communications committee so I can make sure
> that it gets posted. Please bring me a copy of the CD to SF and I'll
> make sure it's included as soon as I get back from ABSA. I'll try to
> remember to post a note to the group stating its availability.
>
> LouAnn
>
> LouAnn C. Burnett, MS, CBSP
> Biosafety Program Manager & Biological Safety Officer
> Vanderbilt University Environmental Health & Safety
> Nashville, Tennessee
> 615/322-0927 (direct & voice mail)
> 615/343-4951 (fax)
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Barry D. Cohen, MPH, CBSP [mailto:bcohen@]
> Sent: Thursday, October 03, 2002 1:33 PM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: Re: Lab Safety Monograph
>
> I am going to ask ABSA to post it to their web site.
>
> Kim Auletta wrote:
> >
> > Do you have a web site you can post it to? This way, us "poor
> > relations" who won't be going to the conference could still get it! =
If
>
> > you don't have a web site, I'd be happy to post it on ours.
> >
> > Kim Auletta
> > Lab Safety Specialist
> > Environmental Health and Safety
> > SUNY Stony Brook
> > 110 Suffolk Hall
> > Stony Brook, NY 11794-6200
> > phone: 631-632-9672
> > fax: 631-632-9683
> > email: kauletta@.sunysb.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 4 Oct 2002 09:08:34 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Richard Fink
Subject: Fwd: Bugbear PC virus
Mime-Version: 1.0
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boundary="=====================_169764157==_.ALT"
--=====================_169764157==_.ALT
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FYI:
>A new PC mass mailing virus, W32/Bugbear@mm has been spreading
>rapidly. Network Associates released an update to their DAT files
>yesterday which will detect it.
>
>If you are not set up for daily updates please update your dat file as
>soon as possible. Instructions are at web.mit.edu/is/help/virus
>
>Jerry Isaacson
>MIT Information Security Office
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Biosafty List Owner
rfink@mit.edu
--=====================_169764157==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
FYI:
A new PC mass mailing virus, W32/Bugbear@mm has been spreading
rapidly. Network Associates released an update to their DAT files
yesterday which will detect it.
If you are not set up for daily updates please update your dat
file as
soon as possible. Instructions are at web.mit.edu/is/help/virus
Jerry Isaacson
MIT Information Security Office
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Biosafty List Owner
rfink@mit.edu
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=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 4 Oct 2002 09:22:51 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Richard Fink
Subject: Re: Lab Safety Monograph - smaller size
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
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boundary="=====================_170621080==_.ALT"
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It is important to have both versions available. The TIF format is nice
because it is a smaller file, however it cannot be searched while the PDF
file can be. While both formats can be converted to a standard word
processing format, PDF converts nicely while TIF relies on the quality of
ones OCR program (which vary tremendously).
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Biosafty List Owner
rfink@mit.edu
--=====================_170621080==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
It is important to have both versions available. The TIF format is
nice because it is a smaller file, however it cannot be searched
while the PDF file can be. While both formats can be converted to a
standard word processing format, PDF converts nicely while TIF
relies on the quality of ones OCR program (which vary tremendously).
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Biosafty List Owner
rfink@mit.edu
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=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 4 Oct 2002 09:33:23 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Hauck, Philip"
Subject: Re: Lab Safety Monograph - smaller size
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
Content-transfer-encoding: quoted-printable
Hello, All!
I had dialog with Dr. McKinney about five years back as to any hope of =
revising the old Monograph, and at the time he had referred it to Dr. =
Debbie Wilson, after hearing me out on the idea. Unfortunately, an =
undertaking like the revision and publishing would require funding, and =
that is where the decision was made to forgo any future revision.
It may be worthwhile for ABSA to get involved in the revision and =
publication of an updated version...there was (is) a lot of good =
material in there. Basically, if the P-levels are dropped, and the =
current BSL's and RG's are incorporated, along with the current BSC =
types and certification procedures, the Monograph would prove to be a =
very useful tool. AIHA took on the revision / publication of the NIOSH =
"White Book"-The Industrial Environment...it's evaluation and control, =
and had success reintroducing it to the field of Industrial Hygiene.
I think lightning could strike for us, too.
Phil Hauck
Mt Sinai School of Medicine
-----Original Message-----
From: Barry D. Cohen, MPH, CBSP [mailto:bcohen@]
Sent: Thursday, October 03, 2002 3:38 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Lab Safety Monograph - smaller size
Hey Gang:
I am glad I stimulated such interest!
Michael, I can see why yours is smaller. The resolution on
the photos is quite poor. This may not be a big deal. For
9 more MB, I have better pictures.
Man, my head hurts and it is raining.
Hope all in Louisiana are fairing well, despite the weather.
Regards,
--bdc
"Hanna, Michael" wrote:
>
> I've scanned as a multipage TIF document (9.06M) which can be =
downloaded from:
> (you don't =
need to log into the site to download the document)
>
> When you get to the site, right-click on the "go to it" hypertext and =
select "Save Target As" to download it to a file. Directly clicking the =
hypertext may result in your browser attempting to run it in QuickTime, =
which won't work. mgh
>
> Enjoy, mgh
>
> - - - - - - - - - - -
> .tif - Tagged Image Format - This file type is frequently used for =
scans of multi-page documents. Many paint programs have the ability to =
read this type of file, although sometimes as several separated files. =
Also, Windows 98 and 2000 include a program called Kodak Imaging that =
reads these files in their multi-page form. The Imaging program is =
normally found by selecting Start/Programs/Accessories/Imaging.
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Burnett, LouAnn Crawford [mailto:louann.burnett@VANDERBILT.EDU]
> Sent: Thursday, October 03, 2002 2:50 PM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: Re: Lab Safety Monograph
>
> Barry - I'm chair of the communications committee so I can make sure
> that it gets posted. Please bring me a copy of the CD to SF and I'll
> make sure it's included as soon as I get back from ABSA. I'll try to
> remember to post a note to the group stating its availability.
>
> LouAnn
>
> LouAnn C. Burnett, MS, CBSP
> Biosafety Program Manager & Biological Safety Officer
> Vanderbilt University Environmental Health & Safety
> Nashville, Tennessee
> 615/322-0927 (direct & voice mail)
> 615/343-4951 (fax)
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Barry D. Cohen, MPH, CBSP [mailto:bcohen@]
> Sent: Thursday, October 03, 2002 1:33 PM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: Re: Lab Safety Monograph
>
> I am going to ask ABSA to post it to their web site.
>
> Kim Auletta wrote:
> >
> > Do you have a web site you can post it to? This way, us "poor
> > relations" who won't be going to the conference could still get it! =
If
>
> > you don't have a web site, I'd be happy to post it on ours.
> >
> > Kim Auletta
> > Lab Safety Specialist
> > Environmental Health and Safety
> > SUNY Stony Brook
> > 110 Suffolk Hall
> > Stony Brook, NY 11794-6200
> > phone: 631-632-9672
> > fax: 631-632-9683
> > email: kauletta@.sunysb.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 4 Oct 2002 08:39:04 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Therese M. Stinnett"
Subject: Re: Lab Safety Monograph--revise?
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
I'd like to second Phil's motion. I scanned it in about a year ago and
started bits and pieces of what I thought appropriate. I believe that =
I may
have had a conversation with Emmett Barkley on it at the time. So, as =
a
member of ABSA, I'd really like to encourage us to look at doing this.
Therese M. Stinnett
Biosafety Officer
Health and Safety Division
UCHSC, Mailstop C275
4200 E. 9th Avenue
Denver, CO=A0 80262
Voice:=A0 303-315-6754
Pager:=A0 303-266-5402
Fax:=A0 303-315-8026
email:=A0 therese.stinnett@uchsc.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 4 Oct 2002 10:01:26 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Therese M. Stinnett"
Subject: water question
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Is deionized water fit for human consumption? We have a doc who wants to do
a study and prepare a "shake" for human volunteers, with double-deionized
H2O. It's my fuzzy recollection that these systems can harbor
micro-organisms. Please help
Therese M. Stinnett
Biosafety Officer
Health and Safety Division
UCHSC, Mailstop C275
4200 E. 9th Avenue
Denver, CO 80262
Voice: 303-315-6754
Pager: 303-266-5402
Fax: 303-315-8026
email: therese.stinnett@uchsc.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 4 Oct 2002 12:10:08 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Faison, Brendlyn"
Subject: Re: water question
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
all h2o contains microorganisms. deionized water has simply undergone ion
exchange, and may pick up additional bugs from whatever ix resin is used.
distilled water has been heated, but will pick up non-thermotolerant bugs
from whatever vessel is used. microbial load of *any* water increases upon
storage -- especially if unrefrigerated. "tap" water is dechlorinated to
"remove" the most dangerous bugs, but there is no such thing as sterility --
from either chemical or physical means. routine sterilization simply causes
a reduction of the most resistant indicator bugs by a factor of 10^13 (13
log cycles). the indicator bugs are almost always bacteria. special
techniques are need for viruses and prions, which are physically smaller.
but even some bacteria (the heat- or radiation-resistant ones) survive
normal sterilization. that's why the selection of indicator bug is
critical. good luck.
-----Original Message-----
From: Therese M. Stinnett [mailto:Therese.Stinnett@UCHSC.EDU]
Sent: Friday, 04 October 2002 12:01 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: water question
Is deionized water fit for human consumption? We have a doc who wants to do
a study and prepare a "shake" for human volunteers, with double-deionized
H2O. It's my fuzzy recollection that these systems can harbor
micro-organisms. Please help
Therese M. Stinnett
Biosafety Officer
Health and Safety Division
UCHSC, Mailstop C275
4200 E. 9th Avenue
Denver, CO 80262
Voice: 303-315-6754
Pager: 303-266-5402
Fax: 303-315-8026
email: therese.stinnett@uchsc.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 4 Oct 2002 12:35:34 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Megan G. Marks"
Subject: SOPs for detoxification
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii; format=flowed
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I am in the process of authoring various BS SOPs for our office. I would
like to include various detoxification methods for various select agents.
It would save me a great deal of time and be greatly appreciated if any of
you are willing to share.
You may correspond directly to me.
Thank you,
Megan
...........................................
Megan G. Marks, Ph.D.
Biological and Radiological Safety
Environmental Health and Safety
313 Mellon Institute
4400 Fifth Avenue
Pittsburgh, PA 15213
(412) 268-3221 office
(412) 268-1736 fax
...........................................
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 4 Oct 2002 13:26:12 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Margaret Rakas
Subject: Re: SOPs for detoxification
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Would it be possible to post these SPO's somewhere, as I imagine there
are a number of us who would like to refer to them?
--=_5905F45E.C2A30AA4
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Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
size=2>Would it be possible to post these SPO's somewhere, as I
imagine there are a number of us who would like to refer to them?
--=_5905F45E.C2A30AA4--
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 4 Oct 2002 12:34:46 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Gordon, Deborah"
Subject: West Nile Permits
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Content-Type: text/plain
We have an Investigator who has proposed to isolate West Nile Virus from
mosquitoes. We need to be sure that we have the correct permits to have the
virus once he does isolate it. Can anyone please tell me what permits and
or approvals we will need?
Deborah Gordon
e-mail: gordon@
phone: (205) 581-2417
Fax: (205) 581-2880
Southern Research Institute
2000 9th Ave. South
P.O. Box 55305
Birmingham,Alabama 35255-5305
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Date: Fri, 4 Oct 2002 14:05:08 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Erik A. Talley"
Subject: Re: water question
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
You have likely thought about these things, but to throw them out there I
would caution you to find out the particulars about the water purification
process. There are many ways to make "purified" water. I see people
commonly refer synonymously to distilled, deionized, reverse osmosis, etc.
types of water. Boiling water and then recondensing the vapor is much
different from sending the water through a bed of resin beads or a membrane.
Most systems we see in educational institutions are not intended to make
potable water (even though the resulting water may be quite drinkable).
Therefore, they may not have the safeguards in place when creating potable
water. In a particular situation I dealt with a couple of years ago, we
received complaints that the house DI system in a medical science building
smelled strange. Further testing revealed the presence of formaldehyde in
the water. It turned out the filters from the contracted water purification
company (very large world-wide company) were shedding organics including
formaldehyde from the resin into the water. This occurred each time
recharged filters were changed out and would slowly decrease as the filters
were flushed. Worse yet, some faculty were using the water to make tea and
coffee (at least is was boiled first...).
You will also find a lot of arguments back and forth about water being an
aggressive solvent and once you remove the minerals water is "seeking" it
will scavenge them from your body. Take it with a grain of salt (pun
intended). It is all relative to the amount of uptake versus the other
things added to the body.
Good luck!
Erik
At 10:01 AM 10/4/2002 -0600, you wrote:
>Is deionized water fit for human consumption? We have a doc who wants to do
>a study and prepare a "shake" for human volunteers, with double-deionized
>H2O. It's my fuzzy recollection that these systems can harbor
>micro-organisms. Please help
>
>Therese M. Stinnett
>Biosafety Officer
>Health and Safety Division
>UCHSC, Mailstop C275
>4200 E. 9th Avenue
>Denver, CO 80262
>Voice: 303-315-6754
>Pager: 303-266-5402
>Fax: 303-315-8026
>email: therese.stinnett@uchsc.edu
___________________________________
Erik A. Talley, Director
Environmental Health and Safety
Weill Medical College of Cornell University
418 East 71st Street, Suite 62
New York, NY 10021
212-746-6201
ert2002@med.cornell.edu
(Cornell Access Only)
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 4 Oct 2002 15:14:21 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Richard Pollack
Subject: 'Purified' water, formaldehyde
In-Reply-To:
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII; format=flowed
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As it has been explained to me by folks who install/maintain deionized
water systems, the resin beds through which the water flows serve to
remove dissolved contaminants... but they are also terrific substrates
for bacterial colonization. Because of concerns that endotoxins (et
al) are then shed into the water, the systems are periodically flushed
with formaldehyde and/or other solutions. The plumbing is then purged
(ideally) until the product is acceptable. We, too, have experienced
occasional problems with lingering formaldehyde in the pipes.
Sometimes you can readily detect the stuff, and sometimes you find out
later when your precious cells or other creatures have gone belly up.
It still likely beats city tap water in several regions of the country.
Richard J. Pollack, Ph.D.
Laboratory of Public Health Entomology
Harvard School of Public Health
665 Huntington Ave.
Boston, MA 02115
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 4 Oct 2002 15:20:21 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ed Gaunt
Subject: Re: 'Purified' water, formaldehyde
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
In my "other" life, I used to do human embryology and we had an RO/DI system
that was passed thru ultrafiltration (0.1u) with in-line UV. Before using
the water for embryo culture, we did HPLC for VOCs and LAL assay for
endotoxins.
Ed
-----Original Message-----
From: Richard Pollack [mailto:rpollack@HSPH.HARVARD.EDU]
Sent: Friday, October 04, 2002 3:14 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: 'Purified' water, formaldehyde
As it has been explained to me by folks who install/maintain deionized
water systems, the resin beds through which the water flows serve to
remove dissolved contaminants... but they are also terrific substrates
for bacterial colonization. Because of concerns that endotoxins (et
al) are then shed into the water, the systems are periodically flushed
with formaldehyde and/or other solutions. The plumbing is then purged
(ideally) until the product is acceptable. We, too, have experienced
occasional problems with lingering formaldehyde in the pipes.
Sometimes you can readily detect the stuff, and sometimes you find out
later when your precious cells or other creatures have gone belly up.
It still likely beats city tap water in several regions of the country.
Richard J. Pollack, Ph.D.
Laboratory of Public Health Entomology
Harvard School of Public Health
665 Huntington Ave.
Boston, MA 02115
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 4 Oct 2002 14:34:57 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Judy Pointer
Subject: Re: water question
Mime-Version: 1.0
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Years ago when I was doing tissue culture in a research hospital
environment - came down with multi-antibiotic resistant pseudomonas in
my tc cell lines (the micro lab did resistant disks on it and isolated
other bugs too). After 3 months of searching for the source, found out
that the tygon tubing lines down stream of the distilled & deionized H20
system used for media prep, was loaded with these bugs. Point is - even
if it comes out pure from the DI or distilled tap (with no chlorine in
it) doesn't mean it stays that way while it waits for the next person to
open the tap. A terminal microfiltration system is really important for
both DI and distilled water taps.
Judy Pointer, MS, CBSP
University Biosafety Officer
Office of Research Protection
UNM School of Medicine
BMSB B77
915 Camino de Salud NE
Albuquerque, NM 87131-5196
(505) 272-8001
(505) 272-0803 (Fax)
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 4 Oct 2002 15:14:44 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Klenner, James"
Subject: Committee memberships
MIME-Version: 1.0
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When any of the group has a moment, could you reply back with a couple =
of answers regarding committee memberships?
First, does your institution have a separate committee to review =
non-recombinant biohazardous research (if your IBC does not review such =
proposals)?
Second, does this biohazardous material committee have non-scientist or =
community members?
Thanks for the info,
Jim
James W. Klenner, MSc, MPH, MPA
Biological Safety Manager
INDIANA UNIVERSITY - PURDUE UNIVERSITY INDIANAPOLIS
Department of Environmental Health & Safety
620 Union Drive, Room 043
Indianapolis, IN 46202
(317) 274-2830
Fax (317) 278-2158
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Serif"'>When any of the group has a moment, could you reply back
with a couple of answers = regarding committee memberships?
First, does your institution have = a separate committee to
review non-recombinant biohazardous research (if your IBC = does
not review such proposals)?
Second, does this biohazardous = material committee have
non-scientist or community members?
Thanks for the info,
Jim
width=3D74 style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: black; FONT-FAMILY:
'Microsoft Sans = Serif'">James style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt;
FONT-FAMILY: 'Microsoft Sans = Serif'">Biological Safety
style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: #9b0000; FONT-FAMILY: 'Microsoft
Sans = Serif'">INDIANA style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: black;
FONT-FAMILY: 'Microsoft Sans = Serif'">- style=3D"FONT-SIZE:
10pt; COLOR: #cd9b00; FONT-FAMILY: 'Microsoft Sans =
Serif'">PURDUE style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: 'Microsoft
Sans = Serif'">INDIANAPOLIS style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR:
black; FONT-FAMILY: 'Microsoft Sans = Serif'">Department
style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: 'Microsoft Sans Serif'">620
Union = Drive, style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: 'Microsoft
Sans = Serif'">Indianapolis, IN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt;
FONT-FAMILY: 'Microsoft Sans Serif'">(317) style=3D"FONT-SIZE:
10pt; FONT-FAMILY: 'Microsoft Sans Serif'">Fax (317) = 278-2158
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Date: Fri, 4 Oct 2002 17:11:44 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Eric Hansen
Subject: Re: Committee memberships
In-Reply-To:
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: multipart/related;
boundary="----=_NextPart_000_004D_01C26BC9.1D397AE0"
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boundary="----=_NextPart_001_004E_01C26BC9.1D397AE0"
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Jim,
Yes, we do have a separate committee, no it doesn't have a community member.
It does have a person from our office.
Eric Hansen
Utah State University
-----Original Message-----
From: A Biosafety Discussion List [mailto:BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU]On
Behalf Of Klenner, James
Sent: Friday, October 04, 2002 2:15 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Committee memberships
When any of the group has a moment, could you reply back with a couple of
answers regarding committee memberships?
First, does your institution have a separate committee to review
non-recombinant biohazardous research (if your IBC does not review such
proposals)?
Second, does this biohazardous material committee have non-scientist or
community members?
Thanks for the info,
Jim
James W. Klenner, MSc, MPH, MPA
Biological Safety Manager
INDIANA UNIVERSITY - PURDUE UNIVERSITY INDIANAPOLIS
Department of Environmental Health & Safety
620 Union Drive, Room 043
Indianapolis, IN 46202
(317) 274-2830
Fax (317) 278-2158
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Content-Type: text/html;
charset="iso-8859-1"
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face=3D'"MS Sans Serif"'>Jim,
Yes, we do have a separate = committee, no it doesn't have a
community member. It does have a person from our office.
Serif"'>Eric Hansen
Utah State University
face=3DTahoma size=3D2>-----Original Message-----
From: A Biosafety = Discussion List
[mailto:BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU]On Behalf Of Klenner, James
Sent: Friday, October 04, 2002 2:15 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Committee memberships
Serif"'>When any of the group has a moment, could you reply
back with a couple of answers regarding committee memberships?
First, does your institution = have a separate committee to
review non-recombinant biohazardous research (if = your IBC
does not review such proposals)?
Second, does this biohazardous = material committee have
non-scientist or community members?
Thanks for the = info,
Jim
width=3D74 style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: black; FONT-FAMILY:
'Microsoft Sans = Serif'">James style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt;
FONT-FAMILY: 'Microsoft Sans = Serif'">Biological Safety
style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: #9b0000; FONT-FAMILY: 'Microsoft
Sans = Serif'">INDIANA style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: black;
FONT-FAMILY: 'Microsoft Sans = Serif'">- style=3D"FONT-SIZE:
10pt; COLOR: #cd9b00; FONT-FAMILY: 'Microsoft Sans =
Serif'">PURDUE style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY:
'Microsoft Sans = Serif'">INDIANAPOLIS style=3D"FONT-SIZE:
10pt; COLOR: black; FONT-FAMILY: 'Microsoft Sans =
Serif'">Department style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY:
'Microsoft Sans Serif'">620 = Union Drive, style=3D"FONT-SIZE:
10pt; FONT-FAMILY: 'Microsoft Sans = Serif'">Indianapolis, IN
style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: 'Microsoft Sans
Serif'">(317) style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: 'Microsoft
Sans Serif'">Fax = (317) 278-2158
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Date: Fri, 4 Oct 2002 23:05:01 EDT
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Jay L. Stern"
Subject: Re: water question
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In a message dated 10/4/02 9:03:36 AM Pacific Daylight Time,
Therese.Stinnett@UCHSC.EDU writes:
Klenner, James
[mailto:jklenner@IUPUI.EDU]
Sent: Friday, October 04, 2002 4:15 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Committee memberships
When any of the group has a moment, could you reply back with a couple of answers regarding committee memberships?
First, does your institution have a separate committee to review non-recombinant biohazardous research (if your IBC does not review such proposals)?
Thanks for the info,
James W. Klenner, MSc, MPH, MPA
Biological Safety Manager
INDIANA UNIVERSITY
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Date: Mon, 7 Oct 2002 10:21:33 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Lori Nicholson
Subject: Re: Committee memberships
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Yes, we do have an Activity Initiation Process that directs PI to get
approval from the appropriate committee. It may go to the IBC, or
biological hazard assessment team (BAT). Specific information is requested
via forms from that committee.
Regards,
Lori Nicholson
Corporate Manager of EH&S
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 7 Oct 2002 11:22:51 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Robert N. Latsch"
Subject: USA PATRIOT Act fallout
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
FYI,
My Director just informed me that he has recieved a 12 page questionairre
from our insurance firms concerning patriot act listed agents. Answer or
else!
I do not know any more at this point.
Bob
_____________________________________________________________________
__ / _____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 7 Oct 2002 09:05:39 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Funk, Glenn"
Subject: Re: USA PATRIOT Act fallout
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Bob -
It would be most helpful to know which insurance firm(s) are sending this
questionnaire so we can be on the lookout for it. I wouldn't be surprised
to find it's an industry-wide form.
-- Glenn
Glenn A. Funk
Director, EHS
MedImmune Vaccines, Inc.
408-845-8847
-----Original Message-----
From: Robert N. Latsch [mailto:rnl2@PO.CWRU.EDU]
Sent: Monday, October 07, 2002 8:23 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: USA PATRIOT Act fallout
FYI,
My Director just informed me that he has recieved a 12 page questionairre
from our insurance firms concerning patriot act listed agents. Answer or
else!
I do not know any more at this point.
Bob
_____________________________________________________________________
__ /
_____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 7 Oct 2002 11:28:50 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Burnett, LouAnn Crawford"
Subject: Re: USA PATRIOT Act fallout
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I've been working with this issue since the summer. We let our
prospective insurer know that we possessed Select Agents; were aware of
the Select Agents regulations, the USA PATRIOT Act, and the Public
Health Security (et al.) Act; and that we were complying accordingly.
But we respectfully declined to release detailed information to
third-parties as we had no way to verify that the insurance company did
not employ restricted persons, etc. This all was done in conjunction
with our legal counsel and risk management groups. Haven't heard a peep
back. LouAnn
LouAnn C. Burnett, MS, CBSP =09
Biosafety Program Manager & Biological Safety Officer=09
Vanderbilt University Environmental Health & Safety
Nashville, Tennessee
615/322-0927 (direct & voice mail)
615/343-4951 (fax) =09
-----Original Message-----
From: Funk, Glenn [mailto:funkg@]
Sent: Monday, October 07, 2002 11:06 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: USA PATRIOT Act fallout
Bob -
It would be most helpful to know which insurance firm(s) are sending
this questionnaire so we can be on the lookout for it. I wouldn't be
surprised to find it's an industry-wide form.
-- Glenn
Glenn A. Funk
Director, EHS
MedImmune Vaccines, Inc.
408-845-8847
-----Original Message-----
From: Robert N. Latsch [mailto:rnl2@PO.CWRU.EDU]
Sent: Monday, October 07, 2002 8:23 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: USA PATRIOT Act fallout
FYI,
My Director just informed me that he has recieved a 12 page
questionairre from our insurance firms concerning patriot act listed
agents. Answer or else!
I do not know any more at this point.
Bob
_____________________________________________________________________
__ /
_____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental
Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail
rlatsch@
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 7 Oct 2002 12:56:46 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Robert N. Latsch"
Subject: Re: USA PATRIOT Act fallout
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
I have bounced this back up to my Director. I have suggested that he
contact the three people who have responded. I will let you know what he
says.
Bob
PS LouAnn, I love your idea!
>I've been working with this issue since the summer. We let our
>prospective insurer know that we possessed Select Agents; were aware of
>the Select Agents regulations, the USA PATRIOT Act, and the Public
>Health Security (et al.) Act; and that we were complying accordingly.
>But we respectfully declined to release detailed information to
>third-parties as we had no way to verify that the insurance company did
>not employ restricted persons, etc. This all was done in conjunction
>with our legal counsel and risk management groups. Haven't heard a peep
>back. LouAnn
>
>LouAnn C. Burnett, MS, CBSP
>Biosafety Program Manager & Biological Safety Officer
>Vanderbilt University Environmental Health & Safety
>Nashville, Tennessee
>615/322-0927 (direct & voice mail)
>615/343-4951 (fax)
>
>
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From: Funk, Glenn [mailto:funkg@]
>Sent: Monday, October 07, 2002 11:06 AM
>To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
>Subject: Re: USA PATRIOT Act fallout
>
>
>Bob -
>
>It would be most helpful to know which insurance firm(s) are sending
>this questionnaire so we can be on the lookout for it. I wouldn't be
>surprised to find it's an industry-wide form.
>
>-- Glenn
>
>Glenn A. Funk
>Director, EHS
>MedImmune Vaccines, Inc.
>408-845-8847
>
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From: Robert N. Latsch [mailto:rnl2@PO.CWRU.EDU]
>Sent: Monday, October 07, 2002 8:23 AM
>To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
>Subject: USA PATRIOT Act fallout
>
>
>FYI,
>
>My Director just informed me that he has recieved a 12 page
>questionairre from our insurance firms concerning patriot act listed
>agents. Answer or else!
>
>I do not know any more at this point.
>
>Bob
>
>
>_____________________________________________________________________
>__ /
>_____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
>_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
> \ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
> \ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental
>Safety
> \__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail
>rlatsch@
_____________________________________________________________________
__ / _____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 7 Oct 2002 07:54:56 -1000
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Hubert B Olipares
Subject: Re: USA PATRIOT Act fallout
In-Reply-To:
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII
Here at Univ. of Hawaii we (EHSO, IBC and Legal Counsel) have reviewed and
submitted the survey.
United Educators Insurance assessment is distributing a supplemental
application for laboratory using select agents per 42 CFR 72.6
(exclusively). As explained by the insurance agent, this is an evaluation
of terrorism liability exposures.
"Included in the evaluation was the type of research performed, evaluation
of physical protections of research facilities and assessment of other
procedures such as inventory control and laboratory access. Disaster
mitigation/prevention techniques and disaster preparedness/response
planning and activities, including review of he institution's written
disaster preparedness/response plan."
This was in conjunction with an additional survey on NCAA 1A regarding
mass gathering at football games.
This review could result in renewal policy terms which includes, full
exclusion of all terrorism liability coverage, limited exclusion of
terrorism liability coverage, including but not limited to sublimits and
coinsurance, and additional premium charge.
The RFO and Director of Environmental Health and Safety needs to sign off.
==============================================================================
Hubert B. Olipares, RBP, MSPH, MT(ASCP), MT(NCA)
Biological Safety Professional
University of Hawaii
Environmental Health and Safety Office
Biological Safety Program
2040 East-West Road
Honolulu, Hawaii 96822-2022
Telephone: 808-956-3197
Fax: 808-956-3205
Biosafety Prgm. E-mail: biosafe@hawaii.edu
Personnel E-Mail: olipares@hawaii.edu
Biosafety Website:
==============================================================================
On Mon, 7 Oct 2002, Robert N. Latsch wrote:
> FYI,
>
> My Director just informed me that he has recieved a 12 page questionairre
> from our insurance firms concerning patriot act listed agents. Answer or
> else!
>
> I do not know any more at this point.
>
> Bob
>
>
> _____________________________________________________________________
> __ / _____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
> _ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
> \ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
> \ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
> \__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
>
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 7 Oct 2002 13:46:09 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ed Gaunt
Subject: Re: USA PATRIOT Act vs Regulations
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Public Law 107-188 was signed by the President on June 12, 2002. The Law
just specifies what the desires of Congress and the President are. They do
not specify how the law is to be implemented. CDC (under DHHS direction)
and APHIS (under USDA direction) are developing the regulations that will
implement the law. The Notification Process was to gather information to
assist them in these two agencies in that task. Agencies are typically
given 6 months to develop regulations that implement new public laws. That
is why we had such short deadlines to collect this information. (REMINDER:
For folks that only possess USDA High Consequence Livestock Pathogens and
Toxins, the Notification reporting deadline is this Friday October 11.)
The PROPOSED regulations will probably be published in the Federal Register
as a "Notice of Proposed Rulemaking" (or NPRM) on or about December 9, 2002.
After that, there will probably be a 60-day public comment period. The
Government will then consider all comments offered by the public on or about
February 7, 2003, and make any revisions to the proposed rules as deemed
necessary. The Final Rule will likely be published in early March as a
revision to Title 42, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 72
. ASSUMING that the final
rule will not be all that different from the Proposed Rule, folks ought to
have a good idea of what they need to be doing in order to come into
compliance in December.
CAVEAT: This is my interpretation of events as they might unfold, and not
the Government's!
Ed Gaunt
-----Original Message-----
From: Francis Churchill [mailto:fchurchi@ZOO.UVM.EDU]
Sent: Monday, October 07, 2002 9:35 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: USA PATRIOT Act vs Regulations
As the registration(s) and pink card fervor subsides, I am looking to
the next implementation phase regarding biosecurity. The Act passed
by Congress has sections on background checks, electronic
communication surveillance, registration, etc., but the regulations
have yet to be promulgated. The regulations were written, passed and
implemented this summer for the registration of Select & High
Consequence Agents, but I believe we are waiting until December for
the rest of the regulations.
My question is this: Are you waiting to see what the regulations
will require, or are you developing/implementing programs/procedures
based on the Act?
My answer to that for our institution, is that we are waiting to see
what comes. Nobody here has ordered any of the SA since 1996 so we
have not had to register for transporting/receiving. I'm just not
sure what to do with the momentum created by last month's
registration process.
Thanks,
Francis
--
Francis Churchill
University of Vermont - Environmental Safety Facility
667 Spear Street, UVM, Burlington, VT 05405-3010
(802) 656-5405
Francis.Churchill@uvm.edu
"Show me pollution and I'll show you a subsidy." Robert F Kennedy Jr
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 7 Oct 2002 14:06:29 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Francis Churchill
Subject: Re: USA PATRIOT Act fallout
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed"
United Educators has presented a "Laboratory Profile" to be completed
with 35 questions for the facilities that possess a SA.
1 - Lab info: building, room Principal investigator, etc
2 - check the SA that are stored/used inthat lab.
3 - Registered with CDC?
4 - BSL level
5 - 24/7 security guard?
6 - security alarm?
7 - There is no number 7 (Sort of Monty Python ish, but there really
is no question 7)
8 - self-closing doors?
9 - Is the building locked at all times?
10 - video camera monitoring entrance/exits
11 - access to SA storage area restricted?
12 - Can lab personnel who are not directly conducting research
activities involving SA access SA?
13 - Does any lab supervisor directly oversee all research
activities involving SA?
14 - photo ID's required?
15 - Non-lab personnel access procedures?
16 - Other security protections not identified
17 - Most recent assessment of lab security procedures?
18 - inventory/tracking of SA
19 - Does inventory track shipping/receiving, quantities
used/consumed, Individuals, type of work, dates SA used/consumed?
20 - Who at the laboratory has authority to acquire SA? Transfer SA?
(list title/role)
21 - List title of researcher responsible for inventory of SA
22 - Do you know what SA are on hand prior to enactment of 42 CFR 72.6?
23 - Is inventory updated immediately upon use/transfer/disposition of SA?
24 - Does inventory track details of SA destruction?
25 - Is all destruction of SA done at Lab?
26 - Are SA destroyed according to CDC guidelines?
27 - Is form EA-101 completed prior to tansfer and after the
destruction/exhaustion of SA?
28 - policy to control hand carrying of SA outside of lab?
29 - When was most recent assessment of inventory process?
30 - Biosafety manual?
31 - procedures to identify SA that are no longer n use and to destry these?
32 - Have you confirmed that n non-permanent resident lab personnel
from Cuba, Iraq, Iran, N Korea, Sudan or Syria have access to SA?
33 - Does your IBC govern work with SA?
34 - Has CDC or DHHS inspected within last 12 months?
35 - (whew!) when was most recent assessment of lab procedures?
Signature of RFO AND
Signature of EHS director (if different from RFO)
FWIW, there it is,
Francis
--
Francis Churchill
University of Vermont - Environmental Safety Facility
667 Spear Street, UVM, Burlington, VT 05405-3010
(802) 656-5405
Francis.Churchill@uvm.edu
"Show me pollution and I'll show you a subsidy." Robert F Kennedy Jr
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 7 Oct 2002 15:11:09 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Vinita
Subject: Emergency Procedures for Biosafety Level 3 labs
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Hi! Could anyone give me a list of Emergency Procedures for Biosafety =
Level 3 labs?
Thanks in advance.
Vinita Kumar
NYU-School of Medicine
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Hi! Could anyone give me a list of = Emergency Procedures for
Biosafety Level 3 labs?
Thanks in advance.
Vinita Kumar
NYU-School of Medicine
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=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 7 Oct 2002 14:27:37 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Elizabeth Smith
Subject: Re: USA PATRIOT Act vs Regulations
In-Reply-To:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
I (I=RFO) got Legal & HR to be the point for me (delegation!).
We (Legal, HR & Safety) sat down with all of the PIs working
with SA and explained the up-coming laws to them. We also
included the manager of security, and a few other select
employees. We asked them to consider what makes someone a
"restricted person" and discuss any potential problems they
could forsee with HR, now, while it was still calm & quiet.
My complaint about the Proposed rule: what exactly constitutes
"access"? The person who has the combination to the lock box
where bot toxin stored - well, sure she's got access. But, what
about the maintenance tech who has physical access into the
BSL-3 laboratory where there are infected animals living? He
doesn't exactly have access to the Select Agent, but if he picks
up the animal and walks off with it (especially if it's already
dead), ... is that "access"?
I can identify everyone who has access, if I knew what it was
... but HR/Legal/Safety(me) aren't agreeing on what constitutes
"access", so that we can enforce the law. And the law, in this
case, is no help.
Sigh ...
Does anyone know *who* in the government is actually making
these final rule? Maybe I can persuade our gov't relations
people to work for me for a while ... :) what a pleasant
thought!
Elizabeth
=====
Elizabeth Smith
Environmental, Health & Safety Manager
BioPort Corporation
3500 N. Martin L. King Blvd.
Lansing, MI 48906
__________________________________________________
Do you Yahoo!?
Faith Hill - Exclusive Performances, Videos & More
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 7 Oct 2002 17:31:06 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ed Gaunt
Subject: Re: USA PATRIOT Act vs Regulations
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Government personnel involved with the rulemaking are "embargoed" from
discussing the DRAFT rules with anyone until the rules are published for
public comment. Basically, it is against the law for the rule-makers to
discuss the DRAFT rules with ANYONE (outside of the rule-making task force)
before EVERYONE has a chance to see them at the same time (no
sneaky-peeks!).
You'll have to wait until December 9th...
Ed
(of course, this is just my interpretation...)
-----Original Message-----
From: Elizabeth Smith [mailto:safety_queen@]
Sent: Monday, October 07, 2002 5:28 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: USA PATRIOT Act vs Regulations
I (I=RFO) got Legal & HR to be the point for me (delegation!).
We (Legal, HR & Safety) sat down with all of the PIs working
with SA and explained the up-coming laws to them. We also
included the manager of security, and a few other select
employees. We asked them to consider what makes someone a
"restricted person" and discuss any potential problems they
could forsee with HR, now, while it was still calm & quiet.
My complaint about the Proposed rule: what exactly constitutes
"access"? The person who has the combination to the lock box
where bot toxin stored - well, sure she's got access. But, what
about the maintenance tech who has physical access into the
BSL-3 laboratory where there are infected animals living? He
doesn't exactly have access to the Select Agent, but if he picks
up the animal and walks off with it (especially if it's already
dead), ... is that "access"?
I can identify everyone who has access, if I knew what it was
... but HR/Legal/Safety(me) aren't agreeing on what constitutes
"access", so that we can enforce the law. And the law, in this
case, is no help.
Sigh ...
Does anyone know *who* in the government is actually making
these final rule? Maybe I can persuade our gov't relations
people to work for me for a while ... :) what a pleasant
thought!
Elizabeth
=====
Elizabeth Smith
Environmental, Health & Safety Manager
BioPort Corporation
3500 N. Martin L. King Blvd.
Lansing, MI 48906
__________________________________________________
Do you Yahoo!?
Faith Hill - Exclusive Performances, Videos & More
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 7 Oct 2002 19:07:24 EDT
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ed Krisiunas
Subject: Re: Immunization of Sewage Treatment Workers
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CA = Canada.
Ed Krisiunas
(My godparents live in Winnipeg, I was born in Sioux Lookout, Ontario,
Canada)
> See CDC guidelines (page 14 answers your question)
>
>
> They mention studies done in England and Scandinavia, both of which have a
> high prevalence of HAV, while in most of USA it is much lower, and I think
> this is another reason CDC discounts that research (as inapplicable to
> USA.).
>
> However, I think you have to use your own good sense (and also your
> economic/mercenary sense. You didn't identify your locale, but I suspect
> CA. The incidence there and AZ and many of the border states is greater
> than the rest of the USA (we have almost "none" in most of SC). So if you
> are in a state with a "lot" of HAV, and don't have a problem with spending
> the money, it is probably a wise investment despite CDC
> "recommendations." A sewer worker in that area who happens to contract HAV
> will automatically claim it was from his employment --- rather than the
> dirty little restaurant he may have visited while on vacation, and in an
> area with a lot of HAV you may not be able to prove otherwise. Your money
> will have been well spent and justifiable, while in my area the virtual
> "non-existence" of HAV is the best reason not to immunize (if nobody has it
> then the sewer workers can't get it). Also, when I called CDC personally a
> few years ago they say that sewage is too cold, wet, and diluted to support
> a great enough concentration of HAV to cause disease.Hope this helps. MY
> opinion only -- not necessarily that of my employer.
>
>
> At 04:13 PM 10/2/02 -0500, you wrote:
> >Dear BIOSAFTY List Subscribers,
> >
> >What are the immunization requirements for municipal sewage treatment
> >workers? This seems to be a recurring question without a definitive
> >opinion from the public health professionals. Please contact me off the
> >list.
> >
> >Thank you in advance,
> >
> >Andrew Cutz, CIH
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CA = Canada.
Ed Krisiunas
(My godparents live in Winnipeg, I was born in Sioux Lookout,
Ontario, Canada)
See CDC guidelines (page 14 answers your question)
They mention studies done in England and Scandinavia, both of
which have a
high prevalence of HAV, while in most of USA it is much lower, and
I think
this is another reason CDC discounts that research (as
inapplicable to USA.).
However, I think you have to use your own good sense (and also
your
economic/mercenary sense. You didn't identify your locale, but I
suspect
CA. The incidence there and AZ and many of the border states is
greater
than the rest of the USA (we have almost "none" in most of SC).
So if you
are in a state with a "lot" of HAV, and don't have a problem with
spending
the money, it is probably a wise investment despite CDC
"recommendations." A sewer worker in that area who happens to
contract HAV
will automatically claim it was from his employment --- rather
than the
dirty little restaurant he may have visited while on vacation, and
in an
area with a lot of HAV you may not be able to prove otherwise.
Your money
will have been well spent and justifiable, while in my area the
virtual
"non-existence" of HAV is the best reason not to immunize (if
nobody has it
then the sewer workers can't get it). Also, when I called CDC
personally a
few years ago they say that sewage is too cold, wet, and diluted
to support
a great enough concentration of HAV to cause disease.Hope this
helps. MY
opinion only -- not necessarily that of my employer.
At 04:13 PM 10/2/02 -0500, you wrote:
>Dear BIOSAFTY List Subscribers,
>
>What are the immunization requirements for municipal sewage
treatment
>workers? This seems to be a recurring question without a
definitive
>opinion from the public health professionals. Please contact me
off the
>list.
>
>Thank you in advance,
>
>Andrew Cutz, CIH
--part1_7d.2ed03c9e.2ad36dac_boundary--
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 7 Oct 2002 19:13:16 EDT
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ed Krisiunas
Subject: "AIDS Cases by State and Metropolitan Area of Residence, 2000"
MIME-Version: 1.0
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"AIDS Cases by State and Metropolitan Area of Residence, 2000" HIV/AIDS
Surveillance Supplemental Report 2002;8(No. 2) is now available at
.
Volume 8, Number 1 of the Surveillance Supplemental Report will be available
soon.
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CDC HIV/AIDS Listserv Manager
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"AIDS Cases by State and Metropolitan Area of Residence, 2000"
HIV/AIDS Surveillance Supplemental Report 2002;8(No. 2) is now
available at .
Volume 8, Number 1 of the Surveillance Supplemental Report will be
available soon.
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=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 8 Oct 2002 07:19:28 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Barry D. Cohen, MPH, CBSP"
Subject: Employee Performance Evaluation
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Good Morning:
I have been asked by Human Resources to assist in modifying
the company's employee performance evaluation form.
Currently, the form makes no mention or reference to
on-the-job safety (and environmental) performance.
This is a huge issue for me because this shows a lack of
accountability on the part of supervisors and a lack of
personal responsibility on the part of the individual
contributor. I'll save senior management issues for another
day.
If your company uses an evaluation form and there is a
section on EH&S performance, AND, you are willing to share
with me those parameters by which you evaluate, my contact
information is listed below.
Thank you in advance for taking the time.
Regards,
Barry D. Cohen, MPH, CBSP
Director, Environmental Health and Safety
Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc.
195 Albany Street
Cambridge, MA 02139
(V): 617/613-4385
(F): 617/613-4492
(E): bcohen@
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 8 Oct 2002 09:21:35 EDT
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Jim Kaufman
Subject: Re: BIOSAFTY Digest - 4 Oct 2002 to 7 Oct 2002 (#2002-220)
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="part1_102.1c0b28b4.2ad435df_boundary"
--part1_102.1c0b28b4.2ad435df_boundary
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="US-ASCII"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
The digest that I'm receiving are incomplete with nothing to download. Can
anyone help? ... Jim
James A. Kaufman, Ph.D., Director
The Laboratory Safety Institute
A Nonprofit Organization Dedicated to
Safety in Science and Science Education
192 Worcester Road, Natick, MA 01760-2252
508-647-1900 Fax: 508-647-0062
Cell: 508-574-6264 Res: 781-237-1335
labsafe@
--part1_102.1c0b28b4.2ad435df_boundary
Content-Type: text/html; charset="US-ASCII"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
The digest that I'm receiving are incomplete with nothing to
download. Can anyone help? ... Jim
James A. Kaufman, Ph.D., Director
The Laboratory Safety Institute
A Nonprofit Organization Dedicated to
Safety in Science and Science Education
192 Worcester Road, Natick, MA 01760-2252
508-647-1900 Fax: 508-647-0062
Cell: 508-574-6264 Res: 781-237-1335
labsafe@
--part1_102.1c0b28b4.2ad435df_boundary--
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 8 Oct 2002 09:30:20 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Baxley, Karen"
Subject: Re: BIOSAFTY Digest - 4 Oct 2002 to 7 Oct 2002 (#2002-220)
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="----_=_NextPart_001_01C26ECE.D8EC7A50"
This message is in MIME format. Since your mail reader does not understand
this format, some or all of this message may not be legible.
------_=_NextPart_001_01C26ECE.D8EC7A50
Content-Type: text/plain;
charset="iso-8859-1"
Me, too. I finally gave up and re-subscribed without the digest version.
Less convenient but at least I can see the valuable messages on this list
serve. It is apparently a wide-spread problem.
Karen
Karen P. Baxley, CSP
Senior Manager, Environment, Health, and Safety
MedImmune, Inc.
35 West Watkins Mill Road
Gaithersburg, MD 20878
Office 301-527-4313
Fax 240-632-4048
Pager 888-709-1099
baxleyk@
-----Original Message-----
From: Jim Kaufman [mailto:Labsafe@]
Sent: Tuesday, October 08, 2002 9:22 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: BIOSAFTY Digest - 4 Oct 2002 to 7 Oct 2002 (#2002-220)
The digest that I'm receiving are incomplete with nothing to download. Can
anyone help? ... Jim
James A. Kaufman, Ph.D., Director
The Laboratory Safety Institute
A Nonprofit Organization Dedicated to
Safety in Science and Science Education
192 Worcester Road, Natick, MA 01760-2252
508-647-1900 Fax: 508-647-0062
Cell: 508-574-6264 Res: 781-237-1335
labsafe@
------_=_NextPart_001_01C26ECE.D8EC7A50
Content-Type: text/html;
charset="iso-8859-1"
Me, too. I finally gave up and re-subscribed without the digest
version. Less convenient but at least I can see the valuable
messages on this list serve. It is apparently a wide-spread
problem.
size=2>Karen
size=2>Senior Manager, Environment, Health, and Safety
MedImmune, Inc.
35 West Watkins Mill Road
Gaithersburg, MD 20878
size=2>baxleyk@
size=2>-----Original Message-----
From: Jim Kaufman [mailto:Labsafe@]
Sent: Tuesday, October 08, 2002 9:22 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: BIOSAFTY face=arial,helvetica>The digest that I'm
receiving are incomplete with nothing to download. Can anyone
help? ... Jim
James A. Kaufman, Ph.D., Director
The Laboratory Safety Institute
A Nonprofit Organization Dedicated to
Safety in Science and Science Education
192 Worcester Road, Natick, MA 01760-2252
508-647-1900 Fax: 508-647-0062
Cell: 508-574-6264 Res: 781-237-1335
labsafe@
------_=_NextPart_001_01C26ECE.D8EC7A50--
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 8 Oct 2002 09:30:40 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Robert N. Latsch"
Subject: Patriot Act Fallout
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
It appears that we are also being asked questions by United Educators. the
questionairre is the same,
Bob
_____________________________________________________________________
__ / _____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 8 Oct 2002 09:37:19 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Sue Pedrick
Subject: Re: Immunization of Sewage Treatment Workers
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="=====================_3133477==_.ALT"
--=====================_3133477==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
Thanks, Ed. My motto has always been "Why show my stupidity to just a few,
when I can share it with the whole world! First I watched helplessly as my
reply sailed out to the group rather than just Andrew, and now I find out
CA = CANADA as well as CALIFORNIA! It's just too much to bear! Thanks
for saving me from myself in future postings ! Sue
At 07:07 PM 10/7/02 -0400, you wrote:
>CA = Canada.
>
>Ed Krisiunas
>
>(My godparents live in Winnipeg, I was born in Sioux Lookout, Ontario, Canada)
--=====================_3133477==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
Thanks, Ed. My motto has always been "Why show my stupidity to just
a few, when I can share it with the whole world! First I watched
helplessly as my reply sailed out to the group rather than just
Andrew, and now I find out CA = CANADA as well as CALIFORNIA! It's
just too much to bear! Thanks for saving me from myself in future
postings ! Sue
At 07:07 PM 10/7/02 -0400, you wrote:
CA = Canada.
Ed Krisiunas
(My godparents live in Winnipeg, I was born in Sioux Lookout,
Ontario, Canada)
--=====================_3133477==_.ALT--
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 8 Oct 2002 10:06:04 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Richard Fink
Subject: Re: BIOSAFTY Digest - 4 Oct 2002 to 7 Oct 2002 (#2002-220)
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="=====================_5314501==_.ALT"
--=====================_5314501==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
The digest problem is being look at by the MIT postmaster. So far, it
seems that it is due to a "fault" at the receiving end not the transmission
end.
At 09:21 AM 10/8/2002 -0400, you wrote:
>The digest that I'm receiving are incomplete with nothing to
>download. Can anyone help? ... Jim
>
>James A. Kaufman, Ph.D., Director
>The Laboratory Safety Institute
>A Nonprofit Organization Dedicated to
>Safety in Science and Science Education
>
>192 Worcester Road, Natick, MA 01760-2252
>508-647-1900 Fax: 508-647-0062
>Cell: 508-574-6264 Res: 781-237-1335
>labsafe@
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Biosafty List Owner
rfink@mit.edu
--=====================_5314501==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
The digest problem is being look at by the MIT postmaster. So far,
it seems that it is due to a "fault" at the receiving end not the
transmission end.
At 09:21 AM 10/8/2002 -0400, you wrote:
The digest that I'm receiving are incomplete with nothing to
download. Can anyone help? ... Jim
James A. Kaufman, Ph.D., Director
The Laboratory Safety Institute
A Nonprofit Organization Dedicated to
Safety in Science and Science Education
192 Worcester Road, Natick, MA 01760-2252
508-647-1900 Fax: 508-647-0062
Cell: 508-574-6264 Res: 781-237-1335
labsafe@
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Biosafty List Owner
rfink@mit.edu
--=====================_5314501==_.ALT--
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 8 Oct 2002 10:10:39 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Norman, Randy"
Subject: Re: USA PATRIOT Act vs Regulations
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Won't they be publishing an Interim Final Rule (not a Proposed Rule)? I
believe PL 107-188 calls for an Interim Final Rule, which will go into
effect 60 days after it is published, regardless of any public comments. To
my understanding, Interim Final Rules are generally used in emergencies,
when it is felt that they cannot wait to obtain public comments before
regulations go into effect.
Unless a very ambitious and concerted effort is made to solicit feedback and
modify the interim final rule before it goes into effect, I fear the
regulations will not have the benefit of the regulated community's input by
the time we are all expected to comply.
Of course, this (the requirement for an interim final rule rather than a
proposed rule) is mandated by the Act. It's not like HHS or USDA are able to
do it any other way. So in all fairness, any complaints should not be laid
at their feet.
Randy Norman
Safety Specialist Sr.
BioReliance Corporation
Rockville, MD 20850
Rnorman@
"Success is a journey, not a destination" - Ben Sweetland
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 8 Oct 2002 10:25:04 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Gordon, Deborah"
Subject: West Nile Virus-A repeat.
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
I asked this question last week.
We have an Investigator who has proposed to isolate West Nile Virus from
mosquitoes. We need to be sure that we have the correct permits to have the
virus once he does isolate it. Can anyone please tell me what permits and
or approvals we will need?
Deborah Gordon
e-mail: gordon@
phone: (205) 581-2417
Fax: (205) 581-2880
Southern Research Institute
2000 9th Ave. South
P.O. Box 55305
Birmingham,Alabama 35255-5305
____________________________________________________________________________
_
Confidentiality Notice
The information contained in this communication and its attachments is
intended only for the use of the individual to whom it is addressed and may
contain information that is legally privileged, confidential, or exempt from
disclosure. If the reader of this message is not the intended recipient, you
are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution, or copying of this
communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this
communication in error, please notify postmaster@ (205-581-2999) and
delete the communication without retaining any copies.
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 8 Oct 2002 11:54:35 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Mariann Hodge
Subject: Re: BIOSAFTY Digest - 4 Oct 2002 to 7 Oct 2002
=?us-ascii?q?=28#2002-220=29?=
In-Reply-To:
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
-----I had the same problem as well as another lister at OU. I
finally gave up (a long time ago) and stopped getting the digest.
Could all of us "receivers" be at fault??--------------
> The digest problem is being look at by the MIT postmaster. So far,
it
> seems that it is due to a "fault" at the receiving end not the
transmission
> end.
>
> At 09:21 AM 10/8/2002 -0400, you wrote:
> >The digest that I'm receiving are incomplete with nothing to
> >download. Can anyone help? ... Jim
> >
> >James A. Kaufman, Ph.D., Director
> >The Laboratory Safety Institute
> >A Nonprofit Organization Dedicated to
> >Safety in Science and Science Education
> >
> >192 Worcester Road, Natick, MA 01760-2252
> >508-647-1900 Fax: 508-647-0062
> >Cell: 508-574-6264 Res: 781-237-1335
> >labsafe@
>
> Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
> Biosafty List Owner
> rfink@mit.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 8 Oct 2002 11:04:04 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "OLINGER, PATRICIA L [S&C/0216]"
Subject: Re: USA PATRIOT Act fallout
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Realistically, in the face of "security". Should we even be responding to
this request for information. The list of those who have SAs is no longer
confidential.
Patty Olinger
Pharmacia - Kalamazoo Corporate Services - ESH
Biosafety Officer
-----Original Message-----
From: Francis Churchill [mailto:fchurchi@ZOO.UVM.EDU]
Sent: Monday, October 07, 2002 2:06 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: USA PATRIOT Act fallout
United Educators has presented a "Laboratory Profile" to be completed
with 35 questions for the facilities that possess a SA.
1 - Lab info: building, room Principal investigator, etc
2 - check the SA that are stored/used inthat lab.
3 - Registered with CDC?
4 - BSL level
5 - 24/7 security guard?
6 - security alarm?
7 - There is no number 7 (Sort of Monty Python ish, but there really
is no question 7)
8 - self-closing doors?
9 - Is the building locked at all times?
10 - video camera monitoring entrance/exits
11 - access to SA storage area restricted?
12 - Can lab personnel who are not directly conducting research
activities involving SA access SA?
13 - Does any lab supervisor directly oversee all research
activities involving SA?
14 - photo ID's required?
15 - Non-lab personnel access procedures?
16 - Other security protections not identified
17 - Most recent assessment of lab security procedures?
18 - inventory/tracking of SA
19 - Does inventory track shipping/receiving, quantities
used/consumed, Individuals, type of work, dates SA used/consumed?
20 - Who at the laboratory has authority to acquire SA? Transfer SA?
(list title/role)
21 - List title of researcher responsible for inventory of SA
22 - Do you know what SA are on hand prior to enactment of 42 CFR 72.6?
23 - Is inventory updated immediately upon use/transfer/disposition of SA?
24 - Does inventory track details of SA destruction?
25 - Is all destruction of SA done at Lab?
26 - Are SA destroyed according to CDC guidelines?
27 - Is form EA-101 completed prior to tansfer and after the
destruction/exhaustion of SA?
28 - policy to control hand carrying of SA outside of lab?
29 - When was most recent assessment of inventory process?
30 - Biosafety manual?
31 - procedures to identify SA that are no longer n use and to destry these?
32 - Have you confirmed that n non-permanent resident lab personnel
from Cuba, Iraq, Iran, N Korea, Sudan or Syria have access to SA?
33 - Does your IBC govern work with SA?
34 - Has CDC or DHHS inspected within last 12 months?
35 - (whew!) when was most recent assessment of lab procedures?
Signature of RFO AND
Signature of EHS director (if different from RFO)
FWIW, there it is,
Francis
--
Francis Churchill
University of Vermont - Environmental Safety Facility
667 Spear Street, UVM, Burlington, VT 05405-3010
(802) 656-5405
Francis.Churchill@uvm.edu
"Show me pollution and I'll show you a subsidy." Robert F Kennedy Jr
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 8 Oct 2002 09:29:53 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Shiozaki, Debbie J"
Subject: Re: BIOSAFTY Digest - 4 Oct 2002 to 7 Oct 2002 (#2002-220)
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="----_=_NextPart_001_01C26EE7.EE36BA60"
This message is in MIME format. Since your mail reader does not understand
this format, some or all of this message may not be legible.
------_=_NextPart_001_01C26EE7.EE36BA60
Content-Type: text/plain;
charset="iso-8859-1"
I had the same problem and canceled the digest as well. Debbie
Debbie Shiozaki, MPH, CIH
Manager, EH&S
Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center
1100 Fairview Ave N J5-400
Seattle, WA 98109
206-667-6200
-----Original Message-----
From: Baxley, Karen [mailto:BaxleyK@]
Sent: Tuesday, October 08, 2002 6:30 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: BIOSAFTY Digest - 4 Oct 2002 to 7 Oct 2002 (#2002-220)
Me, too. I finally gave up and re-subscribed without the digest version.
Less convenient but at least I can see the valuable messages on this list
serve. It is apparently a wide-spread problem.
Karen
Karen P. Baxley, CSP
Senior Manager, Environment, Health, and Safety
MedImmune, Inc.
35 West Watkins Mill Road
Gaithersburg, MD 20878
Office 301-527-4313
Fax 240-632-4048
Pager 888-709-1099
baxleyk@
-----Original Message-----
From: Jim Kaufman [mailto:Labsafe@]
Sent: Tuesday, October 08, 2002 9:22 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: BIOSAFTY Digest - 4 Oct 2002 to 7 Oct 2002 (#2002-220)
The digest that I'm receiving are incomplete with nothing to download. Can
anyone help? ... Jim
James A. Kaufman, Ph.D., Director
The Laboratory Safety Institute
A Nonprofit Organization Dedicated to
Safety in Science and Science Education
192 Worcester Road, Natick, MA 01760-2252
508-647-1900 Fax: 508-647-0062
Cell: 508-574-6264 Res: 781-237-1335
labsafe@
------_=_NextPart_001_01C26EE7.EE36BA60
Content-Type: text/html;
charset="iso-8859-1"
I had the same problem and canceled the digest as well. Debbie
size=2>
Debbie Shiozaki, MPH, CIH
size=2>Manager, EH&S
size=2>
Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center
1100 Fairview Ave N J5-400
size=2>Seattle, WA 98109
size=2>206-667-6200
size=2>
size=2>-----Original Message-----
From: Baxley, Karen [mailto:BaxleyK@]
Sent: Tuesday, October 08, 2002 6:30 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: BIOSAFTY Digest - 4 Oct 2002 to 7 Oct 2002
(#2002-220)
Me, too. I finally gave up and re-subscribed without the digest
version. Less convenient but at least I can see the valuable
messages on this list serve. It is apparently a wide-spread
problem.
size=2>Karen
size=2>Senior Manager, Environment, Health, and Safety
size=2>Gaithersburg, MD 20878
size=2>baxleyk@
size=2>-----Original Message-----
From: Jim Kaufman [mailto:Labsafe@]
Sent: Tuesday, October 08, 2002 9:22 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: BIOSAFTY face=arial,helvetica>The digest that I'm
receiving are incomplete with nothing to download. Can anyone
help? ... Jim
James A. Kaufman, Ph.D., Director
The Laboratory Safety Institute
A Nonprofit Organization Dedicated to
Safety in Science and Science Education
192 Worcester Road, Natick, MA 01760-2252
508-647-1900 Fax: 508-647-0062
Cell: 508-574-6264 Res: 781-237-1335
labsafe@
------_=_NextPart_001_01C26EE7.EE36BA60--
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 8 Oct 2002 12:45:37 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Richard Fink
Subject: digest
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="=====================_14887186==_.ALT"
--=====================_14887186==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
Sorry to have to post a nonbiosafety issue, but, would the folks who tried
Digest mode and did not succeed email me (rfink@mit.edu) what email program
you are (or were) using. Thanks,
Richie
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Biosafty List Owner
rfink@mit.edu
--=====================_14887186==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
Sorry to have to post a nonbiosafety issue, but, would the folks who
tried Digest mode and did not succeed email me (rfink@mit.edu) what
email program you are (or were) using. Thanks,
Richie
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Biosafty List Owner
rfink@mit.edu
--=====================_14887186==_.ALT--
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 8 Oct 2002 15:42:38 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Norman, Randy"
Subject: Re: USA PATRIOT Act fallout
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Patty raises a very important concern, in my opinion. One that I believe
needs to be addressed on a more comprehensive basis.
Since the law (107-188) prohibits the disclosure of much of this information
by any Federal Agency, one could certainly argue that it would be
inappropriate for anyone else to be disclosing it except in carefully
prescribed circumstances. At the very least, the nondisclosure provisions
should be extended to State and Local governments. Some State or Local
governments might otherwise be required to make this kind of information
publicly available under their own freedom of information regulations.
Somebody needs to put a lid on this, if it is truly a concern in the first
place.
Randy Norman
Safety Specialist Sr.
BioReliance Corporation
Rockville, MD 20850
Rnorman@
"Success is a journey, not a destination" - Ben Sweetland
-----Original Message-----
From: OLINGER, PATRICIA L [S&C/0216]
[SMTP:patricia.l.olinger@]
Sent: Tuesday, October 08, 2002 12:04 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: USA PATRIOT Act fallout
Realistically, in the face of "security". Should we even be responding to
this request for information. The list of those who have SAs is no longer
confidential.
Patty Olinger
Pharmacia - Kalamazoo Corporate Services - ESH
Biosafety Officer
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 8 Oct 2002 17:12:49 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ed Gaunt
Subject: Re: USA PATRIOT Act fallout
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
FYI...
Our Notification database has been classified by the Department of Defense
as SECRET, basically to protect information that links possessed agents to
specific facilities or persons. That is why we have not returned
incorrectly completed or incomplete forms to the sender for correction, but
have required that they be filled out and submitted again.
In addition to biocontainment, I'm sure that we will soon be seeing
increased emphasis on physical security as well as information security of
laboratories where these agents are stored. At this point, facility and
individual security clearances are NOT required to work with Select Agents,
nor is there any indication that I am aware of that will change this, but
all of the information that the Government is collecting regarding
possession and possessors falls under these security requirements. Here is
a link to the National Industrial Security Program that provides information
on how to protect sensitive and classified information.
and
As usual, this is just my 2 cents worth...
Ed
-----Original Message-----
From: Norman, Randy [mailto:RNorman@]
Sent: Tuesday, October 08, 2002 3:43 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: USA PATRIOT Act fallout
Patty raises a very important concern, in my opinion. One that I believe
needs to be addressed on a more comprehensive basis.
Since the law (107-188) prohibits the disclosure of much of this information
by any Federal Agency, one could certainly argue that it would be
inappropriate for anyone else to be disclosing it except in carefully
prescribed circumstances. At the very least, the nondisclosure provisions
should be extended to State and Local governments. Some State or Local
governments might otherwise be required to make this kind of information
publicly available under their own freedom of information regulations.
Somebody needs to put a lid on this, if it is truly a concern in the first
place.
Randy Norman
Safety Specialist Sr.
BioReliance Corporation
Rockville, MD 20850
Rnorman@
"Success is a journey, not a destination" - Ben Sweetland
-----Original Message-----
From: OLINGER, PATRICIA L [S&C/0216]
[SMTP:patricia.l.olinger@]
Sent: Tuesday, October 08, 2002 12:04 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: USA PATRIOT Act fallout
Realistically, in the face of "security". Should we even be responding to
this request for information. The list of those who have SAs is no longer
confidential.
Patty Olinger
Pharmacia - Kalamazoo Corporate Services - ESH
Biosafety Officer
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 9 Oct 2002 08:30:42 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Robin Newberry
Subject: Re: USA PATRIOT Act fallout
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed"
>FYI...
>
>Our Notification database has been classified by the Department of Defense
>as SECRET, basically to protect information that links possessed agents to
>specific facilities or persons.
Machs nix. One of our concerns was that, as a state agency, state law
requires that once this data was gathered it is required to be
available to the public via a FOIA request. Maybe not the form itself
(or photocopies thereof) but any internal communications/data sets
used to create the form are fair game.
--
Robin
--------------------------------------------------------------
W. Robert Newberry, IV CIH, CHMM
Chief Environmental Health and Safety Officer
Clemson University
wnewber@clemson.edu ehs@clemson.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 9 Oct 2002 09:27:47 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Francis Churchill
Subject: Re: USA PATRIOT Act fallout
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed"
My understanding is that the USA PATRIOT Act, emphasis on act,
addresses protecting select agent information from FOIA, public
document, etc. We have to wait until the regulations are promulgated
to see what steps we need to take in order to do this. I think we
need to sit tight, stall, obfuscate, (where's my thesaurus), and wait
until December. We intend to give our insure certain information
(that we have some SA, the amounts and probably the names of the SA).
We do not intend at this time to release individual laboratory
information. This allows (we hope) the insurer to understand the
risk, and it allows us the time (I hope) to understand the
regulations.
I hope this doesn't become a battle of conflicting regulations -
"FOIA says tell everybody!" "USA PATRIOT says tell nobody" "FOIA was
here first!" "USA PATRIOT is bigger!" "Oh Yeah!" "Yeah!" - It could
get ugly ;-)
Francis
>Machs nix. One of our concerns was that, as a state agency, state law
>requires that once this data was gathered it is required to be
>available to the public via a FOIA request. Maybe not the form itself
>(or photocopies thereof) but any internal communications/data sets
>used to create the form are fair game.
--
Francis Churchill
University of Vermont - Environmental Safety Facility
667 Spear Street, UVM, Burlington, VT 05405-3010
(802) 656-5405
Francis.Churchill@uvm.edu
"Show me pollution and I'll show you a subsidy." Robert F Kennedy Jr
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 9 Oct 2002 09:43:47 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Robin Newberry
Subject: HazMat Inventory system
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed"
We are in the planning stages of a centralized hazardous materials
(chemical, biological, radiological, and DEA controlled) inventory
system for our labs, and I'd like to correspond with other Higher Ed
institutions which have implemented such a system. We're considering
something along these lines:
Centralized database on a UNIX/LINUX/OS X server
Data entry via secure connection over the internet (probably VPN, but
maybe SSL or SSH)
May involve an initial physical inventory using barcode readers and
some hand held collection device (e.g. Palm, but not necessarily Palm)
What it will **NOT** be is anything based on any version of Windows,
so if you are a vendor with a Windows only solution DO NOT CONTACT
ME. Period.
--
Robin
--------------------------------------------------------------
W. Robert Newberry, IV CIH, CHMM
Chief Environmental Health and Safety Officer
Clemson University
wnewber@clemson.edu ehs@clemson.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 9 Oct 2002 08:46:09 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Kyle Boyett
Subject: NSF 49 2002 and Applicability
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
List members,
Recently a statement was made to the list that the new NSF 49 standard only
applies to those units manufactured after March 19, 2002. I realize that the
new Standard was adopted that day. I also realize that a statement is made
in the standard on page 1 that "Units with component parts covered under
existing NSF standards or criteria shall comply with those applicable
requirements". Am I to assume that this statement means that only units
manufactured after the adopted date are to comply with the new standard? Any
help would be much appreciated as this has a great impact on our program.
Thanks.
Kyle G. Boyett
Asst. Director of Biosafety
Safety Short Distribution List Administrator
University of Alabama @ Birmingham
Department of Occupational Health and Safety
933 South 19th Street Suite 445
Birmingham, Alabama 35294
Phone: 205.934.9181
Fax: 205.934.7487
Visit our WEB site at: healthsafe.uab.edu
Asking me to overlook a safety violation is like asking me to reduce the
value I place on YOUR life
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 9 Oct 2002 09:37:51 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Norman, Randy"
Subject: Re: USA PATRIOT Act fallout
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Again in my opinion, a very valid concern. I HOPE that various State and
Local Agencies are working on addressing these concerns at least as actively
as in our area. I am a member of our Local Emergency Planning Committee
(technically constituted as a "Council" here) and I can tell you it has been
an issue of no small concern with which we have wrestled.
Strictly in my personal opinion, a clear and specific mandate from the
Federal government forbidding the disclosure of specific kinds of sensitive
information, clearly and specifically pre-empting any other State or Local
law or regulation, would be a BIG help. Admittedly it would run contrary to
the general concept of community right-to-know, but some believe that it is
a very serious matter.
Randy Norman
Safety Specialist Sr.
BioReliance Corporation
Rockville, MD 20850
Rnorman@
"Success is a journey, not a destination" - Ben Sweetland
-----Original Message-----
From: Robin Newberry [SMTP:wnewber@CLEMSON.EDU]
Sent: Wednesday, October 09, 2002 8:31 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: USA PATRIOT Act fallout
>FYI...
>
>Our Notification database has been classified by the Department of Defense
>as SECRET, basically to protect information that links possessed agents to
>specific facilities or persons.
Machs nix. One of our concerns was that, as a state agency, state law
requires that once this data was gathered it is required to be
available to the public via a FOIA request. Maybe not the form itself
(or photocopies thereof) but any internal communications/data sets
used to create the form are fair game.
--
Robin
--------------------------------------------------------------
W. Robert Newberry, IV CIH, CHMM
Chief Environmental Health and Safety Officer
Clemson University
wnewber@clemson.edu ehs@clemson.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 9 Oct 2002 10:39:12 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Mary Ann Sondrini
Subject: Re: NSF 49 2002 and Applicability
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Hi Kyle,
The answer to your question is a bit confusing...
Traditionally a new NSF standard only applies to cabinets tested and listed
by NSF under the new standard. This means that it could be 5 years after
the standard goes into effect that a cabinet falls under the new standard,
as manufacturers send each model to NSF once every 5 years.
However, NSF is currently considering "partial adoption" of the 2002
standard for existing cabinets. This means that certain requirements of the
new standard may apply to currently NSF listed cabinets. NSF is hoping that
this will be clarified in a couple of months.
Hope this helps...
Mary Ann Sondrini and David Stuart
-----Original Message-----
From: Kyle Boyett [mailto:KBoyett@HEALTHSAFE.UAB.EDU]
Sent: Wednesday, October 09, 2002 6:46 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: NSF 49 2002 and Applicability
List members,
Recently a statement was made to the list that the new NSF 49 standard only
applies to those units manufactured after March 19, 2002. I realize that the
new Standard was adopted that day. I also realize that a statement is made
in the standard on page 1 that "Units with component parts covered under
existing NSF standards or criteria shall comply with those applicable
requirements". Am I to assume that this statement means that only units
manufactured after the adopted date are to comply with the new standard? Any
help would be much appreciated as this has a great impact on our program.
Thanks.
Kyle G. Boyett
Asst. Director of Biosafety
Safety Short Distribution List Administrator
University of Alabama @ Birmingham
Department of Occupational Health and Safety
933 South 19th Street Suite 445
Birmingham, Alabama 35294
Phone: 205.934.9181
Fax: 205.934.7487
Visit our WEB site at: healthsafe.uab.edu
Asking me to overlook a safety violation is like asking me to reduce the
value I place on YOUR life
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 9 Oct 2002 10:58:20 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Michael Wendeler
Organization: Incyte Genomics
Subject: Herpes B Virus Training
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="------------5B76E87E8FDA4F034306D5F7"
This is a multi-part message in MIME format.
--------------5B76E87E8FDA4F034306D5F7
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Does anyone know of any "canned" training programs on Herpes B virus for
researchers working with non-human primate blood, body fluids and
tissues?
Mike Wendeler
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 9 Oct 2002 08:48:55 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Melinda Young
Subject: Re: Herpes B Virus Training
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="=_530FC7ED.4D2C4026"
--=_530FC7ED.4D2C4026
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This isn't a program but here is a starting point.
Melinda Young
Health & Safety Coordinator
Wa National Primate Research Center
Box 357330
Phone: 206-543-8686
Fax: 206-685-0305
melinday@bart.rprc.washington.edu
biosafe@u.washington.edu
>>> wendeler@ 10/09/02 07:58AM >>>
Does anyone know of any "canned" training programs on Herpes B virus for
researchers working with non-human primate blood, body fluids and
tissues?
Mike Wendeler
--=_530FC7ED.4D2C4026
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
2px">
This isn't a program but here is a starting point.
href=3D"">
washington.edu/updates/lsumar99.htm
Melinda Young
Health & Safety Coordinator
Wa National = Primate Research Center
Box 357330
Phone: 206-543-8686
href=3D"mailto:melinday@bart.rprc.washington.edu">melinday@bart.rprc.washin=
href=3D"mailto:biosafe@u.washington.edu">biosafe@u.washington.edu
&n= bsp; = ;
>>> wendeler@ 10/09/02 07:58AM >>>
D= oes anyone know of any "canned" training programs on Herpes B
virus for
researchers working with non-human primate blood, body fluids and
tissues?
Mike Wendeler
--=_530FC7ED.4D2C4026--
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 9 Oct 2002 12:13:11 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Isabel Jean Goldberg
Subject: Protecting Mechanics who work in BSL3 Facilities
MIME-Version: 1.0
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boundary="----=_NextPart_000_0011_01C26F8D.3C426010"
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charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
After a near miss, we realize that we need to develop better procedures =
for protecting our mechanics when they respond to our BSL3 lab. Does =
anyone have a written protocol that they'd be willing to share? Thanks =
in advance. - Jean
------=_NextPart_000_0011_01C26F8D.3C426010
Content-Type: text/html;
charset="iso-8859-1"
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After a near miss, we realize that we need to = develop better
procedures for protecting our mechanics when they respond to our =
BSL3 lab. Does anyone have a written protocol that they'd be
willing to = share? Thanks in advance. - Jean
------=_NextPart_000_0011_01C26F8D.3C426010--
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 9 Oct 2002 12:37:37 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Joseph P. Kozlovac"
Subject: Re: Herpes B Virus Training
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="=====================_10708718==_.ALT"
--=====================_10708718==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
You might want to check out some of the training programs that NIH has put
together.
At 10:58 AM 10/9/2002 -0400, you wrote:
>Does anyone know of any "canned" training programs on Herpes B virus for
>researchers working with non-human primate blood, body fluids and
>tissues?
>
>Mike Wendeler
______________________________________________________________________________
Biological Safety Officer
Environment, Health, Safety
SAIC-Frederick
National Cancer Institute -
Frederick
(301)846-1451 fax: (301)846-6619
email: jkozlovac@mail.
______________________________________________________________________________
--=====================_10708718==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
You might want to check out some of the training programs that NIH
has put together.
At 10:58 AM 10/9/2002 -0400, you wrote:
Does anyone know of any "canned" training programs on Herpes B
virus for
researchers working with non-human primate blood, body fluids and
tissues?
Mike Wendeler
______________________________________________________________________________
Biological Safety Officer
Environment, Health, Safety
SAIC-Frederick
National Cancer Institute - Frederick
(301)846-1451 fax: (301)846-6619
email: jkozlovac@mail.
______________________________________________________________________________
--=====================_10708718==_.ALT--
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 9 Oct 2002 14:15:33 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ricardo Tappan
Subject: Re: Protecting Mechanics who work in BSL3 Facilities
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Same here if you have a written protocol for outside contractors
RT
>>> Jean.Goldberg@MED.NYU.EDU 10/09/02 12:13PM >>>
After a near miss, we realize that we need to develop better procedures
for protecting our mechanics when they respond to our BSL3 lab. Does
anyone have a written protocol that they'd be willing to share? Thanks
in advance. - Jean
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 9 Oct 2002 11:49:49 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Steve Stauffer
Subject: Cleaning and certifying piping systems
In-Reply-To:
Mime-version: 1.0
Content-type: multipart/alternative; boundary="B_3117008991_818373"
> This message is in MIME format. Since your mail reader does not understand
this format, some or all of this message may not be legible.
--B_3117008991_818373
Content-type: text/plain; charset="US-ASCII"
Content-transfer-encoding: 7bit
We are looking for someone qualified to clean and certify PVC piping in a
new BSL3-P facility being built on the UC Davis campus. The construction
document specs are as follows:
> B. Piping Distribution Cleaning:
>> 1. Cleaning procedure will require the following materials and equipment:
>>> a. Alconox detergent and 30% hydrogen peroxide cleaning agents.
>>> b. Circulating pump.
>>> c. Acid resistant tanks of sufficient size to fill all lines.
>>> d. 1% potassium permanganate testing solution.
>>> e. Balsbough resistivity meter.
>> 2. Procedure:
>>> a. Flush piping system with research grade Type III water to remove all
>>> foreign substances.
>>> b. Connect piping systems to be cleaned to the pump and tank. Fill the tank
>>> with research grade Type III water and all Alconox 25 grams/gallon.
>>> c. Circulate solution through all research grade piping for 6 hours,
>>> bleeding 0.5 gallons from each valve at 2-hour intervals.
>>> d. Drain system and refill with research grade Type III water and test
>>> resistivity. Repeat procedure until the return side of each loop conforms
>>> to the NCCLS Type III water specifications.
>>> e. Add hydrogen peroxide (one gallon per five gallons of system volume) and
>>> repeat Procedures C and D.
>>> f. Flush system with fresh research grade Type III water and test all
>>> discharge point with potassium permanganate. Continue flushing until test
>>> shows negative. (A positive test will show color change from violet to
>>> brown.)
>>> g. Drain and fill system including filter housings, pumps, and storage tanks
>>> with fresh research grade water and proceed to operate entire system.
>>> h. Check water quality until the return side of each loop conforms to the
>>> NCCSL water type of this piping system
Anyone know of a company in our area capable of dealing with this?
Thanks,
Steve
-------------------------------------------------
Steve Stauffer
Quarantine Officer: Contained Research Facility
University of California at Davis
(530) 752-6920 (voice); (530) 754-7757 (fax)
--B_3117008991_818373
Content-type: text/html; charset="US-ASCII"
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We are looking for someone qualified to clean and cert= ify PVC
piping in a new BSL3-P facility being built on the UC Davis campus.
= The construction document specs are as follows:
> Piping Distribution Cleaning:
> Cleaning procedure will require the fo= llowing materials and
equipment:
> Alconox detergent and 30% hydrogen per= oxide cleaning agents.
b. Circulatin= g pump.
c. Acid resis= tant tanks of sufficient size to fill all lines.
d. 1% potassi= um permanganate testing solution.
e. Balsbough = resistivity meter.
>
> Flush piping system with research grad= e Type III water to remove
all foreign substances.
b. Connect pi= ping systems to be cleaned to the pump and tank.
Fill the tank with re= search grade Type III water and all Alconox
25 grams/gallon.
c. Circulate = solution through all research grade piping for 6
hours, bleeding 0.5 gallons= from each valve at 2-hour intervals.
d. Drain syst= em and refill with research grade Type III water and
test resistivity. = ;Repeat procedure until the return side of each
loop conforms to the NCCLS T= ype III water specifications.
e. Add hydrog= en peroxide (one gallon per five gallons of system
volume) and repeat Proced= ures C and D.
f. Flush syst= em with fresh research grade Type III water and test
all discharge point wit= h potassium permanganate. Continue
flushing until test shows negative.= (A positive test will show
color change from violet to brown.)
g. Drain and = fill system including filter housings, pumps, and
storage tanks with fresh r= esearch grade water and proceed to
operate entire system.
h. Check wate= r quality until the return side of each loop conforms
to the NCCSL water typ= e of this piping system
=
Anyone know of a company in our area capable of= dealing with this?
Thanks,
Steve
-------------------------------------------------
Steve Stauffer
Quarantine Officer: Contained Research Facility
University of California at Davis
(530) 752-6920 (voice); (530) 754-7757 (fax)
--B_3117008991_818373--
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 9 Oct 2002 15:00:10 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "William A. Lorenzen"
Organization: Children's Hospital Boston
Subject: Re: Cleaning and certifying piping systems
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="Boundary_(ID_Zu/UxrVxyA5t/GPPeRmmAQ)"
--Boundary_(ID_Zu/UxrVxyA5t/GPPeRmmAQ)
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
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Be careful Alconox may contain mercury and be an issue for compliance of
your waste water. It is in Massachusetts.
And most of our Hg issues were created by removal of the biomass on the
insides of PVC pipes that contained an accumulation of Hg over time.
Regards,
Steve Stauffer wrote:
> We are looking for someone qualified to clean and certify PVC piping
> in a new BSL3-P facility being built on the UC Davis campus. The
> construction document specs are as follows:
>
> B. Piping Distribution Cleaning:
>
> 1. Cleaning procedure will require the following
> materials and equipment:
>
> a. Alconox detergent and 30% hydrogen
> peroxide cleaning agents.
> b. Circulating pump.
> c. Acid resistant tanks of sufficient
> size to fill all lines.
> d. 1% potassium permanganate testing
> solution.
> e. Balsbough resistivity meter.
>
> 2. Procedure:
>
> a. Flush piping system with research
> grade Type III water to remove all
> foreign substances.
> b. Connect piping systems to be cleaned
> to the pump and tank. Fill the tank
> with research grade Type III water and
> all Alconox 25 grams/gallon.
> c. Circulate solution through all
> research grade piping for 6 hours,
> bleeding 0.5 gallons from each valve at
> 2-hour intervals.
> d. Drain system and refill with research
> grade Type III water and test
> resistivity. Repeat procedure until the
> return side of each loop conforms to the
> NCCLS Type III water specifications.
> e. Add hydrogen peroxide (one gallon per
> five gallons of system volume) and
> repeat Procedures C and D.
> f. Flush system with fresh research
> grade Type III water and test all
> discharge point with potassium
> permanganate. Continue flushing until
> test shows negative. (A positive test
> will show color change from violet to
> brown.)
> g. Drain and fill system including
> filter housings, pumps, and storage
> tanks with fresh research grade water
> and proceed to operate entire system.
> h. Check water quality until the return
> side of each loop conforms to the NCCSL
> water type of this piping system
>
>
> Anyone know of a company in our area capable of dealing with this?
>
> Thanks,
> Steve
> -------------------------------------------------
> Steve Stauffer
> Quarantine Officer: Contained Research Facility
> University of California at Davis
> (530) 752-6920 (voice); (530) 754-7757 (fax)
--Boundary_(ID_Zu/UxrVxyA5t/GPPeRmmAQ)
Content-type: text/html; charset=us-ascii
Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT
Be careful Alconox may contain mercury and be an issue for
compliance of your waste water. It is in Massachusetts.
And most of our Hg issues were created by removal of the biomass on
the insides of PVC pipes that contained an accumulation of Hg over
time.
Regards,
Steve Stauffer wrote:
We are looking for someone qualified to clean and certify PVC
piping in a new BSL3-P facility being built on the UC Davis
campus. The construction document specs are as follows:
B. Piping Distribution Cleaning:
1. Cleaning procedure will require the following materials and
equipment:
a. Alconox detergent and 30% hydrogen peroxide cleaning
agents.
b. Circulating pump.
c. Acid resistant tanks of sufficient size to fill all
lines.
d. 1% potassium permanganate testing solution.
e. Balsbough resistivity meter.
2. Procedure:
a. Flush piping system with research grade Type III water to
remove all foreign substances.
b. Connect piping systems to be cleaned to the pump and
tank. Fill the tank with research grade Type III water and
all Alconox 25 grams/gallon.
c. Circulate solution through all research grade piping for
6 hours, bleeding 0.5 gallons from each valve at 2-hour
intervals.
d. Drain system and refill with research grade Type III
water and test resistivity. Repeat procedure until the
return side of each loop conforms to the NCCLS Type III
water specifications.
e. Add hydrogen peroxide (one gallon per five gallons of
system volume) and repeat Procedures C and D.
f. Flush system with fresh research grade Type III water and
test all discharge point with potassium permanganate.
Continue flushing until test shows negative. (A positive
test will show color change from violet to brown.)
g. Drain and fill system including filter housings, pumps,
and storage tanks with fresh research grade water and
proceed to operate entire system.
h. Check water quality until the return side of each loop
conforms to the NCCSL water type of this piping system
Anyone know of a company in our area capable of dealing with this?
Thanks,
Steve
-------------------------------------------------
Steve Stauffer
Quarantine Officer: Contained Research Facility
University of California at Davis
(530) 752-6920 (voice); (530) 754-7757 (fax)
--Boundary_(ID_Zu/UxrVxyA5t/GPPeRmmAQ)--
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 9 Oct 2002 15:10:20 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Doob, Peter (NIDA/IRP)"
Subject: Re: Herpes B Virus Training
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="----_=_NextPart_000_01C26FC7.8311EBC0"
This message is in MIME format. Since your mail reader does not understand
this format, some or all of this message may not be legible.
------_=_NextPart_000_01C26FC7.8311EBC0
Content-Type: text/plain;
charset="iso-8859-1"
Mike
Since I have borrowed freely from many of my brother and sister Biosafty
member web sites over the years, I figure I ought to share my stuff from
time to time. Here is what we use in our Monkey-B training at the National
Institute on Drug Abuse, a tiny cog in the vast NIH wheel. Please share
with me any oversights, omissions, inaccuracies, etc. that you notice. All
it is is repackaged material developed elsewhere, so it may be of limited
utility. Whatever.
Incidentally, I produced these for local inhouse use only, where
only Macaques we have used were Rhesus and pigtails (now Rhesus only).
Among the materials not included above is our arrangement for access
by facilities staff, which we limit to a very small group of specially
trained folks, who may only enter if accompanied by an animal care
staffmember. I apply this access regimen 24/7.
Peter A. Doob, MPH, JD
Chief, Safety and Operations Support Section, ASB
National Institute for Drug Abuse, NIH
Intramural Research Program
5500 Nathan Shock Drive
Baltimore, MD 21224
vc: 410-550-1675
> ----------
> From: Michael Wendeler
> Reply To: A Biosafety Discussion List
> Sent: Wednesday, October 9, 2002 10:58 AM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: Herpes B Virus Training
>
>
> Does anyone know of any "canned" training programs on Herpes B virus for
> researchers working with non-human primate blood, body fluids and
> tissues?
>
> Mike Wendeler
>
>
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Date: Wed, 9 Oct 2002 11:34:14 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "David A. Bunzow"
Subject: Re: Cleaning and certifying piping systems
MIME-Version: 1.0
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I would also advise using H2O2 of a much lower strength.
Steve Stauffer wrote:
> We are looking for someone qualified to clean and certify PVC piping in a new
> BSL3-P facility being built on the UC Davis campus. The construction document
> specs are as follows:
>
> B. Piping Distribution Cleaning:
>
> 1. Cleaning procedure will require the following materials
> and equipment:
>
> a. Alconox detergent and 30% hydrogen peroxide
> cleaning agents.
> b. Circulating pump.
> c. Acid resistant tanks of sufficient size to
> fill all lines.
> d. 1% potassium permanganate testing solution.
> e. Balsbough resistivity meter.
>
> 2. Procedure:
>
> a. Flush piping system with research grade Type
> III water to remove all foreign substances.
> b. Connect piping systems to be cleaned to the
> pump and tank. Fill the tank with research
> grade Type III water and all Alconox 25
> grams/gallon.
> c. Circulate solution through all research grade
> piping for 6 hours, bleeding 0.5 gallons from
> each valve at 2-hour intervals.
> d. Drain system and refill with research grade
> Type III water and test resistivity. Repeat
> procedure until the return side of each loop
> conforms to the NCCLS Type III water
> specifications.
> e. Add hydrogen peroxide (one gallon per five
> gallons of system volume) and repeat Procedures
> C and D.
> f. Flush system with fresh research grade Type
> III water and test all discharge point with
> potassium permanganate. Continue flushing until
> test shows negative. (A positive test will show
> color change from violet to brown.)
> g. Drain and fill system including filter
> housings, pumps, and storage tanks with fresh
> research grade water and proceed to operate
> entire system.
> h. Check water quality until the return side of
> each loop conforms to the NCCSL water type of
> this piping system
>
>
> Anyone know of a company in our area capable of dealing with this?
>
> Thanks,
> Steve
> -------------------------------------------------
> Steve Stauffer
> Quarantine Officer: Contained Research Facility
> University of California at Davis
> (530) 752-6920 (voice); (530) 754-7757 (fax)
--
David A. Bunzow CET; CHMM; NRCC-CHO; REM
University of Alaska
Many Traditions One Alaska
Statewide Office of Risk Management
Environmental, Health and Safety Manager
PO Box 755240
Fairbanks, AK 99775-5240
1-907-474-5005 (phone)
1-907-474-5634 (fax)
sndab1@alaska.edu
alaska.edu/swrisk
Please Note:
The statements, opinions and views expressed
in this communication are mine alone. They
should not be construed as necessarily being
those of the University of Alaska System, or
any of its other employees.
--------------52134B73EEF5C615BBAE7606
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I would also advise using H2O2 of a much lower strength.
Steve Stauffer wrote:
We are looking for someone qualified to clean and certify PVC
piping in a new BSL3-P facility being built on the UC Davis
campus. The construction document specs are as follows:
B. Piping Distribution Cleaning:
1. Cleaning procedure will require the following materials and
equipment:
a. Alconox detergent and 30% hydrogen peroxide cleaning
agents.
b. Circulating pump.
c. Acid resistant tanks of sufficient size to fill all
lines.
d. 1% potassium permanganate testing solution.
e. Balsbough resistivity meter.
2. Procedure:
a. Flush piping system with research grade Type III water to
remove all foreign substances.
b. Connect piping systems to be cleaned to the pump and
tank. Fill the tank with research grade Type III water and
all Alconox 25 grams/gallon.
c. Circulate solution through all research grade piping for
6 hours, bleeding 0.5 gallons from each valve at 2-hour
intervals.
d. Drain system and refill with research grade Type III
water and test resistivity. Repeat procedure until the
return side of each loop conforms to the NCCLS Type III
water specifications.
e. Add hydrogen peroxide (one gallon per five gallons of
system volume) and repeat Procedures C and D.
f. Flush system with fresh research grade Type III water and
test all discharge point with potassium permanganate.
Continue flushing until test shows negative. (A positive
test will show color change from violet to brown.)
g. Drain and fill system including filter housings, pumps,
and storage tanks with fresh research grade water and
proceed to operate entire system.
h. Check water quality until the return side of each loop
conforms to the NCCSL water type of this piping system
Anyone know of a company in our area capable of dealing with this?
Thanks,
Steve
-------------------------------------------------
Steve Stauffer
Quarantine Officer: Contained Research Facility
University of California at Davis
(530) 752-6920 (voice); (530) 754-7757 (fax)
--
David A. Bunzow CET; CHMM; NRCC-CHO; REM
University of Alaska
Many Traditions One Alaska
Statewide Office of Risk Management
Environmental, Health and Safety Manager
PO Box 755240
Fairbanks, AK 99775-5240
1-907-474-5005 (phone)
1-907-474-5634 (fax)
sndab1@alaska.edu
alaska.edu/swrisk
Please Note:
The statements, opinions and views expressed
in this communication are mine alone. They
should not be construed as necessarily being
those of the University of Alaska System, or
any of its other employees.
--------------52134B73EEF5C615BBAE7606--
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 9 Oct 2002 15:22:32 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Andrew Cutz, CIH"
Organization: MFL Occupational Health Centre, Inc.
Subject: Re: Herpes B Virus Training -- Website
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="------------050603040608000402060101"
--------------050603040608000402060101
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Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Joseph Kozlovac,
I am not having luck connecting to this website. Please advise.
Thank you,
Andrew Cutz
______________________________________
Andrew Cutz, CIH
Occupational Hygienist
MFL Occupational Health Centre, Inc.
102 - 275 Broadway
Winnipeg, Manitoba
R3C 4M6 CANADA
Main: (204) 949-0811
Direct: (204) 926-7902
Fax: (204) 956-0848
E-mail: acutz@mflohc.mb.ca
URL:
Joseph P. Kozlovac wrote earlier:
> You might want to check out some of the training programs that NIH has
> put together.
>
>
> At 10:58 AM 10/9/2002 -0400, you wrote:
>
>> Does anyone know of any "canned" training programs on Herpes B virus for
>> researchers working with non-human primate blood, body fluids and
>> tissues?
>>
>> Mike Wendeler
>
> ______________________________________________________________________________
>
> Biological Safety Officer
> Environment, Health, Safety
> SAIC-Frederick
> National Cancer Institute - Frederick
>
> (301)846-1451 fax: (301)846-6619
> email: jkozlovac@mail.
> ______________________________________________________________________________
>
--------------050603040608000402060101
Content-Type: text/html; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Joseph Kozlovac,
I am not having luck connecting to this website. Please advise.
Thank you,
Andrew Cutz
______________________________________
Andrew Cutz, CIH
Occupational Hygienist
MFL Occupational Health Centre, Inc.
102 - 275 Broadway
Winnipeg, Manitoba
R3C 4M6 CANADA
Main: (204) 949-0811
Direct: (204) 926-7902
Fax: (204) 956-0848
E-mail: acutz@mflohc.mb.ca
URL:
Joseph P. Kozlovac wrote earlier:
cite="mid5.1.0.14.2.20021009123635.015ba408@mail."> You
might want to check out some of the training programs that NIH has
put together.
eudora="autourl">
At 10:58 AM 10/9/2002 -0400, you wrote:
Does anyone know of any "canned" training programs on Herpes B
virus for
researchers working with non-human primate blood, body fluids and
tissues?
Mike Wendeler
______________________________________________________________________________
Biological Safety Officer
Environment, Health, Safety
SAIC-Frederick
National Cancer Institute - Frederick
(301)846-1451 fax: (301)846-6619
email: jkozlovac@mail.
______________________________________________________________________________
--------------050603040608000402060101--
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2002 08:31:43 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Lisa Bognar
Subject: Re: Herpes B Virus Training -- Website
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
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I have a faculty member who wants to send out a vial of AMA
antibodies. I can't seem to find information on shipping information
(specifically labeling and shipping description). Can anyone help?
You can respond to me directly.
Lisa
Lisa Bognar, CHMM, CHO
Chemical Safety Specialist
Risk Management and Safety
636 Grace Hall
Notre Dame, IN 46556
Phone: 219-631-5037 Fax: 219-631-8794
email: dahl.2@nd.edu
"The purpose of life is a life of purpose."
--Robert Byrne
--=====================_3300280==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
I have a faculty member who wants to send out a vial of AMA
antibodies. I can't seem to find information on shipping
information (specifically labeling and shipping description). Can
anyone help?
You can respond to me directly.
Lisa
Lisa Bognar, CHMM, CHO
Chemical Safety Specialist
Risk Management and Safety
636 Grace Hall
Notre Dame, IN 46556
Phone: 219-631-5037 Fax: 219-631-8794
email: dahl.2@nd.edu
"The purpose of life is a life of purpose."
--Robert Byrne
--=====================_3300280==_.ALT--
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2002 08:58:28 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Joseph P. Kozlovac"
Subject: Re: Herpes B Virus Training -- Website
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
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boundary="=====================_991484==_.ALT"
--=====================_991484==_.ALT
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Try OLAW's main webpage.. If
you can't access go to NIH's web page at and search for the
office of laboratory animal welfare.
Here is another useful animal care and use site at NIH as well.
At 03:22 PM 10/9/2002 -0500, you wrote:
>Joseph Kozlovac,
>
>I am not having luck connecting to this website. Please advise.
>
>Thank you,
>
>Andrew Cutz
>______________________________________
>Andrew Cutz, CIH
>Occupational Hygienist
>MFL Occupational Health Centre, Inc.
>102 - 275 Broadway
>Winnipeg, Manitoba
>R3C 4M6 CANADA
>
>Main: (204) 949-0811
>Direct: (204) 926-7902
>Fax: (204) 956-0848
>
>E-mail: acutz@mflohc.mb.ca
>URL:
>
>Joseph P. Kozlovac wrote earlier:
>>You might want to check out some of the training programs that NIH has
>>put together.
>>
>>
>>At 10:58 AM 10/9/2002 -0400, you wrote:
>>>Does anyone know of any "canned" training programs on Herpes B virus for
>>>researchers working with non-human primate blood, body fluids and
>>>tissues?
>>>
>>>Mike Wendeler
>>
>>______________________________________________________________________________
>>
>>Biological Safety Officer
>>Environment, Health, Safety
>>SAIC-Frederick
>>National Cancer Institute -
>>Frederick
>>(301)846-1451 fax: (301)846-6619
>>email: jkozlovac@mail.
>>______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
Biological Safety Officer
Environment, Health, Safety
SAIC-Frederick
National Cancer Institute -
Frederick
(301)846-1451 fax: (301)846-6619
email: jkozlovac@mail.
______________________________________________________________________________
--=====================_991484==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
Try OLAW's main
webpage.. If you can't access go to NIH's web page at
and search for the office of laboratory animal welfare.
Here is another useful animal care and use site at NIH as well.
At 03:22 PM 10/9/2002 -0500, you wrote:
Joseph Kozlovac,
I am not having luck connecting to this website. Please advise.
Thank you,
Andrew Cutz
______________________________________
Andrew Cutz, CIH
Occupational Hygienist
MFL Occupational Health Centre, Inc.
102 - 275 Broadway
Winnipeg, Manitoba
R3C 4M6 CANADA
Main: (204) 949-0811
Direct: (204) 926-7902
Fax: (204) 956-0848
E-mail: acutz@mflohc.mb.ca
URL:
Joseph P. Kozlovac wrote earlier:
You might want to check out some of the training programs that
NIH has put together.
At 10:58 AM 10/9/2002 -0400, you wrote:
Does anyone know of any "canned" training programs on Herpes B
virus for
researchers working with non-human primate blood, body fluids
and
tissues?
Mike Wendeler
______________________________________________________________________________
Biological Safety Officer
Environment, Health, Safety
SAIC-Frederick
National Cancer Institute - Frederick
(301)846-1451 fax: (301)846-6619
email: jkozlovac@mail.
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
Biological Safety Officer
Environment, Health, Safety
SAIC-Frederick
National Cancer Institute - Frederick
(301)846-1451 fax: (301)846-6619
email: jkozlovac@mail.
______________________________________________________________________________
--=====================_991484==_.ALT--
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2002 10:11:33 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "OLINGER, PATRICIA L [S&C/0216]"
Subject: Shipping of NHP Materials
MIME-Version: 1.0
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this format, some or all of this message may not be legible.
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Our shipping folks and vets are having a debate. What is the proper
classification for shipping of NHP blood, tissues or organs. Our vets want
it labeled as potentially infected with Herpes B. Our shipping people are
saying no! Not unless KNOWN to be infected.
Please advise.
Patty Olinger
Pharmacia - Kalamazoo Corporate Services - ESH
Biosafety Officer and Chemical Hygiene Officer
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Our shipping folks and vets are having a debate. What is the proper
classification for shipping of NHP blood, tissues or organs. Our
vets want it labeled as potentially infected with Herpes B. Our
shipping people are saying no! Not unless KNOWN to be infected.
size=2>
face=Arial color=#0000ff size=2>Please advise.
face=Arial> face="Times New Roman">Pharmacia -
class=270100914-10102002>and Chemical Hygiene Officer
------_=_NextPart_001_01C27066.9A8D8A1C--
--------------InterScan_NT_MIME_Boundary--
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2002 09:00:05 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Paul Jennette
Subject: Re: Protecting Mechanics who work in BSL3 Facilities
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
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We developed the attached protocol in consultation with the safety reps and
leadership of our in-house trades shops. It hinges on an agreement that we
made with them; they will not be asked (or allowed) to enter a BSL-3
facility without being escorted by one of our biosafety staff. Vouching
for their safety with our presence went a very long way towards gaining
their trust and cooperation. Another good reference on the topic is the
5th Chapter of the Anthology of Biosafety, Volume 2.
Cheers
- Paul
At 12:13 PM 10/9/2002 -0400, you wrote:
>After a near miss, we realize that we need to develop better procedures
>for protecting our mechanics when they respond to our BSL3 lab. Does
>anyone have a written protocol that they'd be willing to share? Thanks in
>advance. - Jean
J. Paul Jennette, P.E.
Biosafety Engineer
Cornell University
College of Veterinary Medicine
Biosafety Program
S3-010 Schurman Hall, Box 4 (607) 253-4227
Ithaca, New York 14853-6401 fax -3723
--=====================_161009859==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
We developed the attached protocol in consultation with the safety
reps and leadership of our in-house trades shops. It hinges on an
agreement that we made with them; they will not be asked (or
allowed) to enter a BSL-3 facility without being escorted by one of
our biosafety staff. Vouching for their safety with our presence
went a very long way towards gaining their trust and cooperation.
Another good reference on the topic is the 5th Chapter of the
Anthology of Biosafety, Volume 2.
Cheers
- Paul
At 12:13 PM 10/9/2002 -0400, you wrote:
After a near miss, we realize that we need to develop better
procedures for protecting our mechanics when they respond to our
BSL3 lab. Does anyone have a written protocol that they'd be
willing to share? Thanks in advance. - Jean
J. Paul Jennette, P.E.
Biosafety Engineer
Cornell University
College of Veterinary Medicine
Biosafety Program
S3-010 Schurman Hall, Box 4 (607) 253-4227
Ithaca, New York 14853-6401 fax -3723
--=====================_161009859==_.ALT--
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=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2002 08:43:47 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Therese M. Stinnett"
Subject: Re: Shipping of NHP Materials
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Is it known OR REASONABLY EXPECTED to contain pathogens?
Any Old World primate should be expected to have Herpes B--because there's
no sure means of ruling it out. Therefor, I would insist (as the biosafety
expert) that you make the final call.
my opinion, only, of course
Therese M. Stinnett
Biosafety Officer
Health and Safety Division
UCHSC, Mailstop C275
4200 E. 9th Avenue
Denver, CO 80262
Voice: 303-315-6754
Pager: 303-266-5402
Fax: 303-315-8026
email: therese.stinnett@uchsc.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2002 11:25:33 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: David Griffith
Organization: The University of Western Ontario
Subject: Re: Shipping of NHP Materials
MIME-Version: 1.0
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Hi Patty,
Since most couriers follow IATA regulations I will answer your question
using them. IATA rules state that for risk group four items you must
ship them as an infectious shipment if there is even a slight chance
that the organism is present. That means that if you have wild caught
or exposed to wild caught NHP you will need to ship as an infectious
shipment.
Dave
PS Fedex will not take RG4 infectious shipments.
OLINGER, PATRICIA L [S&C/0216] wrote:
>
> Our shipping folks and vets are having a debate. What is the proper
> classification for shipping of NHP blood, tissues or organs. Our vets
> want it labeled as potentially infected with Herpes B. Our shipping
> people are saying no! Not unless KNOWN to be infected.
>
> Please advise.
>
> Patty Olinger
> Pharmacia - Kalamazoo Corporate Services - ESH
> Biosafety Officer and Chemical Hygiene Officer
>
>
>
>
>
--------------030400060109090808050103
Content-Type: text/html; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Hi Patty,
Since most couriers follow IATA regulations I will answer your
question using them. IATA rules state that for risk group four
items you must ship them as an infectious shipment if there is even
a slight chance that the organism is present. That means that if
you have wild caught or exposed to wild caught NHP you will need to
ship as an infectious shipment.
Dave
PS Fedex will not take RG4 infectious shipments.
OLINGER, PATRICIA L [S&C/0216] wrote:
cite="midEBF49D1F55C6D349AFBE297CAC238A5218BDB66A@uskzoms025.uskzo.am.">
color="#0000ff" size="2">Our shipping folks and vets are having a
debate. What is the proper classification for shipping of NHP
blood, tissues or organs. Our vets want it labeled as potentially
infected with Herpes B. Our shipping people are saying no! Not
unless KNOWN to be infected.
face="Arial" color="#0000ff" size="2">Please advise.
face="Arial"> face="Script MT Bold">Patty Olinger
Pharmacia - Kalamazoo Corporate Services - ESH
class="270100914-10102002">and Chemical Hygiene Officer
--------------030400060109090808050103--
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2002 11:14:25 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Mike Durham
Subject: Policy on Select Agents.
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We are upgrading our program to comply with the new requirements of the =
Bioterrorism Law and working in anticipation of new guidelines to be =
issued later. We are considering a new policy on institutional control =
of select agent use. Does anyone have a policy that has been recently =
developed or upgraded that they are satisfied with and willing to share? =
If so, please respond to me offline at mdurham@lsu.edu.
Mike Durham
LSU
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We are upgrading our program to comply = with the new
requirements of the Bioterrorism Law and working in anticipation of
new guidelines to be issued later. We are considering a new
policy on = institutional control of select agent use. Does
anyone have a policy that has been = recently developed or
upgraded that they are satisfied with and willing to share? = If
so, href=3D"mailto:mdurham@lsu.edu">mdurham@lsu.edu.
Mike Durham
LSU
------=_NextPart_000_013C_01C2704E.31736000--
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2002 09:33:42 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Karen E.S. Shaw"
Subject: Re: Shipping of NHP Materials
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
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boundary="=====================_376273062==_.ALT"
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Patty,
Be careful: "unless KNOWN to be infected" is very different from "known NOT to
contain pathogens". The vets are more knowledgable regarding the material's
hazards.
Karen
At 10:11 AM 10/10/02 -0400, you wrote:
>
>
> Our shipping folks and vets are having a debate. What is the proper
> classification for shipping of NHP blood, tissues or organs. Our vets want
> it labeled as potentially infected with Herpes B. Our shipping people are
> saying no! Not unless KNOWN to be infected.
>
> Please advise.
>
> Patty Olinger
> Pharmacia - Kalamazoo Corporate Services - ESH
> Biosafety Officer and Chemical Hygiene Officer
>
>
>
*******************************
Karen E.S. Shaw
Center for Comparative Medicine
County Rd 98 and Hutchison Dr
University of California, Davis
Davis, CA 95616
(530) 752-1561
(530) 752-7914 fax
Facilities Coordinator
kesshaw@ucdavis.edu
--=====================_376273062==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
Patty,
Be careful: "unless KNOWN to be infected" is very different from
"known NOT to contain pathogens". The vets are more knowledgable
regarding the material's hazards.
Karen
At 10:11 AM 10/10/02 -0400, you wrote:
Our shipping folks and vets are having a debate. What is the
proper classification for shipping of NHP blood, tissues or
organs. Our vets want it labeled as potentially infected with
Herpes B. Our shipping people are saying no! Not unless KNOWN to
be infected.
Please advise.
Patty Olinger
Pharmacia - Kalamazoo Corporate Services - ESH
Biosafety Officer and Chemical Hygiene Officer
*******************************
Karen E.S. Shaw
Center for Comparative Medicine
County Rd 98 and Hutchison Dr
University of California, Davis
Davis, CA 95616
(530) 752-1561
(530) 752-7914 fax
Facilities Coordinator
kesshaw@ucdavis.edu
--=====================_376273062==_.ALT--
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2002 13:46:56 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Robert N. Latsch"
Subject: Re: Shipping of NHP Materials
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
This is one of those conflicting regulation problems.
The VETs are appyling universal precautions. Since they do not know it is
there one must assume that it can be there and act appropriately. Correct
Shipping people are trained to label accurately. We cannot say that it is
there unless we know it is there. Also correct
There was a proposed rule that would allow one to declare that there may be
a hazard.
I have never seen the final rule.
SO to ship this item, it cannot be sent as a hazardous material since we do
not know that Herpes B is present.
Is there another hazard to address?
I recommend,
Do not ship as a hazardous material.
Include an accurate shipping description on the outside and the inside of
the package. I like redundancy.
Pack the item as though it is a hazardous material, but do not use HM outer
packaging. Use double sealed inner packages.
Bob
> Our shipping folks and vets are having a debate. What is the
>proper classification for shipping of NHP blood, tissues or organs. Our
>vets want it labeled as potentially infected with Herpes B. Our shipping
>people are saying no! Not unless KNOWN to be infected. Please advise.
>
>Patty Olinger
>Pharmacia - Kalamazoo Corporate Services - ESH
>Biosafety Officer and Chemical Hygiene Officer
>
>
>
>
_____________________________________________________________________
__ / _____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2002 13:56:26 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Doob, Peter (NIDA/IRP)"
Subject: Re: Policy on Select Agents.
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
We will be giving select agents same treatment that we give USNRC and
DEA-controlled items. A single shipping/receiving point, authorized users,
approved protocols, cradle to grave inventory, etc. Don't have a writeup at
this point. Interested in hearing whether anyone else is doing similarly.
Pete
PS=
Discussion of insurance implications of select agent use might be an
interesting ABSA meeting small group item, no? The Fed self-insures, so we
don't feel your pain.
Peter A. Doob, MPH, JD
Chief, Safety and Operations Support Section, ASB
National Institute for Drug Abuse, NIH
Intramural Research Program
5500 Nathan Shock Drive
Baltimore, MD 21224
vc: 410-550-1675
> ----------
> From: Mike Durham
> Reply To: A Biosafety Discussion List
> Sent: Thursday, October 10, 2002 12:14 PM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: Policy on Select Agents.
>
> We are upgrading our program to comply with the new requirements of the
> Bioterrorism Law and working in anticipation of new guidelines to be
> issued later. We are considering a new policy on institutional control of
> select agent use. Does anyone have a policy that has been recently
> developed or upgraded that they are satisfied with and willing to share?
> If so, please respond to me offline at mdurham@lsu.edu.
>
> Mike Durham
> LSU
>
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2002 14:08:06 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Marcham, Cheri"
Subject: Animals and carcinogens
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Not quite _biosafety_ but close, and I know most of you also have other
related duties - where would I find facility requirements for housing
animals administered carcinogens (IP) that may excrete excess
carcinogenic materials? I've looked at NIH's Research Laboratory Design
Policy and their Vivarium Design Policy. Any other ideas?
Cheri Marcham, CIH, CSP, CHMM
Environmental Health and Safety Officer
The University of Oklahoma City Health Sciences Center
P. O. Box 26901 ROB-301
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73120
405/271-3000
FAX 405/271-1606
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2002 12:15:08 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Margaret Stalker
Subject: Listserve talk
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Sandy...thought this from our list serve might be of interest...sounds like what
you feared might be the direction of the future...central shipping/receiving.
"Doob, Peter (NIDA/IRP)" wrote:
> We will be giving select agents same treatment that we give USNRC and
> DEA-controlled items. A single shipping/receiving point, authorized users,
> approved protocols, cradle to grave inventory, etc. Don't have a writeup at
> this point. Interested in hearing whether anyone else is doing similarly.
>
> Pete
>
> PS=
> Discussion of insurance implications of select agent use might be an
> interesting ABSA meeting small group item, no? The Fed self-insures, so we
> don't feel your pain.
>
> Peter A. Doob, MPH, JD
> Chief, Safety and Operations Support Section, ASB
> National Institute for Drug Abuse, NIH
> Intramural Research Program
> 5500 Nathan Shock Drive
> Baltimore, MD 21224
> vc: 410-550-1675
>
> > ----------
> > From: Mike Durham
> > Reply To: A Biosafety Discussion List
> > Sent: Thursday, October 10, 2002 12:14 PM
> > To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> > Subject: Policy on Select Agents.
> >
> > We are upgrading our program to comply with the new requirements of the
> > Bioterrorism Law and working in anticipation of new guidelines to be
> > issued later. We are considering a new policy on institutional control of
> > select agent use. Does anyone have a policy that has been recently
> > developed or upgraded that they are satisfied with and willing to share?
> > If so, please respond to me offline at mdurham@lsu.edu.
> >
> > Mike Durham
> > LSU
> >
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2002 15:15:02 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Petuch, Brian R."
Subject: Re: Animals and carcinogens
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Lawrence Livermore National Labs had a carcinogen risk assessment document
on the web. While it delt with lab risk assessment, some of the criteria
might help with animal waste.
Brian Petuch
Biological Pilot Plant
Safety / Regulatory Operations
Merck Research Labs
WP17-301
West Point, PA 19486-0004
Office 215-652-4039
Fax 215-993-4911
pager 800-759-8888 pin 1380162
-----Original Message-----
From: Marcham, Cheri [mailto:Cheryl-Marcham@OUHSC.EDU]
Sent: Thursday, October 10, 2002 3:08 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Animals and carcinogens
Not quite _biosafety_ but close, and I know most of you also have other
related duties - where would I find facility requirements for housing
animals administered carcinogens (IP) that may excrete excess
carcinogenic materials? I've looked at NIH's Research Laboratory Design
Policy and their Vivarium Design Policy. Any other ideas?
Cheri Marcham, CIH, CSP, CHMM
Environmental Health and Safety Officer
The University of Oklahoma City Health Sciences Center
P. O. Box 26901 ROB-301
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73120
405/271-3000
FAX 405/271-1606
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notice: This e-mail message, together with any attachments, contains information
of Merck & Co., Inc. (Whitehouse Station, New Jersey, USA) that may be
confidential, proprietary copyrighted and/or legally privileged, and is intended
solely for the use of the individual or entity named on this message. If you
are not the intended recipient, and have received this message in error, please
immediately return this by e-mail and then delete it.
=============================================================================
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2002 12:26:13 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Karen E.S. Shaw"
Subject: Re: Shipping of NHP Materials
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Let's face it. It's less time-consuming and less expensive (and less
frustrating) to ship material as diagnostic than to ship material as
infectious - at least until February.
"Diagnostic specimens with a low probability of containing pathogens in
Risk Groups 2 or 3" is packaged according to Packing instructions 650
(IATA) - diagnostic.
"Diagnostic specimens known not to contain pathogens in Risk Groups 2, 3 or
4" is not restricted. I can't think of much that falls under this
definition when it comes to blood, etc..
"Diagnostic specimens known or reasonably expected to contain pathogens in
Risk Groups 2, 3 or 4 and those where a relatively low probability exists
that pathogens of risk group 4 are present. See Infecious substance,
affecting humans (UN2814) or Infectious substance, affecting animals
(UN2900)" - Infectious, not diagnostic (Packing instructions 602).
The question is how to interpret Herpes B in relationship to "reasonably
expected to contain" or "low probability". The recent exchanges regarding
Herpes B training materials certainly give the impression that there is a
clear and obvious risk to handling NHP material, but, for shipping purposes
based on the above choices, what level do we use?
Karen
At 01:46 PM 10/10/02 -0400, you wrote:
>This is one of those conflicting regulation problems.
>
>The VETs are appyling universal precautions. Since they do not know it is
>there one must assume that it can be there and act appropriately. Correct
>
>Shipping people are trained to label accurately. We cannot say that it is
>there unless we know it is there. Also correct
>
>There was a proposed rule that would allow one to declare that there may be
>a hazard.
>
>I have never seen the final rule.
>
>SO to ship this item, it cannot be sent as a hazardous material since we do
>not know that Herpes B is present.
>
>Is there another hazard to address?
>
>I recommend,
>
>Do not ship as a hazardous material.
>Include an accurate shipping description on the outside and the inside of
>the package. I like redundancy.
>Pack the item as though it is a hazardous material, but do not use HM outer
>packaging. Use double sealed inner packages.
>
>Bob
>
>> Our shipping folks and vets are having a debate. What is the
>>proper classification for shipping of NHP blood, tissues or organs. Our
>>vets want it labeled as potentially infected with Herpes B. Our shipping
>>people are saying no! Not unless KNOWN to be infected. Please advise.
>>
>>Patty Olinger
>>Pharmacia - Kalamazoo Corporate Services - ESH
>>Biosafety Officer and Chemical Hygiene Officer
>>
>>
>>
>>
>
>
>
>_____________________________________________________________________
>__ / _____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
>_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
> \ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
> \ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
> \__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2002 13:33:50 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Therese M. Stinnett"
Subject: Re: Animals and carcinogens
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
what a timely question!
this is one of the responsibilities of the IACUC--presumably in concert =
with
any other safety committees; if you have a chemical hygiene program, it
should be addressed in concert with that program and subject matter =
expert;
it is important to know if the carcinogen is water soluble (then it =
will be
excreted in the urine) or not; is there a potential for respiratory
excretion? how does it break down in the animal? should the carcass be
considered contaminated? what is the dosage going to work out to be in
terms of ppm or equivalent measures?
the PI should be able to do a risk assessment, by incorporating the =
info
from the MSDS plus any other manufacturer's info, plus the science =
behind
the treatment, to determine what potential exposures exist; they should =
have
some idea of the "pharmaco"- or chemical kinetics of the materials they =
are
using
then you can determine the risk of contamination of bedding, cages,
personnel exposures and PPE and so on
Therese M. Stinnett
Biosafety Officer
Health and Safety Division
UCHSC, Mailstop C275
4200 E. 9th Avenue
Denver, CO=A0 80262
Voice:=A0 303-315-6754
Pager:=A0 303-266-5402
Fax:=A0 303-315-8026
email:=A0 therese.stinnett@uchsc.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2002 15:36:58 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Isabel Jean Goldberg
Subject: Re: Animals and carcinogens
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
Content-transfer-encoding: 7bit
Cheri - for most of this type of research (IP carcinogens), we house animals
in a standard animal room that has negative pressure room and 100% exhaust.
Animals on hazardous materials protocols are housed separately from other
animals. On our webpage, I've posted an example of a protocol involving
hazardous chemicals (see
) If you
need additional info, let me know. - Jean
----- Original Message -----
From: "Marcham, Cheri"
To:
Sent: Thursday, October 10, 2002 3:08 PM
Subject: Animals and carcinogens
> Not quite _biosafety_ but close, and I know most of you also have other
> related duties - where would I find facility requirements for housing
> animals administered carcinogens (IP) that may excrete excess
> carcinogenic materials? I've looked at NIH's Research Laboratory Design
> Policy and their Vivarium Design Policy. Any other ideas?
>
> Cheri Marcham, CIH, CSP, CHMM
> Environmental Health and Safety Officer
> The University of Oklahoma City Health Sciences Center
> P. O. Box 26901 ROB-301
> Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73120
> 405/271-3000
> FAX 405/271-1606
>
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 11 Oct 2002 07:15:51 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: mike miller
Subject: Re: Shipping of NHP Materials
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; format=flowed
Infectious can be known by: testing, suspected by reasonable
probability, or suspected by subject
matter expert. DOT has recently issued a final rule on infectious
substances and diagnostic
specimens. I would suggest reading it -
. If this is a
Federal, State,local or Indian tribal government agency that want to ship,
utilize the forensic material exception.
Contrary to an earlier comment, FedEx will accept infectious materials
regardless of the RG. They will not accept body parts (regardless of hazard
class)- human for sure - unclear as to whether or not they'll accept NHP.
This is written into their contract with everyone that uses
FedEx. Do not rely on the folks the man the hotline for exact answers.
They ready info. off of a screen that is an electronic version of the IATA
Manual. Speaking with legal counsel is worth the effort or even a DG
specialist in Memphis.
Good Luck.
Michael E. Miller, MHS, CIH
Industrial Hygiene and Safety Manager
FBI, Laboratory Division
memiller@fbiacademy.edu
>From: "Robert N. Latsch"
>Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
>To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
>Subject: Re: Shipping of NHP Materials
>Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2002 13:46:56 -0400
>
>This is one of those conflicting regulation problems.
>
>The VETs are appyling universal precautions. Since they do not know it is
>there one must assume that it can be there and act appropriately. Correct
>
>Shipping people are trained to label accurately. We cannot say that it is
>there unless we know it is there. Also correct
>
>There was a proposed rule that would allow one to declare that there may be
>a hazard.
>
>I have never seen the final rule.
>
>SO to ship this item, it cannot be sent as a hazardous material since we do
>not know that Herpes B is present.
>
>Is there another hazard to address?
>
>I recommend,
>
>Do not ship as a hazardous material.
>Include an accurate shipping description on the outside and the inside of
>the package. I like redundancy.
>Pack the item as though it is a hazardous material, but do not use HM outer
>packaging. Use double sealed inner packages.
>
>Bob
>
> > Our shipping folks and vets are having a debate. What is the
> >proper classification for shipping of NHP blood, tissues or organs. Our
> >vets want it labeled as potentially infected with Herpes B. Our shipping
> >people are saying no! Not unless KNOWN to be infected. Please advise.
> >
> >Patty Olinger
> >Pharmacia - Kalamazoo Corporate Services - ESH
> >Biosafety Officer and Chemical Hygiene Officer
> >
> >
> >
> >
>
>
>
>_____________________________________________________________________
>__ /
>_____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
>_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
> \ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
> \ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental
>Safety
> \__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
_________________________________________________________________
Chat with friends online, try MSN Messenger:
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 11 Oct 2002 10:39:53 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Elaine Broussard
Subject: Re: USA PATRIOT Act fallout
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
And another...
:-) E
-----Original Message-----
From: Robin Newberry [mailto:wnewber@CLEMSON.EDU]
Sent: Wednesday, October 09, 2002 5:31 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: USA PATRIOT Act fallout
>FYI...
>
>Our Notification database has been classified by the Department of Defense
>as SECRET, basically to protect information that links possessed agents to
>specific facilities or persons.
Machs nix. One of our concerns was that, as a state agency, state law
requires that once this data was gathered it is required to be
available to the public via a FOIA request. Maybe not the form itself
(or photocopies thereof) but any internal communications/data sets
used to create the form are fair game.
--
Robin
--------------------------------------------------------------
W. Robert Newberry, IV CIH, CHMM
Chief Environmental Health and Safety Officer
Clemson University
wnewber@clemson.edu ehs@clemson.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 11 Oct 2002 14:10:04 -1000
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Hubert B Olipares
Subject: Estimated Cost
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII
This is a vague question but, does anyone have reference or estimated cost
to build an "average" life science building, with both instructional and
research space?
==============================================================================
Hubert B. Olipares, RBP, MSPH, MT(ASCP), MT(NCA)
Biological Safety Professional
University of Hawaii
Environmental Health and Safety Office
Biological Safety Program
2040 East-West Road
Honolulu, Hawaii 96822-2022
Telephone: 808-956-3197
Fax: 808-956-3205
Biosafety Prgm. E-mail: biosafe@hawaii.edu
Personnel E-Mail: olipares@hawaii.edu
Biosafety Website:
==============================================================================
=========================================================================
Date: Sun, 13 Oct 2002 16:57:53 EDT
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ed Krisiunas
Subject: Plum Island Security
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="part1_143.569fc7.2adb3851_boundary"
--part1_143.569fc7.2adb3851_boundary
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="US-ASCII"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Security Questioned at Disease Lab
By FRANK ELTMAN
.c The Associated Press
GARDEN CITY, N.Y. (AP) - A strike by maintenance workers at a sensitive
government laboratory enters its third month this weekend, and a U.S. senator
is raising concern that replacement workers may pose a security risk.
Sen. Hillary Rodham Clinton, D-N.Y., demanded the parties reach a settlement
to end the walkout at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center, which studies
highly contagious illnesses like foot-and-mouth disease.
``I've called on the U.S. Department of Agriculture to facilitate a
resolution so that the security and safety of Plum Island does not depend on
temporary workers,'' Clinton said in a statement Friday.
She wrote to Agriculture Secretary Ann Veneman last month claiming some
workers hired as replacements for strikers may not have received proper
background checks or drug screenings. She said the island ``stores many
agents that could be used in bioterrorism if they fell into the wrong hands.''
A one-time Army base, the 850-acre island off eastern Long Island is the only
testing and diagnosis center for dangerous animal diseases in the United
States. No testing on human diseases is performed.
Workers walked out Aug. 13 after rejecting an offer from LB&B Associates Inc.
of Baltimore, which operates the center on a government contract. The two
sides met last week with a federal mediator; another session was scheduled
Tuesday.
LB&B's 76 Plum Island workers provide support services including the
operation, maintenance and repair of the power plant, buildings and grounds,
waste disposal and a marine fleet.
LB&B chief operating officer Ed Brandon said Friday he did not want to
negotiate in the media, but a company spokesman previously described the
walkout as ``a pretty classic case of an economic strike.''
The dispute is over wages and benefits, retroactive pay and whether
replacement workers should remain on the payroll once a settlement is reached.
Gerard Devine, a spokesman for Local 30, International Union of Operating
Engineers, said LB&B was ``being completely unreasonable. I think they do not
want to settle the contract and I think they have the backing of the USDA.''
He said LB&B wants 32 replacement workers kept on staff as part of any
settlement. ``Some of the replacement workers haven't even started working
there yet,'' he said. ``How can you call them replacement workers?''
Sandy Miller-Hays, a spokeswoman for the USDA's Agricultural Research
Service, said the USDA had no role in the negotiations and that the strike
has had little effect on operations.
Since the walkout, there have been two ferryboat accidents involving a
replacement worker. LB&B maintains the ferry operator was experienced and
qualified.
An FBI spokesman said the agency investigated a suspicious drop in water
pressure at the laboratory in August, and that any potential hazard had been
contained.
Clinton noted in her letter to Veneman that a van taken by replacement
workers on Sept. 8 with the permission of Plum Island officials was never
returned.
``This is a red flag that security at the island can easily be breached,''
she said.
Plum Island became a USDA research center in the early 1950s after flare-ups
of foot-and-mouth disease in Mexico and Canada. The disease was officially
eradicated in the United States in 1929. It remains common in other parts of
the world.
