Report to HRCP on May 12



A watershed

May 12 2007 will go down as a watershed event in Karachi’s history. It was the day when the Chief Justice of Pakistan, Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry, who was facing a presidential reference, was to attend the Golden Jubilee celebrations of the Supreme Court. The day will be remembered, however, for murders and mayhem and generalized violence that was witnessed on the roads, streets and lanes of the largest metropolis of Pakistan. About fifty people lost their lives, hundreds were injured, and property worth millions of rupees was destroyed.

The aftermath of the events of May 12 has been filled with recrimination and bitterness. There were mutually conflicting claims about responsibility and culpability, and attempts at initiating processes of legal and political accountability. This report does not presume to pre-empt or anticipate the outcomes of the processes of accountability that have been initiated in the courts and elsewhere. Its aim is more limited. It attempts to create a record based on newspaper reports, testimonies and accounts provided by eyewitnesses and affidavits relating to the events in Karachi on May 12. Much of the material used in this report is already in the public domain. In the politically charged atmosphere that prevailed in the city, “facts” became contested almost as soon as they were first reported.

This report does not start with a particular brief for or against any actor. As a starting position, it takes at face value what was said, observed and reported. It tries to corroborate various factual accounts through a method of triangulation wherever possible. Where there appear to be unresolved contradictions between various accounts of the same event, the conflicting accounts are reported. The report does, however, provide analysis of events, patterns of action, and the responses of various players present or active in the events of May 12. It is hoped that the factual reporting and the analysis provided here will be augmented, improved and corrected as more witnesses and stakeholders come forward and provide their inputs into the report.

1. Leading up to May 12

1.1 Rising Political Tension

War of words:

The period leading up to May 12 saw rising political tensions. The Chief Justice’s (CJ) programme to visit Karachi received wide publicity from around May 5 onwards when he made the 26-hour long road journey in a mammoth procession from Islamabad to Lahore. The chain of events in Karachi began to unfold after the announcement of the CJ’s visit to Karachi on May 12th to address the Sindh High Court Bar Association in connection with the 50th anniversary of the Supreme Court. The chronology of events as it developed is as follows:

The MQM (Muttahida Qaumi Movement, a party that is part of the ruling coalition in Sindh and at the centre and is generally considered as the government in Karachi) held a press conference and demonstration at the Karachi Press Club on May 5th evening against what they claimed was the politicization of the CJ case[1]. In the press conference, MQM leader Shoaib Bokhari said: “This constitutional issue of the presidential reference has been converted into a political issue by the opposition parties and certain lawyers’ organisations which are trying to create a crisis-like situation in the country for their ulterior political motives,”

The same evening, three independent television news channels went off the air in Karachi, Hyderabad and Nawabshah, blocking the live coverage of the CJ’s caravan from Islamabad to Lahore. Officials of the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (Pemra) denied any instructions had been issued to stop the transmission of the channels. They said that these channels were not seen only in southern parts of Sindh, and if Pemra had issued any instructions, the transmission would have been blocked all over the country. There were accusations that a political party in the ruling coalition had forced cable operators to stop transmission of the channels. However, MQM denied having played any role in the blocking of the transmission[2].

On May 6th, the Sindh PPP (opposition party) General Secretary, Nafees Siddiqui, stated in a press conference that ARD (Alliance for Restoration of Democracy, formed by opposition parties) and civil society organizations would accord a historic welcome to the CJ. The Sindh ANP (opposition party having strong influence among Pakhtuns who have a large population in Karachi) President, Shahi Syed also announced that the people of Sindh would warmly welcome the CJ on his arrival on May 12 and that a central reception camp would be set up at Natha Khan Goth from where their rally would proceed towards the airport[3].

On May 8th, MQM founder Altaf Hussain addressed party workers from London and said: “… if conspiracies are hatched to end the present democratically elected Government then each and every worker of Muttahida Qaumi Movement … will stand firm and defend the democratic government.” He also announced the holding of an MQM rally on May 12th, the day the CJ was to arrive.

On May 9th, Sindh Home Secretary Brigadier Ghulam Mohammed Mohtaram wrote a letter to the Registrar of the Supreme Court requesting that the CJ postpone his visit to Karachi. The letter stated that the event, which otherwise would have been an event exclusively for the judiciary and the bar was drawing political interest; that all political parties, including those in the opposition and the government, were planning to hold rallies on that day; and that tension in the city was on the rise and law-enforcement and security agencies were unanimous in their assessment that there could be armed clashes and bloodshed. In response, the CJ’s chief counsel Aitzaz Ahsan reiterated that the CJ would attend the programme in Karachi as scheduled[4].

There followed a spate of statements by political leaders from all sides in the build-up to May 12. On May 9th, PML-N (opposition party) Secretary-General Iqbal Zafar Jhagra declared that the lawyers campaign was a national movement for the independence of the judiciary and rule of law and nobody can stop it. He urged the MQM to change its May 12 rally in order avoid any untoward situation. Later in the day, in an address to the Karachi Bar Association, Iqbal Jhagra warned the government that any obstacle in the way of the peaceful rally on the arrival of the Chief Justice would not be tolerated[5]. Some MQM ministers, such as Babar Ghauri, were recalled from vacations for the party rally.

On May 10th, several opposition legislators in the National Assembly charged that there had been aerial firing throughout the night in Karachi and, expressing apprehensions about a clash on May 12, called upon the MQM to call off their rally[6].

The MQM responded the next day. FarooqSattar, Deputy Convener of the MQM Rabita Committee, charged that the opposition rally on May 12 would be illegal and unconstitutional and accused the opposition of mischief[7]. He further said that the opposition had brought the CJ’s issue on to the streets and the MQM has only accepted the challenge and will show the world its strength[8]

The abject hostility of the MQM, one of the coalition partners in the Sindh government, to the CJ and the opposition had ominous overtones, as indicated by the choice of language. Even as the bloody day of May 12 was waning, Waseem Akhter, Advisor to the Sindh Chief Minister on Home Affairs accused the Chief Justice of taking tea at the airport while people were being killed[9]. And his chief, Altaf Husain – speaking from London – said: “Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammed Chaudhry, the Sindh Home Secretary requested you to postpone your visit, but you didn’t listen. You stuck to your decision of coming here, and because of you, a number of people were killed. Are you satisfied now?”[10]

There were conciliatory statements too. MQM founder Altaf Hussain instructed his supporters to remain peaceful[11]. MQM Deputy Convenor Farooq Sattar said that there was no chance of a clash between the rival rallies. This was also echoed by PML-Q (the main party in the ruling coalition) President Chaudhry Shujaat[12]. On the other side, Bar association leaders announced that only lawyers should come to the High Court and that political party workers and the general public should maintain their distance from the lawyers’ contingent[13]. This appeared to be a concession to the MQM, whose main criticism of the lawyer’s movement was that it was being use by political parties for their own agendas. At the end of the day, however, it appears that conciliation failed to prevail.

From words to action:

By May 10th, the war of words had graduated to limited action on the ground. Several incidents – some of them apparently unrelated to the rival rallies -- were reported that indicated rising tensions in the city.

Early on May 10th, unidentified gunmen fired on the house of the Supreme Court Bar Association (SCBA) President. Munir Malik and bullets narrowly missed his daughter[14]. The same day, the Karachi Building Control Authority (KBCA) sealed the private law office of Munir Malik, President of the Supreme Court Bar Association (SCBA) on the grounds that there were violations of building law regulations. The Sindh High Court promptly ordered the premises unsealed.

The same day, two alleged terrorists were arrested from the Korangi area who said that they belonged to MQM Haqiqi and that their party had directed them to carry out terrorist actions on May 12.[15]. The “Pasban” organization called for a shutter down strike in parts of the city on May 11th to protest against power failures and street crime[16]. One person was killed in the Falaknaz Apartments area on Sharah-e-Faisal in a clash between those calling for a shutter down and those resisting it[17]. Malik Amir, a private security guard at a Western Union mobile shop on Shahra-e-Faisal was shot dead by 5 unidentified men when he refused to shut down the shop[18].

Police removed reception camps set up by opposition parties in connection with the rally of the Chief Justice in parts of the city. Capital City Police Officer Azhar Farooqui said that the reception camps were removed under an administrative order by the home department. However, the Chief Minister’s Adviser on Home Affairs Wasim Akhtar said the reception camps were removed irrespective of party affiliations[19].

On May 11th, there was also a drive-by shooting near Abbasi Market in the Model Colony area at three young men, who were setting up a reception camp. One of the men, Asghar Shah, died on the spot, while the other two – Shioz and Liaquat – were wounded. One report claimed that Ashgar Shah was a former activist of the Punjabi-Pakhtun Ittehad (PPI), another claimed that he was a worker of PML(N)[20].

The same day, at least 125 people – including members of the PPP, PML-N, MMA and other opposition parties – were arrested for the “public good”[21]. In the early hours of the morning, one lane of Shahrah-e-Quaideen, leading to the Quaid’s Mazar, was found to be dug up. Area residents and shopkeepers claimed that there was no sign till Friday midnight that there was to be any earthwork on the road. Mohammed Arif, KWSB Chief Engineer Zone B-II said that KWSB had no pending work scheduled on the road. Jamshed Town Administration spokesman also expressed ignorance as to who had ordered the digging and why it had been carried out[22].

The same day, armed cadres of a political party hijacked 19 buses belonging to the University of Karachi, NED University of Engineering and Government College of Technology across the city[23].

Due to mounting anxiety, market associations, traders, and transporters decided to close for business on May 12. And in a late night announcement, the Sindh government declared May 12th a public holiday[24]. Fearing violence, the Sindh Home Department declared emergency at the seven public-sector hospitals in the city[25]. Even the Sindh High Court, acting on a petition, ordered the federal and provincial governments to provide complete security to the CJ wherever he desires to go during his visit to Karachi on Saturday.[26]

1.2 Official Security Plan

Given widespread explicit concerns in official, opposition as well as private circles that there might be violent clashes in Karachi between rival supporters of political parties on May 12, several types of official responses were discerned from press statements.

The Home Affairs Advisor articulated two distinct types of security threats that were expected on May 12. First, there was a possibility of a suicide bombing by a network of terrorists, which he said the government was trying to break. Second, he felt that there might be violence if charged supporters of the opposing rallies came face to face[27].

The letter from the Federal Interior Secretary, Syed Kamal Shah, to the Registrar of the Supreme Court cited three types of security threats: (a) clashes between rival rallies; (b) targeted attacks on key government and opposition leaders; (c) terrorist ambushes of rallies.[28] Reportedly, this letter did not refer to the threat of a suicide bomb attack.

A high-ranking group at the Governor’s House was monitoring the situation on a daily basis.[29] This group included the Governor, the Chief Minister, the provincial advisor on Home Affairs, and senior officials of law enforcement agencies.

Details of the security plan were not made public; however, press reports indicated some specific actions. These included the division of policing activities in the entire city into three zones, each headed by a DIG, the deployment of and patrolling by Rangers and police, and installations of CCTV cameras and aerial surveillance at various locations, including Sharah-e-Faisal. It was specified that Section 144 was not imposed[30].

Interestingly, one report as early as May 7th had recounted that the government had decided to fix cameras around the city courts for complete monitoring of the CJ during his arrival in the city on May 12 and, further, that a monitoring device with a range of 5-kilometre distance, which could also tape a voice, would also be fixed at the main gates of the city courts.

At a meeting on May 11, apparently at the Governor’s House, several “security” and “political” options were discussed for preventing confrontation between rival rallies of supporters of the CJ and the MQM respectively. The “security” options included offering a bulletproof vehicle, identifying potential points of conflict between the rival rallies, stationing Rangers and paramilitary forces at those points, and placing security forces in a state of high alert[31]. The “political” options included delaying the Chief Justice’s flight, requesting the CJ to return due to the tense situation, offering to fly him to the city centre in a helicopter, and allowing his supporters to take him in a rally after the end of the MQM rally[32]. Interestingly, all of the various options reported in the press take it for granted that the MQM would not be asked to make any changes to its plans.

1.2.1 Commandeering of Vehicles and setting Roadblocks

The most conspicuous “security” preparation for May 12 was the commandeering of vehicles and the setting up of roadblocks in various parts of the city from the evening of May 11 onwards. Commandeered vehicles included container trucks and trailers, trucks, water-tankers, Suzuki pick-ups, coaches, buses, mini-buses, and rickshaws. The commandeered vehicles were placed strategically to block roads, streets and lanes and their tyres were deflated to prevent them form being moved.

As referred to earlier, between 7:00-7:30 am of May 11th, 19 buses belonging to the University of Karachi, NED University and Government College of Technology were hijacked by armed MQM cadres from Gulshan-e-Iqbal, Jamshed Quarters, Karimabad, Korangi Road, Malir Jinnah Square, National Highway, Nazimabad Board Office, Nazimabad Petrol Pump, New Karachi, North Nazimabad, Numaish Chowrangi, Shahrah-e-Faisal, and University Road. The drivers were also taken away along with the buses[33].

