TAPE 007 CONT’D - PBS



TAPE 007 CONT’D

BEGIN INTERVIEW

DIRECTIONAL

INT: If you can, sort of give a very brief history of sort of the Philippines from Spanish colonization, you know, since Magellan first landed on the island, maybe a little bit before that and, you know, described basically what life under Spanish occupation was -- I know 300 years is quite a long time.

CAMAGAY: Mm-hm.

INT: If you could just start by giving a very brief ...

CAMAGAY: Just the Spanish period.

INT: Yeah, Spanish period ...

CAMAGAY: Up to the present?

INT: No, not up to the present. Up to like the 1890s and a little bit before. Okay.

DIRECTIONAL

CAMAGAY: Well, ah, Philippine history is quite long. So it's really, ah, how to, to compress it. Ah, well, basically the periodizations followed before was, ah, the Philippines before the coming of the Spaniards, the Philippines during the Spanish period, and the American period. But very recently histor-- Filipino historians have presented the different kind of periodization wherein the Filipino is the focus. Whatever things that they did should be considered as the turning points, not what the colonial experience has been. But basically, ah, before the coming of the Spaniards, the Philippines was in contact with countries in the region, with China, ah Japan, and, ah, Southeast Asian countries. And, ah, they were free -- there was free intercourse between, ah, these countries until the Spanish came and, ah, boundaries were set. In other words, ah, the free movement of the Filipinos in these countries were a bit curtailed. Ah, for the Spanish period, which spans three, ah, centuries, ah, there was, ah, at the onset really resistance on the part of the Filipinos, but ah, little by little, ah, there would be, ah, acceptance of, ah, Spanish rule in the Philippines. Now basically Spanish colonization would affect the, ahm, ah, lowland Filipinos, because, ahm, if we considered the Philippines, there are three communities identifiable, the lowland communities, the, ah, Muslim community, who were here already even before the Spaniards came, and the people in the mountains, or the highlands. So these three communities, if we now consider Philippine seriography, we take a look at how they experienced Spanish colonization for three centuries. So those who got the brunt, who bore the brunt of being subjugated would be the lowland Filipinos because the Muslim Filipinos were able to resist Spanish colonization. So did the people in the Cordillera, or in the mountain area. So, ah, lowland Filipinos, ah, were the ones affected by, ah, Spanish colonization. Now, ah -- and, therefore, in terms of, ah, revolution later on, it would be, ah, the lowland Filipinos who would really be resisting Spanish rule, because the two communities have been long resistant even at very early time of Spanish rule.

INT: What was so bad about ah, Spanish occupation? What did they do? What were some of the injustices?

CAMAGAY: Well, ah, one, ah, would be, ah, the, ah -- probably the resistance or the non- accept -- the intoleration to indigenous, ah, institutions. Ah, they -- the Filipinos had a religion at that time, but, ah, since the Spaniards, part of their colonization was a systematic, ah, conversion of the natives to, ah, to Catholicism, so that was one point of, ah, friction and conflict between the Spaniards and the Filipinos. So basically, ah, it would revolve around religion, even economic institutions. We were not used to paying taxes or tribute. Ah, ah, we were not ah, we never had the experience of, ah, doing commerce under a monopol--polistic system and that was what the Spaniards wanted to do. So, ah, economic institutions also became one source of conflict between the Filipinos and the Spaniards.

INT: Are you familiar with, ah, US-Filipino relations before the war? What was American interest in the Philippines, if any?

CAMAGAY: Well, ah, from what we read in the 19th century, there were already American, ah, ah, businessmen doing some limited trading, mostly from the Massachusetts area. They were interested in one particular crop of the Philippines, which is abaca being used for ropes in the -- in their ships. So, ah, the US was interested particularly in -- in ah, Philippine abaca. No? So there was, ah -- well, ah, initially interest in trading in the Philippines for the Americans here.

INT: What became the interest later on? Ah, a lot of people say that it was to get a, gain a foothold in China.