10/13/02 09:42 EDT
Copyright 2002 The Associated Press. The information contained in the AP news
report may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or otherwise distributed
without the prior written authority of The Associated Press. All active
hyperlinks have been inserted by AOL.
Regards,
Edward Krisiunas, MT(ASCP), CIC, MPH
President
WNWN International
PO Box 1164
Burlington, Connecticut
06013
860-675-1217
860-675-1311(fax)
860-944-2373(mobile)
--part1_143.569fc7.2adb3851_boundary
Content-Type: text/html; charset="US-ASCII"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Security Questioned at Disease Lab
By FRANK ELTMAN
.c The Associated Press
GARDEN CITY, N.Y. (AP) - A strike by maintenance workers at a
sensitive government laboratory enters its third month this weekend,
and a U.S. senator is raising concern that replacement workers may
pose a security risk.
Sen. Hillary Rodham Clinton, D-N.Y., demanded the parties reach a
settlement to end the walkout at the Plum Island Animal Disease
Center, which studies highly contagious illnesses like
foot-and-mouth disease.
``I've called on the U.S. Department of Agriculture to facilitate a
resolution so that the security and safety of Plum Island does not
depend on temporary workers,'' Clinton said in a statement Friday.
She wrote to Agriculture Secretary Ann Veneman last month claiming
some workers hired as replacements for strikers may not have
received proper background checks or drug screenings. She said the
island ``stores many agents that could be used in bioterrorism if
they fell into the wrong hands.''
A one-time Army base, the 850-acre island off eastern Long Island is
the only testing and diagnosis center for dangerous animal diseases
in the United States. No testing on human diseases is performed.
Workers walked out Aug. 13 after rejecting an offer from LB&B
Associates Inc. of Baltimore, which operates the center on a
government contract. The two sides met last week with a federal
mediator; another session was scheduled Tuesday.
LB&B's 76 Plum Island workers provide support services including the
operation, maintenance and repair of the power plant, buildings and
grounds, waste disposal and a marine fleet.
LB&B chief operating officer Ed Brandon said Friday he did not want
to negotiate in the media, but a company spokesman previously
described the walkout as ``a pretty classic case of an economic
strike.''
The dispute is over wages and benefits, retroactive pay and whether
replacement workers should remain on the payroll once a settlement
is reached.
Gerard Devine, a spokesman for Local 30, International Union of
Operating Engineers, said LB&B was ``being completely unreasonable.
I think they do not want to settle the contract and I think they
have the backing of the USDA.''
He said LB&B wants 32 replacement workers kept on staff as part of
any settlement. ``Some of the replacement workers haven't even
started working there yet,'' he said. ``How can you call them
replacement workers?''
Sandy Miller-Hays, a spokeswoman for the USDA's Agricultural
Research Service, said the USDA had no role in the negotiations and
that the strike has had little effect on operations.
Since the walkout, there have been two ferryboat accidents involving
a replacement worker. LB&B maintains the ferry operator was
experienced and qualified.
An FBI spokesman said the agency investigated a suspicious drop in
water pressure at the laboratory in August, and that any potential
hazard had been contained.
Clinton noted in her letter to Veneman that a van taken by
replacement workers on Sept. 8 with the permission of Plum Island
officials was never returned.
``This is a red flag that security at the island can easily be
breached,'' she said.
Plum Island became a USDA research center in the early 1950s after
flare-ups of foot-and-mouth disease in Mexico and Canada. The
disease was officially eradicated in the United States in 1929. It
remains common in other parts of the world.
10/13/02 09:42 EDT
Copyright 2002 The Associated Press. The information contained in
the AP news report may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or
otherwise distributed without the prior written authority of The
Associated Press. All active hyperlinks have been inserted by AOL.
Regards,
Edward Krisiunas, MT(ASCP), CIC, MPH
President
WNWN International
PO Box 1164
Burlington, Connecticut
06013
860-675-1217
860-675-1311(fax)
860-944-2373(mobile)
--part1_143.569fc7.2adb3851_boundary--
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 14 Oct 2002 08:18:44 -0400
Reply-To: ekrisiunas@
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ed Krisiunas
Subject: Article: The Specter of a New and Deadlier Smallpox
This article from
has been sent to you by ekrisiunas@.
In the NY Times Editorial page today.
Ed Krisiunas
ekrisiunas@
The Specter of a New and Deadlier Smallpox
October 14, 2002
By RICHARD PRESTON
The United States government is working to create a
stockpile of smallpox vaccine. But will it work against a
biologically engineered smallpox?
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=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 14 Oct 2002 09:08:40 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Sharron A Daly
Subject: Re: Estimated Cost
In-Reply-To:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII
I'm currently involved with a couple of building remodel/expansion
projects at our University ... the architects are using $75/square foot
for remodeled lab space and $95/square foot for new/build-out space.
Sharron Daly
University of WI - Milwaukee
On Fri, 11 Oct 2002, Hubert B Olipares wrote:
> This is a vague question but, does anyone have reference or estimated cost
> to build an "average" life science building, with both instructional and
> research space?
>
>
>
===============================================================================
>
> Hubert B. Olipares, RBP, MSPH, MT(ASCP), MT(NCA)
> Biological Safety Professional
> University of Hawaii
> Environmental Health and Safety Office
> Biological Safety Program
> 2040 East-West Road
> Honolulu, Hawaii 96822-2022
> Telephone: 808-956-3197
> Fax: 808-956-3205
> Biosafety Prgm. E-mail: biosafe@hawaii.edu
> Personnel E-Mail: olipares@hawaii.edu
> Biosafety Website:
>
>
===============================================================================
>
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 14 Oct 2002 09:08:44 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Andrew J Bartel
Organization: Department of Biological Sciences
Subject: Re: Estimated Cost
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Our engineers estimate between $400 & $500 per square foot for laboratory
space in the state of Alaska. Construction costs tend to be higher here,
and they told us that a smiliar facility in the lower 48 would cost more
along $200 to $300 per square foot. Seems like you're getting a bargain at
$75/$95. (or we're being robbed...) :o)
> > > > > > > > > > >
Andrew J Bartel
Laboratory Manager
Department of Biological Sciences
University of Alaska Anchorage
Science Bldg. 243
3211 Providence Drive
Anchorage AK 99508
(907)786-1268 voice
(907)786-1148 fax
ajb@uaa.alaska.edu
----- Original Message -----
From: "Sharron A Daly"
To:
Sent: Monday, October 14, 2002 6:08 AM
Subject: Re: Estimated Cost
> I'm currently involved with a couple of building remodel/expansion
> projects at our University ... the architects are using $75/square foot
> for remodeled lab space and $95/square foot for new/build-out space.
>
> Sharron Daly
> University of WI - Milwaukee
>
>
>
> On Fri, 11 Oct 2002, Hubert B Olipares wrote:
>
> > This is a vague question but, does anyone have reference or estimated
cost
> > to build an "average" life science building, with both instructional and
> > research space?
> >
> >
> >
===========================================================================
===
> >
> > Hubert B. Olipares, RBP, MSPH, MT(ASCP), MT(NCA)
> > Biological Safety Professional
> > University of Hawaii
> > Environmental Health and Safety Office
> > Biological Safety Program
> > 2040 East-West Road
> > Honolulu, Hawaii 96822-2022
> > Telephone: 808-956-3197
> > Fax: 808-956-3205
> > Biosafety Prgm. E-mail: biosafe@hawaii.edu
> > Personnel E-Mail: olipares@hawaii.edu
> > Biosafety Website:
> >
> >
===========================================================================
===
> >
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 14 Oct 2002 11:30:56 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Therese M. Stinnett"
Subject: Re: USA PATRIOT Act fallout
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
I would certainly want to check with legal counsel for any state agency =
or
academic institution. It is my understanding that there can be a work
product exclusion invoked. I don't know the legalese for it.
Therese M. Stinnett
Biosafety Officer
Health and Safety Division
UCHSC, Mailstop C275
4200 E. 9th Avenue
Denver, CO=A0 80262
Voice:=A0 303-315-6754
Pager:=A0 303-266-5402
Fax:=A0 303-315-8026
email:=A0 therese.stinnett@uchsc.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 14 Oct 2002 13:52:12 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Lori Keen
Subject: Re: Estimated Cost
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
We built a new 4 story facility about 4 years ago with both instructional labs
and research labs for biology and chemistry. Our cost was about $180/sqft.
I might add that he basement level includes a state-of the art animal facility
(no primates) so that may have driven the cost up a bit - the mechanical systems
for that facility alone are amazing.
Lori Keen
Lab Manager, Biology
Calvin College
616-957-6080
Member NAOSMM
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 14 Oct 2002 13:03:17 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "David A. Bunzow"
Subject: Re: Estimated Cost
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Sharron and others:
That figure will not even build a minimum home dwelling, let alone a life
sciences
building. Even if it is all offices and no labs (teaching or research), you're
likely in the $200 - $300 psf range to get a building that is minimum code
complient
and environmentally inhabitable/comfortable.
Sharron A Daly wrote:
> I'm currently involved with a couple of building remodel/expansion
> projects at our University ... the architects are using $75/square foot
> for remodeled lab space and $95/square foot for new/build-out space.
>
> Sharron Daly
> University of WI - Milwaukee
>
> On Fri, 11 Oct 2002, Hubert B Olipares wrote:
>
> > This is a vague question but, does anyone have reference or estimated cost
> > to build an "average" life science building, with both instructional and
> > research space?
> >
> >
> >
===============================================================================
> >
> > Hubert B. Olipares, RBP, MSPH, MT(ASCP), MT(NCA)
> > Biological Safety Professional
> > University of Hawaii
> > Environmental Health and Safety Office
> > Biological Safety Program
> > 2040 East-West Road
> > Honolulu, Hawaii 96822-2022
> > Telephone: 808-956-3197
> > Fax: 808-956-3205
> > Biosafety Prgm. E-mail: biosafe@hawaii.edu
> > Personnel E-Mail: olipares@hawaii.edu
> > Biosafety Website:
> >
> >
===============================================================================
> >
--
David A. Bunzow CET; CHMM; NRCC-CHO; REM
University of Alaska
Many Traditions One Alaska
Statewide Office of Risk Management
Environmental, Health and Safety Manager
PO Box 755240
Fairbanks, AK 99775-5240
1-907-474-5005 (phone)
1-907-474-5634 (fax)
sndab1@alaska.edu
alaska.edu/swrisk
Please Note:
The statements, opinions and views expressed
in this communication are mine alone. They
should not be construed as necessarily being
those of the University of Alaska System, or
any of its other employees.
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 14 Oct 2002 15:51:31 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Judy Pointer
Subject: Re: Estimated Cost
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="=_570BCC95.5B3A55E4"
This is a MIME message. If you are reading this text, you may want to
consider changing to a mail reader or gateway that understands how to
properly handle MIME multipart messages.
--=_570BCC95.5B3A55E4
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
I think the $ figure for the last large Biomedical Sciences Research
Bld. that we built at MD Anderson (completed ~ 1997-98) was $275/sq ft.
There were cost overruns of course - so the end result was more than
this amount. This building was mainly BSL2 labs, no class rooms and had
animal facilities in the basement. The animal facilities were higher $.
It had interstitial floors - every 3rd floor - (where no lab work was
done) that contained the HVAC and other maintenance operations. I
remember that I was told that it was cheaper to build a new building
than remodel an old one to accomplish state-of-the-art in lab space. So
the older buildings were back-filled as administrative space.
Judy Pointer, MS, CBSP
University Biosafety Officer
Office of Research Protection
UNM School of Medicine
BMSB B77
915 Camino de Salud NE
Albuquerque, NM 87131-5196
(505) 272-8001
(505) 272-0803 (Fax)
>>> sndab1@ALASKA.EDU 10/14/02 03:03PM >>>
Sharron and others:
That figure will not even build a minimum home dwelling, let alone a
life sciences
building. Even if it is all offices and no labs (teaching or
research), you're
likely in the $200 - $300 psf range to get a building that is minimum
code complient
and environmentally inhabitable/comfortable.
Sharron A Daly wrote:
> I'm currently involved with a couple of building remodel/expansion
> projects at our University ... the architects are using $75/square
foot
> for remodeled lab space and $95/square foot for new/build-out space.
>
> Sharron Daly
> University of WI - Milwaukee
>
> On Fri, 11 Oct 2002, Hubert B Olipares wrote:
>
> > This is a vague question but, does anyone have reference or
estimated cost
> > to build an "average" life science building, with both
instructional and
> > research space?
> >
> >
> >
==============================================================================
> >
> > Hubert B. Olipares, RBP, MSPH, MT(ASCP), MT(NCA)
> > Biological Safety Professional
> > University of Hawaii
> > Environmental Health and Safety Office
> > Biological Safety Program
> > 2040 East-West Road
> > Honolulu, Hawaii 96822-2022
> > Telephone: 808-956-3197
> > Fax: 808-956-3205
> > Biosafety Prgm. E-mail: biosafe@hawaii.edu
> > Personnel E-Mail: olipares@hawaii.edu
> > Biosafety Website:
> >
> >
==============================================================================
> >
--
David A. Bunzow CET; CHMM; NRCC-CHO; REM
University of Alaska
Many Traditions One Alaska
Statewide Office of Risk Management
Environmental, Health and Safety Manager
PO Box 755240
Fairbanks, AK 99775-5240
1-907-474-5005 (phone)
1-907-474-5634 (fax)
sndab1@alaska.edu
alaska.edu/swrisk
Please Note:
The statements, opinions and views expressed
in this communication are mine alone. They
should not be construed as necessarily being
those of the University of Alaska System, or
any of its other employees.
--=_570BCC95.5B3A55E4
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
I think the $ figure for the last large Biomedical Sciences Research
Bld. that we built at MD Anderson (completed ~ 1997-98) was $275/sq
ft. There were cost overruns of course - so the end result was more
than this amount. This building was mainly BSL2 labs, no class
rooms and had animal facilities in the basement. The animal
facilities were higher $. It had interstitial floors - every 3rd
floor - (where no lab work was done) that contained the HVAC and
other maintenance operations. I remember that I was told that it
was cheaper to build a new building than remodel an old one to
accomplish state-of-the-art in lab space. So the older buildings
were back-filled as administrative space.
Judy Pointer, MS, CBSP
University Biosafety Officer
Office of Research Protection
UNM School of Medicine
BMSB B77
915 Camino de Salud NE
Albuquerque, NM 87131-5196
(505) 272-8001
(505) 272-0803 (Fax)
>>> sndab1@ALASKA.EDU 10/14/02 03:03PM >>>
Sharron and others:
That figure will not even build a minimum home dwelling, let alone a
life sciences
building. Even if it is all offices and no labs (teaching or
research), you're
likely in the $200 - $300 psf range to get a building that is
minimum code complient
and environmentally inhabitable/comfortable.
Sharron A Daly wrote:
> I'm currently involved with a couple of building remodel/expansion
> projects at our University ... the architects are using $75/square
foot
> for remodeled lab space and $95/square foot for new/build-out
space.
>
> Sharron Daly
> University of WI - Milwaukee
>
> On Fri, 11 Oct 2002, Hubert B Olipares wrote:
>
> > This is a vague question but, does anyone have reference or
estimated cost
> > to build an "average" life science building, with both
instructional and
> > research space?
> >
> >
> >
==============================================================================
> >
> > Hubert B. Olipares, RBP, MSPH, MT(ASCP), MT(NCA)
> > Biological Safety Professional
> > University of Hawaii
> > Environmental Health and Safety Office
> > Biological Safety Program
> > 2040 East-West Road
> > Honolulu, Hawaii 96822-2022
> > Telephone: 808-956-3197
> > Fax: 808-956-3205
> > Biosafety Prgm. E-mail: biosafe@hawaii.edu
> > Personnel E-Mail: olipares@hawaii.edu
> > Biosafety
href="">
> >
> >
==============================================================================
> >
--
David A. Bunzow CET; CHMM; NRCC-CHO; REM
University of Alaska
Many Traditions One Alaska
Statewide Office of Risk Management
Environmental, Health and Safety Manager
PO Box 755240
Fairbanks, AK 99775-5240
1-907-474-5005
href="">alaska.edu/swrisk
Please Note:
The statements, opinions and views expressed
in this communication are mine alone. They
should not be construed as necessarily being
those of the University of Alaska System, or
any of its other employees.
--=_570BCC95.5B3A55E4--
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 15 Oct 2002 13:29:40 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Carl Pike
Subject: shipping antibodies from overseas
In-Reply-To:
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; format=flowed; charset=us-ascii
can someone advise me if any permits are required (CDC or APHIS) to
import an antibody (produced in rabbits) because they are an "animal
product"? thanks
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 15 Oct 2002 10:30:46 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "DWAN (Donald Wang)"
Subject: Re: shipping antibodies from overseas
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
You will need an importation permit from APHIS. Go to their web site:
you can apply
online. Expect at least 6 weeks to receive your permit.
-----Original Message-----
From: Carl Pike [mailto:carl.pike@FANDM.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, October 15, 2002 10:30 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: shipping antibodies from overseas
can someone advise me if any permits are required (CDC or APHIS) to
import an antibody (produced in rabbits) because they are an "animal
product"? thanks
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 15 Oct 2002 11:08:57 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Sue Quinn
Subject: Isofluorane use and pregnancy
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="----=_NextPart_000_004E_01C2743B.41F28320"
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------=_NextPart_000_004E_01C2743B.41F28320
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charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Is there a prevailing opinion regarding the use of isofluorane for =
rodent anesthesia by pregnant workers? The MSDS doesn't provide much =
info and my gut reaction is that it would knock her out before it would =
cause her(or the baby) harm, but I would like to hear from others if =
there are opinions out there.
Thanks!
Sue
Suzanne M. Quinn
Senior Manager, Environmental Health and Safety
Exelixis, Inc.
PO Box 511
South San Francisco, CA 94083-0511
------=_NextPart_000_004E_01C2743B.41F28320
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charset="iso-8859-1"
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Is there a prevailing opinion = regarding the use of isofluorane
for rodent anesthesia by pregnant workers? The = MSDS doesn't
provide much info and my gut reaction is that it would knock her =
out before it would cause her(or the baby) harm, but I would like
to hear = from others if there are opinions out there.
Thanks!
Sue
Suzanne M. Quinn
Senior Manager, = Environmental Health and Safety
Exelixis, Inc.
PO Box 511
South San = Francisco, CA 94083-0511
------=_NextPart_000_004E_01C2743B.41F28320--
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 15 Oct 2002 15:34:36 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Dodge, Janice"
Subject: Re: Isofluorane use and pregnancy
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="----_=_NextPart_001_01C27481.E4ED8610"
This message is in MIME format. Since your mail reader does not understand
this format, some or all of this message may not be legible.
------_=_NextPart_001_01C27481.E4ED8610
Content-Type: text/plain;
charset="iso-8859-1"
Be sure and research this by getting information from NIOSH. Studies show
that spontaneous abortion rates are higher for women with occupational
exposure to isofluorane (halothane).
Janice Dodge
Sr. Environmental Health and Safety Specialist
Biological Safety Office
644-8916
jddodge@admin.fsu.edu
-----Original Message-----
From: Sue Quinn [mailto:squinn@]
Sent: Tuesday, October 15, 2002 2:09 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Isofluorane use and pregnancy
Is there a prevailing opinion regarding the use of isofluorane for rodent
anesthesia by pregnant workers? The MSDS doesn't provide much info and my
gut reaction is that it would knock her out before it would cause her(or the
baby) harm, but I would like to hear from others if there are opinions out
there.
Thanks!
Sue
Suzanne M. Quinn
Senior Manager, Environmental Health and Safety
Exelixis, Inc.
PO Box 511
South San Francisco, CA 94083-0511
------_=_NextPart_001_01C27481.E4ED8610
Content-Type: text/html;
charset="iso-8859-1"
Be sure and research this by getting information from NIOSH.
Studies show that spontaneous abortion rates are higher for women
with occupational exposure to isofluorane (halothane).
Janice Dodge
Sr. size=2>644-8916
jddodge@admin.fsu.edu
size=2>-----Original Message-----
From: Sue Quinn [mailto:squinn@]
Sent: Tuesday, October 15, 2002 2:09 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Isofluorane use and pregnancy
Is there a prevailing opinion regarding the use of isofluorane for
rodent anesthesia by pregnant workers? The MSDS doesn't provide
much info and my gut reaction is that it would knock her out before
it would cause her(or the baby) harm, but I would like to hear from
others if there are opinions out there.
Thanks!
Sue
Suzanne M. Quinn
Senior Manager, Environmental Health and Safety
Exelixis, Inc.
PO Box 511
South San Francisco, CA 94083-0511
------_=_NextPart_001_01C27481.E4ED8610--
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 15 Oct 2002 16:36:42 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Michael Wendeler
Organization: Incyte Genomics
Subject: Non-Biosafety Question about NMR
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="------------07DB2D31A541645FAD1A46C7"
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--------------07DB2D31A541645FAD1A46C7
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
I have a non-biosafety question, but since so many of the folks on here
are skilled in other aspects of safety I thought I give this a shot.
We want to put an oxygen sensor in our NMR lab in case there is a quench
and for when the magnet has to be filled with liquid N2.
Does anyone have any information on whether it's better to use an O2
monitor for the entire room, or to use a personal O2 for the person
working in the room or doing the filling?
Mike Wendeler
Incyte Genomics
Newark, DE
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 15 Oct 2002 16:33:45 -0500
Reply-To: speaker@ehs.psu.edu
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Curt Speaker
Organization: UNIVERSITY SAFETY
Subject: Re: Non-Biosafety Question about NMR
In-Reply-To:
Mike:
If you are going to use an area O2 monitor, be sure to mount it at
about waist level of the shortest person who enters the room. That
way, if you start to displace oxygen out of the room, you have some
room for error. If you mount it at face level, you get essentially no
warning before you run out of breathable air.
I think area O2 monitors work just fine, if the above caveat is
considered.
my $0.02
Curt
Curt Speaker
Biosafety Officer
Penn State University
Environmental Health and Safety
speaker@ehs.psu.edu
^...^
(O_O)
=(Y)=
"""
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 15 Oct 2002 14:51:06 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Dina Sassone
Subject: Re: Non-Biosafety Question about NMR
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
Mysuggestion: Use an O2 monitor for the room, and place it near the fill
point. You may want more than one, and you may want to have it be a
general alarm that alerts others, especially if the fill is done by one
person alone in the room. Make sure you calibrate it regularly, and do a
performance check regularly. The other thing you may want to do is a worse
case calculation, based on the amount of N2 that could be released, the
room volume/ventilation (air changes per hour)-to see if you would even get
to an oxygen deficiency. This calculation can help you decide if there is
an acceptable risk, or to help drive engineering controls, such as increase
in air changes/hour or relocating large dewars outside.
At 04:36 PM 10/15/2002 -0400, you wrote:
>I have a non-biosafety question, but since so many of the folks on here
>are skilled in other aspects of safety I thought I give this a shot.
>We want to put an oxygen sensor in our NMR lab in case there is a quench
>and for when the magnet has to be filled with liquid N2.
>Does anyone have any information on whether it's better to use an O2
>monitor for the entire room, or to use a personal O2 for the person
>working in the room or doing the filling?
>
>Mike Wendeler
>Incyte Genomics
>Newark, DE
Dina M. Sassone, CIH, CSP, SM (NRM)
University of California
Los Alamos National Laboratory
HSR-5
MS K486
Los Alamos, NM 87545
(505) 665-2977 (voice)
((505) 996-3807 (pager)
"To infinity and beyond"-Buzz Lightyear
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 16 Oct 2002 09:34:22 +1000
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Peter.LeBlancSmith@CSIRO.AU
Subject: Re: Non-Biosafety Question about NMR
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
The following may be useful.
Peter Le Blanc Smith
Biocontainment Microbiologist
CSIRO Livestock Industries
Australian Animal Health Laboratory (AAHL)
Private Bag 24
Geelong Vic 3220
Australia
Ph: +61 3 5227 5451
Fax: +61 3 5227 5555
E-mail address. Peter.LeBlancSmith@csiro.au
-----Original Message-----
From: Michael Wendeler [mailto:wendeler@]
Sent: Wednesday, 16 October 2002 6:37 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Non-Biosafety Question about NMR
I have a non-biosafety question, but since so many of the folks on here
are skilled in other aspects of safety I thought I give this a shot.
We want to put an oxygen sensor in our NMR lab in case there is a quench
and for when the magnet has to be filled with liquid N2.
Does anyone have any information on whether it's better to use an O2
monitor for the entire room, or to use a personal O2 for the person
working in the room or doing the filling?
Mike Wendeler
Incyte Genomics
Newark, DE
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 16 Oct 2002 08:10:17 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Doob, Peter (NIDA/IRP)"
Subject: Re: Isofluorane use and pregnancy
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Jan=
If memory serves, isoflurane is not halothane. It is another halogenated
hydrocarbon anesthetic agent, but was introduced as a safer alter native to
halothane.
NIOSH is a great place to look for waste anesthetic gas toxicity
information. They published in this area some years ago, and have issued
alert items more recently. At the time of their initial involement, nitrous
oxide had been implicated in miscarriages of women who worked in operating
rooms who had been exposed to waste N2O, as well as in wives of male
operating room workers similarly exposed.
We use downdraft tables at NIDA for scavenging isoflurane, even though we
believe it to be considerably less problematic than halothane.
=Pete
Peter A. Doob, MPH, JD
Chief, Safety and Operations Support Section, ASB
National Institute for Drug Abuse, NIH
Intramural Research Program
5500 Nathan Shock Drive
Baltimore, MD 21224
vc: 410-550-1675
SLTC/wasteanestheticgases/
NEWSLETTERS/1999/07_99/Waste_0799.html
ehs.unc.edu/manuals/HSMManual/Chapter5html/h5-05.htm
professional/Position/waste.htm
LinksAnestheticGas.htm
> ----------
> From: Dodge, Janice
> Reply To: A Biosafety Discussion List
> Sent: Tuesday, October 15, 2002 3:34 PM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: Re: Isofluorane use and pregnancy
>
> Be sure and research this by getting information from NIOSH. Studies show
> that spontaneous abortion rates are higher for women with occupational
> exposure to isofluorane (halothane).
>
>
> Janice Dodge
> Sr. Environmental Health and Safety Specialist
> Biological Safety Office
> 644-8916
> jddodge@admin.fsu.edu
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Sue Quinn [mailto:squinn@]
> Sent: Tuesday, October 15, 2002 2:09 PM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: Isofluorane use and pregnancy
>
>
> Is there a prevailing opinion regarding the use of isofluorane for
> rodent anesthesia by pregnant workers? The MSDS doesn't provide much info
> and my gut reaction is that it would knock her out before it would cause
> her(or the baby) harm, but I would like to hear from others if there are
> opinions out there.
>
> Thanks!
> Sue
>
> Suzanne M. Quinn
> Senior Manager, Environmental Health and Safety
> Exelixis, Inc.
> PO Box 511
> South San Francisco, CA 94083-0511
>
>
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 16 Oct 2002 07:17:25 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Jill Hyslop Bohling
Subject: Jill Hyslop-Bohling/UNLusrv/UNL/UNEBR is out of the office.
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
I will be out of the office starting 10/16/2002 and will not return until
10/25/2002.
I will respond to your message when I return.
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 16 Oct 2002 08:31:56 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Morris, Gary"
Subject: Re: Non-Biosafety Question about NMR
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Mike,
Place the O2 sensor in the room. Most monitoring systems permit multiple
sensor points. As such, you might consider placing one near the point of
operation and one near the doorway. The system will probably require
periodic callibration, both internally and by the manufacturer's rep.
Also, if possible, locate any N2/process shut off valves outside the room so
that you don't have to enter the room to shut the valve off under alarm/leak
conditions.
Contact you N2 supplier. They have technical reps who can help answer
questions and can calculate the expected O2 concentration based on the room
volume, air exchange and max N2 volume.
Gary Morris, MS, CIH, CSP
Wellstat Biologics
-----Original Message-----
From: Michael Wendeler [mailto:wendeler@]
Sent: Tuesday, October 15, 2002 4:37 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Non-Biosafety Question about NMR
I have a non-biosafety question, but since so many of the folks on here
are skilled in other aspects of safety I thought I give this a shot.
We want to put an oxygen sensor in our NMR lab in case there is a quench
and for when the magnet has to be filled with liquid N2.
Does anyone have any information on whether it's better to use an O2
monitor for the entire room, or to use a personal O2 for the person
working in the room or doing the filling?
Mike Wendeler
Incyte Genomics
Newark, DE
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 16 Oct 2002 09:19:21 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Michael Wendeler
Organization: Incyte Genomics
Subject: Another O2 Monitoring Question
MIME-Version: 1.0
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--------------58CF9331365706C6AACBF791
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Can anyone recommend some manufacturers of oxygen monitoring systems for
NMR labs?
Mike Wendeler
Incyte Genomics
Newark, DE
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 16 Oct 2002 09:22:09 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Morris, Gary"
Subject: Re: Another O2 Monitoring Question
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
I'm partial to MSA.
-----Original Message-----
From: Michael Wendeler [mailto:wendeler@]
Sent: Wednesday, October 16, 2002 9:19 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Another O2 Monitoring Question
Can anyone recommend some manufacturers of oxygen monitoring systems for
NMR labs?
Mike Wendeler
Incyte Genomics
Newark, DE
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 16 Oct 2002 10:40:53 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ed Gaunt
Subject: Notification Reminder
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Just a friendly reminder that this past Friday (Oct 11) was the USDA
deadline for returning Notification forms.
If you still have forms or postcards that have not been returned, and do not
want to get a FINAL NOTICE of non-compliance, please get these forms to us
by this Friday AM, because we are taking a final snapshot of non-responders
at 5:00 PM and will be mailing out notices on Monday, 10/21 (while everyone
is at ABSA). There are still a BUNCH of folks who have not responded!!
Ed Gaunt
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 16 Oct 2002 10:56:44 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Barry D. Cohen, MPH, CBSP"
Subject: Re: Isofluorane use and pregnancy
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Peter is correct.
Metaphane is a commercial name for generic methoxyflurane.
Fluothane is a commercial name for generic halothane.
Forane is a commercial name for generic isoflurane.
Check out this link for more information.
Isoflurane is the gas of choice, but still requires
monitoring.
Regards,
Barry D. Cohen, MPH, CBSP
Director, Environmental Health and Safety
Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc.
195 Albany Street
Cambridge, MA 02139
(V): 617/613-4385
(F): 617/613-4492
(E): bcohen@
"Doob, Peter (NIDA/IRP)" wrote:
>
> Jan=
>
> If memory serves, isoflurane is not halothane. It is another halogenated
> hydrocarbon anesthetic agent, but was introduced as a safer alter native to
> halothane.
>
> NIOSH is a great place to look for waste anesthetic gas toxicity
> information. They published in this area some years ago, and have issued
> alert items more recently. At the time of their initial involement, nitrous
> oxide had been implicated in miscarriages of women who worked in operating
> rooms who had been exposed to waste N2O, as well as in wives of male
> operating room workers similarly exposed.
>
> We use downdraft tables at NIDA for scavenging isoflurane, even though we
> believe it to be considerably less problematic than halothane.
>
> =Pete
>
> Peter A. Doob, MPH, JD
> Chief, Safety and Operations Support Section, ASB
> National Institute for Drug Abuse, NIH
> Intramural Research Program
> 5500 Nathan Shock Drive
> Baltimore, MD 21224
> vc: 410-550-1675
>
> SLTC/wasteanestheticgases/
> NEWSLETTERS/1999/07_99/Waste_0799.html
> ehs.unc.edu/manuals/HSMManual/Chapter5html/h5-05.htm
> professional/Position/waste.htm
> LinksAnestheticGas.htm
> > ----------
> > From: Dodge, Janice
> > Reply To: A Biosafety Discussion List
> > Sent: Tuesday, October 15, 2002 3:34 PM
> > To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> > Subject: Re: Isofluorane use and pregnancy
> >
> > Be sure and research this by getting information from NIOSH. Studies show
> > that spontaneous abortion rates are higher for women with occupational
> > exposure to isofluorane (halothane).
> >
> >
> > Janice Dodge
> > Sr. Environmental Health and Safety Specialist
> > Biological Safety Office
> > 644-8916
> > jddodge@admin.fsu.edu
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Sue Quinn [mailto:squinn@]
> > Sent: Tuesday, October 15, 2002 2:09 PM
> > To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> > Subject: Isofluorane use and pregnancy
> >
> >
> > Is there a prevailing opinion regarding the use of isofluorane for
> > rodent anesthesia by pregnant workers? The MSDS doesn't provide much info
> > and my gut reaction is that it would knock her out before it would cause
> > her(or the baby) harm, but I would like to hear from others if there are
> > opinions out there.
> >
> > Thanks!
> > Sue
> >
> > Suzanne M. Quinn
> > Senior Manager, Environmental Health and Safety
> > Exelixis, Inc.
> > PO Box 511
> > South San Francisco, CA 94083-0511
> >
> >
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 16 Oct 2002 11:02:44 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Francis Churchill
Subject: Re: Isofluorane use and pregnancy
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed"
We have used the sample badges for anesthetic gasses found in Lab
Safety Supply (Chem Express) to quantify the exposures. Great
turn-around and repeatable so everybody feels more comfortable that
exposure levels are very low.
Francis
--
Francis Churchill
University of Vermont - Environmental Safety Facility
667 Spear Street, UVM, Burlington, VT 05405-3010
(802) 656-5405
Francis.Churchill@uvm.edu
"Show me pollution and I'll show you a subsidy." Robert F Kennedy Jr
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 16 Oct 2002 11:27:56 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Doob, Peter (NIDA/IRP)"
Subject: Re: Isofluorane use and pregnancy
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Agree, Francis. Badges are nice for getting an integrated dose estimate.
Our doses have never been near the applicable limits as long as the
engineering control used was effective.
At NIDA, we use MIRAN to sample during first run of a new procedure
involving halogenated anesthetic gases. We use the device in "Geiger
counter" mode so that the operating staff can tell what they were doing
when/if the scavenger fails to adequately control the emissions. Then they
modify to achieve the desired control.
Peter A. Doob, MPH, JD
Chief, Safety and Operations Support Section, ASB
National Institute for Drug Abuse, NIH
Intramural Research Program
5500 Nathan Shock Drive
Baltimore, MD 21224
vc: 410-550-1675
> ----------
> From: Francis Churchill
> Reply To: A Biosafety Discussion List
> Sent: Wednesday, October 16, 2002 11:02 AM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: Re: Isofluorane use and pregnancy
> Importance: High
>
> We have used the sample badges for anesthetic gasses found in Lab
> Safety Supply (Chem Express) to quantify the exposures. Great
> turn-around and repeatable so everybody feels more comfortable that
> exposure levels are very low.
>
> Francis
> --
> Francis Churchill
> University of Vermont - Environmental Safety Facility
> 667 Spear Street, UVM, Burlington, VT 05405-3010
> (802) 656-5405
> Francis.Churchill@uvm.edu
>
> "Show me pollution and I'll show you a subsidy." Robert F Kennedy Jr
>
>
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 16 Oct 2002 15:03:17 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Michael Wendeler
Organization: Incyte Genomics
Subject: Courier Services
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="------------F3F7D00D07CCCF8821DA5EA0"
This is a multi-part message in MIME format.
--------------F3F7D00D07CCCF8821DA5EA0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
I am looking into a courier service to transport some monkey tissue from
a collaborator to our facility. The service I want to use says that
they are qualified to handle the transport of hazardous materials. Is
there any documentation I should get from them to verify that?
Mike Wendeler
EH&S Engineer
Incyte Genomics
Newark, DE
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 16 Oct 2002 16:33:00 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Michael Wendeler
Organization: Incyte Genomics
Subject: More on courier services
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="------------4253E5AE5B17D29610B4E01B"
This is a multi-part message in MIME format.
--------------4253E5AE5B17D29610B4E01B
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Does anyone know of any courier services that are qualified to transport
infectious substances and are located in the Philadelphia, South Jersey
or Delaware areas?? I'm having a heck of a time finding any via the
web.
Mike Wendeler
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 16 Oct 2002 14:20:59 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Chris Carlson
Subject: Re: Y.pestis - avirulent strain
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="============_-1177319220==_ma============"
--============_-1177319220==_ma============
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed"
Hi Gerry - We have been known to report what we know, when we know it
(hypothetically of course). You could send a note to the CDC
outlining just what you said below.
I believe that you and the IBC still have the authority to determine
biosafety containment levels, based on the risk assessment.
Registration is not the same as declaring agreement with the BS level.
Chris
>Hypothetical situation (ahem): During this notification process we
>find that one of our researchers has Y. pestis in his lab. We
>report it, of course. Although the registration process (the old
>regs.) is for transfer and receiving not possession of agents, we
>find that this agent was brought to the facility after the effective
>date of the law (4/97). Do we go through the registration process
>now for something we already possess. The complicating factor is
>that this strain of Y. pestis is avirulent - it is missing the
>virulence plasmid which is required to cause infection and according
>to the researcher it is considered safe to work with it at BSL2.
>The organism is listed as BSL3 though and the researcher does not
>have a BSL3 facility to work in. Anyone have any experience with
>this situation or advice on registering? Thanks in advance,
>
>
--
******************************************************************************
Chris Carlson
Biosafety Officer, CBSP (ABSA)
Office of Environment, Health & Safety
317 University Hall - #1150
University of California
Berkeley, CA 94720-1150
phone: (510) 643-6562
e-mail: ccarlson@uclink4.berkeley.edu
fax: (510) 643-7595
******************************************************************************
Visit our Web Site at
******************************************************************************
--============_-1177319220==_ma============
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
blockquote, dl, ul, ol, li { padding-top: 0 ; padding-bottom: 0 }
-->
Hi Gerry - We have been known to report what we know, when we know
it (hypothetically of course). You could send a note to the CDC
outlining just what you said below.
I believe that you and the IBC still have the authority to
determine biosafety containment levels, based on the risk
assessment. Registration is not the same as declaring agreement with
the BS level.
Chris
size="-1">Hypothetical situation (ahem): During this notification
process we find that one of our researchers has Y. pestis in his
lab. We report it, of course. Although the registration process
(the old regs.) is for transfer and receiving not possession of
agents, we find that this agent was brought to the facility after
the effective date of the law (4/97). Do we go through the
registration process now for something we already possess. The
complicating factor is that this strain of Y. pestis is avirulent -
it is missing the virulence plasmid which is required to cause
infection and according to the researcher it is considered safe to
work with it at BSL2. The organism is listed as BSL3 though and the
researcher does not have a BSL3 facility to work in. Anyone have
any experience with this situation or advice on registering? Thanks
in advance,
size="-1">
--
>*********
Chris Carlson
Biosafety Officer, CBSP (ABSA)
Office of Environment, Health & Safety
> 317 University Hall - #1150
University of California
Berkeley, CA 94720-1150
phone: (510) 643-6562
e-mail: ccarlson@uclink4.berkeley.edu
fax: (510) 643-7595
>*********
> Visit our Web Site at
>*********
--============_-1177319220==_ma============--
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 17 Oct 2002 07:52:09 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Kim Auletta
Subject: Re: Another O2 Monitoring Question
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
We purchased the Biosystems O2 monitor with the A/V alarms for our NMR
rooms. Its in the Fisher (best price) catalog. No metal parts, etc to
interfer with the magnets.
Kim Auletta
Lab Safety Specialist
Environmental Health and Safety
SUNY Stony Brook
110 Suffolk Hall
Stony Brook, NY 11794-6200
phone: 631-632-9672
fax: 631-632-9683
email: kauletta@.sunysb.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 17 Oct 2002 08:05:12 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Kim Auletta
Subject: Re: Isofluorane use and pregnancy
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Get the badges directly from Assay Technology () and
save bunches of money over the lab safety catalog!
Kim Auletta
Lab Safety Specialist
Environmental Health and Safety
SUNY Stony Brook
110 Suffolk Hall
Stony Brook, NY 11794-6200
phone: 631-632-9672
fax: 631-632-9683
email: kauletta@.sunysb.edu
Francis Churchill
cc:
Sent by: A Subject: Re: Isofluorane use and
pregnancy
Biosafety
Discussion List
10/16/2002 11:02
AM
Please respond to
A Biosafety
Discussion List
We have used the sample badges for anesthetic gasses found in Lab
Safety Supply (Chem Express) to quantify the exposures. Great
turn-around and repeatable so everybody feels more comfortable that
exposure levels are very low.
Francis
--
Francis Churchill
University of Vermont - Environmental Safety Facility
667 Spear Street, UVM, Burlington, VT 05405-3010
(802) 656-5405
Francis.Churchill@uvm.edu
"Show me pollution and I'll show you a subsidy." Robert F Kennedy Jr
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 17 Oct 2002 08:12:34 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Bernholc, Nicole M"
Subject: Re: Another O2 Monitoring Question
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Pay attention to the sensor life. We found some have a very short life and
the experimenters dismantled them .
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 17 Oct 2002 09:25:47 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Gerry Griffin
Subject: Re: Y.pestis - avirulent strain
In-Reply-To:
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="----=_NextPart_000_000C_01C275BF.2CE2A750"
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------=_NextPart_000_000C_01C275BF.2CE2A750
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charset="us-ascii"
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Thanks for your reply. I did send a note to the CDC and they confirmed
that it could be handled at BSL2 but would still need to be registered.
Researcher decided it wasn't worth the hassle and autoclaved what he had
(wasn't currently using it anyway and would need the virulent strain as
well for future work.).
-----Original Message-----
From: A Biosafety Discussion List [mailto:BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU] On
Behalf Of Chris Carlson
Sent: Wednesday, October 16, 2002 5:21 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Y.pestis - avirulent strain
Hi Gerry - We have been known to report what we know, when we know it
(hypothetically of course). You could send a note to the CDC outlining
just what you said below.
I believe that you and the IBC still have the authority to determine
biosafety containment levels, based on the risk assessment. Registration
is not the same as declaring agreement with the BS level.
Chris
Hypothetical situation (ahem): During this notification process we find
that one of our researchers has Y. pestis in his lab. We report it, of
course. Although the registration process (the old regs.) is for
transfer and receiving not possession of agents, we find that this agent
was brought to the facility after the effective date of the law (4/97).
Do we go through the registration process now for something we already
possess. The complicating factor is that this strain of Y. pestis is
avirulent - it is missing the virulence plasmid which is required to
cause infection and according to the researcher it is considered safe to
work with it at BSL2. The organism is listed as BSL3 though and the
researcher does not have a BSL3 facility to work in. Anyone have any
experience with this situation or advice on registering? Thanks in
advance,
--
************************************************************************
******
Chris Carlson
Biosafety Officer, CBSP (ABSA)
Office of Environment, Health & Safety
317 University Hall - #1150
University of California
Berkeley, CA 94720-1150
phone: (510) 643-6562
e-mail: ccarlson@uclink4.berkeley.edu
fax: (510) 643-7595
************************************************************************
******
Visit our Web Site at
************************************************************************
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 17 Oct 2002 09:28:05 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Schlank, Bliss M"
Subject: Animal Allergens
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Does anyone know of a good video on the prevention of exposure to animal
allergens?
> Biosafety Manager
> OW Basement
> 1800 Concord Pike
> Wilmington, DE 19850
> Phone: 302.886.2185
> Fax: 302.886.2909
> Cell #: 302.218.5306
> email: bliss.schlank@
>
>
>
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 17 Oct 2002 09:55:31 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Harriet Izenberg
Subject: Re: new DOT security proposal?
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
I will be out of the office Oct 17-25 returning Oct 25. Please call
215-898-4453 if you need immediate assistance during my absence.
Harriet Izenberg, RBP
Institutional Biosafety Officer
EHRS/UPENN
3160 Chestnut Street, Suite 400
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6287
215.898.6236 (Phone)
215.898.0140 (FAX)
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 17 Oct 2002 08:14:30 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Heather Jutila
Organization: Genentech, Inc.
Subject: Re: Isofluorane use and pregnancy
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii; x-mac-type="54455854";
x-mac-creator="4D4F5353"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
We have also done quite a few exposure assessments with the isoflurane
badges by AT Labs, and they work well especially since the research
barely notices them. If you can in your exposure assessment, capture
the researcher re-filling the isoflurane reservoir as we found that this
action can be a significant exposure if done improperly.
Heather
Francis Churchill wrote:
> We have used the sample badges for anesthetic gasses found in Lab
> Safety Supply (Chem Express) to quantify the exposures. Great
> turn-around and repeatable so everybody feels more comfortable that
> exposure levels are very low.
>
> Francis
> --
> Francis Churchill
> University of Vermont - Environmental Safety Facility
> 667 Spear Street, UVM, Burlington, VT 05405-3010
> (802) 656-5405
> Francis.Churchill@uvm.edu
>
> "Show me pollution and I'll show you a subsidy." Robert F Kennedy Jr
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 17 Oct 2002 11:02:14 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "OLINGER, PATRICIA L [S&C/0216]"
Subject: Re: Animal Allergens
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
While we're on that subject. Does anyone have a "newletter" type article
that they would be willing to share? :-)
Thanks,
Patty Olinger
Pharmacia - Kalamazoo R&D
Biosafety and Chemical Hygiene
-----Original Message-----
From: Schlank, Bliss M [mailto:bliss.schlank@]
Sent: Thursday, October 17, 2002 9:28 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Animal Allergens
Does anyone know of a good video on the prevention of exposure to animal
allergens?
> Biosafety Manager
> OW Basement
> 1800 Concord Pike
> Wilmington, DE 19850
> Phone: 302.886.2185
> Fax: 302.886.2909
> Cell #: 302.218.5306
> email: bliss.schlank@
>
>
>
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 17 Oct 2002 12:33:16 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Michelle DeStefano
Subject: Re: More on courier services
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Hi Mike,
We always use Airborne Express to transport infectious substances and I know
that they service the areas you mentioned. While this is a delivery service
vs. a courier service, it certainly should meet your needs. Their personnel
are required to have "Haz-Mat" training. They will provide the mailing
forms for this as well and if you phone them, they will expedite the
process. (I'm sure that you are well aware of the regulations regarding
training for shipping of hazardous items!).
Hope that this helps!
Michelle
At 04:33 PM 10/16/2002 -0400, you wrote:
>Does anyone know of any courier services that are qualified to transport
>infectious substances and are located in the Philadelphia, South Jersey
>or Delaware areas?? I'm having a heck of a time finding any via the
>web.
>
>Mike Wendeler
Michelle DeStefano, CBSP
Laboratory Supervisor
CNY Research Corp
800 Irving Ave
Syracuse, NY 13212
email: destefam@
phone: (315) 477-4597
fax: (315) 476-5348
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 17 Oct 2002 16:15:23 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Robin Newberry
Subject: Flavobacteria
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed"
Can somewone point me to a good (preferably online) resource about
Flavobacteria. I'm particularly interested in Flavobacteria in the
indoor (non-hospital) environment.
--
Robin
--------------------------------------------------------------
W. Robert Newberry, IV CIH, CHMM
Chief Environmental Health and Safety Officer
Clemson University
wnewber@clemson.edu ehs@clemson.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 18 Oct 2002 07:31:23 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Lindsey Kayman
Subject: Re: Animal Allergens
In-Reply-To:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="0-578061128-1034951483=:64058"
--0-578061128-1034951483=:64058
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
There are lots of resources for a newsletter article at:
Lindsey Kayman
"OLINGER, PATRICIA L [S&C/0216]" wrote:While
we're on that subject. Does anyone have a "newletter" type article
that they would be willing to share? :-)
Thanks,
Patty Olinger
Pharmacia - Kalamazoo R&D
Biosafety and Chemical Hygiene
-----Original Message-----
From: Schlank, Bliss M [mailto:bliss.schlank@]
Sent: Thursday, October 17, 2002 9:28 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Animal Allergens
Does anyone know of a good video on the prevention of exposure to animal
allergens?
> Biosafety Manager
> OW Basement
> 1800 Concord Pike
> Wilmington, DE 19850
> Phone: 302.886.2185
> Fax: 302.886.2909
> Cell #: 302.218.5306
> email: bliss.schlank@
>
>
>
---------------------------------
Do you Yahoo!?
Faith Hill - Exclusive Performances, Videos, & more
faith.
--0-578061128-1034951483=:64058
Content-Type: text/html; charset=us-ascii
There are lots of resources for a newsletter article at:
Lindsey Kayman
"OLINGER, PATRICIA L [S&C/0216]"
<patricia.l.olinger@> wrote:
While we're on that subject. Does anyone have a "newletter" type
articlethat they would be willing to share? :-)Thanks,Patty
OlingerPharmacia - Kalamazoo R&DBiosafety and Chemical
Hygiene-----Original Message-----From: Schlank, Bliss M
[mailto:bliss.schlank@]Sent: Thursday, October 17, 2002 9:28
AMTo: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDUSubject: Animal AllergensDoes
anyone know of a good video on the prevention of exposure to
animalallergens?> Biosafety Manager> OW Basement>
1800 Concord Pike> Wilmington, DE 19850> Phone:
302.886.2185> Fax: 302.886.2909> Cell #: 302.218.5306>
email:
bliss.schlank@>>>Do you Yahoo!?
Faith Hill - Exclusive Performances,
Videos, & more
faith.
--0-578061128-1034951483=:64058--
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 18 Oct 2002 11:05:25 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Katrina Doolittle
Organization: NMSU Environmental Health & Safety
Subject: Hantavirus
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
The BMBL recommends that tissue samples potentially infected with
hantavirus should be handled in BSL-2 facilities with BSL-3 practices
and procedures. What about potentially infected urine, feces and
saliva? Since most cases of human illness have resulted from exposure
to infected wild rodent urine and feces, should we assume that
laboratory excreta samples are potentially more infective and if so does
this warrant BL3 facilities?
Thank you.
Katrina Doolittle
NMSU EH&S
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 18 Oct 2002 12:58:28 EDT
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ed Krisiunas
Subject: HIV/AIDS Surveillance Supplemental Report 2002
MIME-Version: 1.0
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boundary="part1_cf.1ed855bc.2ae197b4_boundary"
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"Deaths among Persons with AIDS through December 2000," HIV/AIDS Surveillance
Supplemental Report 2002;8(No. 1) is now available at
.
Edward Krisiunas, MT(ASCP), CIC, MPH
President
WNWN International
PO Box 1164
Burlington, Connecticut
06013
860-675-1217
860-675-1311(fax)
860-944-2373(mobile)
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"Deaths among Persons with AIDS through December 2000," HIV/AIDS
Surveillance Supplemental Report 2002;8(No. 1) is now available at
.
Edward Krisiunas, MT(ASCP), CIC, MPH
President
WNWN International
PO Box 1164
Burlington, Connecticut
06013
860-675-1217
860-675-1311(fax)
860-944-2373(mobile)
--part1_cf.1ed855bc.2ae197b4_boundary--
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 18 Oct 2002 13:50:47 -1000
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Hubert B Olipares
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII
ABSA:
My administration would like to know whether it is cost effective to have
an in-house person to certify BSL-3 facilities (according to BMBL, item
no. 15) or an outside vendor to annually come in and do the work.
For people that do in-house certification, could you share with me your
in-house job description, types of equipment/instruments needed, where the
individual got trained (or required training), and any other relevant
information.
Thanks for the great service....
==============================================================================
Hubert B. Olipares, RBP, MSPH, MT(ASCP), MT(NCA)
Biological Safety Professional
University of Hawaii
Environmental Health and Safety Office
Biological Safety Program
2040 East-West Road
Honolulu, Hawaii 96822-2022
Telephone: 808-956-3197
Fax: 808-956-3205
Biosafety Prgm. E-mail: biosafe@hawaii.edu
Personnel E-Mail: olipares@hawaii.edu
Biosafety Website:
==============================================================================
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 22 Oct 2002 09:26:40 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Kim Auletta
Subject: Toxin question
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
One of our PIs will be working with some new material. Does anyone have any
experience with this? Thanks for your help.
"purified Lethal Factor, the toxin from Bacillus anthracis which we are
studying, is actually harmless by itself. We never work with the bacterium
(from List Biological Laboratories in California does, and that company
makes the toxins from genetically altered strains which lack essential
cofactors and are therefore nonpathogenic)
Kim Auletta
Lab Safety Specialist
Environmental Health and Safety
SUNY Stony Brook
110 Suffolk Hall
Stony Brook, NY 11794-6200
phone: 631-632-9672
fax: 631-632-9683
email: kauletta@.sunysb.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 22 Oct 2002 09:32:28 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Marcham, Cheri"
Subject: poliovirus forms
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Just checking - the poliovirus survey forms aren't coded like the select
agent ones were, are they? In other words, if we get multiple forms, do
we have to send them all back?
Cheri Marcham
University Environmental Health and Safety Officer
The University of Oklahoma
cheri-marcham@ouhsc.edu
------_=_NextPart_001_01C279D7.D8C11BA2
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size=3D2>Just checking - the poliovirus survey forms aren't coded
like the select = agent ones were, are they? In other words, if
we get multiple forms, do we = have to send them all back?
size=3D2>
size=3D2>Cheri Marcham
size=3D2>University Environmental Health and Safety = Officer
size=3D2>The University of Oklahoma
size=3D2>cheri-marcham@ouhsc.edu
=00
------_=_NextPart_001_01C279D7.D8C11BA2--
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 22 Oct 2002 10:50:23 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Robin Newberry
Subject: Re: poliovirus forms
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed"
And I've another question - perhaps this has been asked, and I missed it:
Why the heck wasn't this included with the Select Agents? This
necessitates another survey on our part, as we didn't ask about Polio
the last time.
--
Robin
--------------------------------------------------------------
W. Robert Newberry, IV CIH, CHMM
Chief Environmental Health and Safety Officer
Clemson University
wnewber@clemson.edu ehs@clemson.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 22 Oct 2002 10:11:22 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Dave Mulligan
Subject: David M Mulligan/LAKE/PPRD/ABBOTT is out of the office.
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
I will be out of the office starting 10/21/2002 and will not return until
10/25/2002.
Please direct Biosafety issues to Laurie Corsi during my absence at extension
7-6944
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 22 Oct 2002 12:25:56 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Gerry Griffin
Subject: Re: poliovirus forms
In-Reply-To:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
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We thought we were ahead of the game by including poliovirus on our
institution's select agent survey. Didn't really help though since the
polio survey is much more extensive than simply do you possess
poliovirus or not.... Looks like there's no getting around doing
another survey.
-----Original Message-----
From: A Biosafety Discussion List [mailto:BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU] On
Behalf Of Robin Newberry
Sent: Tuesday, October 22, 2002 10:50 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: poliovirus forms
And I've another question - perhaps this has been asked, and I missed
it:
Why the heck wasn't this included with the Select Agents? This
necessitates another survey on our part, as we didn't ask about Polio
the last time.
--
Robin
--------------------------------------------------------------
W. Robert Newberry, IV CIH, CHMM
Chief Environmental Health and Safety Officer
Clemson University
wnewber@clemson.edu ehs@clemson.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 23 Oct 2002 10:46:45 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Koporc, Kim"
Subject: Re: poliovirus forms
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Dear Gerry and Robin - Your comments are appreciated. The wild =
poliovirus inventory is a public health initiative and part of the =
worldwide effort to eradicate polio. In conducting the inventory, the =
US joins 122 other countries that have already started or completed =
their inventories. For additional information, we refer you to the =
Global Action Plan for Laboratory Containment of Wild Polioviruses, =
which can be accessed at od/nvpo/polio. The Select Agents =
Registry is a separate process carried out under the Public Health =
Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness Response Act of 2002.
Best regards,
Kim
-----Original Message-----
From: Gerry Griffin [mailto:griffg01@MED.NYU.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, October 22, 2002 12:26 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: poliovirus forms
We thought we were ahead of the game by including poliovirus on our
institution's select agent survey. Didn't really help though since the
polio survey is much more extensive than simply do you possess
poliovirus or not.... Looks like there's no getting around doing
another survey.
-----Original Message-----
From: A Biosafety Discussion List [mailto:BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU] On
Behalf Of Robin Newberry
Sent: Tuesday, October 22, 2002 10:50 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: poliovirus forms
And I've another question - perhaps this has been asked, and I missed
it:
Why the heck wasn't this included with the Select Agents? This
necessitates another survey on our part, as we didn't ask about Polio
the last time.
--
Robin
--------------------------------------------------------------
W. Robert Newberry, IV CIH, CHMM
Chief Environmental Health and Safety Officer
Clemson University
wnewber@clemson.edu ehs@clemson.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 23 Oct 2002 08:35:16 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Gergis, Nasr"
Subject: Re: Smoke Evaluation in OR
MIME-Version: 1.0
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boundary="----_=_NextPart_001_01C27AA9.C967B978"
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------_=_NextPart_001_01C27AA9.C967B978
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charset=iso-8859-1
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Good morning colleagues: I have an issue regarding a smoke evaluation in the
operation room. An employee is complaining about the smoke during
cauterization process, which may causes a health hazard to personnel. I
understand there is a guideline regarding this issue. Does anyone has more
information and knows these guidelines. Thanks
Nasr Gergis,DVM,PhD
Interim Director-Biosafety & Safety Officer
Occupational Safety and Health
COH/Beckman Research Institute
http:
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Good morning colleagues: I have an issue regarding a = smoke
evaluation in the operation room. An employee is complaining = about
the smoke during cauterization process, which may causes a health =
hazard to personnel. I understand there is a guideline regarding
this = issue. Does anyone has more information and knows these
guidelines. = Thanks
Nasr Gergis,DVM,PhD
Interim Director-Biosafety & Safety = Officer
Occupational Safety and Health
COH/Beckman Research Institute TARGET=3D"_blank">http:
------_=_NextPart_001_01C27AA9.C967B978--
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 23 Oct 2002 11:41:04 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Kim Auletta
Subject: Re: Smoke Evaluation in OR
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
OSHA has laser guidelines & other similar smoke generating issues in the
OR/Healthcare area. See their web site , follow links to
Healthcare.
Kim Auletta
Lab Safety Specialist
Environmental Health and Safety
SUNY Stony Brook
110 Suffolk Hall
Stony Brook, NY 11794-6200
phone: 631-632-9672
fax: 631-632-9683
email: kauletta@.sunysb.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 23 Oct 2002 11:42:25 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Morris, Gary"
Subject: Re: Smoke Evaluation in OR
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="----_=_NextPart_001_01C27AAA.C8B80F90"
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this format, some or all of this message may not be legible.
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charset="iso-8859-1"
Nasr,
Check out these links, particularly the first one.
Gary Morris
-----Original Message-----
From: Gergis, Nasr [mailto:NGergis@]
Sent: Wednesday, October 23, 2002 11:35 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Smoke Evaluation in OR
Good morning colleagues: I have an issue regarding a smoke evaluation in the
operation room. An employee is complaining about the smoke during
cauterization process, which may causes a health hazard to personnel. I
understand there is a guideline regarding this issue. Does anyone has more
information and knows these guidelines. Thanks
Nasr Gergis,DVM,PhD
Interim Director-Biosafety & Safety Officer
Occupational Safety and Health
COH/Beckman Research Institute
http:
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 23 Oct 2002 13:38:59 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Carl Pike
Subject: Re: poliovirus forms
In-Reply-To:
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; format=flowed; charset=us-ascii
Can someone go back to square one on the poliovirus topic for me?
Have the forms been mailed? What mailing lists are being used? If
we don't get a form, does that mean we don't have to reply? Or if we
do have to report, how do we get a form?
Thanks.
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 23 Oct 2002 14:01:11 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Bill Homovec
Subject: Re: poliovirus forms
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
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The forms were mailed on or about October 11, 2002.
I know that one of the databases that was used was for CLIA-licensed =
clinical microbiology laboratories.
Hope this helps.
Bill Homovec
LabCorp
(336) 436-5022
>>> carl.pike@FANDM.EDU 10/23/02 01:38PM >>>
Can someone go back to square one on the poliovirus topic for me?
Have the forms been mailed? What mailing lists are being used? If
we don't get a form, does that mean we don't have to reply? Or if we
do have to report, how do we get a form?
Thanks.
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 23 Oct 2002 13:09:34 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "OLINGER, PATRICIA L [S&C/0216]"
Subject: Re: poliovirus forms
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Yes the forms have been mailed. I attended the round table in San Francisco
on Monday at the ABSA conference.
If you did not get one or it was lost on your CEO desk you can go to the CDC
web site and download the registration forms and packets.
If you have a complex registration (multiple US sites) contact CDC (the
email id is on the site) and let them know you will be responding for your
university/company etc as a single registration or multiple registration.
They were pretty open to what ever you need to do.
When you do your inventory remember to include not only the culture samples
but also "environmental" samples, other potentially infectious materials
(ie. soil samples from parts of the world that are endemic with Polio).
Hope this helps.
Patty Olinger
Pharmacia -Kalamazoo Corporate Services - ESH
Biosafety Officer
-----Original Message-----
From: Carl Pike [mailto:carl.pike@FANDM.EDU]
Sent: Wednesday, October 23, 2002 1:39 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: poliovirus forms
Can someone go back to square one on the poliovirus topic for me?
Have the forms been mailed? What mailing lists are being used? If
we don't get a form, does that mean we don't have to reply? Or if we
do have to report, how do we get a form?
Thanks.
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 23 Oct 2002 14:22:11 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Stetz, Sharon"
Subject: Wild Polio Virus Survey - Penalties?
MIME-Version: 1.0
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this format, some or all of this message may not be legible.
------_=_NextPart_001_01C27AC1.1ADEC8C0
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charset="iso-8859-1"
Does anyone know if there are any noncompliance penalties associated with
this survey? (such as for not having it completed on time or for deciding to
exclude particular off-site facilities). I have contacted the help line to
ask if this process is site (address)-driven or employer driven and they
couldn't answer my question. At least for the SA notification, we were
repeatedly reminded about the definition of a "facility" so we knew who had
to report what. For this next survey, it appears that less guidance is
available. We did receive a number of SA notification forms but haven't
seen a single copy of the Wild Polio Virus Inventory. Is anyone else facing
similar questions and problems?
------_=_NextPart_001_01C27AC1.1ADEC8C0
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Does anyone know if there are any = noncompliance penalties
associated with this survey? (such as for not = having it completed
on time or for deciding to exclude particular = off-site
facilities). I have contacted the help line to ask if = this
process is site (address)-driven or employer driven and they =
couldn't answer my question. At least for the SA notification, we =
were repeatedly reminded about the definition of a "facility" = so
we knew who had to report what. For this next survey, it = appears
that less guidance is available. We did receive a number = of SA
notification forms but haven't seen a single copy of the Wild =
Polio Virus Inventory. Is anyone else facing similar questions =
and problems?
------_=_NextPart_001_01C27AC1.1ADEC8C0--
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 23 Oct 2002 15:31:41 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Koporc, Kim"
Subject: Re: poliovirus forms
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Patty - Many thanks for sending out your very informative e-mail. Just =
to confirm to the rest of the group, all the inventory packets were sent =
to CEOs of biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies, to Chancellors or =
Presidents of academic institutions, and to Laboratory Directors of =
clinical laboratories and hospitals. A small percentage of the =
inventory packets have been returned. We are in the process of updating =
our database and will resend the inventory packets by the end of next =
week. If you have not received a packet, the forms can be downloaded =
from our web site at od/nvpo/polio. If you do not have a =
User ID or Password, you can submit results via the Internet by logging =
on as new user at od/nvpo/polio/submit.
Please keep the questions and comments coming. They are appreciated. =
Best regards, Kim
-----Original Message-----
From: OLINGER, PATRICIA L [S&C/0216] =
[mailto:patricia.l.olinger@]
Sent: Wednesday, October 23, 2002 2:10 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: poliovirus forms
Yes the forms have been mailed. I attended the round table in San =
Francisco
on Monday at the ABSA conference.
If you did not get one or it was lost on your CEO desk you can go to the =
CDC
web site and download the registration forms and packets.
If you have a complex registration (multiple US sites) contact CDC (the
email id is on the site) and let them know you will be responding for =
your
university/company etc as a single registration or multiple =
registration.
They were pretty open to what ever you need to do.
When you do your inventory remember to include not only the culture =
samples
but also "environmental" samples, other potentially infectious materials
(ie. soil samples from parts of the world that are endemic with Polio).
Hope this helps.
Patty Olinger
Pharmacia -Kalamazoo Corporate Services - ESH
Biosafety Officer
-----Original Message-----
From: Carl Pike [mailto:carl.pike@FANDM.EDU]
Sent: Wednesday, October 23, 2002 1:39 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: poliovirus forms
Can someone go back to square one on the poliovirus topic for me?
Have the forms been mailed? What mailing lists are being used? If
we don't get a form, does that mean we don't have to reply? Or if we
do have to report, how do we get a form?
Thanks.
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 23 Oct 2002 15:56:25 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Koporc, Kim"
Subject: Institutions with multiple laboratories
MIME-Version: 1.0
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Dear All - There have been a few questions on the list serve today =
regarding institutions with multiple laboratories. The responsible =
facility officer reports for the entire institution. The inventory =
should include all biomedical laboratories that may contain wild =
poliovirus infectious or potential infectious materials. Worksheets and =
brochures to assist with inventory process can be downloaded from our =
website at od/nvpo/polio.
Institution branches or subsidiaries independently registered with CLIA =
were sent inventory packets with unique User IDs and Passwords. The =
institutional RFO reporting on behalf of these branches/subsidiaries =
should submit each inventory result separately using the User ID and =
Password assigned to each branch/subsidiary. We encourage everyone to =
use the Internet to submit results - od/nvpo/polio/submit.
Best regards, Kim
-----Original Message-----
From: Marcham, Cheri [mailto:Cheryl-Marcham@OUHSC.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, October 22, 2002 10:32 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: poliovirus forms
Just checking - the poliovirus survey forms aren't coded like the select =
agent ones were, are they? In other words, if we get multiple forms, do =
we have to send them all back?
Cheri Marcham
University Environmental Health and Safety Officer
The University of Oklahoma
cheri-marcham@ouhsc.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 23 Oct 2002 16:09:09 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Daryl Rowe
Subject: Re: Institutions with multiple laboratories
MIME-Version: 1.0
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boundary="----_=_NextPart_001_01C27AD0.0C20C14B"
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charset="iso-8859-1"
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Since environmental samples of water and/or sewage may have been =
collected for other purposes, those samples may not have been tested for =
poliovirus. Now what?
Have a safe and healthful day.
Daryl E. Rowe
Office of Biosafety
542-0112
-----Original Message-----
From: Koporc, Kim [mailto:KKoporc@]
Sent: Wednesday, October 23, 2002 3:56 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Institutions with multiple laboratories
Dear All - There have been a few questions on the list serve today =
regarding institutions with multiple laboratories. The responsible =
facility officer reports for the entire institution. The inventory =
should include all biomedical laboratories that may contain wild =
poliovirus infectious or potential infectious materials. Worksheets and =
brochures to assist with inventory process can be downloaded from our =
website at od/nvpo/polio.
Institution branches or subsidiaries independently registered with CLIA =
were sent inventory packets with unique User IDs and Passwords. The =
institutional RFO reporting on behalf of these branches/subsidiaries =
should submit each inventory result separately using the User ID and =
Password assigned to each branch/subsidiary. We encourage everyone to =
use the Internet to submit results - od/nvpo/polio/submit.
Best regards, Kim
-----Original Message-----
From: Marcham, Cheri [mailto:Cheryl-Marcham@OUHSC.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, October 22, 2002 10:32 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: poliovirus forms
Just checking - the poliovirus survey forms aren't coded like the select =
agent ones were, are they? In other words, if we get multiple forms, do =
we have to send them all back?
Cheri Marcham
University Environmental Health and Safety Officer
The University of Oklahoma
cheri-marcham@ouhsc.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 23 Oct 2002 16:39:12 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Koporc, Kim"
Subject: Re: Wild Polio Virus Survey - Penalties?
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Dear Sharon - I believe that some of your questions were answered in the =
e-mail I recently sent out on the List Serve. Regarding your question =
about penalties, the inventory assumes all institutions endorse polio =
eradication, understand the public health implications of poliovirus =
containment, and take their responsibility seriously. To date the =
inventory process has been carried out in 122 other countries, and very =
few of these countries have found it necessary to legislate penalties. =
Many thanks for your questions. Best regards, Kim
-----Original Message-----
From: Stetz, Sharon [mailto:Sharon.Stetz@]
Sent: Wednesday, October 23, 2002 2:22 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Wild Polio Virus Survey - Penalties?
Does anyone know if there are any noncompliance penalties associated =
with this survey? (such as for not having it completed on time or for =
deciding to exclude particular off-site facilities). I have contacted =
the help line to ask if this process is site (address)-driven or =
employer driven and they couldn't answer my question. At least for the =
SA notification, we were repeatedly reminded about the definition of a =
"facility" so we knew who had to report what. For this next survey, it =
appears that less guidance is available. We did receive a number of SA =
notification forms but haven't seen a single copy of the Wild Polio =
Virus Inventory. Is anyone else facing similar questions and problems?
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 23 Oct 2002 16:40:50 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ricardo Tappan
Subject: Re: Wild Polio Virus Survey - Penalties?
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I will out of the office on training until October 28th, 2002
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 23 Oct 2002 15:31:37 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Bruce J. Brown"
Subject: Re: Institutions with multiple laboratories
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Kim,
When you state the institutional RFO reporting on behalf of these
branches/subsidiaries should submit each inventory result separately,
should the inventory reflect the results of the specific
branch/subsidiary or the same results for the entire institution entered
for each individual User ID the institution receives?
Thanks in advance for the clarification,
Bruce J. Brown
The University of Texas
Health Science Center at Houston
Bruce.J.Brown@uth.tmc.edu
-----Original Message-----
From: Koporc, Kim [mailto:KKoporc@]
Sent: Wednesday, October 23, 2002 2:56 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Institutions with multiple laboratories
Dear All - There have been a few questions on the list serve today
regarding institutions with multiple laboratories. The responsible
facility officer reports for the entire institution. The inventory
should include all biomedical laboratories that may contain wild
poliovirus infectious or potential infectious materials. Worksheets and
brochures to assist with inventory process can be downloaded from our
website at od/nvpo/polio.
Institution branches or subsidiaries independently registered with CLIA
were sent inventory packets with unique User IDs and Passwords. The
institutional RFO reporting on behalf of these branches/subsidiaries
should submit each inventory result separately using the User ID and
Password assigned to each branch/subsidiary. We encourage everyone to
use the Internet to submit results - od/nvpo/polio/submit.
Best regards, Kim
-----Original Message-----
From: Marcham, Cheri [mailto:Cheryl-Marcham@OUHSC.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, October 22, 2002 10:32 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: poliovirus forms
Just checking - the poliovirus survey forms aren't coded like the select
agent ones were, are they? In other words, if we get multiple forms, do
we have to send them all back?
Cheri Marcham
University Environmental Health and Safety Officer
The University of Oklahoma
cheri-marcham@ouhsc.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 23 Oct 2002 16:47:55 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Koporc, Kim"
Subject: Wild Poliovirus Infectious Materials
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Dear All - If the samples were collected in a geographical area and at a =
time where wild poliovirus was suspected to be present, then consider =
them as potentially infectious. Appendix II of the inventory form lists =
the last documented polio case for polio-free countries. For =
containment purposes, samples may be considered polio-free immediately =
after the year of the last documented case. Complete definitions and =
examples can be found on our website. Best regards, Kim
-----Original Message-----
From: Daryl Rowe [mailto:drowe@ESD.UGA.EDU]
Sent: Wednesday, October 23, 2002 4:09 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Institutions with multiple laboratories
Since environmental samples of water and/or sewage may have been =
collected for other purposes, those samples may not have been tested for =
poliovirus. Now what?
Have a safe and healthful day.
Daryl E. Rowe
Office of Biosafety
542-0112
-----Original Message-----
From: Koporc, Kim [mailto:KKoporc@]
Sent: Wednesday, October 23, 2002 3:56 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Institutions with multiple laboratories
Dear All - There have been a few questions on the list serve today =
regarding institutions with multiple laboratories. The responsible =
facility officer reports for the entire institution. The inventory =
should include all biomedical laboratories that may contain wild =
poliovirus infectious or potential infectious materials. Worksheets and =
brochures to assist with inventory process can be downloaded from our =
website at od/nvpo/polio.
Institution branches or subsidiaries independently registered with CLIA =
were sent inventory packets with unique User IDs and Passwords. The =
institutional RFO reporting on behalf of these branches/subsidiaries =
should submit each inventory result separately using the User ID and =
Password assigned to each branch/subsidiary. We encourage everyone to =
use the Internet to submit results - od/nvpo/polio/submit.
Best regards, Kim
-----Original Message-----
From: Marcham, Cheri [mailto:Cheryl-Marcham@OUHSC.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, October 22, 2002 10:32 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: poliovirus forms
Just checking - the poliovirus survey forms aren't coded like the select =
agent ones were, are they? In other words, if we get multiple forms, do =
we have to send them all back?
Cheri Marcham
University Environmental Health and Safety Officer
The University of Oklahoma
cheri-marcham@ouhsc.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 23 Oct 2002 17:38:16 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Koporc, Kim"
Subject: Re: Institutions with multiple laboratories
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Hi Bruce - We are tracking responses by the User IDs. If the inventory =
form is submitted via the Internet, it should reflect the results of the =
subsidiary/branch assigned to the User ID and Password used when logging =
on. Alternatively, you can mail or fax one form that records the =
results of your entire institution and attach a list of the laboratories =
inventoried and their assigned User ID and Password. Best regards, Kim
-----Original Message-----
From: Bruce J. Brown [mailto:bruce.j.brown@UTH.TMC.EDU]
Sent: Wednesday, October 23, 2002 4:32 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Institutions with multiple laboratories
Kim,
When you state the institutional RFO reporting on behalf of these =
branches/subsidiaries should submit each inventory result separately, =
should the inventory reflect the results of the specific =
branch/subsidiary or the same results for the entire institution entered =
for each individual User ID the institution receives?
Thanks in advance for the clarification,
Bruce J. Brown
The University of Texas
Health Science Center at Houston
Bruce.J.Brown@uth.tmc.edu
-----Original Message-----
From: Koporc, Kim [mailto:KKoporc@]
Sent: Wednesday, October 23, 2002 2:56 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Institutions with multiple laboratories
Dear All - There have been a few questions on the list serve today =
regarding institutions with multiple laboratories. The responsible =
facility officer reports for the entire institution. The inventory =
should include all biomedical laboratories that may contain wild =
poliovirus infectious or potential infectious materials. Worksheets and =
brochures to assist with inventory process can be downloaded from our =
website at od/nvpo/polio.
Institution branches or subsidiaries independently registered with CLIA =
were sent inventory packets with unique User IDs and Passwords. The =
institutional RFO reporting on behalf of these branches/subsidiaries =
should submit each inventory result separately using the User ID and =
Password assigned to each branch/subsidiary. We encourage everyone to =
use the Internet to submit results - od/nvpo/polio/submit.
Best regards, Kim
-----Original Message-----
From: Marcham, Cheri [mailto:Cheryl-Marcham@OUHSC.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, October 22, 2002 10:32 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: poliovirus forms
Just checking - the poliovirus survey forms aren't coded like the select =
agent ones were, are they? In other words, if we get multiple forms, do =
we have to send them all back?
Cheri Marcham
University Environmental Health and Safety Officer
The University of Oklahoma
cheri-marcham@ouhsc.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 24 Oct 2002 08:39:42 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Lori Nicholson
Subject: Plasmid DNA
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
I wonder how your facilities are handling the disposal of plasmid DNA?
Do you dispose of this as biohazard waste or regular trash. Under my
reading of the NIH Guidelines, rDNA that is outside of an organism or virus
is exempt from the Guidelines (Section III-F-1). I believe that this means
that purified rDNA is not in and of itself a biohazard and can be disposed
of in regular trash.
Practically speaking, there is no way for DNA to get inside of cells except
under extraordinary circumstances such as a high concentration
contaminating a sharp which then punctures a person or animal. This would
suggest that DNA in glass containers should be disposed of carefully,
perhaps by removing the DNA from the vial first.
Any discussion or suggestions that contradict this?
Regards,
Lori Nicholson
Corporate Manager of EH&S
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 24 Oct 2002 13:49:16 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ed Gaunt
Subject: Re: poliovirus forms
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
As Kim indicated, the polio survey actually started back in the spring with
a pilot being performed prior to the approval of the June Antiterrorist
Bill. Since the Select Agent data collection requirement was different from
the Polio collection, more emergent (i.e., the SA information was needed
before the main polio survey collection was completed), and the SA data
collected are classified, the two projects could not be combined. Sorry
:>(
Ed
PS...It was great to meet lots of you in San Francisco!
-----Original Message-----
From: Koporc, Kim [mailto:KKoporc@]
Sent: Wednesday, October 23, 2002 10:47 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: poliovirus forms
Dear Gerry and Robin - Your comments are appreciated. The wild poliovirus
inventory is a public health initiative and part of the worldwide effort to
eradicate polio. In conducting the inventory, the US joins 122 other
countries that have already started or completed their inventories. For
additional information, we refer you to the Global Action Plan for
Laboratory Containment of Wild Polioviruses, which can be accessed at
od/nvpo/polio. The Select Agents Registry is a separate process
carried out under the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness
Response Act of 2002.
Best regards,
Kim
-----Original Message-----
From: Gerry Griffin [mailto:griffg01@MED.NYU.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, October 22, 2002 12:26 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: poliovirus forms
We thought we were ahead of the game by including poliovirus on our
institution's select agent survey. Didn't really help though since the
polio survey is much more extensive than simply do you possess
poliovirus or not.... Looks like there's no getting around doing
another survey.
-----Original Message-----
From: A Biosafety Discussion List [mailto:BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU] On
Behalf Of Robin Newberry
Sent: Tuesday, October 22, 2002 10:50 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: poliovirus forms
And I've another question - perhaps this has been asked, and I missed
it:
Why the heck wasn't this included with the Select Agents? This
necessitates another survey on our part, as we didn't ask about Polio
the last time.
--
Robin
--------------------------------------------------------------
W. Robert Newberry, IV CIH, CHMM
Chief Environmental Health and Safety Officer
Clemson University
wnewber@clemson.edu ehs@clemson.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 24 Oct 2002 15:23:50 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Josh Harney
Subject: Re: Smoke Evaluation in OR
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NIOSH also has done several Health Hazard Evaluations characterizing OR
personnel exposures to the many components in surgical smoke. By cc
of
this email, Brad King [bfk2@], the NIOSH project officer whom I
assisted on one of these studies during my past life at NIOSH, will not
be surprised if you contact him directly. I'm sure he'd be happy to
discuss his latest findings with you, and help you find the latest
guidelines and
recommendations useful for your facility.
Joshua M. Harney
Assistant Director, Health & Safety
Cincinnati Children's Hospital Medical Center
phone: 513-636-7286
fax: 513-636-2123
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 25 Oct 2002 08:01:27 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Carl Pike
Subject: poliovirus forms
In-Reply-To:
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; format=flowed; charset=us-ascii
I am writing about the "cutoff date" for possibly infectious water
samples from the U.S. In Appendix 2 it is stated that the last
reported U.S. case was 1986. In the brochure "National Inventory of
Wild Poliovirus Materials", item 9, the date 1979 is given. Which is
correct???
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 25 Oct 2002 09:26:51 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Gerry Griffin
Subject: Re: poliovirus forms
In-Reply-To:
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-transfer-encoding: 7bit
If you look at the current Appendix II on the CDC website, it also uses
1979. I had an earlier version also, which was confusing me. The
laboratory worksheet forms are also a little different from the ones I
first printed out.
-----Original Message-----
From: A Biosafety Discussion List [mailto:BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU] On
Behalf Of Carl Pike
Sent: Friday, October 25, 2002 8:01 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: poliovirus forms
I am writing about the "cutoff date" for possibly infectious water
samples from the U.S. In Appendix 2 it is stated that the last
reported U.S. case was 1986. In the brochure "National Inventory of
Wild Poliovirus Materials", item 9, the date 1979 is given. Which is
correct???
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 25 Oct 2002 10:15:15 EDT
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ed Krisiunas
Subject: Re: [APIC] Smallpox disinfection
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Companies involved in the decontamination of biological safety cabinets
(before removal of HEPA filters) use the "frying-pan" procedure - See NSF 49
- Standards for biological safety cabinets.
Individuals involved with work related to biological safety cabinets are
often certified to test cabinets, decontaminate them, etc. These
professionals could be a good source of practical application of the "frying
pan" procedure as well as other issues.
Also see (American Biological Safety Association).
I have forwarded this their LISTSERV as well.
Regards,
Edward Krisiunas, MT(ASCP), CIC, MPH
President
WNWN International
PO Box 1164
Burlington, Connecticut
06013
860-675-1217
860-675-1311(fax)
860-944-2373(mobile)
>
> ================
> From: Jessica Hilburn
> Sent: Wed 10/23/2002 3:46 AM
> Subject: Smallpox disinfection (04)
> ================
>
> Of interest is an article on infection control in smallpox from the CDC
> bioterrorism website, bt., on decontamination procedures, I
> believe it is called annex F? I t discusses the use of formaldehyde
> vaporization for 2 hours in the rooms of smallpox patients post-
> discharge
> to decontaminate the room. The drawers of cabinets etc. are pulled out
> so
> the vapor is contained in the room more effectively. I would assume the
> air
> ducts would have to be controlled as well. The reference says that
> persons
> who are not skilled or knowledgeable in this technique should not
> attempt
> this! Indeed. The formaldehyde is put in a deep fat fryer and used in
> that
> manner. The room is sealed with tape under doors and openings to
> control
> the vapors from escaping. The reference discussed in detail
> decontamination/disinfection of mattresses, beds, linens, hard surfaces,
> medical waste, human remains,etc.
>
> In reference posting on phenolics-most labs use these type of
> phenolics-(even if you do not know they do,) in my experience. Bleach
> is
> another alternative which is readily available. The above reference
> also
> lists the commercial names of phenolics which are readily available at
> your
> local grocery or Walmart. At least, they are available now, pre-event!
>
> Jessica Hilburn,MT(ASCP),CIC
> Manager of Infection Control
> Texas Children's Hospital
> Houston, Texas
> jlhilbur@
> .....kw
>
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Companies involved in the decontamination of biological safety
cabinets (before removal of HEPA filters) use the "frying-pan"
procedure - See NSF 49 - Standards for biological safety cabinets.
Individuals involved with work related to biological safety cabinets
are often certified to test cabinets, decontaminate them, etc. These
professionals could be a good source of practical application of the
"frying pan" procedure as well as other issues.
Also see (American Biological Safety Association).
I have forwarded this their LISTSERV as well.
Regards,
Edward Krisiunas, MT(ASCP), CIC, MPH
President
WNWN International
PO Box 1164
Burlington, Connecticut
06013
860-675-1217
860-675-1311(fax)
860-944-2373(mobile)
================
From: Jessica Hilburn
Sent: Wed 10/23/2002 3:46 AM
Subject: Smallpox disinfection (04)
================
Of interest is an article on infection control in smallpox from
the CDC
bioterrorism website, bt., on decontamination
procedures, I
believe it is called annex F? I t discusses the use of
formaldehyde
vaporization for 2 hours in the rooms of smallpox patients post-
discharge
to decontaminate the room. The drawers of cabinets etc. are pulled
out
so
the vapor is contained in the room more effectively. I would
assume the
air
ducts would have to be controlled as well. The reference says
that
persons
who are not skilled or knowledgeable in this technique should not
attempt
this! Indeed. The formaldehyde is put in a deep fat fryer and
used in
that
manner. The room is sealed with tape under doors and openings to
control
the vapors from escaping. The reference discussed in detail
decontamination/disinfection of mattresses, beds, linens, hard
surfaces,
medical waste, human remains,etc.
In reference posting on phenolics-most labs use these type of
phenolics-(even if you do not know they do,) in my experience.
Bleach
is
another alternative which is readily available. The above
reference
also
lists the commercial names of phenolics which are readily
available at
your
local grocery or Walmart. At least, they are available now,
pre-event!
Jessica Hilburn,MT(ASCP),CIC
Manager of Infection Control
Texas Children's Hospital
Houston, Texas
jlhilbur@
.....kw
--part1_15a.16681f79.2aeaabf3_boundary--
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 25 Oct 2002 10:32:31 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Barry D. Cohen, MPH, CBSP"
Subject: Re: [APIC] Smallpox disinfection
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
The question becomes: Do you need a Crisis Exemption from
EPA? :)
I am still a bit perplexed with this one! :(
I reference the recent EPA presentation at ABSA.
Regards,
Barry D. Cohen, MPH, CBSP
Director, Environmental Health and Safety
Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc.
195 Albany Street
Cambridge, MA 02139
(V): 617/613-4385
(F): 617/613-4492
(E): bcohen@
Ed Krisiunas wrote:
> Companies involved in the decontamination of biological
> safety cabinets (before removal of HEPA filters) use the
> "frying-pan" procedure - See NSF 49 - Standards for
> biological safety cabinets.
>
> Individuals involved with work related to biological
> safety cabinets are often certified to test cabinets,
> decontaminate them, etc. These professionals could be a
> good source of practical application of the "frying pan"
> procedure as well as other issues.
>
> Also see (American Biological Safety
> Association).
>
> I have forwarded this their LISTSERV as well.
>
> Regards,
>
> Edward Krisiunas, MT(ASCP), CIC, MPH
> President
> WNWN International
> PO Box 1164
> Burlington, Connecticut
> 06013
> 860-675-1217
> 860-675-1311(fax)
> 860-944-2373(mobile)
>
>
>
>
>>
>> ================
>> From: Jessica Hilburn
>> Sent: Wed 10/23/2002 3:46 AM
>> Subject: Smallpox disinfection (04)
>> ================
>>
>> Of interest is an article on infection control in
>> smallpox from the CDC
>> bioterrorism website, bt., on decontamination
>> procedures, I
>> believe it is called annex F? I t discusses the use
>> of formaldehyde
>> vaporization for 2 hours in the rooms of smallpox
>> patients post-
>> discharge
>> to decontaminate the room. The drawers of cabinets etc.
>> are pulled out
>> so
>> the vapor is contained in the room more effectively. I
>> would assume the
>> air
>> ducts would have to be controlled as well. The
>> reference says that
>> persons
>> who are not skilled or knowledgeable in this technique
>> should not
>> attempt
>> this! Indeed. The formaldehyde is put in a deep fat
>> fryer and used in
>> that
>> manner. The room is sealed with tape under doors and
>> openings to
>> control
>> the vapors from escaping. The reference discussed in
>> detail
>> decontamination/disinfection of mattresses, beds,
>> linens, hard surfaces,
>> medical waste, human remains,etc.
>>
>> In reference posting on phenolics-most labs use these
>> type of
>> phenolics-(even if you do not know they do,) in my
>> experience. Bleach
>> is
>> another alternative which is readily available. The
>> above reference
>> also
>> lists the commercial names of phenolics which are
>> readily available at
>> your
>> local grocery or Walmart. At least, they are available
>> now, pre-event!
>>
>> Jessica Hilburn,MT(ASCP),CIC
>> Manager of Infection Control
>> Texas Children's Hospital
>> Houston, Texas
>> jlhilbur@
>> .....kw
>
>
>
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 25 Oct 2002 10:46:10 -0400
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Erik A. Talley"
Subject: Re: [APIC] Smallpox disinfection
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
Yes, it was interesting to see the number of people at the ABSA meeting
raise their hand for paraformaldehyde use (including me). Isn't part of the
problem "paraformaldehyde" is a chemical name and EPA will need a product
manufacturer to register the product? This is sort of like Chlorox Bleach
is registered as a list C agent, but Wal-mart brand bleach is not.
Erik
At 10:32 AM 10/25/2002 -0400, you wrote:
>The question becomes: Do you need a Crisis Exemption from
>EPA? :)
>
>I am still a bit perplexed with this one! :(
>
>I reference the recent EPA presentation at ABSA.
>
>Regards,
>
>Barry D. Cohen, MPH, CBSP
>Director, Environmental Health and Safety
>Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc.
>195 Albany Street
>Cambridge, MA 02139
>(V): 617/613-4385
>(F): 617/613-4492
>(E): bcohen@
>
>
>Ed Krisiunas wrote:
>
> > Companies involved in the decontamination of biological
> > safety cabinets (before removal of HEPA filters) use the
> > "frying-pan" procedure - See NSF 49 - Standards for
> > biological safety cabinets.
> >
> > Individuals involved with work related to biological
> > safety cabinets are often certified to test cabinets,
> > decontaminate them, etc. These professionals could be a
> > good source of practical application of the "frying pan"
> > procedure as well as other issues.
> >
> > Also see (American Biological Safety
> > Association).
> >
> > I have forwarded this their LISTSERV as well.
> >
> > Regards,
> >
> > Edward Krisiunas, MT(ASCP), CIC, MPH
> > President
> > WNWN International
> > PO Box 1164
> > Burlington, Connecticut
> > 06013
> > 860-675-1217
> > 860-675-1311(fax)
> > 860-944-2373(mobile)
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >>
> >> ================
> >> From: Jessica Hilburn
> >> Sent: Wed 10/23/2002 3:46 AM
> >> Subject: Smallpox disinfection (04)
> >> ================
> >>
> >> Of interest is an article on infection control in
> >> smallpox from the CDC
> >> bioterrorism website, bt., on decontamination
> >> procedures, I
> >> believe it is called annex F? I t discusses the use
> >> of formaldehyde
> >> vaporization for 2 hours in the rooms of smallpox
> >> patients post-
> >> discharge
> >> to decontaminate the room. The drawers of cabinets etc.
> >> are pulled out
> >> so
> >> the vapor is contained in the room more effectively. I
> >> would assume the
> >> air
> >> ducts would have to be controlled as well. The
> >> reference says that
> >> persons
> >> who are not skilled or knowledgeable in this technique
> >> should not
> >> attempt
> >> this! Indeed. The formaldehyde is put in a deep fat
> >> fryer and used in
> >> that
> >> manner. The room is sealed with tape under doors and
> >> openings to
> >> control
> >> the vapors from escaping. The reference discussed in
> >> detail
> >> decontamination/disinfection of mattresses, beds,
> >> linens, hard surfaces,
> >> medical waste, human remains,etc.
> >>
> >> In reference posting on phenolics-most labs use these
> >> type of
> >> phenolics-(even if you do not know they do,) in my
> >> experience. Bleach
> >> is
> >> another alternative which is readily available. The
> >> above reference
> >> also
> >> lists the commercial names of phenolics which are
> >> readily available at
> >> your
> >> local grocery or Walmart. At least, they are available
> >> now, pre-event!
> >>
> >> Jessica Hilburn,MT(ASCP),CIC
> >> Manager of Infection Control
> >> Texas Children's Hospital
> >> Houston, Texas
> >> jlhilbur@
> >> .....kw
> >
> >
> >
___________________________________
Erik A. Talley, Director
Environmental Health and Safety
Weill Medical College of Cornell University
418 East 71st Street, Suite 62
New York, NY 10021
212-746-6201
ert2002@med.cornell.edu
(Cornell Access Only)
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 25 Oct 2002 16:09:30 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Marcham, Cheri"
Subject: chemical weapons
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I just reviewed a proposal involving the use of animals and one of the
agents considered to be a chemical of mass destruction (like soman,
lewisite, mustard, etc.) and it occurred to me that none of these
biological surveys have addressed those agents. Is there another agency
looking into these issues, or another listserve that discusses these I
should be on?
Cheri Marcham
University Environmental Health and Safety Officer
The University of Oklahoma
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 25 Oct 2002 14:31:40 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: LUKENS Carl B
Subject: Re: chemical weapons
I would say this should fall under the lab chemical health safety standard,
since that standard has a requirement for special precautions for particularly
hazardous materials. Thus, it should already be covered under your campus
CHP, much like other highly toxic gases. In fact, some universities include
highly toxic gas uses as something your campus Laboratory CHemical Safety
Committee would have to review, prior to allowing the researcher to do the
work, to see that they have the "special precautions" in place, or at least
that what was done at one Univ of Cal campus.
Carl Lukens
CIH/MSPH
Oregon OSHA consultation
>>> Cheryl-Marcham@OUHSC.EDU 10/25/02 02:11PM >>>
I just reviewed a proposal involving the use of animals and one of the
agents considered to be a chemical of mass destruction (like soman,
lewisite, mustard, etc.) and it occurred to me that none of these
biological surveys have addressed those agents. Is there another agency
looking into these issues, or another listserve that discusses these I
should be on?
Cheri Marcham
University Environmental Health and Safety Officer
The University of Oklahoma
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 25 Oct 2002 17:50:44 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Katrina Doolittle
Organization: NMSU Environmental Health & Safety
Subject: Re: chemical weapons
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
The proceedings of the National Symposium on Biosafety: Working Safely with
Research Animals might be helpful. There were several articles describing
containment of hazardous materials used in research animals.
Katrina Doolittle
NMSU
LUKENS Carl B wrote:
> I would say this should fall under the lab chemical health safety standard,
> since that standard has a requirement for special precautions for particularly
> hazardous materials. Thus, it should already be covered under your campus
> CHP, much like other highly toxic gases. In fact, some universities include
> highly toxic gas uses as something your campus Laboratory CHemical Safety
> Committee would have to review, prior to allowing the researcher to do the
> work, to see that they have the "special precautions" in place, or at least
> that what was done at one Univ of Cal campus.
>
> Carl Lukens
> CIH/MSPH
> Oregon OSHA consultation
>
> >>> Cheryl-Marcham@OUHSC.EDU 10/25/02 02:11PM >>>
>
> I just reviewed a proposal involving the use of animals and one of the
> agents considered to be a chemical of mass destruction (like soman,
> lewisite, mustard, etc.) and it occurred to me that none of these
> biological surveys have addressed those agents. Is there another agency
> looking into these issues, or another listserve that discusses these I
> should be on?
>
> Cheri Marcham
> University Environmental Health and Safety Officer
> The University of Oklahoma
=========================================================================
Date: Sun, 27 Oct 2002 23:08:51 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Thomas J. Shelley"
Subject: Re: chemical weapons
In-Reply-To:
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>I just reviewed a proposal involving the use of animals and one of
>the agents considered to be a chemical of mass destruction (like
>soman, lewisite, mustard, etc.) and it occurred to me that none of
>these biological surveys have addressed those agents. Is there
>another agency looking into these issues, or another listserve that
>discusses these I should be on?
Dear Cheri and Colleagues--To the best of my knowledge, these agents
are also somewhat, more or less (pending the outcome of various
regulations), "regulated" by the CDC. See
and related pages. Tom
--
*********************************************************
Tom Shelley, Chemical Hygiene Officer, Cornell University
Department of Environmental Health and Safety, 125 Humphreys Service Building,
Ithaca, NY 14853. (607) 255-4288 tjs1@cornell.edu
****************************DISCLAIMER********************
The comments and views expressed in this communication are strictly my own and
are not to be construed to officially represent those of my peers,
supervisors or
Cornell University.
--============_-1176344361==_ma============
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-->
I just reviewed a proposal involving the use of animals and one of
the agents considered to be a chemical of mass destruction (like
soman, lewisite, mustard, etc.) and it occurred to me that none of
these biological surveys have addressed those agents. Is there
another agency looking into these issues, or another listserve
that discusses these I should be on?
Dear Cheri and Colleagues--To the best of my knowledge, these agents
are also somewhat, more or less (pending the outcome of various
regulations), "regulated" by the CDC. See
and related pages.
Tom
--
*********************************************************
Tom Shelley, Chemical Hygiene Officer, Cornell University
Department of Environmental Health and Safety, 125 Humphreys Service
Building,
Ithaca, NY 14853. (607) > tjs1@cornell.edu
****************************DISCLAIMER********************
The comments and views expressed in this communication are strictly
my own and
are not to be construed to officially represent those of my peers,
supervisors or
Cornell University.
--============_-1176344361==_ma============--
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 28 Oct 2002 08:42:11 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "OLINGER, PATRICIA L [S&C/0216]"
Subject: Re: Wild Polio Virus Survey - Penalties?
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Hi Kim,
In San Fransico it was indicated that we could see the list of countries
that has completed the survey. Where would we find this list?
Patty Olinger
Pharmacia, Kalamazoo Corporate Services - ESH
Biosafety Officer
-----Original Message-----
From: Koporc, Kim [mailto:KKoporc@]
Sent: Wednesday, October 23, 2002 4:39 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Wild Polio Virus Survey - Penalties?
Dear Sharon - I believe that some of your questions were answered in the
e-mail I recently sent out on the List Serve. Regarding your question about
penalties, the inventory assumes all institutions endorse polio eradication,
understand the public health implications of poliovirus containment, and
take their responsibility seriously. To date the inventory process has been
carried out in 122 other countries, and very few of these countries have
found it necessary to legislate penalties. Many thanks for your questions.
Best regards, Kim
-----Original Message-----
From: Stetz, Sharon [mailto:Sharon.Stetz@]
Sent: Wednesday, October 23, 2002 2:22 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Wild Polio Virus Survey - Penalties?
Does anyone know if there are any noncompliance penalties associated with
this survey? (such as for not having it completed on time or for deciding to
exclude particular off-site facilities). I have contacted the help line to
ask if this process is site (address)-driven or employer driven and they
couldn't answer my question. At least for the SA notification, we were
repeatedly reminded about the definition of a "facility" so we knew who had
to report what. For this next survey, it appears that less guidance is
available. We did receive a number of SA notification forms but haven't
seen a single copy of the Wild Polio Virus Inventory. Is anyone else facing
similar questions and problems?
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 28 Oct 2002 11:16:23 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Joseph P. Kozlovac"
Subject: Re: Plasmid DNA
In-Reply-To:
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I am glad I am not the trash handler for their facility.
At 08:39 AM 10/24/2002 -0500, you wrote:
>I wonder how your facilities are handling the disposal of plasmid DNA?
>
>Do you dispose of this as biohazard waste or regular trash. Under my
>reading of the NIH Guidelines, rDNA that is outside of an organism or virus
>is exempt from the Guidelines (Section III-F-1). I believe that this means
>that purified rDNA is not in and of itself a biohazard and can be disposed
>of in regular trash.
>
>Practically speaking, there is no way for DNA to get inside of cells except
>under extraordinary circumstances such as a high concentration
>contaminating a sharp which then punctures a person or animal. This would
>suggest that DNA in glass containers should be disposed of carefully,
>perhaps by removing the DNA from the vial first.
>
>Any discussion or suggestions that contradict this?
>
>Regards,
>
>Lori Nicholson
>Corporate Manager of EH&S
______________________________________________________________________________
Biological Safety Officer
Environment, Health, Safety
SAIC-Frederick
National Cancer Institute -
Frederick
(301)846-1451 fax: (301)846-6619
email: jkozlovac@mail.
______________________________________________________________________________
--=====================_8666515==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
I am glad I am not the trash handler for their facility.
At 08:39 AM 10/24/2002 -0500, you wrote:
I wonder how your facilities are handling the disposal of plasmid
DNA?
Do you dispose of this as biohazard waste or regular trash. Under
my
reading of the NIH Guidelines, rDNA that is outside of an organism
or virus
is exempt from the Guidelines (Section III-F-1). I believe that
this means
that purified rDNA is not in and of itself a biohazard and can be
disposed
of in regular trash.
Practically speaking, there is no way for DNA to get inside of
cells except
under extraordinary circumstances such as a high concentration
contaminating a sharp which then punctures a person or animal.
This would
suggest that DNA in glass containers should be disposed of
carefully,
perhaps by removing the DNA from the vial first.
Any discussion or suggestions that contradict this?
Regards,
Lori Nicholson
Corporate Manager of EH&S
______________________________________________________________________________
Biological Safety Officer
Environment, Health, Safety
SAIC-Frederick
National Cancer Institute - Frederick
(301)846-1451 fax: (301)846-6619
email: jkozlovac@mail.
______________________________________________________________________________
--=====================_8666515==_.ALT--
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 28 Oct 2002 11:31:18 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Gilpin, Richard"
Subject: Re: Plasmid DNA
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Ditto...
Richard W. Gilpin, Ph.D., RBP, CBSP
Assistant Director & Biosafety Officer
Environmental Health & Safety (EHS)
University of Maryland Baltimore
714 West Lombard Street, Room 305
Baltimore MD 21201-1084
(410) 706-7845
Fax (410) 706-1520
rgilpin@ehs.umaryland.edu < mailto:rgilpin@ehs.umaryland.edu
>
ehs.umaryland.edu <
>
-----Original Message-----
From: Joseph P. Kozlovac [mailto:jkozlovac@]
Sent: Monday, October 28, 2002 11:16 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Plasmid DNA
I am glad I am not the trash handler for their facility.
At 08:39 AM 10/24/2002 -0500, you wrote:
I wonder how your facilities are handling the disposal of plasmid DNA?
Do you dispose of this as biohazard waste or regular trash. Under my
reading of the NIH Guidelines, rDNA that is outside of an organism or virus
is exempt from the Guidelines (Section III-F-1). I believe that this means
that purified rDNA is not in and of itself a biohazard and can be disposed
of in regular trash.
Practically speaking, there is no way for DNA to get inside of cells except
under extraordinary circumstances such as a high concentration
contaminating a sharp which then punctures a person or animal. This would
suggest that DNA in glass containers should be disposed of carefully,
perhaps by removing the DNA from the vial first.
Any discussion or suggestions that contradict this?
Regards,
Lori Nicholson
Corporate Manager of EH&S
____________________________________________________________________________
__
Biological Safety Officer
Environment, Health, Safety
SAIC-Frederick
National Cancer Institute - Frederick
(301)846-1451 fax: (301)846-6619
email: jkozlovac@mail.
____________________________________________________________________________
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 28 Oct 2002 11:58:38 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Mark Campbell
Subject: Transporting samples revisited
MIME-version: 1.0
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Hey group,
Still fighting with the interpretation of the DOT regs with regards to
shipping from building to building and having to access a short distance
of public roadway to do so. Is anyone familiar with the formal and
informal interpretation letters that are posted on the DOT HMR's web
site:
One of these letters indicates that if you are not involved in
transporting materials in commerce or transporting hazardous materials
to further a commercial enterprise, you are exempt from the HMRs
171-180. See following link.
Is this applicable for the non-for-profit university?
Thanks,
Mark C.
-------------------------------
Mark J. Campbell, MS, CBSP
Biological Safety Officer
Saint Louis University
1402 S. Grand Blvd.
Caroline Bldg. Rm. 307
St. Louis, MO 63104
(314) 577-8608 Phone
(314) 268-5560 Fax
campbem@slu.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 28 Oct 2002 13:25:44 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Hauck, Philip"
Subject: Re: chemical weapons
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Just for the H of it- check with =
; there may be some regulation at the =
Military end of things, too. Not sure if Dugway or Edgewood =
Arsenal can help you on this.
Phil Hauck
-----Original Message-----
From: Thomas J. Shelley [mailto:tjs1@CORNELL.EDU]
Sent: Sunday, October 27, 2002 11:09 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: chemical weapons
I just reviewed a proposal involving the use of animals and one of the =
agents considered to be a chemical of mass destruction (like soman, =
lewisite, mustard, etc.) and it occurred to me that none of these =
biological surveys have addressed those agents. Is there another agency =
looking into these issues, or another listserve that discusses these I =
should be on?
Dear Cheri and Colleagues--To the best of my knowledge, these agents are =
also somewhat, more or less (pending the outcome of various =
regulations), "regulated" by the CDC. See =
and related pages. Tom
--
*********************************************************
Tom Shelley, Chemical Hygiene Officer, Cornell University
Department of Environmental Health and Safety, 125 Humphreys Service =
Building,
Ithaca, NY 14853. (607) 255-4288 tjs1@cornell.edu
****************************DISCLAIMER********************
The comments and views expressed in this communication are strictly my =
own and
are not to be construed to officially represent those of my peers, =
supervisors or
Cornell University.
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 28 Oct 2002 11:13:53 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Elizabeth Smith
Subject: Re: chemical weapons
In-Reply-To:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Possession of these items, if new to your facility, may require
notification and/or coordination with your local emergency
response group (LEPC, local fire/HazMat, etc.). They probably
don't want to find out you've got chemical WMD by rumor/gossip.
They'll want to keep abreast of what's at your facility to be
able to respond appropriately. Refer to the recent FUBAR in
Moscow, Russia - 100s of people ill, and no one knows what's
made them sick, which makes treatment difficult.
Have the PI produce for your institution's safety
dept./committee a preparedness plan. Has she/he actually
thought it all out? Consulted with a physician about
availability and speed of treatment of employees/students? etc.
etc. etc.
And, don't forget to check the plethora of new laws about
anti-terrorism to make sure they don't also include chemical
WMD.
Peace,
Elizabeth
=====
Elizabeth Smith
Environmental, Health & Safety Manager
BioPort Corporation
3500 N. Martin L. King Blvd.
Lansing, MI 48906
__________________________________________________
Do you Yahoo!?
Y! Web Hosting - Let the expert host your web site
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 28 Oct 2002 13:21:49 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Marcham, Cheri"
Subject: Re: chemical weapons
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Thanks, but that's what I'm trying to find out - are there any NEW laws
regarding the chemical WMD? I am aware of all the existing
requirements, i.e. chemical hygiene plan, emergency response procedures,
etc. The question is whether or not these chemical WMD are now more
regulated, whether we should be surveying for these chemicals and
notifying anyone,etc. was the original intent of my question. I have
not been able to find any new regulation or agency addressing these WMD.
Perhaps, with the Russian issue, they will be?
Cheri Marcham
-----Original Message-----
From: Elizabeth Smith [mailto:safety_queen@]
Sent: Monday, October 28, 2002 1:14 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: chemical weapons
Possession of these items, if new to your facility, may require
notification and/or coordination with your local emergency response
group (LEPC, local fire/HazMat, etc.). They probably don't want to find
out you've got chemical WMD by rumor/gossip.
They'll want to keep abreast of what's at your facility to be able to
respond appropriately. Refer to the recent FUBAR in Moscow, Russia -
100s of people ill, and no one knows what's made them sick, which makes
treatment difficult.
Have the PI produce for your institution's safety dept./committee a
preparedness plan. Has she/he actually thought it all out? Consulted
with a physician about availability and speed of treatment of
employees/students? etc. etc. etc.
And, don't forget to check the plethora of new laws about anti-terrorism
to make sure they don't also include chemical WMD.
Peace,
Elizabeth
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
Elizabeth Smith
Environmental, Health & Safety Manager
BioPort Corporation
3500 N. Martin L. King Blvd.
Lansing, MI 48906
__________________________________________________
Do you Yahoo!?
Y! Web Hosting - Let the expert host your web site
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 28 Oct 2002 14:43:27 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Erik A. Talley"
Subject: Re: chemical weapons
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
Yes! Try the Chemical Weapons Convention Act. It isn't getting a lot of
attention at the moment. Wait for our first sarin attack and watch the
switch to chemical preparedness. Some of our toxins on the select agent
list (ricin, saxitoxin, etc.) can be found here as well. This is part of a
world-wide convention. The federal register notice came out on 12/30/99. I
have a copy of it if anyone needs it. The US requirements for
implementation can be found at:
I did a lot of background work with this when it first came out. If you
need anything specific, feel free to ask.
Erik
At 01:21 PM 10/28/2002 -0600, you wrote:
>Thanks, but that's what I'm trying to find out - are there any NEW laws
>regarding the chemical WMD? I am aware of all the existing
>requirements, i.e. chemical hygiene plan, emergency response procedures,
>etc. The question is whether or not these chemical WMD are now more
>regulated, whether we should be surveying for these chemicals and
>notifying anyone,etc. was the original intent of my question. I have
>not been able to find any new regulation or agency addressing these WMD.
>Perhaps, with the Russian issue, they will be?
>
>Cheri Marcham
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From: Elizabeth Smith [mailto:safety_queen@]
>Sent: Monday, October 28, 2002 1:14 PM
>To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
>Subject: Re: chemical weapons
>
>
>Possession of these items, if new to your facility, may require
>notification and/or coordination with your local emergency response
>group (LEPC, local fire/HazMat, etc.). They probably don't want to find
>out you've got chemical WMD by rumor/gossip.
>
>They'll want to keep abreast of what's at your facility to be able to
>respond appropriately. Refer to the recent FUBAR in Moscow, Russia -
>100s of people ill, and no one knows what's made them sick, which makes
>treatment difficult.
>
>Have the PI produce for your institution's safety dept./committee a
>preparedness plan. Has she/he actually thought it all out? Consulted
>with a physician about availability and speed of treatment of
>employees/students? etc. etc. etc.
>
>And, don't forget to check the plethora of new laws about anti-terrorism
>to make sure they don't also include chemical WMD.
>
>Peace,
>
>Elizabeth
>
>
>
>=====
>Elizabeth Smith
>Environmental, Health & Safety Manager
>BioPort Corporation
>3500 N. Martin L. King Blvd.
>Lansing, MI 48906
>
>__________________________________________________
>Do you Yahoo!?
>Y! Web Hosting - Let the expert host your web site
>
___________________________________
Erik A. Talley, Director
Environmental Health and Safety
Weill Medical College of Cornell University
418 East 71st Street, Suite 62
New York, NY 10021
212-746-6201
ert2002@med.cornell.edu
(Cornell Access Only)
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 28 Oct 2002 13:29:21 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Edwin Jackson
Subject: Re: Transporting samples revisited
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
In furtherance of a commercial enterprise has been interpreted by the DOT to
include any facility that pays people to transport materials. Thus if you are
transporting for your own personal use and not for a company or business you are
outside the DOT regulations. If you transport the material as part of your job
for which you are paid you are "in commerce". This is the interpretation that I
got while attending the DOT Hazardous Materials Transportation Safety course in
Oklahoma City. We actually spent over 30 minutes talking about "in commerce"
and got to speak with some of the regulators who enforce the rules.
If you have questions such as this, RSPA is willing to answer questions. I've
called them several times to get a clarification of the rules. Following is the
contact information.
Contacting the Information Center -- The Hazardous Materials Information Center
can be contacted on 1-800-HMR-4922 (1-800-467-4922) or 202-366-4488 for
Washington DC residents Monday through Friday from 9:00 am to 5:00 pm
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 28 Oct 2002 15:33:13 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ed Gaunt
Subject: Re: chemical weapons
MIME-Version: 1.0
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Ta da...
Ed
-----Original Message-----
From: Erik A. Talley [mailto:ert2002@MED.CORNELL.EDU]
Sent: Monday, October 28, 2002 2:43 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: chemical weapons
Yes! Try the Chemical Weapons Convention Act. It isn't getting a lot of
attention at the moment. Wait for our first sarin attack and watch the
switch to chemical preparedness. Some of our toxins on the select agent
list (ricin, saxitoxin, etc.) can be found here as well. This is part of a
world-wide convention. The federal register notice came out on 12/30/99. I
have a copy of it if anyone needs it. The US requirements for
implementation can be found at:
I did a lot of background work with this when it first came out. If you
need anything specific, feel free to ask.
Erik
At 01:21 PM 10/28/2002 -0600, you wrote:
>Thanks, but that's what I'm trying to find out - are there any NEW laws
>regarding the chemical WMD? I am aware of all the existing
>requirements, i.e. chemical hygiene plan, emergency response procedures,
>etc. The question is whether or not these chemical WMD are now more
>regulated, whether we should be surveying for these chemicals and
>notifying anyone,etc. was the original intent of my question. I have
>not been able to find any new regulation or agency addressing these WMD.
>Perhaps, with the Russian issue, they will be?
>
>Cheri Marcham
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From: Elizabeth Smith [mailto:safety_queen@]
>Sent: Monday, October 28, 2002 1:14 PM
>To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
>Subject: Re: chemical weapons
>
>
>Possession of these items, if new to your facility, may require
>notification and/or coordination with your local emergency response
>group (LEPC, local fire/HazMat, etc.). They probably don't want to find
>out you've got chemical WMD by rumor/gossip.
>
>They'll want to keep abreast of what's at your facility to be able to
>respond appropriately. Refer to the recent FUBAR in Moscow, Russia -
>100s of people ill, and no one knows what's made them sick, which makes
>treatment difficult.
>
>Have the PI produce for your institution's safety dept./committee a
>preparedness plan. Has she/he actually thought it all out? Consulted
>with a physician about availability and speed of treatment of
>employees/students? etc. etc. etc.
>
>And, don't forget to check the plethora of new laws about anti-terrorism
>to make sure they don't also include chemical WMD.
>
>Peace,
>
>Elizabeth
>
>
>
>=====
>Elizabeth Smith
>Environmental, Health & Safety Manager
>BioPort Corporation
>3500 N. Martin L. King Blvd.
>Lansing, MI 48906
>
>__________________________________________________
>Do you Yahoo!?
>Y! Web Hosting - Let the expert host your web site
>
___________________________________
Erik A. Talley, Director
Environmental Health and Safety
Weill Medical College of Cornell University
418 East 71st Street, Suite 62
New York, NY 10021
212-746-6201
ert2002@med.cornell.edu
(Cornell Access Only)
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=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 28 Oct 2002 14:54:22 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Judy Pointer
Subject: Re: Transporting samples revisited
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I hate to throw a wrench at this monkey, but about 4 years back I had
the same question and got a different answer when I called the DOT
folks. I was told that "in commerce" meant money exchanged hands. And
specifically if our state employee was transporting materials from one
of our campus sites to another state employee at another campus building
(even if across or via a public road) that so long as it was not
transported out-of-state, that it was not technically "in commerce" -
and therefore exempt. We came up with an institutional "safe-transport
policy" whereby personal transport of viable infectious materials was
discouraged, but allowed, if the material was packaged equivalent to DOT
regs. The package must be biohazard labeled, contained in
double-sealed, unbreakable leak-proof containers and we made an
accompanying "transport form" that identified the Biosafety level, the
specific hazard, and the sender's and the receiver's contact
information. For Risk Group 3 and higher agents we also required a
sign-off form to be returned to the biosafety office before it was sent.
In our case, many of our buildings were just one public road crossing
from another and often staff would walk the material across the street.
Many labs began saving and reusing, old transport boxes just for these
treks.
Judy Pointer
>>> Edwin_Jackson@BYU.EDU 10/28/02 01:29PM >>>
In furtherance of a commercial enterprise has been interpreted by the
DOT to
include any facility that pays people to transport materials. Thus if
you are
transporting for your own personal use and not for a company or
business you are
outside the DOT regulations. If you transport the material as part of
your job
for which you are paid you are "in commerce". This is the
interpretation that I
got while attending the DOT Hazardous Materials Transportation Safety
course in
Oklahoma City. We actually spent over 30 minutes talking about "in
commerce"
and got to speak with some of the regulators who enforce the rules.
If you have questions such as this, RSPA is willing to answer
questions. I've
called them several times to get a clarification of the rules.
Following is the
contact information.
Contacting the Information Center -- The Hazardous Materials
Information Center
can be contacted on 1-800-HMR-4922 (1-800-467-4922) or 202-366-4488
for
Washington DC residents Monday through Friday from 9:00 am to 5:00 pm
--=_5C00D106.A3C2A680
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I hate to throw a wrench at this monkey, but about 4 years back I
had the same question and got a different answer when I called the
DOT folks. I was told that "in commerce" meant money exchanged
hands. And specifically if our state employee was transporting
materials from one of our campus sites to another state employee at
another campus building (even if across or via a public road) that
so long as it was not transported out-of-state, that it was not
technically "in commerce" - and therefore exempt. We came up with
an institutional "safe-transport policy" whereby personal transport
of viable infectious materials was discouraged, but allowed, if the
material was packaged equivalent to DOT regs. The package must be
biohazard labeled, contained in double-sealed, unbreakable
leak-proof containers and we made an accompanying "transport form"
that identified the Biosafety level, the specific hazard, and the
sender's and the receiver's contact information. For Risk Group 3
and higher agents we also required a sign-off form to be returned to
the biosafety office before it was sent.
In our case, many of our buildings were just one public road
crossing from another and often staff would walk the material across
the street. Many labs began saving and reusing, old transport boxes
just for these treks.
Judy Pointer
>>> Edwin_Jackson@BYU.EDU 10/28/02 01:29PM >>>
In furtherance of a commercial enterprise has been interpreted by
the DOT to
include any facility that pays people to transport materials. Thus
if you are
transporting for your own personal use and not for a company or
business you are
outside the DOT regulations. If you transport the material as part
of your job
for which you are paid you are "in commerce". This is the
interpretation that I
got while attending the DOT Hazardous Materials Transportation
Safety course in
Oklahoma City. We actually spent over 30 minutes talking about "in
commerce"
and got to speak with some of the regulators who enforce the rules.
If you have questions such as this, RSPA is willing to answer
questions. I've
called them several times to get a clarification of the rules.
Following is the
contact information.
Contacting the Information Center -- The Hazardous Materials
Information Center
can be contacted on 1-800-HMR-4922 (1-800-467-4922) or 202-366-4488
for
Washington DC residents Monday through Friday from 9:00 am to 5:00
pm
--=_5C00D106.A3C2A680--
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 28 Oct 2002 16:12:55 -0600
Reply-To: campbem@SLU.EDU
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: campbem
Subject: Re: Transporting samples revisited
>Judy, I was basically told the same thing from the Hazmat
specialist on the 800 hotline. Confusing issue.
Thanks,
Mark C.
I hate to throw a wrench at this monkey, but about 4 years
> back I had
> the same question and got a different answer when I called
> the DOT
> folks. I was told that "in commerce" meant money
> exchanged hands. And
> specifically if our state employee was transporting
> materials from one
> of our campus sites to another state employee at another
> campus building
> (even if across or via a public road) that so long as it
> was not
> transported out-of-state, that it was not technically "in
> commerce" -
> and therefore exempt. We came up with an institutional
> "safe-transport
> policy" whereby personal transport of viable infectious
> materials was
> discouraged, but allowed, if the material was packaged
> equivalent to DOT
> regs. The package must be biohazard labeled, contained in
> double-sealed, unbreakable leak-proof containers and we
> made an
> accompanying "transport form" that identified the
> Biosafety level, the
> specific hazard, and the sender's and the receiver's
> contact
> information. For Risk Group 3 and higher agents we also
> required a
> sign-off form to be returned to the biosafety office
> before it was sent.
>
>
> In our case, many of our buildings were just one public
> road crossing
> from another and often staff would walk the material
> across the street.
> Many labs began saving and reusing, old transport boxes
> just for these
> treks.
> Judy Pointer
>
> >>> Edwin_Jackson@BYU.EDU 10/28/02 01:29PM >>>
> In furtherance of a commercial enterprise has been
> interpreted by the
> DOT to
> include any facility that pays people to transport
> materials. Thus if
> you are
> transporting for your own personal use and not for a
> company or
> business you are
> outside the DOT regulations. If you transport the
> material as part of
> your job
> for which you are paid you are "in commerce". This is the
> interpretation that I
> got while attending the DOT Hazardous Materials
> Transportation Safety
> course in
> Oklahoma City. We actually spent over 30 minutes talking
> about "in
> commerce"
> and got to speak with some of the regulators who enforce
> the rules.
>
> If you have questions such as this, RSPA is willing to
> answer
> questions. I've
> called them several times to get a clarification of the
> rules.
> Following is the
> contact information.
>
> Contacting the Information Center -- The Hazardous
> Materials
> Information Center
> can be contacted on 1-800-HMR-4922 (1-800-467-4922) or
> 202-366-4488
> for
> Washington DC residents Monday through Friday from 9:00 am
> to 5:00 pm
>
>
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 28 Oct 2002 16:21:19 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Jeppesen, Eric R"
Subject: Re: Transporting samples revisited
MIME-Version: 1.0
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I talked to a person at DOT on Friday 10-25-02 about transporting biohazard
agents from out of state.
I was told that since it's coming from one state facility to another that it
would not be in commerce and therefore
would not fall under the DOT regs. The person from DOT said it would still
be a good idea to have the material properly contained
and labeled, with which I agreed completely.
Eric R. Jeppesen
Laboratory Safety Specialist
-----Original Message-----
From: Judy Pointer [mailto:JPointer@SALUD.UNM.EDU]
Sent: Monday, October 28, 2002 3:54 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Transporting samples revisited
I hate to throw a wrench at this monkey, but about 4 years back I had the
same question and got a different answer when I called the DOT folks. I was
told that "in commerce" meant money exchanged hands. And specifically if
our state employee was transporting materials from one of our campus sites
to another state employee at another campus building (even if across or via
a public road) that so long as it was not transported out-of-state, that it
was not technically "in commerce" - and therefore exempt. We came up with
an institutional "safe-transport policy" whereby personal transport of
viable infectious materials was discouraged, but allowed, if the material
was packaged equivalent to DOT regs. The package must be biohazard labeled,
contained in double-sealed, unbreakable leak-proof containers and we made an
accompanying "transport form" that identified the Biosafety level, the
specific hazard, and the sender's and the receiver's contact information.
For Risk Group 3 and higher agents we also required a sign-off form to be
returned to the biosafety office before it was sent.
In our case, many of our buildings were just one public road crossing from
another and often staff would walk the material across the street. Many
labs began saving and reusing, old transport boxes just for these treks.
Judy Pointer
>>> Edwin_Jackson@BYU.EDU 10/28/02 01:29PM >>>
In furtherance of a commercial enterprise has been interpreted by the DOT to
include any facility that pays people to transport materials. Thus if you
are
transporting for your own personal use and not for a company or business you
are
outside the DOT regulations. If you transport the material as part of your
job
for which you are paid you are "in commerce". This is the interpretation
that I
got while attending the DOT Hazardous Materials Transportation Safety course
in
Oklahoma City. We actually spent over 30 minutes talking about "in
commerce"
and got to speak with some of the regulators who enforce the rules.
If you have questions such as this, RSPA is willing to answer questions.
I've
called them several times to get a clarification of the rules. Following is
the
contact information.
Contacting the Information Center -- The Hazardous Materials Information
Center
can be contacted on 1-800-HMR-4922 (1-800-467-4922) or 202-366-4488 for
Washington DC residents Monday through Friday from 9:00 am to 5:00 pm
------_=_NextPart_001_01C27ED0.56CA48B0
Content-Type: text/html;
charset="iso-8859-1"
I talked to a person at DOT on Friday 10-25-02 about transporting
biohazard agents from out of state.
I was told that since it's coming from one state facility to another
that it would not be in commerce and therefore
would not fall under the DOT regs. The person from DOT said it
would still be a good idea to have the material properly contained
and labeled, with which I agreed completely.
size=2>
size=2>
-----Original Message-----
From: Judy Pointer [mailto:JPointer@SALUD.UNM.EDU]
Sent: Monday, October 28, 2002 3:54 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Transporting samples revisited
I hate to throw a wrench at this monkey, but about 4 years back I
had the same question and got a different answer when I called the
DOT folks. I was told that "in commerce" meant money exchanged
hands. And specifically if our state employee was transporting
materials from one of our campus sites to another state employee
at another campus building (even if across or via a public road)
that so long as it was not transported out-of-state, that it was
not technically "in commerce" - and therefore exempt. We came up
with an institutional "safe-transport policy" whereby personal
transport of viable infectious materials was discouraged, but
allowed, if the material was packaged equivalent to DOT regs. The
package must be biohazard labeled, contained in double-sealed,
unbreakable leak-proof containers and we made an accompanying
"transport form" that identified the Biosafety level, the specific
hazard, and the sender's and the receiver's contact information.
For Risk Group 3 and higher agents we also required a sign-off
form to be returned to the biosafety office before it was sent.
In our case, many of our buildings were just one public road
crossing from another and often staff would walk the material
across the street. Many labs began saving and reusing, old
transport boxes just for these treks.
Judy Pointer
>>> Edwin_Jackson@BYU.EDU 10/28/02 01:29PM >>>
In furtherance of a commercial enterprise has been interpreted by
the DOT to
include any facility that pays people to transport materials.
Thus if you are
transporting for your own personal use and not for a company or
business you are
outside the DOT regulations. If you transport the material as
part of your job
for which you are paid you are "in commerce". This is the
interpretation that I
got while attending the DOT Hazardous Materials Transportation
Safety course in
Oklahoma City. We actually spent over 30 minutes talking about
"in commerce"
and got to speak with some of the regulators who enforce the
rules.
If you have questions such as this, RSPA is willing to answer
questions. I've
called them several times to get a clarification of the rules.
Following is the
contact information.
Contacting the Information Center -- The Hazardous Materials
Information Center
can be contacted on 1-800-HMR-4922 (1-800-467-4922) or
202-366-4488 for
Washington DC residents Monday through Friday from 9:00 am to 5:00
pm
------_=_NextPart_001_01C27ED0.56CA48B0--
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 28 Oct 2002 15:27:34 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Baker Sharyn
Subject: Re: Transporting samples revisited
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Also, anyone thinking of transporting hazardous materials of any kind =
across public roads, where in fact a material of trade exemption =
applies, would be smart to read the actual regulations. Infectious =
agents, for example, if memory serves me correctly, are not exempted by =
this US DOT Materials of Trade exemption, nor are certain other items, =
quantities etc. As well, remember that your state highway law =
enforcement agency may have some specific regulations of their own. So =
it is always wise to get their interpretation on what one is doing.\
Sharyn Baker, M.S., M.A.
