PROJECT INFORMATION DOCUMENT (PID)



PROJECT INFORMATION DOCUMENT (PID)

APPRAISAL STAGE

Report No.: AB2215

|Project Name |PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM TA |

|Region |EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA |

|Sector |General public administration sector (80%);Other social services (10%); health sector (10%) |

|Project ID |P096861 |

|Borrower(s) |MINISTRY OF FINANCE |

|Implementing Agency | |

| |Ministry of Finance |

| |Ak. Rajabova Str.3 |

| |Tajikistan |

| |Tel: (992-372) 21-14-17 |

| |Executive Office of the President of the Client |

| |80 Rudaki Avenue |

| |Dushanbe, Tajikistan |

| |734023 |

|Environment Category |[ ] A [ ] B [X] C [ ] FI [ ] TBD (to be determined) |

|Date PID Prepared |March 3, 2006 |

|Date of Appraisal Authorization |March 20, 2006 |

|Date of Board Approval |May 30, 2006 |

A. CONTEXT

Country and sector issues

Overall Country Context

Tajikistan is a small economy in Central Asia with 6.7 million inhabitants and a per capita income of $310. The economy, which has been growing on average at 10 percent during 2001-04, depends heavily on exports of cotton, aluminum and hydro-electricity, 84 percent destined for other CIS countries and Europe, as well as on growing remittances of migrants to Russia conservatively estimated at 16 percent of GDP per year. Poverty although declining steadily remains very high. In 2003, the headcount was 64 percent using PPP poverty line of US$2.15. However, social indicators have continued to worsen, reflecting deteriorating public service delivery and weak governance.

After independence from the USSR in 1991, Tajikistan suffered a prolonged civil war through mid 1997, when it was resolved with a peace accord. Following the war, there was a long period of political stabilization and consolidation.

Table 1 Tajikistan: Key Economic Indicators 2000-2005

| |2000 |2001 |2002 |2003 |2004 |2005 |

| | | | | | |(est.) |

|GDP at Current Prices, TJS million| 1,787 | 2,564 | 3,375 | 4,758 | 6,158 |7,100.0 |

|GDP at Current Prices, US$ million|980 | 1,104 | 1,238 | 1,553 | 2,078 |2,337.8 |

|GDP Growth, percent | 8.3 | 10.2 | 9.1 | 10.2 | 10.6 | 8.0 |

|CPI inflation, percent | 32.9 | 38.6 | 12.2 | 16.4 | 7.1 | 5.9 |

|Per Capita GDP, US$ |158 |175 |192 |236 |310 | 342 |

|In percent of GDP |

|Total Revenues | 13.8 | 14.9 | 16.6 | 17.3 | 17.9 | 18.8 |

|Total Expenditures | 19.3 | 17.9 | 19.0 | 19.1 | 20.6 | 22.6 |

|o/w Wages and Salaries | 3.7 | 3.3 | 3.2 | 2.8 | 2.7 | 3.8 |

|Fiscal Balance (incl. PIP) |-5.6 |-3.1 |-2.4 |-1.8 |-2.4 |-3.8 |

|Current Account Balance |-6.2 |-6.6 |-2.7 |-1.3 |-4.0 |-1.5 |

|External Debt Stock | 125.1 | 92.2 | 81.0 | 66.4 | 39.6 | 39.0 |

|Debt Service | 7.2 | 7.3 | 7.3 | 3.8 | 14.6 | 2.9 |

Soucre: EIU country report 2005, IMF data and WB staff estimates

Notwithstanding the gradual political transition, Tajikistan managed to quickly stabilize the economy by 2000 and undertake key structural reforms. As a result, economic growth accelerated to 10.2 percent in 2001 and has averaged 9 percent through 2005. However, this growth reflects mainly recovery in capacity utilization primarily in agricultural, favorable world prices of cotton and aluminum, strong growth in Russia and other trading partners, and increasing remittances from Tajik migrants, mainly in Russia. Over the medium term, Tajikistan’s macroeconomic prospects are positive with growth projected at 4–6 percent during the next few years, but the economy remains vulnerable to changes in external conditions.