Armed MQM workers also commandeered a large number of private vehicles from transporters and other tradesmen. In most cases, owners or drivers of the vehicles were instructed to remain with their vehicles. This was done in an organized way with “military” precision. MQM unit offices collected the vehicles, along with their documents, and parked the vehicles at designated collection points.

According to Ashiq Husain Khan Niazi, General Secretary of Karachi Goods Carrier Association, armed persons in the presence of police and rangers seized heavy transport at gunpoint. According to Maddad Khan, General Secretary of the KPT Transport Carrier Association, armed groups started lifting vehicles at gunpoint from Landhi, Malir, Ghani Chowrangi, Ranchore Lines, Baloch Colony, Port Qasim and other areas from Friday afternoon till Saturday early morning. According to Amir Kalam of the Karachi Trucks, Trailers and Brokers Association, when their organization contacted the Inspector-General of Police, he expressed his helplessness[34].

Suzuki pick-ups and rickshaws were commandeered by MQM’s local unit offices from tradesmen in the surrounding localities of Bohra Peer, Ranchhore Lines, etc.[35] The commandeered vehicles were used to blockade key roads and access point in the city.

The Sindh government had ordered Shahrah-e-Faisal, the road from the airport that the Chief Justice would have to take to proceed to the city, and all link roads to be declared as a ‘no-go’ area for workers and supporters of opposition political parties. It also ordered the police to arrest every person on Shahrah-e-Faisal found with party flags and/or portraits of party leaders[36].

It placed the commandeered vehicles to block Shahrah-e-Faisal and all its intersections and link roads; rendering it completely inaccessible to motorists and even to motorcyclists[37]. The access to the airport from the city center was blocked at Natha Khan Bridge near Drigh Road Station. Heavy contingents of police were present and the police beat several people, protesting against the setting up of the barricades. Containers were laid across Shahrah-e-Faisal at various points between the airport and COD. Vehicles were also parked across Korangi Road at various points. A container truck was parked across the city-bound carriageway on Clifton Road before Teen Talwar junction. Both carriageways of the Clifton Bridge were blocked using mini-buses.[38]

Roads around Quaid-e-Azam’s Mazar as well as approaches to M.A. Jinnah Road were also blocked at various points south of Civil Hospital. Vehicles were also placed between M.A. Jinnah Road and I.I. Chundrigar Road. In some cases, roadblocks were more makeshift, e.g., moveable steel fences were used, so that roadblocks could be moved quickly and easily. MQM cadres had taken over the task of directing traffic.[39]

Road blocks, using containers, rickshaws and moveable steel fences, were placed by the police on all access roads leading to the Sindh High Court The area around City Courts on M.A. Jinnah Road was barricaded using smaller vehicles – mostly, Suzuki pickups.[40]

1.3 Evaluating the Security Plan

From reported statements it is clear that the authorities identified at least four distinct types of security threats on May 12. These were articulated by responsible officials in the days leading up to May 12. The four types of security threats that were identified were:

1. Clashes between rival supporters and their rallies

1. Targeted assassination attempts on key individuals

1. Suicide bomb attack on CJ and members of his entourage

1. Terrorist ambushes of political rallies

It appears that three types of security measures were taken.

1. Dissuade the CJ from making the trip to Karachi, or to modify his programme. This it appears was the primary focus of the efforts of government functionaries.

1. Place police contingents along the routes of the rallies and use helicopters and CCTVs for surveillance; with additional police contingents and Rangers acting as backup.

1. Pre-emptive measures such as the declaration of a public holiday and emergency alerts at hospitals.

The most significant preparation for the day was the setting up of roadblocks and barricades on various roads and streets in different parts of the city. This was also admitted by Home Affairs Advisor Wasim Akhtar in a subsequent TV interview. Roadblocks and barricades could only possibly deal with the first of the four types of security threats identified by the various functionaries in the lead up to May 12, i.e., the possibility of a clash between rival rallies. This particular security threat appears to have received much of the attention of officials. As such, it is useful to examine the points where this threat was the most acute.

There was considerable confusion about the route plan of the various rallies. In the case of the CJ, at least two parameters were fixed. He was to arrive at the airport and end up at the Sindh High Court. In addition, it was expected that he would address the Malir District Bar and pay a visit to the Quaid’s Mazar. His movement, therefore, was mostly to be along the National Highway/Sharah-e-Faisal axis.

The MQM had announced that it would hold its rally at Tibet Centre on M.A. Jinnah Road and that it would use Numaish and Quaid’s Mazar as collection points. It further announced that its supporters will arrive at Tibet Centre from two separate directions: one, along the main thoroughfares from Liaqatabad and Nazimabad via Guru Mandir and, two, along National Highway/Sharah-e-Faisal via Shahrah-e-Quaideen. The MQM claimed that it needed the latter route in order to bring its supporters from eastern parts of Karachi, including from Thatta and Badin areas.

Potentially, there were several flashpoints where the CJ’s and MQM’s supporters might have crossed each other’s paths en route to their respective destinations, either in processions, groups or individually. However, two points of potential conflict that emerged were National Highway/Sharah-e-Faisal and Quaid’s Mazar. These were the two locations where the rival rallies were likely to cross and face one another head on. For the CJ’s supporters from Lyari, for example, the most direct route to the airport would have been through “MQM lines” along M.A. Jinnah Road. Those coming from northern parts of the city, the most direct route to the airport would cut across “MQM lines” along the Nazimabad and Liaqatabad corridors. Thus, while it was possible to find alternative routes around other possible points of confrontation along these routes, there was little possibility of avoiding contact between the rallies along National Highway/Sharah-e-Faisal and Quaid’s Mazar.

If the main security threat was perceived to arise from a clash between supporters of the two rival rallies, the focus of the security plan ought to have to keep the two rallies apart – possibly by creating buffers of police and Rangers between them along Shara-e-Faisal and at Quaid’s Mazar.

Securing Quaid’s Mazar was likely to have been less challenging than policing National Highway/Sharah-e-Faisal. The Quaid’s Mazar is one single location, albeit over a fairly large area. However, it is ringed by wide double roads on all four sides and it might have been possible to allocate one road on either side to each of the two rallies; along with a large presence of law enforcement personnel acting as a buffer between the two segments.

The National Highway/Sharah-e-Faisal corridor would have been a more challenging route to secure. It was known that the CJ’s supporters would converge at Karachi Airport from two sides – some coming from the National Highway end from Gulshan-e-Hadeed, Quaidabad, Landhi and Malir, while others arriving from the city along Sharah-e-Faisal. MQM supporters would also need to use the same route and turn left onto Sharah-e-Quaideen to proceed towards the Quaid’s Mazar. The CJ’s supporters would have to take the same route if they also intended to go to the Quaid’s Mazar. The challenge would be to keep the rival processions separate while they were both headed in the same direction for most of their journeys.

Incidentally, experience was not lacking. The task of securing the Sharah-e-Faisal-Quaid’s Mazar route would, in effect, have been similar to the policing of separate and potentially conflicting Shia and Sunni processions along M.A. Jinnah Road during Moharram. The city police have been eminently successful in maintaining peace by ensuring that there is a time-lag between the Shia and the Sunni processions. The Shia procession has already dispersed by the time the main Sunni processions start entering MA Jinnah Road.

There are three salient aspects in the securing of Muharram processions in Karachi:

a) maintenance of a time-lag between processions traveling in the same direction

a) prior planning and cooperation between leaders of both sides, and

a) active presence of law enforcement personnel as the principal mediators between rival groups.

Unfortunately, however, if the authorities feared violent clashes between rival rallies as the main security threat, the lessons of Muharram policing appear not have been much in evidence in the preparation for May 12. In fact, some of the known preparations for May 12th were in direct contradiction to the lessons of successful policing of Moharram processions. While there is some logic in setting up roadblocks and barricades to channel rival processions away from one another and to restrict the number of entry points into the main procession route, the setting up of barriers across the main route of the rallies – i.e., on Sharah-e-Faisal – appeared to make no sense at all. Rather than facilitating the passage of the two rival rallies, the barriers actually ensured that none of the rallies could actually pass.

There is no evidence either of a serious attempt at negotiating a time-lag between the two potential rival rallies. There was an indication that among the options being considered by the government one included allowing the CJ to move from the airport after the MQM rally had ended. It is not known if this option was pursued with any seriousness. There is also no evidence that the authorities made any attempt to persuade the MQM to alter the route or timing of its proposed rallies along the National Highway/Sharah-e-Faisal corridor. As it turned out, there was no MQM rally along the National Highway/Sharah-e-Faisal corridor towards the Quaid’s Mazar and M.A. Jinnah Road. It is, therefore, quite likely that the authorities had already decided that there would not be any rival rallies along the route. The objective, it then appears, was to obstruct opposition rallies.

The roadblocks were also the wrong instruments for dealing with the other three security threats, as perceived by authorities. Again, as the experience of VVIP movement along the Shara-e-Faisal corridor shows, avoiding any of the three kinds of threats requires blocking of entry onto Sharah-e-Faisal from the side roads and unimpeded flow of traffic along the corridor. While the former procedure was carried out, i.e., entry onto Sharah-e-Faisal from the side roads was restricted, the placing of barriers across Shahrah-e-Faisal created ideal conditions for an assassin, a suicide bomber or a terrorist aiming to target or ambush anyone.

2. Flashpoints on May 12 and After

At least 34 people were killed and 140 injured on May 12th alone as parts of Karachi turned into battlegrounds[41]. The main areas that saw fierce clashes between rival groups were along the National Highway/Shahrah-e-Faisal corridor, as well as in other parts of the city. The situation was so grim that the Jinnah Postgraduate Medical Centre (JPMC) receptionist asked those enquiring for their loved ones to first check the morgue[42].

An overall picture of the May 12 events is reconstructed in this section using published accounts and individual testimonials of victims and eyewitnesses. An attempt is made to identify flashpoints, or locations where violence and casualties are known to have taken place, and to provide an account of what happened at these various locations during the course of the day.

The earliest reports of violence relate to the difficulties experienced by lawyers in reaching their designated meeting points in the City Courts, the Sindh High Court and the Malir District Courts respectively. This violence was threatening but mostly non-lethal. However, from around midday onwards, many segments of the National Highway/Sharah-e-Faisal corridor experienced intensive use of firearms and a large number of casualties and injuries caused by firing. Violence then spread to other parts of the city from around 1.30 pm onwards, with areas such as Patel Para/Business Recorder Road, Benaras Chowk, Sohrab Goth, Lyari, Keamari, Malir Halt, and Baloch Colony Bridge flaring up and remaining tense through the night and into the next day.

2.1 City Courts

According to eyewitness accounts obtained by HRCP[43], scores of young men – several of them armed and/or carrying MQM banners – surrounded the City Court premises and commandeered vehicles were used to block all entrances and exits to prevent lawyers from going in. However, about 150 lawyers – including several women lawyers – managed to gather at the City Courts. Lawyers reported using a number of means to get pass the MQM pickets. Some changed their clothes from the usual black jacket to other colours and pretended not to be lawyers. Others arrived either the night before or very early in the morning, after parking their vehicles at safe distances and walking past the barricades. However, they found themselves besieged in the City Courts premises and subjected to verbal abuse by picketers. The lawyers contacted DSP Malik Manzar and SHOs of City Court and Risala police stations for security, but to no avail.

The lawyers attempted to march towards the Sindh High Court in the form of a rally in order to join their colleagues already gathered there, with the intent to proceed from there to the airport to receive the CJ. The rally was stopped at a barricade created by placing a container across the road. Some of the lawyers managed to reach as far as the Paper Market, but had to retreat when the MQM picketers began to fire in the air. The rally began to disperse, but the picketers caught up with some of the lawyers and subjected them to physical abuse. Two women lawyers were slapped and pushed around and their clothes torn. One lawyer was beaten up and had his motorcycle, money and mobile phone snatched from him. Another was caught and a motorcycle was run over his leg causing a fracture. Some lawyers then hid in the City Courts Bar Room, while others hid in a law chamber nearby. The lawyers remained besieged by armed MQM activists, some of whom set fire to the Women’s Bar Room in the City Courts.[44]

The lawyers requested the police to call the Rangers because they did not have confidence in the police’s ability to protect them. At about 3.45pm, DSP Malik Manzar informed them that he had orders from “above” that he could not help us; but at about 4.30pm, he called again to assure security, but asked the lawyers to leave the City Courts. Finally, on the intervention of Justice Sarmad Jalal Usmani, the Town Police Officer phoned to say that the Rangers would not come, but that the lawyers could leave in police mobiles. At about 5:00pm, the lawyers were taken from the City Courts to Sindh High Court. On the way, armed MQM picketers hurled abuses at them in the presence of the police, who failed to take any notice.

2.2 Sindh High Court (SHC)

There was a meeting between Sindh High Court Bar Association offcials led by its President, Abrar Hasan, and Preedy/Saddar police officials led by Jam Zafarullah Dharejo on May 10th in the Sindh High Court Conference Room to discuss security arrangements for May 12th. Among other measures, it was decided that only inner and outer gates at Passport Office side would be used for entry and exit. Accordingly, police had blocked the roads leading to and around the Sindh High Court to prevent access.