Instructor/Computer-Based-Training Design
Master's in Environmental Science And Engineering
University of Colorado Health Sciences Center
Department of Research Affairs
4200 E. 9th Avenue
Denver, Colorado 80262
Email: sharyn.baker@uchsc.edu
Voicemail: (303) 315-8003
> ----------
> From: Jeppesen, Eric R
> Reply To: A Biosafety Discussion List
> Sent: Monday, October 28, 2002 3:21 PM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: Re: Transporting samples revisited
>
> I talked to a person at DOT on Friday 10-25-02 about transporting =
biohazard agents from out of state.
> I was told that since it's coming from one state facility to another =
that it would not be in commerce and therefore
> would not fall under the DOT regs. The person from DOT said it would =
still be a good idea to have the material properly contained
> and labeled, with which I agreed completely.
>
> Eric R. Jeppesen
> Laboratory Safety Specialist
>
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Judy Pointer [mailto:JPointer@SALUD.UNM.EDU]
> Sent: Monday, October 28, 2002 3:54 PM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: Re: Transporting samples revisited
>
>
>
> I hate to throw a wrench at this monkey, but about 4 years back I had =
the same question and got a different answer when I called the DOT =
folks. I was told that "in commerce" meant money exchanged hands. And =
specifically if our state employee was transporting materials from one =
of our campus sites to another state employee at another campus building =
(even if across or via a public road) that so long as it was not =
transported out-of-state, that it was not technically "in commerce" - =
and therefore exempt. We came up with an institutional "safe-transport =
policy" whereby personal transport of viable infectious materials was =
discouraged, but allowed, if the material was packaged equivalent to DOT =
regs. The package must be biohazard labeled, contained in =
double-sealed, unbreakable leak-proof containers and we made an =
accompanying "transport form" that identified the Biosafety level, the =
specific hazard, and the sender's and the receiver's contact =
information. For Risk Group 3 and higher agents we also required a =
sign-off form to be returned to the biosafety office before it was sent. =
>
> In our case, many of our buildings were just one public road crossing =
from another and often staff would walk the material across the street. =
Many labs began saving and reusing, old transport boxes just for these =
treks.
> Judy Pointer
>
> >>> Edwin_Jackson@BYU.EDU 10/28/02 01:29PM >>>
> In furtherance of a commercial enterprise has been interpreted by the =
DOT to
> include any facility that pays people to transport materials. Thus =
if you are
> transporting for your own personal use and not for a company or =
business you are
> outside the DOT regulations. If you transport the material as part =
of your job
> for which you are paid you are "in commerce". This is the =
interpretation that I
> got while attending the DOT Hazardous Materials Transportation Safety =
course in
> Oklahoma City. We actually spent over 30 minutes talking about "in =
commerce"
> and got to speak with some of the regulators who enforce the rules.
>
> If you have questions such as this, RSPA is willing to answer =
questions. I've
> called them several times to get a clarification of the rules.> =
Following is the
> contact information.
>
> Contacting the Information Center -- The Hazardous Materials =
Information Center
> can be contacted on 1-800-HMR-4922 (1-800-467-4922) or 202-366-4488 =
for
> Washington DC residents Monday through Friday from 9:00 am to 5:00 pm
>
>
>
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 29 Oct 2002 11:30:34 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "OLINGER, PATRICIA L [S&C/0216]"
Subject: Picture - Biocontainment
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Does anyone have and willing to share a digital picture of centrifuge
biocontainment cups?
If so, would you PLEASE send it to me.
Thanks,
Patty Olinger
Pharmacia, Kalamazoo Corporate Services - ESH
Biosafety Officer
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 29 Oct 2002 08:33:54 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Criscuolo, TR (Tedi)"
Subject: Re: Picture - Biocontainment
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
I would be interested in that picture also. Thanks
Tedi Criscuolo
Industrial Hygienist/Safety Representative
Battelle IH & OS Operations Group
Office: (509) 373-1169
Pager: (509) 544-3144
tedi.criscuolo@
> -----Original Message-----
> From: OLINGER, PATRICIA L [S&C/0216]
> [mailto:patricia.l.olinger@]
> Sent: Tuesday, October 29, 2002 8:31 AM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: Picture - Biocontainment
>
>
> Does anyone have and willing to share a digital picture of centrifuge
> biocontainment cups?
>
> If so, would you PLEASE send it to me.
>
> Thanks,
>
> Patty Olinger
> Pharmacia, Kalamazoo Corporate Services - ESH
> Biosafety Officer
>
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 29 Oct 2002 09:49:03 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Judy Pointer
Subject: Re: Picture - Biocontainment
Mime-Version: 1.0
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HI Patty,
I've attached a .gif of one.
Judy Pointer, MS, CBSP
University Biosafety Officer
Office of Research Protection
UNM School of Medicine
BMSB B77
915 Camino de Salud NE
Albuquerque, NM 87131-5196
(505) 272-8001
(505) 272-0803 (Fax)
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HI Patty,
I've attached a .gif of one.
Judy Pointer, MS, CBSP
University Biosafety Officer
Office of Research Protection
UNM School of Medicine
BMSB B77
915 Camino de Salud NE
Albuquerque, NM 87131-5196
(505) 272-8001
(505) 272-0803 (Fax)
--=_401CCE17.0F6E0277--
--=_401CCE17.0E6F0376
Content-Type: image/gif; name="Picture1.gif"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="Picture1.gif"
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 29 Oct 2002 11:53:49 -0500
Reply-To: pr18@columbia.edu
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: paul rubock
Organization: EH&S
Subject: Re: Picture - Biocontainment
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="------------95F8367CE81DB81FDF4CF973"
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--------------95F8367CE81DB81FDF4CF973
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"OLINGER, PATRICIA L [S&C/0216]" wrote:
> Does anyone have and willing to share a digital picture of centrifuge
> biocontainment cups?
>
> If so, would you PLEASE send it to me.
>
> Thanks,
>
> Patty Olinger
> Pharmacia, Kalamazoo Corporate Services - ESH
> Biosafety Officer
--------------95F8367CE81DB81FDF4CF973
Content-Type: application/msword;
name="safety cup.jpg.doc"
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 29 Oct 2002 09:42:51 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Hofherr, Leslie"
Subject: Re: Picture - Biocontainment
MIME-Version: 1.0
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This message is in MIME format. Since your mail reader does not understand
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------_=_NextPart_000_01C27F72.9A81EAC0
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-----Original Message-----
From: OLINGER, PATRICIA L [S&C/0216]
[mailto:patricia.l.olinger@]
Sent: Tuesday, October 29, 2002 8:31 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Picture - Biocontainment
Does anyone have and willing to share a digital picture of centrifuge
biocontainment cups?
If so, would you PLEASE send it to me.
Thanks,
Patty Olinger
Pharmacia, Kalamazoo Corporate Services - ESH
Biosafety Officer
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Date: Tue, 29 Oct 2002 19:50:25 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Koporc, Kim"
Subject: Re: Wild Polio Virus Survey - Penalties?
MIME-Version: 1.0
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Hi Patricia - I have been away from the office (jury duty) but will work =
on getting the list up on our website, od/nvpo/polio, as =
soon as I return. Best regards, Kim
Please note that although I am away from the office, I am still =
monitoring e-mail so please keep the questions coming. My colleagues =
and I will do our best to answer questions in a timely manner.
-----Original Message-----
From: OLINGER, PATRICIA L [S&C/0216] =
[mailto:patricia.l.olinger@]
Sent: Mon 10/28/2002 9:42 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Cc:=09
Subject: Re: Wild Polio Virus Survey - Penalties?
Hi Kim,
In San Fransico it was indicated that we could see the list of countries
that has completed the survey. Where would we find this list?
Patty Olinger
Pharmacia, Kalamazoo Corporate Services - ESH
Biosafety Officer
-----Original Message-----
From: Koporc, Kim [mailto:KKoporc@]
Sent: Wednesday, October 23, 2002 4:39 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Wild Polio Virus Survey - Penalties?
Dear Sharon - I believe that some of your questions were answered in the
e-mail I recently sent out on the List Serve. Regarding your question =
about
penalties, the inventory assumes all institutions endorse polio =
eradication,
understand the public health implications of poliovirus containment, and
take their responsibility seriously. To date the inventory process has =
been
carried out in 122 other countries, and very few of these countries have
found it necessary to legislate penalties. Many thanks for your =
questions.
Best regards, Kim
-----Original Message-----
From: Stetz, Sharon [mailto:Sharon.Stetz@]
Sent: Wednesday, October 23, 2002 2:22 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Wild Polio Virus Survey - Penalties?
Does anyone know if there are any noncompliance penalties associated =
with
this survey? (such as for not having it completed on time or for =
deciding to
exclude particular off-site facilities). I have contacted the help line =
to
ask if this process is site (address)-driven or employer driven and they
couldn't answer my question. At least for the SA notification, we were
repeatedly reminded about the definition of a "facility" so we knew who =
had
to report what. For this next survey, it appears that less guidance is
available. We did receive a number of SA notification forms but haven't
seen a single copy of the Wild Polio Virus Inventory. Is anyone else =
facing
similar questions and problems?
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Hi Patricia - I have been away from the office (jury = duty) but
will work on getting the list up on our website, =
od/nvpo/polio, as soon as I return. Best regards, = Kim
Please note that although I am away from the office, I am still =
monitoring e-mail so please keep the questions coming. My =
colleagues and I will do our best to answer questions in a timely =
manner.
-----Original Message-----
HREF=3D"mailto:patricia.l.olinger@">mailto:patricia.l.olinge=
r@]
Sent: Mon 10/28/2002 9:42 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Cc:
Subject: = Re: Wild Polio Virus Survey - Penalties?
Hi Kim,
In San Fransico it was indicated that we could see the list of =
countries
that has completed the survey. Where would we find this list?
Patty Olinger
Pharmacia, Kalamazoo Corporate Services - ESH
Biosafety Officer
-----Original Message-----
R> Sent: Wednesday, October 23, 2002 4:39 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Wild Polio Virus Survey - Penalties?
Dear Sharon - I believe that some of your questions were answered in
= the
e-mail I recently sent out on the List Serve. Regarding your =
question about
penalties, the inventory assumes all institutions endorse polio =
eradication,
understand the public health implications of poliovirus containment,
= and
take their responsibility seriously. To date the inventory process
= has been
carried out in 122 other countries, and very few of these countries
= have
found it necessary to legislate penalties. Many thanks for your =
questions.
Best regards, Kim
-----Original Message-----
R> Sent: Wednesday, October 23, 2002 2:22 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Wild Polio Virus Survey - Penalties?
Does anyone know if there are any noncompliance penalties associated
= with
this survey? (such as for not having it completed on time or for =
deciding to
exclude particular off-site facilities). I have contacted the help
= line to
ask if this process is site (address)-driven or employer driven and
= they
couldn't answer my question. At least for the SA notification, we =
were
repeatedly reminded about the definition of a "facility" so we =
knew who had
to report what. For this next survey, it appears that less =
guidance is
available. We did receive a number of SA notification forms but =
haven't
seen a single copy of the Wild Polio Virus Inventory. Is anyone =
else facing
similar questions and problems?
------_=_NextPart_001_01C27FAE.559EA30E--
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 29 Oct 2002 19:58:07 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Koporc, Kim"
Subject: Re: poliovirus forms
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="----_=_NextPart_001_01C27FAF.68F4412A"
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Dear All - I apologize for the confusion. The correct year for the US =
is 1979. Best regards, Kim
-----Original Message-----
From: Gerry Griffin [mailto:griffg01@MED.NYU.EDU]
Sent: Fri 10/25/2002 9:26 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Cc:=09
Subject: Re: poliovirus forms
If you look at the current Appendix II on the CDC website, it also uses
1979. I had an earlier version also, which was confusing me. The
laboratory worksheet forms are also a little different from the ones I
first printed out.
-----Original Message-----
From: A Biosafety Discussion List [mailto:BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU] On
Behalf Of Carl Pike
Sent: Friday, October 25, 2002 8:01 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: poliovirus forms
I am writing about the "cutoff date" for possibly infectious water
samples from the U.S. In Appendix 2 it is stated that the last
reported U.S. case was 1986. In the brochure "National Inventory of
Wild Poliovirus Materials", item 9, the date 1979 is given. Which is
correct???
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Dear All - I apologize for the confusion. The = correct year for
the US is 1979. Best regards, Kim
-----Original Message-----
HREF=3D"mailto:griffg01@MED.NYU.EDU">mailto:griffg01@MED.NYU.EDU]
= Sent: Fri 10/25/2002 9:26 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Cc:
Subject: = Re: poliovirus forms
If you look at the current Appendix II on the CDC website, it also =
uses
1979. I had an earlier version also, which was confusing me. = The
laboratory worksheet forms are also a little different from the ones
= I
first printed out.
-----Original Message-----
HREF=3D"mailto:BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU">mailto:BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU]
On
Behalf Of Carl Pike
Sent: Friday, October 25, 2002 8:01 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: poliovirus forms
I am writing about the "cutoff date" for possibly infectious = water
samples from the U.S. In Appendix 2 it is stated that the last
reported U.S. case was 1986. In the brochure "National = Inventory
of
Wild Poliovirus Materials", item 9, the date 1979 is given. = Which
is
correct???
------_=_NextPart_001_01C27FAF.68F4412A--
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 30 Oct 2002 10:41:10 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ruth Medina
Subject: Re: La Sota strain of Newcastle disease virus
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
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boundary="=====================_4243331==_.ALT"
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Hi there,
Is anybody familiar with La Sota strain of Newcastle disease virus ?
Ruth.
Ruth Medina, Ph.D.
Committee on Microbiological Safety
Harvard Medical School
Gordon Hall, Suite 411
25 Shattuck St. Phone (617) 432-4897
Boston, MA 02215 Fax (617) 432-3169
--=====================_4243331==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
Hi there,
Is anybody familiar with La Sota strain of Newcastle disease virus
?
Ruth.
Ruth Medina, Ph.D.
Committee on Microbiological Safety
Harvard Medical School
Gordon Hall, Suite 411
25 Shattuck St. Phone (617) 432-4897
Boston, MA 02215 Fax (617) 432-3169
--=====================_4243331==_.ALT--
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 30 Oct 2002 14:10:20 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: David Gillum
Subject: Security Questions for Polio Labs
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Dear Biosafety Listserve Members,
Can anyone tell me how they are handling security for poliovirus
laboratories? I know of the CDC/NIH BMBL BSL-2/Polio requirements. I am
especially wondering if you are taking extra precautions (i.e. background
checks) with these labs.
Your thoughts are appreciated.
-David
--
David R. Gillum
Laboratory Safety Officer
Environmental Health and Safety
11 Leavitt Lane, Perpetuity Hall
Durham, NH 03824
Telephone #: 603-862-0197
Facsimile #: 603-862-0047
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 30 Oct 2002 14:33:32 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: David Gillum
Subject: Polio - Informed Consent Form
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Dear Biosafety Listserve Members,
Do you have or know of an "Informed Consent" document for polio usage? This
document would probably be similar to a Hepatitis B consent document. It
should contain the health risks associated with poliovirus, immunization
information, etc. This form would be given to faculty, staff, students, and
visitors that enter a poliovirus research laboratory.
Thanks, in advance, for your help.
-David
--
David R. Gillum
Laboratory Safety Officer
Environmental Health and Safety
11 Leavitt Lane, Perpetuity Hall
Durham, NH 03824
Telephone #: 603-862-0197
Facsimile #: 603-862-0047
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 30 Oct 2002 14:34:23 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Jeffrey Good
Subject: Prion Research
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
** High Priority **
** Reply Requested by 10/30/2002 (Wednesday) **
URGENT REQUEST
We are in the process of vetting some protocols dealing with Prions and
HSE (CJD, vCJD) and noticed that Bovine (BSE) is on the USDA
high-consequence list. With the assumption (no one it appears, has any
real knowledge) of the species transfer capability of Prions, is it a
safe assumption that HSE (all Prions) in general should be treated as
either Select Agents or High-Consequence Pathogens?
Please repond to list or directly. Your assistance is appreciated.
Jeff
Jeffrey M. Good
Acting Director &
Hazardous Materials Safety Officer
Office of Laboratory Safety and Compliance
The George Washington University Medical Center
Office: (202) 994-5059
Mobile: (202) 437-6155
rsojmg@gwumc.edu
gwumc.edu/research/labsafety.htm
>>> David.Gillum@UNH.EDU 10/30/02 02:10PM >>>
Dear Biosafety Listserve Members,
Can anyone tell me how they are handling security for poliovirus
laboratories? I know of the CDC/NIH BMBL BSL-2/Polio requirements. I
am
especially wondering if you are taking extra precautions (i.e.
background
checks) with these labs.
Your thoughts are appreciated.
-David
--
David R. Gillum
Laboratory Safety Officer
Environmental Health and Safety
11 Leavitt Lane, Perpetuity Hall
Durham, NH 03824
Telephone #: 603-862-0197
Facsimile #: 603-862-0047
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 30 Oct 2002 13:39:09 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Kathryn Harris
Subject: Re: Security Questions for Polio Labs
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
Dear David,
It would seem to me that extra security precautions are not required at
this stage of the game. Unlike the Select Agents, polio could be considered
no different to any other BSL-2 agent used in the Lab (with the BSL-2/Polio
requirements in place of course) so should be subject to the same level of
precaution/security. When there comes a point that vaccination programs are
ceased and the population at large becomes susceptible this issue may need
to be re-addressed. As of now I can't see how polio in a lab setting poses
a specific bio-terrorist type threat beyond that of any other BSL-2
organism, less so in fact as the majority of the population in the USA are
vaccinated.
Thanks for bringing it up, I would also be interested if anyone is taking a
more stringent approach at this time.
Kath Harris
**********************************************
Kathryn Louise Harris, Ph.D.
Biological Safety Professional
Office of Research Safety
Northwestern University
NG-71 Technological Institute
2145 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208-3121
Phone: (847) 491-4387
Fax: (847) 467-2797
Email: kathrynharris@northwestern.edu
**********************************************
At 02:10 PM 10/30/2002 -0500, you wrote:
>Dear Biosafety Listserve Members,
>
>Can anyone tell me how they are handling security for poliovirus
>laboratories? I know of the CDC/NIH BMBL BSL-2/Polio requirements. I am
>especially wondering if you are taking extra precautions (i.e. background
>checks) with these labs.
>
>Your thoughts are appreciated.
>
>-David
>
>--
>David R. Gillum
>
>Laboratory Safety Officer
>Environmental Health and Safety
>11 Leavitt Lane, Perpetuity Hall
>Durham, NH 03824
>Telephone #: 603-862-0197
>Facsimile #: 603-862-0047
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 30 Oct 2002 15:26:51 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Richard Fink
Subject: Re: Prion Research
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="=====================_198710720==_.ALT"
--=====================_198710720==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
First, treat HSE as either RG 2 or 3 depending upon the experiment (see the
NIH/CDC's BMBL for details).
Second is vCJD considered HSE or BSE - good question. I would tend to say
it is human adapted BSE but you had better check with the CDC or USDA to
find out for sure.
At 02:34 PM 10/30/2002 -0500, you wrote:
>** High Priority **
>** Reply Requested by 10/30/2002 (Wednesday) **
>
>URGENT REQUEST
>
>We are in the process of vetting some protocols dealing with Prions and
>HSE (CJD, vCJD) and noticed that Bovine (BSE) is on the USDA
>high-consequence list. With the assumption (no one it appears, has any
>real knowledge) of the species transfer capability of Prions, is it a
>safe assumption that HSE (all Prions) in general should be treated as
>either Select Agents or High-Consequence Pathogens?
>
>Please repond to list or directly. Your assistance is appreciated.
>
>Jeff
>
>
>Jeffrey M. Good
>Acting Director &
>Hazardous Materials Safety Officer
>Office of Laboratory Safety and Compliance
>The George Washington University Medical Center
>Office: (202) 994-5059
>Mobile: (202) 437-6155
>rsojmg@gwumc.edu
>gwumc.edu/research/labsafety.htm
>
> >>> David.Gillum@UNH.EDU 10/30/02 02:10PM >>>
>Dear Biosafety Listserve Members,
>
>Can anyone tell me how they are handling security for poliovirus
>laboratories? I know of the CDC/NIH BMBL BSL-2/Polio requirements. I
>am
>especially wondering if you are taking extra precautions (i.e.
>background
>checks) with these labs.
>
>Your thoughts are appreciated.
>
>-David
>
>--
>David R. Gillum
>
>Laboratory Safety Officer
>Environmental Health and Safety
>11 Leavitt Lane, Perpetuity Hall
>Durham, NH 03824
>Telephone #: 603-862-0197
>Facsimile #: 603-862-0047
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
--=====================_198710720==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
First, treat HSE as either RG 2 or 3 depending upon the experiment
(see the NIH/CDC's BMBL for details).
Second is vCJD considered HSE or BSE - good question. I would tend
to say it is human adapted BSE but you had better check with the CDC
or USDA to find out for sure.
At 02:34 PM 10/30/2002 -0500, you wrote:
** High Priority **
** Reply Requested by 10/30/2002 (Wednesday) **
URGENT REQUEST
We are in the process of vetting some protocols dealing with
Prions and
HSE (CJD, vCJD) and noticed that Bovine (BSE) is on the USDA
high-consequence list. With the assumption (no one it appears, has
any
real knowledge) of the species transfer capability of Prions, is
it a
safe assumption that HSE (all Prions) in general should be treated
as
either Select Agents or High-Consequence Pathogens?
Please repond to list or directly. Your assistance is appreciated.
Jeff
Jeffrey M. Good
Acting Director &
Hazardous Materials Safety Officer
Office of Laboratory Safety and Compliance
The George Washington University Medical Center
Office: (202) 994-5059
Mobile: (202) 437-6155
rsojmg@gwumc.edu
gwumc.edu/research/labsafety.htm
>>> David.Gillum@UNH.EDU 10/30/02 02:10PM >>>
Dear Biosafety Listserve Members,
Can anyone tell me how they are handling security for poliovirus
laboratories? I know of the CDC/NIH BMBL BSL-2/Polio requirements.
I
am
especially wondering if you are taking extra precautions (i.e.
background
checks) with these labs.
Your thoughts are appreciated.
-David
--
David R. Gillum
Laboratory Safety Officer
Environmental Health and Safety
11 Leavitt Lane, Perpetuity Hall
Durham, NH 03824
Telephone #: 603-862-0197
Facsimile #: 603-862-0047
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
--=====================_198710720==_.ALT--
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 30 Oct 2002 12:40:31 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Funk, Glenn"
Subject: Re: Prion Research
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
At UCSF, the Prusiner lab's policy called for handling all human, BSE and
other prions being grown in "humanized" animal hosts at BSL3 and all other
animal prions at BSL2, often with enhanced practices. I don't believe this
has changed since I left - if it has, I trust Brynte Johnson, the current
BSO, will jump in here. So in this sense, they should be treated as serious
pathogens but there is no current requirement to register their possession
or use under the new Select Agent regs.
Glenn A. Funk, Ph.D., CBSP
Director and Biosafety Officer
Environment, Health and Safety
MedImmune Vaccines, Inc.
408-845-8847
(ex-UCSF BSO)
-----Original Message-----
From: Jeffrey Good [mailto:rsojmg@GWUMC.EDU]
Sent: Wednesday, October 30, 2002 11:34 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Prion Research
** High Priority **
** Reply Requested by 10/30/2002 (Wednesday) **
URGENT REQUEST
We are in the process of vetting some protocols dealing with Prions and
HSE (CJD, vCJD) and noticed that Bovine (BSE) is on the USDA
high-consequence list. With the assumption (no one it appears, has any
real knowledge) of the species transfer capability of Prions, is it a
safe assumption that HSE (all Prions) in general should be treated as
either Select Agents or High-Consequence Pathogens?
Please repond to list or directly. Your assistance is appreciated.
Jeff
Jeffrey M. Good
Acting Director &
Hazardous Materials Safety Officer
Office of Laboratory Safety and Compliance
The George Washington University Medical Center
Office: (202) 994-5059
Mobile: (202) 437-6155
rsojmg@gwumc.edu
gwumc.edu/research/labsafety.htm
>>> David.Gillum@UNH.EDU 10/30/02 02:10PM >>>
Dear Biosafety Listserve Members,
Can anyone tell me how they are handling security for poliovirus
laboratories? I know of the CDC/NIH BMBL BSL-2/Polio requirements. I
am
especially wondering if you are taking extra precautions (i.e.
background
checks) with these labs.
Your thoughts are appreciated.
-David
--
David R. Gillum
Laboratory Safety Officer
Environmental Health and Safety
11 Leavitt Lane, Perpetuity Hall
Durham, NH 03824
Telephone #: 603-862-0197
Facsimile #: 603-862-0047
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 30 Oct 2002 16:44:23 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Robert N. Latsch"
Subject: Re: Prion Research
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
My people are working with CJD at BSL2+. It is really only level two
according to my sources. But they are being very careful. My researchers
tell me that THEY THINK CJD is inherited not tranmissable. BUT, they are
not confident of this theory. ERGO they wear all of the gear.
Bob
>** High Priority **
>** Reply Requested by 10/30/2002 (Wednesday) **
>
>URGENT REQUEST
>
>We are in the process of vetting some protocols dealing with Prions and
>HSE (CJD, vCJD) and noticed that Bovine (BSE) is on the USDA
>high-consequence list. With the assumption (no one it appears, has any
>real knowledge) of the species transfer capability of Prions, is it a
>safe assumption that HSE (all Prions) in general should be treated as
>either Select Agents or High-Consequence Pathogens?
>
>Please repond to list or directly. Your assistance is appreciated.
>
>Jeff
>
>
>Jeffrey M. Good
>Acting Director &
>Hazardous Materials Safety Officer
>Office of Laboratory Safety and Compliance
>The George Washington University Medical Center
>Office: (202) 994-5059
>Mobile: (202) 437-6155
>rsojmg@gwumc.edu
>gwumc.edu/research/labsafety.htm
>
>>>> David.Gillum@UNH.EDU 10/30/02 02:10PM >>>
>Dear Biosafety Listserve Members,
>
>Can anyone tell me how they are handling security for poliovirus
>laboratories? I know of the CDC/NIH BMBL BSL-2/Polio requirements. I
>am
>especially wondering if you are taking extra precautions (i.e.
>background
>checks) with these labs.
>
>Your thoughts are appreciated.
>
>-David
>
>--
>David R. Gillum
>
>Laboratory Safety Officer
>Environmental Health and Safety
>11 Leavitt Lane, Perpetuity Hall
>Durham, NH 03824
>Telephone #: 603-862-0197
>Facsimile #: 603-862-0047
_____________________________________________________________________
__ / _____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 31 Oct 2002 07:44:33 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Kim Auletta
Subject: Retrovirus Question
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
One of our PIs is interested in working with "amphotrophic retrovirus that
can infect human cells". Other than BSL 2 requirements, is anyone aware of
additional requirements?
Kim Auletta
Lab Safety Specialist
Environmental Health and Safety
SUNY Stony Brook
110 Suffolk Hall
Stony Brook, NY 11794-6200
phone: 631-632-9672
fax: 631-632-9683
email: kauletta@.sunysb.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 31 Oct 2002 08:40:51 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Richard Fink
Subject: Re: Retrovirus Question
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
We generally look at the whole experiment before setting a containment
level. Is the virus replication competent? If incompetent, how
debilitated is it, is recombination likely? What gene is it carrying --
toxin, oncogene, etc. Once you have all that information you can assign a
containment level and the containment level may be two-fold, i.e. BL2+ for
the initial infection and then lower once the virus is integrated into the
genome and it is replication incompetent with no more free virus.
Hope this helps.
Richie
At 07:44 AM 10/31/2002 -0500, you wrote:
>One of our PIs is interested in working with "amphotrophic retrovirus that
>can infect human cells". Other than BSL 2 requirements, is anyone aware of
>additional requirements?
>
>
>Kim Auletta
>Lab Safety Specialist
>Environmental Health and Safety
>SUNY Stony Brook
>110 Suffolk Hall
>Stony Brook, NY 11794-6200
>phone: 631-632-9672
>fax: 631-632-9683
>email: kauletta@.sunysb.edu
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 31 Oct 2002 09:19:18 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Norman, Randy"
Subject: Re: Security Questions for Polio Labs
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
I fear there may still be some confusion out there. Let's be totally clear:
the poliovirus eradication program of the WHO, involving the CDC in the
U.S., is a completely separate, distinct program from the one dealing with
Select Agents and anti-bioterrorism laws. The two have no relation to one
another whatsoever. Their reporting deadlines just happened to come up at
nearly the same time.
Randy Norman
Safety Specialist Sr.
BioReliance Corporation
Rockville, MD 20850
Rnorman@
"Success is a journey, not a destination" - Ben Sweetland
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 31 Oct 2002 10:15:39 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Lisa Bognar
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
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Biosafety members:
Have any of you had experience sending live fruit flies overseas. If so,
can you assist me in packaging and labeling requirements. they are not
considered infectious.
Thanks for your help.
Lisa
Lisa Bognar, CHMM, CHO
Chemical Safety Specialist
Risk Management and Safety
636 Grace Hall
Notre Dame, IN 46556
Phone: 219-631-5037 Fax: 219-631-8794
email: dahl.2@nd.edu
"The purpose of life is a life of purpose."
--Robert Byrne
--=====================_11254245==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
Biosafety members:
Have any of you had experience sending live fruit flies overseas.
If so, can you assist me in packaging and labeling requirements.
they are not considered infectious.
Thanks for your help.
Lisa
Lisa Bognar, CHMM, CHO
Chemical Safety Specialist
Risk Management and Safety
636 Grace Hall
Notre Dame, IN 46556
Phone: 219-631-5037 Fax: 219-631-8794
email: dahl.2@nd.edu
"The purpose of life is a life of purpose."
--Robert Byrne
--=====================_11254245==_.ALT--
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 31 Oct 2002 10:29:52 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Margaret Rakas
Subject: Fixed vs Unfixed Human Tissues/Body Parts
Mime-Version: 1.0
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I understand the need to have a BBP program in place and have BL2
operating procedures when working with unfixed human cells or tissues,
as per Appendix H of the BMBL. Would these precautions/procedures be
reasonably required for fixed tissue? If handling fixed human tissue,
are there other or additonal safe handling practices? Any references
would also be appreciated.
Many thanks.
Margaret
--=_431FB29B.D9B804F0
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I understand the need to have a BBP program in place and have BL2
operating procedures when working with unfixed human cells or
tissues, as per Appendix H of the BMBL. Would these
precautions/procedures be reasonably required for fixed tissue? If
handling fixed human tissue, are there other or additonal safe
handling practices? Any references would also be appreciated.
Many thanks.
Margaret
--=_431FB29B.D9B804F0--
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 31 Oct 2002 11:50:29 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Lisa Bognar
Subject: Sending Fruitflies
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
Apologies if this is a duplicate message. I got an error message on the first.
Biosafety members:
Have any of you had experience sending live fruit flies overseas. If so,
can you assist me in packaging and labeling requirements. they are not
considered infectious.
Thanks for your help.
Lisa
Lisa Bognar, CHMM, CHO
Chemical Safety Specialist
Risk Management and Safety
636 Grace Hall
Notre Dame, IN 46556
Phone: 219-631-5037 Fax: 219-631-8794
email: dahl.2@nd.edu
"The purpose of life is a life of purpose."
--Robert Byrne
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 31 Oct 2002 12:12:23 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Kathryn Harris
Subject: Vaccinia Decontamination Advice
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
Dear All
We have a lab space being vacated by an investigator who has used vaccinia
in the past. The experiments ceased well over a year ago. I know spores can
persist for very long periods of time so do people recommend
decontaminating the whole room or just the equipment? What would be the
best agent to decontaminate with?
Thanks
Kath Harris
**********************************************
Kathryn Louise Harris, Ph.D.
Biological Safety Professional
Office of Research Safety
Northwestern University
NG-71 Technological Institute
2145 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208-3121
Phone: (847) 491-4387
Fax: (847) 467-2797
Email: kathrynharris@northwestern.edu
**********************************************
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 31 Oct 2002 15:08:03 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Jairo Betancourt
Subject: Orange cards
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: multipart/related;
boundary="----=_NextPart_000_0001_01C280EF.53E80990"
This is a multi-part message in MIME format.
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boundary="----=_NextPart_001_0002_01C280EF.53EB16D0"
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charset="us-ascii"
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Well, Ed where are you? I just receive an orange card today (October 31)
sent to the Vice-Provost for Research (1of 3). The telephone for help is
inactive and they no longer receive the cards with the corrective
information. Now, What do I do with this card? They actually chose a
very appropriate color for today Pumpkin Orange. Happy Haloween!!
Booo!
Jairo
Jairo Betancourt, RBP
Laboratory Safety Specialist
(305) 243-3400 Fax : (305) 243-3272
E-mail: jairob@miami.edu
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=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 31 Oct 2002 15:17:22 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Brown, Virginia R"
Subject: Poliovirus Survey
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Hopefully these questions will be answered by Kim for the whole group.
If an institution did not receive a poliovirus inventory form in the =
mail, but biomedical labs are
present, do they need to download an inventory form and send it in, even =
if no wild poliovirus
materials are present?
Second, if a lab has environmental samples (e.g., water) that are =
potentially infectious, will
that lab need to go to the enhanced BL2/Polio level of security when the =
time comes?
Thanks for your help.
Ginger Brown, CBSP
Env Health & Safety
TX A&M University
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 31 Oct 2002 16:06:47 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ed Gaunt
Subject: Final Bell for SA Notification!
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="----_=_NextPart_000_01C28121.6CBE7440"
This message is in MIME format. Since your mail reader does not understand
this format, some or all of this message may not be legible.
------_=_NextPart_000_01C28121.6CBE7440
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="----_=_NextPart_001_01C28121.6CBE7440"
------_=_NextPart_001_01C28121.6CBE7440
Content-Type: text/plain;
charset="iso-8859-1"
Ding-a-ling-a-ling!!!
Closing Bell for the Select Agent Notification program!
All Notification mail received by ASI after COB today is being forwarded to
CDC. Information provided in this forwarded mail will probably not be
included in the final data compilation. You may already know that the Help
Line closed last Friday afternoon. The CDC and USDA Web sites with
information about the Notification Process will close down at COB today.
If anyone possesses agents which have not already been reported, please
forward the information to the following secure PO Box at CDC (and NOT to
the Select Agent Program):
Security Officer
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
PO Box 95865
Atlanta, GA 30347
Ciao,
Ed Gaunt
------_=_NextPart_001_01C28121.6CBE7440
Content-Type: text/html;
charset="iso-8859-1"
color=#ff0000>Ding-a-ling-a-ling!!!
Closing Bell for the Select Agent Notification program!
All Notification mail received by ASI after COB today is being
forwarded to CDC. Information provided in this forwarded mail will
probably not be included in the final data compilation. You may
already know that the Help Line closed last Friday afternoon. The
CDC and USDA Web sites with information about the Notification
Process will close down at COB today.
If anyone possesses agents which have not already been reported,
please forward the information to the following secure PO Box at CDC
(and NOT to the Select Agent Program):
Security Officer
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
PO Box 95865
Atlanta, GA 30347
Ciao,
Ed Gaunt
src="cid:950541621@31102002-22a5" align=baseline border=0>
------_=_NextPart_001_01C28121.6CBE7440--
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Content-Type: image/gif;
name="US-FLAG1.GIF"
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 31 Oct 2002 15:34:19 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Catherine Walker
Subject: animal care and use training
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Please share any information anyone has regarding the availability
of an interactive CD rom training program for all persons who care
for and/or use animals. Any assistance will be appreciated.
--
Catherine M. Walker
University of Alabama
Environmental Health and Safety
Box 870178
Tuscaloosa, AL 35487-0178
Phone (205) 348-5905
FAX (205) 348-7773
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 31 Oct 2002 16:50:54 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Wickland, Tim"
Subject: Re: animal care and use training
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
We use online modules produced by the Laboratory Animal Training Association
() and have been quite happy with them. If you're not
wedded to CD-ROM, there are advantages to LATA in that users can take the
modules at their convenience and LATA will notify your animal care office
when each individual has successfully passed the test.
A wealth of training materials are also listed at .
Timothy H. Wickland
Director, Sciences Support Services
Bicentennial Hall 333
Middlebury College
Middlebury, VT 05753
twickland@middlebury.edu
(802) 443-5421 (voice)
(802) 443-2072 (FAX)
> ----------
> From: Catherine Walker
> Reply To: A Biosafety Discussion List
> Sent: Thursday, October 31, 2002 4:34 PM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: animal care and use training
>
> Please share any information anyone has regarding the availability
> of an interactive CD rom training program for all persons who care
> for and/or use animals. Any assistance will be appreciated.
>
> --
> Catherine M. Walker
> University of Alabama
> Environmental Health and Safety
> Box 870178
> Tuscaloosa, AL 35487-0178
> Phone (205) 348-5905
> FAX (205) 348-7773
>
>
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=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 1 Nov 2002 06:57:17 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Mann, Richard"
Subject: Re: animal care and use training
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Check out
Richard Mann, DVM
VMO
VA Medical Centers
Northport and Bronx
New York
-----Original Message-----
From: Catherine Walker [mailto:cmwalker@BAMA.UA.EDU]
Sent: Thursday, October 31, 2002 4:34 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: animal care and use training
Please share any information anyone has regarding the availability
of an interactive CD rom training program for all persons who care
for and/or use animals. Any assistance will be appreciated.
--
Catherine M. Walker
University of Alabama
Environmental Health and Safety
Box 870178
Tuscaloosa, AL 35487-0178
Phone (205) 348-5905
FAX (205) 348-7773
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 1 Nov 2002 08:41:58 -0500
Reply-To: pr18@columbia.edu
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: paul rubock
Organization: EH&S
Subject: Re: Retrovirus Question
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Kim,
Requirements, per se-no. But since the design of retroviral vectors has been
undergoing rapid changes as far as built in safety features (the literature
now talks about 3rd and 4th generation vectors) I would find out what it was
constructed vis-a-vis eliminating/reducing the possibility of ending up with
replication competant virus in the material. For an excellent review see
latest "Fields Virology" an article by Inder Verma who has been one of the
pioneers in this field.
Paul Rubock
Kim Auletta wrote:
> One of our PIs is interested in working with "amphotrophic retrovirus that
> can infect human cells". Other than BSL 2 requirements, is anyone aware of
> additional requirements?
>
> Kim Auletta
> Lab Safety Specialist
> Environmental Health and Safety
> SUNY Stony Brook
> 110 Suffolk Hall
> Stony Brook, NY 11794-6200
> phone: 631-632-9672
> fax: 631-632-9683
> email: kauletta@.sunysb.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 1 Nov 2002 08:57:49 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Robert N. Latsch"
Subject: Re: Fixed vs Unfixed Human Tissues/Body Parts
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
OSHA considers fixed human tissue(I.E. in formaldehyde) NOT to be a
bloodborne pathogen. The bbp standard does not need to be followed.
However, CJD(Creightsfeld-Jacobs disease) has been known to survie and be
viable in formaldehyde/tissue. I would take proper precautions.
Bob
>Content-Type: text/html
>Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
>Content-Description: HTML
>
> I understand the need to have a BBP program in place and have BL2
>operating procedures when working with unfixed human cells or tissues, as
>per Appendix H of the BMBL. Would these precautions/procedures be
>reasonably required for fixed tissue? If handling fixed human tissue, are
>there other or additonal safe handling practices? Any references would
>also be appreciated. Many thanks. Margaret
_____________________________________________________________________
__ / _____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 1 Nov 2002 09:43:10 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Koporc, Kim"
Subject: Re: Security Questions for Polio Labs
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Thanks Randy - you are correct. The Select Agents Registry and the =
National Inventory of Wild Poliovirus Materials are completely separate. =
The national inventory is part of the worldwide effort to eradicate =
polio. It was two years in the planning, and it nothing more than a =
coincidence that both are being carried out at the same time. Best =
regards, Kim
-----Original Message-----
From: Norman, Randy [mailto:RNorman@]
Sent: Thursday, October 31, 2002 9:19 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Security Questions for Polio Labs
I fear there may still be some confusion out there. Let's be totally =
clear:
the poliovirus eradication program of the WHO, involving the CDC in the
U.S., is a completely separate, distinct program from the one dealing =
with
Select Agents and anti-bioterrorism laws. The two have no relation to =
one
another whatsoever. Their reporting deadlines just happened to come up =
at
nearly the same time.
Randy Norman
Safety Specialist Sr.
BioReliance Corporation
Rockville, MD 20850
Rnorman@
"Success is a journey, not a destination" - Ben Sweetland
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 1 Nov 2002 09:46:34 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Koporc, Kim"
Subject: Re: Poliovirus Survey
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Hi Ginger - If an institution did not receive an inventory form in the =
mail, but biomedical labs are present, they need to download the =
inventory form and send it in. An important component of the inventory =
process is documentation that laboratories do not have wild poliovirus =
materials. We have about a 3% return rate of inventory packets. We are =
doing our best to correct addresses and get the inventory packets back =
out, but don't wait for us. Everything you need is on the website at =
od/nvpo/polio.
Regarding your second question, stored environmental materials meeting =
the definition of wild poliovirus potential infectious materials should =
be stored and handled under BSL-2/polio conditions. Box 6 of WHO's =
"Global Action Plan for Laboratory Containment of Wild Poliovirus =
Materials," which is on our website, gives a very nice summary of =
biosafety containment levels for wild poliovirus materials.
-----Original Message-----
From: Brown, Virginia R [mailto:gingerbrown@TAMU.EDU]
Sent: Thursday, October 31, 2002 4:17 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Poliovirus Survey
Hopefully these questions will be answered by Kim for the whole group.
If an institution did not receive a poliovirus inventory form in the =
mail, but biomedical labs are
present, do they need to download an inventory form and send it in, even =
if no wild poliovirus
materials are present?
Second, if a lab has environmental samples (e.g., water) that are =
potentially infectious, will
that lab need to go to the enhanced BL2/Polio level of security when the =
time comes?
Thanks for your help.
Ginger Brown, CBSP
Env Health & Safety
TX A&M University
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 1 Nov 2002 09:11:17 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Joseph H. Coggin, Jr. Ph.D., Professor"
Organization: Department of Microbiology & Immunology,
University of South Alabama, College of Medicine, Mobile,
AL 36688 Phone (251) 460-6314; Fax (251) 460-7269
Subject: Re: Vaccinia Decontamination Advice
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Kathryn: Vaccinia is a virus and doesn't make "spores". The virus can
apparently survive in drying conditions on scab or human or animal
pustular lesion material according to ancient Chinese claims for
hundreds of years.
Chlorine treatment will likely do a good job of sanitization.
Joe Coggin
Kathryn Harris wrote:
> Dear All
>
> We have a lab space being vacated by an investigator who has used
> vaccinia
> in the past. The experiments ceased well over a year ago. I know
> spores can
> persist for very long periods of time so do people recommend
> decontaminating the whole room or just the equipment? What would be the
> best agent to decontaminate with?
>
> Thanks
>
> Kath Harris
>
> **********************************************
> Kathryn Louise Harris, Ph.D.
> Biological Safety Professional
> Office of Research Safety
> Northwestern University
> NG-71 Technological Institute
> 2145 Sheridan Road
> Evanston, IL 60208-3121
> Phone: (847) 491-4387
> Fax: (847) 467-2797
> Email: kathrynharris@northwestern.edu
> **********************************************
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 1 Nov 2002 10:19:41 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: David Gillum
Subject: Re: Security Questions for Polio Labs
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Thanks Kath, Kim & Randy,
I am very much aware that the select agent inventory and the polio inventory
are distinct initiatives. My point was to find out if anyone else is
increasing their security to deal with poliovirus. My primary concern is to
ensure that individuals who are not immunized do not enter a poliovirus
laboratory. However, our IBC has become more security conscious and would
like to see what other institutions are doing to minimize a bioterrorism
threat and prevent unauthorized individuals from being in this lab space.
If you're not doing anything besides the CDC/NIH BMBL BSL-2/Polio
requirements, that is fine. I am looking for comments from people who are
doing more than these recommendations: specifically how they are doing it.
Thanks for listening.
-David
Dear David,
It would seem to me that extra security precautions are not required at this
stage of the game. Unlike the Select Agents, polio could be considered no
different to any other BSL-2 agent used in the Lab (with the BSL-2/Polio
requirements in place of course) so should be subject to the same level of
precaution/security. When there comes a point that vaccination programs are
ceased and the population at large becomes susceptible this issue may need
to be re-addressed. As of now I can't see how polio in a lab setting poses a
specific bio-terrorist type threat beyond that of any other BSL-2 organism,
less so in fact as the majority of the population in the USA are vaccinated.
Thanks for bringing it up, I would also be interested if anyone is taking a
more stringent approach at this time.
Kath Harris
**********************************************
Kathryn Louise Harris, Ph.D.
Biological Safety Professional
Office of Research Safety
Northwestern University
NG-71 Technological Institute
2145 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208-3121
Phone: (847) 491-4387
Fax: (847) 467-2797
Email: kathrynharris@northwestern.edu
**********************************************
At 02:10 PM 10/30/2002 -0500, you wrote:
>Dear Biosafety Listserve Members,
>
>Can anyone tell me how they are handling security for poliovirus
>laboratories? I know of the CDC/NIH BMBL BSL-2/Polio requirements. I am
>especially wondering if you are taking extra precautions (i.e.
>background
>checks) with these labs.
>
>Your thoughts are appreciated.
>
>-David
>
>--
>David R. Gillum
>
>Laboratory Safety Officer
>Environmental Health and Safety
>11 Leavitt Lane, Perpetuity Hall
>Durham, NH 03824
>Telephone #: 603-862-0197
>Facsimile #: 603-862-0047
-----Original Message-----
From: Koporc, Kim [mailto:KKoporc@]
Sent: Friday, November 01, 2002 9:43 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Security Questions for Polio Labs
Thanks Randy - you are correct. The Select Agents Registry and the
National Inventory of Wild Poliovirus Materials are completely separate.
The national inventory is part of the worldwide effort to eradicate polio.
It was two years in the planning, and it nothing more than a coincidence
that both are being carried out at the same time. Best regards, Kim
-----Original Message-----
From: Norman, Randy [mailto:RNorman@]
Sent: Thursday, October 31, 2002 9:19 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Security Questions for Polio Labs
I fear there may still be some confusion out there. Let's be totally clear:
the poliovirus eradication program of the WHO, involving the CDC in the
U.S., is a completely separate, distinct program from the one dealing with
Select Agents and anti-bioterrorism laws. The two have no relation to one
another whatsoever. Their reporting deadlines just happened to come up at
nearly the same time.
Randy Norman
Safety Specialist Sr.
BioReliance Corporation
Rockville, MD 20850
Rnorman@
"Success is a journey, not a destination" - Ben Sweetland
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 1 Nov 2002 09:15:27 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Joseph H. Coggin, Jr. Ph.D., Professor"
Organization: Department of Microbiology & Immunology,
University of South Alabama, College of Medicine, Mobile,
AL 36688 Phone (251) 460-6314; Fax (251) 460-7269
Subject: Re: Final Bell for SA Notification!
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="------------040704050803070106040903"
--------------040704050803070106040903
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Ed: great news! Now can we go to work to get the IRS to shut dow?.
Joe Coggin
Ed Gaunt wrote:
> Ding-a-ling-a-ling!!!
>
> Closing Bell for the Select Agent Notification program!
>
> All Notification mail received by ASI after COB today is being
> forwarded to CDC. Information provided in this forwarded mail will
> probably not be included in the final data compilation. You may
> already know that the Help Line closed last Friday afternoon. The CDC
> and USDA Web sites with information about the Notification Process
> will close down at COB today.
>
> If anyone possesses agents which have not already been reported,
> please forward the information to the following secure PO Box at CDC
> (and NOT to the Select Agent Program):
>
> Security Officer
> Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
> PO Box 95865
> Atlanta, GA 30347
>
> Ciao,
>
>
>
> Ed Gaunt
>
>
>
>
>
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
>
>
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Ed: great news! Now can we go to work to get the IRS to shut dow?.
Joe Coggin
Ed Gaunt wrote:
Ding-a-ling-a-ling!!!
Closing Bell for the Select Agent Notification program!
All Notification mail received by ASI after COB today is being
forwarded to CDC. Information provided in this forwarded mail
will probably not be included in the final data compilation. You
may already know that the Help Line closed last Friday afternoon.
The CDC and USDA Web sites with information about the Notification
Process will close down at COB today.
If anyone possesses agents which have not already been reported,
please forward the information to the following secure PO Box at
CDC (and NOT to the Select Agent Program):
Security Officer
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
PO Box 95865
Atlanta, GA 30347
Ciao,
Ed Gaunt
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Date: Fri, 1 Nov 2002 07:37:40 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Criscuolo, TR (Tedi)"
Subject: Biological Remediation Methods
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I am looking to put together the pros and cons of biological remediation
methods with paraformaldehyde, VHP, or the chlorine dioxide. Can you help?
Tedi Criscuolo
Industrial Hygienist/Safety Representative
Battelle IH & OS Operations Group
Office: (509) 373-1169
Pager: (509) 544-3144
tedi.criscuolo@
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class=3D130343415-01112002>I am looking to put together the pros =
and cons of biological remediation = class=3D130343415-01112002>s
= with class=3D130343415-01112002>. Can you face=3D"Monotype
Corsiva">Tedi = Criscuolo size=3D-1>Industrial
Hygienist/Safety Representative = face=3DGeorgia>Battelle IH & = OS
Operations
href=3D"mailto:tedi.criscuolo@">tedi.criscuolo@=
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=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 1 Nov 2002 08:03:16 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Funk, Glenn"
Subject: Re: Vaccinia Decontamination Advice
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Kathryn -
Spores aren't an issue with vaccinia or other viruses but residual
infectivity can be. Many labs use a standard SOP for lab shutdown or
turnover that typically requires the departing PI to coordinate his
departure from any microbiology lab with the BSO. Part of the regimen is a
decon of anywhere from all horizontal surfaces to formaldehyde or VHP
treatment of the lab volume. It's basically the responsibility of the
departing PI to leave a clean and safe lab for the next guy (or the
demolishers) but who actually does this decon work is often negotiable -
sometimes it's contracted out, sometimes it's the new occupant, sometimes
it's a crew from the acquiring department. The BSO ultimately "certifies"
the lab as ready and safe for its new occupants before occupancy is
permitted.
Don't assume that the infectivity of residual agents disappears with time -
it does typically reduce but that resistant fraction will bite you every
time. Unless the vaccinia user was performing aerosol generating procedures
that may have contaminated other surfaces, I'd do a horizontal surface
wipedown with freshly prepared 20% household bleach, with plenty of
ventilation and the wipers wearing appropriate PPE. If there are concerns
about residuals from the bleach, I'd follow with a clear water wipe. One
easy source for disinfectant sensitivity is the Canadian MSDS's; the one for
vaccinia indicates that 1% sodium hypochlorite, 2% glutaraldehyde or
formaldehyde are good disinfectants.
-- Glenn
Glenn A. Funk, Ph.D., CBSP
Director and Biosafety Officer
Environment, Health and Safety
MedImmune Vaccines, Inc.
408-845-8847
-----Original Message-----
From: Kathryn Harris [mailto:kathrynharris@NORTHWESTERN.EDU]
Sent: Thursday, October 31, 2002 10:12 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Vaccinia Decontamination Advice
Dear All
We have a lab space being vacated by an investigator who has used vaccinia
in the past. The experiments ceased well over a year ago. I know spores can
persist for very long periods of time so do people recommend
decontaminating the whole room or just the equipment? What would be the
best agent to decontaminate with?
Thanks
Kath Harris
**********************************************
Kathryn Louise Harris, Ph.D.
Biological Safety Professional
Office of Research Safety
Northwestern University
NG-71 Technological Institute
2145 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208-3121
Phone: (847) 491-4387
Fax: (847) 467-2797
Email: kathrynharris@northwestern.edu
**********************************************
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 1 Nov 2002 12:11:41 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Richard Fink
Subject: Re: Biological Remediation Methods
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
At 07:37 AM 11/1/2002 -0800, you wrote:
>I am looking to put together the pros and cons of biological remediation
>methods with paraformaldehyde, VHP, or the chlorine dioxide. Can you help?
>Tedi Criscuolo
Paraformaldehyde: pros - CHEAP, easy to prepare, very effective sterilant
(except for prions which aren't exactly living), does not penetrate well
(which can also be a negative), very noticeable warning properties if it
leaks, effective neutralizer available, nonreactive to most building
materials, automated system available (makes it less cheap). Cons -
formaldehyde is a possible carcinogen, extremely irritating, sensitizer,
takes 6 hours for high level decontamination longer for sterilization, low
PEL, can be explosive if too high a concentration is used.
VHP - pros - relatively fast, good sterilant, decomposes into harmless
stuff, so-so penetrative powers, automated system. Cons - equipment to
generate VHP is EXPENSIVE, reactive with some building materials,
decomposed by cellulitic materials, low PEL.
Chlorine dioxide - pros - very potent sterilant, works very fast, okay
penetrative powers. Cons - fairly nasty gas once made (needs to made on
site), somewhat reactive, don't know if it can be decomposed to less
harmful stuff.
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 1 Nov 2002 09:03:55 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Robert Hashimoto
Organization: Genentech, Inc.
Subject: Re: Vaccinia Decontamination Advice
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Good Morning Kathryn,
Bleach would be an appropriate disinfectant to use on both surfaces and
equipment. You will also want to make sure that anyone cleaning the area did
not have a pre-exisiting condition of eczema, or may be recovering from illness
as Vaccinia is known to cause potential medical complications (Eczema
vaccinatum, Progressive Vaccinia) in eczema and immunocompromised patients.
Individuals who may receive the Vaccinia vaccine are screened accordingly for
these potential medical complications.
Hope this helps,
Best Regards,
Bob
Kathryn Harris wrote:
> Dear All
>
> We have a lab space being vacated by an investigator who has used vaccinia
> in the past. The experiments ceased well over a year ago. I know spores can
> persist for very long periods of time so do people recommend
> decontaminating the whole room or just the equipment? What would be the
> best agent to decontaminate with?
>
> Thanks
>
> Kath Harris
>
> **********************************************
> Kathryn Louise Harris, Ph.D.
> Biological Safety Professional
> Office of Research Safety
> Northwestern University
> NG-71 Technological Institute
> 2145 Sheridan Road
> Evanston, IL 60208-3121
> Phone: (847) 491-4387
> Fax: (847) 467-2797
> Email: kathrynharris@northwestern.edu
> **********************************************
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Good Morning Kathryn,
Bleach would be an appropriate disinfectant to use on both surfaces
and equipment. You will also want to make sure that anyone cleaning
the area did not have a pre-exisiting condition of eczema, or may be
recovering from illness as Vaccinia is known to cause potential
medical complications (Eczema vaccinatum, Progressive Vaccinia) in
eczema and immunocompromised patients. Individuals who may receive
the Vaccinia vaccine are screened accordingly for these potential
medical complications.
Hope this helps,
Best Regards,
Bob
Kathryn Harris wrote:
Dear All
We have a lab space being vacated by an investigator who has used
vaccinia
in the past. The experiments ceased well over a year ago. I know
spores can
persist for very long periods of time so do people recommend
decontaminating the whole room or just the equipment? What would
be the
best agent to decontaminate with?
Thanks
Kath Harris
**********************************************
Kathryn Louise Harris, Ph.D.
Biological Safety Professional
Office of Research Safety
Northwestern University
NG-71 Technological Institute
2145 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208-3121
Phone: (847) 491-4387
Fax: (847) 467-2797
Email: kathrynharris@northwestern.edu
**********************************************
--------------971E8C659B90B8DBEF038F9A--
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 1 Nov 2002 15:01:10 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ed Gaunt
Subject: Re: Final Bell for SA Notification!
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
What would life be without change?
Yesterday, I indicated that ASI had closed our Help Line as of last Friday
(Oct 25) and that all mail received after close of business yesterday (Oct
31) was being forwarded to CDC as of today (Nov 1). I provided a Post
Office Box in my message yesterday for folks to send future information to
and I've been asked to let you know that there is a better address for
everyone to use. Here it is:
CDC
1600 Clifton Road
Mailstop E-79
Atlanta, Georgia 30333
In addition, since the Help Line has been closed, CDC is making another
number available if you have questions or concerns regarding this activity.
The number is 404-498-2250.
Finally, although CDC has removed the notification information from the
Select Agent Web site yesterday, it is still available on the APHIS Web site
at aphis.vs/ncie.
Ed Gaunt
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 1 Nov 2002 12:38:52 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "DWAN (Donald Wang)"
Subject: Re: Final Bell for SA Notification!
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
-----Original Message-----
From: Ed Gaunt [mailto:egaunt@]
Sent: Friday, November 01, 2002 12:01 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Final Bell for SA Notification!
What would life be without change?
Yesterday, I indicated that ASI had closed our Help Line as of last Friday
(Oct 25) and that all mail received after close of business yesterday (Oct
31) was being forwarded to CDC as of today (Nov 1). I provided a Post
Office Box in my message yesterday for folks to send future information to
and I've been asked to let you know that there is a better address for
everyone to use. Here it is:
CDC
1600 Clifton Road
Mailstop E-79
Atlanta, Georgia 30333
In addition, since the Help Line has been closed, CDC is making another
number available if you have questions or concerns regarding this activity.
The number is 404-498-2250.
Finally, although CDC has removed the notification information from the
Select Agent Web site yesterday, it is still available on the APHIS Web site
at aphis.vs/ncie.
Ed Gaunt
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 4 Nov 2002 13:55:45 +0100
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Sossai
Organization: San Martino
Subject: R: Another O2 Monitoring Question
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
In Italy normaly we use an O2 monitor for the entire room,(sometime 2 depend
from the surface) at m.1.50 from the foor. Normaly the monitor
is in direct connection with the air system to improve the number of change
air
Dimitri
Dr. Dimitri Sossai
Responsabile Servizio Prevenzione e Protezione
A.O. Ospedale San Martino e Cliniche Universitarie Convenzionate
L.go Rosanna Benzi 10
16132 Genova
Italia
tel. +39 - 0105552293
fax +39 -0105556756
cel. +39- 3351281024
-----Messaggio Originale-----
Da: Michael Wendeler
A:
Data invio: mercoledl 16 ottobre 2002 14.19
Oggetto: Another O2 Monitoring Question
> Can anyone recommend some manufacturers of oxygen monitoring systems for
> NMR labs?
>
> Mike Wendeler
> Incyte Genomics
> Newark, DE
>
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 4 Nov 2002 16:23:09 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: David Gillum
Subject: Aspergillus
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Can anyone tell me what type of biological safety cabinet should be used
when working with Aspergillus spp., including A. fumigatus. I have been told
that a ducted fume hood should be used, although no rationale was given.
Your thoughts are appreciated.
-David
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 4 Nov 2002 16:51:10 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Joseph P. Kozlovac"
Subject: Re: Aspergillus
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
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boundary="=====================_275928515==_.ALT"
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Why not use a BSC.
At 04:23 PM 11/4/2002 -0500, you wrote:
>Can anyone tell me what type of biological safety cabinet should be used
>when working with Aspergillus spp., including A. fumigatus. I have been told
>that a ducted fume hood should be used, although no rationale was given.
>
>Your thoughts are appreciated.
>
>-David
______________________________________________________________________________
Biological Safety Officer
Environment, Health, Safety
SAIC-Frederick
National Cancer Institute -
Frederick
(301)846-1451 fax: (301)846-6619
email: jkozlovac@mail.
______________________________________________________________________________
--=====================_275928515==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
Why not use a BSC.
At 04:23 PM 11/4/2002 -0500, you wrote:
Can anyone tell me what type of biological safety cabinet should
be used
when working with Aspergillus spp., including A. fumigatus. I have
been told
that a ducted fume hood should be used, although no rationale was
given.
Your thoughts are appreciated.
-David
______________________________________________________________________________
Biological Safety Officer
Environment, Health, Safety
SAIC-Frederick
National Cancer Institute - Frederick
(301)846-1451 fax: (301)846-6619
email: jkozlovac@mail.
______________________________________________________________________________
--=====================_275928515==_.ALT--
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 4 Nov 2002 17:56:57 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Michael Kiley
Subject: Re: Aspergillus
Mime-Version: 1.0
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This is a MIME message. If you are reading this text, you may want to
consider changing to a mail reader or gateway that understands how to
properly handle MIME multipart messages.
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David,
My advice would be to go to a medical microbiology textbook or online and =
find out about the infectivity of the agent. That should lead you to the =
proper BSC for the lab.
mpk
>>> David.Gillum@UNH.EDU 11/04/02 04:23PM >>>
Can anyone tell me what type of biological safety cabinet should be used
when working with Aspergillus spp., including A. fumigatus. I have been =
told
that a ducted fume hood should be used, although no rationale was given.
Your thoughts are appreciated.
-David
--=_306CC658.B7D6BE6C
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Content-Description: HTML
2px">
David,
My advice would be to go to a medical microbiology = textbook or
online and find out about the infectivity of the agent. That should
lead = you to the proper BSC for the lab.
mpk
>>> David.Gillum@UNH.EDU 11/04/02 04:23PM >>>
Can anyone tell me what type of biological safety cabinet =
should be used
when working with Aspergillus spp., including A. fumigatus. I =
have been told
that a ducted fume hood should be used, although no rationale =
was given.
Your thoughts are appreciated.
-David
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 4 Nov 2002 16:20:10 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Judy Pointer
Subject: Re: Aspergillus
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="=_4B17BCD9.90F19FC8"
This is a MIME message. If you are reading this text, you may want to
consider changing to a mail reader or gateway that understands how to
properly handle MIME multipart messages.
--=_4B17BCD9.90F19FC8
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Aspergillus spores (the only part that can hurt you if inhaled) can be
removed from ambient air with a HEPA filter. Any type of biological
safety cabinet, IIA or IIB (ducted cabinets), would be adequate.
Judy Pointer jpointer@salud.unm.edu
>>> David.Gillum@UNH.EDU 11/04/02 02:23PM >>>
Can anyone tell me what type of biological safety cabinet should be
used
when working with Aspergillus spp., including A. fumigatus. I have been
told
that a ducted fume hood should be used, although no rationale was
given.
Your thoughts are appreciated.
-David
--=_4B17BCD9.90F19FC8
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Aspergillus spores (the only part that can hurt you if inhaled) can
be removed from ambient air with a HEPA filter. Any type of
biological safety cabinet, IIA or IIB (ducted cabinets), would be
href="mailto:jpointer@salud.unm.edu">jpointer@salud.unm.edu
>>> David.Gillum@UNH.EDU 11/04/02 02:23PM >>>
Can anyone tell me what type of biological safety cabinet should be
used
when working with Aspergillus spp., including A. fumigatus. I have
been told
that a ducted fume hood should be used, although no rationale was
given.
Your thoughts are appreciated.
-David
--=_4B17BCD9.90F19FC8--
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 5 Nov 2002 08:38:07 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: David Gillum
Subject: Open Flames in BSCs
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
I have a researcher that wishes to use a touch plate burner in a BSC. He
wishes to have gas lines installed into the BSC for the burner. I know the
CDC/NIH "Primary Containment for Biohazards," manual does not recommend open
flames in the cabinet. Does anyone have any experience with touch plate
burners in BSCs? Have you have had any trouble with them? Would you
recommend them? What are the alternatives?
Thanks!
-David
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 5 Nov 2002 09:53:26 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Hauck, Philip"
Subject: Re: Open Flames in BSCs
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
Content-transfer-encoding: quoted-printable
The small units are okay....I would recommend one of the thermal =
furnaces, unless it is for flaming glassware. DO NOT use big Bunsen =
Burners....we had a HEPA filter go on fire at my former employer. Also, =
make sure that canvas-cover thick wall hoses are used...NOT TYGON, LATEX =
or any of the other thin walled tubes. WE had gas come through the =
tubing and low-flash, and actually had flame travel up the hose with =
latex. A little knowledge can be a very disastrous thing to your =
research project!!
Phil Hauck
-----Original Message-----
From: David Gillum [mailto:David.Gillum@UNH.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, November 05, 2002 8:38 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Open Flames in BSCs
I have a researcher that wishes to use a touch plate burner in a BSC. He
wishes to have gas lines installed into the BSC for the burner. I know =
the
CDC/NIH "Primary Containment for Biohazards," manual does not recommend =
open
flames in the cabinet. Does anyone have any experience with touch plate
burners in BSCs? Have you have had any trouble with them? Would you
recommend them? What are the alternatives?
Thanks!
-David
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 5 Nov 2002 11:12:55 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Robert N. Latsch"
Subject: Re: Open Flames in BSCs
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
I would not recommend gas burners at all because of the way they work.
BSC's ans LFH's contain, they do not exhaust. The next ignition could be
quite explosive. We had an incident like this several years ago. The
researcher spent 9 monthes in the burn unit.
Bob
>The small units are okay....I would recommend one of the thermal furnaces,
>unless it is for flaming glassware. DO NOT use big Bunsen Burners....we
>had a HEPA filter go on fire at my former employer. Also, make sure that
>canvas-cover thick wall hoses are used...NOT TYGON, LATEX or any of the
>other thin walled tubes. WE had gas come through the tubing and low-flash,
>and actually had flame travel up the hose with latex. A little knowledge
>can be a very disastrous thing to your research project!!
>Phil Hauck
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From: David Gillum [mailto:David.Gillum@UNH.EDU]
>Sent: Tuesday, November 05, 2002 8:38 AM
>To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
>Subject: Open Flames in BSCs
>
>I have a researcher that wishes to use a touch plate burner in a BSC. He
>wishes to have gas lines installed into the BSC for the burner. I know the
>CDC/NIH "Primary Containment for Biohazards," manual does not recommend open
>flames in the cabinet. Does anyone have any experience with touch plate
>burners in BSCs? Have you have had any trouble with them? Would you
>recommend them? What are the alternatives?
>
>Thanks!
>-David
_____________________________________________________________________
__ / _____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 5 Nov 2002 10:18:51 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Brown, Virginia R"
Subject: Spectrophotometer
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
I've had a question posed from a lab person regarding recommended brands =
to consider
to buy a new spectrophotometer. So, if anyone in the group has =
suggestions... either
pro or con, the feedback is appreciated.
Ginger Brown, CBSP
Env Health & Safety
TX A&M University
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 5 Nov 2002 11:45:37 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Richard Fink
Subject: Re: Aspergillus
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="=====================_703837014==_.ALT"
--=====================_703837014==_.ALT
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Any that has been certified. The HEPA will capture the spores, so you just
want to make sure that the cabinet has been certified within the past
year. Ducted gives a bit more safety in that if the exhaust HEPA is faulty
the spores go up the stack rather then into the room. Aspergilli vary a
bit in pathogenicity, with fumigatus being the most capable of causing
disease. Usually it only infects those with an underlying condition though
occasional infections in immune competent folks have occurred and inhaling
high #'s is believed to increase the risk of disease.
At 04:23 PM 11/4/2002 -0500, you wrote:
>Can anyone tell me what type of biological safety cabinet should be used
>when working with Aspergillus spp., including A. fumigatus. I have been told
>that a ducted fume hood should be used, although no rationale was given.
>
>Your thoughts are appreciated.
>
>-David
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
--=====================_703837014==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
Any that has been certified. The HEPA will capture the spores, so
you just want to make sure that the cabinet has been certified
within the past year. Ducted gives a bit more safety in that if the
exhaust HEPA is faulty the spores go up the stack rather then into
the room. Aspergilli vary a bit in pathogenicity, with fumigatus
being the most capable of causing disease. Usually it only infects
those with an underlying condition though occasional infections in
immune competent folks have occurred and inhaling high #'s is
believed to increase the risk of disease.
At 04:23 PM 11/4/2002 -0500, you wrote:
Can anyone tell me what type of biological safety cabinet should
be used
when working with Aspergillus spp., including A. fumigatus. I have
been told
that a ducted fume hood should be used, although no rationale was
given.
Your thoughts are appreciated.
-David
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
--=====================_703837014==_.ALT--
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 5 Nov 2002 12:39:24 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Hauck, Philip"
Subject: Re: Open Flames in BSCs
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
Content-transfer-encoding: quoted-printable
Hi Bob: I would agree with you, except that there is always that one =
time that you need to flame sterilize something. Remember, the really =
bad habit that a lot of researchers have is to walk away and leave the =
burner on all day flaming away, even the little plate burners. Few =
people ever balance the flame out right, so there is always some =
unburned gas emissions.
You are absolutely correct that if you are generating at a steady rate =
unburned methane gas, with even a 30% recirculation, you can get up to =
near explosive quantities. If you have to flame turn the burner on =
during that portion of the operation, and turn it off when it is not =
immediately called for. I am speaking from my own habits when working in =
research...even the little flame is an ignition source which can set-off =
poly bags, or styrene plates etc..etc. We only had it on long enough to =
flame...which was seldom. PS how do you seal a freeze dried ampoule =
without a burner???
Phil Hauck
-----Original Message-----
From: Robert N. Latsch [mailto:rnl2@PO.CWRU.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, November 05, 2002 11:13 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Open Flames in BSCs
I would not recommend gas burners at all because of the way they work.
BSC's ans LFH's contain, they do not exhaust. The next ignition could =
be
quite explosive. We had an incident like this several years ago. The
researcher spent 9 monthes in the burn unit.
Bob
>The small units are okay....I would recommend one of the thermal =
furnaces,
>unless it is for flaming glassware. DO NOT use big Bunsen Burners....we
>had a HEPA filter go on fire at my former employer. Also, make sure =
that
>canvas-cover thick wall hoses are used...NOT TYGON, LATEX or any of the
>other thin walled tubes. WE had gas come through the tubing and =
low-flash,
>and actually had flame travel up the hose with latex. A little =
knowledge
>can be a very disastrous thing to your research project!!
>Phil Hauck
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From: David Gillum [mailto:David.Gillum@UNH.EDU]
>Sent: Tuesday, November 05, 2002 8:38 AM
>To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
>Subject: Open Flames in BSCs
>
>I have a researcher that wishes to use a touch plate burner in a BSC. =
He
>wishes to have gas lines installed into the BSC for the burner. I know =
the
>CDC/NIH "Primary Containment for Biohazards," manual does not recommend =
open
>flames in the cabinet. Does anyone have any experience with touch plate
>burners in BSCs? Have you have had any trouble with them? Would you
>recommend them? What are the alternatives?
>
>Thanks!
>-David
_____________________________________________________________________
__ / =
_____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental =
Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail =
rlatsch@
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 5 Nov 2002 13:33:39 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Hauck, Philip"
Subject: Re: Biological Remediation Methods
MIME-version: 1.0
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boundary="Boundary_(ID_MxJhZ1AyPAfN0x2nXequMA)"
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--Boundary_(ID_MxJhZ1AyPAfN0x2nXequMA)
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boundary="Boundary_(ID_YBawiqou4um6Fy6Y6olwBw)"
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Check out The Laboratory Safety-Principle and Practice (both editions, =
or it=92s successor) Biosafety-Principles and Practices, all three ASM, =
or Biosafety-Reference Manual AIHA. All of these have a table that was =
in the original Lab Safety Monograph from the NIH, that had the uses =
that the major disinfectants were good for.
Hmmmm=85.I looked at chlorine compounds and formaldehyde for the control =
of bacterial spores =85in the older version, D. Vesley and J. Lauer were =
the contributors=85.and it shows that chlorine compounds give a =93less =
positive response=94 as compared to formaldehyde (gas) from =
paraformaldehyde(=93very positive response=94).And we knew that in =
1988=85I guess the folks on the hill better catch-up. And you better get =
your comparison going quick and share it with everyone.
Lack of knowledge in this field on the part of external people making =
policy decisions that impact on those of us who do know what the risks =
are and how to address them is going to create an embarrassing =
situation=85if not a deadly one for all of us someday. Sorry for the =
=93editorial comment=94-my own by the way, but this info has been locked =
away too long.
;> ) Phil Hauck, Mt. Sinai School of Medicine
-----Original Message-----
From: Criscuolo, TR (Tedi) [mailto:tedi.criscuolo@]
Sent: Friday, November 01, 2002 10:38 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Biological Remediation Methods
I am looking to put together the pros and cons of biological remediation =
methods with paraformaldehyde, VHP, or the chlorine dioxide. Can you =
help?
Tedi Criscuolo
Industrial Hygienist/Safety Representative
Battelle IH & OS Operations Group
Office: (509) 373-1169
Pager: (509) 544-3144
tedi.criscuolo@
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 5 Nov 2002 14:36:19 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Robert N. Latsch"
Subject: Re: Open Flames in BSCs
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Hi Phil,
My answer, is I hope a simple solution. Do not use the burner in a laminar
flow hood or BSC. You could position a burner near the hood for use with
minimal contamination.
Bob
>Hi Bob: I would agree with you, except that there is always that one time
>that you need to flame sterilize something. Remember, the really bad habit
>that a lot of researchers have is to walk away and leave the burner on all
>day flaming away, even the little plate burners. Few people ever balance
>the flame out right, so there is always some unburned gas emissions.
>
>You are absolutely correct that if you are generating at a steady rate
>unburned methane gas, with even a 30% recirculation, you can get up to
>near explosive quantities. If you have to flame turn the burner on during
>that portion of the operation, and turn it off when it is not immediately
>called for. I am speaking from my own habits when working in
>research...even the little flame is an ignition source which can set-off
>poly bags, or styrene plates etc..etc. We only had it on long enough to
>flame...which was seldom. PS how do you seal a freeze dried ampoule
>without a burner???
>Phil Hauck
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From: Robert N. Latsch [mailto:rnl2@PO.CWRU.EDU]
>Sent: Tuesday, November 05, 2002 11:13 AM
>To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
>Subject: Re: Open Flames in BSCs
>
>I would not recommend gas burners at all because of the way they work.
>BSC's ans LFH's contain, they do not exhaust. The next ignition could be
>quite explosive. We had an incident like this several years ago. The
>researcher spent 9 monthes in the burn unit.
>
>Bob
>>The small units are okay....I would recommend one of the thermal furnaces,
>>unless it is for flaming glassware. DO NOT use big Bunsen Burners....we
>>had a HEPA filter go on fire at my former employer. Also, make sure that
>>canvas-cover thick wall hoses are used...NOT TYGON, LATEX or any of the
>>other thin walled tubes. WE had gas come through the tubing and low-flash,
>>and actually had flame travel up the hose with latex. A little knowledge
>>can be a very disastrous thing to your research project!!
>>Phil Hauck
>>
>>-----Original Message-----
>>From: David Gillum [mailto:David.Gillum@UNH.EDU]
>>Sent: Tuesday, November 05, 2002 8:38 AM
>>To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
>>Subject: Open Flames in BSCs
>>
>>I have a researcher that wishes to use a touch plate burner in a BSC. He
>>wishes to have gas lines installed into the BSC for the burner. I know the
>>CDC/NIH "Primary Containment for Biohazards," manual does not recommend open
>>flames in the cabinet. Does anyone have any experience with touch plate
>>burners in BSCs? Have you have had any trouble with them? Would you
>>recommend them? What are the alternatives?
>>
>>Thanks!
>>-David
>
>
>
>_____________________________________________________________________
>__ / _____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
>_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
> \ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
> \ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
> \__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
_____________________________________________________________________
__ / _____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 5 Nov 2002 11:43:02 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Elizabeth Smith
Subject: Re: Biological Remediation Methods
In-Reply-To:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
I think Richie & Phillip got most of the comments I would have
made. I would offer, in addition:
Formaldehyde
Pro: 1) simple, cheap equipment to do, 2) if working with
scientists, especially biologists, more likely to have people
treat it without undue fear, since they're familiar with
formalin as a fixtive/preservative
Con: 1) OSHA formaldehyde standard makes for additional
compliance work, 2) bad rep as a carcinogen, 3) pretty low PEL,
4) high humidity required for this to work can pretty much trash
the area being deconned, if it isn't a laboratory (i.e.,
offices)
Vapor Hydrogen Peroxide
Pro: 1) if dealing with the public's "impression" of science,
it would be a great PR issue that it yields "non-toxic products"
(and we'll just ignore the number of people who die from
exposure to dihydrogen monoxide every year :~), 2) fairly small
quantity of starting materials (compared to the other two
methods)
Con: 1) reactive with some lab materials - I heard at the ABSA
conference's course on space decon that it will react with older
BSC gaskets and other bits; 2) no significant odor/indicator if
you have a leak (unlike the other two methods)
Chlorine (I assume you meant via chlorine dioxide, and not
bleach)
Pro: 1) "if it's good enough for the U.S. Senate, it must be
good enough for me", 2) lots of prior experience with this as an
occupational hazard (exposure methods, treatment, PPE should be
readily available and previously determined)
Con: 1) complex equipment to prepare/generate the Cl gas, 2)
low PEL, 3) corrosive to certain types of metals
Peace,
Elizabeth
=====
Elizabeth Smith
Environmental, Health & Safety Manager
BioPort Corporation
3500 N. Martin L. King Blvd.
Lansing, MI 48906
__________________________________________________
Do you Yahoo!?
HotJobs - Search new jobs daily now
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 5 Nov 2002 15:03:05 EST
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Ira F. Salkin"
Subject: Re: Aspergillus
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For any information pertaining to pathogenic fungi, from descriptions of the
etiologic agents to the antifungal agents used in the treatment of the
diseases that they cause, I strongly recommend those on the list check the
following web site:
. I know that its a crazy name but the site contains
everything you would ever want to know about these pathogens and many things
you could probably care less about.
Ira F. Salkin, Ph.D.
Information From Science
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For any information pertaining to pathogenic fungi, from
descriptions of the etiologic agents to the antifungal agents used
in the treatment of the diseases that they cause, I strongly
recommend those on the list check the following web site:
. I know that its a crazy name but the site
contains everything you would ever want to know about these
pathogens and many things you could probably care less about.
Ira F. Salkin, Ph.D.
Information From Science
--part1_19d.b74ff83.2af97df9_boundary--
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 5 Nov 2002 14:55:48 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Dave Mulligan
Subject: Re: Open Flames in BSCs
MIME-Version: 1.0
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David
Like most responders we don't recommend gas lines connected to hoods.
There is an alternative to a gas line. There is an electronic device
called a Bacti-Cinerator. VWR carries it.
Best of Luck
Dave
--=_alternative 00730AFF86256C68_=
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
David
Like most responders we don't recommend gas lines
connected to hoods.
There is an alternative to a gas line. There is an
electronic device called a Bacti-Cinerator. VWR carries it.
Best of Luck
Dave
--=_alternative 00730AFF86256C68_=--
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 5 Nov 2002 16:15:19 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Hauck, Philip"
Subject: Re: Open Flames in BSCs
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="Boundary_(ID_2JkdziB1vcuVyXnySsnWPg)"
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Content-transfer-encoding: quoted-printable
Thanks Dave...I was trying to remember who carried them and =
the name of the device!! When they came out, my Bunsen =
Burner went into retirement!!
Phil Hauck
-----Original Message-----
From: Dave Mulligan [mailto:Dave.Mulligan@]
Sent: Tuesday, November 05, 2002 3:56 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Open Flames in BSCs
David
Like most responders we don't recommend gas lines connected to hoods.
There is an alternative to a gas line. There is an electronic device =
called a Bacti-Cinerator. VWR carries it.
Best of Luck
Dave
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 5 Nov 2002 14:33:58 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Katrina Doolittle
Organization: NMSU Environmental Health & Safety
Subject: BSL for wastewater
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
We are expanding our biosafety oversight and would like to know the
biosafety level you use for labs that process water and sludge samples
from the wastewater treatment plants, bacteria-based waste treatment
reactors and dairies. The labs analyze parameters such as coliform
level, biochemical/chemical oxygen demand (BOD/COD), and products of
microbiological metabolism such as methane, nitrates, and fatty acids.
Your thoughts are much appreciated.
Katrina Doolittle
NMSU
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 5 Nov 2002 14:06:03 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Leila Khatib
Subject: Re: BSL for wastewater
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed"
I would recommend level two. In wastewater you have a plethora of
human enteric microorganisms....you name it, probably it will be in
there particularly human viruses (adenovirus, coxsackievirus,
enterovirus, etc.) since viruses and some bacteria (Salmonella,
Escherichia coli, Shigella and depending where you are Vibrio
cholera). Viruses usually do not settle out in the primary and
secondary treatment so it is a good idea to assume they are there in
all samples except after tertiary or disinfection treatment. The
activated sludge (bacteria-based waste treatment) will contain some
human viruses, bacteria (Shigella, Salmonella, Campylobacter,
Yersinia enterocolitica etc.), and protozoa particularly
Microsporidia, Cryposporidium, sometimes Eimeria etc. The sludge
will contain greater concentrations if a sample of settled sludge is
used. In dairies wastewater, the two primary human pathogens of
concern are E. coli 0157:H7 (there are many references for this) and
Cryptosporidium (the one that infects both humans and cows). On
dairies you can also find Salmonella and other human pathogenic
bacteria. I would find 100,000 E. coli/ml in each sample but not all
were pathogenic only a portion. If you would like references or
additional information for any of this I have them and can provide
them if needed. Hope this helps.
>We are expanding our biosafety oversight and would like to know the
>biosafety level you use for labs that process water and sludge samples
>from the wastewater treatment plants, bacteria-based waste treatment
>reactors and dairies. The labs analyze parameters such as coliform
>level, biochemical/chemical oxygen demand (BOD/COD), and products of
>microbiological metabolism such as methane, nitrates, and fatty acids.
>
>Your thoughts are much appreciated.
>Katrina Doolittle
>NMSU
--
Leila Khatib, Ph.D.
Environment, Health, and Safety
UC Berkeley
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 5 Nov 2002 19:57:59 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Robert P. Ellis"
Subject: Re: BSL for wastewater
In-Reply-To:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: Text/Plain; charset="us-ascii"
Katrina, I would recommend BSL-2. There is adequate reason for
this level of operation in the BMBL. Cheers, Bob Ellis
On Tue, 5 Nov 2002 14:33:58 -0700 Katrina Doolittle
wrote:
> We are expanding our biosafety oversight and would like to know the
> biosafety level you use for labs that process water and sludge samples
> from the wastewater treatment plants, bacteria-based waste treatment
> reactors and dairies. The labs analyze parameters such as coliform
> level, biochemical/chemical oxygen demand (BOD/COD), and products of
> microbiological metabolism such as methane, nitrates, and fatty acids.
>
> Your thoughts are much appreciated.
> Katrina Doolittle
> NMSU
====================
Robert P. Ellis, PhD
University Biosafety Officer, CBSP (ABSA), SM (ASM)
Professor, Department of Microbiology, Immunology, and Pathology
College of Veterinary Medicine and Biomedical Sciences
Colorado State University
Ft. Collins, CO 80523-1677, USA
voice:(970)491-5740, (970)491-6729
fax:(970)491-1815
Robert.Ellis@colostate.edu
====================
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 6 Nov 2002 12:14:12 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Mark Campbell
Subject: Office space in laboratory areas
MIME-version: 1.0
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boundary=------------8A92BC7D22C444AE69670406
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Have a question for the group,
I received an email from a research facility asking for advice......
This research group works in a building that looks like a warehouse (I
know, a nightmare already). Inside the building, in the middle, is
laboratory space with multiple benches. On the side of this laboratory
space, within the same room, are little office cubicles (open to the
room through top and side) that the lab group is calling office space.
The laboratory develops enteric vaccines and frequently manipulates
virulent pathogens like Salmonella sp., Camplyobactor sp., E. coli. and
Shigella sp. within this lab space. In the future, they are planning to
transfer certain Select Agents to this facility as well.
The lab group would like to mark off a walkway using tape which would
indicate office space on the side and serve as a so-called office
barrier separating the strip of offices from the center labs.
With common sense out the door, could someone point to particular regs
which prevents this sort of activity? I've reviewed some of the OSHA
regs but could not find anything concrete. The BMBL recommends lockable
doors for facilities that house restricted agents (as defined in 42 CFR
72.6)....They would lock the entire facility to satisfy this
recommendation.
Thanks for your help!
Mark C.
----------------------------------------
Mark J. Campbell, MS, CBSP
Biological Safety Officer
Saint Louis University
1402 S. Grand Blvd.
Caroline Bldg. Rm. 307
St. Louis, MO 63104
(314) 577-8608 Phone
(314) 268-5560 Fax
campbem@slu.edu
--------------8A92BC7D22C444AE69670406
Content-Type: text/html; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Have a question for the group,
I received an email from a research facility asking for advice......
This research group works in a building that looks like a warehouse
(I know, a nightmare already). Inside the building, in the middle,
is laboratory space with multiple benches. On the side of this
laboratory space, within the same room, are little office cubicles
(open to the room through top and side) that the lab group is
calling office space. The laboratory develops enteric vaccines and
frequently manipulates virulent pathogens like Salmonella sp.,
Camplyobactor sp., E. coli. and Shigella sp. within this lab space.
In the future, they are planning to transfer certain Select Agents
to this facility as well.
The lab group would like to mark off a walkway using tape which
would indicate office space on the side and serve as a so-called
office barrier separating the strip of offices from the center labs.
With common sense out the door, could someone point to particular
regs which prevents this sort of activity? I've reviewed some of
the OSHA regs but could not find anything concrete. The BMBL
recommends lockable doors for facilities that house restricted
agents (as defined in 42 CFR 72.6)....They would lock the entire
facility to satisfy this recommendation.
Thanks for your help!
Mark C.
----------------------------------------
Mark J. Campbell, MS, CBSP
Biological Safety Officer
Saint Louis University
1402 S. Grand Blvd.
Caroline Bldg. Rm. 307
St. Louis, MO 63104
(314) 577-8608 Phone
(314) 268-5560 Fax
campbem@slu.edu
--------------8A92BC7D22C444AE69670406--
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 6 Nov 2002 14:33:08 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Robert N. Latsch"
Subject: Re: Office space in laboratory areas
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
I do not think that you will find support in the regs. Potential aerosols
are the problem.
The way we handle it here(oopen labs, damm them!)...Walls and a door, then
food is allowed. But the area must be totaly isolated by barriers(walls
ceiling, doors) with the labs. Food may be brought in through the lab
using secondary containment.
Bob
> Have a question for the group,
>
>I received an email from a research facility asking for advice......
>
>This research group works in a building that looks like a warehouse (I
>know, a nightmare already). Inside the building, in the middle, is
>laboratory space with multiple benches. On the side of this laboratory
>space, within the same room, are little office cubicles (open to the room
>through top and side) that the lab group is calling office space. The
>laboratory develops enteric vaccines and frequently manipulates virulent
>pathogens like Salmonella sp., Camplyobactor sp., E. coli. and Shigella
>sp. within this lab space. In the future, they are planning to transfer
>certain Select Agents to this facility as well.
>
>The lab group would like to mark off a walkway using tape which would
>indicate office space on the side and serve as a so-called office barrier
>separating the strip of offices from the center labs.
>
>With common sense out the door, could someone point to particular regs
>which prevents this sort of activity? I've reviewed some of the OSHA regs
>but could not find anything concrete. The BMBL recommends lockable doors
>for facilities that house restricted agents (as defined in 42 CFR
>72.6)....They would lock the entire facility to satisfy this
>recommendation.
>
>Thanks for your help!
>
>Mark C.
>
>
>
>----------------------------------------
>Mark J. Campbell, MS, CBSP
>Biological Safety Officer
>Saint Louis University
>1402 S. Grand Blvd.
>Caroline Bldg. Rm. 307
>St. Louis, MO 63104
>(314) 577-8608 Phone
>(314) 268-5560 Fax
>campbem@slu.edu
_____________________________________________________________________
__ / _____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 7 Nov 2002 11:56:24 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Dina Sassone
Subject: Re: Office space in laboratory areas
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
Could we explore this "mark it off using tape" a little more?
I have a LARGE lab that has a bunch of optical tables for microscopes and
other optical equipment. This equipment is used for nonbio samples
now; but they want to use it for RG-1, RG-2 organisms if
possible. Consumption of food etc, would be easy to prohibit; even though
there are computers in there, it isn't really offices. A sink and eyewash
are in the lab. I think BSL-1 requirements are doable for this space, but
I am not sure about BSL-2. The chances for aerosols or splashes is minimal
(other than spills); containers would rarely be open, if at all. The
optical tables are stainless steel, and covered with holes of about 1/8-1/4
inch in diameter (which makes decon problematic). We discussed using the
absorbent plastic backed paper on top of the optical tables where the work
will be performed. The question is, for the few times and areas within
this rather large space that work with a RG-2 organism would be done,
requiring BSL-2, how would you address the requirements for BSL-2, e.g.,
decon of work surfaces that would not ever be used for the organism? Other
issues you can think of ?
Does tape on the floor really work as a way to delineate a boundary for a
BSL-2? I know we use it for hazardous waste site work, spill clean up
etc., but it is really just an arbitrary line, in my opinion. I want to
just designate the whole lab as a BSL-2; it will be easier, but the
tremendous amount of equipment in there that wouldn't be used for the bio
activities is a significant issue when it comes to daily decon. Ideas? We
even bounced around the idea of a plastic air curtain, rather than tape!
At 02:33 PM 11/6/2002 -0500, you wrote:
>I do not think that you will find support in the regs. Potential aerosols
>are the problem.
>
>The way we handle it here(oopen labs, damm them!)...Walls and a door, then
>food is allowed. But the area must be totaly isolated by barriers(walls
>ceiling, doors) with the labs. Food may be brought in through the lab
>using secondary containment.
>
>Bob
>
> > Have a question for the group,
> >
> >I received an email from a research facility asking for advice......
> >
> >This research group works in a building that looks like a warehouse (I
> >know, a nightmare already). Inside the building, in the middle, is
> >laboratory space with multiple benches. On the side of this laboratory
> >space, within the same room, are little office cubicles (open to the room
> >through top and side) that the lab group is calling office space. The
> >laboratory develops enteric vaccines and frequently manipulates virulent
> >pathogens like Salmonella sp., Camplyobactor sp., E. coli. and Shigella
> >sp. within this lab space. In the future, they are planning to transfer
> >certain Select Agents to this facility as well.
> >
> >The lab group would like to mark off a walkway using tape which would
> >indicate office space on the side and serve as a so-called office barrier
> >separating the strip of offices from the center labs.
> >
> >With common sense out the door, could someone point to particular regs
> >which prevents this sort of activity? I've reviewed some of the OSHA regs
> >but could not find anything concrete. The BMBL recommends lockable doors
> >for facilities that house restricted agents (as defined in 42 CFR
> >72.6)....They would lock the entire facility to satisfy this
> >recommendation.
> >
> >Thanks for your help!
> >
> >Mark C.
> >
> >
> >
> >----------------------------------------
> >Mark J. Campbell, MS, CBSP
> >Biological Safety Officer
> >Saint Louis University
> >1402 S. Grand Blvd.
> >Caroline Bldg. Rm. 307
> >St. Louis, MO 63104
> >(314) 577-8608 Phone
> >(314) 268-5560 Fax
> >campbem@slu.edu
>
>
>
>_____________________________________________________________________
>__ / _____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
>_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
> \ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
> \ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
> \__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
Dina M. Sassone, CIH, CSP, SM (NRM), CBSP
University of California
Los Alamos National Laboratory
HSR-5
MS K486
Los Alamos, NM 87545
(505) 665-2977 (voice)
((505) 996-3807 (pager)
"To infinity and beyond"-Buzz Lightyear
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 7 Nov 2002 11:00:10 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Gergis, Nasr"
Subject: Re: Monitor Liquid Nitrogen
MIME-Version: 1.0
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I understand liquid nitrogen tanks inside buildings should be monitored by
Oxygen Sensor. Does anyone know the regulation/guidelines cover this area.
Thanks.
Nasr Gergis, Ph.D., DVM
Biological Safety Officer
Occupational Safety and Health
City of Hope/BRI
------_=_NextPart_001_01C2868F.27AFA324
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I understand liquid nitrogen tanks inside buildings = should be
monitored by Oxygen Sensor. Does anyone know the =
regulation/guidelines cover this area. Thanks.
Nasr Gergis, Ph.D., DVM
Biological Safety Officer
Occupational Safety and Health
City of Hope/BRI
------_=_NextPart_001_01C2868F.27AFA324--
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 7 Nov 2002 14:21:35 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Bernholc, Nicole M"
Subject: Re: Monitor Liquid Nitrogen
MIME-Version: 1.0
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charset="iso-8859-1"
You won't find specifics; it might be cited under process safety, but would
be cited as a general duty clase.
Whether or not you need an oxygen sensor is based on the amount of liquid
nitrogen you are talking about. By performing a hazard assessment,
determine if there is sufficient liquid nitrogen to produce a oxygen
deficiency hazard in the area if there were a catastrophic leak. Also
evaluate if you have any confined spaces where the liquid nitrogen might
flow, it may cause a problem there, or in a small room. If the answer is
yes, in any of these situations (or others I can't think of now) then you
need an alarm.
It doesn't have to be an oxygen alarm, if there is a process alarm that
indicated the loss of liquid nitrogen.
More than one way to do it.
-----Original Message-----
From: Gergis, Nasr [mailto:NGergis@]
Sent: Thursday, November 07, 2002 2:00 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Monitor Liquid Nitrogen
I understand liquid nitrogen tanks inside buildings should be monitored by
Oxygen Sensor. Does anyone know the regulation/guidelines cover this area.
Thanks.
Nasr Gergis, Ph.D., DVM
Biological Safety Officer
Occupational Safety and Health
City of Hope/BRI
------_=_NextPart_001_01C28692.E33B59A0
Content-Type: text/html;
charset="iso-8859-1"
You won't find specifics; it might be cited under process safety,
but would be cited as a general duty clase.
size=2>
size=2>Whether or not you need an oxygen sensor is based on the
amount of liquid nitrogen you are talking about. By performing a
hazard assessment, determine if there is sufficient liquid nitrogen
to produce a oxygen deficiency hazard in the area if there were a
catastrophic leak. Also evaluate if you have any confined spaces
where the liquid nitrogen might flow, it may cause a problem there,
or in a small room. If the answer is yes, in any of these
situations (or others I can't think of now) then you need an alarm.
size=2>
It doesn't have to be an oxygen alarm, if there is a process alarm
that indicated the loss of liquid nitrogen.
size=2>
More than one way to do it.
size=2>-----Original Message-----
From: Gergis, Nasr [mailto:NGergis@]
Sent: Thursday, November 07, 2002 2:00 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Monitor Liquid Nitrogen
I understand liquid nitrogen tanks inside buildings should be
monitored by Oxygen Sensor. Does anyone know the
regulation/guidelines cover this area. Thanks.
Nasr Gergis, Ph.D., DVM
Biological Safety Officer
Occupational Safety and Health
City of Hope/BRI
------_=_NextPart_001_01C28692.E33B59A0--
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 7 Nov 2002 12:12:42 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Funk, Glenn"
Subject: Re: Office space in laboratory areas
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
The basic concept here is "sequesterability" - all contiguous spaces that
share air volume must be classified at the same containment level (BSL2,
BSL3, etc). Any space to be considered outside that containment
classification must be able to be totally sequestered, i.e., made totally
separate from the classified space. This requires floor-to-ceiling walls
without through penetrations (such as suspended ceilings) and doors that
close. Microbes have the bad habit of blithely ignoring tape on the floor
and signs on the wall.
I'm unaware of any "regulatory" edicts pertaining to this, unless you
consider certain ventilation requirements, by (considerable) extension.
-- Glenn
Glenn A. Funk, Ph.D., CBSP
Director and Biosafety Officer
Environment, Health and Safety
MedImmune Vaccines, Inc.
408-845-8847
-----Original Message-----
From: Dina Sassone [mailto:dinas@]
Sent: Thursday, November 07, 2002 10:56 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Office space in laboratory areas
Could we explore this "mark it off using tape" a little more?
I have a LARGE lab that has a bunch of optical tables for microscopes and
other optical equipment. This equipment is used for nonbio samples
now; but they want to use it for RG-1, RG-2 organisms if
possible. Consumption of food etc, would be easy to prohibit; even though
there are computers in there, it isn't really offices. A sink and eyewash
are in the lab. I think BSL-1 requirements are doable for this space, but
I am not sure about BSL-2. The chances for aerosols or splashes is minimal
(other than spills); containers would rarely be open, if at all. The
optical tables are stainless steel, and covered with holes of about 1/8-1/4
inch in diameter (which makes decon problematic). We discussed using the
absorbent plastic backed paper on top of the optical tables where the work
will be performed. The question is, for the few times and areas within
this rather large space that work with a RG-2 organism would be done,
requiring BSL-2, how would you address the requirements for BSL-2, e.g.,
decon of work surfaces that would not ever be used for the organism? Other
issues you can think of ?
Does tape on the floor really work as a way to delineate a boundary for a
BSL-2? I know we use it for hazardous waste site work, spill clean up
etc., but it is really just an arbitrary line, in my opinion. I want to
just designate the whole lab as a BSL-2; it will be easier, but the
tremendous amount of equipment in there that wouldn't be used for the bio
activities is a significant issue when it comes to daily decon. Ideas? We
even bounced around the idea of a plastic air curtain, rather than tape!
At 02:33 PM 11/6/2002 -0500, you wrote:
>I do not think that you will find support in the regs. Potential aerosols
>are the problem.
>
>The way we handle it here(oopen labs, damm them!)...Walls and a door, then
>food is allowed. But the area must be totaly isolated by barriers(walls
>ceiling, doors) with the labs. Food may be brought in through the lab
>using secondary containment.
>
>Bob
>
> > Have a question for the group,
> >
> >I received an email from a research facility asking for advice......
> >
> >This research group works in a building that looks like a warehouse (I
> >know, a nightmare already). Inside the building, in the middle, is
> >laboratory space with multiple benches. On the side of this laboratory
> >space, within the same room, are little office cubicles (open to the room
> >through top and side) that the lab group is calling office space. The
> >laboratory develops enteric vaccines and frequently manipulates virulent
> >pathogens like Salmonella sp., Camplyobactor sp., E. coli. and Shigella
> >sp. within this lab space. In the future, they are planning to transfer
> >certain Select Agents to this facility as well.
> >
> >The lab group would like to mark off a walkway using tape which would
> >indicate office space on the side and serve as a so-called office barrier
> >separating the strip of offices from the center labs.
> >
> >With common sense out the door, could someone point to particular regs
> >which prevents this sort of activity? I've reviewed some of the OSHA
regs
> >but could not find anything concrete. The BMBL recommends lockable doors
> >for facilities that house restricted agents (as defined in 42 CFR
> >72.6)....They would lock the entire facility to satisfy this
> >recommendation.
> >
> >Thanks for your help!
> >
> >Mark C.
> >
> >
> >
> >----------------------------------------
> >Mark J. Campbell, MS, CBSP
> >Biological Safety Officer
> >Saint Louis University
> >1402 S. Grand Blvd.
> >Caroline Bldg. Rm. 307
> >St. Louis, MO 63104
> >(314) 577-8608 Phone
> >(314) 268-5560 Fax
> >campbem@slu.edu
>
>
>
>_____________________________________________________________________
>__ /
_____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
>_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
> \ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
> \ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental
Safety
> \__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
Dina M. Sassone, CIH, CSP, SM (NRM), CBSP
University of California
Los Alamos National Laboratory
HSR-5
MS K486
Los Alamos, NM 87545
(505) 665-2977 (voice)
((505) 996-3807 (pager)
"To infinity and beyond"-Buzz Lightyear
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 7 Nov 2002 14:26:22 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "OLINGER, PATRICIA L [S&C/0216]"
Subject: Re: Office space in laboratory areas
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Yea!
Magic tape doesn't work! Years ago the magic tape concept was run by an NRC
inspector here. As Glenn says, unless you have some type of physical
barrier you can call it what you want but it is the same room. I have seen
unique open labs where they designed it open to the offices with a walk way
between the offices and the lab area. Very special ventilation (expensive)
to ensure directional air flow. Reality, it is still the same room.
Patty Olinger
Pharmacia Corp.
-----Original Message-----
From: Funk, Glenn [mailto:funkg@]
Sent: Thursday, November 07, 2002 3:13 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Office space in laboratory areas
The basic concept here is "sequesterability" - all contiguous spaces that
share air volume must be classified at the same containment level (BSL2,
BSL3, etc). Any space to be considered outside that containment
classification must be able to be totally sequestered, i.e., made totally
separate from the classified space. This requires floor-to-ceiling walls
without through penetrations (such as suspended ceilings) and doors that
close. Microbes have the bad habit of blithely ignoring tape on the floor
and signs on the wall.
I'm unaware of any "regulatory" edicts pertaining to this, unless you
consider certain ventilation requirements, by (considerable) extension.
-- Glenn
Glenn A. Funk, Ph.D., CBSP
Director and Biosafety Officer
Environment, Health and Safety
MedImmune Vaccines, Inc.
408-845-8847
-----Original Message-----
From: Dina Sassone [mailto:dinas@]
Sent: Thursday, November 07, 2002 10:56 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Office space in laboratory areas
Could we explore this "mark it off using tape" a little more?
I have a LARGE lab that has a bunch of optical tables for microscopes and
other optical equipment. This equipment is used for nonbio samples
now; but they want to use it for RG-1, RG-2 organisms if
possible. Consumption of food etc, would be easy to prohibit; even though
there are computers in there, it isn't really offices. A sink and eyewash
are in the lab. I think BSL-1 requirements are doable for this space, but
I am not sure about BSL-2. The chances for aerosols or splashes is minimal
(other than spills); containers would rarely be open, if at all. The
optical tables are stainless steel, and covered with holes of about 1/8-1/4
inch in diameter (which makes decon problematic). We discussed using the
absorbent plastic backed paper on top of the optical tables where the work
will be performed. The question is, for the few times and areas within
this rather large space that work with a RG-2 organism would be done,
requiring BSL-2, how would you address the requirements for BSL-2, e.g.,
decon of work surfaces that would not ever be used for the organism? Other
issues you can think of ?
Does tape on the floor really work as a way to delineate a boundary for a
BSL-2? I know we use it for hazardous waste site work, spill clean up
etc., but it is really just an arbitrary line, in my opinion. I want to
just designate the whole lab as a BSL-2; it will be easier, but the
tremendous amount of equipment in there that wouldn't be used for the bio
activities is a significant issue when it comes to daily decon. Ideas? We
even bounced around the idea of a plastic air curtain, rather than tape!
At 02:33 PM 11/6/2002 -0500, you wrote:
>I do not think that you will find support in the regs. Potential aerosols
>are the problem.
>
>The way we handle it here(oopen labs, damm them!)...Walls and a door, then
>food is allowed. But the area must be totaly isolated by barriers(walls
>ceiling, doors) with the labs. Food may be brought in through the lab
>using secondary containment.
>
>Bob
>
> > Have a question for the group,
> >
> >I received an email from a research facility asking for advice......
> >
> >This research group works in a building that looks like a warehouse (I
> >know, a nightmare already). Inside the building, in the middle, is
> >laboratory space with multiple benches. On the side of this laboratory
> >space, within the same room, are little office cubicles (open to the room
> >through top and side) that the lab group is calling office space. The
> >laboratory develops enteric vaccines and frequently manipulates virulent
> >pathogens like Salmonella sp., Camplyobactor sp., E. coli. and Shigella
> >sp. within this lab space. In the future, they are planning to transfer
> >certain Select Agents to this facility as well.
> >
> >The lab group would like to mark off a walkway using tape which would
> >indicate office space on the side and serve as a so-called office barrier
> >separating the strip of offices from the center labs.
> >
> >With common sense out the door, could someone point to particular regs
> >which prevents this sort of activity? I've reviewed some of the OSHA
regs
> >but could not find anything concrete. The BMBL recommends lockable doors
> >for facilities that house restricted agents (as defined in 42 CFR
> >72.6)....They would lock the entire facility to satisfy this
> >recommendation.
> >
> >Thanks for your help!
> >
> >Mark C.
> >
> >
> >
> >----------------------------------------
> >Mark J. Campbell, MS, CBSP
> >Biological Safety Officer
> >Saint Louis University
> >1402 S. Grand Blvd.
> >Caroline Bldg. Rm. 307
> >St. Louis, MO 63104
> >(314) 577-8608 Phone
> >(314) 268-5560 Fax
> >campbem@slu.edu
>
>
>
>_____________________________________________________________________
>__ /
_____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
>_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
> \ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
> \ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental
Safety
> \__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
Dina M. Sassone, CIH, CSP, SM (NRM), CBSP
University of California
Los Alamos National Laboratory
HSR-5
MS K486
Los Alamos, NM 87545
(505) 665-2977 (voice)
((505) 996-3807 (pager)
"To infinity and beyond"-Buzz Lightyear
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 7 Nov 2002 15:54:22 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: J Daniel James
Subject: Re: Monitor Liquid Nitrogen
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="=_alternative 0072BD3B85256C6A_="
This is a multipart message in MIME format.
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Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
From a Laboratory Safety perspective:
A "catastrophic leak" alone is not necessary for the concentration of O2
to drop below acceptable levels. Depending on the room conditions (room
volume, ventilation rate, etc.), filling a large Dewar with LN2 could
result in low O2 levels. Similarly, cryogenic freezers using LN2 could
be a problem depending on the number freezers and the room conditions.
J. Daniel James
Occupational & Environmental Safety Office
Duke University & Health System
----------------------------------------------------
james028@mc.duke.edu
"Bernholc, Nicole M"
Sent by: A Biosafety Discussion List
11/07/2002 02:21 PM
Please respond to A Biosafety Discussion List
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
cc:
Subject: Re: Monitor Liquid Nitrogen
You won't find specifics; it might be cited under process safety, but
would be cited as a general duty clase.
Whether or not you need an oxygen sensor is based on the amount of liquid
nitrogen you are talking about. By performing a hazard assessment,
determine if there is sufficient liquid nitrogen to produce a oxygen
deficiency hazard in the area if there were a catastrophic leak. Also
evaluate if you have any confined spaces where the liquid nitrogen might
flow, it may cause a problem there, or in a small room. If the answer is
yes, in any of these situations (or others I can't think of now) then you
need an alarm.
It doesn't have to be an oxygen alarm, if there is a process alarm that
indicated the loss of liquid nitrogen.
More than one way to do it.
-----Original Message-----
From: Gergis, Nasr [mailto:NGergis@]
Sent: Thursday, November 07, 2002 2:00 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Monitor Liquid Nitrogen
I understand liquid nitrogen tanks inside buildings should be monitored by
Oxygen Sensor. Does anyone know the regulation/guidelines cover this
area. Thanks.
Nasr Gergis, Ph.D., DVM
Biological Safety Officer
Occupational Safety and Health
City of Hope/BRI
--=_alternative 0072BD3B85256C6A_=
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
From a Laboratory Safety perspective:
A "catastrophic leak" alone is not
necessary for the concentration of O2 to drop below acceptable levels.
Depending on the room conditions (room volume, ventilation rate, etc.), filling
a large Dewar with LN2 could result in low O2 levels. Similarly,
cryogenic freezers using LN2 could be a problem depending on the number freezers
and the room conditions.
J. Daniel James
Occupational & Environmental Safety Office
Duke University & Health System
----------------------------------------------------
james028@mc.duke.edu
"Bernholc, Nicole M"
<bernholc@>
Sent by: A Biosafety Discussion List
<BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU>
11/07/2002 02:21 PM
Please respond to A Biosafety Discussion
List
To:
BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
cc:
Subject:
Re: Monitor Liquid Nitrogen
You won't find specifics; it might be
cited under process safety, but would be cited as a general duty clase.
Whether or not you need an oxygen
sensor is based on the amount of liquid nitrogen you are talking about. By
performing a hazard assessment, determine if there is sufficient liquid nitrogen
to produce a oxygen deficiency hazard in the area if there were a catastrophic
leak. Also evaluate if you have any confined spaces where the liquid
nitrogen might flow, it may cause a problem there, or in a small room. If
the answer is yes, in any of these situations (or others I can't think of now)
then you need an alarm.
It doesn't have to be an oxygen alarm,
if there is a process alarm that indicated the loss of liquid nitrogen.
More than one way to do it.
-----Original Message-----
From: Gergis, Nasr [mailto:NGergis@]
Sent: Thursday, November 07, 2002 2:00 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Monitor Liquid Nitrogen
I understand liquid nitrogen tanks inside
buildings should be monitored by Oxygen Sensor. Does anyone know the
regulation/guidelines cover this area. Thanks.
Nasr Gergis, Ph.D., DVM
Biological Safety Officer
Occupational Safety and Health
City of Hope/BRI
--=_alternative 0072BD3B85256C6A_=--
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 7 Nov 2002 14:19:27 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Dina Sassone
Subject: Re: Office space in laboratory areas
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
What about the daily decon issue?
At 02:26 PM 11/7/2002 -0600, you wrote:
>Yea!
>
>Magic tape doesn't work! Years ago the magic tape concept was run by an NRC
>inspector here. As Glenn says, unless you have some type of physical
>barrier you can call it what you want but it is the same room. I have seen
>unique open labs where they designed it open to the offices with a walk way
>between the offices and the lab area. Very special ventilation (expensive)
>to ensure directional air flow. Reality, it is still the same room.
>
>Patty Olinger
>Pharmacia Corp.
>
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From: Funk, Glenn [mailto:funkg@]
>Sent: Thursday, November 07, 2002 3:13 PM
>To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
>Subject: Re: Office space in laboratory areas
>
>
>The basic concept here is "sequesterability" - all contiguous spaces that
>share air volume must be classified at the same containment level (BSL2,
>BSL3, etc). Any space to be considered outside that containment
>classification must be able to be totally sequestered, i.e., made totally
>separate from the classified space. This requires floor-to-ceiling walls
>without through penetrations (such as suspended ceilings) and doors that
>close. Microbes have the bad habit of blithely ignoring tape on the floor
>and signs on the wall.
>
>I'm unaware of any "regulatory" edicts pertaining to this, unless you
>consider certain ventilation requirements, by (considerable) extension.
>
>-- Glenn
>
>Glenn A. Funk, Ph.D., CBSP
>Director and Biosafety Officer
>Environment, Health and Safety
>MedImmune Vaccines, Inc.
>408-845-8847
>
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From: Dina Sassone [mailto:dinas@]
>Sent: Thursday, November 07, 2002 10:56 AM
>To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
>Subject: Re: Office space in laboratory areas
>
>
>Could we explore this "mark it off using tape" a little more?
>
>I have a LARGE lab that has a bunch of optical tables for microscopes and
>other optical equipment. This equipment is used for nonbio samples
>now; but they want to use it for RG-1, RG-2 organisms if
>possible. Consumption of food etc, would be easy to prohibit; even though
>there are computers in there, it isn't really offices. A sink and eyewash
>are in the lab. I think BSL-1 requirements are doable for this space, but
>I am not sure about BSL-2. The chances for aerosols or splashes is minimal
>(other than spills); containers would rarely be open, if at all. The
>optical tables are stainless steel, and covered with holes of about 1/8-1/4
>inch in diameter (which makes decon problematic). We discussed using the
>absorbent plastic backed paper on top of the optical tables where the work
>will be performed. The question is, for the few times and areas within
>this rather large space that work with a RG-2 organism would be done,
>requiring BSL-2, how would you address the requirements for BSL-2, e.g.,
>decon of work surfaces that would not ever be used for the organism? Other
>issues you can think of ?
>
>Does tape on the floor really work as a way to delineate a boundary for a
>BSL-2? I know we use it for hazardous waste site work, spill clean up
>etc., but it is really just an arbitrary line, in my opinion. I want to
>just designate the whole lab as a BSL-2; it will be easier, but the
>tremendous amount of equipment in there that wouldn't be used for the bio
>activities is a significant issue when it comes to daily decon. Ideas? We
>even bounced around the idea of a plastic air curtain, rather than tape!
>
>At 02:33 PM 11/6/2002 -0500, you wrote:
> >I do not think that you will find support in the regs. Potential aerosols
> >are the problem.
> >
> >The way we handle it here(oopen labs, damm them!)...Walls and a door, then
> >food is allowed. But the area must be totaly isolated by barriers(walls
> >ceiling, doors) with the labs. Food may be brought in through the lab
> >using secondary containment.
> >
> >Bob
> >
> > > Have a question for the group,
> > >
> > >I received an email from a research facility asking for advice......
> > >
> > >This research group works in a building that looks like a warehouse (I
> > >know, a nightmare already). Inside the building, in the middle, is
> > >laboratory space with multiple benches. On the side of this laboratory
> > >space, within the same room, are little office cubicles (open to the room
> > >through top and side) that the lab group is calling office space. The
> > >laboratory develops enteric vaccines and frequently manipulates virulent
> > >pathogens like Salmonella sp., Camplyobactor sp., E. coli. and Shigella
> > >sp. within this lab space. In the future, they are planning to transfer
> > >certain Select Agents to this facility as well.
> > >
> > >The lab group would like to mark off a walkway using tape which would
> > >indicate office space on the side and serve as a so-called office barrier
> > >separating the strip of offices from the center labs.
> > >
> > >With common sense out the door, could someone point to particular regs
> > >which prevents this sort of activity? I've reviewed some of the OSHA
>regs
> > >but could not find anything concrete. The BMBL recommends lockable doors
> > >for facilities that house restricted agents (as defined in 42 CFR
> > >72.6)....They would lock the entire facility to satisfy this
> > >recommendation.
> > >
> > >Thanks for your help!
> > >
> > >Mark C.
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >----------------------------------------
> > >Mark J. Campbell, MS, CBSP
> > >Biological Safety Officer
> > >Saint Louis University
> > >1402 S. Grand Blvd.
> > >Caroline Bldg. Rm. 307
> > >St. Louis, MO 63104
> > >(314) 577-8608 Phone
> > >(314) 268-5560 Fax
> > >campbem@slu.edu
> >
> >
> >
> >_____________________________________________________________________
> >__ /
>_____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
> >_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
> > \ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
> > \ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental
>Safety
> > \__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
>
>Dina M. Sassone, CIH, CSP, SM (NRM), CBSP
>University of California
>Los Alamos National Laboratory
>HSR-5
>MS K486
>Los Alamos, NM 87545
>(505) 665-2977 (voice)
>((505) 996-3807 (pager)
>"To infinity and beyond"-Buzz Lightyear
Dina M. Sassone, CIH, CSP, SM (NRM), CBSP
University of California
Los Alamos National Laboratory
HSR-5
MS K486
Los Alamos, NM 87545
(505) 665-2977 (voice)
((505) 996-3807 (pager)
"To infinity and beyond"-Buzz Lightyear
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 7 Nov 2002 15:48:48 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Terry Lawrin
Subject: Re: Notification Reminder
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
Ed and everyone else,
It's a sunny November 7th here in Chicago, and the orange cards that should
have been mailed out before October 11th are just coming in. I see the old
address is now invalid, so where do we send them?
Thanks,
Terry Lawrin
At 10:40 AM 10/16/02 -0400, you wrote:
>Just a friendly reminder that this past Friday (Oct 11) was the USDA
>deadline for returning Notification forms.
>
>If you still have forms or postcards that have not been returned, and do not
>want to get a FINAL NOTICE of non-compliance, please get these forms to us
>by this Friday AM, because we are taking a final snapshot of non-responders
>at 5:00 PM and will be mailing out notices on Monday, 10/21 (while everyone
>is at ABSA). There are still a BUNCH of folks who have not responded!!
>
>Ed Gaunt
Terrance J. Lawrin, MT. (ASCP) SLS, CBSP (ABSA)
Biosafety Officer / Sanitarian
University of Illinois at Chicago
Environmental Health and Safety Office
Telephone: 312-413-3701
email: tlawrin@uic.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 7 Nov 2002 17:00:55 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Robert N. Latsch"
Subject: Re: Office space in laboratory areas
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Isn't the difference between bsl 1 & 2 that 1 work can be done on a bench
and 2 work in a BLS 2 cabinet? I don't think that tape will work.
Bob
>Could we explore this "mark it off using tape" a little more?
>
>I have a LARGE lab that has a bunch of optical tables for microscopes and
>other optical equipment. This equipment is used for nonbio samples
>now; but they want to use it for RG-1, RG-2 organisms if
>possible. Consumption of food etc, would be easy to prohibit; even though
>there are computers in there, it isn't really offices. A sink and eyewash
>are in the lab. I think BSL-1 requirements are doable for this space, but
>I am not sure about BSL-2. The chances for aerosols or splashes is minimal
>(other than spills); containers would rarely be open, if at all. The
>optical tables are stainless steel, and covered with holes of about 1/8-1/4
>inch in diameter (which makes decon problematic). We discussed using the
>absorbent plastic backed paper on top of the optical tables where the work
>will be performed. The question is, for the few times and areas within
>this rather large space that work with a RG-2 organism would be done,
>requiring BSL-2, how would you address the requirements for BSL-2, e.g.,
>decon of work surfaces that would not ever be used for the organism? Other
>issues you can think of ?
>
>Does tape on the floor really work as a way to delineate a boundary for a
>BSL-2? I know we use it for hazardous waste site work, spill clean up
>etc., but it is really just an arbitrary line, in my opinion. I want to
>just designate the whole lab as a BSL-2; it will be easier, but the
>tremendous amount of equipment in there that wouldn't be used for the bio
>activities is a significant issue when it comes to daily decon. Ideas? We
>even bounced around the idea of a plastic air curtain, rather than tape!
>
>At 02:33 PM 11/6/2002 -0500, you wrote:
>>I do not think that you will find support in the regs. Potential aerosols
>>are the problem.
>>
>>The way we handle it here(oopen labs, damm them!)...Walls and a door, then
>>food is allowed. But the area must be totaly isolated by barriers(walls
>>ceiling, doors) with the labs. Food may be brought in through the lab
>>using secondary containment.
>>
>>Bob
>>
>> > Have a question for the group,
>> >
>> >I received an email from a research facility asking for advice......
>> >
>> >This research group works in a building that looks like a warehouse (I
>> >know, a nightmare already). Inside the building, in the middle, is
>> >laboratory space with multiple benches. On the side of this laboratory
>> >space, within the same room, are little office cubicles (open to the room
>> >through top and side) that the lab group is calling office space. The
>> >laboratory develops enteric vaccines and frequently manipulates virulent
>> >pathogens like Salmonella sp., Camplyobactor sp., E. coli. and Shigella
>> >sp. within this lab space. In the future, they are planning to transfer
>> >certain Select Agents to this facility as well.
>> >
>> >The lab group would like to mark off a walkway using tape which would
>> >indicate office space on the side and serve as a so-called office barrier
>> >separating the strip of offices from the center labs.
>> >
>> >With common sense out the door, could someone point to particular regs
>> >which prevents this sort of activity? I've reviewed some of the OSHA regs
>> >but could not find anything concrete. The BMBL recommends lockable doors
>> >for facilities that house restricted agents (as defined in 42 CFR
>> >72.6)....They would lock the entire facility to satisfy this
>> >recommendation.
>> >
>> >Thanks for your help!
>> >
>> >Mark C.
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >----------------------------------------
>> >Mark J. Campbell, MS, CBSP
>> >Biological Safety Officer
>> >Saint Louis University
>> >1402 S. Grand Blvd.
>> >Caroline Bldg. Rm. 307
>> >St. Louis, MO 63104
>> >(314) 577-8608 Phone
>> >(314) 268-5560 Fax
>> >campbem@slu.edu
>>
>>
>>
>>_____________________________________________________________________
>>__ /
>>_____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
>>_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
>> \ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
>> \ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
>> \__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
>
>Dina M. Sassone, CIH, CSP, SM (NRM), CBSP
>University of California
>Los Alamos National Laboratory
>HSR-5
>MS K486
>Los Alamos, NM 87545
>(505) 665-2977 (voice)
>((505) 996-3807 (pager)
>"To infinity and beyond"-Buzz Lightyear
_____________________________________________________________________
__ / _____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 7 Nov 2002 15:13:31 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Dina Sassone
Subject: Re: Office space in laboratory areas
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
I agree. I think Glenn said it very well!
At 05:00 PM 11/7/2002 -0500, you wrote:
>Isn't the difference between bsl 1 & 2 that 1 work can be done on a bench
>and 2 work in a BLS 2 cabinet? I don't think that tape will work.
>
>Bob
>
> >Could we explore this "mark it off using tape" a little more?
> >
> >I have a LARGE lab that has a bunch of optical tables for microscopes and
> >other optical equipment. This equipment is used for nonbio samples
> >now; but they want to use it for RG-1, RG-2 organisms if
> >possible. Consumption of food etc, would be easy to prohibit; even though
> >there are computers in there, it isn't really offices. A sink and eyewash
> >are in the lab. I think BSL-1 requirements are doable for this space, but
> >I am not sure about BSL-2. The chances for aerosols or splashes is minimal
> >(other than spills); containers would rarely be open, if at all. The
> >optical tables are stainless steel, and covered with holes of about 1/8-1/4
> >inch in diameter (which makes decon problematic). We discussed using the
> >absorbent plastic backed paper on top of the optical tables where the work
> >will be performed. The question is, for the few times and areas within
> >this rather large space that work with a RG-2 organism would be done,
> >requiring BSL-2, how would you address the requirements for BSL-2, e.g.,
> >decon of work surfaces that would not ever be used for the organism? Other
> >issues you can think of ?
> >
> >Does tape on the floor really work as a way to delineate a boundary for a
> >BSL-2? I know we use it for hazardous waste site work, spill clean up
> >etc., but it is really just an arbitrary line, in my opinion. I want to
> >just designate the whole lab as a BSL-2; it will be easier, but the
> >tremendous amount of equipment in there that wouldn't be used for the bio
> >activities is a significant issue when it comes to daily decon. Ideas? We
> >even bounced around the idea of a plastic air curtain, rather than tape!
> >
> >At 02:33 PM 11/6/2002 -0500, you wrote:
> >>I do not think that you will find support in the regs. Potential aerosols
> >>are the problem.
> >>
> >>The way we handle it here(oopen labs, damm them!)...Walls and a door, then
> >>food is allowed. But the area must be totaly isolated by barriers(walls
> >>ceiling, doors) with the labs. Food may be brought in through the lab
> >>using secondary containment.
> >>
> >>Bob
> >>
> >> > Have a question for the group,
> >> >
> >> >I received an email from a research facility asking for advice......
> >> >
> >> >This research group works in a building that looks like a warehouse (I
> >> >know, a nightmare already). Inside the building, in the middle, is
> >> >laboratory space with multiple benches. On the side of this laboratory
> >> >space, within the same room, are little office cubicles (open to the room
> >> >through top and side) that the lab group is calling office space. The
> >> >laboratory develops enteric vaccines and frequently manipulates virulent
> >> >pathogens like Salmonella sp., Camplyobactor sp., E. coli. and Shigella
> >> >sp. within this lab space. In the future, they are planning to transfer
> >> >certain Select Agents to this facility as well.
> >> >
> >> >The lab group would like to mark off a walkway using tape which would
> >> >indicate office space on the side and serve as a so-called office barrier
> >> >separating the strip of offices from the center labs.
> >> >
> >> >With common sense out the door, could someone point to particular regs
> >> >which prevents this sort of activity? I've reviewed some of the OSHA
> regs
> >> >but could not find anything concrete. The BMBL recommends lockable doors
> >> >for facilities that house restricted agents (as defined in 42 CFR
> >> >72.6)....They would lock the entire facility to satisfy this
> >> >recommendation.
> >> >
> >> >Thanks for your help!
> >> >
> >> >Mark C.
> >> >
> >> >
> >> >
> >> >----------------------------------------
> >> >Mark J. Campbell, MS, CBSP
> >> >Biological Safety Officer
> >> >Saint Louis University
> >> >1402 S. Grand Blvd.
> >> >Caroline Bldg. Rm. 307
> >> >St. Louis, MO 63104
> >> >(314) 577-8608 Phone
> >> >(314) 268-5560 Fax
> >> >campbem@slu.edu
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>_____________________________________________________________________
> >>__ /
> >>_____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
> >>_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
> >> \ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
> >> \ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental
> Safety
> >> \__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
> >
> >Dina M. Sassone, CIH, CSP, SM (NRM), CBSP
> >University of California
> >Los Alamos National Laboratory
> >HSR-5
> >MS K486
> >Los Alamos, NM 87545
> >(505) 665-2977 (voice)
> >((505) 996-3807 (pager)
> >"To infinity and beyond"-Buzz Lightyear
>
>
>
>_____________________________________________________________________
>__ / _____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
>_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
> \ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
> \ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
> \__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
Dina M. Sassone, CIH, CSP, SM (NRM), CBSP
University of California
Los Alamos National Laboratory
HSR-5
MS K486
Los Alamos, NM 87545
(505) 665-2977 (voice)
((505) 996-3807 (pager)
"To infinity and beyond"-Buzz Lightyear
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 7 Nov 2002 16:26:01 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Brown, Virginia R"
Subject: Water Question
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Regarding the Wild Poliovirus Survey, environmental sewage and water =
samples are included in the
potentially infectious materials. Does this mean only water from the =
interior of a country where wild
poliovirus was suspected to be present? i.e., a water sample from the =
outer waters off coast would
not be considered as being "in a geographic area where wild polioviruses =
or VDPV were suspected
to be present". I can't imagine that a water sample from the Bay of =
Bengal or the Indian Ocean
would be considered to be potentially infectious just because of the =
proximity to India, for example.
