Verbatim 4.6
Terrorism Disadvantage TOC \o "1-3" \h \z \u Terrorism Disadvantage PAGEREF _Toc429037093 \h 1Glossary PAGEREF _Toc429037094 \h 31NC Terrorism Disadvantage PAGEREF _Toc429037095 \h 41NC Terrorism Disadvantage PAGEREF _Toc429037096 \h 51NC Terrorism Disadvantage PAGEREF _Toc429037097 \h 61NC Terrorism Disadvantage PAGEREF _Toc429037098 \h 7Uniqueness – Surveillance Increasing PAGEREF _Toc429037099 \h 8Link – Surveillance solves terrorist plots PAGEREF _Toc429037100 \h 9Link – Surveillance solves terrorist plots PAGEREF _Toc429037101 \h 10Link – Surveillance is necessary for timely response PAGEREF _Toc429037102 \h 11Link – Surveillance solves bulk intelligence PAGEREF _Toc429037103 \h 12Link – Surveillance solves SIGNIT intelligence PAGEREF _Toc429037104 \h 13Extension: SIGNIT intelligence is necessary PAGEREF _Toc429037105 \h 14Link – Surveillance solves terrorist financing PAGEREF _Toc429037106 \h 15Extension: Surveillance solves terrorist financing PAGEREF _Toc429037107 \h 16Extension: Financing is key to terrorist efforts PAGEREF _Toc429037108 \h 17Link – Surveillance solves counter-terror efforts PAGEREF _Toc429037109 \h 18Link – Surveillance solves Al Qaeda sleeper cells PAGEREF _Toc429037110 \h 19Link – Surveillance solves cyber attack PAGEREF _Toc429037111 \h 20Answer to: Surveillance fails at solving a terrorist attack PAGEREF _Toc429037112 \h 21Answer to: Surveillance fails at solving a terrorist attack PAGEREF _Toc429037113 \h 22Extension: Surveillance is necessary for stopping a terrorist attack PAGEREF _Toc429037114 \h 23Link – Immigration Surveillance PAGEREF _Toc429037115 \h 24Link – Immigration Surveillance PAGEREF _Toc429037116 \h 25Extension : Domestic surveillance of immigrants is necessary to prevent a terrorist attack PAGEREF _Toc429037117 \h 26Link – NSA Reform – Generic PAGEREF _Toc429037118 \h 27Link – NSA Reform – NSA Reform collapses secrecy PAGEREF _Toc429037119 \h 28Impact – Terrorism is the most important security threat PAGEREF _Toc429037120 \h 29Impact – Terrorism threatens freedom PAGEREF _Toc429037121 \h 31Impact – Terrorism hurts psychological well-being PAGEREF _Toc429037122 \h 32Answer to: Terrorist attack is unlikely PAGEREF _Toc429037123 \h 33Answer to: Terrorists aren’t a threat PAGEREF _Toc429037124 \h 34Impact – Terrorist attack causes human rights violation PAGEREF _Toc429037125 \h 35Extension: Terrorist attack causes human rights violation PAGEREF _Toc429037126 \h 36Impact- ISIS is a Threat PAGEREF _Toc429037127 \h 37Impact – AQAP is a threat PAGEREF _Toc429037128 \h 38Impact – Al Qaeda is a threat PAGEREF _Toc429037129 \h 39Impact – Cyber Attacks threaten national security PAGEREF _Toc429037130 \h 40Answer to: Cyber-attacks aren’t a threat PAGEREF _Toc429037131 \h 41Affirmative Answers To DA Surveillance does not solve terror plots PAGEREF _Toc429037132 \h 42Surveillance does not solve terror plots - extensions PAGEREF _Toc429037133 \h 43Surveillance does not solve terror plots - extensions PAGEREF _Toc429037134 \h 44Surveillance does not solve terrorist attack PAGEREF _Toc429037135 \h 45Intelligence gathering does not matter PAGEREF _Toc429037136 \h 46Financial data tracking does not matter PAGEREF _Toc429037137 \h 47Terrorist attack isn’t a national security threat PAGEREF _Toc429037138 \h 48Terrorist attack is unlikely PAGEREF _Toc429037139 \h 49Glossary NSA – The National Security Agency – this is a government agency that is responsible for monitoring, collection, and processing of information for foreign intelligence. The NSA was one of the agencies exposed by Edward Snowden in 2013 as an agency conducting surveillance on domestic (and foreign) populations for counter-terror efforts SIGINT – Signal intelligence – this is a type of intelligence that is largely collected by the NSA. SIGINT is the process of collecting telecommunication data for counter-intelligence purposes Bulk Surveillance – this is the collection of massive amounts of telecommunication information that isn’t all individual monitored, but bits and pieces are collected and pieced together by computer systems to monitor certain activity AUMF – The Authorization for Use of Military Force – this is a piece of legislation signed by congress after the attacks of 9/11 and authorizes the use of?United States Armed Forces?against those responsible for the?attacks on September 11, 2001. The authorization granted the?President?the authority to use all "necessary and appropriate force" against those whom he determined "planned, authorized, committed or aided" the September 11th attacks, or who harbored said persons or groups.Al Qaeda – Al Qaeda is one of the largest terrorist networks in the world that is a radical fundamentalist group often held responsible for the 9/11 attacks. They have networks operating all across the globe in various countries in Africa, Europe and Central Asia. AQAP – Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula – it is considered one of Al Qaeda’s most active branches and operates primarily in Yemen and Saudi Arabia ISIS – The Islamic State of Iraq – this is an extremist terrorist organization that occupies territory in Syria and Iraq. While many folks that subscribe to Islam denounce the activities of ISIS, they are held responsible for war crimes, genocide, and massive ethnic cleansing in the region and are one of the most active terrorist groups attempting to retaliate against the United States1NC Terrorism Disadvantage A. Uniqueness – Domestic surveillance activities are expanding with no expectation to decline Dahl, Assistant Professor at Nataval Postgraduate School, 2011 Erik. “Domestic Intelligence Today: More Security but Less Liberty?.” Homeland Security Affairs 7, 10 Years After: The 9/11 Essays (September 2011). the threat situation changes dramatically, we are not likely to see a new American domestic intelligence agency anytime soon. In the place of an “American MI-5,” however, a huge and expensive domestic intelligence system has been constructed. This system has thus far succeeded in keeping America safer than most experts would have predicted ten years ago, but it has also reduced civil liberties in ways that many Americans fail to understand. Precisely because it was unplanned and is decentralized, this domestic intelligence system has not received the oversight it deserves. In the long run, American liberty as well as security will gain from a fuller discussion of the benefits and risks of homeland security intelligence.1NC Terrorism Disadvantage B. Link – curtailing domestic surveillance prevents intelligence agencies from stopping a terrorist attack – this is empirically true Inserra, Research Associate from the Heritage Foundation, 2015 ("68th Terrorist Plot Calls for Major Counterterrorism Reforms," research/reports/2015/05/68th-terrorist-plot-calls-for-major-counterterrorism-reformsThis 68th Islamist terrorist plot or attack is the 57th homegrown terrorist attack or plot and the 10th targeting a mass gathering, the third most common target. The attack also comes as part of a recent wave of attacks and plots, as this is the sixth Islamist terrorist plot or attack in 2015. All of the plots and attacks this year have been perpetrated by individuals who claim to support the Islamic State to varying degrees. The FBI has stated that Simpson wanted to commit jihad with ISIS, and press reports indicate that he may have been in secret communications with ISIS members.[6]Regardless, with these attacks and the increasing numbers of individuals in the U.S. seeking to support or join ISIS and al-Qaeda affiliates, the U.S. is currently facing what is arguably the most concentrated period of terrorist activity in the homeland since 9/11. Director James Comey of the FBI has recent warned that “hundreds, maybe thousands” of individuals across the U.S. are being directly solicited by ISIS and urged to attack. Other senior officials, including Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh Johnson, the Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, and the director of the National Counterterrorism Center Nicholas Rasmussen have also noted the increasing threat of terrorism here at home.[7]Strengthening the Counterterrorism EnterpriseIn light of these warnings, the U.S. cannot be passive. Heritage has recommended numerous counterterrorism policies for Congress to address, including:Streamlining U.S. fusion centers. Congress should limit fusion centers to the approximately 30 areas with the greatest level of risk as identified by the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI). Some exceptions might exist, such as certain fusion centers that are leading cybersecurity or other important topical efforts. The remaining centers should then be fully funded and resourced by UASI.Pushing the FBI toward being more effectively driven by intelligence. While the FBI has made high-level changes to its mission and organizational structure, the bureau is still working to integrate intelligence and law enforcement activities. This will require overcoming cultural barriers and providing FBI intelligence personnel with resources, opportunities, and the stature they need to become a more effective and integral part of the FBI.Ensuring that the FBI shares information more readily and regularly with state and local law enforcement and treats state and local partners as critical actors in the fight against terrorism. State, 1NC Terrorism Disadvantage[The Evidence Continues]local, and private-sector partners must send and receive timely information from the FBI. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) should play a role in supporting these partners’ efforts by acting as a source or conduit for information to partners and coordinating information sharing between the FBI and its partners.Designating an office in DHS to coordinate countering violent extremism (CVE) efforts. CVE efforts are spread across all levels of government and society. DHS is uniquely situated to lead the federal government’s efforts to empower local partners. Currently, DHS’s CVE working group coordinates efforts across DHS components, but a more substantial office will be necessary to manage this broader task.Supporting state, local, and civil society partners. Congress and the Administration should not lose sight of the fact that all of the federal government’s efforts must be focused on empowering local partners. The federal government is not the tip of the spear for CVE efforts; it exists to support local partners who are in the best position to recognize and counter radicalization in their own communities.Maintaining essential counterterrorism tools. Support for important investigative tools is essential to maintaining the security of the U.S. and combating terrorist threats. Legitimate government surveillance programs are also a vital component of U.S. national security and should be allowed to continue. The need for effective counterterrorism operations, however, does not relieve the government of its obligation to follow the law and respect individual privacy and liberty. In the American system, the government must do both equally well.1NC Terrorism DisadvantageC. Impact – An attack on US soil would devastate populations and poses the greatest threat to securityWolfendale, 7 Jessica, Special Research Center, "Terrorism, Security, and the Threat of Counterterrorism," archives.cerium.ca/IMG/pdf/WOLFENDALE_2007_Terrorism_Security_and_the_Threat_of_Counterterrorism-2.pdfAccording to current counterterrorism rhetoric, non-state terrorism threatens many things: security, lives, values, freedom, democracy, and the existence of civilization itself, and poses a greater threat than the threats posed by war, invasion, accident, natural disasters, and criminal activity. Several government ministers have claimed that the magnitude of the terrorist threat is so great that it imposes a positive moral duty on governments to protect the individual’s right to security even at the expense of many basic civil liberties. The German Interior Minister Otto Schily, for example, argued that the government had an