Through tight monetary policy and strong fiscal discipline, Tajikistan was able to reduce inflation of 30–40 percent during 1998–2001 to below 10 percent since 2004. The external current account deficit fell from –6.4 percent of GDP in 2000 to –3.4 percent of GDP in 2005 In addition, several successful debt relief arrangements brought the countries External debt down from 124 percent of GDP in 2000 to 42 percent in 2005,

The extended political consolidation did, however, complicate key elements of the institutional transition agenda. In the initial years, the main priority of the Government was regime consolidation, which prevented the initiation of institutional reform, as the main priority of the Government was maintaining a status quo. As a result, Tajikistan has made little progress in the transforming its public sector from a central planning and state production apparatus into an instrument for encouraging private investment in human, social and physical capital. Largely unreformed Soviet era structures and a poorly paid civil service marred by years of politicization have left the country low indicators of government effectiveness and regulatory quality even compared to other Central Asian states and members of the CIS[1].

Early efforts to undertake public service reform were plagued by the use of the state sector as a tool for appeasement of the various political factions. Laws were enacted, regulations amended and new institutions established, but all with critical weaknesses and little or no implementation follow-up. Attempts at reform were also stymied by collapsing public sector real wages, weak capacity, and the politicization of key positions and functions. Moreover, the delay in adapting Soviet era practices to the emerging market economy left enormous space for the emergence of state capture and administrative corruption. The result is that the Government has not been very effective in translating the recent strong economic performance into better fundamentals for long term growth and improved social welfare. Investment rates continue to be historically low and key social indicators have been declining since independence.

More recently, however, the combination of sustained economic growth and political consolidation are creating the space for more fundamental reform. Growth of the enterprise sector has allowed for a reduction in the use state sector as a tool for appeasement, as evidenced in the gradual emergence of a corps of more technically qualified managers in the public sector. Growing revenues have created the fiscal space to gradual increase public service wages. And the demands of the electorate are shifting toward better delivery of public goods and services, improvement of the business climate and, not least, a reduction in corruption.

This has culminated in a re-orientation of the Government toward improving the capacity of the public service to implement its policies and a realization of the need for of a stable institutional system, a more professional civil service and more effective procedures and processes. This new focus provides an opportunity for development partners to help Tajikistan catch up on its long agenda of unfinished structural and institutional reforms, including of civil service and public administration.

The Government’s is now preparing a long term vision for the achievement of the MDGs – the National Development Strategy (NDS) for 2006-15.[2] In collaboration with its development partners, the Government has identified the following medium- and long-term development priorities for the achievement of the MDGs: (a) reform of public sector management; (b) development of private sector and attracting investments; and (c) development of human potential. The NDS will form the basis for the upcoming second PRSP to cover 2006-09. The development of the NDS is supported by 12 sector working groups charged with developing individual strategies.

One of these is Public Administrative Reform Strategy (PARS) which aims to address in a systematic manner the main weaknesses in the current public administration system. These include (i) the lack of clear separation of state and market functions; (ii) inadequate organizational structures and management systems; (iii) the need to develop a professional civil service system, including transparent and adequate incentive systems; and (iv) inadequate financing management systems and the lack of clear alignment of functions and finances across levels of government.

The sequencing of the actions under the strategy reflects lessons learned from public administration reform in other transition countries[3]. For example, it includes an early focus on: (i) raising the quality of management structures and senior management as a means of ensuring better reform implementation; (ii) separating the function of the state and the market primarily through regulatory reform; and (iii) improving the quality of the civil service through better wages, recruitment and performance management processes.

In addition to the overall PAR Strategy, the Government also intends to adopt a specific strategy on Public Sector Wage reform, which will provide the basis for a staged implementation of wage reform in the Civil and Public Service that is aligned with the PAR program. The PAR strategy also prioritizes interventions and pilots in the social services where there is an urgent need to halt the deterioration of Tajikistan’s human capital, but also seeks some short term results that affect the private sector in order to strengthen the constituency for reform. Reform of lower levels of government is proposed as a second stage focus, although the priority focus on social services will have an early impact on local governments which are generally responsible for service delivery.

Objectives

The project development objective is to assist the Recipient in the implementation of PARS, through strengthening policy making and service delivery systems and enhancing transparency of public management in selected core public sector entities.

