Ethics Paper



Social Responsibility and Collaboration in Leadership

Deontology and Collaboration

Kurt Stuke

Franklin Pierce University

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of

HTL 605 Collaborative Leadership

James J. Freiburger, PhD

30Jan2010

Can a deontologist collaborate? That is, if a moral agent is duty bound to follow a set guideline of values as expressed though moral and even categorical imperatives, will his or her obligation create a barrier to collaboration? In order to explore this question, I will examine the character of Thomas More as presented within Robert Bolt’s “A Man for All Seasons.” I shall first present a brief explanation of normative deontology. I shall follow the explanation with my reasoning as to why the character of Thomas More should be considered rightly a deontologist. I shall conclude by exploring the interaction between duty and collaboration.

What is Deontology

While Immanuel Kant offered only one of many non-consequentialistic approaches to framing ethics, his model is often considered the paradigm of deontological (duty-bound) views. Kant argued that we should not consider the consequences of our actions in order to evaluate moral right and wrongness. We should do the right thing because it is the right thing to do. Kant expressed the underlying sentiment supporting his deontology through two formulations of the "categorical imperative." Kant's imperatives are categorical in that they do not depend upon any one agent's understanding; the imperatives apply absolutely to all agents and in all situations. The first formulation is often stated as “act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.” (Palmer, 266) So, if you find yourself in a situation in which you must decide upon a course of action, simply ask yourself if you could “will” that the action you are about to undertake as a law that applies for all agents. The second formulation of Kant’s categorical imperative is typically paraphrased as “act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as en end and never as a means only.” (Palmer, 262) In short, we have a model in which the potential consequences of actions, good or bad, should not enter into our decision process or taint our game theory. If we can universalize our actions and never treat each other merely as a means to an end, at least within this version of deontology, we have acted morally.

Thomas the Deontologist

It would be difficult to reconcile the climax of the play (Thomas’s beheading) with normative consequentialistic thought. I suppose an argument could be made that Thomas is motivated by political and theological concerns and is attempting to martyr himself so as to stand in the way of a view he deems heretical. But such a treatment, like so many other conspiracy type theories, cannot be supported through the facts. I believe a more supportable depiction of Thomas is as a deontologist. Consider, for example, the following: “Well…I believe, when statesmen forsake their own private conscience for the sake of their public duties…they lead their country by a short route to chaos.” (Bolt, 22)Thomas’s insistence here is upon doing the right thing simply because it is the right thing. Thomas is petitioning the listener not to consider the utility or the goods procured by an action but to be motivated by conscience. The character of Thomas also rallies against prioritizing the results (versus doing what is “just”) when he instructs his daughter’s suitor about the danger of bending laws to bring about personal gain: “And when the last law was down, and the Devil turned round on you – where would you hide, Roper, the laws all being flat?” (Bolt, 66) Finally, he argues for the transcendence of justice (and, by extension, goodness and morality). Within the following quotation, the character argues that right and wrong are goods in and of themselves (apart from consequences), while at the same time argues against reducing right and wrong to the merely instrumental – an unavoidable result within some consequentialistic theories: “The law is not a “light” for you or any man to see by; the law is not an instrument of any kind.” (Bolt, 152)

Given Thomas’s deprioritizing of consequences, given his insistence upon the transcendence of justice, and considering his emphasis on doing the right thing even in the face of mortal peril, I believe Thomas should be considered a deontologist.

Duty and Collaboration

Now that I have explained, at least to some degree, the concept of deontology, and have presented an argument as to why the character of Thomas should be considered a deontologist, I turn towards the task of exploring if a deontologist can be collaborative.

For the sake of this brief discussion, I shall treat an endeavor as collaborative if it meets Stagich’s characterization of collaboration, i.e. “[the endeavor can be] characterized by mutual sharing, respect, diversity, participation and the transformations which occur through high order thinking and communication.” (Stagich, 2001)

Strangely enough, the character of Thomas embraced the majority of the criteria. He certainly was respectful of all those with whom he transacted. His ratiocentricity and syllogistic-like thinking was certainly sophisticated – you might say Thomastic! He participated as fully as was ethically appropriate in assigned tasks; he was a loyal and faithful servant. As Thomas meets the cited criteria, either he should be understood as being collaborative or the criteria need to be re-examined. I believe most of us will want to re-examine the criteria as it seem counter-intuitive to classify Thomas as collaborative. I believe we wish to reject the notion of Thomas as being collaborative because, in spite of meeting Stagich’s criteria, he would not budge on the one issue of central importance, i.e. Henry’s annulment. We divorce his character from the notion of collaboration on the grounds of “irreconcilable differences” - he dares to take a value-positive stance. He does not compromise regarding the source or the application of his values. Because he rejects the axiological egalitarianism so facilely accepted within our pluralistic society, we tend to understand his character as non-collaborative. Yet the application of Stagich’s criteria clearly demonstrate that, despite his axiological rigidity (some might label as integrity), Thomas the deontologist is collaborative.

In summary, the lesson learned is that even a deontologist can be understood rightly as potentially being collaborative. Being duty-bound to perform some actions is not a barrier to entrance standing between the deontologist and collaboration. It does also seem, however, that differences in values can be potent sources of tension and disruption. Since the deontologist is prepared to universalize righteous actions and is motivated by a sense of duty to perform such actions, it seems unlikely that tensions among those seeking to collaborate will simply resolve themselves quickly and quietly. A collaborative effort, as Stagich notes, will need to recognize and address disagreements – including differences of values. True collaboration should therefore seek to move beyond the mere normative and connect the agents involved, in some way, at the meta-ethical level. The trick will be to do so in such a way as to not ask the agents involved to surrender his or her self or to adulterate that which is most sacred.

References

Bolt, Robert. (1960). A Man for all seasons. New York, NY: Random House.

Palmer, Donald. (1996). Does the Center hold?. Mountain View, CA: Mayfield Pub Co.

Stagich, Timothy. (2001). Collaborative leadership and global transformation. LaVergne, TN: Global Leadership Resources.

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