CAMAGAY: Well, that could be part of it because towards the 19th cen-- later part of the 19th century, the Pacific was a very important area already. Ah, the United States has reached the limits of its boundaries. It has reached California. The Westward expansion spirit there was still very strong and the, ah, logical move to expand would be in the Pacific area. And also we know that the whaling industry was very strong and, ah, that was one of the reasons why, ahm, US President Filmore was interested in opening Japan to the outside world, no? So basically this -- this the value of the Pacific, ah, was dawning on the Americans and, therefore, wanted a foothold in the Pacific.

DIRECTIONAL

INT: Okay, Now why...Why in 1896 did the revolution begin after some 270 years of Spanish occupation? Why 1896?

CAMAGAY: Well, actually, ah, this is not an event which happens overnight. It happens to be -- it was a time when you would have a confluence of many events, ah, both outside and, ah, within the Philippines. So, for example, why 1896? Ahm, well, first, ah, thing was that, ahm, this was a time -- the Katipunan was ah-- the secret organization was, ah, discovered, but, ah, at the same time, ah, in the countryside, when we look at it, there was already economic dislocation, because at that time there was locust infestation of the Philippines. So people were feeling really the -- the brunt already, little by little. And, ah, also at this particular point in time all efforts to get reforms from Spain apparently was futile. So I mean it's, ah, just like the French Revolution. It's a confluence of many events. There was also bad harvest of wheat in France. And there was also social dislocation because of this and so on. So, ah, it's 1896 because of a confluence of events happening in the Philippines. Mm-hm.

INT: Now that -- can you characterize the Katipunan, I understand that it had a leadership of the illustrados, the elite. Ah, what did that mean in terms of mass support for revolution? Did it really represent the, ah, issues that affected everyone or only the elite, and why did they want ...

CAMAGAY: Well, actually, ah, apparently at this point in time, not only the masses were getting affected, but even the middle class and the upper class. Ah, for example, those who were planting sugar at the wide scale were getting affected because of the price of sugar went down. And so they were also feeling, ah, ah, the bad effects of this drop in sugar prices. So they -- they become eventually the leaders, the articulators of the masses, the ideologues, in effect. And so they -- the middle class and the upper class, because the word "illustrad" actually is a word which means "enlightened Filipino" and it cuts across economic lines. You can have a poor illustrado. You can have a middle class illustrado and -- and a rich illustrado, because Mabini, for example, is a poor illustrado. He came from a very poor, ah, farmer family, but because he finished law, ah, he was considered an illustrado.

INT: So the Katipunan basically, ah, got its support from all classes?

CAMAGAY: Mm-hm. Yes. Yes.

DIRECTIONAL

CAMAGAY: Okay. So what were the aims of the revolution? It's basically to destroy the yoke of, ah, subjugation or colonization from Spain. Ah, and to -- to be independent of one's, ah, one's destiny as a nation and as a people. So, ah, that, ah, apparently was articulated as early as, ahm, during the reform, reform period, because we have a reform period, but the futility of getting reforms from Spain was -- ah, disillusioned quite a number of Filipinos. So the recourse left was to have a revolution. So they've tried a peaceful means. Now they wanted a more, ah, radical means of a revolution. Now where did they get the support? The initial efforts were from Japan, because at this point in time Japan became a model, having defeated, ah, the, ah, Chinese in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895. So it was a model for the Filipinos and there were initial, ah, negotiations for Japan, ah, to be the source of arms and ammunitions to be used. So, ah, there are evidences that ah, Bonifacio tried to, ahm, talk to some Japanese military authorities for a possible purchase of arms, but, ah, this was -- did not materialize apparently. But it did not make the Filipinos forget about Japan as a possible source, because even, ah, in 1897-1898, Mariano Ponce was assigned by the revolutionary government to Yokohama, Japan in order to purchase arms and ammunitions. One shipment, ah, ah, was sent, but, unfortunately, the boat which had this load was shipwrecked. The second shipment did not materialize because apparently Japanese authorities were already survey-- the Filipinos were under strict surveillance already by the Japanese authorities. And Japan at that time didn't want to arouse the ire of the United States. So it stopped, ah, the shipment of these arms. Now ...