Any interpretation on this? Kim??
Ginger Brown, CBSP
Env Health & Safety
TX A&M University
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 7 Nov 2002 16:39:09 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Kathryn Harris
Subject: more polio
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
We have an investigator who is doing genetic analysis on salvia samples
collected in Bangladesh. They have been stored for more than 3 months at
room temperature and contain NaN3 as a preservative. Should we be
implementing BSL-2/polio for this lab?
Thanks
Kath Harris
**********************************************
Kathryn Louise Harris, Ph.D.
Biological Safety Professional
Office of Research Safety
Northwestern University
NG-71 Technological Institute
2145 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208-3121
Phone: (847) 491-4387
Fax: (847) 467-2797
Email: kathrynharris@northwestern.edu
**********************************************
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 7 Nov 2002 17:05:25 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Jeppesen, Eric R"
Subject: Re: more polio
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Right off of CDC's polio website.
"Clinical or environmental materials stored without refrigeration for three
months or more, refrigerated for one year or more, heat inactivated, treated
with disinfectants known to inactivate polioviruses, or tested and found
negative for the presence of enteroviruses are not considered infectious or
potentially infectious for wild poliovirus."
So, those samples that have been stored at room temp for over three months
are not considered infectious and you would not need to implement the
BSL2/polio criteria for this lab.
Eric R. Jeppesen
Laboratory Safety Specialist
KU-EHS Dept.
(785) 864-2857 phone
(785) 864-2852 fax
jeppesen@ku.edu
-----Original Message-----
From: Kathryn Harris [mailto:kathrynharris@NORTHWESTERN.EDU]
Sent: Thursday, November 07, 2002 4:39 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: more polio
We have an investigator who is doing genetic analysis on salvia samples
collected in Bangladesh. They have been stored for more than 3 months at
room temperature and contain NaN3 as a preservative. Should we be
implementing BSL-2/polio for this lab?
Thanks
Kath Harris
**********************************************
Kathryn Louise Harris, Ph.D.
Biological Safety Professional
Office of Research Safety
Northwestern University
NG-71 Technological Institute
2145 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208-3121
Phone: (847) 491-4387
Fax: (847) 467-2797
Email: kathrynharris@northwestern.edu
**********************************************
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 8 Nov 2002 08:16:30 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Erik A. Talley"
Subject: Re: BSL for wastewater
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
Hello Katrina,
I had a lot of those labs at my last institution, including a wet chemistry
lab under me in Environmental Health and Safety. We generally operated at
BSL1 and most that you find at water treatment works will be at BSL1. There
are some operations that require engineering controls such as homogenizing
wastewater samples, but overall it is fairly straightforward.
Erik
At 02:33 PM 11/5/2002 -0700, you wrote:
>We are expanding our biosafety oversight and would like to know the
>biosafety level you use for labs that process water and sludge samples
>from the wastewater treatment plants, bacteria-based waste treatment
>reactors and dairies. The labs analyze parameters such as coliform
>level, biochemical/chemical oxygen demand (BOD/COD), and products of
>microbiological metabolism such as methane, nitrates, and fatty acids.
>
>Your thoughts are much appreciated.
>Katrina Doolittle
>NMSU
___________________________________
Erik A. Talley, Director
Environmental Health and Safety
Weill Medical College of Cornell University
418 East 71st Street, Suite 62
New York, NY 10021
212-746-6201
ert2002@med.cornell.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 8 Nov 2002 08:51:45 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Bernholc, Nicole M"
Subject: Re: Monitor Liquid Nitrogen
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="----_=_NextPart_001_01C2872D.F9F38780"
This message is in MIME format. Since your mail reader does not understand
this format, some or all of this message may not be legible.
------_=_NextPart_001_01C2872D.F9F38780
Content-Type: text/plain;
charset="iso-8859-1"
I agree wholeheartedly.
-----Original Message-----
From: J Daniel James [mailto:james028@MC.DUKE.EDU]
Sent: Thursday, November 07, 2002 3:54 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Monitor Liquid Nitrogen
From a Laboratory Safety perspective:
A "catastrophic leak" alone is not necessary for the concentration of O2 to
drop below acceptable levels. Depending on the room conditions (room
volume, ventilation rate, etc.), filling a large Dewar with LN2 could result
in low O2 levels. Similarly, cryogenic freezers using LN2 could be a
problem depending on the number freezers and the room conditions.
J. Daniel James
Occupational & Environmental Safety Office
Duke University & Health System
----------------------------------------------------
james028@mc.duke.edu
"Bernholc, Nicole M"
Sent by: A Biosafety Discussion List
11/07/2002 02:21 PM
Please respond to A Biosafety Discussion List
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
cc:
Subject: Re: Monitor Liquid Nitrogen
You won't find specifics; it might be cited under process safety, but would
be cited as a general duty clase.
Whether or not you need an oxygen sensor is based on the amount of liquid
nitrogen you are talking about. By performing a hazard assessment,
determine if there is sufficient liquid nitrogen to produce a oxygen
deficiency hazard in the area if there were a catastrophic leak. Also
evaluate if you have any confined spaces where the liquid nitrogen might
flow, it may cause a problem there, or in a small room. If the answer is
yes, in any of these situations (or others I can't think of now) then you
need an alarm.
It doesn't have to be an oxygen alarm, if there is a process alarm that
indicated the loss of liquid nitrogen.
More than one way to do it.
-----Original Message-----
From: Gergis, Nasr [mailto:NGergis@]
Sent: Thursday, November 07, 2002 2:00 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Monitor Liquid Nitrogen
I understand liquid nitrogen tanks inside buildings should be monitored by
Oxygen Sensor. Does anyone know the regulation/guidelines cover this area.
Thanks.
Nasr Gergis, Ph.D., DVM
Biological Safety Officer
Occupational Safety and Health
City of Hope/BRI
------_=_NextPart_001_01C2872D.F9F38780
Content-Type: text/html;
charset="iso-8859-1"
I agree wholeheartedly.
size=2>-----Original Message-----
From: J Daniel James [mailto:james028@MC.DUKE.EDU]
Sent: Thursday, November 07, 2002 3:54 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Monitor Liquid Nitrogen
From a Laboratory Safety perspective:
A "catastrophic leak" alone is not necessary for the concentration
of O2 to drop below acceptable levels. Depending on the room
conditions (room volume, ventilation rate, etc.), filling a large
Dewar with LN2 could result in low O2 levels. Similarly, cryogenic
freezers using LN2 could be a problem face=sans-serif size=2>
J. Daniel James
Occupational & Environmental Safety Office
Duke University & Health System
----------------------------------------------------
james028@mc.duke.edu
"Bernholc, Nicole M" size=1>Sent by: A Biosafety Discussion
List face=sans-serif size=1>Please
respond to A Biosafety Discussion List
face=sans-serif size=1> To: size=1> cc:
Subject: Re: Monitor Liquid size=2>You won't
find specifics; it might be cited under process safety, but
size=2>Whether or not you need an oxygen sensor is based on
the amount of liquid nitrogen you are talking about. By
performing a hazard assessment, determine if there is
sufficient liquid nitrogen to produce a oxygen deficiency
hazard in the area if there were a catastrophic leak. Also
evaluate if you have any confined spaces where the liquid
nitrogen might flow, it may cause a problem there, or in a
small room. If the answer is yes, in any of these situations
(or others I can't think of now) then you need an alarm.
It doesn't have to be an oxygen alarm, if there is a process
alarm that indicated the loss of liquid nitrogen.
size=2>-----Original Message-----
From: Gergis, Nasr [mailto:NGergis@]
Sent: Thursday, November 07, 2002 2:00 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Monitor Liquid Nitrogen
I understand liquid nitrogen tanks inside buildings should be
monitored by Oxygen Sensor. Does anyone know the
regulation/guidelines cover this area. Thanks. size=3>
Occupational Safety and face="Times New Roman" size=3>
------_=_NextPart_001_01C2872D.F9F38780--
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 8 Nov 2002 12:28:02 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Richard Fink
Subject: Re: Biological Remediation Methods
In-Reply-To:
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>
>
>Hmmmm=85.I looked at chlorine compounds and formaldehyde for the control of=
>bacterial spores =85in the older version, D. Vesley and J. Lauer were the=
>contributors=85.and it shows that chlorine compounds give a =93less=
positive
>response=94 as compared to formaldehyde (gas) from paraformaldehyde(=93very=
>positive response=94).And we knew that in 1988=85I guess the folks on the=
hill
>better catch-up. And you better get your comparison going quick and share=
>it with everyone.
If I remember correctly, that was based on the use of hypochlorite for the=
chlorine compound. Chlorine dioxide is more active then
hypochlorite. Since 1988 more careful research concerning sporocidal
activity has shown that most compounds registered as sporocides only kill
about 3-4 logs of spores (these were dried, chemically resistant spores, so=
getting 3-4 logs was damn good).
Richie
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
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color=3D"#000080">
Hmmmm=85.I looked at chlorine compounds and formaldehyde for
the control of bacterial spores =85in the older version, D.
Vesley and J. Lauer were the contributors=85.and it shows that
chlorine compounds give a =93less positive response=94 a= s
compared to formaldehyde (gas) from paraformaldehyde(=93very
positive response=94).And we knew that in 1988=85I guess the
folks on the hill better catch-up. And you better get your
comparison going quick and share it with everyone.
If I remember correctly, that was based on the use of
hypochlorite for the chlorine compound. Chlorine dioxide is
more active then hypochlorite. Since 1988 more careful
research concerning sporocidal activity has shown that most
compounds registered as sporocides only kill about 3-4 logs of
spores (these were dried, chemically resistant spores, so
getting 3-4 logs was damn good).
Richie
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
href=3D""
eudora=3D"autourl"> du/environment
--=====================_925851==_.ALT--
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 8 Nov 2002 13:44:16 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Francis Churchill
Subject: Re: Monitor Liquid Nitrogen
In-Reply-To:
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Oxygen monitors are not a complete solution by themselves. Monitors
need to be maintained and calibrated. Users of the space need to be
trained regarding procedures. Case in point - a lab disconnected the
oxygen monitor because it was defective. how did they know it was
defective? Because it kept going off!!!
So, we require that liquid nitrogen tanks are kept in ventilated
areas and NOT in cold rooms. We have performed monitoring during the
filling of dewars and found significantly low oxygen levels (I don't
remember the numbers but could look them up). We try to get
laboratorians to perform this task outside of coldrooms as well, but
with varying degrees of success. At the very least, I think,
everybody keeps the door open and uses a buddy system. And we'll
keep after them as best we can.
Francis
--
Francis Churchill
University of Vermont - Environmental Safety Facility
667 Spear Street, UVM, Burlington, VT 05405-3010
(802) 656-5405
Francis.Churchill@uvm.edu
"Show me pollution and I'll show you a subsidy." Robert F Kennedy Jr
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Oxygen monitors are not a complete solution by themselves.
Monitors need to be maintained and calibrated. Users of the
space need to be trained regarding procedures. Case in point
- a lab disconnected the oxygen monitor because it was
defective. how did they know it was defective? Because it
kept going off!!!
So, we require that liquid nitrogen tanks are kept in
ventilated areas and NOT in cold rooms. We have performed
monitoring during the filling of dewars and found
significantly low oxygen levels (I don't remember the numbers
but could look them up). We try to get laboratorians to
perform this task outside of coldrooms as well, but with
varying degrees of success. At the very least, I think,
everybody keeps the door open and uses a buddy system. And
we'll keep after them as best we can.
Francis
--
Francis Churchill
University of Vermont - Environmental Safety Facility
667 Spear Street, UVM, Burlington, VT 05405-3010
(802) 656-5405
Francis.Churchill@uvm.edu
"Show me pollution and I'll show you a subsidy." Robert F
Kennedy Jr
--============_-1175341166==_ma============--
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 8 Nov 2002 13:54:52 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Bernholc, Nicole M"
Subject: Re: Monitor Liquid Nitrogen
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In some places we use personal oxygen alarming devices along with the buddy
system.
-----Original Message-----
From: Francis Churchill [mailto:fchurchi@ZOO.UVM.EDU]
Sent: Friday, November 08, 2002 1:44 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Monitor Liquid Nitrogen
Oxygen monitors are not a complete solution by themselves. Monitors need to
be maintained and calibrated. Users of the space need to be trained
regarding procedures. Case in point - a lab disconnected the oxygen monitor
because it was defective. how did they know it was defective? Because it
kept going off!!!
So, we require that liquid nitrogen tanks are kept in ventilated areas and
NOT in cold rooms. We have performed monitoring during the filling of
dewars and found significantly low oxygen levels (I don't remember the
numbers but could look them up). We try to get laboratorians to perform
this task outside of coldrooms as well, but with varying degrees of success.
At the very least, I think, everybody keeps the door open and uses a buddy
system. And we'll keep after them as best we can.
Francis
--
Francis Churchill
University of Vermont - Environmental Safety Facility
667 Spear Street, UVM, Burlington, VT 05405-3010
(802) 656-5405
Francis.Churchill@uvm.edu
"Show me pollution and I'll show you a subsidy." Robert F Kennedy Jr
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charset="iso-8859-1"
In some places we use personal oxygen alarming devices along
with the buddy system.
size=2>-----Original Message-----
From: Francis Churchill [mailto:fchurchi@ZOO.UVM.EDU]
Sent: Friday, November 08, 2002 1:44 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Monitor Liquid Nitrogen
Oxygen monitors are not a complete solution by themselves.
Monitors need to be maintained and calibrated. Users of the
space need to be trained regarding procedures. Case in point
- a lab disconnected the oxygen monitor because it was
defective. how did they know it was defective? Because it
kept going off!!!
So, we require that liquid nitrogen tanks are kept in
ventilated areas and NOT in cold rooms. We have performed
monitoring during the filling of dewars and found
significantly low oxygen levels (I don't remember the numbers
but could look them up). We try to get laboratorians to
perform this task outside of coldrooms as well, but with
varying degrees of success. At the very least, I think,
everybody keeps the door open and uses a buddy system. And
we'll keep after them as best we can.
Francis
--
Francis Churchill
University of Vermont - Environmental Safety Facility
667 Spear Street, UVM, Burlington, VT 05405-3010
(802) 656-5405
Francis.Churchill@uvm.edu
"Show me pollution and I'll show you a subsidy." Robert F
Kennedy Jr
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=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 8 Nov 2002 14:51:15 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Koporc, Kim"
Subject: List of countries
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Hi Patty - I haven't forgotten your request for a list of countries that =
have completed their inventories. I will obtain the list and post it on =
the List Serve. FYI - I have Included in this e-mail a link to an =
article that appeared in today's Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, =
entitled "Global Progress Toward Laboratory Containment of Wild =
Polioviruses." The article includes a map of countries that are =
conducting or have completed the inventory. Please circulate the =
article to your colleagues involved in the inventory process. Best =
regards, Kim
-----Original Message-----
From: OLINGER, PATRICIA L [S&C/0216] =
[mailto:patricia.l.olinger@]
Sent: Monday, October 28, 2002 9:42 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Wild Polio Virus Survey - Penalties?
Hi Kim,
In San Fransico it was indicated that we could see the list of countries =
that has completed the survey. Where would we find this list?
Patty Olinger
Pharmacia, Kalamazoo Corporate Services - ESH
Biosafety Officer
-----Original Message-----
From: Koporc, Kim [mailto:KKoporc@]
Sent: Wednesday, October 23, 2002 4:39 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Wild Polio Virus Survey - Penalties?
Dear Sharon - I believe that some of your questions were answered in the =
e-mail I recently sent out on the List Serve. Regarding your question =
about penalties, the inventory assumes all institutions endorse polio =
eradication, understand the public health implications of poliovirus =
containment, and take their responsibility seriously. To date the =
inventory process has been carried out in 122 other countries, and very =
few of these countries have found it necessary to legislate penalties. =
Many thanks for your questions. Best regards, Kim
-----Original Message-----
From: Stetz, Sharon [mailto:Sharon.Stetz@]
Sent: Wednesday, October 23, 2002 2:22 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Wild Polio Virus Survey - Penalties?
Does anyone know if there are any noncompliance penalties associated =
with this survey? (such as for not having it completed on time or for =
deciding to exclude particular off-site facilities). I have contacted =
the help line to ask if this process is site (address)-driven or =
employer driven and they couldn't answer my question. At least for the =
SA notification, we were repeatedly reminded about the definition of a =
"facility" so we knew who had to report what. For this next survey, it =
appears that less guidance is available. We did receive a number of SA =
notification forms but haven't seen a single copy of the Wild Polio =
Virus Inventory. Is anyone else facing similar questions and problems?
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 8 Nov 2002 15:18:59 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Koporc, Kim"
Subject: Re: Water Question
MIME-Version: 1.0
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Hi Ginger - Thanks for posting your question. The answer is, it =
depends. A plume of raw sewage or surface runoff that flowed into the =
Bay of Bengal from endemic populations could be infectious for =
polioviruses for several miles, depending on currents, rate of dilution, =
sunlight, and temperature. Polioviruses persist longer in fresh than in =
marine water, with a 99% infectivity loss in the latter within 5 days.
Kim Koporc
kkoporc@
od/nvpo/polio
-----Original Message-----
From: Brown, Virginia R [mailto:gingerbrown@TAMU.EDU]
Sent: Thursday, November 07, 2002 5:26 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Water Question
Regarding the Wild Poliovirus Survey, environmental sewage and water =
samples are included in the
potentially infectious materials. Does this mean only water from the =
interior of a country where wild
poliovirus was suspected to be present? i.e., a water sample from the =
outer waters off coast would
not be considered as being "in a geographic area where wild polioviruses =
or VDPV were suspected
to be present". I can't imagine that a water sample from the Bay of =
Bengal or the Indian Ocean
would be considered to be potentially infectious just because of the =
proximity to India, for example.
Any interpretation on this? Kim??
Ginger Brown, CBSP
Env Health & Safety
TX A&M University
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 8 Nov 2002 15:40:42 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Richard Fink
Subject: Re: Office space in laboratory areas
In-Reply-To:
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The previous replies were great, I just wanted to add a note or two. The
idea of demarcation comes from the NIH rDNA Guidelines where you can mark
off a lower containment within a higher containment lab. This is lab space
within lab space, not office space within lab space. If the lab uses
radioactivity, the NRC will take a very dim view of food within a lab space
and a lab space is defined by the walls, floor and ceiling. Walls that do
not go all the way up to the decking do not provide a containment envelop.
The difference between a BL1 and a BL2 lab is just personal practices, so
one can have a BL1 within a BL2 without any problem.
Richie
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
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The previous replies were great, I just wanted to add a note
or two. The idea of demarcation comes from the NIH rDNA
Guidelines where you can mark off a lower containment within a
higher containment lab. This is lab space within lab space,
not office space within lab space. If the lab uses
radioactivity, the NRC will take a very dim view of food
within a lab space and a lab space is defined by the walls,
floor and ceiling. Walls that do not go all the way up to the
decking do not provide a containment envelop.
The difference between a BL1 and a BL2 lab is just personal
practices, so one can have a BL1 within a BL2 without any
problem.
Richie
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
--=====================_12488817==_.ALT--
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 11 Nov 2002 09:00:44 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Criscuolo, TR (Tedi)"
Subject: Re: Biological Remediation Methods
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OK, I am going to work on it this week. I was in Maine, attending some
training at Eagleson institute all last week. What a great place!!! I will
share the comparison!!! :)
Tedi Criscuolo
Industrial Hygienist/Safety Representative
Battelle IH & OS Operations Group
Office: (509) 373-1169
Pager: (509) 544-3144
tedi.criscuolo@
-----Original Message-----
From: Richard Fink [mailto:rfink@MIT.EDU]
Sent: Friday, November 08, 2002 9:28 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Biological Remediation Methods
Hmmmm....I looked at chlorine compounds and formaldehyde for the control of
bacterial spores ...in the older version, D. Vesley and J. Lauer were the
contributors....and it shows that chlorine compounds give a "less positive
response" as compared to formaldehyde (gas) from paraformaldehyde("very
positive response").And we knew that in 1988...I guess the folks on the hill
better catch-up. And you better get your comparison going quick and share it
with everyone.
If I remember correctly, that was based on the use of hypochlorite for the
chlorine compound. Chlorine dioxide is more active then hypochlorite.
Since 1988 more careful research concerning sporocidal activity has shown
that most compounds registered as sporocides only kill about 3-4 logs of
spores (these were dried, chemically resistant spores, so getting 3-4 logs
was damn good).
Richie
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
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OK, I am going to work on it this week. I was in Maine,
attending some training at Eagleson institute all last week.
What a great place!!! I will share the comparison!!! :)
face="Monotype Corsiva">Tedi Criscuolo
Industrial face=Georgia>Battelle IH & OS Operations
href="mailto:tedi.criscuolo@">tedi.criscuolo@
style="PADDING-LEFT: 5px; MARGIN-LEFT: 5px; BORDER-LEFT:
#000000 2px solid; MARGIN-RIGHT: 0px"> size=2>-----Original
Message-----
From: Richard Fink [mailto:rfink@MIT.EDU]
Sent: Friday, November 08, 2002 9:28 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Biological Remediation Methods
size=2>Hmmmm....I looked at chlorine compounds and
formaldehyde for the control of bacterial spores ...in the
older version, D. Vesley and J. Lauer were the
contributors....and it shows that chlorine compounds give a
"less positive response" as compared to formaldehyde (gas)
from paraformaldehyde("very positive response").And we knew
that in 1988...I guess the folks on the hill better catch-up.
And you better get your comparison going quick and share it
with everyone.
If I remember correctly, that was based on the use of
hypochlorite for the chlorine compound. Chlorine dioxide is
more active then hypochlorite. Since 1988 more careful
research concerning sporocidal activity has shown that most
compounds registered as sporocides only kill about 3-4 logs of
spores (these were dried, chemically resistant spores, so
getting 3-4 logs was damn good).
Richie
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Senior Biosafety
eudora="autourl">
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=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 11 Nov 2002 12:00:14 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ed Gaunt
Subject: Re: Notification Reminder
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Pink reminder cards were mailed out on Sept 13 indicating that the Sept 10th
deadline had passed and that the Oct 11th deadline was approaching. Orange
FINAL NOTICE cards were mailed on October 21st based on who had not
responded as of COB Oct 18. This allowed for mail postmarked via the
October 11 USDA due date to be received and processed.
Although I indicated earlier that mail sent to the ASI PO Box was being
forwarded to CDC, you can still send mail to the address below and it will
be dealt with...
Ed
ASI
Attn: FSO
PO Box 341809
Bethesda, MD 29827-1809
-----Original Message-----
From: Terry Lawrin [mailto:tlawrin@UIC.EDU]
Sent: Thursday, November 07, 2002 4:49 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Notification Reminder
Ed and everyone else,
It's a sunny November 7th here in Chicago, and the orange cards that should
have been mailed out before October 11th are just coming in. I see the old
address is now invalid, so where do we send them?
Thanks,
Terry Lawrin
At 10:40 AM 10/16/02 -0400, you wrote:
>Just a friendly reminder that this past Friday (Oct 11) was the USDA
>deadline for returning Notification forms.
>
>If you still have forms or postcards that have not been returned, and do
not
>want to get a FINAL NOTICE of non-compliance, please get these forms to us
>by this Friday AM, because we are taking a final snapshot of non-responders
>at 5:00 PM and will be mailing out notices on Monday, 10/21 (while everyone
>is at ABSA). There are still a BUNCH of folks who have not responded!!
>
>Ed Gaunt
Terrance J. Lawrin, MT. (ASCP) SLS, CBSP (ABSA)
Biosafety Officer / Sanitarian
University of Illinois at Chicago
Environmental Health and Safety Office
Telephone: 312-413-3701
email: tlawrin@uic.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 11 Nov 2002 12:42:59 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Hauck, Philip"
Subject: Re: [APIC] Smallpox disinfection
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
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Just one point to note....it is not formaldehyde that is placed in a =
skillet, that would be extremely dangerous with 37% Formaldehyde plus a =
little methanol(!)...it is Paraformaldehyde that is used, a solid =
polymer. When heated it develops Formaldehyde gas. Usually some water is =
added so that a humidity of >60% is maintained. The amount of =
Paraformaldehyde evaporated is 0.3 g /cu. ft. of space, the space =
usually being a Biosafety Cabinet.
See: Pages 160-161 in Laboratory Safety-Principle and Practices, 2nd =
edition; Fleming,D.O., et al. ASM press(or the more recent edition).
-----Original Message-----
From: Erik A. Talley [mailto:ert2002@MED.CORNELL.EDU]
Sent: Friday, October 25, 2002 10:46 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: [APIC] Smallpox disinfection
Yes, it was interesting to see the number of people at the ABSA meeting
raise their hand for paraformaldehyde use (including me). Isn't part of =
the
problem "paraformaldehyde" is a chemical name and EPA will need a =
product
manufacturer to register the product? This is sort of like Chlorox =
Bleach
is registered as a list C agent, but Wal-mart brand bleach is not.
Erik
At 10:32 AM 10/25/2002 -0400, you wrote:
>The question becomes: Do you need a Crisis Exemption from
>EPA? :)
>
>I am still a bit perplexed with this one! :(
>
>I reference the recent EPA presentation at ABSA.
>
>Regards,
>
>Barry D. Cohen, MPH, CBSP
>Director, Environmental Health and Safety
>Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc.
>195 Albany Street
>Cambridge, MA 02139
>(V): 617/613-4385
>(F): 617/613-4492
>(E): bcohen@
>
>
>Ed Krisiunas wrote:
>
> > Companies involved in the decontamination of biological
> > safety cabinets (before removal of HEPA filters) use the
> > "frying-pan" procedure - See NSF 49 - Standards for
> > biological safety cabinets.
> >
> > Individuals involved with work related to biological
> > safety cabinets are often certified to test cabinets,
> > decontaminate them, etc. These professionals could be a
> > good source of practical application of the "frying pan"
> > procedure as well as other issues.
> >
> > Also see (American Biological Safety
> > Association).
> >
> > I have forwarded this their LISTSERV as well.
> >
> > Regards,
> >
> > Edward Krisiunas, MT(ASCP), CIC, MPH
> > President
> > WNWN International
> > PO Box 1164
> > Burlington, Connecticut
> > 06013
> > 860-675-1217
> > 860-675-1311(fax)
> > 860-944-2373(mobile)
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >>
> >> =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
> >> From: Jessica Hilburn
> >> Sent: Wed 10/23/2002 3:46 AM
> >> Subject: Smallpox disinfection (04)
> >> =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
> >>
> >> Of interest is an article on infection control in
> >> smallpox from the CDC
> >> bioterrorism website, bt., on decontamination
> >> procedures, I
> >> believe it is called annex F? I t discusses the use
> >> of formaldehyde
> >> vaporization for 2 hours in the rooms of smallpox
> >> patients post-
> >> discharge
> >> to decontaminate the room. The drawers of cabinets etc.
> >> are pulled out
> >> so
> >> the vapor is contained in the room more effectively. I
> >> would assume the
> >> air
> >> ducts would have to be controlled as well. The
> >> reference says that
> >> persons
> >> who are not skilled or knowledgeable in this technique
> >> should not
> >> attempt
> >> this! Indeed. The formaldehyde is put in a deep fat
> >> fryer and used in
> >> that
> >> manner. The room is sealed with tape under doors and
> >> openings to
> >> control
> >> the vapors from escaping. The reference discussed in
> >> detail
> >> decontamination/disinfection of mattresses, beds,
> >> linens, hard surfaces,
> >> medical waste, human remains,etc.
> >>
> >> In reference posting on phenolics-most labs use these
> >> type of
> >> phenolics-(even if you do not know they do,) in my
> >> experience. Bleach
> >> is
> >> another alternative which is readily available. The
> >> above reference
> >> also
> >> lists the commercial names of phenolics which are
> >> readily available at
> >> your
> >> local grocery or Walmart. At least, they are available
> >> now, pre-event!
> >>
> >> Jessica Hilburn,MT(ASCP),CIC
> >> Manager of Infection Control
> >> Texas Children's Hospital
> >> Houston, Texas
> >> jlhilbur@
> >> .....kw
> >
> >
> >
___________________________________
Erik A. Talley, Director
Environmental Health and Safety
Weill Medical College of Cornell University
418 East 71st Street, Suite 62
New York, NY 10021
212-746-6201
ert2002@med.cornell.edu
(Cornell Access Only)
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 11 Nov 2002 12:10:01 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Ruhl, Karen"
Subject: Project registration forms?
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Good Day:
Is anyone out there in possession of project registration forms for IBC
review that they would be willing to share? We are setting up our IBC and
would like to not reinvent a wheel if possible. You can respond to me
directly.
Thank you.
Karen
Karen Ruhl
Manager, Safety
Gen-Probe
San Diego, CA 92121
858.410.8874
858.410.8170- FAX
karenr@gen-
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 11 Nov 2002 15:43:50 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Margaret Rakas
Subject: Re: Project registration forms?
Mime-Version: 1.0
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Hello,
We are in the same position and would also welcome any forms..
Margaret
Margaret Rakas, Ph.D.
Manager, Inventory & Regulatory Affairs
Clark Science Center
Smith College
Northampton, MA. 01063
>>> KarenR@GEN- 11/11/02 03:10PM >>>
Good Day:
Is anyone out there in possession of project registration forms for
IBC
review that they would be willing to share? We are setting up our IBC
and
would like to not reinvent a wheel if possible. You can respond to me
directly.
Thank you.
Karen
Karen Ruhl
Manager, Safety
Gen-Probe
San Diego, CA 92121
858.410.8874
858.410.8170- FAX
karenr@gen-
--=_1C40FC8F.0362DB8E
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Content-Description: HTML
Hello,
We are in the same position and would also welcome any forms..
Margaret
Margaret Rakas, Ph.D.
Manager, Inventory & Regulatory Affairs
Clark Science Center
Smith College
Northampton, MA. 01063
>>> KarenR@GEN- 11/11/02 03:10PM >>>
Good Day:
Is anyone out there in possession of project registration
forms for IBC
review that they would be willing to share? We are setting up
our IBC and
would like to not reinvent a wheel if possible. You can
respond to me
directly.
Thank you.
Karen
Karen Ruhl
Manager, Safety
Gen-Probe
San Diego, CA 92121
858.410.8874
858.410.8170- FAX
karenr@gen-
--=_1C40FC8F.0362DB8E--
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 11 Nov 2002 10:50:11 -1000
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Hubert B Olipares
Subject: BSL3
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: multipart/mixed; boundary="Boundary_(ID_YKXzU2q/NHfWuem/JD/10w)"
This is a multi-part message in MIME format.
--Boundary_(ID_YKXzU2q/NHfWuem/JD/10w)
Content-type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252
Content-transfer-encoding: quoted-printable
Content-disposition: inline
We have opened our BSL3 laboratory=2E=A0 The facility has been certified =
by =
an outside contractor=2E My administration is asking whether or not =
certification of the facility can be done in-house=2E=A0 Does any one hav=
e =
an in-house staff that test for verification that the design and =
operational parameters have been met at least annually (as specified by =
BMBL)=2E Did anyone do a cost-analysis on outside versus inside =
certification=2C that they could share=3F And share the specific testing=
=
parameters=2E
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 11 Nov 2002 16:27:28 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Hauck, Philip"
Subject: Re: Project registration forms?
MIME-version: 1.0
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Content-transfer-encoding: quoted-printable
Go to mssm.edu/research
and specifically
There are all of the forms you need for IACUC submissions
Philip Hauck,MS,MSHS,CIH,SM(NRM)
-----Original Message-----
From: Ruhl, Karen [mailto:KarenR@GEN-]
Sent: Monday, November 11, 2002 3:10 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Project registration forms?
Good Day:
Is anyone out there in possession of project registration forms for IBC
review that they would be willing to share? We are setting up our IBC =
and
would like to not reinvent a wheel if possible. You can respond to me
directly.
Thank you.
Karen
Karen Ruhl
Manager, Safety
Gen-Probe
San Diego, CA 92121
858.410.8874
858.410.8170- FAX
karenr@gen-
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 12 Nov 2002 08:40:51 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Jennifer Minogue
Subject: Re: Project registration forms
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
you can find our form at this web site:
Researchers are expected to attach a detailed health and safety protocol
to this two-page form. The protocol can be one page or many pages
depending on the complexity of the work.
This is not the best form in the world, but it does cover some bases -
it is co-signed; it requires a designate in the absence of the principal
researcher (since faculty are always wandering off on special leaves);
they have to give some thought to medical surveillance; it is fairly
short which researchers really like. Some day I will try to expand it
to three pages;-)
Our animal care and human subjects forms are about 8 pages long (without
all the attachments). Radiation forms are about four pages.
Cheers,
--
Jennifer Minogue
Hazardous Materials Safety Officer
Environmental Health and Safety
University of Guelph
Guelph, Ontario N1G 2W1 Canada
Voice 519-824-4120-x3190
Fax 519-824-0364
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 12 Nov 2002 08:46:12 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Jennifer Minogue
Subject: Re: BSL3
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We will have a Level 3 lab opening soon. To the best of my knowledge,
we have no plans to try to do any sort of commissioning or certification
in-house. The work is pretty specialized and no one would stay up to
speed on it.
It is likely that we would use some in-house maintenance people to do
some work such as fixing a loose outlet, fix the dripping shower, or
caulking a seam. Our maintenance people would not do things like
certify bio cabinets, change HEPA filters, or other more complicated
tasks.
--
Jennifer Minogue
Hazardous Materials Safety Officer
Environmental Health and Safety
University of Guelph
Guelph, Ontario N1G 2W1 Canada
Voice 519-824-4120-x3190
Fax 519-824-0364
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 12 Nov 2002 06:42:30 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Criscuolo, TR (Tedi)"
Subject: Re: BSL3
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
We are in the process of designing a BSL-3 lab and I was wondering about
autoclave location. Specifically, do you need to have an autoclave located
so that before any waste is taken out of a BSL-3 lab, it is autoclaved first
before going into say a BSL-2 laboratory or any other laboratory/space? We
are trying to figure out how many autoclaves we need. The set-up is to have
2-separate BSL-3 labs entering into a BSL-2+ lab. Should we have a pass
through autoclave in each level 3 lab passing into the BSL-2 lab?
Tedi Criscuolo
Battelle IH & OS Operations Group
Office: (509) 373-1169
Pager: (509) 544-3144
tedi.criscuolo@
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Jennifer Minogue [mailto:jminogue@UOGUELPH.CA]
> Sent: Tuesday, November 12, 2002 5:46 AM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: Re: BSL3
>
>
> We will have a Level 3 lab opening soon. To the best of my knowledge,
> we have no plans to try to do any sort of commissioning or
> certification
> in-house. The work is pretty specialized and no one would stay up to
> speed on it.
>
> It is likely that we would use some in-house maintenance people to do
> some work such as fixing a loose outlet, fix the dripping shower, or
> caulking a seam. Our maintenance people would not do things like
> certify bio cabinets, change HEPA filters, or other more complicated
> tasks.
>
> --
> Jennifer Minogue
> Hazardous Materials Safety Officer
> Environmental Health and Safety
> University of Guelph
> Guelph, Ontario N1G 2W1 Canada
> Voice 519-824-4120-x3190
> Fax 519-824-0364
>
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 12 Nov 2002 09:58:12 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Robert N. Latsch"
Subject: Re: BSL3
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
We have three level three facilities with pas thorugh autoclaves. Once an
item is cycled through an autoclave it is sterilized. Our autoclaves open
in to the main hallway out side of the labs.
Bob
>We are in the process of designing a BSL-3 lab and I was wondering about
>autoclave location. Specifically, do you need to have an autoclave located
>so that before any waste is taken out of a BSL-3 lab, it is autoclaved first
>before going into say a BSL-2 laboratory or any other laboratory/space? We
>are trying to figure out how many autoclaves we need. The set-up is to have
>2-separate BSL-3 labs entering into a BSL-2+ lab. Should we have a pass
>through autoclave in each level 3 lab passing into the BSL-2 lab?
>
> Tedi Criscuolo
>Battelle IH & OS Operations Group
>Office: (509) 373-1169
>Pager: (509) 544-3144
>tedi.criscuolo@
>
>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Jennifer Minogue [mailto:jminogue@UOGUELPH.CA]
>> Sent: Tuesday, November 12, 2002 5:46 AM
>> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
>> Subject: Re: BSL3
>>
>>
>> We will have a Level 3 lab opening soon. To the best of my knowledge,
>> we have no plans to try to do any sort of commissioning or
>> certification
>> in-house. The work is pretty specialized and no one would stay up to
>> speed on it.
>>
>> It is likely that we would use some in-house maintenance people to do
>> some work such as fixing a loose outlet, fix the dripping shower, or
>> caulking a seam. Our maintenance people would not do things like
>> certify bio cabinets, change HEPA filters, or other more complicated
>> tasks.
>>
>> --
>> Jennifer Minogue
>> Hazardous Materials Safety Officer
>> Environmental Health and Safety
>> University of Guelph
>> Guelph, Ontario N1G 2W1 Canada
>> Voice 519-824-4120-x3190
>> Fax 519-824-0364
>>
_____________________________________________________________________
__ / _____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 12 Nov 2002 10:04:43 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Jeffrey Good
Subject: Re: BSL3
Mime-Version: 1.0
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I suggest talking to the designer, former institutional Biosafety =
Officer/RFO and laboratory director for the BSL-3 and ABSL-3 facilities, =
Mark Ennen. He can be reached via email at resmse@gwumc.edu. I understand =
he provides consulting services on the design, operation, etc of these lab =
facilities. For our opening, I believe he worked with Diane Flemming's =
group to provide "certification" that our lab facility met the appropriate =
criteria.
Hope this lead helps.
Jeff
Jeffrey M. Good
Acting Director &
Hazardous Materials Safety Officer
Office of Laboratory Safety and Compliance
The George Washington University Medical Center
Office: (202) 994-5059
Mobile: (202) 437-6155
rsojmg@gwumc.edu
gwumc.edu/research/labsafety.htm
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 12 Nov 2002 09:11:25 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Kyle Boyett
Subject: Re: BSL3
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Tedi, BMBL page 34 section 7 states that all BSL-3 spaces should have a
method for decontaminating the waste and that it should be available in the
facility, preferably in the lab. It goes on to indicate that chemical
disinfection, autoclaves, incineration, or other approved methods can be
utilized. Consideration should also be given as to how contaminated
equipment should be dealt with.
I say all this to say that there are many ways to deal with materials that
are contaminated. The way that is chosen should be risk based. Also, if this
project is from the ground up and not renovation perhaps the engineer of
record can devise a method to install one pass through to serve both areas.
Hope this helps.
Kyle G. Boyett
Asst. Director of Biosafety
Safety Short Distribution List Administrator
University of Alabama @ Birmingham
Department of Occupational Health and Safety
933 South 19th Street Suite 445
Birmingham, Alabama 35294
Phone: 205.934.9181
Fax: 205.934.7487
Visit our WEB site at: healthsafe.uab.edu
Asking me to overlook a safety violation is like asking me to reduce the
value I place on YOUR life
-----Original Message-----
From: Criscuolo, TR (Tedi) [mailto:tedi.criscuolo@]
Sent: Tuesday, November 12, 2002 8:43 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: BSL3
We are in the process of designing a BSL-3 lab and I was wondering about
autoclave location. Specifically, do you need to have an autoclave located
so that before any waste is taken out of a BSL-3 lab, it is autoclaved first
before going into say a BSL-2 laboratory or any other laboratory/space? We
are trying to figure out how many autoclaves we need. The set-up is to have
2-separate BSL-3 labs entering into a BSL-2+ lab. Should we have a pass
through autoclave in each level 3 lab passing into the BSL-2 lab?
Tedi Criscuolo
Battelle IH & OS Operations Group
Office: (509) 373-1169
Pager: (509) 544-3144
tedi.criscuolo@
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Jennifer Minogue [mailto:jminogue@UOGUELPH.CA]
> Sent: Tuesday, November 12, 2002 5:46 AM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: Re: BSL3
>
>
> We will have a Level 3 lab opening soon. To the best of my knowledge,
> we have no plans to try to do any sort of commissioning or
> certification
> in-house. The work is pretty specialized and no one would stay up to
> speed on it.
>
> It is likely that we would use some in-house maintenance people to do
> some work such as fixing a loose outlet, fix the dripping shower, or
> caulking a seam. Our maintenance people would not do things like
> certify bio cabinets, change HEPA filters, or other more complicated
> tasks.
>
> --
> Jennifer Minogue
> Hazardous Materials Safety Officer
> Environmental Health and Safety
> University of Guelph
> Guelph, Ontario N1G 2W1 Canada
> Voice 519-824-4120-x3190
> Fax 519-824-0364
>
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 12 Nov 2002 10:21:51 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Byers, Karen B"
Subject: O2 sensors in areas where liquid nitrogen is used for cryogenic s
torage..
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Would anyone share policies on the use of oxygen sensors in areas where liquid
nitrogen tanks are used to maintain cryogenic storage? I'm particularly
interested in the criteria used to decide whether O2 sensors are required
...Obviously, it makes sense to monitor oxygen in large cryogenic storage
areas... but how do you decide whether osygen monitoring is required in the many
little areas where cryogenic storage occurs in research labs? What sensors
have you used and is re-calibration a problem? Are the oxygen sensor alarms
you use merely an audible warning system ["don't go in now or leave
immediately"]... or do you connect oxygen sensors to a control panel for
response? Does anyone use ventilation alarms to alert HVAC that attention to
exhaust fans may be required?
If you would prefer to reply off-line, I would be happy to post a summary of the
responses. Thank you.
Karen B. Byers, MS, RBP, CBSP-ABSA
Biosafety Officer
Dana Farber Cancer Institute
44 Binney Street
Boston, MA 02115
Phone: 617-632-3890
Fax: 617-632-1932
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 12 Nov 2002 10:44:38 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "William A. Lorenzen"
Organization: Children's Hospital Boston
Subject: Re: O2 sensors in areas where liquid nitrogen is used for
cryogenic storage..
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT
With your facility air handling system design of the labs should have adequate
ventilation so that this is not an issue. However, walk-in cold rooms and other
non
ventilated spaces are of concern. I also believe these areas may qualify as
confined spaces (ask Liz). They have no ventilation, no phone and no buddy
system
is required for entry. So if someone collapses in a cold room who will know??
"Byers, Karen B" wrote:
> Would anyone share policies on the use of oxygen sensors in areas where liquid
> nitrogen tanks are used to maintain cryogenic storage? I'm particularly
> interested in the criteria used to decide whether O2 sensors are required
> ...Obviously, it makes sense to monitor oxygen in large cryogenic storage
> areas... but how do you decide whether osygen monitoring is required in the
many
> little areas where cryogenic storage occurs in research labs? What sensors
> have you used and is re-calibration a problem? Are the oxygen sensor alarms
> you use merely an audible warning system ["don't go in now or leave
> immediately"]... or do you connect oxygen sensors to a control panel for
> response? Does anyone use ventilation alarms to alert HVAC that attention to
> exhaust fans may be required?
>
> If you would prefer to reply off-line, I would be happy to post a summary of
the
> responses. Thank you.
>
> Karen B. Byers, MS, RBP, CBSP-ABSA
> Biosafety Officer
> Dana Farber Cancer Institute
> 44 Binney Street
> Boston, MA 02115
> Phone: 617-632-3890
> Fax: 617-632-1932
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 12 Nov 2002 08:45:55 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Katrina Doolittle
Organization: NMSU Environmental Health & Safety
Subject: Re: BSL3
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
I recommend that you locate the autoclave in a manner that maintenance can be
performed without entering the containment area, you will have fewer headaches
in the long run. We did not have the space and have to deal with management of
maintenance personnel in a BL3 area.
Katrina Doolittle
NMSU
"Criscuolo, TR (Tedi)" wrote:
> We are in the process of designing a BSL-3 lab and I was wondering about
> autoclave location. Specifically, do you need to have an autoclave located
> so that before any waste is taken out of a BSL-3 lab, it is autoclaved first
> before going into say a BSL-2 laboratory or any other laboratory/space? We
> are trying to figure out how many autoclaves we need. The set-up is to have
> 2-separate BSL-3 labs entering into a BSL-2+ lab. Should we have a pass
> through autoclave in each level 3 lab passing into the BSL-2 lab?
>
> Tedi Criscuolo
> Battelle IH & OS Operations Group
> Office: (509) 373-1169
> Pager: (509) 544-3144
> tedi.criscuolo@
>
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Jennifer Minogue [mailto:jminogue@UOGUELPH.CA]
> > Sent: Tuesday, November 12, 2002 5:46 AM
> > To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> > Subject: Re: BSL3
> >
> >
> > We will have a Level 3 lab opening soon. To the best of my knowledge,
> > we have no plans to try to do any sort of commissioning or
> > certification
> > in-house. The work is pretty specialized and no one would stay up to
> > speed on it.
> >
> > It is likely that we would use some in-house maintenance people to do
> > some work such as fixing a loose outlet, fix the dripping shower, or
> > caulking a seam. Our maintenance people would not do things like
> > certify bio cabinets, change HEPA filters, or other more complicated
> > tasks.
> >
> > --
> > Jennifer Minogue
> > Hazardous Materials Safety Officer
> > Environmental Health and Safety
> > University of Guelph
> > Guelph, Ontario N1G 2W1 Canada
> > Voice 519-824-4120-x3190
> > Fax 519-824-0364
> >
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 12 Nov 2002 07:46:25 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Funk, Glenn"
Subject: Re: Project registration forms?
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Karen -
Try the UCSF EHS web site (ehs.ucsf.edu), click on Forms and look at the
BUA form. This is the UCSF registration form. Perhaps it may be helpful
for you.
-- Glenn
Glenn A. Funk, Ph.D., CBSP
Director and Biosafety Officer
Environment, Health and Safety
MedImmune Vaccines, Inc.
408-845-8847
-----Original Message-----
From: Ruhl, Karen [mailto:KarenR@GEN-]
Sent: Monday, November 11, 2002 12:10 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Project registration forms?
Good Day:
Is anyone out there in possession of project registration forms for IBC
review that they would be willing to share? We are setting up our IBC and
would like to not reinvent a wheel if possible. You can respond to me
directly.
Thank you.
Karen
Karen Ruhl
Manager, Safety
Gen-Probe
San Diego, CA 92121
858.410.8874
858.410.8170- FAX
karenr@gen-
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 12 Nov 2002 10:50:11 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Robert N. Latsch"
Subject: Re: O2 sensors in areas where liquid nitrogen is used for
cryogenic storage..
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
While I agree that walk in coldrooms, ect are an area of concern for oxygen
depletion, I do not believe they qualify as a confined space. These areas
have a door and are meant to be entered and occupied for work.
Bob
>With your facility air handling system design of the labs should have adequate
>ventilation so that this is not an issue. However, walk-in cold rooms and
>other non
>ventilated spaces are of concern. I also believe these areas may qualify as
>confined spaces (ask Liz). They have no ventilation, no phone and no
>buddy system
>is required for entry. So if someone collapses in a cold room who will know??
>
>"Byers, Karen B" wrote:
>
>> Would anyone share policies on the use of oxygen sensors in areas where
>>liquid
>> nitrogen tanks are used to maintain cryogenic storage? I'm particularly
>> interested in the criteria used to decide whether O2 sensors are required
>> ...Obviously, it makes sense to monitor oxygen in large cryogenic storage
>> areas... but how do you decide whether osygen monitoring is required in
>>the many
>> little areas where cryogenic storage occurs in research labs? What
>>sensors
>> have you used and is re-calibration a problem? Are the oxygen sensor
>>alarms
>> you use merely an audible warning system ["don't go in now or leave
>> immediately"]... or do you connect oxygen sensors to a control panel for
>> response? Does anyone use ventilation alarms to alert HVAC that
>>attention to
>> exhaust fans may be required?
>>
>> If you would prefer to reply off-line, I would be happy to post a
>>summary of the
>> responses. Thank you.
>>
>> Karen B. Byers, MS, RBP, CBSP-ABSA
>> Biosafety Officer
>> Dana Farber Cancer Institute
>> 44 Binney Street
>> Boston, MA 02115
>> Phone: 617-632-3890
>> Fax: 617-632-1932
_____________________________________________________________________
__ / _____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 12 Nov 2002 11:10:07 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Morris, Gary"
Subject: Re: O2 sensors in areas where liquid nitrogen is used for cryogen
ic s torage..
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
I have recently discussed this topic with product safety reps of two
suppliers of liquid N2. Both recommended installing oxygen monitors in area
in which LN2 is stored, as a prudent measure, excluding high bay areas such
as warehouses/loading docks.
The criteria for decision making would be the room volume, the amount of LN2
stored (assume complete discharge of a full container) and the air exchange
rate, although since ventilation systems can fail, its prudent to discount
this in your calculation. One of our product safety reps worked through our
typical room volume and one cylinder. My conclusion from her input is that
it would be possible to render a room oxygen deficient if a full cylinder
discharged its entire contents (assuming worst case scenario). The biggest
question is the likelihood of a cylinder failing completely.
In response, we are looking at a new line of monitors from MSA called the
Ultima X Series Gas Monitor. Very user friendly. All of your sensors can
be calibrated and controlled via a hand-held unit.
I would recommend discussing this topic with the product safety rep for your
LN2 manufacturer/supplier. They can be alot of help.
Gary Morris
-----Original Message-----
From: Byers, Karen B [mailto:Karen_Byers@DFCI.HARVARD.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, November 12, 2002 10:22 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: O2 sensors in areas where liquid nitrogen is used for cryogenic
s torage..
Would anyone share policies on the use of oxygen sensors in areas where
liquid
nitrogen tanks are used to maintain cryogenic storage? I'm particularly
interested in the criteria used to decide whether O2 sensors are required
...Obviously, it makes sense to monitor oxygen in large cryogenic storage
areas... but how do you decide whether osygen monitoring is required in the
many
little areas where cryogenic storage occurs in research labs? What
sensors
have you used and is re-calibration a problem? Are the oxygen sensor
alarms
you use merely an audible warning system ["don't go in now or leave
immediately"]... or do you connect oxygen sensors to a control panel for
response? Does anyone use ventilation alarms to alert HVAC that attention
to
exhaust fans may be required?
If you would prefer to reply off-line, I would be happy to post a summary of
the
responses. Thank you.
Karen B. Byers, MS, RBP, CBSP-ABSA
Biosafety Officer
Dana Farber Cancer Institute
44 Binney Street
Boston, MA 02115
Phone: 617-632-3890
Fax: 617-632-1932
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 12 Nov 2002 11:13:49 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Hauck, Philip"
Subject: Re: BSL3
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
Content-transfer-encoding: quoted-printable
I would recommend a double-door pass through autoclave (I guess that is =
redundant)-it worked well in the locations we used them in, at my old =
job.
-----Original Message-----
From: Criscuolo, TR (Tedi) [mailto:tedi.criscuolo@]
Sent: Tuesday, November 12, 2002 9:43 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: BSL3
We are in the process of designing a BSL-3 lab and I was wondering about
autoclave location. Specifically, do you need to have an autoclave =
located
so that before any waste is taken out of a BSL-3 lab, it is autoclaved =
first
before going into say a BSL-2 laboratory or any other laboratory/space? =
We
are trying to figure out how many autoclaves we need. The set-up is to =
have
2-separate BSL-3 labs entering into a BSL-2+ lab. Should we have a pass
through autoclave in each level 3 lab passing into the BSL-2 lab?
Tedi Criscuolo
Battelle IH & OS Operations Group
Office: (509) 373-1169
Pager: (509) 544-3144
tedi.criscuolo@
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Jennifer Minogue [mailto:jminogue@UOGUELPH.CA]
> Sent: Tuesday, November 12, 2002 5:46 AM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: Re: BSL3
>
>
> We will have a Level 3 lab opening soon. To the best of my knowledge,
> we have no plans to try to do any sort of commissioning or
> certification
> in-house. The work is pretty specialized and no one would stay up to
> speed on it.
>
> It is likely that we would use some in-house maintenance people to do
> some work such as fixing a loose outlet, fix the dripping shower, or
> caulking a seam. Our maintenance people would not do things like
> certify bio cabinets, change HEPA filters, or other more complicated
> tasks.
>
> --
> Jennifer Minogue
> Hazardous Materials Safety Officer
> Environmental Health and Safety
> University of Guelph
> Guelph, Ontario N1G 2W1 Canada
> Voice 519-824-4120-x3190
> Fax 519-824-0364
>
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 12 Nov 2002 10:27:59 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Leland, Stephen F"
Subject: Re: O2 sensors in areas where liquid nitrogen is used for cryogen
ic s torage..
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Is it reasonable to use 30 minutes as the time for catastrophic release or
is some other time factor appropriate considering freeze up as the loss
proceeds?
Steve Leland
-----Original Message-----
From: Morris, Gary [mailto:gmorris@]
Sent: Tuesday, November 12, 2002 8:10 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: O2 sensors in areas where liquid nitrogen is used for cryogen
ic s torage..
I have recently discussed this topic with product safety reps of two
suppliers of liquid N2. Both recommended installing oxygen monitors in area
in which LN2 is stored, as a prudent measure, excluding high bay areas such
as warehouses/loading docks.
The criteria for decision making would be the room volume, the amount of LN2
stored (assume complete discharge of a full container) and the air exchange
rate, although since ventilation systems can fail, its prudent to discount
this in your calculation. One of our product safety reps worked through our
typical room volume and one cylinder. My conclusion from her input is that
it would be possible to render a room oxygen deficient if a full cylinder
discharged its entire contents (assuming worst case scenario). The biggest
question is the likelihood of a cylinder failing completely.
In response, we are looking at a new line of monitors from MSA called the
Ultima X Series Gas Monitor. Very user friendly. All of your sensors can
be calibrated and controlled via a hand-held unit.
I would recommend discussing this topic with the product safety rep for your
LN2 manufacturer/supplier. They can be alot of help.
Gary Morris
-----Original Message-----
From: Byers, Karen B [mailto:Karen_Byers@DFCI.HARVARD.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, November 12, 2002 10:22 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: O2 sensors in areas where liquid nitrogen is used for cryogenic s
torage..
Would anyone share policies on the use of oxygen sensors in areas where
liquid nitrogen tanks are used to maintain cryogenic storage? I'm
particularly interested in the criteria used to decide whether O2 sensors
are required ...Obviously, it makes sense to monitor oxygen in large
cryogenic storage areas... but how do you decide whether osygen monitoring
is required in the many
little areas where cryogenic storage occurs in research labs? What
sensors
have you used and is re-calibration a problem? Are the oxygen sensor
alarms
you use merely an audible warning system ["don't go in now or leave
immediately"]... or do you connect oxygen sensors to a control panel for
response? Does anyone use ventilation alarms to alert HVAC that attention
to
exhaust fans may be required?
If you would prefer to reply off-line, I would be happy to post a summary of
the responses. Thank you.
Karen B. Byers, MS, RBP, CBSP-ABSA
Biosafety Officer
Dana Farber Cancer Institute
44 Binney Street
Boston, MA 02115
Phone: 617-632-3890
Fax: 617-632-1932
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 12 Nov 2002 16:52:22 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Erik A. Talley"
Subject: Sigma-Aldrich Pays $1.76 Million Penalty to Settle Charges of
Illegal Exports of Biological Toxins
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
It looks like the Department of Commerce is going after people for
exporting biological toxins without appropriate approvals. The press
release is at:
The legal opinion is available at:
Erik
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 12 Nov 2002 17:34:08 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Twedt, Tru"
Subject: Re: BSL3
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
As long as we are discussing BSL-3 labs, I have a quick question. We would
like to collect sink waste water into an autoclavable carboy positioned
under each of the two sinks in our nearly completed BSL-3 lab. We currently
have a ball valve in place to direct the water either into the sanitary
sewer or into the carboy. Does anyone have any plans or suggestions on
connecting the ball valve to the carboy? We obviously need a leak proof
connection to the carboy and a HEPA filtered vent on the carboy. We also
need a convenient and splash proof method to disconnect the filled carboy
for sterilization. Once disconnected, the drain line from the ball valve
would need to be leak proof so waste water did not drip onto the floor.
Thank you for any help you can provide.
=======================
Tru F. Twedt, DVM
Biosecurity Specialist
Iowa State University
Environmental Health & Safety
118 Agronomy Lab
Ames, IA 50011-3200
E-mail: ttwedt@iastate.edu
Phone: (515) 294-6593
Fax: (515) 294-9357
Website:
-----Original Message-----
From: Jeffrey Good [mailto:rsojmg@GWUMC.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, November 12, 2002 9:05 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: BSL3
I suggest talking to the designer, former institutional Biosafety
Officer/RFO and laboratory director for the BSL-3 and ABSL-3 facilities,
Mark Ennen. He can be reached via email at resmse@gwumc.edu. I understand he
provides consulting services on the design, operation, etc of these lab
facilities. For our opening, I believe he worked with Diane Flemming's group
to provide "certification" that our lab facility met the appropriate
criteria.
Hope this lead helps.
Jeff
Jeffrey M. Good
Acting Director &
Hazardous Materials Safety Officer
Office of Laboratory Safety and Compliance
The George Washington University Medical Center
Office: (202) 994-5059
Mobile: (202) 437-6155
rsojmg@gwumc.edu
gwumc.edu/research/labsafety.htm
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 12 Nov 2002 10:21:51 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Byers, Karen B"
Subject: O2 sensors in areas where liquid nitrogen is used for cryogenic s
torage..
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Would anyone share policies on the use of oxygen sensors in areas where liquid
nitrogen tanks are used to maintain cryogenic storage? I'm particularly
interested in the criteria used to decide whether O2 sensors are required
..Obviously, it makes sense to monitor oxygen in large cryogenic storage
areas... but how do you decide whether osygen monitoring is required in the many
little areas where cryogenic storage occurs in research labs? What sensors
have you used and is re-calibration a problem? Are the oxygen sensor alarms
you use merely an audible warning system ["don't go in now or leave
immediately"]... or do you connect oxygen sensors to a control panel for
response? Does anyone use ventilation alarms to alert HVAC that attention to
exhaust fans may be required?
If you would prefer to reply off-line, I would be happy to post a summary of the
responses. Thank you.
Karen B. Byers, MS, RBP, CBSP-ABSA
Biosafety Officer
Dana Farber Cancer Institute
44 Binney Street
Boston, MA 02115
Phone: 617-632-3890
Fax: 617-632-1932
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 13 Nov 2002 07:38:53 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Doob, Peter (NIH/NIDA/IRP)"
Subject: Re: O2 sensors in areas where liquid nitrogen is used for cryogen
ic s torage..
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Karen=
The inherent risks depend on all the factors cited earlier by others on the
list, plus some hardware issues.
If one portable 240-liter LN2 dewar is used to feed one cryovat, the
connection is typically made using a flexible metal-jacketed cryo hose.
Contrast the same dewar manifolded to provide backup capability for 4 -70C
freezers. Now the cryo hose is connected to a distribution line that may or
may not be made of appropriate material, may or may not be soldered with
appropriate solder, may or may not be properly supported, may or may not
have valves that are cryo-capable (may work hard at low temps and cause
folks to torque the manifold excessively when they operate them), and
hopefully has no sections lacking relief valves that could be valved off
while containing LN2 (such pipe sections will rupture/explode as liquid LN2
in them warms up).
Obviously this is not ordinary plumbing. A degree of sophistication is
required, particularly when manifolds are involved. Asphyxiation by air too
rich in N2 is insidious--no warning properties here that the unaided senses
can read.
Whatever you decide on monitoring in a particular instance, ensuring that
the setup is intrinsically as safe as reasonably possible is, in my view,
well worth the effort. As a small research organization without a staff
cryo-plumber, we use a local cyogenics engineering firm to get the
assurances we need.
Good luck!
Peter A. Doob, MPH, JD
Chief, Safety and Operations Support Section, ASB
National Institute for Drug Abuse, NIH
Intramural Research Program
5500 Nathan Shock Drive
Baltimore, MD 21224
vc: 410-550-1675
> ----------
> From: Byers, Karen B
> Reply To: A Biosafety Discussion List
> Sent: Tuesday, November 12, 2002 10:21 AM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: O2 sensors in areas where liquid nitrogen is used for
> cryogenic s torage..
>
> Would anyone share policies on the use of oxygen sensors in areas where
> liquid
> nitrogen tanks are used to maintain cryogenic storage? I'm particularly
> interested in the criteria used to decide whether O2 sensors are required
> ..Obviously, it makes sense to monitor oxygen in large cryogenic storage
> areas... but how do you decide whether osygen monitoring is required in
> the many
> little areas where cryogenic storage occurs in research labs? What
> sensors
> have you used and is re-calibration a problem? Are the oxygen sensor
> alarms
> you use merely an audible warning system ["don't go in now or leave
> immediately"]... or do you connect oxygen sensors to a control panel for
> response? Does anyone use ventilation alarms to alert HVAC that
> attention to
> exhaust fans may be required?
>
> If you would prefer to reply off-line, I would be happy to post a summary
> of the
> responses. Thank you.
>
>
> Karen B. Byers, MS, RBP, CBSP-ABSA
> Biosafety Officer
> Dana Farber Cancer Institute
> 44 Binney Street
> Boston, MA 02115
> Phone: 617-632-3890
> Fax: 617-632-1932
>
>
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 13 Nov 2002 11:09:43 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ben Owens
Subject: poliovirus inventory form
MIME-Version: 1.0
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boundary="----=_NextPart_000_0000_01C28B05.2B0F8550"
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Content-Type: text/plain;
charset="Windows-1252"
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Dear All,
Section B. of the Wild Poliovirus Materials form asks for the specific
number of =93relevant biomedical laboratories in this institution.=94 =
Then
you are asked whether or not your institution has any wild poliovirus
materials. I am confused by the term =93relevant biomedical
laboratories.=94 Since environmental samples may be classified as wild
poliovirus material, labs that I do not consider biomedical laboratories
(such as water quality labs) may have these materials. Is the number of
relevant biomedical laboratories the total number of labs surveyed, or
is it only the labs that possess wild poliovirus materials? Section C.
then specifically asks for the total number of labs surveyed. Can
anyone provide some clarification?
Thanks,
Ben
------------
Ben Owens
Chemical Hygiene Officer
Environmental Health and Safety Department, MS 328
University of Nevada, Reno 89557
(775) 327-5196
(775) 784-4553 fax
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 13 Nov 2002 14:00:56 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Mike Durham
Subject: Re: poliovirus inventory form
MIME-Version: 1.0
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boundary="----=_NextPart_000_0093_01C28B1D.166A68A0"
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charset="Windows-1252"
I can't help Ben, but let me throw another question in the mix on the =
polio survey. Does old (more than a year old) samples which have been =
allowed to sit at ambient temperature, and are thus inactivated after a =
few days, have to be reported? It was not clear to me from my quick =
read, but it makes sense that these materials, such as soil samples and =
water samples from pre 1979 should not be reported unless they have been =
frozen. It indicates in the instructions that "inactivated" materials do =
not have to be reported.
Mike Durham
LSU
----- Original Message -----
From: A Biosafety Discussion List
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Sent: Wednesday, November 13, 2002 1:09 PM
Subject: poliovirus inventory form
Dear All,
Section B. of the Wild Poliovirus Materials form asks for the specific =
number of =93relevant biomedical laboratories in this institution.=94 =
Then you are asked whether or not your institution has any wild =
poliovirus materials. I am confused by the term =93relevant biomedical =
laboratories.=94 Since environmental samples may be classified as wild =
poliovirus material, labs that I do not consider biomedical laboratories =
(such as water quality labs) may have these materials. Is the number of =
relevant biomedical laboratories the total number of labs surveyed, or =
is it only the labs that possess wild poliovirus materials? Section C. =
then specifically asks for the total number of labs surveyed. Can =
anyone provide some clarification?
Thanks,
Ben
------------
Ben Owens
Chemical Hygiene Officer
Environmental Health and Safety Department, MS 328
University of Nevada, Reno 89557
(775) 327-5196
(775) 784-4553 fax
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 13 Nov 2002 15:09:00 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Koporc, Kim"
Subject: Re: poliovirus inventory form
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="----_=_NextPart_001_01C28B50.814BF836"
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------_=_NextPart_001_01C28B50.814BF836
Content-Type: text/plain;
charset="Windows-1252"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Dear All =96 =93Relevant biomedical laboratories=94 means all =
laboratories that may possess wild poliovirus infectious and potential =
infectious materials. All laboratories that may possess wild poliovirus =
materials should be inventoried, and so you will give the same answer in =
both Sections B and C. Remember =96 you only have to complete Section C =
if you have wild poliovirus materials. We realize that repeating the =
question in Section C seems redundant, but it is a check for us. Best =
regards, Kim
-----Original Message-----
From: Ben Owens [mailto:bowens@UNR.EDU]
Sent: Wednesday, November 13, 2002 2:10 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: poliovirus inventory form
Dear All,
Section B. of the Wild Poliovirus Materials form asks for the specific =
number of =93relevant biomedical laboratories in this institution.=94 =
Then you are asked whether or not your institution has any wild =
poliovirus materials. I am confused by the term =93relevant biomedical =
laboratories.=94 Since environmental samples may be classified as wild =
poliovirus material, labs that I do not consider biomedical laboratories =
(such as water quality labs) may have these materials. Is the number of =
relevant biomedical laboratories the total number of labs surveyed, or =
is it only the labs that possess wild poliovirus materials? Section C. =
then specifically asks for the total number of labs surveyed. Can =
anyone provide some clarification?
Thanks,
Ben
------------
Ben Owens
Chemical Hygiene Officer
Environmental Health and Safety Department, MS 328
University of Nevada, Reno 89557
(775) 327-5196
(775) 784-4553 fax
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 13 Nov 2002 14:13:22 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Kathryn Harris
Subject: Re: poliovirus inventory form
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="=====================_-561288812==_.ALT"
--=====================_-561288812==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
Ben
This seemed to cause a lot of angst for our faculty too (who would think it
of such a simple form). In our situation, after fielding numerous questions
about this, we decided that as this form is basically just an internal form
for institutional use, we are really only concerned with identifying
whether a specific PI possesses the material or not, not whether his or
hers labs are 'relevant' or 'biomedical'.
Most PI's consider their whole space one 'lab' so most entered one, some
PI's decided they did not have a 'biomedical lab or it wasn't 'relevant'
because they didn't possess any material of interest so they entered zero.
If we get a positive response to possession of polio we will go and assess
for ourselves how many 'relevant labs' are under that PI's control for the
purpose of reporting to the CDC on the institutional master form.
Kath Harris
**********************************************
Kathryn Louise Harris, Ph.D.
Biological Safety Professional
Office of Research Safety
Northwestern University
NG-71 Technological Institute
2145 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208-3121
Phone: (847) 491-4387
Fax: (847) 467-2797
Email: kathrynharris@northwestern.edu
**********************************************
At 11:09 AM 11/13/2002 -0800, you wrote:
>Dear All,
>
>
>
>Section B. of the Wild Poliovirus Materials form asks for the specific
>number of "relevant biomedical laboratories in this institution." Then
>you are asked whether or not your institution has any wild poliovirus
>materials. I am confused by the term "relevant biomedical
>laboratories." Since environmental samples may be classified as wild
>poliovirus material, labs that I do not consider biomedical laboratories
>(such as water quality labs) may have these materials. Is the number of
>relevant biomedical laboratories the total number of labs surveyed, or is
>it only the labs that possess wild poliovirus materials? Section C. then
>specifically asks for the total number of labs surveyed. Can anyone
>provide some clarification?
>
>
>
>Thanks,
>
>Ben
>
>------------
>
>Ben Owens
>
>Chemical Hygiene Officer
>
>Environmental Health and Safety Department, MS 328
>
>University of Nevada, Reno 89557
>
>(775) 327-5196
>
>(775) 784-4553 fax
>
>
--=====================_-561288812==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
X-MIME-Autoconverted: from 8bit to quoted-printable by lulu.it.northwestern.edu
id gADKBm7J025891
Ben
This seemed to cause a lot of angst for our faculty too (who
would think it of such a simple form). In our situation, after
fielding numerous questions about this, we decided that as
this form is basically just an internal form for institutional
use, we are really only concerned with identifying whether a
specific PI possesses the material or not, not whether his or
hers labs are 'relevant' or 'biomedical'.
Most PI's consider their whole space one 'lab' so most entered
one, some PI's decided they did not have a 'biomedical lab or
it wasn't 'relevant' because they didn't possess any material
of interest so they entered zero.
If we get a positive response to possession of polio we will
go and assess for ourselves how many 'relevant labs' are under
that PI's control for the purpose of reporting to the CDC on
the institutional master form.
Kath Harris
***********************************= ***********
Kathryn Louise Harris, Ph.D.
Biological Safety Professional
Office of Research Safety
Northwestern University
NG-71 Technological Institute
2145 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208-3121
Phone: (847) 491-4387
Fax: (847) 467-2797
Email: kathrynharris@northwestern.edu
**********************************************
At 11:09 AM 11/13/2002 -0800, you wrote:
D= ear All,
Section B. of the Wild Poliovirus Materials form asks for
the specific number of =93relevant biomedical laboratories =
in this institution.=94 Then you are asked whether or not
your institution has any wild poliovirus materials. I am
confused by the term =93relevant biomedical laboratories.=94
Since environmen= tal samples may be classified as wild
poliovirus material, labs that I do not consider biomedical
laboratories (such as water quality labs) may have these
materials. Is the number of relevant biomedical
laboratories the total number of labs surveyed, or is it
only the labs that possess wild poliovirus materials?
Section C. then specifically asks for the total number of
labs surveyed. Can anyone provide some clarification?
Thanks,
Ben
------------
Ben Owens
Chemical Hygiene Officer
Environmental Health and Safety Department, MS 328
University of Nevada, Reno 89557
(775) 327-5196
(775) 784-4553 fax
--=====================_-561288812==_.ALT--
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 13 Nov 2002 14:16:26 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Kathryn Harris
Subject: Re: poliovirus inventory form
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="=====================_-561105062==_.ALT"
--=====================_-561105062==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
Mike..
I asked a similar question a few days back.. here was the answer:
Right off of CDC's polio website:
"Clinical or environmental materials stored without refrigeration for three
months or more, refrigerated for one year or more, heat inactivated, treated
with disinfectants known to inactivate polioviruses, or tested and found
negative for the presence of enteroviruses are not considered infectious or
potentially infectious for wild poliovirus."
Kath Harris
At 02:00 PM 11/13/2002 -0600, you wrote:
>"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office" xmlns:w =
>"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:word" xmlns:st1 =
>"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags">
>I can't help Ben, but let me throw another question in the mix on the
>polio survey. Does old (more than a year old) samples which have been
>allowed to sit at ambient temperature, and are thus inactivated after a
>few days, have to be reported? It was not clear to me from my quick read,
>but it makes sense that these materials, such as soil samples and water
>samples from pre 1979 should not be reported unless they have been frozen.
>It indicates in the instructions that "inactivated" materials do not have
>to be reported.
>Mike Durham
>LSU
>>----- Original Message -----
>>From: A Biosafety Discussion List
>>To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
>>Sent: Wednesday, November 13, 2002 1:09 PM
>>Subject: poliovirus inventory form
>>
>>Dear All,
>>
>>
>>
>>Section B. of the Wild Poliovirus Materials form asks for the specific
>>number of "relevant biomedical laboratories in this institution." Then
>>you are asked whether or not your institution has any wild poliovirus
>>materials. I am confused by the term "relevant biomedical
>>laboratories." Since environmental samples may be classified as wild
>>poliovirus material, labs that I do not consider biomedical laboratories
>>(such as water quality labs) may have these materials. Is the number of
>>relevant biomedical laboratories the total number of labs surveyed, or is
>>it only the labs that possess wild poliovirus materials? Section C. then
>>specifically asks for the total number of labs surveyed. Can anyone
>>provide some clarification?
>>
>>
>>
>>Thanks,
>>
>>Ben
>>
>>------------
>>
>>Ben Owens
>>
>>Chemical Hygiene Officer
>>
>>Environmental Health and Safety Department, MS 328
>>
>>University of Nevada, Reno 89557
>>
>>(775) 327-5196
>>
>>(775) 784-4553 fax
>>
>>
>
>**********************************************
>Kathryn Louise Harris, Ph.D.
>Biological Safety Professional
>Office of Research Safety
>Northwestern University
>NG-71 Technological Institute
>2145 Sheridan Road
>Evanston, IL 60208-3121
>Phone: (847) 491-4387
>Fax: (847) 467-2797
>Email: kathrynharris@northwestern.edu
>**********************************************
--=====================_-561105062==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
X-MIME-Autoconverted: from 8bit to quoted-printable by lulu.it.northwestern.edu
id gADKEnxX000810
Mike..
I asked a similar question a few days back.. here was the
answer:
Right off of CDC's polio website:
"Clinical or environmental materials stored without
refrigeration for three
months or more, refrigerated for one year or more, heat
inactivated, treated
with disinfectants known to inactivate polioviruses, or tested
and found
negative for the presence of enteroviruses are not considered
infectious or
potentially infectious for wild poliovirus."
Kath Harris
At 02:00 PM 11/13/2002 -0600, you wrote:
"urn:schemas-microsoft-com= :office:office" xmlns:w =3D
"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:word" xmlns:st1 =3D
"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags">
I can't help Ben, but let me throw another question in the
mix on the polio survey. Does old (more than a year old)
samples which have been allowed to sit at ambient
temperature, and are thus inactivated after a few days, have
to be reported? It was not clear to me from my quick read,
but it makes sense that these materials, such as soil
samples and water samples from pre 1979 should not be
reported unless they have been frozen. It indicates in the
instructions that "inactivated" materials do not have to
be reported.
Mike Durham
LSU
r> From: A Biosafety Discussion List
To: r> Sent: Wednesday, November 13, 2002 1:09 PM
Subject: poliovirus inventory form
Dear All,
Section B. of the Wild Poliovirus Materials= form asks for
the specific number of =93relevant biomedical laboratories=
in this institution.=94 Then you are asked whether or not
your ins= titution has any wild poliovirus materials. I am
confused by the te= rm =93relevant biomedical
laboratories.=94 Since environmenta= l samples may be
classified as wild poliovirus material, labs that I do n= ot
consider biomedical laboratories (such as water quality
labs) may have= these materials. Is the number of relevant
biomedical laboratories= the total number of labs surveyed,
or is it only the labs that possess w= ild poliovirus
materials? Section C. then specifically asks for the= total
number of labs surveyed. Can anyone provide some
clarificati= on?
Thanks,
Ben
------------
Ben Owens
Chemical Hygiene Officer
Environmental Health and Saf= ety Department, MS 328
University of Nevada, Reno 8= 9557
(775) 327-5196
(775) 784-4553 fax
**********************************************
Kathryn Louise Harris, Ph.D.
Biological Safety Professional
Office of Research Safety
Northwestern University
NG-71 Technological Institute
2145 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208-3121
Phone: (847) 491-4387
Fax: (847) 467-2797
Email: kathrynharris@northwestern.edu
**********************************************
--=====================_-561105062==_.ALT--
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 13 Nov 2002 15:52:34 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Gerry Griffin
Subject: Re: poliovirus inventory form
In-Reply-To:
MIME-version: 1.0
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I decided that since they wanted us to survey all labs, the word
"relevant" was confusing so I removed it on our internal forms.
-----Original Message-----
From: A Biosafety Discussion List [mailto:BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU] On
Behalf Of Kathryn Harris
Sent: Wednesday, November 13, 2002 3:13 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: poliovirus inventory form
Ben
This seemed to cause a lot of angst for our faculty too (who would think
it of such a simple form). In our situation, after fielding numerous
questions about this, we decided that as this form is basically just an
internal form for institutional use, we are really only concerned with
identifying whether a specific PI possesses the material or not, not
whether his or hers labs are 'relevant' or 'biomedical'.
Most PI's consider their whole space one 'lab' so most entered one, some
PI's decided they did not have a 'biomedical lab or it wasn't 'relevant'
because they didn't possess any material of interest so they entered
zero.
If we get a positive response to possession of polio we will go and
assess for ourselves how many 'relevant labs' are under that PI's
control for the purpose of reporting to the CDC on the institutional
master form.
Kath Harris
**********************************************
Kathryn Louise Harris, Ph.D.
Biological Safety Professional
Office of Research Safety
Northwestern University
NG-71 Technological Institute
2145 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208-3121
Phone: (847) 491-4387
Fax: (847) 467-2797
Email: kathrynharris@northwestern.edu
**********************************************
At 11:09 AM 11/13/2002 -0800, you wrote:
Dear All,
Section B. of the Wild Poliovirus Materials form asks for the specific
number of =13relevant biomedical laboratories in this institution.=14 =
Then
you are asked whether or not your institution has any wild poliovirus
materials. I am confused by the term =13relevant biomedical
laboratories.=14 Since environmental samples may be classified as wild
poliovirus material, labs that I do not consider biomedical laboratories
(such as water quality labs) may have these materials. Is the number of
relevant biomedical laboratories the total number of labs surveyed, or
is it only the labs that possess wild poliovirus materials? Section C.
then specifically asks for the total number of labs surveyed. Can
anyone provide some clarification?
Thanks,
Ben
------------
Ben Owens
Chemical Hygiene Officer
Environmental Health and Safety Department, MS 328
University of Nevada, Reno 89557
(775) 327-5196
(775) 784-4553 fax
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 14 Nov 2002 14:40:38 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Gerry Griffin
Subject: Pertussis Toxin
MIME-version: 1.0
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Does anyone recommend pertussis vaccine for researchers working with the
toxin. From a powerpoint presentation on the CDC website, I see that
there is no pertussis vaccine licensed for use in adults in the U.S.,
that the acellular vaccine is safe and immunogenic in adults but that it
is not routinely recommended at this time. Not routinely, but is it
recommended for those working with the toxin in research?
Gerry Griffin
Environmental Services
NYU Medical Center
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 14 Nov 2002 14:09:00 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Kathryn Harris
Subject: Re: Pertussis Toxin
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
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boundary="=====================_-475151546==_.ALT"
--=====================_-475151546==_.ALT
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I'll be displaying my ignorance here I'm sure, but isn't a vaccine against
the organism (Bordetella pertussis) not the toxin it produces? I thought
the vaccines actually contain detoxified forms of PT?
Can there even be a vaccine against a toxin? Wouldn't it be something more
like an antitoxin/antidote?
Time for me to crack out those intro-bio text books I guess..
Kath Harris
At 02:40 PM 11/14/2002 -0500, you wrote:
>Does anyone recommend pertussis vaccine for researchers working with the
>toxin. From a powerpoint presentation on the CDC website, I see that
>there is no pertussis vaccine licensed for use in adults in the U.S., that
>the acellular vaccine is safe and immunogenic in adults but that it is not
>routinely recommended at this time. Not routinely, but is it recommended
>for those working with the toxin in research?
>
>
>
>Gerry Griffin
>
>Environmental Services
>
>NYU Medical Center
>
>
**********************************************
Kathryn Louise Harris, Ph.D.
Biological Safety Professional
Office of Research Safety
Northwestern University
NG-71 Technological Institute
2145 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208-3121
Phone: (847) 491-4387
Fax: (847) 467-2797
Email: kathrynharris@northwestern.edu
**********************************************
--=====================_-475151546==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
I'll be displaying my ignorance here I'm sure, but isn't a
vaccine against the organism (Bordetella pertussis) not the
toxin it produces? I thought the vaccines actually contain
detoxified forms of PT?
Can there even be a vaccine against a toxin? Wouldn't it be
something more like an antitoxin/antidote?
Time for me to crack out those intro-bio text books I guess..
Kath Harris
At 02:40 PM 11/14/2002 -0500, you wrote:
Does anyone recommend pertussis vaccine for researchers
working with the toxin. From a powerpoint presentation on
the CDC website, I see that there is no pertussis vaccine
licensed for use in adults in the U.S., that the acellular
vaccine is safe and immunogenic in adults but that it is not
routinely recommended at this time. Not routinely, but is
it recommended for those working with the toxin in research?
Gerry Griffin
Environmental Services
NYU Medical Center
**********************************************
Kathryn Louise Harris, Ph.D.
Biological Safety Professional
Office of Research Safety
Northwestern University
NG-71 Technological Institute
2145 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208-3121
Phone: (847) 491-4387
Fax: (847) 467-2797
Email: kathrynharris@northwestern.edu
**********************************************
--=====================_-475151546==_.ALT--
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 14 Nov 2002 15:25:44 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Robin Newberry
Subject: Re: Pertussis Toxin
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed"
>Can there even be a vaccine against a toxin?
There is a botulinum toxin vaccine, so I guess the answer is yes.
>>Does anyone recommend pertussis vaccine for researchers working
>>with the toxin.
I recommend that all adults should get pertussis boosters. Having
recently had a bout of pertussis (over a year ago, now), I can attest
it is a truly miserable and unpleasant disease to have. Trust me, you
don't want it.
--
Robin
--------------------------------------------------------------
W. Robert Newberry, IV CIH, CHMM
Chief Environmental Health and Safety Officer
Clemson University
wnewber@clemson.edu ehs@clemson.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 14 Nov 2002 15:29:05 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Gerry Griffin
Subject: Re: Pertussis Toxin
In-Reply-To:
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Well that was part of the question. The MSDS for the toxin from List
Biological Laboratories had this statement: "If i.v. or i.m. injection
should occur, consult a physician. Attempt to obtain hyperimmune
globulin from the CDC. In an adult immunized versus whooping cough, no
long term ill effects are likely to result." Not that you believe
everything on an MSDS, but it did get me thinking..
-----Original Message-----
From: A Biosafety Discussion List [mailto:BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU] On
Behalf Of Kathryn Harris
Sent: Thursday, November 14, 2002 3:09 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Pertussis Toxin
I'll be displaying my ignorance here I'm sure, but isn't a vaccine
against the organism (Bordetella pertussis) not the toxin it produces? I
thought the vaccines actually contain detoxified forms of PT?
Can there even be a vaccine against a toxin? Wouldn't it be something
more like an antitoxin/antidote?
Time for me to crack out those intro-bio text books I guess..
Kath Harris
At 02:40 PM 11/14/2002 -0500, you wrote:
Does anyone recommend pertussis vaccine for researchers working with the
toxin. From a powerpoint presentation on the CDC website, I see that
there is no pertussis vaccine licensed for use in adults in the U.S.,
that the acellular vaccine is safe and immunogenic in adults but that it
is not routinely recommended at this time. Not routinely, but is it
recommended for those working with the toxin in research?
Gerry Griffin
Environmental Services
NYU Medical Center
**********************************************
Kathryn Louise Harris, Ph.D.
Biological Safety Professional
Office of Research Safety
Northwestern University
NG-71 Technological Institute
2145 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208-3121
Phone: (847) 491-4387
Fax: (847) 467-2797
Email: kathrynharris@northwestern.edu
**********************************************
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 14 Nov 2002 15:38:59 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Meechan, Paul J."
Subject: Re: Pertussis Toxin
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
I would be careful in recommending pertussis boosters for adults. The CDC
has noted that no pertussis-containing vaccine is recommended for children
over 7, as the adverse reaction rate increases sharply for adults. Perhaps
the acellular vaccine will be available for adults, but not yet. You can
read the prescribing information from both GSK and Aventis Pasteur and get
the same information or from the CDC site below.
Paul J. Meechan, Ph.D.
Biosafety Manager, WP
Merck & Co., Inc.
215-652-0744
meechan@
-----Original Message-----
From: Robin Newberry [mailto:wnewber@CLEMSON.EDU]
Sent: Thursday, November 14, 2002 3:26 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Pertussis Toxin
>Can there even be a vaccine against a toxin?
There is a botulinum toxin vaccine, so I guess the answer is yes.
>>Does anyone recommend pertussis vaccine for researchers working
>>with the toxin.
I recommend that all adults should get pertussis boosters. Having
recently had a bout of pertussis (over a year ago, now), I can attest
it is a truly miserable and unpleasant disease to have. Trust me, you
don't want it.
--
Robin
--------------------------------------------------------------
W. Robert Newberry, IV CIH, CHMM
Chief Environmental Health and Safety Officer
Clemson University
wnewber@clemson.edu ehs@clemson.edu
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notice: This e-mail message, together with any attachments, contains
information of Merck & Co., Inc. (Whitehouse Station, New Jersey, USA) that may
be confidential, proprietary copyrighted and/or legally privileged, and is
intended solely for the use of the individual or entity named in this message.
If you are not the intended recipient, and have received this message in error,
please immediately return this by e-mail and then delete it.
=============================================================================
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 14 Nov 2002 13:56:02 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Mark Grushka
Subject: Charging for IBC Review?
MIME-Version: 1.0
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Dear Listserve Members:
A question has recently been raised whether it would be appropriate to =
charge a fee for IBC proposal review. My questions are as follows:
1. Do you charge a fee for IBC review of research proposals?
2. If yes, what is the amount of the fee?
3. If yes, do you charge;
a). Only private sponsors?
b). Only public sponsors?
c). Both?
4. Is the fee revenue;
a). Retained by the Department/Administrative Entity housing the =
IBC/Biosafety Officer?
b). Forwarded to general operating fund for institution?
5. Even if you do not currently charge a fee, do you think this is a;
a). Good idea.
b). Bad idea
c). Not sure
If you have any other experience with such a system, please feel free to =
comment.
Thank you for your feedback.
Respectfully,
Mark J. Grushka, M.S., CSP
Biosafety Officer
University of Arizona
520-621-5279
mgrushka@u.arizona.edu
------=_NextPart_000_001F_01C28BE5.91A868A0
Content-Type: text/html;
charset="Windows-1252"
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Dear Listserve Members:
A question has recently been raised = whether it would be
appropriate to charge a fee for IBC proposal review. My =
questions are as follows:
1. Do you charge a = fee for IBC review of research
proposals?
2. If yes, what is the amount of the fee?
3. If yes, do you charge;
a). Only private sponsors?
b). Only public sponsors?
c). = Both?
4. Is the fee revenue;
a). Retained by the Department/Administrative Entity
housing the IBC/Biosafety = Officer?
b). Forwarded to general operating fund for institution?
5. Even if you do not = currently charge a fee, do you
think this is a;
a). Good = idea.
b). Bad = idea
c). Not = sure
If you have any other experience with = such a system,
please feel free to comment.
Thank you for your = feedback.
Respectfully,
Mark J. Grushka, M.S., CSP
Biosafety Officer
University of Arizona
520-621-5279
href=3D"mailto:mgrushka@u.arizona.edu">mgrushka@u.arizona.edu
------=_NextPart_000_001F_01C28BE5.91A868A0--
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 14 Nov 2002 15:49:33 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Amy Barringer
Subject: Shipping Insect Pathogens
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A shipping question for you folks out there...
I have a researcher that needs to ship insect pathogens (mainly Gypsy Moth =
pathogens).
I know that agents that are infectious to human or animals must be =
packaged and sent as infectious substances. Insects are animals, but, do =
they fall under the legal definition of animals according to DOT/IATA? Or =
are the DOT/IATA regs. referring to the vertebrates? Thanks in advance =
for your input. Amy
Amy A. Barringer
Biosafety Officer, SOHES
ARS/USDA
Beltsville Agricultural Research Center
Bldg. 003, Rm. 118
Beltsville, MD 20705
(Ph) 301-504-5557, (F) 301-504-5857
barringa@ba.ars.
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 14 Nov 2002 14:56:51 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: George Pankey
Subject: Re: Charging for IBC Review?
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
We do not GAP
George A. Pankey, MD
Director,
Infectious Disease Research
Alton Ochsner Medical Foundation
Ochsner Clinic AT 2W
1514-16 Jefferson Highway
New Orleans, LA 70121-2483
Phone: 504-842-4005
Fax: 504-842-5433
>>> mgrushka@U.ARIZONA.EDU 11/14/02 02:56PM >>>
Dear Listserve Members:
A question has recently been raised whether it would be appropriate to =
charge a fee for IBC proposal review. My questions are as follows:
1. Do you charge a fee for IBC review of research proposals?
2. If yes, what is the amount of the fee?
3. If yes, do you charge;
a). Only private sponsors?
b). Only public sponsors?
c). Both?
4. Is the fee revenue;
a). Retained by the Department/Administrative Entity housing the =
IBC/Biosafety Officer?
b). Forwarded to general operating fund for institution?
5. Even if you do not currently charge a fee, do you think this is a;
a). Good idea.
b). Bad idea
c). Not sure
If you have any other experience with such a system, please feel free to =
comment.
Thank you for your feedback.
Respectfully,
Mark J. Grushka, M.S., CSP
Biosafety Officer
University of Arizona
520-621-5279
mgrushka@u.arizona.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 14 Nov 2002 16:13:22 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Harriet Izenberg
Subject: Re: Charging for IBC Review?
In-Reply-To:
MIME-Version: 1.0
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We do not charge
Harriet Izenberg, RBP
Institutional Biosafety Officer
EHRS/UPENN
3160 Chestnut Street, Suite 400
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6287
215.898.6236 (Phone)
215.898.0140 (FAX)
-----Original Message-----
From: A Biosafety Discussion List [mailto:BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU]On Behalf
Of Mark Grushka
Sent: Thursday, November 14, 2002 3:56 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Charging for IBC Review?
Dear Listserve Members:
A question has recently been raised whether it would be appropriate to
charge a fee for IBC proposal review. My questions are as follows:
1. Do you charge a fee for IBC review of research proposals?
2. If yes, what is the amount of the fee?
3. If yes, do you charge;
a). Only private sponsors?
b). Only public sponsors?
c). Both?
4. Is the fee revenue;
a). Retained by the Department/Administrative Entity housing the
IBC/Biosafety Officer?
b). Forwarded to general operating fund for institution?
5. Even if you do not currently charge a fee, do you think this is a;
a). Good idea.
b). Bad idea
c). Not sure
If you have any other experience with such a system, please feel free to
comment.
Thank you for your feedback.
Respectfully,
Mark J. Grushka, M.S., CSP
Biosafety Officer
University of Arizona
520-621-5279
mgrushka@u.arizona.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 14 Nov 2002 16:11:03 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Sickles, Sharon"
Subject: Re: Pertussis Toxin
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
There are "vaccines" against bacterial toxins, eg. tetanus toxoid and
diphtheria toxoid which are inactivated forms of toxins produced by the
bacteria C. tetani and C. diphtheriae.
B. pertussis produces several toxins which are associated with virulence.
There are two types of vaccines used against B. pertussis, an inactivated
(killed)one which has been associated with adverse reactions and an
acellular vaccine which is less immunogenic/effective but without the
adverse effects. If you are working with the toxin, a pertussis vaccination
is not going to be helpful as it is directed against the organism, not the
toxin. It works in the field because bacteria are producing the toxins in
the host and the toxins produce the clinical signs of disease.
Sharon A. Sickles, PhD, DVM
University Veterinarian
Director of Research Compliance
211 Couper Administration Bldg
Binghamton University
Binghamton, NY 13902
(607) 777-4170
e-mail ssickles@binghamton.edu
-----Original Message-----
From: A Biosafety Discussion List [mailto:BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU]On
Behalf Of Meechan, Paul J.
Sent: Thursday, November 14, 2002 3:39 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Pertussis Toxin
I would be careful in recommending pertussis boosters for adults. The CDC
has noted that no pertussis-containing vaccine is recommended for children
over 7, as the adverse reaction rate increases sharply for adults. Perhaps
the acellular vaccine will be available for adults, but not yet. You can
read the prescribing information from both GSK and Aventis Pasteur and get
the same information or from the CDC site below.
Paul J. Meechan, Ph.D.
Biosafety Manager, WP
Merck & Co., Inc.
215-652-0744
meechan@
-----Original Message-----
From: Robin Newberry [mailto:wnewber@CLEMSON.EDU]
Sent: Thursday, November 14, 2002 3:26 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Pertussis Toxin
>Can there even be a vaccine against a toxin?
There is a botulinum toxin vaccine, so I guess the answer is yes.
>>Does anyone recommend pertussis vaccine for researchers working
>>with the toxin.
I recommend that all adults should get pertussis boosters. Having
recently had a bout of pertussis (over a year ago, now), I can attest
it is a truly miserable and unpleasant disease to have. Trust me, you
don't want it.
--
Robin
--------------------------------------------------------------
W. Robert Newberry, IV CIH, CHMM
Chief Environmental Health and Safety Officer
Clemson University
wnewber@clemson.edu ehs@clemson.edu
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
--
Notice: This e-mail message, together with any attachments, contains
information of Merck & Co., Inc. (Whitehouse Station, New Jersey, USA) that
may be confidential, proprietary copyrighted and/or legally privileged, and
is intended solely for the use of the individual or entity named in this
message. If you are not the intended recipient, and have received this
message in error, please immediately return this by e-mail and then delete
it.
===========================================================================
==
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 14 Nov 2002 16:14:16 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Susan Souder
Subject: Re: Charging for IBC Review?
MIME-Version: 1.0
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Hi Mark,
We do not charge either.
Sue
Susan Souder, MS, CBSP
Biological Safety Officer
Environmental Health and Safety
Thomas Jefferson University
Philadelphia, Pa. 19107
215-503-7422
----- Original Message -----
From: Mark Grushka
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Sent: Thursday, November 14, 2002 3:56 PM
Subject: Charging for IBC Review?
Dear Listserve Members:
A question has recently been raised whether it would be appropriate to =
charge a fee for IBC proposal review. My questions are as follows:
1. Do you charge a fee for IBC review of research proposals?
2. If yes, what is the amount of the fee?
3. If yes, do you charge;
a). Only private sponsors?
b). Only public sponsors?
c). Both?
4. Is the fee revenue;
a). Retained by the Department/Administrative Entity housing the =
IBC/Biosafety Officer?
b). Forwarded to general operating fund for institution?
5. Even if you do not currently charge a fee, do you think this is =
a;
a). Good idea.
b). Bad idea
c). Not sure
If you have any other experience with such a system, please feel free =
to comment.
Thank you for your feedback.
Respectfully,
Mark J. Grushka, M.S., CSP
Biosafety Officer
University of Arizona
520-621-5279
mgrushka@u.arizona.edu
------=_NextPart_000_0117_01C28BF8.E0EA7FD0
Content-Type: text/html;
charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Hi Mark,
We do not charge either.
Sue
Susan Souder, MS, CBSP
Biological Safety Officer
Environmental Health and = Safety
Thomas Jefferson = University
Philadelphia, Pa. 19107
215-503-7422
style=3D"PADDING-RIGHT: 0px; PADDING-LEFT: 5px; MARGIN-LEFT:
5px; = BORDER-LEFT: #000000 2px solid; MARGIN-RIGHT: 0px">
----- Original Message -----
style=3D"BACKGROUND: #e4e4e4; FONT: 10pt arial; font-color: =
black">From: href=3D"mailto:mgrushka@U.ARIZONA.EDU">Mark
Grushka
title=3DBIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
href=3D"mailto:BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU">BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
=
Sent: Thursday, November 14, = 2002 3:56 PM
Subject: Charging for IBC = Review?
Dear Listserve Members:
A question has recently been raised = whether it would be
appropriate to charge a fee for IBC proposal review. My =
questions are as follows:
1. Do you charge a = fee for IBC review of research
proposals?
2. If yes, what is the amount of the fee?
3. If yes, do you charge;
a). Only private sponsors?
b). Only = public sponsors?
c). = Both?
4. Is the fee revenue;
a). Retained by the Department/Administrative Entity
housing the IBC/Biosafety Officer?
b). Forwarded to general operating fund for institution?
5. Even if you do = not currently charge a fee, do you
think this is a;
a). Good = idea.
b). Bad = idea
c). Not = sure
If you have any other experience with = such a system,
please feel free to comment.
Thank you for your = feedback.
Respectfully,
Mark J. Grushka, M.S., = CSP
Biosafety Officer
University of Arizona
520-621-5279
=
href=3D"mailto:mgrushka@u.arizona.edu">mgrushka@u.arizona.edu
------=_NextPart_000_0117_01C28BF8.E0EA7FD0--
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 14 Nov 2002 16:11:31 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Brown, Virginia R"
Subject: Re: Charging for IBC Review?
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="----_=_NextPart_001_01C28C2A.C983D310"
This is a multi-part message in MIME format.
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Content-Type: text/plain;
charset="Windows-1252"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
TX A&M IBC reviews at no charge.
Ginger Brown, CBSP
Env Health & Safety
TX A&M University
-----Original Message-----
From: Mark Grushka [mailto:mgrushka@u.arizona.edu]
Sent: Thursday, November 14, 2002 2:56 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Charging for IBC Review?
Dear Listserve Members:
A question has recently been raised whether it would be appropriate to =
charge a fee for IBC proposal review. My questions are as follows:
1. Do you charge a fee for IBC review of research proposals?
2. If yes, what is the amount of the fee?
3. If yes, do you charge;
a). Only private sponsors?
b). Only public sponsors?
c). Both?
4. Is the fee revenue;
a). Retained by the Department/Administrative Entity housing the =
IBC/Biosafety Officer?
b). Forwarded to general operating fund for institution?
5. Even if you do not currently charge a fee, do you think this is a;
a). Good idea.
b). Bad idea
c). Not sure
If you have any other experience with such a system, please feel free to =
comment.
Thank you for your feedback.
Respectfully,
Mark J. Grushka, M.S., CSP
Biosafety Officer
University of Arizona
520-621-5279
mgrushka@u.arizona.edu
------_=_NextPart_001_01C28C2A.C983D310
Content-Type: text/html;
charset="Windows-1252"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
size=3D2>TX A&M IBC reviews at no charge.
size=3D2>
size=3D2>Ginger Brown, CBSP
size=3D2>Env Health & Safety
size=3D2>TX A&M University
size=3D2>
face=3DTahoma size=3D2>-----Original Message-----
From: Mark Grushka [mailto:mgrushka@u.arizona.edu]
Sent: Thursday, November 14, = 2002 2:56 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: = Charging for IBC Review?
Dear Listserve Members:
A question has recently been raised = whether it would be
appropriate to charge a fee for IBC proposal review. My =
questions are as follows:
1. Do you charge a = fee for IBC review of research
proposals?
2. If yes, what is the amount of the fee?
3. If yes, do you charge;
a). Only private sponsors?
b). Only = public sponsors?
c). = Both?
4. Is the fee revenue;
a). Retained by the Department/Administrative Entity
housing the IBC/Biosafety Officer?
b). Forwarded to general operating fund for
institution?
5. Even if you do = not currently charge a fee, do you
think this is a;
a). Good = idea.
b). Bad = idea
c). Not = sure
If you have any other experience with = such a system,
please feel free to comment.
Thank you for your = feedback.
Respectfully,
Mark J. Grushka, M.S., = CSP
Biosafety Officer
University of Arizona
520-621-5279
=
href=3D"mailto:mgrushka@u.arizona.edu">mgrushka@u.arizona.edu
------_=_NextPart_001_01C28C2A.C983D310--
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 14 Nov 2002 16:59:02 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Carol McGhan
Subject: locking security boxes?
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
Would anyone have sources for a security box that will withstand -80 degree
C temperatures to share with the group? I imagine many of us will be in
need of such items to secure toxins and cultures in freezers that have to
be shared. I would think something approximately 8X10X4 inches or so may
work well.
Thank you!
Carol
Carol McGhan, SM(AAM), CBSP
Biological Safety Professional
Health Protection Office
122 Grand Ave Ct
The University of Iowa
E-Mail:carol-mcghan@uiowa.edu
Tel:319-335-9553
Fax:319-335-7564
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 14 Nov 2002 18:28:03 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: David Hwang
Subject: Re: locking security boxes?
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
There are numerous suppliers that carry lock boxes (Fisher Scientific, VWR,
etc.) that can withstand the temperature. Also, check with your Radiation
Safety people, they usually have to lock up their stock solutions of
radioactive materials.
David S. Hwang, CSP
Director, EH&S / Facilities Operation
TMRI/ Syngenta Research & Technology
3115 Merryfield Row
San Diego, CA 92121
-----Original Message-----
From: Carol McGhan [mailto:carol-mcghan@UIOWA.EDU]
Sent: Thursday, November 14, 2002 2:59 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: locking security boxes?
Would anyone have sources for a security box that will withstand -80 degree
C temperatures to share with the group? I imagine many of us will be in
need of such items to secure toxins and cultures in freezers that have to
be shared. I would think something approximately 8X10X4 inches or so may
work well.
Thank you!
Carol
Carol McGhan, SM(AAM), CBSP
Biological Safety Professional
Health Protection Office
122 Grand Ave Ct
The University of Iowa
E-Mail:carol-mcghan@uiowa.edu
Tel:319-335-9553
Fax:319-335-7564
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 14 Nov 2002 19:41:30 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Robert Hashimoto
Organization: Genentech, Inc.
Subject: Re: Charging for IBC Review?
MIME-Version: 1.0
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boundary="------------C0B3CF83727B23AF0789BFAD"
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Hi Mark,
Genentech does not charge for its institutional review. I don't think
charging a fee is appropriate if the applicant is a member of the same
organization as the IBC.
If the organization is reviewing an application from an investigator who
is not an employee of the organization and is not funded with the
organization, then it may be something to consider (e.g., a hospital who
has a clinical lab director who is applying for government research
money but does not have a hospital IBC and the hospital is a separate
corporate entity from the university but has an existing agreement with
the university for its IRB review).
Hope this helps,
Bob
Mark Grushka wrote:
> Dear Listserve Members: A question has recently been raised whether it
> would be appropriate to charge a fee for IBC proposal review. My
> questions are as follows: 1. Do you charge a fee for IBC review of
> research proposals? 2. If yes, what is the amount of the fee? 3.
> If yes, do you charge; a). Only private sponsors? b). Only public
> sponsors? c). Both? 4. Is the fee revenue; a). Retained by
> the Department/Administrative Entity housing the IBC/Biosafety
> Officer? b). Forwarded to general operating fund for
> institution? 5. Even if you do not currently charge a fee, do you
> think this is a; a). Good idea. b). Bad idea c). Not sure If
> you have any other experience with such a system, please feel free to
> comment. Thank you for your feedback. Respectfully, Mark J. Grushka,
> M.S., CSPBiosafety OfficerUniversity of
> Arizona520-621-5279mgrushka@u.arizona.edu
--------------C0B3CF83727B23AF0789BFAD
Content-Type: text/html; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Hi Mark,
Genentech does not charge for its institutional review. I
don't think charging a fee is appropriate if the applicant is
a member of the same organization as the IBC.
If the organization is reviewing an application from an
investigator who is not an employee of the organization and is
not funded with the organization, then it may be something to
consider (e.g., a hospital who has a clinical lab director who
is applying for government research money but does not have a
hospital IBC and the hospital is a separate corporate entity
from the university but has an existing agreement with the
university for its IRB review).
Hope this helps,
Bob
Mark Grushka wrote:
Dear Listserve Members: A question has recently been raised
whether it would be appropriate to charge a fee for IBC
proposal review. My questions are as follows: 1. Do you
charge a fee for IBC review of research proposals? 2. If
yes, what is the amount of the fee? 3. If yes, do you
charge; a). Only private sponsors? b). Only public
sponsors? c). Both? 4. Is the fee revenue; a).
Retained by the Department/Administrative Entity housing the
IBC/Biosafety Officer? b). Forwarded to general operating
fund for institution? 5. Even if you do not currently
charge a fee, do you think this is a; a). Good idea. b).
Bad idea c). Not sure If you have any other experience
with such a system, please feel free to comment. Thank you
for your feedback. Respectfully, Mark J. Grushka, M.S.,
CSPBiosafety OfficerUniversity of
Arizona520-621-5279mgrushka@u.arizona.edu
--------------C0B3CF83727B23AF0789BFAD--
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 15 Nov 2002 07:57:28 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "William A. Lorenzen"
Organization: Children's Hospital Boston
Subject: Re: locking security boxes?
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT
We lock the -80 freezer using the supplied hasp that comes with the freezer.
Carol McGhan wrote:
> Would anyone have sources for a security box that will withstand -80 degree
> C temperatures to share with the group? I imagine many of us will be in
> need of such items to secure toxins and cultures in freezers that have to
> be shared. I would think something approximately 8X10X4 inches or so may
> work well.
> Thank you!
> Carol
>
> Carol McGhan, SM(AAM), CBSP
> Biological Safety Professional
> Health Protection Office
> 122 Grand Ave Ct
> The University of Iowa
> E-Mail:carol-mcghan@uiowa.edu
> Tel:319-335-9553
> Fax:319-335-7564
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 15 Nov 2002 07:58:09 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "William A. Lorenzen"
Organization: Children's Hospital Boston
Subject: Re: locking security boxes?
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT
None of these will work after storage in a -80 (my opinion/experience)
David Hwang wrote:
> There are numerous suppliers that carry lock boxes (Fisher Scientific, VWR,
> etc.) that can withstand the temperature. Also, check with your Radiation
> Safety people, they usually have to lock up their stock solutions of
> radioactive materials.
>
> David S. Hwang, CSP
> Director, EH&S / Facilities Operation
> TMRI/ Syngenta Research & Technology
> 3115 Merryfield Row
> San Diego, CA 92121
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Carol McGhan [mailto:carol-mcghan@UIOWA.EDU]
> Sent: Thursday, November 14, 2002 2:59 PM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: locking security boxes?
>
> Would anyone have sources for a security box that will withstand -80 degree
> C temperatures to share with the group? I imagine many of us will be in
> need of such items to secure toxins and cultures in freezers that have to
> be shared. I would think something approximately 8X10X4 inches or so may
> work well.
> Thank you!
> Carol
>
> Carol McGhan, SM(AAM), CBSP
> Biological Safety Professional
> Health Protection Office
> 122 Grand Ave Ct
> The University of Iowa
> E-Mail:carol-mcghan@uiowa.edu
> Tel:319-335-9553
> Fax:319-335-7564
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 15 Nov 2002 07:59:33 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Kim Auletta
Subject: Re: Charging for IBC Review?
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
We do not charge. I have a feeling it wouldn't be allowed for federal grant
reviews, anyway. Our dept used to charge for hazardous waste pick ups, but
the feds threatened to stop funding the Univ. grants. Seems it was a
"double dipping" issue. We now get paid from the overhead that is
collected.
Kim Auletta
Lab Safety Specialist
Environmental Health and Safety
SUNY Stony Brook
110 Suffolk Hall
Stony Brook, NY 11794-6200
phone: 631-632-9672
fax: 631-632-9683
email: kauletta@.sunysb.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 15 Nov 2002 08:06:41 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Scott Alderman
Subject: BSC decon times
MIME-Version: 1.0
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This is a multipart message in MIME format.
--=_alternative 00483AFE85256C72_=
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Annex G (Recommended Microbiological Decontamination Procedure) of the
2002 edition of NSF Standard 49 recommends a minimum decontamination time
of six hours. This differs significantly from the 1992 edition, which
recommended a minimum decon time of two hours. I haven't read the
reference noted in the new edition (Fink, D. et. al., 1988. Biological Safety
Cabinets, Decontamination or Sterilization with
Paraformaldehyde, Am. Ind. Hyg. Assoc. J. 49 (6): 277-279), but I assume it
justifies this
change.
Vesley et. al., indicate in the third edition of Biological Safety
Principles and Practices, that "safety cabinet total decontamination" is
accomplished in 60-180 minutes using 0.3 g/ft3 of paraformaldehyde (at
Temp >23C and RH >60%).
I would appreciate any comments on the topic. Does your institution
adhere to this revised recommendation?
Thanks,
Scott Alderman
--=_alternative 00483AFE85256C72_=
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
Annex G (Recommended Microbiological
Decontamination Procedure) of the 2002 edition of NSF Standard 49 recommends a
minimum decontamination time of six hours. This differs significantly from
the 1992 edition, which recommended a minimum decon time of two hours. I
haven't read the reference noted in the new edition (Fink, D. et. al., 1988.
Biological Safety Cabinets, Decontamination or Sterilization with
Paraformaldehyde, Am. Ind. Hyg. Assoc. J. 49 (6): 277-279), but I assume it
justifies this change.
Vesley et. al., indicate in the third edition
of Biological Safety Principles and Practices, that "safety cabinet total
decontamination" is accomplished in 60-180 minutes using 0.3 g/ft3 of
paraformaldehyde (at Temp >23C and RH >60%).
I would appreciate any comments on the topic.
Does your institution adhere to this revised recommendation?
Thanks,
Scott Alderman
--=_alternative 00483AFE85256C72_=--
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 15 Nov 2002 08:28:21 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Andy Glode
Subject: Re: Shipping Insect Pathogens
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Amy, Perhaps consideration of the Risk Groups could clarify things. If the
pathogens are considered Risk Group 1, they are not considered infectious
substances by IATA. This would not help with the question of DOT though.
Andy Glode
Chemical Transfer Station
Environmental Health and Safety
University of New Hampshire
1 Leavitt Lane
Durham, NH 03824
office (603)862-5038; fax (603)862-0047
-----Original Message-----
From: Amy Barringer [mailto:BarringA@BA.ARS.]
Sent: Thursday, November 14, 2002 3:50 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Shipping Insect Pathogens
A shipping question for you folks out there...
I have a researcher that needs to ship insect pathogens (mainly Gypsy Moth
pathogens).
I know that agents that are infectious to human or animals must be packaged
and sent as infectious substances. Insects are animals, but, do they fall
under the legal definition of animals according to DOT/IATA? Or are the
DOT/IATA regs. referring to the vertebrates? Thanks in advance for your
input. Amy
Amy A. Barringer
Biosafety Officer, SOHES
ARS/USDA
Beltsville Agricultural Research Center
Bldg. 003, Rm. 118
Beltsville, MD 20705
(Ph) 301-504-5557, (F) 301-504-5857
barringa@ba.ars.
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 15 Nov 2002 08:44:33 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Erik A. Talley"
Subject: Re: locking security boxes?
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
We have been using the Nalgene brand "6850 Beta Bench-Top Lock
Box" thus far with success (minus the trifoil). I hope we
don't have to eventually pry them open!
The web page is at:
ET
At 04:59 PM 11/14/2002 -0600, you wrote:
Would anyone have sources for a security box that will
withstand -80 degree
C temperatures to share with the group? I imagine many of
us will be in
need of such items to secure toxins and cultures in freezers
that have to
be shared. I would think something approximately 8X10X4
inches or so may
work well.
Thank you!
Carol
Carol McGhan, SM(AAM), CBSP
Biological Safety Professional
Health Protection Office
122 Grand Ave Ct
The University of Iowa
E-Mail:carol-mcghan@uiowa.edu
Tel:319-335-9553
Fax:319-335-7564
___________________________________
Erik A. Talley, Director
Environmental Health and Safety
Weill Medical College of Cornell University
418 East 71st Street, Suite 62
New York, NY 10021
212-746-6201
ert2002@med.cornell.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 15 Nov 2002 09:03:57 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Richard Fink
Subject: Re: BSC decon times
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="=====================_88749244==_.ALT"
--=====================_88749244==_.ALT
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Hi Scott,
As the main author of the quoted article I think I can help. For many
years I had been teaching at the Harvard School of Public Health in their
cabinet course. We did the standard two hour with spore strips for
validation. I noticed that quite frequently we were getting growth after
72 hours of incubation. So that spurred doing a more thorough field study
to see how many logs of killing one was getting. How long you expose the
cabinet to formaldehyde gas depends upon how high a level of
decontamination you want. If you want a consistent high level decon., you
need a 6 hour exposure. If the cabinet was only used to tissue or cell
culture and thus you need a low level decon., then 2-3 hours will be
fine. The 2 hour time was based on fairly old studies, some with formalin,
some with paraformaldehyde and not always in a cabinet situation. The last
is important, as outside of a cabinet (i.e. room) fans can be left on to
circulate the gas, not usually possible in a BSC. Formaldehyde diffuses
poorly and there are reports that running the BSC fan more cuts down on the
decon time. We did not test that, and used the standard fan on when 1/2 of
the paraform. was gone and again when all of it turned to gas. We also
found that RH mattered little only affecting the results when it got really
low.
Since B&V Testing was part of the study and since they do most of the BSC
decons at MIT, they do adhere to the 6 hour minimum.
At 08:06 AM 11/15/2002 -0500, you wrote:
>Annex G (Recommended Microbiological Decontamination Procedure) of the
>2002 edition of NSF Standard 49 recommends a minimum decontamination time
>of six hours. This differs significantly from the 1992 edition, which
>recommended a minimum decon time of two hours. I haven't read the
>reference noted in the new edition (Fink, D. et. al., 1988. Biological
>Safety Cabinets, Decontamination or Sterilization with Paraformaldehyde,
>Am. Ind. Hyg. Assoc. J. 49 (6): 277-279), but I assume it justifies this
>change.
>
>Vesley et. al., indicate in the third edition of Biological Safety
>Principles and Practices, that "safety cabinet total decontamination" is
>accomplished in 60-180 minutes using 0.3 g/ft3 of paraformaldehyde (at
>Temp >23C and RH >60%).
>
>I would appreciate any comments on the topic. Does your institution
>adhere to this revised recommendation?
>
>
>Thanks,
>Scott Alderman
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
--=====================_88749244==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/html; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Hi Scott,
As the main author of the quoted article I think I can help.
For many years I had been teaching at the Harvard School of
Public Health in their cabinet course. We did the standard
two hour with spore strips for validation. I noticed that
quite frequently we were getting growth after 72 hours of
incubation. So that spurred doing a more thorough field study
to see how many logs of killing one was getting. How long you
expose the cabinet to formaldehyde gas depends upon how high a
level of decontamination you want. If you want a consistent
high level decon., you need a 6 hour exposure. If the cabinet
was only used to tissue or cell culture and thus you need a
low level decon., then 2-3 hours will be fine. The 2 hour
time was based on fairly old studies, some with formalin, some
with paraformaldehyde and not always in a cabinet situation.
The last is important, as outside of a cabinet (i.e. room)
fans can be left on to circulate the gas, not usually possible
in a BSC. Formaldehyde diffuses poorly and there are reports
that running the BSC fan more cuts down on the decon time. We
did not test that, and used the standard fan on when 1/2 of
the paraform. was gone and again when all of it turned to gas.
We also found that RH mattered little only affecting the
results when it got really low.
Since B&V Testing was part of the study and since they do most
of the BSC decons at MIT, they do adhere to the 6 hour
minimum.
At 08:06 AM 11/15/2002 -0500, you wrote:
Annex G (Recommended Microbiological Decontamination
Procedure) of the 2002 edition of NSF Standard 49 recommends
a minimum decontamination time of six hours. This differs
significantly from the 1992 edition, which recommended a
minimum decon time of two hours. I haven't read the
reference noted in the new edition (Fink, D. et. al., 1988.
Biological Safety Cabinets, Decontamination or Sterilization
with Paraformaldehyde, Am. Ind. Hyg. Assoc. J. 49 (6):
277-279), but I assume it justifies this change.
Vesley et. al., indicate in the third edition of Biological
Safety Principles and Practices, that "safety cabinet total
decontamination" is accomplished in 60-180 minutes using 0.3
g/ft3 of paraformaldehyde (at Temp >23C and RH >60%).
I would appreciate any comments on the topic. Does your
institution adhere to this revised recommendation?
Thanks,
Scott Alderman
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
href=3D""
eudora=3D"autourl"> du/environment
--=====================_88749244==_.ALT--
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 15 Nov 2002 09:20:21 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Eric Cook
Subject: Re: Shipping Insect Pathogens
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
Hi Amy,
In my experience, insect pathogens are not considered
hazardous materials. I don't believe regulators consider
insects as "animals". Farmers use B. thurengiensis (an insect
pathogen) as a pesticide. They spread bags of spores on their
fields. I don't think that stuff is considered an infectious
substance for transportation purposes. If you want to be sure
call the DOT answer line 800-HMR-4922.
At 03:49 PM 11/14/2002 -0500, you wrote:
A shipping question for you folks out there...
I have a researcher that needs to ship insect pathogens
(mainly Gypsy Moth pathogens).
I know that agents that are infectious to human or animals
must be packaged and sent as infectious substances. Insects
are animals, but, do they fall under the legal definition of
animals according to DOT/IATA? Or are the DOT/IATA regs.
referring to the vertebrates? Thanks in advance for your
input. Amy
Amy A. Barringer
Biosafety Officer, SOHES
ARS/USDA
Beltsville Agricultural Research Center
Bldg. 003, Rm. 118
Beltsville, MD 20705
(Ph) 301-504-5557, (F) 301-504-5857
barringa@ba.ars.
_=====_
========
| | | | | | | |
========
MIT BSP
Eric Cook, Asst. Biosafety Officer
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Biosafety Program, N52-496
77 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02139-4307
(Voice) 617-258-5648
(Fax) 617-258-6831
(E-mail)ecook@mit.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 15 Nov 2002 09:34:21 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "William A. Lorenzen"
Organization: Children's Hospital Boston
Subject: Re: locking security boxes?
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These will (eventually) freeze too.
You will need to squirt them with alcohol to unfreeze these locks..
"Erik A. Talley" wrote:
> We have been using the Nalgene brand "6850 Beta Bench-Top Lock Box"
> thus far with success (minus the trifoil). I hope we don't have to
> eventually pry them open!
>
> The web page is at:
>
> products/catalog/productgroup.asp?pgroupId=488
>
> ET
>
> At 04:59 PM 11/14/2002 -0600, you wrote:
>
>> Would anyone have sources for a security box that will withstand -80
>> degree
>> C temperatures to share with the group? I imagine many of us will
>> be in
>> need of such items to secure toxins and cultures in freezers that
>> have to
>> be shared. I would think something approximately 8X10X4 inches or
>> so may
>> work well.
>> Thank you!
>> Carol
>>
>> Carol McGhan, SM(AAM), CBSP
>> Biological Safety Professional
>> Health Protection Office
>> 122 Grand Ave Ct
>> The University of Iowa
>> E-Mail:carol-mcghan@uiowa.edu
>> Tel:319-335-9553
>> Fax:319-335-7564
>
> ___________________________________
> Erik A. Talley, Director
> Environmental Health and Safety
> Weill Medical College of Cornell University
> 418 East 71st Street, Suite 62
> New York, NY 10021
>
> 212-746-6201
> ert2002@med.cornell.edu
>
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These will (eventually) freeze too.
You will need to squirt them with alcohol to unfreeze these
locks..
"Erik A. Talley" wrote:
We have been using the Nalgene brand "6850 Beta Bench-Top
Lock Box" thus far with success (minus the trifoil). I hope
we don't have to eventually pry them open!
The web page is at:
ET
At 04:59 PM 11/14/2002 -0600, you wrote:
Would anyone have sources for a security box that will
withstand -80 degree
C temperatures to share with the group? I imagine many of
us will be in
need of such items to secure toxins and cultures in
freezers that have to
be shared. I would think something approximately 8X10X4
inches or so may
work well.
Thank you!
Carol
Carol McGhan, SM(AAM), CBSP
Biological Safety Professional
Health Protection Office
122 Grand Ave Ct
The University of Iowa
E-Mail:carol-mcghan@uiowa.edu
Tel:319-335-9553
Fax:319-335-7564
___________________________________
Erik A. Talley, Director
Environmental Health and Safety
Weill Medical College of Cornell University
418 East 71st Street, Suite 62
New York, NY 10021
212-746-6201
ert2002@med.cornell.edu
--Boundary_(ID_tQgIAYgryymJSikMUAGsrw)--
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 15 Nov 2002 09:49:03 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Richard Pollack
Subject: Re: locking security boxes?
In-Reply-To:
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII; format=flowed
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The standard acrylic and other plastic lock boxes frequently used for
securing isotopes seem to be impractical for use in a -80C freezer.
Technical staff working for plastics producers and for manufacturers of
isotope storage boxes confirmed that although a few boxes may be rated
for use at -70C, none of these are meant to be used at -80C or below.
At the colder temperatures, the plastic will become increasingly
brittle and will comprome the integrity of the box. Cryostable
plastics do exist, but these are fairly expensive and apparently not as
yet used for this purpose. Locking metal boxes might be an
alternative. Regardless of the material used to construct the box, the
metal locks would become difficult to operate at these temperatures.
Because -80C freezers are not frost free, the locks would need to be
thawed periodically - and this would present an interesting challenge.
Thus, these devices should not be expected to meaningfully enhance
security, and they might also add unnecessary burden (and perhaps also
a hazard) as it might require a bit of a struggle to open the lock box.
Finally, such a box would need to be secured within the freezer.
Bolting the box to the inside of the freezer would require that holes
be bored into the freezer - a potentially hazardous activity to the
freezer and to the technician. Adhesive pads and glues commonly found
on security cable anchors may also become brittle and fail at low
temperatures. More suitable is a means of securing the door with a
locking latch, and ensuring that the latch and hinges are not easily
compromised. Finally, replace the factory-supplied lock cylinder on
your freezers, as these are generally all keyed alike... and then limit
access to the unique keys.
Richard J. Pollack, Ph.D.
Laboratory of Public Health Entomology
Harvard School of Public Health
665 Huntington Ave.
Boston, MA 02115
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 15 Nov 2002 09:58:30 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: David Gillum
Subject: Saliva Samples
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
I have a post-doctoral student that wishes to perform a study involving
human saliva. The student will be collecting the saliva from volunteers. Is
anyone aware of any reason why she would need to get approval from our IBC
beforehand? I know saliva isn't considered a bloodborne pathogen.
As always, your thoughts are appreciated.
-David
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 15 Nov 2002 10:14:46 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "William A. Lorenzen"
Organization: Children's Hospital Boston
Subject: Re: locking security boxes?
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
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You can cable it through the shelving (no drilling or adhesive pads needed)
The isotope vendors can provide you (your researcher) information on the
degradation rate of the chemicals if you were to store at a higher
temperature. We have done this since the time of use comes well before any
concerns with chemical degradation occur. This eliminates (in some
instances) this -80 storage need.
Richard Pollack wrote:
> The standard acrylic and other plastic lock boxes frequently used for
> securing isotopes seem to be impractical for use in a -80C freezer.
> Technical staff working for plastics producers and for manufacturers of
> isotope storage boxes confirmed that although a few boxes may be rated
> for use at -70C, none of these are meant to be used at -80C or below.
> At the colder temperatures, the plastic will become increasingly
> brittle and will comprome the integrity of the box. Cryostable
> plastics do exist, but these are fairly expensive and apparently not as
> yet used for this purpose. Locking metal boxes might be an
> alternative. Regardless of the material used to construct the box, the
> metal locks would become difficult to operate at these temperatures.
> Because -80C freezers are not frost free, the locks would need to be
> thawed periodically - and this would present an interesting challenge.
> Thus, these devices should not be expected to meaningfully enhance
> security, and they might also add unnecessary burden (and perhaps also
> a hazard) as it might require a bit of a struggle to open the lock box.
> Finally, such a box would need to be secured within the freezer.
> Bolting the box to the inside of the freezer would require that holes
> be bored into the freezer - a potentially hazardous activity to the
> freezer and to the technician. Adhesive pads and glues commonly found
> on security cable anchors may also become brittle and fail at low
> temperatures. More suitable is a means of securing the door with a
> locking latch, and ensuring that the latch and hinges are not easily
> compromised. Finally, replace the factory-supplied lock cylinder on
> your freezers, as these are generally all keyed alike... and then limit
> access to the unique keys.
>
> Richard J. Pollack, Ph.D.
> Laboratory of Public Health Entomology
> Harvard School of Public Health
> 665 Huntington Ave.
> Boston, MA 02115
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 15 Nov 2002 10:23:14 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Klenner, James"
Subject: Re: Saliva Samples
MIME-Version: 1.0
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Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
David,
She would only need IBC approval if the research involved recombinant =
DNA work. However, because her research involves human volunteers, she =
may need approval from your IRB. You're right that saliva is not =
included under OPIM (except during dental treatments), but as we enter =
the "flu & cold" season, in addition to potential exposure to HAV, EBV, =
etc., she may want to consider appropriate PPE for sample collection.
Jim
-----Original Message-----
From: David Gillum [mailto:David.Gillum@UNH.EDU]
Sent: Friday, November 15, 2002 9:59 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Saliva Samples
I have a post-doctoral student that wishes to perform a study involving
human saliva. The student will be collecting the saliva from volunteers. =
Is
anyone aware of any reason why she would need to get approval from our =
IBC
beforehand? I know saliva isn't considered a bloodborne pathogen.
As always, your thoughts are appreciated.
-David
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 15 Nov 2002 10:32:41 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Paul Jennette
Subject: Re: BSL3
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
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Tru,
Sounds like there are plenty of opportunities for exposure during handling
of this big heavy carboy...
I suggest you first consider carefully whether the sink wastewater from
your BSL-3 is any more hazardous than what's getting flushed down the
toilet from the nearest bathroom.
If you still decide that some form of treatment is needed, then you might
want to consider a more static method. Our TB BSL-3 is on the 5th floor of
a big building, and we were concerned about potential exposure of plumbers
working on lower floors. In addition to protocols for pre-bleaching all
liquid cultures, etc, we decided to install an in-line treatment
system. We "borrowed" this idea from Univ. of Florida's SIV BSL-3:
- wastewater from the sink flows through a standard trap and then to a
10-gallon tank in the cabinet underneath. The tank is connected to the
building's waste drain, and has a (manually-operated) valve at the
connection.
