In Somalia, Islam can be viewed as the third most ...



Origins, Doctrine, and Objectives of Al-Shabaab

Newmann

The origins of al-Shabaab are best understood as the evolution of three movements whose roots lay in the importation of radical Islam to Somalia in the 1970s: al-Itahaad al-Islaami (AIAI) in the 1980s, the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) in the 2000s, and finally al-Shabaab from 2006 to the present. The spread and success of each movement lay in the political instability in Somalia since the 1991 overthrow of President Mohammed Siad Barre. Each group shared a doctrine based in radical Islamic thought, and a belief in shariah law as the form of governmental authority. Al-Shabaab’s objectives are to create a Somali state and ultimately a regional caliphate based in its version of radical Islam. Since its creation al-Shabaab and its allies have controlled most of the territory of Somalia, but have not been able to regain control of the capital, Mogadishu, or the government since the UIC’s short-lived rule in 2006. It is opposed by all the surrounding states and the African Union, and therefore is unlikely to reach its goals.

Origins: Radical Islam spread to Somalia in the 1970s as Somalia became a member of the Arab League (1974). Along with increased trade came the ideas of Sayyid Qutb and fundamentalist-preaching Islamic charities.[i] The al-Itahaad al-Islaami (AIAI) had its roots in the early 1980s in the 1982 merger of al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya, a Salafi group based in the Mogadishu region, and Wahdat al-Sahbaab al Islamiyya, a Wahhabi and Muslim Brotherhood based-group, that surfaced in the north.[ii] The overthrow of President Mohammed Siad Barre led to clan-based civil war in Somalia in 1991; in the chaos many Somalis turned to religion as an alternate source of authority.[iii] Under the leadership of Hassan Dahir Aweys AIAI had developed a fierce militia, capable of contesting that war.[iv] Ethiopia responded in 1996, 1998, and 1999, nearly destroying AIAI.[v] As lawlessness, clan violence, and famine took its toll on local communities, Islamic courts based in mosques or subclan leadership began to spring up to restore order by mediating local disputes. The Mogadishu-based Supreme Council of Sharia Courts of Somalia, again with Aweys as a key leader, recruited a militia, grew in power, and evolved into the UIC. In 2006 the UIC ended the civil war, capturing Mogadishu where it declared itself the new government of Somalia in June 2006. An Ethiopian intervention to aid the forces of a coalition Transitional Federal Government (TFG), backed by the US, overthrew the UIC in December 2006. In the aftermath, the UIC movement fragmented. The al-Shabaab then formed as an al-Qaeda-linked terrorist organization, based in the remnants of the youth wing of the UIC; Hizbul Islam was also formed -- Aweys newest vehicle for his own ambitions.[vi]

Doctrine: These groups have not produced charters or covenants that detail their doctrine. However, all of these groups shared the radical Islamist ideology based on the writings of Hassan al-Banna, Sayyid Abu Alal Maududi, and Sayyid Qutb: an anti-western, anti-American, ideologically rigid totalitarian system based on a Salafist interpretation of the original sources of the Islam.[vii] Each believed that violence against foreigners and Muslim “apostates” was justified. The anarchy of civil war and continued instability today, encourages radical Islamists in the region to maintain their support for and connections to al-Shabab.[viii]

Objectives: Each group hoped to create a Somali state governed by religious leaders who would implement a shariah-based law. Al-Shabaab intended to use the Qur’an, as they interpreted it, as the source of all authority and law.[ix] Al-Shabaab has also stated explicitly that an objective of building a wider Islamic regime on the Horn of Africa; its attacks into neighboring Ethiopia and Kenya are evidence of that goal.[x] Analysts consider al-Shabaab a strategic threat to the entire region.[xi]

Conclusion: Al-Shabaab is unlikely to achieve its goals. Though estimated at over 7,000-9,000 fighters, it is opposed by the governments of Kenya, Ethiopia (backed by the US), and by the African Union (AU). The AU’s peace enforcement mission, AMISOM, totaling over 20,000 soldiers has fought al-Shabaab since 2007, but is scheduled to hand the mission over to Somali security forces.[xii] Al-Shabaab has launched devastating attacks in Somalia and in the region, and will likely continue to do so; however, it is unlikely that the regional nation-states will allow radical Islamic forces to seize power again.