obligation to “protect the “basic right to security” of all German Citizens.”7 Similarly the Australian Attorney-General Phillip Ruddock said that “I believe that some protagonists fail to recognise a national government’s obligation under Article 3 of the human rights convention—that is, that governments have an obligation to protect human life.”8 The need to counter the threat of terrorism is claimed to both justify and require radical infringements of civil liberties such as the right to privacy, the right to due process, and the right not to be detained without just cause. Yet despite these strong claims there has been little clear explanation of how and why terrorism threatens lives, values, and freedom. Perhaps it is meant to be obvious, but the author does not find it so. How does terrorism threaten security? What kind of security does it threaten?Uniqueness – Surveillance Increasing(__)(__) FBI terrorism surveillance activities are increasing now and effective in the status quoDahl, Assistant Professor at Nataval Postgraduate School, 2011 Erik. “Domestic Intelligence Today: More Security but Less Liberty?.” Homeland Security Affairs 7, 10 Years After: The 9/11 Essays (September 2011). FBI is expanding its domestic intelligence and surveillance operations in other ways, as well. It is changing its own internal rules to give its agents more leeway to conduct investigations and surveillance, such as by searching databases or sorting through a person’s trash.35 And it appears to be making greater use of undercover informants in intelligence investigations, leading in some cases to successful arrests and prosecutions, but in others to controversy.36(__) Newest government reports show surveillance is increasing by the government and is effectiveGilens, ACLU Speech, Privacy and Technology Project, 2012 (Naomi, ACLU, "New Justice Department Documents Show Huge Increase in Warrantless Electronic Surveillance," Department documents released today by the ACLU reveal that federal law enforcement agencies are increasingly monitoring Americans’ electronic communications, and doing so without warrants, sufficient oversight, or meaningful accountability. The documents, handed over by the government only after months of litigation, are the attorney general’s 2010 and 2011 reports on the use of “pen register” and “trap and trace” surveillance powers. The reports show a dramatic increase in the use of these surveillance tools, which are used to gather information about telephone, email, and other Internet communications. The revelations underscore the importance of regulating and overseeing the government’s surveillance power. (Our original Freedom of Information Act request and our legal complaint are online.)(__) Data shows electronic surveillance is on the riseGilens, ACLU Speech, Privacy and Technology Project, 2012 (Naomi, ACLU, "New Justice Department Documents Show Huge Increase in Warrantless Electronic Surveillance," Surveillance Is Sharply on the Rise The reports that we received document an enormous increase in the Justice Department’s use of pen register and trap and trace surveillance. As the chart below shows, between 2009 and 2011 the combined number of original orders for pen registers and trap and trace devices used to spy on phones increased by 60%, from 23,535 in 2009 to 37,616 in 2011.Link – Surveillance solves terrorist plots(__) Domestic surveillance solves terrorist plots – since 9/11, the NSA program has prevent 50 homeland threats New York Times, 2013(Charlie Savage, "N.S.A. Chief Says Surveillance Has Stopped Dozens of Plots," 2013/06/19/us/politics/nsa-chief-says-surveillance-has-stopped-dozens-of-plots.html?_r=0WASHINGTON — Top national security officials on Tuesday promoted two newly declassified examples of what they portrayed as “potential terrorist events” disrupted by government surveillance. The cases were made public as Congress and the Obama administration stepped up a campaign to explain and defend programs unveiled by recent leaks from a former intelligence contractor.One case involved a group of men in San Diego convicted of sending money to an extremist group in Somalia. The other was presented as a nascent plan to bomb the New York Stock Exchange, although its participants were not charged with any such plot. Both were described by Sean Joyce, deputy director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, at a rare public oversight hearing by the House Intelligence Committee.At the same hearing, Gen. Keith B. Alexander, the head of the National Security Agency, said that American surveillance had helped prevent “potential terrorist events over 50 times since 9/11,” including at least 10 “homeland-based threats.” But he said that a vast majority of the others must remain secret.(__) The plan prevents the government from accessing critical information to prevent a terrorist attack on US soilSterman, masters from Georgetown University, 2014 "DO NSA'S BULK SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMS STOP TERRORISTS?," June 5, 2013, the Guardian broke the first story in what would become a flood of revelations regarding the extent and nature of the NSA’s surveillance programs. Facing an uproar over the threat such programs posed to privacy, the Obama administration scrambled to defend them as legal and essential to U.S. national security and counterterrorism. Two weeks after the first leaks by former NSA contractor Edward Snowden were published, President Obama defended the NSA surveillance programs during a visit to Berlin, saying: “We know of at least 50 threats that have been averted because of this information not just in the United States, but, in some cases, threats here in Germany. So lives have been saved.” Gen. Keith Alexander, the director of the NSA, testified before Congress that: “the information gathered from these programs provided the U.S. government with critical leads to help prevent over 50 potential terrorist events in more than 20 countries around the world.” Rep. Mike Rogers (R-Mich.), chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, said on the House floor in July that “54 times [the NSA programs] stopped and thwarted terrorist attacks both here and in Europe – saving real lives.”Link – Surveillance solves terrorist plots (__) Domestic surveillance data mining capabilities prevents a terrorist attack before it is too late Yoo, 7 John, Heller Professor of Law at the University of California, Berkeley, and a visiting scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, "THE TERRORIST SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM AND THE CONSTITUTION," SSRNIt seems that critics are mostly interested in blindly limiting the powers of the government, even as it fights a tough war. They presume the American government to be acting in bad faith, and so all of its activities must be treated with the highest possible level of suspicion. Meanwhile, data mining technology and databases are exploding in the private sector.121 It would be ironic if al Qaeda and private individuals were permitted greater legal access to new data technology than our own government, especially in wartime. Overreaction and plain scare tactics killed TIA, a potentially valuable tool to counter al Qaeda’s offensive within the United States.122 It made little sense to cut off TIA at the research and development stage out of sheer anti-government paranoia. There was no chance to see what computer technology could even do, no discussion of whether adequate safeguards for privacy could be installed, and no opportunity to evaluate whether data mining would yield leads on terrorist activity that would be worth any costs to privacy. No analysis could be done on the legal issues. Perhaps worst of all, we could never explore the ways that computers could be used to protect privacy. Data mining scans many perfectly innocent transactions and activities, but this in itself does not make the search illegal; even searches of homes and businesses or wiretaps with warrants will encounter many items or communications that are not linked to criminal activity.123 The understandable concern is that much innocent activity will come under scrutiny by data (discussing the need for an attenuated probable cause requirement in the national security context, because “intelligence officers will often not have a good idea . . . what they are looking for”).. 21 mining, unless controlled in some way by a warrant requirement.124 But if computers are doing the primary scanning, privacy might not be implicated because no human eyes would ever have seen the data.125 Only when the computer programs highlight individuals who fit parameters that reasonably suggest further study for terrorist links—say a young man who has traveled from Ohio to Pakistan several times, has taken flight lessons in the U.S., has received large deposits of cash wired into his account from abroad, and has purchased equipment that could be used for bomb-making—would a human intelligence officer view the recordsLink – Surveillance is necessary for timely response(__) (__) The plan prevents a swift and timely response to a terrorist attack – domestic surveillance is key to act upon attacks on the US before it is too lateYoo, 7 John, Heller Professor of Law at the University of California, Berkeley, and a visiting scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, "THE TERRORIST SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM AND THE CONSTITUTION," SSRNYet, when Congress delegates broad authority to the President to defend the nation from attack, critics demand that Congress list every power it wishes to authorize.192 While the threats to individual liberty may be greater in this setting, it makes little sense to place Congress under a heavier burden to describe every conceivable future contingency that might arise when we are fighting a war, perhaps the most unpredictable and certainly most dangerous of human endeavors. Rather, we would expect and want Congress to delegate power to that branch, Executive, which is best able to act with speed to combat threats to our national security.193 War is too difficult to plan for with fixed, antecedent legislative rules, and war also is better run by the executive, which is structurally designed to take quick, decisive action. If the AUMF authorized the President to detain and kill the enemy,194 the ability to search for them is necessarily included. Link – Surveillance solves bulk intelligence(__)(__) NSA surveillance use bulk collection as key piece to the intelligence puzzle Lewis, CSIS Fellow, 14, "Underestimating Risk in the Surveillance Debate," files/publication/141209_Lewis_UnderestimatingRisk_Web.pdfNSA carried out two kinds of signals intelligence programs: bulk surveillance to support counterterrorism and collection to support U.S. national security interests. The debate over surveillance unhelpfully conflated the two programs. Domestic bulk collection for counterterrorism is politically problematic, but assertions that a collection program is useless because it has not by itself prevented an attack reflect unfamiliarity with intelligence. Intelligence does not work as it is portrayed in films—solitary agents do not make startling discoveries that lead to dramatic, last-minute success. Success is the product of the efforts of teams of dedicated individuals from many agencies, using many tools and techniques, working together to assemble fragments of data from many sources into a coherent picture. In practice, analysts must simultaneously explore many possible scenarios. A collection program contributes by not only what it reveals, but also what it lets us reject as false. The Patriot Act Section 215 domestic bulk telephony metadata program provided information that allowed analysts to rule out some scenarios and suspects. The consensus view from interviews with current and former intelligence officials is that while metadata collection is useful, it is the least useful of the collection programs available to the intelligence community. If there was one surveillance program they had to give up, it would be 215, but this would not come without an increase in risk. Restricting metadata collection will make it harder to identify attacks and increase the time it takes to do thisLink – Surveillance solves SIGNIT intelligence(__)(__) Domestic surveillance are key to gathering SIGINT data which is the most important data in combatting terrorist efforts to launch an attack on US soil Yoo, 7 John, Heller Professor of Law at the University of California, Berkeley, and a visiting scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, "THE TERRORIST SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM AND THE CONSTITUTION," SSRNGathering intelligence has long been understood as a legitimate aspect of conducting war; indeed, it is critical to the successful use of force.134 Our military cannot attack or defend to good 132 December 2005 Briefing, supra note 1; see also Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 1. 