DIRECTIONAL

START TAPE 008

CAMAGAY: Well, Aguinaldo's emergence as a pow-- as a leader came from winning in most of the big military battles in Cavite, because Cavite became the theater of, ah, of, ah, the war, no -- or of the revolution. And so he seemed to have, ah, shown, ah, exemplary action in battle. And, ah, therefore, ahm, since the dissolution of the -- of the revolutionary -- of Katipunan as a secret organization took place in Cavite, much to the surprise of Andres Bonifacio, the people in the Tejeros convention which decided the fate of the Katipunan, therefore, drafted mostly Cavitenos and, ah, he was one of those, ah, ah, nominated for the position of, ah, president. And this, of course, is appointed Andres Bonifacio because he was thinking that as a supremo of the old organization, automatically he would get the position. Now what made him, ah, very attractive? I think it's he has a charisma which, ah, one revolutionary, Mariano Ponce, ah, said that, ah, it's his being very unassuming that made him attractive, no, ah, and for an illustrado to say this is, ah, quite significant because they did not perceive him as a threat, but they were all, ahm -- well, they were all agreeing to themselves that since he has the charisma, it is better to, ah, support him instead of to, ah, ah, contradict him or come into conflict with him. So, ah, in fact they didn't know. Most of those who were in the Hong Kong junta, because after the, ah, first phase of the revolution, Aguinaldo and some companions went to Hong Kong and that was the first time that these illustrados, who were of the upper class, got to meet him. And they were, ah -- they were describing him as a very unassuming individual. So, ah -- and I think the charisma, because apparently he got a number of followers, ah, with him. Probably it's the fact that he -- he could identify more with the ordinary folks instead of, let's say, somebody from the rich class or the middle class assuming the leadership of the revolution, it would have been a very difficult one. But the fact that he could identify, he could understand these, ah, ordinary people made him, ah, quite a popular, ah, leader during the revolution.

INT: Um, he was not an illustrado?

CAMAGAY: He was not an illustrado. If I defined illustrado as having gone to finish a degree, have -- assume a profession. No. He, according to his memoirs, he never was very fond of education. You know, he was more, ah, keen on doing business because the family had some businesses. And he was more interested in running the business of the family instead of going to school. But he had some rudimentary education.

INT: Um, so what, what happened in Hong Kong in terms of the American generals? I know there was a consul general in Hong Kong, consul general in Singapore. Um, Virata and Jose have both referred to Aguinaldo's naivete, you know, with regard to American promises. Could you tell a little bit about what happened in terms of their promises and also your sort of take on how he reacted to American intentions?

CAMAGAY: Well, ah, probably ...

DIRECTIONAL

CAMAGAY: Ah, well, probably, ahm, Aguinaldo never knew about, ah, the Americans, existence of the Americans, or the brewing Spanish-American War that was at that time. But he got to know of it when he went to Singapore because he was, ah, left Hong Kong secretly to go to Singapore to avoid a lawsuit, ah, because a Filipino was asking for one-half of the, ah, ah, monetary, ah, compensation of the Treaty of -- of Biaknabato. So, well, he was introduced -- Aguinaldo was introduced to, ah, Consul General, ah, Pratt, ah, who was assigned in Singapore and, ah, brought, ah, offered, supposedly, a sort of an alliance between the Filipinos and the Americans, because, ah, they have a common foe, he explained, and these were the Spaniards. So, ah, Aguinaldo apparently asked what is, ah, their -- what do they have, no, in exchange of this alliance. And, ah, they -- Pratt is supposed to have mentioned that we will recognize Philippine independence. And, ah, assured Aguinaldo that since the Philippines is 20,000 miles away from the United States, it had no interest whatsoever in getting the Philippines as a colony. So with that assurance, ah, Aguinaldo was asked to go back to Hong Kong and, ah, board, ah, Dewey's ship which was en route to the Philippines, but Aguinaldo did not, ah, find Dewey because he departed earlier and, ah, therefore, it was Consul Wildman who, ah, met, ah, Aguinaldo and, ah, told him that he was supposed to go to Manila. And, ah, Wildman was given money by Aguinaldo to buy arms and ammunitions and, ah, I think this purchase was -- did materialize, but the second order of arms and ammunitions did not materialize. Now they say -- now if they -- I think if I were going to put myself in the shoes of Aguinaldo, being really naive. You know, he was, ah, just a simple general, ah, in the Philippines, first time to get out of the Philippines, ah, first time to come into contact with Americans. So he took the word of these Americans as, you know, accepted it as true. So, ah, he was basically that kind of a person, a trusting person, a person who believed in the word of honor of people. So, you know, I'm not saying that he was not naive, but he could be naive because of this particular, ah, experience. He had no experience in, ah, diplomacy, no experience in dealing with people, making arrangements like this, hmm?