However, according to eyewitnesses, the Sindh High Court was literally taken over by about 2,500 MQM armed activists.[45] Some of the High Court judges had to leave their official cars and make their way through intimidating activists and climb over the court’s back wall in order to reach their chambers. Some lawyers, attempting to enter the building, were reportedly verbally and physically abused. At about 09:00am, CJ Sindh High Court arrived in his car. According to eyewitness reports, alleged MQM workers gathered around his car, restricted his movement towards the High Court and started hitting his car.   However, lawyers interfered and thus he managed to enter the building.

The 300-plus lawyers who had managed to reach the High Court premises implored the CJ to provide protection from the menacing crowd. Accordingly, he summoned the IG Sindh and Home Secretary. One report said that the Corps Commander and DG Rangers were also summoned, but declined to appear on account of the security situation[46].  Only the IG Sindh and Home Secretary came, but claimed they were unable to do anything. At noon, according to an eyewitness, the provincial Minster of Transport telephoned the President of the SHCBA and said that the CJ should go back because their lives could be in danger from the protesting crowds. There is a slight gap in reporting between the afternoon and the lifting of the blockade; therefore, it is not known how some of the lawyers left the SHC. The blockade of the SHC was finally lifted at 8.00 pm when lawyers and others CJ supporters were allowed to enter the Court compound.[47]

Mohammed Tahir Naveed, Town Police Officer (TPO) Saddar, in his deposition before the Sindh High Court[48] confirmed the decisions reached at the above meeting, denied that “the entire High Court premises was surrounded by a mob”, but also admitted that “Unfortunately, some miscreants managed to reach the controlled entry point and accosted bona fide users of the Sindh High Court. As a result some advocates and members of the staff, faced uncalled for inconvenience which is regretted.”

2.3 Malir District Court

According to eyewitnesses,[49] roads to the Malir District Court were blocked from 7 am onwards. Some lawyers had to walk there, as rickshaws were not taking people to the area. Many of them did not wear the black jacket to avoid harassment. One female lawyer reportedly did not wear her uniform and instead wore an off-white suit and hijab so that no one would harass her on the way to the Malir District Court. Some lawyers were stopped by armed MQM activists at Quaidabad. President of the Malir Bar, Zahoor Hussain Mahar was badly beaten, and his car was damaged. Flags and banners in his car, meant for the protest, were also taken away.[50] He was rescued by some lawyers and brought to the Malir District Courts in an injured state at around 10 am. Some lawyers who had already reached the Courts managed to contact SHO Jameel Akhtar of Shah Lateef Town to intervene, but to no avail.

The main roadblocks affecting the Malir area were in Quaidabad. Traffic from Landhi, Quaidabad, Gulshan-e-Hadeed, Steel Mills and from cities and towns in Thatta and Badin districts needs to pass through the Quaidabad junction in order to get to Malir and onwards to Karachi city centre. Although this area was far away from the planned venue of the MQM public meeting, the party had announced that it would use this route in order to bring its supporters from these very areas into the city. The CJ supporters had planned to bring rallies through this route too. In fact, the Quaidabad junction was blockaded by armed MQM cadres. Testimonies of a number of Malir lawyers, and the experience of the president of the Malir Bar ( Zahoor Hussain) attest to this. There was violence in other parts of Quaidabad too. In particular, the house of Zahoor Hussain came under fire early in the day.

By around 10.30am, about 150 lawyers had gathered at the Malir District Court. Supporters of political parties were gathered outside the courts as it had been decided that only lawyers would be allowed to enter. Soon news starting coming from the City Courts and SHC that the lawyers gathered there would not be able to reach the airport to receive the CJ. Lawyers at the Malir Court, who had initially planned to receive the CJ at their Court, then decided to go to the airport to meet the CJ there.

Between 11.15-11.30am, lawyers and political activists started marching towards the Airport in order to receive the CJ. Some of the lawyers joined the rally in their vehicles. At Malir-15, they went past armed MQM activists who were chanting slogans. After that point there was a steady presence of MQM activists and vehicles with MQM flags. The lawyers’ rally was accompanied for a while by a police mobile, which suddenly disappeared as the rally went pass Malir railway station. At Kala Board, the road was blocked using buses and other vehicles. The men in the vehicles were all armed. The rally was first fired upon from behind the boundary wall of T&T Colony near the Bhitai Rangers base gate. The initial firing was in the air and of low intensity. The rally participants regrouped and started again. At that stage, MQM activists started firing directly into the rally, particularly at the vehicles.

According to Amanullah, Advocate, he and his two fellow passengers left his vehicle and came out with their arms raised. While the other two lawyers who were with him managed to escape, an MQM activist managed to catch hold of Amanullah and shot at him at point blank range with a pistol. The pistol failed to fire and Amanullah managed to escape. He heard a round fired behind him and saw the bullet strike a political party activist. Amanullah managed to run across a railway gate to a safe spot where some other rally participants were already present. He finally managed to reach a house near Malir Halt by 6:00pm where a number of lawyers and political activists and lawyers were present. At about 6:30pm, the police arrived and escorted the stranded lawyers to Malir Court. The police vehicles also came under fire and MQM activists continued to roam around outside the Courts and fire in the air for some time. Some of the injured were taken to hospital under the protection of media representatives.[51]

According to Syeda Ulfat Shah, when the vehicle in which she was riding came under fire from T&T Colony, near the Bhitai Rangers base, she and her colleagues abandoned their vehicle and raised their arms. Some people called out to them from behind the boundary wall of T&T Colony to come over to them, saying they would not be harmed. When Syeda Shah and her colleagues went over to them, they were made to sit down and one man armed with a pistol was posted to guard them. According to her, the men there had a great amount of firearms and ammunition, including petrol canisters and petrol bombs. The same group had snipers on the upper floors in buildings around T&T Colony, who were receiving instructions on cell phones to fire upon supporters of particular political organizations.[52]

The first reported case of use of hand grenades in an attack on ANP and PML(N) rallies came from Malir Halt. Over 18 people were injured, including PML-N leader Tariq Khan. Because of the firing upon the rally at Malir Halt, many advocates and political workers were not able to proceed further along their route.

2.4 Sharae-Faisal: Aisha Bawany/FTC Flyover

The area between Aisha Bawany School and the FTC flyover on Shahrah-e-Faisal was the site of violence from midday till around 3:00pm. One of the rallies heading towards the airport from the direction of the city centre to welcome the CJ found its way to this point on the Shara-e-Faisal. The rally consisted of an estimated 300-400 vehicles and over five thousand supporters, including women and children, of various political parties. The main constituents of the rally were activists of the PPP and the ANP. There were also other participants who were not directly affiliated with political parties, and these included members of trade unions and community organizations.

According to some accounts there were two main rallies that merged into one as they travelled along Sharah-e-Faisal. One group consisted of PPP leaders and activists most of whom had started their journey from Lyari in south Karachi. They had been prevented from a more direct route along M.A. Jinnah Road due to barricades put up by MQM activists guarding approaches to their own rally to be held at Tibet Centre. Prominent PPP leaders who were leading this rally included Naheed Khan, Safdar Abbassi, Fauzia Wahab, and Jameel. The PPP contingent was joined at the Jinnah Bridge (near Tower) by an ANP-led rally that had commenced its journey in Orangi. The ANP rally too was unable to take a more direct route to the airport due to barricades and alleged lathi-charge and tear-gas shelling by the police at the Habib Bank Chowrangi in the SITE area of west Karachi.

The rally led by PPP leaders proceeded across Jinnah Bridge and moved vehicles and containers parked across the bridge quite easily as these were unmanned. It went along Maulvi Tamizuddin Road, past Club Road, and onto Sharah-e-Faisal at Metropole. At the Sheraton-PC junction before Club Road and again at the Metropole Hotel junction, policemen on duty waved the rally forward. The rally arrived at the FTC flyover at around 11.30am and found its progress blocked due to the setting up of road-blocks under the flyover. The road-blocks consisted of buses parked across the road, with their tyres deflated. There were no law enforcement personnel or other persons staffing the road-blocks. However, some participants of the rally reported that they were tear-gassed by policemen positioned inside a police station located across the road from Aisha Bawany School.

The front of the rally was close to FTC flyover while its rear was some 500 meters down the road beyond Aisha Bawany School. The rally came under fire from gunmen, allegedly MQM activists, positioned on the FTC flyover and in the surrounding buildings in the Lines Area that overlook Sharah-e-Faisal. There was return firing also from the participants towards the back of the rally, some of whom were armed. According to eyewitness accounts, it became difficult for the rally participants to move forward, because of the firing and the road-blocks in the front, or for them to withdraw safely, due to the firing from the rear.

A number of deaths and injuries took place as a result of the firing. Most of those who died or were wounded were ANP and PPP activists. There are no confirmed reports of casualties caused by the firing carried out by ANP and PPP activists. It is possible that the other side escaped serious injury because they were better positioned.

There are conflicting accounts in the precise run-up to the start of the violence. Some accounts suggest that the rally participants were first subjected to tear-gas shelling from the police station across the road. Another account holds that the vehicles that had reached the FTC flyover were attacked by stones and rocks thrown at them from the flyover. Then firing was initiated from the FTC flyover and surrounding buildings by suspected MQM activists, and that the ANP and PPP armed activists retaliated by using their own weapons. According to this account, the ANP and PPP activists were trying to find a way around the road-blocks when they came under fire from above. Initially both sides carried out aerial firing, before escalating to direct firing.

An alternative account holds that when the ANP and PPP workers realized they were no longer able to proceed further due to the roadblocks, some of them started to smash and set alight the vehicles that had been used as roadblocks and started aerial firing. This was followed by firing from positions above – from the bridge and from the surrounding buildings.

The two accounts differ in the precise circumstances leading to the drawing of firearms and their first use. One account has the MQM activists starting the firing, while the other holds that ANP and PPP activists initiated the firing. There is little disagreement, though, that the use of firearms started at around midday and continued for a couple of hours till the rally participants remained on the road.

As the dead and the injured were evacuated to the nearby Jinnah Hospital there were reports of further clashes around the hospital. According to one PPP leader, when the injured party activists were taken to the Jinnah Hospital, MQM activists again opened fire.[53] There were also scenes of mob violence outside the Jinnah Hospital as angry opposition political activists attacked police personnel and people whom they suspected of being MQM activists. There were no reports of serious injury, however, in the fighting outside the hospital.

2.5 Sharae-Faisal: COD Flyover/Baloch Colony Flyover

Another rally of CJ supporters consisting mainly of political leaders and activists belonging to the PPP and ANP, alongwith some supporters of PML-N and Tehreek-e-Insaf, was stopped further along the Sharah-e-Faisal. This rally had started from a meeting point in the DHA area and had proceeded along Korangi Road, across Kalapul, and had entered Sharah-e-Faisal at FTC using not the flyover which was blocked but the side lanes. This rally had negotiated its way past road-blocks through various means. At one point, along Korangi Road/Kalapul there was a vehicle parked across the road with its tyres deflated. The rally participants replaced the deflated tyres and moved the vehicle. None of the road-blocks on Korangi Road nor the FTC Flyover were then manned. There was a police barrier just before the Baloch Colony flyover, but the police did not attempt to stop the rally.

The opposition rally reached the COD/Drigh Colony Station flyover at around 11.30am – coincidentally, around the same time as the rally that had started at the Jinnah Bridge reached the FTC flyover. The road was blockaded at this point using containers and heavy vehicles and manned by activists carrying MQM flags. Senior party leaders including Nisar Khuhro, Qaim Ali Shah, Khurshid Shah, Raza Rabbani, Naveed Qamar, Nabil Gabol, Sherry Rehman and Waqar Mehdi, who were riding the front vehicles, led the PPP rally. After the PPP vehicles, there were vehicles with ANP activists and supporters, and these were followed by PML-N and TI activists and supporters. All of the vehicles carrying supporters of various parties carried their respective party flags.

The front of the opposition rally stopped some 150 meters short of the MQM manned roadblock and motorcycle riders with the rally drove ahead. These front riders were attacked with stones thrown by MQM activists positioned on the flyover above. Within minutes, firing was initiated. One of the first persons to be struck was Sherry Rehman’s guard who had stepped out of the vehicle, when the rally had come to a halt[54]. He was himself carrying a firearm and received a bullet in his leg. MQM activists were positioned on the flyover, inside the Drigh Colony railway station, and in some of the buildings located some distance away from the main road, but with a view of the road. Armed PPP and ANP activists were firing their weapons from their vehicles or from behind the cover of other rally vehicles on the road.

The firing started just before midday and continued for around two hours, till the opposition rally participants began withdrawing to the rear. The withdrawal took some time because there appeared to be little coordination between the front and the rear of the rally about when to withdraw. The firing made it difficult to evacuate the injured to hospital, as ambulances were not being allowed to get through either. Stray MQM activists, who happened to be riding by on their motorcycles, came under fire on the stretch between Drigh Colony and Awami Markaz. PPP/ANP activists tore down MQM banners from buildings around Awami Markaz and set them alight[55].