- the valve is normally kept closed, so that wastewater is collected in the
tank
- every morning, the lab staff drain the tank, then close the valve and
dump a measured volume of Clorox down the drain.
- as the sink is used during the day, the wastewater is held in the tank
along with the Clorox (until the following morning or the tanks fills up,
whichever comes first)
The tank is vented to the interior of the BSL-3, lab exhaust air is HEPA
filtered and occupants wear N-95s --- we determined that the risk did not
justify putting a HEPA filter on the vent.
I hope this helps!
- Paul
At 05:34 PM 11/12/2002 -0600, you wrote:
>As long as we are discussing BSL-3 labs, I have a quick question. We would
>like to collect sink waste water into an autoclavable carboy positioned
>under each of the two sinks in our nearly completed BSL-3 lab. We currently
>have a ball valve in place to direct the water either into the sanitary
>sewer or into the carboy. Does anyone have any plans or suggestions on
>connecting the ball valve to the carboy? We obviously need a leak proof
>connection to the carboy and a HEPA filtered vent on the carboy. We also
>need a convenient and splash proof method to disconnect the filled carboy
>for sterilization. Once disconnected, the drain line from the ball valve
>would need to be leak proof so waste water did not drip onto the floor.
>
>Thank you for any help you can provide.
>
>=======================
>Tru F. Twedt, DVM
>Biosecurity Specialist
>Iowa State University
>Environmental Health & Safety
>118 Agronomy Lab
>Ames, IA 50011-3200
>E-mail: ttwedt@iastate.edu
>Phone: (515) 294-6593
>Fax: (515) 294-9357
>Website:
>
>
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From: Jeffrey Good [mailto:rsojmg@GWUMC.EDU]
>Sent: Tuesday, November 12, 2002 9:05 AM
>To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
>Subject: Re: BSL3
>
>
>I suggest talking to the designer, former institutional Biosafety
>Officer/RFO and laboratory director for the BSL-3 and ABSL-3 facilities,
>Mark Ennen. He can be reached via email at resmse@gwumc.edu. I understand he
>provides consulting services on the design, operation, etc of these lab
>facilities. For our opening, I believe he worked with Diane Flemming's group
>to provide "certification" that our lab facility met the appropriate
>criteria.
>
>Hope this lead helps.
>
>Jeff
>
>
>Jeffrey M. Good
>Acting Director &
>Hazardous Materials Safety Officer
>Office of Laboratory Safety and Compliance
>The George Washington University Medical Center
>Office: (202) 994-5059
>Mobile: (202) 437-6155
>rsojmg@gwumc.edu
>gwumc.edu/research/labsafety.htm
J. Paul Jennette, P.E.
Biosafety Engineer
Cornell University
College of Veterinary Medicine
Biosafety Program
S3-010 Schurman Hall, Box 4 (607) 253-4227
Ithaca, New York 14853-6401 fax -3723
--=====================_-1287744148==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
Tru,
Sounds like there are plenty of opportunities for exposure
during handling of this big heavy carboy...
I suggest you first consider carefully whether the sink
wastewater from your BSL-3 is any more hazardous than what's
getting flushed down the toilet from the nearest bathroom.
If you still decide that some form of treatment is needed,
then you might want to consider a more static method. Our TB
BSL-3 is on the 5th floor of a big building, and we were
concerned about potential exposure of plumbers working on
lower floors. In addition to protocols for pre-bleaching all
liquid cultures, etc, we decided to install an in-line
treatment system. We "borrowed" this idea from Univ. of
Florida's SIV BSL-3:
- wastewater from the sink flows through a standard trap and
then to a 10-gallon tank in the cabinet underneath. The tank
is connected to the building's waste drain, and has a
(manually-operated) valve at the connection.
- the valve is normally kept closed, so that wastewater is
collected in the tank
- every morning, the lab staff drain the tank, then close the
valve and dump a measured volume of Clorox down the drain.
- as the sink is used during the day, the wastewater is held
in the tank along with the Clorox (until the following morning
or the tanks fills up, whichever comes first)
The tank is vented to the interior of the BSL-3, lab exhaust
air is HEPA filtered and occupants wear N-95s --- we
determined that the risk did not justify putting a HEPA filter
on the vent.
I hope this helps!
- Paul
At 05:34 PM 11/12/2002 -0600, you wrote:
As long as we are discussing BSL-3 labs, I have a quick
question. We would
like to collect sink waste water into an autoclavable carboy
positioned
under each of the two sinks in our nearly completed BSL-3
lab. We currently
have a ball valve in place to direct the water either into
the sanitary
sewer or into the carboy. Does anyone have any plans or
suggestions on
connecting the ball valve to the carboy? We obviously need
a leak proof
connection to the carboy and a HEPA filtered vent on the
carboy. We also
need a convenient and splash proof method to disconnect the
filled carboy
for sterilization. Once disconnected, the drain line from
the ball valve
would need to be leak proof so waste water did not drip onto
the floor.
Thank you for any help you can provide.
=======================
Tru F. Twedt, DVM
Biosecurity Specialist
Iowa State University
Environmental Health & Safety
118 Agronomy Lab
Ames, IA 50011-3200
E-mail: ttwedt@iastate.edu
Phone: (515) 294-6593
Fax: (515) 294-9357
Website:
-----Original Message-----
From: Jeffrey Good [mailto:rsojmg@GWUMC.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, November 12, 2002 9:05 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: BSL3
I suggest talking to the designer, former institutional
Biosafety
Officer/RFO and laboratory director for the BSL-3 and ABSL-3
facilities,
Mark Ennen. He can be reached via email at resmse@gwumc.edu.
I understand he
provides consulting services on the design, operation, etc
of these lab
facilities. For our opening, I believe he worked with Diane
Flemming's group
to provide "certification" that our lab facility met the
appropriate
criteria.
Hope this lead helps.
Jeff
Jeffrey M. Good
Acting Director &
Hazardous Materials Safety Officer
Office of Laboratory Safety and Compliance
The George Washington University Medical Center
Office: (202) 994-5059
Mobile: (202) 437-6155
rsojmg@gwumc.edu
gwumc.edu/research/labsafety.htm
J. Paul Jennette, P.E.
Biosafety Engineer
Cornell University
College of Veterinary Medicine
Biosafety Program
S3-010 Schurman Hall, Box 4 (607) 253-4227
Ithaca, New York 14853-6401 fax -3723
--=====================_-1287744148==_.ALT--
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 15 Nov 2002 10:45:54 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Richard Fink
Subject: Re: Saliva Samples
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
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Hi David,
Depends upon what your IBC reviews. If your IBC's charge is to review all
biological projects then this may come under their purview, if their charge
is only rDNA then no. At MIT this research would be review by our
Committee on the Use of Humans as Experimental Subjects.
At 09:58 AM 11/15/2002 -0500, you wrote:
>I have a post-doctoral student that wishes to perform a study involving
>human saliva. The student will be collecting the saliva from volunteers. Is
>anyone aware of any reason why she would need to get approval from our IBC
>beforehand? I know saliva isn't considered a bloodborne pathogen.
>
>As always, your thoughts are appreciated.
>
>-David
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
--=====================_94866100==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
Hi David,
Depends upon what your IBC reviews. If your IBC's charge is
to review all biological projects then this may come under
their purview, if their charge is only rDNA then no. At MIT
this research would be review by our Committee on the Use of
Humans as Experimental Subjects.
At 09:58 AM 11/15/2002 -0500, you wrote:
I have a post-doctoral student that wishes to perform a
study involving
human saliva. The student will be collecting the saliva from
volunteers. Is
anyone aware of any reason why she would need to get
approval from our IBC
beforehand? I know saliva isn't considered a bloodborne
pathogen.
As always, your thoughts are appreciated.
-David
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
--=====================_94866100==_.ALT--
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 15 Nov 2002 10:50:03 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Lori Keen
Subject: Re: Saliva Samples
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
I thought more recent rulings from OSHA stated that ALL saliva was to be
considered potentially infectious (OPIM). AT least, that's what I was told at
the last training update I attended. (given by a private consultant, not OSHA)
I would love to hear "proof" that dental procedures is still the intent.
Lori Keen
Lab Manager, Biology
Calvin College
616-957-6080
Member NAOSMM
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 15 Nov 2002 11:03:30 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Bruce MacDonald
Subject: Shipping Biological Agents
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="=_570BB2CD.4120052E"
This is a MIME message. If you are reading this text, you may want to
consider changing to a mail reader or gateway that understands how to
properly handle MIME multipart messages.
--=_570BB2CD.4120052E
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Content-Disposition: inline
Has anyone in the group put together a flow chart for researchers to
walk them through the process and maze of what to do in order to ship
out a biological agent? Are you willing to share the chart? Does the
chart include shipping to sites outside the US?
******************************************
Bruce L. Macdonald MPH, CSP, RM
Manager Health & Safety
NC State University - EHS
Box 8007
Raleigh, NC 27695
(919) 515-6858
Fax (919) 515-6307
******************************************
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 15 Nov 2002 08:18:55 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Funk, Glenn"
Subject: Re: Saliva Samples
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
I haven't heard about this one and, like Lori, would appreciate
confirmation. Saliva in dental procedures would be an absolute minimum,
under the general duty guideline that any body fluid visibly contaminated
with blood is automatically OPIM. I think my gums must experience Pavlovian
bleeding even when I pass a dental office, let alone when he works in my
mouth. But the previous points are well made. The charge to your
institutional IBC may include review of such studies. Your IRB would
certainly be interested. And with the winter ARD/URI season upon us, some
level (BSO, IBC??) of protocol review would be wise to ensure appropriate
levels of training and exposure protection.
Personally, I'd recommend the full BBP shtick, with training, hep B
vaccination offers, universal precautions (should be in general use anyway)
just to make sure the possibility of slightly bloody saliva is covered and
the operators protected.
(Thank God I'm not nearly as conservative politically as I am in the safety
context ...)
-- Glenn
Glenn A. Funk, Ph.D., CBSP
Director and Biosafety Officer
Environment, Health and Safety
MedImmune Vaccines, Inc.
408-845-8847
-----Original Message-----
From: Lori Keen [mailto:keel@CALVIN.EDU]
Sent: Friday, November 15, 2002 7:50 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Saliva Samples
I thought more recent rulings from OSHA stated that ALL saliva was to be
considered potentially infectious (OPIM). AT least, that's what I was told
at
the last training update I attended. (given by a private consultant, not
OSHA)
I would love to hear "proof" that dental procedures is still the intent.
Lori Keen
Lab Manager, Biology
Calvin College
616-957-6080
Member NAOSMM
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 15 Nov 2002 11:22:48 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Gilpin, Richard"
Subject: Re: Saliva Samples
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
...you mean standard precautions...
Richard
mailto:biosafety@
-----Original Message-----
From: Funk, Glenn [mailto:funkg@]
Sent: Friday, November 15, 2002 11:19 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Saliva Samples
I haven't heard about this one and, like Lori, would appreciate
confirmation. Saliva in dental procedures would be an absolute minimum,
under the general duty guideline that any body fluid visibly contaminated
with blood is automatically OPIM. I think my gums must experience Pavlovian
bleeding even when I pass a dental office, let alone when he works in my
mouth. But the previous points are well made. The charge to your
institutional IBC may include review of such studies. Your IRB would
certainly be interested. And with the winter ARD/URI season upon us, some
level (BSO, IBC??) of protocol review would be wise to ensure appropriate
levels of training and exposure protection.
Personally, I'd recommend the full BBP shtick, with training, hep B
vaccination offers, universal precautions (should be in general use anyway)
just to make sure the possibility of slightly bloody saliva is covered and
the operators protected.
(Thank God I'm not nearly as conservative politically as I am in the safety
context ...)
-- Glenn
Glenn A. Funk, Ph.D., CBSP
Director and Biosafety Officer
Environment, Health and Safety
MedImmune Vaccines, Inc.
408-845-8847
-----Original Message-----
From: Lori Keen [mailto:keel@CALVIN.EDU]
Sent: Friday, November 15, 2002 7:50 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Saliva Samples
I thought more recent rulings from OSHA stated that ALL saliva was to be
considered potentially infectious (OPIM). AT least, that's what I was told
at
the last training update I attended. (given by a private consultant, not
OSHA)
I would love to hear "proof" that dental procedures is still the intent.
Lori Keen
Lab Manager, Biology
Calvin College
616-957-6080
Member NAOSMM
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 15 Nov 2002 10:36:44 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Carol McGhan
Subject: security lock boxes
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
Thanks to all for your excellent and helpful comments on this topic. Much
appreciated!!
Carol
Carol McGhan, SM(AAM), CBSP
Biological Safety Professional
Health Protection Office
122 Grand Ave Ct
The University of Iowa
E-Mail:carol-mcghan@uiowa.edu
Tel:319-335-9553
Fax:319-335-7564
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 15 Nov 2002 11:56:06 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Scott, Rick"
Subject: Re: BSC decon times
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Good info. I like to let them sit overnight (or at least 6 hours) whenever
possible. My feeling has always been that the A/B3 types are inherently
easier to decon effectively because of the recirculation that takes place
inside the cabinet when the fan runs. The challenge to me is how do you get
the formaldehyde to the downstream side of the exhaust filter. When you
seal the cabinet up you are essentially preventing air from passing though
the exhaust filter. When you run the fan you will see the plastic you used
to cover the exhaust filter stretch up from the pressure. I always run a
hose from the exhaust "seal/plastic" back down to the face to relieve this
pressure, and therefore allows the gas to penetrate that filter. (I tape in
a piece of plexiglass that has a fitting mounted to it that the hose
connects too- one on the face and one on the exhaust, then finish the job
with the plastic/duct tape, etc...) Someone did a paper/ presentation at
ABSA a few years ago testing this technique and found it to be beneficial.
(I'd love to have a copy of that paper).
So I have thought before (for B2's) that it would be great if you could have
fittings/connections mounted on the top of the cabinet- one above
(downstream) the exhaust filter (but before the damper), and one connected
to the "intake". Then you could essentially connect the intake to the
exhaust with a hose and use the supply blower to re-circulate
air/paraformaldehyde through the cabinet (and the exhaust filter- which is
what you REALLY need to get deconed on a B2, of course). Not sure how well
that would work in practice, and not something I have given too much
thought, but it's an idea.
Rick
> ----------
> From: Richard Fink
> Reply To: A Biosafety Discussion List
> Sent: Friday, November 15, 2002 10:03 PM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: Re: BSC decon times
>
> Hi Scott,
>
> As the main author of the quoted article I think I can help. For many
> years I had been teaching at the Harvard School of Public Health in their
> cabinet course. We did the standard two hour with spore strips for
> validation. I noticed that quite frequently we were getting growth after
> 72 hours of incubation. So that spurred doing a more thorough field study
> to see how many logs of killing one was getting. How long you expose the
> cabinet to formaldehyde gas depends upon how high a level of
> decontamination you want. If you want a consistent high level decon., you
> need a 6 hour exposure. If the cabinet was only used to tissue or cell
> culture and thus you need a low level decon., then 2-3 hours will be fine.
> The 2 hour time was based on fairly old studies, some with formalin, some
> with paraformaldehyde and not always in a cabinet situation. The last is
> important, as outside of a cabinet (i.e. room) fans can be left on to
> circulate the gas, not usually possible in a BSC. Formaldehyde diffuses
> poorly and there are reports that running the BSC fan more cuts down on
> the decon time. We did not test that, and used the standard fan on when
> 1/2 of the paraform. was gone and again when all of it turned to gas. We
> also found that RH mattered little only affecting the results when it got
> really low.
>
> Since B&V Testing was part of the study and since they do most of the BSC
> decons at MIT, they do adhere to the 6 hour minimum.
>
> At 08:06 AM 11/15/2002 -0500, you wrote:
>
>
>
> Annex G (Recommended Microbiological Decontamination Procedure) of
> the 2002 edition of NSF Standard 49 recommends a minimum decontamination
> time of six hours. This differs significantly from the 1992 edition,
> which recommended a minimum decon time of two hours. I haven't read the
> reference noted in the new edition (Fink, D. et. al., 1988. Biological
> Safety Cabinets, Decontamination or Sterilization with Paraformaldehyde,
> Am. Ind. Hyg. Assoc. J. 49 (6): 277-279), but I assume it justifies this
> change.
>
> Vesley et. al., indicate in the third edition of Biological Safety
> Principles and Practices, that "safety cabinet total decontamination" is
> accomplished in 60-180 minutes using 0.3 g/ft3 of paraformaldehyde (at
> Temp >23C and RH >60%).
>
> I would appreciate any comments on the topic. Does your institution
> adhere to this revised recommendation?
>
>
> Thanks,
> Scott Alderman
>
> Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
> Senior Biosafety Officer
> Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
> 617-258-5647
> rfink@mit.edu
>
>
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 15 Nov 2002 09:07:27 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Criscuolo, TR (Tedi)"
Subject: Other alternatives for BSC decon
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Has anyone ever used the vaporized hydrogen peroxide or chlorine dioxide for
deconing their BSC? If so, what are your experiences?
Tedi Criscuolo
Industrial Hygienist/Safety Representative
Battelle IH & OS Operations Group
Office: (509) 373-1169
Pager: (509) 544-3144
tedi.criscuolo@
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Scott, Rick [mailto:SCOTTWI@MAIL.ECU.EDU]
> Sent: Friday, November 15, 2002 8:56 AM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: Re: BSC decon times
>
>
> Good info. I like to let them sit overnight (or at least 6
> hours) whenever
> possible. My feeling has always been that the A/B3 types are
> inherently
> easier to decon effectively because of the recirculation that
> takes place
> inside the cabinet when the fan runs. The challenge to me is
> how do you get
> the formaldehyde to the downstream side of the exhaust
> filter. When you
> seal the cabinet up you are essentially preventing air from
> passing though
> the exhaust filter. When you run the fan you will see the
> plastic you used
> to cover the exhaust filter stretch up from the pressure. I
> always run a
> hose from the exhaust "seal/plastic" back down to the face to
> relieve this
> pressure, and therefore allows the gas to penetrate that
> filter. (I tape in
> a piece of plexiglass that has a fitting mounted to it that the hose
> connects too- one on the face and one on the exhaust, then
> finish the job
> with the plastic/duct tape, etc...) Someone did a paper/
> presentation at
> ABSA a few years ago testing this technique and found it to
> be beneficial.
> (I'd love to have a copy of that paper).
>
> So I have thought before (for B2's) that it would be great if
> you could have
> fittings/connections mounted on the top of the cabinet- one above
> (downstream) the exhaust filter (but before the damper), and
> one connected
> to the "intake". Then you could essentially connect the intake to the
> exhaust with a hose and use the supply blower to re-circulate
> air/paraformaldehyde through the cabinet (and the exhaust
> filter- which is
> what you REALLY need to get deconed on a B2, of course). Not
> sure how well
> that would work in practice, and not something I have given too much
> thought, but it's an idea.
>
> Rick
>
>
> > ----------
> > From: Richard Fink
> > Reply To: A Biosafety Discussion List
> > Sent: Friday, November 15, 2002 10:03 PM
> > To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> > Subject: Re: BSC decon times
> >
> > Hi Scott,
> >
> > As the main author of the quoted article I think I can
> help. For many
> > years I had been teaching at the Harvard School of Public
> Health in their
> > cabinet course. We did the standard two hour with spore strips for
> > validation. I noticed that quite frequently we were
> getting growth after
> > 72 hours of incubation. So that spurred doing a more
> thorough field study
> > to see how many logs of killing one was getting. How long
> you expose the
> > cabinet to formaldehyde gas depends upon how high a level of
> > decontamination you want. If you want a consistent high
> level decon., you
> > need a 6 hour exposure. If the cabinet was only used to
> tissue or cell
> > culture and thus you need a low level decon., then 2-3
> hours will be fine.
> > The 2 hour time was based on fairly old studies, some with
> formalin, some
> > with paraformaldehyde and not always in a cabinet
> situation. The last is
> > important, as outside of a cabinet (i.e. room) fans can be
> left on to
> > circulate the gas, not usually possible in a BSC.
> Formaldehyde diffuses
> > poorly and there are reports that running the BSC fan more
> cuts down on
> > the decon time. We did not test that, and used the
> standard fan on when
> > 1/2 of the paraform. was gone and again when all of it
> turned to gas. We
> > also found that RH mattered little only affecting the
> results when it got
> > really low.
> >
> > Since B&V Testing was part of the study and since they do
> most of the BSC
> > decons at MIT, they do adhere to the 6 hour minimum.
> >
> > At 08:06 AM 11/15/2002 -0500, you wrote:
> >
> >
> >
> > Annex G (Recommended Microbiological Decontamination
> Procedure) of
> > the 2002 edition of NSF Standard 49 recommends a minimum
> decontamination
> > time of six hours. This differs significantly from the
> 1992 edition,
> > which recommended a minimum decon time of two hours. I
> haven't read the
> > reference noted in the new edition (Fink, D. et. al., 1988.
> Biological
> > Safety Cabinets, Decontamination or Sterilization with
> Paraformaldehyde,
> > Am. Ind. Hyg. Assoc. J. 49 (6): 277-279), but I assume it
> justifies this
> > change.
> >
> > Vesley et. al., indicate in the third edition of
> Biological Safety
> > Principles and Practices, that "safety cabinet total
> decontamination" is
> > accomplished in 60-180 minutes using 0.3 g/ft3 of
> paraformaldehyde (at
> > Temp >23C and RH >60%).
> >
> > I would appreciate any comments on the topic. Does
> your institution
> > adhere to this revised recommendation?
> >
> >
> > Thanks,
> > Scott Alderman
> >
> > Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
> > Senior Biosafety Officer
> > Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
> > 617-258-5647
> > rfink@mit.edu
> >
> >
>
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 15 Nov 2002 12:23:37 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Klenner, James"
Subject: Re: Saliva Samples
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
The intent behind mentioning dental procedures involved the potential =
exposure to blood in saliva samples for dental hygienists and dentists =
(as they are the healthcare workers most likely to be exposed). There is =
some excellent info at:
BLES&p_id=3D811&p_text_version=3DFALSE
The BBP Standard deals specifically with bloodborne pathogens, and =
saliva is thought to have minimal risk of transmitting Bloodborne =
Pathogens unless tinged with infected blood. Dental procedures are the =
typical source of blood in saliva samples, but other routes not =
mentioned (accidents, fighting, sports, etc.) would be of concern to =
healthcare workers. The point to take home is that under the BBP =
Standard, saliva would be considered OPIM if tinged with blood. However, =
diluted blood in saliva may not always be visible and considering the =
possible number of non-bloodborne pathogens in any given mouth, saliva =
should be treated as potentially infectious and appropriate PPE =
utilized. If anyone can reference recent rulings to the contrary, please =
pass them along.
James W. Klenner, MSc, MPH, MPA
Biological Safety Manager
INDIANA UNIVERSITY - PURDUE UNIVERSITY INDIANAPOLIS
Department of Environmental Health & Safety
620 Union Drive, Room 043
Indianapolis, IN 46202
(317) 274-2830
Fax (317) 278-2158
-----Original Message-----
From: Lori Keen [mailto:keel@CALVIN.EDU]
Sent: Friday, November 15, 2002 10:50 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Saliva Samples
I thought more recent rulings from OSHA stated that ALL saliva was to be
considered potentially infectious (OPIM). AT least, that's what I was =
told at
the last training update I attended. (given by a private consultant, =
not OSHA)
I would love to hear "proof" that dental procedures is still the =
intent.
Lori Keen
Lab Manager, Biology
Calvin College
616-957-6080
Member NAOSMM
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 15 Nov 2002 12:41:43 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ed Gaunt
Subject: Re: Saliva Samples
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Hi ya'll!
Several (many?) years ago I did a study where we measured hormones in
saliva. Saliva production was stimulated by chewing unflavored dental wax.
The amount of blood in the specimen (usually undetectable or VERY minor RBC
content under microscopic exam) could generally be correlated to the extent
of gum disease and how recently the patient had brushed their teeth or
flossed.
Ed
-----Original Message-----
From: Klenner, James [mailto:jklenner@IUPUI.EDU]
Sent: Friday, November 15, 2002 12:24 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Saliva Samples
The intent behind mentioning dental procedures involved the potential
exposure to blood in saliva samples for dental hygienists and dentists (as
they are the healthcare workers most likely to be exposed). There is some
excellent info at:
p_id=811&p_text_version=FALSE
The BBP Standard deals specifically with bloodborne pathogens, and saliva is
thought to have minimal risk of transmitting Bloodborne Pathogens unless
tinged with infected blood. Dental procedures are the typical source of
blood in saliva samples, but other routes not mentioned (accidents,
fighting, sports, etc.) would be of concern to healthcare workers. The point
to take home is that under the BBP Standard, saliva would be considered OPIM
if tinged with blood. However, diluted blood in saliva may not always be
visible and considering the possible number of non-bloodborne pathogens in
any given mouth, saliva should be treated as potentially infectious and
appropriate PPE utilized. If anyone can reference recent rulings to the
contrary, please pass them along.
James W. Klenner, MSc, MPH, MPA
Biological Safety Manager
INDIANA UNIVERSITY - PURDUE UNIVERSITY INDIANAPOLIS
Department of Environmental Health & Safety
620 Union Drive, Room 043
Indianapolis, IN 46202
(317) 274-2830
Fax (317) 278-2158
-----Original Message-----
From: Lori Keen [mailto:keel@CALVIN.EDU]
Sent: Friday, November 15, 2002 10:50 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Saliva Samples
I thought more recent rulings from OSHA stated that ALL saliva was to be
considered potentially infectious (OPIM). AT least, that's what I was told
at
the last training update I attended. (given by a private consultant, not
OSHA)
I would love to hear "proof" that dental procedures is still the intent.
Lori Keen
Lab Manager, Biology
Calvin College
616-957-6080
Member NAOSMM
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 15 Nov 2002 07:53:52 -1000
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Hubert B Olipares
Subject: Re: Charging for IBC Review?
In-Reply-To:
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII
In our institution our institutional review boards (Committee on Human
Subjects, Radiation Safety, Diving Control, Animal Care and Use, IBC) have
been debating this very issue within recent months. Our conclusion: we
could not charge for reviewing the proposal but could charge for
processing (photocopying, mailing, etc.) Our Legal Counsel is reviewing a
draft policy.
==============================================================================
Hubert B. Olipares, RBP, MSPH
Biological Safety Professional
University of Hawaii
Environmental Health and Safety Office
Biological Safety Program
2040 East-West Road
Honolulu, Hawaii 96822-2022
Telephone: 808-956-3197
Fax: 808-956-3205
Biosafety Prgm. E-mail: biosafe@hawaii.edu
Personnel E-Mail: olipares@hawaii.edu
Biosafety Website:
==============================================================================
On Thu, 14 Nov 2002, Robert Hashimoto wrote:
> Hi Mark,
>
> Genentech does not charge for its institutional review. I don't think
> charging a fee is appropriate if the applicant is a member of the same
> organization as the IBC.
>
> If the organization is reviewing an application from an investigator who
> is not an employee of the organization and is not funded with the
> organization, then it may be something to consider (e.g., a hospital who
> has a clinical lab director who is applying for government research
> money but does not have a hospital IBC and the hospital is a separate
> corporate entity from the university but has an existing agreement with
> the university for its IRB review).
>
> Hope this helps,
> Bob
>
> Mark Grushka wrote:
>
> > Dear Listserve Members: A question has recently been raised whether it
> > would be appropriate to charge a fee for IBC proposal review. My
> > questions are as follows: 1. Do you charge a fee for IBC review of
> > research proposals? 2. If yes, what is the amount of the fee? 3.
> > If yes, do you charge; a). Only private sponsors? b). Only public
> > sponsors? c). Both? 4. Is the fee revenue; a). Retained by
> > the Department/Administrative Entity housing the IBC/Biosafety
> > Officer? b). Forwarded to general operating fund for
> > institution? 5. Even if you do not currently charge a fee, do you
> > think this is a; a). Good idea. b). Bad idea c). Not sure If
> > you have any other experience with such a system, please feel free to
> > comment. Thank you for your feedback. Respectfully, Mark J. Grushka,
> > M.S., CSPBiosafety OfficerUniversity of
> > Arizona520-621-5279mgrushka@u.arizona.edu
>
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 15 Nov 2002 10:26:59 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Funk, Glenn"
Subject: Re: Shipping Biological Agents
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
You could ask Art Rutledge (Saf-T-Pak) for permission to use the Saf-T-Pak
Class 6.2 flow chart as a starting point and modify it for your own
particular needs. It's pretty well done and I assume it's copyrighted.
Glenn A. Funk, Ph.D., CBSP
Director and Biosafety Officer
Environment, Health and Safety
MedImmune Vaccines, Inc.
408-845-8847
-----Original Message-----
From: Bruce MacDonald [mailto:blmacdon@GW.FIS.NCSU.EDU]
Sent: Friday, November 15, 2002 8:04 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Shipping Biological Agents
Has anyone in the group put together a flow chart for researchers to
walk them through the process and maze of what to do in order to ship
out a biological agent? Are you willing to share the chart? Does the
chart include shipping to sites outside the US?
******************************************
Bruce L. Macdonald MPH, CSP, RM
Manager Health & Safety
NC State University - EHS
Box 8007
Raleigh, NC 27695
(919) 515-6858
Fax (919) 515-6307
******************************************
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 15 Nov 2002 19:28:06 +0100
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Esmeralda Prat
Subject: Re: Shipping Insect Pathogens
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
If the insects do not belong to RG2 or above for humans or animals then they
are not considered infectious substances by IATA, but they are considered live
animals, so check those requirements (special labels ...)
Esmeralda Prat
Andy Glode wrote:
> Amy, Perhaps consideration of the Risk Groups could clarify things. If the
> pathogens are considered Risk Group 1, they are not considered infectious
> substances by IATA. This would not help with the question of DOT though.
>
> Andy Glode
> Chemical Transfer Station
> Environmental Health and Safety
> University of New Hampshire
> 1 Leavitt Lane
> Durham, NH 03824
> office (603)862-5038; fax (603)862-0047
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Amy Barringer [mailto:BarringA@BA.ARS.]
> Sent: Thursday, November 14, 2002 3:50 PM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: Shipping Insect Pathogens
>
> A shipping question for you folks out there...
> I have a researcher that needs to ship insect pathogens (mainly Gypsy Moth
> pathogens).
> I know that agents that are infectious to human or animals must be packaged
> and sent as infectious substances. Insects are animals, but, do they fall
> under the legal definition of animals according to DOT/IATA? Or are the
> DOT/IATA regs. referring to the vertebrates? Thanks in advance for your
> input. Amy
>
> Amy A. Barringer
> Biosafety Officer, SOHES
> ARS/USDA
> Beltsville Agricultural Research Center
> Bldg. 003, Rm. 118
> Beltsville, MD 20705
> (Ph) 301-504-5557, (F) 301-504-5857
> barringa@ba.ars.
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 15 Nov 2002 13:04:09 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Kathryn Harris
Subject: Re: Shipping Biological Agents
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
A similar classification flow chart exists in the 3rd edition of the IATA
book (I believe it's on or about p26 of the 'infectious substance shipping
guidelines'). Drop me a note and I'll copy and send to you if you don't
have the book.
Kath Harris
At 10:26 AM 11/15/2002 -0800, you wrote:
>You could ask Art Rutledge (Saf-T-Pak) for permission to use the Saf-T-Pak
>Class 6.2 flow chart as a starting point and modify it for your own
>particular needs. It's pretty well done and I assume it's copyrighted.
>
>Glenn A. Funk, Ph.D., CBSP
>Director and Biosafety Officer
>Environment, Health and Safety
>MedImmune Vaccines, Inc.
>408-845-8847
>
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From: Bruce MacDonald [mailto:blmacdon@GW.FIS.NCSU.EDU]
>Sent: Friday, November 15, 2002 8:04 AM
>To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
>Subject: Shipping Biological Agents
>
>
>Has anyone in the group put together a flow chart for researchers to
>walk them through the process and maze of what to do in order to ship
>out a biological agent? Are you willing to share the chart? Does the
>chart include shipping to sites outside the US?
>
>******************************************
>Bruce L. Macdonald MPH, CSP, RM
>Manager Health & Safety
>NC State University - EHS
>Box 8007
>Raleigh, NC 27695
>(919) 515-6858
>Fax (919) 515-6307
>******************************************
**********************************************
Kathryn Louise Harris, Ph.D.
Biological Safety Professional
Office of Research Safety
Northwestern University
NG-71 Technological Institute
2145 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208-3121
Phone: (847) 491-4387
Fax: (847) 467-2797
Email: kathrynharris@northwestern.edu
**********************************************
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 15 Nov 2002 14:21:01 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Marcham, Cheri"
Subject: Exporting toxins
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
In light of the recent Sigma Aldrich penalties
I have a researcher who needs to send a toxin gene (perfringolysin O) to
Europe. The toxin is not on the select agent list and he intends to
send only the plasmid DNA so the sample won't be the toxin itself.
I looked in the BMBL and there is a reference to two web sites for
information to , or , which
are very confusing.
Can anyone be specific about what exactly is needed to export toxins?
Cheri Marcham, CIH, CSP, CHMM
University Environmental Health and Safety Officer
The University of Oklahoma
P. O. Box 26901 ROB-301
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73120
405/271-3000
FAX 405/271-1606
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 15 Nov 2002 16:24:24 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: David Gillum
Subject: Biological and Dry Ice Shipping Manual
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Dear Biosafety Listserve Folks,
We have developed a Biological and Dry Ice Shipping Manual for our faculty,
staff and students to use when shipping such materials. If anyone is
interested in receiving an electronic copy, please let me know. I can send
you one. It's 327 KB and 18 pages long.
Best wishes!
--
David R. Gillum
Laboratory Safety Officer
Environmental Health and Safety
11 Leavitt Lane, Perpetuity Hall
Durham, NH 03824
Telephone #: 603-862-0197
Facsimile #: 603-862-0047
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 15 Nov 2002 13:49:30 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Manuel, Francis"
Subject: Re: Biological and Dry Ice Shipping Manual
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="----_=_NextPart_001_01C28CF0.E096C694"
This message is in MIME format. Since your mail reader does not understand
this format, some or all of this message may not be legible.
------_=_NextPart_001_01C28CF0.E096C694
Content-Type: text/plain;
charset=iso-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
David,
I am interested in taking a look at the shipping manual that you developed.
Thanks in advance,
Francis Manuel
-----Original Message-----
From: David Gillum [mailto:David.Gillum@UNH.EDU]
Sent: Friday, November 15, 2002 1:24 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Biological and Dry Ice Shipping Manual
Dear Biosafety Listserve Folks,
We have developed a Biological and Dry Ice Shipping Manual for our faculty,
staff and students to use when shipping such materials. If anyone is
interested in receiving an electronic copy, please let me know. I can send
you one. It's 327 KB and 18 pages long.
Best wishes!
--
David R. Gillum
Laboratory Safety Officer
Environmental Health and Safety
11 Leavitt Lane, Perpetuity Hall
Durham, NH 03824
Telephone #: 603-862-0197
Facsimile #: 603-862-0047
------_=_NextPart_001_01C28CF0.E096C694
Content-Type: text/html;
charset=iso-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
David,
I am interested in taking a look at the shipping manual that
you developed.
Thanks in advance,
Francis Manuel
-----Original Message-----
From: David Gillum [mailto:David.Gillum@UNH.EDU]
Sent: Friday, November 15, 2002 1:24 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Biological and Dry Ice Shipping Manual
Dear Biosafety Listserve Folks,
We have developed a Biological and Dry Ice Shipping Manual for
our faculty,
staff and students to use when shipping such materials. If
anyone is
interested in receiving an electronic copy, please let me
know. I can send
you one. It's 327 KB and 18 pages long.
Best wishes!
--
David R. Gillum
Laboratory Safety Officer
Environmental Health and Safety
11 Leavitt Lane, Perpetuity Hall
Durham, NH 03824
Telephone #: 603-862-0197
Facsimile #: 603-862-0047
------_=_NextPart_001_01C28CF0.E096C694--
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 15 Nov 2002 14:53:53 -0800
Reply-To: "jjackson@"
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Jim Jackson
Organization: lacsd
Subject: Re: Biological and Dry Ice Shipping Manual
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
David
I am interested in a copy
Thank you
Jim Jackson
James L. Jackson
Microbiologist II
County Sanitation Districts of Los Angeles County
1965 Workman Mill Rd.
Whittier, CA 90601
Tel: (562) 699-7411 Ext. 3023
FAX: (562) 695-7267
On Friday, November 15, 2002 1:24 PM, David Gillum [SMTP:David.Gillum@UNH.EDU]
wrote:
> Dear Biosafety Listserve Folks,
>
> We have developed a Biological and Dry Ice Shipping Manual for our faculty,
> staff and students to use when shipping such materials. If anyone is
> interested in receiving an electronic copy, please let me know. I can send
> you one. It's 327 KB and 18 pages long.
>
> Best wishes!
>
> --
> David R. Gillum
>
> Laboratory Safety Officer
> Environmental Health and Safety
> 11 Leavitt Lane, Perpetuity Hall
> Durham, NH 03824
> Telephone #: 603-862-0197
> Facsimile #: 603-862-0047
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 15 Nov 2002 21:18:54 -0600
Reply-To: campbem@SLU.EDU
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: campbem
Subject: Re: Biological and Dry Ice Shipping Manual
>Hey David,
I would like to have a copy.
Thanks!
Mark Campbell, MS, CBSP
Saint Louis University
Dear Biosafety Listserve Folks,
>
> We have developed a Biological and Dry Ice Shipping Manual
> for our faculty,
> staff and students to use when shipping such materials. If
> anyone is
> interested in receiving an electronic copy, please let me
> know. I can send
> you one. It's 327 KB and 18 pages long.
>
> Best wishes!
>
> --
> David R. Gillum
>
> Laboratory Safety Officer
> Environmental Health and Safety
> 11 Leavitt Lane, Perpetuity Hall
> Durham, NH 03824
> Telephone #: 603-862-0197
> Facsimile #: 603-862-0047
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 18 Nov 2002 15:46:23 +0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: b102081
Subject: Re: Biological and Dry Ice Shipping Manual
In-Reply-To:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="big5"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
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OiA2MDMtODYyLTAwNDcNCg==
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 18 Nov 2002 08:43:04 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "William A. Lorenzen"
Organization: Children's Hospital Boston
Subject: Re: Biological and Dry Ice Shipping Manual
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT
Please send one along...
Thanks
David Gillum wrote:
> Dear Biosafety Listserve Folks,
>
> We have developed a Biological and Dry Ice Shipping Manual for our faculty,
> staff and students to use when shipping such materials. If anyone is
> interested in receiving an electronic copy, please let me know. I can send
> you one. It's 327 KB and 18 pages long.
>
> Best wishes!
>
> --
> David R. Gillum
>
> Laboratory Safety Officer
> Environmental Health and Safety
> 11 Leavitt Lane, Perpetuity Hall
> Durham, NH 03824
> Telephone #: 603-862-0197
> Facsimile #: 603-862-0047
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 18 Nov 2002 09:08:10 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Robin Newberry
Subject: Re: Biological and Dry Ice Shipping Manual
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed"
I'd love one, too.
>Please send one along...
>
>Thanks
>
>David Gillum wrote:
>
>> Dear Biosafety Listserve Folks,
>>
>> We have developed a Biological and Dry Ice Shipping Manual for our faculty,
>> staff and students to use when shipping such materials. If anyone is
>> interested in receiving an electronic copy, please let me know. I can send
>> you one. It's 327 KB and 18 pages long.
>>
>> Best wishes!
>>
>> --
>> David R. Gillum
>>
>> Laboratory Safety Officer
>> Environmental Health and Safety
>> 11 Leavitt Lane, Perpetuity Hall
> > Durham, NH 03824
> > Telephone #: 603-862-0197
> > Facsimile #: 603-862-0047
--
Robin
--------------------------------------------------------------
W. Robert Newberry, IV CIH, CHMM
Chief Environmental Health and Safety Officer
Clemson University
wnewber@clemson.edu ehs@clemson.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 18 Nov 2002 09:14:25 -0500
Reply-To: pr18@columbia.edu
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: paul rubock
Organization: EH&S
Subject: Re: Biological and Dry Ice Shipping Manual
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
David,
I would like a copy too.
Thanks,
Paul Rubock
Robin Newberry wrote:
> I'd love one, too.
>
> >Please send one along...
> >
> >Thanks
> >
> >David Gillum wrote:
> >
> >> Dear Biosafety Listserve Folks,
> >>
> >> We have developed a Biological and Dry Ice Shipping Manual for our
faculty,
> >> staff and students to use when shipping such materials. If anyone is
> >> interested in receiving an electronic copy, please let me know. I can send
> >> you one. It's 327 KB and 18 pages long.
> >>
> >> Best wishes!
> >>
> >> --
> >> David R. Gillum
> >>
> >> Laboratory Safety Officer
> >> Environmental Health and Safety
> >> 11 Leavitt Lane, Perpetuity Hall
> > > Durham, NH 03824
> > > Telephone #: 603-862-0197
> > > Facsimile #: 603-862-0047
>
> --
> Robin
> --------------------------------------------------------------
> W. Robert Newberry, IV CIH, CHMM
> Chief Environmental Health and Safety Officer
> Clemson University
>
> wnewber@clemson.edu ehs@clemson.edu
>
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 18 Nov 2002 09:20:24 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Daryl Rowe
Subject: Re: Biological and Dry Ice Shipping Manual
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
I would like to have a copy too. Have a biologically safe day
Daryl E. Rowe, DrPH
Office of Biosafety
Environmental Safety Division
(706) 542-0112
-----Original Message-----
From: Robin Newberry [mailto:wnewber@CLEMSON.EDU]
Sent: Monday, November 18, 2002 9:08 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Biological and Dry Ice Shipping Manual
I'd love one, too.
>Please send one along...
>
>Thanks
>
>David Gillum wrote:
>
>> Dear Biosafety Listserve Folks,
>>
>> We have developed a Biological and Dry Ice Shipping Manual for our =
faculty,
>> staff and students to use when shipping such materials. If anyone is
>> interested in receiving an electronic copy, please let me know. I =
can send
>> you one. It's 327 KB and 18 pages long.
>>
>> Best wishes!
>>
>> --
>> David R. Gillum
>>
>> Laboratory Safety Officer
>> Environmental Health and Safety
>> 11 Leavitt Lane, Perpetuity Hall
> > Durham, NH 03824
> > Telephone #: 603-862-0197
> > Facsimile #: 603-862-0047
--
Robin
--------------------------------------------------------------
W. Robert Newberry, IV CIH, CHMM
Chief Environmental Health and Safety Officer
Clemson University
wnewber@clemson.edu ehs@clemson.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 18 Nov 2002 09:30:17 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Jairo Betancourt
Subject: Re: Biological and Dry Ice Shipping Manual
In-Reply-To:
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-transfer-encoding: 7bit
David: I would appreciate a copy. Thanks.
Jairo
Jairo Betancourt, RBP
Laboratory Safety Specialist
(305) 243-3400 Fax : (305) 243-3272
E-mail: jairob@miami.edu
-----Original Message-----
From: A Biosafety Discussion List [mailto:BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU] On
Behalf Of David Gillum
Sent: Friday, November 15, 2002 4:24 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Biological and Dry Ice Shipping Manual
Dear Biosafety Listserve Folks,
We have developed a Biological and Dry Ice Shipping Manual for our
faculty,
staff and students to use when shipping such materials. If anyone is
interested in receiving an electronic copy, please let me know. I can
send
you one. It's 327 KB and 18 pages long.
Best wishes!
--
David R. Gillum
Laboratory Safety Officer
Environmental Health and Safety
11 Leavitt Lane, Perpetuity Hall
Durham, NH 03824
Telephone #: 603-862-0197
Facsimile #: 603-862-0047
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 18 Nov 2002 09:47:48 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Sickles, Sharon"
Subject: Re: Biological and Dry Ice Shipping Manual
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
David,
I would appreciate a copy, as well. Thank you!
Sharon
Sharon A. Sickles, PhD, DVM
University Veterinarian
Director of Research Compliance
211 Couper Administration Bldg
Binghamton University
Binghamton, NY 13902
(607) 777-4170
e-mail ssickles@binghamton.edu
-----Original Message-----
From: A Biosafety Discussion List [mailto:BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU]On
Behalf Of David Gillum
Sent: Friday, November 15, 2002 4:24 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Biological and Dry Ice Shipping Manual
Dear Biosafety Listserve Folks,
We have developed a Biological and Dry Ice Shipping Manual for our faculty,
staff and students to use when shipping such materials. If anyone is
interested in receiving an electronic copy, please let me know. I can send
you one. It's 327 KB and 18 pages long.
Best wishes!
--
David R. Gillum
Laboratory Safety Officer
Environmental Health and Safety
11 Leavitt Lane, Perpetuity Hall
Durham, NH 03824
Telephone #: 603-862-0197
Facsimile #: 603-862-0047
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 18 Nov 2002 09:52:47 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Greg Merkle
Organization: Wright State University
Subject: Re: Biological and Dry Ice Shipping Manual
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: multipart/mixed; boundary="Boundary_(ID_HsHvSdzgWAIquLRUQNcoWg)"
This is a multi-part message in MIME format.
--Boundary_(ID_HsHvSdzgWAIquLRUQNcoWg)
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-transfer-encoding: 7bit
David,
I would also like to get a copy of the manual that you have
produced. With a number of people showing interest why not
post it to the list serve. Thank you for willing to share
the information.
Greg Merkle
David Gillum wrote:
>
> Dear Biosafety Listserve Folks,
>
> We have developed a Biological and Dry Ice Shipping Manual for our faculty,
> staff and students to use when shipping such materials. If anyone is
> interested in receiving an electronic copy, please let me know. I can send
> you one. It's 327 KB and 18 pages long.
>
> Best wishes!
>
> --
> David R. Gillum
>
> Laboratory Safety Officer
> Environmental Health and Safety
> 11 Leavitt Lane, Perpetuity Hall
> Durham, NH 03824
> Telephone #: 603-862-0197
> Facsimile #: 603-862-0047
Merkle;Greg
tel;fax:1-937-775-3761
tel;work:1-937-775-2217
url:wright.edu/admin/ehs
Wright State University;Department of Environmental Health and Safety
email:greg.merkle@wright.edu
Senior Industrial Hygienist
145 Health Sciences Bldg.
Col. Glenn Hwy.
Dayton;Ohio;45435-0001
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 18 Nov 2002 09:58:10 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: David Gillum
Subject: Shipment of Biological Materials and Dry Ice Manual
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Dear Biosafety Listserve Members,
Since I have received over 100 e-mails, I figure it's a good idea to just
throw out the link to the manual. Here it is:
If you find major flaws with the document, please send me an e-mail directly
(not to the listserve).
Thanks!
--
David R. Gillum
Laboratory Safety Officer
Environmental Health and Safety
11 Leavitt Lane, Perpetuity Hall
Durham, NH 03824
Telephone #: 603-862-0197
Facsimile #: 603-862-0047
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 18 Nov 2002 10:13:52 -0500
Reply-To: mkinsey@
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Melina Kinsey
Subject: Bat guano elimination
In-Reply-To:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
List-
We have recently eliminated (removed not killed) bats from our building.
However, we are now left
with a strong odor in our front office. The contractor who eliminated the bats
can eliminated the
odor. However, do any of you know of other companies that specialize in this?
Or have procedures
that I might be able to do this in house, with of course proper respirator
protection. I really
would rather contract this dirty work out.
Thanks!
Melina Kinsey
Biosafety Specialist
Midwest Research Institute
Florida Division
1470 Treeland Blvd. S.E.
Palm Bay, Florida 32909-2211
mkinsey@
(321) 723-4547 ext. 404
(321) 759-1018 (cell)
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 18 Nov 2002 07:39:29 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Funk, Glenn"
Subject: Re: Exporting toxins
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Cheri -
Whenever I have even the slightest doubt about whether something I want to
send overseas may require an export license, I call my local BXA
representative and ask. She's located in San Jose, CA so most likely isn't
your "local" rep but I got her phone number from the BXA web site. She has
always responded quickly with a definitive "yes" or "no" or called me back
for more info. It takes a little longer but at least, when I ship the stuff
off, I do so with a degree of comfort that I'm not going to spend some time
in the hoosegow because I failed to do the proper export paperwork. And, by
the way, I've never sent anything that ended up requiring an export license
...
-- Glenn
Glenn A. Funk, Ph.D., CBSP
Director and Biosafety Officer
Environment, Health and Safety
MedImmune Vaccines, Inc.
408-845-8847
-----Original Message-----
From: Marcham, Cheri [mailto:Cheryl-Marcham@OUHSC.EDU]
Sent: Friday, November 15, 2002 12:21 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Exporting toxins
In light of the recent Sigma Aldrich penalties
I have a researcher who needs to send a toxin gene (perfringolysin O) to
Europe. The toxin is not on the select agent list and he intends to
send only the plasmid DNA so the sample won't be the toxin itself.
I looked in the BMBL and there is a reference to two web sites for
information to , or , which
are very confusing.
Can anyone be specific about what exactly is needed to export toxins?
Cheri Marcham, CIH, CSP, CHMM
University Environmental Health and Safety Officer
The University of Oklahoma
P. O. Box 26901 ROB-301
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73120
405/271-3000
FAX 405/271-1606
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 18 Nov 2002 09:14:28 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Dina Sassone
Subject: Re: Shipping Biological Agents
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
I have something I use for select agent (the EA101 process) that I would be
willing to share. We have a shipping procedure as well (currently being
updated to reflect the new DOT requirements)-could share with you when
complete.
At 11:03 AM 11/15/2002 -0500, you wrote:
>Has anyone in the group put together a flow chart for researchers to
>walk them through the process and maze of what to do in order to ship
>out a biological agent? Are you willing to share the chart? Does the
>chart include shipping to sites outside the US?
>
>******************************************
>Bruce L. Macdonald MPH, CSP, RM
>Manager Health & Safety
>NC State University - EHS
>Box 8007
>Raleigh, NC 27695
>(919) 515-6858
>Fax (919) 515-6307
>******************************************
>
Dina M. Sassone, CIH, CSP, SM (NRM), CBSP
University of California
Los Alamos National Laboratory
HSR-5
MS K486
Los Alamos, NM 87545
(505) 665-2977 (voice)
((505) 996-3807 (pager)
"To infinity and beyond"-Buzz Lightyear
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 18 Nov 2002 11:52:42 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Donald G. Robasser"
Organization: Princeton University
Subject: Re: Shipping Biological Agents
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Dina,
I would like to have a copy of your select agent procedure as well as the
revised shipping procedure when it is ready.
Thanks much for making this available.
Don Robasser
Dina Sassone wrote:
> I have something I use for select agent (the EA101 process) that I would be
> willing to share. We have a shipping procedure as well (currently being
> updated to reflect the new DOT requirements)-could share with you when
> complete.
>
> At 11:03 AM 11/15/2002 -0500, you wrote:
> >Has anyone in the group put together a flow chart for researchers to
> >walk them through the process and maze of what to do in order to ship
> >out a biological agent? Are you willing to share the chart? Does the
> >chart include shipping to sites outside the US?
> >
> >******************************************
> >Bruce L. Macdonald MPH, CSP, RM
> >Manager Health & Safety
> >NC State University - EHS
> >Box 8007
> >Raleigh, NC 27695
> >(919) 515-6858
> >Fax (919) 515-6307
> >******************************************
> >
>
> Dina M. Sassone, CIH, CSP, SM (NRM), CBSP
> University of California
> Los Alamos National Laboratory
> HSR-5
> MS K486
> Los Alamos, NM 87545
> (505) 665-2977 (voice)
> ((505) 996-3807 (pager)
> "To infinity and beyond"-Buzz Lightyear
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 18 Nov 2002 10:57:04 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Brown, Virginia R"
Subject: Updated Select Agent List?
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
The August 23rd Federal Register contained a proposal for changes to the =
Select Agent list.
Has that been adopted? If so, when was it published in the FR?
Ginger Brown, CBSP
Env Health & Safety
TX A&M University
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 18 Nov 2002 09:07:24 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ellyn Segal
Subject: Re: Biological and Dry Ice Shipping Manual
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
David,
I would like one also.
thanks
Ellyn Segal
Dear Biosafety Listserve Folks,
>
> We have developed a Biological and Dry Ice Shipping Manual for our faculty,
> staff and students to use when shipping such materials. If anyone is
> interested in receiving an electronic copy, please let me know. I can send
> you one. It's 327 KB and 18 pages long.
>
> Best wishes!
>
> --
> David R. Gillum
>
> Laboratory Safety Officer
> Environmental Health and Safety
> 11 Leavitt Lane, Perpetuity Hall
> Durham, NH 03824
> Telephone #: 603-862-0197
> Facsimile #: 603-862-0047
Ellyn Segal, Ph.D.
Biosafety Manager
Stanford University
ph: 650.725.1473
fax: 650.725.3468
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 18 Nov 2002 12:18:36 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Jennifer Minogue
Subject: Re: Charging for IBC Review?
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
We do not charge for protocol reviews; however, I know of one
neighboring university that charges $2,000 (Canadian dollars) for
reviewing human subject protocols that are "contract" research (not the
govt granting agencies - places like industry, pharmaceutical companies,
etc).
--
Jennifer Minogue
Hazardous Materials Safety Officer
Environmental Health and Safety
University of Guelph
Guelph, Ontario N1G 2W1 Canada
Voice 519-824-4120-x3190
Fax 519-824-0364
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 18 Nov 2002 12:48:16 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Hauck, Philip"
Subject: Select Agent Transfer Flow chart
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: multipart/mixed; boundary="Boundary_(ID_ve1dOdme0jZnwQocIhsrRA)"
This is a multi-part message in MIME format.
--Boundary_(ID_ve1dOdme0jZnwQocIhsrRA)
Content-type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="Boundary_(ID_+gCrZocz1HQ7xZBoZLrEXg)"
--Boundary_(ID_+gCrZocz1HQ7xZBoZLrEXg)
Content-type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-transfer-encoding: quoted-printable
Hello to everyone:
Have you folks gone over the tracking requirements for =
Select Agent List transactions? I put together a flow chart based on =
the requirements of what (and who)does what with the EA 101. It is =
really interesting that if either of the RFO's, either the =
Transferror's or the Requestor's suspect that there is suspicious =
activity on the part of the other entity, that activity has to =
be reported at once to the CDC. At any rate, out of desperation, I =
constructed a flow chart which should help. For the =
immediate notification parts, either a phone call or an e-mail or fax =
will work, provided a hard copy follows within the required =
time window for each reporting activity. Also note this is a simplified =
general chart. There are additional reports that have to be =
issued, i.e. when the last drop is reached, the RFO's have to make the =
necessary reports, and close out the files. Gooooooood Luck!
Phil Hauck
Mt. Sinai School of Medicine - "just back" from =
Alcatraz...where I saw a lot of other ABSA-types that Wednesday =
afternoon!!
PS: some wag asked if we were checking out our future =
"living accommodations" if we don't fill out our Select Agent forms =
correctly.......HA, HA! Funny....NOT!!!
--Boundary_(ID_ve1dOdme0jZnwQocIhsrRA)
Content-type: application/msword; name=Chart2SAL.doc
Content-transfer-encoding: BASE64
Content-disposition: attachment; filename=Chart2SAL.doc
Content-description: Chart2SAL.doc
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 18 Nov 2002 12:49:33 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Josh Harney
Subject: Re: Bat guano elimination
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Melina,
Sorry that I'm not able to recommend a good contractor for you. But if
you do hire one, or if MRI ends up doing the remediation, a good
reference to review ahead of time is one from NIOSH: Histoplasmosis -
Protecting Workers at Risk It has
some PPE and procedural recommendations you may find useful. Good
luck.
Josh
Joshua M. Harney
Assistant Director, Health & Safety
Cincinnati Children's Hospital Medical Center
phone: 513-636-7286
fax: 513-636-2123
>>> Melina Kinsey 11/18/02 10:13AM >>>
List-
We have recently eliminated (removed not killed) bats from our
building. However, we are now left
with a strong odor in our front office. The contractor who eliminated
the bats can eliminated the
odor. However, do any of you know of other companies that specialize
in this? Or have procedures
that I might be able to do this in house, with of course proper
respirator protection. I really
would rather contract this dirty work out.
Thanks!
Melina Kinsey
Biosafety Specialist
Midwest Research Institute
Florida Division
1470 Treeland Blvd. S.E.
Palm Bay, Florida 32909-2211
mkinsey@
(321) 723-4547 ext. 404
(321) 759-1018 (cell)
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 18 Nov 2002 11:18:27 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Robert P. Ellis"
Subject: Re: Charging for IBC Review?
In-Reply-To:
MIME-Version: 1.0
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Mark, We do not charge directly. The cost for administration of the
Regulatory Compliance Office is borne through Indirect Cost Recovery.
I have not seen what the increments (administration, radiation, human
subjects, ACUC, IBC, etc) cost the University, but they would not be
trivial. We do not review non-university projects, unless the entities
are collaborating with university personnel and renting university
space. Sincerely, Bob
On Thu, 14 Nov 2002 13:56:02 -0700 Mark Grushka
wrote:
> Dear Listserve Members:
>
> A question has recently been raised whether it would be appropriate to charge
a fee for IBC proposal review. My questions are as follows:
>
> 1. Do you charge a fee for IBC review of research proposals?
>
> 2. If yes, what is the amount of the fee?
>
> 3. If yes, do you charge;
>
> a). Only private sponsors?
>
> b). Only public sponsors?
>
> c). Both?
>
>
> 4. Is the fee revenue;
>
> a). Retained by the Department/Administrative Entity housing the
IBC/Biosafety Officer?
>
> b). Forwarded to general operating fund for institution?
>
> 5. Even if you do not currently charge a fee, do you think this is a;
>
> a). Good idea.
>
> b). Bad idea
>
> c). Not sure
>
> If you have any other experience with such a system, please feel free to
comment.
>
> Thank you for your feedback.
>
> Respectfully,
>
> Mark J. Grushka, M.S., CSP
> Biosafety Officer
> University of Arizona
> 520-621-5279
> mgrushka@u.arizona.edu
>
>
>
>
>
====================
Robert P. Ellis, PhD
University Biosafety Officer, CBSP (ABSA), SM (ASM)
Professor, Department of Microbiology, Immunology, and Pathology
College of Veterinary Medicine and Biomedical Sciences
Colorado State University
Ft. Collins, CO 80523-1677, USA
voice:(970)491-5740, (970)491-6729
fax:(970)491-1815
Robert.Ellis@colostate.edu
====================
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 18 Nov 2002 13:22:02 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Hauck, Philip"
Subject: Re: Biological and Dry Ice Shipping Manual
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
Content-transfer-encoding: quoted-printable
IBID Philip.hauck@mssm.edu
-----Original Message-----
From: Ellyn Segal [mailto:esegal@STANFORD.EDU]
Sent: Monday, November 18, 2002 12:07 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Biological and Dry Ice Shipping Manual
David,
I would like one also.
thanks
Ellyn Segal
Dear Biosafety Listserve Folks,
>
> We have developed a Biological and Dry Ice Shipping Manual for our =
faculty,
> staff and students to use when shipping such materials. If anyone is
> interested in receiving an electronic copy, please let me know. I can =
send
> you one. It's 327 KB and 18 pages long.
>
> Best wishes!
>
> --
> David R. Gillum
>
> Laboratory Safety Officer
> Environmental Health and Safety
> 11 Leavitt Lane, Perpetuity Hall
> Durham, NH 03824
> Telephone #: 603-862-0197
> Facsimile #: 603-862-0047
Ellyn Segal, Ph.D.
Biosafety Manager
Stanford University
ph: 650.725.1473
fax: 650.725.3468
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 18 Nov 2002 15:04:38 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Robert N. Latsch"
Subject: Re: Saliva Samples
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
I went to my last bbp update last year. At that time I was told that all
human body fluids were considered a bbp by way of a letter of
intrepretation. I went looking this morning and cannot find the letter on
the OSHA website.
At this point I would still say that the bbp standard needs to be followed.
Bob
>I have a post-doctoral student that wishes to perform a study involving
>human saliva. The student will be collecting the saliva from volunteers. Is
>anyone aware of any reason why she would need to get approval from our IBC
>beforehand? I know saliva isn't considered a bloodborne pathogen.
>
>As always, your thoughts are appreciated.
>
>-David
_____________________________________________________________________
__ / _____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 18 Nov 2002 15:28:57 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Tina Charbonneau
Subject: Needles/syringes
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Could someone point me to a regulation OSHA, NYS or otherwise that would =
stipulate that needles and syringes must be kept in a locked cabinet.
My feeling is that this is a standard practice but there is not a =
regulation stating that it MUST be done. Is this not so?
Thanks,
Tina Charbonneau
BSO
Trudeau Institute
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 18 Nov 2002 15:42:32 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Hauck, Philip"
Subject: Re: Saliva Samples
MIME-version: 1.0
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Basically, in all of my BBP training, I stress the need to follow =
"Universal" or "Standard" Precautions for all Human Source Materials.
The Rationale is as follows:
The only excluded materials I know of is urine and feces, with a caveat;
The caveat is, if the urine or feces is tainted with Human Blood, then =
it is BBP Material;
If other Human body fluids are tainted with blood, saliva, tears etc. =
then this material too, is BBP.
Since I am not going to test for trace amounts of Human Blood in any of =
these materials, it is easier to assume that ANYTHING out of a HUMAN, be =
He Live or Dead, and it is unfixed, it is BBP material to be Handled =
with Universal Precautions. It works for me.
-----Original Message-----
From: Robert N. Latsch [mailto:rnl2@PO.CWRU.EDU]
Sent: Monday, November 18, 2002 3:05 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Saliva Samples
I went to my last bbp update last year. At that time I was told that =
all
human body fluids were considered a bbp by way of a letter of
intrepretation. I went looking this morning and cannot find the letter =
on
the OSHA website.
At this point I would still say that the bbp standard needs to be =
followed.
Bob
>I have a post-doctoral student that wishes to perform a study involving
>human saliva. The student will be collecting the saliva from =
volunteers. Is
>anyone aware of any reason why she would need to get approval from our =
IBC
>beforehand? I know saliva isn't considered a bloodborne pathogen.
>
>As always, your thoughts are appreciated.
>
>-David
_____________________________________________________________________
__ / =
_____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental =
Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail =
rlatsch@
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 18 Nov 2002 15:53:11 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Hauck, Philip"
Subject: Re: Needles/syringes
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
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In New York State and New York City, under the State and Municipal =
Health Laws, respectively, because of the misuse of needles in drug =
addiction, needles and syringes actually became "controlled substances" =
in their own right, and were required to be under lock and key control. =
This was also the reason for shearing used needles to prevent them from =
falling into the wrong hands and being resold on the streets of New =
York. Nobody was worried about the housekeepers or the staff, just the =
"street abusers" from getting the needles for making "works". I remember =
this from the late '70's, so it is probably still in the Health Regs.
Phil Hauck
-----Original Message-----
From: Tina Charbonneau [mailto:tcharbonneau@]
Sent: Monday, November 18, 2002 3:29 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Needles/syringes
Could someone point me to a regulation OSHA, NYS or otherwise that =
would stipulate that needles and syringes must be kept in a locked =
cabinet.
My feeling is that this is a standard practice but there is not a =
regulation stating that it MUST be done. Is this not so?
Thanks,
Tina Charbonneau
BSO
Trudeau Institute
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 18 Nov 2002 15:44:52 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ed Gaunt
Subject: Re: Needles/syringes
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Try or
and
?
Ed
-----Original Message-----
From: Tina Charbonneau [mailto:tcharbonneau@]
Sent: Monday, November 18, 2002 3:29 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Needles/syringes
Could someone point me to a regulation OSHA, NYS or otherwise that would
stipulate that needles and syringes must be kept in a locked cabinet.
My feeling is that this is a standard practice but there is not a
regulation stating that it MUST be done. Is this not so?
Thanks,
Tina Charbonneau
BSO
Trudeau Institute
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 18 Nov 2002 16:03:08 EST
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Ira F. Salkin"
Subject: Re: Saliva Samples
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Phil:
If we follow your generalization, then all such materials, in the vast
majority of states, would have to be considered to be regulated medical waste
and disposed of in accordance with state regulations. Are you suggesting
this as well? Given that treatment and disposal of medical waste is now
around 25 to 30 cents per pound while the disposal of conventional waste is
around 3-5 cents per pound, this would increase costs tremendously for
virtually all facilities.
Ira
Ira F. Salkin, Ph.D., F(AAM)
Information From Science, LLC
P.O. Box 408
West Sand Lake, NY 12196
Voice/Fax - 518-674-1713
Cellphone - 518-791-7969
E-Mail - irasalkin@
--part1_178.11f6c843.2b0aaf8c_boundary
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Phil:
If we follow your generalization, then all such materials, in
the vast majority of states, would have to be considered to be
regulated medical waste and disposed of in accordance with
state regulations. Are you suggesting this as well? Given
that treatment and disposal of medical waste is now around 25
to 30 cents per pound while the disposal of conventional waste
is around 3-5 cents per pound, this would increase costs
tremendously for virtually all facilities.
Ira
Ira F. Salkin, Ph.D., F(AAM)
Information From Science, LLC
P.O. Box 408
West Sand Lake, NY 12196
Voice/Fax - 518-674-1713
Cellphone - 518-791-7969
E-Mail - irasalkin@
--part1_178.11f6c843.2b0aaf8c_boundary--
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 18 Nov 2002 16:04:46 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Hauck, Philip"
Subject: Re: Charging for IBC Review?
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="Boundary_(ID_VzF6GwtKzhTyJXXWlYB+Mw)"
This is a multi-part message in MIME format.
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We do not charge at Mt. Sinai School of Medicine for IACUC, =
IBC or IRB approvals. After all, our jobs come partly out of the =
overhead, so some giveback is in order!
-----Original Message-----
From: Robert Hashimoto [mailto:bobhash@]
Sent: Thursday, November 14, 2002 10:42 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Charging for IBC Review?
Hi Mark,
Genentech does not charge for its institutional review. I don't think =
charging a fee is appropriate if the applicant is a member of the same =
organization as the IBC.
If the organization is reviewing an application from an investigator who =
is not an employee of the organization and is not funded with the =
organization, then it may be something to consider (e.g., a hospital who =
has a clinical lab director who is applying for government research =
money but does not have a hospital IBC and the hospital is a separate =
corporate entity from the university but has an existing agreement with =
the university for its IRB review).
Hope this helps,
Bob
Mark Grushka wrote:
Dear Listserve Members: A question has recently been raised whether it =
would be appropriate to charge a fee for IBC proposal review. My =
questions are as follows: 1. Do you charge a fee for IBC review of =
research proposals? 2. If yes, what is the amount of the fee? 3. =
If yes, do you charge; a). Only private sponsors? b). Only public =
sponsors? c). Both? 4. Is the fee revenue; a). Retained by the =
Department/Administrative Entity housing the IBC/Biosafety Officer? b). =
Forwarded to general operating fund for institution? 5. Even if you =
do not currently charge a fee, do you think this is a; a). Good idea. =
b). Bad idea c). Not sure If you have any other experience with =
such a system, please feel free to comment. Thank you for your feedback. =
Respectfully, Mark J. Grushka, M.S., CSPBiosafety OfficerUniversity of =
Arizona520-621-5279mgrushka@u.arizona.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 18 Nov 2002 15:12:21 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Kathryn Harris
Subject: Re: Needles/syringes
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
Thinking back to my time as a grad student in New York, it was illegal to
be in possession of hypodermic needles and syringes without an approved
registration or a prescription. We used them only for filling electrodes in
the lab and our lab had to have a registration.
It was also illegal to 'furnish' other people, so from this perspective,
even if it's not specifically 'regulated' it would be wise to lock up your
stash if you're storing them in a place where unregistered people could
gain access.
I couldn't find the specific information on registration that I had back
when I was in NY, but here is a link to "Amendments to the Public Health
Law enacted by the New York State Legislature" which might help.
Kath
At 03:28 PM 11/18/2002 -0500, you wrote:
>Could someone point me to a regulation OSHA, NYS or otherwise that would
>stipulate that needles and syringes must be kept in a locked cabinet.
>
>My feeling is that this is a standard practice but there is not a
>regulation stating that it MUST be done. Is this not so?
>
>Thanks,
>
>Tina Charbonneau
>BSO
>Trudeau Institute
**********************************************
Kathryn Louise Harris, Ph.D.
Biological Safety Professional
Office of Research Safety
Northwestern University
NG-71 Technological Institute
2145 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208-3121
Phone: (847) 491-4387
Fax: (847) 467-2797
Email: kathrynharris@northwestern.edu
**********************************************
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 18 Nov 2002 16:12:34 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Hauck, Philip"
Subject: Re: locking security boxes?
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
Content-transfer-encoding: quoted-printable
How about metal boxes secured with the plastic securing devices =
electricians use to bundle wire. Basically for inventory control and =
security they will work just as well, since you will have to cut them =
off in order to open the box. And in this way you will also be able to =
note if somebody tampered with the samples. The external access to the =
freezer should be lockable or chainable.
Phil Hauck
-----Original Message-----
From: Richard Pollack [mailto:rpollack@HSPH.HARVARD.EDU]
Sent: Friday, November 15, 2002 9:49 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: locking security boxes?
The standard acrylic and other plastic lock boxes frequently used for
securing isotopes seem to be impractical for use in a -80C freezer.
Technical staff working for plastics producers and for manufacturers of
isotope storage boxes confirmed that although a few boxes may be rated
for use at -70C, none of these are meant to be used at -80C or below.
At the colder temperatures, the plastic will become increasingly
brittle and will comprome the integrity of the box. Cryostable
plastics do exist, but these are fairly expensive and apparently not as
yet used for this purpose. Locking metal boxes might be an
alternative. Regardless of the material used to construct the box, the
metal locks would become difficult to operate at these temperatures.
Because -80C freezers are not frost free, the locks would need to be
thawed periodically - and this would present an interesting challenge.
Thus, these devices should not be expected to meaningfully enhance
security, and they might also add unnecessary burden (and perhaps also
a hazard) as it might require a bit of a struggle to open the lock box.
Finally, such a box would need to be secured within the freezer.
Bolting the box to the inside of the freezer would require that holes
be bored into the freezer - a potentially hazardous activity to the
freezer and to the technician. Adhesive pads and glues commonly found
on security cable anchors may also become brittle and fail at low
temperatures. More suitable is a means of securing the door with a
locking latch, and ensuring that the latch and hinges are not easily
compromised. Finally, replace the factory-supplied lock cylinder on
your freezers, as these are generally all keyed alike... and then limit
access to the unique keys.
Richard J. Pollack, Ph.D.
Laboratory of Public Health Entomology
Harvard School of Public Health
665 Huntington Ave.
Boston, MA 02115
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 18 Nov 2002 16:16:11 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Robert N. Latsch"
Subject: Re: Needles/syringes
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
The bbp standard states that needles must be secured.
I am in Ohio,"GO BUCKS", Ohio EPA requires that such sharps be be in a
controlled environament to prevent public access. Check with your state
and county authorities.
Bob
>Could someone point me to a regulation OSHA, NYS or otherwise that would
>stipulate that needles and syringes must be kept in a locked cabinet.
>
>My feeling is that this is a standard practice but there is not a
>regulation stating that it MUST be done. Is this not so?
>
>Thanks,
>
>Tina Charbonneau
>BSO
>Trudeau Institute
_____________________________________________________________________
__ / _____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 18 Nov 2002 16:26:22 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Hauck, Philip"
Subject: Re: Saliva Samples
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="Boundary_(ID_nPPi77HlgPyvFfqswb7hWQ)"
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No, I wasn't advocating using that rationale for waste =
disposal. I was advocating that from the perspective of material =
coming into the lab for evaluation / use in research-the assumption =
is that the specimens are hot is valid. To me, and this is =
what we did in the lab before the BBP Standard, or BMBL's, (the '70's) =
this was a practical approach...to treat anything coming into =
my lab as infectious if it was human source. It was an immunology lab, =
and twice we received "hot" blood from Blood(HBV) donors! To =
follow the equivalent of the BBP regs as far as hand-washing etc., and =
do everything under a BSC made absolute sense. Once the protocols =
were done, we would knock everything down by autoclave, and dispose of =
most material as red bag anyhow ( we were (are) in New York City, =
and have a Very Powerful NYC Sanitation Union).
Phil Hauck
-----Original Message-----
From: Ira F. Salkin [mailto:Irasalkin@]
Sent: Monday, November 18, 2002 4:03 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Saliva Samples
Phil:
If we follow your generalization, then all such materials, in the vast =
majority of states, would have to be considered to be regulated medical =
waste and disposed of in accordance with state regulations. Are you =
suggesting this as well? Given that treatment and disposal of medical =
waste is now around 25 to 30 cents per pound while the disposal of =
conventional waste is around 3-5 cents per pound, this would increase =
costs tremendously for virtually all facilities.
Ira
Ira F. Salkin, Ph.D., F(AAM)
Information From Science, LLC
P.O. Box 408
West Sand Lake, NY 12196
Voice/Fax - 518-674-1713
Cellphone - 518-791-7969
E-Mail - irasalkin@
-
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 18 Nov 2002 16:28:08 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Hauck, Philip"
Subject: Re: Needles/syringes
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
Content-transfer-encoding: quoted-printable
Bingo-it's the 1972 law I remember.
-----Original Message-----
From: Kathryn Harris [mailto:kathrynharris@NORTHWESTERN.EDU]
Sent: Monday, November 18, 2002 4:12 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Needles/syringes
Thinking back to my time as a grad student in New York, it was illegal =
to
be in possession of hypodermic needles and syringes without an approved
registration or a prescription. We used them only for filling electrodes =
in
the lab and our lab had to have a registration.
It was also illegal to 'furnish' other people, so from this perspective,
even if it's not specifically 'regulated' it would be wise to lock up =
your
stash if you're storing them in a place where unregistered people could
gain access.
I couldn't find the specific information on registration that I had back
when I was in NY, but here is a link to "Amendments to the Public Health
Law enacted by the New York State Legislature" which might help.
Kath
At 03:28 PM 11/18/2002 -0500, you wrote:
>Could someone point me to a regulation OSHA, NYS or otherwise that =
would
>stipulate that needles and syringes must be kept in a locked cabinet.
>
>My feeling is that this is a standard practice but there is not a
>regulation stating that it MUST be done. Is this not so?
>
>Thanks,
>
>Tina Charbonneau
>BSO
>Trudeau Institute
**********************************************
Kathryn Louise Harris, Ph.D.
Biological Safety Professional
Office of Research Safety
Northwestern University
NG-71 Technological Institute
2145 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208-3121
Phone: (847) 491-4387
Fax: (847) 467-2797
Email: kathrynharris@northwestern.edu
**********************************************
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 18 Nov 2002 16:32:34 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Erik A. Talley"
Subject: Re: Saliva Samples
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
Read the "June 24, 1988 / 37(24);377-388" MMWR at:
I think this is the document OSHA used for their dental saliva inclusion
(??). Is there anything newer from CDC or OSHA?
I don't know about you, but I don't want someone else's saliva on me! That
said, we have to be careful about what we include as potentially infectious
material under the bloodborne pathogen standard as opposed to having
biological hazards which require extra care in certain situations (based on
risk). I only say that thinking about an assisted-living employee feeding a
resident or a day care employee working with a child.
CDC does recommend universal precautions for contact with mucous membranes:
"Use examination gloves for procedures involving contact with mucous
membranes, unless otherwise indicated, and for other patient care or
diagnostic procedures that do not require the use of sterile gloves."
Erik
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 18 Nov 2002 15:22:53 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Gajdusek, Corinne M"
Subject: Re: Saliva Samples
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
If you search the OSHA site under "Standard Precautions", you will find
information on "Body Substance Isolation" and "Standard Precautions".
Standard Precautions omits only sweat from the category of potentially
infectious bodily materials. This approach to infection control includes all
bodily secretions as potentially infectious, whether or not they contain
visible blood.
-----Original Message-----
From: Erik A. Talley [mailto:ert2002@MED.CORNELL.EDU]
Sent: Monday, November 18, 2002 1:33 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Saliva Samples
Read the "June 24, 1988 / 37(24);377-388" MMWR at:
I think this is the document OSHA used for their dental saliva inclusion
(??). Is there anything newer from CDC or OSHA?
I don't know about you, but I don't want someone else's saliva on me! That
said, we have to be careful about what we include as potentially infectious
material under the bloodborne pathogen standard as opposed to having
biological hazards which require extra care in certain situations (based on
risk). I only say that thinking about an assisted-living employee feeding a
resident or a day care employee working with a child.
CDC does recommend universal precautions for contact with mucous membranes:
"Use examination gloves for procedures involving contact with mucous
membranes, unless otherwise indicated, and for other patient care or
diagnostic procedures that do not require the use of sterile gloves."
Erik
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 19 Nov 2002 10:45:36 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Hauck, Philip"
Subject: Re: Shipment of Biological Materials and Dry Ice Manual
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
Content-transfer-encoding: quoted-printable
Thanks David for sharing your materials....and to everyone else who does =
likewise. It goes a long way in helping all of us and the profession to =
attain to a high level of consistency in our methods and practice.
Philip Hauck
Mt. Sinai School of Medicine
-----Original Message-----
From: David Gillum [mailto:David.Gillum@UNH.EDU]
Sent: Monday, November 18, 2002 9:58 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Shipment of Biological Materials and Dry Ice Manual
Dear Biosafety Listserve Members,
Since I have received over 100 e-mails, I figure it's a good idea to =
just
throw out the link to the manual. Here it is:
If you find major flaws with the document, please send me an e-mail =
directly
(not to the listserve).
Thanks!
--
David R. Gillum
Laboratory Safety Officer
Environmental Health and Safety
11 Leavitt Lane, Perpetuity Hall
Durham, NH 03824
Telephone #: 603-862-0197
Facsimile #: 603-862-0047
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 19 Nov 2002 15:57:40 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Donald G. Robasser"
Organization: Princeton University
Subject: Poliovirus survey
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
BioListservers,
There was a message on the BIOSAFTY Listserv recently that indicated
that soil samples were to be included in "environmental material" to be
considered in the wild poliovirus inventory. Since all of the
information and definitions provided for the survey only include water
and sewage samples as "environmental material" to be considered, I
wanted to get some clarification on this.
Beyond water and sewage samples, is there any other material (including
soil) that is to be considered for the purpose of the wild poliovirus
survey?
Thanks for the clarification.
Don
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 19 Nov 2002 16:37:01 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Koporc, Kim"
Subject: soil samples and potential infectious wild poliovirus materials
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Hi Chris -
Soil samples are not included in the inventory because the half-life of =
poliovirus in soil is relatively short. Polioviruses are inactivated by =
sunlight and by harmful bacterial enzymes usually found in soils.
Potential infectious materials are feces, respiratory secretions, and =
environmental sewage and water samples of unknown origin or collected =
for any purpose at a time and in a geographic area where wild =
polioviruses or vaccine derived polioviruses were suspected to be =
present, as well as products of such materials in poliovirus permissive =
cells or animals, including:
* Harvests untested for polioviruses and enteroviruses
* Uncharacterized enterovirus-like cell culture isolates
* Undifferentiated poliovirus isolates
The Global Action Plan for Laboratory Containment of Wild Poliovirus =
Materials, which is posted on our website at od/nvpo/polio, =
mentions soil samples in the "Poliovirus Survival" section. There is =
also a section on wild poliovirus infectious materials.
Best regards,
Kim
-----Original Message-----
From: Donald G. Robasser [mailto:robasser@PRINCETON.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, November 19, 2002 3:58 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Poliovirus survey
BioListservers,
There was a message on the BIOSAFTY Listserv recently that indicated
that soil samples were to be included in "environmental material" to be
considered in the wild poliovirus inventory. Since all of the
information and definitions provided for the survey only include water
and sewage samples as "environmental material" to be considered, I
wanted to get some clarification on this.
Beyond water and sewage samples, is there any other material (including
soil) that is to be considered for the purpose of the wild poliovirus
survey?
Thanks for the clarification.
Don
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 19 Nov 2002 16:15:14 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Elaine Broussard
Subject: bioBubbleR systems
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="----_=_NextPart_001_01C29019.22634B30"
This message is in MIME format. Since your mail reader does not understand
this format, some or all of this message may not be legible.
------_=_NextPart_001_01C29019.22634B30
Content-Type: text/plain
Calling on anyone with knowledge or experience using a bioBubble(r) system
for containment; please share with me what you know. Opinions are also
welcome. You may email me directly at eeb.uab.edu.
Many thanks,
Elaine E. Broussard, Director of Biosafety
UAB Occupational Health & Safety
CH 19, Suite 445
933 South 19th Street
Birmingham, AL 35294-2041
Ph: 205-934-2487
Fax: 205-934-7487
Visit our website at healthsafe.uab.edu
------_=_NextPart_001_01C29019.22634B30
Content-Type: text/html
font-family:Arial'>Calling on anyone with knowledge or
experience using a bioBubble(r) system for containment; please
share with me what you know. Opinions are also welcome. You
may email me directly at eeb.uab.edu.
font-family:Arial'>Many thanks,
font-family:Arial'>
font-family:Arial'>Elaine E. Broussard, Director of Biosafety
font-family:Arial'>UAB Occupational Health & Safety
face=Arial> 445
font-family:Arial'>933 South 19th Street
size=2 face=Arial>35294-2041
font-family:Arial'>
font-family:Arial'>Ph: 205-934-2487
font-family:Arial'>Fax: 205-934-7487
font-family:Arial'>
font-family:Arial'>Visit our website at healthsafe.uab.edu
12.0pt'>
------_=_NextPart_001_01C29019.22634B30--
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 19 Nov 2002 17:37:14 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Kathryn Harris
Subject: Restricted Persons, Select Agents and RFO responsibility
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="=====================_-30656718==_.ALT"
--=====================_-30656718==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
Hello All,
Maybe this has come up before so being new to the listserv I apologize if
I'm hashing over old threads..
2 questions which are a bit complicated so bear with me on the explanations..:
1)We are planning to take affidavits from employees with access to select
agents regarding their status as restricted persons. Obviously if someone
does have dishonest intentions these would not be worth the paper they were
written on so we need to investigate the veracity by background checks etc.
This undertaking of background checks seems to us to be a prudent measure
to 'cover ourselves' that we are doing everything reasonable to prevent
restricted persons from gaining access.
I may not be reading carefully enough but is there actually anything in the
current law which requires facilities to determine if an individual is a
restricted person? If this is a legal requirement, then taken literally, we
would have to perform drug tests and psychological assessments as well as
criminal and visa checks.
2)We have 2 separate campuses, a main campus and a medical school, we also
have a bunch of university employees working off campus in sites such as
local area hospitals. We are trying to decide just exactly who we are
'responsible for' in terms of implementing the select agents security
requirements (background checks etc).
For example, we may have a researcher on the payroll who is working at a
hospital that is not part of our campus, do we need to run background
checks on individuals (not necessarily employed by us) who have 'access' to
his lab, or is that the responsibility of that hospital as a separate
'facility'.
We would like to know how other institutes have approached this in terms of
defining what constitutes their facility and who they have responsibility
over (legally).
This has come up in different guises in the past - for example do we have
to maintain safety or evacuation plans for all sites where an employees,
faculty members or students work? Medical students may work in tens of
sites across the city in clinics, is it our responsibility as the employer
(morally to protect our workers) or is the specific facility responsible
for the individuals working under it's roof?
Any insight would be greatly appreciated.
Kath Harris
**********************************************
Kathryn Louise Harris, Ph.D.
Biological Safety Professional
Office of Research Safety
Northwestern University
NG-71 Technological Institute
2145 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208-3121
Phone: (847) 491-4387
Fax: (847) 467-2797
Email: kathrynharris@northwestern.edu
**********************************************
--=====================_-30656718==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
Hello All,
Maybe this has come up before so being new to the listserv I
apologize if I'm hashing over old threads..
2 questions which are a bit complicated so bear with me on the
explanations..:
1)We are planning to take affidavits from employees with
access to select agents regarding their status as restricted
persons. Obviously if someone does have dishonest intentions
these would not be worth the paper they were written on so we
need to investigate the veracity by background checks etc.
This undertaking of background checks seems to us to be a
prudent measure to 'cover ourselves' that we are doing
everything reasonable to prevent restricted persons from
gaining access.
I may not be reading carefully enough but is there actually
anything in the current law which requires facilities to
determine if an individual is a restricted person? If this is
a legal requirement, then taken literally, we would have to
perform drug tests and psychological assessments as well as
criminal and visa checks.
2)We have 2 separate campuses, a main campus and a medical
school, we also have a bunch of university employees working
off campus in sites such as local area hospitals. We are
trying to decide just exactly who we are 'responsible for' in
terms of implementing the select agents security requirements
(background checks etc).
For example, we may have a researcher on the payroll who is
working at a hospital that is not part of our campus, do we
need to run background checks on individuals (not necessarily
employed by us) who have 'access' to his lab, or is that the
responsibility of that hospital as a separate 'facility'.
We would like to know how other institutes have approached
this in terms of defining what constitutes their facility and
who they have responsibility over (legally).
This has come up in different guises in the past - for example
do we have to maintain safety or evacuation plans for all
sites where an employees, faculty members or students work?
Medical students may work in tens of sites across the city in
clinics, is it our responsibility as the employer (morally to
protect our workers) or is the specific facility responsible
for the individuals working under it's roof?
Any insight would be greatly appreciated.
Kath Harris
**********************************************
Kathryn Louise Harris, Ph.D.
Biological Safety Professional
Office of Research Safety
Northwestern University
NG-71 Technological Institute
2145 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208-3121
Phone: (847) 491-4387
Fax: (847) 467-2797
Email: kathrynharris@northwestern.edu
**********************************************
--=====================_-30656718==_.ALT--
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 20 Nov 2002 13:53:11 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ray Hackney
Subject: Biosafety Course - January 29-31
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="----=_NextPart_000_00B8_01C2909C.2A0713C0"
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------=_NextPart_000_00B8_01C2909C.2A0713C0
Content-Type: text/plain;
charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
For those who may be looking for a two and a half day course in basic
biosafety, the following course is offered January 29-31, 2003, in =
Tampa, Florida:
"Biosafety for Safety and Health Professionals"
more information and registration can be found at:
The course is also offered August in Norfolk, VA. .
Ray
Raymond W. Hackney, Jr. , DrPH, CIH, CBSP
Industrial Hygiene Manager
Dept. of Environment Health and Safety
212 Finley Golf Course Rd.
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Chapel Hill, NC 27514
(919) 962-5712
(919) 962-0227 (fax)
------=_NextPart_000_00B8_01C2909C.2A0713C0
Content-Type: text/html;
charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
size=3D3>For those who may be looking for a two and a half
day course in basic
biosafety, = the following course is offered January 29-31,
2003, in Tampa, Florida:
"Biosafety for Safety and Health = Professionals"
more
href=3D"">
ph.unc.edu/osherc/ce/courses/bshp02.htm
size=3D3>The course is also offered August in Norfolk, =
VA. .
Ray
Raymond W. Hackney, Jr. , DrPH, CIH, CBSP
Industrial Hygiene Manager
Dept. of Environment Health and Safety
212 Finley Golf = Course Rd.
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Chapel Hill, NC 27514
(919) 962-5712
(919) 962-0227 = (fax)
------=_NextPart_000_00B8_01C2909C.2A0713C0--
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 20 Nov 2002 15:36:12 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Jeffrey Good
Subject: Service in BSL-3
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
We are having some troubles getting a company to service portions of a
confocal imager (laser, etc.) in our BSL-3 facility.
The unit is in a "Commons Area" that is deconned every day, and where
no research, storage, etc occurs. Only fixed samples have been used in
the device. We have assured the reps that we will decon unit, and have
entire facility closed while they are servicing - but no luck
Anyone else ever had this issue?
Is there a list of contractors?
The device had a service contract on it with the manufacturer, but they
refused to service in the lab.
Any leads, advise, shared experiences is appreciated.
Jeff
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 20 Nov 2002 15:02:05 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Volz, Mike (DHS-LS)"
Subject: Disinfection Alternatives to Incineration
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Do any of the list members know of key professional contacts,
organizations, etc. that are wrestling with disinfection alternatives to
incineration for infectious waste generators such as hospitals, clinics,
etc.
I am fairly comfortable knowing what alternative technologies are available
at present because I have been involved in some of the dialogue over the
past few years. However, now I have been asked to provide some real-time and
specific input to the chaotic situation which appears to be gaining momentum
and am having major problems identifying and justifying the best, most
practical, and politically palatable technological alternatives based upon
specific situations.
Example: If a hospital needs to dispose of its infectious waste and cannot
utilize incineration either on- or off-site, for whatever reason(s), what
appear to be its best alternatives, and why/why not?
If the members could point me to either/both a good reference source that
lays out such an assessment process or could direct me to someone who'd be
willing to spend a few minutes in serious dialogue, I'd certainly appreciate
it.
Thanks for any feedback.
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 20 Nov 2002 20:09:51 EST
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Jim Kaufman
Subject: Re: BIOSAFTY Digest - 18 Nov 2002 to 19 Nov 2002 (#2002-252)
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="part1_103.1fbf370c.2b0d8c5f_boundary"
--part1_103.1fbf370c.2b0d8c5f_boundary
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Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
When I changed my subscription to non-digest mode I got all the messages. I
just switched back to digest and now there's only one of five in the digest
and nothing to download. What's up?
James A. Kaufman, Ph.D., Director
The Laboratory Safety Institute
A Nonprofit Organization Dedicated to
Safety in Science and Science Education
192 Worcester Road, Natick, MA 01760-2252
508-647-1900 Fax: 508-647-0062
Cell: 508-574-6264 Res: 781-237-1335
labsafe@
--part1_103.1fbf370c.2b0d8c5f_boundary
Content-Type: text/html; charset="US-ASCII"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
When I changed my subscription to non-digest mode I got all
the messages. I just switched back to digest and now there's
only one of five in the digest and nothing to download.
What's up?
James A. Kaufman, Ph.D., Director
The Laboratory Safety Institute
A Nonprofit Organization Dedicated to
Safety in Science and Science Education
192 Worcester Road, Natick, MA 01760-2252
508-647-1900 Fax: 508-647-0062
Cell: 508-574-6264 Res: 781-237-1335
labsafe@
--part1_103.1fbf370c.2b0d8c5f_boundary--
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 20 Nov 2002 22:09:15 EST
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ed Krisiunas
Subject: Re: Disinfection Alternatives to Incineration
MIME-Version: 1.0
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boundary="part1_72.262829d9.2b0da85b_boundary"
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Have you spoken to the folks in your own department (California Department of
Health Services - Jack McGurk or Mike Schott)?
Edward Krisiunas, MT(ASCP), CIC, MPH
President
WNWN International
PO Box 1164
Burlington, Connecticut
06013
USA
Phone 860-675-1217
Fax 860-675-1311
Mobile - 860-944-2373
e-mail - ekrisiunas@
>
> Do any of the list members know of key professional contacts,
> organizations, etc. that are wrestling with disinfection alternatives to
> incineration for infectious waste generators such as hospitals, clinics,
> etc.
>
> I am fairly comfortable knowing what alternative technologies are available
> at present because I have been involved in some of the dialogue over the
> past few years. However, now I have been asked to provide some real-time
> and
> specific input to the chaotic situation which appears to be gaining
> momentum
> and am having major problems identifying and justifying the best, most
> practical, and politically palatable technological alternatives based upon
> specific situations.
>
> Example: If a hospital needs to dispose of its infectious waste and cannot
> utilize incineration either on- or off-site, for whatever reason(s), what
> appear to be its best alternatives, and why/why not?
>
> If the members could point me to either/both a good reference source that
> lays out such an assessment process or could direct me to someone who'd be
> willing to spend a few minutes in serious dialogue, I'd certainly
> appreciate
> it.
>
> Thanks for any feedback.
--part1_72.262829d9.2b0da85b_boundary
Content-Type: text/html; charset="US-ASCII"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Have you spoken to the folks in your own department
(California Department of Health Services - Jack McGurk or
Mike Schott)?
Edward Krisiunas, MT(ASCP), CIC, MPH
President
WNWN International
PO Box 1164
Burlington, Connecticut
06013
USA
Phone 860-675-1217
Fax 860-675-1311
Mobile - 860-944-2373
e-mail - ekrisiunas@
Do any of the list members know of key professional
contacts,
organizations, etc. that are wrestling with disinfection
alternatives to
incineration for infectious waste generators such as
hospitals, clinics,
etc.
I am fairly comfortable knowing what alternative
technologies are available
at present because I have been involved in some of the
dialogue over the
past few years. However, now I have been asked to provide
some real-time and
specific input to the chaotic situation which appears to be
gaining momentum
and am having major problems identifying and justifying the
best, most
practical, and politically palatable technological
alternatives based upon
specific situations.
Example: If a hospital needs to dispose of its infectious
waste and cannot
utilize incineration either on- or off-site, for whatever
reason(s), what
appear to be its best alternatives, and why/why not?
If the members could point me to either/both a good
reference source that
lays out such an assessment process or could direct me to
someone who'd be
willing to spend a few minutes in serious dialogue, I'd
certainly appreciate
it.
Thanks for any feedback.
--part1_72.262829d9.2b0da85b_boundary--
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 21 Nov 2002 10:05:11 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Mike Durham
Subject: Alternatives to Incineration
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charset="iso-8859-1"
A good source of info on this subject is Steam Sterilization Systems by =
Sterile Technology Industries, Inc. Their website is
Mike Durham
LSU
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charset="iso-8859-1"
A good source of info on this subject = is Steam
Sterilization Systems by Sterile Technology Industries, Inc.
Their =
href=3D"">
Mike Durham
LSU
------=_NextPart_000_0010_01C29145.7A6FBF70--
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 21 Nov 2002 11:51:08 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Hauck, Philip"
Subject: Re: Exporting toxins
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
Content-transfer-encoding: quoted-printable
The key to all this is that you need an ECCN number, and it is going to =
be based either on existing CCL's, for example , the 1C351, -352,-535, =
and -354, all for pathogenic organisms and toxins, or on a determination =
made by DofC based on information you supply on FORM BXA-748P, available =
on line or by calling your local Export Assistance Center.
Other "Helpful" sites:
The Latter web-site has the actual Export Administration Regs
-but make contact through the Commerce sites with a knowledgeable
=
Export agent try:
.
I'm just starting on this learning curve, too, so that's about as far
=
as I have been with this. We are filling out the form and throwing =
ourselves at the mercy of the D of C.
Phil Hauck
-----Original Message-----
From: Marcham, Cheri [mailto:Cheryl-Marcham@OUHSC.EDU]
Sent: Friday, November 15, 2002 3:21 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Exporting toxins
In light of the recent Sigma Aldrich penalties
I have a researcher who needs to send a toxin gene (perfringolysin O) to
Europe. The toxin is not on the select agent list and he intends to
send only the plasmid DNA so the sample won't be the toxin itself.
I looked in the BMBL and there is a reference to two web sites for
information to , or , which
are very confusing.
Can anyone be specific about what exactly is needed to export toxins?
Cheri Marcham, CIH, CSP, CHMM
University Environmental Health and Safety Officer
The University of Oklahoma
P. O. Box 26901 ROB-301
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73120
405/271-3000
FAX 405/271-1606
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 21 Nov 2002 09:56:01 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Therese M. Stinnett"
Subject: Re: Disinfection Alternatives to Incineration
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Mike:
I think many of us are constantly looking at this issue. However, with
state responsibility for classification of wastes, no single federal
guidance, and the (misplaced in my opinion) over-riding concern for the
"political" or public perception issues, we are going to continue to
struggle "alone"
With the exception of some pathological wastes (tissues, limbs, organs) and
some chemotherapeutic drug/cytotoxic drug wastes, in MY state, we have
significant opportunity to direct the bulk of our waste to autoclaving,
followed by landfill.
Even the Risk Group 4 agents can be relatively "easy" to treat, if proper
methodology is developed and applied. Dr. Hawley (USAMRIID) and David
Bressler (CDC) gave a wonderful session on BSL4 containment at the ABSA
conference last month. An important take-home message was the very fragile
nature of those viruses, making them very susceptible to decontamination
strategies.
The best alternatives are based on science--most microbes (viral, fungal,
parasitic) are effectively treated by steam sterilization. Those that elude
this treatment (prions, TSE agents) are effectively treated by chemical
digestion (thankfully, I don't have to deal with those).
Presumably some of the tissue digester methods could be used for treatment
of human pathological wastes as well.
I understand you are in California--and potentially subject to far more
scrutiny than my organization in Colorado. But it really is about the
science. And we have an obligation to educate our public stakeholders, as
well as our legislators and our policy-makers. It does a disservice, in the
wasting of valuable and limited health care dollars and taxpayer dollars, to
do less.
As long as it remains a state responsibility (vs federal), you need to
partner with your colleagues in CA. Your solid waste management at the
state level should be able to advise on what could potentially go "wrong" at
the landfill. Not my subject area, but as I understand it, the landfills
are divided into "cells", so that materials from hospitals/clinics/labs
could be isolated away from "household" or other wastes, once autoclaved. I
don't know how others do it, but in Colorado, each landfill is
permitted/licensed by the county or municipality in which it is located.
That means dealing with 64 different jurisdictions, potentially. If it is
centrally administered, you could be dealing with just one agency. And
still have to educate hundreds of stakeholders.
I don't believe there will be a move on the part of the federal government
to start making regulations in this arena. The EPA Med Waste Tracking act
was sunset-ed in 1999. They have other issues on their agenda.
Potentially, it could make a comeback, IF there were to be further evidence
of the use of biological weapons in the US. But I perceive the burden would
still be on the locals to handle anything not confiscated as evidence.
My nickel's worth....
Terry Stinnett
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 21 Nov 2002 12:37:12 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Stefan Wagener
Subject: NEW, International High Containment Biosafety Workshop!
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
May 12-16, 2003, Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada
Canadian Science Centre for Human and Animal Health
Five day hands-on training in practical aspects of Level 3 and Level 4
biocontainment.
Learn how to:
- Verify the physical integrity of high containment laboratories
- Decontaminate large rooms and areas
- Test level 4 personal protective equipment
- Establish performance of primary containment devices
- Monitor waste treatment systems
.... and more.
This is your opportunity to go beyond the lecture type courses and finally do
the hands-on work and learning inside the most advanced biocontainment
facility in the world. If you are involved in BSL 3 and/or BSL 4 work, or will
be because of a new or renovated facility, this course is for you.
For more information go to:
biosafety.ca
Presented by the Centres for Applied Biosafety and Research:
Office of Biosafety and Environment, Canadian Science Centre for Human and
Animal Health,
Biocontainment and Facility Services Division, Canadian Food Inspection Agency,
Office of Laboratory Security, Health Canada.
Greetings,
Stefan Wagener, PhD., CBSP
Canadian Science Centre for Human and Animal Health
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 21 Nov 2002 16:11:31 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Mike Durham
Subject: Handling of human brains
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One of our faculty wants to use human brains in demonstrations in her =
classroom. She is asking for our guidance. She is a kinesiology =
professor. (Really)
She would like to be able to handle the brains and allow students to =
"poke" around on them. Does anyone have guidelines for this type =
activity? Are there any legal/moral/safety/health issues you feel should =
be addressed?
Thanks,
Mike Durham
LSU
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One of our faculty wants to use human = brains in
demonstrations in her classroom. She is asking for our
guidance. She is = a kinesiology professor. (Really)
She would like to be able to handle the = brains and
size=3D2>Does anyone have guidelines for this type
activity? Are there any = legal/moral/safety/health issues
you feel should be addressed?
Thanks,
Mike Durham
LSU
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Date: Thu, 21 Nov 2002 17:20:47 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Hauck, Philip"
Subject: Re: Handling of human brains
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Hello Mike:
One RED FLAG comes to mind immediately! CREUTZFELD - JAKOB =
DISEASE PRION! I hope the brains are well fixed with a documented =
procedure that is known to inactivate the prion completely! Also, 29 CFR =
1910.1030 Blood- Borne Pathogens ( =
)states that OPIM includes unfixed HUMAN =
tissues, and unfixed Human Brains would fall into that =
category.
Phil Hauck, MS, MSHS, CBSP, CIH, SM(NRM)
Mt. Sinai School of Medicine
212 241 1451
-----Original Message-----
From: Mike Durham [mailto:mdurham@LSU.EDU]
Sent: Thursday, November 21, 2002 5:12 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Handling of human brains
One of our faculty wants to use human brains in demonstrations in her =
classroom. She is asking for our guidance. She is a kinesiology =
professor. (Really)
She would like to be able to handle the brains and allow students to =
"poke" around on them. Does anyone have guidelines for this type =
activity? Are there any legal/moral/safety/health issues you feel should =
be addressed?
Thanks,
Mike Durham
LSU
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 21 Nov 2002 14:53:17 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Funk, Glenn"
Subject: Re: Handling of human brains
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Mike -
I recommend that you tell her that she may NOT use human central nervous
system tissues in her classroom, her lab or anywhere else until (1) the
material has been fixed in accordance with the 96% formic acid procedure
provided in Section VII-D (Prions) in the BMBL, and (2) her handling
protocols have been approved by you and your IBC, with all that implies (and
requires). And don't forget implementation of all requirements of the BBP
Standard ...
I would suggest she would be as well served with sheep brains - the scrapie
risk would be logs less than the CJD risk.
-- Glenn
Glenn A. Funk, Ph.D., CBSP
Director and Biosafety Officer
Environment, Health and Safety
MedImmune Vaccines, Inc.
408-845-8847
-----Original Message-----
From: Mike Durham [mailto:mdurham@LSU.EDU]
Sent: Thursday, November 21, 2002 2:12 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Handling of human brains
One of our faculty wants to use human brains in demonstrations in her
classroom. She is asking for our guidance. She is a kinesiology professor.
(Really)
She would like to be able to handle the brains and allow students to "poke"
around on them. Does anyone have guidelines for this type activity? Are
there any legal/moral/safety/health issues you feel should be addressed?
Thanks,
Mike Durham
LSU
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Mike -
size=2>
I recommend that you tell her that she may NOT use human
central nervous system tissues in her classroom, her lab or
anywhere else until (1) the material has been fixed in
accordance with the 96% formic acid procedure provided in
Section VII-D (Prions) in the BMBL, and (2) her handling
protocols have been approved by you and your IBC, with all
that implies (and requires). And don't forget implementation
of all requirements of the BBP Standard ...
size=2>
I would suggest she would be as well served with sheep brains
- the scrapie risk would be logs less than the CJD risk.
size=2>
-- Glenn
Glenn A. Funk, Ph.D., CBSP size=2>408-845-8847
size=2>-----Original Message-----
From: Mike Durham [mailto:mdurham@LSU.EDU]
Sent: Thursday, November 21, 2002 2:12 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Handling of human brains
One of our faculty wants to use human brains in
demonstrations in her classroom. She is asking for our
guidance. She is a kinesiology professor. (Really)
She would like to be able to handle the brains and allow
students to "poke" around on them. Does anyone have
guidelines for this type activity? Are there any
legal/moral/safety/health issues you feel should be
addressed?
Thanks,
Mike Durham
LSU
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=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 21 Nov 2002 20:14:17 EST
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ed Krisiunas
Subject: Dishwasher
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Following scenario was presented to me this evening:
I have a dishwasher that was used to clean labware, including labware that
had been used to store acrylamide and ethidium bromide, as well as flasks
used to grow yeast and bacteria.=A0
I have been now asked to move this dishwasher to a kitchen/cafeteria for
employees that would now be used for their dishes/coffee mugs etc.
The bacteria and yeast may not be an issue (all BSL 1 agents) as several
cycles can be run at high water temp plus dry heat to allay concerns of
viable organisms/agents .
But what about the acrylamide and ethidium bromide?
Edward Krisiunas, MT(ASCP), CIC, MPH
President
WNWN International
PO Box 1164
Burlington, Connecticut
06013
USA
Phone 860-675-1217
Fax 860-675-1311
Mobile - 860-944-2373
e-mail - ekrisiunas@
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R>
I have a dishwasher that was used to clean labware, including
labware = that had been used to store acrylamide and
ethidium bromide, as well as flas= ks used to grow yeast and
bacteria.=A0
I have been now asked to move this dishwasher to a
kitchen/cafeteria for emp= loyees that would now be used for
their dishes/coffee mugs etc.
The bacteria and yeast may not be an issue (all BSL 1 agents)
as seve= ral cycles can be run at high water temp plus dry
heat to allay concerns of = viable organisms/agents .
But what about the acrylamide and ethidium bromide?
Edward Krisiunas, MT(ASCP), CIC, MPH
President
WNWN International
PO Box 1164
Burlington, Connecticut
06013
USA
Phone 860-675-1217
Fax 860-675-1311
Mobile - 860-944-2373
e-mail - ekrisiunas@
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=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 22 Nov 2002 06:59:43 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Barry D. Cohen"
Subject: Re: Dishwasher
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Neurotoxin and suspect mutagen. Show me the cleaning data
that shows no residual.
New washer = $200.00 - $300.00
My reputation = Priceless
NOT IN MY KITCHEN!
Regards,
Barry D. Cohen, MPH, CBSP
Director, Environmental Health and Safety
Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc.
700 Main Street
Cambridge, MA 02139
(V): 617/613-4385
(F): 617/613-4492
(E): bcohen@
Ed Krisiunas wrote:
> Following scenario was presented to me this evening:
>
> I have a dishwasher that was used to clean labware,
> including labware that had been used to store acrylamide
> and ethidium bromide, as well as flasks used to grow yeast
> and bacteria.
>
> I have been now asked to move this dishwasher to a
> kitchen/cafeteria for employees that would now be used for
> their dishes/coffee mugs etc.
>
> The bacteria and yeast may not be an issue (all BSL 1
> agents) as several cycles can be run at high water temp
> plus dry heat to allay concerns of viable organisms/agents
> .
>
> But what about the acrylamide and ethidium bromide?
>
>
>
>
>
> Edward Krisiunas, MT(ASCP), CIC, MPH
> President
> WNWN International
> PO Box 1164
> Burlington, Connecticut
> 06013
> USA
> Phone 860-675-1217
> Fax 860-675-1311
> Mobile - 860-944-2373
> e-mail - ekrisiunas@
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 22 Nov 2002 07:35:56 EST
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ed Krisiunas
Subject: Re: Dishwasher
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Perfect - not additional responses needed.
Thannks.
ED
> Neurotoxin and suspect mutagen. Show me the cleaning data
> that shows no residual.
>
> New washer = $200.00 - $300.00
> My reputation = Priceless
>
> NOT IN MY KITCHEN!
>
> Regards,
>
> Barry D. Cohen, MPH, CBSP
> Director, Environmental Health and Safety
> Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc.
> 700 Main Street
> Cambridge, MA 02139
> (V): 617/613-4385
> (F): 617/613-4492
> (E): bcohen@
>
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Perfect - not additional responses needed.
Thannks.
ED
Neurotoxin and suspect mutagen. Show me the cleaning data
that shows no residual.
New washer = $200.00 - $300.00
My reputation = Priceless
NOT IN MY KITCHEN!
Regards,
Barry D. Cohen, MPH, CBSP
Director, Environmental Health and Safety
Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc.
700 Main Street
Cambridge, MA 02139
(V): 617/613-4385
(F): 617/613-4492
(E): bcohen@
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=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 22 Nov 2002 08:03:51 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Bruce MacDonald
Subject: CDC EA 101 Form
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Does anyone in the group know where on CDC's site you can find the EA
101 form? I've found the instructions for filling out the form but not
the form itself. Thanks.
******************************************
Bruce L. Macdonald MPH, CSP, RM
Manager Health & Safety
NC State University - EHS
Box 8007
Raleigh, NC 27695
(919) 515-6858
Fax (919) 515-6307
******************************************
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 22 Nov 2002 09:28:46 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ed Gaunt
Subject: Re: CDC EA 101 Form
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I'm checking for you... Stand by.
Ed
-----Original Message-----
From: Bruce MacDonald [mailto:blmacdon@GW.FIS.NCSU.EDU]
Sent: Friday, November 22, 2002 8:04 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: CDC EA 101 Form
Does anyone in the group know where on CDC's site you can find the EA
101 form? I've found the instructions for filling out the form but not
the form itself. Thanks.
******************************************
Bruce L. Macdonald MPH, CSP, RM
Manager Health & Safety
NC State University - EHS
Box 8007
Raleigh, NC 27695
(919) 515-6858
Fax (919) 515-6307
******************************************
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 22 Nov 2002 08:41:56 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Kathryn Harris
Subject: Re: CDC EA 101 Form
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
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I've searched for this myself on several occasions. I believe the
instructions are on-line but you have to submit a request for an
application package with the forms (see
). It may in fact be there, but
it's pretty well hidden if it is!
Kath Harris
At 08:03 AM 11/22/2002 -0500, you wrote:
>Does anyone in the group know where on CDC's site you can find the EA
>101 form? I've found the instructions for filling out the form but not
>the form itself. Thanks.
>
>******************************************
>Bruce L. Macdonald MPH, CSP, RM
>Manager Health & Safety
>NC State University - EHS
>Box 8007
>Raleigh, NC 27695
>(919) 515-6858
>Fax (919) 515-6307
>******************************************
>
**********************************************
Kathryn Louise Harris, Ph.D.
Biological Safety Professional
Office of Research Safety
Northwestern University
NG-71 Technological Institute
2145 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208-3121
Phone: (847) 491-4387
Fax: (847) 467-2797
Email: kathrynharris@northwestern.edu
**********************************************
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 22 Nov 2002 09:32:15 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Reeves, Beth Ann"
Subject: Re: CDC EA 101 Form
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
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Dear Bruce,
The EA101 forms are not available online. Your institution must be =
registered with the CDC first and then they will tell you how to obtain =
one. I sent an email to the CDC stating the same request you have. It =
is not available until your site is registered.
-----Original Message-----
From: Bruce MacDonald [mailto:blmacdon@GW.FIS.NCSU.EDU]
Sent: Friday, November 22, 2002 8:04 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: CDC EA 101 Form
Does anyone in the group know where on CDC's site you can find the EA
101 form? I've found the instructions for filling out the form but not
the form itself. Thanks.
******************************************
Bruce L. Macdonald MPH, CSP, RM
Manager Health & Safety
NC State University - EHS
Box 8007
Raleigh, NC 27695
(919) 515-6858
Fax (919) 515-6307
******************************************
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 22 Nov 2002 09:48:38 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Margaret Rakas
Subject: Certificate of Origin-Int'l Shipping
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We were recently sending research samples of
non-pathogenic cDNA libraries to a university in Germany for further
research. When we completed the Fedex international shipping document
and offered the package, we were told we had to complete a Certificate
of Origin since Fedex had categorized our materials as "Biological
Products" but we said Diagnostic specimens, UN 3373, on the paperwork.
These materials were for research purposes only and we had assigned
$2.00 commercial value to them for custom's purposes. I have reviewed
the 'standard' COA form and done an internet search and while I cannot
find an exemption for research materials, I find it difficult to believe
that we are a 'manufacturer'. Has anyone else had this issue come up
when using Fedex and if so how have you dealt with it? It is possible
the Fedex employee didn't know what category to place the package in and
didn't understand the category Diagnostic specimens yet. Should we
offer $0 for value and write something like "RESEARCH MATERIALS ONLY"?
Many thanks
Margaret
Margaret A. Rakas, Ph.D.
Manager, Inventory & Regulatory Affairs
Clark Science Center
Smith College
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We were recently sending research samples of
non-pathogenic cDNA libraries to a university in Germany for
further research. When we completed the Fedex international
shipping document and offered the package, we were told we had
to complete a Certificate of Origin since Fedex had
categorized our materials as "Biological Products" but we said
Diagnostic specimens, UN 3373, on the paperwork. These
materials were for research purposes only and we had assigned
$2.00 commercial value to them for custom's purposes. I have
reviewed the 'standard' COA form and done an internet search
and while I cannot find an exemption for research materials, I
find it difficult to believe that we are a 'manufacturer'.
Has anyone else had this issue come up when using Fedex and if
so how have you dealt with it? It is possible the Fedex
employee didn't know what category to place the package in and
didn't understand the category Diagnostic specimens yet.
Should we offer $0 for value and write something like
"RESEARCH MATERIALS ONLY"?
Many thanks
Margaret
Margaret A. Rakas, Ph.D.
Manager, Inventory & Regulatory Affairs
Clark Science Center
Smith College
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=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 22 Nov 2002 09:48:42 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Gilpin, Richard"
Subject: Re: CDC EA 101 Form
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
the EA 101 was left out of the website on purpose...so it's available from
CDC LRSAT
Richard W. Gilpin, Ph.D., RBP, CBSP
Assistant Director & Biosafety Officer
Environmental Health & Safety (EHS)
University of Maryland Baltimore
714 West Lombard Street, Room 305
Baltimore MD 21201-1084
(410) 706-7845
Fax (410) 706-1520
rgilpin@ehs.umaryland.edu
ehs.umaryland.edu
-----Original Message-----
From: Kathryn Harris [mailto:kathrynharris@NORTHWESTERN.EDU]
Sent: Friday, November 22, 2002 09:42 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: CDC EA 101 Form
I've searched for this myself on several occasions. I believe the
instructions are on-line but you have to submit a request for an
application package with the forms (see
). It may in fact be there, but
it's pretty well hidden if it is!
Kath Harris
At 08:03 AM 11/22/2002 -0500, you wrote:
>Does anyone in the group know where on CDC's site you can find the EA
>101 form? I've found the instructions for filling out the form but not
>the form itself. Thanks.
>
>******************************************
>Bruce L. Macdonald MPH, CSP, RM
>Manager Health & Safety
>NC State University - EHS
>Box 8007
>Raleigh, NC 27695
>(919) 515-6858
>Fax (919) 515-6307
>******************************************
>
**********************************************
Kathryn Louise Harris, Ph.D.
Biological Safety Professional
Office of Research Safety
Northwestern University
NG-71 Technological Institute
2145 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208-3121
Phone: (847) 491-4387
Fax: (847) 467-2797
Email: kathrynharris@northwestern.edu
**********************************************
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 22 Nov 2002 09:36:46 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ed Gaunt
Subject: Re: CDC EA 101 Form
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Right answer...I should have know that myself!
Ed
-----Original Message-----
From: Reeves, Beth Ann [mailto:bereeves@INDIANA.EDU]
Sent: Friday, November 22, 2002 9:32 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: CDC EA 101 Form
Dear Bruce,
The EA101 forms are not available online. Your institution must be
registered with the CDC first and then they will tell you how to obtain one.
I sent an email to the CDC stating the same request you have. It is not
available until your site is registered.
-----Original Message-----
From: Bruce MacDonald [mailto:blmacdon@GW.FIS.NCSU.EDU]
Sent: Friday, November 22, 2002 8:04 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: CDC EA 101 Form
Does anyone in the group know where on CDC's site you can find the EA
101 form? I've found the instructions for filling out the form but not
the form itself. Thanks.
******************************************
Bruce L. Macdonald MPH, CSP, RM
Manager Health & Safety
NC State University - EHS
Box 8007
Raleigh, NC 27695
(919) 515-6858
Fax (919) 515-6307
******************************************
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 22 Nov 2002 09:03:06 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Mark Campbell
Subject: Re: CDC EA 101 Form
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-transfer-encoding: 7bit
This might help:
Mark J. Campbell, MS, CBSP
Saint Louis University
Bruce MacDonald wrote:
> Does anyone in the group know where on CDC's site you can find the EA
> 101 form? I've found the instructions for filling out the form but not
> the form itself. Thanks.
>
> ******************************************
> Bruce L. Macdonald MPH, CSP, RM
> Manager Health & Safety
> NC State University - EHS
> Box 8007
> Raleigh, NC 27695
> (919) 515-6858
> Fax (919) 515-6307
> ******************************************
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> Name: Bruce MacDonald.vcf
> Bruce MacDonald.vcf Type: Plain Text (text/plain)
> Encoding: 7bit
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 22 Nov 2002 10:06:04 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Gilpin, Richard"
Subject: Re: CDC EA 101 Form
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
nice collection!
Richard
-----Original Message-----
From: Mark Campbell [mailto:campbem@SLU.EDU]
Sent: Friday, November 22, 2002 10:03 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: CDC EA 101 Form
This might help:
Mark J. Campbell, MS, CBSP
Saint Louis University
Bruce MacDonald wrote:
> Does anyone in the group know where on CDC's site you can find the EA
> 101 form? I've found the instructions for filling out the form but not
> the form itself. Thanks.
>
> ******************************************
> Bruce L. Macdonald MPH, CSP, RM
> Manager Health & Safety
> NC State University - EHS
> Box 8007
> Raleigh, NC 27695
> (919) 515-6858
> Fax (919) 515-6307
> ******************************************
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> Name: Bruce MacDonald.vcf
> Bruce MacDonald.vcf Type: Plain Text (text/plain)
> Encoding: 7bit
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 22 Nov 2002 10:58:57 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Jairo Betancourt
Subject: Re: Certificate of Origin-Int'l Shipping
In-Reply-To:
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Margaret: I am missing something (?):
1. You sent your shipment as "Diagnostic specimens" UN 3373.
According to IATA, Diagnostic specimens are exempt from the regulations.
It is not a Proper Shipping Name, therefore it does not have a UN
number. I could not find UN 3373. Where did you find it?
2. Your DNA samples are not a diagnostic specimen as per the
regulations, it is a biological product because somebody "manufactured"
or extracted from any organism or microorganism. If it is a Biological
Product not containing any infectious trait, therefore is not
Infectious. "not restricted" and it is not covered under the DGR
regulations and you do not have to use the "Shipper's Declaration of
Dangerous Goods"
Unless I am missing some information, I do believe that you can ship
your samples using the regular FeDex forms, checking the box for
non-hazardous items. Can some one correct me?
Jairo
Jairo Betancourt, RBP
Laboratory Safety Specialist
(305) 243-3400 Fax : (305) 243-3272
E-mail: jairob@miami.edu
-----Original Message-----
From: A Biosafety Discussion List [mailto:BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU] On
Behalf Of Margaret Rakas
Sent: Friday, November 22, 2002 9:49 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Certificate of Origin-Int'l Shipping
We were recently sending research samples of
non-pathogenic cDNA libraries to a university in Germany for further
research. When we completed the Fedex international shipping document
and offered the package, we were told we had to complete a Certificate
of Origin since Fedex had categorized our materials as "Biological
Products" but we said Diagnostic specimens, UN 3373, on the paperwork.
These materials were for research purposes only and we had assigned
$2.00 commercial value to them for custom's purposes. I have reviewed
the 'standard' COA form and done an internet search and while I cannot
find an exemption for research materials, I find it difficult to believe
that we are a 'manufacturer'. Has anyone else had this issue come up
when using Fedex and if so how have you dealt with it? It is possible
the Fedex employee didn't know what category to place the package in and
didn't understand the category Diagnostic specimens yet. Should we
offer $0 for value and write something like "RESEARCH MATERIALS ONLY"?
Many thanks
Margaret
Margaret A. Rakas, Ph.D.
Manager, Inventory & Regulatory Affairs
Clark Science Center
Smith College
------=_NextPart_000_0001_01C29216.2C081C20
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Date: Fri, 22 Nov 2002 10:14:44 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Joseph H. Coggin, Jr. Ph.D., Professor"
Organization: Department of Microbiology & Immunology,
University of South Alabama, College of Medicine, Mobile,
AL 36688 Phone (251) 460-6314; Fax (251) 460-7269
Subject: Re: Handling of human brains
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boundary="------------000109050009090509000000"
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Mike: According to the OSHA BBP Standard, handling human materials,
especially human brain [even if it in formalin for several years] can
and has transmitted Jakob Creutzfeldt prions to pathologists. This
requires BSL-2 containiment and practices!!!!!!!!!!!! No a good idea but
can be done with BSL-2 protections.
Joe Coggin
Mike Durham wrote:
> One of our faculty wants to use human brains in demonstrations in her
> classroom. She is asking for our guidance. She is a kinesiology
> professor. (Really)
>
> She would like to be able to handle the brains and allow students to
> "poke" around on them. Does anyone have guidelines for this type
> activity? Are there any legal/moral/safety/health issues you feel
> should be addressed?
>
> Thanks,
> Mike Durham
> LSU
--------------000109050009090509000000
Content-Type: text/html; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Mike: According to the OSHA BBP Standard, handling human
materials, especially human brain [even if it in formalin for
several years] can and has transmitted Jakob Creutzfeldt
prions to pathologists. This requires BSL-2 containiment and
practices!!!!!!!!!!!! No a good idea but can be done with
BSL-2 protections.
Joe Coggin
Mike Durham wrote:
http-equiv="Content-Type">
One of our faculty wants to use human brains in
demonstrations in her classroom. She is asking for our
guidance. She is a kinesiology professor. (Really)
She would like to be able to handle the size="2">Does anyone
have guidelines for this type activity? Are there any
legal/moral/safety/health issues you feel should be
addressed?
Thanks,
Mike Durham
LSU
--------------000109050009090509000000--
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 22 Nov 2002 09:14:59 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Hofherr, Leslie"
Subject: F. tularensis LVS strain
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Is the LVS strain of F. tularensis approved by FDA for human vaccination and
thus exempt from the select agent registration rule?
Is this strain avirulent and thus can be used in research experiments observing
BSL1 containment?
Thanks for any information.
Leslie Hofherr
UCLA
310-206-3929
leslie@admin.ucla.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 22 Nov 2002 12:19:12 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Kim Auletta
Subject: Re: F. tularensis LVS strain
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
We're using this strain & it is exempt from registration, but we're using
BSL 2.
Kim Auletta
Lab Safety Specialist
Environmental Health and Safety
SUNY Stony Brook
110 Suffolk Hall
Stony Brook, NY 11794-6200
phone: 631-632-9672
fax: 631-632-9683
email: kauletta@.sunysb.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 22 Nov 2002 10:52:17 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Dina Sassone
Subject: Re: CDC EA 101 Form
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
They purposely do not have the form available on the web...controlled
document. You can get a fax version from the select agent CDC guys.
At 10:06 AM 11/22/2002 -0500, you wrote:
>nice collection!
>Richard
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From: Mark Campbell [mailto:campbem@SLU.EDU]
>Sent: Friday, November 22, 2002 10:03 AM
>To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
>Subject: Re: CDC EA 101 Form
>
>
>This might help:
>
>
>
>Mark J. Campbell, MS, CBSP
>Saint Louis University
>
>Bruce MacDonald wrote:
>
> > Does anyone in the group know where on CDC's site you can find the EA
> > 101 form? I've found the instructions for filling out the form but not
> > the form itself. Thanks.
> >
> > ******************************************
> > Bruce L. Macdonald MPH, CSP, RM
> > Manager Health & Safety
> > NC State University - EHS
> > Box 8007
> > Raleigh, NC 27695
> > (919) 515-6858
> > Fax (919) 515-6307
> > ******************************************
> >
> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> > Name: Bruce MacDonald.vcf
> > Bruce MacDonald.vcf Type: Plain Text (text/plain)
> > Encoding: 7bit
Dina M. Sassone, CIH, CSP, SM (NRM), CBSP
University of California
Los Alamos National Laboratory
HSR-5
MS K486
Los Alamos, NM 87545
(505) 665-2977 (voice)
((505) 996-3807 (pager)
"To infinity and beyond"-Buzz Lightyear
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 22 Nov 2002 12:06:19 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Kathryn Harris
Subject: Re: Certificate of Origin-Int'l Shipping
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
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boundary="=====================_156969218==_.REL"
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Information on UN 3373 and a question too..
Straight from the email of a well known shipping material manufacturer:
Diagnostic specimens are being assigned a UN Number (UN 3373) by IATA and
that takes effect January 1/2003.
Diagnostic specimens remain under the umbrella of Class 6.2 Dangerous Goods
and as such are partially regulated (triple packaging, marking etc.)and
most shipments require the use of PI 650. In February 14/2003, when HM 226
becomes law in the US. 49CFR will be updated to include 173.199 which
basically brings the packaging requirements for diagnostic shipments within
the US up to IATA Packing Instruction 650 standards.
Question:
I am still confused about cDNA and protein extracts etc. from infectious
materials. I have a PI wanting to ship both of these types of sample
originating from Pseudomonas aeruginosa. Are these infectious material or
can they be shipped as biological products if the cDNA/protein itself is
not reasonably expected to cause an infection?
I have so many shipping information documents all over my office I can't
see the floor!
Kath Harris
At 10:58 AM 11/22/2002 -0500, you wrote:
>Margaret: I am missing something (?):
>
>
> * You sent your shipment as Diagnostic specimens UN 3373. According to
> IATA, Diagnostic specimens are exempt from the regulations. It is not a
> Proper Shipping Name, therefore it does not have a UN number. I could not
> find UN 3373. Where did you find it?