133 See Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 1. 134 In the 1907 Hague Regulations, one of the first treaties on the laws of war, the leading military powers agreed that “the employment of measures necessary for obtaining information about the enemy and the country is 24 effect unless it knows where to aim. America has a long history of conducting intelligence operations to obtain information on the enemy. General Washington used spies extensively during the Revolutionary War, and as President he established a secret fund for spying that existed until the creation of the CIA.135 President Lincoln personally hired spies during the Civil War, a practice which the Supreme Court upheld.136 In both World Wars I and II, Presidents ordered the interception of electronic communications leaving the United States.137 Some of America’s greatest wartime intelligence successes have involved SIGINT, most notably the breaking of Japanese diplomatic and naval codes during World War II, which allowed the U.S. Navy to anticipate the attack on Midway Island.138 SIGINT is even more important in this war than in those of the last century. Al Qaeda continues to launch a variety of efforts to attack the United States, including acquiring and deploying weapons of mass destruction.139 The primary way to stop those attacks is to locate and stop al Qaeda operatives who have infiltrated the United States. One way to find them is to intercept their electronic communications entering or leaving the country. Extension: SIGNIT intelligence is necessary (__)(__) SIGNIT intelligence is necessary to uncover terrorist plots Dahl, 7 – (Erik, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Journal of Strategic Studies, “Warning of Terror: Explaining the Failure of Intelligence Against Terrorist,” Taylor and Francis) Scholars and analysts of terrorism generally agree that good intelligence is critical: the National Commission on Terrorism, for example, concluded that ‘no other single policy effort is more important for preventing, preempting, and responding to attacks’ than intelligence. 17 But terrorism analysts tend to share several assumptions regarding intelligence that are not all held by traditional scholars of intelligence failure. First, there is agreement that terrorism presents a particularly difficult problem for intelligence (as well as for policy and operations). Because terrorist groups are often small, dispersed and do not rely on the large infrastructure of a conventional state-based threat, intelligence is limited in its ability to use traditional tools and techniques to gain insight on terrorist intentions and capabilities Second, the primary limitation for intelligence is believed to be its lack of Humint capability. For example, terrorism experts still today frequently complain that decades ago, then-Director of Central Intelligence Stansfield Turner turned the community away from Humint and toward technical intelligence. The importance of Humint in the fight against terror, in fact, is one assumption that unites analysts of intelligence, such as Richard Betts, and of terrorism, such as Paul Pillar. 18 Third, terrorist attacks are not likely to be preceded by tactical warning. This has been the finding of several official investigations following terrorist attacks, such as the Crowe Commission that studied the Kenya and Tanzania US Embassy bombings and criticized the intelligence and policy communities for having relied too much on tactical intelligence to determine threat levels. 19 And fourth, in a point related to the stress on human intelligence, writers on terrorism tend to pay relatively little attention to the importance of intelligence analysis. They focus instead on the need for better collection, particularly from human sources, and for increased counter-terrorist operations in the form of counter-intelligence and covert action.Link – Surveillance solves terrorist financing(__)(__) Domestic surveillance capabilities are key to find terrorist organizations and freeze their assets Lormel, 2 Chief of Financial Crimes, FBI, Before the House Committee on Financial Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, news/testimony/financing-patterns-associated-with-al-qaeda-and-global-terrorist-networksAs a participant on the National Security Council's Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) on terrorist financing, chaired by Treasury Department General Counsel David Aufhauser, the FRG continues to function in a leadership role in the efforts to target Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) believed to provide financial support to known Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO) and other affiliated terrorist cells. The FRG is currently actively involved in the coordination of twelve multi-jurisdictional NGO investigations. In order to disrupt the terrorist financing channels, the FRG has coordinated these and other FBI terrorist investigations with the terrorist designation and asset freezing efforts of the Department of Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and Operation Green Quest. These efforts have resulted in the freezing of millions of dollars in foreign and U.S. bank accounts. Specifically, the joint efforts targeting Al-Barakaat, the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development, the Global Relief Foundation, and the Benevolence International Foundation have resulted in the execution of numerous search warrants and the disruption of the fund-raising and money remittance operations of these and other NGOs. Financial investigations of these entities have revealed that approximately $200 million in contributions passed through these organizations each year. The FRG will also coordinate with the Department of the Treasury in its other initiatives in order to help ensure their success.(__) Finance and money are the lifeblood to terrorist efforts – the plan prevents the governments ability to dismantle terrorist groups Lormel, 2 Chief of Financial Crimes, FBI, Before the House Committee on Financial Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, news/testimony/financing-patterns-associated-with-al-qaeda-and-global-terrorist-networksIdentifying, tracking, and dismantling the financial structure supporting terrorist groups is critical to successfully dismantling the organization and preventing future terrorist attacks. As is the case in so many types of criminal investigations, identifying and "following the money" plays a critical role in identifying those involved in the criminal activity, establishing links among them, and developing evidence of their involvement in the activity. In the early stages of the investigation into the events of September 11, it was financial evidence that quickly established direct links among the hijackers of the four flights and helped identify co-conspirators.Extension: Surveillance solves terrorist financing (__) (__) Domestic surveillance is critical to terrorism financing Yoo, 7 John, Heller Professor of Law at the University of California, Berkeley, and a visiting scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, "THE TERRORIST SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM AND THE CONSTITUTION," SSRNData mining is the best hope for an innovative counter-terrorism strategy to detect and prevent future al Qaeda attacks. Rather than hope an agent will one day penetrate al Qaeda’s inner circles—a dubious possibility—or that we will successfully seal our vast borders from terrorists, data mining would allow us to see patterns of activity that reveal the al Qaeda network’s activity before it can attack.92 Computerized pattern analysis could quickly reveal whether anyone linked to al Qaeda made large purchases of chemicals or equipment that could be used for explosives or chemical weapons. We could learn whether they traveled regularly to certain cities, and we could discover where they stayed and who they called in those cities. As civil libertarians complain, almost all transactions of this nature—calling, emailing, spending money, traveling—are innocent.93 We engage in them every day. That is exactly why al Qaeda has trained its operatives to use them as tools to conceal their plots.94 Al Qaeda’s leaders understand the difficulty in analyzing billions of transactions and interactions every day to detect their cells, and they realize that western societies impose legal obstacles on government access to such information.95 Civil libertarian critics don’t seem to have noticed that our government already employs modest forms of data mining to track down criminals and terrorists. In response to drug cartels and organized crime, our government has used simple data mining to track and analyze money flows for years.96 Banks and financial institutions provide records of financial transactions to the Department of the Treasury, which searches the patterns for money laundering activity.97 While the great majority of the transactions are legal, the information can piece together proof of criminal links after a conspiracy has been stopped, or it can help indicate suspicious activity that demands further investigation.98 Analyzing money flows has also proven to be an important tool in detecting and breaking up terrorist networks.99 If civil libertarians are right, consumers would also have an absolute right to privacy over their banking transactions and our government would lose this valuable, commonsense tool to combat crime, as well as terrorism. Two examples illustrate this point: (1) the NSA’s use of phone records and (2) the Total Information Awareness program.Extension: Financing is key to terrorist efforts (__)(__) Financing is the key to terrorist efforts to launch an attack on US soil Lormel, 2 Chief of Financial Crimes, FBI, Before the House Committee on Financial Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, news/testimony/financing-patterns-associated-with-al-qaeda-and-global-terrorist-networksCutting off the financial lifeblood of individuals and organizations responsible for acts of terrorism is a vital step in dismantling the organization and preventing future terrorist acts. The FBI is leading law enforcement efforts to accomplish this mission. The USA PATRIOT Act has provided law enforcement with powerful new tools to assist in accomplishing this mission. The FBI welcomes the opportunity to work with this Subcommittee and others to ensure that law enforcement efforts can be the most effective. I would welcome any questions you may have at this time. Thank you.Link – Surveillance solves counter-terror efforts(__)(__) The plan prevents the government from having access to data that is critical to counter-terror and troops on the ground combat Yoo, 7 John, Heller Professor of Law at the University of California, Berkeley, and a visiting scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, "THE TERRORIST SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM AND THE CONSTITUTION," SSRNCritics of the NSA program want to overturn American historical practice in favor of a new and untested theory about the wartime powers of the President and Congress.257 