As the opposition rally participants started the journey back, they came under intense fire from the Baloch Colony flyover and surrounding buildings, where armed MQM activists had taken up positions. This was between 2:00 and 3:00pm, or around two hours after the violence first started at midday.[56]. There were several casualties. Syed Ahmed Shah, member of the Central Council of the ANP, received six bullets. He was taken to the hospital but died on the way. Firing from an armed group on top of the Bridge also left a member of Pakhtoonkhwah Milli Awami Party (PKMAP) dead. Some of the dead included people who might have been saved had it been possible to evacuate them promptly to the hospital. Most of the casualties from this flashpoint eventually ended up in Jinnah Hospital. There were no reports of casualties among MQM activists from this flashpoint.[57]

2.6 Sharae-Faisal: COD/Natha Khan Bridge/Kala Board

MQM activists had taken control of the entire stretch of the road, including all flyovers and pedestrian bridges, along the National Highway/Shahrah-e-Faisal corridor. Their cadres had also secured positions on adjacent buildings. However, there was one stretch between Natha Khan Bridge and Kala Board, where the situation was different.

This section of the corridor, overlooked by high-rise apartment buildings on one side (e.g., Falaknaz Apartments), includes Shah Faisal Police Station, Natha Khan Bridge, approaches to Shah Faisal Colony and approaches to Goth Natha Khan. The section is crucial for controlling access to the airport.

Here, while MQM activists controlled the road and the barricades at COD/Drigh Road Station and Natha Khan Bridge, opposition supporters inhabited adjacent buildings. This stretch saw MQM activists come under fire at a number of points. There had already been a clash at Falaknaz Apartments the day before when a security guard had been killed when armed Pasban (an affiliate of Jamaat-e-Islami) activists had tried to enforce a shutter down strike.[58] On May 12th, firing started at both the COD/Drigh Colony and the Kala Board flashpoints at around midday. Soon after, the armed men controlling the Natha Khan Bridge came under fire from Falaknaz Apartments and surrounding neighbourhoods. Resultantly, MQM activists on the Natha Khan Bridge abandoned their positions and were seen crawling across the bridge to avoid fire.[59] There were also clashes here between police and armed activists belonging to opposition parties.

Unlike at COD/Drigh Road Station and Baloch Colony, where no police or Rangers presence was witnessed, police were present in the Natha Khan Bridge area. In fact, the Shah Faisal Police Station is located within this segment, and one of the first firefights took place within 50 meters of the police station. It was also reported that policemen, including, senior officers such as DIG Operations Mushtaq Shah, and the TPO, were locked up inside the Shah Faisal Police Station. The police were only issued with batons and teargas shells and had therefore refused to come out of the station.[60] There were some armed police present, nevertheless, and they were forcibly confined along with their officers in the police station compound.

The senior officers requested additional support from outside and armed police personnel arrived on the scene and broke the lock in order to secure the release of the officers. Constable Abdullah, the head of the Shara-e-Faisal Investigation Unit, was disarmed by some armed MQM activists who snatched his police-issued SMG rifle. When Constable Abdullah informed his senior officer, DSP Chaudhry Sohail Faiz,[61] the DSP called up a senior MQM member on his mobile and the weapon was promptly returned. A senior police officer also reportedly phoned up PPP leaders caught in the firing across the roadblocks at COD/Drigh Road Station and urged them to withdraw in the interest of their personal safety. He reportedly told the PPP leaders that the police were unable to provide them with security.

A number of casualties occurred in this segment of the National Highway/Shahrah-e-Faisal corridor. Three MQM activists were killed near Wireless Gate[62]. Several were killed or wounded in the Natha Khan Bridge area. There were conflicting claims about the identity and affiliation of the casualties sustained here. MQM claimed that three of the dead were activists of its Punjabi-Pashtun Organizing Committee (PPOC), who had come there to take part in their rally. A fourth person – Sarwar from Badin – was also claimed by the MQM as its member. He was also claimed by the PPP to be its worker.[63] The deceased man’s family in Badin, however, reportedly denied that he had any political affiliation and said that he had gone to Karachi to work in a factory and was an innocent victim of the bloodshed.

An Edhi driver, Faiz-ur-Rahman, taking the injured from Kala Board area to the Jinnah Postgraduate Medical Centre, himself fell victim to bullets.[64] The firing from both sides was so intense that the dead and injured lay on the road for hours.

The few members of the PIA staff that were able to reach the airport confirmed they had been stopped and ordered to produce their ID cards by armed MQM activists while the police looked on.

2.7 Airport

As stated earlier, all roads leading to the airport, particularly Sharah-e-Faisal, were blocked by containers and heavy vehicles by midnight of May 11-12[65]. Passengers booked on out-bound flights could not reach the airport and passengers arriving on in-bound flights were stranded at the airport[66]. A small number of CJ supporters did manage to reach the airport through various means. Some had stayed overnight in localities close to the airport such as Gulistan-e-Jauhar and the PIA Colony and were able to walk to the airport terminal. Some managed to walk past the barricades very early in the morning before the arrival of MQM activists or police personnel. As the day progressed, however, even the limited entry points that were open to pedestrians or two-wheelers were more stringently blocked. Those attempting to cross these barriers were subjected to physical assault.

While the main approaches to the airport from the National Highway/Shahrah-e-Faisal corridor were blocked using heavy vehicles and containers, at least two local or “back-street” approaches from Pehlwan Goth[67] and PIA Colony were blocked by police mobile vans. When a small group of CJ supporters managed to reach the Gulistan-e-Jauhar roadblock, police prevented them from going any further by baton charging and firing in the air. Some of them were also arrested[68]. Opposition party activists, who had arrived in PIA Colony the night before in anticipation of road-blocks – and had stayed there overnight in homes of their supporters who happened to be local residents – collected and began to proceed towards the airport. They came under heavy firing from MQM activists.

Rangers and Airport Security Force (ASF) personnel guarded the airport perimeter itself. These law enforcement personnel ensured that, beginning the evening of May 11th, the terminal, approaches to the terminal, and car parks were kept clear of all unauthorized persons, i.e., anyone other than bona fide staff and passengers[69].

When the CJ’s flight arrived at midday, CJ supporters at the airport tried to hold a rally in order to welcome him. Soon after a group of around 150 armed MQM activists were allowed through the security cordon and reached the Arrivals area of the airport terminal. There were skirmishes with CJ supporters outside, in which several people were injured. There were also reports of people being held hostage at gunpoint around the arrivals area. At one stage, MQM activists attempted to break into the Arrivals hall where the CJ was confined. ASF personnel finally intervened and persuaded the MQM activists to back off.

2.8 Patel Para/Business Recorder Road/Aaj TV

The corridor to be used by MQM rallies – from north and central Karachi towards M.A. Jinnah Road – was relatively peaceful during the early part of the day. There were few reports of incidents along this corridor.

The Business Recorder Road segment of this corridor saw some sporadic violence in the morning, when some unidentified men burnt tyres and stoned vehicles. An MQM rally also gathered at about 10:30am at Guru Mandir near Business Recorder House and eyewitnesses reported seeing some vehicles with armed young men.

After 1:00 pm, however, the situation took a more violent turn. There were reports of an attack on an MQM rally led by Gulshan-e-Iqbal Town Nazim Wasi Jaleel as it went past the Patel Para area. It might be recalled that the Patel Para area has a large concentration of ethnic Pashtun residents. The afternoon saw the Patel Para/Business Recorder Road area become a free fire zone between rival political parties. Armed MQM activists were located at the Guru Mandir end of Business Recorder Road while their rivals, presumably Pashtun, were firing from the Lasbela Chowk end. The clashes led to one death[70] and injured more than 8, including a 10 year-old boy[71]. Additionally, dozens of rickshaws were set on fire.[72],[73]

The firing in this area was filmed live by Aaj TV, which then itself came under attack by armed MQM activists. The account of the attack on Aaj TV is detailed in section 3.6.

2.9 Paposhnagar

Sakhi Rehman, a resident of Pahar Ganj in North Nazimabad was a victim of cold-blooded murder near the Chandni Chowk area. At about 3 pm,[74] he along with his three friends Sikander, Nawaz, and Rehmat Shah – employed at a hosiery factory in Metroville – left work early, because they learned that the situation in the city was tense. Upon leaving, they saw that there was no available transport to take them home. According to Sikandar, they decided to walk and take a shortcut to their respective houses. When they reached the Chandni Chowk Bridge and began to ascend it, they saw about 20-25 young men on the bridge armed with TT pistols and Kalashnikovs. These young men interrogated them and demanded to see their NICs. Only Rehmat Shah had his NIC. After explaining their whereabouts and that they were not affiliated with any political party, they were let go.

A few minutes later, however, they encountered another large group of young armed men who also interrogated them. But this time, after making them wait about 15 minutes, they handed Sakhi and his friends over to two other armed men, and ordered them to be taken under the bridge by the tree. Once they got to that area, they saw two other people being taken there. Many of these armed men were receiving instructions on their cell phones, and their captors were told to take Sakhi and his friends to the ‘women’s park.’ Once there, they were ordered to sit in a row with their heads bowed down. At this point, Sikandar and his friends ran to save their lives, with the armed men shooting at them. Sikandar and Rahmat Shah, running in different directions, managed to escape.[75]

Nawaz and Sakhi Rehman (and another unknown hostage) were held in a house down the road. There is no report of how they were taken to this house and whether it was immediately after their attempt to escape. Here, “They shot us one by one at point blank range. I looked into the eyes of my friend, Sakhi Rehman, as he was shot in the chest. I heard his anguish, I saw his pain. I pray to God not to let anyone see what I’ve seen,” said a tearful Nawaz. [76]

After seeing his friend get shot, Nawaz knew he had to run away, and he got up and fled as bullets flew. Fortunately he managed to escape unhurt. “Area residents saw all that was happening but didn’t do anything. Even the police, who were about 500 yards away, acted like spectators,” said Nawaz. [77]

Meanwhile, Sikandar ran towards Paposhnagar and once there, ran into another group of young armed men who stopped him and beat him. Suddenly, one of the men from the Chandni Chowk bridge came on his motorcycle and took Sikandar back to the women’s park, as he had recognized him. At the women’s park, Sikandar saw two dead bodies, one of whom was the unknown person who was brought to the bridge earlier. He did not see Sakhi’s or his friends’ bodies. Ten minutes later, he was asked to sit and bow his head down, and two bullets were fired at him. Sikandar put his arm on his face and was shot in the arm, and seemed to have become unconscious. Presuming he was dead, he was dragged by his assistants to a nearby drain and left there for an hour and a half until he heard some voices and asked for some water. According to Sikandar, some people from “Tableeghi Jamaat” found him and took him to the hospital.[78]

Sakhi Rehman’s body was found dumped in a drain. He was brought to Abbasi Shaheed for formalities. According to local residents, Sakhi Rehman had never been involved with any political party. Altaf Hussain, in his Open Letter to the People of Pakistan, lists Sahki Rehman as a Pashto-speaking MQM worker who was martyred on May 12. This is particularly ironic, considering that his killers were suspected of being from that very party.

2.10 Benaras Chowk, Qasba, Aligarh Colony, Manghopir Road

Contiguous areas in the west and north-west of Karachi – Benares Chowk, Qasba Colony, Aligarh Colony, Orangi and Manghopir Road – were sites of intense violence from the afternoon of 12 May onwards. Violence continued in these areas into the next day, and even after that. The abductions and execution-style killings reported for Paposhnagar above might also be regarded as being part of the violence that engulfed the west and north-west of Karachi.

While there are no clear accounts of the precise timing of the start of violence in this area, various TV channels started reporting violent incidents from around 2 pm onwards. There were two reports of violent incidents that might have taken place earlier in the day. Both were related to the passage of political rallies through areas dominated by rival groups. MQM sources reported that ANP and Jamaat-Islami workers had fired on rallies going from Orangi to Tibet Centre wounding 4 people. They also alleged that 8 MQM workers were abducted at gunpoint.[79] ANP and trade union sources, on the other hand, had reported that they had been prevented from moving from the Habib Bank Chowrangi area in west Karachi through MQM-dominated areas in order to get to the airport. It is presumed that since both these alleged incidents related to rallies going towards their respective destinations, they must have occurred some time in the morning.

These earlier incidents notwithstanding, accounts from various sides appear to concur that the most intensive violence – involving and affecting large numbers of people – started in the afternoon. Benares Chowk was an important flashpoint, where large numbers of ethnic Pashtuns had gathered in protest against the attacks on the pro-CJ rallies earlier in the day. There was intense exchange of fire between ethnic Pashtuns in Benares Chowk and MQM supporters (presumably ethnic Mohajirs) in Aligarh Colony in the Qasba area. These clashes took on overt ethnic tones, as people of “Mohajir appearance” were stopped, beaten and humiliated at Benares Chowk. Violent treatment was meted out to people of “Pakhtun appearance” on the other side. At least two people died and several were injured as a result of the clashes in these areas. Three policemen were among the wounded. [80]

According to eyewitness reports, Rangers were not patrolling Qasba Colony despite the ongoing violence. A mob set a hotel on fire as well as 3 motorcycles and two shops.[81] There were reports of people being attacked in their homes and being forced to leave their areas. Deputy Convener of the MQM, Dr. Farooq Sattar, claimed that people in Qasba Colony were attacked, tortured and injured by terrorists who wanted to engineer ethnic riots in the city on the pattern of what had happened in 1986.[82] However, another report claimed that it was MQM supporters who were firing at innocent people in Qasba Colony.