> * Your DNA samples are not a diagnostic specimen as per the
> regulations, it is a biological product because somebody manufactured or
> extracted from any organism or microorganism. If it is a Biological
> Product not containing any infectious trait, therefore is not Infectious.
> not restricted and it is not covered under the DGR regulations and you
> do not have to use the Shipper s Declaration of Dangerous Goods
>
>
>Unless I am missing some information, I do believe that you can ship your
>samples using the regular FeDex forms, checking the box for non-hazardous
>items. Can some one correct me?
>
>
>
>Jairo
>
>
>
>image001.gif
>
>Jairo Betancourt, RBP
>
>Laboratory Safety Specialist
>
>(305) 243-3400 Fax : (305) 243-3272
>
>E-mail: jairob@miami.edu
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From: A Biosafety Discussion List [mailto:BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU] On
>Behalf Of Margaret Rakas
>Sent: Friday, November 22, 2002 9:49 AM
>To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
>Subject: Certificate of Origin-Int'l Shipping
>
>
>
>We were recently sending research samples of
>
>non-pathogenic cDNA libraries to a university in Germany for further
>research. When we completed the Fedex international shipping document and
>offered the package, we were told we had to complete a Certificate of
>Origin since Fedex had categorized our materials as "Biological Products"
>but we said Diagnostic specimens, UN 3373, on the paperwork. These
>materials were for research purposes only and we had assigned $2.00
>commercial value to them for custom's purposes. I have reviewed the
>'standard' COA form and done an internet search and while I cannot find an
>exemption for research materials, I find it difficult to believe that we
>are a 'manufacturer'. Has anyone else had this issue come up when using
>Fedex and if so how have you dealt with it? It is possible the Fedex
>employee didn't know what category to place the package in and didn't
>understand the category Diagnostic specimens yet. Should we offer $0 for
>value and write something like "RESEARCH MATERIALS ONLY"?
>
>Many thanks
>
>Margaret
>
>
>
>Margaret A. Rakas, Ph.D.
>
>Manager, Inventory & Regulatory Affairs
>
>Clark Science Center
>Smith College
>
**********************************************
Kathryn Louise Harris, Ph.D.
Biological Safety Professional
Office of Research Safety
Northwestern University
NG-71 Technological Institute
2145 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208-3121
Phone: (847) 491-4387
Fax: (847) 467-2797
Email: kathrynharris@northwestern.edu
**********************************************
--=====================_156969234==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/html; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Information on UN 3373 and a question too..
Straight from the email of a well known shipping material
manufacturer:
Diagnostic specimens are being assigned a UN Number (UN 3373)
by IATA and that takes effect January 1/2003.
Diagnostic specimens remain under the umbrella of Class 6.2
Dangerous Goods and as such are partially regulated (triple
packaging, marking etc.)and most shipments require the use of
PI 650. In February 14/2003, when HM 226 becomes law in the
US. 49CFR will be updated to include 173.199 which basically
brings the packaging requirements for diagnostic shipments
within the US up to IATA Packing Instruction 650 standards.
Question:
I am still confused about cDNA and protein extracts etc. from
infectious materials. I have a PI wanting to ship both of
these types of sample originating from Pseudomonas aeruginosa.
Are these infectious material or can they be shipped as
biological products if the cDNA/protein itself is not
reasonably expected to cause an infection?
I have so many shipping information documents all over my
office I can't see the floor!
Kath Harris
At 10:58 AM 11/22/2002 -0500, you wrote:
r=3D"#000080">Margaret: I am missing something (?):
You sent your shipment as Diagnostic specimens UN 3373.
According to IATA, Diagnostic specimens are exempt from the
regulations. It is not a Proper Shipping Name, therefore it
does not have a UN number. I could not find UN 3373. Where
did you find it?
Your DNA samples are not a diagnostic specimen as per the
regulations, it is a biological product because somebody
manufactured or extracted from any organism or
microorganism. If it is a Biological Product not containing
any infectious trait, therefore is not Infectious. not
restricted and it is not covered under the DGR regulations
and you do not have to use the Shipper s Declaration of
Dangerous Goods
Unless I am missing some information, I do believe that you
can ship your samples using the regular FeDex forms, checking
the box for non-hazardous items. Can some one correct me?
Jairo
face=3D"Times New Roman, Times" color=3D"#000080">
Jairo Betancourt, RBP
Laboratory Safety Specialist
(305) 243-3400 Fax : (305) 243-3272
E-mail: jairob@miami.edu
-----Original Message-----
From: A Biosafety Discussion List [mailto:BIOSAF=
TY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU] On Behalf Of Margaret Rakas
Sent: Friday, November 22, 2002 9:49 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Certificate of Origin-Int'l Shipping
We were recently sending research samples of
non-pathogenic cDNA libraries to a university in Germany for
further research. When we completed the Fedex international
shipping document and offered the package, we were told we had
to complete a Certificate of Origin since Fedex had
categorized our materials as "Biological Products" but we said
Diagnostic specimens, UN 3373, on the paperwork. These
materials were for research purposes only and we had assigned
$2.00 commercial value to them for custom's purposes. I have
reviewed the 'standard' COA form and done an internet search
and while I cannot find an exemption for research materials, I
find it difficult to believe that we are a 'manufacturer'.
Has anyone else had this issue come up when using Fedex and if
so how have you dealt with it? It is possible the Fedex
employee didn't know what category to place the package in and
didn't understand the category Diagnostic specimens yet.
Should we offer $0 for value and write something like
"RESEARCH MATERIALS ONLY"?
Many thanks
Margaret
Margaret A. Rakas, Ph.D.
Manager, Inventory & Regulatory Affairs
Clark Science Center
Smith College
**********************************************
Kathryn Louise Harris, Ph.D.
Biological Safety Professional
Office of Research Safety
Northwestern University
NG-71 Technological Institute
2145 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208-3121
Phone: (847) 491-4387
Fax: (847) 467-2797
Email: kathrynharris@northwestern.edu
**********************************************
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=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 22 Nov 2002 13:36:06 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Hauck, Philip"
Subject: Re: Certificate of Origin-Int'l Shipping
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: multipart/mixed; boundary="Boundary_(ID_WcgeT69bUt2BMKjQgGa4FA)"
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Content-transfer-encoding: quoted-printable
Fed-Ex, and some other carriers in general have been going =
"nut-zo" over the requirements in the 49 CFR Regs regarding =
Haz-Mat Training.
As an Offeror / Shipper of Infectious Substances or =
Clinical Specimens, you should have enough understanding and =
training in knowing how to fill out the documents required, what =
labeling and handling instructions, and what packaging is =
required for shipping your specimens. I have people asking me about =
receiving HAZ - MAT Training so they can ship their =
materials, because the carriers are asking for documentation!! Next I'll =
have to give Driver Training on how to safely ship the =
material by truck, or send them for 40 hour Haz-Mat Training!!
As I said, my read is that you must train your people in:
General Awareness Training: At a minimum, all hazmat employees must be =
given a general understanding of the entire hazardous materials =
transportation program, so that they know how their jobs fit into the =
system.
And:
Function-Specific Training: Each employee (by job function) also must =
be trained on any requirements that he or she must meet in performing =
transportation-related duties.
Even stretching this as thin as I can, it means I have to train people =
in the relevant regulations (Most are in the BMBL and related sites, and =
ABSA's Bio Resources) and practices centered around shipping specimens, =
R-DNA material and Microbial Stock Cultures. I can do that case - by- =
case and if needed, issue a Letter or Memo documenting training - who, =
what ,where, and when and sign it as a recognized Professional-see there =
is value to being an RBP or CBSP! As to how they are coming to their =
interpretations of the definitions regarding the actual shipments-I =
haven't a clue!! I think it all has to do with getting rid of / limiting =
Liability....which they can't do with their disclaimers.
Phil Hauck
Mt. Sinai School of Medicine
-----Original Message-----
From: Margaret Rakas [mailto:mrakas@EMAIL.SMITH.EDU]
Sent: Friday, November 22, 2002 9:49 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Certificate of Origin-Int'l Shipping
We were recently sending research samples of
non-pathogenic cDNA libraries to a university in Germany for further =
research. When we completed the Fedex international shipping document =
and offered the package, we were told we had to complete a Certificate =
of Origin since Fedex had categorized our materials as "Biological =
Products" but we said Diagnostic specimens, UN 3373, on the paperwork. =
These materials were for research purposes only and we had assigned =
$2.00 commercial value to them for custom's purposes. I have reviewed =
the 'standard' COA form and done an internet search and while I cannot =
find an exemption for research materials, I find it difficult to believe =
that we are a 'manufacturer'. Has anyone else had this issue come up =
when using Fedex and if so how have you dealt with it? It is possible =
the Fedex employee didn't know what category to place the package in and =
didn't understand the category Diagnostic specimens yet. Should we =
offer $0 for value and write something like "RESEARCH MATERIALS ONLY"?
Many thanks
Margaret
Margaret A. Rakas, Ph.D.
Manager, Inventory & Regulatory Affairs
Clark Science Center
Smith College
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 22 Nov 2002 14:08:16 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Robert N. Latsch"
Subject: Re: Certificate of Origin-Int'l Shipping
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
There may be some justification for them going nutzo. I recently was at a
DOT then an IATA conference.
According to the DOT guys. Coming soon to an airport near you. If
violations are found, the company AND the individual will be fined. The
transporter can get separate fines if they fail to catch shipper errors.
The individual fines are said to run about 3 figures. That will dent my
wallet. I do not know when this is going to happen.
Bob
>
>
> Fed-Ex, and some other carriers in general have been going
> nut-zo over the requirements in the 49 CFR Regs regarding
>Haz-Mat Training.
>
>
>
>
>
> As an Offeror / Shipper of Infectious Substances or Clinical
>Specimens, you should have enough understanding and training
>in knowing how to fill out the documents required, what labeling and
>handling instructions, and what packaging is required for
>shipping your specimens. I have people asking me about receiving HAZ - MAT
>Training so they can ship their materials, because the
>carriers are asking for documentation!! Next I ll have to give Driver
>Training on how to safely ship the material by truck, or send
>them for 40 hour Haz-Mat Training!!
>
>
>As I said, my read is that you must train your people in:
>
>
> General Awareness Training: At a minimum, all hazmat employees must be
>given a general understanding of the entire hazardous materials
>transportation program, so that they know how their jobs fit into the
>system.
>
>
>And:
>
>
> Function-Specific Training: Each employee (by job function) also must be
>trained on any requirements that he or she must meet in performing
>transportation-related duties.
>
>
>Even stretching this as thin as I can, it means I have to train people in
>the relevant regulations (Most are in the BMBL and related sites, and ABSA
> s Bio Resources) and practices centered around shipping specimens, R-DNA
>material and Microbial Stock Cultures. I can do that case by- case and
>if needed, issue a Letter or Memo documenting training - who, what
>,where, and when and sign it as a recognized Professional-see there is
>value to being an RBP or CBSP! As to how they are coming to their
>interpretations of the definitions regarding the actual shipments I haven
> t a clue!! I think it all has to do with getting rid of / limiting
>Liability &.which they can t do with their disclaimers.
>
>
>Phil Hauck
>
>
>Mt. Sinai School of Medicine
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>-----Original Message-----
> From: Margaret Rakas [mailto:mrakas@EMAIL.SMITH.EDU]
> Sent: Friday, November 22, 2002 9:49 AM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: Certificate of Origin-Int'l Shipping
>
>
>
>
>
>We were recently sending research samples of
>
>
>non-pathogenic cDNA libraries to a university in Germany for further
>research. When we completed the Fedex international shipping document and
>offered the package, we were told we had to complete a Certificate of
>Origin since Fedex had categorized our materials as "Biological Products"
>but we said Diagnostic specimens, UN 3373, on the paperwork. These
>materials were for research purposes only and we had assigned $2.00
>commercial value to them for custom's purposes. I have reviewed the
>'standard' COA form and done an internet search and while I cannot find an
>exemption for research materials, I find it difficult to believe that we
>are a 'manufacturer'. Has anyone else had this issue come up when using
>Fedex and if so how have you dealt with it? It is possible the Fedex
>employee didn't know what category to place the package in and didn't
>understand the category Diagnostic specimens yet. Should we offer $0 for
>value and write something like "RESEARCH MATERIALS ONLY"?
>
>
>Many thanks
>
>
>Margaret
>
>
>
>
>
>Margaret A. Rakas, Ph.D.
>
>
>Manager, Inventory & Regulatory Affairs
>
>
>Clark Science Center
> Smith College
>
>Content-type: application/msword;
> name="Training Requirements Under the Hazardous Materials Regulations.doc"
>Content-disposition: attachment;
> filename="Training Requirements Under the Hazardous Materials
>Regulations.doc"
>Content-description: Training Requirements Under the Hazardous Materials
> Regulations.doc
>
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>(00027A8C)
>Content-type: application/msword; name=Training_TransportRegs.doc
>Content-disposition: attachment; filename=Training_TransportRegs.doc
>Content-description: Training_TransportRegs.doc
>
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>(00027A8D)
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>Content-disposition: attachment; filename="TITLE 49Training Requirements.doc"
>Content-description: TITLE 49Training Requirements.doc
>
>Attachment converted: Siberia:TITLE 49Training Requirements.d (WDBN/MSWD)
>(00027A90)
_____________________________________________________________________
__ / _____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 22 Nov 2002 14:40:46 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Gilpin, Richard"
Subject: Re: Certificate of Origin-Int'l Shipping
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
yes...the new IATA language does put the transporter (read overnight
delivery company) at risk, it's about time!
Richard
-----Original Message-----
From: Robert N. Latsch [mailto:rnl2@PO.CWRU.EDU]
Sent: Friday, November 22, 2002 02:08 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Certificate of Origin-Int'l Shipping
There may be some justification for them going nutzo. I recently was at a
DOT then an IATA conference.
According to the DOT guys. Coming soon to an airport near you. If
violations are found, the company AND the individual will be fined. The
transporter can get separate fines if they fail to catch shipper errors.
The individual fines are said to run about 3 figures. That will dent my
wallet. I do not know when this is going to happen.
Bob
>
>
> Fed-Ex, and some other carriers in general have been going
> nut-zo over the requirements in the 49 CFR Regs regarding
>Haz-Mat Training.
>
>
>
>
>
> As an Offeror / Shipper of Infectious Substances or Clinical
>Specimens, you should have enough understanding and training
>in knowing how to fill out the documents required, what labeling and
>handling instructions, and what packaging is required for
>shipping your specimens. I have people asking me about receiving HAZ - MAT
>Training so they can ship their materials, because the
>carriers are asking for documentation!! Next I ll have to give Driver
>Training on how to safely ship the material by truck, or send
>them for 40 hour Haz-Mat Training!!
>
>
>As I said, my read is that you must train your people in:
>
>
> General Awareness Training: At a minimum, all hazmat employees must be
>given a general understanding of the entire hazardous materials
>transportation program, so that they know how their jobs fit into the
>system.
>
>
>And:
>
>
> Function-Specific Training: Each employee (by job function) also must be
>trained on any requirements that he or she must meet in performing
>transportation-related duties.
>
>
>Even stretching this as thin as I can, it means I have to train people in
>the relevant regulations (Most are in the BMBL and related sites, and ABSA
> s Bio Resources) and practices centered around shipping specimens, R-DNA
>material and Microbial Stock Cultures. I can do that case by- case and
>if needed, issue a Letter or Memo documenting training - who, what
>,where, and when and sign it as a recognized Professional-see there is
>value to being an RBP or CBSP! As to how they are coming to their
>interpretations of the definitions regarding the actual shipments I haven
> t a clue!! I think it all has to do with getting rid of / limiting
>Liability &.which they can t do with their disclaimers.
>
>
>Phil Hauck
>
>
>Mt. Sinai School of Medicine
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>-----Original Message-----
> From: Margaret Rakas [mailto:mrakas@EMAIL.SMITH.EDU]
> Sent: Friday, November 22, 2002 9:49 AM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: Certificate of Origin-Int'l Shipping
>
>
>
>
>
>We were recently sending research samples of
>
>
>non-pathogenic cDNA libraries to a university in Germany for further
>research. When we completed the Fedex international shipping document and
>offered the package, we were told we had to complete a Certificate of
>Origin since Fedex had categorized our materials as "Biological Products"
>but we said Diagnostic specimens, UN 3373, on the paperwork. These
>materials were for research purposes only and we had assigned $2.00
>commercial value to them for custom's purposes. I have reviewed the
>'standard' COA form and done an internet search and while I cannot find an
>exemption for research materials, I find it difficult to believe that we
>are a 'manufacturer'. Has anyone else had this issue come up when using
>Fedex and if so how have you dealt with it? It is possible the Fedex
>employee didn't know what category to place the package in and didn't
>understand the category Diagnostic specimens yet. Should we offer $0 for
>value and write something like "RESEARCH MATERIALS ONLY"?
>
>
>Many thanks
>
>
>Margaret
>
>
>
>
>
>Margaret A. Rakas, Ph.D.
>
>
>Manager, Inventory & Regulatory Affairs
>
>
>Clark Science Center
> Smith College
>
>Content-type: application/msword;
> name="Training Requirements Under the Hazardous Materials Regulations.doc"
>Content-disposition: attachment;
> filename="Training Requirements Under the Hazardous Materials
>Regulations.doc"
>Content-description: Training Requirements Under the Hazardous Materials
> Regulations.doc
>
>Attachment converted: Siberia:Training Requirements Under the (WDBN/MSWD)
>(00027A8C)
>Content-type: application/msword; name=Training_TransportRegs.doc
>Content-disposition: attachment; filename=Training_TransportRegs.doc
>Content-description: Training_TransportRegs.doc
>
>Attachment converted: Siberia:Training_TransportRegs.doc (WDBN/MSWD)
>(00027A8D)
>Content-type: application/msword; name="TITLE 49Training Requirements.doc"
>Content-disposition: attachment; filename="TITLE 49Training
Requirements.doc"
>Content-description: TITLE 49Training Requirements.doc
>
>Attachment converted: Siberia:TITLE 49Training Requirements.d (WDBN/MSWD)
>(00027A90)
_____________________________________________________________________
__ /
_____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 22 Nov 2002 14:46:38 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Robert N. Latsch"
Subject: Re: Certificate of Origin-Int'l Shipping
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
They were planning on getting the shipper and the transporters.
Bob
>yes...the new IATA language does put the transporter (read overnight
>delivery company) at risk, it's about time!
>Richard
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From: Robert N. Latsch [mailto:rnl2@PO.CWRU.EDU]
>Sent: Friday, November 22, 2002 02:08 PM
>To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
>Subject: Re: Certificate of Origin-Int'l Shipping
>
>
>There may be some justification for them going nutzo. I recently was at a
>DOT then an IATA conference.
>
>According to the DOT guys. Coming soon to an airport near you. If
>violations are found, the company AND the individual will be fined. The
>transporter can get separate fines if they fail to catch shipper errors.
>The individual fines are said to run about 3 figures. That will dent my
>wallet. I do not know when this is going to happen.
>
>Bob
>
>>
>>
>> Fed-Ex, and some other carriers in general have been going
>> nut-zo over the requirements in the 49 CFR Regs regarding
>>Haz-Mat Training.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> As an Offeror / Shipper of Infectious Substances or Clinical
>>Specimens, you should have enough understanding and training
>>in knowing how to fill out the documents required, what labeling and
>>handling instructions, and what packaging is required for
>>shipping your specimens. I have people asking me about receiving HAZ - MAT
>>Training so they can ship their materials, because the
>>carriers are asking for documentation!! Next I ll have to give Driver
>>Training on how to safely ship the material by truck, or send
>>them for 40 hour Haz-Mat Training!!
>>
>>
>>As I said, my read is that you must train your people in:
>>
>>
>> General Awareness Training: At a minimum, all hazmat employees must be
>>given a general understanding of the entire hazardous materials
>>transportation program, so that they know how their jobs fit into the
>>system.
>>
>>
>>And:
>>
>>
>> Function-Specific Training: Each employee (by job function) also must be
>>trained on any requirements that he or she must meet in performing
>>transportation-related duties.
>>
>>
>>Even stretching this as thin as I can, it means I have to train people in
>>the relevant regulations (Most are in the BMBL and related sites, and ABSA
>> s Bio Resources) and practices centered around shipping specimens, R-DNA
>>material and Microbial Stock Cultures. I can do that case by- case and
>>if needed, issue a Letter or Memo documenting training - who, what
>>,where, and when and sign it as a recognized Professional-see there is
>>value to being an RBP or CBSP! As to how they are coming to their
>>interpretations of the definitions regarding the actual shipments I haven
>> t a clue!! I think it all has to do with getting rid of / limiting
>>Liability &.which they can t do with their disclaimers.
>>
>>
>>Phil Hauck
>>
>>
>>Mt. Sinai School of Medicine
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>-----Original Message-----
>> From: Margaret Rakas [mailto:mrakas@EMAIL.SMITH.EDU]
>> Sent: Friday, November 22, 2002 9:49 AM
>> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
>> Subject: Certificate of Origin-Int'l Shipping
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>We were recently sending research samples of
>>
>>
>>non-pathogenic cDNA libraries to a university in Germany for further
>>research. When we completed the Fedex international shipping document and
>>offered the package, we were told we had to complete a Certificate of
>>Origin since Fedex had categorized our materials as "Biological Products"
>>but we said Diagnostic specimens, UN 3373, on the paperwork. These
>>materials were for research purposes only and we had assigned $2.00
>>commercial value to them for custom's purposes. I have reviewed the
>>'standard' COA form and done an internet search and while I cannot find an
>>exemption for research materials, I find it difficult to believe that we
>>are a 'manufacturer'. Has anyone else had this issue come up when using
>>Fedex and if so how have you dealt with it? It is possible the Fedex
>>employee didn't know what category to place the package in and didn't
>>understand the category Diagnostic specimens yet. Should we offer $0 for
>>value and write something like "RESEARCH MATERIALS ONLY"?
>>
>>
>>Many thanks
>>
>>
>>Margaret
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>Margaret A. Rakas, Ph.D.
>>
>>
>>Manager, Inventory & Regulatory Affairs
>>
>>
>>Clark Science Center
>> Smith College
>>
>>Content-type: application/msword;
>> name="Training Requirements Under the Hazardous Materials Regulations.doc"
>>Content-disposition: attachment;
>> filename="Training Requirements Under the Hazardous Materials
>>Regulations.doc"
>>Content-description: Training Requirements Under the Hazardous Materials
>> Regulations.doc
>>
>>Attachment converted: Siberia:Training Requirements Under the (WDBN/MSWD)
>>(00027A8C)
>>Content-type: application/msword; name=Training_TransportRegs.doc
>>Content-disposition: attachment; filename=Training_TransportRegs.doc
>>Content-description: Training_TransportRegs.doc
>>
>>Attachment converted: Siberia:Training_TransportRegs.doc (WDBN/MSWD)
>>(00027A8D)
>>Content-type: application/msword; name="TITLE 49Training Requirements.doc"
>>Content-disposition: attachment; filename="TITLE 49Training
>Requirements.doc"
>>Content-description: TITLE 49Training Requirements.doc
>>
>>Attachment converted: Siberia:TITLE 49Training Requirements.d (WDBN/MSWD)
>>(00027A90)
>
>
>
>_____________________________________________________________________
>__ /
>_____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
>_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
> \ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
> \ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
> \__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
_____________________________________________________________________
__ / _____________________AMIGA_LIVES!___________________________________
_ \ / /Robert N. Latsch USSF State Referee 6 CWRU
\ \ / / 27610 Tremiane Dr. USSF Assessor 7 Occupational &
\ \/ / Euclid, Ohio, 44132 High School, Indoor Environmental Safety
\__/ U.S.A. RA Member Personal e-mail rlatsch@
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 22 Nov 2002 15:49:43 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Hauck, Philip"
Subject: Re: CDC EA 101 Form
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: multipart/mixed; boundary="Boundary_(ID_1Kh5SeKvflaGiWDTh470XQ)"
This is a multi-part message in MIME format.
--Boundary_(ID_1Kh5SeKvflaGiWDTh470XQ)
Content-type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-transfer-encoding: quoted-printable
One Caveat! Do Not put an EA 101 on your website....Notice, I didn't, or =
else you will have no way of preventing a researcher from doing an =
end-run around you...not that they ever do things like that, right?
But,seriously, if you have some people who do not want to wait for the =
amendment process,( I have two in, one is @ 1 year old and waiting, the =
other 6-months and counting ) it is an easy temptation to download and =
"do it yourself" and avoid the wait. The RFO is the individual who is =
the gate keeper on these forms and on the whole transfer process. You =
will also be held accountable for any "discrepancies"...read the =
signature blocks and see what you are swearing to, under penalty of =
fines and imprisonment( yes, you too can have your very own cell...just =
like the ones at Alcatraz!). Keep the EA 101's under Lock and Key, and =
give them out only as part of an actually filing.
Phil Hauck
-----Original Message-----
From: Gilpin, Richard [mailto:rgilpin@EHS.UMARYLAND.EDU]
Sent: Friday, November 22, 2002 10:06 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: CDC EA 101 Form
nice collection!
Richard
-----Original Message-----
From: Mark Campbell [mailto:campbem@SLU.EDU]
Sent: Friday, November 22, 2002 10:03 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: CDC EA 101 Form
This might help:
Mark J. Campbell, MS, CBSP
Saint Louis University
Bruce MacDonald wrote:
> Does anyone in the group know where on CDC's site you can find the EA
> 101 form? I've found the instructions for filling out the form but not
> the form itself. Thanks.
>
> ******************************************
> Bruce L. Macdonald MPH, CSP, RM
> Manager Health & Safety
> NC State University - EHS
> Box 8007
> Raleigh, NC 27695
> (919) 515-6858
> Fax (919) 515-6307
> ******************************************
>
> =
------------------------------------------------------------------------
> Name: Bruce MacDonald.vcf
> Bruce MacDonald.vcf Type: Plain Text (text/plain)
> Encoding: 7bit
--Boundary_(ID_1Kh5SeKvflaGiWDTh470XQ)
Content-type: application/msword; name=Chart1SAL.doc
Content-transfer-encoding: BASE64
Content-disposition: attachment; filename=Chart1SAL.doc
Content-description: Chart1SAL.doc
Content-type: application/msword; name="Instructions for LR_SAT.doc"
Content-transfer-encoding: BASE64
Content-disposition: attachment; filename="Instructions for LR_SAT.doc"
Content-description: Instructions for LR_SAT.doc
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 22 Nov 2002 17:12:44 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Kathryn Harris
Subject: BL 3 and a half
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
Hi All,
I know there was just a recent slew of posts about BL3 facilities which I
intend to go back and muse over, but can anyone point me in the right
direction for starting to educate myself on BL3 and BL3+ lab design and
requirements etc (beyond what one can find in the BMBL of course). We have
someone who wants a BL3.5??? lab.
Much appreciated..
Kath
**********************************************
Kathryn Louise Harris, Ph.D.
Biological Safety Professional
Office of Research Safety
Northwestern University
NG-71 Technological Institute
2145 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208-3121
Phone: (847) 491-4387
Fax: (847) 467-2797
Email: kathrynharris@northwestern.edu
**********************************************
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 22 Nov 2002 15:38:47 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Funk, Glenn"
Subject: Re: BL 3 and a half
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Kath -
BSL-X+ labs exist only in the minds of their creators and users. In other
words, there are no official guidelines for what constitutes a BSL2+ or
BSL3+ lab. You won't find them listed in the BMBL, the rDNA Guidelines, the
USDA ARS Manual. The most common interpretation of the "+" term is a lab
that meets the physical and equipment requirements of BSL-X but uses the
operational, i.e., work practice requirements of the next higher level of
containment.
There are two important points here: (1) you must define what you mean by
BSL-X+ in the context of your own operation, and establish that common
understanding among those who are affected by that lab, and (2), if you want
a "+" lab as an approved reduction in what would otherwise be a higher level
(for example, using a BSL-3+ lab because the conditions don't quite justify
a BSL-4 lab), you should document the lab director's justification and
approval pretty thoroughly. Section 6, pg 86, of the BMBL allows the lab
director to "adjust" the containment level of a lab, based on certain
criteria. While these adjustments clearly result in what most folks
consider the "+" levels, the term "+" is not used.
For basic lab design requirements, you might check out the USDA Agricultural
Research Svc ARS Manual 242.1 August 30, 1991 (Construction Project Design
Standard). Try . Chapter
9.4.3 provides BSL-3 guidance.
Hope this helps.
-- Glenn
Glenn A. Funk, Ph.D., CBSP
Director and Biosafety Officer
Environment, Health and Safety
MedImmune Vaccines, Inc.
408-845-8847
-----Original Message-----
From: Kathryn Harris [mailto:kathrynharris@NORTHWESTERN.EDU]
Sent: Friday, November 22, 2002 3:13 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: BL 3 and a half
Hi All,
I know there was just a recent slew of posts about BL3 facilities which I
intend to go back and muse over, but can anyone point me in the right
direction for starting to educate myself on BL3 and BL3+ lab design and
requirements etc (beyond what one can find in the BMBL of course). We have
someone who wants a BL3.5??? lab.
Much appreciated..
Kath
**********************************************
Kathryn Louise Harris, Ph.D.
Biological Safety Professional
Office of Research Safety
Northwestern University
NG-71 Technological Institute
2145 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208-3121
Phone: (847) 491-4387
Fax: (847) 467-2797
Email: kathrynharris@northwestern.edu
**********************************************
=========================================================================
Date: Sat, 23 Nov 2002 14:38:17 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Rowe, Thomas"
Subject: Re: BL 3 and a half
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
BL3+ or BL# and 1/2 has now been designated BSL-3Ag by the USDA. In our
"BL-3+" lab we utilize BL-3 guidelines with these additions: 1)Mandatory
respirator usage (PAPR or N99 Mask), 2)Change in (Scrubs, wrap-around gown,
shoe covers, double glove), and 3)Mandatory shower out. These conditions
are used when working with exotic avian influenza viruses, since they pose a
threat to both humans and domestic poultry. You can refer to chapter on
Biocontainment of highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses in the Anthology
of Biosafety, Vol II - Facility Design Considerations published by ABSA for
further information.
I hope this helps.
Thanks,
Thomas Rowe
CDC Influenza Branch
-----Original Message-----
From: Kathryn Harris
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Sent: 11/22/2002 6:12 PM
Subject: BL 3 and a half
Hi All,
I know there was just a recent slew of posts about BL3 facilities which
I
intend to go back and muse over, but can anyone point me in the right
direction for starting to educate myself on BL3 and BL3+ lab design and
requirements etc (beyond what one can find in the BMBL of course). We
have
someone who wants a BL3.5??? lab.
Much appreciated..
Kath
**********************************************
Kathryn Louise Harris, Ph.D.
Biological Safety Professional
Office of Research Safety
Northwestern University
NG-71 Technological Institute
2145 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208-3121
Phone: (847) 491-4387
Fax: (847) 467-2797
Email: kathrynharris@northwestern.edu
**********************************************
=========================================================================
Date: Sun, 24 Nov 2002 14:42:56 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Elizabeth Smith
Subject: Bizarre, yet true: biosafety question for non-occupational
In-Reply-To:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Good afternoon,
Have you ever been confronted with someone whose paradigm of the
world is just so completely different that you simply stare and
wonder *how* they came to have an understanding so completely
different than yours ...? Normally this happens when discussing
such trivial matters as religion or politics. I finally found
it (indirectly) in biosafety. This isn't the old
run-of-the-mill "I don't think safety glasses are important"
thing, oh, no.
So, while this is (thankfully) not a work-related issue, as it
doesn't involve anyone I work with or anyone in the safety
field, it is still a biosafety-ish question, and a bit long, to
be able to explain it.
So, a friend tells me that he doesn't think the use of soap is
necessary to clean himself. He has developed what I call a
theory of solubility, as it all relates to what is and isn't
water soluble. His opinion is as follows:
Oil is an important component of your skin working right (no oil
= dry skin and eczema (sp?). Soap dissolves oil, and will
therefore disrupt the "natural balance" of the skin. Therefore
soap is to be avoided during the normal daily bathing. (Shampoo
is apparently okay, as not using it leaves one's hair too oily
and therefore unattractive.)
Such things as grease and cooking oil should be removed from the
body, as they would leave stains on things, and soap is the
obvious choice for removal.
So far, this only addresses the issue of unpleasant body odor,
which might be a social problem, but not a safety one. But ...
Washing one's hands after using the toilet, to continue the
explaination I was given, is intended to remove trace amounts of
urine or feces, both of which are water soluble. Therefore soap
is not needed to remove them. I should emphasize that he was
discussing the "ordinary person" - not nurses/physicians or
those attempting to work in sterile or clean environments.
So, my questions are:
1. how important is the use of soap in the cleaning of one's
hands for personal hygiene after using the bathroom? I simply
grew up with the belief that one would wash one's hands - with
soap - for this. In my professional carrer, I was told once
(can't recall where) that the mechanical removal of bacteria is
as important, if not more important, than the presence of soap.
So, maybe he has a point (not that I'm giving up soap!).
The person in question is a scientist, who clings with something
neigh unto religious fervor to the belief that he is "rational".
So, since he is persuade-able by the power of data, my second
question is:
2. Are there studies (and this is the occupaional health part)
demonstrating the efficacy of hand-washing with different
methods (with soap vs. without)? I assume those in the health
care industry would have looked into this extensively, since
clean hands are so important to the minimization of infection.
Please reply off-line at safety_queen@.
Have a nice Thanksgiving. And be sure to wash your hands -
repeatedly - with soap - while cooking the Turkey.
Elizabeth
=====
Elizabeth Smith
Environmental, Health & Safety Manager
BioPort Corporation
3500 N. Martin L. King Blvd.
Lansing, MI 48906
__________________________________________________
Do you Yahoo!?
Yahoo! Mail Plus Powerful. Affordable. Sign up now.
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 25 Nov 2002 09:44:35 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Hauck, Philip"
Subject: Re: BL 3 and a half
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
Content-transfer-encoding: quoted-printable
The ABSA Anthology of Biosafety-#2 Facility Design Consideration isd an =
excellent resource to start, and "Designing a Modern =
Microbiological/Biomedical Laboratory: Lab Design Process & Technology, =
Am. Public Health Association are two very good resources. I think the =
most recent ABSA Anthology also has a section on BSL3 in it. These will =
give you some "bang for the buck" very quickly.
Phil Hauck
-----Original Message-----
From: Kathryn Harris [mailto:kathrynharris@NORTHWESTERN.EDU]
Sent: Friday, November 22, 2002 6:13 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: BL 3 and a half
Hi All,
I know there was just a recent slew of posts about BL3 facilities which =
I
intend to go back and muse over, but can anyone point me in the right
direction for starting to educate myself on BL3 and BL3+ lab design and
requirements etc (beyond what one can find in the BMBL of course). We =
have
someone who wants a BL3.5??? lab.
Much appreciated..
Kath
**********************************************
Kathryn Louise Harris, Ph.D.
Biological Safety Professional
Office of Research Safety
Northwestern University
NG-71 Technological Institute
2145 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208-3121
Phone: (847) 491-4387
Fax: (847) 467-2797
Email: kathrynharris@northwestern.edu
**********************************************
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 25 Nov 2002 09:59:21 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Hauck, Philip"
Subject: Re: Bizarre, yet true: biosafety question for non-occupational
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
Content-transfer-encoding: quoted-printable
I have a very simple solution to this, Elizabeth.
Take your friend, and TSA plates into a lab. Devide the two plates in =
half with a sharpie pen and mark them "before" and "after". On the =
"before" side rub your fingertips gingerly over the surface of the agar =
taking care not to break the surface or push the agar out. Next, have =
your friend wash his hands w/o soap, and you wash yours....and hedge the =
bet in your favor, do the "surgeon's " wash with a lot of mechanical =
friction and a good rinsing. Now, both of you run your finger tips over =
the "after" side. Incubate at 37 deg. C. for 3-4 days and, Voila! Your =
friend will start using soap on his hands again.
We did this as a routine experiment in hygiene during the Principles of =
Microbiology Course I taught at U. Kentucky as a TA....I noticed shortly =
after that lab people were a little more fastidious about hand =
washing...even the nurses who thought they were doing a good job. And =
the demo speaks more loudly than words or figures....the colonies are =
right off of YOUR fingertips! Remember, Ignaz Semmelweiss was Right!!!
Philip Hauck, MS,MSHS, CBSP, SM(NRM)
Mt Sinai School of Medicine
-----Original Message-----
From: Elizabeth Smith [mailto:safety_queen@]
Sent: Sunday, November 24, 2002 5:43 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Bizarre, yet true: biosafety question for non-occupational
Good afternoon,
Have you ever been confronted with someone whose paradigm of the
world is just so completely different that you simply stare and
wonder *how* they came to have an understanding so completely
different than yours ...? Normally this happens when discussing
such trivial matters as religion or politics. I finally found
it (indirectly) in biosafety. This isn't the old
run-of-the-mill "I don't think safety glasses are important"
thing, oh, no.
So, while this is (thankfully) not a work-related issue, as it
doesn't involve anyone I work with or anyone in the safety
field, it is still a biosafety-ish question, and a bit long, to
be able to explain it.
So, a friend tells me that he doesn't think the use of soap is
necessary to clean himself. He has developed what I call a
theory of solubility, as it all relates to what is and isn't
water soluble. His opinion is as follows:
Oil is an important component of your skin working right (no oil
=3D dry skin and eczema (sp?). Soap dissolves oil, and will
therefore disrupt the "natural balance" of the skin. Therefore
soap is to be avoided during the normal daily bathing. (Shampoo
is apparently okay, as not using it leaves one's hair too oily
and therefore unattractive.)
Such things as grease and cooking oil should be removed from the
body, as they would leave stains on things, and soap is the
obvious choice for removal.
So far, this only addresses the issue of unpleasant body odor,
which might be a social problem, but not a safety one. But ...
Washing one's hands after using the toilet, to continue the
explaination I was given, is intended to remove trace amounts of
urine or feces, both of which are water soluble. Therefore soap
is not needed to remove them. I should emphasize that he was
discussing the "ordinary person" - not nurses/physicians or
those attempting to work in sterile or clean environments.
So, my questions are:
1. how important is the use of soap in the cleaning of one's
hands for personal hygiene after using the bathroom? I simply
grew up with the belief that one would wash one's hands - with
soap - for this. In my professional carrer, I was told once
(can't recall where) that the mechanical removal of bacteria is
as important, if not more important, than the presence of soap.
So, maybe he has a point (not that I'm giving up soap!).
The person in question is a scientist, who clings with something
neigh unto religious fervor to the belief that he is "rational".
So, since he is persuade-able by the power of data, my second
question is:
2. Are there studies (and this is the occupaional health part)
demonstrating the efficacy of hand-washing with different
methods (with soap vs. without)? I assume those in the health
care industry would have looked into this extensively, since
clean hands are so important to the minimization of infection.
Please reply off-line at safety_queen@.
Have a nice Thanksgiving. And be sure to wash your hands -
repeatedly - with soap - while cooking the Turkey.
Elizabeth
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
Elizabeth Smith
Environmental, Health & Safety Manager
BioPort Corporation
3500 N. Martin L. King Blvd.
Lansing, MI 48906
__________________________________________________
Do you Yahoo!?
Yahoo! Mail Plus Powerful. Affordable. Sign up now.
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 25 Nov 2002 09:44:05 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ed Gaunt
Subject: Re: Bizarre, yet true: biosafety question for non-occupational
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
CDC Hand washing guidelines can be found at
. Also, I did a GREAT
hand washing demonstration several years ago for "Bring your kids to work"
day. Check out for materials such as the Glitterbug Handwash
Show Kit. I used the Clue Spray "invisible fluorescent aerosol mist" and a
black light to demonstrate how washing with water alone does not remove
everything on your hands!
Ed Gaunt
-----Original Message-----
From: Elizabeth Smith [mailto:safety_queen@]
Sent: Sunday, November 24, 2002 5:43 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Bizarre, yet true: biosafety question for non-occupational
Good afternoon,
Have you ever been confronted with someone whose paradigm of the
world is just so completely different that you simply stare and
wonder *how* they came to have an understanding so completely
different than yours ...? Normally this happens when discussing
such trivial matters as religion or politics. I finally found
it (indirectly) in biosafety. This isn't the old
run-of-the-mill "I don't think safety glasses are important"
thing, oh, no.
So, while this is (thankfully) not a work-related issue, as it
doesn't involve anyone I work with or anyone in the safety
field, it is still a biosafety-ish question, and a bit long, to
be able to explain it.
So, a friend tells me that he doesn't think the use of soap is
necessary to clean himself. He has developed what I call a
theory of solubility, as it all relates to what is and isn't
water soluble. His opinion is as follows:
Oil is an important component of your skin working right (no oil
= dry skin and eczema (sp?). Soap dissolves oil, and will
therefore disrupt the "natural balance" of the skin. Therefore
soap is to be avoided during the normal daily bathing. (Shampoo
is apparently okay, as not using it leaves one's hair too oily
and therefore unattractive.)
Such things as grease and cooking oil should be removed from the
body, as they would leave stains on things, and soap is the
obvious choice for removal.
So far, this only addresses the issue of unpleasant body odor,
which might be a social problem, but not a safety one. But ...
Washing one's hands after using the toilet, to continue the
explaination I was given, is intended to remove trace amounts of
urine or feces, both of which are water soluble. Therefore soap
is not needed to remove them. I should emphasize that he was
discussing the "ordinary person" - not nurses/physicians or
those attempting to work in sterile or clean environments.
So, my questions are:
1. how important is the use of soap in the cleaning of one's
hands for personal hygiene after using the bathroom? I simply
grew up with the belief that one would wash one's hands - with
soap - for this. In my professional carrer, I was told once
(can't recall where) that the mechanical removal of bacteria is
as important, if not more important, than the presence of soap.
So, maybe he has a point (not that I'm giving up soap!).
The person in question is a scientist, who clings with something
neigh unto religious fervor to the belief that he is "rational".
So, since he is persuade-able by the power of data, my second
question is:
2. Are there studies (and this is the occupaional health part)
demonstrating the efficacy of hand-washing with different
methods (with soap vs. without)? I assume those in the health
care industry would have looked into this extensively, since
clean hands are so important to the minimization of infection.
Please reply off-line at safety_queen@.
Have a nice Thanksgiving. And be sure to wash your hands -
repeatedly - with soap - while cooking the Turkey.
Elizabeth
=====
Elizabeth Smith
Environmental, Health & Safety Manager
BioPort Corporation
3500 N. Martin L. King Blvd.
Lansing, MI 48906
__________________________________________________
Do you Yahoo!?
Yahoo! Mail Plus Powerful. Affordable. Sign up now.
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 25 Nov 2002 11:31:22 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Delpin, Leslie"
Subject: FW: Bio-Bubble
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Does anyone have any experience with the "Bio-Bubble" from the Colorado
Clean Room Co.?
Leslie Delpin, RBP, SM(NRM), CBSP
Biological Health and Safety Manager
University of Connecticut
Environmental Health and Safety Department U-4097
3102 Horsebarn Hill Road
Storrs, CT 06269-4097
Tel: 860-486-2436
Fax: 850-486-1106
E-mail: lm.delpin@uconn.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 25 Nov 2002 11:48:49 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Andrew Cockburn
Subject: Re: FW: Bio-Bubble
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="=_772BA594.DDBCD448"
This is a MIME message. If you are reading this text, you may want to
consider changing to a mail reader or gateway that understands how to
properly handle MIME multipart messages.
--=_772BA594.DDBCD448
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
We have installed a Bio-Bubble in our animal quarters as a clean room
for nude mice. This is the opposite of using it to contain biohazards,
but it seems to be working well so far.
Andrew Cockburn, PhD
Institutional Biosafety Officer
309 I Chesnut Ridge Research Bldg
Box 6845
West Virginia University
Morgantown, WV 26506-6845
telephone: 304-293-7157
>>> lm.delpin@UCONN.EDU 11/25/02 11:31AM >>>
Does anyone have any experience with the "Bio-Bubble" from the Colorado
Clean Room Co.?
Leslie Delpin, RBP, SM(NRM), CBSP
Biological Health and Safety Manager
University of Connecticut
Environmental Health and Safety Department U-4097
3102 Horsebarn Hill Road
Storrs, CT 06269-4097
Tel: 860-486-2436
Fax: 850-486-1106
E-mail: lm.delpin@uconn.edu
--=_772BA594.DDBCD448
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Content-Description: HTML
We have installed a Bio-Bubble in our animal quarters as a
clean room for nude mice. This is the opposite of using it to
contain biohazards, but it seems to be working well so far.
Andrew Cockburn, PhD
Institutional Biosafety Officer
309 I Chesnut Ridge Research Bldg
Box 6845
West Virginia University
Morgantown, WV 26506-6845
telephone: 304-293-7157
>>> lm.delpin@UCONN.EDU 11/25/02 11:31AM >>>
Does anyone have any experience with the "Bio-Bubble" from the
Colorado
Clean Room Co.?
Leslie Delpin, RBP, SM(NRM), CBSP
Biological Health and Safety Manager
University of Connecticut
Environmental Health and Safety Department U-4097
3102 Horsebarn Hill Road
Storrs, CT 06269-4097
Tel: 860-486-2436
Fax: 850-486-1106
E-mail: lm.delpin@uconn.edu
--=_772BA594.DDBCD448--
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 25 Nov 2002 14:50:07 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ed Gaunt
Subject: Re: Bizarre, yet true: biosafety question for non-occupational
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Add a third variable in this experiment to test the alcohol gel solutions as
well.
Ed
-----Original Message-----
From: Hauck, Philip [mailto:philip.hauck@MSSM.EDU]
Sent: Monday, November 25, 2002 9:59 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Bizarre, yet true: biosafety question for non-occupational
I have a very simple solution to this, Elizabeth.
Take your friend, and TSA plates into a lab. Devide the two plates in half
with a sharpie pen and mark them "before" and "after". On the "before" side
rub your fingertips gingerly over the surface of the agar taking care not to
break the surface or push the agar out. Next, have your friend wash his
hands w/o soap, and you wash yours....and hedge the bet in your favor, do
the "surgeon's " wash with a lot of mechanical friction and a good rinsing.
Now, both of you run your finger tips over the "after" side. Incubate at 37
deg. C. for 3-4 days and, Voila! Your friend will start using soap on his
hands again.
We did this as a routine experiment in hygiene during the Principles of
Microbiology Course I taught at U. Kentucky as a TA....I noticed shortly
after that lab people were a little more fastidious about hand
washing...even the nurses who thought they were doing a good job. And the
demo speaks more loudly than words or figures....the colonies are right off
of YOUR fingertips! Remember, Ignaz Semmelweiss was Right!!!
Philip Hauck, MS,MSHS, CBSP, SM(NRM)
Mt Sinai School of Medicine
-----Original Message-----
From: Elizabeth Smith [mailto:safety_queen@]
Sent: Sunday, November 24, 2002 5:43 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Bizarre, yet true: biosafety question for non-occupational
Good afternoon,
Have you ever been confronted with someone whose paradigm of the
world is just so completely different that you simply stare and
wonder *how* they came to have an understanding so completely
different than yours ...? Normally this happens when discussing
such trivial matters as religion or politics. I finally found
it (indirectly) in biosafety. This isn't the old
run-of-the-mill "I don't think safety glasses are important"
thing, oh, no.
So, while this is (thankfully) not a work-related issue, as it
doesn't involve anyone I work with or anyone in the safety
field, it is still a biosafety-ish question, and a bit long, to
be able to explain it.
So, a friend tells me that he doesn't think the use of soap is
necessary to clean himself. He has developed what I call a
theory of solubility, as it all relates to what is and isn't
water soluble. His opinion is as follows:
Oil is an important component of your skin working right (no oil
= dry skin and eczema (sp?). Soap dissolves oil, and will
therefore disrupt the "natural balance" of the skin. Therefore
soap is to be avoided during the normal daily bathing. (Shampoo
is apparently okay, as not using it leaves one's hair too oily
and therefore unattractive.)
Such things as grease and cooking oil should be removed from the
body, as they would leave stains on things, and soap is the
obvious choice for removal.
So far, this only addresses the issue of unpleasant body odor,
which might be a social problem, but not a safety one. But ...
Washing one's hands after using the toilet, to continue the
explaination I was given, is intended to remove trace amounts of
urine or feces, both of which are water soluble. Therefore soap
is not needed to remove them. I should emphasize that he was
discussing the "ordinary person" - not nurses/physicians or
those attempting to work in sterile or clean environments.
So, my questions are:
1. how important is the use of soap in the cleaning of one's
hands for personal hygiene after using the bathroom? I simply
grew up with the belief that one would wash one's hands - with
soap - for this. In my professional carrer, I was told once
(can't recall where) that the mechanical removal of bacteria is
as important, if not more important, than the presence of soap.
So, maybe he has a point (not that I'm giving up soap!).
The person in question is a scientist, who clings with something
neigh unto religious fervor to the belief that he is "rational".
So, since he is persuade-able by the power of data, my second
question is:
2. Are there studies (and this is the occupaional health part)
demonstrating the efficacy of hand-washing with different
methods (with soap vs. without)? I assume those in the health
care industry would have looked into this extensively, since
clean hands are so important to the minimization of infection.
Please reply off-line at safety_queen@.
Have a nice Thanksgiving. And be sure to wash your hands -
repeatedly - with soap - while cooking the Turkey.
Elizabeth
=====
Elizabeth Smith
Environmental, Health & Safety Manager
BioPort Corporation
3500 N. Martin L. King Blvd.
Lansing, MI 48906
__________________________________________________
Do you Yahoo!?
Yahoo! Mail Plus Powerful. Affordable. Sign up now.
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 25 Nov 2002 14:57:52 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Funk, Glenn"
Subject: Re: Service in BSL-3
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Jeff -
Equipment manufacturers have legitimate concerns about when and how will
they service their instruments that have been used with RG3 or 4 agents or
have been in residence in a BSL-3 or BSL-4 lab. Many are OK with having the
customer decon the instruments from Level 3 with a protocol developed by the
PI and approved by the corporate Biosafety Officer, after which the
instruments have to be removed to a BSL-2 or lower space for the servicing.
Field engineers generally will not work within BSL-3 or BSL-4 labs. In
addition, fluidics often have to be deconned and parts with dead spaces
removed and discarded as biohazardous waste. In my experience, companies
are very, very reluctant to service instruments used in BSL-4 labs and will
generally "just say 'no'". Exceptions may be made if the PI works closely
with the corporate BSO to develop a protocol, or possibly even to provide
training to the PI to allow the PI or staff to do the servicing. This is
obviously done on a case-by-case basis.
Hope this helps. Sorry I couldn't be more encouraging. I suggest you call
the company's Health and Safety department, explain your predicament, and
offer to develop a decon procedure for their approval, and to remove the
imager to a lower level containment area for the service job. Such service
dilemmas are usually resolved only with EHS help.
Glenn A. Funk, Ph.D., CBSP
Director and Biosafety Officer
Environment, Health and Safety
MedImmune Vaccines, Inc.
408-845-8847
-----Original Message-----
From: Jeffrey Good [mailto:rsojmg@GWUMC.EDU]
Sent: Wednesday, November 20, 2002 12:36 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Service in BSL-3
We are having some troubles getting a company to service portions of a
confocal imager (laser, etc.) in our BSL-3 facility.
The unit is in a "Commons Area" that is deconned every day, and where
no research, storage, etc occurs. Only fixed samples have been used in
the device. We have assured the reps that we will decon unit, and have
entire facility closed while they are servicing - but no luck
Anyone else ever had this issue?
Is there a list of contractors?
The device had a service contract on it with the manufacturer, but they
refused to service in the lab.
Any leads, advise, shared experiences is appreciated.
Jeff
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 26 Nov 2002 17:49:13 +1000
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Watson, Sonya (LI, Indooroopilly)"
Subject: BSC's and UV lights
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Hello fellow Biosafety people,
Sometime back (probably 1999 - 2000) there was a message on the list about a
nasty accident with a BSC and someone using chlorine based products while
the UV light was on. The result, I seem to remember, was that the person
received nasty burns. I was just wanting some further details around this
incident. Can someone remember if the incident was published somewhere, and
if so, would you be able to tell me where so that I can follow up on it?
Many thanks in advance,
Sonya
********************************************************************
Sonya Watson
Occupational Health, Safety and Environment Co-ordinator
CSIRO Long Pocket Laboratories
120 Meiers Road, INDOOROOPILLY QLD 4068
Ph: 07 3214 2367
Fax: 07 3214 2224
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 26 Nov 2002 02:51:31 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Bill Homovec
Subject: Re: BSC's and UV lights (Out of Office)
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Thanks for the message. I will be out of the office on vacation until =
Monday, December 2, 2002.
Thank you.
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 26 Nov 2002 07:14:32 EST
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Jim Kaufman
Subject: Incomplete Digest Problem Solved
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="part1_14a.17f435a2.2b14bfa8_boundary"
--part1_14a.17f435a2.2b14bfa8_boundary
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="US-ASCII"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
I think I've solved the problem with the digest format by changing to the
NOMIME mode. Yeah. Thanks to all who put up quietly with my struggles. ...
Jim
James A. Kaufman, Ph.D., Director
The Laboratory Safety Institute
A Nonprofit Organization Dedicated to
Safety in Science and Science Education
192 Worcester Road, Natick, MA 01760-2252
508-647-1900 Fax: 508-647-0062
Cell: 508-574-6264 Res: 781-237-1335
labsafe@
--part1_14a.17f435a2.2b14bfa8_boundary
Content-Type: text/html; charset="US-ASCII"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
I think I've solved the problem with the digest format by
changing to the NOMIME mode. Yeah. Thanks to all who put up
quietly with my struggles. ... Jim
James A. Kaufman, Ph.D., Director
The Laboratory Safety Institute
A Nonprofit Organization Dedicated to
Safety in Science and Science Education
192 Worcester Road, Natick, MA 01760-2252
508-647-1900 Fax: 508-647-0062
Cell: 508-574-6264 Res: 781-237-1335
labsafe@
--part1_14a.17f435a2.2b14bfa8_boundary--
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 26 Nov 2002 08:10:44 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Mike Durham
Subject: Exemptions from select agent rules
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="----=_NextPart_000_0009_01C29523.51B055E0"
This is a multi-part message in MIME format.
------=_NextPart_000_0009_01C29523.51B055E0
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Content-Type: text/plain;
charset="iso-8859-1"
I have excerpted below a listing of exemptions for "select agents". One =
of our faculty questioned whether the first one (clinical speciments) =
is still exempt. Can someone help me on this? Have these changed since =
first published as a result of the Patriot Act? Since this list is busy, =
replies might be made off-list.
Mike Durham
LSU
mdurham@lsu.edu
The following list explains exemptions from the regulations:
The agent is part of a clinical specimen intended for diagnostic =
reference or verification purposes.
Vaccine strains of viral agents (Junin Virus strain candid #1, Rift =
Valley Fever Virus strain MP-12, Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis Virus =
strain TC-83, Yellow Fever Virus strain 17D) are exempt.
Vaccine strains of bacteria listed as described in Title 9 CFR, Part =
78.1.
Toxins used for medical purposes and inactivated for vaccine purposes.
Vaccines administered for medical purposes. (This applies to the Student =
Health Center at LSU.)
Toxins used for biomedical research with an LD50 for vertebrates of more =
than 100 nanograms per kilogram of body weight.
Clinical Laboratories certified under the Clinical Laboratory =
Improvement Amendments (CLIA) of 1988,that utilize select agents for =
diagnostic, reference verification, or proficiency testing purposes.
Products subject to regulation under the Federal Insecticide Fungicide =
and Rondenticide Act (7 U.S.C. =A7 136 et seq.).
Products subject to regulation under the Toxic Substances Control Act =
(15 U.S.C. =A7 2601 et seq.).
Additional exemptions for otherwise covered strains will be considered =
when CDC reviews and updates the list of select agents.
------=_NextPart_000_0009_01C29523.51B055E0
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Content-Type: text/html;
charset="iso-8859-1"
I have excerpted below a listing of = exemptions for
"select agents". One of our faculty questioned whether the
first = one (clinical speciments) is still exempt. Can
someone help me on this? Have = these changed since first
published as a result of the Patriot Act? Since this = list
is busy, replies might be made off-list.
Mike Durham
LSU
href=3D"mailto:mdurham@lsu.edu">mdurham@lsu.edu
The following list explains exemptions from the = regulations:
The agent is part of a clinical specimen intended for
diagnostic reference or verification purposes.
Vaccine strains of viral agents (Junin Virus strain candid #1,
= Rift Valley Fever Virus strain MP-12, Venezuelan Equine
Encephalitis Virus = strain TC-83, Yellow Fever Virus
strain 17D) are exempt.
Vaccine strains of bacteria listed as described in Title 9
CFR, = Part 78.1.
Toxins used for medical purposes and inactivated for
vaccine purposes.
Vaccines administered for medical purposes. (This applies to
the = Student Health Center at LSU.)
Toxins used for biomedical research with an LD50 for
vertebrates = of more than 100 nanograms per kilogram of
body weight.
Clinical Laboratories certified under the Clinical Laboratory
= Improvement Amendments (CLIA) of 1988,that utilize select
agents for diagnostic, = reference verification, or
proficiency testing purposes.
Products subject to regulation under the Federal Insecticide =
Fungicide and Rondenticide Act (7 U.S.C. =A7 136 et seq.).
Products subject to regulation under the Toxic Substances
Control = Act (15 U.S.C. =A7 2601 et seq.).
Additional exemptions for otherwise covered strains will be =
considered when CDC reviews and updates the list of
select agents.
------=_NextPart_000_0009_01C29523.51B055E0--
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 26 Nov 2002 11:41:31 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Dave Mulligan
Subject: David M Mulligan/LAKE/PPRD/ABBOTT is out of the office.
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
I will be out of the office starting 11/26/2002 and will not return until
12/02/2002.
Please direct Biosafety issues to Laurie Corsi during my absence at extension
7-6944
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 26 Nov 2002 15:27:38 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Katrina Doolittle
Organization: NMSU Environmental Health & Safety
Subject: BSO on IBC
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Hello Biosafety Experts,
We just added a biosafety position and I would like to know if the
Biosafety Officer is affiliated with the IBC as a voting member or
ex-offico. I would appreciate some feedback on how this is organized
within your institution.
Muchas gracias and
Happy Thanksgiving.
Katrina Doolittle
NMSU
EH&S Director
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 26 Nov 2002 17:29:46 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Daryl Rowe
Subject: Re: BSO on IBC
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Katrina,
At the University of Georgia, the biosafety officer is a voting member =
of the biosafety committee. Have a biologically safe day
Daryl E. Rowe, DrPH
Office of Biosafety
Environmental Safety Division
(706) 542-0112
-----Original Message-----
From: Katrina Doolittle [mailto:kadoolit@NMSU.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, November 26, 2002 5:28 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: BSO on IBC
Hello Biosafety Experts,
We just added a biosafety position and I would like to know if the
Biosafety Officer is affiliated with the IBC as a voting member or
ex-offico. I would appreciate some feedback on how this is organized
within your institution.
Muchas gracias and
Happy Thanksgiving.
Katrina Doolittle
NMSU
EH&S Director
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 26 Nov 2002 14:36:41 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Funk, Glenn"
Subject: Re: BSO on IBC
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Katrina -
According to the NIH rDNA Guidelines, "When the institution conducts
recombinant DNA research at BL3, BL4, or Large Scale (greater than 10
liters), a Biological Safety Officer is mandatory and shall be a member of
the Institutional Biosafety Committee (see Section IV-B-3, Biological Safety
Officer)." Beyond that, it's mainly an institutional call. Most
institutions with which I'm familiar consider the BSO a full voting member
of the IBC.
Happy Turkey Day!
-- Glenn
Glenn A. Funk, Ph.D., CBSP
Director and Biosafety Officer
Environment, Health and Safety
MedImmune Vaccines, Inc.
408-845-8847
-----Original Message-----
From: Katrina Doolittle [mailto:kadoolit@NMSU.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, November 26, 2002 2:28 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: BSO on IBC
Hello Biosafety Experts,
We just added a biosafety position and I would like to know if the
Biosafety Officer is affiliated with the IBC as a voting member or
ex-offico. I would appreciate some feedback on how this is organized
within your institution.
Muchas gracias and
Happy Thanksgiving.
Katrina Doolittle
NMSU
EH&S Director
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 26 Nov 2002 14:59:10 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Robert Hashimoto
Organization: Genentech, Inc.
Subject: Re: BSO on IBC
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Hi Katrina,
The Biosafety Officer at Genentech is an employee of EHS, the department
that also manages the administrative duties of the IBC. I am a voting
member of the IBC. My Director is an ex-officio, non-voting member of
the IBC as the ranking Health and Safety officer of the company.
Hope this helps,
Bob
Katrina Doolittle wrote:
> Hello Biosafety Experts,
> We just added a biosafety position and I would like to know if the
> Biosafety Officer is affiliated with the IBC as a voting member or
> ex-offico. I would appreciate some feedback on how this is organized
> within your institution.
> Muchas gracias and
> Happy Thanksgiving.
> Katrina Doolittle
> NMSU
> EH&S Director
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 27 Nov 2002 08:25:02 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Mark Grushka
Subject: Re: BSO on IBC
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
I am a voting member of our IBC.
Thanks to all of you out there who replied to my questions about assessing a
separate fee to sponsors for IBC review. The results of this admittedly
unscientific survey were clear. Charging a fee for review is not the way
most IBC's are currently operating. Hope all of you have a good Thanksgiving
holiday.
Yours in safety,
Mark J. Grushka
Biosafety Officer, M.S., CSP
University of Arizona
520-621-5279
mgrushka@u.arizona.edu
----- Original Message -----
From: "Katrina Doolittle"
To:
Sent: Tuesday, November 26, 2002 3:27 PM
Subject: BSO on IBC
> Hello Biosafety Experts,
> We just added a biosafety position and I would like to know if the
> Biosafety Officer is affiliated with the IBC as a voting member or
> ex-offico. I would appreciate some feedback on how this is organized
> within your institution.
> Muchas gracias and
> Happy Thanksgiving.
> Katrina Doolittle
> NMSU
> EH&S Director
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 27 Nov 2002 10:44:53 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Hauck, Philip"
Subject: Re: BSO on IBC
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
Content-transfer-encoding: quoted-printable
At our Institution, I am a full member of the IBC and of the IACUC, =
since most of our work involves pilot GT studies and transgenics.
Phil Hauck,
My. Sinai School of Medicine
New York, New York
-----Original Message-----
From: Katrina Doolittle [mailto:kadoolit@NMSU.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, November 26, 2002 5:28 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: BSO on IBC
Hello Biosafety Experts,
We just added a biosafety position and I would like to know if the
Biosafety Officer is affiliated with the IBC as a voting member or
ex-offico. I would appreciate some feedback on how this is organized
within your institution.
Muchas gracias and
Happy Thanksgiving.
Katrina Doolittle
NMSU
EH&S Director
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 27 Nov 2002 10:36:34 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Kathryn Harris
Subject: VESICULAR STOMATITIS VIRUS
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
I have a question regarding VSV.
On various forms (for reporting Select Agents and High Consequence
Livestock Pathogens etc) I have seen 'exotic' in parentheses following
VSV. I am aware of two serotypes endemic to the USA - Indiana and New
Jersey, are either/both of these 'exotic'? In other on-line material the
word exotic does not appear after VSV. We have two PI's with VSV who are
about to destroy their stocks (by their choice) rather that go through the
security issues with select agents. I'd hate to see them do that if their
material is not covered under these laws. A virologist colleague said
'everyone is using it' (uh huh) and expressed skepticism that what they are
using could be 'that bad' (possibly they are using replication deficient or
attenuated strains?) however in my reading on the web both the US serotypes
seem to have the capacity to cause a lot of damage to livestock. Is there
some distinction I'm missing with the 'exotic' or some exemption? Is this a
similar situation to Newcastle Disease Virus where the velogenic exotic
forms are the ones for concern? Does anyone have any info or clarification?
Thanks and Happy Thanksgiving to all!
Kath Harris
**********************************************
Kathryn Louise Harris, Ph.D.
Biological Safety Professional
Office of Research Safety
Northwestern University
NG-71 Technological Institute
2145 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208-3121
Phone: (847) 491-4387
Fax: (847) 467-2797
Email: kathrynharris@northwestern.edu
**********************************************
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 27 Nov 2002 12:03:17 -0500
Reply-To: speaker@ehs.psu.edu
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Curt Speaker
Organization: UNIVERSITY SAFETY
Subject: Re: VESICULAR STOMATITIS VIRUS
In-Reply-To:
Kathryn:
Exotic generally refers to non-indigenous. The New Jersey and
Indiana strains are not considered exotic, are not considered select
agents, but require a USDA-APHIS permit to work with them
nontheless.
Curt
Curt Speaker
Biosafety Officer
Penn State University
Environmental Health and Safety
speaker@ehs.psu.edu
^...^
(O_O)
=(Y)=
"""
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 27 Nov 2002 12:18:46 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Johnson, Julie A."
Subject: Re: BSO on IBC
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
At Iowa State University, the EH&S office handles the administrative
(recordkeeping, etc.) end of the IBC< and I, as the Biosafety Officer, am a
full voting member. We also always have a member of our Biosafety staff on
the IACUC as a full voting member.
Julie A. Johnson, Ph.D., CBSP
Biosafety Officer
Environmental Health and Safety
118 Agronomy Lab
Iowa State University
Ames, IA 50011
Phone: 515-294-7657
Fax: 515-294-9357
Email: jajohns@iastate.edu
Web site: ehs.iastate.edu
-----Original Message-----
From: Katrina Doolittle [mailto:kadoolit@NMSU.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, November 26, 2002 5:28 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: BSO on IBC
Hello Biosafety Experts,
We just added a biosafety position and I would like to know if the
Biosafety Officer is affiliated with the IBC as a voting member or
ex-offico. I would appreciate some feedback on how this is organized
within your institution.
Muchas gracias and
Happy Thanksgiving.
Katrina Doolittle
NMSU
EH&S Director
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 27 Nov 2002 14:18:21 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Danowski, Kristine (KL)"
Subject: Benchtop autoclave qualification
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
List:
A colleague needs to qualify an autoclave under FDA GLP regulations. He needs
to know that the temperature inside the autoclave is 121C. Is there a protocol
available for this? I called the autoclave manufacturer, but they don't have
anything. The FDA website lists an indirect way to measure the temperature, but
are there any ways to directly measure an autoclave's temperature while it is in
use?
Many thanks for answering a newbie's question.
Regards,
Kristine L. Danowski
The Dow Chemical Company
Corporate R&D
Analytical Sciences Biotechnology
1897 Building
Midland, MI 48667
989-638-6912 phone
989-638-6027 fax
kldanowski@ email
He has all the virtues I dislike and none of the vices I admire. -- Sir Winston
Churchill
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 27 Nov 2002 13:25:43 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Katrina Doolittle
Organization: NMSU Environmental Health & Safety
Subject: BSO on IBC
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Thanks to everyone for responding to my question regarding the BSO's
role on the IBC. The majority responded that the BSO is a voting member
which I am glad to see. Your input is very valuable and we will follow
the majority.
Thanks again,
Katrina Doolittle
NMSU
EH&S
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 27 Nov 2002 15:25:59 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Petuch, Brian R."
Subject: Re: Benchtop autoclave qualification
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
You can temperature map the interior, but you need a thermocouple
pass-through. This has to be designed in. You can use biological
indicators (spore strips) to validate kill.
-----Original Message-----
From: Danowski, Kristine (KL) [mailto:KLDanowski@]
Sent: Wednesday, November 27, 2002 3:18 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Benchtop autoclave qualification
List:
A colleague needs to qualify an autoclave under FDA GLP regulations. He
needs to know that the temperature inside the autoclave is 121C. Is there a
protocol available for this? I called the autoclave manufacturer, but they
don't have anything. The FDA website lists an indirect way to measure the
temperature, but are there any ways to directly measure an autoclave's
temperature while it is in use?
Many thanks for answering a newbie's question.
Regards,
Kristine L. Danowski
The Dow Chemical Company
Corporate R&D
Analytical Sciences Biotechnology
1897 Building
Midland, MI 48667
989-638-6912 phone
989-638-6027 fax
kldanowski@ email
He has all the virtues I dislike and none of the vices I admire. -- Sir
Winston Churchill
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=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 2 Dec 2002 12:20:31 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ed Gaunt
Subject: Re: VESICULAR STOMATITIS VIRUS
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
On August 16, I posted the response below from Dr. Denise Spencer USDA/APHIS
about VSV NJ and IN in response to another Biosafty query about these
agents:
"The New Jersey and Indiana strains of Vesicular stomatitis virus are not
considered exotic to the U.S., so possession of either of these strains of
VSV do not need to be reported on the "Notification of Possession of Select
Agents or High Consequence Livestock Pathogens and Toxins" form. However,
to be in compliance with Title 9 of the Code of Federal Regulations part
122, you are required to have a permit to possess either of these strains
if they were imported from another country or transported from another
state or the District of Columbia to your facility."
Ed
-----Original Message-----
From: Kathryn Harris [mailto:kathrynharris@NORTHWESTERN.EDU]
Sent: Wednesday, November 27, 2002 11:37 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: VESICULAR STOMATITIS VIRUS
I have a question regarding VSV.
On various forms (for reporting Select Agents and High Consequence
Livestock Pathogens etc) I have seen 'exotic' in parentheses following
VSV. I am aware of two serotypes endemic to the USA - Indiana and New
Jersey, are either/both of these 'exotic'? In other on-line material the
word exotic does not appear after VSV. We have two PI's with VSV who are
about to destroy their stocks (by their choice) rather that go through the
security issues with select agents. I'd hate to see them do that if their
material is not covered under these laws. A virologist colleague said
'everyone is using it' (uh huh) and expressed skepticism that what they are
using could be 'that bad' (possibly they are using replication deficient or
attenuated strains?) however in my reading on the web both the US serotypes
seem to have the capacity to cause a lot of damage to livestock. Is there
some distinction I'm missing with the 'exotic' or some exemption? Is this a
similar situation to Newcastle Disease Virus where the velogenic exotic
forms are the ones for concern? Does anyone have any info or clarification?
Thanks and Happy Thanksgiving to all!
Kath Harris
**********************************************
Kathryn Louise Harris, Ph.D.
Biological Safety Professional
Office of Research Safety
Northwestern University
NG-71 Technological Institute
2145 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208-3121
Phone: (847) 491-4387
Fax: (847) 467-2797
Email: kathrynharris@northwestern.edu
**********************************************
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 2 Dec 2002 14:08:58 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Larry Mendoza
Organization: VCU-OEHS-Biological/Chemical Safety Section
Subject: TAT Protein and Modified Lethal Factor protein
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="------------A6666DAF1118ACB5E27827B5"
This is a multi-part message in MIME format.
--------------A6666DAF1118ACB5E27827B5
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Good day to all.
1. I was wondering whether anyone can direct me towards any kind of legislation
or policy dealing with TAT protein use. I would imagine it being
a BSL-2 agent but I need proof.
2. Another researcher wants to recieve the B. anthracis derived, although
modified, Lethal factor protein. Supposedly this protein is patented by
the NIH and has been shown in the literature to bind to cancer cells only. My
question is: Does the PI need to register with the CDC, regarding
it as a select agent if he gets it shipped to him? or is this exempt?
Thanks in advanced
Larry
=========================================================================
From: "Hauck, Philip"
To:
Sent: Wednesday, November 27, 2002 10:44 AM
Subject: Re: BSO on IBC
At our Institution, I am a full member of the IBC and of the IACUC, since
most of our work involves pilot GT studies and transgenics.
Phil Hauck,
My. Sinai School of Medicine
New York, New York
-----Original Message-----
From: Katrina Doolittle [mailto:kadoolit@NMSU.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, November 26, 2002 5:28 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: BSO on IBC
Hello Biosafety Experts,
We just added a biosafety position and I would like to know if the
Biosafety Officer is affiliated with the IBC as a voting member or
ex-offico. I would appreciate some feedback on how this is organized
within your institution.
Muchas gracias and
Happy Thanksgiving.
Katrina Doolittle
NMSU
EH&S Director
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 2 Dec 2002 15:04:11 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Scott Alderman
Subject: Re: TAT Protein and Modified Lethal Factor protein
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="=_mixed 006E1C6585256C83_="
--=_mixed 006E1C6585256C83_=
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="=_alternative 006E1C6585256C83_="
--=_alternative 006E1C6585256C83_=
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Larry,
Regarding your second inquiry:
In July of this year, I received written documentation from CDC's
Laboratory Registration and Select Agent Transfer Program that anthrax
toxin, by itself, is not a select agent. The toxin consists of three
known components that contribute to its pathogenicity: protective antigen,
lethal factor, and edema factor. The following statement was included on
an attached document: "The Select Agent Rule does not cover protein
toxins or protein components (subunits) of toxins unless the toxin is
specifically designated as a select agent in Appendix A of 42 CFR 72.6
(e.g. Botulinum toxin)."
Hope this helps,
Scott Alderman
Larry Mendoza
Sent by: A Biosafety Discussion List
12/02/2002 02:08 PM
Please respond to A Biosafety Discussion List
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
cc:
Subject: TAT Protein and Modified Lethal Factor protein
Good day to all.
1. I was wondering whether anyone can direct me towards any kind of
legislation or policy dealing with TAT protein use. I would imagine it
being
a BSL-2 agent but I need proof.
2. Another researcher wants to recieve the B. anthracis derived, although
modified, Lethal factor protein. Supposedly this protein is patented by
the NIH and has been shown in the literature to bind to cancer cells only.
My question is: Does the PI need to register with the CDC, regarding
it as a select agent if he gets it shipped to him? or is this exempt?
Thanks in advanced
Larry
--=_alternative 006E1C6585256C83_=
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
Larry,
Regarding your second inquiry:
In July of this year, I received written
documentation from CDC's Laboratory Registration and Select Agent Transfer
Program that anthrax toxin, by itself, is not a select agent. The toxin
consists of three known components that contribute to its pathogenicity:
protective antigen, lethal factor, and edema factor. The following
statement was included on an attached document: "The Select Agent
Rule does not cover protein toxins or protein components (subunits) of toxins
unless the toxin is specifically designated as a select agent in Appendix A of
42 CFR 72.6 (e.g. Botulinum toxin)."
Hope this helps,
Scott Alderman
Larry Mendoza
<lgmendoz@HSC.VCU.EDU>
Sent by: A Biosafety Discussion List
<BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU>
12/02/2002 02:08 PM
Please respond to A Biosafety Discussion
List
To:
BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
cc:
Subject:
TAT Protein and Modified Lethal Factor protein
Good day to all.
1. I was wondering whether anyone can direct me towards any kind of
legislation or policy dealing with TAT protein use. I would imagine it
being
a BSL-2 agent but I need proof.
2. Another researcher wants to recieve the B. anthracis derived, although
modified, Lethal factor protein. Supposedly this protein is patented
by
the NIH and has been shown in the literature to bind to cancer cells only.
My question is: Does the PI need to register with the CDC, regarding
it as a select agent if he gets it shipped to him? or is this exempt?
Thanks in advanced
Larry
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 2 Dec 2002 16:25:56 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Greg Merkle
Organization: Wright State University
Subject: Re: Water Question - Poliovirus
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: multipart/mixed; boundary="Boundary_(ID_PUw0g//VzeUH+cvX7VOBkA)"
This is a multi-part message in MIME format.
--Boundary_(ID_PUw0g//VzeUH+cvX7VOBkA)
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-transfer-encoding: 7bit
Regarding the collection of water samples that may be
considered to potentially infectious with the poliovirus.
What samples should be considered? There are several
members of the faculty at the university that collect water
samples for the purpose of identifying hazards associated
with blue-green algae blooms and collection of invertebrates
from local waters (most recently in Thailand). Should all
water samplings be suspect? Are the water samples of
concern only if they originate from an area that still has
active cases? If old samples (more than a year old) are in
cold storage would the sample still be suspect or is there a
period after which viability of the viruses would be
negligible or non-existent?
Thanks for your help.
Greg Merkle
"Koporc, Kim" wrote:
>
> Hi Ginger - Thanks for posting your question. The answer is, it depends. A
plume of raw sewage or surface runoff that flowed into the Bay of Bengal from
endemic populations could be infectious for polioviruses for several miles,
depending on currents, rate of dilution, sunlight, and temperature.
Polioviruses persist longer in fresh than in marine water, with a 99%
infectivity loss in the latter within 5 days.
>
> Kim Koporc
> kkoporc@
> od/nvpo/polio
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Brown, Virginia R [mailto:gingerbrown@TAMU.EDU]
> Sent: Thursday, November 07, 2002 5:26 PM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: Water Question
>
> Regarding the Wild Poliovirus Survey, environmental sewage and water samples
are included in the
> potentially infectious materials. Does this mean only water from the interior
of a country where wild
> poliovirus was suspected to be present? i.e., a water sample from the outer
waters off coast would
> not be considered as being "in a geographic area where wild polioviruses or
VDPV were suspected
> to be present". I can't imagine that a water sample from the Bay of Bengal or
the Indian Ocean
> would be considered to be potentially infectious just because of the proximity
to India, for example.
>
> Any interpretation on this? Kim??
>
> Ginger Brown, CBSP
> Env Health & Safety
> TX A&M University
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 3 Dec 2002 10:19:15 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Koporc, Kim"
Subject: Re: Water Question - Poliovirus
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Hi Greg - Many thanks for your e-mail. First, ask yourself how the =
materials were stored. Then determine where and when they were =
collected.
1. How are materials are stored (this is key)? Materials stored without =
refrigeration for three months or more, refrigerated for one year or =
more, heat inactivated, treated with disinfectants known to inactivate =
polioviruses, or tested and found negative for the presence of =
enteroviruses are not considered infectious or potentially infectious =
for wild poliovirus. If the samples have been frozen, they are =
considered infectious
2. Where were the samples collected? Water samples are considered =
potentially infectious if their origin is unknown or if they are =
collected for any purpose at a time and in a geographic area where wild =
polioviruses were suspected to be present (See Appendix 2 of the =
inventory form).
3. When were the samples collected? Samples collected in a country =
after the year listed in Appendix 2 are no longer considered infectious.
Best regards, Kim
-----Original Message-----
From: Greg Merkle [mailto:greg.merkle@WRIGHT.EDU]
Sent: Monday, December 02, 2002 4:26 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Water Question - Poliovirus
>
Regarding the collection of water samples that may be
considered to potentially infectious with the poliovirus.
What samples should be considered? There are several
members of the faculty at the university that collect water
samples for the purpose of identifying hazards associated
with blue-green algae blooms and collection of invertebrates
from local waters (most recently in Thailand). Should all
water samplings be suspect? Are the water samples of
concern only if they originate from an area that still has
active cases? If old samples (more than a year old) are in
cold storage would the sample still be suspect or is there a
period after which viability of the viruses would be
negligible or non-existent?
Thanks for your help.
Greg Merkle
"Koporc, Kim" wrote:
>
> Hi Ginger - Thanks for posting your question. The answer is, it =
depends. A plume of raw sewage or surface runoff that flowed into the =
Bay of Bengal from endemic populations could be infectious for =
polioviruses for several miles, depending on currents, rate of dilution, =
sunlight, and temperature. Polioviruses persist longer in fresh than in =
marine water, with a 99% infectivity loss in the latter within 5 days.
>
> Kim Koporc
> kkoporc@
> od/nvpo/polio
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Brown, Virginia R [mailto:gingerbrown@TAMU.EDU]
> Sent: Thursday, November 07, 2002 5:26 PM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: Water Question
>
> Regarding the Wild Poliovirus Survey, environmental sewage and water =
samples are included in the
> potentially infectious materials. Does this mean only water from the =
interior of a country where wild
> poliovirus was suspected to be present? i.e., a water sample from the =
outer waters off coast would
> not be considered as being "in a geographic area where wild =
polioviruses or VDPV were suspected
> to be present". I can't imagine that a water sample from the Bay of =
Bengal or the Indian Ocean
> would be considered to be potentially infectious just because of the =
proximity to India, for example.
>
> Any interpretation on this? Kim??
>
> Ginger Brown, CBSP
> Env Health & Safety
> TX A&M University
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 5 Dec 2002 11:50:21 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: David Gillum
Subject: Pregnancy
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Dear Biosafety Listserve,
Is anyone aware of any regulations (or CDC recommendations) for pregnant
women working with biological materials? Do you have any policies for
pregnant women working with biological materials? If so, can you send me
your verbiage?
Thanks in advance.
-David
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 5 Dec 2002 12:11:38 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Hauck, Philip"
Subject: Re: Pregnancy
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
Content-transfer-encoding: quoted-printable
Hello, Dave! I do it on a case by case evaluation of what agents are =
being used in the protocols. Any viruses with teratogenic or mutagenic =
capability, such as Rubella, Herpes, etc, or any other microbial agents =
that could cause fetal death such as Brucella, would warrant a =
researcher who is pregnant to absent themselves from the laboratory. I =
would feel more relaxed if the individual(s) had been vaccinated before =
their pregnancy, if a vaccine exists. But there comes a point where the =
researcher has to be given the facts and given the opportunity to decide =
on the health of their future baby or the research project. Since this =
is a Medical School, I cannot mandate someone to do this, as may be =
possible under corporate policies.
Remember, any guidance from the CDC, APHA or APIC regarding the ability =
of an infectious agent to cause death or birth defects can be used by =
OSHA to cite offences under the General Duty Clause 5a.
Phil Hauck
-----Original Message-----
From: David Gillum [mailto:David.Gillum@UNH.EDU]
Sent: Thursday, December 05, 2002 11:50 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Pregnancy
Dear Biosafety Listserve,
Is anyone aware of any regulations (or CDC recommendations) for pregnant
women working with biological materials? Do you have any policies for
pregnant women working with biological materials? If so, can you send me
your verbiage?
Thanks in advance.
-David
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 5 Dec 2002 12:44:47 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Burnett, LouAnn Crawford"
Subject: FW: December 6, 2002 MMWR Recommendations and Reports(TOC)
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
See the MMWR for tomorrow - link below. LouAnn
LouAnn C. Burnett, MS, CBSP
Biosafety Program Manager & Biological Safety Officer
Vanderbilt University Environmental Health & Safety
Nashville, Tennessee
615/322-0927 (direct & voice mail)
615/343-4951 (fax)
-----Original Message-----
From: MMWR Questions [mailto:mmwrq@]
Sent: Thursday, December 05, 2002 10:46 AM
To: MMWR-TOC@LISTSERV.
Subject: December 6, 2002 MMWR Recommendations and Reports(TOC)
The December 6, 2002 edition of the MMWR Recommendations
and Reports is now available in Adobe Acrobat format on
the Internet. View this MMWR Recommendations and Reports at:
and
Spain Mirror Site*
December 6, 2002/Vol. 51/No. RR-19 (file size 152,319 bytes)
* Laboratory Security and Emergency Response Guidance
for Laboratories Working with Select Agents
The file types available are Adobe Acrobat (PDF).
The PDF files, contain graphics and figures and are true representations
of the hard copy of the MMWR. The Adobe Acrobat format requires an Adobe
Reader.
The Adobe Acrobat files will be e-mailed
in uuencoded format. If your e-mail system does not automatically
uudecode the file, you will need to uudecode the file manually.
------------------------------------------------
*Spain Mirror Site
------------------------------------------------
CDC, in collaboration with the Toxic Oil Syndrome Research Centre
(CISAT) of the Institute of Health Carlos III, Madrid, Spain, has
established a MMWR mirror website in Spain. The website was developed to
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---------------------------------------------
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If you have problems or questions, send e-mail to
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=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 5 Dec 2002 11:53:38 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Michele Johnson
Subject: Re: Laboratory Security and Emergency Response Plan
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="=_C39F1CD9.6B0A67B1"
This is a MIME message. If you are reading this text, you may want to
consider changing to a mail reader or gateway that understands how to
properly handle MIME multipart messages.
--=_C39F1CD9.6B0A67B1
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Content-Disposition: inline
Here is the December 6, 2002 MMWR "Laboratory Security and Response =
Guidance for Laboratories Working With Select Agents" in pdf.
The url is:
Michele Johnson, MPH
Assistant Director
Acting Biosafety Officer
University of Utah
Environmental Health & Safety
125 S. Fort Douglas Blvd.
Salt Lake City, UT 84113
801-585-9322
mjohnson@ehs.utah.edu
We are what we repeatedly do. Excellence, then, is not an act, but a =
habit.
- Aristotle
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 5 Dec 2002 15:26:56 -0500
Reply-To: speaker@ehs.psu.edu
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Curt Speaker
Organization: UNIVERSITY SAFETY
Subject: Re: MMWR Report
Hi:
Has anyone else noticed that this report referenced 42 CFR Part 73,
which does not exist yet?!?!? Is that where the new Select Agent
regulation will be placed? Anyone know???
curious...
Curt
Curt Speaker
Biosafety Officer
Penn State University
Environmental Health and Safety
speaker@ehs.psu.edu
^...^
(O_O)
=(Y)=
"""
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 5 Dec 2002 16:05:59 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: David Gillum
Subject: C. Elegans
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Does anyone know which biosafety level should be assigned to Caenorhabditis
elegans and why? I've heard by some folks that it should be treated as a
biosafety level two organism. Is this correct?
Thanks in advance.
-David
--
David R. Gillum
Laboratory Safety Officer
Environmental Health and Safety
11 Leavitt Lane, Perpetuity Hall
Durham, NH 03824
Telephone #: 603-862-0197
Facsimile #: 603-862-0047
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 5 Dec 2002 14:15:53 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Dina Sassone
Subject: lab benches with wheels-need catalog or source
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
Does anyone know where we could get, for a BSL-3, lab benches that have
wheels, that have still have the correct bench top called for in the BMBL
(impervious to water, resistant to moderate heat and the ogranic solvents,
acids, alkalis, and chemicals used to decon.) We have only been able to
locate stainless steel.
thanks in advance!
Dina M. Sassone, CIH, CSP, SM (NRM), CBSP
University of California
Los Alamos National Laboratory
HSR-5
MS K486
Los Alamos, NM 87545
(505) 665-2977 (voice)
((505) 996-3807 (pager)
"To infinity and beyond"-Buzz Lightyear
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 5 Dec 2002 16:50:46 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Hauck, Philip"
Subject: Re: C. Elegans
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
Content-transfer-encoding: quoted-printable
I haven't run across this one personally...is it a bacteria or a =
fungus???
At any rate, after years of playing with things like this, BSL-2 is the =
bare minimum level any one should use for laboratory work. If you have a =
sink, a BSC Class II Cabinet of the Type A, B1, B2, or B3 persuasions, =
an autoclave and GOOD microbiological aseptic technique....you are at =
BSL-2 already. And if you are not sure what hazards are posed you can =
add on additional safety practices, and start sliding up that scale =
within the BSL groups that Richard Knudsen and Jonathan Richmond =
offered two ABSA's back.
There is only a scant number of Risk Group 3 Bacteria or Fungi, so odds =
are in your favor that BSL-2 would be adequate, unless this organism has =
been associated with disease in animals, and then,what was the severity =
and route of contraction of the disease. If it is a respiratory acquired =
infection, or can be spread in aerosols, start looking at BSL-3 level =
protection.
Phil Hauck
-----Original Message-----
From: David Gillum [mailto:David.Gillum@UNH.EDU]
Sent: Thursday, December 05, 2002 4:06 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: C. Elegans
Does anyone know which biosafety level should be assigned to =
Caenorhabditis
elegans and why? I've heard by some folks that it should be treated as a
biosafety level two organism. Is this correct?
Thanks in advance.
-David
--
David R. Gillum
Laboratory Safety Officer
Environmental Health and Safety
11 Leavitt Lane, Perpetuity Hall
Durham, NH 03824
Telephone #: 603-862-0197
Facsimile #: 603-862-0047
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 5 Dec 2002 16:02:14 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Kyle Boyett
Subject: Re: C. Elegans
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
C. elegans is a small nematode that usually lives in temperate regions.
Check out the link below. Hope this helps.
Kyle G. Boyett
Asst. Director of Biosafety
Safety Short Distribution List Administrator
University of Alabama @ Birmingham
Department of Occupational Health and Safety
933 South 19th Street Suite 445
Birmingham, Alabama 35294
Phone: 205.934.9181
Fax: 205.934.7487
Visit our WEB site at: healthsafe.uab.edu
Asking me to overlook a safety violation is like asking me to reduce the
value I place on YOUR life
-----Original Message-----
From: Hauck, Philip [mailto:philip.hauck@MSSM.EDU]
Sent: Thursday, December 05, 2002 3:51 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: C. Elegans
I haven't run across this one personally...is it a bacteria or a fungus???
At any rate, after years of playing with things like this, BSL-2 is the bare
minimum level any one should use for laboratory work. If you have a sink, a
BSC Class II Cabinet of the Type A, B1, B2, or B3 persuasions, an autoclave
and GOOD microbiological aseptic technique....you are at BSL-2 already. And
if you are not sure what hazards are posed you can add on additional safety
practices, and start sliding up that scale within the BSL groups that
Richard Knudsen and Jonathan Richmond offered two ABSA's back.
There is only a scant number of Risk Group 3 Bacteria or Fungi, so odds are
in your favor that BSL-2 would be adequate, unless this organism has been
associated with disease in animals, and then,what was the severity and route
of contraction of the disease. If it is a respiratory acquired infection, or
can be spread in aerosols, start looking at BSL-3 level protection.
Phil Hauck
-----Original Message-----
From: David Gillum [mailto:David.Gillum@UNH.EDU]
Sent: Thursday, December 05, 2002 4:06 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: C. Elegans
Does anyone know which biosafety level should be assigned to Caenorhabditis
elegans and why? I've heard by some folks that it should be treated as a
biosafety level two organism. Is this correct?
Thanks in advance.
-David
--
David R. Gillum
Laboratory Safety Officer
Environmental Health and Safety
11 Leavitt Lane, Perpetuity Hall
Durham, NH 03824
Telephone #: 603-862-0197
Facsimile #: 603-862-0047
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 5 Dec 2002 17:09:57 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Richard Pollack
Subject: Re: C. elegans
In-Reply-To:
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII; format=flowed
Mime-Version: 1.0 (Apple Message framework v543)
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Caenorhabditis elegans is a free-living nematode. It is readily
cultivated in the lab, and has been extensively studied in diverse labs
in all corners of the world. These worms are not parasites. The worm
itself poses no risk, but because it is sometimes used for
toxicological testing, worms so exposed (and the maintenance medium and
associated labware) may pose some hazard. Similarly, there may be
reason to scrutinize the procedures if recombinant work is pursued.
Richard J. Pollack, Ph.D.
Laboratory of Public Health Entomology
Harvard School of Public Health
665 Huntington Ave.
Boston, MA 02115
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 5 Dec 2002 16:12:53 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Kathryn Harris
Subject: Re: C. Elegans
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
It's a very simple nematode worm used in a lot of labs for genetic
development studies (and currently a hot little organism in genome
sequencing). I've never heard of it requiring a BSL in and of itself. The
BSL would rather more depend on the experiment you were doing. However I
suppose if someone ingested some....it's about 1 mm long and may be handled
as a microorganism - it is usually grown on petri dishes seeded with
bacteria which could account for the possible need to have it at BSL2..
At 04:50 PM 12/5/2002 -0500, you wrote:
>I haven't run across this one personally...is it a bacteria or a fungus???
>
>At any rate, after years of playing with things like this, BSL-2 is the
>bare minimum level any one should use for laboratory work. If you have a
>sink, a BSC Class II Cabinet of the Type A, B1, B2, or B3 persuasions, an
>autoclave and GOOD microbiological aseptic technique....you are at BSL-2
>already. And if you are not sure what hazards are posed you can add on
>additional safety practices, and start sliding up that scale within the
>BSL groups that Richard Knudsen and Jonathan Richmond offered two ABSA's
>back.
>
>There is only a scant number of Risk Group 3 Bacteria or Fungi, so odds
>are in your favor that BSL-2 would be adequate, unless this organism has
>been associated with disease in animals, and then,what was the severity
>and route of contraction of the disease. If it is a respiratory acquired
>infection, or can be spread in aerosols, start looking at BSL-3 level
>protection.
>
>Phil Hauck
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From: David Gillum [mailto:David.Gillum@UNH.EDU]
>Sent: Thursday, December 05, 2002 4:06 PM
>To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
>Subject: C. Elegans
>
>Does anyone know which biosafety level should be assigned to Caenorhabditis
>elegans and why? I've heard by some folks that it should be treated as a
>biosafety level two organism. Is this correct?
>
>Thanks in advance.
>-David
>
>--
>David R. Gillum
>
>Laboratory Safety Officer
>Environmental Health and Safety
>11 Leavitt Lane, Perpetuity Hall
>Durham, NH 03824
>Telephone #: 603-862-0197
>Facsimile #: 603-862-0047
**********************************************
Kathryn Louise Harris, Ph.D.
Biological Safety Professional
Office of Research Safety
Northwestern University
NG-71 Technological Institute
2145 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208-3121
Phone: (847) 491-4387
Fax: (847) 467-2797
Email: kathrynharris@northwestern.edu
**********************************************
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 6 Dec 2002 08:21:50 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Christina Thompson
Subject: VHP sterilization
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="Boundary_(ID_3pdve1t8jA82ZGVIbbIiwQ)"
This is a multipart message in MIME format.
--Boundary_(ID_3pdve1t8jA82ZGVIbbIiwQ)
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
I'd like to find out what experience you all have with VHP sterilization
for equipment and/or rooms. I have heard anecdotal evidence that some
folks have had trouble validating sterilization using these units. Our
veterinary staff is considering VHP sterilization in a new vivarium - to
be used for equipment and rooms. If there concerns are primarily
parasites and nematodes, the validation issues may be simpler than with
viruses, bacterial spores, etc. However, I'd like to provide them with
all the information I can so they can make their decision based on data
and real experiences, rather than manufacturer's advertising.
You may reply to me directly, and if others are interested, I will compile
responses and send out later.
Thanks very much -
Chris Thompson
Corporate Biosafety Officer
Eli Lilly and Company
cz.thompson@
317-277-4795
--Boundary_(ID_3pdve1t8jA82ZGVIbbIiwQ)
Content-type: text/html; charset=us-ascii
I'd like to find out what experience you all
have with VHP sterilization for equipment and/or rooms. I have heard
anecdotal evidence that some folks have had trouble validating sterilization
using these units. Our veterinary staff is considering VHP sterilization
in a new vivarium - to be used for equipment and rooms. If there concerns
are primarily parasites and nematodes, the validation issues may be simpler than
with viruses, bacterial spores, etc. However, I'd like to provide them
with all the information I can so they can make their decision based on data and
real experiences, rather than manufacturer's advertising.
You may reply to me directly, and if others
are interested, I will compile responses and send out later.
Thanks very much -
Chris Thompson
Corporate Biosafety Officer
Eli Lilly and Company
cz.thompson@
317-277-4795
--Boundary_(ID_3pdve1t8jA82ZGVIbbIiwQ)--
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 6 Dec 2002 10:29:24 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Hauck, Philip"
Subject: Re: C. Elegans
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
Content-transfer-encoding: quoted-printable
I learn something new every day! A Nematode! And yes, if you are =
sticking an RG-2 or RG-3 organism bacteria in a benign organism =
(nematode), you still have to consider if the former is going to come =
out of the latter in some fashion and pose a risk to you, and thereby =
require BSL-2 or higher practices.
Another consideration, has anyone developed allergies to the worms? That =
also would be a good reason to keep 'em under a BSC!
Nematodes...haven't seen them since Parasitology days!
Phil Hauck
Mt. Sinai School of Medicine
-----Original Message-----
From: Kathryn Harris [mailto:kathrynharris@NORTHWESTERN.EDU]
Sent: Thursday, December 05, 2002 5:13 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: C. Elegans
It's a very simple nematode worm used in a lot of labs for genetic
development studies (and currently a hot little organism in genome
sequencing). I've never heard of it requiring a BSL in and of itself. =
The
BSL would rather more depend on the experiment you were doing. However I
suppose if someone ingested some....it's about 1 mm long and may be =
handled
as a microorganism - it is usually grown on petri dishes seeded with
bacteria which could account for the possible need to have it at BSL2..
At 04:50 PM 12/5/2002 -0500, you wrote:
>I haven't run across this one personally...is it a bacteria or a =
fungus???
>
>At any rate, after years of playing with things like this, BSL-2 is the
>bare minimum level any one should use for laboratory work. If you have =
a
>sink, a BSC Class II Cabinet of the Type A, B1, B2, or B3 persuasions, =
an
>autoclave and GOOD microbiological aseptic technique....you are at =
BSL-2
>already. And if you are not sure what hazards are posed you can add on
>additional safety practices, and start sliding up that scale within the
>BSL groups that Richard Knudsen and Jonathan Richmond offered two =
ABSA's
>back.
>
>There is only a scant number of Risk Group 3 Bacteria or Fungi, so odds
>are in your favor that BSL-2 would be adequate, unless this organism =
has
>been associated with disease in animals, and then,what was the severity
>and route of contraction of the disease. If it is a respiratory =
acquired
>infection, or can be spread in aerosols, start looking at BSL-3 level
>protection.
>
>Phil Hauck
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From: David Gillum [mailto:David.Gillum@UNH.EDU]
>Sent: Thursday, December 05, 2002 4:06 PM
>To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
>Subject: C. Elegans
>
>Does anyone know which biosafety level should be assigned to =
Caenorhabditis
>elegans and why? I've heard by some folks that it should be treated as =
a
>biosafety level two organism. Is this correct?
>
>Thanks in advance.
>-David
>
>--
>David R. Gillum
>
>Laboratory Safety Officer
>Environmental Health and Safety
>11 Leavitt Lane, Perpetuity Hall
>Durham, NH 03824
>Telephone #: 603-862-0197
>Facsimile #: 603-862-0047
**********************************************
Kathryn Louise Harris, Ph.D.
Biological Safety Professional
Office of Research Safety
Northwestern University
NG-71 Technological Institute
2145 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208-3121
Phone: (847) 491-4387
Fax: (847) 467-2797
Email: kathrynharris@northwestern.edu
**********************************************
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 6 Dec 2002 11:10:35 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Jennifer Minogue
Subject: Friday humor- Norwalk virus
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
From a New York Times article on Norwalk-like virus/cruise ships. The
reporter must have had a hard time keeping a straight face:
"Last month, 150 people became ill from Norwalk infections
after eating in a Salt Lake City restaurant called the
Chuck-A-Rama."
--
Jennifer Minogue
Hazardous Materials Safety Officer
Environmental Health and Safety
University of Guelph
Guelph, Ontario N1G 2W1 Canada
Voice 519-824-4120-x3190
Fax 519-824-0364
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 6 Dec 2002 17:04:10 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Kathleen Gilbert
Subject: Re: lab benches with wheels-need catalog or source
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
New England Lab will make one with the black epoxy top.
New England Lab Casework
36 West Water Street
Wakefield, MA 01880
781-224-3420
-----Original Message-----
From: Dina Sassone [mailto:dinas@]
Sent: Thursday, December 05, 2002 4:16 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: lab benches with wheels-need catalog or source
Does anyone know where we could get, for a BSL-3, lab benches that have
wheels, that have still have the correct bench top called for in the
BMBL
(impervious to water, resistant to moderate heat and the ogranic
solvents,
acids, alkalis, and chemicals used to decon.) We have only been able to
locate stainless steel.
thanks in advance!
Dina M. Sassone, CIH, CSP, SM (NRM), CBSP
University of California
Los Alamos National Laboratory
HSR-5
MS K486
Los Alamos, NM 87545
(505) 665-2977 (voice)
((505) 996-3807 (pager)
"To infinity and beyond"-Buzz Lightyear
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 9 Dec 2002 10:23:51 +0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Jong Teck Keong
Subject: Re: lab benches with wheels-need catalog or source
In-Reply-To:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Fisher-hamilton have a wide range...stainless steel, timber, even hybrid of
steel with a timber look. Bench-tops are epoxy.
Cheers,
Jong
___________________________________
Jong Teck Keong
Safety Officer
Institute of Molecular and Cell Biology
30 Medical Drive Singapore 117609
Tel: 6874 8067
Fax: 6779 1117
-----Original Message-----
From: A Biosafety Discussion List [mailto:BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU]On Behalf
Of Dina Sassone
Sent: Friday, December 06, 2002 5:16 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: lab benches with wheels-need catalog or source
Does anyone know where we could get, for a BSL-3, lab benches that have
wheels, that have still have the correct bench top called for in the BMBL
(impervious to water, resistant to moderate heat and the ogranic solvents,
acids, alkalis, and chemicals used to decon.) We have only been able to
locate stainless steel.
thanks in advance!
Dina M. Sassone, CIH, CSP, SM (NRM), CBSP
University of California
Los Alamos National Laboratory
HSR-5
MS K486
Los Alamos, NM 87545
(505) 665-2977 (voice)
((505) 996-3807 (pager)
"To infinity and beyond"-Buzz Lightyear
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 9 Dec 2002 09:21:24 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Robin Newberry
Subject: Responsibilities of the RFO
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed"
HAs anyone seen or written a summary of the responsibilities of the RFO?
--
Robin
--------------------------------------------------------------
W. Robert Newberry, IV CIH, CHMM
Chief Environmental Health and Safety Officer
Clemson University
wnewber@clemson.edu ehs@clemson.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 9 Dec 2002 09:51:04 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Kathryn Harris
Subject: All quiet on the select agent front??
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
Hi All,
Can anyone advise the best place to point my web browser to watch for 'hot
off the press' information?
Thanks,
Kath
**********************************************
Kathryn Louise Harris, Ph.D.
Biological Safety Professional
Office of Research Safety
Northwestern University
NG-71 Technological Institute
2145 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208-3121
Phone: (847) 491-4387
Fax: (847) 467-2797
Email: kathrynharris@northwestern.edu
**********************************************
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 9 Dec 2002 09:59:59 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Olinger, Patricia L [S&C/0216]"
Subject: Article
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Does anyone have a copy of the article about the grad student who was
arrested and put on probation due to not destroying a SA and putting it in
the wrong refrigerator.
Thanks,
Patty Olinger
Pharmacia, Kalamazoo R&D - ESH
Biosafety & Chemical Hygiene Officer
269-833-7931 office, 269-720-1608 cell
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 9 Dec 2002 11:14:58 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Koporc, Kim"
Subject: Re: Responsibilities of the RFO and Section C of the wild
poliovirus inventory form
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Hi Robin - This is a very good question - During the inventory process =
the RFO is responsible for completing the inventory and submitting the =
report on behalf of their institution. Once the inventory is complete, =
the RFO becomes the liaison between the Office of Laboratory Containment =
Preparedness and the institution. S/he will receive all follow-up =
communication regarding the inventory and poliovirus laboratory =
containment. For example - when polio is eradicated, RFOs will be =
notified to destroy all materials or implement appropriate biosafety =
measures to further reduce the risk of transmitting wild poliovirus to =
the community.
I would like to take this opportunity to answer a related question that =
has been asked a few times. A few people have asked me what kind of =
information needs to be included in Section C of the inventory form - =
building numbers or names of principal investigators. The inventory =
form is for your information as well. Include all information that will =
assist you or future RFOs to identify and communicate with laboratories =
retaining wild poliovirus materials. I suggest listing names of =
principal investigators and building numbers. I understand that =
principal investigators tend to take their materials with them when they =
move, but I'm sure some materials will be left behind.
I hope this helps.
Best regards,
Kim
-----Original Message-----
From: Robin Newberry [mailto:wnewber@CLEMSON.EDU]
Sent: Monday, December 09, 2002 9:21 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Responsibilities of the RFO
HAs anyone seen or written a summary of the responsibilities of the RFO?
--
Robin
--------------------------------------------------------------
W. Robert Newberry, IV CIH, CHMM
Chief Environmental Health and Safety Officer
Clemson University
wnewber@clemson.edu ehs@clemson.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 9 Dec 2002 11:17:16 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Andrew Cockburn
Subject: Re: Article
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="=_59059D3A.E584ED44"
This is a MIME message. If you are reading this text, you may want to
consider changing to a mail reader or gateway that understands how to
properly handle MIME multipart messages.
--=_59059D3A.E584ED44
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Science 297:751-2 (2 August 2002)
Andrew Cockburn, PhD
Institutional Biosafety Officer
309 I Chesnut Ridge Research Bldg
Box 6845
West Virginia University
Morgantown, WV 26506-6845
telephone: 304-293-7157
>>> patricia.l.olinger@ 12/09/02 10:59AM >>>
Does anyone have a copy of the article about the grad student who was
arrested and put on probation due to not destroying a SA and putting it
in
the wrong refrigerator.
Thanks,
Patty Olinger
Pharmacia, Kalamazoo R&D - ESH
Biosafety & Chemical Hygiene Officer
269-833-7931 office, 269-720-1608 cell
--=_59059D3A.E584ED44
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Content-Description: HTML
Science 297:751-2 (2 August 2002)
Andrew Cockburn, PhD
Institutional Biosafety Officer
309 I Chesnut Ridge Research Bldg
Box 6845
West Virginia University
Morgantown, WV 26506-6845
telephone: 304-293-7157
>>> patricia.l.olinger@ 12/09/02 10:59AM >>>
Does anyone have a copy of the article about the grad student who
was
arrested and put on probation due to not destroying a SA and putting
it in
the wrong refrigerator.
Thanks,
Patty Olinger
Pharmacia, Kalamazoo R&D - ESH
Biosafety & Chemical Hygiene Officer
269-833-7931 office, 269-720-1608 cell
--=_59059D3A.E584ED44--
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 9 Dec 2002 11:28:37 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Koporc, Kim"
Subject: When is a poliovirus strain not considered wild?
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="----_=_NextPart_001_01C29FA0.06622D41"
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boundary="----_=_NextPart_002_01C29FA0.06622D41"
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Content-Type: text/plain;
charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Dear All - I have received several questions on specific poliovirus =
strains. I am attaching a document which will help answer "When is a =
poliovirus strain not considered wild?" Best regards, Kim
Kim Koporc
Poliovirus Laboratory Containment Preparedness
750 Commerce Drive
Suite 400
Decatur, GA 30030
Fax 404-371-1087
Phone 404-687-5625
E-mail kkoporc@
od/nvpo/polio
------_=_NextPart_002_01C29FA0.06622D41
Content-Type: text/html;
charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Content-Description: Questions on containment answered.doc
Content-Disposition: attachment;
filename="Questions on containment answered.doc"
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 9 Dec 2002 12:07:01 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Bruce MacDonald
Subject: Re: All quiet on the select agent front??
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="=_BCE078D0.C4A599AE"
This is a MIME message. If you are reading this text, you may want to
consider changing to a mail reader or gateway that understands how to
properly handle MIME multipart messages.
--=_BCE078D0.C4A599AE
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Kath
Here is the Fed Reg site:
>>> kathrynharris@NORTHWESTERN.EDU 12/09/02 10:51AM >>>
Hi All,
Can anyone advise the best place to point my web browser to watch for
'hot
off the press' information?
Thanks,
Kath
**********************************************
Kathryn Louise Harris, Ph.D.
Biological Safety Professional
Office of Research Safety
Northwestern University
NG-71 Technological Institute
2145 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208-3121
Phone: (847) 491-4387
Fax: (847) 467-2797
Email: kathrynharris@northwestern.edu
**********************************************
--=_BCE078D0.C4A599AE
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Kath
Here is the Fed Reg site:
href="">
>>> kathrynharris@NORTHWESTERN.EDU 12/09/02 10:51AM >>>
Hi All,
Can anyone advise the best place to point my web browser to watch
for 'hot
off the press' information?
Thanks,
Kath
**********************************************
Kathryn Louise Harris, Ph.D.
Biological Safety Professional
Office of Research Safety
Northwestern University
NG-71 Technological Institute
2145 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208-3121
Phone: (847) 491-4387
Fax: (847) 467-2797
Email: kathrynharris@northwestern.edu
**********************************************
--=_BCE078D0.C4A599AE--
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 9 Dec 2002 12:25:57 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Andrew Braun
Subject: No Hot News
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="=====================_16683000==_.ALT"
--=====================_16683000==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
Dear all,
As far as I can see the interim rule has not yet appeared in
today's Federal Register. There is nothing on the CDC or USDA web sites,
either.
A 2 December notice in the Federal Register said "DHHS will issue its
Interim Final Rule on or about December 9, 2002, and USDA will issue its
Interim Final Rule on or about December 9, 2002. These rules will describe
implementation of the Act." It appears that "on or about" is the operative
phrase.
The simplest way to find the Federal Register publication is using
a browse feature at
Next is to try a look up at
(for the look up try
CDC or "select agent" (use the quotes).
According to Federal Register site the 9 December copy has come
out. Let's hope the interim rule comes out in the 10 December issue.
Andy
---------------------------------------
Andrew G. Braun (Andy)
Harvard Medical School, Office for Research
25 Shattuck Street
Boston, MA 02115
617-432-4899; FAX 617-432-6262
---------------------------------------
--=====================_16683000==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
Dear all,
As far as I can see the interim rule has not yet appeared in
today's Federal Register. There is nothing on the CDC or USDA web
sites, either.
A 2 December notice in the Federal Register said "DHHS will issue
its Interim Final Rule on or about December 9, 2002, and USDA will
issue its Interim Final Rule on or about December 9, 2002. These
rules will describe implementation of the Act." It appears that "on
or about" is the operative phrase.
The simplest way to find the Federal Register publication is
using a browse feature at
Next is to
try a look up at
(for the look up try CDC or "select agent" (use the quotes).
According to Federal Register site the 9 December copy has
come out. Let's hope the interim rule comes out in the 10 December
issue.
Andy
---------------------------------------
Andrew G. Braun (Andy)
Harvard Medical School, Office for Research
25 Shattuck Street
Boston, MA 02115
617-432-4899; FAX 617-432-6262
---------------------------------------
--=====================_16683000==_.ALT--
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 9 Dec 2002 12:13:47 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Cheri L Hildreth
Subject: Re: Article on UConn grad student
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
I do have fax copies from I think Hartford paper that are not the best
quality. Also, I think I may have the DOJ press release on the plea
agreement -- will look for this. If you want the articles, please e-mail
your fax number and we;ll get them to you..
Cheri Hildreth Watts, Director
Department of Environmental Health &Safety
University of Louisville
(502) 852-2954
e-mail: cheri.hildreth@louisville.edu
>>> patricia.l.olinger@ 12/09/02 10:59AM >>>
Does anyone have a copy of the article about the grad student who was
arrested and put on probation due to not destroying a SA and putting it
in
the wrong refrigerator.
Thanks,
Patty Olinger
Pharmacia, Kalamazoo R&D - ESH
Biosafety & Chemical Hygiene Officer
269-833-7931 office, 269-720-1608 cell
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 9 Dec 2002 09:46:54 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Gergis, Nasr"
Subject: Re: TAT Protein and Modified Lethal Factor protein
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="----_=_NextPart_001_01C29FAA.59FD1E54"
This message is in MIME format. Since your mail reader does not understand
this format, some or all of this message may not be legible.
------_=_NextPart_001_01C29FAA.59FD1E54
Content-Type: text/plain;
charset=iso-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Dear Colleagues: I understand CDC send a letter of Certificate to facilities
registered for Select Agent. Does anyone know how long take to receive the
registration letter. Thanks,
Nasr Gergis, Ph.D., DVM
Interim Director-Biosafety & Safety Officer
Occupational Safety and Health
City of Hope/BRI
Ph: 626-539-8111 Ext. 64262
Fax: 626-301-8970
Pager: 626-423-5454
E-mail: ngergis@
------_=_NextPart_001_01C29FAA.59FD1E54
Content-Type: text/html;
charset=iso-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Dear Colleagues: I understand CDC send a letter of Certificate to
facilities registered for Select Agent. Does anyone know how long
take to receive the registration letter. Thanks,
Nasr Gergis, Ph.D., DVM
Interim color=#808080>Occupational Safety and Health
City of Hope/BRI
Ph: 626-539-8111 Ext. size=1>E-mail: ngergis@
------_=_NextPart_001_01C29FAA.59FD1E54--
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 9 Dec 2002 13:14:11 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Kathleen Gilbert
Subject: Re: TAT Protein and Modified Lethal Factor protein
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="----_=_NextPart_001_01C29FAE.C5F233D9"
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------_=_NextPart_001_01C29FAE.C5F233D9
Content-Type: text/plain;
charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Eight weeks from the date that they receive the application
-----Original Message-----
From: Gergis, Nasr [mailto:NGergis@]
Sent: Monday, December 09, 2002 12:47 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: TAT Protein and Modified Lethal Factor protein
Dear Colleagues: I understand CDC send a letter of Certificate to
facilities registered for Select Agent. Does anyone know how long take
to receive the registration letter. Thanks,
Nasr Gergis, Ph.D., DVM
Interim Director-Biosafety & Safety Officer
Occupational Safety and Health
City of Hope/BRI
Ph: 626-539-8111 Ext. 64262
Fax: 626-301-8970
Pager: 626-423-5454
E-mail: ngergis@
------_=_NextPart_001_01C29FAE.C5F233D9
Content-Type: text/html;
charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
style'font-size: 10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Eight weeks
from the date that they = receive the application
style'font-size: 10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>
style'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Tahoma'>-----Original =
Message-----
From: Gergis, Nasr [mailto:NGergis@]
Sent: Monday, December = 09, 2002 12:47 PM
To: = BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: TAT Protein = and Modified Lethal Factor protein
style'font-size:12.0pt'>
style'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:blue'>Dear
Colleagues: = I understand CDC send a letter of Certificate to
facilities = registered for Select Agent. Does anyone know how long
take to receive the registration letter. Thanks,
style'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Comic Sans
MS";color:gray'>Nasr = Gergis,
style'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Comic Sans MS";color:blue'>
style'font-size:10.0pt; font-family:Arial;color:gray'>Interim
Director-Biosafety & Safety =
style'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial; color:blue'>
style'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Arial;color:gray'>Occupational Safety and =
style'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial; color:blue'>
style'font-size:10.0pt; size2
style'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial; color:blue'>
style'font-size:7.5pt; font-family:Arial;color:gray'>Ph:
626-539-8111 Ext. = style'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;
color:blue'>
style'font-size:7.5pt; size2
style'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial; color:blue'>
style'font-size:7.5pt; size2
style'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial; color:blue'>
style'font-size:7.5pt;
style'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial; color:blue'>
=00
------_=_NextPart_001_01C29FAE.C5F233D9--
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 9 Dec 2002 14:00:05 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ed Gaunt
Subject: Re: No Hot News
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="----_=_NextPart_001_01C29FB5.2F563130"
This message is in MIME format. Since your mail reader does not understand
this format, some or all of this message may not be legible.
------_=_NextPart_001_01C29FB5.2F563130
Content-Type: text/plain;
charset="iso-8859-1"
Correct. The rules did not appear in the FR today. OMB was delayed in
submitting the final text of the rules to the GPO for inclusion in today's
Federal Register (by last week's weather and other(?) issues). A physical
(paper) document may be posted at the GPO this afternoon in order to meet
the requirements of the law, but unless you live in DC and know where the
Govt Printing Office is located, and know which bulletin board to look on,
good luck trying to find it! The electronic version will appear in the
Federal Register "soon."
Ed
-----Original Message-----
From: Andrew Braun [mailto:andrew_braun@HMS.HARVARD.EDU]
Sent: Monday, December 09, 2002 12:26 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: No Hot News
Dear all,
As far as I can see the interim rule has not yet appeared in today's
Federal Register. There is nothing on the CDC or USDA web sites, either.
A 2 December notice in the Federal Register said "DHHS will issue its
Interim Final Rule on or about December 9, 2002, and USDA will issue its
Interim Final Rule on or about December 9, 2002. These rules will describe
implementation of the Act." It appears that "on or about" is the operative
phrase.
The simplest way to find the Federal Register publication is using a
browse feature at
Next is to try a look
up at
(for the look up try CDC
or "select agent" (use the quotes).
According to Federal Register site the 9 December copy has come out.
Let's hope the interim rule comes out in the 10 December issue.
Andy
---------------------------------------
Andrew G. Braun (Andy)
Harvard Medical School, Office for Research
25 Shattuck Street
Boston, MA 02115
617-432-4899; FAX 617-432-6262
---------------------------------------
------_=_NextPart_001_01C29FB5.2F563130
Content-Type: text/html;
charset="iso-8859-1"
size=2>Correct. The rules did not appear in the FR today. OMB was
delayed in submitting the final text of the rules to the GPO for
inclusion in today's Federal Register (by last week's weather and
other(?) issues). A physical (paper) document may be posted at the
GPO this afternoon in order to meet the requirements of the law, but
unless you live in DC and know where the Govt Printing Office is
located, and know which bulletin board to look on, good luck trying
to find it! The electronic version will appear in the Federal
Register "soon."
size=2>
size=2>Ed
size=2>-----Original Message-----
From: Andrew Braun [mailto:andrew_braun@HMS.HARVARD.EDU]
Sent: Monday, December 09, 2002 12:26 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: No Hot News
Dear all,
As far as I can see the interim rule has not yet appeared
in today's Federal Register. There is nothing on the CDC or USDA
web sites, either.
A 2 December notice in the Federal Register said "DHHS will issue
its Interim Final Rule on or about December 9, 2002, and USDA will
issue its Interim Final Rule on or about December 9, 2002. These
rules will describe implementation of the Act." It appears that
"on or about" is the operative phrase.
The simplest way to find the Federal Register publication
is using a browse
color=#0000ff>
href=""
color=#0000ff>
(for the look up try CDC or "select agent" (use the quotes).
According to Federal Register site the 9 December copy has
come out. Let's hope the size=2>
---------------------------------------
Andrew G. Braun (Andy)
Harvard Medical School, Office for Research
25 Shattuck Street
Boston, MA 02115
617-432-4899; FAX 617-432-6262
---------------------------------------
------_=_NextPart_001_01C29FB5.2F563130--
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 9 Dec 2002 14:19:44 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Olinger, Patricia L [S&C/0216]"
Subject: Re: TAT Protein and Modified Lethal Factor protein
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="------------InterScan_NT_MIME_Boundary"
This message is in MIME format. Since your mail reader does not understand
this format, some or all of this message may not be legible.
--------------InterScan_NT_MIME_Boundary
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="----_=_NextPart_001_01C29FB7.EE262DCA"
------_=_NextPart_001_01C29FB7.EE262DCA
Content-Type: text/plain;
charset="iso-8859-1"
Not necessarily. Sometimes it's longer......
Patty
-----Original Message-----
From: Kathleen Gilbert [mailto:gilbert@]
Sent: Monday, December 09, 2002 1:14 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: TAT Protein and Modified Lethal Factor protein
Eight weeks from the date that they receive the application
-----Original Message-----
From: Gergis, Nasr [mailto:NGergis@]
Sent: Monday, December 09, 2002 12:47 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: TAT Protein and Modified Lethal Factor protein
Dear Colleagues: I understand CDC send a letter of Certificate to facilities
registered for Select Agent. Does anyone know how long take to receive the
registration letter. Thanks,
Nasr Gergis, Ph.D., DVM
Interim Director-Biosafety & Safety Officer
Occupational Safety and Health
City of Hope/BRI
Ph: 626-539-8111 Ext. 64262
Fax: 626-301-8970
Pager: 626-423-5454
E-mail: ngergis@
------_=_NextPart_001_01C29FB7.EE262DCA
Content-Type: text/html;
charset="iso-8859-1"
Not necessarily. Sometimes it's longer......
Patty
size=2>-----Original Message-----
From: Kathleen Gilbert [mailto:gilbert@]
Sent: Monday, December 09, 2002 1:14 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: TAT Protein and Modified Lethal Factor protein
style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">Eight weeks
from the date that they receive the application
style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">
style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: Tahoma">-----Original
Message-----
From: Gergis, style="FONT-WEIGHT: bold">Sent: Monday, December 09,
2002 12:47 PM
To: style="FONT-WEIGHT: bold">Subject: Re: TAT Protein and Modified
Lethal Factor protein
size=3>
size=2>Dear Colleagues: I understand CDC send a letter of
Certificate to facilities registered for Select Agent. Does anyone
know how long take to receive the registration letter. Thanks,
style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: gray; FONT-FAMILY: 'Comic Sans
MS'">Nasr style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: blue; FONT-FAMILY: 'Comic
Sans MS'"> style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: gray; FONT-FAMILY:
Arial">Interim style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: blue; FONT-FAMILY:
Arial"> style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: gray; FONT-FAMILY:
Arial">Occupational Safety style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: blue;
FONT-FAMILY: Arial"> style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: gray;
FONT-FAMILY: Arial">City of style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: blue;
FONT-FAMILY: Arial"> style="FONT-SIZE: 7.5pt; COLOR: gray;
FONT-FAMILY: Arial">Ph: 626-539-8111 style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR:
blue; FONT-FAMILY: Arial"> style="FONT-SIZE: 7.5pt; COLOR: gray;
FONT-FAMILY: Arial">Fax: style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: blue;
FONT-FAMILY: Arial"> style="FONT-SIZE: 7.5pt; COLOR: gray;
FONT-FAMILY: Arial">Pager: style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: blue;
FONT-FAMILY: Arial"> style="FONT-SIZE: 7.5pt; COLOR: gray;
FONT-FAMILY: Arial">E-mail: style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: blue;
FONT-FAMILY: Arial">
------_=_NextPart_001_01C29FB7.EE262DCA--
--------------InterScan_NT_MIME_Boundary--
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 9 Dec 2002 14:06:52 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Kathryn Harris
Subject: The wonders of modern technology huh..
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="=====================_624289125==_.ALT"
--=====================_624289125==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
One would think that in this day and age it would be possible to get an
electronic copy posted on a web page FAR more, or at least AS easily, as a
paper one sent to the printers in the snow! I guess there are procedures
which just have to be followed!
Anyone care to speculate on how this may effect the (already-short) comment
period?
>OMB was delayed in submitting the final text of the rules to the GPO for
inclusion in today's Federal Register (by last week's weather and >other(?)
issues). A physical (paper) document may be posted at the GPO this
afternoon in order to meet the requirements of the law, but >unless you
live in DC and know where the Govt Printing Office is located, and know
which bulletin board to look on, good luck trying to >find it! The
electronic version will appear in the Federal Register "soon."
**********************************************
Kathryn Louise Harris, Ph.D.
Biological Safety Professional
Office of Research Safety
Northwestern University
NG-71 Technological Institute
2145 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208-3121
Phone: (847) 491-4387
Fax: (847) 467-2797
Email: kathrynharris@northwestern.edu
**********************************************
--=====================_624289125==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
One would think that in this day and age it would be possible to get
an electronic copy posted on a web page FAR more, or at least AS
easily, as a paper one sent to the printers in the snow! I guess
there are procedures which just have to be followed!
Anyone care to speculate on how this may effect the (already-short)
comment period?
>OMB was delayed in submitting the final text of the rules to the
GPO for inclusion in today's Federal Register (by last week's
weather and >other(?) issues). A physical (paper) document may be
posted at the GPO this afternoon in order to meet the requirements
of the law, but >unless you live in DC and know where the Govt
Printing Office is located, and know which bulletin board to look
on, good luck trying to >find it! The electronic version will appear
in the Federal Register "soon."
**********************************************
Kathryn Louise Harris, Ph.D.
Biological Safety Professional
Office of Research Safety
Northwestern University
NG-71 Technological Institute
2145 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208-3121
Phone: (847) 491-4387
Fax: (847) 467-2797
Email: kathrynharris@northwestern.edu
**********************************************
--=====================_624289125==_.ALT--
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 10 Dec 2002 10:04:01 -0500
Reply-To: speaker@ehs.psu.edu
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Curt Speaker
Organization: UNIVERSITY SAFETY
Subject: Strike Two!
Morning:
Well, another day, another Federal Register, and we seem to be no
closer to knowing what the government expects of us with regards
to Select Agents. I realize that "on or about Dec. 9th" is purposely
vague, but after not telling us anything for the last several months, I
would have hoped that they could meet their own self-imposed
timeline. Jonathan and Shanna's document helps understanding
what will be expected of facilities, but the actual list of Select Agents
is of greater interest to most of us (especially the exemption levels
for the toxins).
I am planning a trip to Washington, DC to hear the presentations on
Monday morning, December 16th.
I just hope the Select Agent regs are published by THEN!!!
Curt
Curt Speaker
Biosafety Officer
Penn State University
Environmental Health and Safety
speaker@ehs.psu.edu
^...^
(O_O)
=(Y)=
"""
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 10 Dec 2002 10:13:09 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Koporc, Kim"
Subject: Inventory reports are due December 31, 2002
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="----_=_NextPart_001_01C2A05E.A6280435"
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------_=_NextPart_001_01C2A05E.A6280435
Content-Type: text/plain;
charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Dear All - FYI - Reminder letters were sent out to pharmaceutical and =
biotechnology companies and academic institutions. If you have already =
submitted your inventory results, please disregard the reminder and =
accept our thanks for your support of polio eradication. Even if your =
institution/laboratory does not have wild polioviruses, the completed =
form is required to compile the national inventory.