DIRECTIONAL

INT: Let’s hear about the meeting between Dewey and Aguinaldo. What happened exactly?

CAMAGAY: Well, I really have no, ah, idea what really happened, but I -- I read of impressions of Aguinaldo -- of Dewey, impressions of Dewey of Aguinaldo. That, ah, he, at the onset, had a very high opinion of Aguinaldo, ah, but little by little, ah, during, I think, a congressional investigation, made, ah, when Dewey went back to the United States, there seemed to have a change in opinion. And, ah, I think this is also the root of, ahm, the growing disillusionment of the Filipinos with Americans, because they were very, ah, optimistic of, ah, the promise of Filipino recog-- of American recognition of Philippine independence, but, ah, later events, ah, were happening that, ah, the Americans, ah, had no intention of, ah, honoring their word that, ah, they would recognize Philippine independence. No?

INT: Now what, when troops under General Anderson and Merritt soon after, came and landed on the Philippines, what was, ah, the reaction? What was the interaction between Filipinos and US troops? How did they react to one another?

CAMAGAY: Well, ah, so basically, ah, with the Dewey, he could not really, ahm, ah, do a land occupation of the Philippines because he had a navy man with him. So -- and at the time I think the United States was not yet clear as to what they really wanted of the Philippines, whether to, ah, get the Philippines or not, and if it's going to get the Philippines, what part of the Philippines, just the port, the harbor of Manila and leave the rest of islands to other foreign powers. So, they were really also in a quandary as to, ah, to what to do exactly, though some historiography would say no, they were there, this was deliberate. Anyway, it looks like, ah, for me, there was that, ah, moment that they really didn't know what to do. Now so little by little enforcements were coming when probably the American government decided what really to do with the Philippines. And, of course, this would create some friction between the Filipinos and the Americans, because, ahm, Aguinaldo would come out with proclamations that, ahm, that the whole of the archipelago was already in the hands of Filipinos and Intramuros was the only one left to be taken. And, ah, what was hap-- what happened in the surrender in the mock battle of Intramuros was that, ah, trenches were now being made, ah, surrounding Intramuros and, ahm, the Filipinos were in the first line of the trenches. And, ah, behind them were the Americans. Now, ah, the Spaniards who were now hold inside Intramuros were trying to negotiate with the Filipinos, ah, promising them reforms, et cetera, et cetera. But the Filipinos already decided that they didn't want to have anything to do with, ah, the Spaniards. Now what the Amer-- the Spaniards did, they had negotiations with Americans, that there would -- the negotiations resulted that a mock battle would take place and that, ah, for that to be successful, the Filipinos had to leave their trenches and give their place to the Americans, because the Spaniards made it very clear that they wanted to surrender to the Americans and not to the Filipinos. And they wanted it clear that no Filipinos would enter Intramuros.

INT: Why was that?

CAMAGAY: Well, ah, imagine in -- a former colonial power, it would be very dishonorable for Spaniards whose, who, ah, who honor, no, who value honor, it would be very, ah, demeaning for them to surrender to -- to a former colonial.

DIRECTIONAL

INT: How the US troops sort of saw the Filipinos, the troops themselves.