The Benares/Qasba area also bore the brunt of the violence on 13 May. It was reported that the police maintained a low profile all day, and only ventured into the area at around 6 pm with the help of an armoured personnel carrier (APC), and made some arrests.[83]

Several types of casualties were reported from this area over the period of 12-14 May. One 24-year-old Noorani Khan s/o Juma Khan was reported killed in cross-firing between rival MQM and Pakhtun gunmen on 13 May. It was not clear if he was himself a party activist, or if he was simply caught in the crossfire. Another person, a 60-year-old man Mohammad Ali was found dead in the same area. The circumstances of his death were also known or reported. An MQM activist Ashraf who was wounded in the area succumbed to his injuries in the Abbasi Shaheed Hospital.

Somewhat further to the southwest of the Benares/Qasba area, there were several reports of gruesome killings in the Manghopir area. Newspapers of 13 May reported that two people had been killed in the Manghopir area on 12 May.[84] One was identified by the Pakhtun Action Jirga leader as 25-year-old Sher Ali s/o Yahya and was killed in the Kunwari Colony area. It is not clear if the PAJ had claimed Sher Ali as one of their activists. Another body was found near Nusrat Bhutto Mor in Manghopir. The deceased was thought to be 27 years of age, but the circumstances of his death are not known or reported.

The 14 May newspapers reported the recovery of two unidentified bodies from near Javedan Cement Factory in Manghopir. Both were men who had been blindfolded and had their hands and feet tied before being killed.[85] The bodies bearing torture marks were taken to the Abbasi Shaheed Hospital, and from there to the Edhi morgue. It is quite likely that these men had been killed the day before on 12 May.[86] They were later identified as Dilawar s/o Khudai Nazar and Islamdin s/o Abdul Rauf, residents of Qasba colony.[87] There was no follow-up report indicating if there was any link between this find and the story of execution-style killings a day earlier in the Paposhnagar area.

An off-duty police head constable, 48-year-old Mansoor Ahmed was caught by a mob and beaten and then shot dead in the Manghopir area on 13 May.[88] He was returning home to Qasba Colony after finishing his duty at the IG Operations Office. His motorbike was also set on fire. A statement by Altaf Hussain identified the deceased as an MQM activist.[89]

2.11 Lyari

The southern neighbourhood of Lyari, in the old city of Karachi, was the site of conflict over a number of days. This was also the only part of the city where there were reports of the use of lethal weapons on the part of the law enforcement agencies, leading to three deaths.

There was tension in and around Lyari from the night of 11 May onwards, as it became clear that roadblocks were been erected in the city. A large number of political activists and their supporters had gathered in Lyari to take part in the pro-CJ rallies. They found their route to the airport blocked by barricades manned by MQM supporters. The opposition rallies that did manage to reach Shahrah-e-Faisal/National Highway corridor included many activists from Lyari.[90]

Agitation started in Lyari and other surrounding parts of the old city in the afternoon of May 12 as news spread that opposition rallies had been ambushed on the Shahrah-e-Faisal/National Highway corridor. It was reported that PPP activists attacked a police “15 Madadgar” post in the Aath Chowk area.[91] The policemen fled and the post was set on fire. In Keamari, also in the south of the city, an MQM office was ransacked. MQM offices and properties associated with MQM activists were attacked and set on fire. One of these was a medical store in the Sarbazi area where three people were also assaulted.[92] Armed youth set up road blocks, burnt tyres and threw stones at passing vehicles.

The violence in Lyari spilled over the next couple of days. On 14 May, there was a call for a strike, and youths belonging to opposition parties (mostly PPP) went around the area trying to enforce the strike. There are conflicting reports about what happened next. According to some sources, the police and the Rangers appeared on the scene and attempted to force residents to open their shops. There were skirmishes which led to firing on the part of the Rangers, in which two minors (one aged 10 and the other aged 17) lost their lives.[93] Another account suggests that the Rangers used their short-lived “shoot-on-sight” orders to fire on youths who were trying to enforce the strike.[94] The official account, however, is at variance with both these stories. It holds that the deaths were caused in the cross-fire of an ongoing gang-war in Lyari and that the Rangers did not fire upon the people.[95]

2.12 Other flashpoints

Violent incidents were reported from other parts of the city besides the main flashpoints identified above. There were violent protests in the Sohrab Goth area, which is the main entry point into the city for traffic from upcountry, from the afternoon of 12 May onwards. Roads were blocked and vehicles stoned by supporters of Pashtun ethnic organizations. Passengers were forced to disembark from vehicles and were beaten. While no serious casualties were reported it is suspected that people thought to belong to the Urdu-speaking community were targeted in particular. In the Federal B Area the funeral procession of an MQM activist Babar Changezi turned violent, and a number of Pashtun-owned shops including a bamboo yard were set alight.

On 13 May, opposition party supporters protesting against the May 12 events attempted to block the roads at Quaidabad. Saif-ur-Rehman aged 18 was killed by police firing on demonstrators.[96] ANP leaders claimed that the youth was a member of their party. His family members reported that Saif was wounded and died as a result of delay in taking him to the hospital. When they approached a Ranger’s contingent for help they were told to “take him to Jinnah Hospital” which is over 20 km away.[97]

A dead body was found in a sack in Port Qasim Road with a short note saying: “mukhbari ka anjam” or “informer’s end”.[98] However, the area police, quoting the relatives of the deceased, stated that the murder was a result of personal enmity.[99]

There were attacks on MQM offices in a number of outlying areas of Karachi, and in other towns and cities of Sindh, in Quetta, and in a number of cities in Punjab. These attacks did not lead to any deaths or injuries.

3. Patterns of Violence

3.1 Roadblocks and sieges

The Sindh High Court, City Courts, and Malir District Court were under siege by MQM activists on May 12. There are many detailed accounts from lawyers, attempting to enter these buildings or already present, of political activists violently enforcing the siege. Some of these political activists were reported to be armed and they beat lawyers and/or attempted to kidnap them. The siege went so far that activists set the Ladies’ Bar Room on fire in the City Courts.[100] Given the activists’ presence and early arrival to the Courts, there is evidence that the sieges were planned and designed to prevent the lawyers from receiving the Chief Justice. Additionally, there was no law enforcement agency present at any of these locations to prevent the siege.

Karachiites faced many hurdles moving around that day because of the roadblocks that had been set up for the rallies. These roadblocks were placed throughout the city on major roads and junctions such as Shara-e-Faisal and around the Courts. Interestingly, only a few of the roadblocks were manned by law enforcement agencies whilst others were manned by MQM activists, or not at all.

Many of these roadblocks led to an effective division of the city between areas of MQM support and areas expected to be for the CJ and the opposition. Roadblocks were intended to facilitate movement along the corridor through the Former District North via former District Central into MA Jinnah Road. Instead, the roadblocks created traffic jams from areas in the former District West from going across this corridor. They also blocked traffic from southern parts of the city from going through MA Jinnah Road and the City Center towards the airport. In addition, they blocked most of the points of entry onto Shahrah-e-Faisal/National Highway corridor, which itself was blocked at various points.

3.2 Ambushes

There were six reported main ambushes that took place on May 12. Four on rallies passing through the Shahrah-e-Faisal/National Highway corridor, namely (1) at Aisha Bawany School, (2) the COD flyover and subsequently (3) on their return at the Baloch Colony flyover, and lastly the (4) Malir Kala Board area. Interestingly, these three ambushes occurred around the same time, and it appears that MQM activists planned these ambushes. However, it is unclear in each instance who fired the first shot that lead to the ensuing mayhem. (Please refer to Section 2.1 Flashpoints for further detail.) The ambushes also lead to fatalities at each of these four flashpoints. The other two ambushes were ambushes, reportedly, of MQM rallies. One of the rallies was coming from the Orangi area at Benares Chowk, but did not have any reports of fatalities. The second report was of a rally at Patel Para at 2 pm.

The aforementioned four incidents had certain conditions in common that facilitated the attacks. Firstly and perhaps most importantly, there was a serious lack of law enforcement agencies at all three points. Neither Police nor Rangers could be seen at the scenes of the crimes, and if present, as is the case at both Malir and Baloch Colony Bridge, they reportedly did not attempt to enforce law and order or abate the bloodshed. Secondly, rally participants faced major barriers in the form of roadblocks that restricted their mobility and access to their desired destinations. These roadblocks literally trapped participants, when firing started, as they were unable to move forward. The roadblocks were steel containers, heavy goods vehicles, and parked buses with deflated tires; some of these roadblocks were manned by MQM activists (COD) whilst others were unmanned (Aisha Bawany).

It is evident from these three incidents that there was military-style organization among the armed activists. These activists either took sniper positions in surrounding buildings and high points (such as bridges), used sophisticated weapons such as hand grenades (Malir), and again used roadblocks in ways that prevented people from moving freely. There is also some evidence of selected targeting of political activists, as many prominent leaders of PPP and ANP were not injured despite their proximity to the firing. This evidence suggests that the armed activists were well prepared and perhaps given specific instructions. Lastly, emergency services were prevented from evacuating injured persons immediately. Their assistance could clearly have prevented deaths, and dead bodies were seen lying on the streets for several hours.

The other minor ambushes did not seem to be as planned as the aforementioned ones. MQM supporters returning from a rally in the Patel Para neighborhood were fired at. Patel Para is largely a Pashtun neighborhood, and it is suspected that Pashtun armed activists fired upon the MQM rally. This subsequently turned into an armed clash between the rival groups.

There were similar incidents between rival groups in the west and north-west areas of Karachi. There was minimal police presence in these areas, and most of the violence was related to the passing by of political rallies through areas dominated by rival groups. Each rival group blamed the other for firing upon them or preventing them from getting to their final destination. Each rival group nonetheless resorted to violence.

3.3 Armed clashes and cross-fire

The armed clashes witnessed on May 12 were mostly a result of the ambushes that morphed into clashes and crossfire between rival armed groups. There were two distinct types of armed clashes on that day. The first is the aforementioned metamorphosis of the ambushes on rival groups and second is the conflict that spread to different neighborhoods. While ambushes lasted for 2 to 6 hours, neighborhood violence lasted for several days..

The neighborhood violence, particularly along ethnic fault lines in the city, erupted into mob violence, such as setting a hotel on fire in Qasba Colony or setting the Baans’s 15 shops on fire in the Lyari neighborhood. This subsequently resulted in armed clashes and cross firing between rival groups. There are many reports among the different neighborhoods of Pashtun and Urdu-speaking residents being targeted, gruesome killings, and general lawlessness with free-firing zones. Again, this lasted onto the next day and in a few cases the day after under minimal security presence.

3.4 Abduction and execution-style killings

There were several cases of abductions in various areas from armed political activists preventing lawyers entering or leaving the Courts, to targeted abductions leading to torture and/or execution. Although these abductions were conducted in different manners, ultimately rival groups operated under a similar manifesto.

The most prominent case is MQM armed activists holding lawyers literally hostage at the City, Malir, and Sindh High Courts. Although this is not typically considered abduction, armed activists barricaded lawyers, physically harassed and threatened them in many cases.

There are also cases of people being taken forcefully by armed political activists in Malir, Paposhnagar, and Manghopir. It is evident that many of these abductions took an ethnic tone. There are a few distinct types of abductions that took place that day. The majority of abductions were short term where the victim was tortured and eventually released. A second type of abduction occurred in different neighborhoods such as Paposhnagar where the kidnapping lead to not only torturing and threatening the victim, but also executing the victim. Many of the victims were unaffiliated with any political party, but were targeted along ethnic lines.

One of the motives behind abductions appears to be the possibility of “prisoner exchange”. Some people who survived abduction reported over-hearing their captors discussing over their cell phones the possible need for hostages among themselves. Although the more organized abductions were carried out by armed MQM activists, there were also unconfirmed reports of suspected MQM supporters being abducted by ANP/Pashtun activists.

3.5 Ethnic targeting

There is emerging evidence of ethnic targeting particularly around some of the ethnic fault lines in the city. The neighborhoods that can be highlighted are Patel Para, Benares Chowk, Qasba Colony, and Manghopir. The violence was mainly between the Pashtuns and Urdu-speaking population.