The key indicators are:

• The number of civil servants (new entrants) recruited through merit-based competitions increases by 50 percent from the baseline level to be established in summer 2006;

• Reform Plans are implemented for 8 line ministries or central agencies[4] by the end of the project and reports on their implementation are published on the Government web site;

• The level of deviation between approved and executed central government budget decreases by 30 percent;[5]

• Access to information and regulation, norms and procedures by businesses increases 40-50 percent from the baseline level to be established by a survey to be conducted in early 2007.

Baseline data will either be based on existing data, or where required through a baseline survey to be conducted in early 2007. Data on civil service recruitment procedures will be provided by the Civil Service Department, while the implementation of Reform Plans will be monitored by the Executive Office of the President.

B. Rationale for Bank Involvement

To maintain the institutional reform momentum built up over the last eighteen months, it will be important to address the persistent resource and capacity constraints faced by the Government. This project will assist the Government to address these constraints by financing requisite advisory and capacity-building support.

The Government has set out a clear reform agenda in the draft National Development Strategy, which constitutes the main long term policy statement of the Government. This agenda is further elaborated in specific strategies addressing key priorities in the NDS, including the Public Administration Reform Strategy, the Health Financing Strategy and the Education Strategy. A Private Sector Development Strategy is under formulation.

However, for reasons outlined above, capacities in the state administration to take forward the implementation of these strategies are limited. Whereas recently initiated reforms in the Civil Service aim to address the capacity constraints faced by the Government, their impact will be visible only in the medium term. Therefore, the Government requires significant external assistance in support of the realization of the development objectives set out in the draft NDS.

Policy support to the implementation of the Government program is provided through the medium-term Policy Lending Program (a series of Programmatic Development Policy Credits), and an IMF PRGF program. However, in view of the capacity constraints the Government is facing, policy support alone is insufficient to move forward its strategic agenda.

Capacity building and advisory support is provided by several donors, but has focused mainly on selected aspects of public sector reform agenda, such as public expenditure management (DFID, EU), social sector reforms (SDC, ADB, World Bank), and enhancing the investment and business climate (IFC/FIAS/MIGA, USAID). However, there are no donors that are active in supporting core public administration capacity building. In view of priority attached to the reforms and the lack of current donor support for capacity building in public management, World Bank support is crucial for progress in this area.

The project builds on previous analytical work, such as the Public Expenditure and Institutional Review (2004), the Policy Note on Public Sector Wages (2005), as well as on the Country Procurement Assessment and the Country Financial Accountability Assessment (2003).

C. Description

The Project will have five main components, providing support to the key priorities set out in the National Development Strategy, and directly related to the objectives of the Public Administration Reform Strategy. Components 1 (Civil Service Management) and 2 (Implementation of Key Actions under the Public Administration Reform Strategy) support overall systemic reforms and capacity building. Component 3 supports the reforms in budget preparation and execution, focusing on selected elements of social sector spending. Component 4 will provide capacity-building support for regulatory management. Component 5 will strengthen the management of governance reforms and build project management capacity.

Component 1: Civil Service Management (US$0.81 Million)

The objective is to develop and implement the legal basis and institutional capacity to apply merit principles in civil service recruitment and promotion. By the end of the project, the Civil Service Department will have the ability to ensure that basic merit principles are applied across the civil service. Accompanying measures on civil service wage reform will make civil service positions more attractive and provide improved incentives for performance. The main implementing agencies for this component will be the Civil Service Department and the Institute for Higher Qualification of Civil Servants

The Grant will finance consultancy services and training for the Civil Service Department and Human Resource Management units in selected line ministries and agencies[6], including:

• training and advisory support to establish and implement merit-based recruitment and promotion under the amended Civil Service Law;

• capacity building for the new regional branches of the Civil Service Department;

• preparation of a concept for the medium-term development of the Civil Service Systems;

• developing key management tools for the Civil Service Department, such as the Civil Service Registry system and assessment centers for civil service recruitment;

• modernizing civil service incentives, including continued wage decompression and the monetization of benefits;

• providing networking equipment and software.