DIRECTIONAL

CAMAGAY: Okay. So, ah, this, ah, the relations between the Filipino and, ah, Spanish -- the American soldiers, ah, actually there would be, ahm, directives from Aguinaldo to -- to telling the Filipinos soldiers to be more patient. You know, ahm, ah, as much as possible avoid conflict, you know, with the American soldiers. So, ah, that was the policy of -- of Aguinaldo. And, ah, the Filipino soldiers apparently hated this policy, ah, but, you know, it's also, ahm, if you take a look at the other sources, like the French consular dispatches. So the French consul also was, ah, a witness to this happening and, ah, well, he was also quite critical of American soldiers, because he would say that, ahm, they would just enter the homes of Filipinos and then just play the piano. And for this -- because these are cultural, no? So if, ah, you know-- in the Filipino culture, you just don't enter the house and, you know, play the piano. But, ah, they were rather shocked by these, ah, things. So these were -- in other words, American soldiers, in their mind, whose actions or activations were not -- were not refined. They find -- they found that as an observation. But, ah, ah, to -- to -- as a whole, the Filipino soldiers were really quite, ah, respectful, you know, of this directive of Aguinaldo. That's why when the February 4 outbreak of the fil-- Spanish-Amer-- Filipino-American war, Aguinaldo immediately told, ah, the head of the occupied forces here in the Philippines that, ah, "Let's talk this out," but apparently the reply was, "Well, it has started. Let's go on with it."

INT: How did -- so tensions between the treaty ...

DIRECTIONAL

INT: Why does fighting break out in February?

CAMAGAY: Well, the -- according to the -- the narration of the incident, ah, because Manila was already divided into lines, what was American line and what was Filipino line, apparently there was this Filipino soldier who was approaching the -- the line of the Americans and, ah, he was given the -- a warning of halt. Now a Filipino soldier was not understand the word "halt". So ignoring that warning, continued, no? He continued, ah, to move towards the American lines. And, ah, that was how, you know, firing -- the Americans fired from their end and, ah, there was now a reply on the Filipino end. And, ah, but Aguinaldo, upon learning about this particular incident, wanted to isolate it is as much as possible and not to escalate the -- the conflict, but that was, ah, reply, that "It has started and it might as well go on."

INT: Yeah. Now during this time how would you characterize -- I know Otis was, was the governor general of the US military. How would you characterize American military leadership at the time? A lot of people compare it to Vietnam, ah, in that, you know, they didn't really keep in touch with -- they sort of censored the press, they, ah, exaggerated about American successes. Can you sort of go into that a little bit?

CAMAGAY: Well, that's we -- what we also hear from, ah, the sources, ah, the critical sources in the Philippine-American war from the American side, that, ah, it was Otis who really ordered strict censorship of press releases coming from the Philippines, because, well, ah, it was also election year in the United States. President McKinley was very much concerned with American opinion and he didn't want, ah, that to affect his candidacy for the Presidency. So very positive things were reported about, ah, the Philippines, that the insurrection would, ah, be contained in a very short time, et cetera. But actually it did prolong, go on, despite these, ahm, press releases of things being under control.

INT: Also Aguinaldo and a lot of the leadership of the rebels -- the revolutionaries were getting sort of misrepresentations of what the general mood in the United States was in terms of Bryan might beat McKinley back in 1900. Can you talk about the source of the misconception on the part of Aguinaldo?

CAMAGAY: Ah, that ah ...Bryan, ah, was supportive of, ah ...

INT: Or that he might win?

CAMAGAY: He might win. Therefore, the imperialist -- anti-imperialists, ah -- well, I really, ah, have no idea about, ah, how far Aguinaldo was being fed with this information, because, ahm, ah, clearly, ah, with the -- Philippines there, there was, there would be two camps in the United States, those who were in favor of getting the Philippines, ah, with, of course, all the lobby groups there, and those who were against, like the Democrats were against and the anti-imperialist leagues, no? Now how far of that kind of discourse trickled down in the level of Aguinaldo is another question, because apparently this would be, ah, a discourse done, ah, and prevailing among the, ah -- the, ah, ideologues of the revolution. But, ah, probably if we take a look at the proclamations of Aguinaldo, there would be some inkling, but I doubt whether he had a grasp of this particular discourse.

DIRECTIONAL

INT: So sometime in this period -- this is while Aguinaldo was awaiting this election, or at least that's my understanding of it, because the anti-imperialists might win, the US might get out of the Philippines -- Aguinaldo changed his tactics in terms of warfare. Could you describe that change and why it took place and what it really involved?