Armed activists, on both sides, were reportedly asking people for their NICs and in some cases executing or beating those of different ethnicities. There are also reports of shooting people based on their appearances—people being targeted as Mohajirs if clean-shaven or wearing ‘pant-shirt.’ For example, Benares Chowk was an important flashpoint, where large numbers of ethnic Pashtuns had gathered in protest against the attacks on the pro-CJ rallies earlier in the day. There was intense exchange of fire between ethnic Pashtuns in Benares Chowk and MQM supporters (presumably ethnic Mohajirs) in Aligarh Colony in the Qasba area. These clashes took on overt ethnic tones, as people of “Mohajir appearance” were stopped, beaten and stripped at Benares Chowk. Violent treatment was meted out to people of “Pakhtun appearance” on the other side. At least two people died and several were injured as a result of the clashes in these areas. [101]

3.6 Targeting of reporters/journalists

Journalists were affected by the May 12 violence, especially around the Sindh High Court area, as they dared to cover the conflict. Several reporters and cameramen were caught amidst the crossfire and luckily survived. A common story among journalists covering different conflicts was that some were confronted by gunmen who ignored them after learning they were journalists. However, many journalists were beaten and political workers destroyed their expensive camera equipment.[102] Shockingly, the staff of the Aaj Television faced an onslaught of bullets for more than five hours. The staff appealed to the law-enforcement agencies and was only responded to after five hours with two mobile police units. [103]

The attack on Aaj TV, which also houses the offices of the daily Business Recorder, began at about 1:30pm when MQM activists realized that the channel was telecasting live footage of youths flaunting guns in front of its offices on the Business Recorder Road and firing on their rivals in the Patel Para neighbourhood.

The firing was carried out from the street level as well as from atop nearby buildings, including one where the Blue Ribbon Bakery is located. Heavy ammunition, including repeaters, was used in the attack. The building’s windowpanes were shattered, the satellite dish was ridden with bullet holes and bullets were found embedded in the walls of the channel’s newsroom, administration and IT offices, and the office of the Chief Executive. Employees, including newscasters and commentators, were forced to take cover; however, there was no interruption of the coverage. The attackers also set on fire cars and motorcycles in the parking lot.

According to Associated Press (AP), the network’s chief executive Arshad Zubairi was quoted as saying that the Aaj TV building came under fire from MQM supporters who wanted the airing of live footage of the unrest in the city stopped. “We are under attack,” senior journalist Talat Hussain said on air as he took shelter behind a wall. “We have seen no security force. No one has come to help us.”[104]

The footage also caught motorcycles, flying MQM flags, parked close to the attackers on the Guru Mandir side and cars driving up and replenishing the attackers with ammunition[105]. MQM activists appeared to conduct their firing in a highly organized manner, with gunmen seen grouping into successive four-person formations one behind the other. As soon as the first four-person formation would run out of ammunition, they would retreat to a bus parked near the Blue Ribbon Bakery to reload while the next row took position. They appeared to work as a team, alongside other youths who acted as pointers, and yet others whose task it was to reload and supply loaded weapons to the gunmen. According to an eyewitness, whenever a bullet hit the intended target they would shout “Woh Mara” – “Jiye Altaf” - “Jiye Muttahida”.

According to Mr. Arshad Zuberi, the management and staff contacted the following officials for help:

1. DG Rangers, Major General Javed Zia

2. Governor Sindh

3. Sindh Industries Minister, Adil Siddiqui

4. Home Secretary, Brig. Mohtarem

5. Mr. Babar Ghauri, Minister for Shipping

6. Federal Interior Minister, Aftab Sherpao

7. Federal Minister for Information

8. Secretary Information, Anwar Mahmood

9. Mr. Farooq Sattar, MQM

10. Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister, Khalid Saeed

Later, at about 6:00pm, he received a call from a member of the President’s family in Karachi who finally sent help.

3.7 Targeting of emergency services

The Edhi Foundation declared a state of emergency on May 12, following the announcement of seven hospitals doing the same throughout the city. Anwer Kazmi, Abdul Sattar Edhi’s Secretary at the Mereweather Tower Edhi Centre, said that they had briefed all their station managers and circle in-charges. They said that no one was allowed to take leave on May 12 and that the ambulances would not move with the rally but that they would be on standby at Star Gate and Malir Station. Ambulances at other stations were to provide back-up and each ambulance was equipped with walkie-talkies and two new bed sheets.[106]

Indeed, on May 12 the Edhi Foundation continued to provide relief work throughout the city. Abdul Sattat Edhi said that their workers were being harassed while the windowpanes of a few of their vehicles were also smashed.[107] Seven out of their 123 ambulances were damaged throughout the city.[108] However, due to roadblocks and the ensuing mayhem, it was very difficult for ambulances to reach their desired destination.

Unfortunately, the May 12 violence did not spare emergency services employees. An Edhi ambulance driver, Faizur Rehman, died in the line of duty in Malir. According to Abdul Sattar Edhi, the driver was taking victims of the crossfire, which had erupted near Malir’s Kala Board area, to the Jinnah Postgraduate Medical Centre, when he himself fell victim to the bullets. It is not confirmed whether the driver was targeted or whether he was the victim of indiscriminate fire. According to another report, Faiz-ur-Rehman reached Malir while firing between two armed groups was taking place and dead bodies and injured people were lying on the road. As he started to move the injured into the ambulance, reportedly some MQM people stopped him -- as the area was under their control -- and beat him. They then killed Faiz-ur-Rehman and Faisal Tariq. Unfortunately, Faiz-ur-Rehman remained lying on the road for one hour.[109] Faisal Tariq was claimed later to be a worker of Jamaat Islami.[110] Following this incident, ambulances could not reach the affected areas with the result that many severely injured died on the roadside.

Another Edhi driver, Obaid Rehman, filed an FIR claiming he was injured whilst the victim he was transporting was shot dead by assailants[111]. There is also another reported incident of an Edhi driver being targeted in Baldia Town. While bullets damaged the ambulance, the driver managed to get away.[112]

3.8 Damage to property

The violence caused considerable damage to property resulting in economic losses. Damage was mostly done to private stores, private vehicles, police stations, MQM offices[113], the PPP secretariat, AAJ Television building, and the Women’s Room in the City Court[114]. Most of the property damage was done by, reportedly, people belonging to various political parties. Much of this damage was done after the major ambushes on rallies took place on May 12.

There were a few instances of participants at rallies setting vehicles on fire. This was mainly done because the vehicles were placed in a way that many found themselves enclosed and unable to move forward. Presumably this was done out of frustration and an attempt to move forward. In other instances, armed activists were firing at private vehicles at rallies or those caught in crossfire. As a result, seven Edhi ambulances were also damaged.

Much of the damage was mainly done in various neighborhoods seemingly as retaliation to the news of the ambushes on the rallies. These kinds of attacks took an overtly political and ethnic tone. Qasba Colony bore the brunt of the damage when a mob set a hotel on fire as well as 3 motorcycles and two shops.[115] Lyari, as well, was another area where property was damaged. PPP activists attacked a police post in the Aath Chowk area[116] where the policemen fled and the post was set on fire. In Keamari an MQM office was ransacked and set on fire. Additionally, a medical store owned by an MQM supporter in the Sarbazi area was also set on fire.[117]

The violence caused considerable economic losses. Air and rail services were disrupted, with outgoing passengers failing to reach the airport or the railway station on time and incoming passengers stranded at the airport or in trains that stopped at Malir and Landhi stations. Several flights and outgoing trains had to be cancelled. Business activity also came to a virtual halt. Business activity was largely suspended. According to SITE Association of industry sources, about 60-85 percent of industrial units were shut and those too had 20-25 percent attendance. Government and private sector offices, banks, wholesale and retail markets remained largely closed. Export consignments too could not reach the port and logistics operations at the port remained sluggish[118].

4. Patterns of Response

4.1 Police

As has been stated previously in this report, there was virtual withdrawal of law enforcement agencies on May 12. This is despite the fact that it had been announced earlier that a total of 16,000 law enforcement personnel were to be deployed in the city, including 2,000 additional police personnel along Shahra-e-Faisal. However, police were not present at most of the roadblocks throughout the city or arrived too late to relieve the sieges at the Courts. Additionally, police were not given arms to respond to the unfolding violent situation, and in some cases were either locked inside the station or stayed inside for fear of their lives. In a few instances police went on leave, and thus were understaffed.

In some instances police were present and were taking action against opposition parties. This was reported in Habib Bank Chowk in SITE, Pehlwan Goth near the airport, and at Aisha Bawany on Shara-e-Faisal. Police were present at or near the three main courts where lawyers had gathered but failed to protect citizens as they declared their helplessness against the armed activists. There are detailed eyewitness reports from both the Sindh High Court and the City Courts where lawyers state that police were within range of both of these places, and yet activists were allowed to encircle the buildings and verbally and physically assault lawyers. A police mobile unit followed a lawyers’ procession from the Malir District Court, but disappeared as they reached Malir Halt just when lawyers came under fire. At the City Courts, lawyers requested the police to call the Rangers because of the ensuing mayhem and later that afternoon DSP Malik Manzar informed them that he had orders from “above” that he could not help them and instead asked the lawyers to leave the City Courts. (Please refer to Section 2.1 City Courts for further details.)

Another reported incident of police acting as witnesses rather than a security apparatus is at the Shah Faisal Police Station. This is located at the Natha Khan Bridge where police refused to come out of the station because they only had teargas shells and batons with them and feared they would not be able to protect themselves from armed assailants. There is another instance of police almost collaborating or supporting assailants, as a lawyer who was harassed at the City Court, ostensibly by MQM activists, attempted to lodge an FIR only to be turned over by the SHO to the MQM assailants.[119]

There were also cases of police assisting lawyers and citizens in need. However, this intervention occurred only when they were directed by the High Court to assist them. For example, on the intervention of Justice Sarmad Jalal Usmani, the TPO phoned to say that the Rangers would not come, but that the lawyers could leave in police mobiles. At about 5:00pm, the lawyers were taken from the City Courts to Sindh High Court.

The police were also relatively inactive in the aftermath of May 12 as violence continued unabated. Though some action was taken to curb the violence in the form of setting up buffer points, and even trying to control violent mobs and protestors, however this still led to several deaths and injuries in various neighborhoods. For example, in the Benares/Qasba area it was reported that the police maintained a low profile all day until around 6 pm when they made some arrests with the help of an armoured personnel carrier (APC).[120]

The police were also not spared during the ensuing mayhem. Many police were injured when their mobile units came under fire near the courts and other skirmishes between the police and armed activists. An off-duty police head constable, 48-year-old Mansoor Ahmed was caught by a mob and beaten and then shot dead in the Manghopir area on 13 May.[121] There was also damage to police posts, such as the 15 Madadgar” post in the Aath Chowk area.[122]

4.2 Rangers and military

In contrast to the police, Rangers and the military were entirely absent on May 12, despite the Rangers being placed in potential conflict areas as per the official security plan. When either of these security forces was present, they maintained distance and diligently avoided any engagement with violent elements. These forces were not responsive to judicial orders either, as was the case with the City Courts.

Some of the main ambushes took place within close range of military and paramilitary installations. The ambush at COD/Drigh Road Railway station on Shara-e-Faisal was in close proximity to army installations. In Malir, firing at the CJ supporters was reportedly started from close to the main gate of the Bhitai Rangers’ base at Kala Board. In both these places firing continued for several hours. It is incomprehensible that the military and paramilitary forces could remain aloof while there were war-like scenes at their very doorsteps. Such indifference not only betrayed callousness towards the lives of citizens it also displayed a sloppy and lackadaisical attitude to the security of important military installations.

Major-General Javed Zia, the Director General of the Rangers in Karachi, met a delegation of Pashtun community leaders and some journalists on 16 May and told them some 13,000 troops had been deployed on May 12. He also stated that they were assigned security duties at the airport and were responsible to protect the Chief Justice, multinational companies, banks and other important installations. “As there were no unfortunate occurrences at these places, the Rangers cannot be held accountable for incidents in other parts of the city”[123]. He further said that the primary duty of the Rangers was to secure the Sindh segment of the Pakistan-India international border.[124] A day later he was reported as saying that if the Rangers had become active in the city on May 12 there would have been heaps of bodies.[125] These comments and remarks, if reported correctly, reveal some level of confusion within the command structure of the security policy vis-à-vis May 12. The numbers mentioned by the DG were certainly not in evidence in the streets. If such large numbers were indeed present and available, it is not clear what their rules of engagement were. Even if the Rangers’ primary duty was with respect to the Indian border, it was inexplicable that they did not regard continuous heavy exchange of gun-fire just outside their base for several hours, and hence their inability to move out freely from the base, as compromising their primary mandate.

In his speech on the evening of May 12 in Islamabad General Musharraf announced that a contingent of Qasim Rangers was being dispatched from Hyderabad to Karachi in order to maintain the peace. It was also announced that the Rangers would have shoot-on-sight powers. Both measures appeared inexplicable. There was already large Rangers presence in Karachi, and there appeared to be little sense in sending for Rangers contingents stationed in Hyderabad. The shoot-on-sight orders were also deemed illegal - these orders make sense only as part of enforcing a curfew, and none had been declared. This confusion was possibly responsible for the death of two minors in Lyari on May 14, allegedly due to firing by the Rangers. The Rangers’ spokesman denied responsibility for these deaths and blamed them on a gang fight. [126]

4.3 Hospitals:

Jinnah Postgraduate Medical Centre, Karachi[127]

Dr. Rashid Jooma, Director Jinnah Postgraduate Medical Centre himself was trapped at airport on 12 May while coming from Quetta. He remained in touch with the relevant departments and staff on telephone. As emergency was declared for 12th May, no problem of staff was faced. In addition, the staff of night duty that could not go home due to roadblocks, also joined in. The nurses’ hostel is in the hospital premises so there was no shortage of staff.