This component will also finance the implementation of the new in-service training system at the Institute for Higher Qualification of Civil Servants. Under previous assistance provided by the Bank[7] and the EU, the Institute has conducted a comprehensive training needs assessment and developed a small core curriculum of training courses. The project will finance the expansion and improvement of the training curricula of the Institute, including the design of tailor-made training programs for top-level officials and the introduction of training results impact assessment.

Component 2: Supporting Implementation of Key Reforms under the Public Administration Reform Strategy (US$2.31 Million)

The objective is to ensure the effective implementation of organizational and management system reforms in the core public administration. This includes elimination of duplication in government functions, implementation of clear accountability and reporting systems between executive entities, and the gradual introduction of modern public management processes to enhance transparency and accountability, such as institutionalized consultation mechanisms, impact assessment and strategic planning. The main implementing agency of this component is the Executive Office of the President, Department of Economic Reforms and Investment (DERI). The implementation of the component is subject to the adoption of the PARS, which is expected to be signed by the President by mid-April, 2006.

Considering the need for a flexible instrument to finance priority actions under the PARS, the project proposes to fund sequenced implementation of selected key institutional development activities in the PARS. An initial set of first phase priority activities have been already identified, including:

• A horizontal functional review of central state administration bodies to identify duplication of functions, redundant and excessive functions as well as inefficiencies due to fragmentation in the allocation of functions;

• Support to the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection as a selected pilot for reforming the service delivery system, focusing both on creating clear accountability and reporting systems between different entities under the Ministry and introduction of citizen feed-back to pinpoint problems in service delivery;

• Technical assistance and capacity building for the structures in charge of public administration reform management in the Executive Office of the President to strengthen the ability of the Office to introduce key governance reforms and track their implementation and impact over time.

Second phase activities will be defined following the implementation of the first three priority actions. The scope and priority areas will be defined in the course of implementation of first phase actions, inter alia:

• The horizontal functional review will define the ministries and particular areas most in need of organizational restructuring support;

• The service delivery pilot will define what further support can be provided to other social sector ministries in reforming their service delivery systems. Since service delivery system reform has to address a number of sensitive issues of subordination and accountability, it will be first piloted, followed by roll-out after evaluation of the pilot;

• Monitoring systems will be developed for the overall PARS, and subsequently replicated for individual PARS activities that will be identified in the first phase of the project.

The criteria and principles for selecting second phase activities are outlined in Annex 4.

Component 3: Capacity-building in Budget Management (US$0.57 Million)

The objective is to provide technical support to introduce a Medium Term Budget Framework (MTBF) in Tajikistan, and modernize budget execution. Major support for these activities will be provided by the proposed Public Financial Management Modernization Project, currently under preparation. The PSRP will support essential preparatory diagnostics and advisory work, and provide budget management support to the health and education sectors, focusing on wage and staff planning reforms. The implementation agency for the component is the Ministry of Finance.

The activities funded under this component leverage parallel support from other donor partners: the IMF (on budget and treasury), EU (on capacity building in macro-economic forecasting) and DFID (on public financial management including MTBF). The component has two subcomponents:

• Subcomponent 1 will finance, through training and advisory activities, the development of an Action Plan to modernize the Public Financial Management system, including the creation of the Medium Term Budget Framework.

• Subcomponent 2 will finance advisory support and training to the Ministries of Finance and Health to plan and implement health financing reform, in particular wage system and staff planning reforms.

Component 4: Capacity Building in Regulatory Management (US$0.66 million)

Recent surveys on regulatory management institutions indicate lack of predictability in policy making, bureaucratic inefficiency, and usage of outdated regulations. These have impeded innovation and created a barrier to trade and investment. Moreover, survey data indicates that unofficial payments made to various inspection agencies have increased between 2002 and 2005.[8]

The objective of this component is therefore to enhance transparency and accessibility in regulatory management, through capacity-building and advisory support to the Ministry of Justice and pilot inspection agencies. The implementing agencies for this component are the Ministry of Justice, The Sanitary Epidemiological Services (SES) and the Fire and Safety Inspectorate.