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[i] Roland Marchal. “Islamic Political Dynamics in the Somali Civil War,” in Alex de Waal, Islamic Extremism and its Enemies in the Horn of Africa (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), p. 118; and Shaul Shay, The Red Sea Terror Triangle (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2005), p. 73.

[ii] International Crisis Group, Somalia’s Islamists, Africa Report No. 100, December 12, 2005, p. 3. Available at . Accessed August 21, 2006.

[iii] Excellent sources on clan rivalries and their importance in Somali politics are Ali Jimele Ahmed, The Invention of Somalia, Lawrenceville, NJ; The Red Sea Press, 1995); I. M. Lewis, Saints and Sinners: Popular Islam in a Clan-based Society (Lawrenceville, NJ: The Red Sea Press, 1998); and Ken Menkhaus, Somalia: State Collapse and the Threat of Terrorism, Adelphi Paper 364 (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 2004), p. 29. Menkhaus provides a chart of simplified chart of Somali clan structure. He identifies five major clans, fifteen major subclans, twenty second tier subclan, and eighteen third tier subclans all with political significance in the civil war; Menkhaus, Somalia: State Collapse and the Threat of Terrorism, p. 24. On the Somali civil war and the UN-sponsored intervention in the early 1990s see Samuel Makinda. Seeking Peace from Chaos (Boulder, CO; Lynne Rienner, 1993); John L. Hirsch and Robert C, Oakley. Somalia and Operation restore Hope (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1995); and Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst. Learning from Somalia (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997).

[iv] International Crisis Group, Somalia’s Islamists, pp. 3-5. These battles were more about clan rivalries for power in the nation. Siad Barre belonged to the Marehan subclan of the Darood clan; Aidid was a member of the Habir Gedir subclan and Aweys belonged to the Ayr subclan of the Hawiye clan. Aidid, a former General in Siad Barre’s military led a rebel group, the Somali national Alliance against Siad Barre. On Aweys background see International Crisis Group, Can the Somali Crisis be Contained, Africa Report No. 116, August 10, 2006) pp. 9-10 and 17-18. Available at . Accessed August 21, 2006. On Aweys background see pp. 9-10 and 17-18.

[v] Its political flexibility allowed it to establish cells in Kenya, Djibouti, and the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, and launch attacks in Ethiopia with the help of Eritrea, Sudan, and AQ. Ken Menkhaus, “Political Islam in Somalia,” Middle East Policy, Vol. 9, No. 1 (March 2002), pp. 114-115.

[vi] On the emergence of al-Shabaab see International Crisis Group, Counter-Terrorism in Somalia: Losing Hearts and Minds, pp. 4-9.

[vii] Marchal in de Waal, Islamism and its Enemies in the Horn of Africa, pp. 124-127.

[viii] Shay, The Red Sea Terror Triangle, pp. 73-78. Radical Islamist groups viewed the US and UN intervention in the early 1990s as a Western attempt to re-colonize Somalia. The withdrawal of these forces in 1994 and 1995 was seen as a victory for revolutionary Islam, and cause to continue supporting radicals in Somalia. See Marchal in de Waal, Islamism and its Enemies in the Horn of Africa, p. 130; See Shay, The Red Sea Terror Triangle, pp. 80-82; Pinio, The African Jihad, pp. 51-55; and Peter Bergen, Holy War, Inc. (New York: Simon and Shuster, 2002), pp. 25 and 85. For al-Qaeda, Somalia became more of a staging point for operations outside the Horn of Africa as in the case of the 1998 embassy bombings and the November 2002 attempt to shoot down Arkia airline 582 leaving from Moi International Airport. International Crisis Group, Counter-Terrorism in Somalia: Losing Hearts and Minds? Africa Report, No. 95, July 11, 2005. Available at .

[ix] Shay, The Red Sea Terror Triangle, pp. 73-78.

[x] Brendon J. Cannon and Dominic Ruto Pkalya. "Why al-Shabaab Attacks Kenya: Questioning the Narrative Paradigm." Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 31, no. 4 (2019), p. 844.

[xi] Godfrey Buluma. Al-Shabaab: The Threat to Kenya and the Horn of Africa (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College 2013), pp. 6-18. Available at .

[xii] Al-Shabab in Somalia. Council on Foreign Relations: Global Conflict Tacker. Available at .

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