We should encourage innovation and creativity in our intelligence and military—and the NSA program is precisely that—to confront the unprecedented challenges of al Qaeda. For too long, our system retarded aggressive measures to pre-empt terrorist attacks.258 But seeking to give Congress the dominant hand in setting wartime policy would render our tactics against al Qaeda less, rather than more effective. It would slow down decisions, make sensitive policies and intelligence public, and encourage risk aversion rather than risk taking. It ignores the reality of the al Qaeda challenge to require the President to seek, every time he wants to make an important policy change, congressional permission first. (__) Domestic surveillance is the foundation for all counter-terror strategies Yoo, 7 John, Heller Professor of Law at the University of California, Berkeley, and a visiting scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, "THE TERRORIST SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM AND THE CONSTITUTION," SSRNCongress also implicitly authorized the President to carry out electronic surveillance to prevent further attacks on the United States.179 Congress’s September 18, 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (“AUMF”) is sweeping; it has no limitation on time or place—the only directive is that the President pursues terrorists, such as al Qaeda.180 Although the President did not need, as a constitutional matter, Congress’s permission to pursue and attack al Qaeda after the attacks on New York City and the Pentagon,181 AUMF’s passage shows that the President and Congress fully agreed that military action would be appropriate. Congress’s support for the President cannot just be limited to the right to use force, but to all the necessary subcomponents that permit effective military action.182 Congress’s approval of the killing and capture of al Qaeda must obviously include the tools to locate them in the first placeLink – Surveillance solves Al Qaeda sleeper cells (__)(__) Domestic Surveillance is key to combat necessary to track and thwart Al Qaeda sleeper cellsYoo, 7 John, Heller Professor of Law at the University of California, Berkeley, and a visiting scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, "THE TERRORIST SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM AND THE CONSTITUTION," SSRNThese privacy concerns are exaggerated. The Supreme Court has found that such information does not receive Fourth Amendment protection because the consumer has already voluntarily turned over the information to a third party.108 It is not covered by FISA because no electronic interception or surveillance of the calls has occurred.109 Meanwhile, the data is potentially of enormous use in frustrating al Qaeda plots. If our agents are pointed to members of an al Qaeda sleeper cell by a U.S. phone number found in a captured al Qaeda leader’s cell phone, call pattern analysis would allow the NSA to determine the extent of the network and its activities.110 It could track the sleeper cell as it periodically changed phone numbers.111 This could give a quick, initial database-generated glimpse of the possible size and activity level of the cell in an environment where time is of the essenceLink – Surveillance solves cyber attack(__)(__) Ending domestic surveillance hampers the ability of the government to secure networks against cyber attacks Goldsmith, Professor at Harvard Law, 13 "We need an Invasive NSA," article/115002/invasive-nsa-will-protect-us-cyber-attacksThe Times editorial board is quite right about the seriousness of the cyber- threat and the federal government’s responsibility to redress it. What it does not appear to realize is the connection between the domestic NSA surveillance it detests and the governmental assistance with cybersecurity it cherishes. To keep our computer and telecommunication networks secure, the government will eventually need to monitor and collect intelligence on those networks using techniques similar to ones the Timesand many others find reprehensible when done for counterterrorism ends.The fate of domestic surveillance is today being fought around the topic of whether it is needed to stop Al Qaeda from blowing things up. But the fight tomorrow, and the more important fight, will be about whether it is necessary to protect our ways of life embedded in computer networksAnswer to: Surveillance fails at solving a terrorist attack(__)(__) Surveillance capabilities are an integral part to preventing a terrorist attack – it’s the foundation of all other counter-terror capabilitiesRoberts, 15 Martin, "Intelligence leaders cite Texas attack before deadline on NSA surveillance," us-news/2015/may/10/nsa-surveillance-domestic-texas-isis“This threat is like finding a needle in a haystack and it’s going to get worse, not better,” McCaul added. “I think the threat environment today is one of the highest I have ever seen.” Controversial NSA powers to monitor suspicious communication by collecting all American phone records are due to expire at the end of the month, a circumstance that was dramatically complicated by a US appeal court judgment on Thursday ruling the practice first revealed by Edward Snowden to be unlawful. A number of lawmakers warned on Sunday the Garland attack showed why it was essential Congress face down opposition to the so-called “bulk collection” programme and reauthorise the original Patriot Act provision, despite Thursday’s legal challenge. “I hope that the reality of the situation, the reality of the threats we face, will actually play a great part in terms of exactly how Congress responds,” Senate homeland security chairman Ron Johnson told CNN. “Our first line of defence is an effective intelligence-gathering capability,” the Wisconsin Republican added. “I think the demagoguery and the revelations of Edward Snowden have done a great deal of harm to our ability to gather that information.” Richard Burr, Republican chair of the Senate intelligence committee, also insisted the Patriot Act provision should be reauthorised rather than amended when it expires on 1 June. “It’s very effective at keeping America safe,” he told ABC, claiming the alternative USA Freedom Act, which would rely on phone companies to keep records rather than the NSA, “turns us back to pre-9/11” days.Answer to: Surveillance fails at solving a terrorist attack(__)(__) The utility of domestic surveillance in combatting terrorism is empirically proven – there have been over 50 plots thwarted since 9/11Savage, reporter for NYT, 13, "N.S.A. Chief Says Surveillance Has Stopped Dozens of Plots," 2013/06/19/us/politics/nsa-chief-says-surveillance-has-stopped-dozens-of-plots.html?_r=0WASHINGTON — Top national security officials on Tuesday promoted two newly declassified examples of what they portrayed as “potential terrorist events” disrupted by government surveillance. The cases were made public as Congress and the Obama administration stepped up a campaign to explain and defend programs unveiled by recent leaks from a former intelligence contractor.One case involved a group of men in San Diego convicted of sending money to an extremist group in Somalia. The other was presented as a nascent plan to bomb the New York Stock Exchange, although its participants were not charged with any such plot. Both were described by Sean Joyce, deputy director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, at a rare public oversight hearing by the House Intelligence Committee.At the same hearing, Gen. Keith B. Alexander, the head of the National Security Agency, said that American surveillance had helped prevent “potential terrorist events over 50 times since 9/11,” including at least 10 “homeland-based threats.” But he said that a vast majority of the others must remain secret.Extension: Surveillance is necessary for stopping a terrorist attack(__) (__) NSA surveillance is critical for information to stop a terrorist attack – this has empirically been proven Sterman, masters from Georgtown University, 2014 "DO NSA'S BULK SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMS STOP TERRORISTS?," June 5, 2013, the Guardian broke the first story in what would become a flood of revelations regarding the extent and nature of the NSA’s surveillance programs. Facing an uproar over the threat such programs posed to privacy, the Obama administration scrambled to defend them as legal and essential to U.S. national security and counterterrorism. Two weeks after the first leaks by former NSA contractor Edward Snowden were published, President Obama defended the NSA surveillance programs during a visit to Berlin, saying: “We know of at least 50 threats that have been averted because of this information not just in the United States, but, in some cases, threats here in Germany. So lives have been saved.” Gen. Keith Alexander, the director of the NSA, testified before Congress that: “the information gathered from these programs provided the U.S. government with critical leads to help prevent over 50 potential terrorist events in more than 20 countries around the world.” Rep. Mike Rogers (R-Mich.), chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, said on the House floor in July that “54 times [the NSA programs] stopped and thwarted terrorist attacks both here and in Europe – saving real lives.”Link – Immigration Surveillance (__) (__) Terrorist will use exploit a lax immigration system in order to get in the U.S Kephart, Researcher at Center for Immigration Studies, 2005 [Janice Kephart, Moving Beyond the 9/11 Staff Report on Terrorist Travel, ] The report highlights the danger of our lax immigration system, not just in terms of who is allowed in, but also how terrorists, once in the country, used weaknesses in the system to remain here. The report makes clear that strict enforcement of immigration law -- at American consulates overseas, at ports of entry, and within the United States -- must be an integral part of our efforts to prevent future attacks on U.S. soil. Among the findings: Of the 94 foreign-born terrorists who operated in the United States, the study found that about two-thirds (59) committed immigration fraud prior to or in conjunction with taking part in terrorist activity. Of the 59 terrorists who violated the law, many committed multiple immigration violations -- 79 instances in all. In 47 instances, immigration benefits sought or acquired prior to 9/11 enabled the terrorists to stay in the United States after 9/11 and continue their terrorist activities. In at least two instances, terrorists were still able to acquire immigration benefits after 9/11. Temporary visas were a common means of entering; 18 terrorists had student visas and another four had applications approved to study in the United States. At least 17 terrorists used a visitor visa -- either tourist (B2) or business (B1). There were 11 instances of passport fraud and 10 instances of visa fraud; in total 34 individuals were charged with making false statements to an immigration official. In at least 13 instances, terrorists overstayed their temporary visas. In 17 instances, terrorists claimed to lack proper travel documents and applied for asylum, often at a port of entry. Fraud was used not only to gain entry into the United States, but also to remain, or "embed," in the country. Seven terrorists were indicted for acquiring or using various forms of fake identification, including driver's licenses, birth certificates, Social Security cards, and immigration arrival records. Once in the United States, 16 of 23 terrorists became legal permanent residents, often by marrying an American. There were at least nine sham marriages. In total, 20 of 21 foreign terrorists became naturalized U.S. citizens.Link – Immigration Surveillance(___)(___) Effective immigration surveillance could have prevented 9/11 Kobach, Professor of Law, University of Missouri (Kansas City), 2005 [THE QUINTESSENTIAL FORCE MULTIPLIER: THE INHERENT AUTHORITY OF LOCAL POLICE TO MAKE IMMIGRATION ARRESTS. Albany Law Review, 69(1), 179-235.Of critical importance is the fact that all four of the hijackers who were stopped by local police prior to 9/11 had violated federal immigration laws and could have been detained by the state or local police officers. Indeed, there were only five hijackers who were clearly in violation of immigration laws while in the United States— and four of the five were encountered by state or local police officers.'' These were four missed opportunities of tragic dimension. Had information about their immigration violations been disseminated to state and local police through the NCIC system, the four terrorist aliens could have been detained for their violations. Adding even greater poignancy to these missed opportunities is the fact that they involved three of the four terrorist pilots of 9/11. Had the police officers involved been able to detain Atta, Hanjour, and Jarrah, these three pilots would have been out of the picture. It is difficult to imagine the hijackings proceeding without three of the four pilots.