According to the Deputy Director and in-charge, Casualty Department, of JPMC[128], a total of 53 casualties were brought from various parts of the city (predominantly Shahrah-e-Faisal, Model Colony and Ferozabad police station vicinity). A total of 23 were brought dead, while two others died in the wards; adding the total to 25 dead (list enclosed). Three injured were brought between 11th night 12th morning, one of them died at 6:00 am. Majority of patients were brought between 12:30pm onwards. Two were brought after 6 hours of being shot due to obstruction on roads. No patients were brought on 13th May.

All casualties were brought in by Edhi ambulances. All the injured and dead were male and sustained injuries by firing. Most of them belonged to one ethnic group, though to different parties. Leaders of different opposition parties, including the Sindh Governor, visited the hospital. The agitation and slogan-mongering by the former and the security detail of the latter caused disturbance in the treatment process. All the dead bodies were taken away forcibly without postmortem. The hospital wanted sensitive areas like Casualty Ward to be cordoned off by police so that unconcerned people were kept out and the treatment could be carried out without interference. However, no police force was made available, in spite of repeated requests.

Civil Hospital, Karachi

A total of 30 victims were brought to Civil Hospital, including two dead bodies.  Twenty-eight of them had injuries due to firing; 23 victims were brought on May 12, 5 victims were brought on May 13 and 2 on May 14.  The first victim was brought at 01:15 pm on May 12, 2007 and the last victim was brought in the morning of May 14, 2007. Of the injured, 11 were seriously injured and admitted to the Hospital, while others were discharged after first-aid.

 All the casualties were male and brought to hospital by armed MQM activists in ambulances of Khidmat-e-Khilaq Foundation, owned and operated by Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM). The armed men threatened the Medico-Legal Officers (MLOs) and disallowed them from entering the cases in their records. Majority of the victims were Pushtu speking and were brought in largely from areas controlled by MQM: 12 from Jamsheed Quarters, 4 from Soldier Bazar, 4 from Lyari, 3 from Malir, 2 from Saddar, 2 from Baghdadi, and one each from Baloch Colony, Baldia Town and Pakistan Bazar.  The Governor, City Nazim, provincial Home Affairs Advisor and other officials visited the injured and the Governor distributed cash compensation.

4.4 Emergency services

In contrast with the security services, the emergency services proved to be very professionally prepared for May 12, and proactive by sending out ambulances that day wherever needed. The Edhi Foundation declared emergency alert for May 12, following the announcement of seven hospitals doing the same throughout the city. Anwer Kazmi, Abdul Sattar Edhi’s Secretary at the Mereweather Tower Edhi Centre, said that they had briefed all their station managers and circle in-charges. They said that no one was allowed to take leave on May 12 and that the ambulances would not move with the rallies but that there would be 10 on standby at the Star Gate and Malir Stations. Ambulances at other stations were to provide back-up and each ambulance was equipped with walkie-talkies and two new bed sheets.[129]

Ambulance drivers were particularly proactive as the violent events unfolded on May 12. Unfortunately, due to the roadblocks and aggressive armed activists, some ambulances were not able to reach the scenes of violence. The ambulance drivers also proved to be very courageous driving through zones of conflict, and facing harassment from activists. One Edhi driver, Faizur Rehman, was shot dead in the line of duty. This incident is of grave concern as it reflects the thought that emergency service personnel were treated as a party to conflict by some.

Thus far, all evidence indicates that hospital personnel were working meticulously and professionally, especially under the circumstances. In preparation for May 12, a state of emergency was declared on May 11 in seven public-sector hospitals, located near the expected rally routes. The health department directed the executive district officer of health and the medical superintendents (MS) at Civil Hospital Karachi (CHK), Services Hospital, Sindh Govt Lyari General Hospital, Sindh Govt Qatar Hospital, Sindh Govt Hospital Liaquatabad, Sindh Govt Hospital Saudabad, and Sindh Govt Hospital Korangi No.5 to stay on high alert.[130] Additionally, staff were not allowed to take leave on May 12.

Interestingly, the majority of fatalities and injuries were seen at Jinnah, Abbasi Shaheed, Civil and Liaqat National Hospitals. Reportedly, most of the injured were taken to Jinnah Hospital. However, there were not enough beds available in the Emergency Section of Jinnah, and therefore many of the injured had to remain on the floor; seventy wounded people were brought to the hospital’s emergency centre, but only 25 with critical bullet injuries were admitted.[131]

A disturbing element witnessed was that there was an effective partisan division of hospitals. The Chief Justice supporters were typically taken to Jinnah Hospital whilst MQM supporters were taken to Civil and Abbasi Shaheed Hospitals. Perhaps this situation was inevitable, as the city had already been divided into conflicting camps. Political workers were cognizant of this divide and some workers were purposely taken to different hospitals to avoid any potential rival conflict.

Another disconcerting element is that many political workers were present outside the hospitals waiting for the victims to leave, attempting to take them prisoners, or protesting the situation. This was seen at Jinnah’s Emergency Section where political activists were raising slogans against the government.[132] According to many eyewitnesses, activists openly started firing at the Sindh Government Hospital as 30 injured ANP workers were taken there. It is reported that these activists attempted to kill the injured workers but later on some PPP activists sneaked them out of the hospital and moved them elsewhere.[133] In a similar incident, according to an anonymous doctor, nine armed MQM activists came into his hospital attempting to drag out wounded opposition workers. When he and his staff tried to stop them, they were threatened. The doctor then ran to the Rangers for help but was told that they were given orders from ‘above’ not to take action until 4 pm. In the event a wounded opposition activist was shot dead after having been dragged out of hospital.[134]

In other instances, political workers were holding patients in hospitals as abductees in a holding area. This was seson, Umair Khan. They told the doctors not to discharge him and that they would return for him later.[135] There were also other such instances elsewhere in the city.

5. Conclusions

This fact-finding report has attempted to document the events of May 12 in Karachi as fully as possible using published accounts, recorded testimonies and eyewitness accounts. A number of matters investigated here are subject to existing legal and judicial proceedings, and it would be prudent to allow those proceedings to take their course. It is possible, nevertheless, to summarize a number of conclusions based on the findings of this report. It is expected that these finding will be of some assistance to the legal and judicial functionaries, as well as members of civil society at large, to draw some lessons and to move forward for preventing the future occurrence of the type of violence that was seen on May 12 and its aftermath. However, two elements stand out. One, the withdrawal of the state apparatus for almost the entire day and, two, the presence of a militarily organized wing within at least one of the political parties operating in the city.

5.1 Unprecedented events

It can be stated without fear of contradiction that May 12 represented something quite unprecedented in the history of Pakistan. In quantitative terms the violence perpetrated on that day might find parallel only very occasionally. Well over 40 people lost their lives, and the number of the injured ran into hundreds. But it was in qualitative terms that the events of May 12 were truly without historical comparison. An entire city of nearly 15 million was held hostage by people who appeared to be private citizens. The violence and the threat of violence engulfed nearly all of the localities of this huge city – in the east, west, north, south and the centre.

There was something qualitatively distinct also about the nature and scale of the violence that was unleashed, and the political context in which this happened (the fact that MQM is in government). The escalation of tensions in the build-up to May 12 was entirely avoidable. The idea of a showdown between supporters of the CJ – who despite the reference was a serving functionary of the state – and supporters of a political party was almost entirely artificially created. There was nothing inherently antagonistic in the two positions held by the supporters of the lawyers’ movement and the MQM that warranted any form of violence or bloodshed. It appears almost incomprehensible that large-scale violence of various types – roadblocks, ambushes, armed clashes, abductions etc. – was meticulously planned and executed across the city, while the state security apparatus was effectively withdrawn.

There can be no doubt that the events of May 12 have changed how Karachi is viewed. Despite the normalcy that has returned to the city, the very fact that political violence of this nature could be organized and executed and state security agencies withdrawn, ought to be taken extremely seriously. There is a need for accountability. No city can be allowed to descend deliberately into organized chaos. But there are also lessons to be learnt – both of foreboding as well as opportunity. If the civil society fails to take seriously the events of May 12 there is a danger that they will be repeated on a far bigger scale some time in the future. At the same time, how various actors behaved provides possible avenues of opportunity for the maintenance of sustainable peace in the city.

5.2 Absence or compromised presence of state agencies

May 12: 2007 will be remembered as the day the State withdrew. While the loss of precious lives is the most deplorable aspect of the day, a matter of grave concern from the perspective of institutional integrity of the state is the virtual withdrawal of the state’s security apparatus for almost 20 hours and the actual takeover of the city by armed cadres of one or more than one political party. The spectacle of a disarmed police force[136] operating on the directions of armed cadres was highly disturbing, especially since key officers of the state responsible for security were reduced to expressing their helplessness. That such armed groups were allowed to hold almost complete sway and operate with impunity for most of the day, despite the presence of a duly installed government in the province and the presence of more than one federal security agency in the city, represented an alarming phenomenon with respect to the writ of the government and the state.

The failure of the state’s security apparatus to discharge its responsibilities has been confirmed by Lt.-General (R) Moinuddin Haider, acting chairman of the National Public Service Commission (NPSC). Addressing a news conference in Quetta, Lt.-General (R) Haider expressed his dismay at the performance of police and other law enforcement agencies and admitted that certain security lapses were witnessed and that the police could not provide safety to the general public in Karachi[137].

The primary responsibility of law and order and ensuring civil peace rests with the police. However, in the peculiar conditions of Karachi and Pakistan, the paramilitary forces and the military itself has been a key stakeholder. Karachi like much of Sindh has never really been free of paramilitary/military presence in civil policing for the last three decades. While the presence of paramilitary/military forces in civil policing must be opposed on principled and practical grounds, it is also needs to be pointed out that as long as these forces maintain a presence in civil policing they must be held accountable for their actions and inactions.

On balance, it is clear that the security plan for May 12 and the statements emanating for various government sources before that date about the threats to security were simply a smokescreen for a political objective. For some apparently inexplicable reason that objective was to stop the CJ – a serving state functionary – from being received by his lawyer and political supporters. It is clear from the benefit of hindsight that all of the actions of the Sindh government – which was the main state organ responsible for security – were geared to achieve this aim.

Regardless of whether this political objective was justifiable, legal or correct, what was remarkable on May 12 was the virtually exclusive reliance on illegal, non-administrative and non-state agents for the achievement of the objective. There is a history in Pakistan of a government using administrative levers – sometimes legally, at other times semi-legally – in order to attain its political objectives. There are very rare cases in Pakistan or elsewhere of a government making such systematic and wide use of non-administrative and illegal means – essentially handing over security to armed cadres of a political party – in order to achieve short-term political objectives.

5.3 Responsibility

There is no escaping a discussion of responsibility for May 12. The primary responsibility for the lapse in security – even if we do not take any other details into account – must rest with the state and its relevant organs. In this, these organs were the Sindh provincial government, and the federal security agencies such as the Rangers and military that arrogate and retain de facto and de jure policing duties in Karachi. To this extent the functionaries of the federal and provincial governments, and military and paramilitary forces stationed in Karachi bear responsibility.

In terms of specific acts of violence the legal responsibility lies with the individual perpetrators, organizers and instigators, in accordance with the law. The fact is that Karachi was not in a state of war, and individual citizens, regardless of their political party affiliation must bear individual responsibility for crimes committed. It is the job of the prosecution system and the police to identify, investigate, prosecute and successfully convict those who committed crimes on that day.

There are two further levels of responsibility. First, it is clear that individuals were acting within a political context. Their actions formed part of a bigger game that was being played in the city and the country at large. The notion of collective political responsibility, therefore, cannot be avoided in this case. In fact, much of the debate around the events of May 12 has focused almost exclusively on the notion of collective political responsibility. The idea of collective political responsibility has been linked in the public debate with the issue of the escalation of political tension in the build-up to May 12. There is mutual recrimination between the MQM and the supporters of the CJ about collective political responsibility. Some MQM leaders went so far as to blame the CJ himself for the violence in Karachi on May 12. Such charges were later withdrawn, but they do nevertheless indicate the manner in which the idea of collective political responsibility has been misinterpreted and misused.

In fact, in the context of the events of May 12, collective political responsibility is too general and non-specific a concept to be of much help. The MQM and the CJ supporters can have mutually opposing views regarding political responsibility. But it needs to be stated very clearly that the events of May 12 require much more than the assignment of collective political responsibility. We must immediately dispense with the notion that just because the CJ’s plane landed at midday, and that the firing on rallies also started at that time, the CJ or his supporters share any of the responsibility for the violence. Similarly, the fact that the MQM leadership had been openly raising the rhetoric against the CJ and his supporters is not sufficient to indicate their responsibility for what happened.