The first subcomponent will finance capacity development activities to address some of the issues related to the inspection functions raised above. Specifically, the project will:

a. provide consultancy services to the two agencies to review existing normative acts and bring them up to date with internationally accepted technical regulations;

b. provide support in reviewing the internal instructions of these agencies, and provide advice on their possible improvement;

c. train inspectors to follow the new norms and standards.

The second subcomponent will finance selected capacity building activities for the Ministry of Justice, including:

a. Capacity building for the department responsible for legal documentation to assist with; (i) the creation of a recording procedure to ensure maintenance of a comprehensive record of regulatory documents; and (ii) a review of existing regulations and norms and identifying those which are outdated or from the Soviet period.

b. Assistance in networking the line ministries, agencies, and those with legislative initiative to the MoJ.[9] This will allow other governmental bodies to efficiently transfer their regulatory instruments to the MoJ, as well as make the regulatory drafts under preparation to be in line with the Law on Normative and Legal Acts (LNA). The network will also have the capability to make the drafts, as well as existing legislative acts, available for access to businesses.

Component 5: Effective Management of Governance Reforms (US$0.65 Million)

Components 1-4 above comprise a set of complementary but distinct public sector management reforms. Each needs to be managed as a specific undertaking. Yet, each must be orchestrated in the overall country context, which is one of weak governance, and within unified project governance and administrative arrangements. This is of particular importance in Tajikistan, where a high risk of capture of reform initiatives continues to exist.

This component includes measures to address project governance risks. In particular, these measures aim to mitigate the risks of corruption, collusion, fraud and mismanagement associated with weak institutions and opaque state functioning. The actions taken to mitigate these risks are summarized in annex 15. This component will also finance, through a robust results framework, monitoring of the implementation of the PAR Strategy, as a means to keep the reforms on track, and establish transparent project governance arrangements with appropriate checks and balances.

The activities to be financed under this component comprise two sub-components:

• Subcomponent A will finance efficient and effective project management arrangements, building project management capacity in the DERI and the ACU, including how to address risks of corruption, collusion and fraud. Annex 15 outlines the project governance principles the Government has committed to for the implementation of the project.

• Subcomponent B will enhance government capacity to effectively manage and monitor governance reforms. This will be supported by conducting regular surveys on the impact of governance reforms, the creation of a website to provide wider coverage of reform initiatives and other outreach activities. In addition, a monitoring system for managing reform implementation will be designed to effectively track reform impact.

D. Financing

|Source: |($m.) |

|BORROWER/RECIPIENT |0 |

|IDA GRANT FOR DEBT VULNERABLE |5 |

| Total |5 |

E. Implementation

Project governance in Tajikistan poses specific challenges, which are enhanced by the fact that this project deals with sensitive aspects of the reform of core governance institutions. Thus, the project implementation arrangements ensure (i) ownership of the individual components by government agencies, (ii) high-level political support and (iii) checks and balances to safeguard the project from the inappropriate use of funds. The project management arrangements set out in Annex 6 aim to ensure that these three requirements are fulfilled. Additional safeguards regarding checks and balances on the use of project funds have been agreed and are presented in Annex 15.

In order to ensure high level commitment and support, the project will be managed by a Project Board, which will formed from selected members of the Presidential Working Group on Administrative Reform. The Project Board is a high level project management body that will meet once every three months and perform the following key functions:

▪ Ensure efficient interdepartmental interaction & resolve interdepartmental issues;

▪ Endorse project implementation plans, procurement plans, project budget;

▪ Exercise monitoring and evaluation of project progress on a quarterly basis;

▪ Approve members of the Project Coordination Team and experts nominated as members of evaluation committee from each Ministry.

The Executive Office of the President will be the Project Implementation Agency. The Department for Economic Reform and Investment of the Executive Office of the President (DERI EOP), in line with Decree AP-2017 of January 4, 2006, is responsible for overall project implementation. DERI will also coordinate the implementation of the PARS. The Head of the Department will act as a Project Director. The DERI EOP will report to the Project Board on project-related matters. A Project Coordination Team will be created to take charge of day-to-day project management. Consultants that will work in the Project Coordination Team are being hired under the Project Preparation Facility and will be in place by Negotiations.