*Extension : Domestic surveillance of immigrants is necessary to prevent a terrorist attack(__) Surveillance of undocumented immigrants is key to preventing another terrorist attack such as the one that occurred on 9/11/Kobach, Professor of Law, University of Missouri (Kansas City), 2005 [THE QUINTESSENTIAL FORCE MULTIPLIER: THE INHERENT AUTHORITY OF LOCAL POLICE TO MAKE IMMIGRATION ARRESTS. Albany Law Review, 69(1), 179-235.The fact that the 9/11 terrorists had been able to exploit weaknesses in the enforcement of immigration laws was not surprising to those engaged in the execution of federal immigration law. Enforcing the immigration laws is one of the most daunting challenges faced by the federal government. With an estimated 7 to 10 million illegal aliens already present in the United States" and fewer than 2000 interior enforcement agents at its disposal, the U.S. Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has a Herculean task on its hands—one that it cannot easily accomplish alone.^ After 9/11, it became clear that an effective domestic war against terrorism would require improvements in the enforcement of immigration laws. On June 6, 2002, Attorney General John Ashcroft announced the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (NSEERS), a program that would require high-risk alien visitors to provide fingerprints and extensive biographical information. It would also require such aliens to re-register with U.S. immigration officials periodically a n d would, for t h e first time, impose real-time departure controls on such high-risk visitors.* Violators of the NSEERS requirements would be listed in the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) database, accessible in the squad cars of most local police departments, allowing local law enforcement officers to make arrests of such high-risk immigration law . Had local police officers had access to the names of the five 9/11 hijackers who violated civil provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) prior to the attack, they might have been able to arrest and detain one or more of the hijackers. The assistance of state and local law enforcement agencies can also mean the difference between success and failure in enforcing the nation's immigration laws generally. The nearly 800,000 police officers nationwide represent a massive force multiplier.' This assistance need only be occasional, passive, voluntary, and pursued during the course of normal law enforcement activity. The net that is cast daily by local law enforcement during routine encounters with members of the public is so immense that it is inevitable illegal aliens will be identified. When a local police officer establishes probable cause to believe that an alien is in violation ofU.S. immigration law, he may contact the ICE Law Enforcement Support Center in Williston, Vermont, to confirm that ICE wishes to take custody of the alien."* Link – NSA Reform – Generic (__)(__) Reforming the NSA still prevents critical data gathering to thwart a terrorist attack and hampers the ability for the government to effectively respond in a timely manner Schneier, computer security and intelligence specialist, 13 "The NSA-Reform Paradox: Stop Domestic Spying, Get More Security," politics/archive/2013/09/the-nsa-reform-paradox-stop-domestic-spying-get-more-security/279537/Any solution we devise will make the NSA less efficient at its eavesdropping job. That's a trade-off we should be willing to make, just as we accept reduced police efficiency caused by requiring warrants for searches and warning suspects that they have the right to an attorney before answering police questions. We do this because we realize that a too-powerful police force is itself a danger, and we need to balance our need for public safety with our aversion of a police state.The same reasoning needs to apply to the NSA. We want it to eavesdrop on our enemies, but it needs to do so in a way that doesn’t trample on the constitutional rights of Americans, or fundamentally jeopardize their privacy or security. This means that sometimes the NSA won’t get to eavesdrop, just as the protections we put in place to restrain police sometimes result in a criminal getting away. This is a trade-off we need to make willingly and openly, because overall we are safer that way.Link – NSA Reform – NSA Reform collapses secrecy (__) (__) NSA needs to maintain its secrecy to not compromise classified data – the plan collapses that by forcing agencies to disclose classified info about counter-terror efforts that allows organizations like Al Qaeda to continue Yoo, 7 John, Heller Professor of Law at the University of California, Berkeley, and a visiting scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, "THE TERRORIST SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM AND THE CONSTITUTION," SSRNIf ever there were an emergency that Congress could not prepare for, it was the war brought upon the United States on 9/11. FISA was a law written with Soviet spies working out of their embassy in Washington, D.C. in mind.221 No one then anticipated war with an international terrorist organization wielding the destructive power of a nation. The Presidency was the institution of government best able to respond quickly to the 9/11 attacks and to take measures to defeat al Qaeda’s further efforts. While the certainty and openness of a congressional act would certainly be desirable, the success of the NSA surveillance program depends on secrecy and agility, two characteristics Congress as an institution lacks. Impact – Terrorism is the most important security threat (__) (__)an attack on US soil is imminent and this inflicts suffering and death against innocent people Kephart, Researcher at Center for Immigration Studies, 2005 [Janice Kephart, Moving Beyond the 9/11 Staff Report on Terrorist Travel, ] Al Qaeda operatives discussed here were strategically positioned throughout the United States -- often in places not previously associated with terrorist activity, such as Peoria and Chicago, Illinois; Columbus, Ohio; Baltimore, Maryland, and its suburbs; Seattle, Washington; Portland, Oregon; Minneapolis, Minnesota; and upstate New York. A couple of al Qaeda operatives covered in this report are still at large and currently unindicted, including Adnan Shukrijumah and Aafia Siddiqui, yet are included here because they are high on the FBI's list for questioning and spent long periods of time in the United States. The lists found throughout this report (under immigration benefit subject headings at the end of each section) begin with Mir Aimal Kansi, who in January 1993 opened fire outside CIA headquarters in McLean, Virginia; the most recent cases, from 2004, involve the surveillance cases in New York City; in Charlotte, North Carolina; Nashville, Tennessee; Las Vegas, Nevada; and southern California. All told, 21 of these terrorists committed five attacks against U.S. interests causing a total of 3,341 deaths and 8,463 injuries; 29 were involved in 12 unexecuted plots. Five hijackers from 9/11 had clear immigration violations, while one (Marwan Al-Shehhi), had a possible violation; thus, 13 hijackers are not included in the chart below. I do not discuss the 9/11 plotters in this report or other earlier terrorists in detail, as each is covered in 9/11 and Terrorist Travel. In 47 instances, immigration benefits sought or acquired prior to 9/11 enabled the terrorists to stay in the United States after 9/11 and continue their terrorist activities. This includes three terrorists whose visas or entries into the United States were on 9/2/01, 9/6/01 and 9/10/01. In three instances, terrorists sought immigration benefits after 9/11. One political asylee associated with the 9/11 hijackers was denied and deported after having previous immigration violations. The second managed to maintain his student status in the United States through mid-2002. A third gained legal permanent residency status in 2002. Although each of these 94 terrorists had committed an immigration violation of some kind, criminal charges alone were brought in at least 37 instances and immigration charges in 18. Indictments in 50 cases included both immigration and criminal charges. There have been a total of 15 deportations and 23 criminal convictions. In 16 instances, individuals were not convicted (e.g., the six 9/11 hijackers), are being held as an enemy combatant (e.g., Khalid Sheikh Mohammed), or have fled the United States (e.g., Anwar Al-Aulaqi, an imam associated with the 9/11 hijackers and believed to be now in Yemen.)Impact – Terrorism causes death (__)(__) Terrorism causes countless deaths for innocent civilians Moon, 9 Ban-Ki, Secretary General of the UN, "United Nations Efforts to Address Terrorism Threat ‘Crucial to Global Security’, Says Secretary-General, in Message to Vienna Meeting," press/en/2009/sgsm12544.doc.htmTerrorism is a major security threat in today’s world. Countless innocent civilians and the United Nations itself have suffered heinous terrorist acts. Our efforts to address this problem comprehensively are crucial to global security. I attach great importance to your work. As you know, I have appointed Jean-Paul Laborde to lead the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force [CTIFTF], and have established a CTITF Office in the Department of Political Affairs. These measures should allow you to build on your already considerable accomplishments. I congratulate Task Force members for bringing together more than two dozen entities. Some are focused directly on terrorism, while others bring expertise on non-proliferation, disarmament, education, cultural and inter-religious dialogue, human rights, peacekeeping, health and other issues. This range of experience allows the United Nations to address terrorism as part of our broader mission to promote development, human rights and peace. It also promotes synergies and information-sharing, and allows each entity to maximize its comparative advantageImpact – Terrorism threatens freedom (__)(__) Even in the face of privacy concerns, terrorism is still a comparatively larger threat to combat Wolfendale, 7 Jessica, Special Research Center, "Terrorism, Security, and the Threat of Counterterrorism," archives.cerium.ca/IMG/pdf/WOLFENDALE_2007_Terrorism_Security_and_the_Threat_of_Counterterrorism-2.pdfAccording to current counterterrorism rhetoric, non-state terrorism threatens many things: security, lives, values, freedom, democracy, and the existence of civilization itself, and poses a greater threat than the threats posed by war, invasion, accident, natural disasters, and criminal activity. Several government ministers have claimed that the magnitude of the terrorist threat is so great that it imposes a positive moral duty on governments to protect the individual’s right to security even at the expense of many basic civil liberties. The German Interior Minister Otto Schily, for example, argued that the government had an obligation to “protect the “basic right to security” of all German Citizens.”7 Similarly the Australian Attorney-General Phillip Ruddock said that “I believe that some protagonists fail to recognise a national government’s obligation under Article 3 of the human rights convention—that is, that governments have an obligation to protect human life.”8 The need to counter the threat of terrorism is claimed to both justify and require radical infringements of civil liberties such as the right to privacy, the right to due process, and the right not to be detained without just cause. Yet despite these strong claims there has been little clear explanation of how and why terrorism threatens lives, values, and freedom. Perhaps it is meant to be obvious, but the author does not find it so. How does terrorism threaten security? What kind of security does it threaten?Impact – Terrorism hurts psychological well-beingTerrorism inflicts psychological harm by causing populations to live in fear and anxiety Wolfendale, 7 Jessica, Special Research Center, "Terrorism, Security, and the Threat of Counterterrorism," archives.cerium.ca/IMG/pdf/WOLFENDALE_2007_Terrorism_Security_and_the_Threat_of_Counterterrorism-2.pdfAlthough the threat of terrorism to individual lives is less than many other threats, terrorism does not only threaten lives; it threatens psychological well being. Terrorism causes deep anxiety and fear in the target population. Indeed, causing fear and anxiety is often part of the very definition of terrorism.32 Furthermore, the fear induced by terrorist attacks is different from the fear and anxiety felt about other threats to lives for several reasons. First, terrorist attacks are often highly visible and shocking. Unlike car accidents, for instance, terrorist attacks can kill thousands of people instantly. The graphic nature of terrorist attacks and their apparent randomness (from the victims’ point of view) greatly contributes to the terror they instill. According to psychological research on terror management theory events such as terrorist attacks forcefully remind us of our mortality. Because of this, we desire reassurance and a sense of security that we do not require for less visible threats that pose a greater objective threat to our lives and well being.33 Terrorist attacks make human fragility and vulnerability highly salient. Second, new threats are feared far more than old. For many people, the fear of contracting the SARS virus was greater than the fear of contracting tuberculosis, a disease more prevalent and far more fatal than SARS.34 For Americans and Australians, therefore, the threat of terrorism is both relatively new and highly visible. Citizens of countries like Israel who have lived with terrorist violence for years probably do not feel nearly the same level of anxiety or fear as citizens of AmericaAnswer to: Terrorist attack is unlikely(__)(__) Even if it the risk of the attack is unlikely, the magnitude of the impact means it’s a relevant concern to act upon Wolfendale, 7 Jessica, Special Research Center, "Terrorism, Security, and the Threat of Counterterrorism," archives.cerium.ca/IMG/pdf/WOLFENDALE_2007_Terrorism_Security_and_the_Threat_of_Counterterrorism-2.pdfDespite the relatively low statistical threat to life posed by non-state terrorism, government officials have portrayed the threat as both immediate and of great magnitude. So there are statements from Phillip Ruddock and the Australian Prime Minister John Howard claiming that “there is “high probability” of a terrorist attack occurring sooner rather than later.”18 Similarly, in the United States officials have claimed that “Terrorism is a clear and present danger to Americans today” and “The threat of international terrorism knows no boundaries.”19 This view is shared by the general population. Opinion polls in the United States and in Australia show that the majority of the population believe that the threat of terrorism is both an imminent and far greater threat than other threats.20 But perhaps the discrepancy between the actual statistical threat of terrorism and the claims of politicians is not based just on what terrorists might do now, but also on what they might do in the future. A supporter of radical counterterrorism measures might accept that the statistical threat of being killed in a terrorist attack is, at present, less than many other threats but point out that the future threat of what might be called super-terrorism is significant enough to justify the suspension of civil liberties and the massive spending on defense and other counterterrorism organizations. Because it is possible that a single act of terrorism could wipe out hundreds of thousands of people instantly, the mere existence of that possibility is sufficient to make the threat of terrorism far more significant than the threat posed by crime, disease and povertyAnswer to: Terrorists aren’t a threat(__) (__) There is a growing threat of a terrorist attack on US soil due to resentment generated by US presence abroad Lewis, CSIS Fellow, 14, "Underestimating Risk in the Surveillance Debate," files/publication/141209_Lewis_UnderestimatingRisk_Web.pdfThe echoes of September 11 have faded and the fear of attack has diminished. We are reluctant to accept terrorism as a facet of our daily lives, but major attacks—roughly one a year in the last five years—are regularly planned against U.S. targets, particularly passenger aircraft and cities. America’s failures in the Middle East have spawned new, aggressive terrorist groups. These groups include radicalized recruits from the West—one estimate puts the number at over 3,000—who will return home embittered and hardened by combat. Particularly in Europe, the next few years will see an influx of jihadis joining the existing population of homegrown radicals, but the United States itself remains a target. America’s size and population make it is easy to disappear into the seams of this sprawling society. Government surveillance is, with one exception and contrary to cinematic fantasy, limited and disconnected. That exception is communications surveillance, which provides the best and perhaps the only national-level solution to find and prevent attacks against Americans and their allies. Some of the suggestions for alternative approaches to surveillance, such as the recommendation that NSA only track “known or suspected terrorists,” reflect both deep ignorance and wishful thinking. It is the unknown terrorist who will inflict the greatest harmImpact – Terrorist attack causes human rights violation (__)(__) Another terrorist attack would usher in a police state and expansive war powers – public would demand itIgnatieff ‘4 (Michael, Director of the Carr Center at the Kennedy School of Gov. @ Harvard, May 9, Edmonton Journal, “How the war on terror can be won--or lost”)It has taken nearly three years, but the 9/11 commission and the Supreme Court hearings on enemy combatants have given Americans our first serious public discussion about how to balance civil liberties and national security in a war on terror. Even so, we have not begun to ask the really hard questions. The hardest one is: Could we actually lose the war on terror? Consider the consequences of a second major attack on the mainland United States -- the detonation of a radiological or dirty bomb, perhaps, or a low-yield nuclear device or a chemical strike in a subway. Any of these events could cause death, devastation and panic on a scale that would make 9/11 seem like a pale prelude. After such an attack, a pall of mourning, anger and fear would hang over our public life for a generation. An attack of this sort is already in the realm of possibility. The recipes for making ultimate weapons are on the Internet, and the materiel required is available for the right price. A democracy can allow its leaders one fatal mistake -- and that's what 9/11 looks like to many observers -- but Americans will not forgive a second one. Once the zones of devastation were cordoned off and the bodies buried, we might find ourselves living in a national-security state on continuous alert, with sealed borders, constant identity checks and permanent detention camps for dissidents and aliens. Our constitutional rights might disappear from our courts, while torture might reappear in our interrogation cells. The worst of it is that government would not have to impose tyranny on a cowed populace. We would demand it for our own protection. And if the institutions of our democracy were unable to protect us from our enemies, we might go even farther, taking the law into our own hands. That is what defeat in a war on terror looks like. We would survive, but we would no longer recognize ourselves. We would endure, but we would lose our identity as free peoples.Extension: Terrorist attack causes human rights violation(__)(__) Terror attack turns the entire case---fear would cause public acquiescence to rights-violations and government crackdowns that outweigh the case by an order of magnitude Peter Beinart 8, associate professor of journalism and political science at CUNY, The Good Fight; Why Liberals – and only Liberals – Can Win the War on Terror and Make America Great Again, 110-1Indeed, while the Bush administration bears the blame for these hor- rors, White House officials exploited a shift in public values after 9/11. When asked by Princeton Survey Research Associates in 1997 whether stopping terrorism required citizens to cede some civil liberties, less than one-t hird of Americans said yes. By the spring of 2002, that had grown to almost three- quarters. Public support for the government’s right to wire- tap phones and read people’s mail also grew exponentially. In fact, polling in the months after the attack showed Americans less concerned that the Bush administration was violating civil liberties than that it wasn’t violating them enough. What will happen the next time? It is, of course, impossible to predict the reaction to any particular attack. But in 2003, the Center for Public Integrity got a draft of something called the Domestic Security Enhance- ment Act, quickly dubbed Patriot II. According to the center’s executive director, Charles Lewis, it expanded government power five or ten times as much as its predecessor. One provision permitted the government to strip native-born Americans of their citizenship, allowing them to be indefinitely imprisoned without legal recourse if they were deemed to have provided any support—even nonviolent support—to groups designated as terrorist. After an outcry, the bill was shelved. But it offers a hint of what this administration—or any administration—might do if the United States were hit again. ? When the CIA recently tried to imagine how the world might look in 2020, it conjured four potential scenarios. One was called the “cycle of fear,” and it drastically inverted the assumption of security that C. Vann Woodward called central to America’s national character. The United States has been attacked again and the government has responded with “large- scale intrusive security measures.” In this dystopian future, two arms dealers, one with jihadist ties, text- message about a potential nuclear deal. One notes that terrorist networks have “turned into mini-s tates.” The other jokes about the global recession sparked by the latest attacks. And he muses about how terrorism has changed American life. “That new Patriot Act,” he writes, “went way beyond anything imagined after 9/11.” “The fear cycle generated by an increasing spread of WMD and terrorist attacks,” comments the CIA report, “once under way, would be one of the hardest to break.” And the more entrenched that fear cycle grows, the less free America will become. Which is why a new generation of American liberals must make the fight against this new totalitarianism their own. Impact- ISIS is a ThreatISIS is growing in power – all tools are necessary to mitigate their strengthRojas June 19, 2015 (Nicole; US State Department: Isis knocks off al-Qaeda as leading terrorist oganisation; ibtimes.co.uk/us-state-department-isis-knocks-off-al-qaeda-leading-terrorist-oganisation-1507091; kdf)The Country Reports on Terrorism by the US State Department, released on 19 