CAMAGAY: Well, actually, ah, the -- the use of guerrilla warfare is, ah, one of the things that they already -- or Aguinaldo already toyed with in the light of a scarcity of arms and ammunition. You can not really do conventional warfare in this particular time. So the scarcity of arms and ammunitions forced Aguinaldo, he came out with a proclamation that then on, we are now going to resort to guerrilla warfare. And, ah, well, ah, there are accounts which say that in the light of scarcity of arms and ammunitions, there would be one line of Filipinos there facing the Americans when they fall. Another line of Filipinos get the guns and then face the Americans, ah, like the first line. So it, ah, was, I think, a tactic or a strategy which made long the -- the insurrection or the war, the Philippine-American war, the use of this tactic.

INT: Okay. I'm going to jump back pretty significantly because there’s something I’d just like to bring up. There’s something I forgot to ask you. Um, I want to talk a little about the, ah, temporary government organized in Malolos. When did that happen and why did the US sort of pick on the fact that Filipinos were in fact capable of self-government after this? If you could just define what happened there briefly and then say if there was any US reaction to it at all or if it was completely ignored.

CAMAGAY: Well, ah, things would really happen starting, ah, May in the Battle of Manila Bay. June 12th, there was declaration of Philippine independence by Aguinaldo in Cavite. And, ah, ah, by August or September they were now thinking of a, ah, Malolos Congress. The Malolos Congress was first perceived as an advisory body to Aguinaldo because he made a proclamation calling all the bright people to help him, ah, run the government. So it was per-- conceived first as an advisory body until there was now the plan to make this congress draft a constitution. So, ah, the, the congress, therefore, became a constitutional body to draft a constitution and they did draft a constitution which was the Malolos, ah, Constitution. Now, ah, what were the Americans, ah -- how did they perceive this? Well, I think they intentionally did not, ah -- they did not -- they did not -- they were not present. They were invited in the inauguration of the Malolos Republic, but they did not come. Ah, they were also invited in the June 12th declaration of Philippine independence. Except for one American, who, I think, went there in individual capacity, the Americans also did not go. So, ah, I think at this point in time, the Americans purposely did not, ah, personally go to these, ah, events which were very important to the Filipinos because, ah, going there would mean recognition of, ah, Philippine independence and also the inauguration of the Malolos Republic.

INT: And also on July 4th, Aguinaldo did not attend some sort of Fourth of July celebration that was taking place?

CAMAGAY: No. No. Mm-hm. July 4th celebration in the Philippines?

INT: Yeah. You know, that the US soldiers were having at the time or something?

CAMAGAY: Well, ah, I don't know if they were invitations, ah, sent, ah, to Aguinaldo, but, ah, if, ah, if we go into the context of Aguinaldo trying to really have good relations with Americans, he could have sent -- he could have gone himself or sent a representative.

INT: Yeah.

DIRECTIONAL

INT: One last question. When Roosevelt was President year later, he referred to the Philippines as an achilles heel in terms of US defense. Can you talk a little bit about what he meant by that, not only from the US perspective, strategy in terms of (Unintell.) halfway around the world, but also in terms of, you know, the Filipino perspective, that it couldn't be governed necessarily from so far away and, therefore, it sort of represented the failure of the imperialists.

CAMAGAY: Well, ah, if it was considered an achilles heel by the Americans, ah, they could have easily left, scuttled the Philippines, but, ah, when we consider the geopolitics at that time, ah, it -- the Americans felt it still had a value, a strategic value at that, and, therefore, they were not willing to, ah, give it up, ah. The 1930s during the -- the Depression, that's when again that issue of the Philippines becoming an achilles heel comes again, because, ah, there was, ah, Japanese expansionism in Asia and, ah, defending the Philippines was really going to be a liability -- I mean the Philippines was a liability than an asset because they were constrained to defend the Philippines and, ah, well, ah, that was good for the Filipinos because, ahm, the independence mission sent to the US at the time was successful in getting an independence law for the Philippines, ah, because, ah, the Tidings-MacDuffy Law, ah, stated that the Philippines would be, ah, set free or would be given independence after a ten-year transition period, no? So it was good for the Filipinos.

INT: Yeah.

DIRECTIONAL

END INTERVIEW

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