To ensure appropriate use of grant proceeds, procurement and financial management functions will be vested in the Aid Coordination Unit under the Executive Office of the President of Tajikistan, which has developed expertise in these functions. This will ensure that fiduciary functions are vested in an appropriate entity, with knowledge and understanding of Bank fiduciary requirements, and that appropriate checks and balances are in place for the use of grant proceeds. These arrangements are also in line with policies on project implementation mechanisms agreed between the Government and the Bank, which is to vest project implementation in existing government institutions.

To ensure agency level ownership of individual project components, Technical Groups will be formed on four main substantive aspects of project implementation. The Technical Groups will be responsible for drafting terms of reference for project activities. These will be approved by the Project Board and, where necessary, subject to prior review by the Bank. The Technical Groups will monitor the implementation of activities related to their area of expertise. The Technical Groups will be formally established by Negotiations.

To ensure transparency and joint accountability, a list of officials nominated to Evaluation Committees on behalf of each Technical Group will be endorsed by the Project Board.

Finally, in order to ensure the effective implementation of project activities by the beneficiary, each of the institutions involved in the project will, by Board date, (i) designate a structural unit responsible for implementation of said Part of the Project, (ii) designate specified staff, of adequate experience and qualifications, responsible for implementation and oversight of said Part of the Project, and (iii) specify the role and responsibilities of said unit vis-à-vis the ACU and the DERI in respect of procurement of goods and services and the selection of consultants for the carrying out of the related part of the Project.

The Project Operational Manual, detailing the above implementation arrangements, has been drafted and submitted to the Bank on 1 March 2006, and has been subsequently endorsed by IDA.

In addition to the above checks and balances in the project management arrangements, and considering the sensitive nature of the project it has been agreed to take several additional measures to prevent fraud and corruption, including:

1. The design and implementation, by the ACU, of a system for handling complaints, and the periodic publication of reports on complaints received and the way these were addressed

2. The publication of all contracts awarded to firms on the project website

3. NGO/civil society organization representatives/donor representatives (except the World Bank) will be invited to be present at ICB and NCB bid openings

4. A 'one-strike' policy will be applied to all contractors and consultants - any case of complicity in corruption, collusion, nepotism and/or fraud will lead to dismissal, disqualification from all further project activities and possible prosecution.

F. Sustainability

Project addressing weaknesses in Governance tend to show results only after a certain time lag, posing risks of reform fatigue and reduced political interest in reform objectives. Long term political commitment is in turn a key factor in ensuring the sustainability of project results. In order to help maintain political momentum, and ensure sustainability of project results, the project includes the following measures:

a) The project includes some ‘quick win’ pilot activities (such as support for the already initiated reform process of the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection), which would help in securing commitment to reforms over a medium term and improve prospects for sustainability;

b) the project includes a flexible facility which will help to address institutional reform issues identified in the course of implementation of the PAR strategy;

c) management of the project and management of the reform process are vested in the same institution, thus ensuring that project activities directly contribute to core reforms, thus enhancing the chances of successful project and reform implementation

G. Lessons Learned from Past Operations in the Country/Sector

The project applies the following key lessons:

Country context: Successful public sector institutional reform calls for tailored solutions and approaches that fit client conditions and circumstances. The project will support implementation of the government’s Strategy documents.

Ownership and flexibility: A key lessons from previous Bank and other donor support (EU) to institutional reforms in Tajikistan is the need to empower the executive in managing its own reform program and, related to this, build flexibility into project design to accommodate changes in reform priorities over the medium term, as reflected in the design and sequencing of Component 2.

Programmatic approach: In a transition environment the policy of supporting ‘small steps in the right direction’ in governance reforms works better than grand designs. The project provides technical support, focusing on implementation practicalities. Related policy issues are dealt within the framework of policy-based operations.

Implementation arrangements: Other countries’ experience (e.g. that of Russia) has demonstrated that proclaimed leadership commitment and availability of a strategy are not enough. For changes to happen there is a need for: (i) an approved set of practical actions; (ii) adequate implementation arrangements; (iii) built-in mechanisms of monitoring and evaluation; (iv) incentives to implement the reforms. The PAR Strategy has a detailed Matrix of Actions which the project will partially support.