June, reveals Isis has beaten al-Qaeda as the world's leading terrorist organisation. The new report found that the Islamic State in the Middle East, as well as its partner Boko Haram in Africa, has led to the decline of al-Qaeda's power. It reported that al-Qaeda leadership "appeared to lose momentum as the self-styled leader of a global movement in the face of Isil's [Isis] rapid expansion." However, the report noted that al-Qaeda continued to have an impact on terrorism. "Though AQ central leadership was weakened, the organisation continued to serve as a focal point of 'inspiration' for a worldwide network of affiliated groups, including al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula—a long-standing threat to Yemen, the region, and the United States; al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb; a;-Nusrah Front; and al-Shabaab," the report said. The report also found that nearly 33,000 people were killed and another 34,700 were injured in about 13,500 terrorist attacks around the world last year. According to NBC News, that equates to a 35% increase in terrorist attacks and an 81% rise in fatalities since 2013. CNN reported that 24 Americans died last year in terrorist attacks, specifically in Afghanistan, Jerusalem and Somalia. The attacks, which were dominate in Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, India, Nigeria and Syria, happened in 95 countries total. More aggressive and ruthless attacks Terrorist groups were conducting more aggressive attacks, which included "ruthless methods of violence such as beheadings and crucifixions intended to terrify opponents". Isis and Boko Haram also employed tactics such as "stoning, indiscriminate mass casualty attacks, and kidnapping children for enslavement".Impact – AQAP is a threat AQAP has the intent and capability to strike the US homelandZimmerman 2012 (Katherine Zimmerman, senior analyst and the al Qaeda and Associated Movements Team Lead for the American Enterprise Institute’s Critical Threats Project, October 19, 2012, “Al Qaeda in Yemen: Countering the Threat from the Arabian Peninsula,” AEI Critical Threats, )The evolution of AQAP into an insurgent group aiming at controlling and governing territory in Yemen could seem to indicate that the threat the group poses to the U.S. directly is declining. The devotion of resources to AQAP’s internal operations, it could be argued, subtracts resources from its efforts to attack Americans outside of Yemen. One might even suggest that American interests could be served by encouraging AQAP, in a sense, to focus on its insurgent activities. Events do not support such a conclusion, however. AQAP has demonstrated that it retains both the will and the capability to attempt attacks on the U.S. homeland even as it seeks to expand territorial control within Yemen.? AQAP operatives mailed bombs disguised as printer cartridges to a Chicago synagogue in October 2010 while the campaign against Yemeni military and security targets was picking up speed.[13] The bombs were discovered after they were already en route to the U.S. AQAP attempted another attack in May 2012, improving on the bomb design used in the December 25, 2009 attack by Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab (which AQAP had also planned, resourced, and directed).[14] The attempt shows that AQAP still seeks to conduct international attacks, even though the details of the attack were purported to be known to American and other intelligence agencies before it became fully operational.[15] Should AQAP succeed in holding a significant territorial safe haven in Yemen, of course, its ability to plan and conduct attacks abroad could increase considerably. Impact – Al Qaeda is a threatAl Qaeda’s actions, statements, and internal documents prove they want nuclear weapons and mass casualty attacks---if the US relents, it guarantees nuclear attacks Larry J. Arbuckle 8, Naval Postgraduate School, "The Deterrence of Nuclear Terrorism through an Attribution Capability", Thesis for master of science in defense analysis, approved by Professor Robert O'Connell, and Gordon McCormick, Chairman, Department of Defense Analysis, Naval Postgraduate School, JuneHowever, there is evidence that a small number of terrorist organizations in recent history, and at least one presently, have nuclear ambitions. These groups include Al Qaeda, Aum Shinrikyo, and Chechen separatists (Bunn, Wier, and Friedman; 2005). Of these, Al Qaeda appears to have made the most serious attempts to obtain or otherwise develop a nuclear weapon. Demonstrating these intentions, in 2001 Osama Bin Laden, Ayman al Zawahiri, and two other al Qaeda operatives met with two Pakistani scientists to discuss weapons of mass destruction development (Kokoshin, 2006). Additionally, Al Qaeda has made significant efforts to justify the use of mass violence to its supporters. Sulaiman Abu Ghaith, an al Qaeda spokesman has stated that al Qaeda, “has the right to kill 4 million Americans – 2 million of them children,” in retaliation for deaths that al Qaeda links to the U.S. and its support of Israel (as cited in Bunn, Wier, and Friedman; 2005). Indeed Bin Laden received a fatwa in May 2003 from an extreme Saudi cleric authorizing the use of weapons of mass destruction against U.S. civilians (Bunn, Wier, and Friedman; 2005). Further evidence of intent is the following figure taken from al Qaeda documents seized in Afghanistan. It depicts a workable design for a nuclear weapon. Additionally, the text accompanying the design sketch includes some fairly advanced weapons design parameters (Boettcher & Arnesen, 2002). Clearly maximizing the loss of life is key among al Qaeda’s goals. Thus their use of conventional means of attack presently appears to be a result of their current capabilities and not a function of their pure preference (Western Europe, 2005).Impact – Cyber Attacks threaten national security (__)(__) Impact – cyber attacks are one of the largest threats to US infrastructure and securityGoldsmith, Professor at Harvard Law, 13 "We need an Invasive NSA," article/115002/invasive-nsa-will-protect-us-cyber-attacksSuch cyber-intrusions threaten corporate America and the U.S. government every day. “Relentless assaults on America’s computer networks by China and other foreign governments, hackers and criminals have created an urgent need for safeguards to protect these vital systems,” the Times editorial page noted last year while supporting legislation encouraging the private sector to share cybersecurity information with the government. It cited General Keith Alexander, the director of the NSA, who had noted a 17-fold increase in cyber-intrusions on critical infrastructure from 2009 to 2011 and who described the losses in the United States from cyber-theft as “the greatest transfer of wealth in history.” If a “catastrophic cyber-attack occurs,” the Timesconcluded, “Americans will be justified in asking why their lawmakers ... failed to protect them.”(__) Cyber threat is massive and creates a cascading effectGoldsmith, Professor at Harvard Law, 13 "We need an Invasive NSA," article/115002/invasive-nsa-will-protect-us-cyber-attacksThe first is that the cybersecurity threat is more pervasive and severe than the terrorism threat and is somewhat easier to see. If the Times’ website goes down a few more times and for longer periods, and if the next penetration of its computer systems causes large intellectual property losses or a compromise in its reporting, even the editorial page would rethink the proper balance of privacy and security. The point generalizes: As cyber-theft and cyber-attacks continue to spread (and they will), and especially when they result in a catastrophic disaster (like a banking compromise that destroys market confidence, or a successful attack on an electrical grid), the public will demand government action to remedy the problem and will adjust its tolerance for intrusive government measures.Answer to: Cyber-attacks aren’t a threat(__)(__) There is growing access to cyber terror capabilities Goldsmith, Professor at Harvard Law, 13 "We need an Invasive NSA," article/115002/invasive-nsa-will-protect-us-cyber-attacksAnyone anywhere with a connection to the Internet can engage in cyber-operations within the United States. Most truly harmful cyber-operations, however, require group effort and significant skill. The attacking group or nation must have clever hackers, significant computing power, and the sophisticated software—known as “malware”—that enables the monitoring, exfiltration, or destruction of information inside a computer. The supply of all of these resources has been growing fast for many years—in governmental labs devoted to developing these tools and on sprawling black markets on the Internet. Telecommunication networks are the channels through which malware typically travels, often anonymized or encrypted, and buried in the billions of communications that traverse the globe each day. The targets are the communications networks themselves as well as the computers they connect—things like the Times’ servers, the computer systems that monitor nuclear plants, classified documents on computers in the Pentagon, the nasdaq exchange, your local bank, and your social-network providers. To keep these computers and networks secure, the government needs powerful intelligence capabilities abroad so that it can learn about planned cyber-intrusions. It also needs to raise defenses at home. An important first step is to correct the market failures that plague cybersecurity. Through law or regulation, the government must improve incentives for individuals to use security software, for private firms to harden their defenses and share information with one another, and for Internet service providers to crack down on the botnets—networks of compromised zombie computers—that underlie many cyber-attacks. More, too, must be done to prevent insider threats like Edward Snowden’s, and to control the stealth introduction of vulnerabilities during the manufacture of computer components—vulnerabilities that can later be used as windows for cyber-attacks. And yet that’s still not enough. The U.S. government can fully monitor air, space, and sea for potential attacks from abroad. But it has limited access to the channels of cyber-attack and cyber-theft, because they are owned by private telecommunication firms, and because Congress strictly limits government access to private communications. “I can’t defend the country until I’m into all the networks,” General Alexander reportedly told senior government officials a few months ago.Surveillance does not solve terror plots (__)(__) No link – domestic surveillance doesn’t solve terrorist plots – empirically the NSA fails at combatting threats Sterman, masters from Georgetown University, 2014 "DO NSA'S BULK SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMS STOP TERRORISTS?," , our review of the government’s claims about the role that NSA “bulk” surveillance of phone and email communications records has had in keeping the United States safe from terrorism shows that these claims are overblown and even misleading. An in-depth analysis of 225 individuals recruited by al-Qaeda or a like-minded group or inspired by al-Qaeda’s ideology, and charged in the United States with an act of terrorism since 9/11, demonstrates that traditional investigative methods, such as the use of informants, tips from local communities, and targeted intelligence operations, provided the initial impetus for investigations in the majority of cases, while the contribution of NSA’s bulk surveillance programs to these cases was minimal. Indeed, the controversial bulk collection of American telephone metadata, which includes the telephone numbers that originate and receive calls, as well as the time and date of those calls but not their content, under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act, appears to have played an identifiable role in initiating, at most, 1.8 percent of these cases. NSA programs involving the surveillance of non-U.S. persons outside of the United States under Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act played a role in 4.4 percent of the terrorism cases we examined, and NSA surveillance under an unidentified authority played a role in 1.3 percent of the cases we examined.Surveillance does not solve terror plots - extensions(__) The judge should reject the negative teams evidence about the effectiveness of surveillance – its biased and comes from government sources rather than backed up data Sterman, masters from Georgetown University, 2014 "DO NSA'S BULK SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMS STOP TERRORISTS?," , a careful review of three of the key terrorism cases the government has cited to defend NSA bulk surveillance programs reveals that government officials have exaggerated the role of the NSA in the cases against David Coleman Headley and Najibullah Zazi, and the significance of the threat posed by a notional plot to bomb the New York Stock Exchange.In 28 percent of the cases we reviewed, court records and public reporting do not identify which specific methods initiated the investigation. These cases, involving 62 individuals, may have been initiated by an undercover informant, an undercover officer, a family member tip, other traditional law enforcement methods, CIA- or FBI-generated intelligence, NSA surveillance of some kind, or any number of other methods. In 23 of these 62 cases (37 percent), an informant was used. However, we were unable to determine whether the informant initiated the investigation or was used after the investigation was initiated as a result of the use of some other investigative means. Some of these cases may also be too recent to have developed a public record large enough to identify which investigative tools were used.Surveillance does not solve terror plots - extensions(__) You should prefer all of our evidence – newest studies prove the NSA is ineffective at combatting a terrorist attack Neal, 14 Meghan, January 13, Deputy Editor of Gizmodo citing New American Foundation report, "You'll Never Guess How Many Terrorist Plots the NSA's Domestic Spy Program Has Foiled,"motherboard.blog/youll-never-guess-how-many-terrorist-plots-the-nsas-domestic-spy-program-has-foiledA new analysis of terrorism charges in the US found that the NSA's dragnet domestic surveillance "had no discernible impact" on preventing terrorist acts. Instead, the majority of threats over the last decade were detected by regular old intelligence and law enforcement methods—tips, informants, CIA and FBI ops, routine law enforcement. The nonprofit think tank New America Foundation published a report today after investigating the 227 Al Qaeda-affiliated people or groups that have been charged for committing an act of terrorism in the US since 9/11. It found just 17 of the cases were credited to NSA surveillance, and just one conviction came out of the government's extra-controversial practice of spying on its own citizens. And that charge, against San Diego cab driver Basaaly ?Moalin, was for sending money to a terrorist group in Somalia. There was no threat of an actual attack. This is hardly the first time experts have searched for a link between bulk metadata collection and foiled terrorist plots and come up empty-handed. So far, the only real value in collecting and monitoring billions of US phone records has been to provide extra support in investigations already underway by the FBI or another agency, or to verify that a rumored threat isn't real (the "peace of mind" metric), the report found. Surveillance does not solve terrorist attack (__) (__) Domestic surveillance isn’t NEARLY enough to solve terrorism – other programs are necessary Sterman, masters from Georgetown University, 2014 "DO NSA'S BULK SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMS STOP TERRORISTS?," of American phone metadata has had no discernible impact on preventing acts of terrorism and only the most marginal of impacts on preventing terrorist-related activity, such as fundraising for a terrorist group. Furthermore, our examination of the role of the database of U.S. citizens’ telephone metadata in the single plot the government uses to justify the importance of the program – that of Basaaly Moalin, a San Diego cabdriver who in 2007 and 2008 provided $8,500 to al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda’s affiliate in Somalia – calls into question the necessity of the Section 215 bulk collection program. According to the government, the database of American phone metadata allows intelligence authorities to quickly circumvent the traditional burden of proof associated with criminal warrants, thus allowing them to “connect the dots” faster and prevent future 9/11-scale attacks. Yet in the Moalin case, after using the NSA’s phone database to link a number in Somalia to Moalin, the FBI waited two months to begin an investigation and wiretap his phone. Although it’s unclear why there was a delay between the NSA tip and the FBI wiretapping, court documents show there was a two-month period in which the FBI was not monitoring Moalin’s calls, despite official statements that the bureau had Moalin’s phone number and had identified him. , This undercuts the government’s theory that the database of Americans’ telephone metadata is necessary to expedite the investigative process, since it clearly didn’t expedite the process in the single case the government uses to extol its virtues.Intelligence gathering does not matter(__)(__) No link – the intelligence that domestic surveillance captures doesn’t matter because government officials cannot interpret it correctly to act upon it and prevent an attack Sterman, masters from Georgetown University, 2014 "DO NSA'S BULK SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMS STOP TERRORISTS?," , the overall problem for U.S. counterterrorism officials is not that they need vaster amounts of information from the bulk surveillance programs, but that they don’t sufficiently understand or widely share the information they already possess that was derived from conventional law enforcement and intelligence techniques. This was true for two of the 9/11 hijackers who were known to be in the United States before the attacks on New York and Washington, as well as with the case of Chicago resident David Coleman Headley, who helped plan the 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai, and it is the unfortunate pattern we have also seen in several other significant terrorism cases.Financial data tracking does not matter(__)(__) No link – Surveillance cannot track finances accurately and financing is a small and insignificant part to resolving terrorism Sterman, masters from Georgetown University, 2014 "DO NSA'S BULK SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMS STOP TERRORISTS?," of American phone metadata has had no discernible impact on preventing acts of terrorism and only the most marginal of impacts on preventing terrorist-related activity, such as fundraising for a terrorist group. Furthermore, our examination of the role of the database of U.S. citizens’ telephone metadata in the single plot the government uses to justify the importance of the program – that of Basaaly Moalin, a San Diego cabdriver who in 2007 and 2008 provided $8,500 to al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda’s affiliate in Somalia – calls into question the necessity of the Section 215 bulk collection program. According to the government, the database of American phone metadata allows intelligence authorities to quickly circumvent the traditional burden of proof associated with criminal warrants, thus allowing them to “connect the dots” faster and prevent future 9/11-scale attacks. Yet in the Moalin case, after using the NSA’s phone database to link a number in Somalia to Moalin, the FBI waited two months to begin an investigation and wiretap his phone. Although it’s unclear why there was a delay between the NSA tip and the FBI wiretapping, court documents show there was a two-month period in which the FBI was not monitoring Moalin’s calls, despite official statements that the bureau had Moalin’s phone number and had identified him. , This undercuts the government’s theory that the database of Americans’ telephone metadata is necessary to expedite the investigative process, since it clearly didn’t expedite the process in the single case the government uses to extol its virtues.Terrorist attack isn’t a national security threat(__)(__) No impact – Terrorism and terrorist attacks aren’t major threats to countries Wolfendale, 7 Jessica, Special Research Center, "Terrorism, Security, and the Threat of Counterterrorism," archives.cerium.ca/IMG/pdf/WOLFENDALE_2007_Terrorism_Security_and_the_Threat_of_Counterterrorism-2.pdfIf the claim that terrorism threatens individual lives to such an extent that it justifies radical counterterrorism measures is based on misleading claims about the extent of the terrorist threat, the claim about the threat posed to national security is just as misleading. Historically, non-state terrorist activity has not significantly undermined nor damaged the national cohesiveness or integrity of liberal democracies. Israel, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and many other countries have lived with terrorist activity for many years without such activity seriously threatening their very existence, or even their “way of life.” As noted earlier, greater threats to the existence and survival of states come from other human activities and natural disasters.Terrorist attack is unlikely(__)(__) No impact – A catastrophic terrorist attack on US soil is unlikely Wolfendale, 7 Jessica, Special Research Center, "Terrorism, Security, and the Threat of Counterterrorism," archives.cerium.ca/IMG/pdf/WOLFENDALE_2007_Terrorism_Security_and_the_Threat_of_Counterterrorism-2.pdfThis is not to deny that terrorism poses a threat to the lives of individuals. Terrorism currently does threaten lives and it is indeed possible that terrorists might be planning even more destructive attacks then have hitherto occurred. But to realistically assess the threat to security posed by terrorism is not enough to show that a threat exists and may continue to exist. Justifying radical counterterrorism measures and massive counterterrorism budgets requires more than postulating possibilities; it requires a clear assessment of the likelihood of the possibility occurring, particularly compared to the likelihood of other future threats. Merely claiming that terrorist could perform an act of super-terrorism because the means for such an act (e.g., weapons and biological pathogens) are available is a truism, not a threat assessment. In fact it is states, not non-state terrorists, that have the easiest access to weapons of mass destruction and deadly biological agents. In the United States, for example, the Center for Disease Control has estimated that there are “about 800 labs nationwide who work with so-called select agents, the 49 toxins, on the government’s bioterrorism list” and Federal officials have admitted that “policing these labs won’t be easy.”27 History has demonstrated that states cannot be relied on not to use such weapons against their perceived enemies (as occurred in World War II with the bombing of Hiroshima) and the deaths caused by state violence far outnumber those caused by non-state terrorism.28 It is untenable to conclude that the possibility of non-state terrorists using weapons of mass destruction or biological agents means that they are in fact going to use such weapons. It is equally possible that a state will use such weapons, or that scientists working in the 800 labs mentioned earlier will cause mass casualties through careless handling of biological agents. Given that there have already been cases of what is known as “vial in pocket” syndrome—where scientists carry vials of deadly viruses in their jacket pockets while travelling on international and domestic flights—the possibility of a catastrophic accident should not be ignored ................
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