If you have not received the form, please download it from our website =
at od/nvpo/polio. Please do not hesitate to contact me if =
you have any questions. Best regards, Kim
Kim Koporc
Poliovirus Laboratory Containment Preparedness
750 Commerce Drive
Suite 400
Decatur, GA 30030
Fax 404-371-1087
Phone 404-687-5625
E-mail kkoporc@
od/nvpo/polio
------_=_NextPart_001_01C2A05E.A6280435
Content-Type: text/html;
charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
FACE"Arial">Dear All - FYI - Reminder letters were sent =
COLOR"#000000" SIZE2 FACE"Arial"> and = COLOR"#000000"
SIZE2 FACE"Arial">and academic = COLOR"#000000" SIZE2
FACE"Arial">If you have already submitted = COLOR"#000000"
SIZE2 FACE"Arial">disregard = LANG"en-us"> our =
COLOR"#000000" SIZE2 FACE"Arial">Even if your =
institution/laboratory does not have wild polioviruses, the
completed = FACE"Arial">
FACE"Arial">If you have not received the form, = LANG"en-us">
our = COLOR"#0000FF" SIZE2 = COLOR"#000000" SIZE2
FACE"Arial">Please do not hesitate to = contact me if you have
any questions. Best regards, = FACE"Arial">
COLOR"#000000" SIZE2 FACE"Arial">Kim Koporc
FACE"Arial">Poliovirus Laboratory Containment Preparedness =
FACE"Arial">750 Commerce Drive
FACE"Arial">Suite 400
FACE"Arial">Decatur, GA 30030
FACE"Arial">Fax 404-371-1087
FACE"Arial">Phone 404-687-5625
FACE"Arial">E-mail kkoporc@
FACE"Arial">od/nvpo/polio
------_=_NextPart_001_01C2A05E.A6280435--
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 10 Dec 2002 10:43:13 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Andrew Braun
Subject: Re: Strike Two!
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="=====================_10844515==_.ALT"
--=====================_10844515==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
If you look at
()
it has the following:
-------------------
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES DEPARTMENT
RULES
Quarantine, inspection, and licensing:
Select agents and toxins; possession, use, and transfer,
02-31370
[AA08; 84 PGS.; Filed 12/9/02 at 4:03pm]
Publication Date: 12/13/02
------------------------
If I understand this entry it means the Interim Rule will be published on
Friday and it has 84 pages (or "PGS."). That means we will have to work
double fast to get our comments in on Thursday.
Andy
At 10:04 AM 12/10/2002 -0500, you wrote:
>Morning:
>
>Well, another day, another Federal Register, and we seem to be no
>closer to knowing what the government expects of us with regards
>to Select Agents. I realize that "on or about Dec. 9th" is purposely
>vague, but after not telling us anything for the last several months, I
>would have hoped that they could meet their own self-imposed
>timeline. Jonathan and Shanna's document helps understanding
>what will be expected of facilities, but the actual list of Select Agents
>is of greater interest to most of us (especially the exemption levels
>for the toxins).
>
>I am planning a trip to Washington, DC to hear the presentations on
>Monday morning, December 16th.
>
>I just hope the Select Agent regs are published by THEN!!!
>
>Curt
>
>Curt Speaker
>Biosafety Officer
>Penn State University
>Environmental Health and Safety
>speaker@ehs.psu.edu
>
>^...^
>(O_O)
>=(Y)=
> """
---------------------------------------
Andrew G. Braun (Andy)
Harvard Medical School, Office for Research
25 Shattuck Street
Boston, MA 02115
617-432-4899; FAX 617-432-6262
---------------------------------------
--=====================_10844515==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
If you look at
()
it has the following:
-------------------
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES DEPARTMENT
RULES
Quarantine, inspection, and licensing:
Select agents and toxins; possession, use, and transfer,
02-31370
[AA08; 84 PGS.; Filed 12/9/02 at 4:03pm]
Publication Date: 12/13/02
------------------------
If I understand this entry it means the Interim Rule will be
published on Friday and it has 84 pages (or "PGS."). That means we
will have to work double fast to get our comments in on Thursday.
Andy
At 10:04 AM 12/10/2002 -0500, you wrote:
Morning:
Well, another day, another Federal Register, and we seem to be no
closer to knowing what the government expects of us with regards
to Select Agents. I realize that "on or about Dec. 9th" is
purposely
vague, but after not telling us anything for the last several
months, I
would have hoped that they could meet their own self-imposed
timeline. Jonathan and Shanna's document helps understanding
what will be expected of facilities, but the actual list of Select
Agents
is of greater interest to most of us (especially the exemption
levels
for the toxins).
I am planning a trip to Washington, DC to hear the presentations
on
Monday morning, December 16th.
I just hope the Select Agent regs are published by THEN!!!
Curt
Curt Speaker
Biosafety Officer
Penn State University
Environmental Health and Safety
speaker@ehs.psu.edu
^...^
(O_O)
=(Y)=
"""
---------------------------------------
Andrew G. Braun (Andy)
Harvard Medical School, Office for Research
25 Shattuck Street
Boston, MA 02115
617-432-4899; FAX 617-432-6262
---------------------------------------
--=====================_10844515==_.ALT--
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 10 Dec 2002 10:52:38 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ed Gaunt
Subject: Interim Rules--More info
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
After Command Emphasis and Devine intervention, OMB approved the rule late
yesterday. As I indicated before, it has been put "on public display" at
the Government Printing Office since yesterday afternoon. OMB was supposed
to deliver the rules to the FR late yesterday for publication today, but it
did not make it in time. As Andy Braun just indicated in his posting, it
will be now be published in Friday's Federal Register (DHHS stuff only gets
published on certain days of the week).
However, CDC and APHIS should be posting copies of the rules on their
respective Web sites this afternoon! I'll let you know when.
Ed
-----Original Message-----
From: Curt Speaker [mailto:SPEAKER@SAFETY-1.SAFETY.PSU.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, December 10, 2002 10:04 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Strike Two!
Morning:
Well, another day, another Federal Register, and we seem to be no
closer to knowing what the government expects of us with regards
to Select Agents. I realize that "on or about Dec. 9th" is purposely
vague, but after not telling us anything for the last several months, I
would have hoped that they could meet their own self-imposed
timeline. Jonathan and Shanna's document helps understanding
what will be expected of facilities, but the actual list of Select Agents
is of greater interest to most of us (especially the exemption levels
for the toxins).
I am planning a trip to Washington, DC to hear the presentations on
Monday morning, December 16th.
I just hope the Select Agent regs are published by THEN!!!
Curt
Curt Speaker
Biosafety Officer
Penn State University
Environmental Health and Safety
speaker@ehs.psu.edu
^...^
(O_O)
=(Y)=
"""
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 10 Dec 2002 12:43:39 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Erik A. Talley"
Subject: Re: Interim Rules--More info
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
It is there now!
Erik
At 10:52 AM 12/10/2002 -0500, you wrote:
>After Command Emphasis and Devine intervention, OMB approved the rule late
>yesterday. As I indicated before, it has been put "on public display" at
>the Government Printing Office since yesterday afternoon. OMB was supposed
>to deliver the rules to the FR late yesterday for publication today, but it
>did not make it in time. As Andy Braun just indicated in his posting, it
>will be now be published in Friday's Federal Register (DHHS stuff only gets
>published on certain days of the week).
>
>However, CDC and APHIS should be posting copies of the rules on their
>respective Web sites this afternoon! I'll let you know when.
>
>Ed
>
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From: Curt Speaker [mailto:SPEAKER@SAFETY-1.SAFETY.PSU.EDU]
>Sent: Tuesday, December 10, 2002 10:04 AM
>To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
>Subject: Strike Two!
>
>
>Morning:
>
>Well, another day, another Federal Register, and we seem to be no
>closer to knowing what the government expects of us with regards
>to Select Agents. I realize that "on or about Dec. 9th" is purposely
>vague, but after not telling us anything for the last several months, I
>would have hoped that they could meet their own self-imposed
>timeline. Jonathan and Shanna's document helps understanding
>what will be expected of facilities, but the actual list of Select Agents
>is of greater interest to most of us (especially the exemption levels
>for the toxins).
>
>I am planning a trip to Washington, DC to hear the presentations on
>Monday morning, December 16th.
>
>I just hope the Select Agent regs are published by THEN!!!
>
>Curt
>
>Curt Speaker
>Biosafety Officer
>Penn State University
>Environmental Health and Safety
>speaker@ehs.psu.edu
>
>^...^
>(O_O)
>=(Y)=
> """
___________________________________
Erik A. Talley, Director
Environmental Health and Safety
Weill Medical College of Cornell University
418 East 71st Street, Suite 62
New York, NY 10021
212-746-6201
ert2002@med.cornell.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 10 Dec 2002 13:00:16 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Margaret Rakas
Subject: Re: Interim Rules--More info
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="=_530F95DB.BEDF5279"
--=_530F95DB.BEDF5279
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
OK, it was a VERY quick read...but since they chose 'more scientific'
names for some of the Select Agents, am I correct in assuming that "T-2
toxin" is tetrodotoxin? I can find no documentation of this change, but
(although no where near as exact as a CAS #) it would make sense.
Thanks
Margaret
--=_530F95DB.BEDF5279
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Content-Description: HTML
OK, it was a VERY quick read...but since they chose 'more
scientific' names for some of the Select Agents, am I correct in
assuming that "T-2 toxin" is tetrodotoxin? I can find no
documentation of this change, but (although no where near as exact
as a CAS #) it would make sense.
Thanks
Margaret
--=_530F95DB.BEDF5279--
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 10 Dec 2002 12:14:18 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Twedt, Tru"
Subject: Re: Interim Rules--More info
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="----_=_NextPart_001_01C2A077.F46A1320"
This message is in MIME format. Since your mail reader does not understand
this format, some or all of this message may not be legible.
------_=_NextPart_001_01C2A077.F46A1320
Content-Type: text/plain;
charset="iso-8859-1"
T-2 toxin is a tricothecene mycotoxin. The tricothecene mycotoxins are a
large group of toxins produced by several genera of fungi, including
Fusarium, Myrotecium, Trichoderma, and Stachybotrys. T-2 is produced by the
fungi Fusarium tricinctum.
Tetrodotoxin comes from the pufferfish.
=======================
Tru F. Twedt, DVM
Biosecurity Specialist
Iowa State University
Environmental Health & Safety
118 Agronomy Lab
Ames, IA 50011-3200
E-mail: ttwedt@iastate.edu
Phone: (515) 294-6593
Fax: (515) 294-9357
Website:
-----Original Message-----
From: Margaret Rakas [mailto:mrakas@EMAIL.SMITH.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, December 10, 2002 12:00 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Interim Rules--More info
OK, it was a VERY quick read...but since they chose 'more scientific' names
for some of the Select Agents, am I correct in assuming that "T-2 toxin" is
tetrodotoxin? I can find no documentation of this change, but (although no
where near as exact as a CAS #) it would make sense.
Thanks
Margaret
------_=_NextPart_001_01C2A077.F46A1320
Content-Type: text/html;
charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
2px"> face"Times New Roman" style"FONT-SIZE: 12pt;
FONT-FAMILY: 'Times New Roman'; = mso-fareast-font-family: 'Times
New Roman'; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; = mso-fareast-language: EN-US;
mso-bidi-language: AR-SA">The tricothecene mycotoxins are a large
group of toxins produced by several = genera of fungi, including
Fusarium, Myrotecium, Trichoderma, = and style"FONT-SIZE:
12pt; FONT-FAMILY: 'Times New Roman'; = mso-fareast-font-family:
'Times New Roman'; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; = mso-fareast-language:
EN-US; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA">T-2 is produced by the fungi
Fusarium tricinctum.
style"FONT-SIZE: 12pt; FONT-FAMILY: 'Times New Roman'; =
mso-fareast-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-ansi-language:
EN-US; = mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-language: = AR-SA">
style"FONT-SIZE: 12pt; FONT-FAMILY: 'Times New Roman'; =
mso-fareast-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-ansi-language:
EN-US; = mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-language:
AR-SA">Tetrodotoxin comes from the pufferfish.
size2>=
size2>Biosecurity Specialist
Iowa State = University
Environmental Health & = size2>Ames, size2>E-mail:
ttwedt@iastate.edu
Phone: = (515) size2>Fax: (515) 294-9357
Website: target_blank
href"">
faceTahoma size2>-----Original Message-----
From: Margaret Rakas [mailto:mrakas@EMAIL.SMITH.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, December 10, = 2002 12:00 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: = Interim Rules--More info
OK, it was a VERY quick read...but since they = chose 'more
scientific' names for some of the Select Agents, am I correct in =
assuming that "T-2 toxin" is tetrodotoxin? I can find no
documentation of = this change, but (although no where near as
exact as a CAS #) it would make sense.
Thanks
Margaret
------_=_NextPart_001_01C2A077.F46A1320--
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 10 Dec 2002 12:49:41 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Jeppesen, Eric R"
Subject: Re: Interim Rules--More info
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="----_=_NextPart_001_01C2A07C.E5DAB620"
This message is in MIME format. Since your mail reader does not understand
this format, some or all of this message may not be legible.
------_=_NextPart_001_01C2A07C.E5DAB620
Content-Type: text/plain;
charset="iso-8859-1"
So...I'm not seeing Tetrodotoxin (TTX) on the list. Does that mean it's
off?
We have a couple of researchers who are in the middle of getting registered
for TTX.
It would be nice to tell them not to worry about it.
Eric
Eric R. Jeppesen
Laboratory Safety Specialist
KU-EHS Dept.
(785) 864-2857 phone
(785) 864-2852 fax
jeppesen@ku.edu
-----Original Message-----
From: Twedt, Tru [mailto:ttwedt@IASTATE.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, December 10, 2002 12:14 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Interim Rules--More info
T-2 toxin is a tricothecene mycotoxin. The tricothecene mycotoxins are a
large group of toxins produced by several genera of fungi, including
Fusarium, Myrotecium, Trichoderma, and Stachybotrys. T-2 is produced by the
fungi Fusarium tricinctum.
Tetrodotoxin comes from the pufferfish.
=======================
Tru F. Twedt, DVM
Biosecurity Specialist
Iowa State University
Environmental Health & Safety
118 Agronomy Lab
Ames, IA 50011-3200
E-mail: ttwedt@iastate.edu
Phone: (515) 294-6593
Fax: (515) 294-9357
Website:
-----Original Message-----
From: Margaret Rakas [mailto:mrakas@EMAIL.SMITH.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, December 10, 2002 12:00 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Interim Rules--More info
OK, it was a VERY quick read...but since they chose 'more scientific' names
for some of the Select Agents, am I correct in assuming that "T-2 toxin" is
tetrodotoxin? I can find no documentation of this change, but (although no
where near as exact as a CAS #) it would make sense.
Thanks
Margaret
------_=_NextPart_001_01C2A07C.E5DAB620
Content-Type: text/html;
charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
2px"> size2>So...I'm not seeing Tetrodotoxin (TTX) on the
list. Does that mean it's off?
We = have a couple of researchers who are in the middle of
getting registered for TTX.
It = would be nice to tell them not to worry about it.
size2>
size2>Eric
faceArial size2>KU-EHS Dept.
(785) 864-2857 = size2>jeppesen@ku.edu
size1>
faceTahoma size2>-----Original Message-----
From: Twedt, Tru [mailto:ttwedt@IASTATE.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, December 10, = 2002 12:14 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: = Interim Rules--More info
face"Times New Roman" style"FONT-SIZE: 12pt; FONT-FAMILY:
'Times New Roman'; = mso-fareast-font-family: 'Times New Roman';
mso-ansi-language: EN-US; = mso-fareast-language: EN-US;
mso-bidi-language: AR-SA">The tricothecene mycotoxins are a
large group of toxins produced by = several genera of fungi,
including Fusarium, Myrotecium, Trichoderma, = and
style"FONT-SIZE: 12pt; FONT-FAMILY: 'Times New Roman'; =
mso-fareast-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-ansi-language:
EN-US; = mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-language:
AR-SA">T-2 is produced by the fungi Fusarium tricinctum.
style"FONT-SIZE: 12pt; FONT-FAMILY: 'Times New Roman'; =
mso-fareast-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-ansi-language:
EN-US; = mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-language: = AR-SA">
style"FONT-SIZE: 12pt; FONT-FAMILY: 'Times New Roman'; =
mso-fareast-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-ansi-language:
EN-US; = mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-language:
AR-SA">Tetrodotoxin comes from the pufferfish.
size2>=
size2>Iowa State University
Environmental = Health & Safety
118 Agronomy Lab = faceArial faceArial size2>Fax:
(515) 294-9357 = color#0000ff
target_blank>
faceTahoma size2>-----Original Message-----
From: Margaret Rakas [mailto:mrakas@EMAIL.SMITH.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, December = 10, 2002 12:00 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: = Re: Interim Rules--More info
OK, it was a VERY quick read...but since they = chose 'more
scientific' names for some of the Select Agents, am I correct in
= assuming that "T-2 toxin" is tetrodotoxin? I can find no
documentation = of this change, but (although no where near
as exact as a CAS #) it would = make sense.
Thanks
size2>Margaret
------_=_NextPart_001_01C2A07C.E5DAB620--
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 10 Dec 2002 13:42:08 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ed Gaunt
Subject: Re: Interim Rules--More info
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="----_=_NextPart_001_01C2A07B.D826FAD0"
This message is in MIME format. Since your mail reader does not understand
this format, some or all of this message may not be legible.
------_=_NextPart_001_01C2A07B.D826FAD0
Content-Type: text/plain;
charset="iso-8859-1"
TTX is an HHS agent. This reg only covers primarily USDA and Overlap agents
(the B and C lists on the Notification Forms). Once the HHS regs are
available, I'm sure this will be covered there.
Ed
-----Original Message-----
From: Jeppesen, Eric R [mailto:jeppesen@KU.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, December 10, 2002 1:50 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Interim Rules--More info
So...I'm not seeing Tetrodotoxin (TTX) on the list. Does that mean it's
off?
We have a couple of researchers who are in the middle of getting registered
for TTX.
It would be nice to tell them not to worry about it.
Eric
Eric R. Jeppesen
Laboratory Safety Specialist
KU-EHS Dept.
(785) 864-2857 phone
(785) 864-2852 fax
jeppesen@ku.edu
-----Original Message-----
From: Twedt, Tru [mailto:ttwedt@IASTATE.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, December 10, 2002 12:14 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Interim Rules--More info
T-2 toxin is a tricothecene mycotoxin. The tricothecene mycotoxins are a
large group of toxins produced by several genera of fungi, including
Fusarium, Myrotecium, Trichoderma, and Stachybotrys. T-2 is produced by the
fungi Fusarium tricinctum.
Tetrodotoxin comes from the pufferfish.
=======================
Tru F. Twedt, DVM
Biosecurity Specialist
Iowa State University
Environmental Health & Safety
118 Agronomy Lab
Ames, IA 50011-3200
E-mail: ttwedt@iastate.edu
Phone: (515) 294-6593
Fax: (515) 294-9357
Website:
-----Original Message-----
From: Margaret Rakas [mailto:mrakas@EMAIL.SMITH.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, December 10, 2002 12:00 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Interim Rules--More info
OK, it was a VERY quick read...but since they chose 'more scientific' names
for some of the Select Agents, am I correct in assuming that "T-2 toxin" is
tetrodotoxin? I can find no documentation of this change, but (although no
where near as exact as a CAS #) it would make sense.
Thanks
Margaret
------_=_NextPart_001_01C2A07B.D826FAD0
Content-Type: text/html;
charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
2px">
TTX is an HHS = agent. This reg only covers primarily USDA and
Overlap agents (the B and C = lists on the Notification Forms).
Once the HHS regs are available, I'm sure = this will be covered
there.
size1>
size1>Ed
faceTahoma size2>-----Original Message-----
From: Jeppesen, Eric R [mailto:jeppesen@KU.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, December 10, 2002 = 1:50 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: = Interim Rules--More info
size2>So...I'm not seeing Tetrodotoxin (TTX) on the list.
Does that mean it's = off?
We = have a couple of researchers who are in the middle of
getting registered for TTX.
It = would be nice to tell them not to worry about it.
size2>
size2>Eric
faceArial size2>KU-EHS Dept.
(785) 864-2857 = faceArial size2>jeppesen@ku.edu
size1>
faceTahoma size2>-----Original Message-----
From: Twedt, Tru [mailto:ttwedt@IASTATE.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, December 10, = 2002 12:14 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: = Interim Rules--More info
face"Times New Roman" size3>T-2 toxin is a tricothecene =
mycotoxin. style"FONT-SIZE: 12pt; FONT-FAMILY: 'Times New
Roman'; = mso-fareast-font-family: 'Times New Roman';
mso-ansi-language: EN-US; = mso-fareast-language: EN-US;
mso-bidi-language: AR-SA">The tricothecene mycotoxins are a
large group of toxins produced by = several genera of fungi,
including Fusarium, Myrotecium, = Trichoderma,
style"FONT-SIZE: 12pt; FONT-FAMILY: 'Times New Roman'; =
mso-fareast-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-ansi-language:
EN-US; = mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-language:
AR-SA">T-2 is produced by the fungi Fusarium tricinctum.
style"FONT-SIZE: 12pt; FONT-FAMILY: 'Times New Roman'; =
mso-fareast-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-ansi-language:
EN-US; = mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-language: =
AR-SA">
style"FONT-SIZE: 12pt; FONT-FAMILY: 'Times New Roman'; =
mso-fareast-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-ansi-language:
EN-US; = mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-language:
AR-SA">Tetrodotoxin comes from the pufferfish.
size2>=
faceArial size2>Iowa State University
Environmental = Health & Safety
118 Agronomy = faceArial faceArial size2>Fax:
(515) 294-9357 = color#0000ff =
href"">
faceTahoma size2>-----Original Message-----
From: Margaret = Rakas [mailto:mrakas@EMAIL.SMITH.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, December = 10, 2002 12:00 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: = Re: Interim Rules--More info
OK, it was a VERY quick read...but since they = chose 'more
scientific' names for some of the Select Agents, am I =
correct in assuming that "T-2 toxin" is tetrodotoxin? I
can find no documentation of this change, but (although no
where near as = exact as a CAS #) it would make sense.
Thanks
size2>Margaret
------_=_NextPart_001_01C2A07B.D826FAD0--
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 10 Dec 2002 14:00:30 -0500
Reply-To: speaker@ehs.psu.edu
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Curt Speaker
Organization: UNIVERSITY SAFETY
Subject: Re: Interim Rules--More info
In-Reply-To:
After a (very quick) read:
It seems:
Tetrodotoxin is not on the list
neither is Ricin
Aflatoxin was removed
Exemption quantities are as follows:
Botulism neurotoxins 0.5 mg
C. perfringens E toxin 100mg
Shigatoxin 100mg
Staph Entrotoxin 5mg (wasn't this just SEB before?)
T-2 1000mg
It also looks like...
Yellow Fever was deleted
B Virus was not added
Monkeypox virus was not added
lastly (for now), it appears the 100 base pair limit for genetic
elements has also been removed.
Am I reading this right???
Curt
Curt Speaker
Biosafety Officer
Penn State University
Environmental Health and Safety
speaker@ehs.psu.edu
^...^
(O_O)
=(Y)=
"""
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 10 Dec 2002 14:05:39 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Thompson, Larry"
Subject: Re: Interim Rules--More info
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Margaret, et al.
T-2 toxin is a mycotoxin. It is not tetrodotoxin.
TTFN,
Larry
Larry J. Thompson, DVM PhD DABVT CBSP
Clinical Toxicologist
University of Georgia-Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory
43 Brighton Road
Tifton, GA 31793-3000
Phone 229-386-3340 Fax 229-386-7128
OK, it was a VERY quick read...but since they chose 'more scientific' =
names for some of the Select Agents, am I correct in assuming that "T-2 =
toxin" is tetrodotoxin? I can find no documentation of this change, but =
(although no where near as exact as a CAS #) it would make sense.
Thanks
Margaret
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 10 Dec 2002 14:07:13 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Joseph P. Kozlovac"
Subject: Re: Interim Rules--More info
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="=====================_19345640==_.ALT"
--=====================_19345640==_.ALT
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Margaret
To answer your question T-2 is not short for tetrodotoxin which is a marine
toxin (i.e Puffer Fish) but rather T-2 is short for tricothecene mycotoxins
a dermally active toxin produced by certain species of fungi including
Fusarium species.
At 01:00 PM 12/10/2002 -0500, you wrote:
>OK, it was a VERY quick read...but since they chose 'more scientific'
>names for some of the Select Agents, am I correct in assuming that "T-2
>toxin" is tetrodotoxin? I can find no documentation of this change, but
>(although no where near as exact as a CAS #) it would make sense.
>Thanks
>Margaret
______________________________________________________________________________
Biological Safety Officer
Environment, Health, Safety
SAIC-Frederick
National Cancer Institute -
Frederick
(301)846-1451 fax: (301)846-6619
email: jkozlovac@mail.
______________________________________________________________________________
--=====================_19345640==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
Margaret
To answer your question T-2 is not short for tetrodotoxin which is a
marine toxin (i.e Puffer Fish) but rather T-2 is short for
tricothecene mycotoxins a dermally active toxin produced by certain
species of fungi including Fusarium species.
At 01:00 PM 12/10/2002 -0500, you wrote:
OK, it was a VERY quick read...but since they chose 'more
scientific' names for some of the Select Agents, am I correct in
assuming that "T-2 toxin" is tetrodotoxin? I can find no
documentation of this change, but (although no where near as exact
as a CAS #) it would make sense.
Thanks
Margaret
______________________________________________________________________________
Biological Safety Officer
Environment, Health, Safety
SAIC-Frederick
National Cancer Institute - Frederick
(301)846-1451 fax: (301)846-6619
email: jkozlovac@mail.
______________________________________________________________________________
--=====================_19345640==_.ALT--
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 10 Dec 2002 11:15:55 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Elizabeth Smith
Subject: ABL2 laboratory needed
In-Reply-To:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Dear Colleagues:
someone I know in the pharmaceutical business is looking for a
laboratory facility to contract for some work. I believe she's
open minded about who/where - only major geographical limit is
that I think it needs to be in the U.S.A. (I'm not 100% sure,
though)
primary facility needs are:
capable of housing small mammal (rabbit, guinea pigs)
operating at ABSL2 or BSL-2
provide technicians qualified to perform animal test and work
with Risk Group 2/3 organisms
ideally, already intimate with cGMP regualtions
Beyond that is too detailed for a general discussion.
Basically, she is looking for a contract laboratory who can do
potency testing for pharmaceutical products. Knowing me and my
employer, she asked me. I'm passing on the request.
If you, your facility, or someone else you know might be
intersted in taking on this type of challege (ha, ha), please
respond directly to me (not the list serve) at:
safety_queen@. I'll forward the information to my
colleague.
Thank you for any help you can provide.
Elizabeth
=====
Elizabeth Smith
Environmental, Health & Safety Manager
BioPort Corporation
3500 N. Martin L. King Blvd.
Lansing, MI 48906
__________________________________________________
Do you Yahoo!?
Yahoo! Mail Plus - Powerful. Affordable. Sign up now.
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 10 Dec 2002 15:03:28 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Robin Newberry
Subject: HHS proposed regs
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed"
The CDC's version of the proposed regs are available now at:
and the FAQ at
On a related note, who will be attending the CDC and APHIS meetings
in D.C. next week?
--
Robin
--------------------------------------------------------------
W. Robert Newberry, IV CIH, CHMM
Chief Environmental Health and Safety Officer
Clemson University
wnewber@clemson.edu ehs@clemson.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 10 Dec 2002 15:03:45 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Jeffrey Good
Subject: CDC Publishes on Web...
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
CDC has a header up and link from main page, complete with FAQ's, etc..
Direct to the "interim final rule" (an oxymoron if there ever was
one!)
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 10 Dec 2002 12:13:17 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: David Silberman
Subject: Re: Strike Two! Here's the connection!
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed"
I found the CDC version at just a few
minutes ago, all 84 pages of it!
--
David H. Silberman
Director, Health and Safety Programs
Stanford University School of Medicine
Medical School Office Building
Stanford, CA 94305 Mail Code: 5460
650 723-6336 (DIRECT LINE)
650 725-7878 (FAX)
silberman@stanford.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 10 Dec 2002 15:26:31 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Don Callihan
Subject: Re: HHS proposed regs
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
To each of the biosafty contributers who provided this up-to-the-minute
information, "THANKS".
Don Callihan
BD Diagnostic Systems
410-773-6684
Robin Newberry @MITVMA.MIT.EDU> on 12/10/2002 03:03:28
PM
Please respond to A Biosafety Discussion List
Sent by: A Biosafety Discussion List
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
cc:
Subject: HHS proposed regs
The CDC's version of the proposed regs are available now at:
and the FAQ at
On a related note, who will be attending the CDC and APHIS meetings
in D.C. next week?
--
Robin
--------------------------------------------------------------
W. Robert Newberry, IV CIH, CHMM
Chief Environmental Health and Safety Officer
Clemson University
wnewber@clemson.edu ehs@clemson.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 10 Dec 2002 16:02:01 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Peter Robinson
Subject: Bio Safety information resources
In-Reply-To:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
I have gained a lot of helpful information from this list but is there a
monthly magazine that deals with biosafety issues. I recieve safety
magazines such as Occupational Health & Safety, or Plant Safety &
Maintenance which are great for primarily safety issues. I might add that
it would be nice if they were free like the above mentioned two.
Peter Robinson
Assistant Director
Environmental Health & Safety
University of West Florida
11000 University Parkway
Pensacola, Florida 32514
850-474-2435
"Twenty years from now you will be more disappointed by the things you
didn't
do than by the ones you did do. So throw off the bowlines. Sail away from
the safe harbor. Catch the trade winds in your sails. Explore. Dream.
Discover." - Mark Twain
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 10 Dec 2002 17:24:59 EST
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Ira F. Salkin"
Subject: Re: Bio Safety information resources
MIME-Version: 1.0
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Good Evening:
An excellent source of information on biosafety issues can be found in
Applied Biosafety, the publication of the American Biological Safety
Association. All you have to do to receive this quarterly publication is be
a member of the Association. I think that it discusses in its articles and
columns issues of practical importance to the biosafety specialist. Try it,
I think you will like it.
Ira F. Salkin, Ph.D.
Editor, Applied Biosafety
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Good Evening:
An excellent source of information on biosafety issues can be found
in Applied Biosafety, the publication of the American Biological
Safety Association. All you have to do to receive this quarterly
publication is be a member of the Association. I think that it
discusses in its articles and columns issues of practical importance
to the biosafety specialist. Try it, I think you will like it.
Ira F. Salkin, Ph.D.
Editor, Applied Biosafety
--part1_17c.13427f30.2b27c3bb_boundary--
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 10 Dec 2002 16:16:42 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Dina Sassone
Subject: BSL-3 training
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
Does anyone out there have a BSL-3 training program they could share? How
are you demonstrating proficiency? What are you requiring for
experience? How do you document training? Are there requirements for PIs
vs. technicians?
Dina M. Sassone, CIH, CSP, SM (NRM), CBSP
University of California
Los Alamos National Laboratory
HSR-5
MS K486
Los Alamos, NM 87545
(505) 665-2977 (voice)
((505) 996-3807 (pager)
"To infinity and beyond"-Buzz Lightyear
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 10 Dec 2002 15:43:07 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ellyn Segal
Subject: new regs
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
After having spent the last few hours reading the 200+ pages put out today
by our government, I have a question (actually I have a couple, but one for
now).
My take on the regs is that exclusions for certain toxins based on the
aggregate amount of the toxin is per PI, and not per institute as had been
previously indicated. Does anyone agree/disagree?
Thanks
Ellyn Segal
Ellyn Segal, Ph.D.
Biosafety Manager
Stanford University
ph: 650.725.1473
fax: 650.725.3468
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 10 Dec 2002 18:44:32 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Andrew Cutz, CIH"
Organization: MFL Occupational Health Centre, Inc.
Subject: Disinfecting solutions ...
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="------------030409080805030203040202"
--------------030409080805030203040202
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Tuesday, December 10, 2002
Dear BIOSAF(E)TY List,
What is your experience when using diluted hypochlorite solution [sodium
hypochlorite CAS 7681-52-9] and 70% alcohol solution [isopropanol CAS
67-63-0] for disinfecting laboratory surfaces?
A client has expressed health concerns upon repeated usage (contact
dermatitis) and is looking for effective alternatives.
Please contact me off list at (mailto:acutz@mflohc.mb.ca) with any
suggestions and/or leads ...
Thank you in advance,
Andrew Cutz, CIH
Occupational Hygienist
Winnipeg, Manitoba
CANADA
eMail: acutz@mflohc.mb.ca
--------------030409080805030203040202
Content-Type: text/html; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Tuesday, December 10, 2002
Dear BIOSAF(E)TY List,
What is your experience when using diluted hypochlorite solution
[sodium hypochlorite CAS 7681-52-9] and 70% alcohol solution
[isopropanol CAS 67-63-0] for disinfecting laboratory surfaces?
A client has expressed health concerns upon repeated usage (contact
dermatitis) and is looking for effective alternatives.
href="mailto:acutz@mflohc.mb.ca">mailto:acutz@mflohc.mb.ca) with any
suggestions and/or leads ...
Thank you in advance,
Andrew Cutz, CIH
Occupational Hygienist
Winnipeg, Manitoba
CANADA
class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated"
href="mailto:acutz@mflohc.mb.ca">acutz@mflohc.mb.ca
--------------030409080805030203040202--
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 10 Dec 2002 19:05:12 -0600
Reply-To: campbem@SLU.EDU
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: campbem
Subject: Re: Disinfecting solutions ...
>Hey Andy,
When we move from the standards (i.e., Bleach and alcohol) I
prefer the use of a disinfectant named Envirocide. It also
goes by the name of Cavicide. It is a EPA registered
disinfectant and is very effective against many
micro-organisms without the harsh corrosive properties. I
don't have the CAS # handy. You can look it up on the EPA
site. Also, if you like, I can fax you the manufacturers
product information sheet. I went to the manufacturer for
this material as part of the information gathering process
for a risk assessment we were performing on a particular
project here at our institution.
Thanks,
Mark J. Campbell, MS, CBSP
Biological Safety Officer
Saint Louis University
> Tuesday, December 10, 2002
>
>
> Dear BIOSAF(E)TY List,
>
> What is your experience when using diluted hypochlorite
> solution [sodium
> hypochlorite CAS 7681-52-9] and 70% alcohol solution
> [isopropanol CAS
> 67-63-0] for disinfecting laboratory surfaces?
>
> A client has expressed health concerns upon repeated usage
> (contact
> dermatitis) and is looking for effective alternatives.
>
> Please contact me off list at (mailto:acutz@mflohc.mb.ca)
> with any
> suggestions and/or leads ...
>
> Thank you in advance,
>
> Andrew Cutz, CIH
> Occupational Hygienist
> Winnipeg, Manitoba
> CANADA
>
> eMail: acutz@mflohc.mb.ca
>
>
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 11 Dec 2002 06:13:25 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Funk, Glenn"
Subject: Re: BSL-3 training
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Dina -
At UCSF, each BSL3 lab conducted its own training for new users. This
usually consisted of a very brief generic section on BSL3 ops plus specific
details about how that particular lab operated. A check off sheet was used
for the Gladstone lab ()mainly HIV work), which also required X hours or
entries under tutelage of a "lab buddy" and demonstrated proficiency in
required lab tasks before unrestricted access was granted to a user. I was
also asked by the Gladstone folks to provide a one-hour annual Level 3
operations training session with Gary Fujimoto, my Occ Doc buddy - this
ultimately covered infection control in the high risk environment, biosafety
cabinet operation and use, and emergency response protocols. Other BSL3
labs at UCSF (Microbiology Department's, SF General's TB lab, Prusiner's
prion lab, the ACF sheep barn) all had different training requirements for
new users but no new user was ever granted unrestricted access until they
had been through some sort of indoctrination.
When I get back to my office (Friday would be best), give me a call
(408-845-8857). I've collected BSL3 ops manuals from a couple of other
institutions. I can check them for training requirements. If they sound
useful to you, I'll fax them along.
-- Glenn
-----Original Message-----
From: Dina Sassone [mailto:dinas@]
Sent: Tuesday, December 10, 2002 6:17 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: BSL-3 training
Does anyone out there have a BSL-3 training program they could share? How
are you demonstrating proficiency? What are you requiring for
experience? How do you document training? Are there requirements for PIs
vs. technicians?
Dina M. Sassone, CIH, CSP, SM (NRM), CBSP
University of California
Los Alamos National Laboratory
HSR-5
MS K486
Los Alamos, NM 87545
(505) 665-2977 (voice)
((505) 996-3807 (pager)
"To infinity and beyond"-Buzz Lightyear
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 11 Dec 2002 08:38:47 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Kathryn Harris
Subject: Re: new regs
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
Ellyn,
That would be my take too.. it specifically says PI or equivalent.
My question is to do with shipping.. will we still need EA101 forms for
transfer of ANY amount? Otherwise someone could repeatedly transfer under
the limit to obtain 'a lot' if they had evil intentions. I'll have to read
again more carefully to see if that is addressed specifically but if anyone
has come across it I'd appreciate a page pointer.
Thanks..
Blurry Eyed Kath
>My take on the regs is that exclusions for certain toxins based on the
>aggregate amount of the toxin is per PI, and not per institute as had been
>previously indicated. Does anyone agree/disagree?
>
>Thanks
>Ellyn Segal
Kathryn Louise Harris, Ph.D.
Biological Safety Professional
Office of Research Safety
Northwestern University
NG-71 Technological Institute
2145 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208-3121
Phone: (847) 491-4387
Fax: (847) 467-2797
Email: kathrynharris@northwestern.edu
**********************************************
=========================================================================
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 11 Dec 2002 10:25:36 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Michelle DeStefano
Subject: Re: BSL-3 training
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Hi Dina,
We have a BSL-3 training program that is slanted toward work with
tuberculosis. If you think that this would be useful, I would be happy to
share it with you. As far as experience goes, our techs must first show
proficiency in the BSL-2 setting before being considered for work in the
BSL-3. All procedures have a checklist and/or quiz to document training
that is signed off on by both the trainer and the trainee. We have a master
list of all procedures that we check as each is accomplished by the trainee.
Our requirement for the P.I. is different, simply because he is not
"hands-on" in the lab--it would be the same as the techs if he was!
Hope that this helps,
Michelle
At 04:16 PM 12/10/2002 -0700, you wrote:
>Does anyone out there have a BSL-3 training program they could share? How
>are you demonstrating proficiency? What are you requiring for
>experience? How do you document training? Are there requirements for PIs
>vs. technicians?
>
>
>Dina M. Sassone, CIH, CSP, SM (NRM), CBSP
>University of California
>Los Alamos National Laboratory
>HSR-5
>MS K486
>Los Alamos, NM 87545
>(505) 665-2977 (voice)
>((505) 996-3807 (pager)
>"To infinity and beyond"-Buzz Lightyear
>
Michelle DeStefano, CBSP
Laboratory Supervisor
CNY Research Corp
800 Irving Ave
Syracuse, NY 13212
email: destefam@
phone: (315) 425-4878 NEW!
fax: (315) 425-4871 NEW!
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 11 Dec 2002 09:38:13 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Joseph H. Coggin, Jr. Ph.D., Professor"
Organization: Department of Microbiology & Immunology,
University of South Alabama, College of Medicine, Mobile,
AL 36688 Phone (251) 460-6314; Fax (251) 460-7269
Subject: Re: BSL-3 training
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Dina: I am sending you some literature on a new website based on-line
training program that contains BSL-3 audit requirements as relates to
the OSHA BBP Standard. Let me know if you are interested.
Joe Coggin Ph.D.
Dina Sassone wrote:
> Does anyone out there have a BSL-3 training program they could share? How
> are you demonstrating proficiency? What are you requiring for
> experience? How do you document training? Are there requirements for
> PIs
> vs. technicians?
>
>
> Dina M. Sassone, CIH, CSP, SM (NRM), CBSP
> University of California
> Los Alamos National Laboratory
> HSR-5
> MS K486
> Los Alamos, NM 87545
> (505) 665-2977 (voice)
> ((505) 996-3807 (pager)
> "To infinity and beyond"-Buzz Lightyear
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 11 Dec 2002 10:43:58 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Brian Waters
Subject: Re: BSL-3 training
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="=_BCE07B43.6203462F"
This is a MIME message. If you are reading this text, you may want to
consider changing to a mail reader or gateway that understands how to
properly handle MIME multipart messages.
--=_BCE07B43.6203462F
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Glenn:
If you would be willing, I would appreciate a fax of the BL-3 training =
protocols as well. We are preparing to commission a new BL-3 facility, and =
this would be a good time to see how our operational training program =
compares with that of other, larger institutions. Many Thanks (Fax: =
518-891-5126).
Brian A. Waters
Director of Facilities
Trudeau Institute
PO Box 59
Saranac Lake, NY 12983
bwaters@
(518) 891-3080 voice
(518) 891-5126 fax
>>> funkg@ 12/11/02 09:13AM >>>
Dina -
At UCSF, each BSL3 lab conducted its own training for new users. This
usually consisted of a very brief generic section on BSL3 ops plus =
specific
details about how that particular lab operated. A check off sheet was =
used
for the Gladstone lab ()mainly HIV work), which also required X hours or
entries under tutelage of a "lab buddy" and demonstrated proficiency in
required lab tasks before unrestricted access was granted to a user. I =
was
also asked by the Gladstone folks to provide a one-hour annual Level 3
operations training session with Gary Fujimoto, my Occ Doc buddy - this
ultimately covered infection control in the high risk environment, =
biosafety
cabinet operation and use, and emergency response protocols. Other BSL3
labs at UCSF (Microbiology Department's, SF General's TB lab, Prusiner's
prion lab, the ACF sheep barn) all had different training requirements for
new users but no new user was ever granted unrestricted access until they
had been through some sort of indoctrination.
When I get back to my office (Friday would be best), give me a call
(408-845-8857). I've collected BSL3 ops manuals from a couple of other
institutions. I can check them for training requirements. If they sound
useful to you, I'll fax them along.
-- Glenn
-----Original Message-----
From: Dina Sassone [mailto:dinas@]
Sent: Tuesday, December 10, 2002 6:17 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: BSL-3 training
Does anyone out there have a BSL-3 training program they could share? How
are you demonstrating proficiency? What are you requiring for
experience? How do you document training? Are there requirements for PIs
vs. technicians?
Dina M. Sassone, CIH, CSP, SM (NRM), CBSP
University of California
Los Alamos National Laboratory
HSR-5
MS K486
Los Alamos, NM 87545
(505) 665-2977 (voice)
((505) 996-3807 (pager)
"To infinity and beyond"-Buzz Lightyear
--=_BCE07B43.6203462F
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Content-Description: HTML
2px">
Glenn:
If you would be willing, I would appreciate a fax of the BL-3 =
training protocols as well. We are preparing to commission a new
BL-3 facility, and = this would be a good time to see how our
operational training program compares = with that of other,
larger institutions. Many Thanks (Fax: 518-891-5126).
Brian A. Waters
Director of Facilities
Trudeau Institute
PO = Box 59
Saranac Lake, NY 12983
href"mailto:bwaters@">bwaters@
(5= 18) 891-3080 voice
(518) 891-5126 fax
>>> funkg@MEDIMMUNE.CO= M 12/11/02 09:13AM >>>
Dina -
At UCSF, each BSL3 lab = conducted its own training for new
users. This
usually consisted of a very = brief generic section on BSL3 ops
plus specific
details about how that = particular lab operated. A check off
sheet was used
for the Gladstone lab = ()mainly HIV work), which also required X
hours or
entries under tutelage of a = "lab buddy" and demonstrated
proficiency in
required lab tasks before = unrestricted access was granted to a
user. I was
also asked by the Gladstone = folks to provide a one-hour annual
Level 3
operations training session with = Gary Fujimoto, my Occ Doc
buddy - this
ultimately covered infection control = in the high risk
environment, biosafety
cabinet operation and use, and = emergency response protocols.
Other BSL3
labs at UCSF (Microbiology = Department's, SF General's TB lab,
Prusiner's
prion lab, the ACF sheep barn) all = had different training
requirements for
new users but no new user was = ever granted unrestricted access
until they
had been through some sort of indoctrination.
When I get back to my office (Friday would be = best), give me a
call
(408-845-8857). I've collected BSL3 ops manuals from a = couple
of other
institutions. I can check them for training requirements. If
they sound
useful to you, I'll fax them along.
-- Glenn
-----Original Message-----
From: Dina = Sassone [mailto:dinas@]
Sent: = Tuesday, December 10, 2002 6:17 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: = BSL-3 training
Does anyone out there have a BSL-3 training program = they could
share? How
are you demonstrating proficiency? What are = you requiring for
experience? How do you document training? Are = there
requirements for PIs
vs. technicians?
Dina M. Sassone, CIH, = CSP, SM (NRM), CBSP
University of California
Los Alamos National Laboratory
HSR-5
MS K486
Los Alamos, NM 87545
(505) 665-2977= (voice)
((505) 996-3807 (pager)
"To infinity and beyond"-Buzz Lightyear
--=_BCE07B43.6203462F--
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 11 Dec 2002 10:54:05 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Brian Waters
Subject: Re: BSL-3 training
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="=_4F1388B2.1273365F"
This is a MIME message. If you are reading this text, you may want to
consider changing to a mail reader or gateway that understands how to
properly handle MIME multipart messages.
--=_4F1388B2.1273365F
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Joe: I would also be greatful for the information on the new biosafety =
website in regards to BL-3 training. Thank You.
Brian A. Waters
Director of Facilities
Trudeau Institute
PO Box 59
Saranac Lake, NY 12983
bwaters@
(518) 891-3080 voice
(518) 891-5126 fax
>>> jcoggin@JAGUAR1.USOUTHAL.EDU 12/11/02 10:38AM >>>
Dina: I am sending you some literature on a new website based on-line
training program that contains BSL-3 audit requirements as relates to
the OSHA BBP Standard. Let me know if you are interested.
Joe Coggin Ph.D.
Dina Sassone wrote:
> Does anyone out there have a BSL-3 training program they could share? =
How
> are you demonstrating proficiency? What are you requiring for
> experience? How do you document training? Are there requirements for
> PIs
> vs. technicians?
>
>
> Dina M. Sassone, CIH, CSP, SM (NRM), CBSP
> University of California
> Los Alamos National Laboratory
> HSR-5
> MS K486
> Los Alamos, NM 87545
> (505) 665-2977 (voice)
> ((505) 996-3807 (pager)
> "To infinity and beyond"-Buzz Lightyear
--=_4F1388B2.1273365F
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Content-Description: HTML
2px">
Joe: I would also be greatful for the information on the new =
biosafety website in regards to BL-3 training. Thank You.
Brian A. Waters
Director of Facilities
Trudeau Institute
PO = Box 59
Saranac Lake, NY 12983
href"mailto:bwaters@">bwaters@
(5= 18) 891-3080 voice
(518) 891-5126 fax
>>> jcoggin@JAGUAR1.USOUTHAL.EDU 12/11/02 10:38AM >>>
Dina: = I am sending you some literature on a new website based
on-line
training = program that contains BSL-3 audit requirements as
relates to
the OSHA BBP Standard. Let me know if you are interested.
Joe Coggin Ph.D.
Dina Sassone wrote:
> Does anyone out there have a = BSL-3 training program they
could share? How
> are you demonstrating proficiency? What are you requiring for
> experience? = How do you document training? Are there
requirements for
> PIs
>= vs. technicians?
>
>
> Dina M. Sassone, CIH, CSP, SM = (NRM), CBSP
> University of California
> Los Alamos National Laboratory
> HSR-5
> MS K486
> Los Alamos, NM 87545
&g= t; (505) 665-2977 (voice)
> ((505) 996-3807 (pager)
> "To = infinity and beyond"-Buzz Lightyear
--=_4F1388B2.1273365F--
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 11 Dec 2002 12:05:43 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Kathleen Gilbert
Subject: ABSL3 contract facility
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Dear listserve members,
Does anyone know of an ABSL3 facility that does contract work. We are
looking for an ABSL3 facility that could do animal (rat, mouse or
rabbit) anthrax inhalation studies for us. Thank you.
Kathy Gilbert
Facilities Manager
Archemix
1 Hamphsire Street
Cambridge, MA 02139
T 617.475.2326
F 617.621.9300
Email gilbert@
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 11 Dec 2002 12:15:12 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Rowe, Thomas"
Subject: Re: ABSL3 contract facility
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
You should check with Dr. Tom Voss at Southern Research Institute
(). They are currently performing these types of studies on a
contract basis.
Thomas Rowe
CDC
-----Original Message-----
From: Kathleen Gilbert [mailto:gilbert@]
Sent: Wednesday, December 11, 2002 12:06 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: ABSL3 contract facility
Dear listserve members,
Does anyone know of an ABSL3 facility that does contract work. We are
looking for an ABSL3 facility that could do animal (rat, mouse or
rabbit) anthrax inhalation studies for us. Thank you.
Kathy Gilbert
Facilities Manager
Archemix
1 Hamphsire Street
Cambridge, MA 02139
T 617.475.2326
F 617.621.9300
Email gilbert@
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 11 Dec 2002 11:53:42 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Joseph H. Coggin, Jr. Ph.D., Professor"
Organization: Department of Microbiology & Immunology,
University of South Alabama, College of Medicine, Mobile,
AL 36688 Phone (251) 460-6314; Fax (251) 460-7269
Subject: Re: BSL-3 training
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="------------020503090409000105090908"
--------------020503090409000105090908
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Brian: Glad to do so. Multiservices ProViders will send you some
helpful literature immediately by mail. When you get it please give me
a call by phone for more details. It is a great on-line OSHA BBP
training program which train in all the BSL-levels except BSL-4. We use
it in our large College of Medicine R&D groups and in our clinical
groups serving four University hospitals for our OSHA and general
biosafety pathogen training for about two years now as a Beta test
site. It delivers the ideal training message for supervisors in one
mode and for bench workers in another mode adn has a great biosafety
electronic library and keeps training records nicely.
Joe Coggin, Jr Ph.D., ABSA RBP, CBSP, NRM CPHLM
Professor and Chair, Dept of M&I
(251) 460-6314
Brian Waters wrote:
> Joe: I would also be greatful for the information on the new biosafety
> website in regards to BL-3 training. Thank You.
>
> Brian A. Waters
> Director of Facilities
> Trudeau Institute
> PO Box 59
> Saranac Lake, NY 12983
>
> bwaters@
>
> (518) 891-3080 voice
> (518) 891-5126 fax
>
> >>> jcoggin@JAGUAR1.USOUTHAL.EDU 12/11/02 10:38AM >>>
> Dina: I am sending you some literature on a new website based on-line
> training program that contains BSL-3 audit requirements as relates to
> the OSHA BBP Standard. Let me know if you are interested.
> Joe Coggin Ph.D.
>
> Dina Sassone wrote:
>
> > Does anyone out there have a BSL-3 training program they could
> share? How
> > are you demonstrating proficiency? What are you requiring for
> > experience? How do you document training? Are there requirements for
> > PIs
> > vs. technicians?
> >
> >
> > Dina M. Sassone, CIH, CSP, SM (NRM), CBSP
> > University of California
> > Los Alamos National Laboratory
> > HSR-5
> > MS K486
> > Los Alamos, NM 87545
> > (505) 665-2977 (voice)
> > ((505) 996-3807 (pager)
> > "To infinity and beyond"-Buzz Lightyear
--------------020503090409000105090908
Content-Type: text/html; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Brian: Glad to do so. Multiservices ProViders will send you some
helpful literature immediately by mail. When you get it please give
me a call by phone for more details. It is a great on-line OSHA
BBP training program which train in all the BSL-levels except BSL-4.
We use it in our large College of Medicine R&D groups and in our
clinical groups serving four University hospitals for our OSHA and
general biosafety pathogen training for about two years now as a
Beta test site. It delivers the ideal training message for
supervisors in one mode and for bench workers in another mode adn
has a great biosafety electronic library and keeps training records
nicely.
Joe Coggin, Jr Ph.D., ABSA RBP, CBSP, NRM CPHLM
Professor and Chair, Dept of M&I
(251) 460-6314
Brian Waters wrote:
Joe: I would also be greatful for the information on the new
biosafety website in regards to BL-3 training. Thank You.
Brian A. Waters
Director of Facilities
Trudeau Institute
PO Box 59
Saranac Lake, NY 12983
bwaters@
(518) 891-3080 voice
(518) 891-5126 fax
>>> jcoggin@JAGUAR1.USOUTHAL.EDU 12/11/02 10:38AM >>>
Dina: I am sending you some literature on a new website based
on-line
training program that contains BSL-3 audit requirements as relates
to
the OSHA BBP Standard. Let me know if you are interested.
Joe Coggin Ph.D.
Dina Sassone wrote:
> Does anyone out there have a BSL-3 training program they could
share? How
> are you demonstrating proficiency? What are you requiring for
> experience? How do you document training? Are there
requirements for
> PIs
> vs. technicians?
>
>
> Dina M. Sassone, CIH, CSP, SM (NRM), CBSP
> University of California
> Los Alamos National Laboratory
> HSR-5
> MS K486
> Los Alamos, NM 87545
> (505) 665-2977 (voice)
> ((505) 996-3807 (pager)
> "To infinity and beyond"-Buzz Lightyear
--------------020503090409000105090908--
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 11 Dec 2002 15:23:00 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Jeppesen, Eric R"
Subject: Re: CDC Publishes on Web...
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Is anyone else having problems reading it off of CDC's site?
I click on it, Adobe opens it but I only get the first page. It lists 84
pages at the bottom of the Adobe screen but once I move the sidebar down it
only shows the first page.
Quite frustrating!
Eric
Eric R. Jeppesen
Laboratory Safety Specialist
KU-EHS Dept.
(785) 864-2857 phone
(785) 864-2852 fax
jeppesen@ku.edu
-----Original Message-----
From: Jeffrey Good [mailto:rsojmg@GWUMC.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, December 10, 2002 2:04 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: CDC Publishes on Web...
CDC has a header up and link from main page, complete with FAQ's, etc..
Direct to the "interim final rule" (an oxymoron if there ever was
one!)
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 11 Dec 2002 16:43:39 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Borzynski, Leonard"
Subject: Re: CDC Publishes on Web...
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Eric,
I am having the same problem.
Len
-----Original Message-----
From: Jeppesen, Eric R [mailto:jeppesen@KU.EDU]
Sent: Wednesday, December 11, 2002 4:23 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: CDC Publishes on Web...
Is anyone else having problems reading it off of CDC's site?
I click on it, Adobe opens it but I only get the first page. It lists 84
pages at the bottom of the Adobe screen but once I move the sidebar down it
only shows the first page.
Quite frustrating!
Eric
Eric R. Jeppesen
Laboratory Safety Specialist
KU-EHS Dept.
(785) 864-2857 phone
(785) 864-2852 fax
jeppesen@ku.edu
-----Original Message-----
From: Jeffrey Good [mailto:rsojmg@GWUMC.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, December 10, 2002 2:04 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: CDC Publishes on Web...
CDC has a header up and link from main page, complete with FAQ's, etc..
Direct to the "interim final rule" (an oxymoron if there ever was
one!)
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 11 Dec 2002 15:49:07 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Jeppesen, Eric R"
Subject: Re: CDC Publishes on Web...
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
I cleared the cookies, internet files, and history from my browser then
restarted it. I also had to take the viewing size down to 100% instead of
my normal 156%. Now I'm able to view it.
Try that and see if it helps.
(I admit, I had to go to the boss and get a little help on this one).
Eric
Eric R. Jeppesen
Laboratory Safety Specialist
KU-EHS Dept.
(785) 864-2857 phone
(785) 864-2852 fax
jeppesen@ku.edu
-----Original Message-----
From: Borzynski, Leonard [mailto:lborzyns@FACILITIES.BUFFALO.EDU]
Sent: Wednesday, December 11, 2002 3:44 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: CDC Publishes on Web...
Eric,
I am having the same problem.
Len
-----Original Message-----
From: Jeppesen, Eric R [mailto:jeppesen@KU.EDU]
Sent: Wednesday, December 11, 2002 4:23 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: CDC Publishes on Web...
Is anyone else having problems reading it off of CDC's site?
I click on it, Adobe opens it but I only get the first page. It lists 84
pages at the bottom of the Adobe screen but once I move the sidebar down it
only shows the first page.
Quite frustrating!
Eric
Eric R. Jeppesen
Laboratory Safety Specialist
KU-EHS Dept.
(785) 864-2857 phone
(785) 864-2852 fax
jeppesen@ku.edu
-----Original Message-----
From: Jeffrey Good [mailto:rsojmg@GWUMC.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, December 10, 2002 2:04 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: CDC Publishes on Web...
CDC has a header up and link from main page, complete with FAQ's, etc..
Direct to the "interim final rule" (an oxymoron if there ever was
one!)
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 11 Dec 2002 16:43:39 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ed Gaunt
Subject: Re: CDC Publishes on Web...
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="----_=_NextPart_000_01C2A15E.5DC7FB20"
This message is in MIME format. Since your mail reader does not understand
this format, some or all of this message may not be legible.
------_=_NextPart_000_01C2A15E.5DC7FB20
Content-Type: text/plain;
charset="iso-8859-1"
Here is a Word version
Ed
-----Original Message-----
From: Jeppesen, Eric R [mailto:jeppesen@KU.EDU]
Sent: Wednesday, December 11, 2002 4:49 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: CDC Publishes on Web...
I cleared the cookies, internet files, and history from my browser then
restarted it. I also had to take the viewing size down to 100% instead of
my normal 156%. Now I'm able to view it.
Try that and see if it helps.
(I admit, I had to go to the boss and get a little help on this one).
Eric
Eric R. Jeppesen
Laboratory Safety Specialist
KU-EHS Dept.
(785) 864-2857 phone
(785) 864-2852 fax
jeppesen@ku.edu
-----Original Message-----
From: Borzynski, Leonard [mailto:lborzyns@FACILITIES.BUFFALO.EDU]
Sent: Wednesday, December 11, 2002 3:44 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: CDC Publishes on Web...
Eric,
I am having the same problem.
Len
-----Original Message-----
From: Jeppesen, Eric R [mailto:jeppesen@KU.EDU]
Sent: Wednesday, December 11, 2002 4:23 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: CDC Publishes on Web...
Is anyone else having problems reading it off of CDC's site?
I click on it, Adobe opens it but I only get the first page. It lists 84
pages at the bottom of the Adobe screen but once I move the sidebar down it
only shows the first page.
Quite frustrating!
Eric
Eric R. Jeppesen
Laboratory Safety Specialist
KU-EHS Dept.
(785) 864-2857 phone
(785) 864-2852 fax
jeppesen@ku.edu
-----Original Message-----
From: Jeffrey Good [mailto:rsojmg@GWUMC.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, December 10, 2002 2:04 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: CDC Publishes on Web...
CDC has a header up and link from main page, complete with FAQ's, etc..
Direct to the "interim final rule" (an oxymoron if there ever was
one!)
------_=_NextPart_000_01C2A15E.5DC7FB20
Content-Type: application/msword;
name="2002.12.10 HHS SA Final Interim Rules.doc"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
Content-Disposition: attachment;
filename="2002.12.10 HHS SA Final Interim Rules.doc"
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 11 Dec 2002 15:24:54 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Criscuolo, TR (Tedi)"
Subject: Re: BSL-3 training
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: multipart/mixed;
boundary="----=_NextPartTM-000-3cd26e90-9c6d-49c3-a018-e9bdea7633e0"
This message is in MIME format. Since your mail reader does not understand
this format, some or all of this message may not be legible.
------=_NextPartTM-000-3cd26e90-9c6d-49c3-a018-e9bdea7633e0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="----_=_NextPart_001_01C2A16C.832030A0"
------_=_NextPart_001_01C2A16C.832030A0
Content-Type: text/plain;
charset="iso-8859-1"
I wouldn't mind having the info if possible too! We are still in the
planning stage of a BSL-3 lab.
Tedi Criscuolo
Industrial Hygienist/Safety Representative
Battelle IH & OS Operations Group
Office: (509) 373-1169
Pager: (509) 544-3144
Fax: (509) 376-1321
tedi.criscuolo@
-----Original Message-----
From: Brian Waters [mailto:bwaters@]
Sent: Wednesday, December 11, 2002 7:44 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: BSL-3 training
Glenn:
If you would be willing, I would appreciate a fax of the BL-3 training
protocols as well. We are preparing to commission a new BL-3 facility, and
this would be a good time to see how our operational training program
compares with that of other, larger institutions. Many Thanks (Fax:
518-891-5126).
Brian A. Waters
Director of Facilities
Trudeau Institute
PO Box 59
Saranac Lake, NY 12983
bwaters@
(518) 891-3080 voice
(518) 891-5126 fax
>>> funkg@ 12/11/02 09:13AM >>>
Dina -
At UCSF, each BSL3 lab conducted its own training for new users. This
usually consisted of a very brief generic section on BSL3 ops plus specific
details about how that particular lab operated. A check off sheet was used
for the Gladstone lab ()mainly HIV work), which also required X hours or
entries under tutelage of a "lab buddy" and demonstrated proficiency in
required lab tasks before unrestricted access was granted to a user. I was
also asked by the Gladstone folks to provide a one-hour annual Level 3
operations training session with Gary Fujimoto, my Occ Doc buddy - this
ultimately covered infection control in the high risk environment, biosafety
cabinet operation and use, and emergency response protocols. Other BSL3
labs at UCSF (Microbiology Department's, SF General's TB lab, Prusiner's
prion lab, the ACF sheep barn) all had different training requirements for
new users but no new user was ever granted unrestricted access until they
had been through some sort of indoctrination.
When I get back to my office (Friday would be best), give me a call
(408-845-8857). I've collected BSL3 ops manuals from a couple of other
institutions. I can check them for training requirements. If they sound
useful to you, I'll fax them along.
-- Glenn
-----Original Message-----
From: Dina Sassone [ mailto:dinas@]
Sent: Tuesday, December 10, 2002 6:17 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: BSL-3 training
Does anyone out there have a BSL-3 training program they could share? How
are you demonstrating proficiency? What are you requiring for
experience? How do you document training? Are there requirements for PIs
vs. technicians?
Dina M. Sassone, CIH, CSP, SM (NRM), CBSP
University of California
Los Alamos National Laboratory
HSR-5
MS K486
Los Alamos, NM 87545
(505) 665-2977 (voice)
((505) 996-3807 (pager)
"To infinity and beyond"-Buzz Lightyear
------_=_NextPart_001_01C2A16C.832030A0
Content-Type: text/html;
charset="iso-8859-1"
I wouldn't mind having the info if possible too! We are still in
the planning stage of a BSL-3 size=+2>
color=#800000>Industrial Hygienist/Safety size=-1>Battelle IH & OS
Operations Group
Office: (509) 373-1169
Pager: (509) 544-3144
size=2>Fax: (509)
href="mailto:tedi.criscuolo@">tedi.criscuolo@
style="PADDING-LEFT: 5px; MARGIN-LEFT: 5px; BORDER-LEFT: #000000 2px
solid; MARGIN-RIGHT: 0px"> size=2>-----Original Message-----
From: Brian Waters [mailto:bwaters@]
Sent: Wednesday, December 11, 2002 7:44 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: BSL-3 training
Glenn:
If you would be willing, I would appreciate a fax of the BL-3
training protocols as well. We are preparing to commission a new
BL-3 facility, and this would be a good time to see how our
operational training program compares with that of other, larger
institutions. Many Thanks (Fax: 518-891-5126).
Brian A. Waters
Director of Facilities
Trudeau Institute
PO Box 59
Saranac Lake, NY 12983
href="">
(518) 891-3080 voice
(518) 891-5126 fax
>>> funkg@ 12/11/02 09:13AM >>>
Dina -
At UCSF, each BSL3 lab conducted its own training for new users.
This
usually consisted of a very brief generic section on BSL3 ops plus
specific
details about how that particular lab operated. A check off sheet
was used
for the Gladstone lab ()mainly HIV work), which also required X
hours or
entries under tutelage of a "lab buddy" and demonstrated proficiency
in
required lab tasks before unrestricted access was granted to a user.
I was
also asked by the Gladstone folks to provide a one-hour annual Level
3
operations training session with Gary Fujimoto, my Occ Doc buddy -
this
ultimately covered infection control in the high risk environment,
biosafety
cabinet operation and use, and emergency response protocols. Other
BSL3
labs at UCSF (Microbiology Department's, SF General's TB lab,
Prusiner's
prion lab, the ACF sheep barn) all had different training
requirements for
new users but no new user was ever granted unrestricted access until
they
had been through some sort of indoctrination.
When I get back to my office (Friday would be best), give me a call
(408-845-8857). I've collected BSL3 ops manuals from a couple of
other
institutions. I can check them for training requirements. If they
sound
useful to you, I'll fax them along.
-- Glenn
-----Original Message-----
From: Dina Sassone [mailto:dinas@]
Sent: Tuesday, December 10, 2002 6:17 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: BSL-3 training
Does anyone out there have a BSL-3 training program they could
share? How
are you demonstrating proficiency? What are you requiring for
experience? How do you document training? Are there requirements
for PIs
vs. technicians?
Dina M. Sassone, CIH, CSP, SM (NRM), CBSP
University of California
Los Alamos National Laboratory
HSR-5
MS K486
Los Alamos, NM 87545
(505) 665-2977 (voice)
((505) 996-3807 (pager)
"To infinity and beyond"-Buzz Lightyear
------_=_NextPart_001_01C2A16C.832030A0--
------=_NextPartTM-000-3cd26e90-9c6d-49c3-a018-e9bdea7633e0--
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 12 Dec 2002 13:50:05 +0100
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Sullivan Christine
Subject: Re: ABSL3 contract facility
MIME-Version: 1.0
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Did you try Charles River? Victor Occhilaini is the Cambridge sales rep.
and can put you in touch with their contract lab that is in Wilmington, MA.
Victor's #617-524-4434, or messaging service: 1-800-772-0717 ext. 1936.
Christine
-----Original Message-----
From: Kathleen Gilbert [mailto:gilbert@]
Sent: Wednesday, December 11, 2002 12:06 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: ABSL3 contract facility
Dear listserve members,
Does anyone know of an ABSL3 facility that does contract work. We are
looking for an ABSL3 facility that could do animal (rat, mouse or
rabbit) anthrax inhalation studies for us. Thank you.
Kathy Gilbert
Facilities Manager
Archemix
1 Hamphsire Street
Cambridge, MA 02139
T 617.475.2326
F 617.621.9300
Email gilbert@
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 12 Dec 2002 08:26:41 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Richard Fink
Subject: Re: CDC Publishes on Web...
In-Reply-To:
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I got the whole 84 pages. Check the version of Adobe that you are using,
it should be 5.0.
Richie
At 03:23 PM 12/11/2002 -0600, you wrote:
>Is anyone else having problems reading it off of CDC's site?
>I click on it, Adobe opens it but I only get the first page. It lists 84
>pages at the bottom of the Adobe screen but once I move the sidebar down it
>only shows the first page.
>
>Quite frustrating!
>
>Eric
>
>Eric R. Jeppesen
>Laboratory Safety Specialist
>KU-EHS Dept.
>(785) 864-2857 phone
>(785) 864-2852 fax
>jeppesen@ku.edu
>
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From: Jeffrey Good [mailto:rsojmg@GWUMC.EDU]
>Sent: Tuesday, December 10, 2002 2:04 PM
>To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
>Subject: CDC Publishes on Web...
>
>
>CDC has a header up and link from main page, complete with FAQ's, etc..
>
>Direct to the "interim final rule" (an oxymoron if there ever was
>one!)
>
>
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
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I got the whole 84 pages. Check the version of Adobe that you are
using, it should be 5.0.
Richie
At 03:23 PM 12/11/2002 -0600, you wrote:
Is anyone else having problems reading it off of CDC's site?
I click on it, Adobe opens it but I only get the first page. It
lists 84
pages at the bottom of the Adobe screen but once I move the
sidebar down it
only shows the first page.
Quite frustrating!
Eric
Eric R. Jeppesen
Laboratory Safety Specialist
KU-EHS Dept.
(785) 864-2857 phone
(785) 864-2852 fax
jeppesen@ku.edu
-----Original Message-----
From: Jeffrey Good [mailto:rsojmg@GWUMC.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, December 10, 2002 2:04 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: CDC Publishes on Web...
CDC has a header up and link from main page, complete with FAQ's,
etc..
Direct to the "interim final rule" (an oxymoron if there ever was
one!)
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Senior Biosafety Officer
Mass. Inst. of Tech. N52-461
617-258-5647
rfink@mit.edu
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=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 12 Dec 2002 10:53:42 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Donald G. Robasser"
Organization: Princeton University
Subject: Interim Rules on Select Agents
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Biosafers,
Am I correctly interpreting the newly posted interim rules under section
73.0 which discusses phase-in period for those "entities" not previously
conducting registered research in that research can be initiated and
continue after submission of the application covering the required
elements while the application is being reviewed and the registration
processed; with the actual certificate of registration obtained by the
"entity" on or before November 12, 2003?
I would apprciate your thoughts on whether I am reading and interpreting
this correctly.
Don Robasser
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Biosafers,
Am I correctly interpreting the newly posted interim rules under
section 73.0 which discusses phase-in period for those "entities"
not previously conducting registered research in that research can
be initiated and continue after submission of the application
covering the required elements while the application is being
reviewed and the registration processed; with the actual certificate
of registration obtained by the "entity" on or before November 12,
2003?
I would apprciate your thoughts on whether I am reading and
interpreting this correctly.
Don Robasser
--------------DD4E057D7C08FCFB1299E7A7--
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 12 Dec 2002 12:14:33 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Cheri L Hildreth
Subject: UConn grad student article and DOJ press release
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Per my last posting on this issue, a number of people asked for the
article and the DOJ press release.
Below is a link to a PDF file that we put up on our web site to the
Hartford Courant article re: UConn grad student anthrax case that
appeared one year ago tomorrow. I have a fax copy of the Dept. of
Justice press release on the plea agreement that was issued in July of
this year but it is not very legible. I will try to get a better copy so
we can scan and put on our web site as PDF OR we'll retype and then
post to this list serve. Thanks, Cheri
Cheri Hildreth Watts, Director
Department of Environmental Health &Safety
University of Louisville
(502) 852-2954
e-mail: cheri.hildreth@louisville.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 12 Dec 2002 14:01:06 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "McNulty, Hilary"
Subject: Verify adenovirus, mice BSL - SOP
MIME-Version: 1.0
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Currently, when researchers are using adenovirus vectors with animals,
we are having them do the work at BSL2 (ABSL2) unless they can verify to
us that it truly is replication defective.
I like to review procedures to ensure they reflect best practices.
I am interested in knowing what you're doing where you work. What do
you believe to be acceptable ways to verify that the adenovirus is
replication defective?
I'm new to the list and appreciate any input. Thank you
Hilary McNulty
EH&S
Millennium Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
35 Landsdowne Street
Cambridge, MA 02139
(617) 444-1368
=========================================================================
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 12 Dec 2002 12:25:47 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Chris Carlson
Subject: Re: Inventory reports are due December 31, 2002
In-Reply-To:
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Hi Kim - Thanks for all your continuing help in completing the Polio Survey.
I have another kind of problem. It looks as though my institution
does not currently have any polio materials. However, I have one PI
who is approved for working with Poliovirus and plans to begin work
in the Spring. How do I report this? and further, how do I stay on
the contact list for future information?
Thanks,
Chris
--
******************************************************************************
Chris Carlson
Biosafety Officer, CBSP (ABSA)
Office of Environment, Health & Safety
317 University Hall - #1150
University of California
Berkeley, CA 94720-1150
phone: (510) 643-6562
e-mail: ccarlson@uclink4.berkeley.edu
fax: (510) 643-7595
******************************************************************************
Visit our Web Site at
******************************************************************************
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Hi Kim - Thanks for all your continuing help in completing the Polio
Survey.
I have another kind of problem. It looks as though my institution
does not currently have any polio materials. However, I have one PI
who is approved for working with Poliovirus and plans to begin work
in the Spring. How do I report this? and further, how do I stay on
the contact list for future information?
Thanks,
Chris
--
>*********
Chris Carlson
Biosafety Officer, CBSP (ABSA)
Office of Environment, Health & Safety
> 317 University Hall - #1150
University of California
Berkeley, CA 94720-1150
phone: (510) 643-6562
e-mail: ccarlson@uclink4.berkeley.edu
fax: (510) 643-7595
>*********
> Visit our Web Site at
>*********
--============_-1172397746==_ma============--
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 12 Dec 2002 16:32:37 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ed Gaunt
Subject: Re: Interim Rules on Select Agents
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Hi group!
I'd like to remind everyone that for an "official" response or
interpretation to these types of questions on the regs (or anything else
related to select agents), you can contact the CDC Select Agent Program Help
Line at:
phone: 404-498-2255
facsimile: 404-498-2265 and
email:lrsat@
Operators are "standing by"...and we will be responsive to your
queries/requests! One note...this is not the same phone system that was
used for the Notification Help Line, so there are a limited number of
incoming lines that roll to this number, so if there is a high call volume,
you may get a busy signal.
Ed
-----Original Message-----
From: Donald G. Robasser [mailto:robasser@PRINCETON.EDU]
Sent: Thursday, December 12, 2002 10:54 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Interim Rules on Select Agents
Biosafers,
Am I correctly interpreting the newly posted interim rules under section
73.0 which discusses phase-in period for those "entities" not previously
conducting registered research in that research can be initiated and
continue after submission of the application covering the required elements
while the application is being reviewed and the registration processed; with
the actual certificate of registration obtained by the "entity" on or before
November 12, 2003?
I would apprciate your thoughts on whether I am reading and interpreting
this correctly.
Don Robasser
------_=_NextPart_001_01C2A225.FD800370
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charset="iso-8859-1"
Hi group!
I'd like to remind everyone that for an "official" response or
interpretation to these types of questions on the regs (or anything
else related to select agents), you can contact the CDC Select Agent
Program Help Line at:
phone: 404-498-2255
facsimile: 404-498-2265 and
email:lrsat@
size=2>Operators are "standing by"...and we will be responsive to
your queries/requests! One note...this is not the same phone system
that was used for the Notification Help Line, so there are a limited
number of incoming lines that roll to this number, so if there is a
high call volume, you may get a busy signal.
size=2>Ed
size=2>-----Original Message-----
From: Donald G. Robasser [mailto:robasser@PRINCETON.EDU]
Sent: Thursday, December 12, 2002 10:54 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Interim Rules on Select Agents
Biosafers,
Am I correctly interpreting the newly posted interim rules under
section 73.0 which discusses phase-in period for those "entities"
not previously conducting registered research in that research can
be initiated and continue after submission of the application
covering the required elements while the application is being
reviewed and the registration processed; with the actual certificate
of registration obtained by the "entity" on or before November 12,
2003?
I would apprciate your thoughts on whether I am reading and
interpreting this correctly.
Don Robasser
------_=_NextPart_001_01C2A225.FD800370--
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 12 Dec 2002 16:53:33 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Koporc, Kim"
Subject: Re: Inventory reports are due December 31, 2002
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Hi Chris - Many thanks for your e-mail. I would suggest listing the =
laboratory as retaining wild poliovirus materials in Section C of the =
inventory form. Your institution will be placed on the national =
inventory, which means you will receive follow-up communications (i.e. =
notified when polio has been eradicated, encouraged to destroy all =
unneeded materials, and provided information on appropriate biosafety =
measure).
All - However, the status of inventories are anticipated to change. =
Institutions/laboratories should register all changes with Sandra =
Browning by e-mail at plcp@ or at the address on your inventory =
forms:
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
National Center for Infectious Diseases
Poliovirus Laboratory Containment Preparedness
1600 Clifton Road,
Mail Stop C-12
Atlanta, GA 30333
Best regards,
Kim
-----Original Message-----
From: Chris Carlson [mailto:ccarlson@UCLINK4.BERKELEY.EDU]
Sent: Thursday, December 12, 2002 3:26 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Inventory reports are due December 31, 2002
Hi Kim - Thanks for all your continuing help in completing the Polio =
Survey.
I have another kind of problem. It looks as though my institution does =
not currently have any polio materials. However, I have one PI who is =
approved for working with Poliovirus and plans to begin work in the =
Spring. How do I report this? and further, how do I stay on the contact =
list for future information?
Thanks,
Chris
--
*************************************************************************=
*****
Chris Carlson
Biosafety Officer, CBSP (ABSA)
Office of Environment, Health & Safety
317 University Hall - #1150
University of California
Berkeley, CA 94720-1150
phone: (510) 643-6562
e-mail: ccarlson@uclink4.berkeley.edu
fax: (510) 643-7595
*************************************************************************=
*****
Visit our Web Site at =
*************************************************************************=
*****
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 13 Dec 2002 11:21:05 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Elizabeth Smith
Subject: Re: ABSL3 contract facility
In-Reply-To:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Mr. Rowe,
Thank you for your recommendation. Dr. Voss already recommended
his facility, which I forwarded to my acquaintence.
Elizabeth Smith
--- "Rowe, Thomas" wrote:
> You should check with Dr. Tom Voss at Southern Research
> Institute
> (). They are currently performing these types of
> studies on a
> contract basis.
>
> Thomas Rowe
> CDC
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Kathleen Gilbert [mailto:gilbert@]
> Sent: Wednesday, December 11, 2002 12:06 PM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: ABSL3 contract facility
>
>
> Dear listserve members,
>
> Does anyone know of an ABSL3 facility that does contract work.
> We are
> looking for an ABSL3 facility that could do animal (rat, mouse
> or
> rabbit) anthrax inhalation studies for us. Thank you.
>
> Kathy Gilbert
> Facilities Manager
> Archemix
> 1 Hamphsire Street
> Cambridge, MA 02139
>
> T 617.475.2326
> F 617.621.9300
> Email gilbert@
=====
Elizabeth Smith
Environmental, Health & Safety Manager
BioPort Corporation
3500 N. Martin L. King Blvd.
Lansing, MI 48906
__________________________________________________
Do you Yahoo!?
Yahoo! Mail Plus - Powerful. Affordable. Sign up now.
=========================================================================
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 16 Dec 2002 10:51:18 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Koporc, Kim"
Subject: Re: When is a poliovirus strain not considered wild?
MIME-Version: 1.0
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Dear All - This is in follow-up to the e-mail I posted last week. The =
article, "When is a poliovirus strain not considered wild," generated a =
few questions. The attached, revised article reflects those questions =
and replaces the first. Best regards, Kim
-----Original Message-----
From: Koporc, Kim
Sent: Monday, December 09, 2002 11:29 AM
To: BIOSAFTY list (E-mail)
Subject: When is a poliovirus strain not considered wild?
Dear All - I have received several questions on specific
poliovirus =
strains. I am attaching a document which will help answer "When is a =
poliovirus strain not considered wild?" Best regards, Kim
>
Kim Koporc
Poliovirus Laboratory Containment Preparedness
750 Commerce Drive
Suite 400
Decatur, GA 30030
Fax 404-371-1087
Phone 404-687-5625
E-mail kkoporc@
od/nvpo/polio
=09
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Date: Mon, 16 Dec 2002 11:27:19 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Benoit Latreille
Subject: Health and safety in animal labs.
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At my work I will be involved in developing a protocol to manage
health and safety in research facilities.
I would like to have some input specially for the management of:
1) animal laboratories
2) medical research laboratories
Any help or suggestions will be greatly appreciated,
Beno=EEt Latreille
Research assistant (IH)
INRS-Institut Armand-Frappier
Universit=E9 du Qu=E9bec
tel: (1) 450 687-5010 ext 4606
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 16 Dec 2002 10:47:23 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Kathryn Harris
Subject: Select Agents
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
Has anyone put together yet/found on a web page a combined list of the
updated HHS and USDA/overlap select agents?
Thanks,
Kath
**********************************************
Kathryn Louise Harris, Ph.D.
Biological Safety Professional
Office of Research Safety
Northwestern University
NG-71 Technological Institute
2145 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208-3121
Phone: (847) 491-4387
Fax: (847) 467-2797
Email: kathrynharris@northwestern.edu
**********************************************
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 16 Dec 2002 10:52:10 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Burnett, LouAnn Crawford"
Subject: Re: Select Agents
MIME-Version: 1.0
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If someone puts together a document with these listed, I'll get it
posted on the ABSA website. LouAnn
LouAnn C. Burnett, MS, CBSP
Biosafety Program Manager & Biological Safety Officer
Vanderbilt University Environmental Health & Safety
Nashville, Tennessee
615/322-0927 (direct & voice mail)
615/343-4951 (fax)
-----Original Message-----
From: Kathryn Harris [mailto:kathrynharris@NORTHWESTERN.EDU]
Sent: Monday, December 16, 2002 10:47 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Select Agents
Has anyone put together yet/found on a web page a combined list of the
updated HHS and USDA/overlap select agents?
Thanks,
Kath
**********************************************
Kathryn Louise Harris, Ph.D.
Biological Safety Professional
Office of Research Safety
Northwestern University
NG-71 Technological Institute
2145 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208-3121
Phone: (847) 491-4387
Fax: (847) 467-2797
Email: kathrynharris@northwestern.edu
**********************************************
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 16 Dec 2002 11:05:30 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Kathryn Harris
Subject: Re: Select Agents
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
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I'm working on one now.. just wanted another example to double check
against.. will post as soon as I'm done..
Kath
At 10:52 AM 12/16/2002 -0600, you wrote:
>If someone puts together a document with these listed, I'll get it
>posted on the ABSA website. LouAnn
>
>LouAnn C. Burnett, MS, CBSP
>Biosafety Program Manager & Biological Safety Officer
>Vanderbilt University Environmental Health & Safety
>Nashville, Tennessee
>615/322-0927 (direct & voice mail)
>615/343-4951 (fax)
>
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From: Kathryn Harris [mailto:kathrynharris@NORTHWESTERN.EDU]
>Sent: Monday, December 16, 2002 10:47 AM
>To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
>Subject: Select Agents
>
>
>Has anyone put together yet/found on a web page a combined list of the
>updated HHS and USDA/overlap select agents?
>
>Thanks,
>
>Kath
>
>**********************************************
>Kathryn Louise Harris, Ph.D.
>Biological Safety Professional
>Office of Research Safety
>Northwestern University
>NG-71 Technological Institute
>2145 Sheridan Road
>Evanston, IL 60208-3121
>Phone: (847) 491-4387
>Fax: (847) 467-2797
>Email: kathrynharris@northwestern.edu
>**********************************************
**********************************************
Kathryn Louise Harris, Ph.D.
Biological Safety Professional
Office of Research Safety
Northwestern University
NG-71 Technological Institute
2145 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208-3121
Phone: (847) 491-4387
Fax: (847) 467-2797
Email: kathrynharris@northwestern.edu
**********************************************
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 16 Dec 2002 11:58:20 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Kathryn Harris
Subject: updated list
Mime-Version: 1.0
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Dear All
I made a combined updated list of USDA/HHS and overlap agents with
exemptions listed. This was a quick type up so please double check over
before use!
Kath
**********************************************
Kathryn Louise Harris, Ph.D.
Biological Safety Professional
Office of Research Safety
Northwestern University
NG-71 Technological Institute
2145 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208-3121
Phone: (847) 491-4387
Fax: (847) 467-2797
Email: kathrynharris@northwestern.edu
**********************************************
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x-mac-type="42494E41"; x-mac-creator="4D535744"
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Date: Mon, 16 Dec 2002 13:13:57 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Andrew Braun
Subject: Re: Select Agents
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
Try
At 10:47 AM 12/16/2002 -0600, you wrote:
>Has anyone put together yet/found on a web page a combined list of the
>updated HHS and USDA/overlap select agents?
>
>Thanks,
>
>Kath
>
>**********************************************
>Kathryn Louise Harris, Ph.D.
>Biological Safety Professional
>Office of Research Safety
>Northwestern University
>NG-71 Technological Institute
>2145 Sheridan Road
>Evanston, IL 60208-3121
>Phone: (847) 491-4387
>Fax: (847) 467-2797
>Email: kathrynharris@northwestern.edu
>**********************************************
---------------------------------------
Andrew G. Braun (Andy)
Harvard Medical School, Office for Research
25 Shattuck Street
Boston, MA 02115
617-432-4899; FAX 617-432-6262
---------------------------------------
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 16 Dec 2002 15:26:11 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: David Gillum
Subject: Flow Cytometers
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Dear Biosafety Listserve,
Is anyone aware of any biosafety issues with flow cytometers? Does any have
a protocol for working with them?
Many thanks!
-David
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 16 Dec 2002 12:37:15 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Donald Mosier
Subject: Re: Flow Cytometers
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
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David,
Our IBC has a review form for flow cytometry work with infectious
materials, including human cells. I have attached a PDF version.
Don Mosier
IBC Chair
>Dear Biosafety Listserve,
>
>Is anyone aware of any biosafety issues with flow cytometers? Does any have
>a protocol for working with them?
>
>Many thanks!
>-David
--============_-1172051459==_============
Content-Id:
Content-Type: application/pdf; name="BiohazardForm-Ap1.pdf"
_______________________________________________________________________________
Donald E. Mosier, PhD, MD
Professor
Department of Immunology, IMM-7
The Scripps Research Institute
10550 North Torrey Pines Road
La Jolla, CA 92037, USA
858 784-9121 phone
858 784-9190 fax
This email and any files transmitted with it are confidential and
intended solely for the use of the individual or entity to whom they
are addressed. If you have received this email in error please notify
Dr. Mosier by telephone or fax.
--============_-1172051459==_============--
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 17 Dec 2002 09:27:50 +0100
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Verduin, Dick"
Subject: Re: updated list
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-transfer-encoding: quoted-printable
Dear Kath,
I checked with my list and all match except that you list Hendra virus =
as overlap apart from Nipah virus.
Why don't you include USDA Plant agents and toxins to make it complete.
USDA Plant agents and toxins
Liberobacter africanus, Liberobacter asiaticus
Peronosclerospora philippinensis
Phakopsora pachyrhizi
Plum pox potyvirus
Ralstonia solanacearum, race 3, biovar 2
Sclerophthora rayssiae var. zeae
Synchytrium endobioticum
Xanthomonas oryzae pv. oryzicola
Xylella fastidiosa (citrus variegated chlorosis strain)
with regards
Dick Verduin
Biological Safety Officer
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Dr Benedictus J.M. Verduin
Wageningen University (WU)
Department Plant Sciences
Laboratory of Virology
Binnenhaven 11
6709 PD Wageningen
The Netherlands
Building number 504
Telephone +31.317.483093
Facsimile +31.317.484820
E-mail Dick.Verduin@WUR.NL
-------------------------------------------------------------------
-----Original Message-----
From: Kathryn Harris [mailto:kathrynharris@NORTHWESTERN.EDU]
Sent: maandag 16 december 2002 18:58
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: updated list
Dear All
I made a combined updated list of USDA/HHS and overlap agents with
exemptions listed. This was a quick type up so please double check over
before use!
Kath
**********************************************
Kathryn Louise Harris, Ph.D.
Biological Safety Professional
Office of Research Safety
Northwestern University
NG-71 Technological Institute
2145 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208-3121
Phone: (847) 491-4387
Fax: (847) 467-2797
Email: kathrynharris@northwestern.edu
**********************************************
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 17 Dec 2002 07:05:53 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Dotti Gauggel
Subject: Translations
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
To all,
I am trying to translate some biosafety information and internal training into
Spanish. Is there/Do any of you have an equivalent Spanish word for the
following biosafety terms:
Cleanbench
Opportunistic
Thanks in advance
Dotti
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 17 Dec 2002 08:13:42 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Andrew Braun
Subject: What happened at the CDC Meeting?
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
Dear Biosafety,
Several members were at the Washington CDC meeting yesterday. Can they
summarize what they learned? Since we haven't heard much from the
Department of Justice, their presentation may be of wide interest.
Andy
---------------------------------------
Andrew G. Braun (Andy)
Harvard Medical School, Office for Research
25 Shattuck Street
Boston, MA 02115
617-432-4899; FAX 617-432-6262
---------------------------------------
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 17 Dec 2002 08:28:03 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Jeff Owens
Subject: Re: What happened at the CDC Meeting?
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
Disappointingly, no representative from DOJ attended. Some very insightful
information was provided on their behalf, however. We'll soon find out how
accurate that information actually was.
I will be glad, and I'm certain others will as well, to provide a summary
of the meeting as soon as I collect my thoughts from yesterday. I just
thought you might be interested to learn right away that DOJ did not attend.
Jeff Owens
Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia
At 08:13 AM 12/17/2002 -0500, you wrote:
>Dear Biosafety,
> Several members were at the Washington CDC meeting yesterday. Can they
>summarize what they learned? Since we haven't heard much from the
>Department of Justice, their presentation may be of wide interest.
> Andy
>
>---------------------------------------
>Andrew G. Braun (Andy)
>Harvard Medical School, Office for Research
>25 Shattuck Street
>Boston, MA 02115
>617-432-4899; FAX 617-432-6262
>---------------------------------------
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 17 Dec 2002 08:52:00 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Christina Thompson
Subject: VHP Sterilization - reprise
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="Boundary_(ID_8cLx9NHurqGlpH/0bPoXBA)"
This is a multipart message in MIME format.
--Boundary_(ID_8cLx9NHurqGlpH/0bPoXBA)
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
A couple weeks ago, I posted an question to the list, and -- for the 1st
time ever -- received no replies!! :-{ That's right, I'm pouting.
Does anyone out there have experience with VHP sterilization -- for rooms
or for biosafety cabinets or other equipment? Our veterinary staff is
considering it for a new enormous vivarium. If they buy an expensive
system, I want to make sure it can be proven to be completely effective.
If you would like to reply to me directly, feel free.
Thanks!
Chris Thompson
Corporate Biosafety Officer
Eli Lilly and Company
317-277-4795
cz.thompson@
--Boundary_(ID_8cLx9NHurqGlpH/0bPoXBA)
Content-type: text/html; charset=us-ascii
A couple weeks ago, I posted an question to
the list, and -- for the 1st time ever -- received no replies!! :-{
That's right, I'm pouting.
Does anyone out there have experience with
VHP sterilization -- for rooms or for biosafety cabinets or other equipment?
Our veterinary staff is considering it for a new enormous vivarium.
If they buy an expensive system, I want to make sure it can be proven to
be completely effective.
If you would like to reply to me directly,
feel free.
Thanks!
Chris Thompson
Corporate Biosafety Officer
Eli Lilly and Company
317-277-4795
cz.thompson@
--Boundary_(ID_8cLx9NHurqGlpH/0bPoXBA)--
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 17 Dec 2002 08:56:42 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ricardo Tappan
Subject: Re: Translations
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="=_B6EA7931.EC8DCAA4"
This is a MIME message. If you are reading this text, you may want to
consider changing to a mail reader or gateway that understands how to
properly handle MIME multipart messages.
--=_B6EA7931.EC8DCAA4
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Content-Disposition: inline
oportunistica, por ejemplo una infection oportunistica
banqete de trabajo-limpio
Hope this helps
Cheers
Rick. T.
Ricardo Tappan, CHSM, FF/NREMT-P
Senior EHS Specialist
Office of Lab Safety & Complience
George Washington University Medical Center
2300 I Street N.W. Suite B-32
Washington Dc 20037
Office (202) 994-2085
Pager 1-800-759-8352 Pin-1137274
gwumc.edu/research/labsafety.htm
rsorxt@gwumc
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 17 Dec 2002 09:40:18 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Jairo Betancourt
Subject: Re: Translations
In-Reply-To:
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-transfer-encoding: 7bit
Clean bench = it is literally "mesa de trabajo limpia" but in
Microbiology could be "mesa de laboratorio esteril".
Opportunistic = oportunista
Jairo Betancourt, RBP
Laboratory Safety Specialist
(305) 243-3400 Fax : (305) 243-3272
E-mail: jairob@miami.edu
-----Original Message-----
From: A Biosafety Discussion List [mailto:BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU] On
Behalf Of Dotti Gauggel
Sent: Tuesday, December 17, 2002 7:06 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Translations
To all,
I am trying to translate some biosafety information and internal
training into
Spanish. Is there/Do any of you have an equivalent Spanish word for the
following biosafety terms:
Cleanbench
Opportunistic
Thanks in advance
Dotti
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 17 Dec 2002 09:52:07 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Dotti Gauggel
Subject: Re: Translations
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Thank you for the immediate and very useful responses!!
Happy Holidays to all
Dotti Gauggel
Procter & Gamble
CHS&E Biosafety Office
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 16 Dec 2002 21:46:37 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: MARTA LUZ BERNAL
Subject: Re: Translations
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
opportunistic can be traslanted as oportunista (infeccisn oportunista or
microorganismo oportunista)
clean bench can be translated as meson de trabajo limpio or superficie de
trabajo limpia or limpieza del messn de trabajo
hope this helps
MARTA LUZ BERNAL C.
Occupational Physician
Biosafety Consultor
Bogota, Colombia
----- Original Message -----
From: Dotti Gauggel
To:
Sent: Tuesday, December 17, 2002 7:05 AM
Subject: Translations
> To all,
> I am trying to translate some biosafety information and internal training
into
> Spanish. Is there/Do any of you have an equivalent Spanish word for the
> following biosafety terms:
> Cleanbench
> Opportunistic
> Thanks in advance
> Dotti
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 17 Dec 2002 08:57:03 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Kathryn Harris
Subject: Re: updated list
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
Thanks Dick for 'proof reading' - As soon as I posted it I realized I had
missed those out.. it was Monday morning etc etc..
Kath
At 09:27 AM 12/17/2002 +0100, you wrote:
>Dear Kath,
>
>I checked with my list and all match except that you list Hendra virus as
>overlap apart from Nipah virus.
>Why don't you include USDA Plant agents and toxins to make it complete.
>
>
>USDA Plant agents and toxins
> Liberobacter africanus, Liberobacter asiaticus
> Peronosclerospora philippinensis
> Phakopsora pachyrhizi
> Plum pox potyvirus
> Ralstonia solanacearum, race 3, biovar 2
> Sclerophthora rayssiae var. zeae
> Synchytrium endobioticum
> Xanthomonas oryzae pv. oryzicola
> Xylella fastidiosa (citrus variegated chlorosis strain)
>
>with regards
>
>Dick Verduin
>Biological Safety Officer
>
>-------------------------------------------------------------------
>Dr Benedictus J.M. Verduin
>
>Wageningen University (WU)
>Department Plant Sciences
>Laboratory of Virology
>Binnenhaven 11
>6709 PD Wageningen
>The Netherlands
>Building number 504
>Telephone +31.317.483093
>Facsimile +31.317.484820
>E-mail Dick.Verduin@WUR.NL
>-------------------------------------------------------------------
>
>
>
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From: Kathryn Harris [mailto:kathrynharris@NORTHWESTERN.EDU]
>Sent: maandag 16 december 2002 18:58
>To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
>Subject: updated list
>
>
>Dear All
>
>I made a combined updated list of USDA/HHS and overlap agents with
>exemptions listed. This was a quick type up so please double check over
>before use!
>
>Kath
>
>**********************************************
>Kathryn Louise Harris, Ph.D.
>Biological Safety Professional
>Office of Research Safety
>Northwestern University
>NG-71 Technological Institute
>2145 Sheridan Road
>Evanston, IL 60208-3121
>Phone: (847) 491-4387
>Fax: (847) 467-2797
>Email: kathrynharris@northwestern.edu
>**********************************************
**********************************************
Kathryn Louise Harris, Ph.D.
Biological Safety Professional
Office of Research Safety
Northwestern University
NG-71 Technological Institute
2145 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208-3121
Phone: (847) 491-4387
Fax: (847) 467-2797
Email: kathrynharris@northwestern.edu
**********************************************
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 17 Dec 2002 06:56:06 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Funk, Glenn"
Subject: Re: VHP Sterilization - reprise
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="----_=_NextPart_001_01C2A5DC.6D2EB180"
This message is in MIME format. Since your mail reader does not understand
this format, some or all of this message may not be legible.
------_=_NextPart_001_01C2A5DC.6D2EB180
Content-Type: text/plain;
charset="iso-8859-1"
Chris -
I don't have hands-on experience operating the system but, with a Steris
Process Engineer, I did develop a plan at UCSF to use two Steris VHP 1000's
to sterilize a BSL3 animal facility estimated to comprise 50,000 cubic feet
prior to decommissioning. So far, the largest volume I've heard of being
treated by a single VHP 1000 is around 5,000 cu ft but doing larger
facilities is not difficult, conceptually. We're also doing testing here to
use the same instrument to sterilize filled egg incubators. I'll be happy
to share my experience with you, such as it is. Give me a call at your
convenience at 408-845-8857. I'll be away for the Holidays 12/20-27 but
around before and after. If I don't talk with you before, have a wonderful
Holiday Season!
-- Glenn
Glenn A. Funk, Ph.D., CBSP
Director and Biosafety Officer
Environment, Health and Safety
MedImmune Vaccines, Inc.
408-845-8847
-----Original Message-----
From: Christina Thompson [mailto:THOMPSON_CHRISTINA_Z@]
Sent: Tuesday, December 17, 2002 5:52 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: VHP Sterilization - reprise
A couple weeks ago, I posted an question to the list, and -- for the 1st
time ever -- received no replies!! :-{ That's right, I'm pouting.
Does anyone out there have experience with VHP sterilization -- for rooms or
for biosafety cabinets or other equipment? Our veterinary staff is
considering it for a new enormous vivarium. If they buy an expensive
system, I want to make sure it can be proven to be completely effective.
If you would like to reply to me directly, feel free.
Thanks!
Chris Thompson
Corporate Biosafety Officer
Eli Lilly and Company
317-277-4795
cz.thompson@
------_=_NextPart_001_01C2A5DC.6D2EB180
Content-Type: text/html;
charset="iso-8859-1"
Chris -
size=2>
I don't have hands-on experience operating the system but, with a
Steris Process Engineer, I did develop a plan at UCSF to use two
Steris VHP 1000's to sterilize a BSL3 animal facility estimated to
comprise 50,000 cubic feet prior to decommissioning. So far, the
largest volume I've heard of being treated by a single VHP 1000 is
around 5,000 cu ft but doing larger facilities is not difficult,
conceptually. We're also doing testing here to use the same
instrument to sterilize filled egg incubators. I'll be happy to
share my experience with you, such as it is. Give me a call at your
convenience at 408-845-8857. I'll be away for the Holidays 12/20-27
but around before and after. If I don't talk with you before, have
a wonderful Holiday Season!
size=2>
-- Glenn
size=2>
size=2>Glenn A. Funk, Ph.D., CBSP
Director and Biosafety Officer
Environment, Health and Safety
MedImmune Vaccines, Inc.
408-845-8847
size=2>-----Original Message-----
From: Christina Thompson [mailto:THOMPSON_CHRISTINA_Z@]
Sent: Tuesday, December 17, 2002 5:52 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: VHP Sterilization - reprise
A couple weeks ago, I posted an question to the list, and -- for
the 1st time ever -- received no replies!! :-{ That's right,
I'm pouting.
Does anyone out there have experience with VHP sterilization --
for rooms or for biosafety cabinets or other equipment? Our
veterinary staff is considering it for a new enormous vivarium.
If they buy an expensive system, I want to make sure
face=sans-serif size=2>If you would like to reply to me directly,
feel size=2>Corporate Biosafety Officer
Eli Lilly and Company
317-277-4795
cz.thompson@
------_=_NextPart_001_01C2A5DC.6D2EB180--
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 17 Dec 2002 10:29:03 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Christina Thompson
Subject: Re: VHP Sterilization - reprise
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="Boundary_(ID_ySt7hSL2PwDJNcOrweF1Gw)"
This is a multipart message in MIME format.
--Boundary_(ID_ySt7hSL2PwDJNcOrweF1Gw)
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Thanks, Glenn! I'll probably contact you after the holidays. I'm out
from 12/20-Jan 6. What I'm fishing for is people's experiences -- success
or not -- in validating sterilization with VHP.
Happy Holidays to you too!
Chris
"Funk, Glenn"
Sent by: A Biosafety Discussion List
12/17/2002 09:56 AM
Please respond to A Biosafety Discussion List
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
cc:
Subject: Re: VHP Sterilization - reprise
Chris -
I don't have hands-on experience operating the system but, with a Steris
Process Engineer, I did develop a plan at UCSF to use two Steris VHP
1000's to sterilize a BSL3 animal facility estimated to comprise 50,000
cubic feet prior to decommissioning. So far, the largest volume I've
heard of being treated by a single VHP 1000 is around 5,000 cu ft but
doing larger facilities is not difficult, conceptually. We're also doing
testing here to use the same instrument to sterilize filled egg
incubators. I'll be happy to share my experience with you, such as it is.
Give me a call at your convenience at 408-845-8857. I'll be away for the
Holidays 12/20-27 but around before and after. If I don't talk with you
before, have a wonderful Holiday Season!
-- Glenn
Glenn A. Funk, Ph.D., CBSP
Director and Biosafety Officer
Environment, Health and Safety
MedImmune Vaccines, Inc.
408-845-8847
-----Original Message-----
From: Christina Thompson [mailto:THOMPSON_CHRISTINA_Z@]
Sent: Tuesday, December 17, 2002 5:52 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: VHP Sterilization - reprise
A couple weeks ago, I posted an question to the list, and -- for the 1st
time ever -- received no replies!! :-{ That's right, I'm pouting.
Does anyone out there have experience with VHP sterilization -- for rooms
or for biosafety cabinets or other equipment? Our veterinary staff is
considering it for a new enormous vivarium. If they buy an expensive
system, I want to make sure it can be proven to be completely effective.
If you would like to reply to me directly, feel free.
Thanks!
Chris Thompson
Corporate Biosafety Officer
Eli Lilly and Company
317-277-4795
cz.thompson@
--Boundary_(ID_ySt7hSL2PwDJNcOrweF1Gw)
Content-type: text/html; charset=us-ascii
Thanks, Glenn! I'll probably contact
you after the holidays. I'm out from 12/20-Jan 6. What I'm fishing
for is people's experiences -- success or not -- in validating sterilization
with VHP.
Happy Holidays to you too!
Chris
"Funk, Glenn"
<funkg@>
Sent by: A Biosafety Discussion List
<BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU>
12/17/2002 09:56 AM
Please respond to A Biosafety Discussion
List
To:
BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
cc:
Subject:
Re: VHP Sterilization - reprise
Chris -
I don't have hands-on
experience operating the system but, with a Steris Process Engineer, I did
develop a plan at UCSF to use two Steris VHP 1000's to sterilize a BSL3 animal
facility estimated to comprise 50,000 cubic feet prior to decommissioning.
So far, the largest volume I've heard of being treated by a single VHP
1000 is around 5,000 cu ft but doing larger facilities is not difficult,
conceptually. We're also doing testing here to use the same instrument to
sterilize filled egg incubators. I'll be happy to share my experience with
you, such as it is. Give me a call at your convenience at 408-845-8857.
I'll be away for the Holidays 12/20-27 but around before and after.
If I don't talk with you before, have a wonderful Holiday Season!
-- Glenn
Glenn A. Funk, Ph.D., CBSP
Director and Biosafety Officer
Environment, Health and Safety
MedImmune Vaccines, Inc.
408-845-8847
-----Original Message-----
From: Christina Thompson [mailto:THOMPSON_CHRISTINA_Z@]
Sent: Tuesday, December 17, 2002 5:52 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: VHP Sterilization - reprise
A couple weeks ago, I posted an question to the list, and -- for the 1st time
ever -- received no replies!! :-{ That's right, I'm
pouting.
Does anyone out there have experience with VHP sterilization -- for rooms or for
biosafety cabinets or other equipment? Our veterinary staff is considering
it for a new enormous vivarium. If they buy an expensive system, I want to
make sure it can be proven to be completely effective.
If you would like to reply to me directly, feel free.
Thanks!
Chris Thompson
Corporate Biosafety Officer
Eli Lilly and Company
317-277-4795
cz.thompson@
--Boundary_(ID_ySt7hSL2PwDJNcOrweF1Gw)--
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 17 Dec 2002 10:51:07 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Daryl Rowe
Subject: Re: What happened at the CDC Meeting?
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Jeff,
Thanks for the information.
-----Original Message-----
From: Jeff Owens [mailto:Jeff.Owens@USG.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, December 17, 2002 9:28 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: What happened at the CDC Meeting?
Disappointingly, no representative from DOJ attended. Some very =
insightful
information was provided on their behalf, however. We'll soon find out =
how
accurate that information actually was.
I will be glad, and I'm certain others will as well, to provide a =
summary
of the meeting as soon as I collect my thoughts from yesterday. I just
thought you might be interested to learn right away that DOJ did not =
attend.
Jeff Owens
Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia
At 08:13 AM 12/17/2002 -0500, you wrote:
>Dear Biosafety,
> Several members were at the Washington CDC meeting yesterday. =
Can they
>summarize what they learned? Since we haven't heard much from the
>Department of Justice, their presentation may be of wide interest.
> Andy
>
>---------------------------------------
>Andrew G. Braun (Andy)
>Harvard Medical School, Office for Research
>25 Shattuck Street
>Boston, MA 02115
>617-432-4899; FAX 617-432-6262
>---------------------------------------
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 17 Dec 2002 11:06:42 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Morris, Gary"
Subject: Ergonomic Bone Cutters
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
One of our researchers conducts a procedure where he removes brain material
from rats using a standard bone cutter (Roboz RS-8340). The animal is
frozen which requires him to jab the unit through the skin/skull and then
exise the material.
The tool is not very well ergonomically designed - has short, thin handles
and no padding whatsoever. I did a search on the web, but all the versions
found are similar to the one currently in use.
I was wondering if anybody was aware of a more ergonomically-designed tool
for the job. Any suggestions/recommendations will be greatly appreciated.
Thanks in advance,
Gary Morris
EHS Manager
Wellstat Companies
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 17 Dec 2002 11:29:19 -0500
Reply-To: speaker@ehs.psu.edu
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Curt Speaker
Organization: UNIVERSITY SAFETY
Subject: Re: What happened at the CDC Meeting?
In-Reply-To:
Morning:
Since no one else is coming forward, I will share what I learned at
yesterday's meeting in DC. These are taken from my notes, and are
listed in the order presented (read: not particularly well organized!).
A couple interesting initial facts: The 9/10/02 Notice of Possession
survey yielded ~42 institutions using USDA agents only, and ~1800
using HHS or overlab agents. This does not include the recently
published exemptions, which CDC feels will reduce the final number
to 800-1000 institutions covered by the SA regs. The breakdown:
35% Academic facilities
46% Commercial facilities
12% Government facilities
7% Private facilities
The effective date of the new regs will be Feb. 7, 2003
They reviewed the phase-in timetable published on pages 30-31 of
the CDC regs. Any application received after 11/12/03 must be in
full compliance with ALL provision of the new regs.
They reiterated that the new regs cover amounts of SA toxins by PI,
not by aggregate in the institution.
The revisions to the genetic elements section was reviewed, with
emphesis on the "...that encode infectious and replication-competent
forms of the SA viruses" and "...that encode for the functional forms
of any SA toxin". Inactivated agents and non-functional forms and
subunits of toxins are exempt.
The new regs will require that SA transfers must have PRIOR
approval by CDC to ensure that both the sender and recipient are
registered (effective 3/12/03).
SAs in their naturally occuring hosts (i.e., B virus in primates) are
exempt unless you are isolating the agents.
As someone stated earlier, the big issue was that no one from DOJ
was there to discuss their end of the regs. However, CDC did offer
up the following info on behalf (?) of DOJ:
DOJ will create a web-based database where ROs and individuals
required to access SAs may input their information. These names
will be cross-referenced to a number of DOJ databases. The RO for
each institution must verify the need of each person to access SAs.
Fingerprints will need to be submitted. If no "hit" occurs, then the
person will be cleared to use SAs. If there is a "hit", further
investigation will be needed. Ultimately, the Secty. of HHS or Secty.
of Ag. will have the final determination on approval or denial. If a
person is approved, the institution will receive a list of personnel
okayed to work with SAs. If a person is denied, both the institution
and the person in question will receive a letter. Denials may be
appealed to the appropriate secty. If there is no "hit", the approval
process should only take a few days; if there is a "hit", it may take
MUCH longer.
Approval at one facility does NOT transfer to another facility if a PI
moves from one institution to another; i.e., each institution must
verify the need of the PI to have access to SAs.
ALL SAs isolated in clinical and diagnostic labs must be reported to
CDC; "A-List" pathogens require immediate notification.
There were a number of good public comments, and some decent Q
& A with the interagency panel.
Turnout was amazingly small, probably less than 30 people.
That's my $0.02 on the meeting yesterday. Other folks may correct
anything that I have posted in error.
Hope this helps...
Happy Holidays everyone!
Curt
Curt Speaker
Biosafety Officer
Penn State University
Environmental Health and Safety
speaker@ehs.psu.edu
^...^
(O_O)
=(Y)=
"""
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 17 Dec 2002 10:34:06 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Mark Campbell
Subject: Re: Ergonomic Bone Cutters
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-transfer-encoding: 7bit
Don't want to make anyone sick but when I was doing tissue colonization studies
in mice, we would vaccinate mice with a vaccine strain, (e.g., Salmonella
typhi) and excise as many tissues as possible, including the brain, to discover
where this bug was going. When we excised the brain we used a pair of simple
surgical scissors. Made an insicion at the base on the scull and inserted
scissors in this opening. Then finely work the tip of the scissors in a
circular fashion around the top of the scull. Remove the scull cap and then
you can easily remove the brain. Sounds crude but it worked very well and we
could do a fair number of mice at one necropsy. We did not do the procedure on
frozen rats so I don't know how well the procedure will work with the rat skull
being thicker and the tissues frozen. If you have any questions about this
procedure, let me know.
Thanks,
Mark Campbell, MS, CBSP
Biological Safety Officer
Saint Louis University
"Morris, Gary" wrote:
> One of our researchers conducts a procedure where he removes brain material
> from rats using a standard bone cutter (Roboz RS-8340). The animal is
> frozen which requires him to jab the unit through the skin/skull and then
> exise the material.
>
> The tool is not very well ergonomically designed - has short, thin handles
> and no padding whatsoever. I did a search on the web, but all the versions
> found are similar to the one currently in use.
>
> I was wondering if anybody was aware of a more ergonomically-designed tool
> for the job. Any suggestions/recommendations will be greatly appreciated.
>
> Thanks in advance,
>
> Gary Morris
> EHS Manager
> Wellstat Companies
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 17 Dec 2002 11:44:40 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Morris, Gary"
Subject: Re: Ergonomic Bone Cutters
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Thanks Mark. I may call for follow-up discussion.
-----Original Message-----
From: Mark Campbell [mailto:campbem@SLU.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, December 17, 2002 11:34 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Ergonomic Bone Cutters
Don't want to make anyone sick but when I was doing tissue colonization
studies
in mice, we would vaccinate mice with a vaccine strain, (e.g., Salmonella
typhi) and excise as many tissues as possible, including the brain, to
discover
where this bug was going. When we excised the brain we used a pair of
simple
surgical scissors. Made an insicion at the base on the scull and inserted
scissors in this opening. Then finely work the tip of the scissors in a
circular fashion around the top of the scull. Remove the scull cap and then
you can easily remove the brain. Sounds crude but it worked very well and
we
could do a fair number of mice at one necropsy. We did not do the procedure
on
frozen rats so I don't know how well the procedure will work with the rat
skull
being thicker and the tissues frozen. If you have any questions about this
procedure, let me know.
Thanks,
Mark Campbell, MS, CBSP
Biological Safety Officer
Saint Louis University
"Morris, Gary" wrote:
> One of our researchers conducts a procedure where he removes brain
material
> from rats using a standard bone cutter (Roboz RS-8340). The animal is
> frozen which requires him to jab the unit through the skin/skull and then
> exise the material.
>
> The tool is not very well ergonomically designed - has short, thin handles
> and no padding whatsoever. I did a search on the web, but all the
versions
> found are similar to the one currently in use.
>
> I was wondering if anybody was aware of a more ergonomically-designed tool
> for the job. Any suggestions/recommendations will be greatly appreciated.
>
> Thanks in advance,
>
> Gary Morris
> EHS Manager
> Wellstat Companies
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 17 Dec 2002 11:48:49 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ed Gaunt
Subject: Re: What happened at the CDC Meeting?
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Good summary Curt!
At one point late in the morning session, I counted about 75-80 folks in the
audience plus the reps from CDC and USDA on stage. There were only five
folks (ASM and ABSA reps plus 3 others) who came forward with public
comments in the morning session. This probably reflects lack of time to
digest the regs thoroughly. For the afternoon Q&A session, many (most?) of
the core members of the team that wrote the rules were present on the panel
to respond to questions. Throughout the meeting, Larry Sparks (CDC
Moderator) reiterated that the Government really seeks comments on the rules
from the user community. All of the transcripts and PowerPoint
presentations from the meeting will be made available to the public for
review. I'll try to post a link when available.
Ed
-----Original Message-----
From: Curt Speaker [mailto:SPEAKER@SAFETY-1.SAFETY.PSU.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, December 17, 2002 11:29 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: What happened at the CDC Meeting?
Morning:
Since no one else is coming forward, I will share what I learned at
yesterday's meeting in DC. These are taken from my notes, and are
listed in the order presented (read: not particularly well organized!).
A couple interesting initial facts: The 9/10/02 Notice of Possession
survey yielded ~42 institutions using USDA agents only, and ~1800
using HHS or overlab agents. This does not include the recently
published exemptions, which CDC feels will reduce the final number
to 800-1000 institutions covered by the SA regs. The breakdown:
35% Academic facilities
46% Commercial facilities
12% Government facilities
7% Private facilities
The effective date of the new regs will be Feb. 7, 2003
They reviewed the phase-in timetable published on pages 30-31 of
the CDC regs. Any application received after 11/12/03 must be in
full compliance with ALL provision of the new regs.
They reiterated that the new regs cover amounts of SA toxins by PI,
not by aggregate in the institution.
The revisions to the genetic elements section was reviewed, with
emphesis on the "...that encode infectious and replication-competent
forms of the SA viruses" and "...that encode for the functional forms
of any SA toxin". Inactivated agents and non-functional forms and
subunits of toxins are exempt.
The new regs will require that SA transfers must have PRIOR
approval by CDC to ensure that both the sender and recipient are
registered (effective 3/12/03).
SAs in their naturally occuring hosts (i.e., B virus in primates) are
exempt unless you are isolating the agents.
As someone stated earlier, the big issue was that no one from DOJ
was there to discuss their end of the regs. However, CDC did offer
up the following info on behalf (?) of DOJ:
DOJ will create a web-based database where ROs and individuals
required to access SAs may input their information. These names
will be cross-referenced to a number of DOJ databases. The RO for
each institution must verify the need of each person to access SAs.
Fingerprints will need to be submitted. If no "hit" occurs, then the
person will be cleared to use SAs. If there is a "hit", further
investigation will be needed. Ultimately, the Secty. of HHS or Secty.
of Ag. will have the final determination on approval or denial. If a
person is approved, the institution will receive a list of personnel
okayed to work with SAs. If a person is denied, both the institution
and the person in question will receive a letter. Denials may be
appealed to the appropriate secty. If there is no "hit", the approval
process should only take a few days; if there is a "hit", it may take
MUCH longer.
Approval at one facility does NOT transfer to another facility if a PI
moves from one institution to another; i.e., each institution must
verify the need of the PI to have access to SAs.
ALL SAs isolated in clinical and diagnostic labs must be reported to
CDC; "A-List" pathogens require immediate notification.
There were a number of good public comments, and some decent Q
& A with the interagency panel.
Turnout was amazingly small, probably less than 30 people.
That's my $0.02 on the meeting yesterday. Other folks may correct
anything that I have posted in error.
Hope this helps...
Happy Holidays everyone!
Curt
Curt Speaker
Biosafety Officer
Penn State University
Environmental Health and Safety
speaker@ehs.psu.edu
^...^
(O_O)
=(Y)=
"""
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 17 Dec 2002 10:48:37 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Brown, Virginia R"
Subject: BL4 Changes
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Howdy Group,
I have heard a very vague rumor about proposed changes to BL4 =
"regulations".
This may be a total misinterpretation of the HHS and APHIS Interim Rules =
posted
last week, but I've been asked to check this out.
Any input is appreciated.
Happy Holidays!
Ginger Brown, CBSP
Env Health & Safety
TX A&M University
gingerbrown@tamu.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 17 Dec 2002 12:13:43 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: David Gillum
Subject: Biological Reproductive Hazards
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Dear Group,
Is anyone aware of a list of biological agents that are considered
teratogens? I know that cytomegalovirus is considered teratogenic. Are there
any others?
Many thanks, as usual!
-David
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 17 Dec 2002 14:06:41 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Cheri L Hildreth
Subject: Additional info re: 12/16 CDC Public meeting on SA interim rule
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Content-Disposition: inline
fyi.. Dr. Ron Atlas's additional comments on yesterday's public meeting
on SA interim rule. Below that is an article in today's NY Times that
Ron also forwarded to me. Ron Atlas, Wayne Thomann, Matt Finucane and
Barbara Johnson are all quoted... Thanks, Cheri
Cheri Hildreth Watts, Director
Department of Environmental Health &Safety
University of Louisville
(502) 852-2954
e-mail: cheri.hildreth@louisville.edu
>>> Ron Atlas 12/17/02 01:52PM >>>
This is an accurate summary of the meeting. There were only a few from
the biosafety community. There were only 4 comments. ASM, Howard
Hughes, I forget which University (comments were not on target), and
ABSA's comment was that they would comment). ASM worried about lack of
DOJ details--this is a major concern, the proscription of certain
experiments (we think this is the first time this has
happened), and the biosecurity aspects (could be costly and you might
learn they were unacceptable to inspectors--who will be
contractors--only after you invest. USDA did say they would work with
institutions on plans and offer assistance. CDC did not make that
offer. That is about it. ASM will submit formal comments but not until
next year.
After 9/11, Universities Are Destroying Biological Agents
>
> December 17, 2002
> By DIANA JEAN SCHEMO
WASHINGTON, Dec. 16 - As federal officials search for more powerful
tools to investigate biological terrorism, universities across the
country are destroying collections of laboratory agents crucial for
understanding how biological weapons work and tracing their sources.
New federal laws require only that such biological materials be
registered, but many universities are pressing researchers to clean out
their freezers and destroy materials they are not currently working
on.
While there is no official count of how many biological specimens
have been destroyed, concern that laboratories have gone overboard
prompted the White House to ask institutions, through the American
Society of Microbiologists, to reconsider their haste in doing away
with specimens that could prove "difficult or impossible to replace,"
said Rachel Levinson, of the White House Office on Science and
Technology Policy.
"Obviously, these materials are valuable as research tools, and in
terms of developing countermeasures should these agents be used as
weapons, or if there's an unintentional natural outbreak," Dr. Levinson
said. "They're valuable research tools, and we would not like to see
them destroyed."
Under laws enacted since last year's anthrax mailings, which killed
five people, research institutions, clinical and diagnostic
laboratories must inventory and register the presence of 61 select
agents that could be used to make biological weapons, including ebola,
herpes B, smallpox and a variety of toxins. The materials must be kept
under lock and key, with access to them restricted to people cleared
by government background checks. Scientists must also demonstrate a
"bona fide research purpose" for working with a given material.
The problem appears to lie in conflicting messages from Washington
and in overly zealous compliance with the new laws on select agents,
said Ronald Atlas, president of the American Society of
Microbiologists. The prosecution of Tomas Foral, a University of
Connecticut scientist arrested
after he pocketed an anthrax specimen in cleaning out a laboratory
freezer, caused many researchers to think twice, Dr. Atlas recalled.
"Many say Tomas Foral at Connecticut was a clear message from the
Justice Department to the scientific community: If you can't justify
having it, clear it out," Dr. Atlas said. "When you have these criminal
penalties hanging over your head, you ask, `Why should I be the one to
bear that legal
risk?' "
The most spectacular example of the wholesale destruction of specimens
came last year, when Iowa State University at Ames destroyed its entire
collection of anthrax specimens. The university acted after an Ames
strain was tied to the fatal anthrax letters, and with the criminal
investigation in full swing.
John McCarroll, a spokesman for Iowa State, said copies of the
anthrax strains that were destroyed existed elsewhere, but other
scientists disagree. They maintain that recent advances in genetic
engineering have shown that families of strains that appeared the same
were, on closer inspection,> quite different. Mr. McCarroll said that
more recently, Iowa State had asked researchers to destroy select
agents that they were not "currently working on."
Few universities have gone so far as to order the elimination of
specimens outright. Rather, in conducting inventories of biological
agents, most have urged researchers to consider seriously, and justify,
their need for sensitive materials. Some describe the procedure as
good "housekeeping," saying as a matter of principle, dangerous
materials not immediately needed should be discarded.
At the University of Pennsylvania, the new laws on select agents has
prompted not just housekeeping, but also soul searching, said Matthew
Finucane, director of environmental health and radiation safety.
"If they don't have a mission for the material, people are disposing
of it," Mr. Finucane said.
At Duke University, the discovery of a select agent was grounds for
an "internal audit," said Wayne Thomann, the university's director of
occupational and environmental health. If they were "historical stocks"
and researchers could not come up with a current need for the agents,
Mr. Thomann said, "we went through a process of controlled
destruction."
"I can't give any exact numbers," he said, "but it was a fair number
that decided there wasn't a real research benefit in maintaining this
stuff."
Harvard University did not suggest researchers destroy agents, but R.
John Collier, a biochemist who works on anthrax there, said he had
taken it upon himself last year to destroy the only strain he had on
hand "to avoid attracting terrorists and more of the press than I
wanted."
But policies that make sense in other contexts, like discarding old
samples, are madness when it comes to scientific research, said Steven
Block, a physics and biology professor at Stanford University.
Dr. Block said past strains of anthrax were essential for
understanding how quickly an organism altered itself in nature.
"So much you can learn by knowing the evolutionary biology of
bacteria," he said, "but you can't research that evolutionary biology
if you can't look at the past versions of it. It's the connectedness of
all this that's so important."
Dr. W. Ian Lipkin, director of the Center for Immunopathogenesis and
Infectious Diseases at Columbia
University, said, "What you're discarding is access to materials and
intellectual property you may need
downstream."
Dr. Lipkin is investigating what causes diseases like autism and
cancer, and relies on comparing genetic sequences in as many specimens
as possible. "This will definitely interfere with our work," he said.
He noted that in the 1990's accusations arose that American
scientists had introduced the AIDS virus, H.I.V., to Africa through
earlier research infecting monkeys with polio. The scientific community
was only able to disprove the theory conclusively by turning over the
40-year-old cells for
independent scrutiny.
Dr. Levinson, at the White House, said that if institutions really
felt intimidated by the new rules, they should transfer the materials
to a laboratory willing to accept them.
Others have said the administration should have created such a
repository to accept materials that laboratories felt compelled to
discard. And many fear that it may take time to repair the harm that is
being done.
"I would hope that we could recover from any deleterious effect in
the long run," said Barbara Johnson, president of the American Society
of Biological Safety. "But if you had a unique sample that no one had
replicates of, that sample's gone."
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 17 Dec 2002 14:25:45 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Jeff Owens
Subject: Re: What happened at the CDC Meeting?
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
I agree, excellent summary. A few additional points I noted included
probably one of the more obvious regarding the diagnostic/clinical
exemption where if a SA is isolated and is not destroyed in the specified
amount of time (after written notification or immediate notification for
"A" list), it can be transferred to a registered facility without
themselves registering (using the new transfer form 2041 which will become
effective for all on March 12).
The CDC indicated that they will also be developing a new database,
possibly web-based, to handle all the new information; however, they did
not elaborate much on this issue. The CDC is estimating that approximately
20,000 individuals will ultimately need to be registered.
One point that struck me was that the panel seem to agree that many of the
decisions, in particular regarding security, were being left to the
"entity" to define (i.e. what defines "access"). This is somewhat
disconcerting because how I might define something like access, an
inspector might see otherwise. One good point, at least coming from
USDA/APHIS, is that technical assistance/review will be available,
especially in the area of security. CDC did not explicitly offer this same
"service", but I hope it will be available from them as well. This could
prove helpful in that we can have our security plans reviewed prior to
spending large amounts of money implementing them only to find out they
fall short.
Another point to consider for those entities considering working with SA's
that are not currently doing so is that if you are not working with them
prior to 02/07/03, you will basically not be entitled to the transition
process currently outlined in the regs. If an entity first begins working
with an SA after 02/07, then that entity will be required to be in
compliance with "most" of the regs sooner than if you had been working with
SA's prior to 02/07.
Ok, that's my two cents to add to Curt's two cents so if any one else wants
to throw in a penny, we'll all have a whole nickel! As with Curt's
summary, if you note anything that is in error, please correct.
Have a safe and happy holiday!
Jeff Owens
Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia
At 11:48 AM 12/17/2002 -0500, you wrote:
>Good summary Curt!