Strategic approach: The Tajikistan CAS demonstrates that projects supporting specific reform strategies and activities work better than general technical assistance projects. This project will support selected institutional reform strategies, developed and owned by the Government.

Practicality and sustainability of TA: The evaluation of IBTA II suggests that consulting services should focus on practical implementation issues rather than general reform design and should be well scheduled and managed by the client with intensive Bank supervision. The components are defined to include activities to support implementation and ensure sustainability of outcomes.

Partnership: Experience with IBTA II shows that without a strong institutional counterpart in the Government, TA operations cannot achieve their objective.

H. Safeguard Policies (including public consultation)

|Safeguard Policies Triggered by the Project |Yes |No |

|Environmental Assessment (OP/BP/GP 4.01) |[ ] |[X] |

|Natural Habitats (OP/BP 4.04) |[ ] |[X] |

|Pest Management (OP 4.09) |[ ] |[X] |

|Cultural Property (OPN 11.03, being revised as OP 4.11) |[ ] |[X] |

|Involuntary Resettlement (OP/BP 4.12) |[ ] |[X] |

|Indigenous Peoples (OD 4.20, being revised as OP 4.10) |[ ] |[X] |

|Forests (OP/BP 4.36) |[ ] |[X] |

|Safety of Dams (OP/BP 4.37) |[ ] |[X] |

|Projects in Disputed Areas (OP/BP/GP 7.60)* |[ ] |[X] |

|Projects on International Waterways (OP/BP/GP 7.50) |[ ] |[X] |

I. List of Factual Technical Documents

DOCPROPERTY "Country" \* MERGEFORMAT Tajikistan: PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM PROJECT

Back to office report for Preparation Mission

Review Meeting minutes

Post-concept review discussion on PSRP

Project Appraisal Document Data Sheet

PSRP Mission ToR

Mission Back to Office Report: PSRP identification follow-up and PBC, pre-appraisal follow-up 28 November – 9 December.

SES letter translated – request for assistance under project

Ministry of Interior: State Fire Service – request for assistance from PSRP

PSRP Concept Review Meeting December 5, 2005 – Agenda and Comments received

Request for Comments on the Concept Stage ISDS

Concept Review package

Back to Office Report/Aide Memoire identification mission

Integrated Safeguards Data Sheet (Concept Stage)

Identification Mission ToR

Identification mission follow-up IDF grant on Civil Service training

Project Information Document (Concept Stage)

Project Concept Note

Project Concept Note Data Sheet

QER review meeting minutes

J. Contact point

Contact: Antonius Verheijen

Title: Sr Public Sector Spec.

Tel: (202) 458-2264

Fax:

Email: averheijen@

K. For more information contact:

The InfoShop

The World Bank

1818 H Street, NW

Washington, D.C. 20433

Telephone: (202) 458-4500

Fax: (202) 522-1500

Email: pic@

Web:

-----------------------

[1] WBI: Governance Research Indicator Country Snapshot (GCRIS) indicators.

[2] The development of the NDS is being overseen by a Coordination Council was established by Presidential decree. The Council is supported by 12 sector working groups in the following areas: (1) macroeconomic policy; (2) public administration reform; (3) infrastructure, communications and industry; (4) integration into the world economy; (5) private sector development; (6) food security and agriculture; (7) education and science; (8) health; (9) water supply and sanitation; (10) social protection; (11) environmental protection; and (12) gender equality.

[3] “Understanding public sector performance in transition countries: an empirical contribution” (2003). World Bank Working Paper No. 30357.

[4] There are currently 42 central ministries and agencies, but it is expected that their number will be reduced following the horizontal functional review planned for Spring 2006

[5] Subject to the absence of severe external or internal shocks

[6] Priority will be allocated to HRM units in those ministries and agencies with approved reform plans

[7] Under the IDF Grant ‘Strengthening Civil Service Capacity in Tajikistan’ (TF 054817)

[8] EBRD-World Bank Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS)

[9] This will be done by using the existing inter-agency LAN, that current covers 20 central ministries, and adding additional institutions through a secure modem-based connection to the network

* By supporting the proposed project, the Bank does not intend to prejudice the final determination of the parties' claims on the disputed areas

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