On May 12 in Karachi, actions did speak louder than words, and it is these actions that require accountability of a more specific nature than the concept of collective political responsibility allows. In this regard the MQM to a great extent, and other political parties to a smaller extent have a case to answer. It is not just their propaganda against each other, or the atmosphere of fear and hatred, that is relevant. All the evidence shows that these parties, particularly the MQM, acted like organized military forces, which mobilized large numbers of people to carry out acts of brutal violence against their opponents as well as non-partisan citizens. For this the level of responsibility needs to be more specific and direct than the one implied in the notion of collective political responsibility.

The actions of armed MQM activists stand out in this regard. It is clear that there was a prior intent to stop opposition rallies with the use of force. In some cases it even appears that the premeditated use of force was itself the objective – regardless of whether a rally could be held. The level of prior meticulous planning that went into the commandeering of vehicles and the setting up of roadblocks from the day before, the manning of ambushes, the organized military manner of attack and retreat, the attempts at holdings prisoners and hostages, the abduction, torture and execution of suspects, and the reports of armed cadres receiving instructions from their handlers via cell phone – all suggest a frightening military organization cohabiting within a political party. Not even a small part of this activity would have been possible without a high level of coordination. The fact that such a military organization exists hidden behind the cover of a legitimate and popular political party must be a matter of great concern for all citizens.

The other political parties are not without their own specific responsibility. It is clear that MQM activists were not the only private citizens bearing arms on that day and its aftermath. Many of the opposition party supporters had also clearly come prepared for an armed showdown. In some areas it was they who were the assailants and MQM activists who were the victims.

In sum, the primary responsibility (both in terms of omission and commission) must lie with the organs of the state – federal, provincial, and military. The MQM, or at least its military organization, bears the direct and specific responsibility for the majority of the violence. Residual responsibility lies with the armed supporters of other political and religious parties.

5.4 Lessons for the future

5.4.1 Threats

The events of May 12 revealed that there are missing links in the chain of accountability of law enforcement agencies. The fact that one segment of the state – the judiciary – was itself subject to illegal action (detention and harassment) and took an active interest in the evolving situation, highlighted the fact that the existing law enforcement agencies are not operationally accountable to de jure authority. For all their weaknesses, it was the police that finally acted on judicial orders in order to secure the evacuation of lawyers taking refuge or being held hostage in Malir and the city centre. Other law enforcement agencies failed to cooperate. The continued presence of unaccountable “law enforcement agencies” poses a grave threat to the security of citizens. Whether the solution is their withdrawal or introduction of mechanisms for making them accountable remains a political question.

The presence of an armed military organization within a legitimate political party was revealed on May 12. The MQM enjoys popular support in Karachi, and yet the actions of its activists indicated that the organization retains a military capacity that cannot be justified with reference to any legitimate political goal. The political side of the MQM too continues to nurture ideas (such as valuing political monopoly rather than competition) that promote conflict as opposed to accommodation with other parties. It is possible that the prevalence of ideas is contingent on the current political realities, and that they will be abandoned in favour of accommodation in the future. The reform of the MQM, will, nevertheless, remain a matter of concern in the peaceful development of the city.

Other political parties operating in Karachi will also give rise to concern if they continue to develop and protect armed activists amidst their supporters. It was clearly seen that some parties readily allowed the situation to evolve into an ethnic conflict – possibly because they could rely on support on that basis against the MQM.

5.4.2 Opportunities

There were at least three sources of opportunity in the events of May 12 and their aftermath. These could be built upon in the future to prevent the occurrence of events such as May 12, and to build sustainable civic peace in Karachi.

First, media and civil society (particularly the legal fraternity) displayed courage and tenacity in the face of violence. Part of their strength lay in their insistence on doing their jobs as far as they could, under the circumstances. The electronic and print media became witnesses of the violence, and despite strong propaganda efforts on the part of various actors, a record of history was made. It became difficult for government functionaries and political leaders to evade responsibility easily. The lawyers too displayed professionalism in their approach despite facing physical assault, detention and abuse. They maintained a correct posture vis-à-vis their political party supporters, and consistently sought legal redress and relief.

Second, emergency services such as hospitals, health professionals, and ambulance services played a strong professional role through the crisis. They came under attack and pressures, but by and large they discharged their duties with a level of commitment to human life that was not seen elsewhere in the city. Like the media and the lawyers the emergency services remained true to their mandate and showed that civic life was still possible in Karachi. The fact that some political parties had their own emergency services complicated matters. These emergency services were suspected of being partisan, and made supporters of those parties suspicious of other service providers. It is important to value and guard the professionalism of the city’s emergency services, and it needs to be recognized that in the present conditions of the country and the city, party-political emergency services hinder rather than help that cause.

Third, despite all of their problems and weaknesses, it needs to be acknowledged that political parties took conscious and measured steps in the aftermath of May 12 to step back from ethnic polarization in the city. This poses a dilemma for the purposes of accountability – will compromise and reconciliation come at the expense of responsibility and accountability? This is a difficult question, but it is at least clear that the parties have the capacity for stepping back from the brink, and can be vehicles for reconciliation and maintaining civil peace.

Recommendations

1. The events of May 12, 2007, in the Karachi once again confirm the culpability of the administration that allows the freedom of the city to gun-totting activists of parties in power, and demand firm measures to check recurrence of mayhem and chaos.

2. No civilized government can discriminate between public organizations by allowing one of them to make a mockery of law and order as it may wish and telling others to abandon their right to freedom of movement and assembly because it cannot control the former.

3. Media-persons readily accept the risks in on-the-spot overage of conflicts and disturbances, but they cannot be denied adequate security at their workplaces. Failure of authorities to protect media establishments against attacks from any quarter should be held reprehensible.

4. The admirable services rendered on May 12 by voluntary organizations and hospitals should not only be lauded and suitably rewarded but steps need to be taken to strengthen them helping them by acquire the necessary equipment and skills.

5. In view of the apparent and proven involvement of elements that are in or are close to government an inter-party parliamentary commission must be set up to probe the May 12 events, fix responsibility for murder, arson and lawlessness and pave the way for punishing the guilty.

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[1] Dawn May 6 (a)

[2] Dawn May 6 (b)

[3] The News 7 May (b)

[4] Dawn May 10 (a)

[5] Dawn 10 May (b)

[6] The News 11 May (a)

[7] The News 12 May (b)

[8] Daily Times 12 May (b)

[9] See Dawn, “ Riots disrupt Karachi calm”, May 13, 2007; Daily Times, “CJ responsible for deaths: Waseem”, May 13, 2007

[10] Daily Times, May 13: 2007, “You were told not to come here but you didn’t listen: Altaf to CJP”

[11] Jang 12 May (c)

[12] Jang 12 May (b)

[13] Jang 12 May (g)

[14] The News 11 May (a)

[15] Jang 11 May (a)

[16] Dawn 11 May (a)

[17] Express 12 May (b)

[18] Daily Times 12 May (f)

[19] Dawn 11 May (b)

[20] Daily Times 12 May (f)

[21] Jang 12 May (l)

[22] Daily Times 12 May (e)

[23] Daily Times 12 May (f)

[24] Dawn 12 May (c)

[25] Daily Times 12 May (c)

[26] The News 12 May (c)

[27] Jang, 12 May (m)

[28] Express 11 May (b)

[29] Jang 12 May (l)

[30] Dawn 11 May (b)

[31] Jang 12 May (m).

[32] Jang, 12 May (m)

[33] Jang 12 May (d)

[34] Dawn 16 May (h)

[35] Eyewitness account, HRCP observer.

[36] The News 12 May (a)

[37] Dawn 13 May (i)

[38] Eyewitness account, HRCP observer.

[39] Eyewitness account, HRCP observer.

[40] Eyewitness account, HRCP observer.

[41] Dawn 13 May (i)

[42] Daily Times 14 May (b)

[43] FF5, FF6, FF8, FF11.

[44] Ummat 16 May (b).

[45] Dawn 12 May (d).

[46] The News, May 15; Express, May 16 (c); Jang, May 16 (c).

[47] FF1.

[48] A62

[49] FF7, FF15, FF16, FF17.

[50] Ummat 16 May (c)

[51] FF15.

[52] FF17.

[53] The News, 13 May: (a)

[54] Express 13 May: (h)

[55] Daily Express, 13 May: (h)

[56] Jang 13 May: (k)

[57] Jang 13 May: (k)

[58] Express, 12 May (b)

[59] Express, 13 May: (h)

[60] Express, 13 May (n) and Express, 13 May (h)

[61] Express, 13 May (n)

[62] The News 13 May (a)

[63] According to Express, 13 May (h) he was claimed an ANP worker. A report in Ummat 14 May (c) indicated that the PPP claimed that Sarwar was kidnapped from Korangi no-6, Ali Brohi Goth near the boundary wall of the Navy compound. He was shot five times in the head and the chest. Jang, 14 May (c) also speaks of Mohd Sarwar as PPP, while Jang, 14 May (e) reports Mohammad Sarwar as an MQM worker. It is possible that there was more than one person with the same name, but the confusion also indicates that the parties were engaged in a propaganda war to claim “victims”.

[64] A more detailed account of the circumstances surrounding the death of Fiaz-ur-Rehman is provided further below.

[65] The News, May 12 (a)

[66] The News 12 May (a)

[67] Express, May 13 (h)

[68] Express, May 13 (h)

[69] Jang 12 May (l)

[70] Jang 13 May (i)

[71] Ummat 14 May (c) and Express 14 May (a)

[72] Jang 13 May (i)

[73] Express 13 May (h)

[74] Ummat 15 May: (d)

[75] Daily Times 15 May (a)

[76] Daily Times 15 May (a)

[77] ibid.

[78] Ummat 15 May (d)

[79] Jang, 13 May (i)

[80] Dawn 14 May (g)

[81] Ummat 14 May (c)

[82] Dawn, 14 May (f)

[83] Ummat 14 May (c)

[84] Express 13 May (h)

[85] Ummat 14 May (c)

[86] Express 14 May (a)

[87] Ummat 14 May (c)

[88] Ummat 14 May (c),

[89] Jang 16 May (b)

[90] See account above of rally stuck at Aisha Bawany, Shara-e-Faisal.

[91] Dawn 13 May (i), Express 13 May (h).

[92] Dawn 14 May (f), Ummat 14 May (c).

[93] Dawn 15 May (e).

[94] Dawn 15 May (d).

[95] Dawn 15 May (e), The News 15 May (c).

[96] Ummat 14 May (a), Dawn 14 May (g).

[97] Express 14 May (a).

[98] Express 15 May: (i)

[99] The News 15 May: (c)

[100] Ummat 16 May (b)

[101] Dawn, 14 May (g)

[102] Dawn 13 May (i)

[103] Express 13 May (a)

[104] ibid.

[105] HRCP Fact-finding Report based on interviews with Ahmed Zuberi, Managing Director, other senior management and technical staff.

[106] Daily Times 12 May (c)

[107] Dawn, 13 May: (g)

[108] Dawn 14 May (c)

[109] Ummat 14 May (a)

[110] Jang 13 May (j)

[111] Jang 14 May (d)

[112] Jang 15 May (h)

[113] Jang 13 May (d)

[114] Ummat 16 May (b)

[115] Ummat 14 May (c)

[116] Dawn 13 May (i), Express 13 May (h).

[117] Dawn 14 May (f), Ummat 14 May (c).

[118] See Daily Times, “Violence halts business activity in metropolis”, May 13, 2007; The News, “ Industry, commerce comes to a halt”, May 13, 2007

[119] Ummat, 16 May (f)

[120] Ummat 14 May (c)

[121] Ummat 14 May (c),

[122] Dawn 13 May (i), Express 13 May (h).

[123] See The News, “Rangers not guilty for May 12: DG Rangers”, May 17, 2007

[124] Express 17 May (a).

[125] Express 18 May (a).

[126] Dawn 15 May (e)

[127] HRCP Fact-Finding Mission, Report of Jinnah Postgraduate Medical Centre and Civil Hospital Karachi, May 2007

[128] JPMC and Civil Hospital provided typed sheets to HRCP indicating the number of injured, their ages and police stations they belonged to.

[129] Daily Times 12 May (c)

[130] Daily Times 12 May (c)

[131] Dawn 13 May (i)

[132] Express 13 May (j)

[133] Ummat 14 May (a)

[134] Eyewitness: Karachi, May 12, 2007

[135] Ummat 14 May (a)

[136] See Daily Times, “Sindh police deprived of arsenal on Day 2”, May 14, 2007

[137] See The News, “NPSC dismayed at police performance”, May 17, 2007

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Nobody was afraid of displaying guns or using them.

Tansport as usual was a favourite target for rioters.

Tavel by automobiles was not safe.

Containers were used to blockade roads.

Did not know where to take the injured.

Some went to the morgue to look for their dear ones.

The dead were left on roads for hours.

Volunteerism helped.

Live TV coverage made a channel a target for extended firing.

Celebrating freedom to kill fellow beings?

HRCP Chairperson could not leave the Karachi airport.

The killing of an advocate on May 12 is announced.

Lawyers were frustrated.

The long wait by lawyers.

The HRCP fact-finding mission out in the street on 12/5.

A member of the security force. Scared?

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