>
>At one point late in the morning session, I counted about 75-80 folks in the
>audience plus the reps from CDC and USDA on stage. There were only five
>folks (ASM and ABSA reps plus 3 others) who came forward with public
>comments in the morning session. This probably reflects lack of time to
>digest the regs thoroughly. For the afternoon Q&A session, many (most?) of
>the core members of the team that wrote the rules were present on the panel
>to respond to questions. Throughout the meeting, Larry Sparks (CDC
>Moderator) reiterated that the Government really seeks comments on the rules
>from the user community. All of the transcripts and PowerPoint
>presentations from the meeting will be made available to the public for
>review. I'll try to post a link when available.
>
>Ed
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From: Curt Speaker [mailto:SPEAKER@SAFETY-1.SAFETY.PSU.EDU]
>Sent: Tuesday, December 17, 2002 11:29 AM
>To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
>Subject: Re: What happened at the CDC Meeting?
>
>
>Morning:
>
>Since no one else is coming forward, I will share what I learned at
>yesterday's meeting in DC. These are taken from my notes, and are
>listed in the order presented (read: not particularly well organized!).
>
>A couple interesting initial facts: The 9/10/02 Notice of Possession
>survey yielded ~42 institutions using USDA agents only, and ~1800
>using HHS or overlab agents. This does not include the recently
>published exemptions, which CDC feels will reduce the final number
>to 800-1000 institutions covered by the SA regs. The breakdown:
>
>35% Academic facilities
>46% Commercial facilities
>12% Government facilities
>7% Private facilities
>
>The effective date of the new regs will be Feb. 7, 2003
>
>They reviewed the phase-in timetable published on pages 30-31 of
>the CDC regs. Any application received after 11/12/03 must be in
>full compliance with ALL provision of the new regs.
>
>They reiterated that the new regs cover amounts of SA toxins by PI,
>not by aggregate in the institution.
>
>The revisions to the genetic elements section was reviewed, with
>emphesis on the "...that encode infectious and replication-competent
>forms of the SA viruses" and "...that encode for the functional forms
>of any SA toxin". Inactivated agents and non-functional forms and
>subunits of toxins are exempt.
>
>The new regs will require that SA transfers must have PRIOR
>approval by CDC to ensure that both the sender and recipient are
>registered (effective 3/12/03).
>
>SAs in their naturally occuring hosts (i.e., B virus in primates) are
>exempt unless you are isolating the agents.
>
>As someone stated earlier, the big issue was that no one from DOJ
>was there to discuss their end of the regs. However, CDC did offer
>up the following info on behalf (?) of DOJ:
>
>DOJ will create a web-based database where ROs and individuals
>required to access SAs may input their information. These names
>will be cross-referenced to a number of DOJ databases. The RO for
>each institution must verify the need of each person to access SAs.
>Fingerprints will need to be submitted. If no "hit" occurs, then the
>person will be cleared to use SAs. If there is a "hit", further
>investigation will be needed. Ultimately, the Secty. of HHS or Secty.
>of Ag. will have the final determination on approval or denial. If a
>person is approved, the institution will receive a list of personnel
>okayed to work with SAs. If a person is denied, both the institution
>and the person in question will receive a letter. Denials may be
>appealed to the appropriate secty. If there is no "hit", the approval
>process should only take a few days; if there is a "hit", it may take
>MUCH longer.
>
>Approval at one facility does NOT transfer to another facility if a PI
>moves from one institution to another; i.e., each institution must
>verify the need of the PI to have access to SAs.
>
>ALL SAs isolated in clinical and diagnostic labs must be reported to
>CDC; "A-List" pathogens require immediate notification.
>
>There were a number of good public comments, and some decent Q
>& A with the interagency panel.
>
>Turnout was amazingly small, probably less than 30 people.
>
>That's my $0.02 on the meeting yesterday. Other folks may correct
>anything that I have posted in error.
>
>Hope this helps...
>
>Happy Holidays everyone!
>
>Curt
> Curt Speaker
>Biosafety Officer
>Penn State University
>Environmental Health and Safety
>speaker@ehs.psu.edu
>
>^...^
>(O_O)
>=(Y)=
> """
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 17 Dec 2002 15:00:57 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Hauck, Philip"
Subject: Re: Additional info re: 12/16 CDC Public meeting on SA interim
rule
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
Content-transfer-encoding: quoted-printable
This is the "stuff" that I am afraid of. As a person who practiced =
"cultivate it and see what grows out"-type microbiology....what happens =
if you find something novel, but you don't have a grant or immediate use =
for it, but YOUR GUT TELLS YOU that what you found is novel and =
interesting from a scientific perspective. This current environment WILL =
DESTROY the future of microbiology, IF IT HASN'T ALREADY! So much for =
free inquiry! So much for maintaining an inventory of readily available =
microorganisms. We can't see the microorganisms for the potential =
weapons they may become! If the trend follows, only GOVERNMENT-APPROVED =
SCIENTISTS will be able to conduct research in a handful of =
laboratories. At a time when Microbiology was firmly in its Second =
Golden Age, it's future appears to be very short at best. I hate to =
editorialize, but SOMEONE has to say something!!
Has anyone noticed how truly ORWELLIAN this is all becoming? Next the =
THOUGHT-POLICE will be coming in the night for anyone contemplating =
working with an SA!! This provides the environment that is ripe for =
someone else to forge ahead and do research in these areas, with no =
chance of us ever being able to catch up. It has taken one of my =
researchers ONE WHOLE YEAR to get an amendment...she has a novel idea on =
how to attack an SA and render it harmless. ONE WHOLE YEAR! What happens =
if you are now "DISALLOWED" from doing any of this research? Meanwhile =
progress marches on...in other countries...in competitor countries....in =
HOSTILE, COMPETITOR COUNTRIES.
There is always a problem when Legislators legislate in Knee-jerk =
fashion to the "perceived dangers" they think exist, without taking into =
account the long term effects their actions will have on a given sector. =
I have seen it in other areas I am involved in, now it is happening in =
the Microbiological arena. Benjamin Franklin stated something similar to =
this: "A people who trade their freedom for safety [and security], shall =
have neither!" Add to that growing pile,Scientific Advancement as =
another lost freedom.
Philip G. Hauck, MS, MSHS, CBSP, SM(NRM)
-----Original Message-----
From: Cheri L Hildreth [mailto:cheri.hildreth@LOUISVILLE.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, December 17, 2002 2:07 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Additional info re: 12/16 CDC Public meeting on SA interim rule
fyi.. Dr. Ron Atlas's additional comments on yesterday's public meeting
on SA interim rule. Below that is an article in today's NY Times that
Ron also forwarded to me. Ron Atlas, Wayne Thomann, Matt Finucane and
Barbara Johnson are all quoted... Thanks, Cheri
Cheri Hildreth Watts, Director
Department of Environmental Health &Safety
University of Louisville
(502) 852-2954
e-mail: cheri.hildreth@louisville.edu
>>> Ron Atlas 12/17/02 01:52PM >>>
This is an accurate summary of the meeting. There were only a few from
the biosafety community. There were only 4 comments. ASM, Howard
Hughes, I forget which University (comments were not on target), and
ABSA's comment was that they would comment). ASM worried about lack of
DOJ details--this is a major concern, the proscription of certain
experiments (we think this is the first time this has
happened), and the biosecurity aspects (could be costly and you might
learn they were unacceptable to inspectors--who will be
contractors--only after you invest. USDA did say they would work with
institutions on plans and offer assistance. CDC did not make that
offer. That is about it. ASM will submit formal comments but not until
next year.
After 9/11, Universities Are Destroying Biological Agents
>
> December 17, 2002
> By DIANA JEAN SCHEMO
WASHINGTON, Dec. 16 - As federal officials search for more powerful
tools to investigate biological terrorism, universities across the
country are destroying collections of laboratory agents crucial for
understanding how biological weapons work and tracing their sources.
New federal laws require only that such biological materials be
registered, but many universities are pressing researchers to clean out
their freezers and destroy materials they are not currently working
on.
While there is no official count of how many biological specimens
have been destroyed, concern that laboratories have gone overboard
prompted the White House to ask institutions, through the American
Society of Microbiologists, to reconsider their haste in doing away
with specimens that could prove "difficult or impossible to replace,"
said Rachel Levinson, of the White House Office on Science and
Technology Policy.
"Obviously, these materials are valuable as research tools, and in
terms of developing countermeasures should these agents be used as
weapons, or if there's an unintentional natural outbreak," Dr. Levinson
said. "They're valuable research tools, and we would not like to see
them destroyed."
Under laws enacted since last year's anthrax mailings, which killed
five people, research institutions, clinical and diagnostic
laboratories must inventory and register the presence of 61 select
agents that could be used to make biological weapons, including ebola,
herpes B, smallpox and a variety of toxins. The materials must be kept
under lock and key, with access to them restricted to people cleared
by government background checks. Scientists must also demonstrate a
"bona fide research purpose" for working with a given material.
The problem appears to lie in conflicting messages from Washington
and in overly zealous compliance with the new laws on select agents,
said Ronald Atlas, president of the American Society of
Microbiologists. The prosecution of Tomas Foral, a University of
Connecticut scientist arrested
after he pocketed an anthrax specimen in cleaning out a laboratory
freezer, caused many researchers to think twice, Dr. Atlas recalled.
"Many say Tomas Foral at Connecticut was a clear message from the
Justice Department to the scientific community: If you can't justify
having it, clear it out," Dr. Atlas said. "When you have these criminal
penalties hanging over your head, you ask, `Why should I be the one to
bear that legal
risk?' "
The most spectacular example of the wholesale destruction of specimens
came last year, when Iowa State University at Ames destroyed its entire
collection of anthrax specimens. The university acted after an Ames
strain was tied to the fatal anthrax letters, and with the criminal
investigation in full swing.
John McCarroll, a spokesman for Iowa State, said copies of the
anthrax strains that were destroyed existed elsewhere, but other
scientists disagree. They maintain that recent advances in genetic
engineering have shown that families of strains that appeared the same
were, on closer inspection,> quite different. Mr. McCarroll said that
more recently, Iowa State had asked researchers to destroy select
agents that they were not "currently working on."
Few universities have gone so far as to order the elimination of
specimens outright. Rather, in conducting inventories of biological
agents, most have urged researchers to consider seriously, and justify,
their need for sensitive materials. Some describe the procedure as
good "housekeeping," saying as a matter of principle, dangerous
materials not immediately needed should be discarded.
At the University of Pennsylvania, the new laws on select agents has
prompted not just housekeeping, but also soul searching, said Matthew
Finucane, director of environmental health and radiation safety.
"If they don't have a mission for the material, people are disposing
of it," Mr. Finucane said.
At Duke University, the discovery of a select agent was grounds for
an "internal audit," said Wayne Thomann, the university's director of
occupational and environmental health. If they were "historical stocks"
and researchers could not come up with a current need for the agents,
Mr. Thomann said, "we went through a process of controlled
destruction."
"I can't give any exact numbers," he said, "but it was a fair number
that decided there wasn't a real research benefit in maintaining this
stuff."
Harvard University did not suggest researchers destroy agents, but R.
John Collier, a biochemist who works on anthrax there, said he had
taken it upon himself last year to destroy the only strain he had on
hand "to avoid attracting terrorists and more of the press than I
wanted."
But policies that make sense in other contexts, like discarding old
samples, are madness when it comes to scientific research, said Steven
Block, a physics and biology professor at Stanford University.
Dr. Block said past strains of anthrax were essential for
understanding how quickly an organism altered itself in nature.
"So much you can learn by knowing the evolutionary biology of
bacteria," he said, "but you can't research that evolutionary biology
if you can't look at the past versions of it. It's the connectedness of
all this that's so important."
Dr. W. Ian Lipkin, director of the Center for Immunopathogenesis and
Infectious Diseases at Columbia
University, said, "What you're discarding is access to materials and
intellectual property you may need
downstream."
Dr. Lipkin is investigating what causes diseases like autism and
cancer, and relies on comparing genetic sequences in as many specimens
as possible. "This will definitely interfere with our work," he said.
He noted that in the 1990's accusations arose that American
scientists had introduced the AIDS virus, H.I.V., to Africa through
earlier research infecting monkeys with polio. The scientific community
was only able to disprove the theory conclusively by turning over the
40-year-old cells for
independent scrutiny.
Dr. Levinson, at the White House, said that if institutions really
felt intimidated by the new rules, they should transfer the materials
to a laboratory willing to accept them.
Others have said the administration should have created such a
repository to accept materials that laboratories felt compelled to
discard. And many fear that it may take time to repair the harm that is
being done.
"I would hope that we could recover from any deleterious effect in
the long run," said Barbara Johnson, president of the American Society
of Biological Safety. "But if you had a unique sample that no one had
replicates of, that sample's gone."
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 17 Dec 2002 15:53:08 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: David Gillum
Subject: APHIS, HHS, USDA Agents
MIME-Version: 1.0
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This message is in MIME format. Since your mail reader does not understand
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Content-Type: text/plain
Here's another way to look at the same thing. Let me know if you see errors.
-David
------_=_NextPart_000_01C2A60E.4E0B1FA0
Content-Type: application/msword;
name="APHIS-HHS-USDA-Agents.doc"
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filename="APHIS-HHS-USDA-Agents.doc"
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 17 Dec 2002 15:32:13 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "LAMBERT, Margy"
Subject: Re: Biological Reproductive Hazards
David,
I don't have a comprehensive list but ones that should be included as
biological reproductive hazards: Toxoplasma gondii, Listeria monocytogenes,
and human parvovirus (B19).
Margy
//
Margy S. Lambert, Ph.D.
University of Wisconsin - Madison
Office of Biological Safety
30 N. Murray St.
Madison, WI 53715-1227
(608) 263-9013
mlambert@fpm.wisc.edu
-----Original Message-----
From: David Gillum [mailto:David.Gillum@UNH.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, December 17, 2002 11:14 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Biological Reproductive Hazards
Dear Group,
Is anyone aware of a list of biological agents that are considered
teratogens? I know that cytomegalovirus is considered teratogenic. Are there
any others?
Many thanks, as usual!
-David
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 17 Dec 2002 16:52:36 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ricardo Tappan
Subject: Re: Ergonomic Bone Cutters
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Content-Disposition: inline
Not knowing a thing about rat dissection, but knowing about cutting
things, Dremal the small hand held wonder tool now makes a saw blade
attachment for the handheld dremal, which is small and ergonomicaly
pleasing
RT
This is opinion only, no endorsement of said product will result in
profit to me or mine.
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 17 Dec 2002 14:09:26 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Ton, Mimi"
Subject: Animal care and cytoxic drugs
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Dear all,
Does anyone have established procedures for animal care staff to handle =
animals that have been giving cytoxic drugs. This would include: cage =
changing, bedding disposal, cage washing, PPE, BSC requirements. Are =
there major deviations to the procedured required for the researcher who =
is preparing the cytotoxic material and injecting it into the animal? =
Please advise. Thanks for all your help.
Best regards and happy holidays!
Mimi
---------------------------------------------
Mimi C. Ton
Safety Engineer/ Institute Biosafety Officer
California Institute of Technology
Environment, Health & Safety Office
M/C 25-6
1200 E. California Boulevard
Pasadena, CA 91125
Phone: 626.395.2430
Fax: 626.577.6028
E-mail: mimi.ton@caltech.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 17 Dec 2002 15:56:53 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Hall, Christine"
Subject: Re: Ergonomic Bone Cutters
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
I have had experience cutting bone with a dental drill (low speed - similar
to a dremal tool) using a round diamond dental burrs. It worked very well
and efficiently, but the aerosols generated would need to be considered.
Chris
Chris Hall
Instructional Support Assistant IV
Palomar College - Life Sciences
1140 W Mission Rd
San Marcos, CA 92069
(760) 744-1150 x2726
-----Original Message-----
From: Ricardo Tappan [mailto:rsorxt@GWUMC.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, December 17, 2002 1:53 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Ergonomic Bone Cutters
Not knowing a thing about rat dissection, but knowing about cutting
things, Dremal the small hand held wonder tool now makes a saw blade
attachment for the handheld dremal, which is small and ergonomicaly
pleasing
RT
This is opinion only, no endorsement of said product will result in
profit to me or mine.
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 17 Dec 2002 15:58:47 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Mullen, Seth"
Subject: Re: Biological Reproductive Hazards
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Also include lymphocytic choriomeningitis virus.
Seth Mullen
-----Original Message-----
From: LAMBERT, Margy [mailto:MLAMBERT@FPM.WISC.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, December 17, 2002 1:32 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Biological Reproductive Hazards
David,
I don't have a comprehensive list but ones that should be included as
biological reproductive hazards: Toxoplasma gondii, Listeria
monocytogenes, and human parvovirus (B19).
Margy
//
Margy S. Lambert, Ph.D.
University of Wisconsin - Madison
Office of Biological Safety
30 N. Murray St.
Madison, WI 53715-1227
(608) 263-9013
mlambert@fpm.wisc.edu
-----Original Message-----
From: David Gillum [mailto:David.Gillum@UNH.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, December 17, 2002 11:14 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Biological Reproductive Hazards
Dear Group,
Is anyone aware of a list of biological agents that are considered
teratogens? I know that cytomegalovirus is considered teratogenic. Are
there any others?
Many thanks, as usual!
-David
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 17 Dec 2002 10:19:23 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Therese M. Stinnett"
Subject: Re: Biological Reproductive Hazards
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="----_=_NextPart_000_01C2A5F0.5A6DE6E2"
This message is in MIME format. Since your mail reader does not understand
this format, some or all of this message may not be legible.
------_=_NextPart_000_01C2A5F0.5A6DE6E2
Content-Type: text/plain;
charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
check out NIOSH/CDC
Therese M. Stinnett
Biosafety Officer
Health and Safety Division
UCHSC, Mailstop C275
4200 E. 9th Avenue
Denver, CO=A0 80262
Voice:=A0 303-315-6754
Pager:=A0 303-266-5402
Fax:=A0 303-315-8026
email:=A0 therese.stinnett@uchsc.edu =
-----Original Message-----
From: David Gillum [mailto:David.Gillum@UNH.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, December 17, 2002 10:14 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Biological Reproductive Hazards
Dear Group,
Is anyone aware of a list of biological agents that are considered
teratogens? I know that cytomegalovirus is considered teratogenic. Are =
there
any others?
Many thanks, as usual!
-David
------_=_NextPart_000_01C2A5F0.5A6DE6E2
Content-Type: application/octet-stream;
name="chp_male repro.htm"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Content-Disposition: attachment;
filename="chp_male repro.htm"
The Effects of Workplace Hazards on
Male Reproductive Health
Introduction
Many factors can contribute to producing healthy children. It
is well known that the health of an unborn child can suffer if a
woman fails to eat right, smokes, or drinks alcohol during =
pregnancy. It is not well known, however, that a man's exposure
to substances in the workplace can affect his ability to have
healthy children.
This document provides general information about reproductive
hazards, an explanation of how substances in the workplace can
cause reproductive problems in men, and suggestions for
preventing exposure to reproductive hazards. For more information
about the topics covered in this document, call toll free:
1-800-35-NIOSH =
(1-800-356-4674)
DHHS (NIOSH) Publication No. 96-132
What Are Reproductive Hazards?
Substances that affect the ability to have healthy children
are called reproductive hazards.
Radiation, many chemicals, drugs (legal and illegal),
cigarettes, and heat are examples of reproductive hazards.
What Reproductive Hazards Exist in the Workplace?
A number of workplace substances such as lead and radiation
have been identified as reproductive hazards for men (see Table
1). However, there is no complete list of reproductive hazards
in the workplace. Scientists are just beginning to understand
how these hazards affect the male reproductive system. Although
more than 1,000 workplace chemicals have been shown to have
reproductive effects on animals, most have not been studied in
humans. In = addition, most of the 4 million other chemical
mixtures in commercial use remain untested.
Although studies have found that workplace exposures affect
the reproductive system in some men, these effects do not
necessarily occur in every worker. Whether individuals are
affected depends on how much of the hazard they are exposed to,
how long they are exposed, how they are exposed, and other
personal factors.
Reproductive issues are likely to receive more attention in
the future because they are included in the National =
Occupational Research Agenda coordinated by NIOSH. As one of the
21 topics included in the Agenda, research on reproductive issues
will = undoubtedly increase nationwide. For copies of the Agenda,
contact NIOSH at 1-800-356-4674.
How Are Workers Exposed?
Harmful substances can enter the body by inhalation, contact
with the skin, or ingestion (if workers do not properly wash
their hands before eating, drinking, or smoking).
Can A Worker Expose His Family To These Hazards?
Workplace substances that affect male workers may also
indirectly cause harm to their families. Certain substances
unintentionally brought home by a worker may affect a woman's
reproductive system or the health of an unborn child. For
example, lead brought home from the workplace on a worker's skin,
hair, clothes, shoes, tool box, or car can cause severe lead
poisoning among family members and can cause neurobehavioral and
growth effects in a fetus.
Table 1. Male Reproductive Hazards*
=
Observed effects
=
_________________________________________________________________
Type of Exposure Lowered number Abnormal sperm Altered sperm =
Altered hormones/
of sperm shape transfer =
sexual performance
Lead X X X =
X
________________________________________________________________________=
__________________
Dibromochloropropane X
________________________________________________________________________=
__________________
Carbaryl (Sevin ) X
________________________________________________________________________=
__________________
Toluenediamine and X
dinitrotoluene
________________________________________________________________________=
__________________
Ethylene dibromide X X X
________________________________________________________________________=
__________________
Plastic production X
(styrene and acetone)
________________________________________________________________________=
__________________
Ethylene glycol monoethyl X
ether
________________________________________________________________________=
__________________
Welding X X
________________________________________________________________________=
__________________
Perchloroethylene X
________________________________________________________________________=
__________________
Mercury vapor =
X
________________________________________________________________________=
__________________
Heat X X
________________________________________________________________________=
__________________
Military radar X
________________________________________________________________________=
__________________
Kepone** X
________________________________________________________________________=
__________________
Bromine vapor** X X X
________________________________________________________________________=
__________________
Radiation** (Chernobyl) X X X =
X
________________________________________________________________________=
__________________
Carbon disulfide =
X
________________________________________________________________________=
__________________
2,4-Dichlorophenoxy acetic X X
acid (2,4-D)
________________________________________________________________________=
__________________
*Studies to date show that some men experience the health
effects listed here from workplace exposures. However, these
effects may not occur in every worker. The amount of time a
worker is exposed, the amount of hazard to which he is exposed,
and other personal factors may all determine whether an
individual is affected.
**Workers were exposed to high levels as a result of a
workplace accident.
The Male Reproductive System
To understand how reproductive hazards affect a man's ability
to have healthy children, it is important to understand how the
male reproductive system works.
The testicles have two important functions: (1) they produce
the hormone testosterone, which produces the deep male voice,
beard, and sex drive; and (2) they produce sperm.
After the sperm are made (in about 72 days), they are stored
in the epididymis, the outer structure of the testicles. The
sperm remain in the epididymis for about 15 to 25 days. While
there, they mature and develop the ability to swim. If the sperm
are not ejaculated, they eventually die and are absorbed by the
body.
When a man ejaculates, the mature sperm cells move through
the vas deferens (the tube cut in a vasectomy) and past the
seminal vesicles and prostate gland. The seminal vesicles and the
prostate provide most of the liquid in semen.
The semen is deposited in the vagina and the sperm must then
swim through the cervix into the uterus and up into the fallopian
tubes. If an egg is present, it is fertilized in the fallopian
tubes. The fertilized egg then moves down to the uterus, where it
attaches to the wall and continues to grow. If no egg is present,
the sperm may live within the uterus for up to 2 days.
How Do Reproductive Hazards Affect the Male Reproductive System?
Number of Sperm
Some reproductive hazards can stop or slow the actual
production of sperm. This means that there will be fewer sperm
present to fertilize an egg; if no sperm are produced, the man is
sterile. If the hazard prevents sperm from being made, sterility
is = permanent.
Sperm Shape
Reproductive hazards may cause the shape of sperm cells to be
different. These sperm often have trouble swimming or lack the
ability to fertilize the egg.
Sperm Transfer
Hazardous chemicals may collect in the epididymis, seminal
vesicles, or prostate. These chemicals may kill the sperm, change
the way in which they swim, or attach to the sperm and be carried
to the egg or the unborn child.
Sexual Performance
Changes in amounts of hormones can affect sexual performance.
Some chemicals, like alcohol, may also affect the ability to
achieve erections, whereas others may affect the sex drive.
Several drugs (both legal and illegal) have effects on sexual
performance, but little is known about the effects of workplace
hazards.
Sperm Chromosomes
Reproductive hazards can affect the chromosomes found in
sperm. The sperm and egg each contribute 23 chromosomes at
fertilization. The DNA stored in these chromosomes determines
what we will look like and how our bodies will function.
Radiation or chemicals may cause changes or breaks in the DNA. If
the sperm's DNA is damaged, it may not be able to fertilize an
egg; or if it does fertilize an egg, it may affect the
development of the fetus. Some cancer treatment drugs are known
to cause such damage. However, little is known about the effects
of workplace hazards on sperm chromosomes.
Pregnancy
If a damaged sperm does fertilize an egg, the egg might not
develop properly, causing a miscarriage or a possible health
problem in the baby. If a reproductive hazard is carried in the
semen, the fetus might be exposed within the uterus, possibly
leading to problems with the pregnancy or with the health of the
baby after it is born.
How Can Workers Be Protected From Reproductive Hazards?
Employers have a responsibility to protect their workers.
However, because so little is known about reproductive hazards,
workers should also take the following steps to ensure their own
safety:
Store chemicals in sealed containers when they are not in
use.
Wash hands before eating, drinking, or smoking.
Avoid skin contact with chemicals.
If chemicals contact the skin, follow directions for washing
provided in the material safety data sheet = (MSDS). Employers
are required to provide an MSDS for all hazardous materials
used in the workplace.
Become familiar with the potential reproductive hazards used in
your workplace.
To prevent home contamination:
--change out of contaminated clothing and wash with soap and
water before going home,
--store street clothes in a separate area of the workplace to
prevent contamination,
--wash work clothing separately from other laundry (at work if
possible), and
--avoid bringing contaminated clothing or other objects = home.
Participate in all safety and health education, training, and
monitoring programs offered by your employer.
Learn about proper work practices, engineering controls, and
personal protective equipment (i.e., gloves, respirators, and
personal protective clothing)that can be used to reduce
exposures to hazardous substances.
Follow the safety and health work practices and procedures
implemented by your employer to prevent exposures to
reproductive hazards in the workplace.
This page was last updated: 1/23/97
Go back to the NIOSH home page WIDTH"142"
HEIGHT"37"> or to the CDC home page. WIDTH"65"
HEIGHT"40">
Fertility and Pregnancy Abnormalities Introduction
100,000 chemicals in commercial use
3,000 tested in animals
50 adequately studied for human reproductive effects
Both male and female workers can be exposed to
substances that are = harmful to their reproductive systems.
Such exposure can occur through = inhalation, contact with
skin, or ingestion (for example, by not = washing hands
before eating, drinking, or smoking). Some chemicals can =
circulate in a mother=92s blood, pass through the placenta,
and reach = the fetus. Other hazardous agents can affect the
overall health of a = pregnant woman and reduce the delivery
of nutrients to the fetus. = Substances can be brought home
on workers=92 clothes, shoes, or in = their cars which can
affect the health of other family members. Over = 75% of
employed women and men are of reproductive age and are at =
potential risk for adverse reproductive outcomes due to the
abundance = of possible workplace exposures. These exposures
can include chemical, = physical, and biological agents.
Substances and activities that may = disrupt the normal
hormonal environment of the reproductive system, = such as
shift work or pesticides that possess estrogenic activity,
also = need evaluation. Physical factors such as prolonged
standing, reaching, = or lifting, or the interactive effects
of workplace stressors and = exposures on pregnancy and
fertility have not yet been rigorously = investigated.
Reproductive = Effects of Workplace Exposures
Currently there is no complete list of reproductive
hazards to which = workers are exposed. Scientists are only
recently beginning to = understand how these hazards affect
human reproduction. A large number = of chemicals and drugs
have been shown to have some effect on = reproduction in
animals. Much less is known about the effects in = humans,
but we do have some information. The following tables give
some = of the workplace substances that are thought to
affect human = reproductive systems.
Reproductive Effects of Female Exposure
Birth Defects: Birth defects are = the leading cause
of infant mortality in U.S. (20% of infant deaths). = About
3% of live births have major defects.
Developmental Disorders: 10-15% = of all children in
the U.S. have some type of developmental = disability.
Miscarriages and Stillbirths: At = least 15% of
recognized pregnancies end in a miscarriage.
Low Birth Weight and Premature = Birth: About 7% of
babies born in the U.S. are underweight = or premature.
Reduced Fertility: Approximately = 10% of couples
are unable to conceive after 1 year of trying to become =
pregnant, affecting more than 2 million couples in the =
U.S.
SIZE-1>Observed Effects
Cancer treatment = SIZE-1>Infertility, miscarriage, birth
defects, low birth weight
=
Certain ethylene glycol = VALIGN"TOP">Miscarriage
VALIGN"TOP">Menstrual cycle changes
SIZE-1>Infertility, miscarriage, low birth weight,
developmental = disorders
Ionizing radiation (e.g., = SIZE-1>Infertility,
miscarriage, birth defects, low birth weight, = developmental
disorders, childhood cancers
VALIGN"TOP">Miscarriage late in pregnancy,
premature = labor
VALIGN"TOP">Birth defects, low birth weight, =
developmental disorders
VALIGN"TOP">Low birth weight
SIZE-1>Low birth weight, childhood cancer
VALIGN"TOP">Miscarriage
VALIGN"TOP">Birth defects, low birth weight
VALIGN"TOP">Miscarriage, birth defects, =
developmental disorders
VALIGN"TOP">Birth defects, low birth weight with =
(Chicken Pox)
SIZE-1>Reproductive Effects of Male Exposure
Birth DefectsNumber of Sperm, Sperm Shape, = Sperm
Transfer, Sexual Performance, Sperm Chromosomes, Pregnancy =
Outcomes: Little is known about the effects of workplace =
hazards on male reproductive endpoints.
height"389">
Goals
1. Identify research needs in the areas of toxicology,
field study = research, and basic surveillance studies.
2. Assist in the development of reproductive health
research.
3. Expand existing surveillance systems to include
accurate information = collected on parental occupational
factors to identify research = needs.
4. Create new partnerships and expand resources.
5. Encourage research that would increase the
understanding of = fundamental biological processes
underlying normal and abnormal = reproductive function or
outcomes.
6. Incorporate reproductive outcomes into existing
methods that = identify hazards before placing humans at
risk.
7. Encourage the dissemination of results to the
public to increase = awareness and to encourage safety
assurance.
Current and = Future Plans
Identify Data Gaps
Redesign the National Occupational Exposure Survey (NOES)
that will = identify current levels of exposure to
specific hazards.
Evaluate existing knowledge of chemicals by publishing =
comprehensive literature reviews in epidemiologic field
studies and = toxicological studies.
Prioritize Research = Needs
Publish current research needs in occupational
reproductive = health.
Partnerships
Examine occupational information in existing surveillance
systems = in state and local health care departments.
NIOSH, in partnership with five institutes of the National
= Institutes of Health (NIH), is sponsoring requests for
grant = applications (RFA) in 1999. Eight of the
twenty-one NORA priority = areas, including fertility and
pregnancy abnormalities, are featured = for competition of
the $7.5 million in grant funds.
The National Toxicology Program (NTP) and the National
Institute = for Environmental Health Sciences (NIEHS)
established the Center for = the Evaluation of Risks to
Human Reproduction. The Center will bring = together
experts to evaluate whether a chemical could impair human
= reproduction and development. Consensus reports will be
published in = both the scientific and public forums.
NORA Internet Homepage
Update and expand NORA=92s Internet homepage to include
general = information on reproductive hazards,
recommendations for reducing = occupational exposures, and
links to informative and factual Internet = sites.
Dissemination of Known Reproductive = Hazards
Increase public awareness and understanding of known
reproductive = hazards. (See Contact Information)
Workshop planned for discussing ways to bridge the
different = methodological approaches used by
epidemiologists and toxicologists. = Concerns include
sample size issues, statistical analysis methods, and =
presentation of results.
Contact = Information
HREF"npreg.html">
HREF"pubs.html"
>; email: =
pubstaff@
HREF""> =
Team = Roster
Teresa Schnorr, NIOSH
Coleen Boyle, NCEH/CDC
Kenneth Bridbord, NIH
Sally Perreault Darney, EPA
George Daston, Procter&Gamble
Barbara Grajewski, NIOSH
Ronald Gray, Johns Hopkins U.
Christina Lawson, NIOSH
Barbara Mackenzie, NIOSH
Michele Marcus, Emory U.
Melissa McDiarmid, U of MD
Eisuke Murono, NIOSH
Steven Schrader, NIOSH
Michael Shelby, NIEHS
Support Provided By: Pam Schumacher, NIOSH
Poster = available in ppt format (9,210 = Kb)
SRC"./images/nioshicn.gif" ALT" NIOSH HOMEPAGE"
BORDER0 = HSPACE10 width"142" height"37"> NORA
Homepage" HSPACE10 BORDER0 width"100" =
height"37"> ALT" CDC Homepage" BORDER0 HSPACE10
width"65" = height"40">
------_=_NextPart_000_01C2A5F0.5A6DE6E2
Content-Type: application/octet-stream;
name="reprohealth_fem.pdf"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
Content-Disposition: attachment;
filename="reprohealth_fem.pdf"
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 18 Dec 2002 08:16:41 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Rob MacCormick
Subject: Re: Ergonomic Bone Cutters
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Some bone saws I've seen used by saw bones are oscillating rather than
rotary...Both varieties produce tremendous aerosols and sling liquids in
startling proportions.
Rob "never been on TV never played a Dr...Will someone please wipe my
faceshield?" MacCormick
Manager - EH&S
Olin College of Engineering & Babson College
Ricardo Tappan wrote:
> Not knowing a thing about rat dissection, but knowing about cutting
> things, Dremal the small hand held wonder tool now makes a saw blade
> attachment for the handheld dremal, which is small and ergonomicaly
> pleasing
>
> RT
>
> This is opinion only, no endorsement of said product will result in
> profit to me or mine.
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 18 Dec 2002 08:31:10 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Morris, Gary"
Subject: Re: Ergonomic Bone Cutters
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Thanks Chris.
-----Original Message-----
From: Hall, Christine [mailto:chall@PALOMAR.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, December 17, 2002 6:57 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Ergonomic Bone Cutters
I have had experience cutting bone with a dental drill (low speed - similar
to a dremal tool) using a round diamond dental burrs. It worked very well
and efficiently, but the aerosols generated would need to be considered.
Chris
Chris Hall
Instructional Support Assistant IV
Palomar College - Life Sciences
1140 W Mission Rd
San Marcos, CA 92069
(760) 744-1150 x2726
-----Original Message-----
From: Ricardo Tappan [mailto:rsorxt@GWUMC.EDU]
Sent: Tuesday, December 17, 2002 1:53 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Ergonomic Bone Cutters
Not knowing a thing about rat dissection, but knowing about cutting
things, Dremal the small hand held wonder tool now makes a saw blade
attachment for the handheld dremal, which is small and ergonomicaly
pleasing
RT
This is opinion only, no endorsement of said product will result in
profit to me or mine.
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 18 Dec 2002 08:49:51 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Richard Fink
Subject: Fwd: Re: Additional info re: 12/16 CDC Public meeting on SA
interim rule
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="=====================_174773280==_.ALT"
--=====================_174773280==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
>X-Comment: mitvma.mit.edu: Mail was sent by smtpout.
>X-Sender: wnewber@mail.
>Date: Tue, 17 Dec 2002 18:00:54 -0500
>To: BIOSAFTY-request@mitvma.mit.edu
>From: Robin Newberry
>Subject: Re: Additional info re: 12/16 CDC Public meeting on SA interim
> rule
>
>I'm not at my Clemson address, and it won't forward from a third address;
>could you post this for me?
>
>>Has anyone noticed how truly ORWELLIAN this is all becoming?
>
>I had expected something along the lines of the requirements for work with
>rad material, but what we've gotten is something more along the lines of
>the DEA requirements for working with Schedule 1 agents.
>
>But I can see why they're panicked - someone with very little money and a
>modicum of expertise can produce large quantities of dangerous materials.
>Maybe crude and not wholly effective - that requires much greater
>expertise - but enough to inspire terror.
>
>The question is: Are there effective alternatives? How else could we do
>this and still ensure that these agents aren't hijacked for nefarious purposes?
>--
>Robin
>************************************************************
>W. Robert Newberry, IV CIH, CHMM
>Chief Environmental Health and Safety Officer
>Clemson University
>
>
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Biosafty List Owner
rfink@mit.edu
--=====================_174773280==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
X-Comment: mitvma.mit.edu: Mail was sent by smtpout.
X-Sender: wnewber@mail.
Date: Tue, 17 Dec 2002 18:00:54 -0500
To: BIOSAFTY-request@mitvma.mit.edu
From: Robin Newberry
Subject: Re: Additional info re: 12/16 CDC Public meeting on SA
interim
rule
I'm not at my Clemson address, and it won't forward from a third
address; could you post this for me?
Has anyone noticed how truly ORWELLIAN this is all becoming?
I had expected something along the lines of the requirements for
work with rad material, but what we've gotten is something more
along the lines of the DEA requirements for working with Schedule
1 agents.
But I can see why they're panicked - someone with very little
money and a modicum of expertise can produce large quantities of
dangerous materials. Maybe crude and not wholly effective - that
requires much greater expertise - but enough to inspire terror.
The question is: Are there effective alternatives? How else could
we do this and still ensure that these agents aren't hijacked for
nefarious purposes?
--
Robin
************************************************************
W. Robert Newberry, IV CIH, CHMM
Chief Environmental Health and Safety Officer
Clemson University
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Biosafty List Owner
rfink@mit.edu
--=====================_174773280==_.ALT--
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 18 Dec 2002 08:50:33 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Richard Fink
Subject: Fwd: Re: Additional info re: 12/16 CDC Public meeting on SA
interim rule
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="=====================_174814499==_.ALT"
--=====================_174814499==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
>X-Comment: mitvma.mit.edu: Mail was sent by smtpout.
>X-Sender: wnewber@mail.
>Date: Tue, 17 Dec 2002 18:03:08 -0500
>To: BIOSAFTY-request@mitvma.mit.edu
>From: Robin Newberry
>Subject: Re: Additional info re: 12/16 CDC Public meeting on SA interim
> rule
>
>I'm not at my Clemson address, and it won't forward from a third address;
>could you post this for me?
>
>>and the biosecurity aspects (could be costly and you might
>>learn they were unacceptable to inspectors--who will be
>>contractors--
>
>Any idea how you become a contractor?
>--
>Robin
>************************************************************
>W. Robert Newberry, IV CIH, CHMM
>Chief Environmental Health and Safety Officer
>Clemson University
>
>
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Biosafty List Owner
rfink@mit.edu
--=====================_174814499==_.ALT
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
X-Comment: mitvma.mit.edu: Mail was sent by smtpout.
X-Sender: wnewber@mail.
Date: Tue, 17 Dec 2002 18:03:08 -0500
To: BIOSAFTY-request@mitvma.mit.edu
From: Robin Newberry
Subject: Re: Additional info re: 12/16 CDC Public meeting on SA
interim
rule
I'm not at my Clemson address, and it won't forward from a third
address; could you post this for me?
and the biosecurity aspects (could be costly and you might
learn they were unacceptable to inspectors--who will be
contractors--
Any idea how you become a contractor?
--
Robin
************************************************************
W. Robert Newberry, IV CIH, CHMM
Chief Environmental Health and Safety Officer
Clemson University
Richard Fink, SM(NRM), CBSP
Biosafty List Owner
rfink@mit.edu
--=====================_174814499==_.ALT--
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 18 Dec 2002 08:47:28 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Ferin, Mark"
Subject: Mid West Paraformaldehyde Decontamination Consultants
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Can anyone recommend a mid-west consultant with experience in
paraformaldehyde decontamination? Feel free to contact me off-line if you
choose.
Thanks,
Mark
Mark Ferin
Manager, IH and Biosafety
Pfizer Global Research and Development
Ann Arbor, MI 48105
734-622-7568
mark.ferin@
LEGAL NOTICE
Unless expressly stated otherwise, this message is confidential and may be
privileged. It is intended for the addressee(s) only. Access to this E-mail by
anyone else is unauthorized. If you are not an addressee, any disclosure or
copying of the contents of this E-mail or any action taken (or not taken) in
reliance on it is unauthorized and may be unlawful. If you are not an addressee,
please inform the sender immediately.
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 18 Dec 2002 08:57:59 -0500
Reply-To: speaker@ehs.psu.edu
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Curt Speaker
Organization: UNIVERSITY SAFETY
Subject: Re: Additional info re: 12/16 CDC Public meeting on SA interim
rule
In-Reply-To:
Morning:
I believe one of the contractors discussed at the meeting was ASI.
Ed, would you care to comment.
One addition to my summary yesterday:
The CDC and USDA made it very clear that they are strongly
encouraging the end users (i.e., US) to make comments about the
new regulations, especially if you feel that there are aspects of the
regs that are unworkable or ill-conceived. The addresses to send
comments to each agency are listed in their respective regulations.
We have until 2/7/03 to get these comments in...It's kinda like voting:
"if you don't comment, don't complain about the regs later!"
Curt
Curt Speaker
Biosafety Officer
Penn State University
Environmental Health and Safety
speaker@ehs.psu.edu
^...^
(O_O)
=(Y)=
"""
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 18 Dec 2002 08:59:07 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Isabel Jean Goldberg
Subject: Re: Animal care and cytoxic drugs
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
Content-transfer-encoding: 7bit
We do, and they seem to work well. If you look on our website,
, you can
view an example that summarizes them.
----- Original Message -----
From: "Ton, Mimi"
To:
Sent: Tuesday, December 17, 2002 5:09 PM
Subject: Animal care and cytoxic drugs
> Dear all,
>
> Does anyone have established procedures for animal care staff to handle
animals that have been giving cytoxic drugs. This would include: cage
changing, bedding disposal, cage washing, PPE, BSC requirements. Are there
major deviations to the procedured required for the researcher who is
preparing the cytotoxic material and injecting it into the animal? Please
advise. Thanks for all your help.
>
> Best regards and happy holidays!
>
> Mimi
> ---------------------------------------------
> Mimi C. Ton
> Safety Engineer/ Institute Biosafety Officer
> California Institute of Technology
> Environment, Health & Safety Office
> M/C 25-6
> 1200 E. California Boulevard
> Pasadena, CA 91125
> Phone: 626.395.2430
> Fax: 626.577.6028
> E-mail: mimi.ton@caltech.edu
>
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 18 Dec 2002 09:59:35 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Sue Pedrick
Subject: Re: Biological Reproductive Hazards
In-Reply-To:
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
Dear David,
Among the cobwebs of my files I found a '99 NIOSH publication, "The Effects
of Workplace Hazards on Female Reproductive Health" which contains a
comprehensive (though old) list, at:
text: or pdf:
And just in case you are feeling left out, here's one covering the guys at:
Happy Holidays to ALL !
Sue
At 12:13 PM 12/17/02 -0500, you wrote:
>Dear Group,
>
>Is anyone aware of a list of biological agents that are considered
>teratogens? I know that cytomegalovirus is considered teratogenic. Are there
>any others?
>
>Many thanks, as usual!
>
>-David
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 18 Dec 2002 07:51:36 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: AIR SAFE
Subject: Re: Mid West Paraformaldehyde Decontamination Consultants
In-Reply-To:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Mark,
Most hood certification companies could provide you
with the information you are looking for. I'd be more
than happy to assist you if you are in our
geographical regions covered (central Midwest)
Mike Alleman
Air Safe
--- "Ferin, Mark" wrote:
> Can anyone recommend a mid-west consultant with
> experience in
> paraformaldehyde decontamination? Feel free to
> contact me off-line if you
> choose.
>
> Thanks,
>
> Mark
>
> Mark Ferin
> Manager, IH and Biosafety
> Pfizer Global Research and Development
> Ann Arbor, MI 48105
> 734-622-7568
> mark.ferin@
=====
Air Safe
Michael Alleman
2221 NE 76TH Street
Gladstone, MO 64118-2035
816 468 9850
816 468 9851 fax
__________________________________________________
Do you Yahoo!?
Yahoo! Mail Plus - Powerful. Affordable. Sign up now.
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 18 Dec 2002 15:50:30 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Koporc, Kim"
Subject: Submitting results via the Internet
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="----_=_NextPart_001_01C2A6D7.19F328B5"
This is a multi-part message in MIME format.
------_=_NextPart_001_01C2A6D7.19F328B5
Content-Type: text/plain;
charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
All - I would like to strongly encourage everyone to submit their =
national inventory results via the Internet. Go to =
od/nvpo/polio and click submit. You will be asked to enter =
your User ID and Password, which were included in the original letter. =
If the letter has been misplaced, click New User, and you will be =
assigned a new User ID and Password. Detailed instructions can be =
downloaded from our website, and technical support is available at =
plcp@. Best regards, Kim
Kim Koporc
Poliovirus Laboratory Containment Preparedness
750 Commerce Drive
Suite 400
Decatur, GA 30030
Fax 404-371-1087
Phone 404-687-5625
E-mail kkoporc@
od/nvpo/polio
------_=_NextPart_001_01C2A6D7.19F328B5
Content-Type: text/html;
charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
COLOR"#000000" SIZE2 FACE"Arial">I would like =
FACE"Arial">strongly encourage everyone to submit =
LANG"en-us"> results = COLOR"#0000FF" SIZE2 = SIZE2
FACE"Arial"> and click submit. You will be asked to = enter your
User ID and Password, which were included in the original = letter.
If the letter has been misplaced, click New User, and you =
LANG"en-us"> Detailed = instructions can be downloaded from our
website, and technical support = COLOR"#0000FF" SIZE2 =
COLOR"#000000" SIZE2 FACE"Arial">Best regards, = Kim
COLOR"#000000" SIZE2 FACE"Arial">Kim Koporc
FACE"Arial">Poliovirus Laboratory Containment Preparedness =
FACE"Arial">750 Commerce Drive
FACE"Arial">Suite 400
FACE"Arial">Decatur, GA 30030
FACE"Arial">Fax 404-371-1087
FACE"Arial">Phone 404-687-5625
FACE"Arial">E-mail kkoporc@
FACE"Arial">od/nvpo/polio
------_=_NextPart_001_01C2A6D7.19F328B5--
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 18 Dec 2002 16:09:06 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "McNulty, Hilary"
Subject: Re: Submitting results via the Internet
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="----_=_NextPart_001_01C2A6D9.B37EA9D8"
This is a multi-part message in MIME format.
------_=_NextPart_001_01C2A6D9.B37EA9D8
Content-Type: text/plain;
charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
I did that yesterday and it was very straight forward. I was surprised
at how easy it was!
Hilary McNulty
Biosafety Officer
Millennium Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
Cambridge, MA 02139
617-444-1368
-----Original Message-----
From: Koporc, Kim [mailto:KKoporc@]
Sent: Wednesday, December 18, 2002 3:51 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Submitting results via the Internet
All - I would like to strongly encourage everyone to submit their
national inventory results via the Internet. Go to
od/nvpo/polio and click
submit. You will be asked to enter your User ID and Password, which
were included in the original letter. If the letter has been misplaced,
click New User, and you will be assigned a new User ID and Password.
Detailed instructions can be downloaded from our website, and technical
support is available at plcp@ . Best
regards, Kim
Kim Koporc
Poliovirus Laboratory Containment Preparedness
750 Commerce Drive
Suite 400
Decatur, GA 30030
Fax 404-371-1087
Phone 404-687-5625
E-mail kkoporc@
od/nvpo/polio
------_=_NextPart_001_01C2A6D9.B37EA9D8
Content-Type: text/html;
charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
style'font-size: 10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>I did that
yesterday and it was very straight forward. I was = surprised at
how easy it was!
style'font-size: 10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>
style'font-size: 10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Hilary
McNulty
style'font-size: 10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Biosafety
Officer
style'font-size: 10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Millennium
Pharmaceuticals, = Inc.
style'font-size: size2
style'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial; =
style'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>MA style'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Tahoma'>-----Original Message-----
From: Koporc, Kim [mailto:KKoporc@]
Sent: Wednesday, December = 18, 2002 3:51 PM
To: = BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Submitting = results via the Internet
style'font-size: 12.0pt'>
style'font-size:10.0pt;
style'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;
style'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:black'>strongly =
encourage
style'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:black'>national =
inventory style'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:
Arial;color:black'>results via the Internet. Go to =
style'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial'>od/nvpo/polio
and click submit. You will be asked to enter your = User ID and
Password, which were included in the original letter. If the =
letter has been misplaced, click New User, and you will be assigned
a new User = ID and
style'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:black'>Detailed =
instructions can be downloaded from our website, and technical
support is available = at style'font-size:
style'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;
style'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:black'>Best
regards, = Kim
style'font-size:10.0pt; font-family:Arial;color:black'>Kim Koporc
style'font-size:10.0pt; font-family:Arial;color:black'>Poliovirus
Laboratory Containment = Preparedness
style'font-size:10.0pt; font-family:Arial;color:black'>750
Commerce Drive
style'font-size:10.0pt; font-family:Arial;color:black'>Suite 400
style'font-size:10.0pt; font-family:Arial;color:black'>Decatur,
GA 30030
style'font-size:10.0pt; font-family:Arial;color:black'>Fax
404-371-1087
style'font-size:10.0pt; font-family:Arial;color:black'>Phone
404-687-5625
style'font-size:10.0pt; font-family:Arial;color:black'>E-mail =
kkoporc@
style'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Arial;color:black'>od/nvpo/polio
style'font-size: 12.0pt'>
=00
------_=_NextPart_001_01C2A6D9.B37EA9D8--
=========================================================================
Date: Wed, 18 Dec 2002 16:30:27 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Koporc, Kim"
Subject: Re: Submitting results via the Internet
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="----_=_NextPart_001_01C2A6DC.AEF18463"
This is a multi-part message in MIME format.
------_=_NextPart_001_01C2A6DC.AEF18463
Content-Type: text/plain;
charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
All - In follow-up to my most recent e-mail, if you choose to submit =
your results via the Internet, you do not need to send in a hard copy of =
the report. Cheers, Kim
-----Original Message-----
From: Koporc, Kim
Sent: Wednesday, December 18, 2002 3:51 PM
To: BIOSAFTY list (E-mail)
Cc: Sandra Browning (E-mail 2)
Subject: Submitting results via the Internet
All - I would like to strongly encourage everyone to submit
their =
national inventory results via the Internet. Go to =
od/nvpo/polio and click submit. You will be asked to enter =
your User ID and Password, which were included in the original letter. =
If the letter has been misplaced, click New User, and you will be =
assigned a new User ID and Password. Detailed instructions can be =
downloaded from our website, and technical support is available at =
plcp@. Best regards, Kim
Kim Koporc
Poliovirus Laboratory Containment Preparedness
750 Commerce Drive
Suite 400
Decatur, GA 30030
Fax 404-371-1087
Phone 404-687-5625
E-mail kkoporc@
od/nvpo/polio
=09
------_=_NextPart_001_01C2A6DC.AEF18463
Content-Type: text/html;
charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
FACE"Arial">All - In follow-up to my most recent = SIZE2
FACE"Arial">, if you choose to submit your results via the =
Internet, you do not need to send in a hard copy of the =
LANG"en-us">
FACE"Arial">-----Original Message-----
COLOR"#000000" SIZE2 FACE"Arial">Koporc, Kim =
SIZE2 FACE"Arial">Wednesday, December 18, 2002 3:51 = PM
SIZE2 FACE"Arial">BIOSAFTY list (E-mail)
SIZE2 FACE"Arial">Sandra Browning (E-mail 2)
FACE"Arial">Subject: Submitting results via the = Internet
COLOR"#000000" SIZE2 FACE"Arial">I would like to
strongly = encourage everyone to submit their national inventory
results via the = COLOR"#0000FF" SIZE2 = SIZE2
FACE"Arial"> and click submit. You will be asked to = enter
your User ID and Password, which were included in the original =
letter. If the letter has been misplaced, click New User, and
you = will be assigned a new User ID and Password. Detailed
instructions = can be downloaded from our website, and technical
support is available = COLOR"#0000FF" SIZE2 =
LANG"en-us">
COLOR"#000000" SIZE2 FACE"Arial">Kim Koporc
FACE"Arial">Poliovirus Laboratory Containment Preparedness =
FACE"Arial">750 Commerce Drive
FACE"Arial">Suite 400
FACE"Arial">Decatur, GA 30030
FACE"Arial">Fax 404-371-1087
FACE"Arial">Phone 404-687-5625
FACE"Arial">E-mail kkoporc@
FACE"Arial">od/nvpo/polio
------_=_NextPart_001_01C2A6DC.AEF18463--
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 19 Dec 2002 09:40:49 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Hauck, Philip"
Subject: Re: Submitting results via the Internet
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="Boundary_(ID_OhfJKvlOe7seR8B5DVk0YQ)"
This is a multi-part message in MIME format.
--Boundary_(ID_OhfJKvlOe7seR8B5DVk0YQ)
Content-type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-transfer-encoding: quoted-printable
I did it too...it's a real snap. Just make sure you keep a =
PRINTED, SIGNED HARD-COPY for your files.
Phil Hauck
-----Original Message-----
From: McNulty, Hilary [mailto:Hilary.McNulty@]
Sent: Wednesday, December 18, 2002 4:09 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Submitting results via the Internet
I did that yesterday and it was very straight forward. I was surprised =
at how easy it was!
Hilary McNulty
Biosafety Officer
Millennium Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
Cambridge, MA 02139
617-444-1368
-----Original Message-----
From: Koporc, Kim [mailto:KKoporc@]
Sent: Wednesday, December 18, 2002 3:51 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Submitting results via the Internet
All - I would like to strongly encourage everyone to submit their =
national inventory results via the Internet. Go to =
od/nvpo/polio and click =
submit. You will be asked to enter your User ID and Password, which =
were included in the original letter. If the letter has been misplaced, =
click New User, and you will be assigned a new User ID and Password. =
Detailed instructions can be downloaded from our website, and technical =
support is available at plcp@ . Best =
regards, Kim
Kim Koporc
Poliovirus Laboratory Containment Preparedness
750 Commerce Drive
Suite 400
Decatur, GA 30030
Fax 404-371-1087
Phone 404-687-5625
E-mail kkoporc@
od/nvpo/polio
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 19 Dec 2002 09:59:35 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Hauck, Philip"
Subject: Federal Repository
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="Boundary_(ID_j3TnF95fNRrfY01XXEStTw)"
This is a multi-part message in MIME format.
--Boundary_(ID_j3TnF95fNRrfY01XXEStTw)
Content-type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-transfer-encoding: quoted-printable
After re-reading the New York Times article from two days =
ago, about the destruction of invaluable samples and specimens, it =
dawned on me....Why can't the Federal Government develop a central =
repository for microbiological specimens, in order that clinical =
isolates and unique strains can be retained without losing them. We =
waste money on other things, why not invest it something that could =
benefit this country scientifically for years to come?
My fear is that we will lose forever some of the genetic information =
that makes a given pathogenic agent unique. I worked with Candida =
albicans and we had strains that were much more pathogenic and =
aggressive than other strains. In fact, there was a characteristic =
morphological shift from a "normal" smooth colony type isolate to a =
"rough" variant,that corresponded directly to increased pathogenicity. =
The point is it takes time to find these things out, and seven days is =
not enough time to do anything with an isolate, before destroying it. =
Yes, I know we can transfer it to someone else, but let's be =
realistic....in our current situations, who has registered laboratories =
that could take Yersinia pestis that was just cultured out of someone? =
This just surfaced in New York City a couple of weeks ago. I'm sure one =
of the questions eveyrone would want to ask is it more virulent or less =
virulent than what commonly roams the Southwest?
So, back to my original point...Why not a central Federal repository, so =
that we can have access to these materials at a future date. I =
personally was involved in destroying a retired Microbiologist's =
collection of stock microorganisms...I AM SURE there were invaluable =
cultures there that went to the autoclave or to the destructor. I had =
people contact me months later inquiring if Dr.XXXXXXXXXX's cultures =
were available. But I had no one to take them and nowhere to send =
them...so they all became part of the great universal recycling phase of =
the Universe. I would have loved to ship them to a specimen =
repository-most were already freeze dried, so there was no wet =
microbiology involved. What are your thoughts, my fellow colleagues?
Phil Hauck
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 19 Dec 2002 09:50:45 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "DRUMMOND, David"
Subject: Re: Federal Repository
Seems like ATCC already has the expertise and security. Why not steer the
federal $$ to them?
Dave Drummond
U Wisconsin - Madison
-----Original Message-----
Why can't the Federal Government develop a central repository for
microbiological specimens, in order that clinical isolates and unique
strains can be retained without losing them. We waste money on other things,
why not invest it something that could benefit this country scientifically
for years to come?
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 19 Dec 2002 12:12:30 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Kathryn Harris
Subject: corrected New Select Agent list
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="=====================_1481427609==_"
--=====================_1481427609==_
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
Thanks to everyone who sent corrections.. here is version 2 - keep those
errors coming if you find 'em - especially on the 'exemptions'
Kath
**********************************************
Kathryn Louise Harris, Ph.D.
Biological Safety Professional
Office of Research Safety
Northwestern University
NG-71 Technological Institute
2145 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208-3121
Phone: (847) 491-4387
Fax: (847) 467-2797
Email: kathrynharris@northwestern.edu
**********************************************
--=====================_1481427609==_
Content-Type: application/msword; name="Dec 2002 select agents and toxins.doc";
x-mac-type="42494E41"; x-mac-creator="4D535744"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="Dec 2002 select agents and
toxins.doc"
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 19 Dec 2002 10:26:19 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Snyder_Sam
Subject: Re: corrected New Select Agent list
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Can anyone assist me in getting up-to-date info on Science Safety for
Schools in California as well as what to avoid in science labs to prevent
litigation.
Sam Snyder Ph.D. MPH PE
Risk Management Coordinator
Risk Management Services
Division of Business Operations
Los Angeles County Office of Education
9300 Imperial Hwy
Downey, CA 90242
Phone: (562) 803-8297
Fax: (562) 940-1898
email: snyder_sam@lacoe.edu
-----Original Message-----
From: Kathryn Harris [mailto:kathrynharris@NORTHWESTERN.EDU]
Sent: Thursday, December 19, 2002 10:13 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: corrected New Select Agent list
Thanks to everyone who sent corrections.. here is version 2 - keep those
errors coming if you find 'em - especially on the 'exemptions'
Kath
**********************************************
Kathryn Louise Harris, Ph.D.
Biological Safety Professional
Office of Research Safety
Northwestern University
NG-71 Technological Institute
2145 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208-3121
Phone: (847) 491-4387
Fax: (847) 467-2797
Email: kathrynharris@northwestern.edu
**********************************************
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 19 Dec 2002 14:30:44 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Jennifer Jones
Subject: Re: corrected New Select Agent list
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Disposition: inline
You might try contacting the Laboratory Safety Institute. They teach safety to
science teachers. Web site is
labsafe@
508-647-1900
Good Luck!
Jennifer Jones
Biosafety Specialist
Environmental Health & Safety
University of Texas MD Anderson Cancer Center
Houston, Texas
Snyder_Sam on 12/19/2002 12:26:19 PM
Please respond to A Biosafety Discussion List
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
cc: (bcc: Jennifer Jones/MDACC)
Subject: Re: corrected New Select Agent list
Can anyone assist me in getting up-to-date info on Science Safety for
Schools in California as well as what to avoid in science labs to prevent
litigation.
Sam Snyder Ph.D. MPH PE
Risk Management Coordinator
Risk Management Services
Division of Business Operations
Los Angeles County Office of Education
9300 Imperial Hwy
Downey, CA 90242
Phone: (562) 803-8297
Fax: (562) 940-1898
email: snyder_sam@lacoe.edu
-----Original Message-----
From: Kathryn Harris [mailto:kathrynharris@NORTHWESTERN.EDU]
Sent: Thursday, December 19, 2002 10:13 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: corrected New Select Agent list
Thanks to everyone who sent corrections.. here is version 2 - keep those
errors coming if you find 'em - especially on the 'exemptions'
Kath
**********************************************
Kathryn Louise Harris, Ph.D.
Biological Safety Professional
Office of Research Safety
Northwestern University
NG-71 Technological Institute
2145 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208-3121
Phone: (847) 491-4387
Fax: (847) 467-2797
Email: kathrynharris@northwestern.edu
**********************************************
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 19 Dec 2002 15:53:52 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Dan Liberman
Subject: CMV and pregnancy
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Does any one on the list have a specific policy on CMV and pregnancy? If so
please contact me off line.
Daniel F. Liberman, Ph.D.
Associate Director
Environmental Affairs and Safety
Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
900 Ridgebury Road, P.O. Box 368
Ridgefield, CT 06877-0368
Telephone (203) 798-4081
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 19 Dec 2002 12:58:04 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Snyder_Sam
Subject: Re: corrected New Select Agent list
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Thank you Jennifer.
>Sam
-----Original Message-----
From: Jennifer Jones [mailto:jejones@MAIL.]
Sent: Thursday, December 19, 2002 12:31 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: corrected New Select Agent list
You might try contacting the Laboratory Safety Institute. They teach safety
to
science teachers. Web site is
labsafe@
508-647-1900
Good Luck!
Jennifer Jones
Biosafety Specialist
Environmental Health & Safety
University of Texas MD Anderson Cancer Center
Houston, Texas
Snyder_Sam on 12/19/2002 12:26:19 PM
Please respond to A Biosafety Discussion List
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
cc: (bcc: Jennifer Jones/MDACC)
Subject: Re: corrected New Select Agent list
Can anyone assist me in getting up-to-date info on Science Safety for
Schools in California as well as what to avoid in science labs to prevent
litigation.
Sam Snyder Ph.D. MPH PE
Risk Management Coordinator
Risk Management Services
Division of Business Operations
Los Angeles County Office of Education
9300 Imperial Hwy
Downey, CA 90242
Phone: (562) 803-8297
Fax: (562) 940-1898
email: snyder_sam@lacoe.edu
-----Original Message-----
From: Kathryn Harris [mailto:kathrynharris@NORTHWESTERN.EDU]
Sent: Thursday, December 19, 2002 10:13 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: corrected New Select Agent list
Thanks to everyone who sent corrections.. here is version 2 - keep those
errors coming if you find 'em - especially on the 'exemptions'
Kath
**********************************************
Kathryn Louise Harris, Ph.D.
Biological Safety Professional
Office of Research Safety
Northwestern University
NG-71 Technological Institute
2145 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208-3121
Phone: (847) 491-4387
Fax: (847) 467-2797
Email: kathrynharris@northwestern.edu
**********************************************
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 19 Dec 2002 15:01:55 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Michele Crase
Subject: Select Agent Public Meeting
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Content-Disposition: inline
Here is another summary of the meeting from the Council on Government
Regulations. For your reading pleasure.
Michele Crase
This originator of this message is Tony DeCrappeo. If you have
questions/comments, please email: tdecrappeo@cogr.edu
The CDC and USDA held a public meeting on Monday December 16, to
provide
presentations by officials of each agency on the proposed Interim Rules
for
Possession, Use, and Transfer of Select Biological Agents, which were
published in the December 13, 2002 Federal Register. Representatives
from
the COGR Working Group on Research Security attended the meeting and
prepared a summary of the main points, which is attached to this
message.
The meeting was split into two parts- in the morning there were
presentations from Mark Hemphill, the Chief of the Select Agent Program
at
CDC, and Denise Spencer, Senior Staff Veterinarian at USDA National
Center
for Import and Export. There was also a brief formal public comment
period.
In the afternoon, panelists consisting of members of the Inter-Agency
Committee that developed the regulations, responded to questions from
the
conference attendees.
The entire meeting was taped, and at some point a transcript is to be
made
available on the CDC and USDA web site, along with their power point
presentations. Those web sites are and
.
Comments on the Interim Rules are due February 11, 2003.
Tony DeCrappeo
Council on Governmental Relations
1200 New York Ave. NW
Suite 320
Washington DC 20005
202.289.6655
202.289.6698(fax)
cogr.edu
CDC/USDA meeting: New Regulations for the Possession, Use and Transfer
of Select Biological Agents and Toxins - 16 December 2002.
A. Information from Morning Sessions Presentations: NOTE: It was
announced at the beginning that no one from the Justice Department would
be in attendance.
Some information was provided from the results of the September/October
2002 requirement for notification of possession:
About 42 institutions have USDA agents only.
About 1800 reported having HHS and/or overlap agents.
This does not take into account the new exemptions and changes to the
select agent list. CDC believes there will ultimately be between
800-1000 institutions covered by the new regulations. The breakdown
is:
35% Academic facilities
46% Commercial facilities
12% Government facilities
7% Private facilities
The effective date of the new regulations will be Feb. 7, 2003. They
reviewed the phase-in timetable published in the CDC regulations. This
phased-in approach is for entities that are already in possession of
select agents that have notified CDC, and is in accordance with the law
that specified that ongoing research was not to be disrupted, or
disrupted as little as possible, as the new requirements are put in
place. Other entities, wishing to work with select agents after Feb. 7,
must be in compliance with almost all the new requirements. The
regulations become fully effective 11/12/03.
They clarified that the new regulations cover amounts of select agent
toxins by PI,
not by aggregate in the institution.
CDC also explained that if it becomes clear that any intermediate
phase-in deadline cannot be due to delays that are the fault of the
government, they will publish extensions to the deadlines. The example
given was if the Justice Dept. system to receive information and conduct
background checks were not ready in time, they would push back the
deadline to submit names for clearance.
Formal Public Comments:
The speakers during this session all pointed out that the short time to
review the regulations precluded a thorough review, but the following
points were made:
1. The CDC regulations prohibit two specific types of experimentation
involving recombinant DNA. It was suggested that this section might be
more effective if it simply stated that the NIH guidelines for approving
certain types of procedures involving rDNA must be followed.
2. The cost of implementing these new rules will be significant - will
the government allocate funds to cover the costs? Campuses visited by
the DHHS Inspector General have received recommendations for changing
the security procedures that are extreme and will be very expensive. The
effect could be to force institutions to consolidate all select agent
activity into one facility, and in the extreme case drive some of the
research out of the U.S.
3. It will be difficult for many universities to select a person to be
the Responsible Official, since currently there is no one person who has
the high level, institution-wide authority needed to commit resources
and certify compliance, and at the same time is responsible for carrying
out the many duties required to ensure compliance.
B. Information from Afternoon Session with Inter-Agency Committee that
developed the regulations:
Security Assessments and background checks for access approval:
DOJ, CDC & USDA are working on Memorandum of Understanding on how
security risk assessments will be handled. DOJ is working with a
contractor on a web-based system. The Responsible Official (RO) will
submit names and information on-line. These names will be
cross-referenced to a number of DOJ databases. If no "hits," it will
only take a few days for clearance. If there are hits, there is no
estimate on length of time it may take.
Fingerprints of all individuals to be cleared will need to be
submitted.
By submitting names to DOJ, RO is certifying that these persons require
access to agents
After background checks, DOJ makes recommendation to CDC or USDA, then
it is up to the Secretary of the agency to give or deny permission. USDA
or CDC informs entity of approvals; notifies both entity and individual
if access is denied. The individual will have the opportunity to appeal
a denial by submitting additional information. It is uncertain how long
an appeal review process might take.
If DOJ anticipates major delays in implementing access approval
procedures, CDC will publish delay of applicability dates in the Federal
Register.
Security is in two parts: clearing individuals and facility security.
Individuals will need background check by DOJ even if already have a
security clearance for classified work.
CDC estimates that ~20,000 individuals will need clearance.
Funding security upgrades
When asked if NIH would make efforts to bear costs for security
upgrades, the answer (from Rachel Levinson, Office of Science and
Technology Policy in the White House and Chair of the Inter-Agency
Committee) was a request to provide feedback in written comments on the
estimated costs to upgrade security.
Strain information to be provided:
Name of strain
Genbank accession number
Genetic characterization of organism
Transfers:
Major change is that transfers will require prior approval from CDC or
USDA.
Turn-around time for approval is estimated to be in days, not weeks
EA101 forms will be paper-based at first. Hope to go to web-based
eventually.
Approval at one facility does NOT transfer to another facility if a PI
moves from one institution to another; i.e., each institution must
verify the need of the PI to have access to select agents.
Registrations:
Any changes in information in registration need to be updated and will
require prior approval before changes can be made. Registration needs to
include protocols and objectives of study.
Exemptions:
Inactive subunits of toxins are exempt
Individuals do not have to document that non-viable organisms are
non-viable. They are not covered by regulation.
Security Plan:
New Appendix F, published in the December 6 issue of Morbidity and
Mortality Weekly Report (MMWR) gives best guidance for preparing
security plan. It is available at
USDA offered to review plan before entities start spending money on
upgrades.
Background check is heart of security plan.
Inspection of packages into and out of facility:
Need to know what you are bringing into containment area.
Ensure proper packaging for packages leaving facility.
CDC is not suggesting packages be opened in wrong place (outside of
containment?)
NIH grant requirements:
Expectation is that grant applicants are in compliance with the law,
including new regulations, when submitting funding applications that
will involve select agents.
Access:
There was a good deal of discussion of the definition of "access" with
respect to select agents. The best the government could offer at this
point was to refer us to the new guidance issued on December 6 in the
MMWR, in the section entitled Access Control. This section also has
guidance on package controls. The government appears to want to give
entities flexibility on meeting the requirements for controlling access,
while the concern of many was that it could be wasteful to implement a
system that is later determined to be inadequate. As mentioned above,
USDA officials offered to review entities security plans for adequacy
prior to implementation.
******************************************
Michele Crase
Environmental Health and Safety
Northern Illinois University
DeKalb, IL
mcrase@niu.edu
815-753-9251
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 19 Dec 2002 15:18:13 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Elaine Broussard
Subject: Re: Select Agent Public Meeting
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Max,
Feb. 11 is the new date for responses after the public meeting last Monday.
:-) E
-----Original Message-----
From: Michele Crase [mailto:E00MMC1@WPO.CSO.NIU.EDU]
Sent: Thursday, December 19, 2002 3:02 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Select Agent Public Meeting
Here is another summary of the meeting from the Council on Government
Regulations. For your reading pleasure.
Michele Crase
This originator of this message is Tony DeCrappeo. If you have
questions/comments, please email: tdecrappeo@cogr.edu
The CDC and USDA held a public meeting on Monday December 16, to
provide
presentations by officials of each agency on the proposed Interim Rules
for
Possession, Use, and Transfer of Select Biological Agents, which were
published in the December 13, 2002 Federal Register. Representatives
from
the COGR Working Group on Research Security attended the meeting and
prepared a summary of the main points, which is attached to this
message.
The meeting was split into two parts- in the morning there were
presentations from Mark Hemphill, the Chief of the Select Agent Program
at
CDC, and Denise Spencer, Senior Staff Veterinarian at USDA National
Center
for Import and Export. There was also a brief formal public comment
period.
In the afternoon, panelists consisting of members of the Inter-Agency
Committee that developed the regulations, responded to questions from
the
conference attendees.
The entire meeting was taped, and at some point a transcript is to be
made
available on the CDC and USDA web site, along with their power point
presentations. Those web sites are and
.
Comments on the Interim Rules are due February 11, 2003.
Tony DeCrappeo
Council on Governmental Relations
1200 New York Ave. NW
Suite 320
Washington DC 20005
202.289.6655
202.289.6698(fax)
cogr.edu
CDC/USDA meeting: New Regulations for the Possession, Use and Transfer
of Select Biological Agents and Toxins - 16 December 2002.
A. Information from Morning Sessions Presentations: NOTE: It was
announced at the beginning that no one from the Justice Department would
be in attendance.
Some information was provided from the results of the September/October
2002 requirement for notification of possession:
About 42 institutions have USDA agents only.
About 1800 reported having HHS and/or overlap agents.
This does not take into account the new exemptions and changes to the
select agent list. CDC believes there will ultimately be between
800-1000 institutions covered by the new regulations. The breakdown
is:
35% Academic facilities
46% Commercial facilities
12% Government facilities
7% Private facilities
The effective date of the new regulations will be Feb. 7, 2003. They
reviewed the phase-in timetable published in the CDC regulations. This
phased-in approach is for entities that are already in possession of
select agents that have notified CDC, and is in accordance with the law
that specified that ongoing research was not to be disrupted, or
disrupted as little as possible, as the new requirements are put in
place. Other entities, wishing to work with select agents after Feb. 7,
must be in compliance with almost all the new requirements. The
regulations become fully effective 11/12/03.
They clarified that the new regulations cover amounts of select agent
toxins by PI,
not by aggregate in the institution.
CDC also explained that if it becomes clear that any intermediate
phase-in deadline cannot be due to delays that are the fault of the
government, they will publish extensions to the deadlines. The example
given was if the Justice Dept. system to receive information and conduct
background checks were not ready in time, they would push back the
deadline to submit names for clearance.
Formal Public Comments:
The speakers during this session all pointed out that the short time to
review the regulations precluded a thorough review, but the following
points were made:
1. The CDC regulations prohibit two specific types of experimentation
involving recombinant DNA. It was suggested that this section might be
more effective if it simply stated that the NIH guidelines for approving
certain types of procedures involving rDNA must be followed.
2. The cost of implementing these new rules will be significant - will
the government allocate funds to cover the costs? Campuses visited by
the DHHS Inspector General have received recommendations for changing
the security procedures that are extreme and will be very expensive. The
effect could be to force institutions to consolidate all select agent
activity into one facility, and in the extreme case drive some of the
research out of the U.S.
3. It will be difficult for many universities to select a person to be
the Responsible Official, since currently there is no one person who has
the high level, institution-wide authority needed to commit resources
and certify compliance, and at the same time is responsible for carrying
out the many duties required to ensure compliance.
B. Information from Afternoon Session with Inter-Agency Committee that
developed the regulations:
Security Assessments and background checks for access approval:
DOJ, CDC & USDA are working on Memorandum of Understanding on how
security risk assessments will be handled. DOJ is working with a
contractor on a web-based system. The Responsible Official (RO) will
submit names and information on-line. These names will be
cross-referenced to a number of DOJ databases. If no "hits," it will
only take a few days for clearance. If there are hits, there is no
estimate on length of time it may take.
Fingerprints of all individuals to be cleared will need to be
submitted.
By submitting names to DOJ, RO is certifying that these persons require
access to agents
After background checks, DOJ makes recommendation to CDC or USDA, then
it is up to the Secretary of the agency to give or deny permission. USDA
or CDC informs entity of approvals; notifies both entity and individual
if access is denied. The individual will have the opportunity to appeal
a denial by submitting additional information. It is uncertain how long
an appeal review process might take.
If DOJ anticipates major delays in implementing access approval
procedures, CDC will publish delay of applicability dates in the Federal
Register.
Security is in two parts: clearing individuals and facility security.
Individuals will need background check by DOJ even if already have a
security clearance for classified work.
CDC estimates that ~20,000 individuals will need clearance.
Funding security upgrades
When asked if NIH would make efforts to bear costs for security
upgrades, the answer (from Rachel Levinson, Office of Science and
Technology Policy in the White House and Chair of the Inter-Agency
Committee) was a request to provide feedback in written comments on the
estimated costs to upgrade security.
Strain information to be provided:
Name of strain
Genbank accession number
Genetic characterization of organism
Transfers:
Major change is that transfers will require prior approval from CDC or
USDA.
Turn-around time for approval is estimated to be in days, not weeks
EA101 forms will be paper-based at first. Hope to go to web-based
eventually.
Approval at one facility does NOT transfer to another facility if a PI
moves from one institution to another; i.e., each institution must
verify the need of the PI to have access to select agents.
Registrations:
Any changes in information in registration need to be updated and will
require prior approval before changes can be made. Registration needs to
include protocols and objectives of study.
Exemptions:
Inactive subunits of toxins are exempt
Individuals do not have to document that non-viable organisms are
non-viable. They are not covered by regulation.
Security Plan:
New Appendix F, published in the December 6 issue of Morbidity and
Mortality Weekly Report (MMWR) gives best guidance for preparing
security plan. It is available at
USDA offered to review plan before entities start spending money on
upgrades.
Background check is heart of security plan.
Inspection of packages into and out of facility:
Need to know what you are bringing into containment area.
Ensure proper packaging for packages leaving facility.
CDC is not suggesting packages be opened in wrong place (outside of
containment?)
NIH grant requirements:
Expectation is that grant applicants are in compliance with the law,
including new regulations, when submitting funding applications that
will involve select agents.
Access:
There was a good deal of discussion of the definition of "access" with
respect to select agents. The best the government could offer at this
point was to refer us to the new guidance issued on December 6 in the
MMWR, in the section entitled Access Control. This section also has
guidance on package controls. The government appears to want to give
entities flexibility on meeting the requirements for controlling access,
while the concern of many was that it could be wasteful to implement a
system that is later determined to be inadequate. As mentioned above,
USDA officials offered to review entities security plans for adequacy
prior to implementation.
******************************************
Michele Crase
Environmental Health and Safety
Northern Illinois University
DeKalb, IL
mcrase@niu.edu
815-753-9251
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 20 Dec 2002 06:33:58 EST
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ed Krisiunas
Subject: Power Fails for 3 Hours at Plum Island Infectious Disease Lab
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="part1_137.188dc084.2b345a26_boundary"
--part1_137.188dc084.2b345a26_boundary
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="US-ASCII"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
New York Times
Power Fails for 3 Hours at Plum Island Infectious Disease Lab
By MARC SANTORA
three-hour power failure at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center last
weekend renewed concerns about the safety of the high-security government
laboratory while it is being run partly by replacement workers during a
five-months strike.
The loss of power and failure of all three backup generators raised fears for
the first time that the containment of infectious pathogens could have been
seriously compromised at the laboratory. The center, which is run by the
United States Agriculture Department, studies highly infectious animal
diseases like foot and mouth disease and African swine fever.
Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton called yesterday for the laboratory to cease
all operations until an independent safety review could be conducted.
Scientists familiar with the center said that since the diseases studied on
the island do not, for the most part, affect humans, the risk to workers at
the center and to residents of the nearby North Fork of Long Island was
minimal. Several experts in infectious diseases said, however, that a power
failure at such a facility for so long was extraordinarily unusual.
Ken Alibek, a former top Soviet germ warfare official now at George Mason
University, said that although he knew of power failures at similar
facilities, he did not know of a case in which the power and all the backup
generators failed for this long.
"If there was any risk of a pathogen in the air, they need to quarantine all
healthy animals," he said. "If they are sure there was no pathogen in the
air, they may not need to quarantine but they need to take steps to be sure
there was no contagion."
Sandy Hayes, a spokeswoman for the Agriculture Department, said that the day
after the power failed, safety inspectors recreated what had happened. "They
said they were sure there was no bio-containment breach," she said. She said
that all animals were being monitored and that none had shown any signs of
problems.
Ms. Hayes said that Plum Island called the Long Island Power Authority on
Sunday about 1:30 p.m. reporting that the voltage it was receiving was too
low. Bert Cunningham, a spokesman for the authority, said the Plum Island
workers told the authority that they would turn the power off and use backup
generators until the problem was resolved.
Ms. Hayes said that when the generators failed to start automatically,
managers at Plum Island tried to start them manually. "They would only stay
on for a few minutes and then fail," she said, leaving the center without
power for roughly three hours. She said the problem appeared to be mechanical
and not the result of any tampering. Striking workers said the replacement
workers were unfamiliar with the equipment. This week, two new backup
generators were installed, Ms. Hayes said.
At the time of the power failure, three workers were in the biological
containment areas and they were told they could not leave until the power was
restored. Ms. Hayes said the workers were not at any risk to their own
health.
The Plum Island center employs about 200 people, many of whom are federal
government workers, including the scientists and researchers. The 76 union
members who went on strike Aug. 13 are members of the International Union of
Operating Engineers and are employed by L B & B Associates, a government
subcontractor.
Ed Brandon, the chief operating officer of L B & B, said he had no comment on
the incident. The strikers include operators of the power plant and the
wastewater treatment plant. Since the strike began, union members, workers on
the island and government officials have expressed concern about whether the
center can operate safely.
The F.B.I. was called to the island in August to investigate reports of
sabotage after water pressure fell too low. As a result of that
investigation, Mark J. DePonte, a striking worker, pleaded guilty to
tampering with government property. In October, a 600-gallon container of
liquid nitrogen fell from the rear of a ferry at the center. In November, it
was discovered that a replacement worker had an arrest record.
The latest incident was made public when a replacement worker notified
members of Senator Clinton's staff of the power failure. In an interview, the
worker, who insisted on anonymity, said, "The reason I am coming forward is
because what I have seen at the center is really out of hand and something
needs to be done about it." Requests by The New York Times to visit the
island have been rejected.
The power failure is the first time the possibility of a leak of the
pathogens studied on the island has been raised.
Workers currently on the island, who insisted on anonymity, strikers familiar
with the operation, government officials and outside scientists said the
power failure could have compromised the safety of the center in several
ways.
People leaving the labs have to go through an elaborate cleaning process:
stripping, passing back through the air lock, scrubbing their nails, spitting
and blowing their noses to clear their respiratory systems, showering and
shampooing their hair. All the rooms are separated by doors that are sealed
with what look like bicycle inner tubes filled with air. The pressure in the
seals is maintained by an air compressor, and if the power fails, those seals
begin to deflate after 15 minutes. Government officials confirmed that this
happened.
Ms. Hayes said workers at the center sealed the doors with duct tape.
In addition, the air pressure in the entire building is kept lower than the
pressure outside; if there is a leak, air would enter, not escape. Under
normal operation, air in the building is filtered before being vented. With
the power out, the filtering would have stopped, but experts thought that the
overall pressure of the facility would probably have stayed low enough to
have limited the risk of a leak.
Happy Holidays to all!
Edward Krisiunas, MT(ASCP), CIC, MPH
President
WNWN International
PO Box 1164
Burlington, Connecticut
06013
USA
Phone 860-675-1217
Fax 860-675-1311
Mobile - 860-944-2373
e-mail - ekrisiunas@
--part1_137.188dc084.2b345a26_boundary
Content-Type: text/html; charset="US-ASCII"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
New York Times
Power Fails for 3 Hours at Plum Island Infectious Disease Lab
By MARC SANTORA
three-hour power failure at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center
last weekend renewed concerns about the safety of the high-security
government laboratory while it is being run partly by replacement
workers during a five-months strike.
The loss of power and failure of all three backup generators raised
fears for the first time that the containment of infectious
pathogens could have been seriously compromised at the laboratory.
The center, which is run by the United States Agriculture
Department, studies highly infectious animal diseases like foot and
mouth disease and African swine fever.
Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton called yesterday for the laboratory
to cease all operations until an independent safety review could be
conducted.
Scientists familiar with the center said that since the diseases
studied on the island do not, for the most part, affect humans, the
risk to workers at the center and to residents of the nearby North
Fork of Long Island was minimal. Several experts in infectious
diseases said, however, that a power failure at such a facility for
so long was extraordinarily unusual.
Ken Alibek, a former top Soviet germ warfare official now at George
Mason University, said that although he knew of power failures at
similar facilities, he did not know of a case in which the power and
all the backup generators failed for this long.
"If there was any risk of a pathogen in the air, they need to
quarantine all healthy animals," he said. "If they are sure there
was no pathogen in the air, they may not need to quarantine but they
need to take steps to be sure there was no contagion."
Sandy Hayes, a spokeswoman for the Agriculture Department, said that
the day after the power failed, safety inspectors recreated what had
happened. "They said they were sure there was no bio-containment
breach," she said. She said that all animals were being monitored
and that none had shown any signs of problems.
Ms. Hayes said that Plum Island called the Long Island Power
Authority on Sunday about 1:30 p.m. reporting that the voltage it
was receiving was too low. Bert Cunningham, a spokesman for the
authority, said the Plum Island workers told the authority that they
would turn the power off and use backup generators until the problem
was resolved.
Ms. Hayes said that when the generators failed to start
automatically, managers at Plum Island tried to start them manually.
"They would only stay on for a few minutes and then fail," she said,
leaving the center without power for roughly three hours. She said
the problem appeared to be mechanical and not the result of any
tampering. Striking workers said the replacement workers were
unfamiliar with the equipment. This week, two new backup generators
were installed, Ms. Hayes said.
At the time of the power failure, three workers were in the
biological containment areas and they were told they could not leave
until the power was restored. Ms. Hayes said the workers were not at
any risk to their own health.
The Plum Island center employs about 200 people, many of whom are
federal government workers, including the scientists and
researchers. The 76 union members who went on strike Aug. 13 are
members of the International Union of Operating Engineers and are
employed by L B & B Associates, a government subcontractor.
Ed Brandon, the chief operating officer of L B & B, said he had no
comment on the incident. The strikers include operators of the power
plant and the wastewater treatment plant. Since the strike began,
union members, workers on the island and government officials have
expressed concern about whether the center can operate safely.
The F.B.I. was called to the island in August to investigate reports
of sabotage after water pressure fell too low. As a result of that
investigation, Mark J. DePonte, a striking worker, pleaded guilty to
tampering with government property. In October, a 600-gallon
container of liquid nitrogen fell from the rear of a ferry at the
center. In November, it was discovered that a replacement worker had
an arrest record.
The latest incident was made public when a replacement worker
notified members of Senator Clinton's staff of the power failure. In
an interview, the worker, who insisted on anonymity, said, "The
reason I am coming forward is because what I have seen at the center
is really out of hand and something needs to be done about it."
Requests by The New York Times to visit the island have been
rejected.
The power failure is the first time the possibility of a leak of the
pathogens studied on the island has been raised.
Workers currently on the island, who insisted on anonymity, strikers
familiar with the operation, government officials and outside
scientists said the power failure could have compromised the safety
of the center in several ways.
People leaving the labs have to go through an elaborate cleaning
process: stripping, passing back through the air lock, scrubbing
their nails, spitting and blowing their noses to clear their
respiratory systems, showering and shampooing their hair. All the
rooms are separated by doors that are sealed with what look like
bicycle inner tubes filled with air. The pressure in the seals is
maintained by an air compressor, and if the power fails, those seals
begin to deflate after 15 minutes. Government officials confirmed
that this happened.
Ms. Hayes said workers at the center sealed the doors with duct
tape.
In addition, the air pressure in the entire building is kept lower
than the pressure outside; if there is a leak, air would enter, not
escape. Under normal operation, air in the building is filtered
before being vented. With the power out, the filtering would have
stopped, but experts thought that the overall pressure of the
facility would probably have stayed low enough to have limited the
risk of a leak.
Happy Holidays to all!
Edward Krisiunas, MT(ASCP), CIC, MPH
President
WNWN International
PO Box 1164
Burlington, Connecticut
06013
USA
Phone 860-675-1217
Fax 860-675-1311
Mobile - 860-944-2373
e-mail - ekrisiunas@
--part1_137.188dc084.2b345a26_boundary--
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 20 Dec 2002 09:53:02 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: David Gillum
Subject: Updated Biological Shipping Manual
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Dear Group,
Andy Glode and I have finished updating our biological shipping manual to
reflect the latest APHIS, HHS, USDA, DOT, IATA, etc. rules. The manual can
be found at:
Happy Holidays!
-David
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 20 Dec 2002 10:26:39 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Byers, Karen B"
Subject: Re: Updated Biological Shipping Manual
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="ISO-8859-1"
This is a wonderful gift, arriving just when I was putting review of our
policy on my New Years" Resolution list. Thank you!
Karen B. Byers, MS, RBP, CBSP-ABSA
Biosafety Officer
Dana Farber Cancer Institute
44 Binney Street
Boston, MA 02115
Phone: 617-632-3890
Fax: 617-632-1932
-----Original Message-----
From: David Gillum [mailto:David.Gillum@UNH.EDU]
Sent: Friday, December 20, 2002 9:53 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Updated Biological Shipping Manual
Dear Group,
Andy Glode and I have finished updating our biological shipping manual to
reflect the latest APHIS, HHS, USDA, DOT, IATA, etc. rules. The manual can
be found at:
Happy Holidays!
-David
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 20 Dec 2002 11:32:53 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: George Pankey
Subject: Re: APHIS, HHS, USDA Agents
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Content-Disposition: inline
can someone tell me when a biosafety officer is required [mandated] to
be in place by a federal agency..thank you...Kin Pankey
George A. Pankey, MD
Director,
Infectious Disease Research
Alton Ochsner Medical Foundation
Ochsner Clinic AT 2W
1514-16 Jefferson Highway
New Orleans, LA 70121-2483
Phone: 504-842-4005
Fax: 504-842-5433
>>> David.Gillum@UNH.EDU 12/17/02 02:53PM >>>
Here's another way to look at the same thing. Let me know if you see
errors.
-David
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 20 Dec 2002 12:35:51 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Isabel Jean Goldberg
Subject: Commissioning of BSL3 Labs
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="----=_NextPart_000_00A9_01C2A824.54B089E0"
This is a multi-part message in MIME format.
------=_NextPart_000_00A9_01C2A824.54B089E0
Content-Type: text/plain;
charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
We're constructing a new ABSL3 facility (projected construction start =
date - January 2003) in New York City. I'm looking for a contractor on =
the east coast, to review plans for the facility now - and to test it =
"for verification that the design and operational parameters have been =
met prior to operation". I'd appreciate any and all recommendations. =
Thanks in advance. - Jean
------=_NextPart_000_00A9_01C2A824.54B089E0
Content-Type: text/html;
charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
We're constructing a new ABSL3 facility = (projected construction
start date - January 2003) in New York City. I'm = looking for a
contractor on the east coast, to review plans for the facility = now
- and to test it "for verification that the design and
operational parameters = have been met prior to operation". I'd
appreciate any and all recommendations. Thanks in advance. - =
Jean
------=_NextPart_000_00A9_01C2A824.54B089E0--
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 20 Dec 2002 12:58:03 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ed Gaunt
Subject: Re: APHIS, HHS, USDA Agents
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="----_=_NextPart_000_01C2A851.5756F850"
This message is in MIME format. Since your mail reader does not understand
this format, some or all of this message may not be legible.
------_=_NextPart_000_01C2A851.5756F850
Content-Type: text/plain;
charset="iso-8859-1"
Responsible Officials (ROs-who do not necessarily have to be Biosafety
Officers)) and "entities" must submit Security Risk Assessments to the Dept
of Justice by March 12, 2003, and other PIs and folks with access to SAs and
HCLPT need to submit SRAs to DoJ by April 12.
Ed
-----Original Message-----
From: George Pankey [mailto:GPANKEY@]
Sent: Friday, December 20, 2002 12:33 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: APHIS, HHS, USDA Agents
can someone tell me when a biosafety officer is required [mandated] to
be in place by a federal agency..thank you...Kin Pankey
George A. Pankey, MD
Director,
Infectious Disease Research
Alton Ochsner Medical Foundation
Ochsner Clinic AT 2W
1514-16 Jefferson Highway
New Orleans, LA 70121-2483
Phone: 504-842-4005
Fax: 504-842-5433
>>> David.Gillum@UNH.EDU 12/17/02 02:53PM >>>
Here's another way to look at the same thing. Let me know if you see
errors.
-David
------_=_NextPart_000_01C2A851.5756F850
Content-Type: application/octet-stream;
name="Implementation Timeline.xls"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
Content-Disposition: attachment;
filename="Implementation Timeline.xls"
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 20 Dec 2002 13:49:44 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Belanger, Peter (DPH)"
Subject: Re: APHIS, HHS, USDA Agents
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
the attached chart is good. the only clarifier I would add is that the due
dates for those entities that are already registered also applies to
entities that are not registered but are legally in possession of select
agents and toxins under the CLIA exemption of 42CFR73.6. please correct me
if I am mistaken.
Peter Belanger, MT(ASCP)
Biological Threat Lab Coordinator
MA. Dept of Public Health
State Laboratory Institute
305 South Street
Jamaica Plain, MA 02130
Tel/Voice Mail: (617) 983-6267
E Mail: Peter.Belanger@state.ma.us
-----Original Message-----
From: Ed Gaunt [mailto:egaunt@]
Sent: Friday, December 20, 2002 12:58 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@mitvma.mit.edu
Subject: Re: APHIS, HHS, USDA Agents
Responsible Officials (ROs-who do not necessarily have to be Biosafety
Officers)) and "entities" must submit Security Risk Assessments to the Dept
of Justice by March 12, 2003, and other PIs and folks with access to SAs and
HCLPT need to submit SRAs to DoJ by April 12.
Ed
-----Original Message-----
From: George Pankey [mailto:GPANKEY@]
Sent: Friday, December 20, 2002 12:33 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: APHIS, HHS, USDA Agents
can someone tell me when a biosafety officer is required [mandated] to
be in place by a federal agency..thank you...Kin Pankey
George A. Pankey, MD
Director,
Infectious Disease Research
Alton Ochsner Medical Foundation
Ochsner Clinic AT 2W
1514-16 Jefferson Highway
New Orleans, LA 70121-2483
Phone: 504-842-4005
Fax: 504-842-5433
>>> David.Gillum@UNH.EDU 12/17/02 02:53PM >>>
Here's another way to look at the same thing. Let me know if you see
errors.
-David
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 20 Dec 2002 13:59:55 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Ed Gaunt
Subject: Re: APHIS, HHS, USDA Agents
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Yup...just tried to be concise on spreadsheet, but it is so-stated in 42 CFR
73.0(a).
Ed
-----Original Message-----
From: Belanger, Peter (DPH) [mailto:Peter.Belanger@STATE.MA.US]
Sent: Friday, December 20, 2002 1:50 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: APHIS, HHS, USDA Agents
the attached chart is good. the only clarifier I would add is that the due
dates for those entities that are already registered also applies to
entities that are not registered but are legally in possession of select
agents and toxins under the CLIA exemption of 42CFR73.6. please correct me
if I am mistaken.
Peter Belanger, MT(ASCP)
Biological Threat Lab Coordinator
MA. Dept of Public Health
State Laboratory Institute
305 South Street
Jamaica Plain, MA 02130
Tel/Voice Mail: (617) 983-6267
E Mail: Peter.Belanger@state.ma.us
-----Original Message-----
From: Ed Gaunt [mailto:egaunt@]
Sent: Friday, December 20, 2002 12:58 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@mitvma.mit.edu
Subject: Re: APHIS, HHS, USDA Agents
Responsible Officials (ROs-who do not necessarily have to be Biosafety
Officers)) and "entities" must submit Security Risk Assessments to the Dept
of Justice by March 12, 2003, and other PIs and folks with access to SAs and
HCLPT need to submit SRAs to DoJ by April 12.
Ed
-----Original Message-----
From: George Pankey [mailto:GPANKEY@]
Sent: Friday, December 20, 2002 12:33 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: APHIS, HHS, USDA Agents
can someone tell me when a biosafety officer is required [mandated] to
be in place by a federal agency..thank you...Kin Pankey
George A. Pankey, MD
Director,
Infectious Disease Research
Alton Ochsner Medical Foundation
Ochsner Clinic AT 2W
1514-16 Jefferson Highway
New Orleans, LA 70121-2483
Phone: 504-842-4005
Fax: 504-842-5433
>>> David.Gillum@UNH.EDU 12/17/02 02:53PM >>>
Here's another way to look at the same thing. Let me know if you see
errors.
-David
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 20 Dec 2002 13:18:03 -0600
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Twedt, Tru"
Subject: Re: Commissioning of BSL3 Labs
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="----_=_NextPart_001_01C2A85C.84B24B50"
This message is in MIME format. Since your mail reader does not understand
this format, some or all of this message may not be legible.
------_=_NextPart_001_01C2A85C.84B24B50
Content-Type: text/plain;
charset="iso-8859-1"
I would also be very interested in any recommendations or comments that
anyone may have.
Thank you,
Tru
=======================
Tru F. Twedt, DVM
Biosecurity Specialist
Iowa State University
Environmental Health & Safety
118 Agronomy Lab
Ames, IA 50011-3200
E-mail: ttwedt@iastate.edu
Phone: (515) 294-6593
Fax: (515) 294-9357
Website:
-----Original Message-----
From: Isabel Jean Goldberg [mailto:Jean.Goldberg@MED.NYU.EDU]
Sent: Friday, December 20, 2002 11:36 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Commissioning of BSL3 Labs
We're constructing a new ABSL3 facility (projected construction start date -
January 2003) in New York City. I'm looking for a contractor on the east
coast, to review plans for the facility now - and to test it "for
verification that the design and operational parameters have been met prior
to operation". I'd appreciate any and all recommendations. Thanks in
advance. - Jean
------_=_NextPart_001_01C2A85C.84B24B50
Content-Type: text/html;
charset="iso-8859-1"
I would also be very interested in any recommendations or comments
that anyone may have.
size=2>
Thank you,
size=2>Tru
size=2>Tru F. Twedt, DVM
Biosecurity Specialist
Iowa State University face=Arial size=2>118 Agronomy Lab
Ames, IA 50011-3200
E-mail: ttwedt@iastate.edu
Phone: (515) 294-6593
Fax: (515) 294-9357
Website:
href="">
size=2>-----Original Message-----
From: Isabel Jean Goldberg [mailto:Jean.Goldberg@MED.NYU.EDU]
Sent: Friday, December 20, 2002 11:36 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Commissioning of BSL3 Labs
We're constructing a new ABSL3 facility (projected construction
start date - January 2003) in New York City. I'm looking for a
contractor on the east coast, to review plans for the facility now
- and to test it "for verification that the design and operational
parameters have been met prior to operation". I'd appreciate any
and all recommendations. Thanks in advance. - Jean
------_=_NextPart_001_01C2A85C.84B24B50--
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 20 Dec 2002 15:37:10 -0500
Reply-To: dward@fau.edu
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Darlene Ward
Subject: Re: Commissioning of BSL3 Labs
In-Reply-To:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/mixed;
boundary="----=_NextPart_000_0002_01C2A83D.F3914310"
This is a multi-part message in MIME format.
------=_NextPart_000_0002_01C2A83D.F3914310
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="----=_NextPart_001_0003_01C2A83D.F3914310"
------=_NextPart_001_0003_01C2A83D.F3914310
Content-Type: text/plain;
charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
X-MIME-Autoconverted: from 8bit to quoted-printable by fau.edu id PAA14859
I=A0am also interested in more information, particularly the SE.=A0 Here =
are a
few I looked into in different areas of the country and one in Canada.
Council Rock Consulting=A0Inc. New Mexico (877) 425-8500
Thank you,
Darlene Ward
Biological Safety/Public Health Coordinator
Florida Atlantic University
Environmental Health and Safety
777 Glades Road, CO Bldg
Boca Raton, FL 33431-0991
Phone: (561) 297-0028
Fax: (561) 297-2210
dward@fau.edu
-----Original Message-----
From: A Biosafety Discussion List [mailto:BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU]On Beha=
lf
Of Twedt, Tru
Sent: Friday, December 20, 2002 2:18 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Commissioning of BSL3 Labs
I would also be very interested in any recommendations or comments that
anyone may have.=A0
=A0
Thank you,
Tru
Tru F. Twedt, DVM
Biosecurity Specialist
Iowa State University
Environmental Health & Safety
118 Agronomy Lab
Ames, IA=A0 50011-3200
E-mail:=A0 ttwedt@iastate.edu
Phone:=A0 (515) 294-6593
Fax:=A0 (515) 294-9357
Website:
-----Original Message-----
From: Isabel Jean Goldberg [mailto:Jean.Goldberg@MED.NYU.EDU]
Sent: Friday, December 20, 2002 11:36 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Commissioning of BSL3 Labs
We're constructing a new ABSL3 facility (projected construction start date - January 2003) in New York City.=A0 I'm looking for a contractor on the east
coast, to review plans for the=A0facility now - and to test it "for
verification that the design and operational parameters have been met prior
to operation". I'd appreciate any and all recommendations. Thanks in
advance. - Jean
------=_NextPart_001_0003_01C2A83D.F3914310
Content-Type: text/html;
charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
I am also interested in more information, particularly the SE. Here are a few I looked into in different areas of the country and one in Canada.
Council Rock Consulting Inc. New Mexico (877) 425-8500
href"">
Thank you,
Darlene Ward
Biological Safety/Public Health Coordinator
Florida Atlantic University
Environmental Health and Safety
777 Glades Road, CO Bldg
Boca Raton, FL = 33431-0991
Phone: (561) 297-0028
Fax: (561) 297-2210
dward@fau.edu
-----Original Message-----
From: A Biosafety Discussion List
[mailto:BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU]On Behalf Of Twedt, = Tru
Sent: Friday, December 20, 2002 2:18 PM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Commissioning of BSL3 Labs
I would also be very interested in any recommendations or comments that = anyone may have.
Thank you,
Tru
Biosecurity Specialist
Iowa State University
Environmental Health & Ames
E-mail: ttwedt@iastate.edu
Phone: (515)
Fax: (515) 294-9357
Website""
Original Message-----
From: Isabel Jean = Goldberg [mailto:Jean.Goldberg@MED.NYU.EDU]
Sent: Friday, December = 20, 2002 11:36 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Commissioning of BSL3 Labs
We're constructing a new ABSL3 facility (projected construction start date - January 2003) in New York City. I'm looking for a contractor on the east coast, to review plans for the facility now - and to test it "for verification that the
design and operational parameters have been met prior to operation". I'd appreciate any and all recommendations.
Thanks in advance. - Jean
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\company Agriculture and Agri Food Canada SERVICES- BIOCONTAINMENT DESIGN =
SERVICES-BDS As principal owner of =
Biocontainment Design Services, Mr. Paul Langevin (P.Eng), has been =
directly involved in all aspects and phases for the design, =
construction, commissioning and operation of various categories and =
containment levels of laboratories BSL 2-3-4. BDS provides design =
development and advisory services for biological containment control , =
hazardous chemicals and operations of laboratories. BDS is affiliated =
with several major Architectural & Engineering firms (USA, Canada and =
International based)that provide full scope services.
Programming & Design Advisory and Development =
Services -Biological and chemical containment =
laboratory design
-Scientific equipment used in laboratory research and diagnostic =
services
-HVAC systems, controls, ductwork design, principles of airflow, =
cascading pressure, design criteria for laboratory Biosafety levels 2, 3 =
and 4 (animal, plant and public health)
-Air movement, filtration and treatment
-Laboratory decontamination and test methods
-Waste Management Systems- Liquids, solids and hazardous wastes
Laboratory architectural systems- benching, materials/finishes, =
containment devices
-Containment systems commissioning-components, system and =
integrated systems testing
-Construction methodologies for laboratories
-Security systems and design principles
-Biological containment regulations, standards and codes
-Life safety design requirements (fire/egress/ADA)
-Environmental study development
-Communications planning for team and public consultations
-Animal health design criteria for interior climates
-Commissioning planning and test generation for =
containment laboratories
Provision of shop drawing =
review/acceptance on laboratory systems/equipment, manufacturer plant =
inspections/acceptance of equipment, review/acceptance of construction =
methodologies, review/acceptance of construction performance, review of =
construction progress statements/monthly invoices and provision of =
interim/substantial/final inspections.
Commissioning & Testing Laboratory commissioning =
plan development, development and implementation of a biological =
certifications program for containment laboratories and control systems, =
contractor commissioning testing review and inspection, review/ analysis =
and approval of commissioning data and results. Decontaminating and =
biological efficacy testing of laboratories. Waste management system =
certification program design and delivery.}
Operations and Facilities =
Management Laboratory operational =
study review/development and laboratory management services. Designing =
and/or selecting and application of a computerized Preventive =
Maintenance program for containment labs. Development of alternative =
service deliveries including contract services for laboratory operations =
including HEPA filter housing, autoclaves, centrifuges, Biological =
Safety Cabinets and Fume hoods. Decontamination and annual =
certifications for containment laboratories. Development of biosafety =
and operational protocols for containment laboratories.
Project Management Services Provision of full project =
management services involving project initiation, tendering scheduling, =
cost budgeting/control, and direction to trades/general contractors. =
EXPERIENCE / PROJECTS- Paul Langevin (BDS), 1982 =
to PRESENT
Ames Modernization Project, USDA, Ames Iowa- BSL3 Animal Laboratory =
facilities (2002-2006) Biocontainment Sub-Consultant
University of Georgia, Athens-BSL3 Large Animal Facility =
Renovations -Biocontainment sub-consultant
Statens Serum Institut, Copenhagen, Denmark- Biocontainment =
Laboratory BSL 2-4- Value Engineering design review. (2000)
Sweden National Institut for Health, BSL 3-4 laboratory (1997/98), =
Design review
BSL3 Human Health laboratory, University of Guelph, Ontario =
(2000/2001)- Design sub-consultant
BSL3 Tuberculosis Lab- McGill University/Montreal General Hospital =
(2001-2003):Design Sub-consultant
BSL3 Tuberculosis Lab- Ministry of Health-Public health Laboratory =
(2002): Programming Services-Design Biocontainment Engineer =
sub-consultant
Waste Management Retrofit Project- Cornell University (1998/1999)
Programming for =
the replacement of an incinerator treating pathological carcasses with =
new technology using alkaline hydrolysis with heat/pressure rendering =
equipment.
BSL3 Biocontainment Facility for Plants-USDA, Sidney =
Montana-Biocontainment design sub-consultant (1999-2002)
BSL3 Biocontainment Facility for Infectious Agents- Ohio Medical =
College- Biocontainment engineer-HVAC renovations and decontamination =
program. (1998/99/2000)
BSL3 Biocontainment Facility for Large Animals-University of =
Iowa/USDA, Ames, Iowa- Biocontainment design Sub-consultant. =
(1998-1999-preliminary design)
BSL3 Waste Management Treatment Centre for Biological =
Sterilization-Definitions Study and design sub-consultant-Ames, Iowa =
(2000/2001)
BSL3 Waste Management Treatment Centre for Biological =
Sterilization-Definitions Study-Laramie. Wyoming (1999)
BSL3 Biocontainment Facility, USDA Laramie. Biocontainment Engineer =
Design Sub-consultant (2000-2002)
BSL3 Lab, Springfield Combined Labs, (state/university project) =
Ilinois, USA_ Biocontainment engineer consultant. (2001-2003)
Canadian Science Center for Human and Animal Health- BSL 2-3-4 =
Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada, (1982-1997). Senior client project =
engineer/manager-design/commissioning team member.
BSL3 Laboratory review consultant -US Army, Dugway, Utah (1996)
SAP Integrated Management System Development- AAFC (1997-2002)
1982-1997 AAFC Project Manager / Engineer for =
Laboratory Projects
Design and Construction of: Federal Laboratories- 1982-1998 (joint =
project with Health Canada)-
Cost $176M- Winnipeg, Manitoba- BSL 2/3/4 laboratories
Senior project manager for Federal =
Laboratory Project, Winnipeg, Manitoba. Lead project engineer for the =
department of Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada fulfilling duties of =
project management, design development, construction inspection, =
environmental analysis and commissioning coordination. The project =
involved biocontainment laboratories Levels 2 / 3 / 4 and had a total =
capital value of $176.0 M. Having departmental authority, he was =
instrumental in approving all critical changes and was actively involved =
on developing unique design solutions (including developing prototypical =
biocontainment solutions) achieving mission critical containment.
Animal Virus Laboratory, Nepean, =
Ontario 1982-1986
Lethbridge Large Animal BSL3 Laboratory 1984-1987
BSL3- Large Animal Facility for Experimental Studies, Lethbridge, =
Alta. 1984
Pesticides Testing Services Laboratory, Calgary, Alta. 1985-1986
Plant Pathogen BSL 3 / 4 Containment Facility, Vancouver 1985-1986
Food Research Centre, St Hyacinthe, Que 1983-1985
Potato Containment Research Project, Charlottetown, PEI 1987
Fredericton Dairy and Calf Research Center 1986
Greenhouse Research Complex, Harrow, Ontario 1987-1988
Large Animal Controlled Environment Research Complex, Lethbridge, =
Alta. 1983-1984
Research Feed Mill/laboratory, Lethbridge, Alta. 1983
Harrington Farm Laboratory Services Facility, Charlottetown, PEI =
1985-1986
Beef Cattle Facility, Nappan Research Station, Nova Scotia =
1983-1985
Chemical Storage Facility, Smithfield Experimental Farm, Ontario =
1985-1986
Headerhouse/Greenhouse Complex, Fredericton Research Station, NB =
1984-1985
While working at AAFC Mr. Langevin\rquote s responsibilities =
involved all aspects of project engineering and development. He was =
involved in reviewing all of the department\rquote s laboratory =
developments on behalf of other project managers and advised on =
engineering solutions. During 1987 and 1988 he was responsible for =
developing a National Maintenance Strategy for the department\rquote s =
laboratories and other buildings. He also developed a publication =
outlining storage and containment requirements for chemical and =
dangerous goods based on regulatory requirements and current design =
standards. He supervised other project engineers involved with =
laboratory project development, underground storage tanks and =
environmental assessments.
Mr. Langevin has provided tutorials and speaking engagements on =
laboratory design, testing, commissioning and construction at several =
international conferences, symposiums and lecture series. He has also =
co-authored several guidelines and articles on containment standards.
Field Construction Supervisor: Hardy Associates Ltd. Calgary, Alta
Design Engineer- Eastern Technical Services, Gananoque, Ontario
Assistant Engineer- Kaiser Resources Ltd, Sparwood, British =
Columbia
Plant Laborer- Alcan Aluminum Manufacturing, Kingston, Ontario
Courses/Studies:
Laboratory Design Course-University of Harvard
Electrical Commissioning of Systems
Laboratory Biosafety Course -Health Canada
Fumehood and Laboratory Ventilation
Biological Safety Cabinets
Fire Code Changes
Animal Biocontainment Course-ABSA
Arthropod Containment Design Course-ABSA
Space Decontaminations Course-ABSA
Advanced Design and Ventilation Course-ABSA
Project Management
Construction Claims Management
Education Bachelor of Science- Engineering,
Queens University, =
Kingston, Ontario
Professional Membership Professional Engineers of =
Ontario
American Biological Safety Association
Publications
Chemical Storage Facility Design-AAFC-1987
National Laboratory Maintenance Program-AAFC 1988
BSL 3 laboratory Design Outline/Course-Eagleson Institute
OIE publication for Animal Containment Standards
Containment Standards for Animals AAFC
Containment Standards for Plants CFIA (draft)
International Containment Standards for Animals\tab -International =
Veterinary Workshop Group
Revision (technical) team member for the Canadian Biosafety =
Guidelines, 2002
Biocontainment Design Services Ph 613-799-1437 (w)
613-831-0666 (h)
Kanata, Ontario, Canada
E-Mail Langevinp@agr.gc.ca
Business Registration Number:BIN # 980983993}{
=========================================================================
=========================================================================
Date: Thu, 26 Dec 2002 16:12:44 -0700
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Therese M. Stinnett"
Subject: computer/IS and telecom staff visiting labs
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
here's one I haven't thought about in quite a while....
IS support and telecom support staff visiting labs to correct computer or
telephone problems.....making the way out there presumption that the lab
staff may not be following proper glove/hand hygiene practices
how would you train and advise these folks? should they be gloved to work
on lab computers? phones? phones can probably be wiped down with a
disinfectant. not so the computers, especially keyboards.
open to ideas.....
Therese M. Stinnett
Biosafety Officer
Health and Safety Division
UCHSC, Mailstop C275
4200 E. 9th Avenue
Denver, CO 80262
Voice: 303-315-6754
Pager: 303-266-5402
Fax: 303-315-8026
email: therese.stinnett@uchsc.edu
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 27 Dec 2002 09:42:17 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: John Jessip
Subject: Maintenance/repair personnel in BSL-3 areas
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Does anyone on the list have a written policy for maintenance/repair =
personnel entering BSL-3 areas?
I am considering updating our safety manual and such information would =
be helpful.
Thank you,
John Jessip, M.A.
Safety Officer
Tampa Bay Research Institute
10900 Roosevelt Blvd. N.
St. Petersburg, FL 33716-2308
ph: 727-576-6675 x 124
fax: 727-577-9862
e-mail: jjessip@
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 27 Dec 2002 09:39:47 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Gergis, Nasr"
Subject: Re: Maintenance/repair personnel in BSL-3 areas
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Please send me a copy. Thanks,
Nasr Gergis, Ph.D., DVM
Interim Director-Biosafety Safety Officer
Occupational Safety and Health
City of Hope/BRI
E-mail: ngergis@
-----Original Message-----
From: John Jessip [mailto:tbriat@]
Sent: Friday, December 27, 2002 6:42 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Maintenance/repair personnel in BSL-3 areas
Does anyone on the list have a written policy for maintenance/repair
personnel entering BSL-3 areas?
I am considering updating our safety manual and such information would be
helpful.
Thank you,
John Jessip, M.A.
Safety Officer
Tampa Bay Research Institute
10900 Roosevelt Blvd. N.
St. Petersburg, FL 33716-2308
ph: 727-576-6675 x 124
fax: 727-577-9862
e-mail: jjessip@
=============================================================================
This message and any attachments are intended solely for the use of the
individual or entity to which they are addressed. This communication may contain
information that is privileged, confidential, and exempt from disclosure under
applicable law. If the reader of this communication is not the intended
recipient, or the employee or agent responsible for delivering the message to
the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any dissemination,
distribution or copying of the communication is strictly prohibited. If you
received the communication in error, please notify us immediately by replying to
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Please send me a copy. Thanks,
Nasr Gergis, Ph.D., DVM
Interim Director-Biosafety Safety Officer
Occupational Safety and Health
City of Hope/BRI
E-mail: ngergis@
-----Original Message-----
From: John Jessip [mailto:tbriat@]
Sent: Friday, December 27, 2002 6:42 AM
To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
Subject: Maintenance/repair personnel in BSL-3 areas
Does anyone on the list have a written policy for maintenance/repair
personnel entering BSL-3 areas?
I am considering updating our safety manual and such information
would be helpful.
Thank you,
John Jessip, M.A.
Safety Officer
Tampa Bay Research Institute
10900 Roosevelt Blvd. N.
St. Petersburg, FL 33716-2308
ph: 727-576-6675 x 124
fax: 727-577-9862
e-mail: jjessip@
==============================================================================
This message and any attachments are intended solely for the use of the
individual or entity to which they are addressed. This communication may contain
information that is privileged, confidential, and exempt from disclosure under
applicable law. If the reader of this communication is not the intended
recipient, or the employee or agent responsible for delivering the message to
the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any dissemination,
distribution or copying of the communication is strictly prohibited. If you
received the communication in error, please notify us immediately by replying to
this message and then deleting the message and any accompanying files from your
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Date: Fri, 27 Dec 2002 10:42:26 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Holly Gates-Mayer
Organization: University of Idaho
Subject: Re: Maintenance/repair personnel in BSL-3 areas
In-Reply-To:
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I would also like a copy. Thank you in advance!!
Holly Gates-Mayer, Industrial Hygienist
Environmental Health and Safety
University of Idaho
1108 West Sixth Street
Moscow, Idaho 83844-2030
email: hollyg@uidaho.edu
On 27 Dec 2002 at 9:39, Gergis, Nasr wrote:
> Please send me a copy. Thanks,
> Nasr Gergis, Ph.D., DVM
> Interim Director-Biosafety Safety Officer
> Occupational Safety and Health
> City of Hope/BRI
> E-mail: ngergis@
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: John Jessip [mailto:tbriat@]
> Sent: Friday, December 27, 2002 6:42 AM
> To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
> Subject: Maintenance/repair personnel in BSL-3 areas
>
>
> Does anyone on the list have a written policy for maintenance/repair
> personnel entering BSL-3 areas? I am considering updating our safety
> manual and such information would be helpful. Thank you, John Jessip,
> M.A. Safety Officer Tampa Bay Research Institute 10900 Roosevelt Blvd.
> N. St. Petersburg, FL 33716-2308 ph: 727-576-6675 x 124 fax:
> 727-577-9862 e-mail: jjessip@
>
> ======================================================================
> ======== This message and any attachments are intended solely for the
> use of the individual or entity to which they are addressed. This
> communication may contain information that is privileged,
> confidential, and exempt from disclosure under applicable law. If the
> reader of this communication is not the intended recipient, or the
> employee or agent responsible for delivering the message to the
> intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any dissemination,
> distribution or copying of the communication is strictly prohibited.
> If you received the communication in error, please notify us
> immediately by replying to this message and then deleting the message
> and any accompanying files from your system. CONFIDENTIAL.
>
> ======================================================================
> ========
>
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 27 Dec 2002 14:35:49 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Sue Anderson
Subject: Susan Anderson is out of the office.
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
I will be out of the office from 2002-12-23 until 2003-01-06.
I will respond to your message when I return. Have a wonderful holiday
season.
Susan
=========================================================================
Date: Fri, 27 Dec 2002 14:51:49 -1000
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Thomas Goob
Subject: 2003 IATA Changes
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Biosafety list members,
There has been little discussion about changes to the 2003 IATA DG regs
in
regards to the changes related to shipping "Diagnostic Specimens". I
assume this is because most of you work in research labs and most of the
shipping your labs do are known isolates. This makes the classification of
a specimen as "Infections Substance", as opposed to "Diagnostic Specimen",
simple. What has not been so simple, at least before the changes to the
2003 IATA regs, has been how to classify specimens being sent for clinical
(diagnostic) testing. My company developed a fairly complex flow-chart to
determine if a clinical specimen should be shipped as "Infectious
Substance" or "Diagnostic Specimen".
Under the 2003 IATA, the definition of Diagnostic Specimen has changed
to
the following:
3.6.3.1.4 Diagnostic Specimens
Any human or animal material including, but not limited to, excreta,
secreta, blood and its components, tissue and tissue fluids, being
transported for diagnostic or investigational purposes, but excluding live
infected animals.
Diagnostic specimens must be assigned to UN 3373 unless the source patient
or animal has or may have a serous human or animal disease which can be
readily transmitted from one individual to another, directly or indirectly,
and for which effective treatment and preventive measures are not usually
available, in which case they must be assigned to UN 2814 (Infectious
Substance, Affecting Humans) or UN 2900 (Infectious Substance, Affecting
Animals).
NOTE 2: Assignment to UN 2814 or UN 2900 must be based on known medical
history of the patient or animal, endemic local conditions, symptoms of the
patient or animal, or professional judgement concerning individual
circumstances of the patient or animal.
In the second paragraph under the "Diagnostic Specimen" definition above,
the wording may sound familiar to you because it is the same exact wording
that can be found in the WHO's Risk Group 4 definition. Therefore, based
upon the above information, is it safe to say that under the new 2003 IATA,
if your sending a specimen for diagnostic testing, unless you have good
reason to believe it to possibly be a Risk Group or BSL 4 microorganism, it
can be shipped as a "diagnostic specimen" (IATA Packing Instruction 650)?
Unless of course you have a known isolate, then they would need to be
shipped as an infectious substance as long has they are Risk Group 2, 3, or
4. Risk Group 1 are not considered "Infectious Substances" according to
IATA.
If this is the case, a clinical lab such as the one I work for would rarely
be required to ship "Infectious Substances", as we do not work with Risk
Group 4s. Under the above, the only time I could see us need to send
something as Infectious would be a known isolate that we would be sending
to a reference lab.
Comments/discussion?
Thanks in advance,
Tom
****************************************
Thomas C. Goob, MPH, MBA, CSP
Manager
Safety, Health & Environmental Affairs
DIAGNOSTIC LABORATORY SERVICES, INC.
650 Iwilei Road, Suite 300
Honolulu, Hawaii 96817
(808) 589-5100 Fax: (808) 593-8357
email: tgoob@dls.
****************************************
=========================================================================
Date: Mon, 30 Dec 2002 21:18:00 +0200
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Korpela Kai
Subject: Re: Maintenance/repair personnel in BSL-3 are as
In-Reply-To:
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Terve Markus,
en saanut sinuat kiinni. Tavataan sitten taas. ytv. Kai
Gergis, Nasr (27.12.2002 19:39):
>Please send me a copy. Thanks,
>Nasr Gergis, Ph.D., DVM
>Interim Director-Biosafety Safety Officer
>Occupational Safety and Health
>Cityof Hope/BRI
>E-mail: ngergis@
>
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From: John Jessip [mailto:tbriat@]
>Sent: Friday, December 27, 2002 6:42 AM
>To: BIOSAFTY@MITVMA.MIT.EDU
>Subject: Maintenance/repair personnel in BSL-3 areas
>
>
>Does anyone on the list have a written policy for maintenance/repair
>personnel entering BSL-3 areas=3F
>I am considering updating our safety manual and such information would be
>helpful.
>Thank you,
>John Jessip, M.A.
>Safety Officer
>Tampa Bay Research Institute
>10900 Roosevelt Blvd. N.
>St. Petersburg, FL 33716-2308
>ph: 727-576-6675 x 124
>fax: 727-577-9862
>e-mail: jjessip@
>
>=
=
=
>This message and any attachments are intended solely for the use of the
individual or entity to which they are addressed. This communication may
contain information that is privileged, confidential, and exempt from
disclosure under applicable law. If the reader of this communication is not=
the
intended recipient, or the employee or agent responsible for delivering the
message tothe intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any
dissemination, distribution or copying of the communication is strictly
prohibited. If you received the communication in error, please notify us
immediately by replying to this message and then deleting the message and=
any
accompanying files from your system. CONFIDENTIAL.
>
>=
=
=
>
Kai Korpela
Board for Gene Technology
Ministry of Social Affairs and Health
Kirkkokatu 14, FIN-00170 Helsinki
PO Box 33, FIN-00023 GOVERNMENT, Finland
Phone +358-9-160 4479
Fax +358-9-160 3876
geenitekniikanlautakunta.fi
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 31 Dec 2002 01:01:18 -0500
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: Betsy Daniels
Subject: Betsy Daniels/BOS/US/Vpharm is out of the office.
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
I will be out of the office starting 12/30/2002 and will not return until
01/02/2003.
I will respond to your message when I return.
Thanks,
Betsy
Thanks!
Betsy
=========================================================================
Date: Tue, 31 Dec 2002 09:26:54 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Manuel, Francis"
Subject: SA Registration
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Dear Colleagues,
We have a question regarding the new select agent registration
requirements. Our facility has notified the HHS and the USDA of any
possessions of select agents or toxins and of any "High Consequence
Livestock Pathogens," as required by the Public Health Security and
Bioterrorism Preparedness Act.
We understand that any entity that possesses, uses, or transfers any
select agents or toxins must be registered with the HHS or USDA. Is the
notification of possession sufficient for the time being? When should our
facility initiate the registration process, should we wait until February 7,
2003?
Thanks,
Nasr Gergis, Ph.D., DVM
Biological Safety Officer
Occupational Safety and Health
City of Hope/BRI
And
Francis Manuel
Biological Safety Specialist
Occupational Safety and Health
City of Hope/BRI
=============================================================================
This message and any attachments are intended solely for the use of the
individual or entity to which they are addressed. This communication may contain
information that is privileged, confidential, and exempt from disclosure under
applicable law. If the reader of this communication is not the intended
recipient, or the employee or agent responsible for delivering the message to
the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any dissemination,
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Dear Colleagues, Roman">We have a question regarding the new select
agent registration = requirements. Our facility has notified the
HHS and the USDA of any = possessions of select agents or toxins and
of any "High Consequence = Livestock Pathogens," as required by the
Public Health Security and = Bioterrorism Preparedness Act.
Roman">We understand that any entity that possesses, uses, or
transfers any= = select agents or toxins must be registered with the
HHS or USDA. Is = the notification of possession sufficient for the
time being? When = should our facility initiate the registration
process, should we wait until= = =46ebruary 7, 2003? =
Thanks,
Nasr Gergis, Ph.D., = DVM
Biological Safety = Officer
Occupational Safety and = Health
= =46ACE"Times New Roman">
And
Francis Manuel
Biological Safety = Specialist
Occupational Safety and Health =
City of Hope/BRI
=
=
=
This message and any attachments are intended solely for the use of the =
individual or entity to which they are addressed. This communication may =
contain information that is privileged, confidential, and exempt from =
disclosure under applicable law. If the reader of this communication is not=
=
the intended recipient, or the employee or agent responsible for delivering=
=
the message to the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any =
dissemination, distribution or copying of the communication is strictly =
prohibited. If you received the communication in error, please notify us =
immediately by replying to this message and then deleting the message and =
any accompanying files from your system. CONFIDENTIAL.
=
=
=
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Date: Tue, 31 Dec 2002 10:14:56 -0800
Reply-To: A Biosafety Discussion List
Sender: A Biosafety Discussion List
From: "Manuel, Francis"
Subject: Recall: SA Registration
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Manuel, Francis would like to recall the message, "SA Registration ".
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Manuel, Francis would like to recall the message, "SA Registration
".
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This message and any attachments are intended solely for the use of the
individual or entity to which they are addressed. This communication may contain
information that is privileged, confidential, and exempt from disclosure under
applicable law. If the reader of this communication is not the intended
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distribution or copying of the communication is strictly prohibited. If you
received the communication in error, please notify us immediately by replying to
this message and then deleting the message and any accompanying files from your
system. CONFIDENTIAL.
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